Source: European Parliament
22.10.2024
Question for written answer E-002220/2024
to the Commission
Rule 144
Radan Kanev (PPE), Wouter Beke (PPE), Stefan Berger (PPE), Markéta Gregorová (Verts/ALE), Bernard Guetta (Renew), Miriam Lexmann (PPE), Nicolás Pascual De La Parte (PPE), António Tânger Corrêa (PfE), Sebastian Tynkkynen (ECR), Axel Voss (PPE), Lucia Yar (Renew)
Both the Draghi report on Europe’s global competitiveness and the new European defence industrial strategy[1] have uncovered significant gaps in Europe’s industrial capacity. These gaps have led to Europe being economically dependent on high-risk non-EU countries. This poses credible threats to the security of the EU and the wider Schengen area. One such threat is Chinese cyber warfare, including espionage and alleged data theft through China-produced scanning equipment at the EU’s external borders.
- 1.Will the Commission support the development of European ‘champions’ and EU-based partnerships with trusted allies to provide border scanning equipment and services that are controlled and inspected by the EU?
- 2.Is it the Commission’s view that the Customs Control Equipment Instrument funds could be extended to include defence products, for instance by classifying border scanning equipment as defence-related, and achieving this through transparent award procedures?
- 3.Will the Commission take steps to ensure that border and customs control scanning equipment is procured solely through transparent public tenders, restricted to EU companies and EU-based partnerships, thereby guaranteeing the security of EU and Schengen area borders as well as cybersecurity?
Submitted: 22.10.2024
- [1] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en.