Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Yuri Trutnev arrived in Windhoek

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Yuri Trutnev arrived in Namibia on a working visit.

    Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation – Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Far Eastern Federal District, Co-Chairman of the Intergovernmental Russian-Namibian Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation Yuri Trutnev arrived in Namibia on a working visit. During the working visit, meetings with the leadership of Namibia are planned to discuss the development of Russian-Namibian economic cooperation.

    Immediately upon arrival, Yuri Trutnev visited the memorial composition “Heroes’ Acre” in Windhoek and laid a wreath at the Eternal Flame – a symbol of memory of the patriots who died in the struggle for self-determination, freedom and independence of a united Namibia. The Deputy Prime Minister also laid flowers at the graves of the first President of Namibia Sam Nujoma and the third President of Namibia Hage Gottfried Geingob.

    Answering journalists’ questions, Yuri Trutnev said that he met the first President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma, more than 20 years ago. “The first President of Namibia was the man who led the liberation struggle in Namibia, who gave freedom to the people of Namibia. Mr. Sam Nujoma remembered well the role of the Soviet Union in the liberation struggle of Namibia, and maintained constant friendly ties with our country. Since at the time when the first President of Namibia passed away, I was unable to travel to Namibia, I took the first opportunity to pay my respects to this great man,” he noted.

    During the trip, Yuri Trutnev plans to meet with Minister of International Relations and Trade Selma Ashipala-Musavi.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation, Shri Amit Shah says our relentless hunt against the drug trade continues

    Source: Government of India

    Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation, Shri Amit Shah says our relentless hunt against the drug trade continues

    In line with the Modi government’s zero tolerance against drugs, a major narco-network busted in Delhi-NCR

    NCB and Delhi Police grabbed the gang by its throat and recovered methamphetamine, MDMA, and cocaine worth ₹27.4 crore and arrested five people

    I applaud NCB and Delhi Police for this major breakthrough: Home Minister

    Posted On: 31 MAR 2025 4:53PM by PIB Delhi

    Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation, Shri Amit Shah said that our relentless hunt against the drug trade continues.

    In his post on ‘X’ platform Home Minister said “In line with the Modi government’s zero tolerance against drugs, a major narco-network was busted in Delhi-NCR. The NCB and Delhi Police grabbed the gang by its throat and recovered methamphetamine, MDMA, and cocaine worth ₹27.4 crore and arrested five people. I applaud NCB and Delhi Police for this major breakthrough”.

    Detail of the operation

    On receipt of an input about an imminent exchange of high-quality Methamphetamine in Chhatarpur area of Delhi a joint team of Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and Special cell of the Delhi Police mounted surveillance on the suspects leading to interception of a vehicle carrying 5.103 kilograms of High-quality Crystal Methamphetamine valued at Rs. 10.2 crore (appx.). Five occupants of the vehicle including four African Nationals belonging to influential family of Nigeria have been arrested.

    Sustained on-the-spot, interrogation and technical backtracking revealed that this contraband was sourced from an African Kitchen in the Tilak Nagar area of West Delhi. Search at this kitchen led to recovery of 1.156 kilograms Crystal Methamphetamine, 4.142 kilograms Afghan Heroine and 5.776 kilograms MDMA (Ecstasy pills) valued at Rs 16.4 crore (appx.). Further, a follow-up search at a rented apartment at Greater Noida led to a recovery of 389 grams of Afghan Heroin and 26 grams of cocaine.

    Investigation revealed about involvement of this syndicate in facilitating African Youth peddling drugs and narcotics, in getting student visas for study at major private universities of National Capital Region (NCR) as well as Punjab. For some of the students, the visa was only a cover for their stay in India where as they were involved in supplying drugs and Crypto conversions. Further, investigations to identify the backward and forward linkages of this drug syndicate is underway.

    The seizure exemplifies the NCB’s commitment to successfully dismantle drug networks. To fight against drug trafficking, NCB seeks support of the citizens. Any person can share information related to sale of narcotics by calling on MANAS- National Narcotics Helpline Toll Free Number-1933.

    *****

    RK/VV/ASH/PS

    (Release ID: 2117032) Visitor Counter : 458

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security – B10-0212/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0212/2025

    European Parliament resolution on targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security

    (2025/2612(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

     having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Article 10 thereof on freedom of thought, conscience and religion,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),

     having regard to the statements by the European External Action Service on the security and human rights situation in the DRC,

     having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the DRC is experiencing an escalation of violence, particularly in the eastern regions, where armed groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have targeted Christian communities;

    B. whereas between 12 and 15 February 2025, more than 70 Christians were found dead in a Protestant church near Kazanga, North Kivu province in the DRC; whereas the victims had been beheaded by the Islamist ADF, an affiliate militia of Islamic State Central Africa Wilayat (ISCAP);

    C. whereas according to BBC Monitoring analysis, ISCAP is now the deadliest armed group in the DRC; whereas from 1 January to 30 June 2024, Islamic State claimed responsibility for killing a total of 698 African Christians; whereas ISCAP claimed responsibility for killing 639 Christians;

    D. whereas the National Episcopal Conference of Congo (CENCO) has amplified Pope Francis’s appeals for an end to the violence and has initiated discussions between the government and rebel groups, with consultations ongoing; whereas CENCO and the Church of Christ in Congo have launched an appeal for 2025 to be a ‘Year of Peace and Good Coexistence’ to address the ongoing violence;

    E. whereas churches and Christian institutions have increasingly become targets of violence and persecution by terrorist groups, including the ADF, which has pledged allegiance to Islamic State; whereas the ADF, originally an armed Ugandan rebel movement, has evolved into a jihadist terrorist group operating in the eastern DRC, conducting mass killings, attacking civilian populations and disrupting agricultural and economic activities; whereas despite military operations by Congolese and Ugandan forces, the ADF continues to perpetrate violence and instability in the region;

    F. whereas ISIS-DRC continues to pose a severe threat in the region, carrying out deadly attacks against civilians, including the January 2025 massacre in Makoko, North Kivu, and the December 2024 attack in Batangi-Mbau; whereas recent operations by Interpol and Afripol have led to the arrest of 37 suspected terrorists across East Africa, yet ISIS-DRC remains active, exploiting instability and weak governance to sustain its violent campaign;

    G. whereas the appointment of a new EU Special Envoy for religious freedom by the Commission on 7 December 2022 followed a three-year standstill, during which the former Special Envoy who had been appointed in 2021 returned his mandate after a few months to assume another position in a national government;

    H. whereas in 2016 the Hungarian Government set up a special department for persecuted Christians around the world; whereas the State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians supports, through its ‘Hungary Helps’ programme, faith-based initiatives in more than 50 countries, with hundreds of humanitarian and development projects; whereas in 2019 the Italian Government established a fund for persecuted Christian communities; whereas in May 2022 the Italian Government led by Mario Draghi appointed a special envoy for the protection of religious freedom and interreligious dialogue; whereas in 2023 the Italian Government led by Giorgia Meloni appointed a special envoy attached to the foreign ministry to protect Christian communities around the world;

    I. whereas over the past decade, the EU has provided significant financial assistance to the DRC, including over EUR 272 million in humanitarian aid between 2023 and 2025 to address urgent needs such as shelter, clean water, food and education for vulnerable populations; whereas the EU allocated EUR 584 million through the European Development Fund for the period 2008-2013 to support stability and development projects; whereas the EU has also been involved in security and peacekeeping efforts, deploying missions such as the EU Security Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC) and the EU Police Mission for the DRC (EUPOL RD Congo) to assist in rebuilding the Congolese security forces;

    L. whereas the DRC has consistently ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world, scoring 20 out of 100 in the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International and ranking 162nd out of 180 countries; whereas a conservative estimate of 30 % of the approximately EUR 1.2 billion in aid funded with EU taxpayers’ money, provided between 2008 and 2024, suggests that at least EUR 360 million may have been misappropriated by corrupt officials, seriously undermining efforts to enhance governance, stability, safety and living conditions in the DRC;

    M. whereas the EU and Rwanda signed a memorandum of understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains in February 2024, granting the EU access to sources of raw materials and rare earth elements in Rwanda; whereas several UN reports state that Rwanda supports the M23 group as a means of extracting and exporting minerals from the DRC; whereas the US Embassy in the DRC confirmed that Congolese minerals are being transported, with the support of armed groups, to Rwanda, where they are subsequently sold to international buyers;

    N. whereas this conflict has been overshadowed by global attention focused on crises in the Middle East and Ukraine, despite over 10 million lives lost in years of violence and an estimated 3 000 people killed in just a few days;

    1. Strongly condemns the murder of Christians in the DRC, and all acts of violence targeting them, and expresses its solidarity with the victims;

    2. Notes that the DRC ranks 35th on the Open Doors’ World Watch List 2025 of countries where Christians are persecuted because of their faith; emphasises that Christians face severe persecution and violence especially from Islamist groups; emphasises that the ADF abduct and kill Christians and attack churches, leading to terror, insecurity and population displacement; emphasises that the M23 group also targets Christian civilians; is concerned about the involvement of the M23 group in the widespread violence in the DRC; takes note of the EU sanctions against people holding leading positions in the Rwanda Defence Force and M23; demands that the Rwandan Government withdraw its troops from the DRC and cease its cooperation with M23; notes that the DRC ranks fourth on Global Christian Relief’s Red List of countries where Christians have been forced to flee their homes due to violence;

    3. Is worried about the growing threat posed by ISCAP in Central Africa; notes that the increasing number of violent attacks demonstrates both ISCAP’s willingness and operational capability to intensify its campaign of terror and violent attacks against Christians; is worried that the expansion of Islamic State in Central Africa poses a danger to the security of the whole continent;

    4. Is of the opinion that by stalling the process of mandating an EU Special Envoy for religious freedom for almost three years, the Commission signalled to the outside world that the issue of the persecution of Christians worldwide is not one of the EU’s priorities; notes that this reflects its policy in the EU, only appointing a coordinator for combating Muslim hatred, and neglecting the rising violence against Christians in the EU; finds this lack of commitment highly regrettable and problematic in the light of the rising violence against Christians worldwide; is of the opinion that the significant delay in appointing the EU Special Envoy for religious freedom undermines the credibility of the EU’s commitment to protecting religious freedom and belief beyond its borders;

    5. Welcomes the ‘Hungary Helps’ programme, which helps Christian communities rebuild after persecution and manages projects, reconstructing institutions and improving education and healthcare after violent persecution by Islamic terrorist groups; emphasises that the Hungarian initiative, enabling people to build their future in their own country, is also an important migration prevention policy; welcomes the fact that the ‘Hungary Helps’ programme and the Reformed Church of Hungary will give donations to help the victims of the Islamist terrorist attacks on Christians in the DRC; welcomes the cooperation between the Hungarian and Italian Governments to undertake joint initiatives in Africa, with a focus on supporting persecuted Christians; hopes that Hungarian and Italian policy will inspire other Member States to follow suit;

    6. Calls for the EU and the EU Special Envoy for religious freedom to take all the necessary diplomatic and political initiatives to protect Christians in the DRC;

    7. Calls on the DRC and its authorities to conduct a thorough investigation of the murders and to ensure that the criminals responsible are brought to justice;

    8. Calls on the DRC and its authorities to take immediate and effective action to protect Christian communities and all religious minorities from further violence and persecution;

    9. Calls on the DRC and its authorities to provide financial and logistical support for local and international humanitarian organisations assisting the victims of religious persecution in the DRC;

    10. Welcomes the efforts of religious leaders to foster peace and dialogue and urges all parties involved to seek constructive solutions rather than resorting to violence;

    11. Encourages regional and international African bodies such as the African Union and the East African Community to take the lead in addressing the conflict, as they are the best suited for this task; encourages these African bodies to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation, intelligence-sharing and military coordination against extremist groups operating in the region;

    12. Calls strongly for the EU to work with regional and international actors to protect civilians and Christian communities and bring the perpetrators of these criminal acts to justice;

    13. Emphasises the need to address these crimes at the African Union level;

    14. Calls on the Commission to suspend the implementation of the memorandum of understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains signed with Rwanda in February 2024, in the light of credible reports linking Rwanda to the illicit exploitation and export of minerals from the eastern DRC, including through its support for the M23 armed group; stresses that the continuation of this agreement risks fuelling the ongoing conflict, undermining regional stability and leading to the further killing of Christians in the region;

    15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Envoy for religious freedom, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Degrading and Inhuman Treatment, the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the Government and Parliament of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the African Union and the East African Community.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security – B10-0214/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0214/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security

    (2025/2612(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

     having regard to the UN Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, of August 2010,

     having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2773 (2025) of 21 February 2025 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

     having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part[1] (the Samoa Agreement),

     having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986,

     having regard to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, adopted on 18 February 2006,

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

     having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas there has been a deterioration in the security situation in the eastern DRC over the past year, with different armed groups, and at times government soldiers, committing widespread violence, unlawful killings and other grave abuses, putting civilians at great risk;

    B. whereas the UN Group of Experts, established pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004), estimates that between 3 000 and 4 000 Rwandan army troops are on the ground in the DRC, and considers that the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, and that Rwanda’s de facto control and direction over M23 operations also renders Rwanda liable for the actions of M23;

    C. whereas the World Religion Database estimates that 95.1 % of the population in the DRC is Christian, 1.5 % is Muslim and 2.5 % has no religious affiliation; whereas the Constitution of the DRC provides for freedom of religion and prohibits discrimination based on religious belief;

    D. whereas a group referred to as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), with links to the Islamic State, has reportedly carried out continued indiscriminate attacks against civilians in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces, on occasion targeting churches and religious leaders; whereas such violence targets all communities, but most victims have been Christian, belonging to the religious majority; whereas the deaths of at least 849 men, women and children were attributed to the ADF in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces in 2020, according to the UN Joint Human Rights Office in the DRC; whereas the ADF allegedly also carried out an attack on a church baptism in Kasindi, North Kivu Province in February 2023, killing 16 and injuring at least 62, as well as different attacks on villages in North Kivu in March 2023, killing more than 83 civilians, including children;

    E. whereas, since 2015, the ADF has released increasing amounts of propaganda that reflect the group’s ‘ideological alignment with the Islamic State’, including, among other objectives, ‘an increased focus on efforts to kill non-Muslim civilians’, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies; whereas both local Christian and Muslim leaders, with vocal support from the government, have again condemned the ADF’s attacks on civilians;

    F. whereas the UN and the DRC had agreed on the withdrawal of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in mid-2024, leading to a degradation of the security situation and affecting civilians, who were left exposed to human rights abuses by state security forces and armed actors;

    G. whereas the DRC has one of the highest rates of internal displacement in the world; whereas many women and children live in precarious conditions and are being exposed to the risk of harassment, assault or sexual exploitation; whereas displaced populations often receive no basic life-saving services and are at risk of malnutrition and disease; whereas cities that host internally displaced people in precarious circumstances are also targets of attack by different militias, causing great distress to the displaced communities and to the local population;

    H. whereas state authorities and rebel groups have obligations to civilians under international humanitarian law, including protecting and facilitating access to humanitarian assistance, and permitting freedom of movement;

    I. whereas the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations in the DRC have focused on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed mainly in the eastern DRC, in the Ituri region and the North and South Kivu Provinces, since 1 July 2002; whereas the DRC made a second referral in May 2023 concerning alleged crimes committed in North Kivu since 1 January 2022;

    1. Is concerned by the humanitarian and security situation in the DRC and the findings in the recent reports of the UN Group of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004), and fully supports the reports’ recommendations;

    2. Welcomes the Council’s decision on 17 March 2025[2] to impose restrictive measures on nine individuals and one entity responsible for acts that constitute serious human rights violations and abuses in the DRC and for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC and exploiting the armed conflict through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources;

    3. Commends the announcement of the ICC Prosecutor that the ICC will continue to investigate alleged crimes committed by any person, irrespective of affiliation or nationality; is highly concerned about the fragile situation of the ICC, noting that this fragility is already undermining the ICC’s crucial work to bring justice to victims of the most serious crimes worldwide; reiterates the EU’s unwavering support for the ICC and calls on the European Council and the Commission to fulfil their obligations to ensure the functioning and effectiveness of the ICC;

    4. Calls on the Commission to continue supporting anti-corruption efforts and strengthening governance in the DRC; stresses the primary responsibility of the Government of the DRC to ensure security in its territory and protect its civilians, while respecting the rule of law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law;

    5. Welcomes the special session of the UN Human Rights Council of 7 February 2025 on the human rights situation in the east of the DRC; supports the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry into serious violations committed since January 2022;

    6. Reiterates its condemnation of hate speech, xenophobia, ethnic-based politics, and attacks on religious freedom; underlines that all those responsible for sustaining armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC must be held accountable;

    7. Recalls that human rights violations are being used as a weapon of war and that the vast majority of attacks against civilians in the DRC are not motivated by religion but are most often committed on ethnic, political, terrorist or financial grounds;

    8. Calls upon the relevant parties to provide a safe environment for civil society organisations and human rights defenders to enable them to carry out their work freely;

    9. Calls on the Government of the DRC to implement the recommendations of the 2010 Mapping Report, particularly regarding security sector reforms, the strengthening of institutions and the rule of law, the fight against corruption, and regional cooperation efforts for the arrest and prosecution of perpetrators of serious crimes;

    10. Urges neighbouring states of the DRC to withdraw their troops, to cease all military activities on the soil of the DRC, unless expressly invited to conduct such activities by the Government of the DRC, and to stop their support to armed groups; emphasises that incursions by certain actors in the region, such as the Rwandan forces and M23, further destabilise the DRC by forcing the its army to engage on multiple fronts, making it more difficult to combat armed and terrorist groups;

    11. Calls for a quick resumption of negotiations within the Luanda Process to find a lasting, peaceful and political solution, and urges all sides to fully honour their engagements within the Luanda Process, specifically the ceasefire agreed on 30 July 2024, the neutralisation of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and M23 rebel groups, and the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the territory of the DRC; calls for the EU to have an active role in the diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict, advocating for an immediate ceasefire and a renewed commitment to dialogue, with the protection of civilians at the core of negotiations, in particular women and children;

    12. Deplores the fact that fighting and the shelling of medical infrastructure in and around Goma has severely limited the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need;

    13. Calls on all countries neighbouring the DRC, in particular Rwanda, to facilitate access of humanitarian equipment and personnel to all areas occupied by the rebels groups in the eastern DRC, including through the reopening of Goma airport and of borders;

    14. Calls on the Commission to suspend the EU-Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains, put a halt to any plans to support any mining projects in Rwanda, put in place a trade embargo on all minerals imported from Rwanda into the EU and an export ban on weapons from the EU to Rwanda, and suspend any further military and security assistance to Rwanda until the territorial integrity of the DRC is restored; calls on the Commission to proactively engage with Rwanda’s main partners to ensure coordinated action;

    15. Calls for the Government of the DRC and its international partners, including the EU, to establish new monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the region, signed in Addis Ababa;

    16. Deplores the fact that Rwanda announced the termination of its diplomatic relations with Belgium, and expresses its solidarity with Belgium;

    17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the African Union, the secretariats of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community, and other relevant international bodies.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security – B10-0216/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Cristian Terheş, Maciej Wąsik, Aurelijus Veryga, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0216/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security

    (2025/2612(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as the right to manifest one’s religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which recognises the right of individuals to freedom of religion, including freedom to worship and observe religious practices,

     having regard to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which guarantees the right to freedom of conscience and the free exercise of religious worship for all citizens,

     having regard to the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 November 1981,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Article 9 thereof, which guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,

     having regard to reports from the UN and various other human rights organisations, detailing the rise in attacks and indiscriminate killings and ongoing violations of the freedom of belief by armed groups, including Islamist militants, against Christian communities in the eastern DRC region,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the DRC has endured decades of widespread violence and instability in its eastern provinces, exacerbated by armed conflicts that have created fertile ground for the emergence of over 100 extremist groups targeting vulnerable populations, including religious communities;

    B. whereas Christians in the DRC’s eastern provinces are facing an increasing number of targeted attacks, killings and abductions as well as the destruction of their property, perpetrated by armed groups with extremist ideologies;

    C. whereas, according to local reports, on 13 February 2025, 70 Christians were abducted in the village of Mayba and later found dead in a church in nearby Kasanga; whereas the attack was reportedly committed by militants of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF);

    D. whereas the ADF is one of the most prominent extremist groups with explicitly religious objectives, especially since its leader pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2019;

    E. whereas in May 2020, the ADF participated in ISIS’s global ‘Battle of Attrition’, specifically targeting Christian communities in seven neighbourhoods throughout north-eastern DRC; whereas in 2021, a prominent local Muslim leader received death threats from the ADF, and he was later gunned down; whereas in 2023, the ADF bombed services at a Pentecostal church in Kasindi, killing 14 people; whereas in January 2024, the ADF killed eight people in Beni during an attack on a Pentecostal church and, in May 2024, ADF assailants reportedly killed 14 Catholics in North Kivu province for refusing to convert to Islam; whereas the ADF also reportedly executed 11 Christians in the village of Ndimo in Ituri province and kidnapped several others;

    F. whereas in addition to the ADF, several armed groups in the eastern DRC have politicised religion, targeting religious infrastructure as part of their insurgency strategies;

    G. whereas in 2024, 355 people were reportedly killed in the DRC for their faith, compared to 261 in 2023, while an estimated 10 000 people were internally displaced because of their faith, marking a tenfold increase from 2023; whereas houses have been looted and burned down, schools relocated, churches and healthcare facilities closed, and several Christian villages have been abandoned altogether;

    H. whereas the attacks on Christians are part of a broader trend of escalating violence and religious intolerance, with religious leaders and communities increasingly finding themselves under threat in areas controlled by armed groups;

    I. whereas the recent activities of the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group have further exacerbated the vulnerability of religious communities in the region;

    J. whereas converts to Christianity from Islam and indigenous religions face pressure from their families to revert to their former faiths;

    K. whereas local and international human rights organisations have documented numerous instances of religious violence in the DRC, highlighting the failure of the state to provide adequate protection; whereas, while the DRC Government has demonstrated a strong intention to address the impacts of armed group violence in the eastern DRC, other recent developments call into question the government’s commitment to safeguarding religious freedom specifically;

    L. whereas the EU has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to the promotion and protection of religious freedom globally, and has taken steps to combat religious persecution and intolerance in various parts of the world; whereas Christians are the most persecuted religious group in the world;

    M. whereas Parliament has consistently called for the strengthening of international efforts to combat religious persecution and to hold accountable those responsible for attacks on religious communities;

    1. Strongly condemns the targeted attacks against Christian communities in the DRC, including killings, abductions and the destruction of religious property, and calls for an immediate halt to such acts of violence;

    2. Is deeply concerned about the situation of Christians and Christian converts from Islam and indigenous religions in the region, who are facing a severe and escalating crisis owing to a combination of militant threats, familial pressure and political interference;

    3. Expresses its deep concern about the violence committed by the ADF and other extremist groups in the eastern DRC and underlines that the chaos created by the M23 rebel group has further exacerbated the vulnerability of religious communities;

    4. Calls for the immediate cessation of all forms of violence and for the commitment of all parties involved in the ongoing conflict in the eastern DRC to respect international humanitarian law;

    5. Calls on the DRC Government to counter extremist propaganda and provide armed security at churches and other religious buildings;

    6. Calls for the establishment of early warning mechanisms to more effectively prevent and respond to attacks by the ADF and other armed groups against civilians;

    7. Stresses the critical importance of supporting the DRC Government in strengthening the rule of law, improving security and ensuring the protection of religious communities at risk, while ensuring that perpetrators of attacks against religious communities are brought to justice;

    8. Echoes the calls for international solidarity in defending religious freedom and the protection of religious minorities in conflict zones, particularly in the DRC, while addressing the root causes of violent extremism in the DRC and its neighbourhood;

    9. Encourages the establishment of safe zones in the eastern DRC, where religious communities and other civilians who have been targeted can have access to legal services and psychological support;

    10. Stresses the need for a comprehensive approach that combines humanitarian aid, peacebuilding initiatives and support for the rule of law so as to ensure lasting protection for all religious communities in the DRC, including Christians; underlines the role of religious communities in the DRC in promoting peace, social cohesion and the well-being of local communities;

    11. Urges the EU to uphold its commitment to the promotion of religious freedom and the protection of religious communities, ensuring that the rights of these groups are prioritised in the EU’s external policies;

    12. Calls for enhanced cooperation between the EU and the African Union, as well as regional actors, to promote stability and prevent extremist groups from using religion as a tool for violence and division;

    13. Notes, with concern, the growing influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Africa, which is a staunch supporter of the Putin regime and its violent, unlawful war in Ukraine; underlines that, on 29 December 2021, the Russian Orthodox Church officially announced the formation of the Patriarchate Exarchate of Africa, which consists of two dioceses: the South African Diocese, encompassing 24 countries, and the North African Diocese, covering 31 countries;

    14. Underlines that this move significantly expands the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church across the African continent, encroaching on the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria, which holds the official canonical responsibility for the entire African continent; underlines that this development raises significant questions regarding the broader geopolitical and ideological objectives of the Russian Federation in Africa;

    15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the African Union, the Joint Council of Ministers and Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the EU, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government and Parliament of the DRC.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – European funds supporting illicit exploitation or trading of natural resources by Rwanda – P-001270/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001270/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D), Hilde Vautmans (Renew)

    During its meeting on 19 March 2025, Parliament’s Committee on Internal Trade held an exchange of views with representatives of the Commission on the EU-Rwanda memorandum of understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains. During that discussion, Commission representatives stated that EU financing for mining projects in Rwanda is strictly limited to mines for non-conflict minerals. Since 2023, the EU has been co-financing a project with an estimated budget of EUR 4.15 million on the sustainable development of the Rwandese mining sector with the Rwanda Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board (RMB). Given the fact that, in accordance with Council Implementing Regulation 2025/509, the EU has imposed sanctions on the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the RMB for his role in exploiting the armed conflict and instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), including through the illicit exploitation or trading of natural resources, we would like to ask the Commission the following questions:

    • 1.Is it correct that the EU is funding mining activity with the RMB in cooperation with the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development?
    • 2.How does the Commission guarantee that funds are not being misused by the RMB for trafficking minerals to Rwanda from DRC mines exploited by M23 rebels?
    • 3.Will the Commission suspend funding for the project with the RMB now that the EU has imposed sanctions on the CEO of the aforementioned company?

    Submitted: 26.3.2025

    Last updated: 31 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Meeting of Wednesday 2 April 2025, Strasbourg – Delegation for relations with the Mashreq countries

    Source: European Parliament

    The Delegation held an exchange of views on the situation in Syria with:

    • H.E. Mr Ammar AL ARSAN, Head of Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the EU
    • Mr Sébastien BRABANT, EEAS Deputy Head of Division for the Middle East (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan)

    The meeting will be held in camera.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: BYDFi Lists GUNZ Token: Gunzilla Games Raises Nearly $100M, Ushering in the Next Era of AAA Web3 Gaming

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VICTORIA, Seychelles, March 31, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The globally renowned crypto exchange BYDFi today announced the global listing of the GUNZ token($GUN), the native asset of the GUNZ Layer1 blockchain developed by German AAA game studio Gunzilla Games. As one of the first crypto economies purpose-built for AAA gaming, GUNZ is rapidly emerging as a standout Web3 project thanks to its strong institutional backing and groundbreaking infrastructure tailored for next-generation gaming.

    GUNZ: A Layer-1 Blockchain Built for AAA Games

    Unlike early play-to-earn experiments driven by hype, GUNZ is purpose-built to embed blockchain seamlessly into high-end gaming environments. The chain ensures true digital ownership of in-game assets while enhancing player experience—without disrupting gameplay.

    Developed by Gunzilla Games, GUNZ will power the studio’s flagship title Off The Grid, a cinematic cyberpunk battle royale that blends high-fidelity storytelling with a native on-chain economy. For a Web3 gaming market that has been largely stagnant, this marks a major leap forward.

    The numbers reflect momentum: GUNZ has already onboarded over 12 million wallet addresses, with more than 230 million on-chain transactions processed—clear signs of the scalability and adoption potential of its gaming-focused ecosystem.

    Off The Grid: Flagship Title Fueling the GUNZ Ecosystem

    Off The Grid features film-quality graphics and immersive storytelling wrapped in a cyberpunk setting. It integrates a full-stack blockchain economy where players can earn and trade in-game NFTs—such as weapons, skins, and gear—directly on the GUNZ network. The game solves one of the key issues in traditional gaming: asset ownership. And it gives NFTs real functionality, rather than speculative hype.

    At the protocol level, GUNZ introduces several innovations to support high-performance gaming while remaining decentralized:

    • Ultra-High Throughput & Near-Zero Gas Fees: Built on a custom Avalanche subnet, GUNZ delivers 12,000+ TPS and transaction fees below $0.0001.
    • Game Engine Compatibility: Native support for Unity and Unreal plugins allows traditional games to integrate in as little as 72 hours.
    • Hybrid Validator Network: With node operators including Delphi Ventures and community stakers, GUNZ balances efficiency with decentralization.

    Backed by Capital, Powered by Utility

    Gunzilla Games has raised $76 million to date:

    • In August 2022, the company closed a $46M round led by Republic Capital, with participation from Griffin Gaming Partners, Animoca Brands, Jump Crypto, and Twitch co-founder Justin Kan.
    • In March 2024, it secured a $30M follow-on round co-led by Avalanche’s Blizzard Fund and CoinFund.

    GUNZ has a total token supply of 10 billion, with an initial circulating supply of 6.05%. The token fuels multiple use cases across the ecosystem, including gas payments, in-game transactions, governance, and rewards—laying the foundation for a sustainable and scalable Web3 gaming economy.

    As Gunzilla Games CTO Timur Davidenko put it at the recent developer summit:

    “We’re not putting a game on a chain—we’re growing a chain from within the game.”


    About BYDFi

    Founded in 2020, BYDFi has become one of the most trusted global crypto exchanges, earning recognition from CoinMarketCap, CoinGecko, and Forbes, which ranked it among the Top 10 Crypto Exchanges Globally. With a user base of over 1,000,000 across 150+ countries, BYDFi continues to expand its influence on the digital asset world.

    To celebrate its 5th Anniversary, BYDFi is launching a series of global user campaigns, featuring over $100,000 in rewards, limited-time token airdrops, and special gifts. For more details, visit the official website or download the BYDFi mobile app.

    • Website: https://www.bydfi.com
    • Support Email: CS@bydfi.com
    • Business Partnerships: BD@bydfi.com
    • Media Inquiries: media@bydfi.com

    Twitter (X) LinkedIn Facebook Telegram YouTube

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Opening: 31 March – 3 April plenary session

    Source: European Parliament 3

    President Metsola opened the 31 March – 3 April plenary session in Strasbourg with the following announcements.

    Sanctions for disruption of International Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony

    President Metsola announced the imposition of a penalty on Grzegorz Braun (Non-attached, PL), following his disruptive actions and improper behaviour which “inflicted severe damage on the dignity and reputation of Parliament” during the European Parliament’s solemn session marking International Holocaust Remembrance Day on 29 January 2025.

    Taking into account the recurrent nature of the MEP’s disrespect for Parliament’s standards of conduct, the penalty consists of the forfeiture of his entitlement to the daily subsistence allowance for a period of 30 days, as well as a temporary suspension from participation in all the plenary activities of Parliament for a period of 30 days starting from 10 March 2025, in accordance with Rule 183(5)(e) of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. In addition, Mr Braun is also suspended from participation in the next Parliament solemn session commemorating International Holocaust Remembrance Day, in January 2026.

    Penalty on MEP Alvise Pérez

    Based on the conclusions of the advisory committee on the conduct of Members, President Metsola has decided to impose a penalty on Alvise Pérez MEP (Non-attached, ES) according to rule 183 of the rules of procedure for breaching the transparency obligations in Article 4 of the code of conduct for MEPs. The penalty consists of the forfeiture of the daily subsistence allowance for a period of two days.

    Changes to the agenda

    Monday

    The session will be extended until 23.00.

    Wednesday

    The debate on the European oceans pact (Council and Commission statements) is moved as second point in the afternoon, after the topical debate.

    The Commission statement on Threat to freedom of expression in Algeria: the five-year prison sentence of French writer Boualem Sansal, with one round of group speakers, is added as the seventh point in the afternoon, before the debates under Rule 150. As a consequence, the sitting is extended to 23:00.

    Outgoing MEPs

    Maximilian KRAH (Non-attached, DE)

    Interinstitutional negotiations

    The LIBE, AGRI, and TRAN committees have decided to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, pursuant to Rule 72, paragraph 1 of the Rules of procedure, on the basis of the following reports.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: NPA dismisses ‘fake news’ on alleged executive interference

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) has dismissed the allegations of executive interference in its work.

    This after a Sunday news report alleged that two Cabinet Ministers had instructed the prosecutorial body to bring charges against Deputy President, Paul Mashatile.

    The story titled “Mashatile warned of elaborate plot to charge him with perjury”, was published in the Sunday World newspaper, on Sunday, 30 March 2025.

    In a statement issued on Sunday, the NPA labelled the story as “fake news” derived from a doctored WhatsApp conversation.

    “The NPA rejects the article published in the Sunday World and warns against fake news and political smear campaigns. The story is based on a clearly fake WhatsApp conversation purported to be between the NPA’s Director of Public Prosecutions: North West, Dr Rachel Makhari and two Cabinet Ministers, who are not mentioned in the story. 

    “The article fails to adhere to basic journalistic principles of quality control and verification. The NPA is on record about the status of this matter, which has also been communicated in the media. The NDPP has full confidence in the integrity and independence of Advocate Makhari,” the NPA said.

    The prosecutorial body insists that it discharges its mandate “without fear, favour or prejudice”.

    “The current leadership of the NPA is on record to confirm that it has never been subjected to any executive interference in the discharge of its prosecutorial mandate, and this remains the position. The current leadership is beholden only to the constitutional mandate of the NPA and serves only the people of South Arica. 

    “The NPA is submitting a formal complaint to the editor of Sunday World as we believe that the journalist concerned conducted himself in an unethical and unprofessional manner and sought to tarnish the image of the NPA, the official concerned, and the Ministers concerned. The NPA will also lodge a formal complaint with the Press Ombud,” the NPA said.

    Other law enforcement departments will be engaged to “explore options relating to potential criminal conduct”.

    “The rule of law is under attack at multiple levels. We should not forget the painful lessons from the State Capture era, where our country was brought to its knees by those using every possible avenue, including the media, to try to destroy our institutions. 

    “We should remain vigilant to protect the gains we have made to ensure that the rule of law once again lights our path towards a prosperous and equitable future. The NPA will not be deterred by fake news attacks, driven by various agendas, including political,” the statement said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Minister refutes claims of interference in NPA’s work

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Monday, March 31, 2025

    Justice and Constitutional Development Minister Mmamoloko Kubayi has opened a criminal case to investigate a fabricated WhatsApp conversation falsely linking her to prosecutorial decisions at the National Prosecuting Authority.

    This after a Sunday news report alleged that two Cabinet Ministers had instructed the National Prosecuting Authority to bring charges against Deputy President Paul Mashatile.

    The Minister opened a case of fraud, impersonation and obstruction of justice at the Brooklyn Police Station in Tshwane on Sunday evening.

    “I’ve [opened a case] because it’s important for us to protect [democratic] institutions and that are implementing our justice system. One of the critical institutions that must be protected for its independence is the NPA.

    “We have seen previously how the issues of state capture have compromised our institutions to the point of collapse. I’m one of those that has committed that we will rebuild our institutions and that we allow them to function without fear or favour. 

    “That’s why it’s important for me to open this case because we cannot allow where, in the public domain, an impression is given that these institutions are compromised to the point that they cannot do their work,” she said.

    The Minister emphasised that the “law must take its course in all aspects”.

    “No one must be above the law. But most importantly, no one – including myself – must interfere with law institutions or any institutions that must do their work. 

    “We will not have political interference of any sort in the work of the NPA. I reassure South Africans of my commitment to fulfil my obligation and to abide by my oath of office,” Kubayi said.

    The NPA has also rejected the news story – calling it “fake news” and reaffirmed its commitment to executing its mandate without fear, favour or prejudice.

    “The current leadership of the NPA is on record to confirm that it has never been subjected to any executive interference in the discharge of its prosecutorial mandate, and this remains the position. The current leadership is beholden only to the constitutional mandate of the NPA and serves only the people of South Arica,” the prosecutorial body said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Kuruman high-density operation leads to R38 000 fines issued

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    A high-density operation in the greater Kuruman, Northern Cape, has resulted in fines amounting to R38 500 issued for various road traffic violations.

    The South African Police Service (SAPS), under the leadership of Northern Cape Deputy Provincial Commissioner for Policing, Major General Johny Besnaar, together with the Provincial Head for Proactive Policing, Brigadier Irene Kopeled, and Acting John Taolo Gaetsewe (JTG) District Commissioner, Brigadier Kenneth Baloyi, led a successful high-density operation in the greater Kuruman area and Bothithong policing precint. 

    The high-density operation, which was carried out on 28 and 29 March 2025, was supported by the Community Police Forum (CPF) and Community in Blue Patrollers.

    “The multi-disciplinary operations were executed by members from the affected stations, [including] SAPS K9 unit, flying squad, members from the Provincial Proactive policing, Provincial Corporate Communication and the Vehicle Safeguarding Section (VSS),” the SAPS said in a statement on Sunday. 

    The police actions targeted various offences, including aggravated and business robberies, burglary at residential premises, preventing stolen property in transit, combating of drugs and human trafficking, as well as stock theft 

    The disruptive actions commenced with stop and searches, foot patrols, blue light patrols, compliance inspections and drugs searches.

    Police also conducted roadblocks on the N14 road during which 392 vehicles were stopped and searched, where fines amounting to R38 500, were issued for various road traffic violations.

    During compliance inspections, tuckshops and taverns operating in Kuruman and Bothithong, were visited.

    One tavern was closed down and a fine was issued for non-compliance.

    A total of seven people were also arrested for contraventions, including drunk and driving, possession of drugs, riotous behaviour, shoplifting, and contravention of the Immigration laws.

    Police further discovered an unregistered day care centre operating without the required documentation in a Kuruman residential area, and the local Department of Social Development personnel were contacted for further handling.

    The Acting District Commissioner and Brigadier Baloyi commended all role-players and law enforcement agencies, who were involved the crime blitz, for the collaboration in combating and preventing crime during the operations.

    “These actions reaffirmed that police will continue to stamp down the authority of the state in the district, especially as we are approaching the Easter holidays and beyond,” the SAPS said.

    Members of the public are encouraged to report any criminal activities via the MySAPS  App or the 08600 10111 Crime Stop number. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Operation Vala Umgodi nets seven in Sabie 

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Monday, March 31, 2025

    Seven suspects arrested during Operation Vala Umgodi are expected to appear in the Sabie Magistrate’s court today on charges of the contravention of the Immigration Act of South Africa.

    According to the South African Police Service (SAPS) in Mpumalanga, the seven were arrested in Sabie on Friday, 28 March 2025.

    “The arrested suspects, aged between 18 and 67, were found to be undocumented foreign nationals,” said the police of the intelligence driven operation conducted by the proactive and combat team in collaboration with Phoenix Security.

    During the operation, illegal mining equipment were confiscated, which included Phendukas, gas cylinders, motors, oxygen cylinders, and generators.

    The Acting Provincial Commissioner of the SAPS in Mpumalanga, Major General Zeph Mkhwanazi, welcomed the arrests and emphasised that law enforcement agencies will continue with efforts to eradicate illegal mining activities. 

    Through Operation Vala Umgodi, the men and women in blue remain committed to working alongside other stakeholders to address illegal mining activities in the province.  –SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Call for localised gender-responsive value chains

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Minister in the Presidency responsible for Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities, Sindisiwe Chikunga, has underscored the need to localise gender-responsive value chains and ensure the full and equal participation of women in the economy.

    “Localising gender-responsive value chains require a clearly articulated infant industry development strategy. When one examines how parts of Asia became the manufacturing hub of the world, the literature is clear: their governments have been a patient investor of first resort, with a much higher risk appetite than their private sector,” Chikunga said.

    The Minister was speaking at the 3rd Annual Women Economic Assembly (WECONA), held in Modderfontein, Johannesburg, on Friday.

    WECONA is at the forefront of driving a gender-equal economy, bringing together influential business leaders from a variety of sectors.

    It serves as a powerful platform dedicated to advancing women’s economic empowerment, fostering collaboration, and sparking deliberate, meaningful action.

    Leaders from industries, including finance, technology, and manufacturing, unite to share insights, tackle key challenges, and advocate for policies that drive change.

    Delivering her keynote address, the Minister emphasised the need for bold, measurable, and accountable actions aimed at transforming South Africa’s supply chains.

    She said WECONA needs to urgently study the anatomy of government expenditure, as well as supply chain patterns of every product and every service that has and continues to be procured.

    She stressed the need to break free from the monopolies that entrench barriers to market entry and reimagine a women-led industrial and productive revolution adding that “no sector should be beyond our reach.”

    The Minister also emphasised the need to contend with ways to introduce supplier diversity policies in procurement guidelines that formally mandate the engagement of women-owned suppliers.

    “Thirty years into our democracy, we now know that the mere presence of laws does not translate into their implementation, let alone our lived realities. More work needs to be done. We need enforcement powers that come with the ability to monitor, evaluate and ensure accountability in the implementation of the act.”

    Capacity building 

    The Minister further highlighted the need to modernise and build the capacity of women owned businesses, through access to the latest manufacturing technologies and production equipment, to ensure that they produce, supply, and distribute the best quality of goods and services.

    “In highly regulated sectors, we need to find ways to simplify the certification process and provide assistance with obtaining certifications needed to bid for public contracts. Without dedicated and tailor-made financial support, we will be setting up women for failure.

    “We need to work with both established and emerging financial institutions to provide women-owned businesses with access to credit, grants, and low-interest loans. Some governments have set up funds specifically to finance women-owned businesses participating in public procurement, without this instrument failure is almost guaranteed,” the Minister explained.
    She said delayed payments remain one of the most potent killers of women owned businesses.

    Women’s Empowerment Working Group

    Meanwhile, with South Africa’s G20 Presidency well underway, Chikunga said she is looking forward to seeing the participation of different streams of WECONA at the Women’s Empowerment Working Group.

    The working group has put forward three priorities for consideration by G20 nations and beyond. These include policy perspectives on the care economy, promoting financial inclusion of and for women, and addressing gender-based violence and femicide (GBVF).

    “In each of these priority areas, we intend to establish G20 Legacy Projects that will not only outlive our G20 presidency but also reach ordinary women who are normally not part of G20 proceedings,” she said. – SAnews.gov.za
     

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Digital platform to support spaza shops goes live

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Monday, March 31, 2025

    The Department of Small Business Development has unveiled a digital platform to support spaza shops and other food-handling facilities as well as combat illegal businesses.

    The new digital platforms went live on Friday, 28 March 2025, following the announcement by Small Business Development Minister, Stella Ndabeni.

    DSBD Connect is a digital platform designed to geo-map and support spaza shops and other food-handling facilities, while addressing the proliferation of illegal businesses across South Africa

    The department said DSBD Connect will function as a comprehensive digital platform, offering:

    •    A verified database of spaza shops and food-handling facilities in the country.
    •    Robust business and product authentication processes.
    •    Facilitation of partnerships with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs).
    •    Access to funding and credit opportunities for small enterprises.

    “This initiative is in line with President Cyril Ramaphosa’s commitment to combating illegal business operations that compromise consumer safety and undermine the local economy. Through DSBD Connect, the Department of Small Business Development is fostering sustainable business growth, regulatory compliance, and community empowerment,” the department said in a statement.

    DSBD Connect is available on Link: https://dsbdconnect.co.za/. – SAnews.gov.za
     

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Government allocates R1.44 billion for natural disaster recovery efforts – Hlabisa

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA), Velenkosini Hlabisa, has announced a significant financial commitment of R1.44 billion from the R11 billion requested to assist municipalities impacted by recent natural disasters.

    The funds, dispersed between February and March 2025, aim to address infrastructure damage caused by floods, heat waves, and severe weather events across multiple provinces.

    The grant allocation covers 60 municipalities and provincial sector departments across five provinces, including the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Free State, targeting sectors such as infrastructure repair, education, health and agriculture.

    Meanwhile, the Minister announced that the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) has officially classified recent weather events as a national disaster, enabling prompt intervention and support for affected communities.

    “As we face the growing challenges posed by natural hazards such as floods, heat waves, fires and droughts, it is crucial to recognise the substantial threats these events pose to our communities, to our infrastructure, as well as to our economy.

    “While climate change has exacerbated some of these risks, we also confront challenges that stem from unsustainable practices and inadequate planning,” the Minister said on Monday at a media briefing. 

    He believed that acknowledging these factors allowed government to pursue proactive measures and solutions that can lessen future risks.

    The country has been experiencing significant weather events, including heavy rains, floods, thunderstorms and strong winds since the beginning of 2025. 

    The Minister is of the view that this calls for urgent collaborative action and resilience-building within communities on behalf of the government and South Africans. 

    Hlabisa also took the time to offer his condolences to the families and loved ones of the 40 people who have lost their lives since the December holidays. 

    “We continue to commit our efforts to build resilience and reduce the risk of future disasters so that no more lives are needlessly lost.” 

    He assured citizens that the State was now turning its attention to recovery and improving preparedness for future challenges by learning through developing stronger systems and strategies that will safeguard citizens and enhance collective resilience.

    Hlabisa emphasised the importance of accountability, warning that any mismanagement or diversion of funds will face strict consequences. 

    “I’m speaking about the funds amounting to R1.44 billion already in the accounts of our municipalities, but what we notice in some of our municipalities is that the poor infrastructure, planning and implementation become a serious factor.

    “The poor workmanship is always noted once the money has been spent, diversion from the original allocation. When money was allocated for a bridge, a municipality decides to use the money for salaries, or when the money was allocated for 3 kilometres, the municipality decided to spend the money on 1 kilometre,” he explained. 

    However, he said government will do whatever it takes to ensure that they follow these monies that have been allocated and have given municipalities up until August this year to use the allocated funds.

    “The allocation of disaster response and recovery grants is a testament to our unwavering commitment to safeguarding our communities and rebuilding our nation as we navigate these challenging times. We must work together, leveraging our collective strengths and resources to ensure a resilient and prosperous future for all people of South Africa,” he concluded. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Stakeholders commit to improved water services for all 

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Stakeholders in the water sector have committed to collaborative efforts to implement tangible plans and reforms outlined at the recent Water and Sanitation Indaba aimed at improving water security and services for all citizens.

    This pledge was made on the final day of the two-day Water and Sanitation Indaba, held at the Gallagher Convention Centre in Midrand, Johannesburg, from 27-28 March 2025.

    At the Indaba, stakeholders including government representatives, agreed to work together and hold each other accountable for their actions and commitments. Stakeholders also agreed to increase investment in water research and development as well as technological transfer.

    They also agreed to recognise the existing body of knowledge including indigenous systems as well as promote the inclusion of women, youth, and people with disabilities in the water and sanitation sector.

    Several key resolutions were also made during the event, including a commitment by the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) to finalise the establishment of the National Water Resource Infrastructure Agency by mid-2026, and the creation of Catchment Management Agencies, set to be completed by July 2025.

    The Water Service Authorities (WSAs) pledged to adopt a utility model for water and sanitation to ensure operational efficiency while maintaining municipal ownership, to be implemented within three years.

    A utility can be a ring-fenced internal department, municipal entity, water board, special purpose vehicle, or concession, amongst other options.

    Additionally, the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), in collaboration with the Departments of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) and DWS, committed to implement a coordinated Municipal Systems Act Section 78 consultative process, according to the timeframes in the plan. This process will facilitate the appointment of capable Water Service Providers (WSPs). This should lead to the appointment of capable Water Service Providers (WSPs).

    In line with good governance and legal compliance, it was resolved that all WSAs must separate their WSA and WSP functions, accounting for them independently within one year. Resolutions on this matter should be presented to Council within three months.

    The metropolitan municipalities were also tasked to implement the Reform of Metropolitan Trading Services Programme. This includes establishing or appointing ring-fenced, professionally managed utilities, either internal or external, for water and sanitation services within two years, with support from National Treasury and relevant departments.

    Stakeholders also agreed that COGTA should review the current local government structure including the appropriateness of the two-tier system, followed by the review of the allocation of WSA status to municipalities.

    Furthermore, the DWS committed to finalise the amendments to the Water Services Act for tabling to Parliament by May 2025.

    “Following this, [the] DWS [is] to put in place an operating licensing system for Water Services Providers by June 2026. DWS to provide guidance to WSAs on the different options for external WSPs, on request from April 2025, and to issue guidelines on the roles and functions of WSAs versus WSPs by April 2025.

    “[The] DWS and AWSISA [Association of Water and Sanitation Institutions of South Africa] to develop a plan for building Water Boards’ capacity and readiness to provide a retail WSP function to WSAs if requested, informed by a capacity assessment of the Water Boards, by end July 2025,” the declaration read.

    Non-revenue water programmes 

    Meanwhile, all WSAs and WSPs that have not yet established non-revenue water programmes, will be required to have these in place by May 2025.

    These programmes should cover:

    •    Budgets for maintenance and for reducing leaks in water distribution systems;
    •    Ensuring that all reported leaks are fixed quickly;
    •    Closing illegal water connections; 
    •    Replacing old leaking pipes, including asbestos pipes (which are a danger to health);
    •    Improving management of water systems (through pressure management for example); and
    •    Strengthening metering, billing, and revenue collection, including ensuring that billing systems are accurate.

    All WSAs that have not yet ring-fenced revenues from the sale of water for the water function, will be required to bring resolutions to their Councils within six months.  The DWS will facilitate provincial workshops with all WSAs in each province to develop a common understanding of “ring-fencing.”

    “All WSAs to review their indigent registers and ensure the provision of free basic water to the indigent within two years. All other water users to be billed and revenue to be collected from all other users. DWS and the Water Partnerships Office to develop Green and Blue Bond financing mechanisms with the private sector, for implementation by Catchment Management Agencies and WSAs, starting immediately.”

    In his weekly newsletter on Monday, President Cyril Ramaphosa said a well-functioning water and sanitation sector is not only a constitutional right and a pillar of development, but also a crucial factor in driving economic growth and job creation.

    READ | Water and sanitation sector is a key cog in economic growth 

    President Ramaphosa underscored the importance of efficient water management in boosting investor confidence and ensuring sustainable development. – SAnews.gov.za
     

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Law enforcement is attending to Eastern Cape rape cases

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Monday, March 31, 2025

    The Ministry of Police has assured members of the public that law enforcement is actively investigating two incidences involving the rape of minors in the Eastern Cape.

    This comes after the Ministry has taken note of calls on various social media platforms regarding the tragic violation of the two minors in two separate incidences in October and November last year.

    In both incidences, the suspects have been identified and were arrested.

    In its statement on Saturday, the Ministry said it fully understands the concerns of the public and the urgency surrounding these cases. 

    In respect of the first case, a minor known as “Alu” was raped, with the perpetrator being identified as “Siphesihle.” 
    The suspect was arrested and appeared in court in November last year. 

    “The DNA report is being compiled and once done, same will be presented to the Senior State Prosecutor for a decision. In the second case, a minor from Bergview College in the Eastern Cape was raped, with three individuals, including the school Principal, identified as suspects,” said the Ministry.

    It added that all outstanding statements have since been obtained by the Investigating Officer and that DNA tests have also been conducted.

    The Senior State Prosecutor will be consulted in the course of the coming week whereafter, the family will be provided with feedback on the matter.

    “The Ministry wishes to assure the public that law enforcement is actively investigating both matters. The investigations are being handled with the utmost seriousness and priority. The South African Police Service (SAPS) is working diligently to ensure that justice is served and that those responsible are held accountable.

    “While the Ministry acknowledges the public’s desire for swift action, it is essential to allow the investigation to follow due process in order to ensure fairness, thoroughness and justice,” said the Ministry. –SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Human rights ought to be upheld every day 

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    By Neo Semono

    Human Rights Month may have drawn to a close, but the significance of human rights extends further than a mere month. 

    Human Rights are not just ideals enshrined in our Constitution – they are the foundation of dignity, justice, and freedom that shape our everyday lives.

    South Africa’s Bill of Rights safeguards fundamental freedoms. This includes the right to life, freedom of expression, association, and peaceful protest. Yet, in the hustle and bustle of daily life – how often do we stop and take a minute to reflect on these? 

    In fact, reflecting on them ought not to be a mere ceremonial obligation that takes place during the month of March. It should be instead a commitment and conversation that occurs throughout the year.

    The month of March this year marked over six decades since the painful events of 21 March 1960 where 69 lives were lost in the Sharpeville Massacre in Gauteng. The massacre came to be as a result of citizens choosing to protest against the pass laws of the apartheid government.

    Today, South Africa’s constitution states that everyone has the right to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions, peacefully and unarmed.

    This year’s Human Rights Month was commemorated under the theme: “Deepening a Culture of Social Justice and Human Rights”.

    While some would  likely only remember the month for the convenient long weekend it provided through Human Rights Day on 21 March, the theme spoke to issues affecting the globe today.

    And while many sophisticated advancements have been made over the years and will be made in the future, human rights will always matter. They are that ever-important coat that forms part of the priceless family heirloom.

    Human rights affect every aspect of life in that they are very closely linked to each person’s inner being. For example, each person that has been abused, raped and been a victim of a crime, finds it very difficult to forget how that horrid moment made them feel and how it trampled on their human rights.

    The recent horrific attack and killing of six community-based patrollers in Soshanguve, Gauteng, a day after the commemoration of Human Rights Day, has badly affected the nation’s psyche.

    The brave six, together with six others, had raised their hands up to help keep the community of the Marry Me informal settlement located north of Pretoria, safe. They paid the ultimate sacrifice.

    These patrollers were ordinary people committed to making a difference in their part of the world. The fact that citizens across the country become part of community police forums (CPFs) speaks to the fact that South Africans have an inherent can-do attitude even if it places their lives at risk.

    We should salute the fallen patrollers as well as those who continue to serve on CPFs.

    The South African Police Service (SAPS) Act states that the police service shall liaise with the community through CPFs to establish and maintain a partnership between the community and the SAPS. 

    The Act also speaks to promoting cooperation between the SAPS and the community in fulfilling the needs of the communities regarding policing as well as promoting joint problem identification and problem-solving by the service and the community.

    Government has expressed concern over crime levels with Police Minister Senzo Mchunu voicing his concern over what appears to be the increasing number of murder cases during his visit to Soshanguve last week.

    Human rights also extend to issues including inequality and addressing unemployment as stated by Deputy President Paul Mashatile in his Human Rights Day address describing these as “fundamental human rights issues.” 

    He said that while South Africa has experienced notable economic growth through expanding economic participation, the harsh reality of a 31.9% unemployment rate reveals the ongoing struggle faced by many in the country against poverty and inequality. 

    “This is not merely an economic issue. It represents a fundamental matter of human rights and fairness, demanding a concerted and sustained effort from all of us,” he said.

    Last week, news also broke that 23 South Africans were rescued from Myanmar. This after they were lured by an employment agency to Thailand under the pretences of lucrative jobs that were advertised on various social media platforms. 

    They were held captive for over four months in a cybercrime compound in Myanmar where they were subjected to physical torture and forced labour, among others. The repatriation of the victims was part of a bilateral cooperation agreement to combat human trafficking and other forms of transnational organised crime signed by Thailand and South Africa in 2023. 

    In the same week, it was reported that over 30 Ethiopian nationals were able to escape from a house in Johannesburg’s Lombardy East. It is suspected that they were victims of a human trafficking syndicate.

    Trafficking in persons is a crime and violation of human rights, and the country has the Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act which deals with trafficking in all its various forms while also providing for the protection of and assistance to victims of trafficking.

    As Human Rights Month closes off, we ought to continue to look out for the collective rights of each and every person every day of the year. 

    Human rights are not abstract concepts; they touch every aspect of life. They are about safety, dignity, and the ability to live free from fear and oppression. As we move beyond Human Rights Month, we must carry forward the spirit of vigilance, advocacy, and action. Safeguarding human rights is not the duty of government alone. It is the collective responsibility of all of us. 

    Every day presents an opportunity to uphold the rights of others, ensuring that justice and freedom remain a lived reality for all. –SAnews.gov.za  

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The results of the founding conference of the International Movement for Financial Security have been summed up

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    On March 27, a conference was held in a hybrid format at the Higher School of Economics to finalize the work on establishing the International Movement for Financial Security. During the meeting, the regulations and roadmap were adopted and the presidium was elected.

    The conference was hosted by Vice-Rector of the National Research University Higher School of Economics Vyacheslav Bashev and Vladimir Ovchinnikov, Director of the International Network Institute in the Sphere of AML/CFT. They moderated the meeting from Moscow, and Nikita Anisimov, Rector of the Higher School of Economics, delivered a welcoming speech from the capital of the People’s Republic of China.

    Yuri Chikhanchin, Director of Rosfinmonitoring and Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the movement, opened the conference from Kazakhstan, noting the importance of joint work to protect young people from modern threats, including involvement in illegal activities as dropouts, and also emphasizing the need to create a “forge of personnel” for national anti-money laundering systems.

    Participants were connected from three countries: the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People’s Republic of China, which confirms the international status of the movement, as noted by Vyacheslav Bashev. Today, the organization already covers 36 participating countries.

    Natalia Parshkova, the curator of the International Movement for Financial Security from the Government of the Russian Federation, presented candidates for the presidium for election. Deputy Director General of the International Training and Methodological Center for Financial Monitoring (ITMCFM) Irina Shilina presented a draft regulation, which the conference participants reviewed and unanimously adopted as the main regulatory document.

    Ivan Uvarov, Director General of the MUMCFM, presented a draft roadmap, according to which it is planned to implement subsequent steps to develop the movement. Ambassadors from among students and postgraduates also spoke: Ekaterina Bazarova from Russia, Ngetobai Masangar Rongar from the Republic of Chad, and from Kazakhstan – Sagyn Ismetilla and Temirlan Tuleyev. The students actively support the organization, make their proposals and ideas for its further expansion and development.

    Acting Director of the Center for Digital Educational Platforms of PJSC Promsvyazbank Maxim Lobanov presented information on the operation of the main technological resource — the digital platform “Sodruzhestvo”. The report presented the scale of the platform, its capabilities and content, as well as plans for its development.

    In conclusion, Yuri Chikhanchin said a few words: “Let the Financial Security Movement not stop at the numbers achieved and grow with new countries and participants. Now we have the “Commonwealth” – a platform that allows us to be close to each other even from different corners of the world. The proposals that were voiced today only indicate that all participants are interested in actively promoting new ideas and development projects.”

    Summing up, Vladimir Ovchinnikov offered everyone who wanted to register on the platform and join the organization.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Agenda – Wednesday, 2 April 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament 2

    24 Energy-intensive industries     – Motions for resolutions Wednesday, 26 March 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to the motion for a resolution Friday, 28 March 2025, 12:00 22 Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III
    Andrzej Halicki (A10-0042/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 26 March 2025, 13:00 28 Protocol on the Implementation of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (2024-2029) (Resolution)
    Eric Sargiacomo (A10-0040/2025     – Amendments Friday, 28 March 2025, 12:00 18 Strengthening the security of identity cards of Union citizens and of residence documents issued to Union citizens and their family members exercising their right of free movement
    Malik Azmani (A10-0041/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 26 March 2025, 13:00 40 Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2024
    David McAllister (A10-0010/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 26 March 2025, 13:00 39 Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024
    Nicolás Pascual de la Parte (A10-0011/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 26 March 2025, 13:00 38 Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024
    Isabel Wiseler-Lima (A10-0012/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 26 March 2025, 13:00 49 Prosecution of journalists in Cameroon, notably the cases of Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior, Tsi Conrad     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 31 March 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 14:00 50 Execution spree in Iran and the confirmation of the death sentences of activists Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 31 March 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 14:00 51 Immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus – threats from the Investigative Committee     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 31 March 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 14:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 28 March 2025, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 31 March 2025, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 1 April 2025, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Agenda – Thursday, 3 April 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament 2

    49 Prosecution of journalists in Cameroon, notably the cases of Amadou Vamoulké, Kingsley Fomunyuy Njoka, Mancho Bibixy, Thomas Awah Junior, Tsi Conrad     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 31 March 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 14:00 50 Execution spree in Iran and the confirmation of the death sentences of activists Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 31 March 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 14:00 51 Immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus – threats from the Investigative Committee     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 31 March 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 14:00 20 Estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2026 – Section I – European Parliament
    Matjaž Nemec     – Amendments Tuesday, 1 April 2025, 19:00     – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 13:00 47 Targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security     – Motion for a resolution Friday, 28 March 2025, 12:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 1 April 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 1 April 2025, 14:00     – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Tuesday, 1 April 2025, 19:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 28 March 2025, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 31 March 2025, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 1 April 2025, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Agenda – Tuesday, 1 April 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament 2

    69 Macro-financial assistance to Egypt
    Céline Imart (A10-0037/2025     – Amendments; rejection Friday, 28 March 2025, 12:00     – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Monday, 31 March 2025, 19:00 70 Customs duties on imports of certain products originating in the USA
    Bernd Lange (A10-0034/2025     – Amendments; rejection Friday, 28 March 2025, 12:00     – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Monday, 31 March 2025, 19:00 40 Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2024
    David McAllister (A10-0010/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 26 March 2025, 13:00 39 Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024
    Nicolás Pascual de la Parte (A10-0011/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 26 March 2025, 13:00 38 Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024
    Isabel Wiseler-Lima (A10-0012/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 26 March 2025, 13:00 47 Targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security     – Motion for a resolution Friday, 28 March 2025, 12:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 1 April 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 1 April 2025, 14:00     – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Tuesday, 1 April 2025, 19:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 28 March 2025, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 31 March 2025, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 1 April 2025, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 2 April 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Twenty-Three Lubbock-Area Defendants Charged in Methamphetamine and Fentanyl Trafficking Cases

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

    Twenty-three alleged methamphetamine and fentanyl traffickers in Lubbock, Texas, have been federally charged with drug crimes, announced Acting U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Texas Chad E. Meacham.

    The defendants, charged in nine indictments, were apprehended on Wednesday, March 26th.  Initial appearances began today before U.S. Magistrate Judge Amanda ‘Amy’ R. Burch.

    This investigation began in March 2023.  Over the course of the investigation, law enforcement seized over 43 kilograms of methamphetamine, 285.4 grams of fentanyl (approx. 1,902 pills), 335.5 grams of cocaine, 2,296.7 grams of marijuana, and six firearms.  The 285.4 grams of seized fentanyl equals potentially 21,662 lethal doses of fentanyl.

    Those charged in the indictments include:

    •    Vida Tamor Overstreet, 49, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, unlawful use of communication facility, distribution of methamphetamine

    •    Patrick Wayne Frazier aka Pat Pat, 38, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine

    •    Juantay Dewayne Frazier aka Broadway, 39, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, unlawful use of communication facility, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine

    •    David Wayne Frazier aka Dinky, 39, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, unlawful use of communication facility, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine

    •    Santiago Daniel Baltazar aka Chago, 26, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl, distribution of fentanyl, possession with intent to distribute fentanyl

    •    Walter Wood, 36, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl, possession with intent to distribute fentanyl

    •    Santos Moncada aka Tos, 28, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine

    •    Jessie Franco, 41, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine

    •    Shondra Christine Walker, 40, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine

    •    Orian Emanuel Garcia, 35, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine

    •    Rudolfo Luna aka Roy Luna, 43, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine

    •    Adam Lee Arredondo, 37, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine

    •    Justin Lee Dominguez, 37, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine

    •    Anthony James Lockett, 44, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl, distribution of fentanyl, distribution of     methamphetamine

    •    Rita Adelita Castillo, 44, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine

    •    Paul Wayne Frazier, 38, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine

    •    Charles Andre Sykes, 41, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine

    •    Heather Jane Whitehead, 40, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine

    •    Henry Tienda, Jr., 35, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine

    •    Gary Dewayne Bolton aka Bay Bay, 36, charged with distribution of fentanyl

    •    Arhmad Rashad Fountain aka Ra Ra, 47, charged with distribution of methamphetamine

    •    Rubith Diaz Rodriguez, age 24, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine

    •    Tyler Kristian Piseno, 37, charged with distribution of fentanyl.

    “Cooperation of local, state and federal law enforcement led to success in disrupting a drug trafficking organization,” said Dallas FBI Special Agent in Charge R. Joseph Rothrock. “These arrests will have a considerable impact on the distribution of methamphetamine in the greater-Lubbock area, and law enforcement will continue work together to ensure the safety and security of our communities.”

    “This operation sends a clear message that we will not tolerate the flow of illegal drugs into our neighborhoods,” said Eduardo A. Chavez, Special Agent in Charge of the DEA.  “By working together at every level of law enforcement, we are leveraging all available resources to destroy these criminal networks and commit to safeguard our communities from drug trafficking and violent crime.”

    An indictment is merely an allegation of criminal conduct, not evidence.  All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.

    If convicted, some of the defendants face up to life in federal prison.

    Acting U.S. Attorney Chad E. Meacham praised the joint efforts of all law enforcement agencies involved in the case, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Dallas Field Office – Lubbock Resident Agency, the Texas Department of Public Safety, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Dallas Field Office – Lubbock Resident Office, the Caprock HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area) Task Force, the U.S. Marshals Service, Homeland Security Investigations, the Lubbock Police Department, the Lubbock County Sheriff’s Office, the Texas Anti-Gang Center, the Levelland Police Department, and the Hockley County Sheriff’s Office.  The cases are being prosecuted by the West Texas Branch of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas.

    This prosecution stems from an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) investigation.  OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level drug traffickers, money launderers, gangs, and transitional criminal organizations that threaten the United States by using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach that leverages the strengths of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies against criminal networks. Additional information about the OCDETF program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.  

    This investigation is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime.  Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs).
     

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, “Fiction Litterature Is Messy”

    Source: Universities – Science Po in English

    « Fiction literature is messy, we have to write about the world as it is, not as we wish it were. I really feel that the self that writes fiction is not the self that writes non-fiction. When I’m writing non-fiction, essays, lectures, or a Ted Talk, I am hoping to persuade people. I want you to come on board and care. »

    Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie

    Author and feminist icon

    In March 2025, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie joined us to present her latest novel, L’inventaire des rêves (Dream Count), published by Gallimard. The renowned Nigerian author delivered an inspiring keynote on the power of writing. She generously shared her unfiltered reflections on women in history, literature, and shaping one’s destiny.

    Organised by our Institute for the Arts & Creation, Africa Programme, and Gender Studies Programme (PRESAGE), the event was moderated by Hélène Périvier, economist at the French Economic Observatory (OFCE) and director of PRESAGE, alongside students from our Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA).

    The conversation is now available for replay:

    Cover image caption: Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie with Hélène Périvier at her right, translator Marguerite Capelle at her left and PSIA students on both outer sides. (credits: Louis Roquebert / Sciences Po)

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Nuclear war threat: why Africa’s pushing for a complete ban

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olamide Samuel, Track II Diplomat and Expert in Nuclear Politics, University of Leicester

    At a time of heightened geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine, intensified by strategic dynamics involving the US, Nato and Russia over Europe’s security, nuclear weapons are back on the agenda.

    In recent times, Russia has openly threatened to use nuclear weapons. The UK and France are considering ways to rapidly increase their nuclear weapons stockpiles.

    Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, South Korea and Japan are now seeking nuclear weapons capabilities.

    Even a limited nuclear war in Europe would lead to catastrophic global climatic effects. Huge amounts of debris thrown high into the atmosphere would block sunlight, causing global temperatures to drop sharply. It would be much harder to grow food around the world.

    This would severely threaten Africa’s food security, exacerbating mass migration, disrupting supply chains and potentially collapsing public order systems.

    How should African countries respond to this growing threat?

    Based on my experience in nuclear non-proliferation and politics, I argue that African leaders need to proactively confront the risks, while there is still time.

    All African states, except for South Sudan, abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is an international agreement which limits the spread of nuclear weapons. And 43 African states have gone further to join the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). This was negotiated in the belief that it would “protect African states against possible nuclear attacks on their territories”.

    As conflict and uncertainty pushes many western leaders to support the madness of nuclear weapons proliferation, African leaders are in a unique position to push back against this.

    Africa’s strength in numbers in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Ban Treaty, is a vehicle the continent can use to address nuclear weapons risks, head-on.

    Global divide

    On one side, nuclear-armed states cling to deterrence for their national security. They insist that possessing nuclear arsenals keeps them safe.

    At present, there are nine nuclear-armed states: the US, Russia, the UK, China, France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. These countries possess around 12,331 nuclear warheads (as of 2025).

    The use of only 10% of these weapons could disrupt the global climate and threaten the lives of up to 2 billion people.

    On the other side, African countries and other non-nuclear-weapon states such as Ireland, Austria, New Zealand and Mexico highlight how deterrence creates unacceptable risks for the entire international community.

    This global majority – the 93 countries that have signed the Nuclear Ban Treaty and 73 that are party to it – argue that real safety comes from eliminating nuclear threats.

    The Nuclear Ban Treaty became international law on 22 January 2021. It is the first instance of international law challenging the legality and morality of nuclear deterrence.

    Since 2022, states parties to the Nuclear Ban Treaty have held formal meetings to address current nuclear risks. In March 2025, at their third meeting, 17 African states officially recognised nuclear deterrence as a critical security concern. They called on nuclear armed states to end deterrence.

    The deterioration of the international security environment is so palpable that there has been a noticeable shift in nuclear ban states’ perception of nuclear threats. Nuclear disarmament is no longer just a humanitarian or moral concern to these states, it is now a national security concern.

    South Africa warned that

    any use of nuclear weapons would result in catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would have a global impact.

    Ghana likewise stressed that Africa is not immune to nuclear war’s fallout:

    Africa, despite its geographic distance from the immediate hotspots of nuclear conflict, is not immune to the repercussions of nuclear weapons.

    Africa bears a unique historical connection to nuclear issues. Nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert in the 1960s, when France detonated nuclear bombs in Algeria, had devastating consequences. Widespread radioactive contamination harmed local communities, caused long-lasting health problems, displaced populations, and left large areas environmentally damaged and unsafe for generations.

    For its part, Nigeria recalled that Africa had “long acknowledged the existential threat nuclear weapons posed to human existence.”

    The meeting determined that it is unacceptable that states parties are exposed to nuclear risks, “created without their control and without accountability”. It stressed that eliminating nuclear risks “is a prime and legitimate concern and national responsibility” of states.

    Next steps

    Delegates effectively asked whether their own national security concerns had less value than those of nuclear-armed states. I think this is a valid question.

    Africa’s leaders and their allies in the Nuclear Ban Treaty are reframing what “national security” means in the nuclear age.

    Rather than accepting a world perpetually held hostage by the madness of nuclear deterrence, they are asserting that the security of nations – and of peoples – is best served by dismantling this threat to humanity.

    They are prioritising human life, development and international law over the threat of overwhelming force.

    The outcome of this contest will have profound implications, not just for Africa but for the entire globe.

    Olamide Samuel is affiliated with the Open Nuclear Network.

    ref. Nuclear war threat: why Africa’s pushing for a complete ban – https://theconversation.com/nuclear-war-threat-why-africas-pushing-for-a-complete-ban-253171

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Rwanda and Belgium are at odds over the DRC: what’s led to the latest low point

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

    Rwanda’s foreign affairs ministry suspended all diplomatic relations with Belgium in March 2025. Soon afterwards, Belgium expelled Rwandan diplomats. This came weeks after Belgium had suspended foreign aid to Rwanda. At the root of this diplomatic fallout is the resurgence of the rebel group, March 23 Movement (M23), which has made recent military gains in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

    Prior to Rwanda suspending diplomatic relations, President Paul Kagame accused Belgium of continually undermining Rwanda. This deterioration in Rwanda-Belgium relations illustrates decades of the Kagame regime’s lack of trust in Brussels since the 1994 genocide. Jonathan Beloff, who has studied Rwanda’s political, security and foreign policies for nearly two decades, explains.

    What is the historical relationship between Rwanda and Belgium?

    Belgium is perhaps better known for having colonised the Congo. However, it also colonised present-day Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi.

    Belgian forces conquered Rwanda, a former German colony, in 1916 during the first world war. They got help from nearby British forces in Uganda. The Treaty of Versailles, which brought an end to the world war, officially transferred Rwanda and Burundi to Belgium’s colonial holdings.

    While Rwanda was never a significant interest for the Belgian colonial authorities compared to neighbouring Congo, Brussels nevertheless helped shape Rwandan politics, economy and society for decades.

    Rwanda’s current government claims that ethnic divisions of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa only came to the foreground during Belgian colonial rule, which ended in 1962. Before German and Belgian colonisation, Rwandan officials described these communities as socio-economic groupings rather than ethnicities. It was only with the introduction of ethnic identification cards in 1933 that these groups became intractable ethnicities.

    During much of its rule, Belgium used the existing political structures of kings, called Mwami, to carry out colonial policies.

    While a majority of Tutsis and Hutus suffered under these policies, Belgian officials often blamed the Mwami and his courts. The Mwami was often a Tutsi based on the number of cattle he owned. This led to a growing anti-Tutsi sentiment within the majority Hutu population.

    Eventually, it boiled over and led to the 1959 Hutu Revolution and the 1961 Coup of Gitarama. This anti-Tutsi sentiment established much of the political order following Rwandan independence in July 1962.

    What key moments have shaped the relationship?

    Prior to Rwandan independence, Belgium’s political allegiance shifted away from the mostly Tutsi Mwami and their power base to the growing Hutu movement. Under Rwanda’s Hutu leader and later first post-independence president Grégoire Kayibanda, Belgium began favouring Hutus. The community got increased education opportunities. Its leaders were given more say over post-colonial political events than the Mwami and his court.

    Rwanda-Belgium relations focused on promoting the majority Hutu population, despite some discontent from conservative, mostly Tutsi, actors. With independence, Belgium played an important but diminishing role. It did not provide the financial support Kigali wanted. In response, Kigali turned to France, whose influence grew significantly under President Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994).

    Despite their diminished state, relations between Rwanda and Belgium were still important. Belgium became the primary western nation to help provide stability in Rwanda during the waning years of the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994), known locally as the Liberation War.

    A peace deal in 1993, called the Arusha Accords, between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Habyarimana regime paved the way for a UN mission. However, getting western nations to send soldiers for the mission proved difficult. This was after a peacekeeping disaster in Somalia (the Battle of Mogadishu) earlier that year. As a result, Belgium ended up providing the bulk of troops for the Rwanda mission.

    The assassination of Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 triggered the Genocide against the Tutsi. The UN mission’s commander sent a platoon to guard the home of prime minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The platoon had 10 Belgian and five Ghanaian soldiers. They were captured when Rwandan Presidential Guard officers stormed Uwilingiyimana’s home and killed her.

    The Ghanaian soldiers were released relatively unharmed, while the Belgian soldiers were killed at the Camp Kigali military base. The murders were intended to provoke the UN mission’s withdrawal from Rwanda. Belgian troops departed within the genocide’s first week. This allowed Rwanda’s genocide to run uninterrupted for 100 days until the Rwandan Patriotic Front stopped it in July 1994.

    Since the genocide, the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front has had a sceptical view of Belgium. In 2000, former prime minister Guy Verhofstadt apologised for Belgium’s failure to stop the genocide and for fostering ethnic divisions during the colonial period.

    Nevertheless, many Rwandan officials still believe Brussels hasn’t done enough to acknowledge its colonial record.

    What’s behind the current fallout?

    The current diplomatic crisis erupted because of accusations of Rwandan involvement in eastern DRC. UN experts’ reports have accused Rwanda of supporting the reanimated M23. The rebel group has captured large swathes of eastern DRC.

    Belgium has been leading calls for European sanctions against Rwanda for this involvement. However, Rwanda – which denies supporting the M23 – claims that Belgium’s accusations are aimed at gaining favourable mining rights in the DRC.

    Relations between the two countries have been deteriorating steadily in 2025. In February, Rwanda suspended a five-year (2024-2029) €95 million (US$102.8 million) deal. This was one of the largest aid deals between the two countries. In March, in addition to the suspension of diplomatic ties, the Rwanda Governance Board, which registers and monitors non-governmental organisations, placed restrictions on NGOs receiving financial support from Belgium.

    What’s the impact of this diplomatic falling out?

    Rwanda-Belgium relations have never broken down to the current level.

    It is unlikely to last in the long term. Like many other donor nations, Belgium needs Rwanda as a case study for proper aid utilisation and for its contribution to African peacekeeping.

    Rwanda is Africa’s most active troop-contributing country to UN missions and the fourth most active worldwide. Its primary political, security and economic allies remain the United States and the United Kingdom. While relations with these two nations are strained, they’re not at the level reached with Belgium.

    Nevertheless, the current state of affairs will continue in the near future unless the M23 is defeated. The only available avenues for quick restoration of relations are if Belgium apologises for seemingly siding with the DRC over Rwanda in the conflict in eastern Congo and repeats its apology for its colonial legacy. Neither of these options seems likely in the short term.

    Jonathan Beloff received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/W001217/1).

    ref. Rwanda and Belgium are at odds over the DRC: what’s led to the latest low point – https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-belgium-are-at-odds-over-the-drc-whats-led-to-the-latest-low-point-253349

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Nuclear war threat: why Africa’s pushing for a complete ban

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olamide Samuel, Track II Diplomat and Expert in Nuclear Politics, University of Leicester

    At a time of heightened geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine, intensified by strategic dynamics involving the US, Nato and Russia over Europe’s security, nuclear weapons are back on the agenda.

    In recent times, Russia has openly threatened to use nuclear weapons. The UK and France are considering ways to rapidly increase their nuclear weapons stockpiles.

    Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, South Korea and Japan are now seeking nuclear weapons capabilities.

    Even a limited nuclear war in Europe would lead to catastrophic global climatic effects. Huge amounts of debris thrown high into the atmosphere would block sunlight, causing global temperatures to drop sharply. It would be much harder to grow food around the world.

    This would severely threaten Africa’s food security, exacerbating mass migration, disrupting supply chains and potentially collapsing public order systems.

    How should African countries respond to this growing threat?

    Based on my experience in nuclear non-proliferation and politics, I argue that African leaders need to proactively confront the risks, while there is still time.

    All African states, except for South Sudan, abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is an international agreement which limits the spread of nuclear weapons. And 43 African states have gone further to join the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). This was negotiated in the belief that it would “protect African states against possible nuclear attacks on their territories”.

    As conflict and uncertainty pushes many western leaders to support the madness of nuclear weapons proliferation, African leaders are in a unique position to push back against this.

    Africa’s strength in numbers in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Ban Treaty, is a vehicle the continent can use to address nuclear weapons risks, head-on.

    Global divide

    On one side, nuclear-armed states cling to deterrence for their national security. They insist that possessing nuclear arsenals keeps them safe.

    At present, there are nine nuclear-armed states: the US, Russia, the UK, China, France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. These countries possess around 12,331 nuclear warheads (as of 2025).

    The use of only 10% of these weapons could disrupt the global climate and threaten the lives of up to 2 billion people.

    On the other side, African countries and other non-nuclear-weapon states such as Ireland, Austria, New Zealand and Mexico highlight how deterrence creates unacceptable risks for the entire international community.

    This global majority – the 93 countries that have signed the Nuclear Ban Treaty and 73 that are party to it – argue that real safety comes from eliminating nuclear threats.

    The Nuclear Ban Treaty became international law on 22 January 2021. It is the first instance of international law challenging the legality and morality of nuclear deterrence.

    Since 2022, states parties to the Nuclear Ban Treaty have held formal meetings to address current nuclear risks. In March 2025, at their third meeting, 17 African states officially recognised nuclear deterrence as a critical security concern. They called on nuclear armed states to end deterrence.

    The deterioration of the international security environment is so palpable that there has been a noticeable shift in nuclear ban states’ perception of nuclear threats. Nuclear disarmament is no longer just a humanitarian or moral concern to these states, it is now a national security concern.

    South Africa warned that

    any use of nuclear weapons would result in catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would have a global impact.

    Ghana likewise stressed that Africa is not immune to nuclear war’s fallout:

    Africa, despite its geographic distance from the immediate hotspots of nuclear conflict, is not immune to the repercussions of nuclear weapons.

    Africa bears a unique historical connection to nuclear issues. Nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert in the 1960s, when France detonated nuclear bombs in Algeria, had devastating consequences. Widespread radioactive contamination harmed local communities, caused long-lasting health problems, displaced populations, and left large areas environmentally damaged and unsafe for generations.

    For its part, Nigeria recalled that Africa had “long acknowledged the existential threat nuclear weapons posed to human existence.”

    The meeting determined that it is unacceptable that states parties are exposed to nuclear risks, “created without their control and without accountability”. It stressed that eliminating nuclear risks “is a prime and legitimate concern and national responsibility” of states.

    Next steps

    Delegates effectively asked whether their own national security concerns had less value than those of nuclear-armed states. I think this is a valid question.

    Africa’s leaders and their allies in the Nuclear Ban Treaty are reframing what “national security” means in the nuclear age.

    Rather than accepting a world perpetually held hostage by the madness of nuclear deterrence, they are asserting that the security of nations – and of peoples – is best served by dismantling this threat to humanity.

    They are prioritising human life, development and international law over the threat of overwhelming force.

    The outcome of this contest will have profound implications, not just for Africa but for the entire globe.

    – Nuclear war threat: why Africa’s pushing for a complete ban
    – https://theconversation.com/nuclear-war-threat-why-africas-pushing-for-a-complete-ban-253171

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Rwanda and Belgium are at odds over the DRC: what’s led to the latest low point

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

    Rwanda’s foreign affairs ministry suspended all diplomatic relations with Belgium in March 2025. Soon afterwards, Belgium expelled Rwandan diplomats. This came weeks after Belgium had suspended foreign aid to Rwanda. At the root of this diplomatic fallout is the resurgence of the rebel group, March 23 Movement (M23), which has made recent military gains in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

    Prior to Rwanda suspending diplomatic relations, President Paul Kagame accused Belgium of continually undermining Rwanda. This deterioration in Rwanda-Belgium relations illustrates decades of the Kagame regime’s lack of trust in Brussels since the 1994 genocide. Jonathan Beloff, who has studied Rwanda’s political, security and foreign policies for nearly two decades, explains.

    What is the historical relationship between Rwanda and Belgium?

    Belgium is perhaps better known for having colonised the Congo. However, it also colonised present-day Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi.

    Belgian forces conquered Rwanda, a former German colony, in 1916 during the first world war. They got help from nearby British forces in Uganda. The Treaty of Versailles, which brought an end to the world war, officially transferred Rwanda and Burundi to Belgium’s colonial holdings.

    While Rwanda was never a significant interest for the Belgian colonial authorities compared to neighbouring Congo, Brussels nevertheless helped shape Rwandan politics, economy and society for decades.

    Rwanda’s current government claims that ethnic divisions of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa only came to the foreground during Belgian colonial rule, which ended in 1962. Before German and Belgian colonisation, Rwandan officials described these communities as socio-economic groupings rather than ethnicities. It was only with the introduction of ethnic identification cards in 1933 that these groups became intractable ethnicities.

    During much of its rule, Belgium used the existing political structures of kings, called Mwami, to carry out colonial policies.

    While a majority of Tutsis and Hutus suffered under these policies, Belgian officials often blamed the Mwami and his courts. The Mwami was often a Tutsi based on the number of cattle he owned. This led to a growing anti-Tutsi sentiment within the majority Hutu population.

    Eventually, it boiled over and led to the 1959 Hutu Revolution and the 1961 Coup of Gitarama. This anti-Tutsi sentiment established much of the political order following Rwandan independence in July 1962.

    What key moments have shaped the relationship?

    Prior to Rwandan independence, Belgium’s political allegiance shifted away from the mostly Tutsi Mwami and their power base to the growing Hutu movement. Under Rwanda’s Hutu leader and later first post-independence president Grégoire Kayibanda, Belgium began favouring Hutus. The community got increased education opportunities. Its leaders were given more say over post-colonial political events than the Mwami and his court.

    Rwanda-Belgium relations focused on promoting the majority Hutu population, despite some discontent from conservative, mostly Tutsi, actors. With independence, Belgium played an important but diminishing role. It did not provide the financial support Kigali wanted. In response, Kigali turned to France, whose influence grew significantly under President Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994).

    Despite their diminished state, relations between Rwanda and Belgium were still important. Belgium became the primary western nation to help provide stability in Rwanda during the waning years of the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994), known locally as the Liberation War.

    A peace deal in 1993, called the Arusha Accords, between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Habyarimana regime paved the way for a UN mission. However, getting western nations to send soldiers for the mission proved difficult. This was after a peacekeeping disaster in Somalia (the Battle of Mogadishu) earlier that year. As a result, Belgium ended up providing the bulk of troops for the Rwanda mission.

    The assassination of Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 triggered the Genocide against the Tutsi. The UN mission’s commander sent a platoon to guard the home of prime minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The platoon had 10 Belgian and five Ghanaian soldiers. They were captured when Rwandan Presidential Guard officers stormed Uwilingiyimana’s home and killed her.

    The Ghanaian soldiers were released relatively unharmed, while the Belgian soldiers were killed at the Camp Kigali military base. The murders were intended to provoke the UN mission’s withdrawal from Rwanda. Belgian troops departed within the genocide’s first week. This allowed Rwanda’s genocide to run uninterrupted for 100 days until the Rwandan Patriotic Front stopped it in July 1994.

    Since the genocide, the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front has had a sceptical view of Belgium. In 2000, former prime minister Guy Verhofstadt apologised for Belgium’s failure to stop the genocide and for fostering ethnic divisions during the colonial period.

    Nevertheless, many Rwandan officials still believe Brussels hasn’t done enough to acknowledge its colonial record.

    What’s behind the current fallout?

    The current diplomatic crisis erupted because of accusations of Rwandan involvement in eastern DRC. UN experts’ reports have accused Rwanda of supporting the reanimated M23. The rebel group has captured large swathes of eastern DRC.

    Belgium has been leading calls for European sanctions against Rwanda for this involvement. However, Rwanda – which denies supporting the M23 – claims that Belgium’s accusations are aimed at gaining favourable mining rights in the DRC.

    Relations between the two countries have been deteriorating steadily in 2025. In February, Rwanda suspended a five-year (2024-2029) €95 million (US$102.8 million) deal. This was one of the largest aid deals between the two countries. In March, in addition to the suspension of diplomatic ties, the Rwanda Governance Board, which registers and monitors non-governmental organisations, placed restrictions on NGOs receiving financial support from Belgium.

    What’s the impact of this diplomatic falling out?

    Rwanda-Belgium relations have never broken down to the current level.

    It is unlikely to last in the long term. Like many other donor nations, Belgium needs Rwanda as a case study for proper aid utilisation and for its contribution to African peacekeeping.

    Rwanda is Africa’s most active troop-contributing country to UN missions and the fourth most active worldwide. Its primary political, security and economic allies remain the United States and the United Kingdom. While relations with these two nations are strained, they’re not at the level reached with Belgium.

    Nevertheless, the current state of affairs will continue in the near future unless the M23 is defeated. The only available avenues for quick restoration of relations are if Belgium apologises for seemingly siding with the DRC over Rwanda in the conflict in eastern Congo and repeats its apology for its colonial legacy. Neither of these options seems likely in the short term.

    – Rwanda and Belgium are at odds over the DRC: what’s led to the latest low point
    – https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-belgium-are-at-odds-over-the-drc-whats-led-to-the-latest-low-point-253349

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Africa’s data workers are being exploited by foreign tech firms – 4 ways to protect them

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mohammad Amir Anwar, Senior Lecturer in African Studies and International Development, University of Edinburgh

    Data workers in Africa often have a hard time. They face job insecurities – including temporary contracts, low pay, arbitrary dismissal and worker surveillance – and alarming physical and psychological health risks. The consequences of their work can include exhaustion, burnout, mental health strain, chronic stress, vertigo and weakening of eyesight.

    Data work includes text prediction, image and video annotation, speech to text validation and content moderation.

    The world of data work is built on labour arbitrage – exploiting the fact that workers earn less and have less protection in some countries than in others.

    Large technology firms often outsource this work to the global south, including African countries like Kenya, Uganda and Madagascar, and also India and Venezuela. The result is complex production networks that are generally opaque and shrouded in secrecy.

    Workers and researchers have issued many warnings about data workers’ health. Despite numerous court cases in multiple jurisdictions, nothing much has been done to address these issues either by tech companies or by regulators.


    Read more: For workers in Africa, the digital economy isn’t all it’s made out to be


    Still, the news of the death of a Nigerian content moderator, Ladi Anzaki Olubunmi, who was found dead in her apartment in Nairobi, Kenya on 7 March 2025, came as a shock. While the circumstances of her death are still unclear, it has renewed calls for wider systemic change. Her death has sparked condemnation from the Kenyan Union of Gig Workers, which demanded an investigation.

    Since 2015, we have been studying the central role of African data workers in building and maintaining artificial intelligence (AI) systems, acting as “data janitors”. Our research found that companies rarely acknowledge the use of human workers in AI value chains, thus they remain “hidden” from the public eye. In other words, the world of AI is built on the toil of human workers most people are unaware of.

    In this article, we outline key steps needed to protect these data workers in Africa. They include business process outsourcing regulations, ensuring quality rather than quantity of jobs, and providing social protection. There is also a need to name and shame companies that maltreat data workers.

    Data work needs tighter regulation.


    Read more: Digital labour platforms subject global South workers to ‘algorithmic insecurity’


    Regulation

    Business process outsourcing is the practice of procuring various processes or operations from external suppliers or vendors. Firms that do this are sometimes trying to evade local regulations (like minimum wages) and responsibility towards workers’ welfare (via sub-contracting and the use of temporary employment agencies).

    This is happening in Africa as some data training firms and digital labour platforms circumvent local labour laws.

    But there is more to the story.

    Data work is also seen by lawmakers and practitioners as a solution to the rampant unemployment and informality across Africa. African governments have actively created regulatory environments that enable these practices to thrive, despite adverse outcomes for workers.

    Nonetheless, new regulations have been proposed lately, like the Kenyan government’s Business Law (Amendment) Bill, 2024 targeting the wider business process outsourcing and IT-enabled services sector. Particularly, it makes business process outsourcing firms responsible for any claim raised by employees. It ensures some accountability for firms bringing data work to Africa.

    Other governments should follow with similar measures ensuring worker rights are enforceable. Some data workers are hired on contracts as short as five days and get paid less than the local minimum wage. Firms found violating labour standards should be penalised.

    In fact, there is an urgent need to create regional or continent-wide regulatory frameworks covering the business process outsourcing sector, limiting the space for firms to exploit workers.

    It’s possible, however, that jobs might be lost as firms relocate to places with favourable laws, an everyday reality in the outsourcing networks.


    Read more: Most call centre jobs are a dead end for South Africa’s youth


    Quality, not quantity

    African governments should prioritise the quality of jobs and not quantity. Policymakers should think about wider national economic development plans, particularly structural diversification and upgrading of their economies.

    Historically, these strategies have resulted in success in some states, addressing social and economic issues such as unemployment, poverty and inequality.

    Another option for African governments is to enhance social protection among data workers. Financing this is a serious issue, so proper taxation and compliance among workers and employers is urgently needed.

    Finally, there is a role for naming and shaming firms that treat their data workers poorly. There is evidence that such efforts improve compliance and firms’ behaviour.


    Read more: Digital trade protocol for Africa: why it matters, what’s in it and what’s still missing


    Worker movements

    African data workers have taken risks in openly speaking about their experiences. But these kinds of approaches work well when combined with collective bargaining.

    Workers have historically won their labour and civil rights after long and hard-fought struggles. There is a long history of African worker movements and trade unions resisting the apartheid and colonial regimes across the continent.

    While the freedom of association is enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and most governments have legislation committed to collective bargaining, it is rarely implemented in the new outsourcing sectors, particularly data work.

    It is also difficult to organise workers in the industry, because of the high churn rate. For instance, data training firms like Sama offer short-term contracts to employees, often as short as five days.

    Some firms are hostile to workers’ organising activities.

    But numerous data worker-led associations have emerged in Africa recently, some led by the co-authors of this article. Techworker Community Africa, African Tech Workers Rising, African Content Moderators Unions and Data Labelers Association are among them.

    These initiatives are crucial to ensure workers have decent remuneration, work-life balance, adequate working hours, protection against arbitrary dismissal, safe working environments, and contributions towards their health and welfare.

    Several high-profile court cases are currently being pursued by African data workers against Meta and Sama. There is precedent. In 2021. Meta was ordered by a Californian court to pay US$85 million to 10,000 content moderators.

    AI-dependent tools such as ChatGPT or driverless cars would not exist without African data workers. They are tired of being “hidden”. They deserve to be treated with respect and dignity.

    Mophat Okinyi, Kauna Malgwi, Sonia Kgomo and Richard Mathenge co-authored this article.

    – Africa’s data workers are being exploited by foreign tech firms – 4 ways to protect them
    – https://theconversation.com/africas-data-workers-are-being-exploited-by-foreign-tech-firms-4-ways-to-protect-them-252957

    MIL OSI Africa