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  • MIL-OSI Security: Fentanyl Trafficker and DC Rapper Sentenced for Bringing Thousands of Counterfeit Oxycodone Pills into the District

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

                WASHINGTON – Columbian Thomas, 26, of Washington D.C., was sentenced today in U.S. District Court to 160 months in federal prison for participating in a massive fentanyl trafficking conspiracy that distributed hundreds of thousands of fentanyl-laced counterfeit oxycodone pills from Southern California to destinations throughout the United States, including the District. Thomas, aka “Cruddy Murda,” was one of more than two dozen co-defendants arrested over the course of 2023 in D.C., Virginia, Maryland, San Diego, and Los Angeles and charged in the conspiracy.

                The sentence was announced by U.S. Attorney Matthew M. Graves, DEA Special Agent in Charge Jarod Forget of the Washington Division, Inspector in Charge Damon E. Wood of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service Washington Division, and Chief Pamela A. Smith of the Metropolitan Police Department.

                Thomas pleaded guilty on May 30 to conspiring to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl. In addition to the 160-month prison term, U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly ordered Thomas to serve five years of supervised release.

                The impetus for this investigation was the overdose death of Diamond Lynch, a young mother in Southeast D.C. In addition to investigating and prosecuting the death-resulting case [1] , law enforcement followed the evidence and uncovered a vast network of traffickers who transported fentanyl from Mexico to Los Angeles to the District of Columbia. Since then, investigators have seized more than 450,000 fentanyl pills, 1.5 kilograms of fentanyl powder, and 30 firearms.        

    According to court documents, Thomas entered into the conspiracy after he was introduced to a Los Angeles-based drug trafficker, who was a distributor of fentanyl-laced counterfeit oxycodone pills. Thomas would travel to Southern California to purchase the fake oxycodone from the L.A. supplier and return to the District with the drugs. 

               Thomas and his co-conspirators employed two primary methods to transport the pills to the District: they smuggled them in luggage or carry-on items on airline flights, or they shipped the pills using commercial mail carriers.

               Thomas often bragged on social media about the lucrative business of fentanyl trafficking and proudly showcased the spoils of his drug trafficking. The below-pictured social media post shows Thomas holding a large stack of U.S. currency, exclaiming “I [love] Cali!!!!”

               On June 2, 2023, the date of his arrest, law enforcement found Thomas in the bedroom of his home and recovered a baggie containing about 100 blue M-30 fentanyl-laced counterfeit oxycodone pills, along with a loaded Glock 21 Gen4 pistol that had been equipped with a “giggle switch,” which converted the firearm into a fully automatic machine gun.

               In addition to possessing a machine gun and conspiring to distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl, Thomas, whose rap stage name is “Cruddy Murda,” often boasted about firearms and acts of violence in his songs. Below is a chart outlining the status and charges of other defendants in the case:

    DEFENDANT

    AGE

    LOCATION

    CHARGES/SENTENCE  

    Hector David Valdez,

    aka “Curl”

     

    26

    		 Santa Fe Springs, California

    Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl;

    Conspiracy to commit international money laundering.

    Craig Eastman

     

    20

    		 Washington, D.C.

    Pleaded guilty July 25, 2024, to conspiracy to distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl.

    Sentencing: January 7, 2025.
    Charles Jeffrey Taylor

    20

    		 Washington, D.C.

    Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl;

    Possession with intent to distribute fentanyl.
    Raymond Nava, Jr.

    20

    Bell Gardens,

    California

    		 Sentenced Sept. 17, 2024, to 14 years for conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Ulises Aldaz

    28

    Bell Gardens,

    California

    		 Sentenced June 28, 2024, to 95 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Max Alexander Carias Torres

    26

    Bell Gardens,

    California

    Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl;

    Conspiracy to commit international money laundering
    Teron Deandre McNeil, aka “Wild Boy”

    34

    		 Washington, D.C. Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Marvin Anthony Bussie,

    aka “Money Marr”

    21

    		 Washington, D.C. Sentenced June 28, 2024, to 120 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Marcus Orlando Brown

    28

    		 Washington, D.C. Sentenced on October 9, 2024, to 108 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Columbian Thomas, aka

    “Cruddy Murda”

    26

    		 Washington, D.C. Sentenced October 22, 2024, to 160 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Wayne Rodell Carr-Maiden

    29

    		 Washington, D.C. Sentenced April 29, 2024, to 45 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Andre Malik Edmond,

    aka “Draco”

    23

    		 Temple Hills, Maryland Sentenced July 22, 2024, to 130 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Treyveon James Johnson,

    aka “Treyski”

    20

    		 Alexandria, Virginia Sentenced Sept. 5, 2024, to 108 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Karon Olufemi Blalock,

    aka “Fat Bags”

    30

    		 Alexandria, Virginia Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Ronte Ricardo Greene,

    aka “Cardiddy”

    28

    		 Washington, D.C.

    Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl;

    Possession with intent to distribute fentanyl.
    Melvin Edward Allen, Jr., aka “21”

    38

    		 Washington, D.C. Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Darius Quincy Hodges,

    aka “Brick”

    34

    		 Glen Allen, Virginia Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Lamin Sesay,

    aka “Rock Star”

    27

    		 Alexandria, Virginia Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Paul Alejandro Felix

    25

    Glendale,

    California

    Pleaded guilty July 1, 2024, to conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Sentencing: November 6, 2024

    Omar Arana,

    aka “Frogs”

    27

    Cudahy,

    California

    		 Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Edgar Balderas, Jr., aka “Nano”

    26

    San Diego,

    California

    		 Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
    Raul Pacheco Ramirez

    30

    Long Beach,

    California

    Pleaded guilty July 19, 2024, to conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.

    Sentencing: November 26, 2024.
    Giovani Alejandro Briones

    30

    		 Victorville, California

    Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl;

    Conspiracy to commit international money laundering.
    Alfredo Rodriguez Gonzalez

    26

    		 Rosarito, Mexico

    Conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl;

    Conspiracy to commit international money laundering.

               The prosecutions followed a joint investigation by the DEA Washington Division and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service Washington Division, in partnership with the Metropolitan Police Department and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), with additional support from the DEA Los Angeles, San Diego, and Riverside Field Offices, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Washington Field Office, and the Charles County, Maryland Sheriff’s Office. Valuable assistance was provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices in the Central and Southern Districts of California, the Eastern District of Virginia, and the District of Maryland.

               The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Matthew W. Kinskey, Solomon S. Eppel, and Iris McCranie of the Violence Reduction and Trafficking Offenses (VRTO) Section.

    23cr73

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Norman Wells — Norman wells RCMP respond to serious assaults

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    On September 22nd, 2024, Norman Wells RCMP received a report that a person had been stabbed at a residence. Officers attended the location and confirmed a person had been the victim of a stabbing.

    Further investigation revealed a significant altercation had occurred at the residence and another person had been both shot with a crossbow and bear-sprayed. Both victims were transported out of the community for treatment.

    Police subsequently located and took 23-year-old Teagan Sutherland into custody in relation to the matter. He has been charged with:

    • Breaking and Entering with Intent, contrary to section 348(1)(a) of the Criminal Code
    • Disguised with intent to commit an offence, contrary to section 351(2) of the Criminal Code
    • Uttering threats against a person (2 counts), contrary to section 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code
    • Possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, contrary to section 88(1) of the Criminal Code
    • Aggravated Assault, contrary to section 268(2) of the Criminal Code

    At the time of his arrest, Sutherland had an active warrant for his arrest and was already facing charges from a prior incident on September 11th, 2024. They are as follows:

    • Breaking and Entering with Intent, contrary to section 348(1)(a) of the Criminal Code
    • Disguised with intent to commit an offence (2 counts), contrary to section 351(2) of the Criminal Code
    • Possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose (2 counts), contrary to section 88(1) of the Criminal Code.
    • Assault with a weapon (2 counts), contrary to section 267(a) of the Criminal Code
    • Uttering threats against a person, contrary to section 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code

    Sutherland has appeared before a Justice of the Peace on all charges and was remanded into custody to appear again on September 25th, 2024

    Investigation into this matter remains ongoing at this time.

    Norman Wells RCMP are aware that several people witnessed this event and are asking those witnesses to contact the Norman Wells detachment at 587-1111 or Crimestoppers at http://www.p3tips.com.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0141/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Rasa Juknevičienė, François‑Xavier Bellamy, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Daniel Caspary, Loucas Fourlas, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0141/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous reports and resolutions on Azerbaijan and Armenia,

    – having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, ratified by Azerbaijan in 2002,

    – having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

    – having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part, signed on 22 April 1996[1],

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas 300 people remain in detention in Azerbaijan on politically motivated charges; whereas prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, Anar Mammadli, has been in pre-trial detention since 30 April 2024 on bogus charges of conspiracy to bring illegal foreign currency into the country and his health has deteriorated significantly while in custody; whereas economist and political activist Gubad Ibadoghlu was moved to house arrest on 22 April 2024 after 274 days in detention;

    B. whereas Azerbaijan has also intensified its repression against the remaining independent media, such as Abzas Media and Toplum TV, through detentions and judicial harassment;

    C. whereas the Azerbaijani laws regulating the registration, operation and funding of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are highly restrictive and arbitrarily implemented, thus effectively criminalising unregistered NGO activity;

    D. whereas Freedom House’s 2024 index ranks Azerbaijan among the least free countries in the world, below Russia and Belarus;

    E. whereas on 19 September 2023, after a nine-month illegal blockade of the Lachin corridor and disregarding both the commitments it made in the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020 and an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling, Azerbaijan launched an offensive on the remaining parts of Nagorno-Karabakh not already under its control;

    F. whereas more than 100 000 Armenians had to flee the territory, including 30 000 children, resulting in Nagorno-Karabakh being almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this amounts to ethnic cleansing;

    G. whereas the Russian peacekeeping force did not act in accordance with its mandate, as laid down in the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020, taking no action against Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor, the establishment of the Azerbaijani checkpoint at the entrance to the corridor or the offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023;

    H. whereas the Azerbaijani leadership continues to make irredentist statements with reference to the sovereign territory of Armenia; whereas the Azerbaijani army continues to occupy no less than 170 km2 of the sovereign territory of Armenia;

    1. Stresses its profound concern regarding the human rights situation in Azerbaijan;

    2. Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all human rights defenders, journalists, environmental, political and other activists prosecuted under fabricated and or politically motivated charges; recalls in this context the names of Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, as well as human rights defenders and journalists including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali and Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli and Farid Ismayilov; underlines that since April 2024, Azerbaijan has carried out further arrests of civil society activists on bogus charges, including Farid Mehralidze, Igbal Abilov, Bahurz Samadov, Emin Ibrahimov and Famil Khalilov;

    3. Recalls the need to lift the travel ban in force against Gubad Ibadoghlu and drop all charges against him, and calls on Azerbaijan urgently to ensure an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing, and allow him to receive treatment abroad;

    4. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect human dignity and fundamental freedoms in accordance with their international commitments and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent NGOs and media to the margins of the law;

    5. Calls for the EU to impose sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia;

    6. Recalls that the 1996 EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is the legal basis for bilateral relations, is based on respect for democracy and the principles of international law and human rights and that these have been systematically violated in Azerbaijan;

    7. Reiterates the EU’s unequivocal support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Armenia; strongly supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders based on the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration;

    8. Recalls its previous condemnation of the pre-planned and unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan of 19-20 September 2023 against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to the expulsion of the entirety of the ethnic Armenian community which had been living there for centuries, amounting to ethnic cleansing; recalls that this attack resulted in the complete dissolution of the structures of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and the establishment of full Azerbaijani control over the region; demands the release of all remaining Armenian political prisoners and prisoners of war;

    9. Reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of the sovereign territory of Armenia; rejects and expresses its grave concern regarding the irredentist and inflammatory statements made by the Azerbaijani President and other Azerbaijani officials threatening the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Armenia; warns Azerbaijan against any potential military adventurism against Armenia proper; highlights that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave of Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia;

    10. Calls on Azerbaijan to genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with the Karabakh Armenians to ensure respect for their rights and guarantee their security, including their right to return to and live in their homes in dignity and safety, overseen by an international presence, to access their land and property rights, to maintain their distinct identity and to fully enjoy their civic, cultural, social and religious rights;

    11. Calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee within the European institutions to identify or develop international mechanisms to guarantee the collective, safe, dignified and sustainable return of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh to their ancestral land; calls for the creation of a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the reports and resolutions adopted by Parliament on Nagorno-Karabakh;

    12. Urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destroying, neglecting or altering the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region, bearing in mind the destruction of cultural, religious and historical heritage that has occurred since the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and calls on it to instead strive to preserve, protect and promote this rich diversity; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments;

    13. Recognises the urgent need to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Armenia in the field of security and defence; welcomes the fact that Armenia has frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization; notes the added value of regular EU-Armenian Political and Security Dialogues, as an umbrella platform for all security related matters; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges other Member States to consider similar initiatives;

    14. Expresses its support for the decision of Armenia to discontinue the presence of Russian Federal Security Service border guards at the international airport in Yerevan, and its understanding for the suspension of relations with Belarus;

    15. Calls for the EU to end its dependency on gas exports from Azerbaijan; is seriously concerned about Azerbaijan’s import of Russian gas and the substantial Russian share in the production and transportation of Azerbaijani gas for the EU, which contradicts the EU’s objective of undermining Russia’s capacity to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine by cutting its revenues from oil and gas exports to the EU; urges the Commission to investigate suspicions that Azerbaijan actually exports Russian gas to the EU;

    16. Calls for the suspension of all imports of oil and gas from Azerbaijan to the EU; recalls its demand, in the light of Azerbaijan’s 2023 invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh, for the suspension of the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy between the European Union and Azerbaijan;

    17. Supports all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement; believes that if a peace agreement is to be lasting, it requires genuine engagement from the parties, not the escalation of rhetoric and demands; welcomes the recent achievement in the Commission on Delimitation and Border Security of a preliminary agreement on the delimitation of several sectors of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border;

    18. Welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; takes good note of Armenia’s European aspirations, as expressed by the Armenian foreign minister, among others; recalls its previous position that, pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any European state may apply to become a member of the European Union provided that it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respects fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights, and upholds the rule of law; considers that, should Armenia be interested in applying for candidate status and continuing on its current path of sustained reforms consolidating its democracy, this could set the stage for a transformative phase in EU-Armenia relations; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU, not only in the area of economic partnership but also in political dialogue, people-to-people contacts, sectoral integration and security cooperation; believes that the experience stemming from the Association Agreements / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova should serve as a good basis for closer EU-Armenia cooperation, in particular in relation to a gradual sectoral integration with the single market;

    19. Welcomes the decision of 22 July 2024 to launch the visa liberalisation dialogue with Armenia, which is the first step towards achieving a visa free regime for short stays in the EU; welcomes further the decision to adopt the first assistance measure under the European Peace Facility (EPF) in support of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, worth EUR 10 million; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan;

    20. Condemns the Baku Initiative Group’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise EU Member States; condemns in particular its support for irredentist groups and disinformation operations targeting France, especially in the French departments and territories of New Caledonia, Martinique and Corsica; recalls that these methods were used against Germany in 2013; denounces the smear campaigns targeting Denmark; strongly opposes the allegations made by Ilham Aliyev himself at the Baku Initiative Group meeting in Baku in November 2023;

    21. Condemns the arbitrary arrests of EU citizens based on spurious accusations of espionage and their disproportionate sentencing;

    22. Regrets the smear campaign aimed at damaging France’s reputation by calling into question its capacity to host the 2024 Olympic Games, launched by actors suspected of being close to the Azerbaijani regime;

    23. Strongly condemns the intimidation, death threats and assassination attempts against opponents of the Azerbaijani Government, including in EU countries, and against Azerbaijani citizens who have been granted political asylum by Member States, such as Mahammad Mirzali in France; calls on the Member States to cooperate, if necessary, in the investigation into the murder, in September 2024, of Vivadi Isgandarl, an Azerbaijani political opponent residing in France; stresses that for the Member States, preventing any act of retaliation on their territory is a matter of democracy, human rights, security and sovereignty; insists that Europol should closely monitor this matter;

    24. Strongly condemns the public insults and direct threats made by Azerbaijani diplomatic or government representatives, or members of the Azerbaijani Parliament, targeting elected officials of EU Member States; demands, in this regard, that access for all Azerbaijani officials to EU institutional buildings be denied until further notice;

    25. Welcomes the fact that the Republic of Armenia formally deposited the instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2023 and that the statute entered into force for Armenia on 1 February 2024;

    26. Deplores steps taken by Azerbaijan towards the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, which are against international law and the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984); calls on Azerbaijan to respect the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and to not invite the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus to any meetings of the Organization of Turkic States;

    27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States and the President, Government and Parliament of Azerbaijan.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Improving use of rail infrastructure capacity – 22-10-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    In July 2023, the European Commission tabled a package of proposals aimed at greening freight transport. One of these proposals focuses on improving the use of rail infrastructure capacity. The proposed text suggests changes to the rules governing the planning and allocation of railway infrastructure capacity, which are currently outlined in Directive 2012/34/EU and Regulation (EU) No 913/2010. The goal of the changes is to enhance the management of rail infrastructure capacity and traffic so as to improve service quality, optimise railway network usage, increase traffic capacity and enhance the transport sector’s contribution to decarbonisation. In the European Parliament, the file was referred to the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), which appointed Tilly Metz (Greens/EFA, Luxembourg) as rapporteur. The TRAN committee adopted its report on 4 March 2024. Parliament adopted its first-reading position during its March 2024 plenary session. Following the European elections, the TRAN committee voted on 7 October 2024 to start interinstitutional negotiations. Fourth edition. The ‘EU Legislation in Progress’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan – B10-0138/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

    Adam Bielan, Charlie Weimers, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Michał Dworczyk, Carlo Fidanza, Alexandr Vondra, Alberico Gambino, Rihards Kols, Reinis Pozņaks, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Assita Kanko, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0138/2024

    European Parliament resolution on People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

    (2024/2891(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous reports, recommendations and resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,

    – having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan, passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,

    – having regard to the motion of 12 September 2024 passed in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament on UN resolution 2758,

    – having regard to the statement by the spokesperson of the European External Action Service of 14 October on China’s latest military drills around Taiwan,

    – having regard to the UN Charter,

    – having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas, in the 1970s, in the hope of enhancing prosperity, stability and peace, the PRC was offered a place in the UN; whereas Beijing seized this opportunity, benefiting from close ties with the West, joining the World Trade Organization, enjoying freedom of navigation and experiencing stabilisation in the seas and straits of South-East Asia, all of which opened the door to the country’s unprecedented economic and technological development;

    B. whereas, in recent years, through its actions – such as supporting Russia’s barbaric aggression and assertively expanding in the region, particularly with the threat of invading Taiwan – Beijing is failing to uphold the commitments expected of UN Security Council members and the commitments enshrined in the UN Charter; whereas UN resolution 2758 does not establish the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan and does not determine the future status of Taiwan in the United Nations, nor of Taiwanese participation in UN agencies or international organisations;

    C. whereas the PRC has falsely leveraged some interpretations of UN Resolution 2758 to advance its ‘One China’ narrative globally and put pressure on Taiwan, limiting its voice on the international stage and influencing its diplomatic relationships;

    D. whereas the Australian and Dutch Parliaments have already decided not to go along with the PRC’s interpretation of UN Resolution 2758;

    E. whereas the PRC is perpetuating its overly aggressive actions, and trying to erode the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; whereas since 2019 the PRC has violated the Taiwanese air defence identification zone (ADIZ) with increasing regularity; whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across vast areas of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia;

    F. whereas on 14 October 2024 the PRC launched, without prior warning, a large-scale military drill named Joint Sword 2024-B that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deployed 153 aircraft and 36 naval and coastguard ships around Taiwan, setting single-day records;

    G. whereas the PLA’s air manoeuvres have increased from under 20 incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2019 to 2 459 so far in 2024; whereas the threat is exacerbated by Beijing’s announcement that it was practising for a blockade of Taiwan’s key ports and military bases; whereas the PLA’s primary locus for ADIZ operations has shifted over time from the South China Sea to the Taiwan Strait; whereas the PLA’s flight activity to the east of Taiwan has increased, demonstrating a shift from training and navigation operations to testing likely combat concepts in the event of a blockade or military invasion of Taiwan;

    H. whereas, besides military pressure, the PRC has for years pursued a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including hybrid and cyberattacks, with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;

    I. whereas the PRC under the leadership of Xi Jinping has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan;

    J. whereas on 25 September 2024 the PRC fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Pacific Ocean for the first time since 1980;

    K. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security;

    L. whereas Beijing’s active support of the Russian Federation’s aggressive actions against Ukraine contradicts the PRC’s claim to be a ‘stabilising power’; whereas the Russian war of aggression is being closely watched by the PRC as a test bed for the possible future invasion of Taiwan and to gauge the likely reaction of the international community;

    M. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    N. whereas the PRC is a one-party state controlled and ruled entirely by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); whereas the CCP has used its growing influence in international organisations to reshape the open, rules-based international order to protect and advance its own interests;

    O. whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from the PRC, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas the EU remains the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan; whereas there is considerable potential for increasing Taiwan’s FDI in the EU; whereas Taiwan dominates semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan and advocates stabilising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait;

    1. Reiterates that Taiwan is an important EU partner and a like-minded democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region;

    2. Condemns the sustained efforts made by representatives of the PRC to distort the meaning of UN resolution 2758, historical documents and international rules;

    3. Remains deeply committed to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy, which does not equate with the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle’;

    4. Stresses that nothing in resolution 2758 prevents Taiwan’s participation in international organisations and that it has no bearing on the sovereign choices of other countries with respect to their relationship with Taiwan;

    5. Regrets the PRC’s efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation, in line with the key UN principles of universal representation, in relevant international organisations such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in order to better protect global interests and address the serious challenges facing humanity, such as pandemics, climate change and human rights;

    6. Strongly condemns the PRC’s provocative, irresponsible, disproportionate and destabilising military exercises, including the recent exercises of 14 October, as well as its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its aggressive posture in the wider region; expresses its concern about the PRC’s recent launch of an ICBM into the Pacific Ocean, which has contributed to further tensions across the Indo-Pacific region;

    7. Reaffirms its strong commitment to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted and will be met with a decisive and firm reaction;

    8. Highlights that the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture poses a threat to the freedom of navigation and jeopardises the stability which is vital for global trade; emphasises that this situation is being watched with concern by a growing number of like-minded partners committed to peace and stability in the region, including across the Taiwan Strait; underlines the need to shore up deterrence against destabilising behaviour, including through regular operations to assert freedom of navigation over the PRC’s attempts to impose control over international waters and airspace;

    9. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan;

    10. Urges the PRC to immediately cease all actions and intrusions into the Taiwanese ADIZ and the airspace violations above Taiwan’s outer islands, and to restore the full respect of the Taiwan Strait’s median line, all of which also poses a risk to international aviation, and stop all other grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns;

    11. Recalls that maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is a core interest for the free world, including the EU and its Member States; stresses that a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would not only cause significant economic disruption affecting European interests and prosperity, but would also seriously undermine the rules-based order in the region, as well as democratic governance with human rights, democracy and the rule of law at its core;

    12. Recalls Taiwan’s help and assistance during both the COVID-19 pandemic and the humanitarian crises caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as its continuous involvement and support for the Ukrainian government and countries hosting Ukrainian refugees;

    13. Reiterates the importance of respecting international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight;

    14. Reiterates its call for the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs to change the name of the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan to ‘European Union Office in Taiwan’ to reflect the broad scope of our ties;

    15. Reiterates its previous call for the Commission to launch, without delay, an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment agreement with the Taiwanese authorities in preparation for negotiations on deepening bilateral economic ties;

    16. Recommends further deepening cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; recommends posting a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office to coordinate joint efforts on tackling disinformation and interference; condemns any form of pressure and threats of reprisals, including economic coercion, with regard to the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights, without foreign interference;

    17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Governments of the PRC and Taiwan.

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Shortage of bus drivers in Europe – P-002139/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    17.10.2024

    Priority question for written answer  P-002139/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Rosa Serrano Sierra (S&D), Idoia Mendia (S&D), Alicia Homs Ginel (S&D)

    The Draghi report acknowledges that the European transport sector faces a common challenge: a shortage of professional drivers. In 2023, 105 000 bus driver positions were unfilled in Europe, a figure which could double by 2028, according to the International Road Transport Union (IRU). The shortage could reduce the frequency of or disrupt public transport services, affecting both access to essential services and sectors such as tourism and undermining one of the EU’s fundamental principles: territorial cohesion.

    The Commission has already acknowledged the problem. In 2023, it included bus drivers in the EU talent pool initiative, which makes it easier to recruit third-country workers in professions with shortages. The lack of drivers is also recognised as a challenge to be addressed in the mission letter of the future Commissioner for Transport.

    Against that backdrop:

    • 1.Does the Commission share concerns about the shortage of bus drivers in the EU?
    • 2.What steps, such as improving working conditions or promoting the inclusion of women, could be taken to make the profession more attractive?
    • 3.Is this state of affairs affecting territorial connectivity in the EU?

    Submitted: 17.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Social clause in sustainable fisheries partnership agreements – E-002060/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002060/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Isabelle Le Callennec (PPE)

    The Commission recently amended the social clause in sustainable fisheries partnership agreements (SFPAs). This clause requires EU vessels to comply with decisions, such as that on the basic minimum wage for seafarers, made by the Joint Maritime Commission of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). It does not cite either ILO Convention No 188 on Work in Fishing or Directive 2017/159.

    In December 2023, the Commission informed the social partners in the Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee on Sea-Fisheries (SSDC-F) that it did not have the authority to set a minimum wage in SFPAs. However, in April, July and then September 2024, it proceeded to send them three successive versions of the same social clause. The first imposed the basic minimum wage for seafarers, doing away with the share remuneration system. The second saw the Commission row back, stating that the minimum wage was no longer compulsory, only for that to be reversed two months later by a third clause, with the Commission blaming a translation error in the July version.

    • 1.Does the Commission have the authority to set a minimum wage in SFPAs? In that context, could the Commission provide the legal opinion set out in Ares(2023)6074027 and Ares(2024)4969475?
    • 2.Can the Commission impose the results of biennial wage negotiations on the fishing sector when its social partners are excluded from those negotiations?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The role of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in EU border and migration policy – E-002064/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002064/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle (Renew), Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE)

    On 5 October 2024, it was reported how the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), once a research and dialogue centre, is playing an increasingly prominent role in implementing EU border and migration policy. It provides input, delivers border and surveillance material, and manages training centres. In 2023, the Commission gave EUR 93 million to the ICMPD. Part of this contribution was for a project in Lebanon aimed at preventing Syrian refugees from moving onward to Europe. The ICMPD has been criticised by experts for lacking transparency, democratic oversight and legal accountability, and for its potential for fundamental rights violations[1].

    • 1.How are the accountability structures of the ICMPD arranged, considering that it carries out EU border- and migration-related tasks, including enforcement tasks, supported by considerable EU funding, and how does the Commission ensure that such ICMPD projects comply with fundamental rights?
    • 2.Can the Commission explain why the evaluation reports of projects managed by the ICMPD are ‘not public’, considering that these projects implement EU border and migration policy and are financed by EU funding?
    • 3.Will the Commission provide more transparency regarding the activities of the ICMPD for the EU, which are financed by public funding, so that democratic control can be reinforced?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0133/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Sergey Lagodinsky, Ville Niinistö, Maria Ohisalo, Catarina Vieira, Hannah Neumann, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Markéta Gregorová, Michael Bloss, Alice Kuhnke, Isabella Lövin, Pär Holmgren, Marie Toussaint
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    B10‑0133/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

     

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Azerbaijan and Armenia, and in particular its resolution of 25 April 2024 on Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev[1],

    – having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

    – having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

    – having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

    – having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

    – having regard to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,

    – having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part[2],

    – having regard to the statement of 29 May 2024 by the Spokesperson of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the human rights situation in Azerbaijan,

    – having regard to Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) resolution 2527 (2024) of 24 January 2024 entitled ‘Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Azerbaijan’,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Azerbaijan’s track record on human rights has reached a historic low point owing to the fact that, since late 2022, the government has intensified its systematic repression of critics and dissident voices, with a new and ongoing wave of arrests of human rights defenders, political and civic activists, journalists and independent researchers on the basis of politically motivated baseless charges;

    B. whereas the detained journalists and activists listed in its urgency resolution of 25 April 2024 remain in custody;

    C. whereas these developments are taking place in the lead-up to the 29th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29) in Baku, as part of a concerted effort by the Azerbaijani authorities to effectively silence the few remaining dissenting voices and stifle Azerbaijani civil society; whereas Azerbaijan was granted the status of COP29 host city by the UN Regional Group of Eastern European States, which includes 11 EU Member States;

    D. whereas people are being detained for actions such as participating in public protests, giving media interviews, criticising the government on social media, exposing police brutality and alleging government corruption, which is in violation of the Azerbaijani Government’s obligations under international human rights law; whereas in addition to politically motivated persecution, the Azerbaijani authorities also use tools of intimidation and harassment to incite fear and effectively censor independent voices;

    E. whereas there are credible reports of severe acts of ill treatment and even of torture inflicted upon detained persons by police officers in Azerbaijan; whereas Azerbaijan refuses to cooperate with the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;

    F. whereas Anar Mammadli, who leads the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center and is a founding member of the Climate Justice Initiative, which seeks to advocate for civic freedoms and environmental justice in conjunction with COP29, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities on 29 April 2024 on bogus smuggling charges; whereas Mr Mammadli’s health has deteriorated significantly while in custody;

    G. whereas researcher and activist Bahruz Samadov was arrested on 21 August 2024 and charged with ‘high treason’ for his articles criticising Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh policy;

    H. whereas women human rights defenders continue to face threats, coercion, violations of their right to privacy and smear campaigns that are gender-specific and target them as women;

    I. whereas Azerbaijani laws regulating the registration, operation and funding of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are highly restrictive, and Azerbaijani authorities arbitrarily implement these laws; whereas this results in the effective criminalisation of unregistered NGO activity;

    J. whereas civil society activists have been fleeing the country in growing numbers since November 2023; whereas the ongoing crackdown on freedom of expression in Azerbaijan is also reflected in reports of transnational repression and reprisals against family members of detainees;

    K. whereas the media sector is under the official control of the authorities, and any remaining independent media outlets, primarily AbzasMedia and Toplum TV, have been targeted through judicial harassment and the detention of its journalists;

    L. whereas many international and domestic human rights activists and organisations have called on the international community to recognise and respond to the urgency and gravity of the human rights situation in Azerbaijan;

    M. whereas PACE officially suspended the Azerbaijan delegation on 24 January 2024 owing to Azerbaijan’s failure to conduct free and fair elections and ensure the separation of powers, the weakness of its legislature vis-à-vis the executive, and the lack of independence of the judiciary and respect for human rights;

    N. whereas a number of European Court of Human Rights decisions have found that Azerbaijan has violated human rights; whereas more than 320 court judgments against Azerbaijan have not yet been executed or have been only partially implemented, which is the highest number among all state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights;

    O. whereas the EU has intensified its energy trade relations with Azerbaijan over the past two years with a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy and more recently an MoU on wind energy cooperation; whereas Commissioner Kadri Simson earlier this year praised the dynamism of the EU’s energy cooperation with Azerbaijan;

    P. whereas Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) stipulates that the Union’s action must be guided by democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law;

    Q. whereas, separately, peace talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia are ongoing, with both sides stating that negotiations are edging towards a peace agreement; whereas several significant deadlocks seemingly remain, owing to issues including Azerbaijani demands in relation to Armenia’s constitution and a corridor to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave via southern Armenia, disregarding Armenia’s sovereignty; whereas earlier this year a deal was signed on a joint border commission to demarcate and delimit their shared border;

    1. Reiterates its profound concern regarding the human rights situation in Azerbaijan, in particular the government’s severe restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly and association that have worsened over the past two years;

    2. Is deeply concerned about the systematic repression of freedom of expression by the Azerbaijani authorities, targeting civil society, civic and political activists, journalists and human rights defenders, including acts of harassment, intimidation, arbitrary detention and severe ill treatment and torture by police officers, and politically motivated legal persecution; expresses deep concern about the environment of fear that this has created inside the country, leaving civil society effectively silenced;

    3. Urges the Government of Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release Anar Mammadli, Bahruz Samadov, Igbal Abilov, Farid Mehralizade, Emin Ibrahimov and Famil Khalilov, as well as political prisoners named in previous urgency resolutions, including Ilhamiz Guliyev, Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov and Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, and human rights defenders and journalists Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli and Farid Ismayilov; calls, further, for the vacation of any convictions against those released and the removal of restrictions on their freedom of movement;

    4. Reminds Azerbaijan that the provision of healthcare for prisoners is the responsibility of the state; calls for adequate healthcare and medical treatment to be provided to all those detained in Azerbaijan on politically motivated charges;

    5. Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to drop all charges against renowned scholar, anti-corruption activist and shortlisted finalist of the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, release him from house arrest, and allow him to travel abroad for urgent medical care without delay and attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony in Strasbourg in December;

    6. Is deeply concerned about Azerbaijan’s violations of the freedom of association through undue restrictions and misuse of NGO legislation, resulting in the persecution of civil society and curtailing of its work; calls on the Azerbaijani Government to repeal the restrictive NGO and media legislation and ensure that civil society can operate without undue hindrance or fear of reprisals and persecution;

    7. Encourages the Commission to review its approach to supporting human rights in Azerbaijan and recommends a reassessment of its funding mechanisms for Azerbaijani independent civil society and media, aligning them more closely with the strategies used to support these sectors in Belarus;

    8. Condemns the continued repression of the right to freedom of assembly, for instance in the case of anti-pollution protests in the village of Soyudlu in 2023, which were quashed by security forces using violence and arrests;

    9. Calls on the Azerbaijani Government to swiftly comply with long-standing recommendations of the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on the subject of the widespread recourse to physical ill treatment (including, on occasion, torture) by the police in Azerbaijan;

    10. Calls on the Azerbaijani Government to implement all decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, reminds it of its obligations to respect human dignity and fundamental freedoms and calls on it to repeal repressive legislation on the registration and funding of NGOs, to bring it in line with Venice Commission recommendations;

    11. Deeply regrets statements by various Commission representatives, including President Ursula von der Leyen, calling Azerbaijan a ‘reliable partner’ in the field of energy; insists that, in the interest of its geopolitical security, integrity and pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals, the EU end its reliance on fossil-fuel-rich authoritarian countries once and for all;

    12. Reiterates its denunciation of Azerbaijan’s systematic bribery of European politicians, including in the context of PACE;

    13. Considers that the ongoing human rights violations in Azerbaijan are incompatible with the country’s role as COP29 host; urges the EU and the Member States to use COP29 as an occasion for the international community to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to condemn and address in a meaningful way Azerbaijan’s human rights violations in interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities in Baku during COP29; calls on delegates attending COP29 on behalf of the EU and the Member States, in particular President Ursula von der Leyen, to make public and private calls for the immediate and unconditional release of arbitrarily detained journalists, activists and human rights defenders and to request meetings with political prisoners while in the country;

    14. Stresses the fact that Azerbaijan will host COP29 on behalf of the UN Regional Group of Eastern European States, which includes EU Member States, and that they cannot allow the Azerbaijani Government to use the occasion to whitewash its image and human rights track record; demands that the organisers and the Member States make clear to the Azerbaijani authorities how important a thriving and independent civil society is to the conference’s success, and ensure that human rights, fundamental freedoms and the effective participation of civil society are guaranteed during the event;

    15. Calls for the EU and the Member States to prioritise, in line with Article 21 TEU, addressing Azerbaijan’s appalling human rights situation in their relations with the country and introducing stronger human rights conditions in the EU’s relations with Azerbaijan; calls for the EU’s economic and political ties with and support for Azerbaijan, including any cooperation on energy, to be made conditional on the release of all political prisoners, reform of laws and regulations governing NGOs and their funding, and the improvement of the overall human rights situation in the country; insists, in this regard, that the EU and the Member States suspend all energy trade relations with Azerbaijan, including the MoU on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy, and make any reinstatement conditional on meeting the above requirements;

    16. Calls on the Commission to investigate options for imposing targeted sanctions under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on those individuals responsible for the grave and consistent human rights violations in Azerbaijan;

    17. Welcomes, separately, the ongoing negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on all pending issues with the aim of concluding a peace treaty, and calls on both parties to remain fully committed to a lasting and peaceful settlement of the long-standing dispute, through dialogue and negotiations; believes that an agreement between these two countries needs to be negotiated in good faith and be based on the recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-use of force; recalls that, meanwhile, all rights of the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan must be safeguarded and calls for all prisoners of war to be released in line with the 1949 Third Geneva Convention;

    18. Urges the Commission and the Council to ensure the EU’s ability to credibly and effectively continue supporting the negotiations directed at a lasting peace for the benefit of all people in the region;

    19. Calls on Türkiye to take more diplomatic responsibility in the region by actively contributing to the promotion of peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and by playing a constructive role in facilitating a lasting and peaceful resolution of the conflict;

    20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President and Parliament of Azerbaijan and the President, Prime Minister and Parliament of Armenia.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Common charger for e-bikes – P-002152/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    17.10.2024

    Priority question for written answer  P-002152/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Katarina Barley (S&D), Delara Burkhardt (S&D)

    Consumers throughout the EU are bothered by the need to have several different chargers for the same category of products. This not only applies to mobile phones, for which the EU has now established the requirement to use a common charger, but also to e-bikes.

    The Batteries Regulation obliges the Commission to ‘assess how best to introduce harmonised standards for a common charger for rechargeable batteries designed for light means of transport’, such as e-bikes, by 1 January 2025 (Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, Article 94(6)).

    • 1.Will the Commission carry out this assessment on time?
    • 2.Does the Commission already have preliminary findings?
    • 3.Does the Commission plan to propose legislation on a common charger for e-bikes if the assessment deems common chargers advantageous for consumers in the EU?

    Submitted: 17.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Poland’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of play – 22-10-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    In nominal terms, Poland is the third biggest beneficiary of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), after Italy and Spain. EU support for implementing Poland’s amended national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) – Krajowy Plan Odbudowy – amounts to €59.8 billion, and includes €25.3 billion in grants and €34.5 billion in loans. The amount is €24.5 billion (+69 %) higher than the one initially approved, and takes into account a 2022 update of the maximum financial contribution, additional loans requested by Poland, and the non-repayable allocation for REPowerEU made available in 2023. RRF support per capita for Poland totals €1 584 (up from €935 initially). Poland’s NRRP has twice been amended, on 8 December 2023 to add the REPowerEU chapter, and on 16 July 2024 to adjust the timeline and scope of selected measures. The NRRP includes 54 reforms and 57 investments, and is strongly focused on the green transition and changes in energy production and consumption. The biggest components are dedicated to REPowerEU (41 % of the total allocation) and green energy and energy intensity reduction (26 %). Other priority areas include economic competitiveness, healthcare, well-functioning public institutions and the judiciary. On 28 December 2023, Poland received €5 billion in pre-financing for the REPowerEU chapter. After the satisfactory fulfilment of 37 milestones and one target, including the commitments concerning the reforms of the judicial system (‘super milestones’), and improvements of the audit and control systems, Poland received the first achievements-based payment on 15 April 2024 (€6.3 billion). On 13 September, Poland submitted payment requests for the second and third instalments, amounting to €9.4 billion and linked to achieving 38 milestones and three targets. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on RRF implementation, and scrutinises the European Commission’s work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Third edition. The ‘NGEU delivery’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Scrutiny of EU funding for a university that promotes antisemitism – E-002065/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002065/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Lukas Mandl (PPE), Monika Hohlmeier (PPE), Alice Teodorescu Måwe (PPE), Sabine Verheyen (PPE), Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Miriam Lexmann (PPE), Karlo Ressler (PPE), Petras Auštrevičius (Renew), Moritz Körner (Renew), Andrey Kovatchev (PPE), Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE), Niclas Herbst (PPE)

    According to media reports, EU money is going to a university in Türkiye whose rector is known for his anti-Zionist and antisemitic position. We refer in particular to the article published on welt.de on 8 October 2024 under the headline ‘Rector incites against Israel – EU co-finances Hamas-friendly university’[1]. The article refers to relevant quotes and mentions projects that are financially supported by the EU through the Erasmus programme.

    • 1.Did the above-referenced cash flows to the relevant projects actually take place, and what other cash flows have there been from the Erasmus programme or other EU programmes to this Turkish institution?
    • 2.Are those responsible in the Commission and in the Erasmus programme aware that the rector’s above-referenced statements are incompatible with any concept of academic integrity and are capable of causing and justifying violence?
    • 3.What measures will the Commission take to reclaim the money already disbursed, and to ensure that this institution and others that lack scientific character or even engage in hate speech are not further funded with EU taxpayers’ money?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    • [1] https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article253897712/Erasmus-Programm-Rektor-hetzt-gegen-Israel-EU-finanziert-Hamas-freundliche-Uni-mit.html.
    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Liability of online marketplaces – E-002043/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002043/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Christel Schaldemose (S&D)

    Has the Commission given thought to whether online marketplaces should be regulated at all according to the same principles as social media and music and film services, etc., the former being intermediaries for physical products and the latter involving speech and intangible content?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU measures on customs controls and duties for online purchases of low-cost and low-quality products from China – E-002053/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002053/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Carlo Fidanza (ECR)

    The growth in online purchases of cheap and very low-quality products from China is seriously harming the economy and the safety of European consumers.

    Those products, which are often sold at derisory prices, not only undermine the competitiveness of European businesses, but also pose serious risks to consumers’ health and safety. Many of them do not meet the quality and safety standards imposed by the European Union and, as a result, numerous cases of defective or dangerous products have been reported.

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.What steps will the Commission take to scale up customs controls on products imported from China by means of e-commerce platforms?
    • 2.Is it considering introducing specific import duties for products that do not meet European quality and safety standards?
    • 3.What initiatives are being planned that will help European companies to compete with Chinese companies’ low-cost, low-quality products?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Commission clears JD Sports acquisition of Courir subject to conditions

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Brussels, 22 Oct 2024 The European Commission has approved, under the EU Merger Regulation, the proposed acquisition of Groupe Courir SAS (‘Courir’) by JD Sports Fashion Plc Group (‘JD Sports’). The approval is conditional upon full compliance with the commitments offered by the parties.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Growing Russian oil trade continues to support the war in Ukraine – E-002061/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002061/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE)

    Despite EU sanctions, the Russian budget’s revenues from crude oil and refined petroleum products were 56 % higher for January to August 2024 than for the same months in 2023. This is one and a half times higher than one year ago and are almost the same as in the record year 2022[1].

    The biggest problem and challenge for the EU are the illegal ‘shadow’ tanker fleets that account for 90 % of Russia’s seaborne oil exports[2]. These allow Russia to ignore the price caps, so the Kremlin still has enough money to continue the war. If everything remains as it is, reserves will last at least two more years, according to analysts. Ukraine’s allies should therefore take advantage of Russia’s economic vulnerabilities and step up sanctions pressure now.

    • 1.How will the Commission enforce more decisive sanctions against all Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products and ensure that these sanctions cannot be evaded easily?
    • 2.Will the Commission consider placing greater emphasis on checking compliance with sanctions and monitoring their impact on the Russian economy?
    • 3.How else will the Commission contribute to blocking the illegal flow of Russian oil to the European market?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    • [1] https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/kse-institute-s-russia-chartbook-global-prices-weigh-on-oil-exports-cbr-continues-to-struggle-with-inflation/.
    • [2] https://energyandcleanair.org/august-2024-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/.
    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Outcome of the European Council meeting of 17 October 2024 – 22-10-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    The last formal European Council meeting under the presidency of Charles Michel had an exceptionally full agenda, covered in only a day. The most prominent topic was migration, with EU leaders agreeing on comprehensive conclusions, marking a shift in the European Council’s approach to the issue. Strong emphasis was put on fighting the instrumentalisation of migrants and on increasing returns. Other core agenda points were Ukraine, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presenting his ‘victory plan’, and the Middle East, with EU leaders expressing their deep concern about the military escalation in the region and calling on all actors to show restraint and abide by international law. The meeting’s conclusions also address competitiveness, the rules based-international order, hybrid threats, energy prices, COP29 and COP16, fighting discrimination, and the situations in Moldova, Georgia, Sudan, Venezuela, Morocco and Haiti.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Gov. Kemp Announces Plans for Third Special Tax Refund for Hardworking Georgians

    Source: US State of Georgia

    ATLANTA, GA – Governor Brian P. Kemp, joined by First Lady Marty Kemp, Lieutenant Governor Burt Jones, Speaker of the House Jon Burns, and members of the Georgia General Assembly, today announced plans to return over $1 billion to the taxpayers of Georgia via a third special tax rebate. The proposed one-time, special refund would mirror previous rebates, returning $250 to single tax filers, $375 to head-of-household filers, and $500 to married couples filing jointly. Between this latest measure and the previous tax rebates, multiple state gas tax suspensions, homeowner tax relief grant, and acceleration of the largest income tax cut in state history enacted by the Governor and General Assembly, these policies have saved Georgia taxpayers over $6.6 billion.  

    “Inflation may have fallen, but high prices are still here and weighing down hardworking Georgians every time they go to the grocery store, the gas pump, and so many other places in our daily lives,” said Governor Brian Kemp. “While bad policies coming out of Washington, D.C. are still hurting America’s families, here in Georgia we’re working to give our people relief. I want to thank the General Assembly for their support of the measure we announced today, and the many actions we’ve taken before now to put more money back in the pockets of hardworking Georgians.”

    This special tax refund would serve as the third rebate package delivered by Governor Kemp and the Georgia General Assembly over the last three years, and it follows the historic tax cut package enacted earlier this year which accelerated the largest state income tax cut in Georgia history. 

    “Under our state’s strong conservative leadership, we’ve balanced the budget every year while lowering our income tax rate and returning billions of dollars to taxpayers,” said Lt. Governor Burt Jones. “I want to thank Governor Brian Kemp for his leadership and for prioritizing the budgets of Georgia’s families. Priorities like the one announced today will help Georgians keep more of their hard-earned money and will separate us from the failed policies in Washington. I made a promise to the people of Georgia that as your Lt. Governor, I would work every year to lower your taxes and keep more of your hard-earned dollars in your pockets, and I look forward to working with the Governor and the Speaker to do that again when we reconvene in January.”

    “Georgia’s strong conservative leadership and strategic fiscal policies have created a historic $16 billion budget surplus, and we’re proud that we’ve been able to continue investing in everything from healthcare and education to infrastructure and workforce development – all while cutting taxes and saving Georgia families and businesses millions of dollars,” said Speaker Jon Burns. “The House is looking forward to working alongside Governor Kemp, Lieutenant Governor Jones, and members of the General Assembly in 2025 to continue returning taxpayer dollars to hardworking Georgians.”

    As with the prior special tax refunds, the tax rebates announced today will not be taxable income under Georgia law. No additional action is necessary from taxpayers beyond filing their individual income tax returns from the two previous taxable years (2023 and 2024 tax returns).

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: DOD, German Ministry of Defence Enter Into Security of Supply Arrangement

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    The Department of Defense (DoD) entered into a bilateral, non-binding Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) with the Federal Ministry of Defence for the Federal Republic of Germany (DEU MOD). The arrangement will enable both the U.S. and Germany to acquire the industrial resources they need to quickly meet defense requirements, resolve unanticipated disruptions that challenge defense capabilities, and promote supply chain resiliency.

    The SOSA was signed on October 22, 2024 by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Dr. William LaPlante, on behalf of the United States and the Head of the Directorate-General for Equipment within the Federal Ministry of Defence, Vice Admiral Carsten Stawitzki, on behalf of Germany in Brussels, Belgium.

    “This SOSA is an important step forward and further strengthens the robust defense partnership between Germany and the United States,” said Dr. LaPlante.

    Through this arrangement, the U.S. and Germany commit intent to support one another’s priority delivery requests for procurement of critical national defense resources. The U.S. will provide Germany some assurances under the U.S. Defense Priorities and Allocations System, with program determinations by the DoD and rating authorizations by the Department of Commerce. Germany will in turn establish a government-industry Code of Conduct with its industrial base, in which German firms will voluntarily agree to make every reasonable effort to provide the U.S. with priority support. Participation in this Code of Conduct is made voluntarily.

    SOSAs are an important mechanism for DoD to strengthen interoperability and are a proven supply chain tool for enabling a resilient, global defense ecosystem for the U.S. and key partners and allies. The arrangements institute working groups, establish communication mechanisms, streamline DoD processes, and proactively act to allay anticipated supply chain issues in peacetime, emergency, and armed conflict.

    Germany is the nineteenth SOSA partner of the United States. Other SOSA signatories include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. For more information on SOSAs, visit: https://www.businessdefense.gov/security-of-supply.html

    About the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy (OASD (IBP):

    The OASD IBP works with domestic and international partners to forge and sustain a robust, secure, and resilient industrial base enabling the warfighter, now and in the future.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese FM meets president of Eurasia Group

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with Ian Bremer, president of the Eurasia Group, in Beijing, capital of China, Oct. 18, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

    BEIJING, Oct. 18 — Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Ian Bremer, president of the Eurasia Group, in Beijing on Friday.

    Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said that China and the United States working together to meet global challenges and achieve win-win results serve the interests of the two peoples and meets the common expectations of the rest of the world.

    China will respond to all uncertainties in today’s world with its own certainty, continue to hold the international moral high ground, and make efforts for the overall progress and development of mankind.

    Wang expressed the hope that the U.S. side will earnestly implement the consensus reached by the two heads of state, establish an objective and rational understanding of China, change the mindset of zero-sum game, and work together with China to continue to explore the right way for the two major countries to get along with each other on this planet.

    The Eurasia Group welcomes the relationship between the two countries showing signs of stabilization through bilateral efforts, Bremer said, adding that the company is willing to continue offering suggestions and proposals for the long-term peaceful coexistence between the United States and China, and hopes that the two major countries will work together to maintain a stable international order.

    Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with Ian Bremer, president of the Eurasia Group, in Beijing, capital of China, Oct. 18, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: UN Security Council renews sanctions regime on Haiti

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    The UN Security Council on Friday authorized the renewal for one year the sanctions regime on Haiti.

    The Security Council, by unanimously adopting resolution 2752, decided to continue a travel ban and asset freeze, and expand the scope of an arms embargo as well as the designation criteria for those measures initially established in October 2022 to quell rampant gang violence and restore security in the crisis-torn nation.

    The council decided that, with respect to those designated for sanctions, actions that threaten peace, security or stability of Haiti as set forth in council resolution 2653 (2022) include “engaging in activities that destabilize Haiti through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources.”

    It also decided that the scope of the arms embargo, which had been amended in council resolution 2699 (2023), shall include “arms and related material of all types,” as well as “technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities,” as initially stipulated in council resolution 2653.

    The council encouraged greater coordination among the Security Council Committee and its Panel of Experts, UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other regional frameworks, on the implementation of the sanctions, including arms embargo provisions.

    Further, the council decided to extend for a period of 13 months the mandate of the Panel of Experts, which was requested by the 15-member organ to report on the implementation of the resolution in its regular reporting to the council.

    The Security Council adopted Resolution 2653 in October 2022, which established a sanctions regime on Haiti. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: DPRK says it discovered remains of a South Korean drone

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) said it had discovered remains of a drone identical to a military unmanned aerial vehicle that South Korea showed during the Armed Forces Day parade, calling it decisive material evidence to prove South Korea committed a hostile provocation in violation of the country’s sovereignty, the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on Saturday.

    A spokesman for the DPRK Ministry of National Defense said on Friday that the Pyongyang Municipal Security Bureau of the DPRK Ministry of Public Security on October 13 discovered the remains of a crashed drone during a search operation in Pyongyang, the KCNA said.

    The DPRK assessed through technical examination and analysis the drone it discovered as a light-weight drone for long-range reconnaissance owned by the South Korean military and one of “the same type as the vehicle-carried one opened to public at an event marking the ROK Armed Forces Day”, according to the KCNA report. ROK is the acronym of the official name of South Korea, the Republic of Korea.

    Based on the drone shape, its presumptive flight period and the leaflet-scattering box fixed to the underpart of the drone’s fuselage, among other factors, “it is quite likely that the drone is the one which scattered leaflets over the center of Pyongyang,” the KCNA said, adding though “the conclusion has not yet been drawn.”

    Subsequently, the DPRK asked its military units in the capital city and the southern border area to reinforce anti-air observation posts, and “decided to keep the combined artillery units and the units with important fire duties near the border in full combat readiness,” according to the KCNA.

    The DPRK warned that “if a violation of the DPRK’s territorial ground, air and waters by ROK’s military means is discovered and confirmed again, it will be regarded as a grave military provocation against the DPRK sovereignty and a declaration of war and an immediate retaliatory attack will be launched,” the KCNA said.

    The DPRK Foreign Ministry on October 11th accused South Korea of sending drones over Pyongyang. South Korea’s military denied the accusation on the same day, saying “it did not send drones into North Korea.”

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese FM holds talks with British foreign secretary

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, holds talks with Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs of the United Kingdom David Lammy in Beijing, capital of China, Oct. 18, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks with Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs of the United Kingdom David Lammy in Beijing on Friday.

    Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, noted that China and the UK, both permanent members of the UN Security Council and major economies in the world, should be upholders of the UN-centered international order, collaborators in addressing global challenges, and partners in achieving national development.

    China is willing to work with the UK to follow the consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, adhere to mutual understanding and respect, and make open cooperation the main theme, deepen strategic communication, promote practical cooperation, and push China-UK relations to a new stage of stable development, Wang said.

    China-UK relations have come a long way in history and now stand at a new starting point, Wang said, adding that the British Labour government has put forward the proposal to develop a long-term, stable and strategically significant relationship with China. The Chinese side has positively evaluated this proposal, as it conforms to the historical logic and practical needs of the bilateral relationship, serves the fundamental interests of the two peoples, and aligns with the historical trend and the international situation.

    Noting that Taiwan and Hong Kong affairs are China’s internal affairs, and non-interference in internal affairs is a fundamental principle of international relations, Wang said both sides should respect each other’s concerns, strengthen dialogue on the basis of equality, enhance understanding, and create an atmosphere for communication and cooperation.

    China agrees to fully restore dialogue and cooperation mechanisms in various fields between the two countries, and actively carry out mutually beneficial cooperation in trade, finance, green development, science and technology, health, education, culture and other areas, Wang said.

    China is willing to work with all countries, including the UK, to strengthen dialogue and cooperation, share international responsibilities, uphold true multilateralism, and effectively promote international fairness, justice and open development, he added.

    Lammy said the British government is committed to strengthening dialogue and cooperation with China and effectively managing differences in a coherent, mutually respectful manner that serves the long-term interests of both sides.

    The UK remains steadfast in honoring its commitment on the Taiwan question since the establishment of diplomatic relations and will stick to it in the long term, Lammy said.

    The UK looks forward to strengthening high-level and various levels of dialogue with China, expanding cooperation in areas such as climate change, energy, environmental protection, technology, economy and trade, investment and international development, and embarking on a new journey of strong development of the UK-China partnership, he added.

    As permanent members of the UN Security Council, both the UK and China should jointly uphold free trade and commit to addressing geopolitical crises and complex challenges through diplomatic means, Lammy added. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Current situation in Lebanon ‘most challenging’ for UNIFIL since 2006

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    This photo taken on Sept. 22, 2024 shows a UNIFIL patrol vehicle in Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon. Three people were killed and four others injured on Sunday in Israeli airstrikes on dozens of villages and towns in southern Lebanon, according to Lebanese military sources. (Photo by Ali Hashisho/Xinhua)

    The current situation in Lebanon has been the most challenging for peacekeepers of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) ever since 2006, said UNIFIL Spokesperson Andrea Tenenti on Friday.

    Daily exchanges of fire across the Blue Line since early October last year have made the situation in UNIFIL’s area of operation in south Lebanon extremely challenging, Tenenti told Xinhua in an exclusive interview.

    “Dramatic escalation starting last month, including the Israeli ground incursions into Lebanon, has further complicated the situation. This is the most challenging situation (UNIFIL) peacekeepers have seen since the war in 2006,” Tenenti said.

    While patrols have been largely suspended for the time being, peacekeepers continue to implement the mandate, remaining in all positions, and the UN flag continues to fly, he said.

    Since Sept. 23, the Israeli army has been launching intensive airstrikes on Lebanon in a dangerous escalation with Hezbollah. It has also conducted what it said was a “limited” ground operation across the border, allegedly to cripple Hezbollah capabilities.

    Over the past few days, Israeli forces have attacked UNIFIL positions in Lebanon several times, causing injuries among UN peacekeepers and sparking criticism from the international community. On Wednesday, a Merkava tank of the Israeli army fired at a UNIFIL watchtower near the southeastern Lebanese village of Kafr Kila, destroying two cameras and damaging a tower.

    In response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s earlier remarks urging the UN to “get UNIFIL forces out of harm’s way,” Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the UN under-secretary-general for peace operations, said Monday that UN peacekeepers will stay in all their positions in Lebanon.

    Tenenti told Xinhua that UNIFIL is in regular contact with Lebanese and Israeli authorities, as well as the troop-contributing countries. “The situation is difficult, but the countries that send peacekeepers to UNIFIL understand that the mission’s work is more important than ever,” he said.

    “We are regularly adjusting our posture and activities, and we have contingency plans ready for all scenarios — from best to worst — and to be activated if necessary,” he noted.

    Tenenti assured that UNIFIL continues to contact the relevant parties, urging de-escalation and reminding them of their obligation to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers while refraining from any actions that would harm them.

    “They are further reminded that the inviolability of UN premises must be respected at all times,” he stressed.  

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: China’s Yili wins innovation award at World Dairy Summit

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    A guest visits the stand of China’s Yili Group during the 2024 World Dairy Summit in Paris, France, on Oct. 15, 2024. (Xinhua/Gao Jing)

    Chinese dairy giant Yili has won the International Dairy Federation’s (IDF) innovation award, IDF announced on Friday.

    The announcement came at the 2024 World Dairy Summit in Paris. Yili won the award in the category of new product development, with focus on food safety and consumer nutrition.

    The IDF Dairy Innovation Awards have nine categories, and this year Yili Group was nominated in four. It won with its product Satine Active Lactoferrin Organic Pure Milk, in recognition of its breakthrough in directional lactoferrin extraction and protection technology.

    Speaking to Xinhua, president of the jury for this year’s IDF Innovation Awards Caroline Edmond said that China is a strong presence in the context of innovation for the global dairy sector.

    “Year after year, since we have introduced the innovation, we see great participation from the Chinese community … innovation is important,” she said.

    Edmond added that she looked forward to seeing more Chinese companies presenting their innovation projects in the future.

    Delegates at the summit also signed the Paris Dairy Declaration on Sustainability, to promote the green and sustainable development of the global dairy industry.

    As a signatory of the declaration, executive president of Yili Group Liu Chunxi said the declaration reflects the desire of the humanity to have a sustainable development in the dairy industry and to protect the planet.

    The 2024 World Dairy Summit began on Tuesday in Paris, drawing experts, scholars, and industry leaders from across the globe to discuss the latest trends, as well as the future of the dairy sector.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: China vows tougher regulation to address payment arrears to enterprises

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    China will strengthen regulation of government-funded projects to address payment arrears to enterprises, according to a new official guideline.

    Relevant authorities should regularly verify the availability of government funds, intensify oversight of government procurement payments, and urge state-owned enterprises to standardize and optimize their payment management systems, said the guideline issued by the General Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council.

    Efforts should be made to establish a national platform for small and medium-sized enterprises to report related complaints, and optimize the punishment mechanism for acts of bad faith, said the guideline.

    Addressing payment arrears to enterprises is vital to protecting businesses’ rights and interests and boosting their confidence, according to the guideline. It urged all local governments to implement tailored measures based on their conditions and fulfill their responsibilities. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Hong Kong improves listing rules to attract more IPOs

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Hong Kong on Friday announced an enhanced timeframe for new stock listings, giving companies greater certainty in the timing of their initial public offerings (IPOs), a move that is expected to elevate Hong Kong’s attractiveness as a leading international listing venue.

    The enhanced framework clarified rules for applications fully meeting requirements, accelerated timeframe for eligible A-share listed companies, and applications requiring longer process, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX) said in a joint statement.

    Michael Duignan, the SFC’s executive director of corporate finance, said that the SFC has always been committed to transparency, accountability and better efficiency in listing regulation, and the improvement is in line with its strategic priority to enhance the global competitiveness and appeal of Hong Kong’s capital markets.

    Katherine Ng, HKEX’s head of listing, said that the enhanced timeframe will provide greater clarity and certainty in the application process for new listing applications, further elevating Hong Kong’s attractiveness as an international financial center.

    The enhanced application timeframe will be applicable to new listing applications filed after the statement, the regulators said. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Collins Delivers Remarks at Inauguration of Husson University President

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Maine Susan Collins
    Published: October 18, 2024

    Click HERE, HERE, and HERE for individual photos
    Bangor, ME – Today, U.S. Senator Susan Collins delivered remarks at the inauguration of Husson University’s 7th president, Lynne Coy-Ogan, at the University’s Gracie Theater. Former Husson University Presidents Bob Clark and Bill Beardsley were also in attendance to congratulate President Coy-Ogan.
    “From serving as principal at Bangor’s Fruit Street School to a nearly 20-year career here at Husson as dean, provost, and vice president, Lynne has dedicated her life to education,” Senator Collins said during her remarks. “As a Maine native, she is devoted to our State and its people.  As the first woman to hold this position, she is a role model and an inspiration. I commend the Board of Trustees for this excellent, enthusiastic, and unanimous choice.”
    Dr. Coy-Ogan was born in Bangor, Maine and earned a bachelor’s degree from Boston University, a master’s in school counseling from Johns Hopkins, and an Ed.D. in educational leadership from Liberty University, where she focused her research on first-generation college students. She later served as a principal in the Bangor School Department and Regional School Unit 68. She joined Husson University in 2005 as dean of the School of Education, eventually becoming provost and Vice President before being named the University’s 7th President.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: 10.18.2024 Sen. Cruz Issues Statement Following Senate’s Passage of Bipartisan Bill Cracking Down on Contraband and Organized Crime in Federal Prisons

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas Ted Cruz
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, issued a statement following the Senate passage of the Lieutenant Osvaldo Albarati Stopping Prison Contraband Act to crack down on the smuggling of contraband cellphones into federal prisons by upgrading the charge for smuggling a contraband cellphone into a federal prison from a misdemeanor offense to a felony. The bill is now headed to the House of Representatives.
    Upon passage, Sen. Cruz said, “Prison isn’t a taxpayer-funded hotel. Lieutenant Osvaldo Albarati was murdered for doing his job and enforcing rules against contraband. I’m proud to work with Sens. Ossoff and Grassley on their bipartisan legislation to place stricter penalties on criminals who violate prison contraband rules, to better protect security guards like Lieutenant Albarati.”
    Sen. Cruz joined Sens. Jon Ossoff (D-Ga.), Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), and Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-Miss.) in introducing the legislation.
    Read the full text of the bill here.
    BACKGROUND
    The legislation is named in honor of Lieutenant Osvaldo Albarati, a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) correctional officer who was murderedcompleting his shift at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) Guaynabo in Puerto Rico in 2013. Five men who later pleaded guilty to the crime admitted they targeted Albarati as a direct result of continuous seizures of contraband, including cellphones. The inmate who placed the hit on Albarati did so using a contraband cellphone.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: CSAF, CMSAF visit Korea to engage allies and Airmen

    Source: United States INDO PACIFIC COMMAND

    OSAN AIR BASE, GYEONGGIDO [KYONGGI-DO], South Korea  –  

    U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin met with Republic of Korea Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Lee, Youngsu at the ROKAF Headquarters in Gyeryongdae, Oct. 17, as part of a weeklong visit to the region.

    The Air Chiefs discussed the current strategic environment and ways their two services can integrate even more effectively to deter aggression.

    “Challengers to a free and open Indo-Pacific are real, from the Korean peninsula to the South China Sea,” Allvin said. “That is why our ironclad alliance with the ROK has never been more important. Together, we continue to strengthen our interoperability and sharpen the combined readiness of our forces.”

    One of the initiatives being tested within Seventh Air Force is the Super Squadron at Osan, which has temporarily shifted F-16 Falcons on the Korean peninsula to optimize combat capability and increase readiness.

    “The ongoing F-16 Super Squadron test is centered on two things — readiness and combat effectiveness,” Allvin said. “This initiative demonstrates our nonstop commitment to the defense of the ROK against any threat or adversary. Our Airmen stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our ROK counterparts and are trained and ready to respond to any provocation or crisis.”

    The meeting with Lee was part of Allvin’s trip to Korea where he, along with his wife, Gina Allvin, and Chief Master Sgt. of the Air Force David Flosi visited Osan Air Base to speak with Airmen and discuss Air Force operations in the Korean theater.
    During the visit Allvin and Flosi held office calls with Air Force leaders from Osan and Kunsan, spoke with Airmen during an all call, and toured facilities on base.

    At the all call, Allvin discussed the evolution of the Air Force in response to changing geopolitical dynamics, emphasizing the importance of readiness. He highlighted the need for reoptimization to adapt to Great Power Competition, focusing on improving current force readiness and developing future capabilities. He also stressed the importance of large-scale exercises, agile combat employment, and human-machine teaming.

    Flosi joined Allvin for the question-and-answer portion of the all call, addressing issues from eliminating barriers to service, to enhancing mission readiness through better training and risk management. The discussion also addressed policy discrepancies and efforts to improve medical care standards and prevention.

    The leadership team closed the all call by discussing the importance of enforcing standards.

    “Take a hard look at the culture of standards in your organization,” said Flosi. “Our ability to execute our mission, do our nation’s bidding, hinges on an organization of Airmen who believe in and enforce standards.”
    Following the all-call, Flosi met with senior NCOs for lunch and had a more in-depth discussion about policies and issues that affect Airmen.

    He also toured the hospital, 51st Security Forces Squadron, and 36th Fighter Generation Squadron to learn about different aspects of the mission at Osan.

    Meanwhile, Mrs. Allvin met with Key Support Liaisons and received briefs about noncombatant evacuation operations and the command sponsorship program. She also toured the Military and Family Readiness Center, base schools, the child development center, and the hospital.

    Allvin concluded the visit by expressing his appreciation for Team Osan.

    “I am leaving here feeling refreshed and energized,” he said. “The Airmen here are leaning forward and doing their very best for our nation in one of the toughest and most consequential parts of the world.”

    MIL Security OSI –