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Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Shukriya Bradost, Ph.D. Student of Planning, Governance and Globalization, Virginia Tech

The 12-day confrontation between Iran and Israel in June 2025 may not have escalated into a full-scale regional war, but it marks a potentially critical turning point in Iran’s internal political landscape.

Though the Islamic Republic has entered into direct conflict with a foreign adversary before, it has never done so while so militarily weakened, internally fractured and increasingly alienated from its own population.

And unlike the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, when national unity coalesced around the defense of Iranian sovereignty, this time the government appeared to fight without significant public support. While accurate polling from within Iran is hard to come by, the lack of pro-government rallies, the low approval numbers for the government ahead of the war and the government’s subsequent crackdown since tell their own stories.

As a researcher of different ethnic groups within the country, I know that many Iranians – especially those from historically marginalized communities – viewed the conflict with Israel not as a defense of the nation but as a reckless consequence of the government’s ideological adventurism and regional proxy campaigns. It puts the Islamic Republic in its most vulnerable position since its establishment after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Hard and soft power diminished

It is worth taking a snapshot of just how diminished the Iranian government is following the recent series of blows.

Its soft power – once built on revolutionary legitimacy, Shiite ideological influence and anti-Western propaganda – has eroded dramatically.

For decades, the Islamic Republic relied on a powerful narrative: that it was the only government bold enough to confront the United States and Israel, defend Muslim causes globally and serve as the spiritual leader of the Islamic world. This image, projected through state media, proxy militias and religious rhetoric, helped the government justify its foreign interventions and massive military spending, particularly on nuclear development and regional militias.

But that narrative no longer resonates the way it once did. The leaders of Iran can no longer claim to inspire unity at home or fear abroad. Even among Shiite populations in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, support during the Israel-Iran confrontation was muted. Inside Iran, meanwhile, propaganda portraying Israel as the existential enemy has lost its grip, especially among the youth, who increasingly identify with human rights movements rather than government slogans.

It is also clear that Iran’s hard power is getting weaker. The loss of senior commanders and the destruction of important military infrastructure have shown that the government’s intelligence and security systems are severely compromised.

Even before Israel’s attack, a number of reports showed that Iran’s military was in its weakest state in decades. The real surprise in the recent war came not from the scale of the damage by Israeli and U.S. bombs but from how deeply Israel had penetrated the upper echelons of the Iranian military and intelligence sectors. The recent conflict amounted to a security as well as a military failure.

Externally defeated, internally adrift

As its power across the region appears diminished, so too is the Iranian government’s grip loosening internally. A 2024 survey by Iran’s Ministry of Culture revealed “discontent” among the population, with over 90% of Iranians “dissatisfied” with the country’s current position. Elections in November 2024 saw a turnout of under 40%, further underscoring Iranians’ discontent with the political process.

And reporting from inside Iran suggests many Iranians blame government policies for the war with Israel. “I place the blame on this country’s decision-makers,” one resident of Rasht told Reuters, “their policies have brought war and destruction upon us.”

The government has responded with a tactic it has used before: repression. According to government-aligned media, over 700 people were arrested during and immediately after the conflict, accused of collaborating with the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency.

As in past crackdowns, ethnic minority regions – particularly Kurdish areas – have been targeted.

One day after the ceasefire with Israel, the government executed three Kurdish cross-border laborers who rely on smuggling goods to survive in Iran’s underdeveloped Kurdish provinces.

These executions, which were done without a trial or legal counsel, fit a pattern of how the government uses ethnic scapegoating to stay in power. And it echoes a historic pattern: When the government feels threatened, it strikes the Kurds first.

A historical pattern of repression

Kurds are estimated to number 10-12 million in Iran, composing roughly 12% to 15% of the country’s total population – making them the third-largest ethnic group after Persians and Azeris. Iran also includes significant Baluch and Arab minorities.

When the Islamic Republic was established in 1979, many ethnic groups supported the revolution. They hoped for a more inclusive and democratic Iran than what preceded it – the brutal autocracy of the shah that had frequently targeted minorities.

Those hopes were quickly dashed. By rejecting pluralism and promoting a unifying ideology centered on Shiite Islam and Persian identity, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini marginalized non-Persian and non-Shiite groups.

Other ethnic groups were viewed with suspicion, while Shiite Azerbaijanis were mainly co-opted into the system.

Khomeini declared jihad against Kurdish resistance groups, labeling them infidels, separatists and agents of Israel and the United States.

Armed with advanced weaponry inherited from the last Pahlavi shah, the government launched a military campaign in Kurdistan province. Many Kurdish villages and towns were destroyed, and approximately 50,000 Iranian Kurds were killed between 1979 and 1988.

The region was turned into a militarized zone – a status that continues today.

Campaign against Kurds

After the Iran-Iraq war ended in August 1988, the government – economically strained and militarily weakened – feared a domestic uprising.

But instead of embracing political reform, it responded with one of the most brutal crackdowns in Iran’s history. Khomeini issued a fatwa, or religious edict, ordering the execution of political prisoners, including large numbers of Kurdish dissidents.

Between late July and September 1988, thousands of political prisoners were executed – many without trial or any legal process. At least 5,000 people were killed and buried in unmarked mass graves, according to Amnesty International.

Khomeini labeled them “mohareb,” or “warriors against God,” and criticized the Revolutionary Courts for not sentencing them to death sooner. This mass execution campaign signaled the government’s resolve to eliminate all dissent, regardless of legal precedent or human rights norms.

In the years that followed, the government systematically assassinated prominent Kurdish leaders and other opposition leaders, both in Iran and overseas.

This targeted elimination of Kurdish leadership, combined with the mass executions of political prisoners, was a deliberate strategy to decapitate any organized opposition before it could challenge the government’s survival.

A new crisis, the same strategy

The Islamic Republic appears to be using the same playbook now, but under far more fragile conditions.

Given the precarious state of the government, it is fair to ask why there are not more protests now, especially in ethnic minority regions. For many, the answer is fear over what happens next.

Many Kurds have learned from previous uprisings – particularly the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” movement – that when they lead protests, they face the harshest crackdown. Over 56% of those killed and persecuted in the subsequent crackdown were Kurds.

Meanwhile, the overall opposition remains fractured and leaderless, both along ethnic lines and in terms of goals. The main opposition groups have traditionally been reluctant to acknowledge ethnic rights, let alone include them in any vision for a future Iran. Rather, they insist on “territorial integrity” as a precondition for any dialogue, echoing the Islamic Republic’s rhetoric.

This is a key legacy of the Islamic Republic: Its propaganda has not only shaped domestic opinion but also influenced the opposition, dividing Iranians at home and abroad. And it has long mobilized the dominant ethnic group against minorities, especially Kurds, by portraying them as internal enemies.

Shukriya Bradost does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Iran emerged weakened and vulnerable after war with Israel − and that could mean trouble for country’s ethnic minorities – https://theconversation.com/iran-emerged-weakened-and-vulnerable-after-war-with-israel-and-that-could-mean-trouble-for-countrys-ethnic-minorities-259753