US Senate News:
Source: The White House
8:50 A.M. EDT MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, guys, for being here. Today, we have the fourth Quad Leaders Summit, fourth in-person Quad Leaders Summit, and the first time that President Biden has actually hosted leaders in his hometown and, literally, at his home in Wilmington, Delaware. You guys have heard the President say many times that all politics is personal, all diplomacy is personal. And developing personal relationships has been core to his approach to foreign policy as President. So, opening his home to the leaders of India, Japan, and Australia is a way of him showing, not just saying, that these leaders matter to him, that the Quad matters to him as a significant foreign policy priority. And institutionalizing and deepening and elevating the Quad has been one of the things that he’s going to be very proud of when he leaves office and passes the baton to the next President of the United States. When President Biden came in, within the early months, he held a Quad — a virtual summit, and it was the first time the leaders of the Quad had actually met in any format. And what the President wanted to do was not just have this be something where leaders convened occasionally, but actually a vehicle for driving deepening cooperation and integration across the region. And so, if you look at the last three and a half years, whether it’s on the response to COVID-19 or humanitarian response across the region, or issues like cyber and cyber capacity-building across the region, there’s a range of significant achievements the Quad has already had. And today, the Quad leaders will announce a number of further steps forward. There’ll be the announcement of the Quad Cancer Moonshot, which we’re very excited about, with all four countries coming to the table with resources and capacities to help drive towards the cures to deadly cancers. And there’ll be more to say on that later today. There’s the expansion of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative, which is a mouthful, but is really about integrating new technologies and new capabilities, not just for Quad members, but for countries in Southeast Asia and the rest of the region, for them to understand their maritime domains so they can better manage and regulate them and ensure their security and also ensure that they are delivering economic benefits to the people of the relevant countries. There will be — we’ll have an announcement of the expansion of the Quad fellows, which will now not just be fellows from the four countries, but fellows from Southeast Asia as well. We’ll announce the pre-positioning of relief supplies across the region and the ability for Quad countries to react more rapidly in the case of humanitarian crises and natural disasters. And the Quad will announce its first-ever coast guard mission together as well, which will show the joint capabilities of the four countries in terms of their ability — in terms of their coast guards. So, there’s a number of other things that you’ll see in the fact sheet as well, but this just shows the breadth and range of ways in which the Quad is becoming a feature of the architecture of the Indo-Pacific. And we hope and expect that that will deepen in the years ahead. And the reason I think we can have some confidence in that is there’s genuine bipartisan support for the Quad. It’s something that really transcends party lines. And, in fact, over the last 24 hours, we’ve had the announcement of a bipartisan, bicameral Quad Caucus, something I never quite thought I would see, but Republicans and Democrats in both the House and the Senate actually standing up a caucus to support this, this platform, because of the importance that Congress places on it and what it can deliver. The last thing I would say is that when you look at the Quad and AUKUS and the Camp David trilateral and our engagement with the Pacific Islands in ASEAN, one thing that has been a hallmark of the President’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific has been to move from the traditional hub-and-spoke model, rooted largely in bilateral alliances and bilateral partnerships, to a latticework approach with multiple institutions, overlapping partnerships, different configurations that all add up to genuinely new architecture for the Indo-Pacific, and the Quad is a critical part of that. And I think it leaves the United States in a stronger position, with a more dense and capable and dynamic set of partnerships, and with relationships not just between us and our partners, but among our partners, that allow us to deliver greater results and achieve more stability and security and drive towards the ultimate objective, which is a free and open Indo-Pacific. So let me stop there, and happy to take your questions. Q Jake, just (inaudible), you didn’t mention China directly in the joint leaders’ statement. What sort of language should we expect directed at the PRC? MR. SULLIVAN: The Quad isn’t really about any other country. It’s not directed at another country. It’s directed at problem solving and standing up for a set of common principles and a common vision for the region. So, I don’t think you should expect to see a focus on any particular country, including the PRC, in the Quad leaders’ statement. That’s been the pattern since the beginning, because the nature and purpose of this institution is really about the kinds of things I just described. It’s about delivering vaccines, delivering cyber capacity, delivering coast guard capacity, delivering humanitarian assistance, delivering science and technology progress. So that’s what we’re going to continue to focus on, and that’s what you’ll see in the fact sheet — the joint leaders’ statement. Q But, Jake, as you add more security features to this partnership, you know, is there a risk, a possibility that China, which has already expressed concerns about encirclement related to the Quad, begins to have objections to this cooperation? MR. SULLIVAN: Look, I’ll let the PRC speak for itself, and obviously it does speak for itself about a number of different initiatives the United States has taken in the Indo-Pacific. We’re just going to prove year on year everything that I just said, which is really that the thrust and purpose of the institution writ large and the security features of it are about a positive agenda to enhance security, not just for Quad countries but for other regional partners. So, it’s hard for me to see how and why the PRC should object to the four countries, for example, doing a coast guard mission together, or doing cyber trainings for Southeast Asia together, or taking steps with respect to maritime domain awareness. These do not, to me, indicate any form of aggression or assertive behavior. They’re fundamentally constructive and positive, and that’s where we’re going to continue to position the Quad. Q Can you speak a little bit to the President’s meeting with Prime Minister Modi and what, if anything, he’ll say about what he wants to do vis-à-vis China and Russia (inaudible)? MR. SULLIVAN: I won’t go too deep into the details of what he will say on those issues, which are obviously sensitive and will obviously be critical priorities in the bilateral meeting. I will just say this: that the United States has been clear about our view that Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine flouted every norm and principle of international law, that countries like India should step up and support the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that every country everywhere should refrain from supplying inputs to Russia’s war machine for it to be able to continue to prosecute this brutal war. So they will talk about that. The President will also hear from Prime Minister Modi about his trip to Ukraine, which was an important and indeed historic trip, and it will be the opportunity for the two of them to talk about their respective views of the way forward. And then, with respect to China, you kn
ow, they will talk about how they see China’s actions in the region, where China is headed. And that’s not just true in the security domain, but the economic and technology domain as well. And we’ll work to try to coordinate approaches to the extent that that makes sense for both countries. Q In the past month or so, there’s been a lot of (inaudible) China (inaudible). There’s been lots of (inaudible) still in the offing. Can you speak to, like, how the President himself is reviewing the culmination, I guess, of the administration’s China strategy leading up to this? And should we consider this Quad sort of part of that puzzle, (inaudible)? MR. SULLIVAN: I think you should consider this Quad and all of our other actions part of an effort to strengthen the capacity of the United States to defend our interests, support our allies and partners, advance problem solving on critical common challenges, and generally put ourself in a more robust, competitive position writ large. But I don’t think you should see it again as being directed at China. And I think this is American foreign policy, in a way at its historic best, which innovation partnerships designed to enhance stability, designed to deliver results, and connected to other partnerships that are going the same thing. And I think, kind of, over-cranking the emphasis on any one country is missing what I think the central thrust and purpose of these kinds of institutions, including the Quad, are all about. Q You mentioned at the top the personal nature of this visit. And the White House is using the terminology “personal meeting” rather than the usual “bilateral meeting.” Can you give us a sense of how these meetings are different, what we might expect? For example, Prime Minister Albanese yesterday, did he get a tour of the house? See the Corvette? Were there family members present? Can you can you give us a flavor of that? MR. SULLIVAN: He did get a bit of a tour of the house. I don’t think he saw the Corvette, though. I can’t confirm that for sure, because the two of them sort of went off by themselves for a bit, and I haven’t had a chance to speak to the President about what exactly the Prime Minister saw. There weren’t other family members there. It was really a sort of one-on-one opportunity for President Biden and the Prime Minister to sit and talk. And then, a few of us joined them, obviously, for part of the meeting when it turned to substance. It was just — honestly, the vibe of it was sort of two guys, one at the other guy’s home, talking in broad strokes about where they see the state of the world, about — you know, swapping some stories from their respective political careers, you know, talking about the history of the U.S.-Australia alliance. It just kind of had a feeling like if you had someone come over for a cup of coffee or a meal. You know, that kind of feeling was much more present than, like, a stiff bilateral. And the President told everybody, “Take off your jackets. Get comfortable,” which we all obliged. So, yeah, I’m very bad at answering questions like that, but that’s my best shot at it. Q Well, if I may, on Sudan, a United Nations panel of experts has accused the United Arab Emirates of supplying arms to the RSF in breach of the weapons embargo on Darfur. MBZ, I guess, is coming to the White House this week. Will the President raise those allegations directly with the leader of the United Arab Emirates? MR. SULLIVAN: I’ll let the President talk to Sheikh Mohamed privately about Sudan. I think it would be more effective to do that. What I will say is we are concerned about a number of countries and the steps they are taking to perpetuate rather than resolve the conflict. And I will also say that Sudan will certainly be on the agenda, and the President will be as direct and candid with Sheikh Mohamed as he is with every leader. And then, after the fact, we’ll share what we feel we can. And the reason why I’m not, sort of, laying it out all in public right now is: Our ultimate objective is to get the entire conflict in Sudan on a different track than the tragic and horrific track it is on right now. And I think that requires some intense but sensitive diplomatic conversations with a number of players. That’s what the President is intending to do writ large. And as I said, Sudan will certainly be part of the agenda with the UAE President on Monday. Q Jake, so (inaudible) President will Japan Prime Minister Kishida. Do you expect him to talk about that deal between U.S. Steel and Japan Nippon Steel? And does (inaudible) oppose that deal and try to stop it? MR. SULLIVAN: I cannot say yet whether that particular deal will come up in the conversation today. There are obviously huge priorities in terms of current events and geopolitical trends and economic and technology cooperation. So, I’m not sure that it will come up. And the President has spoken to this issue before, but the matter really is, at the moment, in a official process while the transaction is studied by the relevant authorities and the relevant agencies, the U.S. government. And so, you know, the President will obviously allow that process to run its course because that’s what’s required under the law. And then we will see what happens. Q Prime Minister Kishida will step down soon. You going to talk about his contribution, achievement, but what do you expect from the new Japanese prime minister? MR. SULLIVAN: One thing that I do expect, whoever the new Japanese prime minister is, is continued investment in and support for the U.S.-Japan alliance as the cornerstone peace of security in the Indo-Pacific. And I expect that because the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people support that and because this alliance is bigger than any one leader on either side, in Japan or the United States. So I have confidence that the strong bond and partnership between our two countries will continue no matter who takes the helm, although I will say Prime Minister Kishida should be saluted, and President Biden will salute him, as a very significant contributor to the high-water mark we’ve reached in the U.S.-Japan alliance at this point and in Japan’s global leadership role. So, it will obviously be different because Prime Minister Kishida is a unique individual, but one thing that we think will remain the same is the strong alliance between the United States and Japan. Q Just on the Nippon deal, very quickly: Some proponents of that deal are interpreting last week’s extension as a sign that the President is having second thoughts. What would you say to them? MR. SULLIVAN: I can’t speak to that because I think nobody should overread what happened last week as a substantive expression of views, rather as a matter of process to ensure that the transaction gets the full review that’s appropriate in a case like this, as I said, from the relevant authorities and agencies. And the President really does want to let that play out. Q You mentioned that it’s not about one country, but of course, China comes to mind over time. As just recently, they announced sanctions against American companies. They’re selling weapons to Taiwan. Taiwan is getting money from the United States to be able to defend themselves. And the incidents in the past few weeks in (inaudible) has been escalating, not only with Taiwan with China, but also Philippines. During this meeting, is that top of mind, or is this something that you want to address? Because, I mean, you mentioned the coast guard event shouldn’t be questioned by the Chinese; it’s just an event that they’re going to do as a group. But from their point of view, they’re talking about it and condemning these types of actions. Should we worry about China moving forward or being more aggressive as the world is focused on Lebanon, the Middle East, Ukraine? MR. SULLIVAN: Well, first of all, it’s true that the front pages of news
papers are filled with stories about the Middle East rather than the Indo-Pacific right now. But the United States of America is focused in both places. And there’s probably no better proof point than the fact that we’re sitting here right now, on a Quad Summit day, meeting with leaders of the Indo-Pacific, even as we continue to closely monitor events in the Middle East. So, if you look at the work that we have done over the last four years, the intense engagement with allies and partners, the work on — this latticework that I described, the efforts to strengthen our own industrial and innovation base, the measures we’ve taken to protect our sensitive technologies, we feel like we are in a very strong position to stand up for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. And obviously, we are concerned about actions that China has taken, and we speak out about those actions quite directly and candidly. But we are also putting the United States and our allies and partners in a position to effectively defend our interests and to defend the rules of the road that have kept the peace in the Indo-Pacific for a long time. We’re going to continue to do that. The other thing I would say is that each of the four members of the Quad has their own approach to the PRC. There’s not going to be some “Quad approach” to the PRC. But of course, in the course of the conversation today, the four leaders will have the opportunity to talk about all of the developments in the Indo-Pacific, and obviously the PRC is part of that. So, it will be one of the issues or one of the topics that come up among many. Q If I may, on Venezuela — because Venezuela is close to China right now, and it’s one of the allies, but also Russia and Iran. So we know four Americans are detained in the past few days. The situation is getting just harder and harder to get to an agreement. We are expecting a meeting at the United Nations to talk about Venezuela, led by Uruguay and other countries. Do you see any possibility of moving forward in this subject? We understand the U.S. have supported the talks. Is it a possibility to go back to Qatar? Is Qatar in the table again? MR. SULLIVAN: We continue to talk to Qatar, who wants to play a constructive role in engaging the Maduro regime, the opposition, the United States, other players. At the moment, there’s not much traction on talks, and what we’re instead continuing to see are negative steps by the Maduro regime in the aftermath of an election where we have been very clear our judgment is that Edmundo Gonzalez received the most votes. So, we’ll continue to work, particularly with countries in the region, to try to develop a common approach forward to support democracy and a democratic transition in Venezuela. But I will say that at the moment there is not a substantial diplomatic opportunity to make progress, and we’re going tohave to keep looking for one. Q Jake, on the Middle East, the Lebanese are saying at least 31 were killed in that bombing of a building that apparently targeted at least one Hezbollah commander. Has the U.S. figured out who exactly was targeted and killed? MR. SULLIVAN: The Israelis have announced, and I believe Hezbollah itself has confirmed, some of the people who were killed in that strike. And I will let Israel and Hezbollah speak to it, because obviously we don’t have an independent capacity at this point to confirm. But I believe a fair amount of that is out in the public domain at this point. Q If at least one of those was one of those responsible for organizing the barracks bombing back in the ‘80s, how significant would that be that he’s now dead? MR. SULLIVAN: That individual has American blood on his hands and has a Rewards for Justice price on his head. And he is somebody who the United States promised long ago we would do everything we could to see brought to justice. And anytime a terrorist who has murdered Americans is brought to justice, we believe that that is a good outcome. But again, I’m not in a position this morning, until I have the opportunity to talk again to my Israeli counterparts today, to formally confirm anything; just to say, you know, 1983 seems like a long time ago, but for a lot of families, a lot of people, it was — they’re still living with it every day. Q One other. Paul Whelan and Evan Gershkovich have been in Washington in recent days, mostly to visit with lawmakers. Is there any plan for them to meet with the President? MR. SULLIVAN: I guess not. The President met with both of them, obviously, when they came back to the States. So there wasn’t — we didn’t have a plan for them to sit down this past week or this coming week in Washington. But, you know, I’m sure he would be happy to see them again at some point. Q There’s a report that I got (inaudible) disagree with about U.S. officials conceding that there won’t be a deal during the President’s term. What is your assessment of that? MR. SULLIVAN: I think that’s crazy. I mean — Q So, it was correct that you’d (inaudible). (Laughter.) (Inaudible) disagree with it, that yes — MR. SULLIVAN: This is not me sitting here saying, “Hey, there will be a deal.” One can’t know. And I’ve — you’ve heard me repeatedly use this George Mitchell line of “700 days of failure, one day of success.” But this is diplomacy. Every day, you get up and you try to drive towards a deal that brings about a ceasefire, the return of hostages, surge of humanitarian assistance, and ultimately the end of the war. We’re doing that today. We’re going to do that tomorrow. We’re going to do that every day. And I do still believe there is a path to get there. It has been a winding path, a frustrating path, but we are still on that path, and we hope to reach the destination. But we’re also mindful of the fact and very clear-eyed about the fact that there’s still obstacles in the way; we’re going to do our best to clear them. And I can’t make any predictions about what’s going to happen, but what I can certainly say is we are not conceding that, period. Q But we’ve been waiting a while in terms of a new bridging proposal. Is that right? So when is — when do you expect to put that on the table? MR. SULLIVAN: I can’t tell you that because we’re not at a point right now where I can — where we’re prepared to put something on the table. We’re continuing to work with Qatar and Egypt. They’re talking to Hamas. We’re talking to Israel. The Qataris and Egyptians are talking to Israel. And when we feel ready to take another step, we’ll take another step. Q What’s the holdup? MR. SULLIVAN: Well, at the moment, we don’t feel like we’re in a position, if we put something down today, to get both sides to say yes to it. Could that change over the course of the coming days? It could. You know — yeah, I’ll leave it at that for now. Q Jake, in terms of the events of last week in Lebanon, do you have any assessments what that has done to the operational capabilities of Hezbollah? And what is your current level of concern that what you’ve been trying to prevent the last, you know, 11-plus months could start off as (inaudible)? MR. SULLIVAN: It stands to reason that Lebanese Hezbollah’s capabilities have taken a hit. How significant a hit, how that translates to their ability to represent a threat to Israel, I think we still need some more assessment to reach more guidance on. The risk of escalation is real; it has been since October 7th. There are moments where it is more acute than others. I think we are in one of those moments where it is more acute. But I would take a step back and make an observation that I don’t think gets sufficient attention in the reporting on this dynamic, which is that Hezbollah started this whole thing. Hamas attacks on October 7th, this vicious massacre. And then, as Nasrallah just said in his speech this we
ek, the way he put it, Nasrallah opened the Northern Front. Israel didn’t start just randomly attacking into Lebanon. Hezbollah and its allies in — its terrorist allies in Lebanon started attacking Israel. And tens of thousands of Israeli citizens had to leave their homes. That led to an exchange of fire, and then Lebanese citizens had to leave their homes. And we’ve been in that dynamic ever since. So, that’s an important structural factor that I think, kind of, gets set aside in the commentary and the coverage of the current circumstance. That being said, the United States’ position is we would like to see calm on the northern border and a durable solution that allows the people on both sides of that border to return to their homes. We are driving at that. Amos Hochstein was recently back in the region to work towards that. I’ve spoken with my Israeli counterparts just in the last couple of days to see how we find a way forward on that. And so, while the risk of escalation is real, we actually believe there is also a distinct avenue to getting to a cessation of hostilities and a durable solution that makes people on both sides of the border feel secure, and we’re going to do everything that we can to bring that about. Q And can I just (inaudible) — when you say the risk of escalation is real, are you saying the IDF flattening tower blocks in Beirut is not an escalation? MR. SULLIVAN: I think the question he was asking — the heart of his question was: could we get into a wider war that we have been trying to avoid for the last 11 months. I think that’s what the question was. Q Then I’ll ask the question. MR. SULLIVAN: I was answering (inaudible). Q I’ll ask the question then: Was the IDF strike an escalation, in your view? MR. SULLIVAN: Look, when I talk about escalation, I mean where does this take us from the point of view of, “Are we going to end up in a wider war.” We’re not there yet. I hope we do not get there. When you pose a question, “Was this strike escalation? Was that strike escalation?” the United States is not going to score-keep like that. There’s a number of different ways to look at this strike. The chief way I personally look at it goes back to the discussion we were having before, which is it was a strike against a senior terrorist who has both Israeli and American lives on his hands. So we could pick any moment, any set of rockets launched by Hezbollah, any set of strikes by Israel, and say, “Is this an escalation? Is that an escalation?” and so forth. I think it’s not a particularly useful exercise. For us, the most useful exercise is to try to drive both parties to a place where we get an agreed and durable outcome that can end the cycle and keep us from ending up in the larger war that, as we were just talking about, we’ve worked so hard to (inaudible). Q Is there any announcement that we should expect next week about Haiti? (Inaudible) report that says that even though we have now the Kenya team there and the security forces, 80 percent of Port-au-Prince is run by gangs. Things are not getting better for the people. Violence keep growing. And of course, we don’t have elections or plan of a government soon. MR. SULLIVAN: Look, things are not where we would like them to be in Haiti, but I think it is not correct to say that things have not gotten better from a low point when flights were shut down, the port was shut down, it looked like the entire government was going to be run out of the country. We have improved the situation from that low point, but the progress we have made has been slower and more uneven than we’d like it to be. Our goal is to continue to enhance the Multilateral Security Support Mission and ultimately work with the United Nations to make sure that it gets institutionalized. But I don’t know that we have any particular announcements next week. Rather, our goal is to use the U.N. General Assembly to get more resources, more contributions, and a common vision around building step by step on what we’ve put in place so that we can improve the situation beyond where it is right now. MODERATOR: We have time for about two more questions. Q Just a follow-up. And how can that happen? I know Colombia wanted to help, but, like, it’s not an actual mission like (inaudible) it was the U.N. (inaudible) — is this a security group, and the U.S. is leading the efforts. So how the countries will get involved, and how can they operate? Like, Mexico cannot (inaudible) officers — MR. SULLIVAN: Well, a number of countries have pledged contributions, including police units, former police units. And so, the first thing that can happen is we can turn those pledges into reality, and then we can work bilaterally with countries like Mexico and Colombia on their legal requirements to try to satisfy them so that they could, in fact, (inaudible). Q To put a pin, though, you know, the discussion about China, you know, before, in the lead-up to this, administration officials at the podium were telegraphing that there could be talk about aggressive PRC military action on fair trade practices, tensions over the Taiwan Strait. You know, preview that there’s going to be discussion of North Korea. I know you said that the Quad is not about one country, but to China and to many people, it looks like it’s focusing on China. So I’m curious to what your response to me, to folks that say you’re trying to have it both ways on China. MR. SULLIVAN: I guess what I would say, and I think I said this before, is the leaders are going to talk about all of the significant developments and dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. Everything you just mentioned fits into that category. So we don’t take issues off the table to discuss or speak about. But my point is that the purpose of the Quad is not to come together around China or any other country. It’s to come together around how to construct a free and open Indo-Pacific. And actions and policies that disrupt or undermine that are certainly not just of interest, but are going to be a matter of discussion for Quad members. But the way I square the circle is to say these issues are on the agenda because they relate to a free and open Indo-Pacific, but China is not the focus of the Quad, and the Quad is not about one country. It is about a larger vision that we’re (inaudible). MODERATOR: All right, thanks, everyone. 9:26 A.M. EDT