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Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tom Howe, PhD candidate in International Relations, Monash University

A recently announced Pentagon review of the AUKUS pact has sparked a renewed bout of debate in Australia. Led by the “AUKUS-agnostic” US Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, the review raises serious questions over whether Australia will receive its US-made Virginia-class submarines on schedule from 2032.

AUKUS supporters suggest the review is not overly concerning – they point out governments typically review major programs after taking office. As they note, the UK Labour government did the same when it commissioned Sir Stephen Lovegrove to review AUKUS in 2024. Moreover, the House of Commons Defence Select Committee is currently reviewing AUKUS.

Crucially, however, not all reviews are created equal. Given the US assessment is, according to US officials, being conducted to ensure alignment with the imperatives of “America first”, there is a risk the US will not supply Australia with the Virgina-class submarines it feels it requires to deter China. The UK reviews, on the other hand, did not and do not carry such risks.

The findings of the Lovegrove review remain confidential, but have been shared with Canberra and were incorporated into the UK government’s recent Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The Defence Select Committee is yet to report, but being public, its findings are likely to generate further debate in Australia.

Why are the UK reviews different?

The Defence Select Committee review, launched independently of the government, is an accountability mechanism that scrutinises progress but lacks the power to set policy.

Meanwhile, the Lovegrove review was never intended to question AUKUS, as its terms of reference made clear. Instead, its focus was more on what progress has been made so far and any barriers that might inhibit future success.

There was never any real chance the Lovegrove review would end or amend the UK’s participation in AUKUS, because it has widespread support across mainstream British politics. In foreign and security policy terms, cross-party consensus is the norm in the UK.

However, in the case of AUKUS, two specific factors stand out.

First, AUKUS provides a welcome means to share the burden on a project the UK was already pursuing. Even before AUKUS was announced, the UK had initiated plans for its next generation of nuclear-powered attack submarines, awarding initial design contracts to BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce worth £85 million (A$170 million).

Considering this, AUKUS – and specifically Australia’s £2.4 billion (A$4.6 billion) investment into Rolls-Royce’s reactor production line – was a welcome boon for the cash-strapped British government.

Second, AUKUS has been a crucial component of the UK’s post-Brexit re-emergence. Coming after a period in which Brexit negotiations consumed the British government, it provided important substance to “Global Britain” and its Indo-Pacific tilt.

AUKUS’s cross-party appeal might initially seem strange, given its close association with Boris Johnson’s Brexiteer government. After all, with its “Britain Reconnected” plan, Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s government has been keen to demonstrate how it differs from its Conservative predecessors. This most recent example comes with the SDR’s NATO-first approach, which some interpreted as a sharp break.

However, this is a difference in style rather than substance. Rishi Sunak’s Conservative government had announced Britain had delivered the tilt and would focus on consolidating its position.

In other words, it was making no new commitments. The SDR does not amend this position. It makes clear that “NATO first does not mean NATO only”. This means continuing support for agreements such as AUKUS, which, according to the review, are crucial to shaping the global security environment.

Whether Britain has the capability to shape the global security environment is a question the SDR addresses, if implicitly, by acknowledging the “hollowing out” of the UK’s armed forces. Reconstituting Britain’s armed forces is consequently a key focus of Starmer’s government, which sees rearmament as a route to reindustrialisation.

Militarisation as central to ‘rebirth’

In this rebirth, the government is focusing heavily on the arms industry as a means to bring well-paid, high-skilled jobs to post-industrial parts of the country. There is debate about whether this is the best way to create jobs and growth, but the Starmer government has gone all-in on the strategy.

Indeed, one of the most notable outcomes of the SDR is that the UK plans to invest substantial sums in its fleet of attack submarines, as it plans to go from seven Astute-class boats to 12 AUKUS-class ones.

This ambition may provide some comfort to Australian observers as it indicates the scale of the UK’s commitment to AUKUS. Still, achieving the goal will require a significant increase in industrial capacity, as Britain will need to produce a new submarine every 18 months. The record of the UK government on major capital projects suggests this is a heroic ambition.

For example, the last three Astute-class boats to be commissioned took between 130 and 132 months to build. The sixth and seventh boats of the nearly 25-year-old program are yet to enter service. Moreover, even the active Astute boats are beset by problems; in the first half of 2024, none of the five in-service boats completed an operational deployment due to maintenance issues.

So, while in the context of the US review, Britain’s commitment is likely welcomed, any comfort must be tempered by the expectation that problems will also likely emanate from Britain.

Tom Howe is a Young Professionals Member of the AIIA.

– ref. Britain’s support for AUKUS is unwavering – but its capacity to deliver is another matter – https://theconversation.com/britains-support-for-aukus-is-unwavering-but-its-capacity-to-deliver-is-another-matter-259266