Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable – 4th Cochairs Progress Report

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable – 4th Cochairs Progress Report

    April 23, 2025

    Washington, DC: The Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable (GSDR) met today and reviewed progress on the work to improve debt restructuring processes and timelines, and to help address debt vulnerabilities. Participants also discussed priority areas for the work going forward. At the end of the meeting, the International Monetary Fund Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, World Bank Group President Ajay Banga, and Finance Minister of South Africa, G20 Presidency, Enoch Godongwana, co-chairs of the GSDR, issued the attached “Restructuring Playbook”, which aims to provide debtor country authorities considering a debt restructuring with the key steps, concepts and processes for such an operation. They also issued the attached GSDR 4th Cochairs Report as well as the compilation of technical issues discussed by the GSDR so far.

    The GSDR brings together debtor countries and official and private creditors with the objective to build common understanding among key stakeholders on debt sustainability and debt restructuring challenges, and ways to address them.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Randa Elnagar

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/23/pr25119-global-sovereign-debt-roundtable-4th-cochairs-progress-report

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: From Aid to Investment: Africa Investment Forum Builds $225B Momentum in Making Continent Bankable

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    WASHINGTON D.C., United States of America, April 23, 2025/APO Group/ —

    Buoyed by last year’s successful Africa Investment Forum’s Market Days that generated $29.2 billion of investment interest, its nine founding partners are bracing for an even bigger and better event later this year.

    The 2024 Africa Investment Forum Market Days attracted more than 2,300 investors and participants from 83 countries around the world, more than 40 boardrooms, and 15 sponsors, including investment banks, insurers, and export credit agencies. Many more sponsors are lining up for the 2025 edition.

    Meeting on Monday evening in Washington, DC, on the sidelines of the World Bank and IMF Spring Meetings, the partners reflected on the Forum’s remarkable seven-year journey, which has mobilized more than $225 billion in investment interest and established itself as a global investment movement for Africa.

    The partners include the African Development Bank, Afreximbank, Africa50, Africa Finance Corporation, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Islamic Development, European Investment Bank, Trade and Development Bank, and newcomer, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa  (BADEA).

    The President of the African Development Bank Group and Chairman of the Africa Investment Forum, Dr. Akinwumi Adesina  said, “We have elevated Africa. We have showcased Africa. We have changed perceptions on Africa,” adding, “We have shown our belief in Africa, which has demonstrated to the world that indeed Africa is a bankable destination.”

    “Africa will not be developed by aid. It will be developed by investment,” Adesina said, a vision that has guided the Forum since its launch in 2018.

    The meeting outlined how the Forum has transformed perceptions about investing in Africa while delivering high-quality deal pipelines. To date, 22 deals have closed, with 41% of the financing provided by founding partners alongside other institutional investors.

    Partners also discussed the Africa Investment Forum Partnership Framework to guarantee the Forum’s sustainability, The long-term governance and sustainability framework is expected to be formally signed at the May African Development Bank Annual Meetings in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.

    As Adesina prepares to conclude his tenure as president of the African Development Bank in September, he expressed profound gratitude to the partners for their support and commitment to the Forum.

    At Monday’s meeting, the partners unanimously committed to the Africa Investment Forum because of its convening power to mobilize critical investments for transformative projects across the continent.

    The CEO of Africa 50, Alain Ebobise spoke about the  Forum’s uniqueness because “it  focuses not on speeches but on people transacting in boardrooms,” adding, “We are ready to bring on board more sponsors.”

    The President and CEO of Africa Finance  Corporation, Samaila Zubairu said, “As Africans we have to take ownership of our development. The Africa Investment Forum is an initiative that demonstrates that.”

    Boitumelo Mosako, the CEO of the Development Bank of Southern  Africa, reiterated this, saying, ” The only way to be certain about the future is by creating it.”

    Praising last year’s Market Days event as “fantastic,” the President of the Trade and Development Bank, Admassu Tadesse, pointed to the forum’s strength as a strong global brand promoting synergies among its founding partners.

    Representing BADEA, the Director of Private  Sector, Diab Karrar said that even though BADEA joined the Africa Investment Forum last year, they had always supported the initiative because “we believe in it.”

    The Executive Vice President of Global Trade Bank, Afreximbank, Haytham El Maayergi, expressed a strong commitment to supporting the Africa Investment Forum.

    Andrew McDowell, Director General of the European Investment Bank Global, spoke about the importance of institutional collaboration, which helps institutions like his make informed decisions about investment in Africa.

    “It has been my greatest honor to develop and advance the Africa Investment Forum with you all. “Let us continue to fast-track Africa’s development together, now and in the future!” declared Adesina 

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Ghana Sets Stage for Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) Reform, Responsible Gold Leadership at Mining in Motion Webinar

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    ACCRA, Ghana, April 23, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The Ashanti Green Initiative (AGI) today hosted a high-level virtual briefing to provide an exclusive preview of the upcoming Mining in Motion Summit, set to take place on June 2–4, 2025 in Accra, Ghana. The webinar, led by mining governance expert Charles Kwarteng Antwi, presented a bold advocacy agenda for formalizing Ghana’s artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector, with the aim of positioning the country as a leader in responsible gold production. 

    “Today’s conversation goes beyond gold – it is about people, progress and possibilities. We are here to explore how innovation, responsibility and collective will can transform the artisanal mining sector into a force for good,” said Charles during his keynote. 

    Ghana, which produces more than 130 metric tonnes of gold annually – 35% of it from ASM – faces a critical inflection point. While the ASM sector supports more than 1.1 million people across over 100 districts, it remains largely informal, limiting miners’ access to finance, safety standards and global markets. “The paradox is clear: while ASM contributes over $2 billion in annual gold exports, the very actors producing this gold remain marginalized from its value,” said Charles. “The solution lies in the formalization of the sector, not as a tool for punishment, but to be seen as a tool for empowerment.” 

    The Mining in Motion Summit, organized by AGI in collaboration with the World Bank, World Gold Council and other global partners, will convene public and private sector leaders, development organizations and traditional authorities. Key participants include H.E. John Dramani Mahama, President of Ghana, alongside delegations from South Africa, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations Development Program. 

    The event will feature site visits to artisanal mining areas undergoing rehabilitation, and a three-day agenda of panels and working groups focused on responsible sourcing, traceability, formalization strategies and ESG compliance. “[This] is where Africa asserts its place in the global gold economy – not as a passive exporter, but as a standard-setter, innovator and unifier within the space,” said Charles.  

    Additionally, he emphasized the importance of aligning with global gold standards, including the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, the London Bullion Market Association’s Responsible Gold Guidance and the UAE Good Delivery Standard. However, implementation requires investment and infrastructure. “Setting up a compliance infrastructure comes at a cost: miners need training; cooperatives need formal recognition; certification requires labs, logistics and digital systems. This is why AGI is calling for international investments to ensure desired growth and outcomes,”said Charles.   

    AGI’s long-term vision is to make Ghana a global leader in gold traceability by 2030. “Our vision is one where Ghanaian gold is fully traceable from mine to market, produced under conditions that respect human rights and the environment, recognized globally but rooted locally, and used as a tool not just for export, but for domestic and continental economic empowerment.” 

    The webinar closed with a message of shared responsibility and opportunity: “Ghana’s gold must power more than profits. It must power schools, health clinics, clean rivers, forest restoration and create thriving and sustainable communities.” 

    To secure your spot at the Mining in Motion 2025 Summit, visit www.MininginMotionSummit.com 

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Video: Climate, Gaza & other topics – Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:

    – Climate
    – Deputy Secretary-General
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – Yemen
    – Sudan
    – Sudan/Humanitarian
    – Democratic Republic of the Congo
    – Democratic Republic of the Congo/Peacekeeping
    – Somalia
    – Ukraine
    – Kashmir
    – International Days
    – Briefings Tomorrow

    CLIMATE
    This morning, the Secretary-General and President Lula of Brazil convened a virtual leaders’ session on climate and just transition.
    After the meeting he spoke to some of you and said that he heard a unifying message: our world faces massive headwinds and a multitude of crises, but we cannot allow climate commitments to be blown off course.
    The Secretary-General added that we must keep building momentum for action at COP30 in Brazil— and that today was an important part of that effort.
    The Secretary-General also said that renewables are the economic opportunity of the century. Dissenters and fossil fuel interests may try to stand in the way, but the world is moving forward – full speed ahead.
    The Secretary-General urged leaders to take action on two fronts: first — to step up efforts to submit the strongest possible national climate plans well ahead of COP30.
    And second, to scale-up support for developing countries.

    DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL
    The Deputy Secretary-General, Amina Mohammed, is travelling to Washington, D.C. this afternoon, to attend the World Bank/International Monetary Fund Annual Spring Meetings and engage in discussions with key stakeholders and government officials.
    Ms. Mohammed will participate in a ministerial roundtable to discuss the upcoming fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) and priority actions to support the Sustainable Development Goals. She will separately meet with Finance Ministers, leaders of International Financial Institutions and Multilateral Development Banks to discuss the challenging global economic context, its implications for sustainable development, and how to mitigate the risks for the world’s poorest countries.
    The Deputy Secretary-General will return to New York tomorrow evening. 

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=23%20April%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=31B80i3kYCM

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Video: IMF Seminar: Pathways to Prosperity: Policies and Partnerships for Success

    Source: International Monetary Fund – IMF (video statements)

    While the path of progress is rarely easy, some countries have successfully turned moments of adversity into opportunities for lasting economic progress and better outcomes for people.

    To hear more about the policies and partnerships that make a difference, join us for a seminar discussion with IMF Deputy Managing Director Nigel Clarke, Minister of Economy and Finance of Greece Kyriakos Pierrakakis, Minister of Economy and Finance of Paraguay Carlos Fernandez Valdovinos, Minister of Economy and Finance of Benin Romuald Wadagni, and President Emeritus of the Center for Global Development Masood Ahmed.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BmAblYJ5KK0

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission Reports on Kosovo – A10-0075/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission Reports on Kosovo

    (2025/2019(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and Kosovo, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 April 2016,

     having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2022,

     having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe of 12 May 2022,

     having regard to the framework agreement between the European Union and Kosovo on the general principles for the participation of Kosovo in Union programmes[2], in force since 1 August 2017,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[4],

     having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans Summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia, of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb, of 6 October 2021 in Brdo pri Kranju, of 6 December 2022 in Tirana, of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

     having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0692),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0692),

     having regard to the general summary and the country assessments by the Commission, dated 31 May 2023 and 13 June 2024, on Kosovo’s economic reform programme,

     having regard to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye, adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

     having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, and to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 of 9 September 2010, which acknowledged the content of the ICJ opinion and welcomed the EU’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo,

     having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

     having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and to the implementation annex thereto,

     having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1095 of 5 June 2023 amending Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)[5], which extended the mission’s mandate until 14 June 2025,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Kosovo)[6],

     having regard to the final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2021 municipal elections in Kosovo,

     having regard to the preliminary report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2025 parliamentary elections in Kosovo,

     having regard to the fourth meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council between the European Union and Kosovo held in Brussels on 7 December 2021,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Kosovo,

     having regard to the joint recommendations adopted at the 12th meeting of the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 9 December 2024,

     having regard to the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International,

     having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders,

     having regard to the Democracy Report 2024 of March 2024 by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0075/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement policy is one of the most effective EU foreign policy instruments and one of the most successful policies to incentivise and encourage fundamental reforms, and is a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas democracy, human rights and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    C. whereas the EU enlargement process is a strategic tool for strengthening stability, democracy and economic development in Europe, and each enlargement country is judged on its own merits and whereas it is the implementation of the necessary reforms and compliance with the set of criteria and common European values that determines the timetable and progress of accession; whereas Kosovo’s path towards EU membership also depends on the normalisation of relations with Serbia;

    D. whereas the EU is the largest provider of financial support to Kosovo;

    E. whereas Kosovo has been subjected to foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, particularly from Russia, especially through Serbian nationalist outlets, and China, through soft power, aiming to destabilise its democratic institutions, jeopardise societal cohesion, and incite ethnic violence; whereas the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023 was followed by a massive spread of disinformation that further exacerbated tensions; whereas Kosovo authorities adopted the Law on the Independent Media Commission (IMC) in July 2024; whereas, in May 2024, the Council of Europe published a legal opinion on the draft law on the IMC expressing concerns related to certain aspects of the at-that-time draft law, and providing recommendations on how to address these concerns; whereas the final text of the Law on the IMC did not reflect most of the recommendations made;

    F. whereas the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, also known as EULEX, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the common security and defence policy of the European Union;

    G. whereas in 2018 and 2023, petitions were signed by over 500 people who historically self-identify as Bulgarian;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Commends Kosovo’s commitment to EU accession, which reflects a clear strategic geopolitical choice, and the continued strong support of its citizens for Kosovo’s European path; reiterates that Kosovo has been consistent in its efforts to integrate into the European Union;

    2. Reiterates its firm belief that Kosovo’s future lies in the EU and that all efforts to bring Kosovo out of the ‘grey zone’ are in the interest of the people of both Kosovo and the EU, especially in the context of the current geopolitical dynamics in the region, rapid major shifts in world politics and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    3. Supports Kosovo’s application for EU membership, which reflects the overwhelming cross-party consensus on EU integration and a clear geopolitical strategic choice; reiterates its call on the Member States in the Council to mandate the Commission to present its questionnaire and to submit its opinion on the merits of the country’s application; calls on the five non-recognising Member States that have not yet recognised Kosovo’s independence to do so without delay and thus allow Kosovo to progress on its EU path on an equal footing with the other candidate countries;  recalls the advisory opinion of the ICJ dated 22 July 2010, which states that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence does not violate general international law;

    4. Recalls that membership of the European Union is based on a merit-based process, conditional on the rigorous implementation of reforms aligned with the highest European standards, in particular compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the rule of law, and ensures the effective application of laws in practice; encourages Kosovo to continue its efforts in this regard, by further strengthening its commitment to the values ​​and standards of the Union; stresses that enlargement also implies thorough preparation of potential new members, while respecting the economic stability of the internal market, social and environmental standards and the proper functioning of the European institutions;

    5. Welcomes the visa liberalisation, adopted in April 2023 and in place since 1 January 2024, as a tangible result of Kosovo’s ever-closer relations with the EU and as evidence of Kosovo’s efforts on the path of European integration; welcomes Kosovo’s decision to unilaterally abolish visa requirements for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina; welcomes the decision of Spain to recognise ordinary passports issued by Kosovo as valid travel documents as of January 2024;

    6. Notes the tangible progress in the areas of justice, freedom and security, the fight against organised crime and a functioning market economy; regrets the limited progress and calls for an acceleration of reforms in the area of rule of law; welcomes Kosovo’s ambition to advance the implementation of reforms, which remains the country’s priority; regrets the lack of a decision-making quorum in the Kosovo National Assembly, caused by the boycott of the Assembly work by political parties ahead of parliamentary elections;

    7. Regrets the politicisation of institutions such as the Central Election Commission and the IMC;

    8. Commends Kosovo’s ongoing alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, in particular its firm condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its implementation of the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus, aligning with the Union’s foreign policy, and its support through humanitarian aid and military assistance packages to Ukraine, which confirm that Kosovo is a reliable and valuable partner committed to EU integration and confirms its clear geopolitical orientation, firmly anchored in the European and transatlantic alliance;

    9. Calls for the immediate lifting of the EU measures against Kosovo, which are no longer justified as Kosovo has fulfilled the EU requirements and as the measures also stand in gross contradiction to Kosovo’s demonstrated commitment to European values and alignment with EU policies, limiting the impact of the EU’s partnership with Kosovo and hindering the resumption of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in good faith;

    10. Reiterates its full support for Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe and for the country’s strategic orientation plan to join the NATO Partnership for Peace programme and its bids to join other international organisations; calls on the relevant organisations and the Member States to proactively support Kosovo’s respective bids; calls on the Commission and the EU Office in Kosovo to step up their efforts in enhancing visibility and promoting the role, efforts and benefits of the closer partnership between the EU and Kosovo;

    11. Welcomes the fact that Kosovo reduced administrative burden by simplifying procedures through the implementation of the related program for 2022-2027; notes that the strategic framework for public administration is in place, but not efficiently implemented; regrets the fact that delays in public administration reform have left EU funding management weak and that accountability in the public sector is insufficient; calls on Kosovo to improve public administration and the merit-based civil service system by amending and adopting the Law on public officials and the Law on the independent oversight board of civil service;

    12. Regrets that the Kosovo Constitutional Court ruling on the Law on salaries, which unifies the current system of remuneration for public officials, is not yet functional; calls on the Kosovo Government to revise its legislation on public financial management to meet international standards and to incorporate the public investment methodology into the revised legislation;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13. Welcomes the important and positive progress on addressing many of the EU Election Observation Mission’s (EU EOM) long-standing recommendations and on presenting a consensual law on general elections; notes that this provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections, in line with international and regional standards; notes that in response to an invitation by the president of Kosovo, the European Union deployed an EU EOM, including an observer delegation of Members of the European Parliament, to observe the parliamentary elections in Kosovo on 9 February 2025; welcomes the conclusions of the EU EOM confirming the conduct of peaceful, free and fair elections on 9 February 2025 with the participation of all communities in Kosovo; regrets the harsh rhetoric of the political parties during the campaign; takes note of the technical problems encountered during the counting process and encourages the Kosovo authorities to increase their efforts to improve the organisation of the next elections; notes the lack of genuine political pluralism within the Kosovo Serb community at the parliamentary elections, despite multiple Kosovo Serb electoral lists; is concerned by reports of continuous pressure on voters from the Serbian community exercised by Belgrade; condemns the repeated interference in the electoral campaign by US Special Envoy Richard Grenell;

    14. Notes with concern that the Law on Local Elections and the Law on General Elections are still not implemented and harmonised with the Law on Gender Equality, which mandates 50 % equal representation of women and men; regrets that women continue to be underrepresented;

    15. Welcomes the adoption of the law on the Special Prosecution Office and the progress in adjudicating corruption cases; commends the active work of the Special Prosecution Office for solving seven war crime cases; calls for further clarification of the division of jurisdiction between the Special Prosecution Office and the Basic Prosecution in handling investigations and prosecutions; calls on Kosovo to continue strengthening the Special Prosecution Office by enhancing its capacity to investigate and prosecute high-profile organised crime cases; calls on the police and Special Prosecution Office to work closely together to develop strategies for conducting investigations more effectively, with a clear division of responsibility;

    16. Takes note of the progress in Kosovo’s ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index, as it has moved upward 10 places since last year, considering it to be a positive development while acknowledging that this is attributable both to decreases in other countries’ scores and, more significantly, to the adoption of qualitative legislation, but that it still remains largely unsatisfactory; emphasises that gaining people’s trust requires not only legislative reforms but also visible results in investigating, prosecuting and convicting cases of corruption at all levels; regrets that Kosovo has lacked an anti-corruption strategy since 2019 and urges for more efforts to finalise it as a matter of priority; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption;

    17. Expresses serious concern about systemic vulnerabilities in Kosovo’s judiciary, particularly regarding the independence of the justice system and respect for separation of powers; reiterates its concern about delays to trials and continued criticism by government officials of judicial decisions in individual cases; notes with concern that despite EU advice, the government failed to consult the Venice Commission on judicial reforms, negatively affecting their quality and alignment with European standards; calls on Kosovo to ensure that legislation governing the integrity and accountability of the judiciary is consistent with European standards and Venice Commission recommendations; calls on the Government of Kosovo to allocate adequate budget for the judicial system; welcomes the establishment of the Commercial Court, progress in the recruitment of new judges and prosecutors in a merit-based and transparent process, and an overall increase of transparency;

    18. Welcomes the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the parliamentary elections and encourages their elected representatives to play an active role within the Kosovo legislative framework, in support of Kosovo’s European future; regrets, however, the boycott of parties representing Kosovo Serbs during the local elections in April 2023 and the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions; expresses concern over Serbia’s interference in the parliamentary elections through Srpska Lista (SL);

    19. Welcomes the implementation of the 2016 judgement of the Constitutional Court on the Visoki Dečani/Deçani Monastery land ownership by registering the monastery as the owner, in March 2024;

    20. Welcomes the steady increase in organised crime sentences and the fact that the legal framework on the fight against organised crime is aligned with the EU acquis; emphasises the need for prosecution services and police to strengthen their joint action against criminal groups and networks; expresses concern about the security challenges in the north of Kosovo, particularly following the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023, which demanded significant police resources; emphasises the need to deepen cooperation in the field of combating drug trafficking; calls for further alignment regarding the fight against terrorism;

    21. Welcomes the adoption of the strategy and action plan on control of small arms light weapons and explosives, as well as the high level of compliance with the rules of the UN Firearms Protocol;

    22. Remains concerned over the slow implementation of the rule of law strategy and action plan;

    23. Reaffirms its commitment to maintaining and strengthening its cooperation with the Kosovo Assembly and its members in support of democratic processes related to Kosovo’s European path by using Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives; believes that this partnership can be revitalised and further reinforced following the democratic elections held on 9 February 2025; encourages the active involvement and collaboration of all elected members of the newly formed Kosovo Assembly;

    24. Condemns the serious security incidents in the north of Kosovo in late November 2024, the gravest act occurring near the village of Vragë in Zubin Potok, where explosive devices damaged critical infrastructure by targeting the main channel of the Ibër Lepenc system; expresses its support for Kosovo’s institutions in conducting a full investigation of these criminal actions so that the perpetrators will be brought to justice;

    25. Commends the work of EULEX, which has been assisting Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule of law institutions;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    26. Notes that Kosovo has the necessary institutional set-up for the promotion and protection of human rights; welcomes the adoption of the strategy for the protection and promotion of the rights of communities; emphasises, however, that human rights protection remains weak owing to the lack of legislative implementation, political will and limited human and financial resources and calls for strengthened enforcement and accountability mechanisms;

    27. Acknowledges that Kosovo’s constitution is very progressive in terms of protection of minority rights; notes with regret that the petition signed by nearly 500 people who have historically self-identified as Bulgarian, which was registered at the Assembly of Kosovo in January 2023, has still not been considered and recommends that those rights be enshrined in law and ensured in practice; calls on Kosovo to ensure that all minorities recognised under the Law on protection of minority rights and members of their communities, are fully incorporated into the country’s constitution; calls on the Kosovo authorities to step up efforts to protect the rights of all minorities, including national communities, in particular vulnerable national communities, and to provide them equal opportunities and adequate representation in political and cultural life, public media, the administration and the judiciary, as well as prevent their assimilation and promote their integration into Kosovo’s society and strengthen activities to eliminate social and economic challenges of these national minorities;

    28. Welcomes the increase in funding to shelters for victims of domestic violence and trafficking; notes that domestic violence remains the most common form of gender-based violence; expresses concerns that the system continues to fail in ensuring the effective prevention of domestic violence;

    29. Regrets that the adoption of the draft Civil Code of Kosovo remains pending; highlights that the draft Civil Code addresses several important issues related to gender equality as a fundamental EU value, including enabling an equal share of joint marital property among women and men spouses; stresses the importance of ensuring rights for all people in Kosovo in the Civil Code to safeguard respect for constitutional rights and opportunities for the LGBTIQ community; expresses concern that women remain under-represented in senior political positions, specifically related to security and the dialogue, and emphasises the urgent need for their involvement in peacemaking and reconciliation processes, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; calls for more efforts to be made to improve the place of women in society;

    30. Notes that the prison system broadly follows UN Standard Minimum Rules and calls for the better protection of the rights of prisoners, particularly female, minority and mentally ill prisoners; remains concerned that discriminatory language against women and LGBTIQ people persists, and calls on the authorities to create and implement a national gender strategy for research fields, such as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics; commends the participation of women in high-quality business and management training programmes, as well as in ICT related domains, facilitated by the instrument for pre-accession assistance funds; regrets that women from minority groups, particularly the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, face numerous forms of discrimination, particularly in education, employment and access to healthcare; expresses concerns that the central administration does not adequately represent minority communities, and the number of women in senior positions is low;

    31. Regrets that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has not yet been adopted; expresses concerns that there is insufficient alignment between Kosovo’s legislation and the EU acquis on the rights of people with disabilities, who face discrimination and barriers to accessing social services;

    32. Welcomes Kosovo’s consistent improvement in its position in the 2024 Liberal Democracy Index and Electoral Democracy Index, as prepared by the Varieties of Democracy Institute, which measures the rule of law, checks and balances, civil liberties, and free and fair elections;

    33. Takes note of Kosovo’s pluralistic media environment while awaiting the decision of the Constitutional Court on the main media law and underlines the role of the IMC, whose independence in decision-making needs to be strictly ensured and full functioning restored; regrets, however, the decline in Kosovo’s media freedom, as evidenced by its drop from the 56th to the 75th place in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; reaffirms that media pluralism and transparency are prerequisites for EU accession; calls for greater transparency on media ownership and financing with a view to enhancing media independence and pluralism; emphasises the need for robust measures to protect journalists from harassment and intimidation, and to ensure the independence of media regulatory bodies; notes the concerns raised by civil society about the allegedly politically motivated election of the Chair of the IMC; urges the Kosovo authorities to further revise the Law on the IMC in order to include the recommendations made by the Council of Europe, thus aligning the national law with EU standards and practices; recommends increased support for independent media outlets and fact-checking organisations in Kosovo, recognising their crucial role in countering disinformation and providing accurate information to the public; encourages the EU to provide technical and financial assistance to these entities; encourages the Kosovo authorities to request tailor-made Technical Assistance and Information Exchange expert missions bodies; calls for the adoption of the law on Radio Television of Kosovo and the law on the protection of journalists’ sources;

    34. Expresses concern over the recent cyberattack targeting Kosovo’s digital infrastructure; urges the Kosovo Government to reinforce its capacities to combat foreign interference and disinformation, particularly those originating from Serbian nationalist outlets and Russia, aimed at destabilising the region and undermining the European integration of the Western Balkans, by developing comprehensive strategies that include public awareness campaigns also combating disinformation undermining women’s participation in public life, strengthening cybersecurity and related infrastructure, fostering collaboration with international partners, most notably the European Union, to protect its digital economy, public services and national security, and addressing disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats that aim to destabilise the country and undermine its European perspective; encourages the integration of media literacy programs into Kosovo’s educational curriculum to equip citizens with the skills necessary to identify and counteract disinformation;

    35. Commends the fact that Kosovo provided shelter and asylum to journalists from Ukraine and Afghanistan;

    36. Expresses serious concern about the significant increase in attacks against journalists and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP cases), including by government officials; calls on the authorities to advance their work on anti-SLAPP legislation in line with the new EU Directive 2024/1069[7]; calls on Kosovo to work actively to secure the ability of journalists to carry out their work and to ensure full freedom for the media to operate independently; underlines the need to stop all forms of violence;

    37. Welcomes Kosovo’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a very crucial and positive role in the reform process; encourages the Kosovo Government to enhance its cooperation with civil society, in particular with women’s rights organisations, on decision-making and to make more use of the Government Council for Cooperation with Civil Society for building collaborative relationships and genuinely implicating civil society in a transparent legislative process from an early stage onwards; stresses the importance of increasing accountability and transparency in relation to public funding for civil society organisations; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress;

    38. Regrets the lack of a clear plan for engaging Kosovo Serbs in the north and that initiatives to involve the Serb community in Kosovo’s political, social and economic structures remain very limited; reiterates its call to improve the internal dialogue and genuinely and directly engage with the independent civil society organisations of Kosovo Serbs, in particular in the north, with the aim of building trust, facilitating the daily life of Kosovo Serbs and successfully integrating them;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    39. Commends Kosovo’s engagement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives and encourages it to enhance its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes; commends Kosovo on its constructive approach and active engagement in regional cooperation and trade facilitation that led to the unblocking of the Central European Free Trade Agreement;

    40. Calls on Serbia to open all wartime archives and grant access to the former Yugoslav Secret Service (UDBA) and Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service (KOS) files, ensuring their return to respective governments upon request; emphasises the need to open these archives region-wide to investigate communist-era crimes and strengthen democracy, accountability and institutions in the Western Balkans;

    41. Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    42. Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Kosovo and Serbia in order to achieve a comprehensive legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    43. Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    44. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    45. Condemns all actions that endanger stability and jeopardise the reconciliation process, including the tensions in the north of Kosovo and provocations by Serbian state-sponsored groups and illegal armed formations, and urges the European Union to take a stronger stance against external interference in Kosovo’s internal affairs; emphasises that both sides must fully implement all agreements reached and avoid unilateral actions that could escalate tensions; calls on the Kosovo police to ensure that they fully abide by all rule of law and human rights requirements, and to guarantee that a multi-ethnic and inclusive police force, fully in line with legal requirements, is deployed in the north of Kosovo; recalls the shared responsibility of all political representatives and all communities in Kosovo for upholding peace, security and the rule of law;

    46. Welcomes the establishment of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons in December 2024 and calls for swift progress in implementing the May 2023 Political Declaration on Missing Persons; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to refrain from politicising this humanitarian issue and to step up their efforts in implementing the declaration as part of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and to establish cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia;

    47. Welcomes the recent agreements in the framework of the Berlin Process;

    48. Welcomes Kosovo’s decision to remove restrictions on the entry of Serbian finished products at the Merdare border crossing;

    49. Welcomes the presence of the Kosovo Force and its role in building and maintaining a safe and secure environment and in developing a stable and peaceful Kosovo on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration; recalls the importance of the mission for the ongoing development of the Kosovo Security Force through the provision of advice, training and capacity building;

    Socio-economic reforms

    50. Welcomes Kosovo’s active engagement in the implementation of the new growth plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to deepen EU-related reforms and reduce the socio-economic gap between EU Member States and the Western Balkan countries; welcomes the adoption of Kosovo’s Reform Agenda and recalls that Kosovo (as well as Serbia) needs to show improved commitment to the EU-facilitated Dialogue in order to access the resources;

    51. Welcomes the progress achieved by Kosovo in developing a functioning market economy and encourages Kosovo to implement the necessary structural reforms to address fiscal challenges, while ensuring adequate labour protection, fair wages, and improved working conditions in line with EU legislation;

    52. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to develop a regional strategy to address the persistent youth unemployment and brain drain by tackling the skills mismatch between the education system and the labour market, improving the quality of teaching, and ensuring adequate funding for active labour market measures and vocational training schemes, along with adequate childcare and pre-school education facilities;

    53. Welcomes the fact that Kosovo’s cybercrime legislation is broadly aligned with the EU acquis; notes Kosovo’s limited progress in the digital transformation of public services; emphasises the need for it to align with EU digital legislation as well as with the needs of its people, specifically with the European Electronic Communications Code, the EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2)[8], the EU toolbox for 5G security, and the Digital Services Act[9] and the Digital Markets Act[10]; notes that Kosovo’s economy remains highly dependent on imports and stresses the need for economic diversification to enhance competitiveness and sustainability, particularly in the context of deeper integration into EU markets;

    54. Regrets that the draft law on textbooks, presented in 2022, is still pending final adoption in the Kosovo Assembly; calls on Kosovo to finalise the implementation of the new curricular framework for basic education, complete the revision of current textbooks, provide sustainable training to teachers, and systematically apply quality assurance mechanisms at all education levels;

    55. Urges Kosovo to ensure better access to quality healthcare services; notes that healthcare expenditure remains the second lowest in the region, and calls for a comprehensive healthcare reform to address the needs of all citizens, especially in rural and underserved areas;

    56. Notes with concern that access to social services, particularly for vulnerable groups, worsened with the government’s closure of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which was done without transparent consultation with civil society and other stakeholders and contributed to significant confusion; calls for better, evidence-based budgeting to improve social services, particularly for survivors of gender-based violence in accordance with the new legal framework;

    57. Calls on Kosovo to provide equal and non-discriminatory state education in minority languages;

    58. Reiterates the need to reach out to young people from the Serb majority municipalities and to integrate them in the socio-economic structures of the country;

    Energy, environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    59. Notes that Kosovo has made some progress on the security of energy supply but remains heavily reliant on outdated, highly polluting power plants, posing serious health and environmental risks; notes that Kosovo needs to ensure the time-efficient implementation of its energy programme for 2022-2025 to meet its ambitious targets and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels; calls for the EU to step up and prioritise its efforts to help Kosovo overcome its air pollution problems; notes that Kosovo’s new energy strategy does not promote the construction of hydropower plants due to their harmful environmental impact, in particular because of the water scarcity in the country;

    60. Highlights the need for comprehensive infrastructure development in Kosovo to facilitate the reduction of emissions from public transport and the expansion of electrified transport; stresses that improving accessibility and ensuring compatibility with the EU transport network must remain a priority;

    61. Welcomes the agreement at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of data roaming charges and further reductions leading to prices close to domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entrance into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    62. Urges Kosovo to enhance compliance with emission ceilings, improve the integration of environmental considerations into sectoral policies and adopt necessary measures for pollution, soil and water contamination control and waste management, in line with EU and international standards and commitments; urges Kosovo to improve comprehensive environmental impact assessments and to integrate sustainability measures into infrastructure planning; calls on Kosovo to increase the protected areas in the country and to improve instruments and measures for their protection with a view to safeguarding biodiversity, including key habitats of the critically endangered Balkan lynx; encourages Kosovo to intensify and speed up collaborative efforts with its neighbouring countries to designate transboundary protected areas and establish coherent transboundary management plans;

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    63. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Kosovo.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: CISA, DHS S&T, INL, LSU Help Energy Industry Partners Strengthen Incident Response and OT Cybersecurity

    News In Brief – Source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

    WASHINGTON – The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) hosted Louisiana State University (LSU) and several energy industry and critical infrastructure partners to train against simulated, high-impact cyberattacks on operational technology (OT) and traditional information technology (IT) at CISA’s Control Environment Laboratory Resource (CELR) in Idaho Falls, Idaho, last week. LSU is the first university in the U.S. invited to participate in the CELR exercise, as part of CISA and INL’s efforts to strengthen cyber talent development and research partnerships.

    Cybersecurity threats exploit the increased complexity and connectivity of critical infrastructure systems. The potential incapacitation or destruction of assets, systems and networks, whether physical or virtual, could have a debilitating effect on national security, economic security and on public health and safety. As the nation’s cyber defense agency, CISA is committed to growing operational and strategic partnerships to increase collaboration across the OT and industrial control systems (ICS) community.

    On April 15-17, energy industry partners and the CISA-INL-LSU team used the CELR chemical processing platform, located at and operated by INL on behalf of CISA. CELR platforms are benchtop models of critical infrastructure with integrated industrial processes to represent how real-world components and facilities might be compromised through cyber-physical attacks. The participants were positioned in a live environment with IT and OT traffic and attacked by a technical team posing as a sophisticated adversary. The training participants’ mission was to detect and respond to kinetic cyberattacks through ICS elements, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, human-machine interfaces (HMIs), programmable logic controllers (PLCs), OT and IT systems and other key components widely used in industrial facilities.

    “Collaborating with LSU and industry partners is extremely beneficial in strengthening the nation’s cybersecurity knowledge and ability to respond to threats. This training is another step in our shared vision to expand the opportunity for critical infrastructure entities to strengthen their cybersecurity using CELR,” said Matt Hartman, CISA Deputy Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity. “Malicious cyber actors and nation-state adversaries are a persistent, highly capable threat to critical infrastructure operations, functionality and safety. CELR is a valuable resource for critical infrastructure owners and operators seeking to improve the security of their ICS/OT networks.”

    “INL’s Controls Laboratory hosts five CISA-sponsored ICS testbeds, offering immersive environments for partners to experience realistic cyberattack scenarios against critical infrastructure,” said Tim Huddleston, INL’s Cybersecurity Program Manager. “We were proud to host industry partners and academia in this exercise, helping them improve their skills in cyber hunting and incident response, which reduces the risk from malicious cyber actors.”

    INL leverages scientific expertise and unique controls environments to support the departments of Energy, Defense and Homeland Security in national security challenges, including critical infrastructure protection. Last week’s training is part of an ongoing collaborative effort by CISA, DHS S&T, INL and LSU to equip energy industry cyber defenders to protect ICS environments and develop deeply technical cyber talent for critical infrastructure. Under CISA and S&T oversight, INL is currently developing the first university-based CELR platform. DHS S&T and CISA plan to deliver an Oil and Natural Gas CELR platform to LSU by fall of this year.

    Through a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement, LSU will operate and maintain the Oil and Natural Gas platform and host similar trainings for energy sector partners, state cyber defenders, and LSU faculty, staff and students. This agreement will provide government and industry security professionals in the Louisiana gulf region an extremely valuable, local opportunity to hone their OT/ICS cybersecurity skills.

    “This partnership is a wonderful example of DHS S&T’s role in enabling effective, efficient, and secure operations by applying scientific, engineering, analytic, and innovative approaches to deliver timely solutions. The CELR platforms help ensure critical infrastructure is better positioned to detect, mitigate, or prevent cyber-attacks in the real world. By positioning a platform in close proximity to critical infrastructure owners and operators, as well as making it accessible to the next generation of oil refinery workforce through the university, DHS S&T and CISA are ensuring our nation’s oil supply remains secure and available to consumers,” said Jonathan McEntee,Acting Executive Director for S&T Office of Mission and Capability Support.

    “As a leading energy and chemical manufacturing state, Louisiana’s cybersecurity posture around its critical infrastructure has national implications,” said Greg Trahan, director of economic development at LSU and special advisor to LSU President William F. Tate IV on cyber initiatives. “The invitation by CISA and INL to participate in this exercise underscores what we know: LSU has emerged as one of the most important and consequential cybersecurity schools in the country. The opportunity to be joined by our close industry partners means we can bring these skills and agency relationships home to support and protect Louisiana—that is the LSU Scholarship First Agenda and flagship mission in action.”

    Another outcome from this collaborative effort, LSU and Battelle Energy Alliance, the company that manages INL, recently signed a memorandum of understanding to formalize their partnership in areas of mutual interest, including cybersecurity and advanced nuclear technology. Over the past year, INL has hosted six LSU cybersecurity interns and successfully hired two LSU graduates. This collaboration exemplifies INL’s commitment to expanding partnerships with other industry and academic entities, fostering an environment to develop cyber resilience skills.

    For more information on ICS security, visit the CISA Industrial Control Systems webpage.

    Control Environment Laboratory Exercise (CELR) Exersice

    Government, industry and academia partners gather to view Control Environment Laboratory Resource (CELR) exercise

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Agrinnovate India Limited Pays Dividend of Rs.1.42 crore for FY 2023–24

    Source: Government of India

    Agrinnovate India Limited Pays Dividend of Rs.1.42 crore for FY 2023–24

    Dividend cheque formally presented to Union Agriculture Minister Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan

    Posted On: 23 APR 2025 5:18PM by PIB Delhi

    Agrinnovate India Limited (AgIn), a Government of India enterprise under the Department of Agricultural Research and Education (DARE), Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, has declared a dividend of Rs.1,42,23,513 for the financial year 2023–24. The dividend distribution complies with guidelines issued by the Department of Investment and Public Asset Management (DIPAM). This is the first time the AgIn has paid the dividend since its inception.

    The dividend cheque was formally presented to Union Minister for Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare  Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan in New Delhi today. The event was also graced by the presence of Shri. M.L. Jat, Director General, Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR).  This announcement reflects AgIn’s continued financial strength and strategic vision, under the leadership of Dr. Praveen Malik, Chief Executive Officer, Agrinnovate India Ltd. 

    Established in 2011, Agrinnovate India Ltd. serves as the commercial arm of ICAR, bridging agricultural research and practical implementation. AgIn plays a pivotal role in transferring, valorizing, and scaling agri-technologies across India to benefit farmers and entrepreneurs. The dividend declaration underscores AgIn’s commitment to financial sustainability, institutional accountability, and its broader mission of advancing India’s agricultural innovation ecosystem.

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    Read this release in: Hindi

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Focused, 2-day capacity building programme for electoral field functionaries from Bihar begins

    Source: Government of India

    Focused, 2-day capacity building programme for electoral field functionaries from Bihar begins

    229 BLOs, 12 EROs and 2 DEOs take part in the training program at IIIDEM in the National Capital

    Specialized one-day training programme for State Police Nodal Officer (SPNO) and Police Officers from Bihar also begins

    Posted On: 23 APR 2025 4:54PM by PIB Delhi

    The Election Commission is organising a 2-day training and capacity building of Booth Level Officers (BLOs) at the India International Institute of Democracy & Election Management (IIIDEM), New Delhi. This is the third such batch of BLOs to be trained from the poll-bound state of Bihar. 229 BLOs, 12 EROs and 2 DEOs from the State are participating in the 2-day training programme. A specialized one-day training programme for the State Police Nodal Officer (SPNO) and Police Officers from Bihar also commenced today. The training programme was inaugurated by Chief Election Commissioner of India Shri Gyanesh Kumar in the presence of Election Commissioner Dr. Vivek Joshi at IIIDEM, New Delhi and was followed by an interaction with the participants.

    The training is planned to familiarise the BLOs with their roles and responsibilities as per statutory framework and equip them with to ensure error-free electoral rolls. They will also be trained in the IT applications designed to support their roles.

    This is the latest in the first phase of the ongoing physical training programmes at IIIDEM in which 555 BLOs from poll-bound states of Bihar, West Bengal and Assam and 279 Booth Level Agents (BLA-1s) of 10 recognised national and state political parties from Bihar have already been trained. These well-trained BLOs will form a corps of Assembly Level Master Trainers (ALMTs) to strengthen the entire network of BLOs nationwide.

    The training of SPNOs and Police Officers from Bihar aims to improve coordination between election authorities and the police for enhanced electoral management, especially in the areas of law and order, vulnerability assessment, Paramilitary forces (CAPF) deployment, and model code of conduct (MCC) enforcement.

    Till date over 3000 participants from 141 countries including large democracies such as Australia, United Kingdom, USA, Brazil, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Israel, Russia and South Africa have benefited from training programmes from India’s globally acclaimed election management practices at IIIDEM.

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: International Conference “Shaping the Energy Future: Challenges and Opportunities” (SEFCO-2025) inaugurated at CSIR-Indian Institute of Petroleum, Dehradun

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 23 APR 2025 6:21PM by PIB Delhi

    CSIR-Indian Institute of Petroleum, Dehradun is organising an International Conference “Shaping the Energy Future: Challenges and Opportunities” (SEFCO-2025) from April 23 to 25, 2025. SEFCO conference is annually organized by students and young scientists at CSIR-IIP, Dehradun which is a platform to facilitate discussions on innovative solutions, explore collaborative opportunities in energy & chemical sector.

    1stedition of “SEFCO” Conference was organized in 2017. The present 7thedition is an international conference with a theme of “Catalysing a Sustainable Future with Affordable Energy and Chemicals.”

     

    The inauguration ceremony of SEFCO held on 23 April 2025 was graced by Chief Guest Prof. K.K. Pant, Director, IIT Roorkee and Guest of Honour Sh Alok Sharma, Director (R&D), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Dr. Manoj Srivastava, Secretary, SEFCO 2025 in his opening remarks gave an overview of genesis and relevance of SEFCO and its journey since inception. Dr. Harender Singh Bisht, Director, CSIR-IIP and Chief Patron of the conference, after paying homage to his holiness Pope Francis, welcomed distinguished guests and delegates and highlighted work done at CSIR-IIP and shared his vision on the way forward.

     

     

    Sh Alok Sharma in his guest of honour address highlighted the approaches and measures adopted by Indian refineries towards achieving GoI’snet-zero goal by 2070.

    In his keynote address, Chief guest Prof. K K Pant emphasized various pathways of producing green and sustainable energy and chemicals. He also mentioned that new challenges emerge when the technologies are scale-up from lab to commercial level. He inspired young researchers to think out of box to overcome these challenges.

    This 3-day conference will feature talks from various national and international experts, young scientists and research students from universities, research institutes and industries. Notable International speakers include Prof. Paul A. Webley from Monash University, Australia; Dr. Richard Blom from SINTEF, Norway; Prof. Samira Siahrostami, Simon Fraser University, Canada; Prof. Keiichi Tomishige, Tohoku University, Japan, and Prof. Eric van Steen, SARChI Reaction Engineering, University of Cape Town, South Africa.

    More than 300 delegates from various national and international organizations are attending the conference. An exhibition showcasing CSIR-IIP’s technological achievements is part of this conference. SEFCO-2025 is supported by ONGC, EIL, BPCL, CRISTOL,IOCL, GAIL, AIRBUS, NRL, CPCL & R L Solutions.

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: SHRI ANIL MALIK, SECRETARY, MoWCD, CHAIRS MEETING WITH SENIOR OFFICERS TO REVIEW PROGRESS OF WELFARE SCHEMES & PROJECTS OF MISSION SHAKTI & MISSION VATSALYA

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 22 APR 2025 10:35PM by PIB Delhi

    Secretary of the Ministry of Women and Child Development, Shri Anil Malik chaired the Programme Approval Board (PAB) meeting with Senior Officers of Dadra and Nagar Haveli & Daman & Diu (UT), Nagaland, Assam, Haryana, Chandigarh (UT), Manipur, U.P & Karnataka to review progress of welfare schemes & projects of Mission Shakti & Mission Vatsalya.

    Mission Shakti is a scheme in mission mode aimed at strengthening interventions for women safety, security & empowerment.

    The Mission Vatsalya Scheme is a Centrally Sponsored Scheme which is implemented by the States/ Union Territories with the aim to support children.

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section X – European External Action Service – A10-0069/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section X – European External Action Service

    (2024/2024(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section X – European External Action Service,

     having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0069/2025),

    A. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B. whereas the European External Action Service (the ‘EEAS’) is responsible for the management of the administrative expenditure of its Headquarters in Brussels and for the network of the 144 Union delegations and offices;

    C. whereas the EEAS’ responsibility has been extended to cover the administrative management of the Commission staff in the delegations through a series of Service Level Arrangements (SLAs);

    D. whereas the role of the delegations is to represent the Union and its citizens around the world by building networks and partnerships, and to promote the values of the Union;

    E. whereas the peculiarity of the EEAS remains in its nature and origin, as it was when it was formed by the merging of staff belonging to the former external relation departments of the Council and of the Commission, into which diplomats from the Member States have been integrated;

    F. whereas under the EEAS Internal Rules, the Secretary-General of the EEAS acts as authorising officer by delegation for the institution and the director-general for resource management has the role of principal sub-delegated authorising officer;

    G. whereas the powers conferred by the Staff Regulations on the Appointing Authority are exercised by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President (‘HR/VP’) in respect of staff of the EEAS;

    H. whereas the implementation of the budget is governed by the Financial Regulation and by the Internal Rules of implementation of the Budget of the EEAS;

    1. Notes that the budget of the EEAS falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 12,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,4 % of the total Union budget); notes that the EEAS budget of approximately EUR 1,1 billion represents approximately 9,2 % of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

    2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its annual report for the financial year 2023 examined a sample of 70 transactions under administration, 10 more than were examined in 2022; further notes that the Court writes that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology, and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

    3. Notes that 21 (30 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the five errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold;

    4. Notes with concern that the Court, in its annual report for the financial year 2023, found a quantifiable error in one of the 13 payments examined and raised six non-quantifiable findings concerning the EEAS; notes that the quantifiable error concerned the absence of a valid procurement procedure before a rental contract was signed for a Union delegation; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS took measures to address the two quantifiable errors found by the Court in its 2022 annual report and took measures to avoid such issues in the future;

    Budgetary and financial management

    5. Notes that the final EEAS budget for 2023 was EUR 821 900 280, representing an increase of 4,45 % compared to 2022; notes that the EEAS also disposed of an amount of EUR 259,7 million (including assigned revenues and carried over amounts) from the Commission to cover the administrative costs of Commission staff working in Union delegations; notes further that the EEAS received additional fixed-amount contributions to cover common costs of European Development Fund staff in delegations and co-locations, as well as other amounts received under co-location and other agreements; notes that the total budgetary amount managed by the EEAS in 2023 therefore amounted to EUR 1 198,2 million (commitment appropriations), which represented an increase of 4,8 % compared to the previous year;

    6. Notes that, in 2023, the budgetary implementation rate of commitment appropriations stood at 100 %, whereas the implementation rate for payments was 91,9 % compared to 90,6 % in 2022; notes that the average time for payment was 13,57 days but notes nevertheless that 8,63 % of the total amount was paid late, which led to EUR 50 253,91 in late interest payments in 2023; urges the EEAS to pay its commitments on time; urges the EEAS to continue its efforts in improving the number of electronic payments and the digitalisation of workflows, in particular in delegations;

    7. Notes that the EEAS informed the budgetary authority of two budgetary transfers in accordance with Article 29(1) of the Financial Regulation and made 11 autonomous transfers in accordance with Article 29(4), for an overall value of EUR 55,7 million; notes that the main purpose of the transfers was to increase budget line 3003 on buildings and associate costs in delegations by EUR 18,97 million and budget lines 3001 on External Staff and outside services in delegations by EUR 5,6 million; notes that further to the transfers, the final budget for the EEAS headquarters amounted to EUR 327,8 million and the final budget for delegations amounted to EUR 494,1 million;

    8. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS has faced growing political and financial challenges, as well as challenges with respect to Human Rights and the Rule of Law; notes that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its geopolitical consequences continued to be a key issue in 2023, leading the EEAS to ensure wide-range support for Ukraine, exert pressure on Russia and continue its global outreach to address the wider consequences of the war, including the implementation of the Action Plan on the geopolitical consequences of Russian aggression against Ukraine; acknowledges the EEAS’s role in gathering evidence against EU-sanctioned Russian state-backed outlets and individuals involved in spreading disinformation and manipulating information to justify Russia’s war of aggression; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the EEAS to effectively combat disinformation campaigns deployed as strategic tools by authoritarian and illiberal regimes; calls on the EEAS to reinforce the Union Delegations in the Eastern Partnership countries to support those countries heavily affected by Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine; notes that the financial ceiling of the European Peace Facility managed under the authority of the HR/VP was increased from EUR 5,6 million to more than EUR 12 million in 2023; calls on the EEAS to collaborate with DG ENEST to ensure effective oversight and monitoring of the projects funded by the Facility; notes that the reignited Israel-Palestine conflict following the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 required the EEAS to engage in intense diplomatic efforts, encourage Union institutions to urge regional de-escalation, respond to humanitarian needs and support regional peace efforts; emphasises that Union and EEAS assistance must align with broader human rights and peace objectives in the region, with strong safeguards in place to ensure that the funds do not, either directly or indirectly, support terrorist or violent activities; emphasises that Union funding for the reconstruction of Gaza should only commence once all hostages taken by Hamas have been released; emphasises the importance of transparency in the allocation of financial resources in third countries to ensure accountability in the use of the Union budget and the new financial instruments;

     

    9. Urges the EEAS to work closely with the Commission to ensure that the complete restitution of the Romanian National Treasure, along with the national heritage of other Member States, is on the agenda of any potential future actions regarding the Russian Federation;

    10. Recalls that there have been allegations regarding the involvement of UNRWA employees in Gaza in the terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that in response to these allegations, nine staff members had their employment formally terminated by the UNRWA; underlines that the Commission has been working with the UNRWA to improve control systems, in line with recommendations from the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), including the screening of staff and the strengthening of internal investigative and ethical frameworks; stresses that following the concerns repeatedly raised by Parliament regarding the misuse of Union funding, any Union aid should not under any circumstances be financing terrorism; urges continued vigilance in ensuring that the taxpayer money is not misused; stresses the importance of controls to ensure compliance with Union rules and international law by beneficiaries of Union funds, as well as the need for enhanced measures to prevent misuse of Union financial support; encourages the EEAS to reinforce efforts to safeguard Union funding, and to monitor the implementation of the milestones outlined in the agreement between Commissioner Várhelyi and the UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, which includes provisions for conducting Union audits and reinforcing internal oversight at the UNRWA; underlines the need for the Palestinian Authority to align all educational materials with UNESCO standards, particularly removing any content that includes antisemitism or incitement to violence; stresses that Union financial support for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that these standards are met; encourages the EEAS to support diplomatic efforts for a comprehensive and sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to keep Parliament informed about any developments in Union cooperation with the Palestinian Authority;

    11. Notes that, for 2023, the EEAS reported significant budgetary constraints, leading to drastic cuts and budget optimisation in order to cope with inflation in third countries, fluctuations in local currencies, an increase in prices, in particular the cost of renting office space, IT, security and energy prices, which exposed the EEAS to much higher running costs in foreign countries, thus affecting its ability to function effectively and to fulfil its duty of care towards the staff posted in delegations; regrets that, as a result of the budgetary pressures, the EEAS postponed infrastructure maintenance, set aside or cancelled security expenditures in delegations and made cuts to budget posts, such as cuts to the mission and representation budget, office supplies and training courses; deplores that, for budgetary reasons, the EEAS had to prioritise staff participation in election observation missions over other types of missions, such as follow-up missions; emphasises the necessity of establishing an EU diplomatic service;

    12. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS, both at the EEAS headquarters and in delegations, launched a total of 28 open public procurement procedures, 27 competitive procedures with negotiations, 14 negotiated procedures without prior publication of a contract notice, 6 restricted procedures and 2 negotiated procedures for middle-value works contracts, which were successful and led to the award of a contract in 52 % of cases on average; notes that the high standards and complexity of Union procurement rules might be one of the reasons for the relatively high number of failed procurement procedures, as the application of those rules might be challenging for tenderers, especially in third countries; requests the EEAS to investigate the reasons behind the relatively high number of failed procurement procedures and to propose solutions to ensure their effective implementation while maintaining the standards set by the Union; regrets that, for external actions, procurement rules have been simplified in the recast of the Financial Regulation; underlines that procurement rules are intended to ensure that funded projects maintain high standards and are not prone to fraud; calls on the EEAS to always strive for the highest possible level of scrutiny in any tender process; believes that a lack of familiarity in third countries with the high standards of Union procurement rules should never be a pretext or excuse to lower the bar;

    13. Welcomes that the number of co-locations with Member States and other Union partners in Union delegations was 138 at the end of 2023, 12 more than in 2022; notes that, out of the total number of co-locations in 2023, 42 were concluded with Member States and Partner Countries, 91 with other Union partners and five were reverse co-locations; notes that, in 2023, co-locations represented 8 % of the total office surface in Union delegations and involved more than half of the Union delegations (75), which can be seen as an example of successful optimisation of the EEAS building management, but also as an indicator of the increased interest of partners in sharing premises in third countries and the relevance of co-location in diplomatic affairs;

    14. Notes that the budget for missions was EUR 18 948 650 in 2023, representing a limited increase of 1,46 % compared to the previous year, the aim of which was to compensate the increase in costs due to inflation, but was insufficient when compared with the actual rise in travel costs in 2023; regrets that the EEAS does not have a separate budget line for missions and travel for the HR/VP and that the missions and travel costs for the HR/VP are shared between the EEAS and the Commission depending on the purpose of the mission; notes finally that for 2023, the EEAS had costs of EUR 2 995,14 on 6 missions for the HR/VP and air-taxi costs of EUR 288 145, corresponding to a decrease of 51% compared to 2022 when air-taxi costs were EUR 588 103; underlines that the leaders of the Union’s institutions should act as good examples to the public and citizens, especially when using Union resources in the performance of their duties; stresses that the flight options should be chosen on the basis of sound financial management criteria, provided that such alternatives are available and in line with the agenda and venue of meetings; stresses that transparency and sound financial management in using the Union’s public funds must remain a core principle for all Union institutions;

    15. Underlines the negative impact cuts may have on the implementation of the external affairs instruments, such as Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe) and Global Gateway; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the EEAS to continue to effectively combat disinformation campaigns deployed as strategic tools by authoritarian and illiberal regimes; welcomes in this regard the announcement of the creation of the Task Force for Strategic Communication and Countering Information Manipulation in DG COMM of the Commission;

    16. Insists on the budgetary increase for Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) actions and other appropriate peace, conflict and crisis response instruments, as well as IT and security protocols, in order to fully match the Union’s activities and capabilities with current challenges and conflicts worldwide;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    17. Notes that, following an internal reorganisation, the EEAS created a new Corporate Governance Service in October 2023, composed of three divisions in charge of inspections, internal audit and planning, reporting and compliance, to enable the EEAS to achieve greater accountability, better management and better monitoring of activities; welcomes that a Corporate Governance Board was also established to ensure coherence on corporate management issues in the EEAS; notes furthermore that the EEAS created the Managing Directorate for Peace, Security and Defence (MD PSD), the Peace, Partnership and Crisis Management Directorate and two new Divisions dedicated to “Hybrid Threats and Cyber” and “Maritime Security” in order to better support the Union’s work in security and defence matters;

    18. Notes that, in 2023, the Corporate Governance Service performed a fitness check on governance processes and policies; welcomes that, as part of that process, the EEAS updated the Audit Progress Committee charter, revised its internal control framework, its annual management plan and its risk management framework;

    19. Notes that, in line with the EEAS Audit Plan for 2023, three audits were finalised in 2023, namely an audit on the management of the registry of exceptions and non-compliance and two audits on the management of local agents’ salaries and the recruitment and management of local agents and equivalent local staff; notes furthermore with great concern that, due to an organisational restructuring and corresponding staff turnover in the internal audit function, a planned audit on security could not be launched in 2023 and that such audit will be reassessed in the framework of the preparation of the 2025-27 multiannual strategic internal audit plan; stresses the importance of conducting internal audits diligently and regularly; deeply regrets that 4 critical and 49 very important audit recommendations related to finalised audits remained open in 2023; requests that the Parliament be informed on the implementation of the recommendations;

    20. Notes that, in December 2023, the Court adopted its final report following its audit on the coordination role of the EEAS, the scope of which was to assess whether the coordination, in particular with regard to information management, staffing and reporting, both internally and with the Commission and Council, was effective; notes that, in 2023, some of the audit recommendations had already been covered by ongoing initiatives, such as the sending of mission letters to the newly appointed Ambassadors before taking up duty and the efforts made by the EEAS since 2019 to implement its Information Management Strategy; calls on the EEAS to fully implement the ECA’s report recommendations to address identified weaknesses in information management, both within its headquarters and EU delegations in non-EU countries, as well as within the High Representative/Vice-President’s private office; asks that Parliament be kept informed on the follow-up of the Court’s recommendations;

    21. Notes that, based on the 26 inspections carried out in delegations in 2023, security, buildings and administrative burden were identified as the main challenges for delegations; notes that the EEAS has put in place security risk management measures in delegations based on international standards and best practices; notes that, in 2023, five critical recommendations were formulated by the EEAS inspection service, all related to the management of three delegations; notes that in all cases, the recommendations were addressed through increased oversight and support from the EEAS headquarters; welcomes the toolbox developed by the EEAS to respond to internal management situations;

    22. Notes that, in 2023, three EU Delegations (Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and Syria) submitted reservations in their Declarations of Assurance, primarily concerning operational budget lines managed by the European Commission; highlights that these reservations did not have a substantial financial impact on the administrative budget under the responsibility of the EEAS;

    23. Calls on the EEAS and on the Commission to closely collaborate with the EPLO office in Washington, D.C., and the EU delegation in the United States to identify, fund, and implement initiatives aimed at strengthening the Transatlantic Relationship, including exchange programs for professionals working in public institutions in both the EU and the U.S.;

    24. Calls on the EEAS and Union delegations to intensify monitoring of the state of democracy in various countries and to enhance logistical and technological support for human rights defenders and indigenous individuals, with a particular focus on women;

    25. Recalls that is crucial to further strengthen our support to human rights, democracy and development in third countries through the NDICI – Global Europe, as a world of democracies is a safer world; underlines that resources to the EU’s Digital Diplomacy should be further increased given the current context of rapid technological advancements and geopolitical competition; insists that “green diplomacy” and the green transition, as one of the Union’s priorities, should be enhanced towards third countries through the Union’s External Action; emphasises the need for EEAS to play a central role in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East, to increase funding to ensure humanitarian aid in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, and to strengthen human rights monitoring; highlights financial support for the EEAS delegations deployed in the Middle East, Gulf countries, and Africa to ensure they can continue implementing the Union’s External Action in the region;

    26. Notes that the Special Report 14/2023 of the Court found deficiencies in the methodologies used by the Commission and the EEAS for allocating funding to partner countries and in the setup of the monitoring framework and recommended that the Commission and the EEAS notably improve the methodology for allocating funding and the assessment of the impact of Union support, focus the scope of the programming process and simplify and consistently use the indicators in the multiannual indicative programmes.

    27. Welcomes the appointment of the first EU Special Representative for the Gulf region;

    28. Highlights that recent events, notably Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its hostile attempts to influence democratic processes in Europe as well as growing instability in the Middle East, have brought Union foreign policy and its implementation to the forefront of concerns among the Member States and institutions; underlines the central role played by the EEAS and its delegations in conducting the Union’s external policy and in fighting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); stresses the importance of the EEAS for the Union’s relations with the 25 to 30 million Union citizens living outside the Union; acknowledges that the EEAS budget, already structurally underfunded, was disproportionately affected in comparison to other Union institutions by the higher inflation rates and subsequent energy crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, and is concerned of these negative consequences for the EEAS and the performance of the Union institutions and the lack of action to rectify the current budgetary situation that can severely impact the Union’s relations with third countries;

    29. Welcomes the steadfast support provided to Ukraine, including through the civilian EU Advisory Mission (EUAM Ukraine) and the training of Ukrainian soldiers under the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM);

    30. Underlines that the Union must increase funding to reinforce the dedicated budget line within the Union’s foreign policy actions specifically for gender equality and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, in order to ensure consistent financing for initiatives that promote gender-responsive leadership, protect women’s rights, and combat sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in conflict and post-conflict settings; stresses that such funding is essential to support local civil society organisations, provide survivor-centred support, and integrate gender perspectives into Union diplomatic and security efforts.

    31. Stresses that the Gender Action Plan (GAP) III dictates that 85% of new Union actions must contribute to gender equality and women and girls’ empowerment; calls on the EEAS to accelerate the progress towards the goals of GAP III by meaningfully focusing in its every day work on the GAP III’s key areas of engagement, including ending gender-based violence, promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights, economic and social rights and empowerment, equal participation and leadership; notes that GAP III will expire in 2027 and urges the EEAS, to this end, to develop a more ambitious GAP IV that will ensure a stronger connection between women’s rights and empowerment and the Union’s foreign and security policy, ready for implementation as of 2028;

    32. Underlines the extremely vulnerable situation of children in the world, specifically in armed conflict; expresses serious concern about the tens of thousands of children that were affected by armed conflict across the globe and suffered abhorrent abuses and violations of their most basic rights in 2023; calls on the EEAS to put children’s rights at the centre of their efforts;

    33. Recalls the dire situation of women’s rights and LGBTQI+ rights in many parts of the world; stresses the urgent need to better protect these rights; highlights the central role of the EEAS in advancing human rights around the world; calls on the EEAS to enhance their efforts in this regard;

    34. Sees electoral observation mission as a practical and effective foreign policy instrument that remains central to the Union’s democracy support policies and strategies; calls on the Union to ensure adequate resources to the EU electoral observation missions, in view also of extending them to elections in candidate and neighbouring countries;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    35. Notes that, at the end 2023, the occupation rate of the establishment plan was at 96,7 %; notes that the EEAS was employing a total of 2 812 members of staff, including 1 245 officials, 450 temporary agents, 603 contract agents and 514 seconded national experts (SNEs); notes that out of the total number of officials and temporary agents employed by the EEAS, either in its headquarters or in delegations, 62,5 % was made up of administrators, 32,8 % was made up of assistants and 4,8 % was made up of secretaries;

    36. Notes that 5 252 people in total were working in the EEAS at the end of 2023, employed either directly by the EEAS or through external contractors, from which 46,2 % were working in the EEAS headquarters and 53,8 % in delegations; notes that out of the total number of people working in the EEAS, 46,5 % were non-statutory staff or external contractors; notes that the largest number of external staff employed by an external contractor but working in the premises of the EEAS provide services in the areas of information technology, security and safety and medical care;

    37. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS received 36 full-time equivalents from the budgetary authority, including 31 contract agents and five cost-shared SNEs; notes that the additional resources were allocated to crisis management functions, to the implementation of the Strategic Compass and to other EEAS priorities; notes that, at the end of 2023, the EEAS received an additional 20 cost-free SNEs for the Military Planning and Conduct Capability structures;

    38. Notes that, by the end of 2023, the EEAS statutory population comprised 52,7% men and 47,3% women, reflecting a slight increase in female representation compared to 2022, when 46,8% of staff were women; welcomes the modest progress in gender balance within senior management, where the representation of women increased from 6,3% in 2022 to 7,6% in 2023, and in middle management, where it rose from 30,1% in 2022 to 30,4% in 2023; calls on the EEAS to intensify efforts to achieve a more substantial and visible gender balance across all levels of the organisation;

    39. Welcomes the publication of the mid-term report on the implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP III) by the HR/VP and the Commission at the end of 2023, as well as the decision to extend its timeline to 2027 to align with the multiannual financial framework (MFF); acknowledges GAP III’s significance in promoting gender equality as a strategic priority in EU external action and enhancing its role in this area; welcomes the organisation of the first executive trainings on Gender-Responsive Leadership (GRL) for senior managers in late 2023 by the team of the Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;

    40. Welcomes the first EEAS report on FIMI activities targeting LGBTIQA+ individuals, aimed at enhancing understanding of FIMI tactics and fostering cooperation, including with ENISA, to protect the LGBTIQA+ community; expresses concern about the global status of LGBTIQ+ rights and the increasing resistance to gender equality, women’s rights, and sexual and reproductive health and rights in developing countries; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to address these setbacks and prioritise targeted support for civil society organisations advocating for these rights;

    41. Notes that, in its decision adopted in July 2023, the HR/VP clarified that the maximum duration of the engagement by the EEAS of temporary and contract staff was 8 years in a reference period of 13 years or, in exceptional circumstances and in the interests of the service, 10 years in a reference period of 15 years and that the minimum lapse of time between successive engagements for temporary agents seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States was 2 years from the termination of their last contract;

    42. Notes that at the end of 2023, out of 1695 officials and temporary agents, 863 (51 %) were men and 832 (49 %) were women, which represents a slight increase from 2022; notes that among contract agents 57,4% were women , which is a slight increase from 2022; however regrets that women are still notably underrepresented in senior positions, both in headquarters and in delegations, and overrepresented mainly in AST positions; calls on the EEAS to publish a gender and nationality breakdown of middle and senior management positions; asks the EEAS to address this issue, while at the same time respecting the competences and merits of the candidates; welcomes that the 2023 rotation exercise offered 42 management posts in Delegations and resulted in a 12% increase in the number of women Ambassadors, whereas in 2023 35,50 % of them were women (up from 31,70 %), which, nevertheless, is still an underrepresentation;

    43. Observes that although all Member States are represented in the EEAS staff, significant imbalances persist with Belgium being the most overrepresented Member State making up 12,1 % of total staff employed by the EEAS; points out that a significant geographical imbalance is also concentrated between Western and Eastern Member States; notes also that among managers, Italy is the most overrepresented Member State, with 15 % of all managerial positions being occupied by Italians; notes that out of 141 Union Ambassadors, three Member States still do not occupy any Ambassador posts (Hungary, Luxembourg and Malta), whereas the Member States with most Ambassadors are France with 22, Spain and Italy with 16, Germany with 12 and Belgium with 10, meaning that these five countries occupy 54 % of all Ambassador posts; strongly reiterates its call on the EEAS to continue to ensure a sound geographical balance throughout its organisation and on all levels; also reiterates its concern about gender balance; notes that women are notably under-represented in senior positions, while in AST positions in particular, they are overrepresented; calls on the EEAS to publish a gender and nationality breakdown of middle and senior management positions; asks the EEAS to address this issue, while at the same time respecting the competences and merits of the candidates;

    44. Notes that a major rotation exercise of 52 management posts in delegations was organised in 2023; welcomes the efforts deployed by the EEAS to raise the awareness of Member States in relation to the need to attract a wide range of candidates to the published posts and to propose qualified candidates for the Union Ambassador posts;

    45. Notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the EEAS adopted its Agenda for Diversity and Inclusion 2023-2025, a detailed action plan to promote a safe and respectful working environment and a zero tolerance approach towards harassment; notes that staff representatives, staff associations and the Joint Committee for Equal Opportunities, which was renamed as the Joint Committee on Diversity and Inclusion, were consulted on both documents; notes that the action plan contains anti-harassment preventive measures, such as a mandatory e-learning training course for all staff on “Recognising and addressing harassment at work” and a mandatory management training on “How to create an harassment free work environment”; calls on the EEAS to continue to regularly train managerial and non-managerial staff on issues regarding diversity, equity, inclusion, and belonging;

    46. Notes with concern that, in 2023, the EEAS received three requests for assistance for allegations of psychological harassment involving two officials which led to two administrative enquiries, one of which is still ongoing and the other was closed with a disciplinary sanction; notes that, under the informal procedure, the EEAS mediation service dealt with 28 cases involving allegations of psychological harassment and 10 cases of sexual harassment and that the Confidential Counsellors dealt with 21 cases of allegations of psychological harassment and 6 cases of sexual harassment in 2023; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS prepared a decision on anti-harassment for local staff in delegations, which was adopted in June 2024; acknowledges the efforts made by the EEAS to strengthen its anti-harassment policies, including the introduction of mandatory e-learning modules to raise awareness and the establishment of an ‘Istanbul Convention Task Force’ aimed at identifying measures to ensure a safer workplace for all; however, expresses serious concern about the persistently high number of harassment cases; calls on the EEAS to implement stronger prevention, victim support, strict disciplinary measures to ensure zero tolerance for harassment and a safe working environment;

    47. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS took several measures to ensure the physical and mental wellbeing of its staff, including a systematic health check for all staff before being posted to a delegation, psychological support and awareness-raising actions; notes that, in October 2023, two decisions on working time and flexible working arrangements were adopted, following which flexitime became the default working time regime in the EEAS headquarters and in delegations for all staff, except managers; notes furthermore that the decisions authorise teleworking for up to two days per week in the EEAS headquarters, one day per week in delegations and 10 days per year away from the place of employment for all; notes that, exceptional teleworking for a longer period has remained possible in the event of crises, for medical or other imperative reasons;

    48. Is concerned that the EEAS members of staff on long-term sick leave for more than 50 days increased from 111 members of staff in 2022 to 171 members of staff in 2023, equivalent to an increase of 54 %; notes that the medical service implemented several measures to prevent the risk of burnout, such as the recruitment of a psychiatrist in December 2023 and a more systematic follow-up of sick leave by the medical service, psychological support and guidance to both staff and managers, awareness-raising activities and the creation of a mental health first aiders network; stresses the need for managers to ensure fair task allocation and implement guidance and flexible working arrangements; calls on the EEAS to take a proactive approach to prevent long-term sickness and burnout, prioritising the mental wellbeing of its staff through effective support measures;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    49. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS improved its ethical framework by issuing new instructions to prohibit or limit the missions with costs partially or totally paid by external sources to avoid risks of conflicts of interest by sending a reminder on ethics to all staff; notes that the EEAS also focused on organising specific training courses on ethics, conflicts of interest, internal control and anti-fraud targeted at and adapted to different audiences in the EEAS headquarters and in delegations; notes furthermore that the 16 ‘principles of professional behaviour’ adopted in 2022 continued to be distributed to newcomers and promoted widely, in particular during the ‘Ethics and integrity’ and ‘Anti-harassment policy’ courses; asks that Parliament be kept informed by the EEAS of any further development of its ethical framework; calls on the EEAS to provide regular mandatory trainings on ethics, including ethical usage of AI, and accountability;

    50. Welcomes that, in October 2023, the EEAS adopted a new Anti-Fraud Strategy, applicable to all staff in the EEAS headquarters and in delegations, which resulted from a thorough review process of fraud-related risks and was formally endorsed by OLAF; welcomes that the EEAS devoted particular efforts to staff training and guidance, in particular through the anti-fraud cell established in December 2022; notes that the EEAS staff posted in Union delegations actively participated in a series of workshops and seminars on fraud awareness and prevention, that staff newly assigned to a Union delegation systematically received training on these issues prior to taking up posts and that the intranet page related to anti-fraud was further revamped with the aim of facilitating the reporting of potential fraud cases and providing a wider range of options for anti-fraud training; asks the EEAS to conduct mandatory regular fraud awareness and prevention trainings for all staff;

    51. Notes that the EEAS did not receive any whistleblowing cases in 2023; notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the EEAS started to develop a dedicated whistleblower protection policy in line with the new Anti-Fraud Strategy; asks that Parliament be kept informed about its adoption, scheduled for 2025, and its implementation across the service;

    52. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS received five declarations of conflicts of interest, which were handled in accordance with the applicable rules; notes that, in a case related to a member of an evaluation committee in a procurement procedure, the authorising officer by subdelegation concluded that there was a potential conflict of interest and relieved the member of staff from the duty of member of the evaluation committee;

    53. Notes with concern that OLAF opened eight investigations in 2023, which are still ongoing, concerning potential misconduct in the context of procurement procedures and implementation of contracts, grant agreements or potential irregularities related to human-resource matters; notes that the open cases in 2023 concerned officials, temporary agents and local agents both in the EEAS headquarters and in delegations; asks that Parliament be kept informed regarding the follow-up to those investigations; notes that eight older cases involving former and current staff were closed, with recommendations to take further action in five cases; notes that the EEAS is in regular contact with OLAF through its anti-fraud cell and ensures the timely follow-up of OLAF recommendations; asks that the Parliament is kept informed on the implementation of the recommendations;

    54. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS handled ten requests from the Ombudsman, nine of which related to administrative files and one to a request for access to documents; notes that the Ombudsman found no instances of maladministration or partial maladministration and did not issue any recommendation to the EEAS;

    55. Takes note of all activities undertaken to raise awareness on outside activities; reminds the Parliament’s request to adopt self-standing implementation provisions on outside activities and assignments, in order to protect the image and reputation of the Union in particular in case of Heads of Delegations;

    56. Notes that, in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission, the HR/VP is bound by the rules of the Transparency Register; stresses that while the EEAS is not an Institution within the meaning of Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union and does not have a direct role in Union law, it does, however, have an important role in Union law with regard to decisions concerning sanctions and the negotiation of international trade agreements, which have a considerable regulatory impact; notes that it would be of great relevance for the EEAS to adopt transparency measures, notify them to the management board of the Transparency Register and join the Register; invites the EEAS to publish all meetings with all types of lobby organisations, including those of Heads of Union Delegations, in order to improve transparency; asks that Parliament be kept informed of any new initiative taken by the EEAS to improve transparency; reiterates the importance of further strengthening the democratic scrutiny of the Union and of upholding high standards of accountability and transparency when engaging with civil society organisations; asks Union delegations to ensure that Union funds awarded to civil society organisations and social partners in third countries are used in line with the Union values, policies, and financial rules;

    57. Urges the EEAS to join the EU Transparency Register to align its practices with the European Parliament and Commission, ensuring full disclosure of lobbying activities and financial interests related to defense and diplomatic matters;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    58. Notes that the expenditures for IT projects, equipment and cybersecurity increased from EUR 19,7 million in 2022 to EUR 29,9 million in 2023, corresponding to an increase of 52 %; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS launched important digitalisation projects, such as its collaborative platform ‘HIVE’ for all users at headquarters and delegations and deployed its Corporate Classified Communications and Information System (EC3IS) at the EEAS headquarters, before its progressive rolling out in sensitive delegations and interconnecting it with the corresponding systems at the Commission and at the Council;

    59. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS started to host and control an AI environment so that a complete AI governance model could be put in place; notes that this technical step established the grounds for the adoption of guidelines on the use of generative AI and of an AI Strategy in 2024, as well as running proofs of concept; asks that the Parliament be kept informed of the development of the AI Strategy;

    60. Notes that, as part of the implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence adopted in 2022, the EEAS was involved in the adoption of major policy documents and toolboxes related inter alia to cyber defence, cyber diplomacy, hybrid threats, foreign interference and information manipulation; notes that, internally, the EEAS continued to improve its cybersecurity capabilities via the recruitment of specialised staff and to provide cyber-awareness activities to different audiences including the Security Management Team, members of the delegations, newcomers and managers; asks that the EEAS provides regular mandatory cybersecurity training to all staff; calls further for enhanced Union support for Moldova in combating disinformation, hybrid threats, and cyberattacks; calls on the EU Delegation to Moldova to enhance its efforts to promote a more proactive and effective communication strategy regarding the European perspective, including outreach in the Russian language;

    61. Welcomes the establishment of EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova); highlights the essential role of the EUPM Moldova and calls the EU and its Member States to extend the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025 while increasing resources to enhance its effectiveness;

    62. Notes with concern that, in 2023, the EEAS recorded over 29 623 cyber alerts via the Security Incident and Event Monitoring – SIEM, out of which 92 incidents were confirmed as cyberattacks; notes that four cyberattacks had an impact on EEAS operations and only one had significant consequences; warns that the EEAS is a highly likely target for well-resourced actors, including those sponsored by foreign states, seeking to disrupt Union Institutions; notes that the EEAS Security Operations Centre (SOC) is a key actor in dealing with real time threat monitoring and identification of system vulnerabilities; requests the EEAS to continue to consider the need for users’ cyber discipline and cyber awareness as key elements in its cyber security framework; emphasises the importance of the EEAS continuing to prioritise cybersecurity and hybrid threat mitigation while collaborating closely with other Union Institutions and Member States to identify and counter such threats;

    63. Notes that the EEAS followed up on one European Data Protection Supervisor enquiry in 2023, following a request from a member of staff concerning the publication of his/her personal data on the EU online directory; notes that a case pending since 2018 was dealt with in 2023 and closed in 2024 with a positive outcome for the EEAS; notes the awareness-raising activities and guidance issued by the EEAS to ensure a level playing field in the area of data protection across its network, notably the Joint Guide on the use of third party AI tools from the double perspective of data protection and cybersecurity;

    64. Notes that the fight against FIMI remained a priority for the EEAS in 2023; welcomes that the FIMI toolbox was endorsed by the European Council in December 2023 based on the pillars of situational awareness, resilience building, disruption and diplomatic responses; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS scaled up its analytical capacity to collect FIMI evidence and build responses to the increasing number of incidents and threats, in particular in the run up to the 2024 European elections; notes that the EEAS also launched new flagship projects to raise awareness and counter Russian disinformation, such as the EUvsDisinfo initiative which reached approximately 20,3 million people in 2023, and to create sustainable partnerships to counter FIMI globally; calls on the EEAS, together with the Commission to dedicate adequate resources to effectively combat FIMI; supports the pledged establishment of a “European Democracy Shield” to detect, track and delete deceitful online content, hereby strengthening the Union’s ability to counter FIMI and enhancing its support for protecting democracies in third countries, especially within the Union’s neighbourhood; calls on the EEAS and EU Delegations in third countries to further strengthen their respective capacities in fighting and countering disinformation and propaganda linked to the Union’s CFSP and; calls on the EEAS to scale up its efforts to empower citizens from across the Union to fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

    Buildings and security

    65. Notes that, in the course of 2023, the budget line 3003 on buildings and associated costs was reinforced by EUR 19 million but that important maintenance works were nevertheless deferred; is deeply concerned that the accumulation of maintenance and security needs poses significant challenges to the EEAS with regard to how to operate the delegations’ network safely and effectively, and ensure the duty of care towards delegations staff; requests the EEAS to develop multi-annual contingency plans for buildings maintenance and security;

    66. Notes that the EEAS occupies and manages real estate covering about 87 618 sqm in the EEAS headquarters and 379 300 sqm around the world with 174 office buildings and 152 residences for Ambassadors; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS presented a working document outlining its purchase policy to the budgetary authority, which currently stands at 22 % of office buildings and 20 % of residences for Ambassadors, thereby achieving the best value for money;

    67. Notes that the purchase policy of real estate for Union delegations of April 2023 and the working document on the real estate policy of the EEAS for 2024 aims to achieve the most advantageous long term solution for the Union budget; highlights that none of these documents include any ideas with regard to reducing the number of delegations or creating regional hubs; urges the EEAS to keep Parliament informed of any possible future developments in that direction;

    68. Invites the EEAS to maintain its important network of Delegations around the world with sufficient staff in order to improve its ability to reach out to third countries;

    69. Notes with concern that these budgetary constraints could lead to excessive closures of EU embassies and postponing security installations in a number of EU Delegations hampering the EEAS’ ability to fulfil its mandate and defend EU values and properly ensure the duty of care to all staff in Delegations; urges the Members States to provide enough financing to the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that the EU maintains its network of Delegations untouched as a signal of its global engagement;

    70. Notes that, since 2020, the EEAS has been developing its office management policy towards collaborative and flexible office concepts both at the EEAS headquarters and in delegations; notes that the EEAS started to renovate the Schuman building complex, starting with the 6th and 7th floors, with a view to achieving more efficient use of office space; notes furthermore that the EEAS crisis response centre in the Schuman building was finalised in 2023; notes that, in delegations, the collaborative space concept was implemented in the new premises of 6 delegations;

    71. Welcomes that the EEAS is focused on ensuring that its buildings are accessible to people with disabilities and reduced mobility; notes that the Belmont building in Brussels already fulfils the legal requirements for barrier-free buildings and that the refurbishment of the NEO building complex also accommodates the needs of users with disabilities and reduced mobility; welcomes that, for delegations, the EEAS selection procedures envisage barrier-free construction as a key selection criteria for new office buildings;

    Environment and sustainability

    72. Welcomes that, in 2023, the EEAS continued to implement the Eco-management and Audit Scheme (EMAS/EMS), notably by setting up an Environment Steering Committee and by adopting an Environmental Policy and a relevant communication strategy highlighting the EEAS commitment to environmental sustainability in real estate management; notes that the EMAS Steering Committee worked on new objectives in 2023, the aim of which is to further reduce its carbon footprint by 2030; notes that the measures approved include the reduction of the use of natural gas by 35 %, the reduction of the use of paper, water and waste production by half, an increase in the share of short to medium distance flights for missions in economic class and the better use of green public procurement;

    73. Welcomes that the EEAS started to introduce sustainability clauses in the new co-location agreements, including both compulsory actions and voluntary practices; notes that, as regards the co-location agreements already in force, instead of including explicit environmental sustainability clauses, such agreements mention as an overarching principle that any co-location hosted partners adhere to procedures and practices applicable within the local context of Union office premises;

    74. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS continued to work on the implementation of a policy towards greener commuting and more sustainable travel for staff, which led to the adoption of important measures in 2024, such as the increase of the reimbursement rate for public transport subscriptions to 90 % for all staff relinquishing parking access and the objective of at least 60 % of the kilometres travelled by plane during missions should be in economy class;

    75. Stresses the importance of strong political engagement, bilateral leverage, public and cultural diplomacy to promote Union values and combat disinformation; emphasises the need for a robust and resilient external service with clear political leadership to address current challenges and ensure coherence in the Union’s foreign policy; urges Union delegations to strengthen support for genuine democratic actors and civil society in the Western Balkans, while firmly and publicly condemning actions by illiberal and undemocratic actors that undermine the Union’s interests, and to ensure that IPA III funding is implemented in line with the Union’s objectives; calls on the EU Delegations in the region to apply a more credible and merit-based approach based on the Copenhagen criteria, notably on the rule of law, democracy and the protection of human rights, especially given the limited progress made by some countries in the Western Balkans;

    76. Welcomes the EEAS’s excellent cooperation with bodies such as OLAF, the EPPO, the Court, and the EDPS, reflected in regular meetings and exchanges of information; notes the conclusion of dedicated working arrangements in June 2024; calls nevertheless on the EEAS to institutionalise structured cooperation with those bodies, ensuring systematic fraud detection mechanisms for the Union’s external action funding, particularly in high-risk conflict zones and fragile states;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    77. Notes that, in 2023, the Parliament, the Council and the EEAS continued their technical discussions regarding the replacement of the 2002 Institutional Agreement between Parliament and the Council in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy; regrets that a single technical meeting took place in 2023 following which the Council was not able to find an agreement on the compromise solutions put forward;

    78. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS opened the negotiation process for a working arrangement with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which was signed in 2024; notes that the working arrangement take into account the special context in which the EEAS operates, putting emphasis on the protection of information, the confidentiality of information and the protection of immunity of staff;

    79. Notes that, in its 2023 budget, the EEAS earmarked EUR 990,5 million for a pilot project to launch the European Diplomatic Academy, whereby 50 junior diplomats from Member States and the Union institutions are trained on Union foreign and security policies with the aim of building a true European Diplomatic corps to promote Union foreign policy and external interest; encourages this initiative as a step towards fostering a cohesive and well-trained European diplomatic corps that can effectively represent and defend the Union’s values and interests on the global stage; underlines the necessity to improve the visibility of the European Diplomatic Academy across all Member States and to strengthen its role and capacities;

    80. Welcomes that the EEAS scaled up its cooperation with the European Ombudsman in 2023 to improve awareness amongst its staff of the principles of good administration; notes that the new layer of cooperation involves inviting the European Ombudsman Office to present their work at the EEAS pre-posting seminars and in the EEAS annual staff seminars;

    Communication

    81. Notes that the EEAS has a budget allocation of EUR 22,2 million, spread over different budget lines covering publications, events, strategic communication, outreach activities and press; welcomes that standing up for democracy and the rule of law remained a priority for the EEAS, also by targeting Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference via strengthened policies and instruments;

    82. Points to the rise in the number of violations of freedom of religion worldwide; calls on the EEAS to adequately equip its staff in view of this in countries where there is no religious freedom or where religious freedom is under pressure (including by means of training courses); with a view to entering into discussions on this topic with the relevant authorities at all levels in countries where freedom of religion is being violated; and make this a key focus of its external action;

    83. Notes that, as part of its communication activities, the EEAS reaches out to the general public via public events, open days and the reception of visitors’ groups; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS launched several thematic communication campaigns across different channels on the support to Ukraine, the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the respect for Union values; welcomes that Ukraine remained a top priority for the EEAS; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS consolidated its presence on social media and increased the number of its followers by 41,5 % on LinkedIn, by 13,8 % on Instagram, by 5,4 % on Twitter and by 4,7 % on Facebook; urges the EEAS to enhance its communication of Union policies to citizens in third countries and to strengthen coordination efforts aimed at increasing the visibility of Union-funded projects, particularly in candidate countries, in order to counter the attempts of malicious actors to undermine the Union’s efforts;

    84. Welcomes the involvement of the EEAS in the institutional communication campaign of Parliament for the 2024 European elections, in particular the information campaign targeting the 25 to 30 million European citizens living in third countries on the possible ways to vote in the European elections, in particular via the delegation’ network; notes that this campaign reached out to 11 million recipients, via 26 video campaigns and over 2 000 posts on social media;

    85. Highlights the EEAS’s contribution to the Union’s overarching efforts to demonstrate steadfast support for Ukraine with initiatives like the #StandWithUkraine campaign and targeted communication projects such as Faces of Ukraine, Art vs War, and Share Your Light;

    86. Continues to encourage Union Delegations to promote and engage with local actors, civil society organisations and social partners in third countries to stimulate social dialogue and dialogue regarding the rule of law, fundamental rights and the fight against corruption; notes that, in 2023, under the thematic programme for civil society organisations, based on which Union partnerships are concluded with accountable and transparent organisations, EUR 50 million was allocated to the Union System for an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, which monitors and promotes civic space in 86 partner countries.

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (31.1.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgetary Control

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section X – European External Action Service

    (2024/2024(DEC))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Michael Gahler

     

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Highlights that recent events, notably Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the former’s hostile attempts to influence democratic processes in Europe as well as growing instability in the Middle East, have brought EU foreign policy and its implementation to the forefront of concerns among the EU Member States and institutions; underlines the central role played by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its delegations in conducting the Union’s external policy and in fighting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); stresses the importance of the EEAS for the EU’s relations with the 25 to 30 million EU citizens living outside the Union; acknowledges that the EEAS budget, already structurally underfunded, was disproportionately affected in comparison to other EU institutions by the higher inflation rates and subsequent energy crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, and is concerned of these negative consequences for the EEAS and the performance of the EU institutions and the lack of action to rectify the current budgetary situation that can severely impact the EU’s relations with third countries;

    2. Emphasises the need for the European External Action Service (EEAS) to play a central role in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East, to increase funding to ensure humanitarian aid in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, and to strengthen human rights monitoring.

    3. Highlight financial support for the European External Action Service (EEAS) delegations deployed in the Middle East, Gulf countries, and Africa to ensure they can continue implementing the EU’s External Action in the region.

    4. Insists on the budgetary increase for CFSP actions and other appropriate peace, conflict and crisis response instruments, as well as IT and security protocols, in order to fully match EU’s activities and capabilities with current challenges and conflicts worldwide;

    5. Highlights the EEAS’s contribution to the EU’s overarching efforts to demonstrate steadfast support for Ukraine with initiatives like the #StandWithUkraine campaign and targeted communication projects such as Faces of Ukraine, Art vs War, and Share Your Light;

    6. Reminds that is crucial to further strengthening our support to human rights, democracy and development in third countries through the NDICI – Global Europe, as a world of democracies is a safer world; underlines that resources to the EU’s Digital Diplomacy should be further increased given the current context of rapid technological advancements and geopolitical competition; insists that “green diplomacy” and the green transition, as one of the EU’s priorities, should be enhanced towards third countries through the EU’s External Action;

    7. Acknowledges the EEAS’s role in gathering evidence against EU-sanctioned Russian state-backed outlets and individuals involved in spreading disinformation and manipulating information to justify Russia’s war of aggression;

    8. Regrets that the European Court of Auditors in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 observes that they found quantifiable error in one of the 13 payments examined, concerning the absence of a valid procurement procedure and six non-quantifiable findings concerning procurement at EU Delegations, including weaknesses in the methodology for selecting tenderers and evaluating tenders, as well as entering into a legal commitment before making the budgetary commitment;

    9. Notes that the Special Report 14/2023 of the European Court of Auditors found deficiencies in the methodologies used by the Commission and the EEAS for allocating funding to partner countries and in the setup of the monitoring framework and recommended that the Commission and the EEAS notably improve the methodology for allocating funding and the assessment of the impact of EU support, focus the scope of the programming process and simplify and consistently use the indicators in the multiannual indicative programmes.

    10. Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ Special Report regarding the coordination role of the EEAS and its conclusions that coordination is mostly effective, allowing the service to properly support the High Representative/Vice-President to deliver their mandate; notes that nevertheless some weaknesses in information management, staffing and reporting remain; calls on the EEAS to prioritise the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Report by the deadline in 2025 as timely action is important in reinforcing its operational capacity and enhancing its contribution to the EU foreign policy objectives.

    11. Notes that that the EEAS is committed to make itself more cost-effective while continuing to face significant budgetary constraints in 2023 despite increasing geopolitical challenges; acknowledges that the EEAS has substantially cut its mission and representation budget, which impacts the core functions of a Diplomatic service, and has reduced non-compulsory expenditure and freezing and postponing building maintenance, infrastructure and IT projects; notes with concern that these budgetary constraints could lead to excessive closures of EU embassies and postponing security installations in a number of EU Delegations hampering the EEAS’ ability to fulfil its mandate and defend EU values and properly ensure the duty of care to all staff in Delegations; urges the Members States to provide enough financing to the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that the EU maintains its network of Delegations untouched as a signal of its global engagement; underlines the negative impact cuts may have on the implementation of the external affairs instruments, such as NDICI and Global Gateway; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue to effectively combat disinformation campaigns deployed as strategic tools by authoritarian and illiberal regimes; welcomes in this regard the announcement of the creation of the Task Force for Strategic Communication and Countering Information Manipulation in DG COMM of the Commission;

    12. Welcomes the steadfast support provided to Ukraine, including through the civilian EU Advisory Mission (EUAM Ukraine) and the training of Ukrainian soldiers under the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM);

    13. Welcomes the appointment of the first EU Special Representative for the Gulf region;

    14. Underlines that the EU must increase funding to reinforce the dedicated budget line within EU foreign policy actions specifically for gender equality and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, in order to ensure consistent financing for initiatives that promote gender-responsive leadership, protect women’s rights, and combat sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in conflict and post-conflict settings; stresses that such funding is essential to support local civil society organisations, provide survivor-centered support, and integrate gender perspectives into EU diplomatic and security efforts.

    15. Stresses that the Gender Action Plan (GAP) III dictates that 85% of new EU actions must contribute to gender equality and women and girls’ empowerment; calls on the EEAS to accelerate the progress towards the goals of GAP III by meaningfully focusing in its every day work on the GAP III’s key areas of engagement, including ending gender-based violence, promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights, economic and social rights and empowerment, equal participation and leadership; notes that GAP III will expire in 2027 and urges the EEAS to this end to develop a more ambitious GAP IV that will ensure a stronger connection between women’s rights and empowerment and the EU’s foreign and security policy, ready for implementation as of 2028;

    16. Underlines the extremely vulnerable situation of children in the world, specifically in armed conflict; expresses serious concern about the tens of thousands of children that were affected by armed conflict across the globe and suffered abhorrent abuses and violations of their most basic rights in 2023; calls on the EEAS to put children’s rights at the centre of their efforts;

    17. Continues to encourage the EEAS and Union delegations to promote and engage with local actors and civil society organisations in third countries to stimulate dialogue about the rule of law, fundamental human rights and the fight against corruption and the misuse of EU funds;

    18. Calls on the EU Delegations to enhance support to genuine democratic actors and civil society in the Western Balkans, go strongly and publicly denounce actions by illiberal and undemocratic actors that go against the Union’s interest and to ensure that the implementation of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III funding is in line with the EU’s objectives; calls on the EU Delegations in the region to apply a more credible and merit-based approach based on the Copenhagen criteria, notably on the rule of law, democracy and the protection of human rights, especially given the limited progress made by some countries in the Western Balkans;

    19. Calls for enhanced EU support for Moldova in combating disinformation, hybrid threats, and cyberattacks; calls the EU Delegation to Moldova to enhance its efforts to promote a more proactive and effective communication strategy regarding the European perspective, including outreach in the Russian language;

    20. Recalls the dire situation of women’s rights and LGBTQI+ rights in many parts of the world; stresses the urgent need to better protect these rights; highlights the central role of the EEAS in advancing human rights around the world; calls on the EEAS to enhance their efforts in this regard;

    21. Sees electoral observation mission as a practical and effective foreign policy instrument that remains central to the EU’s democracy support policies and strategies; calls on the EU to ensure adequate resources to the EU electoral observation missions, in view also of extending them to elections in candidate and neighbouring countries.

    22. Welcomes the establishment of EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova); highlights the essential role of the EUPM Moldova and calls the EU and its Member States to extend the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025 while increasing resources to enhance its effectiveness;

    23. Urges the EEAS and the EU Delegations to closely monitor the state of democracy in the different countries and to provide logistical and technological support to human rights defenders and indigenous persons, in particular women;

    24. Emphasises that freedom of religion and belief is a fundamental value of the free world and the European Union; urges the European External Action Service to incorporate faith diplomacy into its actions, recognising religion as a part of the solution to global challenges; underlines that this approach should include actively safeguarding the rights of Christians and other religious groups especially in countries where they are a minority, as well as promoting tolerance, and ensuring that religious freedom is part of all relevant external engagements and policies of the EU;

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR THE OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

     

    The rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye – A10-0067/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye

    (2025/2023(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

     having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

     having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation[1] (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

     having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

     having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

     having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

     having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

     having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

     having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

     

     having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

     having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey’ (COM(2024)0593),

     having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

     having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

     having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

     having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

     having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

     having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

     having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

     having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

     having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye[2], of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey[3], and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks[4],

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide[6],

     having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey[7], of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye[8] and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye[9],

     having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

    A. whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

    B. whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

    C. whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

    D. whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

    E. whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36.7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

    F. whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

    G. whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

    H. whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

    I. whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

    J. whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

    K. whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

    L. whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

    M. whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

    N. whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

    O. whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

    P. whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

    Q. whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

    R. whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3.1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10  billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

    S. whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78.2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

    T. whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians and human rights defenders, among others;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation;

    2. Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

    3. Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

    4. Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

    5. Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

    6. Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

    The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

    7. Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

    8. Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

    9. Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

    10. Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

    11. Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

    12. Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

    13. Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

    14. Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

    15. Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, and Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

    16. Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

    17. Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

    18. Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

    19. Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

    20. Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

    21. Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; is extremely concerned by the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that theses last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, the slowdown on social media, the detention of journalists and the crackdown on peaceful protesters; considers that this is a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model;

    22. Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

    23. Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes;

    24. Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

    25. Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

    26. Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

    Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    27. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3.1 million refugees, including 2.9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3.2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

    28. Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; deeply regrets that Türkiye also continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli) at 12 nautical miles; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranen infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

    29. Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

    30. Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

    31. Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

    32. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

    33. Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

    34. Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

    35. Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye  to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

    36. Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

    37. Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

    38. Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for  the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

    39. Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

    40. Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

    41. Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

    42. Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

    43. Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

    Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

    44. Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

    45. Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

    46. Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

    47. Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

    48. Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

    Wider EU-Türkiye relations

    49. Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points to a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

    50. Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, welcomes various high-level dialogues (HLDs) held recently, including the HLD on trade, and the plans for an HLD on economy, as positive steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities for joint initiatives in fields such as security, climate change, research and innovation; stresses that trade between the EU and Türkiye hit a record high last year and that the EU remains Türkiye’s largest trade and investment partner; calls for the removal of all existing trade barriers and irritants;

    51. Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

    52. Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member states to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities;

    The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

    53. Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

    54. Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement;

    55. Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

    56. Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

    57. Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

    58. Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

    °

    ° °

    59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Is China the new cool? How Beijing is using pop culture to win the soft power war

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Shaoyu Yuan, Research Scientist at the Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers University – Newark

    IShowSpeed, a 20-year-old American YouTuber and internet star, recently livestreamed hourslong tours of Chinese cities including Beijing and Shanghai, showcasing the locations to some of his nearly 40 million viewers.

    During the March events, IShowSpeed, whose real name is Darren Jason Watkins Jr., marveled at friendly locals, spotless streets and the high-speed Wi-Fi available on the subway; Chinese fans mobbed him for selfies on the Great Wall.

    Beijing’s state media lapped up the attention, with one Chinese blogger proclaiming that the American influencer had “eliminated all Western propaganda about China” in the eyes of a new generation.

    IShowSpeed’s YouTube page attests to this assessment.

    “China is so underrated wtf,” reads one top comment. “After watching this video, I realized how foolish my previous views on China were,” reads another.

    The providence of such comments isn’t clear. Nonetheless, to someone who researches the use of Chinese soft power, I find the spectacle of a young American burnishing China’s image to Western audiences hugely significant. It provides an example of how soft power norms have been upended in recent years – and how China appears to be having some success in winning over the global youth.

    Mixing pop and politics

    Soft power refers to a country’s ability to influence others, not through coercion but through attraction – by shaping preferences through culture, values and public diplomacy. Coined by political scientist Joseph Nye, the term captures how nations project power by making others want what they have, rather than forcing outcomes through military or economic pressure.

    Throughout the Cold War and into the 21st century, U.S. soft power didn’t have to try that hard. It came wrapped in denim, was broadcast on MTV and blasted from boom boxes. Rock music crossed the Iron Curtain when diplomacy couldn’t, with artists like Bruce Springsteen and Madonna reaching Soviet youth more effectively than any ambassador.

    And in China, Michael Jackson became a pop icon well before McDonald’s or Hollywood blockbusters arrived, symbolizing a glamorous, open America that millions dreamed of. To many growing up in China in the 1990s, American culture wasn’t just entertainment – it was persuasion, aspiration, even subversion.

    Beijing’s blockbusters

    The U.S. is, of course, still a cultural powerhouse; American stars of film and music continue to be recognizable around the world.

    But there are signs that China is chipping away at that dominance.

    Take cinema. Not so long ago, Chinese films were considered niche abroad. Yet in January 2025, an animated Chinese feature film, “Ne Zha 2,” smashed box-office records. The movie, a dazzling retelling of a mythic boy-god, has grossed an astonishing US$2 billion worldwide, outperforming many Hollywood releases.

    It’s now the highest-grossing animated movie of all time, and it wasn’t made by Disney or Pixar but by a Chinese studio employing hundreds of local animators.

    An artist paints an image of Ne Zha, a character from the animated blockbuster, on an electricity distribution box in a farm field in southwest China.
    Zhong Min/Feature China/Future Publishing via Getty Images

    Beijing lost no time in co-opting “Ne Zha 2” as a symbol of China’s creative rise and cultural “soft power moment.” State media touted the film’s success as proof that Chinese folklore and artistry can captivate the globe just as powerfully as Marvel superheroes.

    “Ne Zha 2” isn’t a one-off. “Detective Chinatown 1900,” released in January by the Beijing-based Wanda Films, is 2025’s third-biggest grossing movie to date.

    Hollywood, once confident in its cultural monopoly, suddenly faces a colossal new competitor on the global stage – one backed by 1.4 billion people and a government eager to topple Western pop-cultural dominance. And the audience isn’t all domestic. “Ne Zha 2” also proved successful when it opened in the U.S.

    Gamers journey to the East

    And it’s not just movies.

    For decades, video games were an American and Japanese stronghold. Yet it is a Chinese-developed game, Black Myth: Wukong – developed by a studio in Hangzhou – that has become the talk of gamers worldwide.

    When its gameplay trailers first appeared in 2020, they went viral, with Black Myth: Wukong promising AAA-level graphics and action rooted in China’s classic “Journey to the West” tale.

    Skeptics wondered whether the final product could really compete with the likes of established franchise God of War or the George R. R. Martin-inspired Elden Ring. But those doubts evaporated when the game finally launched in 2024. Black Myth: Wukong debuted to massive global fanfare in summer 2024, instantly claiming a spot alongside the biggest Western franchises.

    Reviewers around the globe have hailed it as China’s first true blockbuster video game and evidence that the country can produce world-class entertainment.

    Black Myth: Wukong won Best Action Game and Players’ Voice awards at The Game Awards 2024 on Dec. 13, 2024.
    VCG/VCG via Getty Images

    I’d argue that this isn’t just about bragging rights in China’s gaming community; it’s about narrative power for the Chinese state. When millions of young people around the world spend 30 or 40 hours a week immersed in the adventures of Sun Wukong, the Monkey King hero, rather than, say, a Marvel superhero or a Tolkien epic, that subtly shifts the cultural center of gravity eastward.

    It suggests that Chinese myths are becoming as cool as Western ones to a global audience. And that is soft power.

    Small screen, big impact

    Meanwhile, on the smaller screens we carry in our pockets, another Chinese export has embedded itself deeply into global culture: TikTok.

    As of 2025, TikTok boasts over 1.6 billion monthly users worldwide.

    More striking is TikTok’s cultural reach. The app’s algorithm has propelled songs from musicians in South Korea or Nigeria to the top of global charts; it has teenagers in Kansas learning Indonesian dance moves, and grandmothers in Italy trying Mexican recipes they saw on a viral Chinese app.

    In effect, TikTok has built a new transnational pop culture commons – one owned by a Beijing-based company. Yes, the content on TikTok is created by users everywhere, not dictated by the Chinese state, but the platform’s very existence is a triumph of Chinese tech entrepreneurship and global ambition.

    Every minute that Western youths spend scrolling TikTok is a minute they’re within a Chinese-designed cultural sphere. Little wonder the U.S. government has fretted about TikTok’s influence – it’s not just about data security, it’s about cultural security.

    Banning it outright has proven politically difficult, and so TikTok remains, steadily entrenching its position as a staple of global youth culture.

    All these strands – blockbuster films, hit video games, viral apps – tie into a larger truth: China is rapidly building its soft power as America risks letting its own erode. At a time when the U.S. slashes foreign aid, China expands its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative and development loans. And while the U.S. curtails visas for students and scientists, China’s universities – some of which now rank in the global top 20 – become more attractive destinations.

    Can the US maintain a cultural edge?

    Assessing the impact of soft power is notoriously hard – nations that employ it are typically playing a very long game. And Beijing’s soft power push is not guaranteed success everywhere. Many societies remain skeptical of Beijing’s intentions, and China’s authoritarian system limits the appeal of its political model in democratic nations.

    Yet there are clear signs that China’s cultural exports are gaining traction among the younger generation.

    The U.S. once set the global cultural tempo almost by default. But today, as China invests heavily in its creative industries and digital platforms, it is increasingly shaping the soundtrack and storylines for a rising global generation.

    The question is no longer whether China can compete for soft power influence but whether America has a plan to hold its ground.

    Shaoyu Yuan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Is China the new cool? How Beijing is using pop culture to win the soft power war – https://theconversation.com/is-china-the-new-cool-how-beijing-is-using-pop-culture-to-win-the-soft-power-war-254923

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: BitMart Announces Leadership Transition: Sheldon Xia to Group President, Nenter Chow Appointed Global CEO

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Mahe, Seychelles, April 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — BitMart, a leading global digital asset trading platform, today announced a strategic leadership transition. Founder Sheldon Xia will assume the role of Group President, effective immediately, while Nenter (Nathan) Chow has been appointed as the company’s new Global CEO. This change positions BitMart for its next phase of growth and innovation in 2025.

    In his new capacity as Group President, Sheldon Xia will focus on BitMart’s long-term strategy, product innovation, and continued enhancement of platform security. “As BitMart enters its next chapter, I look forward to concentrating on our long-term vision, accelerating innovation, and ensuring our platform’s security remains paramount,” said Xia. “This transition allows me to devote my energy to strategic initiatives and product breakthroughs while entrusting our day-to-day leadership to Nenter.” Xia, who founded BitMart in 2017, will remain closely involved in guiding the company’s direction and upholding its commitment to a user-first, secure trading experience.

    Nenter Chow brings a unique blend of Web3 and traditional finance expertise to his new role as Global CEO. As a former Partner at Animoca Ventures, Chow led investments in notable blockchain projects such as Monad, The Open Network (TON), Berachain, and Titan Content. Prior to his work in the Web3 space, he amassed over 17 years of experience in investment banking at institutions including JP Morgan, MUFG, and ICBC. Chow has extensive cross-border experience bridging Eastern and Western markets, having been involved in initiatives like Digital Dubai’s Web3 investor workshops and the SuiHub accelerator program in the Middle East. This diverse background positions him well to expand BitMart’s global reach and foster innovation across different regions.

    With this leadership change, BitMart also reaffirmed its strategic roadmap for 2025. The company is expanding into high-potential emerging markets (such as MENA and Latin America), scaling up its suite of AI-powered trading tools and analytics features, strengthening its institutional service offerings, and enhancing the overall Web3 user experience on its platform. BitMart aims to serve as a gateway to Web3, bridging today’s crypto economy with tomorrow’s decentralized future. These initiatives underscore BitMart’s commitment to making crypto trading more accessible, intelligent, and secure for a global user base.

    “I am honored to lead BitMart at this pivotal time for the industry,” said Nenter Chow, BitMart’s incoming Global CEO. “Under Sheldon’s leadership, BitMart has grown into a world-class platform with a vibrant community. I intend to build on this strong foundation by accelerating our growth in key markets and leveraging emerging technologies like AI to better serve our users. We will continue to enhance our offerings for both retail and institutional clients, and bridge communities across the East and West to solidify BitMart as the premier gateway to the Web3 world. I’m excited to work with the team as we execute our 2025 roadmap and beyond.”

    About BitMart
    BitMart is the premier global digital asset trading platform. With millions of users worldwide and ranked among the top crypto exchanges on CoinGecko, it currently offers 1,700+ trading pairs with competitive trading fees. Constantly evolving and growing, BitMart is interested in crypto’s potential to drive innovation and promote financial inclusion. To learn more about BitMart, visit their Website, follow their X (Twitter), or join their Telegram for updates, news, and promotions. Download BitMart App to trade anytime, anywhere.

    Disclaimer:
    Use of BitMart services is entirely at your own risk. All crypto investments, including earnings, are highly speculative in nature and involve substantial risk of loss. Past, hypothetical, or simulated performance is not necessarily indicative of future results.

    The value of digital currencies can go up or down and there can be a substantial risk in buying, selling, holding, or trading digital currencies. You should carefully consider whether trading or holding digital currencies is suitable for you based on your personal investment objectives, financial circumstances, and risk tolerance. BitMart does not provide any investment, legal, or tax advice.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Stakeholders acknowledge progress with Zimbabwe arrears clearance dialogue, call for more effort and support

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    WASHINGTON D.C., United States of America, April 23, 2025/APO Group/ —

    • Challenges should not overshadow the good results achieved so far, says former president Chissano
    • “Zimbabwe has made a lot of progress, against all odds. Now, we all should rally around it to conclude this process,” Adesina
    • Former farm owners welcome compensation payment

    International organisations, creditors, and other stakeholders in the Zimbabwe arrears clearance and debt resolution unanimously acknowledged on Monday that tremendous progress has been made after two years of an extensive Structured Dialogue process but observed several challenges that need to be addressed.

    At a roundtable meeting on Zimbabwe’s Arrears Clearance and Debt Resolution Process held on the sidelines of the IMF and World Bank Group Spring Meetings in Washington, participants highlighted achievements in two of three reform areas: economic growth and stability, land reforms, and compensation of former farm owners. However, they called for more effort in the governance pillar.

    “The parameters of the dialogue have been set. Most issues have been dealt with. Commitments and targets have been agreed upon. We should all be proud of the dialogue process and what it has achieved,” said Joachim Chissano, former president of Mozambique and facilitator of Zimbabwe’s Arrears Clearance and Debt Resolution Process.

    Other speakers included Dr Akinwumi Adesina, President of the African Development Bank and champion of the dialogue process; Ndiamé Diop, the World Bank Vice President for Eastern and Southern Africa; Abebe Selassie, Director of the African Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who represented the Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva; representatives of the governments of the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany; and the Southern African Development Community Executive Secretary Elias M. Magosi.

    “Zimbabwe has made a lot of progress, against all odds,” said Adesina, pointing out, however, that recent ascent to the Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) bill is a significant setback and poses a risk to the arrears clearance and debt resolution process.

    Adesina laid out several concrete next steps, including the need for the IMF to approve the Staff Monitored Programme for Zimbabwe at the Spring Meetings, support from potential donors for bridge loan financing, exploration of additional resources from the African Development Fund, and prioritisation of Zimbabwe’s arrears clearance within the G20 Common Framework.

    He said the African Development Bank Group will explore the possibility of mobilising additional resources for Zimbabwe’s arrears clearance within the framework of the 17th replenishment of the African Development Fund coming up towards the end of the year. This will form part of an agreed-upon process for clearing the bridge loan.

    “Similarly, we encourage the World Bank’s International Development Association to do the same to clear arrears,” the Bank Group president said.

    “To move the arrears clearance and debt resolution forward, the African Development Bank Group is financing the Global Sovereign Advisory and legal advisors, Kepler-Karst, to support the arrears clearance and debt resolution process, with clear timelines,” Adesina said.

    Progress across three reform pillars

    Chissano outlined other reforms that the Zimbabwe government undertook within the dialogue process framework, including the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe ceasing its quasi-fiscal operations, with all liabilities transferred to the treasury; the exchange rate system moving closer to market-determined rates; prudent fiscal policy and expenditure rationalisation being pursued; and the ongoing token payments to creditors.

    Under the land tenure reform, Chissano and other speakers welcomed the ongoing compensation for former farm owners and the Farm Title Deed programme launched in December 2024. The programme provides for a 99-year lease agreement that is bankable and transferable.

    Regarding governance reforms, the meeting heard that Zimbabwe had abolished the death penalty and that other significant reforms were underway to improve efficiency in the justice sector, enhance measures to fight corruption, and improve public sector transparency and accountability.

    However, like other speakers, Chissano noted that challenges remain in civil society engagement, democratic elections, judicial processes, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression.

    “These challenges show that dialogue is still needed for reforms to take root. They also show that political reforms are not a linear process,” he said, urging that these challenges “should mobilise us to redouble our efforts and re-energise the dialogue process.”

    The government of Zimbabwe has proposed a plan to secure bridge financing of $2.6 billion to clear arrears to international financial institutions.

    In his presentation, Zimbabwe’s Minister of Finance, Economic Development, and Investment Promotion, Mthuli Ncube said the country’s economic outlook shows signs of recovery with expected growth of 6.0% in 2025. This is a remarkable improvement on last year’s 2.0% due to severe drought. The introduction of ZiG currency in April 2024 is helping to restore macroeconomic stability.

    The arrears clearance roadmap aims to secure and implement a Staff Monitored Programme with the IMF in 2025, develop a credible strategy to close the fiscal financing gap, clear arrears with international financial institutions by early 2026, and complete comprehensive debt restructuring under the G20 Common Framework.

    The Southern African Development Community Executive Secretary, Elias M. Magosi, said Zimbabwe should be supported to bounce back, pointing to its strategic role in regional trade, integration, and development.

    Back in Zimbabwe, the former president of the Commercial Farmers Union, Mr. Andrew J. Pascoe, confirmed receipt of payments made to former landowners, describing the development as “another momentous event.”

    “Monday, 24 March 2025, saw the first US Dollar Cash payments due under this plan being paid to the signed-up Former Farm Owners (FFOs),” he said. “After almost 20 years, we, as Zimbabweans had been able to put aside our differences and, in an atmosphere of mutual respect and trust, negotiated an agreement that laid the foundation for the payment of compensation for improvements on farms which the government of Zimbabwe had acquired under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme.”

    “I would like, as a representative of these farmers, to sincerely thank His Excellency, President Dr. E.D. Mnangagwa and his government for standing by the commitment made by His Excellency in 2018 to pay compensation for acquired farms in line with the Constitution of Zimbabwe,” he said.

    Nearly three years ago, President Emmerson Mnangagwa asked Dr Adesina to champion Zimbabwe’s arrears clearance and debt resolution process.

    “I knew the job would be difficult,” Adesina recalled and expressed confidence, saying, “We will succeed in giving Zimbabwe and its people a full arrears clearance and debt resolution so that it can receive critical concessional financing needed to boost its growth and development further.”

    “Now, we all should rally around it to conclude this process,” he added.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI: UPDATE — HP Announces 2025 Digital Equity Accelerator Cohort

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    News Highlights:

    • Eight nonprofit organizations in Greece, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Spain selected for the 2025 Digital Equity Accelerator.
    • Organizations are serving disconnected adolescents and adults through digital skills training, education access, and other community-driven initiatives.
    • Each nonprofit will receive $100,000 of HP technology and solutions, capacity-building cash grants, and six–months of training and programming to support scale.
    • In its first three years, the Accelerator helped 27 participating organizations expand their reach by more than 9 million people.
    • The Digital Equity Accelerator, a joint initiative of HP Inc. and the HP Foundation, helps power the future of work by improving access to technology, digital literacy, and AI-driven skills development.

    PALO ALTO, Calif., April 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Today, HP Inc. (NYSE: HPQ) and the HP Foundation announced the selection of 8 nonprofit organizations in Greece, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Spain for the 2025 Digital Equity Accelerator (Accelerator). The Accelerator will provide the 2025 cohort with a USD $100,000 grant, HP technology (~USD $100,000 value), and six months of virtual training to strengthen capacity and drive digital inclusion.

    “The future of work depends on equitable access to technology, digital skills, and opportunity,” said Michele Malejki, Global Head of Social Impact, HP Inc. and Executive Director, HP Foundation. “Through the Digital Equity Accelerator, HP is empowering nonprofits to bridge the digital divide, ensuring disconnected adolescents and adults have the tools and training needed to thrive in an increasingly digital world. By investing in these organizations, we are not just expanding access—we are powering the future of work.”

    A $1 trillion-plus digital divide is limiting billions from achieving equal access to education and economic opportunities. Through the Accelerator, HP collaborates with a network of partners to help nonprofit organizations scale digital equity solutions.

    “We are fortunate to work with companies like HP that are committed to scaling tech for good through this Accelerator,” said Hala Hanna, Executive Director, MIT Solve. “Our support programs are designed to meet nonprofit leaders where they are – providing capacity building workshops, executive coaching, peer-to-peer collaboration, and a library of in-kind resources to help them fully benefit from the program.”

    Accelerating Digital Equity in Greece, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Spain
    The Accelerator helps nonprofits scale digital equity programs for disconnected adults and adolescents to power the future of work. Meet the 2025 Digital Equity Accelerator cohort:

    Greece:

    • Socialinnov (Social Impact and Innovation) Leveraging technology to drive social change, Socialinnov has equipped more than 40,000 people in underrepresented communities in Greece with digital skills training that expands access to the digital economy.
    • The Smile of the Child (TSoC) – Founded in 1995 by 10-year-old Andreas Yannopoulos, The Smile of the Child (TSoC) is a non-profit organization supporting more than 2.2 million adults and adolescents with tools, technology and other resources.

    Indonesia:

    • Solve Education Foundation Focusing on empowering Indonesian youth with 21st century skills through its AI-powered learning platform, edbot.ai, an innovative enrichment program, helping students succeed in school and beyond.
    • Markoding (Daya Kreasi Anak Bangsa Foundation) Helps equip underprivileged youth with 21st-century skills to foster a generation of innovators. Its flagship program, Perempuan Inovasi, has empowered over 35,000 women with STEM training, mentorship, and access to job opportunities.

    Nigeria:

    • She-Code Africa Women Tech Initiative (She Code Africa) Provides participants across Africa with in-demand digital and technical skills. Since 2016, its training, mentorship, scholarships, and career programs have helped more than 62,000 people receive the digital skills needed to thrive in the digital economy.
    • The Slum to School Initiative (Slum2School Africa) Addressing Africa’s education crisis, this volunteer-driven organization provides quality education, skills development, and psychosocial support to underserved children and youth, empowering them to drive sustainable development.

    Spain:

    • AlmaNatura Foundation Founded in a small village in Southern Spain, AlmaNatura designs and implements projects that revitalize rural areas through employment, education, health, and sustainability, fostering opportunities for local communities to thrive.
    • Fundación Esplai Ciudadanía Comprometida (Committed Citizenship Esplai Foundation) Focuses on promoting citizen empowerment through inclusive, rights-based projects and programs. It collaborates with local, national, and international organizations to support socio-educational initiatives in information and communication technologies (ICT).

    Since 2022, the Accelerator has helped expand the reach of 27 nonprofit organizations in Brazil, Canada, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, and the U.S. by more than 9 million people.

    HP’s Commitment to Digital Equity and Sustainable Impact
    As nearly half of the world’s population remains offline, equipping youth and adults with critical skills reflects HP’s commitment to bridging the digital divide and supporting economic inclusion. The Digital Equity Accelerator is one way HP is delivering progress toward its goal to accelerate digital equity for 150 million people by 2030.

    For more information on the Digital Equity Accelerator, please visit the website.

    About HP
    HP Inc. is a global technology leader and creator of solutions that enable people to bring their ideas to life and connect to the things that matter most. Operating in more than 170 countries, HP delivers a wide range of innovative and sustainable devices, services and subscriptions for personal computing, printing, 3D printing, hybrid work, gaming, and more. For more information, please visit http://www.hp.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Polis Hosts Colorado-Mexico Friendship Day to Celebrate State’s Strong Trade, Tourism & Cultural Partnership

    Source: US State of Colorado

    Mexico is one of Colorado’s biggest trade partners

    DENVER – While President Trump’s tariffs barrels the U.S. toward a recession and raises costs on hardworking Coloradans, Colorado Governor Jared Polis seeks to strengthen economic prosperity  with Mexico and Canada, Colorado’s largest trading partners, and has been outspoken against the national tariffs and about the important partnerships that Colorado has with both countries. That’s why Governor Polis today hosted Colorado-Mexico Friendship Day alongside Mexican Consul General Pavel Meléndez Cruz. This comes after the Governor hosted Colorado Canada Friendship Day in March alongside Sylvain Fabi, Consul General of Canada in Denver.

    “Trump’s tariff tax increase is raising costs on hardworking people, businesses, housing, agriculture, manufacturing, and creating uncertainty for businesses. I hope our state and country do not fall into a recession because of the economic uncertainty caused by these reckless tariffs. In Colorado, we are doing everything we can to help ensure our economy, jobs, and our future are not destroyed by President Trump’s tariff tax. Republicans and Democrats in Congress can and must stop these federal tariffs,” said Governor Polis. “Colorado-Mexico Friendship Day is a great opportunity for businesses and Coloradans to celebrate the strong trade partnerships with our allies.”

    Mexico and Canada are significant economic partners for Colorado, representing 38.5% and 31% of the state’s imports and exports in 2024. Mexico was the top export destination for Colorado goods, valued at $1.7 billion, or 17% of total exports, followed by Canada at $1.6 billion. Combined, the two countries also account for 46% of Colorado’s international visitation, with Mexico leading at over 250,000 visitors, followed by Canada at 183,000 visitors. The economic impact of international travel from these two countries in 2024 was over $265 million.

    The President’s tariff tax has created uncertainty for Colorado’s thriving industries, from agriculture to manufacturing and small businesses. People in Colorado are deeply concerned about how the President’s tariff tax will increase the costs of everyday life, from gas to groceries. Much of the fruit sold in Colorado grocery stores is imported from Mexico and could see a price spike.

    Governor Polis has taken strong steps to support Colorado’s farmers and ranchers accessing new markets across the world. For instance, Governor Polis helped open exports into Mexico for Colorado’s potato growers. The Trump tariffs could threaten the livelihoods of our farmers in places like the San Luis Valley if Mexico imposes retaliatory tariffs. We have already seen damaging retaliatory tariffs put in place that hit other commodities as well as agricultural equipment. This is another way the Trump tariffs will continue raising the costs of doing business for our nation’s farmers and ranchers.

    “Recently announced widespread tariffs will harm agriculture. History tells us that farmers and ranchers will bear the burden because they rely on imports on inputs and retaliatory tariffs by other countries will lower commodity prices. Higher input costs and lower market prices are going to cause the loss of more family farms and ranches, which will further hurt our rural communities and our country. We call on the administration to use a more thoughtful and less widespread approach to trade policy,” said Chad Franke, Farmer and President of the Rocky Mountain Farmers Union.

    “The tariffs will increase expenses and cut revenues for America’s agricultural producers. The most vulnerable producers are the younger folks, who already face a huge challenge in gaining a foothold in this industry. We have already been losing producers and rural businesses for many years.  I believe if the administration continues to institute these policies this will lead to the need for them to institute a massive government bail-out program to mitigate the economic damage they are inflicting on the agricultural community and rural America. The average American consumer will also feel the pain of these tariffs through their continually increasing grocery bill,” said Kent Peppler, Former Colorado State Director for the Farm Services Agency and former President of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union.

    Colorado is 5th in the nation for beef exports. Beef is among Colorado’s largest exports and is a top driver of Colorado’s agricultural economy. In 2024, the U.S. exported a total of $10.45 billion in beef and beef products around the world. Colorado’s top export countries for beef are Mexico, Canada, South Korea, Japan, China, all countries now facing Trump’s on-again off-again tariffs. Colorado’s other largest agricultural commodities, including dairy, wheat, and corn, all rely on export markets to do business.

    In 2024, Colorado exported a record $10.5 billion of goods to the world and imported $16.8 B in goods. Colorado’s top export partners are Mexico ($1.7B), Canada ($1.6B), China ($0.8B)  South Korea ($0.6B), and Malaysia ($0.6 B), accounting for half of all Colorado exports in 2024. Top export commodities include meat (17%); nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery (15%); electric machinery (13%); optic, photo, medical or surgical instruments (11%); and aircraft, spacecraft, and related parts (5%). In 2022, exports from Colorado supported an estimated 40 thousand jobs.

    An estimated 820,200 jobs in Colorado are supported by international trade, representing 20.8% of all jobs in the state.

    ###

     

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: HP Announces 2025 Digital Equity Accelerator Cohort

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    News Highlights:

    • Eight nonprofit organizations in Greece, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Spain selected for the 2025 Digital Equity Accelerator.
    • Organizations are serving disconnected adolescents and adults through digital skills training, education access, and other community-driven initiatives.
    • Each nonprofit will receive $100,000 of HP technology and solutions, capacity-building cash grants, and six–months of training and programming to support scale.
    • In its first three years, the Accelerator helped 27 participating organizations expand their reach by more than 9 million people.
    • The Digital Equity Accelerator, a joint initiative of HP Inc. and the HP Foundation, helps power the future of work by improving access to technology, digital literacy, and AI-driven skills development.

    PALO ALTO, Calif., April 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Today, HP Inc. (NYSE: HPQ) and the HP Foundation announced the selection of 8 nonprofit organizations in Greece, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Spain for the 2025 Digital Equity Accelerator (Accelerator). The Accelerator will provide the 2025 cohort with a USD $100,000 grant, HP technology (~USD $100,000 value), and six months of virtual training to strengthen capacity and drive digital inclusion.

    “The future of work depends on equitable access to technology, digital skills, and opportunity,” said Michele Malejki, Global Head of Social Impact, HP Inc. and Executive Director, HP Foundation. “Through the Digital Equity Accelerator, HP is empowering nonprofits to bridge the digital divide, ensuring disconnected adolescents and adults have the tools and training needed to thrive in an increasingly digital world. By investing in these organizations, we are not just expanding access—we are powering the future of work.”

    A $1 trillion-plus digital divide is limiting billions from achieving equal access to education and economic opportunities. Through the Accelerator, HP collaborates with a network of partners to help nonprofit organizations scale digital equity solutions.

    “We are fortunate to work with inspiring innovators to amplify their impact through a six-month learning journey for the Accelerator,” said Hala Hanna, Executive Director, MIT Solve. “Our capacity-building workshops are designed to meet nonprofit leaders where they are – providing executive coaching, peer-to-peer collaboration, and a library of in-kind resources to help them fully benefit from the program.”

    Accelerating Digital Equity in Greece, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Spain
    The Accelerator helps nonprofits scale digital equity programs for disconnected adults and adolescents to power the future of work. Meet the 2025 Digital Equity Accelerator cohort:

    Greece:

    • Socialinnov (Social Impact and Innovation) Leveraging technology to drive social change, Socialinnov has equipped more than 40,000 people in underrepresented communities in Greece with digital skills training that expands access to the digital economy.
    • The Smile of the Child (TSoC) – Founded in 1995 by 10-year-old Andreas Yannopoulos, The Smile of the Child (TSoC) is a non-profit organization supporting more than 2.2 million adults and adolescents with tools, technology and other resources.

    Indonesia:

    • Solve Education Foundation Focusing on empowering Indonesian youth with 21st century skills through its AI-powered learning platform, edbot.ai, an innovative enrichment program, helping students succeed in school and beyond.
    • Markoding (Daya Kreasi Anak Bangsa Foundation) Helps equip underprivileged youth with 21st-century skills to foster a generation of innovators. Its flagship program, Perempuan Inovasi, has empowered over 35,000 women with STEM training, mentorship, and access to job opportunities.

    Nigeria:

    • She-Code Africa Women Tech Initiative (She Code Africa) Provides participants across Africa with in-demand digital and technical skills. Since 2016, its training, mentorship, scholarships, and career programs have helped more than 62,000 people receive the digital skills needed to thrive in the digital economy.
    • The Slum to School Initiative (Slum2School Africa) Addressing Africa’s education crisis, this volunteer-driven organization provides quality education, skills development, and psychosocial support to underserved children and youth, empowering them to drive sustainable development.

    Spain:

    • AlmaNatura Foundation Founded in a small village in Southern Spain, AlmaNatura designs and implements projects that revitalize rural areas through employment, education, health, and sustainability, fostering opportunities for local communities to thrive.
    • Fundación Esplai Ciudadanía Comprometida (Committed Citizenship Esplai Foundation) Focuses on promoting citizen empowerment through inclusive, rights-based projects and programs. It collaborates with local, national, and international organizations to support socio-educational initiatives in information and communication technologies (ICT).

    Since 2022, the Accelerator has helped expand the reach of 27 nonprofit organizations in Brazil, Canada, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, and the U.S. by more than 9 million people.

    HP’s Commitment to Digital Equity and Sustainable Impact
    As nearly half of the world’s population remains offline, equipping youth and adults with critical skills reflects HP’s commitment to bridging the digital divide and supporting economic inclusion. The Digital Equity Accelerator is one way HP is delivering progress toward its goal to accelerate digital equity for 150 million people by 2030.

    For more information on the Digital Equity Accelerator, please visit the website.

    About HP
    HP Inc. is a global technology leader and creator of solutions that enable people to bring their ideas to life and connect to the things that matter most. Operating in more than 170 countries, HP delivers a wide range of innovative and sustainable devices, services and subscriptions for personal computing, printing, 3D printing, hybrid work, gaming, and more. For more information, please visit http://www.hp.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: DRC: UN Officials Raise Alarm at the Dramatic Impact of Prolonged Conflict on Women and Children, Including Increased Risk of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence on Displaced People

    Source: United Nations Population Fund

    New York/Geneva, 23 April 2025 – The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for  Children and Armed Conflict, Ms. Virginia Gamba, the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ms. Pramila Patten, UNFPA Deputy Executive Director (Management), Mr. Andrew Saberton, and the Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees for Protection, Ms. Ruvendrini Menikdiwela, raise the alarm over the devastating impact of the prolonged conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly on women and children, expressing grave concern over the rising risks of conflict-related sexual violence.  

    Recent offensives with heightened attacks by non-state armed groups in South and North Kivu  provinces since the beginning of 2025, have contributed to dramatically increasing conflict-related  sexual violence. Sites where internally displaced people (IDP) had been living have been destroyed, and civilians have been forcibly displaced to areas without adequate protection or support, upping  their risks of violence. The looting of supplies and the restriction of humanitarian access have  worsened the condition of survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, while insecurity is expanding to neighboring countries, with Congolese refugees reported in urgent need of  humanitarian aid, including health and psychological support. 

    The DRC has a record number of more than 7.8 million IDP, while an additional 1.1 million Congolese people, who fled years of ongoing violence, are hosted by neighboring countries.  

    The UN Officials warn that sexual violence is widespread and systematically used by parties to  the conflict, including against women and children, as a tactic of war to terrorize and punish the  civilian populations. Incidents of sexual violence remain highly underreported due to fear of  stigma, risks of retaliation, and limited humanitarian services and support. This horrific trend is  also part of a broader pattern of grave violations against children, including recruitment and use,  abduction, and other forms of violence. “In the context of this unprecedented security and humanitarian crisis, the conditions of women and children continue to deteriorate. Their lives are hanging on the countless days awaiting stronger actions by the international community,” the UN  Officials said. 

    More than half of the refugees who fled the DRC to neighboring countries are children; many of them are likely to have endured severe violence, including sexual violence. Their plight is exacerbated by challenging reception conditions in asylum countries, largely due to the impact of  reduced humanitarian funding. The UN Officials call on all parties to implement Security Council Resolution 2773 (2025) and take urgent steps to cease and prevent any form of conflict-related sexual violence, while ensuring protection and timely access to services for survivors, maintain open-door policies for forcibly displaced people from the DRC, and abide by their obligations under international law.  

    Survivors face limited access to essential services, including medical care, sexual and reproductive health services, case management, mental health services, and vital protection services. Ongoing hostilities further hinder service delivery with direct attacks on hospitals and shortages of medical supplies such as life-saving Post Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) kits. “We urge all parties to guarantee safe and unimpeded humanitarian access to those in need, particularly children and  survivors of sexual violence. We further call for urgent action to strengthen accountability, implement gender-sensitive and child-centered responses, reestablish vital aid and support to the humanitarian plan to help survivors of conflict-related sexual violence regain their health and dignity,” the UN Officials concluded.  

    For media inquiries related to the Office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, please contact Ms. Géraldine Boezio (+1 917 367 3306 / geraldine.boezio@un.org

    For media inquiries related to the Office of the Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict, please contact Ms. Fabienne Vinet (+1 646-537-5066 / vinet@un.org

    For media inquiries related to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), please contact Ms. Eujin Byun (+41 79 747 8719 / byun@unhcr.org

    For media inquiries related to the United Nations Population Fund, (UNFPA), please contact Ms. Selinde Dulckeit (+1 646 410 3963 dulckeit@unfpa.org

    Background info: Before the recent hostilities erupted, the country was already on track to have record levels of grave violations against children, including sexual violence. For at least five years  now, the DRC has been the country with the highest level of verified incidents of sexual violence in conflict of all the situations on the children and armed conflict agenda. DRC has been covered in the annual reports of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, which have been compiled by the Office of the SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict since 2012. The DRC also remains the country situation with the highest number of UN-verified conflict-related sexual violence cases recorded year by year.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Security: CISA, DHS S&T, INL, LSU Help Energy Industry Partners Strengthen Incident Response and OT Cybersecurity

    Source: US Department of Homeland Security

    WASHINGTON – The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) hosted Louisiana State University (LSU) and several energy industry and critical infrastructure partners to train against simulated, high-impact cyberattacks on operational technology (OT) and traditional information technology (IT) at CISA’s Control Environment Laboratory Resource (CELR) in Idaho Falls, Idaho, last week. LSU is the first university in the U.S. invited to participate in the CELR exercise, as part of CISA and INL’s efforts to strengthen cyber talent development and research partnerships.

    Cybersecurity threats exploit the increased complexity and connectivity of critical infrastructure systems. The potential incapacitation or destruction of assets, systems and networks, whether physical or virtual, could have a debilitating effect on national security, economic security and on public health and safety. As the nation’s cyber defense agency, CISA is committed to growing operational and strategic partnerships to increase collaboration across the OT and industrial control systems (ICS) community.

    On April 15-17, energy industry partners and the CISA-INL-LSU team used the CELR chemical processing platform, located at and operated by INL on behalf of CISA. CELR platforms are benchtop models of critical infrastructure with integrated industrial processes to represent how real-world components and facilities might be compromised through cyber-physical attacks. The participants were positioned in a live environment with IT and OT traffic and attacked by a technical team posing as a sophisticated adversary. The training participants’ mission was to detect and respond to kinetic cyberattacks through ICS elements, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, human-machine interfaces (HMIs), programmable logic controllers (PLCs), OT and IT systems and other key components widely used in industrial facilities.

    “Collaborating with LSU and industry partners is extremely beneficial in strengthening the nation’s cybersecurity knowledge and ability to respond to threats. This training is another step in our shared vision to expand the opportunity for critical infrastructure entities to strengthen their cybersecurity using CELR,” said Matt Hartman, CISA Deputy Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity. “Malicious cyber actors and nation-state adversaries are a persistent, highly capable threat to critical infrastructure operations, functionality and safety. CELR is a valuable resource for critical infrastructure owners and operators seeking to improve the security of their ICS/OT networks.”

    “INL’s Controls Laboratory hosts five CISA-sponsored ICS testbeds, offering immersive environments for partners to experience realistic cyberattack scenarios against critical infrastructure,” said Tim Huddleston, INL’s Cybersecurity Program Manager. “We were proud to host industry partners and academia in this exercise, helping them improve their skills in cyber hunting and incident response, which reduces the risk from malicious cyber actors.”

    INL leverages scientific expertise and unique controls environments to support the departments of Energy, Defense and Homeland Security in national security challenges, including critical infrastructure protection. Last week’s training is part of an ongoing collaborative effort by CISA, DHS S&T, INL and LSU to equip energy industry cyber defenders to protect ICS environments and develop deeply technical cyber talent for critical infrastructure. Under CISA and S&T oversight, INL is currently developing the first university-based CELR platform. DHS S&T and CISA plan to deliver an Oil and Natural Gas CELR platform to LSU by fall of this year.

    Through a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement, LSU will operate and maintain the Oil and Natural Gas platform and host similar trainings for energy sector partners, state cyber defenders, and LSU faculty, staff and students. This agreement will provide government and industry security professionals in the Louisiana gulf region an extremely valuable, local opportunity to hone their OT/ICS cybersecurity skills.

    “This partnership is a wonderful example of DHS S&T’s role in enabling effective, efficient, and secure operations by applying scientific, engineering, analytic, and innovative approaches to deliver timely solutions. The CELR platforms help ensure critical infrastructure is better positioned to detect, mitigate, or prevent cyber-attacks in the real world. By positioning a platform in close proximity to critical infrastructure owners and operators, as well as making it accessible to the next generation of oil refinery workforce through the university, DHS S&T and CISA are ensuring our nation’s oil supply remains secure and available to consumers,” said Jonathan McEntee,Acting Executive Director for S&T Office of Mission and Capability Support.

    “As a leading energy and chemical manufacturing state, Louisiana’s cybersecurity posture around its critical infrastructure has national implications,” said Greg Trahan, director of economic development at LSU and special advisor to LSU President William F. Tate IV on cyber initiatives. “The invitation by CISA and INL to participate in this exercise underscores what we know: LSU has emerged as one of the most important and consequential cybersecurity schools in the country. The opportunity to be joined by our close industry partners means we can bring these skills and agency relationships home to support and protect Louisiana—that is the LSU Scholarship First Agenda and flagship mission in action.”

    Another outcome from this collaborative effort, LSU and Battelle Energy Alliance, the company that manages INL, recently signed a memorandum of understanding to formalize their partnership in areas of mutual interest, including cybersecurity and advanced nuclear technology. Over the past year, INL has hosted six LSU cybersecurity interns and successfully hired two LSU graduates. This collaboration exemplifies INL’s commitment to expanding partnerships with other industry and academic entities, fostering an environment to develop cyber resilience skills.

    For more information on ICS security, visit the CISA Industrial Control Systems webpage.

    Control Environment Laboratory Exercise (CELR) Exersice

    Government, industry and academia partners gather to view Control Environment Laboratory Resource (CELR) exercise

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Botswana Vice President Lauds African Development Bank’s 60-Year Legacy, Urges Economic Resilient Africa

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    GABORONE, Botswana, April 23, 2025/APO Group/ —

    Botswana’s Vice President and Finance Minister Ndaba Nkosinathi Gaolathe has urged African leaders to build an economically viable and resilient continent amid global funding challenges, geopolitical tensions, and increased tariff regimes.

    Speaking at an event marking the African Development Bank Group’s 60 years of transformative impact across Africa and 53 years of its operations in Botswana,  Gaolathe envisioned a new Africa as a “value definer” rather than a “price taker” in finance, energy, minerals, and technology.

    He highlighted the African Development Bank Group’s development impact, noting it has remained the continent’s partner of choice not merely as an institution but “a beacon of Africa’s own dream.”

    “We have seen the Bank not only as a builder of roads and dams, but also as a partner in thinking, reforming, and reimagining. Whether through technical assistance in procurement reforms, lines of credit to our development institutions, or policy advisory during our most difficult transitions, the African Development Bank has walked quietly, consistently, and strategically with us,” Gaolathe stated.

    “From the construction of the Lobatse-Kanye Road in the 1970s to the Nata-Maun Road, the Gaborone-Lobatse Water Supply, and the Morupule B Power Plant, this Bank’s footprint is woven into the story of our progress,” he said. “As we celebrate these past six decades, I am especially inspired by the bold and courageous conversations that the African Development Bank is leading today, which challenge the world to rethink Africa, not as a continent of scarcity, but as the richest cradle of life on earth.”

    Gaolathe expressed concern about the “systematic undervaluation of Africa’s natural resources.” “When African carbon credits are traded for a fraction of their true value, that is not commerce; it is quiet violence,” he stated, echoing African Development Bank President Akinwumi Adesina’s call to stop “carbon grabs” across the continent.

    Since 1972, the Bank Group has supported transformative projects in Botswana across multiple sectors, including agriculture, finance, power, transport, and industry, with investments exceeding $2.6 billion across 67 projects.

    Gaolathe praised a proposal by the Bank for a Critical Minerals-Backed African Currency, and its push to include natural capital in national balance sheets as “unapologetically African, innovative, and sovereign” leadership. “Africa holds over 30% of the world’s critical minerals. From lithium to cobalt, we power the world’s batteries, yet all too often, we are still exporting dust while importing debt. That must end,” he emphasized.

    Leila Mokaddem, the Bank’s Director General for Southern Africa, highlighted the impact of the Bank’s work in Southern Africa, including the Kazungula Bridge connecting Botswana and Zambia, which she described as “a gateway of integration across SADC.” She also cited the Pandamatenga Agriculture Infrastructure Project that transformed 40,000 hectares of farmland and increased cereal production by 46%.

    “As we mark this Diamond Jubilee, we do so to honor the past and embrace the future. Let us build the next decade of partnership with purpose, optimism, and shared commitment,” she said.

    Angola’s Ambassador to Botswana and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Beatriz Morais, took the audience on a memory lane to September 1964, when 25 countries converged in Khartoum with a singular vision—to create a financial institution by Africans for Africans. “Today, 61 years later, we take pride in what that vision has become.”

    Mothobi Matila, a retiree who joined the Bank from Botswana’s Ministry of Finance in 2005, delivered an emotional speech. He described the Bank as an “equal opportunity place” that became his employer and second home.

    Moono Mupotola, the Bank’s Country Manager for Botswana and Deputy Director General for Southern Africa emphasized its five-decade partnership with Botswana, which began in 1972 with the first loan extended in November 1973 to support telecommunications infrastructure.

    She outlined the Bank’s 2022-2026 strategy for Botswana, which focuses on building economic resilience through improved economic governance, private sector development, and infrastructure development to enhance competitiveness and productivity.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) Hydrocarbons Minister to Speak at Invest in African Energy (IAE) 2025 Amid Renewed Exploration Drive

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    PARIS, France, April 23, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) Minister of Hydrocarbons, Aimé Sakombi Molendo, is confirmed to speak at Invest in African Energy (IAE) 2025 in Paris next month. His participation underscores the DRC’s commitment to revitalizing its hydrocarbons sector through strategic reforms, regional partnerships and renewed investor engagement, following recent exploration breakthroughs and cross-border agreements.

    With an estimated 5 to 22 billion barrels of oil reserves, the DRC is advancing a pro-investment agenda focused on enhancing transparency, improving operational efficiency and accelerating upstream activity – efforts that are already yielding results. In May 2024, Perenco’s subsidiary, Muanda International Oil Company, achieved the DRC’s first offshore oil discovery in nearly three decades with the Moke-East well in the Coastal Basin. To fast-track exploration and strengthen national participation, the government also recently approved a decree granting state-owned Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures du Congo the rights to Blocks 1 and 2 in the Albertine Basin, one of the country’s most promising zones for oil exploration.

    IAE 2025 (https://apo-opa.co/4cHC9it) is an exclusive forum designed to facilitate investment between African energy markets and global investors. Taking place May 13-14, 2025 in Paris, the event offers delegates two days of intensive engagement with industry experts, project developers, investors and policymakers. For more information, please visit www.Invest-Africa-Energy.com. To sponsor or participate as a delegate, please contact sales@energycapitalpower.com.

    In a key regional development, the DRC and Angola signed new terms for the co-development of offshore Block 14 during the Angola Oil & Gas 2024 conference. Straddling the maritime border between the two nations, Block 14 boasts a production capacity of 3.29 million barrels per year and is operated by Chevron’s local subsidiary, Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, alongside partners Eni, etu energias and Sonangol. The agreement, formalizing nearly two decades of negotiations, is poised to encourage further investment and strengthen cross-border petroleum trade.

    Minister Molendo’s presence at IAE 2025 will offer delegates valuable insights into the DRC’s evolving energy landscape – spanning hydrocarbons, energy and mining – and the government’s integrated approach to sustainable resource development. As the DRC strengthens linkages across its extractive industries, the Minister is expected to outline emerging opportunities in exploration, infrastructure and local content development. He joins a high-level lineup of African energy leaders, including ministers from Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Mauritania, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, underscoring the summit’s role as a premier platform for pan-African energy dialogue and investment.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI: Radware Finds 57% of Online Shopping Traffic Now Bots, Not Buyers

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MAHWAH, N.J., April 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) —  Radware® (NASDAQ: RDWR), a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments, today released its “2025 E-commerce Bot Threat Report.” The report found that automated bots—good and bad bots—accounted for 57% of e-commerce website traffic during the 2024 holiday season. It marks the first time that automated, non-DDoS generating bots drove more traffic than human shoppers, signaling a critical shift in the cybersecurity landscape for e-commerce providers and online retailers.

    “Bad bots are no longer just based on simple scripts—they’re sophisticated, AI-enhanced agents capable of outsmarting traditional defenses,” said Ron Meyran, vice president of cyber threat intelligence at Radware. “E-commerce providers and online retailers that rely on conventional security measures will find themselves increasingly exposed, not just during the holidays but year-round.”

    The report highlights major bot attack trends and real-world attack data observed during the 2024 online holiday shopping season. In addition, it offers insights into the distributed, multi-vector attacks e-commerce providers and retailers can expect to battle this year.

    Key findings and insights

    • AI-generated bots with human-like behavior gain dominance: According to the report, bad bots made up 31% of total internet traffic during the last holiday season. Nearly 60% of the malicious traffic employed advanced behavioral techniques to evade traditional, signature-based detection. Combating these bots requires accurate AI-powered detection of attack patterns, including rotating IPs and identities, distributed attacks, CAPTCHA farm services, and other advanced anomalies, without causing false positives.
    • Mobile-focused attacks surge: Malicious bot traffic directed at mobile platforms rose 160% between the 2023 and 2024 holiday shopping seasons, representing a fundamental shift in attacker focus. Security strategies need to be shored up and tailored for vulnerable mobile platforms and attackers using more sophisticated techniques, including mobile emulators, mobile-specific proxies, and headless browsers with mobile user-agent strings.
    • Attacks leveraging distributed infrastructures and residential proxy networks increase: The proportion of holiday attack traffic originating from and blending in with ISP networks increased 32% between 2023 and 2024. Attackers are leveraging wider network and residential proxy services to evade rate-limiting, geo-based, and IP-based blocking mechanisms, creating even greater mitigation challenges for security teams working without advanced, multi-layered protections.
    • Coordinated multi-vector attack campaigns escalate: To maximize their success, attackers are targeting applications by combining bot attacks with web application vulnerability exploits, business logic attacks, and API-focused attacks. Protecting already burdened security systems requires an integrated application security strategy that uses the latest threat intelligence and cross-correlates security threats across security modules.

    Radware will be addressing the new report and advanced protection strategies during the RSA 2025 Conference at the Moscone Center in San Francisco (booth #S-1227). The event takes place April 28–May 1, 2025.

    Radware’s complete bot report can be downloaded here.

    About Radware
    Radware® (NASDAQ: RDWR) is a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments. The company’s cloud application, infrastructure, and API security solutions use AI-driven algorithms for precise, hands-free, real-time protection from the most sophisticated web, application, and DDoS attacks, API abuse, and bad bots. Enterprises and carriers worldwide rely on Radware’s solutions to address evolving cybersecurity challenges and protect their brands and business operations while reducing costs. For more information, please visit the Radware website.

    Radware encourages you to join our community and follow us on: Facebook, LinkedIn, Radware Blog, X, and YouTube.

    ©2025 Radware Ltd. All rights reserved. Any Radware products and solutions mentioned in this press release are protected by trademarks, patents, and pending patent applications of Radware in the U.S. and other countries. For more details, please see: https://www.radware.com/LegalNotice/. All other trademarks and names are property of their respective owners.

    THIS PRESS RELEASE AND 2025 E-COMMERCE BOT THREAT REPORT ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. THESE MATERIALS ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE AN INDICATOR OF RADWARE’S BUSINESS PERFORMANCE OR OPERATING RESULTS FOR ANY PRIOR, CURRENT, OR FUTURE PERIOD.

    Radware believes the information in this document is accurate in all material respects as of its publication date. However, the information is provided without any express, statutory, or implied warranties and is subject to change without notice.

    The contents of any website or hyperlinks mentioned in this press release are for informational purposes and the contents thereof are not part of this press release.

    Safe Harbor Statement
    This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Any statements made herein that are not statements of historical fact, including statements about Radware’s plans, outlook, beliefs, or opinions, are forward-looking statements. Generally, forward-looking statements may be identified by words such as “believes,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “intends,” “estimates,” “plans,” and similar expressions or future or conditional verbs such as “will,” “should,” “would,” “may,” and “could.” For example, when we say in this press release that e-commerce providers and online retailers that rely on conventional security measures will find themselves increasingly exposed, not just during the holidays but year-round, we are using forward-looking statements. Because such statements deal with future events, they are subject to various risks and uncertainties, and actual results, expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements, could differ materially from Radware’s current forecasts and estimates. Factors that could cause or contribute to such differences include, but are not limited to: the impact of global economic conditions, including as a result of the state of war declared in Israel in October 2023 and instability in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, tensions between China and Taiwan, financial and credit market fluctuations (including elevated interest rates), impacts from tariffs or other trade restrictions, inflation, and the potential for regional or global recessions; our dependence on independent distributors to sell our products; our ability to manage our anticipated growth effectively; our business may be affected by sanctions, export controls, and similar measures, targeting Russia and other countries and territories, as well as other responses to Russia’s military conflict in Ukraine, including indefinite suspension of operations in Russia and dealings with Russian entities by many multi-national businesses across a variety of industries; the ability of vendors to provide our hardware platforms and components for the manufacture of our products; our ability to attract, train, and retain highly qualified personnel; intense competition in the market for cybersecurity and application delivery solutions and in our industry in general, and changes in the competitive landscape; our ability to develop new solutions and enhance existing solutions; the impact to our reputation and business in the event of real or perceived shortcomings, defects, or vulnerabilities in our solutions, if our end-users experience security breaches, or if our information technology systems and data, or those of our service providers and other contractors, are compromised by cyber-attackers or other malicious actors or by a critical system failure; our use of AI technologies that present regulatory, litigation, and reputational risks; risks related to the fact that our products must interoperate with operating systems, software applications and hardware that are developed by others;  outages, interruptions, or delays in hosting services; the risks associated with our global operations, such as difficulties and costs of staffing and managing foreign operations, compliance costs arising from host country laws or regulations, partial or total expropriation, export duties and quotas, local tax exposure, economic or political instability, including as a result of insurrection, war, natural disasters, and major environmental, climate, or public health concerns; our net losses in the past and the possibility that we may incur losses in the future; a slowdown in the growth of the cybersecurity and application delivery solutions market or in the development of the market for our cloud-based solutions; long sales cycles for our solutions; risks and uncertainties relating to acquisitions or other investments; risks associated with doing business in countries with a history of corruption or with foreign governments; changes in foreign currency exchange rates; risks associated with undetected defects or errors in our products; our ability to protect our proprietary technology; intellectual property infringement claims made by third parties; laws, regulations, and industry standards affecting our business; compliance with open source and third-party licenses; complications with the design or implementation of our new enterprise resource planning (“ERP”) system; our reliance on information technology systems; our ESG disclosures and initiatives; and other factors and risks over which we may have little or no control. This list is intended to identify only certain of the principal factors that could cause actual results to differ. For a more detailed description of the risks and uncertainties affecting Radware, refer to Radware’s Annual Report on Form 20-F, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the other risk factors discussed from time to time by Radware in reports filed with, or furnished to, the SEC. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date on which they are made and, except as required by applicable law, Radware undertakes no commitment to revise or update any forward-looking statement in order to reflect events or circumstances after the date any such statement is made. Radware’s public filings are available from the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov or may be obtained on Radware’s website at www.radware.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: WISeKey Expands Implementation of Digital Identity Solutions from Seychelles to Africa: Empowering Nations with Secure National ID Systems

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    WISeKey Expands Implementation of Digital Identity Solutions from Seychelles to Africa: Empowering Nations with Secure National ID Systems

    Geneva, Switzerland – April 23, 2025 — WISeKey International Holding Ltd (“WISeKey”) (SIX: WIHN, NASDAQ: WKEY), a leading global cybersecurity, blockchain, and IoT company, today announces that following the successful implementation of “SeyID” in the Seychelles, it is extending proven digital identity solutions to other African nations to help them modernize and secure their national identification systems.

    Since 2022, WISeKey has collaborated with the government of Seychelles to launch SeyID, a comprehensive, secure, and user-friendly digital ID platform. Designed to integrate seamlessly with both public and private sector services, SeyID is now serving as a model for other African nations looking to establish or upgrade their national identity infrastructure.

    A Blueprint for Digital Transformation

    The SeyID platform leverages WISeKey’s trusted WISeID digital identity technology, which provides citizens with a mobile-accessible, secure virtual ID linked to key public services. These include healthcare, government portals, and the tourism industry, vital economic pillars for Seychelles.

    Through SeyID, citizens are able to complement their traditional physical ID cards with a virtual identity stored securely on their smartphones, making authentication easier and services more accessible. Tourists visiting Seychelles can also generate a digital Tourist ID using SeyID, which offers a frictionless digital experience while allowing visitors to access local services. This innovation has positioned Seychelles as a digital pioneer in the African region, providing a strong example of how national digital identity platforms can support economic growth and government efficiency.

    Scaling the Model Across Africa

    WISeKey is now in discussions with several African governments to replicate the SeyID model, tailoring it to meet local needs and regulatory frameworks. These next-generation digital ID solutions aim to:

    • Promote Financial Inclusion by enabling secure digital onboarding and Know Your Customer (KYC) compliance for banking services;
    • Streamline Public Administration by digitizing identity verification for social programs, healthcare, and education;
    • Enhance Tourism and Cross-Border Travel with digital tourist ID systems similar to that of Seychelles; and,
    • Protect Citizen Data with robust Swiss-grade cybersecurity and encryption.

    Use Cases: National Digital IDs as Catalysts for Economic Growth

    1. Digital Financial Services:
      A national digital ID allows unbanked populations to open bank accounts, access credit, and use mobile payment platforms securely, boosting participation in the formal economy and reducing reliance on cash.
    2. e-Government Services:
      Digital IDs facilitate efficient delivery of public services such as tax filing, business registration, land ownership verification, and social welfare programs, increasing transparency and reducing corruption.
    3. Agricultural Supply Chains:
      Farmers can register digitally to receive subsidies, track inputs, and access markets. This fosters trust, increases productivity, and reduces fraud in government support schemes.
    4. Healthcare Access:
      Verified digital IDs help in creating unified health records, ensuring that citizens receive timely, targeted, and secure healthcare, even across borders through regional interoperability.
    5. Job Market Activation:
      With a verifiable identity, citizens can access vocational training, apply for jobs online, and participate in gig economy platforms, driving workforce participation and economic inclusion.
    6. Entrepreneurship & Innovation:
      Startups and SMEs can benefit from streamlined licensing and easier access to investment through identity-based digital platforms, reducing bureaucratic delays and stimulating innovation.
    7. Tourism Growth:
      Digital tourist IDs simplify visa issuance, hotel check-ins, and tourist service access, creating a smoother visitor experience and increasing tourism revenues.
    8. Education & Youth Empowerment:
      Digital IDs allow students to enroll in programs, access e-learning platforms, and validate academic credentials, enhancing skills development for the digital economy.
    9. A Human-Centered, Privacy-First Approach

    WISeKey’s approach is grounded in respecting human dignity and data privacy. All identities created under its platforms are anchored in the OISTE.ORG Root of Trust, a globally recognized cryptographic trust model that guarantees sovereign control over digital identities.

    With the support of international development agencies and local governments, WISeKey is set to deliver customized digital ID solutions that are interoperable, future-proof, and aligned with international standards for data protection and digital governance.

    As Africa accelerates its digital transformation, WISeKey’s expansion beyond Seychelles marks a critical step in ensuring that secure, inclusive, and innovative identity solutions are at the heart of the continent’s technological and economic future.

    For more information, visit www.wisekey.com or follow WISeKey on LinkedIn and Twitter.

    About WISeKey

    WISeKey International Holding Ltd (“WISeKey”, SIX: WIHN; Nasdaq: WKEY) is a global leader in cybersecurity, digital identity, and IoT solutions platform. It operates as a Swiss-based holding company through several operational subsidiaries, each dedicated to specific aspects of its technology portfolio. The subsidiaries include (i) SEALSQ Corp (Nasdaq: LAES), which focuses on semiconductors, PKI, and post-quantum technology products, (ii) WISeKey SA which specializes in RoT and PKI solutions for secure authentication and identification in IoT, Blockchain, and AI, (iii) WISeSat AG which focuses on space technology for secure satellite communication, specifically for IoT applications, (iv) WISe.ART Corp which focuses on trusted blockchain NFTs and operates the WISe.ART marketplace for secure NFT transactions, and (v) SEALCOIN AG which focuses on decentralized physical internet with DePIN technology and house the development of the SEALCOIN platform.

    Each subsidiary contributes to WISeKey’s mission of securing the internet while focusing on their respective areas of research and expertise. Their technologies seamlessly integrate into the comprehensive WISeKey platform. WISeKey secures digital identity ecosystems for individuals and objects using Blockchain, AI, and IoT technologies. With over 1.6 billion microchips deployed across various IoT sectors, WISeKey plays a vital role in securing the Internet of Everything. The company’s semiconductors generate valuable Big Data that, when analyzed with AI, enable predictive equipment failure prevention. Trusted by the OISTE/WISeKey cryptographic Root of Trust, WISeKey provides secure authentication and identification for IoT, Blockchain, and AI applications. The WISeKey Root of Trust ensures the integrity of online transactions between objects and people. For more information on WISeKey’s strategic direction and its subsidiary companies, please visit www.wisekey.com.

    Disclaimer
    This communication expressly or implicitly contains certain forward-looking statements concerning WISeKey International Holding Ltd and its business. Such statements involve certain known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, which could cause the actual results, financial condition, performance or achievements of WISeKey International Holding Ltd to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. WISeKey International Holding Ltd is providing this communication as of this date and does not undertake to update any forward-looking statements contained herein as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    This press release does not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy, any securities, and it does not constitute an offering prospectus within the meaning of the Swiss Financial Services Act (“FinSA”), the FinSa’s predecessor legislation or advertising within the meaning of the FinSA. Investors must rely on their own evaluation of WISeKey and its securities, including the merits and risks involved. Nothing contained herein is, or shall be relied on as, a promise or representation as to the future performance of WISeKey.

    Press and Investor Contacts

    WISeKey International Holding Ltd
    Company Contact: Carlos Moreira
    Chairman & CEO
    Tel: +41 22 594 3000
    info@wisekey.com 
    WISeKey Investor Relations (US) 
    The Equity Group Inc.
    Lena Cati
    Tel: +1 212 836-9611
    lcati@equityny.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: VAT hikes can raise tax without hurting the poor: an economist sets out the evidence

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

    South Africa’s 2025-6 budget has been subjected to more comment than usual. This is due to the political tensions generated by a proposed increase in value added tax (VAT).

    South Africa’s choices on how it manages the revenue and expenditure issues in the budget are critical for how the larger issues of the country’s debt and its economic policies are handled. As things stand, the economy is locked into a low-growth trajectory which make the debt, revenue and expenditure issues more difficult to deal with.

    This piece draws on a longer article which explores these issues in greater detail. Here, I focus only on the VAT issue.

    The finance minister originally tabled an increase of 2 percentage points, then changed it to 0.5 percentage points. Still, it is threatening to end the country’s government of national unity, which was set up after elections in 2024.




    Read more:
    South Africa’s finance minister wanted to raise VAT: the pros and cons of a tricky tax


    Most commentators, including the political parties that have opposed the proposal, many academics, and non-governmental organisations claiming to represent low-income groups, have argued that an increase in VAT places an undue burden on low-income groups. This would make it regressive.

    Based on work as an academic economist over the past three decades, I believe that the debate has been based largely on conjecture and ideological opposition to VAT, rather than on the evidence of its impact.

    This is a pity as there is empirical evidence rooted in research that a VAT increase is, in fact, not regressive and is therefore a good policy decision.

    Tax experts usually refer to the three Es in taxes – equity, efficiency and ease of administration – for evaluating tax policy proposals. New taxes should ideally promote equity (they should be progressive and not regressive), be efficient and be easy to administer.

    An increase in VAT in South Africa ticks all these boxes.

    First, contrary to what many commentators have been arguing, VAT isn’t always regressive – it depends on how it’s implemented. As proposed by the finance minister it would not be regressive because, while it would add to the burden of low-income households, most of the VAT would be collected from higher-income households. Added to this is that the proposed expansion of the existing list of zero-rated items would protect the lowest-income households.

    Second, VAT is a very efficient tax. For relatively low increases in the rate, government is able to raise a large amount of revenue.

    Finally, the system is easy to administer and adds very little cost to collection.

    Key to its efficacy is the way VAT is implemented, including the choice of products to zero rate, and the political credibility of government.

    The case for a VAT increase

    VAT is a consumption tax, so it only affects the income that a household consumes.

    According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), VAT is now the mainstay of tax systems in over 160 countries, raising on average one-third of total government revenues.

    In theory, there are good reasons to be concerned about the impact of VAT. First, it can place a high burden on low-income households because they spend a large proportion of their incomes on consumption goods such as food.

    Second, VAT may also place a heavy burden of tax on women. In South Africa and many other countries, women-led households tend to be clustered in the lower end of the income distribution. And women disproportionately take responsibility for feeding and caring for family members.

    So, at least in theory, VAT is a regressive tax. But is it really so in practice?

    Three studies that have explored this issue in some detail have concluded that, in South Africa, VAT is not regressive.

    In 2008, I worked with colleagues in eight countries (South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, Morocco, Mexico, Argentina, India and the United Kingdom) on the gender issues related to tax. In particular we looked at the burden of VAT on low-income and women-headed households.

    Our findings were that, in general, VAT is regressive and discriminates against women, but it depends on how it is implemented.

    In South Africa, the zero-rating of basic consumption goods is very effective, protecting low-income and female-headed households from VAT. It’s an example of a VAT system that is neutral – neither regressive nor progressive.

    A more recent study by South African economist Ingrid Woolard and colleagues reached a similar conclusion in 2018.

    A third study was done in the same year when VAT was increased from 14% to 15%. Following a similar emotive debate, the finance minister appointed an independent committee which I served on and which was chaired by Woolard, to advise on further zero-rating.

    Our conclusion – again – was that zero-rating is highly effective at protecting low-income groups from the deleterious effects of VAT.

    How it’s done matters

    The challenge with zero-rating is that while low-income households benefit, high-income households benefit more (because they spend more, in absolute terms, on zero-rated goods). Large amounts of potential VAT revenue are lost to high-income groups that don’t need protection.

    The trick is to find a basket of goods that low-income households consume a lot of, but which high-income households don’t consume in large quantities. Some typical examples are beans, canned pilchards and cabbage. These are all goods that low-income households consume and high-income households do not.

    National Treasury’s proposals for increasing the basket of goods to be zero-rated are based on solid research.

    A good example of the trade-offs to consider is the case of chicken. Chicken is an important source of protein for low-income households, but also for high-income households. So, if all chicken were zero-rated, this would protect poor households, but a large amount of VAT revenue would be lost.

    In our 2018 zero-rating report, at 2018 prices and consumption patterns, we calculated that zero-rating all chicken products would be equivalent to R1.3 billion (US$67.6 million) but government would lose R4.6 billion (US$244.4 million) to high income households.

    Not a good trade-off.

    However, some chicken products, such as chicken heads and feet, are mostly consumed by low-income groups, and are therefore good candidates for zero-rating.

    The two other Es – efficiency and ease of administration – of taxes are also key to consider.

    On these two considerations, VAT has big advantages.

    It’s very difficult to avoid or evade VAT because it’s collected along the chain of production. There’s evidence that South Africa has very little leakage in the system.

    So it is relatively easy to increase the VAT rate without needing to invest additional resources to collect the tax.

    Credibility is key

    Apart from the economic considerations, tax policy has to be politically credible. People should believe that their tax contributions are being used effectively, and government should be seen to be acting in line with this.

    If people don’t believe in government’s ability to spend wisely, resistance to taxes increases. Then tax avoidance and evasion increases.

    It would be fair to say that, with the high levels of corruption in South Africa’s political system, government’s credibility is low.

    Thus, if VAT is to be increased, government has to do a lot more to improve its credibility and reassure South Africans that the tax revenues will be well spent.

    Imraan Valodia receives funding from a number of foundations and governments that support academic research.

    ref. VAT hikes can raise tax without hurting the poor: an economist sets out the evidence – https://theconversation.com/vat-hikes-can-raise-tax-without-hurting-the-poor-an-economist-sets-out-the-evidence-254213

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: DWS continues to monitor Integrated Vaal River System water inflow

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Wednesday, April 23, 2025

    With more rainfall predicted in the Upper Vaal Catchment, the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) has reaffirmed its commitment to monitor inflow water levels in the Integrated Vaal River System (IVRS) to ensure that appropriate safety measures are in place.

    In a statement on Tuesday, the department said it is maintaining the current water outflow of 292.86 cubic metres per second (m3/s) at the Vaal Dam via two sluice gates, following the closure of the third sluice gate on 16 April 2025.

    The department said the water inflow has also reduced from 277.63 m3/s to 229.71 m3/s, as of Tuesday morning, while the dam storage levels are currently sitting at 107.69%.

    “The water releases at the Bloemhof Dam were also gradually reduced to 700.0 mᵌ/s on 15 April 2025 and further reduced to 500.0 m3/s on 18 April 2025. These adjustments are necessary to manage the continuous inflows and safe operation of the dam, which is at 106.91% today [Tuesday],” the department said.

    The department added that two sluice gates of the Vaal Dam will remain opened to manage water outflows.

    At Grootdraai Dam, all sluice gates have now been closed, and the storage capacity is at 104.90%, with inflows of 41.43 m³/s. 

    “The department will continue to monitor inflow water levels in the Integrated Vaal River System to ensure that the necessary precautions are in place, in line with dam safety standards and hydrological monitoring systems to safeguard infrastructure and attenuate any flood conditions,” the department said.

    As part of dam safety protocols, sluice gates are opened for controlled water releases when dams breach the full capacity mark. This is to prevent the water resource infrastructure from failing, as it may lead to a dam bursting and causing a disaster of significant magnitude.

    The department implements these necessary controlled water releases at the dams as part of dam safety precautions to safeguard the infrastructure and protect human life. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: KZN Premier encourages faith-based collaboration for social cohesion

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Wednesday, April 23, 2025

    KwaZulu-Natal Premier, Thamsanqa Ntuli, has underscored the critical role of faith-based collaboration in achieving social cohesion and healing fractured communities.

    “The fight against social ills requires more than just policy; it demands the moral authority and compassion that our faith communities provide,” Ntuli said, when he tabled a set of Parliamentary resolutions during an Interfaith Symposium.

    The meeting, held in Glencoe under Umzinyathi District Municipality, in the north-western part of KwaZulu-Natal, brought together a broad spectrum of religious leaders, including faith-based organisations, and community members, to confront pressing societal challenges through shared values and unified action.

    The symposium served as a platform for meaningful dialogue, focusing on how religious communities can play a proactive role in addressing issues such as poverty, inequality, crime, substance abuse, and moral decay within KwaZulu-Natal.

    In his address, Premier Ntuli highlighted the importance of faith-based collaboration in advancing the goals of the province’s moral regeneration agenda.

    Among the key resolutions tabled at the meeting included:
    • Joint community outreach programmes to support vulnerable populations.
    • Partnerships between government and religious institutions for youth empowerment.
    • Faith-driven initiatives to combat crime and substance abuse.
    • Promotion of interfaith tolerance and unity.

    The Premier said the resolutions are not symbolic, but “a call to action to strengthen the moral fabric of our society”.

    The event underscored the provincial government’s recognition of religious institutions as vital partners in building resilient, ethical, and inclusive communities.

    “As KwaZulu-Natal continues to navigate complex social dynamics, the Interfaith Symposium in Glencoe stands as a powerful reminder of the strength found in unity, compassion, and shared purpose across religious and cultural lines,” the Premier said. – SAnews.gov.za

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  • MIL-OSI Africa: Deputy President calls for transparency, inclusivity in SA’s budget process

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Deputy President Paul Mashatile has emphasised the importance of collaborative action and transparency in shaping South Africa’s fiscal future. 

    “We have learnt that the current budgetary process is not transparent and inclusive enough, making it difficult for citizens to understand how government goes about the process of taking some of the most critical decisions in allocation of resources, albeit limited resources because of the competing needs,” Masahtile said. 

    Speaking during a virtual address at the 2025 Budget Roundtable, held at the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) offices in Cape Town, on Wednesday, the Deputy President emphasised the need to revisit the concept of a “people’s budget” advocated by anti-apartheid activists, the late Ben Turok and Joanamarrie Fubbs. 

    “What this means is that we need fiscal planning that is inclusive from the start, in terms of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework and in line with government’s priorities,” he explained.

    “In this case, the budget process as part of fiscal planning must focus on how we address the issues of poverty, unemployment, and inequality specifically.” 

    The country’s second-in-command highlighted the necessity for the budget to reflect fairness and equity, ensuring that vulnerable sectors are not overlooked in the planning process.

    The Deputy President also stressed the critical role of the National Budget as the government’s primary tool for translating policy into action. 

    He noted the historic context of this year’s budget process, highlighting the unprecedented postponement of the Budget Speech, and the subsequent adoption of the 2025 Fiscal Framework and Revenue Proposals by the National Assembly this month. 

    The Deputy President told the attendees about the Cabinet Committee’s formation, which he chairs, tasked with addressing the contentious proposal from the Minister of Finance regarding a VAT increase. 

    The Deputy President acknowledged that, in contrast to other governments around the world that have collapsed due to fiscal disputes, South Africa successfully navigated the challenges and he believesthis underscores South Africa’s strong democracy that is functioning effectively. 

    “Government remains committed to expanding economic growth while improving the quality of life for all citizens.” 

    The Deputy President said equitable resource allocation was particularly timely as South Africa grapples with economic disparities. 

    “Public allocations should be fair, just, and available to all citizens,” he said, reinforcing the government’s commitment to serving all members of society.

    As the budgeting process continues with the looming deadlines for the Division of Revenue Bill and the Appropriation Bill in May and June, Mashatile reiterated the importance of thoughtful engagement and transparent decision-making. 

    He acknowledged the challenges of balancing competing needs, but maintained that, through diligence and collaborative effort, government can chart a path toward a more equitable socio-economic landscape.

    The Deputy President described the 2025 Budget Roundtable as a pivotal moment for shaping a more equitable future. 

    He also touched on another important task that requires fiscal planning and implementing financial strategies to achieve specific economic goals, which is often related to debt management, government spending, and tax policies. 

    This includes considering factors, such as interest rates, economic growth, and structural reforms to ensure a stable and transparent macroeconomic environment. 

    “The goal here is to create a sustainable fiscal position that supports economic growth and manages risks effectively.” – SAnews.gov.za

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  • MIL-OSI Africa: Consumer inflation eases in March

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) has announced that headline consumer inflation decreased for the first time in five months due to lower fuel prices and softer tuition inflation.

    According to Stats SA, inflation was edging lower to 2.7% in March from 3.2% in February. 

    “The fuel index softened by 0.4% from February, taking the annual rate from -3.6% to -8.8%. A litre of 95-octane petrol (inland) was R22.34 in March, down from R24.45 a year before. The average price for diesel declined to R22.80 from R24.85 over the same period.

    “Education fees are surveyed once a year in March. The price index for education increased by 4.5%, lower than the 6.4% rise in 2024. School fees increased by 5.0% (from 6.6% in 2024). Tertiary education institutions charged 3.7% more in 2025, compared with the 5.9% rise recorded the year before,” Stats SA said on Wednesday.

    Food inflation slightly softer in March

    The annual rate for food and non-alcoholic beverages (NAB) edged lower to 2.7% in March from 2.8% in February. 

    Vegetables, fruits and nuts, cereal products, meat and fish registered higher annual rates. 

    Lower rates were recorded for oils and fats; hot beverages; milk, other dairy products and eggs; cold beverages; and sugar, confectionery and desserts.

    “Inflation for cereal products accelerated to 4.3% in March from 3.9% in February. Maize meal remains a key driver in this category, with its annual rate accelerating to 13.1% from 10.6%. 

    “There is some good news, however. Monthly increases for maize meal have recently slowed, from 4.8% in January to 2.4% in February and 1.4% in March. Coffee and tea drinkers continue to feel pain. 

    “Although the annual rate for the hot beverages category declined slightly in March, it remains in double-digit territory at 14.4%. In fact, this category has witnessed double-digit inflation in all but 5 of the 32 months since August 2022,” Stats SA said.

    Instant coffee is 18.8% and black tea 12.8% more expensive than a year ago.

    Alcoholic beverages also added pressure, with prices rising on average by 2.1% between February and March. This took the annual rate to 4.7% from 4.1% in February. 

    Annual increases were recorded for wine (up 5.3%), beer (up 4.4%) and spirits and liqueurs (up 4.3%). – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa