Source: European Parliament
B10‑0107/2025
European Parliament resolution on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular that of 28 November 2024 on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud[1],
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023 and of 27 June 2024,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Commission staff working document of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘Georgia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0697),
– having regard to the joint statement of 8 November 2023 by the Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus and the European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Georgia on the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 on the EU membership application of Georgia,
– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[2], which entered into force on 1 July 2016,
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Article 215(2) thereof, and to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 29 thereof,
– having regard to the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia and to its September 2009 report,
– having regard to the final conclusions of the international election observation mission relating to the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly is a fundamental right enshrined in the Georgian constitution;
B. whereas Georgia, as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights and a member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), has committed itself to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights;
C. whereas Russia has illegally occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the August 2008 conflict that followed Georgia’s attack on Tskhinvali on the night of 7 to 8 August 2008;
D. whereas in June 2014, the EU and Georgia signed an Association Agreement that entered into force on 1 July 2016;
E. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia the status of EU candidate country;
F. whereas in March 2017, the EU visa facilitation agreement with Georgia came into effect, following Georgia’s successful implementation of all the benchmarks set in its visa liberalisation action plan;
G. whereas on 27 January 2025, the Council decided to suspend parts of the EU-Georgia visa facilitation agreement, specifically affecting diplomats and officials, who may now be required to apply for a visa when travelling to the EU;
H. whereas on 28 November 2024, in response to the European Parliament’s November 2024 resolution on Georgia, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would suspend accession talks until the end of 2028 and refuse all EU budget support; whereas he also stated that by 2028, Georgia would be ‘more prepared than any other candidate country to open accession talks with Brussels and become a Member State in 2030’;
I. whereas the parliamentary elections held on 26 October 2024 were the first to take place in Georgia under a fully proportional electoral system and were also the first elections to be held since Georgia was granted the status of EU candidate country in December 2023;
J. whereas the legal framework in Georgia provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections, but several long-standing recommendations of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Venice Commission remain unaddressed, despite numerous reforms;
K. whereas on 16 November 2024, the Georgian electoral authority announced the official results of the country’s parliamentary elections, confirming that the ruling Georgian Dream party had won 89 seats in the 150-seat parliament after receiving 53.93 % of the vote, while four opposition parties had passed the 5 % threshold and had received a combined 37.44 % share of the vote;
L. whereas the international election observation mission on the parliamentary elections in Georgia comprised 529 observers from 42 countries, including 380 expert observers deployed by the ODIHR, 60 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 39 from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 38 from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and 12 from the European Parliament;
M. whereas the election campaign in Georgia was competitive and generally allowed contestants to campaign freely, but was marred by the use of highly divisive rhetoric and imagery, as well as isolated incidents of violence, event disruptions, verbal abuse and the destruction of campaign materials, as reported by both ruling and opposition parties;
N. whereas the administration of the elections was generally orderly, but they took place in a tense environment, with overcrowding in many polling stations and several incidents of physical altercations and intimidation;
O. whereas President Salome Zourabichvili publicly accused the Georgian Government of electoral fraud and irregularities in the recent parliamentary elections; whereas President Zourabichvili subsequently refused to testify before the Georgian Prosecutor’s Office regarding these allegations;
P. whereas Mikheil Kavelashvili was sworn in as President of Georgia on 29 December 2024; whereas the outgoing President, Salome Zourabichvili, refused to step down despite the official end of her term of office; whereas opposition parties boycotted the Georgian Parliament in protest;
Q. whereas Georgia has over 26 000 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – 1 for every 142 citizens, which is greater than the EU average;
R. whereas following the 2020 parliamentary elections, the NGO International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, which received external funding, challenged the official election results and questioned their legitimacy, but later admitted that it had made a significant error in its calculations;
S. whereas the Parliament of Georgia adopted the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law, which was signed into law on 3 June 2024 despite the President’s veto; whereas the law was met with protest from parts of Georgian civil society; whereas the law requires organisations receiving more than 20 % of their funding from overseas to register as ‘agents of foreign influence’;
T. whereas on 17 September 2024, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the ‘family values and the protection of minors’ law, which bans gender transition, prohibits adoption by gay and transgender people, nullifies, on Georgian territory, same-sex marriages performed abroad, and provides a legal basis for the authorities to outlaw Pride events and public displays of the LGBTQI+ rainbow flag and to impose the censorship of films and books;
U. whereas the Venice Commission stresses that, in accordance with international standards, the state has a positive obligation to ensure gender equality; whereas on 4 April 2024, the Parliament of Georgia repealed the 2020 amendments introducing gender quotas for candidate lists in parliamentary and local elections, and abolished the associated financial incentives for political parties;
V. whereas the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been operating in Georgia since 1992; whereas Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze claimed that USAID funding was not directed toward genuine humanitarian objectives but was instead being used to ‘stage revolutions, sow disorder and destabilise countries, including Georgia’; whereas US President Donald Trump implemented a 90-day freeze on US foreign assistance to reassess its alignment with national interests;
1. Recalls that the EU accession process is based on objective criteria; regrets the European Council’s decision to suspend financial assistance to Georgia; underlines the benefits of the visa facilitation agreement and the need to maintain it; emphasises the need for a constructive dialogue between the Government of Georgia and the EU; calls on the Government of Georgia to uphold its commitments to reform and continue implementing the necessary measures for its EU accession process;
2. Stresses that Georgia’s future must be determined by the will of its people, free from external pressure or interference; emphasises that Georgia’s sovereignty and political trajectory should reflect the aspirations of its citizens; condemns any attempts, whether foreign or domestic, to undermine Georgia’s democratic institutions;
3. Takes note of the final report of the international election observation mission, which stated that the overall legal framework in Georgia provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections, that voters were offered a wide choice of 18 candidate lists, that contestants could generally campaign freely and that the administration of the elections was generally orderly; is alarmed that these elections took place in a polarised environment and on an uneven playing field, and that there were reports of pressure on voters and cases where ballot secrecy was potentially compromised;
4. Takes note of the results of the parliamentary elections that took place in Georgia on 26 October 2024; calls on all sides to work together constructively and peacefully and observe the rule of law, and to address the long-standing recommendations of the ODIHR and the Venice Commission with regard to elections and the increasing polarisation of Georgian society; calls for the EU to enter into a holistic and purposeful dialogue with the new Government of Georgia; calls on all foreign actors to respect the outcome of the elections;
5. Rejects, with deep concern, the adoption of the ‘family values and the protection of minors’ law, and considers it an attack on the LGBTQI+ community and a threat to civil liberties as a whole; rejects, furthermore, the law’s implications for the media, given that it imposes censorship by banning broadcasters from reporting freely on LGBTQI+ issues; reiterates that media freedom and tolerance towards sexual minorities are key features of a functioning democracy;
6. Notes that the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law entails the risk that NGOs, civil society organisations, opposition media outlets and other organisations that receive funds from other countries will be labelled ‘foreign agents’;
7. Emphasises that the rights to freedom of expression and assembly and to peaceful protest are fundamental freedoms and must be respected in all circumstances; expresses concern over reports of the unnecessary and disproportionate use of force against demonstrators; highlights the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, that ‘[a]ny restrictions to these rights must abide by principles of legality, necessity and proportionality’ and that ‘[t]he use of force during protests should always be exceptional and a measure of last resort when facing an imminent threat’;
8. Emphasises that foreign assistance for humanitarian and development purposes must be allocated on the basis of need and human dignity, not geopolitical interests; stresses that such aid should remain impartial, transparent and focused on social and economic well-being, rather than serving as a tool for political leverage or interference;
9. Regrets the Georgian Parliament’s decision to abolish mandatory gender quotas; reiterates the need for balanced gender representation in political participation; regrets the under-representation of women in the electoral process; calls on the Government of Georgia to undertake initiatives in this regard;
10. Takes note of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statements at a press conference at the UN General Assembly in New York and the corresponding willingness of Georgian officials to resolve outstanding issues in a peaceful, diplomatic way; encourages both sides to undertake solid initiatives to this end;
11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.