B10‑0140/2024
European Parliament resolution on the People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan
(2024/2891(RSP))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,
– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022,
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),
– having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy,
– having regard to the statement of 23 September 2024 by the Chair of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,
– having regard to the joint declaration by the G7 Defence Ministers of 19 October 2024,
– having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,
– having regard to the motion on UN Resolution 2758 passed by the Dutch House of Representatives on 12 September 2024,
– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas UN Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly on 25 October 1971 and shifted official recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC);
B. whereas since then, most countries have shifted recognition from Taiwan to the PRC; whereas today, Taiwan, while not being a member of the UN, maintains diplomatic relations with 11 of the 193 UN member states, and with the Holy See;
C. whereas following the adoption of UN Resolution 2758, Taiwan lost its right to participate in multilateral forums, such as the World Health Organization;
D. whereas through their statement of 23 September 2024, the G7 members, among other things, underlined their support for ‘Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is’;
E. whereas in recent years, the PRC has deliberately distorted UN Resolution 2758, persistently claiming that the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle allegedly has international endorsement through this resolution, which would entail that Taiwan is part of the PRC;
F. whereas the EU continues to maintain its own ‘One China’ policy position, which is different from the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle; whereas the EU’s long-standing position has been to support the status quo and a peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait, while encouraging dialogue and constructive engagement;
G. whereas Taiwan has never been part of the PRC; whereas the Republic of China was established in 1912 and the PRC was established in 1949;
H. whereas over the past decade, the PRC has persistently tried to increase its influence over international institutions, using this to sideline Taiwan and prevent Taiwanese passport holders, including journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and political activists, from accessing international institutions; whereas the PRC exercises transnational repression by misusing extradition treaties to target Taiwanese people abroad and therefore put them at risk of arbitrary persecution and human rights abuses;
I. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share common values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;
J. whereas Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, with a flourishing civil society; whereas Taiwan held peaceful and well-organised elections on 13 January 2024;
K. whereas the PRC is a one-party state that is entirely controlled and ruled by the Chinese Communist Party; whereas the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is the military of the Chinese Communist Party and not an army of the PRC’s Government;
L. whereas on 14 October 2024, the PRC launched a large-scale military drill, named Joint Sword-2024B, that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas during this exercise, a record number of 153 PRC aircraft,18 warships and 17 PRC coastguard ships were detected around Taiwan;
M. whereas on 23 May 2024, the PRC launched a military drill called Joint Sword-2024A, coming just days after the inauguration of Lai Ching-te as the new President of Taiwan;
N. whereas over the past years, the PRC has held similar military drills around Taiwan; whereas these military drills have increased in intensity and have been moved closer and closer to Taiwan’s mainland; whereas during a previous drill in August 2022, the PRC also fired missiles into the exclusive economic zone of Japan;
O. whereas on top of military pressure, the PRC has long been pursuing a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference, including hybrid and cyber attacks with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;
P. whereas the PRC, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan; whereas the PRC is engaging in a historically unprecedented military build-up that is continuously shifting the power balance in the Indo-Pacific; whereas this is negatively affecting cross-Strait stability;
Q. whereas the PRC is supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through the exportation of dual-use goods to Russia, and the ongoing involvement of PRC-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention;
R. whereas in a speech on 10 October 2024, Taiwan’s national day, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te stated that the PRC has ‘no right to represent Taiwan’ and reiterated that the two sides are ‘not subordinate’ to each other; whereas the PRC has justified its recent military exercise by claiming that President Lai Ching-te is pursuing a separatist strategy;
S. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security; whereas the PRC has for many years promoted an alternative narrative, challenging democratic values, open markets and the rules-based international order; whereas the PRC’s growing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in international institutions;
T. whereas through its 2021 strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the EU and its Member States increased their presence in the region, including a higher military presence and the continued passage of military ships through the Taiwan Strait;
U. whereas the EU is Taiwan’s fourth largest trading partner after the PRC, the United States and Japan; whereas in 2022, Taiwan was the EU’s 12th biggest trading partner; whereas the EU is the largest source of foreign direct investment in Taiwan; whereas Taiwanese investments in the EU remain below their potential;
V. whereas members of the Australian Senate and of the Dutch House of Representatives have recently adopted motions concerning the distortion of UN Resolution 2758 by the PRC, and called for support for Taiwan’s greater participation in multilateral organisations;
1. Reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a like-minded democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region; commends Taiwan and the Taiwanese people for their strong democracy and vibrant civil society, demonstrated once more by the peaceful and well-organised elections of 13 January 2024;
2. Strongly condemns the PRC’s military exercises of 14 October 2024, its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its continued military build-up that is changing the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted;
3. Opposes the PRC’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and its efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change;
4. Underlines that UN Resolution 2758 takes no position on Taiwan; strongly rejects and refutes the PRC’s attempts to distort history and international rules;
5. Strongly underlines that the EU’s ‘One China’ policy corresponds to UN Resolution 2758, while the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle is not endorsed by it;
6. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by Chinese President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan; underlines that the PRC’s use of force or threats or other highly coercive measures to achieve unification contradicts international law; recalls that neither Taiwan nor the PRC is subordinate to the other; expresses grave concern over the PRC’s use of hostile disinformation to undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance; reiterates its previous calls for the EU and its Member States to cooperate with international partners in helping to sustain democracy in Taiwan, keeping it free from foreign interference and threats; underlines that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people on the international stage;
7. Condemns the PRC’s systematic grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan, and urges the PRC to halt these activities immediately; calls, in this regard, for cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to be deepened further in order to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference;
8. Reiterates its call on the Member States to increase the frequency of freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait and to deepen security dialogues with Taiwan to deter Chinese aggression against the democratic island;
9. Reiterates its call on the Member States to engage in meaningful and structural technical cooperation with Taiwan’s National Fire Agency and National Police Agency and with local administrations in the field of civil protection and disaster management;
10. Reiterates its call on the Member States to engage in meaningful and structural technical cooperation with Taiwan in the field of whole-of-society defence;
11. Recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector where Taiwan is the leading producer of semiconductors, and calls for the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan;
12. Calls on the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan;
13. Condemns all forms of pressure and threats of reprisals, including economic coercion, regarding the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan, in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights, without foreign interference;
14. Welcomes visits by former and current Taiwanese politicians to Europe, including the recent visit of former President Tsai Ing-wen to the European Parliament on 17 October 2024; welcomes, furthermore, continued exchanges between its Members and Taiwan and encourages further visits by official European Parliament delegations to Taiwan; also encourages further exchanges between the EU and Taiwan at all levels, including political meetings and people-to-people encounters; encourages, in this light, increased economic, scientific and cultural interactions and exchanges, focusing, among other areas, on youth, academia, civil society, sports, culture and education, as well as city-to-city and region-to-region partnerships;
15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.