Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Saudi Arabia: British citizen Ahmed al-Doush receives a 10 year sentence

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Manchester based British national Ahmed al-Doush been sentenced to 10 years in prison in Saudi Arabia

    It is unknown to Ahmed’s family and UK legal team what the charges were for

    He has faced multiple violations to his fair trial rights

    Amnesty International has documented the Saudi authorities’ increasing crackdown on freedom of expression

    Manchester based British national Ahmed al-Doush, a senior business analyst with Bank of America, has been sentenced to 10 years in prison following his arrest by Saudi authorities on 31 August 2024 on a family holiday to the country.

    His domestic lawyer in Saudi Arabia has refused to share with Ahmed’s family what the sentencing was for. Five months after his arrest, Ahmed was told that charges would be issued against him for using social media to spread fake, untrue and damaging news against the Kingdom, and that he was accused of having a relationship with an individual who threatened the Kingdom’s national security.

    Based on the questions asked during his extensive interrogations, his family believes these accusations may relate to a 2018 tweet he made concerning the situation in Sudan, with no mention of Saudi Arabia, which he then deleted, and that the second accusation is related to his alleged association with a Saudi critic in exile with whom he has no relationship beyond knowing his son.

    Since his arrest, Ahmed has faced multiple violations to his fair trial rights. He was subjected to extensive interrogation without a lawyer present and before being informed of the charges against him. For over two months after his arrest, his family had no contact with him and received no information about his condition or the reasons for his detention, and he was also denied consular access. Since then, his contact with his family and UK based legal team has continued to be severely restricted.

    His wife was pregnant at the time of his arrest and he therefore missed the birth of his fourth child.

    Amnesty International has documented the Saudi authorities’ increasing crackdown on freedom of expression, targeting both citizens and foreign nationals, many of whom have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms solely for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression. 

    Commenting on the news of the sentence, Sacha Deshmukh, Chief Executive of Amnesty International UK, said:

    “We strongly condemn this sentence and reiterate our urgent call on the Saudi authorities to immediately and unconditionally release Ahmed al-Doush, if he is being held solely for peacefully exercising his human rights. He must be allowed to return to his family in the UK without delay. In the meantime, Saudi authorities must uphold his fair trial rights, promptly share his court documents with him and guarantee regular access to both his family and legal counsel.

    “We also urge the UK government to take all necessary steps to secure his immediate and unconditional release. The arbitrary detention of another British national abroad cannot be tolerated. Immediate and decisive action is essential.”

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Draft agenda – Tuesday, 17 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    34 Combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child sexual abuse material and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (recast)
    Jeroen Lenaers     – (possibly) Amendments; rejection Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 31 Amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure implementing the Agreement establishing the Ethics Body
    Sven Simon     – Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 30 Amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure concerning the declaration of input (Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure)
    Sven Simon     – Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 36 Electoral rights of mobile Union citizens in European Parliament elections
    Sven Simon     – (possibly) Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 35 The termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the EU and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and timber products to the European Union (FLEGT)
    Karin Karlsbro     – (possibly) Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 41 Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system
    Anna Stürgkh     – Amendments by the rapporteur, 71 MEPs at least, Alternative motions for resolutions Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00     – Joint alternative motions for resolutions Thursday, 12 June 2025, 12:00 28 Financing for development – ahead of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville
    Charles Goerens     – (possibly) Amendments by the rapporteur, 71 MEPs at least; Alternative motions for resolutions Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00     – (possibly) Joint alternative motions for resolutions Thursday, 12 June 2025, 12:00 26 Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility
    Victor Negrescu, Siegfried Mureşan     – Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 25 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro
    Marjan Šarec     – (possibly) Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 17 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova
    Sven Mikser     – (possibly) Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 13 June 2025, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 16 June 2025, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 17 June 2025, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 18 June 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Commission, executive agencies and European Development Funds – P10_TA(2025)0077 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section III – Commission,

    –  having regard to its decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budgets of the executive agencies for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0074/2025),

    A.  whereas the eleventh EDF has reached its final stage as its sunset clause came into effect on 31 December 2020; whereas, however, specific contracts for existing financing agreements were signed until 31 December 2023, and the implementation of the ongoing projects funded by the EDF will continue until their final completion;

    B.  whereas the ninth, tenth and eleventh(1) EDFs were not incorporated into the Union general budget and continue to be implemented and reported on separately until their closure;

    C.  whereas, for the 2021-2027 MFF, development cooperation aid to ACP countries is integrated in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI-Global Europe’) as part of the EU general budget, and development cooperation aid to OCTs, including Greenland, has been incorporated into the Decision on the Overseas Association;

    D.  whereas the EDFs are managed almost entirely by the Commission’s DG INTPA with a small proportion (7 %) of the 2023 EDF expenditure being managed by DG NEAR;

    Political priorities

    1.  Underlines its strong commitment to the Union’s fundamental values and principles which are enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); in the framework of the discharge process, stresses especially the principles of sound financial management as set out in Article 317 TFEU and the combatting of fraud and protection of the financial interests of the Union as set out in Article 325 TFEU;

    2.  Underlines the importance of the principle of separation of powers in the Union and recalls that according to the Treaty, the institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation; believes that under no circumstances the actions of one Union institution should affect the independence of another institution; urges all other institutions to respect the role of the Parliament as the sole Union institution directly elected by the citizens and to refrain from any undue, direct or indirect interference in its legislative processes, thereby ensuring that Parliament’s decision making-process remains free and independent from other Union institutions or any other entities;

    3.  Highlights the importance of the Union budget for achieving the Union’s political priorities, as well as its role in assisting Member States in unforeseen situations such as international conflicts or crises and their consequences; points out in this regard the continuing relevance of investments and support from the Union budget for reducing disparities between Member States and regions, for promoting economic growth and employment, for combating poverty and social exclusion, and thus for improving the daily life of European citizens;

    4.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the Court) for the financial year 2023 has issued a clean opinion concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, regrets that the Court has had to issue for the 5th consecutive year an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of Union budget expenditure and a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

    5.  Expresses its deep concerns that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been on a rising trend since the financial year 2020 and has reached 5,6 % for the financial year 2023; notes that there are significant differences in the error rates between headings which range from spending areas with error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 % up to an error rate of 9,3 % in the case of cohesion policy; further notes that discharge is a political process where all issues related to a specific financial year may be taken into consideration and that the decision on whether to grant or refuse discharge should remain factual and anchored in the Union acquis, and that it is taken for the budget as a whole; urges the Commission, finally, to take into account the Court’s recommendations and to reduce the overall error rate over the coming years; further asks the Commission to present an Action Plan within the four months on reducing the error rate;

    6.  Is concerned that the Commission and the Court have different interpretations of what the “error rate” represents, thus generating confusion; expresses its support for a common audit approach and methodology and strongly calls on both institutions to find a solution to the divergent approaches before the 2024 discharge; is concerned that the Commission is systematically underestimating the existing error level and that this could lead to an ineffective protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    7.  Expresses again its deep its concern that the accumulated outstanding commitments (RAL – reste à liquider) have reached a record level of EUR 543 billion, equivalent to 3,2 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023 and representing more than double the Union annual budget for 2023; underlines that such a record high level of outstanding commitments risks creating challenges for the future smooth implementation of extraordinary high levels of payments and/or leading to significant decommitments to the detriment of the implementation of Union policy objectives;

    8.  Further expresses its concern that the outstanding debt from borrowing has reached EUR 458,5 billion, equivalent to 2,7 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023; notes that the increase in outstanding debt during 2023, equivalent to EUR 110,5 billion, has made the Union one of the largest debt issuers in Europe; further notes that the amount of outstanding debt is projected to increase further during the coming years, especially due to increased borrowing linked to the RRF and financial assistance to a number of countries including Ukraine which is the victim of a war of aggression by Russia; reiterates its deep concerns that the increase in debt makes the Union budget more vulnerable to increases in interest rates since a part of the debt will have to be serviced and repaid by the Union budget;

    9.  Recalls the importance of a strict application of the financial rules of the Union in all programmes and on all beneficiaries, in order to avoid all forms of fraud, conflicts of interest, corruption, double funding and money laundering;

    10.  Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect the principles of the rule of law; reiterates its deep concerns about the deteriorating rule of law situation in certain Member States including attacks or restrictions to the activities of civil society organisations, which not only poses a significant threat to democratic values but also leads to an increased risk of financial losses for the Union budget; calls for the provision of adequate support to civil society organisations active in the field; acknowledges the emergence of new forms of rule of law violations by national governments and calls on the Commission to address these evolving challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach the principles of the rule of law where such breaches affect, or risk affecting, the financial interests of the Union; at the same time, underlines the need for complete and timely information on decisions related to the implementation of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism; encourages the Commission to explicitly assess when shortcomings in the rule of law are of a systemic nature; calls for a stronger emphasis on the implementation of country-specific recommendations, coupled with effective follow-up mechanisms and measurable benchmarks; proposes the establishment of a comprehensive rule of law monitoring framework involving all Union institutions, Member States, and candidate countries, aimed at ensuring coherence and uniformity across the Union, while at the same time ensuring a fair and impartial application; calls on the Commission to propose measures to ensure the protection of final beneficiaries in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without undermining the application and effectiveness of the regulation;

    11.  Takes note of the innovative nature of the RRF and its contribution to supporting Member States in recovering from the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and creating a more resilient European economy; is of the opinion that any shift to a performance-based approach based on the RRF as a model requires addressing the many issues identified in its implementation, as well as assessing data on its full impact, before using such a model; recalls the many problems identified in the implementation of the RRF which would need to be addressed, including, but not limited to: the lack of adequate consultation of the regional and local authorities and other relevant stakeholders, such as social partners and civil society organisations and the lack of their involvement in the implementation; the weak cross border dimension, which may hint to a reduced EU added value in that respect; the lack of a clear definition of the milestones and targets and their satisfactorily fulfilment; the insufficient flexibility; the common debt with long-term debt payment as a consequence; the serious transparency, audit and control problems of the program which make it impossible for the citizens to be informed about the final beneficiaries of actions funded by the Union and pushes Member States to use RRF funds to cover projects very similar to those financed by Cohesion funds but with a much more limited capacity of control; reiterates the concern about the interpretation of the Commission and Member States on what a “final recipient” of RRF funding represents, which is not in line with the agreement of the REPowerEU negotiations and maintains that ministries, public authorities or other contracting authorities cannot be listed as final recipients of RRF funding; further expresses concern about the findings of the Court in relation to the risk of double funding and financing of recurring budgetary expenditure which are not in line with the RRF legal basis;

    12.  Notes that the set-up of the NGEU mechanism implies that the repayment of NGEU loans must start before the end of 2027 and be completed by 2058 at the latest; is concerned that the increase in interest rates over the last years has increased the borrowing costs under the NGEU significantly compared with original estimates; reiterates the need to fully respect the timeline of the legally binding roadmap for the introduction of new own resources and underlines that swift progress on new own resources is essential to repay NGEU and safeguard the current and future MFFs;

    13.  Stresses the urgent need for significant de-bureaucratisation, streamlining and simplification of all Union policies and their funding in line with the recommendations in the Draghi report(2) in order to ease the burdens for European businesses and increase European competitiveness, while ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union; underlines that simplification will also have a positive effect on error rates in the implementation of policies because many errors happen because of overcomplicated rules which are difficult to navigate, especially for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), new applicants, spin-offs and start-ups;

    14.  Reiterates the need to balance the further simplification of rules and procedures with much more systematic use of digitalised reporting, better and more robust controls and adequate ex post checks on the most repeated areas of irregular spending that do not add excessive bureaucratic complexity for beneficiaries, develop training sessions and practical information for applicants, in particular new applicants, and improve the assistance and guidelines for SMEs, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies and all other relevant stakeholders; reminds that a robust control system under the responsibility of the Commission is particularly needed for the RRF;

    15.  Stresses the need and highlights the importance of the NDICI programme for the support to global challenges, the promotion of human rights, freedoms and democracy; underlines the importance of reinforcing the Eastern Neighbourhood line in order to support political, economic and social reforms in this challenged region;

    16.  Underlines that it is imperative for the credibility of the Union that the Commission ensures that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to any kind of terrorist movements or any other movement expressing extremist views, inciting violence and/or hatred, that are directly in opposition to the European Union’s fundamental values, including Islamist anti-Semitic, anti-Christian and anti-Islamic movements; in this context, recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October; recalls that in 9 cases their employment was formally terminated in the interests of UNRWA; takes note of the results of the investigation launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS); underlines that the Commission should also establish better controls ensuring that no such funding happens indirectly through third parties and organise better traceability of Union funds to final beneficiaries;

    17.  Reiterates deep concerns about the increase in the exploitation of Union funds against Union principles and values, especially when the use of funds and transfers to other organisations are not entirely traceable; warns of the danger of Union funds ultimately being used within corrupt circles and being subject to fraud and irregularities, foreign interference or entrism; emphasises the importance of ‘final beneficiary transparency’ for Union funds;

    18.  Emphasises the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and preventing potential foreign interference; condemns any improper attempt to influence the legislative activities of the European Parliament; insists on the responsibility of OLAF to conduct all necessary in-depth investigations; stresses the importance of the work carried out by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in protecting the European Union’s financial interests; insists to provide to the EPPO adequate financial and human resources; recalls the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union, and insist on its swift implementation in all EU institutions;

    19.  Recalls the crucial role of civil society organisations (CSOs), including NGOs, in upholding democratic values to support a vibrant and lively democratic society, ensuring a sound basis for broad coverage of all relevant views in different debates and highlights that CSOs may receive support from Union funds to exercise these functions, as provided in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union;

    20.  Notes that there have been allegations from some Members of the Budgetary Control committee that grant agreements, concluded by the Commission included detailed lobbying activities which could be interpreted as potentially interfering with internal decision making in the Union Institutions; notes that the Commission took a series of measures to address the allegations by adopting guidance on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy, stating that while such grant agreements did not breach the EU legal framework, they could potentially entail a reputational risk for the Union; notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’; notes that such a disclaimer was further added in the 2024 call for proposals for operation grants;

    21.  Notes that a screening of grant agreements in all portfolios to verify their alignment with the new guidance is ongoing and that, so far, the Commission has not communicated to the Parliament the full results of the screening nor other measures that the Commission might take, if necessary; calls the Commission to keep the discharge authority informed at all times; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with Union institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability;

    22.  Recalls that EU funding requires stringent accountability and transparency standards; in line with the ECA recommendations in the Special Report 05/2024(3) and the recent special Report 11/2025(4), urges the Commission to ensure that the information disclosed in the Financial Transparency System is frequently updated, reliable, comparable and useful; stresses the need to allocate additional resources to the EUTR Secretariat to enable a systematic and thorough monitoring of the Transparency Register; this should include allocating resources towards AI implementation to develop an AI based search mechanism; recalls the need to proactively check that all entities beneficiaries of EU funds respect EU values;

    23.  Welcomes the reply of Commissioner Serafin to the written question(5), once again confirming EU funding was granted and used by NGOs in full respect of EU Treaties and LIFE Regulation(6); takes further note of the recent ECA Special Report on transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs(7), which, while stating that the use of EU funding for NGO advocacy is legal, also confirms it is in line with EU’s legal transparency requirements as laid down in the EU Financial Regulation; at the same time ECA SR 11/2025 points to the fact that more should be done to improve transparency of EU funding received by all beneficiaries; calls in this regard on the Commission to implement ECA recommendations regarding screening of self-declarations in the EU’s Financial Transparency System, as well as proactive monitoring of the respect to EU fundamental values and principles by the beneficiaries;

    24.  Welcomes the entry into force of the recast of the Financial Regulation; welcomes, in particular, the enhancements related to tracking Union funds through digital tools and interoperability that will bolster the protection of the Union Financial Interests, the targeted extension of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management following MFF 2027, the reference to the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism and the introduction of a conditionality based on Union values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as well as the opportunity to streamline SMEs and individual applicants with the introduction of very low-value grants;

    CHAPTER 1 – Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

    The European Court of Auditors’ statement of assurance and budgetary and financial management

    Reliability of the accounts

    25.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023(8), that the consolidated accounts of the European Union for that year are reliable; notes that the Court has issued a clean opinion on the reliability of the accounts every year since 2007;

    26.  Notes that on 31 December 2023, total liabilities amounted to EUR 679,9 billion, and total assets amounted to EUR 467,7 billion; notes that the difference of EUR 212,2 billion represents the negative net assets, comprising debt and the portion of expenses already incurred by the Union up to 31 December 2023 that must be funded by future budgets;

    27.  Notes that at the end of 2023, the estimated value of incurred but not yet claimed eligible expenses due to beneficiaries, recorded as accrued expenses, was EUR 155,2 billion (2021: EUR 148,7 billion), of which EUR 7,4 billion is related to accrued RRF expenditure;

    28.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion that the assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses, including those related to NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the estimate related to the UK’s withdrawal process, and the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are presented fairly in the consolidated annual accounts;

    Legality and regularity of Union revenue

    29.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the Union’s revenue is free from material error and that the managing systems examined by the Court were generally effective;

    Legality and regularity of Union expenditure

    30.  Strongly regrets the adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of the Union budget expenditure issued by the Court for the fifth year in a row; considers this increasingly problematic, as the Commission seems unable, or unwilling, to identify the cause and address the underlying issues; regrets the Commission is not accepting some recommendations of the Court of Auditors; notes in particular the importance of reinforcement of financial management of the Commission and Member States, that is considered as not reliable by the Court and therefore compromises the reliability of the Annual Management and Performance Report; calls on the Commission to present a clear action plan on reducing the error rate within the following four months; stresses that Parliament shall duly scrutinise such an action plan;

    31.  Is seriously concerned by the Court’s estimation of the error level of 5,6 % in 2023 expenditure; notes that this is an accelerated deterioration compared to the previous two years (4,2 % in 2022 and 3.0 % in 2021); notes with concern that the Court continues to detect substantial issues in reimbursement-based expenditure where the estimated level of error is 7,9 %; notes that the effect of the errors found by the Court is estimated to be both material and pervasive; calls for the Commission’s financial management to be tightened up, in accordance with the recommendations made by the Court in its Annual Reports and Special Reports, in order to resolutely tackle the high error rate over the next few years; underlines the Court’s warning that the increasing European debt is placing growing pressure on the Union budget;

    32.  Notes that the Commission in its Annual Management and Performance Report categorises the expenditure into higher, medium and lower risk categories, in order to focus action on high-risk areas; while the Court uses only two risk categories in order to produce an opinion on the legality and regularity of the expenditures; is worried that the Court’s work revealed limitations in the Commission’s ex-post work, which, taken together, affect the robustness of the Commission’s risk assessment; notes with concern that one of the areas most impacted was ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, where the Court assessed the majority of the spending to be high risk, while the Commission classified only a minority in this way;

    33.  Reiterates the concerns about the Court observation that the Commission’s risk assessment is likely to underestimate the level of risk in several areas; is also worried by recurrent weaknesses identified by the Court in Member States’ management and control systems, which are still not still preventing or detecting irregularities in heading 2, thus limiting the reliance that can be placed on their work, while the Commission’s error rates do still rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively;

    34.  Notes that the increase is primarily caused by the estimated level of error under MFF heading 2 – cohesion, resilience and values, where the Court found 9,3 % of expenditure to be in breach of Union rules and regulations; recalls the underlying issues that are reported by the Court and that have been known for several years;

    35.  Underlines that the estimated level of error in the Union’s expenditure, as presented in the Court’s statement of assurance, is an estimate of the money that should not have been paid out because it was not used in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations; considers that, though not an indicator of fraud or corruption, the estimated level of error represents expenditure where corrective actions are necessary, and thus shows a wasteful use of resources; regrets that, while being a problem in itself, this will also give a negative impression to citizens, and may even call into question the Commission’s ability to effectively protect the Union’s financial interests;

    36.  Notes with concern that the Commission´s own estimate of the risk at payment is only 1,9 % for 2023 and has been at that level since 2020; notes that the Commission estimates its capacity to correct and recover irregular expenditure during implementation of the associated programmes at 1,0 %, resulting in a risk at closure of 0,9 %; is concerned that again for this year the Commission’s risk at payment is not only below the Court estimated level of error of 5,6 % but also below the Court range, which is between 4,4 % and 6,8 %; highlights that the divergence between the Court’s overall error rate and the Commission’s risk at payment is also evident in some of the specific spending areas, in particular in heading 2, even more than in the past; welcomes the Court’s estimate of the level of error as an important indicator for the existing risks;

    37.  Notes the multi-annual perspective of the Commission’s risk at closure, as corrections and recoveries after year-end are not reflected in the Court’s estimate of the level of error; regrets, however, the confusion caused by the Commission’s presentation of the risk at payment;

    38.  Recalls the positions expressed in the 2022 discharge resolution and the exchanges of views in the discharge hearings for the financial year 2023 on the diverging methodologies and estimates between the Court and the Commission of errors made in Union expenditure; notes in particular that the Court’s error rate is based on a statistical sample, whereas the Commission’s risk at payment is to a large extent compiled from the error rates reported by national auditing authorities in Member States and calculated only after corrections and repayments; reminds that the Court’s error rate includes the errors that remained undetected by the Member States and the Commission, which demonstrates that the Commission’s error rates are an underestimation; notes with concern an even wider gap between the Court’s and Commission’s estimates; further notes that the Commission and the Court are organising joint workshops on this issue; notes that the Court recently aligned its methodology on procurement in the decentralised agencies with the methodology of the Commission; reiterates its support for the independent audit approach and methodology of the Court and invites the Commission to cooperate with the Court with a view to increasing harmonisation and providing for more comparable estimates of the level of error;

    39.  Recalls that the discharge authority needs a statement of assurance, provided by the Court, on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions at year-end for its decision on discharge for that year; notes that Union spending programmes are multiannual and that their management and control systems cover multiple years, allowing for corrections and recoveries after year-end;

    40.  Recalls that the Commission is responsible for preventing and detecting fraud; notes that the Court, in the exercise of its mandate, is obliged to report any cases of irregularity; notes that the Court forwards to the EPPO suspicions of criminal offences falling under its competences and to OLAF suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activity affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that, in 2023, the Court reported 20 cases of suspected fraud to OLAF, and in parallel reported 12 of these cases to the EPPO, resulting so far in four OLAF investigations and nine EPPO investigations; commends the Court for its reporting of cases of irregularity to OLAF and the EPPO, as information resulting from audit engagements usually has a high degree of reliability; reminds in this framework of the key role played by the whole Union’s anti-fraud architecture and expresses some concerns about the refusal of some Member States to cooperate with one of its elements, the EPPO;

    Budgetary and financial management

    41.  Notes that in 2023, 98,9 % of the available commitment appropriations were used (EUR 184,4 billion out of EUR 186,5 billion); notes that the available appropriations were higher than the MFF ceiling of EUR 182,7 billion due to the use of special instruments for new or unforeseen events; notes that 90,0 % of payment appropriations were used (EUR 162,0 billion of EUR 165,2 billion available);

    42.  Notes with concern that the total outstanding commitments, which represent future debts if not decommitted, reached an all-time high of EUR 543 billion (2022: EUR 450 billion); notes that the Commission foresees a decrease from 2025 to 2029 when committed amounts for both NGEU and the 2021-2027 programming period should be paid out; notes however that the actual amounts for 2023 (EUR 543 billion) are much higher than the forecasted amount (EUR 490 billion), calling the Commission’s estimates into question;

    43.  Recalls that the time available for implementing shared management funds under the 2021-2027 MFF is shorter than under previous MFFs because of the n+2 for the last year, which, coupled with the high RAL, will raise the risk of decommitments; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission has increased its forecasted amount of decommitments from EUR 7,6 billion for 2023-2027, to EUR 8,1 billion for 2024-2027 to EUR 8,8 billion for 2025-2027, a 15 % increase in 2 years; underlines with concern that the Commission has underestimated its projections for the RAL in the last two years, and that the Commission therefore likely underestimates the amount of decommitments that will be made until 2027; notes the introduction of the “cascade mechanism” following the mid-term review of the MFF 2021-2027 and the incentive to use decommitted amounts to cover increased interest costs for amounts borrowed by the Commission for NGEU;

    44.   Notes that the latest long-term payment forecast produced by the Commission foresees substantial decommitments as of 2027 unless Member States undertake additional efforts and implement at a much faster pace than in the period 2014-2020; notes that for the CF, ERDF, and ESF+ cohesion policy funds, the Commission forecast total decommitments for 2024-2027 at EUR 2,2 billion, more than five times its 2022 forecast of EUR 0,4 billion; warns that for the Just Transition Fund (JTF), the low implementation in 2023 puts important amounts at risk from 2025 onwards; calls on the Commission and on the Member States to use all of the available possibilities to avoid decommitments;

    45.  Notes with concern that Union debt increased from EUR 344,3 billion in 2022 to EUR 458,5 billion in 2023, 60 % of which is related to NGEU; notes that only for the debt issued for NGEU, associated interest costs need to be paid directly from the Union Budget and that, due to increased interest rates, these costs for the current MFF (until the end of 2027) are estimated to be between EUR 17 billion and EUR 27 billion higher than the initially forecasted EUR 14,9 billion;

    46.  Notes with concern that the total exposure of the Union budget because of guarantees and contingent liabilities for loans rose to EUR 298,0 billion; notes that assumptions on capital-market interest should be made conservatively, both for existing debt and new debt and that for both categories a viable plan for its repayment is necessary; notes that the Court received information from the Commission that indicates that the exposure will steadily increase in the coming years, putting additional pressure on the headroom of the budget and further reducing the flexibility of the Union budget; supports the Court recommendations to the Commission to act more proactively to ensure that its mitigating tools (such as the Common Provisioning Fund) have sufficient capacity as well as to provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure, making its estimate public;

    47.  Notes with concern that the Court in its Special Report 07/2024(9) observed that a significant share of recovery orders issued between 2014 and 2022 were still outstanding at the time of their audit; further notes that the Commission, in its replies to the Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control’s (CONT Committee) written questions for the 2023 discharge, mentioned that there are 1 357 overdue recovery orders for a total outstanding amount of approximately EUR 335 million for the period 2014-2023; calls on the Commission to prioritise collecting monies under overdue recovery orders and to keep the Committee on Budgetary Control informed about progress made;

    48.  Highlights that equality is a founding value of the Union and is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; recalls the commitment of the Union to gender mainstreaming in its policy-making and implementation of Union funds, including gender budgeting; encourages the Commission to continue the efforts made in gender budgeting and in tracking the impact of the Union budget to foster gender equality; recalls the obligation of the Commission to accompany all legislative proposals with an impact assessment when they are projected to have a significant economic, social, and environmental impact in order to guarantee, among other things, fair distribution of funds;

    49.  Notes that the review of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Transparency Register is due by July 2025; calls on the Commission to ensure that the process is as open as possible, to align financial reporting requirements across all categories of registrants (including funding sources and lobbying budgets), addressing also the risk identified in the Court’s Special Report on the EU Transparency Register (SR 05/2024) regarding self-declarations on the category of interest representation; believes that, in order to address the recommendations of the Court, the resources of the secretariat of the Transparency Register should be increased;

    50.  Recalls the following findings of the Court of Auditors’ Special Report 11/2025: (i) that the identification and registration of entities as NGOs are not always consistent and reliable; (ii) that despite a more streamlined granting process, issues with the completeness and accuracy of data remain; (iii) that the lack of a reliable overview of Union spending on NGOs hampers useful analysis; (iv) that the calls for proposals in the Court’s sample were transparent; (v) that respect for Union values is not pro-actively verified; and (vi) that transparency practices vary widely in the Court’s sample, with larger NGOs performing better. calls on the Commission to fully implement the recommendations in the Court’s Special Report;

    Recommendations

    51.  Strongly supports the recommendations of the Court in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (annual report for the 2023 financial year)(10) as well as in related special reports; calls on the Commission to implement them without delay and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    52.  Calls on the Court to look for ways, together with the Commission, to align their methodologies for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;

    53.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) continue to engage with the Court in order to increase understanding, convergence and comparability of the two approaches to the diverging estimates of errors in Union expenditure;
       (ii) qualify the impact of corrective measures on the overall level of error;
       (iii) look for ways, together with the Court, to align their methodologies as regards the evaluation of procurement errors, and the estimation of the level of error for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;
       (iv) present the discharge authority with a strategy to strengthen the use of funds for their intended purpose, increase absorption and prevent decommitments in order to maximise the EU-added value of the Union Budget;
       (v) increase the reliability of the forecast of the outstanding commitments with a more realistic estimate of the absorption of Union funds to give the discharge authority a better forecast of the development of the RAL over the years and better protect the Union budget;
       (vi) report on, and provide sufficient measures to, protecting the Union budget from the different risks identified beyond the RAL, such as decommitments in cohesion policy, the increasing debt, increased budget exposure and the impact of increasing inflation;
       (vii) provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure by presenting, in the Annual Management and Performance Report, a multi-annual outlook on the exposure of the Union Budget to budgetary guarantees;
       (viii) substantially simplify rules and procedures and improve the assistance to, and ensure consistent and user-friendly guidelines for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies, CSOs and all other relevant stakeholders, without compromising the quality of the controls;
       (ix) make sure that the mitigation tools in place have sufficient capacity to effectively face the exposure risks of the Union budget;
       (x) boost efforts to improve transparency in the use of funds, including as regards information on final beneficiaries, including on the funds that are allocated for the preparation of policy and legislative proposals;
       (xi) put in place all necessary means for ensuring that all interest representatives that approach Union institutions are registered in the Transparency Register; further asks the Commission to set up an effective mechanism to ensure that entities funded by the Union in the Transparency Register are aligned with Union values and demand full transparency on their financing, providing a deeper insight into the financing of all entities registered and which should be the condition to approach all Union institutions, bodies and agencies;
       (xii) together with Parliament and Council, guarantee adequate resources for the secretariat of the Transparency Register in order to ensure that the entries on the lobbying activities of all interest representatives can be checked for accuracy and that lobbying become more transparent as requested in the Court in Special Report 05/2024 on the EU Transparency Register; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to identify irregularities to guarantee a wide range of search capabilities;
       (xiii) require interest representatives in the Transparency Register to list their financial supporters by self-declaring that they are only representing their interests or the collective interests of their members and to propose an amendment to Annex II to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 to require them to list their financial supporters in the EU Transparency Register, even if they state in that register that they are only representing the interests of their own members; urges entities already registered that have not listed their financial resources by self-declaration to declare them voluntarily before the interinstitutional agreement is amended;
       (xiv) continue to support Member States in improving both the quality and the quantity of checks and to share best practices in the fight against fraud and corruption;
       (xv) address the situation regarding late recovery orders and to take all necessary measures to recover the majority of the amount outstanding for the period 2014-2023, including implementation of corporate escalation mechanisms, and keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in recovering the sums;
       (xvi) reinforce the capacity of the Anti-fraud Architecture of the Union, including the provision of sufficient financial and human resources, and facilitate the cooperation between them;

    Revenue

    54.  Welcomes that for 2023, the Court is also able to issue a clean opinion on the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, stresses that the problems with customs duties not being declared or being incorrectly declared (a customs gap) leading to a shortfall in collected import duties has been a persistent problem for many years and could potentially entail a loss of traditional own resources for the Union and for the Member States;

    55.  Notes with serious concern that the Court has examined the implementation of the Commission’s Customs Action Plan, which has the potential to lead to a significant reduction of the customs gap, and has again identified insufficient progress in the implementation of some actions from this plan; notes that the Commission, as part of this plan, proposed a customs reform in May 2023(11), including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub;

    56.  Recalls that the Court has highlighted the risks to the EU’s financial interests from inadequate or ineffective customs controls of imported goods; commends the efforts made by OLAF on the fight against Fraud linked to customs duties and VAT; underlines the rise of the ecommerce and the online platforms risks due to potential security and safety threats and risk of non-compliance with EU taxation and customs rules, product standards, intellectual property rights, prohibitions and restrictions;

    57.  Notes with concern that the Court revealed that the Commission did not charge late interest payments for six cases related to late corrections to GNI data by Member States where the Commission has expressed reservations; agrees with the Court that the Commission, as a matter of principle, ought to charge late interest payments in such cases in order to create an incentive for Member States to address the reservations within the deadlines;

    58.  Notes with satisfaction that the new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste generated by Member States in 2023 amounted to EUR 7,2 billion, equivalent to 4,0 % of the EU’s total revenue; further notes that the Court identified(12) some problems related to the reliability and comparability of data; stresses that it provides an excellent example of a new own resource, as it creates positive incentives for Member States to reduce the volume of non-recycled plastic packaging while at the same time generating a new revenue stream for the Union;

    59.  Stresses that the Commission’s proposals concerning new own resources from 2021 comprising three elements, the first based on revenues from emissions trading (ETS), the second drawing on the resources generated by the Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, and the third based on the share of residual profits from multinationals that will be re-allocated to Member States under the OECD/G20 agreement on a re-allocation of taxing rights (“Pillar One”) are obvious candidates for such new resources; at the same time, points out that other sources might also be considered if they should prove to be easier for Member States to approve; welcomes other initiatives that may lead to new own resources for the Union budget;

    60.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) increase focus and pressure on the implementation of the Customs Action Plan and not least the proposal for a significant customs reform from May 2023, including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub; ensure that Member States implement effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations; initiate infringement proceedings in those cases where there is sufficient evidence that Member States are implementing a manifestly inadequate penalty system for breaches of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 6(13) (DAC 6);
       (ii) insist on the importance of intensifying and diversifying the International customs cooperation with trade partners and stresses the need to strengthen the fight against cross-border tax and customs fraud in the context of the expansion of e-commerce;
       (iii) create incentives for Member States to address reservations related to corrections of GNI data by Member States within the deadlines by charging late interest payments;
       (iv) continue work towards the introduction of additional new own resources;

    Single market, Innovation and Digital

    61.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 1 ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ was EUR 25,3 billion (13,2 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: EUR 15,3 billion (60,5 %) for Research, EUR 4,1 billion (16,1 %) for Transport, Energy and Digital, EUR 2,3 billion (9,1 %) for the InvestEU Programme, EUR 2,2 billion (8,7 %) for Space, and EUR 1,4 billion (5,6 %) for other areas;

    62.  Notes that the Court has examined 127 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading, notably the Horizon 2020 programme (90 transactions), Horizon Europe (7 transactions), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), space programmes and financial instruments, and also that it has reviewed the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA) ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors and the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) and the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA);

    63.  Notes that the Court estimates that the level of error in spending on ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ in 2023 was material at 3,3 %; notes the Court’s observation that research and innovation expenditure is most affected by error, particularly in the area of personnel costs; further notes that the Commission estimates the risk at payment as 1,4 % for this heading, which is in the lower half of the range of the Court’s estimate; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that the Commission’s risk at payment for this heading remains an underestimate, because of weaknesses identified by the Court in the Commission’s ex post audits in this area since the financial year 2019(14);

    64.  Notes with concern that 39 (31 %) of the 127 transactions that the Court examined contained errors; is deeply concerned that for seven cases of quantifiable errors made by beneficiaries, the Commission (or the auditors contracted by the beneficiaries) had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure, and thus, had the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1,4 percentage points lower; highlights that this points to weaknesses in the Commission’s controls;

    Research and innovation

    65.  Highlights the importance of Union research and innovation (R&I) funding programmes for the scientific, societal, economic and technological development of the Union, reducing inequalities, achieving the green and digital transitions and decreasing the Union’s energy dependency on Russia; recalls that Horizon Europe is the most significant research and innovation programme in Europe, with a total budget of EUR 95,5 billion for 2021-2027, including EUR 5,4 billion from the NGEU instrument; notes that the RRF has allocated around EUR 48 billion in investments to R&I; underlines that in order to enhance the Union’s competitiveness and close the innovation gap, additional funding for R&I is needed, taking into account the Draghi report’s pertinent recommendations; highlights, in particular, the need to increase defence-related R&I spending due to the current geopolitical conditions, which could serve as an important component of the innovation policy strategy;

    66.  Notes that its predecessor, Horizon 2020, with a budget of EUR 75,6 billion funded more than 35 000 projects between 2014 and 2020 and its calls attracted over a million individual applications from 177 countries; further notes that in her hearing for the 2023 discharge, Commissioner Ivanova underlined the EU added value of EU R&I funding programmes, explaining that the final evaluation of Horizon 2020 estimated that, for each euro of costs linked to the programme five euros worth of benefits would be generated for society by 2040; deeply regrets that 74 % of proposals assessed as high quality by independent experts could not be funded due to budget constraints; notes that an additional EUR 159 billion would have been needed to fund all high-quality proposals; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for Union research and innovation, not the least to increase the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity, in line with the Union’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029;

    67.  Notes the late adoption of the Horizon Europe legal bases in 2021 and welcomes that the Commission managed to reach close to 100 % budget implementation in 2023; notes that the number of grant agreements signed by the end of 2023 was 10 674 and a further two framework agreements were signed;

    68.  Notes with concern that the Court found errors relating to ineligible costs in 30 of the 97 research and innovation transactions in its sample, and that these errors represent 71 % of the Court’s estimated level of error for this heading in 2023; reiterates its concern that after 9 years of implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme, the calculation of personnel costs remains a major source of errors, as 22 of the 30 research transactions with quantifiable errors in the Court’s sample (around 73 %) are affected by the incorrect application of the methodology for calculating personnel costs; acknowledges both the Commission’s and the Court’s continued efforts to remedy this situation; welcomes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendations to enhance beneficiaries’ compliance with the daily-rate rules and to ensure clarity concerning daily-rate rules in Horizon Europe documents;

    69.  Underlines the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures governing Union R&I funding; notes that in 2023 the Commission has continued the roll out of simplified cost options such as lump sums and unit costs in Horizon Europe; further notes the remarks made by the Director-General for Research and Innovation in the exchange of views with the CONT Committee that the Commission intends to increase the disbursement of Horizon Europe funds through lump sums to 50 % by 2027; welcomes that the Commission, taking the Court’s recommendations issued in its annual reports for 2022 into account, will further specify the requirements defining the proper implementation of lump sum grants, including the elements of each work package triggering payment, and will also provide detailed guidance to those involved in assessing the implementation of projects; further notes that, as described in the Commission’s assessment of Lump Sum Funding in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe 2018-2024, beneficiaries would welcome more clarity on how lump sum grants would be audited; is concerned that the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe is not yet developed;

    70.  Stresses the crucial role of the private sector in addressing the innovation gap in the Union and improving the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity; believes, in particular, that it is imperative to continue to promote and facilitate as much as possible the participation of SMEs in Union R&I funding programmes; notes the Court’s conclusion that SMEs and newcomers are more prone to making errors than other beneficiaries since they lack the experience and resources to administer the funds; welcomes the efforts made by the Commission to support SMEs specifically, for example through information campaigns, contacts with the system of National Contact Points and the dedicated helpdesk of the Research Enquiry Service; considers that the simplification of rules and procedures is the major driver for increased participation of SMEs;

    Energy, Transport and Digital

    71.  Highlights the importance of Union investments in the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services and notes that the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), with EUR 4,1 billion of expenditure in 2023, is a key Union instrument in delivering these objectives;

    72.  Draws attention to the need to simplify the application procedures under the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) in order to enable greater participation of smaller entities and local initiatives in the development of European transport infrastructure; regrets that the CEF-T budget does not cover all the needs for sustainable transport investments and that most of the CEF-T budget has already been allocated, leaving a funding gap until 2027;

    73.  Recalls that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting sanctions imposed on Russia continued to adversely impact the Union’s transport sector in 2023, leading to traffic shortages, supply chain bottlenecks, and the necessity to bypass traditional routes, thereby extending journey times and increasing costs; points out that the Eastern border regions, especially in the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Romania, have been particularly affected by economic losses and a halt of cross-border mobility as a consequence of the Russian aggression; calls on the Commission to introduce targeted measures, including in the next MFF, to facilitate recovery of the affected regions;

    74.  Calls on the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the funding allocated to the cross-border and multi-country infrastructure projects, facing significant implementation challenges, financial difficulties, or delays, such as Rail Baltica; points out that this review should address inefficiencies in planning and management as well as escalating construction costs that threaten project timelines and objectives; reiterates that greater transparency in the management of public funds increases citizens’ trust in the Union institutions;

    75.  Notes with concern that the Court found two errors in CEF projects in its 2023 sample, and that one of these relates to a serious breach of the Union’s public procurement rules, and has led to the contract being awarded to a consortium that did not fulfil the selection criteria and that this error contributed 28 % to the estimated error rate for heading 1;

    76.  Is deeply concerned by the Court’s findings in relation to the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA)ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors, in particular the Court’s conclusion that while the strategies for both CEF1 (2014-2020) and CEF2 (2021-2027) are based on a sound analysis of risks and past irregularities, the guidelines for ex-ante checks on procurement were not detailed enough; fully supports the Court’s recommendation that the Commission should further develop these guidelines;

    Recommendations

    77.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) secure the provision of adequate resources to support high-quality research and innovation project proposals with an EU added value in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework;
       (ii) continue to simplify rules and procedures in line with the new financial regulation, to support training sessions and user-friendly, consistent and practical information for applicants in Member States, in particular for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, CSOs or local action groups and to encourage applications from beneficiaries in Member States with more limited participation, as well as from smaller entities;
       (iii) continue to apply simplified rules and procedures, digitalisation measures and simplified cost options (SCOs) while addressing, in particular, the risk of irregularities and fraud and the costs of controls, and finalising the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe as soon as possible;
       (iv) further specify the requirements for defining proper implementation of lump sum grants, taking into account the Court’s pertinent recommendations from its 2022 Annual Report, and verify the actual implementation of projects using lump sums;
       (v) undertake a thorough analysis of procurement errors found and further develop the guidelines describing the extent of the checks to be performed for ex ante controls on procurement for CEF projects, as recommended by the Court;

    Cohesion, Resilience and Values

    78.  Stresses the importance of Union cohesion policy for economic and territorial convergence and development in the regions of the Union, as well as for supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 2 ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ was EUR 73,3 billion (38,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 47,8 % for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and other regional operations, 18,9 % for the European Social Fund (ESF), 9,8 % for the Cohesion Fund (CF), 3,8 % for Erasmus+, 2,1 % for CEF Transport, and 3,8 % for other areas;

    79.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 238 transactions covering the full range of spending under MFF Heading 2; notes with concern that the Court’s estimated overall level of error in expenditure under this heading in 2023 increased to 9,3 %, which is significantly above the materiality threshold; draws attention to the marked increase in the overall level of error estimated by the Court in 2023 compared to previous years (6,4 % in 2022, 3,6 % in 2021);

    80.  Is concerned about the Court’s observation that the significant additional resources made available under the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU), the approaching end of the eligibility period for 2014-2020 programmes (31 December 2023), and parallel implementation of the NGEU programme have put additional pressure on Member State’s administrations, increasing the risk of errors; is in particular concerned by the practice of reducing Member States’ co-funding, as is the case under REACT-EU, the Coronavirus Investment Initiative (CRII) and CRII+, which reduces the ownership and associated incentives for properly overseeing expenditure; notes from the Commission replies the acknowledgement that some authorities may have carried out less effective controls and verifications due to the heavy overload and increasing pressure of parallel implementation of 2014-2020 programmes and of additional funding under NGEU;

    81.  Notes the Court’s analysis of transactions with additional funding through REACT-EU and flexibility through CRII+ and Cohesion’s Action for Refugees (CARE) and their contribution to the estimated levels of error; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities, without either decreasing requirements or increasing preventive checks and controls at the same time, contributed to the high error rate;

    82.  Notes the Court’s Review 03/2024 “An overview of the assurance framework and the key factors contributing to errors in 2014-2020 cohesion spending” that provides a multi-annual overview covering six years of audit results, including an assessment of management and control issues, aiming to strengthen the assurance model; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that, although the assurance framework for cohesion policy has helped to reduce the level of error, it has not been effective in bringing the overall level of error below the materiality threshold of 2 %; is worried that the Commission can rely only to a limited degree on the work of the national audit authorities, because of the systematic weaknesses; supports the Court’s recommendation to the Commission to strengthen the implementation of the assurance framework for the 2021-2027 cohesion spending; reminds the Commission of the discharge authority’s call to work closely with the Member States to improve the management and control system for Union expenditure to reduce the high error rate to below the 2 % materiality threshold;

    83.  Notes the Court’s observation in its review on the reliability of the work of key actors in the control system for cohesion policy; is concerned by the Court’s finding that during a 6-year period managing authorities, the first line of defence for detection and prevention of errors, are not sufficiently effective in mitigating the inherent high risk of error in cohesion policy; considers it even more worrying that the Court found that the second line of defence, the Member States’ audit authorities, are not able to determine the correct error rate for the packages of expenditure they audit and provide assurance on, since the Court detected additional errors in at least 39 % of these packages; notes that these errors have been detected and reported by the Court annually for more than 6 years and that there is therefore a systemic issue;

    84.  Notes the Court’s categorisation of errors found in cohesion expenditure, with ineligible projects accounting for 29 %, ineligible costs for 26 % and serious non-compliance in public procurement procedures accounting for 21 % of errors and ERDF and CF related expenditure accounting for the largest share of errors (80 %); notes that expenditure under the ESF+, YEI and FEAD are proportionally less affected by error, as they together account for 16 % of errors, while they together account for around 20 % of the budget under this heading;

    85.  Notes the study commissioned by the Committee on Budgetary Control on ‘Lessons learned from the implementation of crisis response tools’ that shows that absorption of uncommitted cohesion resources was supported by the flexibilities introduced under CRII and CRII+; is concerned by the finding of the researchers that quality of fast-tracked projects might not have reached the same level as investments before the pandemic; is further concerned by the researchers’ observation that the risk of low-quality projects is entirely borne by the Union Budget, because of 100 % EU-funding in CRII, CRII+ and REACT-EU; considers that 100 % EU-funding might help absorption, but that absorption is not a goal in itself;

    86.  Stresses that, in its most recent discharge opinions, the Committee on Regional Development called for additional advisory support from the Commission to national, local and regional authorities to avoid a situation of administrative overload; recognises the Commission’s efforts but, observes that, regrettably, these have not been sufficient to mitigate the risk of error; warns that a similar administrative overload might occur at the end of the RRF eligibility period and the final years of the MFF; underlines the need to address the insufficient administrative capacity of national, local and regional authorities as a matter of urgency; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to provide them with clear guidance, and to increase its support for administrative capacity building, including through staff training, best practice sharing, peer-to-peer reviews and technical assistance to ensure effective fund management;

    87.  Notes the public discussions on the post-2027 multiannual financial framework that may indicate a shift towards a performance-based model, coupling investments and reforms, and a desire to simplify rules and procedures; calls on the Commission to prioritise the financial responses to the current threats resulting from the geopolitical situation; warns that any decision on the future design of spending programmes must not be to the detriment of oversight and control of Union expenditure in terms of transparency and information at Union level about non-compliance with rules and regulations; considers that the errors identified by the Court and the way the Commission handles those errors are also an indication of a properly functioning management and control system and notes that both institutions stated their commitment to improve the system and bring down the error rate;

    88.  Notes, as in previous years, the Court’s observation that the Commission’s desk reviews, to review and assess the work of audit authorities, are aimed at checking only consistency of regularity information, and that they are therefore too limited to confirm the residual error rate reported by the national authorities in their assurance packages; notes the Commission’s reply that it complements its desk review with on-the-spot audit work covering the programmes and assurance packages, which enables it to establish a reasonable and fair estimate of the error rates for each programme; considers that the Court’s observation is about the scope of the desk reviews and the fact that they are only aimed at consistency and therefore too limited to provide the Commission with information that is sufficiently reliable;

    89.  Is concerned about the persistent shortcomings observed by the Court in the work of national audit authorities as visible in the weaknesses identified in the assurance packages, with a residual error rate above the materiality threshold for more than 60 % of the value of assurance packages audited in 2023; stresses with concern that managing authorities consistently do not effectively succeed in preventing or detecting irregularities in expenditure declared by beneficiaries and that this reduces the extent to which the Commission can rely on their work;

    90.  Reminds that in shared management, it is the Commission’s responsibility to make sure that Member States set up management and control systems that function effectively during the implementation of programmes; is worried that both the Commission and the Court have identified that not all Member States’ management and control systems function effectively, thus negatively effecting the reliability of the Commission error rates, as they rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively; calls into question the possibility for the Commission to continue to rely on national systems;

    91.  Considers that for the single audit approach to work well, and in order to achieve reduced administrative burden for beneficiaries and managing authorities, adherence to audit standards at all levels of control and audit is of essential importance; is therefore worried by the Court’s finding in its annual report that essential supporting documents about compliance with eligibility conditions were not presented by programme authorities and beneficiaries, and also by the finding by the Court presented in its review that insufficient documentation of audit work from audit authorities limits the reliance that can be placed on audit work of national audit authorities;

    92.  Recalls that following Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council(15) (CPR) for the programming period 2021-2027, Member States need to comply with horizontal and thematic enabling conditions, which need to remain fulfilled and respected throughout the implementation period of the funds; recalls that when enabling conditions are not fulfilled at the time of submission of a payment application to the Commission for the specific objective concerned, the related expenditure will not be reimbursed from the Union budget until the Commission is satisfied that the enabling condition has been fulfilled; recalls the strong regrets of the discharge authority in relation to the Commission decision of 13 December 2023(16) considering that Hungary fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition related to judicial independence that enabled the Hungarian authorities to submit reimbursement claims of up to EUR 10,2 billion; notes with concern that since the release of these funds, the Hungarian government has not taken steps to reinstate the independence of the judiciary but on the contrary; reiterates its worries about the lack of adequate control mechanisms or unreliable public procurement procedures to guarantee sound financial management and the protection of the Union budget; believes that this decision politically contradicts the prolongation of the measures adopted under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(17) (the ‘Conditionality Regulation’);

    93.  Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2023 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm the increasing pressure on judicial independence, including concerns over the selection and promotion of judges, and recent reports of intimidation and interference in judicial decisions, as exemplified by the resignations of judges in protest against political influence; notes with concern in the same vein that the head of the Hungarian Integrity Authority, a key institution established as a condition set by the Commission for the release of Union funds under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, is facing increasing pressure from the Hungarian government; calls on the Commission to ensure a coordinated and holistic approach across all relevant Union funds and legislative tools, emphasizing that Union funds must not be allocated to activities undermining democracy or reinforcing authoritarianism;

    94.  Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation establishes a mechanism and measures to protect the Union Budget from breaches of the rule of law when other procedures set out in Union legislation would not protect the budget more efficiently; recalls that this mechanism was activated on 15 December 2022 in the case of Hungary over concerns related to its system of public procurement, resulting in a temporary suspension of 55 % of budgetary commitments for three cohesion policy programmes; recalls that the same regulation, in line with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093(18) (the ‘MFF Regulation’), stipulates that suspended commitments of 2022 (year n), may not be re-entered into the budget beyond 2024 (year n+2) and that therefore 55 % of commitments from 2022, around EUR 1 billion, were decommitted in December 2024; notes that no other procedures under the Conditionality Regulation are ongoing;

    95.  Notes that the Commission allocated an equivalent of five full-time staff members to the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation and reiterates the European Court of Auditor’s concerns raised in its Special Report 03/2024 that current staff numbers appear to be insufficient to ensure a strict and coherent application of the Regulation;

    96.  Reiterates the need to treat as a single, integral package all the measures required for the release of Union funding under the Conditionality Regulation, the CPR and Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council(19) (the ‘RRF Regulation’); stresses the importance of the protection of the Union financial interests also for disbursement of pre-financing;

    97.  Notes that some investments which would have been eligible for financing under cohesion are included in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans; recalls that the general objective of the RRF enshrined in Article 4 of the RRF Regulation is to promote the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion, and that one of its six pillars is specifically dedicated to this purpose; acknowledges that the wide scope of the RRF results in limited overlap with other Union funding programmes, as intended by the co-legislators when establishing the Article 9 of the RRF Regulation, which establishes additionality and complementarity funding as key principles; draws attention, however, to the risks of double funding emerging from such situations;

    98.  Expresses its preoccupation about the visible delays in implementation of cohesion policy in Member States and the lack of capacity of national administrations to deal in parallel with different spending programmes (e.g. cohesion programmes and RRF programmes) covering complementary or even similar objectives; calls on the Commission to ensure that sufficient technical assistance is provided to Member States facing difficulties in order to address existing delays in the implementation of cohesion programmes;

    99.  Recognises the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly direct public funding into security, defence and preparedness, while facing dramatically reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes, particularly Interreg programmes; notes the measures taken by the European Commission to support these regions, notably through flexibilities provided under cohesion policy; welcomes that providing support to eastern border regions most affected by Russia’s aggression is included in the mission letter of the Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms; calls on the Commission to ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression, both in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;

    100.  Stresses the importance of ESF+ which aims to achieve high employment, fair social protection, a skilled and resilient workforce, and inclusive/cohesive societies as key in eradicating poverty; expresses the need to provide it with the continued financial and political support of the Union, national and regional institutions in the delivery of its objectives and targets in the years to come; underlines the importance of closely involving regional actors, in particular civil society organisations and social partners working on the ground in the implementation of ESF+ funded activities;

    101.  Welcomes the frontloading of EUR 100 million from the 2027 budget of Erasmus+ to the 2023 budget of Erasmus+, which enabled continued support to pupils, students, teachers and qualified staff fleeing from Ukraine, and the extra EUR 20 million awarded to Erasmus+ in 2023 as a result of Parliament’s insistence; stresses that frontloading must remain an exception to rapid response to unforeseen acute crisis situations; underlines that any frontloading of Erasmus+ cannot result in cuts for the programme at the end of current MFF; emphasises that every effort must be made to respond to such situations preferentially with additional funding;

    102.  Emphasises the need for strict oversight of the allocation of funds to prevent misuse within the Erasmus programme; asks the Commission to gather evidence to investigate any case of fraudulent or suspicious recipients, in accordance with its duties outlined in the Financial Regulation and Erasmus+ grant agreements; calls for adequate safeguarding of the programme from abuse by organizations whose activities are not aligned with the fundamental values of the Union (human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights); recalls that the Commission is legally bound to ensure that programme beneficiaries commit to and ensure the respect of these values and do not commit professional misconduct;

    103.  Notes that in 2023, the budget of the EU4Health programme, the main financial instrument to support Union health initiatives, was EUR 735 million, mainly managed by Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and implemented through the European Health and Digital Executive Agency; acknowledges the progress of initiatives funded under this programme, notably in the areas of health emergency preparedness, the Beating Cancer Plan, the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe and in the implementation of Union health legislation;

    Recommendations

    104.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) re-consider the practice of 100 % Union funding in Union crisis response instruments, where increasing pre-financing might provide faster availability of funds, while maintaining a shared financial budgetary control responsibility in implementation of the funds by maintaining financial involvement from both national and Union level;
       (ii) ensure selection of qualitatively good projects with cohesion policy funds by favouring long-term investments, and duly justifying 100 % Union funding while limiting its application;
       (iii) address the systemic issue of non-detection of errors at Member State level in cohesion policy spending with an action plan, aimed at reporting an accurate error rate in assurance packages, and detection of errors at the first lines of defence by making available more, and/or better targeting existing resources and increase detection capacity at Member State and Commission level;
       (iv) calculate and report to the discharge authority the cost of control for all expenditure handled by national authorities concerning cohesion policy funds, and NGEU, and compare these figures with the cost of control when only Cohesion policy funds were handled by the same authorities;
       (v) address the recurrent issue of insufficient documentation at beneficiary, programme authority and audit authority level, not only through checks, awareness raising and information on requirements, but also through increased digitalisation and where possible, through financial incentives to penalise non-respect of the requirements for sound financial management;
       (vi) expand the scope of its desk review of assurance packages to review more quality criteria in addition to consistency to make a reliable estimate of the residual error rate for the assurance package under review, as well as of the risk at payment as a whole;
       (vii) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats for the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;
       (viii) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;
       (ix) continuously monitor the implementation by the Hungarian Government of measures foreseen in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022; assess to what extent the situation has improved or worsened, including in relation to the challenges faced by the Hungarian Integrity Authority, and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation;
       (x) provide Member States with increased technical assistance in order to address delays in the implementation of national programmes in order to increase the absorption rate;
       (xi) closely monitor and mitigate the increasing risk of double funding between Cohesion programmes and RRF funding and address any such occurrences without delay;
       (xii) further enhance simplification in the implementation of cohesion programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xiii) take all necessary measures to bring down the error rate in close cooperation with the Court of Auditors;
       (xiv) ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, both in the short-term and in the medium-term;

    Natural resources

    105.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 3 ‘Natural resources’ was EUR 59,5 billion (31,1 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 65,0 % for direct payments under the European Agricultural Guarantee fund (EAGF), 27,6 % for the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 4,2 % for market-related expenditure under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), 1,9 % for Maritime and Fisheries, 0,9 % for Environment and Climate (LIFE), and 0,4 % for other areas;

    106.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 218 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading; notes that the Court also examined the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) and the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), as well as selected systems in 20 Member States and the United Kingdom; notes that the Court estimates the level of error for ‘Natural Resources’ to be 2,2 % (2,2 % in 2022) and that the majority of the errors found affected rural development transactions;

    107.  Points out, however, that this is partly due to the complexity of environmental schemes in rural development programmes and the recognized negative issue of “gold plating” at national level;

    108.  Notes, in this context, the lower-than-expected implementation rate of EAFRD funding for the period 2023-2027, with an absorption rate of only 1 % at the end of 2023, with payments amounting to EUR 0,7 billion, and expects the absorption rate to increase significantly in the course of the next reporting period;

    109.  Notes that the Court found 16 quantifiable errors in rural development, 15 in direct payments, three in expenditure related to market measures, and three in non-CAP expenditure; is reassured by the Commission’s assessment that most errors concern clerical mistakes and by the actions taken by the Commission to prevent errors in the future;

    110.  Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with ineligible claims accounting for 35 % of the errors, and administrative errors and inaccurate information on areas or animals for 21 % and 20 % respectively; notes with concern, that as in previous years, that the Court found in several cases that the Member State authorities and the Commission had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities and the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1.0 percentage point lower;

    111.  Notes that 2023 was the first year of the CAP 2023-2027 new delivery model, which integrates performance elements, agreed with the Member States in Strategic Plans, as basis for payments; notes that 2023 was a modest start of the new delivery model, EUR 63,65 million declared on the basis of generated outputs and therefore subject to a ‘performance clearance’ by DG AGRI out of EUR 215,52 million declared under the CAP Strategic plans under sectoral interventions and rural development; notes that in 2024 payments under the new delivery model will have increased substantially; notes the Court’s observations as regards processing performance data for the Annual Performance Reports where Member States are in the process of setting-up systems and procedures and at times manually aggregate data, with associated risks for the reliability of data;

    112.  Recalls the farmers’ protests across Europe towards the end of 2023 and early 2024 and the Commission’s response aimed at simplification, in particular for small farmers, and increasing discretionary powers for Member States; stresses that simplification should go hand in hand with sound financial management and take into account the Union’s climate commitments; welcomes the Commission’s targeted approach, especially concerning the distinction between farm size in terms of agricultural land and number of farms; cautions that discretion given to Member States should also be accompanied by thorough oversight by the Commission;

    113.  Recalls that both the Commission and Member States are responsible for addressing fraud in CAP spending; welcomes in that regard the work done in terms of anti-fraud risk assessments and the update of its anti-fraud strategy by DG AGRI;

    114.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 07/2024 on the Commission’s systems for recovering irregular expenditure, and the Commission’s reply; notes the Court’s observation that recoveries concerning agricultural expenditure have been relatively successful, attributed in part to the so-called 50-50 rule that incentivised Member States to recover funds; notes that this rule has not been retained in the 2023-2027 CAP and the Court’s warning that this might lead to a deterioration of the rate of recovery for agricultural expenditure;

    115.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply; stresses the importance of ensuring that all key elements for assessing performance are provided; considers that plans need to account for specific situations in specific Member States and that therefore a certain level of divergence is even desirable, is however worried that divergence in ambitions may mean that there is no level playing field for farmers across Member States; is further disappointed by the Court’s finding that although the new monitoring framework has been simplified, the CAP objectives lack clarity and indicators focus on outputs rather than results, and that important result indicators are missing; notes that the Court recommends the Commission to promote exchange of best practices in the plans and strengthening the future CAP monitoring framework;

    116.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 19/2024 on Organic farming in the EU, and the Commission’s reply; is once more worried by the Court’s finding that a weak strategic framework and data constraints prevent the measurement of the impact of the policy; considers that the increased focus on performance and definition of targets and indicators, and the related monitoring of results across Union policies needs to be supported by an equal increase of the Commission’s capacity to define performance frameworks and monitor performance;

    117.  Welcomes the increased competitiveness achieved through market measures in the wine sector and encourages the Commission and Member States to persevere in their efforts to replicate this success in other sectors;

    118.  Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue; underlines that separation of powers between the institutions as laid down in Article 13 TEU must always be respected and that Union institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation;

    119.  Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme; recalls the provisions of the LIFE+ Regulation, including those related to operating grants, the eligibility conditions, the award criteria, the overall allocation for 2021-2027 and the distribution of funds within the programme;

    120.  Notes that some members of the Budgetary Control committee requested access to a series of grant agreements under the LIFE programme, as well as other Union funding programmes, and after scrutinising them expressed concerns on the content of several of the programmes in February 2024; notes that the Commission, including the Internal Audit Service (IAS), was initially not aware of any issue, but adopted a series of measures with the aim of addressing the concerns; recalls the discharge written questions and hearings with the Secretary-General of the Commission on 5 November 2024, the responsible Commissioners for MFF Heading 3 on 12 November, and the Commissioner responsible for Budget and administration on 9 December 2024 where the concerns and the Commission’s response were discussed;

    121.  Notes the concerns expressed by some members of the Budgetary Control Committee that certain grant agreements between the European Union Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) and beneficiaries, such as CSOs and private companies, under the LIFE Programme include ‘work plans’ containing detailed advocacy actions towards Union institutions or their representatives, as well as other actions directed towards certain trade agreements which the Union was negotiating, or litigation measures to be pursued by the respective entities; acknowledges that this could be potentially interpreted as interfering with internal decision making in Union institutions; notes that the Commission has performed a legal analysis of the grant agreements that raised concerns of some Members of the CONT Committee, which concluded that there was no evidence that the entities concerned had breached their contractual or code of conduct obligations, yet the Commission asked some beneficiaries to make amendments to the grant agreements that contained the specific provisions that potentially entailed a reputational risk; further notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’;

    122.  Underlines that Union financing should not contribute to undermining the rule of law, nor the values on which the Union is founded; recalls the provisions of Article 163 of the Financial Regulation; considers it crucial that there should be no funding without traceability of funds;

    123.  Notes the actions taken by the Commission to address the allegations which included the issuance of guidance for Commission services on funding activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy and screening of their contract portfolios to determine which agreements were not in line with the guidance; takes note of the measures adopted so far by the Commission while awaiting the results of the screening of the grant agreements with all the beneficiaries, which was requested by the Commission’s Corporate Management Board;

    124.  Notes the decision-making structure, including the evaluation board within CINEA, for deciding on contracts between the Commission and beneficiaries; urges the Commission to ensure that the decision-making structure of CINEA for deciding on contracts to be awarded features clear accountability, clear responsibilities and a practical structure;

    125.  Notes that the executive agency conducts annual bottom-up risk management exercises and that these bottom-up risk management exercises did not identify any critical risks; notes that irrespective of the financing programme, evaluation procedures should be constantly reviewed and adapted if needed;

    126.  Notes reports in the media that the President of the Commission hired a paid special adviser to deliver a report on the “Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture” who received a salary equal to a Director-General in the Commission; is concerned by the remuneration of all the special advisers and the discretion the Commission has in deciding their remuneration, which creates arbitrary inequalities;

    Recommendations

    127.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) closely monitor the Member States’ progress as regards the processing of performance data and the aggregation of data for the annual performance report and keep the discharge authority informed about issues with reliability of performance data, in particular where it concerns manually aggregated data;
       (ii) inform the discharge authority why the Court concludes that for several years several errors could have been prevented, had the Commission and Member States used all information at their disposal and why the Commission and Member States do not manage to address this issue appropriately;
       (iii) apply the lessons learned as regards the reduction of the administrative burden from its response to the farmers’ protests in future policy initiatives, while taking due account of the risk of abuse of funds where control measures are reduced, or risk of too much divergence between Member States when discretionary powers are used without proper oversight;
       (iv) keep the discharge authority informed about the recovery rates of agricultural expenditure, in particular if the rate deteriorates in comparison to the recovery rate under the previous CAP and swiftly mitigate the causes for the deterioration, including considering the introduction of new incentives for Member State authorities to recover funds;
       (v) assess the differences in ambition of strategic plans and inform the discharge authority whether there is divergence between Member States, threatening the level-playing field for farmers, and assess how the Commission addresses those differences;
       (vi) make better use of its capacity for setting-up performance frameworks, for defining objectives and indicators and holding those contributing to the achievements, be they Member States or beneficiaries, accountable for their contributions;
       (vii) update the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy to devote attention to advocating for and upholding a clear separation of executive and legislative power in the Union;
       (viii) have a clear and comprehensive strategy at Commission level as to how to better protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure that Union funds are spent for their intended purposes and diligently apply the Financial Regulation provisions, including by ensuring that grant agreements can be suspended or terminated when beneficiaries violate the Union’s legislation;
       (ix) ensure a fair distribution of Union funds to CSOs to contribute to a pluralistic and vibrant society;
       (x) ensure that the Commission’s guidance adopted in 2024 is applied by all authorising officers and, if necessary, further develop guidance to fully align grant agreements with Treaty provisions and existing legislation;
       (xi) make the results of the screening of grant agreements available to the discharge authority in order to allow an assessment of the extent to which the Commission may be exposed to a reputational risk;
       (xii) adequately address issues such as revolving doors, transparency in financing and donations, the fight against money laundering, limiting foreign interference, independence from political and economic influence, whistleblowing and transparent governance structures, in respect of all entities receiving Union funds;
       (xiii) review the template for MoUs between the Commission and executive agencies to ensure clearer division of responsibilities;
       (xiv) instruct the audit structure to review contracts with beneficiaries and to flag in case they identify contracts that are not in line with applicable financial rules;
       (xv) have the IAS review contracts between the Commission and grantees, specifically to search for content that is not in line with applicable financial rules within work packages;
       (xvi) evaluate the decision-making structure in the areas of the awarding of contracts and instruct Commission services and executive agencies to perform better checks on the content of contracts at all stages, including by ensuring that work packages and key performance indicators as listed by applicants align with the objectives of respective funding programmes;
       (xvii) adopt more precise categorisation of entities listed in the Financial Transparency System;
       (xviii) review its rules for special advisers to remove the arbitrary selection and remuneration;
       (xix) further enhance simplification in the implementation of programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xx) improve the quality of dialogue with farmers from all Member States;
       (xxi) react more quickly when serious concerns of the discharge authority are flagged to the Commission;
       (xxii) perform adequate checks of entities listed in the Transparency Register, in order to ensure that they comprehensively list their activities in the Register;
       (xxiii) draw clearer lines of responsibility when implementing collaborative platforms;
       (xxiv) instruct the Corporate Management Board to submit consolidated information on the list of critical risks to the internal audit service and ensure executive agencies address potential risks and ensure a transparent selection of independent evaluators to prevent conflict of interest and guarantee their independence;
       (xxv) instruct all DGs and executive agencies to review the distribution of funds dedicated to auditing in order to ensure sufficient resources;
       (xxvi) ensure that proposals for Multiannual Work Programmes of any Union funding instrument have clear guidelines on the activities eligible for funding, clearer rules on screening of applications and on admissible content as well as clearer requirements for transparency and traceability of the use of Union funds, including in relation to the disclosure requirements under the EU Transparency Register;
       (xxvii) ensure that all grant agreements respect the necessary requirements related to transparency, traceability and visibility of funds;

    Migration and Border management

    128.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 4 ‘Migration and Border Management’ was EUR 2,7 billion (1,4 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 1,2 billion (46,5 %) for three decentralised agencies, the European Boarder Coast Agency (FRONTEX), the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU- LISA); 1 billion (38,6 %) for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), and 0,4 billion (14,9 %) for the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF);

    129.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 4 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 18 % of AMIF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    130.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 23 transactions, which is not large enough to be representative of the spending under MFF headings 4 and 5 and, thus, it cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for these headings; further notes that the Court’s audit results show that the expenditure under MFF headings 4 and 5 is affected by eligibility and procurement issues and that it is a high-risk area (7 out of 23 transactions audited, i.e. 30,4 %, were affected by errors); is concerned that the Court detected four quantifiable errors which had a financial impact on the amounts charged to the Union budget and that it also found further ten cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions (which had no direct financial impact on the Union budget); therefore, invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for heading 4; notes that the Commission concludes that the risk at payment in 2023 is 1,1 % for the expenditure on migration and border management;

    131.  Notes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendation made in its annual report for 2023 to provide further guidance on applicable rules to the Member State authorities responsible for implementing DG HOME funding via shared management; regrets that the Commission has not yet fully implemented the Court’s previous recommendations that were due to be addressed by the end of 2023; notes that DG HOME is undertaking a reassessment of its ex-ante methodology to ensure the respect of the rules applicable to post-2021 generation of grants, and that this reassessment will also address the Court’s relevant recommendations and those of the IAS audit on the preparedness for closing actions and programmes funded under the Internal Security Fund (ISF) and the AMIF 2014-2020 through direct and shared management;

    132.  Notes with concern that two reservations on the declaration of assurance were issued in DG HOME’s Annual Activity Report for 2023 and that one reservation concerns the implementation of AMIF and ISF 2014-2020 in several Member States and the other reservation concerns the implementation of Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 2021-2027 in one Member State; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to take remedial measures for the underlying issues that necessitated the reservations;

    133.  Welcomes the progress identified by the Court in its review of the preparatory work done by five member state audit authorities in managing the transition of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF funds to the CPR of the 2021-2027 MFF; observes that these audit authorities reported to the Court that the support and guidance DG HOME provided to them was satisfactory; notes with concern that at the time of the Court’s audit four out of five Member State audit authorities had not finalised their audit strategies;

    134.  Takes note of the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; welcomes that the mid-term revision of the MFF 2021-2027 allocated an additional EUR 2 billion to migration and border management for 2024-2027 to address the growing challenges in migration and border management resulting from the current geopolitical context; notes, however, that additional funds might be needed with a view to ensuring the full implementation of the Pact; calls for the quick implementation of the Pact in the Member States;

    135.  Stresses that securing the Union’s external borders is a pillar of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; notes with concern that the Commission reported that the number of irregular border crossings in the Union increased in 2023 to 380 000, compared to 330 000 in 2022; observes that the BMVI can support frontline Member States to ensure they have the resources for infrastructure, facilities and installations necessary to secure the external borders of the Union, including electronic border security enhancements and other tools for border surveillance as provided for in annex III of the BMVI regulation; notes the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 that the Union will step up its action to prevent irregular departures and loss of life, to reduce pressure on the borders of the Union and on reception capacities, to fight against smugglers and to increase returns; underlines the need to better protect vulnerable people from smuggling and trafficking networks and address the negative effects of the instrumentalisation of migrants as part of hybrid attacks, notably by pro-Russian forces, as well as by the Belarusian regime;

    136.  Recalls that, according to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States and the Commission must ensure respect for fundamental rights and compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the implementation of Union funds;

    137.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the AMIF 2014-2020 was performing below expectations in terms of facilitating returns of migrants: also takes note of the fact that the Court and the Commission agree that progress in this area was particularly affected by COVID-19-related travel restrictions; further notes that in 2023 return measures were supported with EUR 29,8 million from the AMIF; considers that the Commission must provide stronger efforts to assist Member States in addressing irregular border crossing and in successfully implementing returns of third-country nationals, as well as the integration of legal migrants; looks forward to receiving consolidated information in 2025 on progress in this regard through the ex-post evaluation AMIF 2014-2020; highlights that the Commission should continue to take action on migration and asylum within the framework of external action, including the ‘Team Europe’ approach while also increasing the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries and safeguarding the role of the Parliament;

    Recommendations

    138.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) address the Court’s recommendations in a thorough and timely manner and share DG HOME’s revised ex-ante methodology, once completed, with the discharge authority;
       (ii) continue to support the Member State managing and audit authorities in the timely finalisation of their audit strategies for MFF 2021-2027 funds, paying particular attention to eligibility and procurement issues, as well as all other recurrent findings of the Court;
       (iii) take action to improve the performance of actions funded by the Union in terms of effective returns and combatting irregular migration, while ensuring the full respect of Union legislation and the fundamental values of the Union;
       (iv) take action to increase the efficiency of Union spending on the protection and management of the European Union’s external borders;
       (v) monitor, assist in and scrutinise the timely progress of the administrative, operational and legal steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full implementation of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum by 2026;
       (vi) increase the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries, while safeguarding the role of Parliament in ensuring the democratic scrutiny of Union spending;
       (vii) continuously assess, in the implementation of the Union Budget, compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulation;

    Security and Defence

    139.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ was EUR 1,4 billion (0,7 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 500 million (38,4 %) for the European Defence Fund (EDF), 300 million (19 %) for military mobility, 200 million (17,1 %) for decentralised agencies, namely the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Europol and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), 200 million (13,1 %) for the ISF, and 200 million (12,4 %) for nuclear safety, decommissioning and other areas;

    140.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 5 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 25 % of ISF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    141.  Notes with concern that, for the reasons explained in the section on migration and border management, the Court cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ and that, based on its audit results, the Court considers expenditure from this heading to be high-risk; therefore, invites the Court to provide an estimate of the error rate for this heading as well; notes that the Commission concludes that in 2023 the risk at payment was 0,5 % for the expenditure on security and defence;

    142.  Observes that the Commission has not accepted the Court’s recommendation to carefully check and document the technical aspects of military mobility grant applications to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) during the grant award procedure and that the Commission considers that its current processes already ensure a check on whether dual-use infrastructure projects meet the eligibility conditions;

    143.  Recalls the highly unstable geopolitical situation in the Union’s neighbourhood giving rise to greater security and defence challenges, including hybrid threats, and thereby to greater investment needs in security, defence and preparedness, since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; draws attention to the fact that MFF heading 5, dedicated to security and defence, is the smallest of all MFF headings and regrets that the Union’s current budget for ensuring the security and defence of its citizens is not equal to the challenges to be met either in the short or the long term; notes that in 2023 Union funding in support of the defence industry came exclusively from the EDF; recalls the role played by the EDF in supporting European technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies; welcomes that submissions to the 2023 EDF calls increased by 72 % compared to the previous year, demonstrating the strong and constantly growing interest of European defence industry actors and research organisations in the EDF and the high demand for funding in this sector; notes that under the 2023 calls, the Union committed EUR 1,15 billion for 61 defence R&D projects, benefiting 581 legal entities from 26 Member States and Norway; notes that on average 17 entities from eight different Member States and Norway participate in each project; underlines the importance of a level playing field in supporting cross-border defence R&D cooperation;

    144.  Welcomes the Commission’s actions to enhance support for SMEs in the defence sector, in particular appreciates that the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which provides a diverse range of instruments tailored to support SMEs within the defence ecosystem, became fully operational in 2023, with EUR 224 million allocated to it from the EDF budget; appreciates, further, the role of the SME bonus under the EDF in facilitating the access of smaller actors and innovators in defence supply chains; notes that in the 2023 EDF calls, 42 % of the entities selected for funding were SMEs, an increased share compared to 2022 (38,2 %), and that 18 % of the total funding available through the EDF calls is allocated to SMEs;

    145.  Recalls that the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) was a precursor programme of the EDF with a budget of EUR 90 million that funded 18 research projects selected following calls for proposals in the years 2017 to 2019; further recalls that the Court, in its Special Report 10/2023 ‘The Preparatory action on defence research’, has observed that the Union still lacked a long-term strategy for the projects under the EDF, particularly in terms of impact, additional research, development, manufacturing and procurement; welcomes that the Commission has accepted all of the Court’s recommendations and has confirmed that their implementation is ongoing; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s adoption of a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and legislative proposal establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as well as its commitment to build up the EDF; nevertheless, in view of the geopolitical realities the Union faces, is concerned that the full implementation of the Court’s recommendations is expected only in 2026;

    146.  Recalls the Court’s observations in its Special Report 10/2023 regarding the limited availability of human resources at the Commission and the subsequent risk for the EDF; notes that the growing number of proposals to evaluate and projects to manage puts considerable pressure on human resources; further notes the large share of seconded national experts (17 %) among DG DEFIS staff in 2023 and DG DEFIS’s intention to reinforce staff by the selection of officials through specialised EPSO competitions in the field of space and defence, for which the reserve lists were finalised in November 2023;

    147.  Notes that the implementation of ‘Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0’ is ongoing, with EUR 1,74 billion allocated for dual-use transport infrastructure projects under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) between 2021-2027; notes that so far the Union has co-funded 95 military mobility projects in 21 Member States and that 94 of these projects are still ongoing and most of them are expected to be finalised between 2026 and 2027; notes with concern that following three calls for proposals organised in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the entirety of the military mobility envelope under the CEF for the current programming period has thereby already been exhausted; considers that although making the budget quickly available by frontloading amounts into the 2022 and 2023 calls responded to the need to take into account the evolution of the security situation in Europe following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it simultaneously led to Union funding being unstable and unpredictable by leaving a gap of more than four years with no more Union funds available for military mobility calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects until the post-2027 MFF; recalls the Court’s conclusions in its Special Report 04/2025 that the Action Plan was not built on sufficiently solid foundations and that progress towards its objective, namely ensuring swift and seamless movement of personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale, has been variable due to design weaknesses and remaining obstacles to implementation; notes that the Commission considers that more action is needed to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure corridors, including on regulatory issues such as cross-border movement permission procedures; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission had not carried out a robust assessment of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable; regrets that only EUR 300 million was spent on military mobility in 2023 and is concerned that calls for proposals under the military mobility envelope faced a four-time oversubscription rate, demonstrating the increased interest among Member States and project beneficiaries;

    148.  Expresses deep concern over the Commission’s decision to proceed with the adoption of the “Rearm EU” initiative without prior consultation of the European Parliament; regrets that such a decision bypasses the principle of institutional balance and undermines Parliament’s role as co-legislator in shaping strategic and budgetary priorities; urges the Commission to refrain from initiating substantial policy instruments that impact the Union’s financial and strategic architecture without ensuring full respect for the prerogatives of the Parliament;

    149.  Notes that the European Parliament has called on the Union and its Member States to put in place a legal framework enabling Russia to be classified as a State sponsor of terrorism;

    Recommendations

    150.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) develop a longer-term strategy for the EDF, building on the experience with Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the Court’s recommendations, as soon as possible;
       (ii) secure the provision of adequate resources to enhance Union defence cooperation, in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and the timely recruitment of expert staff, and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;
       (iii) further strengthen military mobility in the Union by substantially increasing the funding available to improve dual-use transport infrastructure corridors and by taking action to eliminate administrative, procedural and regulatory barriers to cross-border military movements, while prioritising Union funding to projects that best respond to the current European threat landscape; taking into account the Court’s findings and recommendations in special report 04/2025;
       (iv) take action to ensure due diligence in relation to project criteria for dual-use military mobility infrastructure projects, in line with the Court’s recommendation;

    Neighbourhood and the world

    151.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ was EUR 15,2 billion (7,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 63,4 % for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe), 16,4 % for Humanitarian Aid (HUMA), 16 % for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) and 4.2 % for other actions and programmes; notes that in total, payments for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ reached 15,2 billion in 2023, representing approximatively 8 % of the overall Union expenditure excluding RRF;

    152.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 72 transactions, which is not adequately representative of the spending under this MFF heading and, therefore, cannot provide an estimate of the error rate; considering that the Court’s audit results show that this is a high-risk area (of 37 out of 72 transactions audited, i.e. 51.4 %, were affected by errors), invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for this chapter; notes that the Court found 31 errors that had a financial impact on the Union budget, relating to ineligible beneficiaries, ineligible costs, expenditure not incurred, and breaches of public procurement rules, areas that could point to risks of unreliable functioning of control mechanisms;

    153.  Notes, additionally, that the Court detected 19 cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions, none of which had direct financial impact on the Union budget, and which included issues such as ambiguous cost allocations, non-compliance with visibility rules, and inadequate documentation;

    154.  Is concerned that the Court found a significant non-compliance with visibility rules in an EU-funded project under indirect management by DG NEAR, which concerned a contribution agreement worth EUR 21,2 million signed with an international organisation in a project where the aim was to support Eastern partnership countries in tackling COVID-19; notes that the Court found that most donation certificates it checked did not contain any acknowledgment that the medical equipment donated was funded by the Union; recalls that beneficiaries of Union funds are required to clearly publicise the fact that the Union has financed or co-financed the action they are implementing; notes the Commission’s replies that it is discussing new communication and visibility guidelines with the United Nations to reduce the risks of errors on compliance with visibility rules;

    155.  Expresses concern that the Court, in its IT audit on the information system OPSYS’ component for managing user access and rights, found three shortcomings including (i) that the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) had not formalised a procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users; (ii) four cases in which standard users had more access rights than they needed for their jobs, which is not in line with the Commission’s IT standards; and that (iii) DG INTPA did not manage all administrator accounts belonging to staff of other directorates-general; is concerned that these weaknesses increase the risks of both inappropriate access to the system and non-compliance with the rules and procedures for implementing external action projects, and also undermine the integrity of system processes and data;

    156.  Notes that the Commission intensified communication with international organisations in order to raise awareness of the need to ensure that the Court’s auditors obtain full access to documents when auditing projects funded by the Union, and that the Commission has supported initiatives to find permanent solutions to the issues of access to and retention of documents; notes, however, the Commission’s acknowledgment that despite efforts, some constraints regarding access to documents persist due to the existing legal frameworks of the implementing partners, which are not expected to change in the near future;

    157.  Urges the Commission to enhance the rule of law conditionality-based approach of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) III funding in order for the instrument to serve its purpose of effectively preparing accession countries to fulfil the conditions of becoming Member States of the Union; reiterates its calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the Court’s Special Report 01/2022 in order to ensure an effective impact of Union financial assistance in support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans, in particular by developing guidelines on the application of the provisions on modulation and conditionality under IPA III;

    158.  Stresses that Union aid should under no circumstances – directly or indirectly – be financing terrorism, hence it should not support any entity connected to Hamas or any other terrorist or extremist organisation; notes to this end, it is legitimate and necessary to be able to clearly know and identify all the final beneficiaries of European aid in third countries; emphasises the need for strict control over the distribution and use of aid to ensure no misuse of funds;

    159.  Notes with regret that the European Commission financed the Gaziantep Islamic Science and Technology University, which has proven ties to terrorist organisation of Hamas; calls on the Commission to cancel all ties to this university and other universities with ties to terrorist organisations;

    160.  Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering enhanced support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, to also make full use of trusted partners, such as the WHO, WFP UNICEF or different Red Crescent organisations; recalls the importance for the Commission to guarantee independent controls of UNRWA by external experts, the Court and experienced international partners;

    161.  Notes that the Commission has been working in the last months with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS on the allegations of involvement of 19 of its staff in the 7th October 2023 attack, and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA on the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Group led by former French Minister of Foreign Affairs Colonna to strengthen control and oversight; notes that the Commission has reassessed the Union’s 2024 funding decision for UNRWA and that, through an exchange of letters between Commissioner Várhelyi and UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, the Union reached an agreement about the Union’s conditional assistance for UNRWA, linked to a number of milestones in relation to three work streams, including the screening of UNRWA staff, an audit by the Union, as well as the reinforcement of the Department of Internal Investigations and Ethics office; notes that Union assistance was resumed;

    162.  Recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards by the next school year, in particular those that contain antisemitism as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance classification endorsed by the Union, incitement to violence, hate speech, and glorification of terrorism; recalls the provisions of previous discharge resolutions; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards, that all anti-Semitic references are deleted, and that examples which incite to hatred and violence are removed, as repeatedly requested in the resolutions accompanying the discharge decisions; recalls the findings of the Georg Eckert Institute’s report funded by the Union, which revealed a complex picture on the textbooks; notes that the Union does not fund the Palestinian textbooks, and that neither are they the responsibility of UNRWA, which nevertheless reviews all issued textbooks to address any problematic content;); notes that the Commission will carry out close scrutiny to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly, to the drafting, teaching, or exposure of such educational materials to Palestinian children, including those provided by UN organisations;

    163.  Notes DG NEAR’s acknowledgement in its AAR 2023 that projects in Kyiv received regular visits but security constraints limited on-site monitoring and project visits in other Ukrainian regions; further notes that the constraints on adequately monitoring projects in Ukraine led to a renewed reservation in the 2023 AAR of DG NEAR and that corrective actions are being implemented, such as monitoring progress on project implementation through desk reviews, remote solutions and using a service provider;

    164.  Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO; welcomes, in addition, that, pursuant to article 36 of the Ukraine Facility Regulation, the Commission established in June 2024 an Audit Board, with the mission of assisting the Commission in assessing the effectiveness of Ukraine’s management and control systems regarding the funds provided under the Facility and in fighting mismanagement of Union funding under the Ukraine Facility; calls on the Commission to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

    165.  Notes with concern the recent reports on the findings of a draft audit report paid for by the Commission on the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) Secretariat which allege to suspected fraud, unpaid salaries and further liabilities; notes that as reported the Commission has contributed EUR 3,7 million to the Secretariat in 2023 and is trying to recover EUR 3,6 million as of March 2024; asks the Commission to ensure full transparency and accountability, grant access to the audit report and inform the members of Parliament on the concrete steps taken;

    166.  Calls on the Commission in line with the Court’s recommendations in its opinion 03/2024 to integrate into the new MFF legislative proposal the recommendations of the External Action Guarantee complementing the Commission’s evaluation, including increased use of blending (grants) in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society;

    167.  Is concerned about the allocation of EFSD+ under the new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope in favour of benefiting countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs, and fragile and conflict-affected countries; calls for reporting on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in these countries and for transparency on how the quota of allocations to LDCs within country MIPs is respected within allocations of the regional MIPs;

    168.  While recognising the Global Gateway strategy as a concerted Union response to global challenges, reiterates that actions bringing together public and private investment must always be guided by the legal framework as provided by the NDICI Regulation, the Agenda 2030, and the needs of partner countries, as communicated by way of an honest dialogue at eye level; is concerned about inconsistencies surrounding Global Gateway programmes; calls, therefore, for improved transparency, democratic accountability, robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in Global Gateway and Team Europe initiatives; calls for a centralised, publicly accessible platform, regularly updated, to detail Global Gateway projects, including their objectives, funding sources, implementing partners, and expected outcomes;

    European Development Fund (EDF)

    169.  Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 140 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 31 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 87 transactions authorised by 14 EU delegations(20) and 19 payments approved by Commission headquarters;

    170.  Notes with concern that, out of the 140 transactions examined, 62 (44,3 %) contained errors, compared to 57 (40,7 %) in 2022 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 52 errors (48 in 2022), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2023 to be 8,9 % (7,1 % in 2022);

    171.  Highlights with concern that the three most common types of errors in the financial year 2023 related to expenditure not incurred at 45 % (51 % in 2022), to absence of essential supporting documents at 31 % (7 % in 2022) and to ineligible expenditure at 23 % (24 % in 2022);

    172.  Notes the Commission’s replies to written questions to Commissioners Jutta Urpilainen and Oliver Varhelyi that in 2023 approximately 45 % of the total errors are due to excess clearing, a practice where expenditure not incurred is included in the accounts as expenditure incurred, and that therefore such errors are temporary, since they will no longer exist after the final clearings; notes furthermore that, to reduce these temporary errors, the Commission has requested its partners to review their reporting templates to allow for easier identification of incurred expenditure, and that DG INTPA launched a special working group to screen the compliance of relevant organisations through a risk management framework; also notes that DG INTPA is currently reviewing its control strategy, which aims also to identify how ex-ante controls can be strengthened and to improve the reporting of the pillar-assessed organisations to the Commission; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the effects of these actions;

    173.  Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and also on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of this review;

    174.  Is concerned that, as in previous years, some international organisations provided only limited access to documents (e.g., in read-only format), which hindered the planning, execution and quality control of the Court’s audit and led to delays; notes that audit and control issues were discussed with UN entities on several occasions, including in the context of joint technical reference group meetings and the relevant EU-UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) working group; notes furthermore that the Commission is working with the International Organisations concerned and has intensified communication with them on the Court’s access to documents; encourages, as in previous years, the Commission to increase these efforts;

    175.  Stresses that, according to Court’s assessment, the Residual Error Rate (RER) study does not constitute an assurance engagement or an audit and is based on the RER methodology and manual provided by DG INTPA; notes that DG INTPA clarifies that the RER study is meant to be a key indicator for the estimated financial impact of residual errors, i.e., it measures the proper functioning of the internal control system and thus, demonstrates the Commission’s corrective capacity; stresses that, as in previous years, the Court has found limitations in the study; notes, furthermore, the Court’s opinion, as in previous years, that the RER methodology allows the contractor to rely entirely on the results of DG INTPA´s controls, and that relying on the work of other auditors is contrary to the purpose of an RER study; highlights the Court’s finding that in cases where these previous checks were carried out under the FAFA between the European Commission and the United Nations, the contractor is not always able to carry out additional substantive testing as the FAFA limits the Commission’s verification rights; highlights the Commission’s reply which recognised the limitations in terms of controls set in the FAFA; urges the Commission to look for workable solutions to resolve this issue;

    176.  Recalls that two EUTFs were created under the EDFs; recalls that EUTF for Africa has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, with 88 % of contributions (EUR 4,4 billion) coming from the EDF and the Union budget; deplores that, despite several requests from Parliament, the process of managing and allocating these funds still lacks transparency; is concerned by the Court’s findings in its Special report 17/2024 “The EU trust fund for Africa Despite new approaches, support remained unfocused; notes that, despite an innovative approach to identifying human rights risks in a difficult environment, these risks were not comprehensively addressed and that the Court found that the assessment of potential risks to human rights was not comprehensive; recalls that the Commission is unable to identify and report on the most efficient and effective approaches to reducing irregular migration and forced displacements in Africa according to the Court; regrets that the new monitoring system aggregates information from all EUTF projects, but suffers from issues of data accuracy; notes that the Union’s Africa trust fund is set to be phased out in 2025;

    Recommendations

    177.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations:

       (i) as regards the OPSYS application system, formalise and enhance the procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users, enhance the quality of the new software, and allocate resources needed to enhance its maturity and robustness;
       (ii) strengthen guidance and controls to ensure that organisations implementing contracts under indirect management, including international organisations, international financial institutions and state agencies, comply with visibility rules;
       (iii) continue to intensify its communication with international organisations in order to provide the Court with complete, unlimited and timely access to documents necessary to carry out its task in accordance with the TFEU, and not just in read-only format;
       (iv) put in place adequate ex ante and ex post control measures in unstable or conflict zones to ensure the proper control of spending of Union funds and ways to recover the Union funds;
       (v) take measures to improve controls systems for the clearing of pre-financing paid to international organisations;
       (vi) strengthen ex ante controls before accepting expenditure;

    178.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) strictly monitor through all available mechanisms and work with UNRWA to ensure the implementation of all agreed actions to guarantee that UNRWA works in full compliance with humanitarian principles and neutrality, including in the forthcoming EU-UNRWA joint declaration and the upcoming financing decisions for conditional Union assistance;
       (ii) ensure that all contracts involving Union funds fully respect applicable Union legislation, including accountability, transparency, and sound financial management, and that this includes verifying that there are no subcontractors, natural persons, participants in workshops and/or trainings or recipients of financial support made to third parties subject to Union restrictive measures or involved in the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as well as other acts of hatred and incitement to hatred;
       (iii) increase evidence-based targeting of geographical areas and beneficiaries, and improve the accuracy of reported achievements of future development action, including through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe;

    European public Administration

    179.  Notes that the Commission is directly responsible for the implementation of 59,1 % of the overall administrative budget of the Union, equivalent to EUR 7,2 billion; further notes that 70 % of the administrative expenditure relates to human resources including pensions while the remaining primarily covers expenditure related to buildings, equipment, energy, communications and IT; notes with satisfaction that also for 2023 the Court concludes that the spending area is low risk;

    180.  Notes that during 2023, 2152 civil servants left the Commission primarily due to retirement, resignation or the end of their contracts; notes that this represents a relatively high turnover, which should give the Commission ample possibilities to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

    181.  Encourages the Commission together with EPSO to ensure that necessary technical systems are put in place as quickly as possible and that processes are accelerated in order for the Commission and other Union institutions to be able to rely on EPSO for the selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions;

    182.  Appreciates that female representation in management positions increased from 46,1 % in December 2022 to 47,8 % in December 2023; encourages the Commission to continue to focus on ensuring and maintaining gender balance on all levels of management;

    183.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission has implemented policies to enhance work-life balance and staff well-being, including the right to disconnect; at the same time commends that a new decision on the prevention and fight against harassment was adopted which establishes the position of a Chief Confidential Counsellor as key figure in the fight against harassment; stresses the need to provide this position with the appropriate resources to effectively carry out multiple challenging tasks;

    184.  Acknowledges the progress of the Commission with regard to the internalisation of crèche staff;

    185.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission issued updated versions of the guidelines on ethical standards for participation of the Members of the European Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament and guidelines for the participation of Members of the Commission in election campaigns at Member State level; further commends that in March 2023, the Commission adopted much needed strengthened rules on missions and costs paid by third parties;

    186.  Stresses the need to ensure that all the Union Institutions in Luxembourg can attract staff to all types of jobs and careers; notes that especially for servants in lower pay grades Luxembourg can be a less attractive option due to the costs of living; notes that with the agreement on the budget for 2025 the first step has been taken by establishing a special housing allowance for staff in lower grades working in Union institutions in Luxembourg;

    187.  Notes that the Commission has an ambitious goal of reducing the overall office space of the Commission by 25 % and the number of buildings by 50 % by 2030 compared to 2020; notes that the total reduction in overall space reached a little over 83 000 m2 in 2023, equal to a reduction of 11 %; welcomes that this goal is an important element in the Commission achieving carbon neutrality and reducing administrative costs; stresses that it is important that the reduction in the number of building and office space and the resulting roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;

    188.  Is concerned about the severe delays, including delays of up to 6 months, faced by civil servants across the institutions when receiving the reimbursements of healthcare costs under the institutions’ sickness insurance scheme; is also concerned about the inadequate treatment of civil servants and MEPs with autoimmune diseases, neurological disorders, COPD (obstructive pulmonary disease), long COVID, undiagnosed and rare diseases by the sickness insurance scheme of the institutions; notes that patients with these symptoms are often not reimbursed for their diagnostic tests;

    189.  Notes that, in 2023, the Ombudsman launched 398 inquiries concerning the Commission; further notes that during 2023 the Commission received 187 closing decisions without remarks and 17 decisions of maladministration; notes with concern that the Ombudsman receives many citizens’ complaints about extreme delays in gaining access to requested documents from the Commission and encourages the Commission to strive to speed up the processing of such requests and further reduce the number of decisions of maladministration and establish clear rules concerning access to all types of written texts whether on paper, email, text messages or any other form of communication, which is part of an administrative process related to Commission policies or decisions; notes that out of the nine investigations related to the Commission concluded by OLAF in 2023, seven were closed with recommendations; calls on the Commission to ensure transparency and accountability in the follow-up to these cases;

    190.  Expresses deep concern that there has been allegations of corruption linked to the Commission; at the same time deplores that there has been allegations about officials from the Commission that allegedly accepted gifts from a country that the Union was negotiating an agreement with; stresses the need for a clear and systematic approach to ensure that all OLAF cases involving relevant potential criminal offences are promptly referred to the EPPO and the competent national authorities; calls on the Commission to reinforce relevant rules and procedures in order to ensure that all cases are handled in a strict, correct and efficient way;

    191.  Notes that only very few cases of psychological and sexual harassment have been recognised as such in the past years and expresses concern that this may point to institutional blind spots in the Commission, given the significant number of employees of the institution;

    192.  Expresses deep concern regarding reports of an ongoing investigation involving the former Commissioner for Justice, who is alleged to have been engaged, during his time in office, in money laundering activities involving funds of unknown origin; calls on the Commission to fully cooperate with the Belgian authorities and to urgently clarify whether these activities were in any way connected to his official duties within the Commission;

    193.  Calls on the Commission to prioritise permanent staff over external consultants and contractual staff, in order to guarantee high quality working conditions and to prevent knowledge and experience from being lost; calls for flexibility for DGs with a high proportion of seconded national experts (SNE) in the establishment plan to convert SNE posts into temporary agent posts with the aim of ensuring better expertise retention, operational functionality and business continuity; further insists on avoiding the externalisation of tasks to consultancies when available know-how can be found in-house;

    194.  Notes that, in recent years, the Commission has increasingly outsourced impact assessments to external companies, raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to strengthen provisions to prevent possible conflicts of interest and to provide better guidance to staff handling public procurement procedures for policy-related service contracts;

    195.  Regrets the alleged espionage organised by the Hungarian Government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent any violations;

    196.  Welcomes the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2023/2841(21); takes note of cybersecurity investments, including EUR 30 million allocated to enhancing digital security in the Commission; calls on the Commission to spare no effort in further developing a cybersecurity culture, promoting training and awareness within the Union institution; stresses the importance of continued adequate investments in cybersecurity towards the longer term indicative target in the order of at least 10 % of total IT spending;

    197.  Reiterates its concern that the significant risks to the security and protection of the registry and operating mechanism of the Union system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading against cyberattacks have still not been adequately addressed; points out that this issue has been highlighted in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) since 2010, with reservations raised in each report; notes that this concern is once again emphasised in the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s 2023 AAR, further underscoring the persistent failure to prioritise the security of the system;

    European Schools

    198.  Notes that the European Schools’ overall budget for 2023 was EUR 417,5 million primarily funded by the Commission, other Union institutions, Member States and fees from parents; further notes that almost 80 % of the budget was spent on staff costs;

    199.  Notes with satisfaction that the Court is able to conclude that nothing has come to their attention that causes them to believe that the consolidated accounts for 2023 are not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards;

    200.  Observes that the Court found some systematic or recurrent weaknesses in payments and related human resources (HR) and procurement procedures including insufficient verification of supporting evidence affecting the regularity of some HR procedures and payments;

    201.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) ensure that Union Institutions can rely on EPSO to efficiently organise and complete selection procedures and other staff related procedures in order to provide Union Institutions with sufficient highly qualified and motivated candidates for open positions;
       (ii) explore all possibilities to correct significant geographical and gender imbalances in different categories of the staff;
       (iii) continue work on measures that will ensure that Union Institutions based in Luxembourg can continue to attract highly qualified staff for all types of job profiles;
       (iv) ensure that the roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;
       (v) make more staff available for processing of reimbursement requests for the sickness insurance scheme, to improve staff training and to have better IT software available to process requests more quickly;
       (vi) act as a role model, particularly for diseases that do not fall into classical fields and rare diseases; urges the Commission to expand their technical knowledge and handling of these cases; urges the Commission to expand the catalogue of tests eligible for reimbursement to include a wider bandwidth for laboratory tests and other diagnostic procedures and exams as well as treatments; urges the Commission to do this promptly;
       (vii) ensure the rapid introduction of strong protective mechanisms for Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and third countries, safeguarding their rights;
       (viii) support the European Schools in their implementation, as soon as possible, of recommendations by the Court from previous years and the recommendation from the report concerning the financial year 2023 which asks the schools to perform systematic checks of supporting evidence on allowances paid to seconded staff;
       (ix) prepare a report analysing the reasons why the vast majority of harassment complaints (requests for assistance) in the Commission are dismissed, most of them without even opening an administrative inquiry, and recommending how such dysfunctionality of the formal procedure can be addressed;
       (x) ensure that as of 2025, requests for assistance in harassment cases are followed up with a proper administrative inquiry by the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) or OLAF so as to ensure that harassers are held accountable and sanctioned proportionately to their wrongdoing;

    CHAPTER II – Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    General remarks

    202.  Notes that in 2023, 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) were revised, and that these revisions had an impact on the pace of implementation of the existing plans, causing delays; notes at the same time that the political priorities in Member States can change; notes that increased energy prices, high inflation and supply chain disruptions caused by Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, and, in some cases, natural disasters, contributed to the revision of the RRPs; underlines that the delays caused by the revisions of the RRPs came in addition to existing ones, as shown by the significant differences between the foreseen calendar of payments requests and the actual transmission of these requests by the Member States to the Commission; remains concerned by the risk of under-implementation and of failure to reach the milestones and targets (M&Ts) as agreed in the RRPs; emphasises the need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms to ensure that delays do not disproportionately impact key projects;

    203.  Notes that there should be a clear thematic link between reforms and investments and that there may be, in certain cases, a long delay between the creation of the national recovery plans and the completion of milestones and targets; regrets that the RRF design does not allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to emerging crises in a prompt manner;

    204.  Draws attention with utmost concern to the statement of the President of the Court, arguing that approximately half of the RRF disbursements had not reached the real economy, and questions if the other half may have been used either to substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or generate profit to Member States from the increased interest rates;

    205.  Recalls that the RRF is a temporary recovery instrument based on performance, i.e. that payments are linked to the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts related to reforms and investments included in the national RRPs; stresses that the effectiveness of the RRF must be assessed, not only in terms of disbursement, but also in terms of its ability to generate tangible, long-term improvements of the consequences of the pandemic; recalls that there is no definition in the RRF Regulation of the “satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts”; recalls that each national plan should effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the European Semester, particularly the country- specific recommendations (CSRs) adopted by the Council; notes the fact that, thanks to the RRF, the percentage of CSRs with progress has increased by 17 % between 2021 and 2023;

    206.  Notes that in 2023, the Commission disbursed a total of EUR 75 billion, and additional pre-financing payments of EUR 7,1 billion, which brought the total disbursements by the end of 2023 to EUR 220,8 billion, divided into EUR 141,6 billion in grants (40 % of the total EUR 357 billion for grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) envelope) and EUR 79,2 billion in loans (27 % of the total EUR 291 billion for loans under the RRF envelope); mandates detailed reporting requirements on how Member States allocate funds, preventing substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures, and ensuring funds reach intended beneficiaries;

    Court’s observations

    207.  Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; is concerned that the Court concluded that seven out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were affected by quantitative findings and that six of these payments were affected by material error; notes that in the Court’s opinion, except for those matters, the RRF expenditure accepted in the accounts for the year 2023 is legal and regular in all material respects; notes that the nature of the RRF spending model relies on the assessments of milestones and targets (M&Ts) to be made by the Commission; notes that in 2023, the Court checked 452 M&Ts included in 23 grant payments and that it does not provide an error rate due to the nature of the RRF’s spending model but estimates the minimum financial impact of its findings to be above the materiality threshold; is convinced that Member States should also bear responsibility for errors detected in post-disbursement;

    208.  Expresses deep concern that the Court was unable to verify the actual financial impact of erroneous or ineligible RRF payments due to the inherent limitations of the milestone and target-based assessment model; calls on the Commission to develop a more transparent error-tracking methodology to prevent misallocation and inefficiency;

    209.  Notes that the Court audited 325 out of 542 milestones and 127 out of 135 targets included in 2023 payment requests for grants; regrets that the Court considers that 16 of them were affected by regularity issues (2.4 % of the total); is concerned by the fact that the Court considers that the requirements had not been satisfactorily fulfilled for seven M&Ts in six payments and that the Commission had still made the corresponding payments; notes that the Court’s conclusions are based on extensive audit work and regrets that the Commission contests some of the Court’s conclusions; notes that all of the RRF payments must be assessed against the framework communicated and applied by the Commission, which must take into consideration for each payment the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee and the scrutiny by Member State experts under the comitology procedure; requests the Commission to ensure that all disputed payments related to unsatisfactorily fulfilled M&Ts undergo independent external review to strengthen public trust in the process; recommends an introduction of real-time tracking systems for disbursements and expenditures to prevent misallocations under the RRF and the MFF;

    210.  Notes with particular concern that the Court has identified nine potential cases of ineligible M&Ts linked to the continuation of a pre-existing project that either started before the eligibility period, or that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure; regrets the lack of clarity in the RRF Regulation, and does not share the Commission’s interpretation that the eligibility period concerns only the date of start of works on a specific project rather than the beginning of the preparatory or projection phase; regrets that such a view led to measures which were planned before the RRF eligibility period being included in the RRPs, and acknowledges that any measure must respect the scope, objectives and eligibility conditions set by the RRF Regulation; calls on the Commission to implement stricter verification mechanisms to prevent the inclusion of pre-existing projects that do not provide added value under the RRF framework;

    211.  Recalls that RRF funds shall not be used to replace recurring budgetary expenditure, unless in duly justified case; and is preoccupied by the Court’s findings that some M&Ts that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure were not adequately justified in the RRPs;

    212.  Notes with concern the Court’s finding that NGEU borrowing may more than double by 2026 while the bulk of repayment is deferred to future MFFs; recalls that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must start before the end of 2027, if unused appropriations remain available in the budget line to cover NGEU financing costs, and be completed by 2058 at the latest; notes that the Union budget exposure at the end of 2023 is expected to rise in 2024 and 2025, mainly due to RRF loans; is concerned that potential changes in market conditions might result in higher borrowing costs which, for the NGEU debt relating to grants, will have to be borne by the Union budget; is concerned that there is to date still no repayment plan for the NGEU common debt, and that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument, NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences for the Union’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas;

    213.  Notes the Court’s finding that payments from RRF were lower than expected in 2023; emphasises that the Court has criticised the slow disbursement and absorption of RRF funds; is concerned by the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that absorption of RRF funds has progressed with some delays, that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period for which a significant proportion of funds have already been paid out, and that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period is more challenging with an increase in number of M&Ts, a shift from reforms to investments and more advanced stage of implementation, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year;

    214.  Notes, conversely, that according to the Commission the achievement of M&Ts is broadly on track, as by 31 August 2024, over 40 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed to Member States, with the disbursement of grants reaching 48 % and loans slightly exceeding 30 %; notes that the pace of payment requests has also accelerated since the second half of 2023 with the revision of the RRPs linked to the introduction of the REPowerEU chapters was finalised in 2023;

    215.  Notes the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that additional reasons for slow absorption included measures not being suited to the RRF’s timeframe and underestimation of the time needed to implement them (due to public procurement and state aid rules); as well as uncertainties on implementing rules and how they should be applied including lacking guidance on the ‘do no significant harm’ principle (DNSH) and how to ascribe to it;

    216.  Expresses strong concerns about the Court’s observation that point to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member States control systems as this poses a risk to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the Union’s financial interests; recalls that, according to the RRF Regulation, Member State control systems have a key role to play in ensuring that the financial interests of the Union are protected effectively; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary, including imposing financial corrections, and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    217.  Expresses concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report N°22/2024 on ‘Double funding from the EU budget: Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to cost’; highlights that Member States can propose so-called ‘zero cost measures’, i.e. measures estimated to have no costs to be financed by the RRF, and for which there is no check at all for double-funding, as the Commission considers that measures which receive no RRF funds are free of risk from that perspective; also notes with concern the Court’s findings that from Member States’ perspective, the many layers of governance involved including national, regional or municipality level, make coordination and oversight very challenging; is concerned that when checks are performed, (i) they suffer from a very complicated environment with different IT tools used often not interoperable and data recorded in an often non-standardised way, leaving manual cross-checks across databases as the only possible tool to check for double funding, and (ii) Member States’ control systems rely to a large extent on self-declarations by recipients of Union funds; notes, however, that the Court did not find any case of double funding;

    218.  Notes the Commission’s observation that, according to the RRF Regulation, double funding is explicitly linked to budgetary costs and thus, there can be no double funding if the Member State has not submitted any cost estimate linked to a specific measure as part of its national plan; notes that the Commission underlines that no-cost reforms do not increase the financial envelope but are nevertheless essential criteria for the Commission’s positive assessment of RRPs, as well as their full implementation for the relevant payments; points out that the Commission, shortly after the Court audit field work, acknowledged it had identified the first two potential cases of double funding;

    219.  Recalls that Article 9 of the RRF Regulation establishes additionality and complementarity between Union programmes and instruments funding as key principles; believes that, to respect these principles but avoid the risk of double financing, the same measures already included in other national plans benefiting from Union funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should either not be included in RRPs or more thoroughly described, even if they do not incur any costs, in order to avoid double funding; underlines that due to the different model of implementation, double funding between RRF and other Union financing instruments might be more difficult to identify, and urges the Commission to remain vigilant and pro-active in identifying any potential situation of double funding;

    220.  Regrets the lack of adequate safeguards to prevent double funding of projects under both the RRF and other Union financial instruments; calls for an automated cross-checking system between RRF and cohesion Funds, the Common Agricultural Policy, and other Union funding programmes to detect and eliminate duplicate claims;

    221.  Expresses concern about the Court’s finding in its Review 01/2023: ‘EU financing through cohesion policy and the RRF: A comparative analysis’ that reporting of fraud involving RRF expenditure still lacks a standardised approach with strong coordination and cooperation between Member States, which are obliged to report on cases of suspected fraud not in an integrated IT system, but in the management declaration accompanying every payment request, although Member States have also reported cases outside of the management declarations; regrets that there are no clear guidelines about exactly when a case of suspected fraud should be reported, whether there is a reporting threshold, and what standard information should be reported for each case and about the remedial measures taken; furthermore supports the request made by the Court to the Commission in the same review 01/2023 to obtain sufficient assurance from the Member States on the effectiveness of national systems to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest;

    222.  Expresses concerns that in 2023 the Commission had to introduce 10 additional control milestones for seven Members States to address the weaknesses identified in their control systems; reminds and supports the Court’s evaluation that the fact control milestones were introduced, which means that Member states systems were not fully functional when the plans started to be implemented, posing a serious risk to the regularity of the of the RRF expenditure and to the protection of financial interests;

    223.  Regrets the findings of the Court’s Special Report No 26/2023 that several policy areas in the RRF’s pillar containing health policies lack a corresponding common indicator to measure progress; is concerned that this impedes the proper monitoring and understanding of progress made towards achieving milestones and targets linked to health policies;

    224.  Welcomes that, in 2023, the Commission made progress in eliminating any possibility of misinterpretation of figures of the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and that the Scoreboard further addressed the related recommendation of the Court to improve the presentation of data displayed on the Scoreboard and to improve explanations with regard to its limitations, in particular by better explaining the underlying methodologies and explicitly stating, where applicable, that the data is estimated;

    Audit and control

    225.  Welcomes that, based on the Court’s recommendations and the experience gained, the Commission, in 2023, published three methodological notes to clarify the application of the RRF Regulation, including its framework for (i) assessing the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts, upon conducting an assessment, and (ii) the application of the provisions related to the reversal of M&Ts, as well as a methodology to determine the amount to be suspended if a milestone or target is not satisfactorily fulfilled; takes note of the updated Guidance on RRPs, adopted on 19 July 2024, which provides additional guidance to ensure the continued adequacy of controls to identify and avoid any risk of double funding as well as the methodology for reductions and recoveries under the RRF in accordance with Article 24(8) of the RRF Regulation;

    226.  Calls on the Commission to increase the number of ex-post audits and on-the-ground inspections for RRF-funded projects, particularly in high-risk sectors such as digital infrastructure, energy where previous Union funding programmes have identified significant irregularities;

    227.  Warns that the inclusion of pre-existing projects and the substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures within the RRF framework undermines the additionality principle, effectively converting the instrument into a backdoor financing mechanism for Member States’ regular budgets, rather than fostering genuine post-crisis recovery and resilience; calls for an urgent review to prevent further dilution of the RRF’s purpose;

    228.  Advocates more decisiveness on the part of both the Commission and Member States in order to detect irregularities in the spending of RRF funds and to recover undue payments;

    229.  Is concerned with the Court’s counter-reply to the Commission’s replies on the existence of an assurance gap at Union level regarding compliance with Union and national rules on public procurement and State aid; notes that the Commission argues that the assurance provided by DG ECFIN covers the effectiveness of Member States’ controls on compliance with public procurement and state aid rules. however, stresses that while DG ECFIN’s AAR refers to Commission assessments of the existence and effectiveness of Member States’ controls, there is no conclusion regarding their effectiveness; expresses concern that, according to the Court, this represents an important limitation of the scope of the Commission’s declaration of assurance, meaning that the Commission still does not provide full assurance as to whether RRF expenditure – which the Commission manages directly – complies with the rules;

    230.  Stresses that delays in disbursement and absorption of RRF funds not only slow down economic recovery but also create substantial risks of last-minute, low-quality spending towards the end of the RRF period; calls on the Commission to introduce stricter interim evaluations to prevent a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rush that could lead to waste and misallocation;

    231.  Notes with serious concern that Member States may strategically forego their final payment requests to avoid fulfilling politically sensitive milestones and targets, thereby evading necessary but unpopular reforms; calls on the Commission to introduce financial penalties for incomplete RRF implementation to prevent manipulation of the payment structure;

    232.  Notes that the Commission’s replies that it extended the scope of its audit work beyond that required by the RRF Regulation to verify that the control procedures put in place in the Member States give the necessary assurance that Member States regularly and effectively verify compliance with public procurement and State aid rules and eligibility for RRF measures, but disagrees with the Commission’s opinion that the conclusions of DG ECFIN’s Annual activity report cover this;

    233.  Notes with concern that, as stated by the Commission in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, a majority of Member States consider that the payment suspension methodology remains unclear when it comes to reforms because of the discretion given to the Commission in applying the methodology; urges the Commission to revise this methodology in order to avoid any double standards in its application;

    234.  Notes that the Commission’s IAS, in its audit on ex-ante controls of the RRF payment requests carried out in 2023, identified a very important issue according to which DG ECFIN, in cooperation with the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, should further develop and formalise the existing guidance for the cases where DG ECFIN requests that Member States make additional commitments concerning action stemming from audit and control milestones, in particular that the guidance should define (i) how DG ECFIN should follow up the fulfilment of the formal confirmation on the Member State’s commitment, (ii) the criteria for determining the deadlines for the Member States to fulfil the commitments, and (iii) the relations between the ‘commitment framework’, the ‘framework for assessing M&Ts under the RRF Regulation’ and the ‘Reversal of M&Ts under the Facility’;

    235.  Notes that the Commission checks during its “Protection of the Financial Interest of the Union” audits that Member States have a clear and codified process for transmitting cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and double funding to all competent authorities, including the EPPO where relevant;

    236.  Is concerned by the Court reporting in its annual reports that by the end of 2023, the EPPO had 206 active investigations related to funds used to implement RRF measures and estimated potential damages of over EUR 1,8 billion (concerning both national and Union funding); notes that the 206 open investigations concern ten Member States, with around 75 % of these cases coming from one country; is worried that at the end of 2023 the Member States’ management declarations had not reported a single case of detected suspected fraud, meaning that none of the EPPO open cases were reported by Member States themselves, casting doubts on Member States’ ability to detect and fight frauds; stresses that, while no investigation has yet been completed, the figures presented by the EPPO confirm that the risk of fraud is present in the RRF, and that they call into question the reliability of Member State management declarations in terms of reporting detected fraud and the remedial measures taken; calls for urgent reinforcement of fraud detection mechanisms, including a mandatory fraud risk assessment for all large-scale RRF projects; calls on the Commission to ensure that the EPPO has adequate resources to investigate cases of fraud related to RRF expenditure, given the increasing number of investigations and high estimated damages;

    237.  Warns that Member States’ self-reported fraud cases under RRF remain significantly underreported, creating a misleading picture of financial integrity;

    238.  Strongly regrets the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations and use the Irregularity Management System (IMS);

    239.  Recalls that the Financial Regulation recast in force since 30 September 2024 (‘FR recast’) provides for the extension of its scope of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management and direct management in cases where the budget is implemented with Member States, for programmes adopted or financed as from 1 January 2028; calls on the Commission to act on the most serious grounds for exclusion in order to better protect the financial interests of the Union;

    240.  Notes that, with a view to reducing the margin between the Commission and the Court, for different interpretations of M&Ts, the Commission has published its approach to the concepts of the start date of a measure and the concept of ‘substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure’ as Annex II and Annex III of its 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the RRF; re-iterate its calls on the Commission to keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;

    Implementation and impact

    241.  Urges the Commission to minimise risks that Member States might chose not to receive parts or the entire amounts of the last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last M&Ts and jeopardising the overall implementation of the RRPs; is extremely concerned about the additional risks of measures being reversed after the RRF lifetime, and urges the Commission, when making the final payments, to ensure that such situations will not occur;

    242.  Emphasises that, according to the Commission’s mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, Member States highlighted the need to mobilise more resources than initially planned to revise the RRPs, and that the efficiency of the performance-based approach is reduced by the ‘excessively complex procedures’ for the plan modifications, which do not distinguish between major or minor amendments and require Council approval for any modification;

    243.  Stresses that for control and audits in the RRF, Member States should put in place arrangements to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests, and that the Commission performs ex-post and system audits on M&Ts; stresses that some confusion persists with respect to the role of the Court, which has developed a strategy (2021-2025 Strategy) for carrying out its responsibilities for the NGEU programme and the RRF, which some Member States perceive as an unnecessary overlap and administrative burden; is concerned that the Commission, both in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024 and its RRF Annual Report of 10 October 2024, acknowledged that Member States’ authorities at all levels found the audit and control procedures to be too complex, and that Member States complained about overlapping audits by national authorities, the Commission and the Court; fully supports the Court work on the RRF; welcomes that the Commission has admitted and accepted that the Court has a full audit mandate on RRF, which is one of the foundation for the Parliament discharge on the RRF funds; recommends to the Member States to cooperate with the European Court of Auditors;

    244.  Is concerned that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation highlighted the entry costs for Member States’ administrations, with room for further simplification; notes, according to this Commission’s Annual Report, that concerning the design of the instrument, in the mid-term evaluation Member States referred to the combined obligations linked to (i) the evidence needed to prove fulfilment of M&Ts, (ii) demanding reporting requirements, for example the common indicators and the bi-annual data; and (iii) the audit and control framework; recalls that Member States see room for simplifying control and audit procedures, ensuring better coordination among the actors involved and avoiding multiple checks; also notes, again according to the Commission RRF Annual Report 2024, that some national authorities also pointed to inflexibility in the Commission’s assessment of milestones and targets and the rigid and resource-intensive procedures to revise RRPs;

    245.  Notes that one of the objectives of the RRF is to help Member States to implement ambitious reforms and investments that make their economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and prepared for the green and digital transitions; highlights with concerns the finding of the Court in its Special Report 15/2024 underlining the lack of relevance, quality and comparability of data submitted by the Member States, with data insufficient to evaluate progress on climate adaptation in the Member States, and thus paving the way for possible greenwashing; expresses concern that the RRF could become a financial vehicle for superficial rebranding of conventional expenditures as ‘green’; encourages the Commission to introduce a mechanism within the RRF framework to track the environmental impact of investments and ensure alignment with the Union’s climate objectives;

    246.  Highlights the RRF impact on the Union business and SMEs; notes that RRF has provided EUR 78 billion in direct support to SMEs, representing 12 % of total RRF expenditure, and that broader measures benefiting businesses amount to EUR 152 billion (23 % of total RRF spending); notes that EUR 2,75 million SMEs, approximately 11 % of all active SMEs in the Union, have received support through the RRF; underlines that nearly 600 000 businesses have benefited from digitalisation initiatives, while EUR 5,2 billion have been allocated to green transition projects, including renewable energy and hydrogen;

    247.  Highlights with concern that the facilitation of cross-border projects has not worked out; deplores that, despite the inclusion in the RRPs of several measures linked to Important Projects of Common Interest (‘IPCEIs’) and cross-border measures in the REPowerEU chapters, the national governance of the Facility has not sufficiently promoted cross-border cooperation; strongly insists that Union financing should be better linked with the achievement of common Union objectives and should generate EU added value;

    248.  Emphasises that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation acknowledged the insufficient involvement of Member States of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations, social partners, and other relevant stakeholders in the preparation and the implementation of the national RRPs; calls for their close involvement in the implementation of the national RRPs on the ground;

    249.  Urges the Commission not to approve any revision of RRPs, which may lead to a re-packaging of planned reforms or investments into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation; notes that any revision should always aim to create added value and increase synergies;

    Transparency

    250.  Recalls that, while Member States are not required to publish all data on final recipients, Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council(22) amending the RRF Regulation requires Member States to publish information on the 100 final recipients receiving the highest amount of funding under the RRF; welcomes that on 10 October 2024, the Commission published, as part of the RRF Annual Report 2024, a dedicated Annex to provide further clarity on the concept of final recipients under the RRF Regulation and the scope of the publication of data on the largest 100 final recipients; expresses deep concern over the interpretation of the Commission of the concept of “final recipient” under the RRF, as often they are listed only at the ministry level, and that the descriptions are vague, with many examples available in almost all lists provided by Member States; reiterates its demand that the list of 100 largest final recipients provides the factual natural person or entity that is the last in a chain of money transfers to be made available in a publicly accessible database to enhance accountability and enable independent oversight, while respecting the legal framework of Union data protection; is concerned that otherwise it will be problematic to measure the impact and guarantee visibility of the RRF funds to the citizens, although also takes into account the RRF Scoreboard and the project map; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance, to prevent a similar interpretation from being applied to the transparency provisions in other financial regulations;

    251.  Reminds the Commission that the letter and spirit of the RRF Regulation must be strictly followed, and that the adoption of guidelines or other internal documents must be fully in line with the results of the negotiations between the co-legislators; is convinced that this has not been the case when the Commission adopted the provisions related to the interpretation of what a “final recipient” is in its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU;

    252.  Notes that not being able to ascertain final recipients of RRF funding poses a severe risk to the transparency and traceability of Union funds and thus to the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    253.  Recalls that a robust IT infrastructure is essential for data collection, programme monitoring and evaluation, and that managing authorities and beneficiaries are critical of the level of information required and duplication with other domestic systems; notes that, in contrast to the Cohesion Policy, the Court under the RRF pointed to the different structures and approaches used by national monitoring authorities, which could be perceived as less reliable by providing non-homogeneous information and leaving room for a potentially high number of errors; stresses that, in this respect, centralised interoperable systems facilitate efficient data collection and reporting, while fragmented systems underscore the need for streamlined approaches;

    254.  Welcomes that the ‘FR recast’ establishes horizontal measures for a centralised website (Financial Transparency System) at Union level, covering all recipients of Union funding, and notes that this website is due to overcome the current fragmentation, enhance transparency, and facilitate public scrutiny of recipients; notes that the Commission, as from the next MFF (i.e. post 2027) will be required to use the relevant data stored in the data mining and risk-scoring tool, Arachne, to feed the centralised website for transparency purposes, and that, in line with data protection rules, the website will include only public data, e.g. relevant data on recipients, contractors, subcontractors, and beneficiaries; further stresses that all Member States will have an obligation to provide the Commission with access to this data, to be fed into Arachne by automated means; regrets that the use of Arachne by Member States is not compulsory;

    255.  Notes that the final M&T of the national RRPs must be completed by 31 August 2026 according to Articles 18(4) and 20(5) of the Regulation; recalls the need for the Commission to work closely with every Member State to speed up implementation on the ground including through providing regular guidance and, upon request, technical assistance to help the implementation of the plans; re-iterates its concerns about the possibility of the reversal of M&Ts after the lifetime of the RRF, and urges the Commission to prevent such situations;

    256.  Calls on the Commission to reject any request of revision of RRPs which would lower the overall ambition of the plan or would eliminate important structural reforms from the RRPs, and to prioritise the completion of measures related to CSRs in RRPs; further calls on the Commission to step up its technical assistance to Member States lagging behind in the RRF implementation;

    Recommendations

    257.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its Annual Report as well as those of its related special reports, and welcomes that the Commission accepts the vast majority of them; calls on the Commission to implement them and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    258.  Calls on the Commission to grant full access to the Court to the new reporting tool on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), FENIX as soon as possible;

    259.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) carefully balance auditing and control requirements with the administrative burden imposed on Member States and beneficiaries of future performance-based instruments, while maintaining a sufficient level of control and audit that would grant a solid protection of the Union financial interests;
       (ii) closely monitor the continued fulfilment of M&Ts, in particular those related to audit, monitoring and control and ensure an adequate monitoring of any potential reversal of previously completed M&Ts;
       (iii) use the results of its checks on Member States control systems to express a clear conclusion on their effectiveness and take all appropriate measures;
       (iv) establish one single contact point for Member States on the Statement of Assurance at the Commission to which the Court can have access without further burdening Member States with requests for additional proofs;
       (v) record and monitor systematically all irregularities and all frauds affecting RRF funds;
       (vi) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the “final recipients”, of the RRF Regulation, by revising its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU, and to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of “final recipients”; calls on the Commission to come forward with proposals requiring Member States to publish details of all final recipients;
       (vii) streamline its control on the M&Ts through the implementation of a Single Audit approach, which would allow reduction of the administrative burden, the consolidation of audit responsibilities between the Commission and the Court, the coordination of audit timelines and requirements to avoid duplication and overlapping controls and audits, but at the same time ensuring the full protection of the Union financial interests;
       (viii) support Member States in making IT systems truly interoperable, so as to facilitate efficient data collection, reporting and exchange between various government departments and agencies to allow the minimisation of the risks of double funding, actively cross-check between relevant databases, and communicate with Member States about their administrative capacities to ensure double funding does not occur; notes in this regard, the positive examples provided at the Court Conference on Transparency and Traceability of EU Recovery and Resilience Funding in October 2024;
       (ix) work closely with Member States to ensure that M&Ts, in particular those of a structural nature or linked with CSRs, are fully and diligently implemented, and that no revision of RRPs will be approved in cases where ambition has been lowered or important measures have been weakened; avoid, to the extent possible, the revision of plans that would represent a “re-packaging” of planned measures into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation;
       (x) strictly apply the provisions of the RRF Regulation, including those regarding suspension of payments or recoveries of amounts, in particular if the protection of the financial interests of the Union is not ensured;
       (xi) apply very strictly the methodology on partial payments, including as regards structural measures and measures linked to the implementation of CSRs;
       (xii) develop a methodology based on quality and comparability of data to evaluate progress on green and digital transitions, as well as the tangible benefits, in the Member States;
       (xiii) ensure that Member States diligently apply the visibility provisions of the RRF, making sure that measures implemented through the Facility are adequately flagged as funded by the Union;
       (xiv) provide technical assistance, administrative support and advice to Member States to strengthen their administrative capacity, including through the organisation of regular meetings of the Informal Expert Group on the implementation of the RRF to discuss technical aspects and encourage the exchange of good practices amongst national authorities;
       (xv) perform, whenever a revision of the RRPs is proposed, a comprehensive analysis of new and existing measures and whether they would substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or would be in breach of other eligibility conditions of the RRPs;
       (xvi) provide training and support to Member States to increase administrative capacities including training on specialised skills, knowledge and providing examples of best practices;
       (xvii) keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;
       (xviii) use the recommendations of the Court from its work on the RRF and the experience gained in the implementation for the design of the next multiannual financial framework architecture including the implementation of future Union performance-based instruments;
       (xix) strengthen the design of future performance-based instruments by ensuring a closer link between disbursements and progress in implementation;
       (xx) ensure that any future revision, as well as the overall implementation, of RRPs is done in close cooperation with and consultation of local and regional authorities, and other relevant stakeholders in order to maximise the RRP’s impact;
       (xxi) analyse the weaknesses present in performance-based instruments, and address these weaknesses when designing new programmes in the future;
       (xxii) build, in the next MFF, on a high-level of interoperability and data exchange between various government departments and agencies to facilitate efficient data sharing and real-time updates across multiple platforms in order to allow to track overlapping projects, minimising the risks of double counting and double funding.
    (1) The 11th EDF covers the 2021-2027 MFF.
    (2) ‘The future of European competitiveness’, 9 September 2024.
    (3) Special report 05/2024: EU Transparency Register – provides useful but limited information on lobbying activities.
    (4) Special Report 11/2025 Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs – despite progress, the overview is still not reliable.
    (5) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (6) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783.
    (7) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (8) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (9) ECA Special Report 07/2024: The Commission’s systems for recovering irregular EU expenditure – Potential to recover more and faster.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (11) COM(2023) 258.
    (12) ECA Special Report 16/2024: EU revenue based on non‑recycled plastic packaging waste – A challenging start hindered by data that is not sufficiently comparable or reliable.
    (13) Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements (OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/822/oj).
    (14) ECA 2023 Annual Report para 1.35.
    (15) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).
    (16) Commission Decision of 13.12.2023 on the reassessment, on the Commission’s initiative, of the fulfilment of the conditions under Article 4 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 following Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 regarding Hungary, C(2023)8999.
    (17) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).
    (18) Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj).
    (19) Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).
    (20) Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, The Gambia, Togo and Uganda.
    (21) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj).
    (22) Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: SCMA visits Hungary and Egypt to promote development opportunities in GBA

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    SCMA visits Hungary and Egypt to promote development opportunities in GBA 
         While in Beijing, Mr Tsang led the HKSAR Government delegation to meet with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ms Hua Chunying and leaders of various bureaus to deepen their understanding of the country’s foreign policies and the latest developments of the international situation. He expressed his gratitude to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its staunch and continuous support for the HKSAR and hoped it would continue to provide support and guidance the HKSAR Government in handling external affairs of Hong Kong, to support Hong Kong in intensifying international interaction and co-operation, and to showcase the successful implementation of “one country, two systems” to the world.
     
         In addition to the visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Tsang also met with the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the Committee on Liaison with Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Overseas Chinese of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and toured the China Foreign Affairs University. Before leaving Beijing tomorrow, he will visit the Museum of Early Revolutionary Activities of the Communist Party of China in Beijing (the Red Building of Peking University), one of the main venues of the May Fourth Movement, meet with Hong Kong students in Beijing, and visit the Office of the Government of the HKSAR in Beijing to receive briefings on its work.
     
         Mr Tsang will depart Beijing for Budapest, Hungary, in the early hours of May 15. He will attend the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area – Europe (Hungary) Economic and Trade Cooperation Exchange Conference co-organised by Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao on May 16. The conference aims to promote the enormous business opportunities brought about by the GBA to the Hungarian business community and how Hong Kong can play its important function as a “super connector” and “super value-adder” between the two places.
     
         During his stay in Hungary, Mr Tsang will meet with local political and business representatives to learn about the latest developments in the region and explore ways to further strengthen co-operation between Hungary and Hong Kong, with a view to opening up new opportunities for enterprises of both places.
     
         After completing his visit to Hungary, Mr Tsang will depart for Cairo, Egypt, on May 17 and attend the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area – Africa (Egypt) Economic and Trade Cooperation Exchange Conference on May 19 to promote the latest developments and the development potential of the GBA, as well as Hong Kong’s unique advantages under “one country, two systems”. During his stay, he will exchange views with representatives of the local political and business circles to understand the local development trends and promote interface between the industries of Hong Kong and Egypt.
     
         The Commissioner for the Development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, Ms Maisie Chan, and the Director-General of Investment Promotion, Ms Alpha Lau, will join the visit.
     
         Mr Tsang will depart from Egypt on the evening of May 19 and return to Hong Kong on May 20. During his absence, the Under Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, Mr Clement Woo, will be the Acting Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs.
    Issued at HKT 19:24

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Woodbridge, Connecticut, Man Admits $2.3 Million Pandemic Relief Program Scheme

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    Marc H. Silverman, Acting United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, today announced that on May 9, 2025, YASIR G. HAMED, 60, of Woodbridge, waived his right to be indicted and pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge Stefan R. Underhill in Bridgeport to offenses stemming from a scheme to defraud a COVID-19 pandemic relief program of more than $2.3 million.

    In March 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act provided emergency financial assistance to Americans suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization of forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other expenses through the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”).  The PPP was overseen by the U.S. Small Business Administration (“SBA”), and individual PPP loans were issued by private lenders, which received and processed PPP applications and supporting documentation, and then made loans using the lenders’ own funds, which were guaranteed by the SBA.

    According to court documents and statements made in court, Hamed, an accountant, had an ownership interest or representative relationship with several New Haven-based businesses, including Access Consulting and Professional Services Inc.; Connecticut Medical Transportation Inc.; Arabic Language Learning Program Inc.; Institute for Global Educational Exchange Inc.; Access Medical Transport Inc.; Ikea Car & Limo Inc.; Center of the World Tours, North America LLC.; and Sudanese American Friendship Association Inc.  Between June 2020 and September 2021, Hamed submitted fraudulent PPP loan applications on behalf of these companies, overstating employee numbers and average monthly payroll, and making other fraudulent representations.  As part of the applications, he submitted false tax filings that had never been filed with the IRS.

    Hamed also submitted PPP loan applications on behalf of companies owned by his clients.  In at least one instance, Hamed convinced the owner of a business, which he knew was not active and had no employees, to seek PPP funding.  Hamed prepared the paperwork for the PPP application and then took a significant portion of the loan proceeds.

    Through this scheme, Hamed obtained than $2.3 million in PPP loans for his businesses and for his clients, receiving more than $1 million in loan proceeds for himself and his family, and significant kickbacks from his clients.  Hamed used the funds for personal expenses, including education expenses for a family member, and for a downpayment on a $880,000 house in Woodbridge that he purchased in October 2020.

    Hamed has agreed to pay $2,384,772 in restitution.

    Hamed pleaded guilty to bank fraud, which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 30 years, and engaging in illegal monetary transactions, which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years.  Judge Underhill scheduled sentencing for August 8.

    Hamed was arrested on November 13, 2024.  He is released on a $500,000 bond pending sentencing.

    This investigation has been conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation Division.  The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher W. Schmeisser.

    Individuals with information about allegations of fraud involving COVID-19 are encouraged to report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud Hotline at 866-720-5721, or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at: https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Change of British High Commissioner to Fiji: Kanbar Hossein-Bor

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Change of British High Commissioner to Fiji: Kanbar Hossein-Bor

    Mr Kanbar Hossein-Bor has been appointed British High Commissioner to the Republic of Fiji.

    Mr Kanbar Hossein-Bor has been appointed British High Commissioner to the Republic of Fiji, non-resident British High Commissioner to the Republic of Kiribati and His Majesty’s non-resident Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, in succession to Dr Brian Jones who will be transferring to another Diplomatic Service appointment.  Mr Hossein-Bor will take up his appointment during July 2025.

    Curriculum Vitae

    Full name: Kanbar Hossein-Bor

    Year Role
    2021 to 2025 FCDO, Deputy Director Democratic Governance and Media Freedom Co-ordinator
    2018 to 2020 Dhaka, Deputy High Commissioner
    2015 to 2015 Monrovia, Chargé d’Affaires
    2012 to 2015 FCO, Head, Libya Team
    2009 to 2012 The Hague, Head of International Tribunals and UK Agent to the International Court of Justice
    2006 to 2007 Baghdad, Legal Adviser and Head of Justice and Human Rights Section
    2006 to 2009 FCO, Legal Directorate
    2002 to 2005 Barrister, Private Practice

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: Russia-China ties on full display on Victory Day – but all is not as well as Putin is making out

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    Chinese troops participating in Russia’s Victory Day parade in Red Square, Moscow, on May 9 is a clear indication that President Xi Jinping is fully committed to his “no-limits” partnership with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.

    Xi’s own attendance of the parade, which came as part of a state visit to Russia, underlines that China is not only supporting Russia. It signified that Beijing wants this support to be understood clearly in Kyiv, Washington and European capitals.

    Travelling to Moscow and having his troops goose-step down Red Square was not a last-minute decision by Xi. Nor was the multitude of agreements signed by the two leaders and their joint declaration anything but part of a well established pattern of deepening relations between Russia and China.

    This trend has accelerated since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But the breadth and depth of China’s commitment to Russia at this particular moment is undoubtedly related to the broader upheaval in the international order that has been worsened since Donald Trump’s return to the White House.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    The Trump administration, possibly spooked by market wobbles, has taken steps to restore stability. China and the US have agreed a deal to slash the import tariffs they have imposed on each other. But uncertainty remains – above all about how the complex relationships in the triangle of Washington, Beijing and Moscow will work out and where this will leave the rest of the world.




    Read more:
    Trump, Xi and Putin: a dysfunctional love triangle with stakes of global significance


    On May 8, in the wake of Xi and Putin’s meetings in Moscow, Russia and China released a joint statement. It stressed the intention of the two leaders to “enhance the coordination of their approaches and to deepen the practical cooperation on maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability, as well as to jointly address common challenges and threats in this sphere”.

    They reiterated this determination in their press statements afterwards. Putin emphasised that he and Xi “personally control all aspects of [the] Russia-China partnership and do all we can to expand the cooperation on bilateral issues and the international agenda alike”.

    A Chinese read-out from the talks was similarly clear on the alignment between the countries. Xi reportedly said that “in the face of unilateralist countercurrents, bullying and acts of power politics, China is working with Russia to shoulder the special responsibilities of major countries and permanent members of the UN Security Council”.

    This unequivocal display of how close Moscow and Beijing are – as well as Putin and Xi personally – is important for both nations. For Russia, it remains important to demonstrate that western attempts at international isolation have not succeeded.

    For China, the very public consolidation of ties with Russia is above all a signal to the US. China is keen to stress that Trump’s efforts to engineer a split between Moscow and Beijing, which the American president described as necessary to “un-unite” the two nations during an interview with US talk show host Tucker Carlson in November 2024, have largely failed.

    However, beyond the glossy surface of the celebrations in Moscow, all is not as well for Russia as Putin is trying to make out. For all the public displays of friendship between Xi and Putin, the relationship between the two countries remains highly asymmetrical.

    Russia would not be able to continue to wage its war against Ukraine without Chinese support. Trade between Russia and China is critical to propping up the Russian war economy, reaching a record high of nearly US$250 billion (£190 billion) in 2024. Their trade has increased by more than 60% since 2021, yet it is only marginally up since 2023.

    China’s diplomatic clout is also helpful for Russia. If Beijing had taken an unequivocal stance opposing Moscow’s aggression, fewer leaders in the developing world would have sided with Putin.

    In this case, Russia would probably have lost organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Brics group of emerging economies as platforms to further its broader agenda of restoring its erstwhile status as a great power.

    In that agenda, Putin has been moderately successful. But with South Africa and India’s leaders absent from Russia’s Victory Day commemorations, the list of attendees was shorter than at the Brics summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024.

    A doubled-edged sword

    Notably absent from the celebrations in Moscow was high-level representation from North Korea and Iran. These are two key allies of Russia with whom Moscow signed strategic partnership agreements in June 2024 and January 2025, respectively.

    Tehran simply sent its ambassador to Moscow to attend. However, it may have compensated Putin in a different and materially more significant way.

    According to reports, Iran is readying a delivery of launchers to enable Russia to use the short-range ballistic missiles already delivered last year. This would further add to Russia’s reliance on Iranian hardware in Ukraine, which has so far been most visible in the use of Iranian-made Shahed drones.

    North Korea dispatched a military delegation led by three-star general Kim Yong-bok. Kim is widely considered the commander of North Korean forces fighting alongside Russian troops in the Kursk region of western Russia, where Ukrainian forces seized territory in August 2024 as a possible bargaining chip in future negotiations with Russia.

    Putin officially acknowledged the participation of North Korean troops in this operation in a statement on April 28. This acknowledgment came two days after he had announced the defeat of Ukrainian forces there in a highly choreographed and televised meeting with his chief of general staff, Valery Gerasimov.

    The demonstration of Russia’s close relationships with its three core allies – China, Iran and North Korea – is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it clearly indicates that Putin is far from isolated on the international stage.

    But it also signals that Russia has become a lot more dependent on these relationships than would befit Putin’s dreams of restoring Russia’s great-power status. Neither can be much comfort to Ukraine and its allies, unfortunately.

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    ref. Russia-China ties on full display on Victory Day – but all is not as well as Putin is making out – https://theconversation.com/russia-china-ties-on-full-display-on-victory-day-but-all-is-not-as-well-as-putin-is-making-out-256385

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Meet the women helping ensure that digital mental health technologies are safe, effective and developed considering the needs of the people who use them

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Meet the women helping ensure that digital mental health technologies are safe, effective and developed considering the needs of the people who use them

    Mental health apps are everywhere, offering everything from mood tracking to therapy. But with so many options, how can people tell what these tools actually do?

    Holly Coole and Grace Gatera. Credit: MHRA

    How do you know that mental health and wellness app on your phone actually works, is safe for you to use and has been developed in partnership with people who have real lived experience of mental health issues? And, how are such technologies being incorporated into our healthcare system to ease burden on staff and to ensure that interventions are available to patients when they need them?

    This Mental Health Awareness Week (12-18 May), meet two women from different backgrounds, united in their own lived experience of mental health issues, who are working together to ensure the digital mental health technologies (DMHT) – including the use of AI – that are being developed to support the growing need within our healthcare system are effective, safe and take into account the needs of those who use them.

    The women at the frontline of helping make digital tools safer and shaping the future of mental health care

    Holly Coole, registered mental health nurse and senior manager for digital mental health at the MHRA, leads on a digital mental health project in partnership with the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and funded by Wellcome, to improve access to safe, effective digital mental health technologies. This project will improve outcomes for people with mental health conditions by ensuring that both medical professionals and the public have safe and effective access to DMHTs.

    Not only does Holly bring a unique perspective, having worked directly with patients before moving into regulation, but she also has her own lived experience of an eating disorder and post-natal depression. Holly is currently working to provide clarity to the public and healthcare professionals around the key considerations for the regulation and evaluation of DMHTs.

    Grace Gatera is a dedicated mental health lived experience advocate living in Kigali Rwanda. As someone who has worked globally in lived experience specifically in mental health science, Grace is passionate about the crucial role of vulnerable and marginalized voices, including young people in shaping and being equal partners in the future of Mental Health. Grace acts as a lived experience advisor to the same project that Holly leads.

    Grace’s passion is fuelled by her own experience of living through the 1994 atrocities that were committed in Rwanda, with almost one tenth of the country’s population killed – having to flee to safety in Uganda with her family at a very young age.

    Grace strongly believes in lived experience being central to mental health science and practice, youth access to specialised and quality mental health care and medication, as well as their involvement in high level policy and decision making involving mental health. 

    How widely these technologies are used

    There are upwards of 10,000 digital health technologies available for use – for example, on platforms such as the App Store and Google Play as well technologies that may be used in healthcare services by patients themselves, clinicians or a combination of both – but these include a huge range of products, including tools that don’t meet the criteria or threshold for regulation in the UK. In short, there are a huge range of products out there.

    These technologies are helping ease the burden on healthcare staff and ensuring mental health interventions are available to patients when they need them

    There is an increasing reliance on technology to be able to support interventions and all sorts of processes across the healthcare system – to try and ease workload burden on healthcare staff, make sure interventions are available to people when they need them, make sure that waiting lists provision are adequately resourced, and so that there’s support for people, even at the point of referral – where clinicians are using assessment and triage tools for entry into services.

    There are lots of different ways in which the technology can be used in our healthcare system – for example:

    • Assessment and triage tools for clinicians at the point of referral to a service
    • Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) self-help apps and diaries
    • Virtual reality software for exposure therapy
    • Diaries for mood tracking over time and enabling people to monitor their results

    As demand in our health service for mental health and wellness support grows, we will see increasing use of these technologies.

    The importance of regulating these technologies and the role of the MHRA

    The regulation of DMHT is a growing public issue due to the rapid increase in the availability of mental health apps and other online tools. Many people rely on various DMHT tools to manage their symptoms, sometimes without professional support, but may not be aware of their effectiveness, risks, or the safeguards in place. 

    These tools also offer real potential to help manage rising demand for mental health services – supporting mental health professionals and health systems at large, but their safe and effective use depends on clear regulatory understanding.

    The MHRA is dedicated to improving outcomes for people with mental health conditions by enabling access to safe and effective digital mental health technologies. Our work on enabling regulation in digital mental health technology is part of the way we are putting the UK at the forefront of innovation in medical devices — our aim is to create smarter and safer technologies to benefit patients and the NHS

    The importance of ensuring these technologies are designed with involvement from people with lived experience

    Lived experience is unique, person-centred knowledge, insight and expertise. It brings important – and often overlooked – perspectives to the field of mental health.

    As a Lived Experience Advisor, with direct experience of trauma from years spent living under the shadow of mental illness after surviving the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Grace brings a first-hand understanding of mental health problems and knowledge of collective and systemic issues. This includes understanding how these issues impact people, the challenges with current interventions, and priorities for improving them. Her experience and knowledge is critical for finding ways to address mental health challenges – including through digital solutions.

    That’s why involving lived experience in the development of digital mental health technologies is more than good practice – it’s essential in shaping the future of mental health and for delivering interventions that genuinely help the people who need them.

    What the public should look out for when using these technologies

    We would advise, when deciding if they want to use a particular digital mental health technology, that people look for references to whether the product has been through rigorous testing or clinical trials to make sure it’s appropriate for its intended use and the population that it’s designed to serve and is fundamentally safe and effective for use. There may also be references to how the product has been developed.

    We would also advise that, with regards to medical devices and specifically in this context software as medical device (SaMD), that the public look for a CE or a UKCA accreditation to state that the technology complies with those particular regulatory standards.  (This is provided that this particular tool meets the criteria or threshold for regulation in the UK, as they are not all regulated by us.)

    There are also all the other markers of a good digital product – such as cybersecurity, data protection and privacy policies that all need to be in place.

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Reconciliation Recommendations of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

    Source: US Congressional Budget Office

    Legislation Summary

    H. Con. Res. 14, the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2025, instructed the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform to recommend legislative changes that would decrease deficits by a specified amount over the 2025-2034 period. As part of the reconciliation process, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform approved legislation on April 30, 2025, that would decrease deficits.

    Estimated Federal Cost

    In CBO’s estimation, the reconciliation recommendations of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform would, on net, decrease deficits by $51.0 billion over the 2025‑2034 period. The estimated budgetary effects of the legislation are shown in Table 1. The costs of the legislation mainly fall within budget functions 550 (health), 600 (income security), 800 (general government), and 950 (undistributed offsetting receipts).

    Return to Reference

    Table 1.

    Estimated Budgetary Effects of Reconciliation Recommendations Title IX, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, as Ordered Reported on April 30, 2025

     

    By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars

       
     

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    2031

    2032

    2033

    2034

    2025-2029

    2025-2034

     

    Increases or Decreases (-) in Direct Spending

       

    Budget Authority

    -22

    -116

    -11

    -575

    -1,007

    -1,418

    -1,784

    -2,046

    -2,277

    -2,491

    -1,731

    -11,747

    Estimated Outlays

    -22

    -189

    4

    -560

    -992

    -1,403

    -1,771

    -2,046

    -2,277

    -2,491

    -1,759

    -11,747

     

    On-Budget

    -22

    -3

    -182

    -560

    -992

    -1403

    -1771

    -2046

    -2277

    -2491

    -1,759

    -11,747

     

    Off-Budget a

    0

    -186

    186

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

     

    Increases in Revenues

       

    Estimated Revenues

    9

    1,839

    4,229

    4,811

    4,802

    4,779

    4,747

    4,707

    4,664

    4,617

    15,690

    39,204

     

    Net Decreases in the Deficit

    From Changes in Direct Spending and Revenues

       

    Effect on the Deficit

    -31

    -2,028

    -4,225

    -5,371

    -5,794

    -6,182

    -6,518

    -6,753

    -6,941

    -7,108

    -17,449

    -50,951

     

    On-Budget Deficit

    -31

    -1,842

    -4,411

    -5,371

    -5,794

    -6,182

    -6,518

    -6,753

    -6,941

    -7,108

    -17,449

    -50,951

     

    Off-Budget Deficit a

    0

    -186

    186

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    a.Cash flows for USPS are recorded in the federal budget in the Postal Service Fund and are classified as off-budget direct spending.

    Basis of Estimate

    For this estimate, CBO assumes that the legislation will be enacted in summer 2025. CBO’s estimates are relative to its January 2025 baseline and cover the period from 2025 through 2034.

    Direct Spending and Revenues

    CBO estimates that enacting the legislation would decrease direct spending by $11.7 billion and increase revenues by $39.2 billion over the 2025-2034 period; the deficit would be reduced $51.0 billion over the 2025-2034 period (see

    The rate for most federal employees, Members of Congress, and Congressional staff who entered the system in 2013 would increase from 3.1 percent to 4.4 percent over the phase-in period. Contributions would remain constant at 3.6 percent for employees who entered in 2013 who are eligible for enhanced benefits and also subject to mandatory retirement. The contributions for FERS Further Revised Annuity Employees (those who entered after 2013) would remain constant at 4.4 percent of their annual salary over the phase-in period for most federal employees, Members of Congress, and Congressional staff and at 4.9 percent for employees who are eligible to receive enhanced benefits.

    Contributions paid by federal employees toward their retirement are recorded as revenues in the federal budget. CBO estimates that the proposed increases in employee contributions would increase revenues by $34.5 billion over the 2025-2034 period.

    Federal agencies also contribute to their employees’ retirement. For each increase proposed for employees, there would be a corresponding reduction for employing agencies. Reducing employers’ contributions for FERS employees (other than employees of the Postal Service, USPS) would reduce spending subject to appropriation by $31.8 billion over the 2025‑2034 period, CBO estimates. That, in turn, would reduce the intragovernmental offsetting receipts paid into the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF) by an equal amount. Because that budgetary action is contingent on future appropriations, the increase in the deficit from the decline in estimated offsetting receipts is not attributed to this legislation.

    By contrast, outlays by USPS are classified as off-budget direct spending. Reducing that agency’s contributions to employee retirement would result in smaller intragovernmental offsetting receipts being paid into the CSRDF, therefore increasing on-budget direct spending by that same amount.

    Under section 90001, the total amount of retirement contributions (employee plus agency shares) paid into the CSRDF would remain the same as under current law. That is, the legislation would replace some of the payments by agencies with payments by federal employees. CBO attributes budgetary savings to the proposal because employees’ contributions are classified in the budget as revenues, whereas agency payments are classified as intragovernmental transfers that are subject to future appropriation. If the reduction in intragovernmental transfers makes possible an offsetting increase in other appropriations, the net effect would be an increase in outlays—because an intragovernmental payment would be replaced by spending that goes outside the government.

    CBO estimates that reducing the USPS contribution rate for affected employees would reduce that agency’s required payments to the CSRDF by nearly $2.7 billion over the 
    2025-2034 period. That reduction of receipts into the fund would result in a nearly $2.7 billion increase in on-budget direct spending over the period. Because CBO projects that USPS will exhaust both its borrowing authority and its reserve funds in 2027, any savings to the Postal Service Fund from lower retirement contributions would be fully offset beginning in that year. As a result, CBO estimates that enacting the provision would result in a reduction in off-budget outlays in 2026 that would be offset by increased off-budget direct spending beginning in 2027 as USPS would spend the amount it saved from lower accrual payments to fund its operations.

    Elimination of FERS Annuity Supplement

    Under current law, certain FERS employees who retire before age 62 receive a supplement to their annuity that is intended to equal the amount they would receive from the Social Security Administration if they were eligible for Social Security benefits at the time of retirement.The annuity supplement ends when the retiree turns 62 or becomes eligible to receive Social Security benefits.

    Section 90002 would eliminate the annuity supplement for most newly retired people under FERS. Employees who retire under a mandatory authority would continue to receive the supplement as under current law. Current FERS annuitants and those who retire before enactment also would continue to receive the supplement.

    Using data from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), CBO estimates that about 21,000 new FERS retirees who do not retire under a mandatory authority are added to the annuity supplement rolls each year. In fiscal year 2025, the average annual supplement for affected annuitants would be about $18,000, CBO estimates. Those annuitants begin to receive the supplement, on average, at age 59 and would therefore receive the supplement for about three years. On that basis, CBO estimates that eliminating the supplement for new annuitants would reduce direct spending by $10.0 billion over the 2025-2034 period.

    High-5 Average Pay for Calculating CSRS and FERS Pension

    Most federal employees hired before 1987 are part of the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), the defined benefit pension plan that was replaced by FERS. Under current law, retirement annuities under both systems are based on a participant’s average salary over the three consecutive years with their highest earnings.

    Section 90003 would change the annuity calculation to use a five-year average for most CSRS and FERS employees who retire on or after January 1, 2027. The annuity calculation for employees who are subject to mandatory retirement would remain at the three-year average, as under current law.

    Using data from OPM, CBO estimates that about 90,000 employees who are not subject to mandatory retirement are added to the CSRS and FERS retirement rolls each year. Under current law, the average monthly benefit for CSRS annuitants was about $5,700 in fiscal year 2024; for FERS the average was about $2,300. Using the five-year average, rather than the three-year average, would reduce an affected retiree’s annuity by about 3 percent. CBO estimates that enacting section 90003 would reduce direct spending by $3.1 billion over the 2025-2034 period.

    Election for At-Will Employment and Lower FERS Contributions for New Federal Civil Service Hires

    Section 90004 would require most new federal civilian hires to choose either to serve as at-will employees or to contribute an additional five percent of their salary toward their retirement. The change would apply to employees hired or appointed after enactment. It would not apply to employees who cannot appeal adverse actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board, including most USPS employees. It also would exclude certain other employees, including positions excepted from the competitive service due to the confidential, policy focused nature of their work.

    At-will employees can have their employment terminated at any time without cause. Those employees retain protection under antidiscrimination laws, however, including laws that prohibit termination on the basis of race, sex, or religion. Under this provision, new hires who choose not to become at-will employees would retain civil service protections that require employers to show cause for any adverse personnel action and would retain the right to appeal employment termination.

    Based on data from OPM, CBO estimates that roughly 124,000 affected federal hires will enter FERS in fiscal year 2026 with an annual salary of about $71,000, on average. Using data about employees’ perceptions of job security and willingness to forgo current compensation for future benefits, CBO estimates that roughly one quarter of affected federal hires would choose to contribute an additional 5 percent of their salary toward retirement rather than enter into at-will employment. On that basis, CBO estimates that the larger retirement contributions of those who reject at-will employment would increase revenues by $4.7 billion over the 2025-2034 period.

    Federal agencies also are required to contribute toward employees’ retirement. Under section 90004, agencies’ contributions would decrease by the same percentage that employees’ contributions rise. CBO estimates that reduced employer contributions for FERS employees in agencies other than USPS would decrease spending subject to appropriation by $4.5 billion over the 2025-2034 period.

    CBO estimates that section 90004 would apply to roughly 10 percent of USPS employees. A reduction in USPS’s contributions for affected hires who do not choose at-will employment would reduce that agency’s required payments to the CSRDF (as well as receipts into the fund) by $112 million over the 2025‑2034 period, CBO estimates, thereby boosting on-budget direct spending by that amount. Because CBO projects that USPS will exhaust both its borrowing authority and its reserve funds in 2027, any savings to the Postal Service Fund would be fully offset beginning in that year. Thus, CBO estimates no net change in off-budget outlays by USPS over the 2025-2034 period.

    Filing Fee for Merit Systems Protection Board Claims and Appeals

    Section 90005 would direct the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) to impose fees for employees, former employees, or applicants for employment to file certain types of claims against federal agencies. Fees collected from claimants whose appeals are denied would be deposited into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. CBO expects that under this provision fewer claims would be filed than the 4,000 that are filed annually, on average, under current law. Using information from the MSPB, CBO estimates that enacting the provision would increase revenues by $3 million over the 2025‑2034 period.

    FEHB Protection

    Section 90006 would require federal agencies to verify the eligibility of enrollees’ dependents to participate in the FEHB program. That program provides health insurance to about 8 million federal workers and annuitants, including current and retired USPS employees, and coverage for their dependents and survivors. Verification would occur when the employee or annuitant starts or changes a dependent’s enrollment—for example, during open season, because of a change in employment, or in response to a qualifying life event, such as a marriage or the birth or adoption of a child. Within six years of enactment, the legislation would require OPM to conduct a verification audit of all dependents enrolled in the program. Dependents found to be ineligible would be denied enrollment or disenrolled. The legislation also would expand OPM’s annual assessment of fraud risk to include a risk assessment for enrollment by ineligible dependents.

    Agencies currently verify dependents’ eligibility at initial enrollment or when employees change their coverage at the time of a qualifying life event. OPM requires federal agencies to verify 10 percent of enrollment elections during open season. However, the Government Accountability Office has indicated that some ineligible dependents have been enrolled and that additional measures could be taken to reduce fraud in the program.

    Over the 2026-2034 period, the legislation would authorize OPM to spend $604 million from the FEHB trust fund to expand that agency’s oversight of the program, increasing outlays by the same amount. Authorized amounts would be for the following activities:

    • $474 million to develop, maintain, and conduct ongoing verifications for and oversight of the FEHB program’s enrollment and eligibility systems;
    • $80 million to audit enrollment of dependents; and
    • $50 million for program oversight by OPM’s Office of the Inspector General.

    Those amounts would be used in part for activities that would reduce enrollment in FEHB and result in smaller government contributions to premiums. CBO anticipates that OPM would implement the section’s auditing requirements using contracts with private-sector entities. Given the likely duration and complexity of such an undertaking, CBO expects that the audit would begin later in fiscal year 2026 and continue through 2031.

    Using data on the composition of enrollment in the FEHB program, along with information about the share of dependents removed as a result of other verification audits, CBO expects that implementing the section would cause enrollment to decline by about 100,000 people, on average, in each year over the 2026-2034 period, of which about 10,000 would be removed as a result of open-season verifications.

    Government contributions to premiums for federal annuitants and USPS employees are classified in the budget as direct spending. Therefore, a decline in FEHB enrollment among those groups would reduce direct spending. CBO estimates that about 35 percent of the people disenrolled would be ineligible dependents of federal annuitants and USPS employees, at an average annual cost of about $6,900 per dependent, for a total reduction in direct spending of $2.1 billion over the 2026-2034 period.

    In total, CBO estimates enacting the section would reduce direct spending by about $1.5 billion over the 2026‑2034 period.

    Uncertainty

    CBO’s estimates for the budgetary effects of enacting title IX are subject to uncertainty. Several areas in particular are difficult to estimate:

    • Anticipating federal employees’ responses to changes in FERS contributions and benefits is uncertain because decisions related to employment and retirement depend on a wide variety of individual circumstances.
    • Estimating new federal employees’ responses to a requirement to contribute a larger percentage of their salary toward their retirement or accept at-will employment is subject to significant uncertainty due to limited data and historical experience related to how workers have responded in similar situations.
    • Estimating the budgetary effects of section 90006 is subject to significant uncertainty because no similar verification audit of the FEHB program has been undertaken. CBO projected the cost of an audit, length of time required to complete an audit, the number of dependents who could be found ineligible, and the number disenrolled, but actual amounts could be larger or smaller than estimated. Moreover, given the inherent uncertainty concerning patterns of health care use by people who would be newly found ineligible, the reductions in spending that would be generated by an audit also could be larger or smaller than estimated here.

    Pay-As-You-Go Considerations

    The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or revenues. The net changes in outlays and revenues that are subject to those pay-as-you-go procedures are shown in Chief, Projections Unit

    Ann E. Futrell
    Acting Chief, Natural and Physical Resources Cost Estimates Unit

    Sarah Masi
    Senior Adviser, Budget Analysis Division

    Kathleen FitzGerald 
    Chief, Public and Private Mandates Unit

    Christina Hawley Anthony
    Deputy Director of Budget Analysis

    H. Samuel Papenfuss 
    Deputy Director of Budget Analysis

    Chad Chirico 
    Director of Budget Analysis

    Phillip L. Swagel

    Director, Congressional Budget Office

    Table 2.

    Estimated Changes in Direct Spending and Revenues Under Reconciliation Recommendations Title IX, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, as Ordered Reported on April 30, 2025

     

    By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars

       
     

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    2031

    2032

    2033

    2034

    2025-2029

    2025-2034

     

    Increases or Decreases (-) in Direct Spending

       

    Sec. 90001, Increase in FERS Employee Contribution Requirements

                       

    Budget Authority

    0

    0

    578

    415

    378

    341

    306

    273

    242

    214

    1,371

    2,747

    Estimated Outlays

    0

    0

    578

    415

    378

    341

    306

    273

    242

    214

    1,371

    2,747

     

    On-Budgeta

    0

    183

    395

    415

    378

    341

    306

    273

    242

    214

    1,371

    2,747

     

    Off-Budgetb

    0

    -183

    183

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    Sec. 90002, Elimination of FERS Annuity Supplement

                       

    Budget Authority

    -22

    -229

    -530

    -781

    -1,013

    -1,219

    -1,387

    -1,521

    -1,623

    -1,709

    -2,575

    -10,034

    Estimated Outlays

    -22

    -229

    -530

    -781

    -1,013

    -1,219

    -1,387

    -1,521

    -1,623

    -1,709

    -2,575

    -10,034

    Sec. 90003, High-5 Average Pay for Calculating CSRS and FERS Pension

                       

    Budget Authority

    0

    0

    -38

    -122

    -224

    -329

    -435

    -541

    -650

    -761

    -384

    -3,100

    Estimated Outlays

    0

    0

    -38

    -122

    -224

    -329

    -435

    -541

    -650

    -761

    -384

    -3,100

    Sec. 90004, Election for At-Will Employment and Lower FERS Contributions for New Federal Civil Service Hires

                       

    Budget Authority

    0

    0

    6

    7

    10

    13

    15

    18

    20

    23

    23

    112

    Estimated Outlays

    0

    0

    6

    7

    10

    13

    15

    18

    20

    23

    23

    112

     

    On-Budgeta

    0

    2

    4

    7

    10

    13

    15

    18

    20

    23

    23

    112

     

    OffBudgetb

    0

    -2

    2

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    Sec. 90006, FEHB Protection

                       

    Budget Authority

    0

    113

    -27

    -94

    -158

    -224

    -283

    -275

    -266

    -258

    -166

    -1,472

    Estimated Outlays

    0

    40

    -12

    -79

    -143

    -209

    -270

    -275

    -266

    -258

    -194

    -1,472

     

    On-Budgetc

    0

    41

    -13

    -79

    -143

    -209

    -270

    -275

    -266

    -258

    -194

    -1,472

     

    Off-Budgetd

    0

    -1

    1

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    Total Changes

                           

    Budget Authority

    -22

    -116

    -11

    -575

    -1,007

    -1,418

    -1,784

    -2,046

    -2,277

    -2,491

    -1,731

    -11,747

    Estimated Outlays

    -22

    -189

    4

    -560

    -992

    -1,403

    -1,771

    -2,046

    -2,277

    -2,491

    -1,759

    -11,747

     

    On-Budget

    -22

    -3

    -182

    -560

    -992

    -1403

    -1771

    -2046

    -2277

    -2491

    -1,759

    -11,747

     

    Off-Budget

    0

    -186

    186

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    (Continued)

    Table 2.

    Estimated Changes in Direct Spending and Revenues Under Reconciliation Recommendations Title IX, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, as Ordered Reported on April 30, 2025

    (Continued)

     

    By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars

       
     

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    2031

    2032

    2033

    2034

    2025-2029

    2025-2034

     

    Increases in Revenues

       

    Sec. 90001, Increase in FERS Employee Contribution Requirements

                       

    Estimated Revenues

    0

    1,768

    4,052

    4,525

    4,404

    4,270

    4,123

    3,967

    3,805

    3,634

    14,749

    34,548

    Sec. 90004, Election for At-Will Employment and Lower FERS Contributions for New Federal Civil Service Hires

                       

    Estimated Revenues

    9

    71

    177

    286

    397

    509

    624

    740

    859

    981

    940

    4,653

    Sec. 90005, Filing Fee for Merit Systems Protection Board Claims and Appeals

                     

    Estimated Revenues

    *

    *

    *

    *

    1

    *

    *

    *

    *

    2

    1

    3

    Total Changes

                           

    Estimated Revenues

    9

    1,839

    4,229

    4,811

    4,802

    4,779

    4,747

    4,707

    4,664

    4,617

    15,690

    39,204

     

    Net Decrease in the Deficit

    From Changes in Direct Spending and Revenues

       

    Effect on the Deficit

    -31

    -2,028

    -4,225

    -5,371

    -5,794

    -6,182

    -6,518

    -6,753

    -6,941

    -7,108

    -17,449

    -50,951

    On-Budget Deficitta,c

    -31

    -1,842

    -4,411

    -5,371

    -5,794

    -6,182

    -6,518

    -6,753

    -6,941

    -7,108

    -17,449

    -50,951

    Off-Budget Deficitb,d

    0

    -186

    186

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    a. The on-budget effect arises from reduced contributions by the Postal Service for FERS employees’ retirement, resulting in smaller deposits of offsetting receipts into the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund.

    b. The off-budget effect arises from reduced contributions by the Postal Service for FERS employees’ retirement. Under current law, CBO expects that the Postal Service will exhaust both its borrowing authority and its reserve funds in 2027. As a result, CBO expects that the savings to the Postal Service Fund under the legislation would be fully offset beginning in that year.

    c. The on-budget effect arises from reductions in enrollment in the FEHB program of dependents of federal annuitants.

    d. The off-budget effect comes from reduced Postal Service contributions for postal employees’ health benefits. Under current law, CBO expects that the Postal Service will exhaust both its borrowing authority and its reserve funds in 2027. As a result, CBO expects that the savings to the Postal Service Fund under the legislation would be fully offset beginning in that year.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Threat of enslavement hangs over reported plans to deport migrants from US to Libya

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London

    Human rights organisations have expressed alarm at possible US plans to send a group of migrants from Vietnam, Laos and the Philippines to Libya on a military flight. They have pointed to the appalling conditions migrants face there, which the US State Department described as “harsh and life-threatening” in its 2023 Libya review.

    The review quoted the UN support mission in Libya and civil society groups as saying they had “numerous reports of women subjected to forced prostitution in prisons or detention facilities”. A UN fact-finding mission to Libya, also in 2023, made similarly shocking allegations about conditions in Libya’s network of official migrant detention centres.

    Such centres are run by the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration, an official entity of the Libyan interior ministry. But, in reality, it is Libya’s complex patchwork of militias that is in control.

    Based on interviews with more than 100 migrants, the report concluded that it had “reasonable grounds to believe that migrants were enslaved in detention centres … in Abu Salim, Zawiyah and Mabani, as well as in places of detention in al-Shwarif, Bani Walid, Sabratah, Zuwarah and Sabha”.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    There is no evidence that the proposed US scheme is in any way connected to the Libyan organisations involved in slavery. Trump has also denied any knowledge of the Libya deportations, referring journalists questioning him about it to the US Department of Homeland Security.

    But the situation is dire for the tens of thousands of refugees and migrants who wind up in Libya each year in an attempt to cross into Europe. The threat of enslavement poses a real threat to anyone sent there.

    Concern about slavery in Libya was perhaps most visibly highlighted in a CNN report from 2017. After receiving grainy footage of a slave sale, CNN sent journalists to Libya to gather evidence. They reported uncovering nine migrant slave auction sites.

    In their report, which gained widespread international attention, the journalists wrote:

    Carrying concealed cameras into a property outside the capital of Tripoli last month, we witness[ed] a dozen people go ‘under the hammer’ in the space of six or seven minutes.

    ‘Does anybody need a digger? This is a digger, a big strong man, he’ll dig,’ the salesman, dressed in camouflage gear, says. ‘What am I bid, what am I bid?’ Buyers raise their hands as the price rises, ‘500, 550, 600, 650 …’ Within minutes it is all over and the men, utterly resigned to their fate, are being handed over to their new ‘masters’.

    After the auction, we met two of the men who had been sold. They were so traumatised by what they’d been through that they could not speak, and so scared that they were suspicious of everyone they met.

    Unlike the Libyan media, which questioned the credibility of the CNN report, Libya’s authorities denounced the migrant slave auctions and said they would launch a formal investigation. But there is no indication that the proposed investigation has changed the operation of the detention centres.

    CNN journalists witnessed migrants being sold at auctions in 2017.

    CNN’s findings were replicated by other investigations. Shamsuddin Jibril, a Cameroonian migrant who saw men traded publicly in the streets of the Libyan town of Sabha, told the Guardian in 2017: “[The slave traders] took people and put them in the street under a sign that said ‘for sale’. They tied their hands just like in the former slave trade, and drove them … in the back of a Toyota Hilux”.

    These practices are still happening. David Yambio, who himself experienced enslavement in Libya, is now the president of the Refugees in Libya movement. I spoke to Yambio while writing my book, Unbroken Chains: A 5,000 year history of African enslavement. He told me:

    From my own experience, and through my daily work with Refugees in Libya, I can confirm that slavery is taking place inside Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration detention facilities.

    I was held in places in such conditions between 2019 and 2022. To this day, people are still being enslaved inside these centres: Tariq al-Sikka, Ain Zara, Abu Salim, Al-Nasr in Zawiya, Al-Mabani, Bir Al-Ghanam, Al-Assah, Al-Maya, Ganfouda and Ajdabiya. The list goes on.

    Just hours ago, I was in contact with around 130 women still enduring the same conditions inside Al-Nasr detention centre (known as Osama Prison) in Zawiya. It is concerning and it is an indisputable fact.

    The Libyan route

    Libya is one of the leading destinations for migrants attempting to reach Europe through Africa. In April 2025 alone, the European border force, Frontex, recorded 15,718 migrants from across the world making what they term “illegal border crossings” by traversing the central Mediterranean from Libya.

    One of the largest groups seeking to reach Europe via Libya are Eritreans. Work led by Mirjam van Reisen of Leiden University has provided firsthand accounts of Eritreans describing the situation in the Tajoura detention centre, where Libyans come to select people to work.

    The labourers are often referred to as slaves. One interviewee said: “Every morning when someone comes there, he says: ‘We need five eubayd, which means five slaves. I need five slaves.’ Everybody that is hearing that one, they are feeling angry.” Their forced labour ranges from farm and construction work to road work and garbage collecting.

    Some refugees manage to raise funds from friends and family members to escape captivity. They are held in detention centres until they are deported or traffickers receive fees for taking them across the Mediterranean. Research by the UN suggests this ranges between US$850 (£644) and US$4,500 (£3,400) per crossing.

    US officials say the military could start flying migrants to Libya imminently. However, authorities in Tripoli have rejected the use of Libyan territory as a destination for deporting migrants without its knowledge or consent.

    There are also judicial hurdles. On May 7, a federal judge in Massachusetts ruled that the deportation of immigrants to Libya would be in violation of a court order he issued in March.

    However, the Trump administration’s record suggests it does not always follow such rulings. This leaves the migrants in considerable jeopardy.

    Martin Plaut does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Threat of enslavement hangs over reported plans to deport migrants from US to Libya – https://theconversation.com/threat-of-enslavement-hangs-over-reported-plans-to-deport-migrants-from-us-to-libya-256145

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Security: Summerfield Man Pleads Guilty to Ponzi Scheme and Tax Fraud

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    Winston-Salem, NC – William Lamar Rhew, III of Summerfield pled guilty today, May 6, 2025, to wire fraud, money laundering, securities fraud, tax evasion, and failure to file tax return in connection with a $20 million Ponzi scheme, announced Acting United States Attorney Randall S. Galyon.  

    According to court documents, from November 2017 to December 2023, Rhew defrauded at least 117 investors of at least $24 million.  He induced victims to invest with his company Chadley Capital, LLC which would allegedly buy accounts receivable at a discount, sell them for a profit, and provide consistently high rates of return on investment.  Rhew touted the company’s increasing deal flow and underwriting standards and, in offering materials, claimed $300 million in transactions in 2023, consistent returns in excess of 20% per year, and nearly 74% total growth over 24 months.  All of Rhew’s representations were false.  Instead of investing victims’ funds as promised, Rhew used their money to pay his personal expenses including the purchases of a boat, a beach house, and luxury cars, and to make “interest” and “withdrawal” payments to other victim-investors as part of the Ponzi scheme.  In addition, for Tax Years 2018 through 2022, Rhew willfully failed to report nearly $9 million in income to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).  As part of the plea agreement, Rhew has agreed to pay restitution to the victims in the amount of $14,868,815.67 and to the IRS in the amount of $3,056,936.

    Sentencing is scheduled to take place on August 22, 2025, at 2:30 p.m. in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, before United States District Judge Thomas D. Schroeder. At sentencing, Rhew faces a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison, a period of supervised release of up to three years, and monetary penalties.

    “Sadly, we see an abundance of investment fraud schemes in which perpetrators exploit people who know and trust them,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Galyon. “We are committed to pursuing justice for victims in these cases but encourage the public to beware of any investment opportunity that sounds too good to be true, no matter who is promoting it.”

    “Today’s guilty plea represents the dedication of our agency in ensuring the actions of one individual are not at the expense of others,” said Special Agent in Charge Donald “Trey” Eakins, Charlotte Field Office, IRS Criminal Investigation. “In this case, the defendant not only victimized his investors, but he also defrauded American taxpayers by concealing his income from the IRS and evading his tax liability. IRS Criminal Investigation’s special agents will continue to use their financial expertise to find and investigate these types of investor fraud schemes alongside our law enforcement partners.”

    “It’s unlikely fraudsters will be up front and admit they’re taking your money and pumping it into a Ponzi scheme.  But there are warning signs: investors should be wary anytime you’re guaranteed high returns with little or no risk,” said FBI Charlotte Special Agent in Charge Robert M. DeWitt.  “Hopefully, the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility will offer some comfort and closure to the victims.”

    “This guilty plea marks another significant victory in the pursuit of justice for the citizens of North Carolina,” said the Director of the NC SBI. “The victims in this case are hardworking men and women, many of whom are small business owners.  The Financial Crimes Investigations Unit of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation will continue to work diligently to combat fraud against the citizens of our great state.  The SBI would like to thank the IRS and FBI for their efforts in ensuring justice for the victims involved in this case.”
        
    The case was investigated by the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation. It is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Laura Jeanne Dildine.

    ###
     

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Nigerian Man Pleads Guilty to Cyberstalking and Other Charges Related to the Sexual Extortion and Death of a Local Young Man

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    PHILADELPHIA – United States Attorney David Metcalf announced that Imoleayo Samuel Aina, aka “Alice Dave,” 27, of Nigeria entered a plea of guilty before United States District Court Judge Joel H. Slomsky Monday to cyberstalking, interstate threat to injure reputation, receiving proceeds of extortion, money laundering conspiracy, and four counts of wire fraud, in connection with the sexual extortion and death of a young man in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

    Aina and co-defendant Samuel Olasunkanmi Abiodun, 25, were arrested on a complaint and warrant in Nigeria, taken into custody by the FBI on July 31, 2024, and extradited to the United States to face charges in this case. They and another Nigerian co-defendant, Afeez Olatunji Adewale, 25, were then charged by indictment in August 2024.

    Aina is scheduled to be sentenced on August 11 and faces a statutory maximum of lifetime imprisonment.

    Abiodun pleaded guilty in December to money laundering conspiracy and four counts of wire fraud. He is scheduled to be sentenced on June 10 and faces a statutory maximum of 100 years’ imprisonment.

    Adewale has also been charged with money laundering conspiracy and four counts of wire fraud. He remains in Nigeria, pending extradition to the U.S.

    The case was investigated by the FBI and the Abington Township Police Department and is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Patrick Brown.

    Aina and Abiodun were extradited to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania with assistance of the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs, the FBI Legal Attaché in Abuja, and the FBI. The support and assistance of Nigerian security authorities was essential to this effort, notably that of Nigeria’s Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, the Federal Ministry of Justice’s International Criminal Justice Cooperation Department, and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission.

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  • MIL-OSI Security: IAEA Launches SMR School as Africa Looks to Nuclear Energy

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    A fraction the size of large reactors, SMRs are under development around the world, with China and Russia having already deployed their first units. With lower upfront costs and flexibility to work in tandem with renewables such as solar and wind, SMRs are expected to make nuclear power a more accessible option amid a global consensus on expanding nuclear power that emerged in 2023 at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai.  

    The inaugural SMR School was the first event for high level officials covering key aspects of SMRs, including technology development and demonstration, legal frameworks, stakeholder engagement, and safety, security and safeguards.  

    “The technical presentations, discussions, and shared experiences deepened our understanding of SMR deployment and regulatory considerations,” said Rasheed Adeola Ogunola of the Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission. “We also appreciated learning about the publications and services available to support Member States in building safe and effective nuclear programmes. This knowledge will directly inform our next steps as we progress through the nuclear power programme development milestones.” 

    “As countries seek clean and reliable solutions to their energy and development challenges, they are increasingly looking to nuclear energy as an option, particularly SMRs,” said Dohee Hahn, IAEA Platform Coordinator. “The new IAEA SMR School aims to fill a critical gap for countries in better understanding the array of issues involved in the development and deployment of this promising new technology.” 

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Statement by IMF African Department Director Abebe Aemro Selassie on Meeting with President João Lourenço of Angola

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    May 13, 2025

    Luanda, Angola: Mr. Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) African Department, met yesterday in Luanda with President João Lourenço of Angola. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Selassie issued the following statement:

    “It was very good to meet President Lourenço this morning. We had constructive discussions on Angola’s economy and the actions the government is taking in this challenging external environment.

    “I congratulated him on Angola’s strong economic performance in 2024 and his administration’s efforts in reducing inflation and containing public debt vulnerabilities.

    “We discussed approaches needed to contain emerging risks to preserve macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability. In this regard, I noted that the IMF shares the President’s priorities of putting public finances on a sustainable path, while protecting the most vulnerable and maintaining the growth momentum. 

    “The reforms the government has been pursuing in recent years have been gaining traction, as evidenced by the country’s improving attractiveness to private investment. 

    “I emphasized the IMF’s readiness to continue supporting Angola’s efforts, and our commitment to maintain and strengthen our longstanding partnership.

     “I thanked President Lourenço, his Ministers, and the Governor of the Banco Nacional de Angola for the warm reception and very productive discussions they afforded me during my visit.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/13/pr-25141-angola-imf-afr-dept-director-abebe-aemro-selassie-meeting-pres-joao-lourenco

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    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Unemployment rate increases by 1%

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Tuesday, May 13, 2025

    The official unemployment rate has crept up by 1% to reach 32.9% in the first quarter of 2025.

    This according to Statistics South Africa’s (Stats SA) Quarterly Labour Force Survey released on Tuesday morning.

    “There was a decrease of 291 000 in the number of employed persons to 16.8 million from 17.1 million in Q4: 2024, while there was an increase of 237 000 in the number of unemployed persons to 8.2 million. This resulted in a decrease of 54 000 [down by 0,2%] in the labour force during the same period.

    “Discouraged work-seekers increased by 7000 [up by 0.2%], and the number of persons who were not economically active for reasons other than discouragement increased by 177 000 [up by 1.4%] between the fourth quarter of 2024 and the first quarter of 2025. This led to an increase of 184 000 in the number of the not economically active population, to 16.7 million,” Stats SA said.

    The expanded unemployment rate increased by 1.2 percentage points to 43.1%.

    “The number of persons employed in the formal sector decreased by 245 000 in Q1: 2025, and the informal sector employment increased by 17 000 over the same period. The largest industry increases in employment were recorded in transport [67 000] finance [60 000] and utilities [35 000].

    “Decreases in employment were recorded in trade [194 000], construction [119 000], private households [68 000], community and social services [45 000], and mining [35 000],” the institution said.

    The provincial breakdown of increases and decreases in employment is as follows:

    • Western Cape: 49 000 increase
    • Gauteng: 9000 increase
    • Free State: 4000 increase
    • KwaZulu-Natal: 104 000 decrease
    • Eastern Cape: 83 000
    • North West: 57 000 decrease
    • Limpopo: 55 000 decrease
    • Mpumalanga: 43 000 decrease
    • Northern Cape: 12 000 decrease

    The institution highlighted that South African youth remain “vulnerable in the labour market”.

    “The results for the first quarter of 2025 show that the total number of unemployed youth increased by 151 000 to 4.8 million, while employed youth recorded a decrease of 153 000 to 5.7 million. 

    “As a result, the youth unemployment rate increased from 44.6% in the fourth quarter of 2024 to 46.1% in the first quarter of 2025,” Stats SA said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Elevating the delivery of government services

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    While  government has made significant strides since the 1990s in adopting digital technologies to ensure that it delivers efficient services to its citizens, it has not fully achieved this ideal.

    To make up for this shortfall, government has, in recent years, taken important steps to improve the quality of and access to services. 

    Digital platforms have expanded in many areas, making it possible to file taxes, apply for grants and access some services online. But for too many people, the experience of accessing public services remains a time-consuming and expensive exercise. 

    Information often proves difficult to find, processes are duplicated in some instances, and some departments still operate in ways that are incompatible with the digital age and the evolving expectations of citizens. 

    “South Africa has made considerable but uneven strides toward government digitalisation. 

    “Despite pockets of excellence, slow and uncoordinated progress has left many people dissatisfied,” says Presidency Director of Strategy and Delivery Support, Saul Musker. 

    In an ongoing effort to ensure that government services are easier to access, more reliable and less complicated to navigate for the people who depend on them, government has launched the Roadmap for the Digital Transformation of Government.

    “We are building on a lot of work that’s unfolded over decades. It started in the 1990s with the early adoption of digital technologies by government. In the 2000s, we had e-Government, which was characterised by silos.

    “We are moving towards taking the ‘whole-of-government and society’ approach, developing solutions that are citizen-centered; that make life for citizens easier and introduces greater cohesiveness in government, so that citizens interface with government in one place to receive services and access information,” Musker said recently, addressing the launch of the Roadmap for the Digital Transformation of Government, which was launched as part of Operation Vulindlela Phase ll.

    Operation Vulindlela Phase ll is a joint initiative between the Presidency and National Treasury to accelerate the implementation of structural reforms to enable economic growth and job creation.

    Phase II of Operational Vulindlela will implement reforms in three new areas, including in digital transformation.

    The roadmap sets out a focused plan to modernise delivery of government services through investment in digital public infrastructure.

    These crucial digital reforms will enable all citizens to access seamless government services through a single trusted platform. This will be driven through improvements in identity verification, real-time payments, and data exchange.

    “We want to invest in shared infrastructure and digital public infrastructure that can be used for hundreds of applications that reduces cost for the State and opens the door to innovation. We are moving away from the silo approach towards Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI).

    “We recognise that digital transformation holds the potential for growth in South Africa. A new approach to digital transformation will restore trust in government and make services more reliable and accessible, reducing administrative burdens and costs for both government, organisations and people,” Musker said.

    The Digital Transformation Roadmap will focus on four catalytic initiatives:

    1. A Digital Identity System will allow South Africans a simple way to verify themselves and access services remotely.
    2. A Data Exchange Framework will eradicate the silo effect in government, and allow greater efficiency and coordination in how the government operates.
    3. A Digital Payments System that provides universal access to secure, low-cost payment options between government and citizens.
    4. A single, zero-rated Digital Services Platform, where citizens can access all government services and information.

    Digital reform

    The Digital Transformation Roadmap will be implemented in two phases, with phase 1 being March 2025 – February 2027 and Phase 2 being March 2027 – February 2030. 

    Phase 1 will prioritise social protection and its linkages with learning and earning opportunities due to its direct impact on millions of vulnerable South Africans. 

    “This phase will deliver immediate, measurable impact and lay the foundation for broader digital reform.  The focus will be on digitising services for faster, more reliable access, linking social grants to employment, training, and income-generating opportunities to create pathways to sustainable livelihoods. 

    “Additionally, technology will be used to address issues such as fraud and exclusion in the SRD370 grants, saving money and strengthening public trust.

    “Phase 2 will expand focus to other key sectors, such as healthcare, education, and business services, building on the lessons learned from Phase 1 to scale successful technologies across government,” the Roadmap for the Digital Transformation of Government said.

    To drive implementation of the roadmap, the Presidency is establishing the Digital Service Unit (DSU) to coordinate this whole-of-government effort to modernise services.

    The Presidency has appointed South African tech entrepreneur, Melvyn Lubega, to lead the DSU. 

    Lubega is a globally recognised technology pioneer, who co-founded Go1 – a platform used by businesses, non-profit organisations, and governments in more than 60 countries. 

    He has advised governments in Africa, Asia and Europe on digital transformation programmes. SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Stage 2 load shedding to be implemented during evening peak

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Eskom has announced that it will implement Stage 2 load shedding during evening peak from 4pm today until 10pm on Thursday evening.

    The power utility explained that the move is aimed at managing “limited generation capacity and to ensure continued supply during the working days”.

    “This decision follows the delayed return of generation units, amounting to 3 120MW, as well as an additional loss of 1 385MW in the past 24 hours due to unplanned breakdowns.

    “The primary reason for this setback is the delay in returning several units from planned maintenance. These delays, coupled with an unplanned capacity loss that has now temporarily exceeded 13 000MW, align with the risk scenarios shared in our Winter 2025 Outlook,” Eskom said.

    The electricity provider added that essential intense maintenance at power stations “temporarily reduces system flexibility and resilience”.

    “As a result, the grid is more sensitive to unexpected disruptions. We sincerely apologise for the inconvenience this causes. Eskom remains firmly committed to supplying electricity reliably. 

    “Our teams continue to work with determination and professionalism to stabilise and strengthen the system as a result of the structural improvements across the generation fleet. Load shedding incidents have significantly decreased when compared to previous years.

    “The recent setbacks impacted our operational performance and have been acknowledged in our Winter Outlook, along with a clear recovery plan,” Eskom said.

    Furthermore, the system remains in a stronger position than in past winters, with 96% of our generating capacity available over the past financial year, compared to just 9% in previous year.

    “We also continue to expand capacity. Three major Eskom projects are on track to bring an additional 2 500MW onto the grid — a crucial milestone toward full recovery, with commitment from our private sector partners to deliver on their commitments,” the power utility said.

    Eskom Group Chief Executive, Dan Marokane, assured that the setbacks at the power utility are being addressed.

    “Our new Operational Excellence Programme is key to restoring performance. We are reinforcing oversight, strengthening accountability, and aligning service providers with stricter performance standards. This forms part of our broader drive for consistent improvement through Systems, People, and Processes.

    “We are determined to build on the progress already achieved. The delays in returning units are being addressed with urgency by senior leadership,” Marokane said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Tourism a powerful economic driver in SA and Africa

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Tourism remains a powerful economic driver in South Africa and across the continent, says Tourism Minister Patricia de Lille.

    “In 2024, South Africa alone welcomed 8.9 million tourists, and their direct spending contribution was R91.6 billion, supporting an estimated 1.6 million jobs,” the Minister said on Tuesday.

    She was speaking at Africa’s Travel Indaba 2025 – a showcase of Southern African tourism products and services for the international travel trade – which is currently underway in Durban.

    Tourism in South Africa makes a significant contribution to the economy, creating jobs and independent livelihoods.

    “In the first quarter of 2025, South Africa welcomed close to 2.6 million tourists, reflecting a 5.7% growth compared to the same period in 2024,” de Lille said.

    According to UN Tourism, in 2024, tourism in Africa saw a sharp rebound, with a 96% recovery compared to 2019, positioning the continent among the world’s fastest-growing regional tourism destinations.

    “I am proud to announce that this year’s Indaba welcomes over 1300 exhibitors, delegates from 27 African countries and over 1200 vetted international buyers from 55 source markets.

    “The tourism economy of tomorrow is African. It is diverse, youthful, digital, and green. But we know that we cannot rest. We need to break through to a much higher rate of growth. We need a plan we can implement immediately,” de Lille said.

    The Minister said 75% of South Africa’s international arrivals come from the rest of Africa.

    “Our collective presence here signifies more than market access – it signals Africa’s readiness to lead, innovate, and inspire the global tourism landscape.

    “We are especially honoured to welcome new participants from Chad, St Helena, and Burkina Faso, whose presence affirms Indaba’s growing role as a truly continental platform,” the Minister said.

    The Minister said it was fitting that the G20 2nd Tourism Working Group meeting was taking place on the sidelines of Africa’s Travel Indaba. She said this placed African tourism at the centre of global dialogue.

    The department is working on finalising a Tourism Growth Partnership Plan for the next 5 years. With the plan, the department aim to grow total employment from approximately 1 840 000 in 2024 to 2 500 000 jobs; grow domestic spend by 25%; grow GDP contribution from approximately 8.8% in 2024 to 10% as well as welcome an extra one million international air arrivals annually. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: As funding cuts bite, UN chief announces new dawn for peacekeeping

    Source: United Nations – Peacekeeping

    The future of peacekeeping took centre stage on Tuesday in Berlin as UN chief António Guterres urged Member States to do more to support the global body’s Blue Helmets and stave off the worst impacts of deep funding cuts.

    Addressing the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial 2025 in the German capital, the Secretary-General told dozens of ministers from more than 130 countries that peacekeepers remain key to “help countries move from conflict to peace.”

    “In trouble spots around the world, Blue Helmets can mean the difference between life and death,” he insisted. “They are also a clear demonstration of the power of multilateral action to maintain, achieve and sustain peace.”

    Despite the proven value of peacekeeping missions in ensuring a durable peace in countless countries from Cambodia to Liberia and Timor Leste, Mr. Guterres warned that today’s challenges have made this task much harder.

    “We are now facing the highest number of conflicts since the founding of the United Nations and record numbers of people fleeing across borders in search of safety and refuge,” he said, before alluding to additional obstacles caused by an absence of political support for peacekeeping mandates.

    Continue reading this story on UN News.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Mauritania’s Gas Future Will Take Center Stage in Exclusive Fireside Chat at Invest in African Energy (IAE) 2025

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    PARIS, France, May 13, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The Invest in African Energy (IAE) Forum in Paris is set to host a pivotal session – In Conversation with Mauritania – featuring a fireside chat with Mohamed Ould Khaled, Minister of Petroleum and Energy of Mauritania. This exclusive dialogue will examine how large-scale energy projects – including the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) LNG development – are ushering in a new era of gas-driven growth in West Africa.

    The GTA project, a collaborative cross-border initiative between Mauritania and Senegal, reached a significant milestone with the launch of first gas production in January 2025. Phase 1 is expected to produce approximately 2.3 million tons of LNG per annum, positioning the two nations as major LNG exporters. The focus now shifts to securing a final investment decision (FID) for Phase 2, which could increase production to 2.5-3 million tons per annum through the implementation of a gravity-based structure, further strengthening the region’s position in the global energy market. FID will depend on continued cross-border cooperation, regulatory alignment and securing additional investment.

    IAE 2025 (https://apo-opa.co/3ZicRSyis an exclusive forum designed to facilitate investment between African energy markets and global investors. Taking place May 13-14, 2025 in Paris, the event offers delegates two days of intensive engagement with industry experts, project developers, investors and policymakers. For more information, please visit www.Invest-Africa-Energy.com. To sponsor or participate as a delegate, please contact sales@energycapitalpower.com.

    Beyond the GTA project, the session will highlight other major developments, including Mauritania’s BirAllah gas field, which is currently seeking new development partners. Estimated to hold 80 trillion cubic feet of offshore gas reserves, BirAllah represents a significant opportunity to enhance national energy self-sufficiency while supporting the country’s broader industrial growth.

    Leveraging its exceptional solar and wind resources, Mauritania is also pursuing an ambitious green hydrogen strategy. This includes the $40-billion AMAN project – developed in partnership with CWP – which aims to install 30 GW of renewable energy capacity to produce 1.7 million tons of green hydrogen annually. Other key initiatives include Chariot’s Project Nour and GreenGo’s Megaton Moon. Overall, Mauritania is targeting a 1.5% share of the global hydrogen market by 2050, supported by the implementation of the world’s first national hydrogen law.

    “If these projects progress as planned, Mauritania could emerge as a key leader in Africa’s energy transition, achieving an unprecedented level of energy self-sufficiency, driving socioeconomic development and strengthening its position within the West African energy market,” says Sandra Jeque, Event and Project Director, Energy Capital & Power.

    IAE 2025 offers a strategic platform to spotlight these opportunities, foster dialogue among policymakers and investors, and promote the sustainable development of the region’s natural resources.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Angola at 50: Angola Oil & Gas (AOG) 2025 Affirms Oil and Gas as a Development Driver

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    LUANDA, Angola, May 13, 2025/APO Group/ —

    As sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest oil producer and an emerging global gas player, Angola is revitalizing its oil and gas sector through policy reform, upcoming projects and aligned industry goals. The country has secured over $60 billion in commitments over the next five years, reflecting the growing interest by international financiers and operators in advancing Angolan projects. As the country continues to promote investment, the upcoming Angola Oil & Gas (AOG) conference affirms the role oil and gas plays as a fuel for development in Angola.  

    This year’s edition of AOG – taking place September 3-4 in Luanda – is hosted under the theme Angola 50 Years: Oil and Gas as a Development Driver, highlighting the fundamental role the industry has played in the country’s economic growth. Taking place on the eve of Angola’s 50 years of independence celebration and with a focus on policy improvements, upcoming investment prospects, major developments and cross-sector opportunities, the event underscores how investing in Angola will unlock long-term growth and high returns.  

    AOG is the largest oil and gas event in Angola. Taking place with the full support of the Ministry of Mineral Resources, Oil and Gas; the National Oil, Gas and Biofuels Agency; the Petroleum Derivatives Regulatory Institute; national oil company Sonangol; and the African Energy Chamber; the event is a platform to sign deals and advance Angola’s oil and gas industry. To sponsor or participate as a delegate, please contact sales@energycapitalpower.com.

    Angola’s oil and gas industry is at a critical juncture, striving to address production decline while accelerating sustainable growth. An upcoming licensing round – planned for this year – in tandem with the country’s 2025-2028 project pipeline is set to bolster production and unlock greater value from the industry. Major developments include the New Gas Consortium’s Quiluma and Maboqueiro fields (2026); the Azule Energy-led Agogo Integrated West Hub Development (late-2025); the TotalEnergies-operated Kaminho Deepwater Development (2028); and the Cabinda Oil Refinery (2025). Beyond existing projects, Angola has committed to unlocking its frontier basins, with the Namibe-Benguela, Etosha-Okavango and Kassanje basins at the fore. ExxonMobil is leading exploration in Namibe while Vietnam’s XTG signed a deal to explore the Etosha-Okavango basin in 2025. Future discoveries will augment the industry’s contribution to the economy while creating new opportunities for joint ventures, increased output and value addition.  

    By sustaining production above one million barrels per day, Angola is positioning the oil and gas industry as a fuel for cross-sector development. The industry already supports activities across key sectors, including mining, agriculture and industry. With goals to become a globally-leading critical mineral producer, produce 17.5 million carats of diamonds by 2027 while enhancing fertilizer production for agri-operations, strengthened synergies between the hydrocarbon, mining and agricultural industries would stand to drive future growth. As such, the government has been implementing policies to support multi-sector development.

    Regulatory reform and aligned policies are expected to support future projects while diversifying the industry through natural gas monetization. To offset production decline, the country implemented an Incremental Production Decree, comprising attractive firms for companies re-investing in producing assets. The country is also expected to introduce its Gas Master Plan in 2025, designed to attract investment across the gas value chain. These policies have already begun to entice spending, and the government is promoting a flexible approach to investing in Angola.

    The AOG 2025 conference steps into this picture to provide a platform where the industry can connect, engage and sign deals. In celebration of 50 years of independence and energy leadership in Angola, the event unites stakeholders from across the economy. Major sponsors have already come on board, underscoring the value AOG plays in supporting portfolio expansion and brand exposure by major oil and gas players. Sonangol Integrated Logistics Services, Cabship and Azule Energy have joined as Gold Sponsors; FAMAR and Petrotec have joined as Silver Sponsors; while Algoa Cabinda Services and Enagol have joined as Bronze Sponsors. There are still a range of sponsorship opportunities available. Visit www.AngolaOilAndGas.com for more information.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Security: Disrupting criminal finances in Africa: INTERPOL’s Silver Notice

    Source: Interpol (news and events)

    NAIROBI, Kenya – Law enforcement and financial crime experts from across Africa have gathered for a workshop dedicated to promoting and implementing the INTERPOL Silver Notice and Diffusion.

    Organized crime in Africa, as in other regions, thrives on illicit financial flows and the laundered proceeds of crimes such as scams, illegal logging, terrorism and corruption. These crimes are increasingly supported by complex financial structures that span borders.

    Launched in January 2025, the INTERPOL Silver Notice allows participating countries to request information related to criminal assets — such as real estate, vehicles, financial accounts, or businesses — with links to individuals suspected or charged of various offences including fraud, drug trafficking and migrant smuggling. The mechanism supports cross-border intelligence exchange and can lay the groundwork for subsequent requests for asset seizure or confiscation under national legal frameworks.

    The Silver Notice, currently in pilot across 51 countries, is one of several tools—alongside the I-GRIP stop-payment mechanism—empowering agencies to move swiftly against illicit finances and fraud.

    The four-day event (13-16 May) brings together 85 participants from 12 pilot African countries including representatives from INTERPOL National Central Bureaus, financial intelligence units, prosecutors’ offices, judicial authorities and asset recovery focal points. This regional session follows similar workshops held in the Americas and Europe earlier this year.

    Mohamed I. Amin, Director of Kenya’s Directorate of Criminal Investigations, said:

    “The Silver Notice is more than a tool, it is a symbol of global solidarity against crime. By targeting illicit wealth, we strike at the heart of criminal enterprises and uphold justice. Let us commit to leveraging this mechanism, ensuring that crime never pays, anywhere, at any time.”

    Theos Badege, Director pro tempore of INTERPOL’s Financial Crime and Corruption Centre said:

    “Money is the thread that runs through almost every form of organized crime. For some, it’s the motive; for others, the means. To dismantle criminal networks, we must follow the money—identify it, trace it, and disrupt the financial systems that enable these operations to survive and expand.”

    INTERPOL Silver Notice/ Diffusion Pilot: Regional Workshop for Africa

    IFCACC Director: Theos Badege, Director pro tempore of INTERPOL’s Financial Crime and Corruption Centre

    Alena Kern, Head of Development Cooperation of the German Embassy

    DCI Director: Mohamed I. Amin, Director of Kenya’s Directorate of Criminal Investigations

    Building capacity for maximum impact

    Throughout the workshop, participants will explore how to leverage INTERPOL’s full range of capabilities—including its Notices, databases, expert networks, and operational support tools—to conduct financial investigations and disrupt criminal economies. Sessions also focus on emerging technologies, such as the use of cryptocurrencies and blockchain in laundering illicit funds.

    Interactive table-top exercises and case-based discussions are designed to encourage regional exchange, identify common challenges and stimulate the practical use of Silver Notices in ongoing cases.

    The workshop was supported by German Development Cooperation through the GIZ Global Program Combatting Illicit Financial Flows and the GIZ Program on Strengthening Good Governance in Kenya, as well as the EU-joint action SecFin Africa.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Gainesville Man Sentenced to Over 10 Years for Receipt of Child Pornography

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News (b)

    GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA – Stephen Christopher Young, 58, of Gainesville, Florida, was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment for receipt/attempted receipt of child pornography. The sentence was announced by Michelle Spaven, Acting United States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida.

    “Crimes against children are unacceptable,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Spaven. “Those who seek to view and maintain child pornography facilitate the abuse of children by those who produce and profit from this illegal content. We will continue to work tirelessly with our law enforcement partners to ensure that we aggressively prosecute these offenders.”

    In March 2024, investigators executed a federal search warrant at Young’s residence and discovered Young had been exchanging child pornography with others using various applications intended to avoid detection by using end-to-end encryption.

    Young’s prison sentence will be followed by a lifetime of supervised release. He was ordered to pay $20,500 in restitution. Young will also be required to register as a sex offender and be subject to all sex offender conditions.

    “It’s crucial to prioritize the protection of children from sexual abuse,” said Alachua County Sheriff Chad Scott.

    The case was investigated by Internet Crime Against Children Task Force Gainesville Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office. Assistant United States Attorneys Meredith Steer and Adam Hapner prosecuted the case.

    “This case is another example of the FBI’s relentless commitment to protecting children by removing predators from our community,” said Jason Carley, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Jacksonville. “Let this be a lesson to others who prey on vulnerable kids; the FBI and our partners will never stop working to identify, pursue, and hold child predators accountable.”

    This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse. Launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice and led by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices and the Criminal Divisions Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS), it marshals federal, state, and local resources to better locate, apprehend, and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the Internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.projectsafechildhood.gov.

    The United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Florida is one of 94 offices that serve as the nation’s principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General.  To access public court documents online, please visit the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida website. For more information about the United States Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Florida, visit http://www.justice.gov/usao/fln/index.html.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Global: AI can be a danger to students – 3 things universities must do

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sioux McKenna, Professor of Higher Education, Rhodes University, South Africa, Rhodes University

    Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is trained on enormous bodies of text, video and images to identify patterns. It then creates new texts, videos and images on the basis of this pattern identification. Thanks to machine learning, it improves its ability to do so every time it is used.

    As AI becomes embedded in academic life, a troubling reality has emerged: students are extremely vulnerable to its use. They don’t know enough about what AI is to be alert to its shortcomings. And they don’t know enough about their subject content to make judgements on this anyway. Most importantly, they don’t know what they don’t know.

    As two academics involved in higher education teaching, we argue that there are four key dangers facing students in today’s world of AI. They are:

    • blind trust in its abilities

    • using it to side-step actual learning

    • not knowing how it works

    • perpetuating the gap between expertise and uncritical yet confident noise.

    Given our experiences as academics who have developed curricula for students and who research generative AI, we think there are three things universities can do. They should teach critical AI literacy, emphasise why developing knowledge is important, and teach students why being an expert matters if they’re going to engage meaningfully with AI.

    The four dangers

    Blind trust in AI’s false confidence. A recent Microsoft report showed that those who know the least about a topic are the most likely to accept AI outputs as correct. Generative AI programs like ChatGPT and Claude produce text with remarkable confidence. Students lacking domain expertise can’t identify when these systems are completely wrong.

    Headlines already demonstrate the consequences of this in the workplace: lawyers submitting fabricated case citations generated by AI, and hospitals using AI transcription tools that invent statements never actually made.

    Generative AI can get it wrong because it doesn’t understand anything in the human sense of the word. But it can identify and replicate patterns with remarkable sophistication. These patterns include not only words and ideas but also tone and style.

    Missing the power of education. A core purpose of higher education is to give students a new way of understanding the world and their place in it. When students use AI in ways that sidestep intellectual challenges, they miss this essential transformation.

    When students simply outsource their thinking to AI, they’re getting credentials without competence. They might graduate with degrees but without knowledge and expertise.

    The false confidence trap. Even students who develop critical awareness about AI’s limitations face what Punya Mishra, a learning engineer professor at Arizona State University, calls “the false confidence trap”. They might recognise that AI can produce errors but lack sufficient subject knowledge to correct those errors.

    As Mishra puts it:

    It’s like having a generic BS detector but no way to separate truth from fiction.

    This creates a dangerous half-measure where students recognise AI isn’t perfect but can’t effectively evaluate its outputs.

    Perpetuating the knowledge gap. As AI becomes ubiquitous in workplaces, the gap between those with genuine expertise and those relying solely on AI will widen. Students who haven’t developed their own knowledge foundations will be increasingly marginalised in a world that paradoxically values human expertise more, not less, as AI advances.

    Answers

    There are three steps universities can take.

    Integrate critical AI literacy. Students need to understand how generative AI works – how AI is trained on massive databases of human-created texts and images to identify patterns by which to craft new outputs.

    It’s not enough to have an “Intro to AI” course. Every discipline needs to show students how AI intersects with their field and, most significantly, empower them to reflect on the ethical implications of its use. This includes engaging in questions around the use of copyrighted materials for the training of generative AI, the biases inherent in AI generated texts and images, and the enormous environmental cost of AI use.

    Emphasise knowledge development. Higher education institutions must actively counter the view that university is merely about the provision of credentials. We need to help students see the value of acquiring domain expertise. This is not always self-evident to those students who understand higher education only as a means to a job, which encourages them to engage with knowledge in an instrumentalist way – and thus to use AI in ways that prevent engagement with complex ideas. It is a personal relationship with knowledge that will prepare them for a future where AI is everywhere. Advocating for the power of knowledge needs to be a central part of every academic’s job description.

    Model dual expertise. Academics should model what Mishra calls “the dual expertise challenge” — combining domain knowledge with critical AI literacy. This means demonstrating to students how experts engage with AI: analysing its outputs against established knowledge, identifying biases or gaps, and using AI as a tool to enhance human expertise rather than replace it.

    As AI becomes increasingly sophisticated, the value of human expertise only grows. Universities that prepare students to critically engage with AI while developing deep domain knowledge will graduate the experts that society needs in this rapidly evolving technological landscape.

    We have our work cut out for us, but expertise remains highly valued.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. AI can be a danger to students – 3 things universities must do – https://theconversation.com/ai-can-be-a-danger-to-students-3-things-universities-must-do-255652

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: The Secretary-General – Remarks to the Ministerial Meeting on the Future of Peacekeeping

    Source: United Nations – Peacekeeping

    [Bilingual, as delivered]

    Dear Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, our generous hosts.

    Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

    My thanks to Germany for bringing us together at this consequential moment.

    This year marks the 80th anniversary of the United Nations.

    Our organization was founded on the conviction that peace is possible if we work as one united human family.

    That is what our peace operations are about. 

    From preventive diplomacy to peacekeeping…

    From negotiating ceasefires to helping to implement them…

    From electoral support and observer missions to de-mining operations and protection of civilians…

    To the focus of today’s Ministerial meeting — peacekeeping.

    Excellencies,

    UN Blue Helmets are the most globally recognized symbol of the world’s ability to come together to help countries move from conflict to peace.

    Peacekeepers hail from every corner of the world.

    But they are united in their commitment to peace.

    As we meet today, UN peacekeepers are hard at work helping to ensure that ceasefires are respected…

    Protecting civilians caught in the line of fire…

    Helping provide the conditions for lifesaving aid to flow to those in need…

    And laying the foundations for long-term recovery.

    In trouble spots around the world, Blue Helmets can mean the difference between life and death.

    And they are also a clear demonstration of the power of multilateral action to maintain, achieve and sustain peace.

    There is a long list of countries that have achieved durable peace with the support of UN Peacekeeping — including Cambodia, Cote d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Liberia, Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Timor Leste.  

    Many of these countries now themselves contribute troops. 

    At the same time, we recognize that peace comes at a price.

    Through the decades, 4,400 peacekeepers have fallen in the line of duty.

    Their service and sacrifice will never be forgotten.  

    Please join me in a moment of silence to honour all those who lost their lives in the pursuit of peace.

    [MOMENT OF SILENCE]

    Thank you.

    Excellencies,

    We owe it to peacekeepers — and the populations they protect — to continue strengthening their ability to answer this call to peace.

    And to do so in the face of daunting challenges.

    Complex, intertwined and frequently borderless conflicts…

    Growing polarization and division around the globe…

    Targeting of peacekeepers through deadly misinformation spreading through social media…

    Terrorism and transnational crime, which find fertile ground in instability…

    The ongoing climate crisis that is exacerbating conflict while leaving more of the planet uninhabitable…

    All the continued trampling of international law and international humanitarian law.

    As a result, we are now facing the highest number of conflicts since the foundation of the United Nations, and record numbers of people fleeing across borders in search of safety and refuge.

    We must recognize that peacekeeping operations are only as effective as the mandates directing them, and can struggle in contexts where political support and clearly defined outcomes and solutions are absent or elusive.

    Meanwhile, we see increasing differences of views around how peacekeeping operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

    And we face dramatic financial constraints across the board.

    We’ve worked to adapt in the face of these challenges.

    But we need to do more.

    Today, I want to highlight three areas of focus.

    First — help us shape peacekeeping operations that are fit for the future.     

    The Pact for the Future called for a Review of Peace Operations — including peacekeeping.

    The review will examine how we can make peacekeeping operations more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep.

    It will also aim to critically examine the tools we have today and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for the future.  

    Through this review, we must ensure that the United Nations is prepared to deploy peace operations tailored to each individual conflict, while preparing for the challenges of tomorrow.

    We can draw inspiration from our UNIFIL operation, which recently developed an adaptation plan to keep peace along the Blue Line, and ensure lifesaving aid can flow to civilians in southern Lebanon.

    In the Central African Republic, we see MINUSCA protecting civilians and assisting the government to extend its reach beyond the capital where people are in desperate need. 

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite ongoing fighting, UN Peacekeepers remain in the field, protecting vulnerable populations. 

    We’re also seeking efficiencies through partnerships — from Member States to regional and sub-regional organizations, to local communities.

    Most important among them is our strong partnership with the African Union.

    Security Council resolution 2719 has lifted this partnership to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the AU’s responsibility, supported by the United Nations through assessed contributions.

    Today, the Review of Peace Operations will need to be informed — and inspired — by your views.

    Member States make peacekeeping possible.

    They must lead the way as we strengthen it for the future.

    Second — as we make our operations more adaptable and flexible, we need to do the same in the use of our resources.

    Peace operations can only succeed when backed by robust mandates and clear, predictable and sustained contributions, both financial and logistical. 

    But these are tough times for the financing of our work across the board.

    Peacekeeping is no exception.

    It is crucial that we are able to use the increasingly limited resources we have — and use them well.

    That requires more flexible rules and processes.

    This means updating our approach to abolishing or establishing positions, and working with troop-contributing countries to ensure we can deliver.

    It means working with Member States and the UN Security Council to ensure that any new mandates are prioritized and achievable with the resources available and with a clear exit strategy.

    And it means driving efficiencies and improvements across our work in light of the continued funding challenges we face.

    Our Review of Peace Operations will work hand-in-hand with our UN80 initiative, to ensure we maximize efficiencies wherever possible, supported at every step by Member States.

    We look forward to your governments’ support and ideas as we tackle these challenges together.

    Troisièmement, nous avons besoin de votre soutien politique – qui passe notamment par les engagements que vous prendrez demain.

    Sans solution politique, les opérations de paix sont vouées à l’échec.

    Ensemble, nous devons rallier un soutien accru en faveur des solutions politiques pour toutes les missions de maintien de la paix.

    Faire avancer ces solutions politiques nécessite d’avoir les moyens nécessaires pour mener à bien nos opérations – notamment un soutien politique unifié de la part des États Membres, un leadership fort, des troupes bien préparées, du matériel et des technologies.

    Ces éléments peuvent renforcer nos opérations et améliorer sensiblement la vie des gens.

    Cela nécessite aussi un soutien de tous les États membres pour assurer la sécurité des Casques bleus sur le terrain, ainsi que le plein respect des privilèges et immunités pertinentes de notre Organisation et de son personnel.

    Nous sommes profondément reconnaissants de votre soutien et des contributions concrètes que nombre d’entre vous annonceront demain.

    Excellences,

    Le budget des opérations de la paix des Nations Unies, réparti entre les 193 États Membres, ne représente qu’une infime partie des dépenses militaires mondiales – environ 0,5 %. Ces opérations demeurent donc l’un des moyens les plus efficaces et les plus économiques de consolider la paix et la sécurité internationales.

    Toutefois, leur force est tributaire de l’engagement des États Membres à leur égard.

    Malheureusement, les opérations de maintien de la paix sont soumises a un sérieux problème de liquidité. Il est absolument essentiel que tous les Etats Membres respectent leurs obligations financières en payant les contributions intégralement et dans les temps.

    Aujourd’hui plus que jamais, le monde a besoin de l’ONU.

    Et l’ONU a besoin que les opérations de maintien de la paix disposent de tous les moyens nécessaires pour faire face aux réalités d’aujourd’hui et relever les défis de demain.

    Ensemble, faisons en sorte que les opérations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU répondent aux défis du moment, aux attentes des États Membres, et aux besoins légitimes de nos soldates et soldats de la paix – et des personnes à qui ils viennent en aide.

    Je vous remercie.

    Full translation in English.

    Full translation in French.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Welcoming Afrikaner Refugees

    Source: United States of America – Department of State (video statements)

    Today U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Landau welcomed the first group of Afrikaner refugees fleeing persecution from their native South Africa. We stand with these refugees, many of them farmers and former business owners, as they build a better future for themselves and their children here in the United States.

    Learn more: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/welcoming-afrikaner-refugees-fleeing-discrimination/

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jIw7aXBB2Jw

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Africa: AI can be a danger to students – 3 things universities must do

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sioux McKenna, Professor of Higher Education, Rhodes University, South Africa, Rhodes University

    Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is trained on enormous bodies of text, video and images to identify patterns. It then creates new texts, videos and images on the basis of this pattern identification. Thanks to machine learning, it improves its ability to do so every time it is used.

    As AI becomes embedded in academic life, a troubling reality has emerged: students are extremely vulnerable to its use. They don’t know enough about what AI is to be alert to its shortcomings. And they don’t know enough about their subject content to make judgements on this anyway. Most importantly, they don’t know what they don’t know.

    As two academics involved in higher education teaching, we argue that there are four key dangers facing students in today’s world of AI. They are:

    • blind trust in its abilities

    • using it to side-step actual learning

    • not knowing how it works

    • perpetuating the gap between expertise and uncritical yet confident noise.

    Given our experiences as academics who have developed curricula for students and who research generative AI, we think there are three things universities can do. They should teach critical AI literacy, emphasise why developing knowledge is important, and teach students why being an expert matters if they’re going to engage meaningfully with AI.

    The four dangers

    Blind trust in AI’s false confidence. A recent Microsoft report showed that those who know the least about a topic are the most likely to accept AI outputs as correct. Generative AI programs like ChatGPT and Claude produce text with remarkable confidence. Students lacking domain expertise can’t identify when these systems are completely wrong.

    Headlines already demonstrate the consequences of this in the workplace: lawyers submitting fabricated case citations generated by AI, and hospitals using AI transcription tools that invent statements never actually made.

    Generative AI can get it wrong because it doesn’t understand anything in the human sense of the word. But it can identify and replicate patterns with remarkable sophistication. These patterns include not only words and ideas but also tone and style.

    Missing the power of education. A core purpose of higher education is to give students a new way of understanding the world and their place in it. When students use AI in ways that sidestep intellectual challenges, they miss this essential transformation.

    When students simply outsource their thinking to AI, they’re getting credentials without competence. They might graduate with degrees but without knowledge and expertise.

    The false confidence trap. Even students who develop critical awareness about AI’s limitations face what Punya Mishra, a learning engineer professor at Arizona State University, calls “the false confidence trap”. They might recognise that AI can produce errors but lack sufficient subject knowledge to correct those errors.

    As Mishra puts it:

    It’s like having a generic BS detector but no way to separate truth from fiction.

    This creates a dangerous half-measure where students recognise AI isn’t perfect but can’t effectively evaluate its outputs.

    Perpetuating the knowledge gap. As AI becomes ubiquitous in workplaces, the gap between those with genuine expertise and those relying solely on AI will widen. Students who haven’t developed their own knowledge foundations will be increasingly marginalised in a world that paradoxically values human expertise more, not less, as AI advances.

    Answers

    There are three steps universities can take.

    Integrate critical AI literacy. Students need to understand how generative AI works – how AI is trained on massive databases of human-created texts and images to identify patterns by which to craft new outputs.

    It’s not enough to have an “Intro to AI” course. Every discipline needs to show students how AI intersects with their field and, most significantly, empower them to reflect on the ethical implications of its use. This includes engaging in questions around the use of copyrighted materials for the training of generative AI, the biases inherent in AI generated texts and images, and the enormous environmental cost of AI use.

    Emphasise knowledge development. Higher education institutions must actively counter the view that university is merely about the provision of credentials. We need to help students see the value of acquiring domain expertise. This is not always self-evident to those students who understand higher education only as a means to a job, which encourages them to engage with knowledge in an instrumentalist way – and thus to use AI in ways that prevent engagement with complex ideas. It is a personal relationship with knowledge that will prepare them for a future where AI is everywhere. Advocating for the power of knowledge needs to be a central part of every academic’s job description.

    Model dual expertise. Academics should model what Mishra calls “the dual expertise challenge” — combining domain knowledge with critical AI literacy. This means demonstrating to students how experts engage with AI: analysing its outputs against established knowledge, identifying biases or gaps, and using AI as a tool to enhance human expertise rather than replace it.

    As AI becomes increasingly sophisticated, the value of human expertise only grows. Universities that prepare students to critically engage with AI while developing deep domain knowledge will graduate the experts that society needs in this rapidly evolving technological landscape.

    We have our work cut out for us, but expertise remains highly valued.

    – AI can be a danger to students – 3 things universities must do
    – https://theconversation.com/ai-can-be-a-danger-to-students-3-things-universities-must-do-255652

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Secretary-General’s remarks to the Ministerial Meeting on the Future of Peacekeeping [bilingual, as delivered; scroll down for all-English and all-French]

    Source: United Nations – English

    ear Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, our generous hosts.

     
    Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,
     
    My thanks to Germany for bringing us together at this consequential moment.
     
    This year marks the 80th anniversary of the United Nations.
     
    Our organization was founded on the conviction that peace is possible if we work as one united human family.
     
    That is what our peace operations are about. 
     
    From preventive diplomacy to peacekeeping…
     
    From negotiating ceasefires to helping to implement them…
     
    From electoral support and observer missions to de-mining operations and protection of civilians…
     
    To the focus of today’s Ministerial meeting — peacekeeping.
     
    Excellencies,
     
    UN Blue Helmets are the most globally recognized symbol of the world’s ability to come together to help countries move from conflict to peace.
     
    Peacekeepers hail from every corner of the world.
     
    But they are united in their commitment to peace.
     
    As we meet today, UN peacekeepers are hard at work helping to ensure that ceasefires are respected…
     
    Protecting civilians caught in the line of fire…
     
    Helping provide the conditions for lifesaving aid to flow to those in need…
     
    And laying the foundations for long-term recovery.
     
    In trouble spots around the world, Blue Helmets can mean the difference between life and death.
     
    And they are also a clear demonstration of the power of multilateral action to maintain, achieve and sustain peace.
     
    There is a long list of countries that have achieved durable peace with the support of UN Peacekeeping — including Cambodia, Cote d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Liberia, Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Timor Leste.  
     
    Many of these countries now themselves contribute troops. 
     
    At the same time, we recognize that peace comes at a price.
     
    Through the decades, 4,400 peacekeepers have fallen in the line of duty.
     
    Their service and sacrifice will never be forgotten.  
     
    Please join me in a moment of silence to honour all those who lost their lives in the pursuit of peace.
     
    [MOMENT OF SILENCE]
     
    Thank you.
     
    Excellencies,
     
    We owe it to peacekeepers — and the populations they protect — to continue strengthening their ability to answer this call to peace.
     
    And to do so in the face of daunting challenges.
     
    Complex, intertwined and frequently borderless conflicts…
     
    Growing polarization and division around the globe…
     
    Targeting of peacekeepers through deadly misinformation spreading through social media…
     
    Terrorism and transnational crime, which find fertile ground in instability…
     
    The ongoing climate crisis that is exacerbating conflict while leaving more of the planet uninhabitable…
     
    All the continued trampling of international law and international humanitarian law.
     
    As a result, we are now facing the highest number of conflicts since the foundation of the United Nations, and record numbers of people fleeing across borders in search of safety and refuge.
     
    We must recognize that peacekeeping operations are only as effective as the mandates directing them, and can struggle in contexts where political support and clearly defined outcomes and solutions are absent or elusive.
     
    Meanwhile, we see increasing differences of views around how peacekeeping operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.
     
    And we face dramatic financial constraints across the board.
     
    We’ve worked to adapt in the face of these challenges.
     
    But we need to do more.
     
    Today, I want to highlight three areas of focus.
     
    First — help us shape peacekeeping operations that are fit for the future.     
     
    The Pact for the Future called for a Review of Peace Operations — including peacekeeping.
     
    The review will examine how we can make peacekeeping operations more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep.
     
    It will also aim to critically examine the tools we have today and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for the future.  
     
    Through this review, we must ensure that the United Nations is prepared to deploy peace operations tailored to each individual conflict, while preparing for the challenges of tomorrow.
     
    We can draw inspiration from our UNIFIL operation, which recently developed an adaptation plan to keep peace along the Blue Line, and ensure lifesaving aid can flow to civilians in southern Lebanon.
     
    In the Central African Republic, we see MINUSCA protecting civilians and assisting the government to extend its reach beyond the capital where people are in desperate need. 
     
    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite ongoing fighting, UN Peacekeepers remain in the field, protecting vulnerable populations. 
     
    We’re also seeking efficiencies through partnerships — from Member States to regional and sub-regional organizations, to local communities.
     
    Most important among them is our strong partnership with the African Union.
     
    Security Council resolution 2719 has lifted this partnership to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the AU’s responsibility, supported by the United Nations through assessed contributions.
     
    Today, the Review of Peace Operations will need to be informed — and inspired — by your views.
     
    Member States make peacekeeping possible.
     
    They must lead the way as we strengthen it for the future.
     
    Second — as we make our operations more adaptable and flexible, we need to do the same in the use of our resources.

    Peace operations can only succeed when backed by robust mandates and clear, predictable and sustained contributions, both financial and logistical. 
     
    But these are tough times for the financing of our work across the board.
     
    Peacekeeping is no exception.
     
    It is crucial that we are able to use the increasingly limited resources we have — and use them well.
     
    That requires more flexible rules and processes.
     
    This means updating our approach to abolishing or establishing positions, and working with troop-contributing countries to ensure we can deliver.
     
    It means working with Member States and the UN Security Council to ensure that any new mandates are prioritized and achievable with the resources available and with a clear exit strategy.
     
    And it means driving efficiencies and improvements across our work in light of the continued funding challenges we face.
     
    Our Review of Peace Operations will work hand-in-hand with our UN80 initiative, to ensure we maximize efficiencies wherever possible, supported at every step by Member States.
     
    We look forward to your governments’ support and ideas as we tackle these challenges together.

    Third — we need your political support, including through the pledges you will make tomorrow.

    Peace operations cannot succeed in the absence of a political solution.

    Together we need to mobilize greater support for political solutions across our peacekeeping missions. 

    Pursuing these political solutions requires adequate means of delivering our operations — including unified political support from Member States, strong leadership, well-trained troops, equipment and technology.

    These can strengthen our operations, and make a real difference in people’s lives.

    And it requires the support of all Member States to ensure the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers in the field, and the full implementation of the relevant privileges and immunities of the Organization and its personnel.

    We are deeply grateful for the support and for the concrete pledges so many of you will announce here tomorrow.

    Excellencies,

    With a budget shared by all 193 Member States and representing a tiny fraction of global military spending — around one half of one per cent — UN Peacekeeping remains one of the most effective and cost-effective tools to build international peace and security.

    But it’s only as strong as Member States’ commitment to it.

    Unfortunately, peacekeeping operations have been facing serious liquidity problems. 
      
    It is absolutely essential that all Member States respect their financial obligations, paying their contributions in full and on time. 

    Now more than ever, the world needs the United Nations.

    And the United Nations needs peacekeeping that is fully equipped for today’s realities and tomorrow’s challenges. 

    Together, let’s shape the UN peacekeeping operations that the challenges require, that Member States demand, and that our peacekeepers and the people they support need and deserve.
    Thank you.
     

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Secretary-General’s remarks to the Ministerial Meeting on the Future of Peacekeeping [bilingual, as delivered; scroll down for all-English and all-French]

    Source: United Nations

    Dear Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, our generous hosts.

     
    Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,
     
    My thanks to Germany for bringing us together at this consequential moment.
     
    This year marks the 80th anniversary of the United Nations.
     
    Our organization was founded on the conviction that peace is possible if we work as one united human family.
     
    That is what our peace operations are about. 
     
    From preventive diplomacy to peacekeeping…
     
    From negotiating ceasefires to helping to implement them…
     
    From electoral support and observer missions to de-mining operations and protection of civilians…
     
    To the focus of today’s Ministerial meeting — peacekeeping.
     
    Excellencies,
     
    UN Blue Helmets are the most globally recognized symbol of the world’s ability to come together to help countries move from conflict to peace.
     
    Peacekeepers hail from every corner of the world.
     
    But they are united in their commitment to peace.
     
    As we meet today, UN peacekeepers are hard at work helping to ensure that ceasefires are respected…
     
    Protecting civilians caught in the line of fire…
     
    Helping provide the conditions for lifesaving aid to flow to those in need…
     
    And laying the foundations for long-term recovery.
     
    In trouble spots around the world, Blue Helmets can mean the difference between life and death.
     
    And they are also a clear demonstration of the power of multilateral action to maintain, achieve and sustain peace.
     
    There is a long list of countries that have achieved durable peace with the support of UN Peacekeeping — including Cambodia, Cote d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Liberia, Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Timor Leste.  
     
    Many of these countries now themselves contribute troops. 
     
    At the same time, we recognize that peace comes at a price.
     
    Through the decades, 4,400 peacekeepers have fallen in the line of duty.
     
    Their service and sacrifice will never be forgotten.  
     
    Please join me in a moment of silence to honour all those who lost their lives in the pursuit of peace.
     
    [MOMENT OF SILENCE]
     
    Thank you.
     
    Excellencies,
     
    We owe it to peacekeepers — and the populations they protect — to continue strengthening their ability to answer this call to peace.
     
    And to do so in the face of daunting challenges.
     
    Complex, intertwined and frequently borderless conflicts…
     
    Growing polarization and division around the globe…
     
    Targeting of peacekeepers through deadly misinformation spreading through social media…
     
    Terrorism and transnational crime, which find fertile ground in instability…
     
    The ongoing climate crisis that is exacerbating conflict while leaving more of the planet uninhabitable…
     
    All the continued trampling of international law and international humanitarian law.
     
    As a result, we are now facing the highest number of conflicts since the foundation of the United Nations, and record numbers of people fleeing across borders in search of safety and refuge.
     
    We must recognize that peacekeeping operations are only as effective as the mandates directing them, and can struggle in contexts where political support and clearly defined outcomes and solutions are absent or elusive.
     
    Meanwhile, we see increasing differences of views around how peacekeeping operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.
     
    And we face dramatic financial constraints across the board.
     
    We’ve worked to adapt in the face of these challenges.
     
    But we need to do more.
     
    Today, I want to highlight three areas of focus.
     
    First — help us shape peacekeeping operations that are fit for the future.     
     
    The Pact for the Future called for a Review of Peace Operations — including peacekeeping.
     
    The review will examine how we can make peacekeeping operations more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep.
     
    It will also aim to critically examine the tools we have today and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for the future.  
     
    Through this review, we must ensure that the United Nations is prepared to deploy peace operations tailored to each individual conflict, while preparing for the challenges of tomorrow.
     
    We can draw inspiration from our UNIFIL operation, which recently developed an adaptation plan to keep peace along the Blue Line, and ensure lifesaving aid can flow to civilians in southern Lebanon.
     
    In the Central African Republic, we see MINUSCA protecting civilians and assisting the government to extend its reach beyond the capital where people are in desperate need. 
     
    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite ongoing fighting, UN Peacekeepers remain in the field, protecting vulnerable populations. 
     
    We’re also seeking efficiencies through partnerships — from Member States to regional and sub-regional organizations, to local communities.
     
    Most important among them is our strong partnership with the African Union.
     
    Security Council resolution 2719 has lifted this partnership to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the AU’s responsibility, supported by the United Nations through assessed contributions.
     
    Today, the Review of Peace Operations will need to be informed — and inspired — by your views.
     
    Member States make peacekeeping possible.
     
    They must lead the way as we strengthen it for the future.
     
    Second — as we make our operations more adaptable and flexible, we need to do the same in the use of our resources.

    Peace operations can only succeed when backed by robust mandates and clear, predictable and sustained contributions, both financial and logistical. 
     
    But these are tough times for the financing of our work across the board.
     
    Peacekeeping is no exception.
     
    It is crucial that we are able to use the increasingly limited resources we have — and use them well.
     
    That requires more flexible rules and processes.
     
    This means updating our approach to abolishing or establishing positions, and working with troop-contributing countries to ensure we can deliver.
     
    It means working with Member States and the UN Security Council to ensure that any new mandates are prioritized and achievable with the resources available and with a clear exit strategy.
     
    And it means driving efficiencies and improvements across our work in light of the continued funding challenges we face.
     
    Our Review of Peace Operations will work hand-in-hand with our UN80 initiative, to ensure we maximize efficiencies wherever possible, supported at every step by Member States.
     
    We look forward to your governments’ support and ideas as we tackle these challenges together.

    Third — we need your political support, including through the pledges you will make tomorrow.

    Peace operations cannot succeed in the absence of a political solution.

    Together we need to mobilize greater support for political solutions across our peacekeeping missions. 

    Pursuing these political solutions requires adequate means of delivering our operations — including unified political support from Member States, strong leadership, well-trained troops, equipment and technology.

    These can strengthen our operations, and make a real difference in people’s lives.

    And it requires the support of all Member States to ensure the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers in the field, and the full implementation of the relevant privileges and immunities of the Organization and its personnel.

    We are deeply grateful for the support and for the concrete pledges so many of you will announce here tomorrow.

    Excellencies,

    With a budget shared by all 193 Member States and representing a tiny fraction of global military spending — around one half of one per cent — UN Peacekeeping remains one of the most effective and cost-effective tools to build international peace and security.

    But it’s only as strong as Member States’ commitment to it.

    Unfortunately, peacekeeping operations have been facing serious liquidity problems. 
      
    It is absolutely essential that all Member States respect their financial obligations, paying their contributions in full and on time. 

    Now more than ever, the world needs the United Nations.

    And the United Nations needs peacekeeping that is fully equipped for today’s realities and tomorrow’s challenges. 

    Together, let’s shape the UN peacekeeping operations that the challenges require, that Member States demand, and that our peacekeepers and the people they support need and deserve.
    Thank you.
     

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: African Ministers to Tackle Energy Investment Gap at Invest in African Energy (IAE) 2025

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    PARIS, France, May 13, 2025/APO Group/ —

    At Invest in African Energy 2025, a high-level ministerial panel will bring together energy ministers from Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe to examine the capital requirements and strategic partnerships needed to bring Africa’s next generation of energy projects online.

    Set against a backdrop of evolving global energy dynamics and intensifying pressure to meet net-zero targets, the session – “Africa on the Global Energy Stage: Financing the Next Generation of Energy Projects” – will explore how African nations are navigating complex investment landscapes to drive sustainable hydrocarbon development. Moderated by NJ Ayuk, Executive Chairman of the African Energy Chamber, the discussion will feature Ekperikpe Ekpo, Minister of State for Petroleum Resources (Gas) of Nigeria; Malam Sambu, Minister of Energy of Guinea-Bissau; Wivine Moleka, Deputy Minister of Hydrocarbons of the DRC; and July Moyo, Minister of Energy & Power Development of Zimbabwe.

    IAE 2025 (apo-opa.co/4iXGe3C) is an exclusive forum designed to facilitate investment between African energy markets and global investors. Taking place May 13-14, 2025 in Paris, the event offers delegates two days of intensive engagement with industry experts, project developers, investors and policymakers. For more information, please visit www.Invest-Africa-Energy.com. To sponsor or participate as a delegate, please contact sales@energycapitalpower.com.

    Nigeria, which holds the largest natural gas reserves in Africa, is advancing its “Decade of Gas” agenda under a reform-oriented administration working to reposition the country as a global gas hub. The government is prioritizing infrastructure development, market liberalization and targeted policy incentives to draw large-scale investment into the sector, which has already led to major capital commitments from international players including Shell, Chevron and TotalEnergies, and the rollout of new LNG, FLNG and mini-LNG projects.

    In Guinea-Bissau, the energy sector is entering a new phase of exploration and frontier investment. As one of the continent’s least developed hydrocarbon markets, the country is laying the institutional and regulatory foundations for future growth, with an emphasis on public-private collaboration and regional integration. Last September, Guinea-Bissau spudded a deep offshore exploration well near the neighboring Sangomar discovery in Senegal, marking a significant step toward unlocking its offshore potential.

    The DRC, meanwhile, is pushing to unlock the potential of its underexplored hydrocarbon basins. With a renewed focus on exploration and development, the DRC is pursuing strategic licensing efforts and engaging international partners to accelerate activity, while also seeking to balance environmental considerations with its economic development goals.

    Zimbabwe continues to prioritize energy diversification and regional power security. In recent years, the country has undertaken efforts to expand its generation capacity and foster investment through independent power producers and infrastructure partnerships. As southern Africa faces persistent energy shortfalls, Zimbabwe is positioning itself as a critical part of the regional solution. Together, Africa’s leading energy ministers will engage in a forward-looking dialogue on innovative partnership models, policy frameworks and the capital flows needed to ensure Africa’s energy projects not only get off the ground, but also deliver long-term value for both investors and local economies.

    MIL OSI Africa