Category: Africa

MIL-OSI Europe: Kenya Upgrades East Africa’s busiest trade and transport route from Kwa Jomvu to Mariakani Under Global Gateway Initiative
Source: European Investment Bank
- Key road upgrade will predominantly increase two lane carriageway to four and six lane dual carriageway.
- The project will contribute to improving road safety, reducing emissions and boosting regional trade.
- The EUR 140 million (Ksh 19 billion) project is receiving Team Europe support with a €50 million (Ksh 6.8 billion) loan from EIB Global, a €50 million (Ksh 6.8 billion) loan from KfW, a €20 million (Ksh 2.7 billion) grant from the EU, and approximately €20 million (Ksh 2.7 billion) from the Government of Kenya.
The European Investment Bank (EIB Global), the Delegation of the European Union (EU) to Kenya and the German Development Bank (KfW) on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), together with President William Ruto, launched the works for upgrading of the road section from Kwa-Jomvu to Mariakani, in the Southeast of Kenya. The works involve converting the predominantly two-lane road to a four and six lane dual carriageway.

Within the Mombasa – Mariakani area, the road forms the main axis to Nairobi, and is part of the Northern Corridor, which links the port of Mombasa with the landlocked Eastern and Central African countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The road rehabilitation and upgrade are part of the Global Gateway EU – Africa Strategy. In a Team Europe approach, EIB Global and KFW are supporting the project with concessional loans of up to €100 million (Ksh 13.6 billion), while EU is providing a grant of €20 million (Ksh 2.7 billion). The Kenyan Government is contributing with approximately €20 million (Kshs 2.7 billion).

Upon completion, the upgraded road will benefit an average of 20,000 vehicles per day travelling through Mariakani. Moreover, the enhancement of the road will contribute to reducing emissions and the number of road accidents.

Speaking during the launch ceremony in Mariakani, President William Ruto said: “I would like to thank our Team Europe partners for their support in developing as well as expanding this road infrastructure which will ease movement of goods to and from the port, thus increasing efficiency.”

The EU Commissioner for International Partnerships, Jozef Sikela said:” This Global Gateway project is a great example of quality infrastructure made possible by the cooperation between the Kenyan government and the European union. Together, we are not just building infrastructure, we are accelerating Kenya’s economic development and supporting trade co-operation in the East African Community more broadly.”

European Investment Bank Vice President, Thomas Östros commented on the launch: “Sustainable transport is key to growth and inclusion as it connects people and enables trade. Projects such as this one brings together important aspects of sustainability and safety, as well as accessibility, resilience, and efficiency. Road transport plays an important role in the Kenyan economy, affecting all sectors – and society as a whole. At the EIB, we are glad to support the national government in realizing its development agenda, which is in line with the EU-Kenya partnership strategy and the Global Gateway initiative.”

The Director of the German Development Bank (KfW) in Nairobi, Kristina Laarmann highlighted: “We all know that the Mombasa port serves as a major gateway for East Africa by connecting Kenya to significant trade routes in East and Central Africa. This is why this project is so important. It will not only create jobs during the construction phase. It will also stimulate job opportunities and local businesses after completion. By widening the carriageways, traffic jams and the average time to pass the road section will be reduced. Ultimately, this shall also lead to a reduction in transport costs and savings in vehicle operating costs.”

The Kwa Jomvu – Mariakani project is part of the wider upgrading of the Northern Corridor, which is East Africa’s busiest trade and transport route. This is part of the EU Global Gateway transport investment that also includes the ongoing Mombasa – Kilifi Road and Kitale – Morpus road, while the upgrading of Isebania-Kisii-Ahero highway and associated feeder roads have been completed.

The road project feeds into the European Union’s wider support for the creation of twelve strategic transport corridors across Africa under the €150 billion Global Gateway EU-Africa Investment package to boost trade.

Background information

About EIB Global:

The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives.

EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm devoted to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance, and a key partner in Global Gateway. We aim to support €100 billion of investment by the end of 2027, around one third of the overall target of this EU initiative. With Team Europe, EIB Global fosters strong, focused partnerships, alongside fellow development finance institutions and civil society. EIB Global brings the Group closer to people, companies and institutions through our offices around the world.

About KfW:

KfW Bankengruppe, founded in 1948, is the German promotional bank and one of the world’s leading promotional banks. It is 80% owned by the Federal Government and 20% by the federal states. The business sector KfW Development Bank carries out Financial Cooperation (FC) projects with developing countries and emerging economies on behalf of the German Federal Government, especially of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). KfW Development Bank employs approximately 1,200 people at the head office in Frankfurt am Main as well as 400 specialists at more than 60 international locations, who cooperate with partners all over the world. Their goal is to combat poverty, secure peace, protect the environment and the climate as well as ensure fair globalization. KfW Development Bank is a competent and strategic adviser for current development policy issues.

About EU:

The European Union has set out the Global Gateway, which is a new European Strategy that helps its partners build better connectivity infrastructure for any society. With this strategy the EU is creating sustainable and trusted connections for people and the planet to tackle the most pressing global challenges from climate change and protecting the environment, to improving health security and boosting competitiveness and global supply chains.

In Kenya, the European Union has cooperated in the transport sector for more than 30 years. This has delivered significant improvements for the Northern and Ethiopia/South Sudan corridors as well as improvements in Rural and Urban Roads. More than €550 million have been provided as EU grants, which have enabled and strengthened the trade flows between Kenya and its neighbours.

For More Information:

EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package

EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package – Strategic Corridors
MIL OSI Europe News –
February 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: South Sudan: Relentless conflict has inflicted immense suffering – OCHA Briefing | United Nations

Source: United Nations (Video News)

Briefing by Edem Wosornu, Director of Operations and Advocacy, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fr3U68rtcBs

MIL OSI Video –

February 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Deputy Secretary-General, Trip Announcement & other topics – Daily Press Briefing

Source: United Nations (Video News)

Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

– Deputy Secretary-General
– Trip Announcement
– Democratic Republic of the Congo
– Occupied Palestinian Territory
– Sudan
– Sudan / Zamzam camp
– Somalia
– Syria
– Central African Republic
– Police Week

DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL
The Deputy Secretary-General, Amina Mohammed, is in Cape Town, in the Republic of South Africa, representing the Secretary-General at the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting. She also attended the Finance in Common Summit of National Development Banks.
In her remarks, Ms. Mohammed conveyed the UN’s support for South Africa’s G20 presidency and stressed the importance of G20 action to shepherd the global economy and improve prospects for sustainable development. She called for proactive steps to support developing countries overwhelmed by debt service, to expand development finance, and to create a stronger global financial safety net that protects all countries. She also stressed the need for strengthening tax systems, and making them fairer and more efficient.
Ms. Mohammed also met with ministers and principals of international financial institutions and development banks ahead of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, that will take place in Sevilla, in Spain in July. She will be back in New York tomorrow.

TRIP ANNOUNCEMENT
The Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, will be travelling to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from tomorrow [27 February] until 1 March. He will first go to Kinshasa, where he will engage with Congolese authorities as well as international partners, to discuss the ongoing situation in the eastern part of the country and the next steps in implementing Resolution 2773 – which was adopted last week.
He will then head to the East and travel to Beni, in North Kivu, where he will engage with provincial authorities, as well as with the newly- appointed Force Commander for the peacekeeping force, Lt. Gen. Ulisses De Mesquita Gomes, and as well, of course, with peacekeepers deployed in the Beni area. He will be there to assess first-hand recent developments and will also visit UN Peacekeeping positions.
On 1 March, he will go to Entebbe, in Uganda, where he will pay a visit to MONUSCO personnel who were evacuated to Uganda from Goma last month, following the advances of the M23.
And as we mentioned – Mr. Lacroix is currently wrapping up his visit to New Delhi, in India, where he attended an international conference on Women, Peace and Security, hosted by the Government of India to address barriers and discuss solutions to women’s participation in peacekeeping efforts.
While in India, Mr. Lacroix also discussed the future of peacekeeping with Indian senior government officials and visited the National War Memorial.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Staying in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs say they are alarmed by escalating violence and insecurity in recent days in the city of Uvira, about 100 kilometers south of South Kivu’s provincial capital Bukavu.
Clashes and rising violence in Uvira put local communities and humanitarian workers in extreme danger, with our humanitarian partners reporting multiple incidents of looting and sexual violence.
Elsewhere in South Kivu, humanitarian assessments over the last ten days indicate that more than 10,000 displaced people have returned from Idjwi island in Lake Kivu – due to dire conditions there – they returned to villages in the areas of Minova and Kalehe. More than 100,000 people had fled to the island since late January.
Our partners also report that people have been returning to parts of North Kivu, where a recent assessment found that 80,000 people have returned to villages in the territory of Masisi, about 80 kilometers northwest of Goma. Infrastructure in these villages was largely destroyed by recent fighting, and returnees urgently need humanitarian assistance. Ongoing clashes in Masisi also expose people to risks of violence and rights violations.
For its part, our colleagues at the UN Children’s Fund said today they are deeply worries by the significant increase in reports of grave violations committed against children in parts of the eastern DRC. They say the number of incidents has tripled since the end of January.
The data collected reveals that cases of sexual violence have risen by more than two and a half times, abductions have increased sixfold, killing and maiming is up sevenfold, and attacks on schools and hospitals have multiplied by 12.

Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=26%20February%202025

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EhHe98GuD9U

MIL OSI Video –

February 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: EIB backs Africa Finance Corporation $750 Million Climate Resilient Infrastructure Fund

Source: European Investment Bank

EIB

The European Investment Bank (EIB) has committed to join Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) in financing a $750 million Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund (ICRF). This landmark initiative will accelerate climate adaptation and sustainable infrastructure across Africa.

As part of this commitment, the EIB today confirmed it will invest $52.48 million in the Fund, which is managed by AFC Capital Partners (ACP), the asset management arm of AFC. ACP has already secured a $253 million commitment from the Green Climate Fund (GCF), marking GCF’s largest-ever equity investment in Africa. In addition, the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) and two private African pension funds have also committed to the Fund, demonstrating robust institutional backing on the continent and internationally.

The Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund aims to accelerate climate adaptation in Africa by embedding resilience measures at every stage of infrastructure development—from design and construction to operation. Using blended finance to de-risk private investment, the Fund also integrates innovative tools such as climate risk parametric insurance to enhance protection against climate-related risks and losses. In addition, the Fund will provide technical assistance to enhance the capacity of countries seeking climate risk assessment and adaptation, aligning with the European Union’s Global Gateway initiative and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The EIB formally signed the agreement at the Finance in Common Summit (FICS) in Cape Town today, demonstrating the close collaboration between the EIB, AFC, and other strategic partners.

“The EIB is committed to supporting private sector investment in climate-resilient infrastructure, especially in regions most vulnerable to climate change,” EIB Vice-President Ambroise Fayolle stated at the ceremony today. “This partnership with the Africa Finance Corporation and the launch of ACP’s Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund are a significant step towards accelerating Africa’s green and digital transition and ensuring a sustainable future for all. The EIB’s investment is not just about the initial capital injection; it is also intended to have a multiplier effect by attracting more investors, reducing risk, showcasing successful projects, and promoting best practices in climate finance.”

ACP’s fund aims to demonstrate that Africa can pursue a climate-resilient and sustainable development path by addressing market failures, mitigating environmental risks, strengthening logistics, trade, and industrialization, and accelerating the continent’s digital and energy transition.

“This Fund is crucial for bridging the funding gap for climate adaptation in Africa,” Samaila Zubairu, AFC’s President & CEO, said at the launch event today. “By focusing on climate-resilient infrastructure, we are not only securing our economic future but also creating opportunities for sustainable growth, and supporting job creation across the continent. We are glad to partner with the EIB and other investors who are committed to increasing the impact of climate finance.”

Developing Climate-Resilient Infrastructure

The ICRF focuses on Africa, the world’s most climate-vulnerable continent, by investing in infrastructure that can withstand the impacts of climate change while reducing carbon emissions. The Fund prioritizes resilient, low-carbon solutions across transport and logistics, clean energy, digital infrastructure, and industrial development, ensuring sustainable growth.

ACP’s investment strategy evaluates climate risk across both physical and transition dimensions, including emissions and climate governance. The Fund is committed to ensuring that infrastructure assets are designed, built, and operated to withstand and adapt to evolving climate conditions. To achieve this, ACP will conduct rigorous climate risk screenings and assessments for every investment, establishing a new benchmark for selecting and implementing the most effective adaptation solutions.

The Fund leverages a powerful partnership between three major institutions—EIB, AFC, and GCF—uniting their expertise, capital, and commitment to climate resilience. Aligned with the EIB’s Climate Bank Roadmap, ACP will draw on the proven track records and deep technical expertise of both EIB and AFC in infrastructure investment, creating a compelling platform to attract additional investors. Through this strategic collaboration, the $750 million fund is poised to unlock up to $3.7 billion in financing, accelerating the deployment of climate-resilient infrastructure across Africa.

The GCF will play a critical role by providing technical assistance for due diligence and climate resilience monitoring while also covering the first-loss tranches on new investments, effectively de-risking projects and attracting private capital.

Once operational, the Fund aims to invest in a diversified portfolio of 10 to 12 projects across Africa. It will also assist countries and entities in capacity building and deployment of climate risk assessment and adaptation solutions.

Background information

Leveraging Partnerships

The Fund is built on a powerful partnership between three major institutions: the European Investment Bank (EIB), Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Through its asset management arm, AFC Capital Partners (ACP), AFC is collaborating with the EIB to deploy the Fund, leveraging both institutions’ proven track records and technical expertise in infrastructure investment to attract additional investors. The partnership is further strengthened by the GCF’s critical role in providing first-loss protection and technical assistance, ensuring a robust framework for scaling climate-resilient infrastructure across Africa.

Mobilizing Climate Finance

The EIB’s $52.48 million commitment is a strategic step toward the Fund’s $750 million target, aimed at catalysing additional investments from both private and public sector partners into climate-resilient infrastructure. This commitment is expected to help mobilize approximately $3.7 billion in total financing, driving tangible, on-the-ground impact across Africa.

Focusing on EIB’s core priorities agreed by ECOFIN

The EIB investment will support the climate bank ambition to accelerate international action on adaptation and resilience. With an expected climate action and environmental sustainability contribution of about 80%, the operation will contribute to EIB’s objectives to dedicate (i) 50% of its financing toward climate action and environmental sustainability and (ii) 15% of its financing toward to climate adaptation by 2025. The Fund supports three of the five EU Global Gateway thematic priorities: i) climate and energy, ii) transport and iii) digital.

Addressing Market Failures

The EIB investment in ACP’s Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund is intended to address the scarcity of equity capital for greenfield infrastructure projects, and to help overcome other market failures such as the lack of incentives for green energy solutions or market failures related to transport accessibility and digital connectivity. The Fund also aims to improve the efficiency of logistics and trade corridors and contribute to the digital and energy transition.

Supporting the Green and Digital Transition

By investing in clean energy and digital infrastructure, the Fund aims to support the broader green and digital transition in Africa and contribute to diversification and security of energy supply, as well as improved access to digital connectivity.

Enhancing Capacity for Climate Risk Management

ACP’s Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund will provide technical assistance to build capacity for climate risk assessment and adaptation, with a focus on integrating climate risk considerations into project design and construction.

Creating Jobs and Economic Opportunities

Projects backed by ACP’s Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund will contribute to job creation, economic growth, and improved quality of life in the target regions. These projects are expected to generate significant temporary employment during construction as well as permanent jobs during operation.

Key projects in the ICRF pipeline, such as the Lobito Corridor, underscore AFC’s pivotal role in driving transformational and climate-resilient infrastructure investments across Africa. As the lead developer of the project, AFC is spearheading efforts to enhance regional connectivity and economic integration through the corridor, which is set to become a critical trade and logistics route linking Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Zambia.

The Lobito Corridor is expected to unlock vast economic opportunities by facilitating efficient transportation of critical minerals, agricultural goods, and other commodities, reducing dependency on other congested export routes and fostering industrial development along the wider corridor. Alongside partners including the European Union, the United States Government, the African Development Bank and the governments of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, AFC is working to ensure the corridor is developed with climate resilience in mind, integrating sustainable infrastructure solutions that can withstand environmental challenges while promoting long-term economic growth.

Beyond Lobito, the ICRF pipeline includes other strategic projects across transport, clean energy, and digital infrastructure, all designed to attract institutional investment and address Africa’s pressing infrastructure gap. Through these initiatives, ACP continues to highlight its commitment to mobilizing capital for projects that deliver both financial returns and lasting developmental impact.

The investments backed by the Fund will actively promote the adoption of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) best practices, including gender equality, protection, and anti-discrimination policies.

De-risking Investments

The Fund’s structure, with support from the EIB and other institutions like the Green Climate Fund (GCF), aims to de-risk climate investments.

The GCF is providing grant funding to help with due diligence and monitoring of climate resilience, which can make the investments more attractive to other investors. Additionally, the Fund will integrate innovative climate risk insurance to complement traditional indemnity programs.

Aligning with Global and Regional Objectives

The EIB investment aligns with EU strategies, the African Union’s Agenda 2063, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and aims to support the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions.

Background information

About EIB Global

EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm dedicated to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance. EIB Global is designed to foster strong, focused partnership within Team Europe, alongside fellow development finance institutions, and civil society. EIB Global brings the Group closer to local people, companies and institutions through our offices across the world.

About AFC

AFC was established in 2007 to be the catalyst for pragmatic infrastructure and industrial investments across Africa. AFC’s approach combines specialist industry expertise with a focus on financial and technical advisory, project structuring, project development, and risk capital to address Africa’s infrastructure development needs and drive sustainable economic growth.

Seventeen years on, AFC has developed a track record as the partner of choice in Africa for investing and delivering on instrumental, high-quality infrastructure assets that provide essential services in the core infrastructure sectors of power, natural resources, heavy industry, transport, and telecommunications. AFC has 44 member countries and has invested over US$15 billion in 36 African countries since its inception.

EIB backs Africa Finance Corporation $750 Million Climate Resilient Infrastructure Fund
EIB backs Africa Finance Corporation $750 Million Climate Resilient Infrastructure Fund
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MIL OSI Europe News –

February 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Oak forest dieback – E-003071/2024(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
1. There are several projects supported with EU funding that relate to the management of holm and cork oak forests and improving their resilience. Under the EU programme for the environment and climate action, LIFE FAGESOS[1] specifically aims to address and remediate outbreaks of Phytophthora cinnamomi disease through the development and application of new integrated pest management protocols. Another relevant completed project is LIFE ADAPTAMED[2], which produced a good practice manual for combating cork oak pests[3]. Conservation and restoration activities are also being undertaken thanks to funding under the Recovery and Resilience Facility[4] and the European Regional Development Fund[5].

2. Forestry interventions under the Common Agricultural Policy[6] should be based on sustainable forest management plans[7] and may comprise sustainable management of forests and investments that guarantee and enhance forest conservation and resilience.

Support may be granted for management commitments and investments aimed at maintaining the health of forests and protecting forests against abiotic and biotic damages caused by animals, plant diseases or pest infestations. Support for the restoration of forestry potential following natural disaster, adverse climatic events or catastrophic events may be granted as well.

3. The Commission is not currently involved in any active cooperation with countries outside of the EU on this issue. In Morocco, the ‘Terre Verte Programme‘ contributes to Morocco’s forests replantation programmes. The programme also focuses on the fight against forest diseases, dieback and promoting effective replantation through research policy reinforcement, but there is no specific focus on Quercus forests.

[1] Project running until 2027: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/life/publicWebsite/project/LIFE21-CCA-IT-LIFE-FAGESOS-101074466/phytophthora-induced-decline-of-fagaceae-ecosystems-in-southern-europe-exacerbated-by-climate-change-preserving-ecosystem-services-through-improved-integrated-pest-management

[2] https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/life/publicWebsite/project/LIFE14-CCA-ES-000612/protection-of-key-ecosystem-services-by-adaptive-management-of-climate-change-endangered-mediterranean-socioecosystems

[3] https://www.lifeadaptamed.eu/?p=1907

[4] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/382020516_Restoring_Mediterranean_Oaks_Enhancing_ Conservation_and_Management_through_Networked_Plot_Monitoring_and_Plot-based_Analysis

[5] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/erdf_en

[6] Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013, OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1-186.

[7] Or equivalent instruments.
Last updated: 27 February 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
February 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the European Semester for economic policy coordination 2025 – A10-0022/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the European Semester for economic policy coordination 2025

(2024/2112(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,

– having regard to Protocol No 1 to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the TFEU on the role of national parliaments in the European Union,

– having regard to Protocol No 2 to the TEU and the TFEU on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,

– having regard to Protocol No 12 to the TEU and the TFEU on the excessive debt procedure,

– having regard to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 [1],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 of 29 April 2024 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [2],

– having regard to Council Directive (EU) 2024/1265 of 29 April 2024 amending Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States [3],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area [4],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [5],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [6],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability [7],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area [8],

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [9] (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility [10] (the RRF Regulation),

– having regard to the Commission’s Spring 2024 Economic Forecast of 15 May 2024,

– having regard to the Commission’s Autumn 2024 Economic Forecast of 15 November 2024,

– having regard to the Commission’s Debt Sustainability Monitor 2023 of 22 March 2024,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘Alert Mechanism Report 2025’ (COM(2024)0702) and to the Commission recommendation of 17 December 2024 for a Council recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area (COM(2024)0704),

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 December 2024 for a joint employment report from the Commission and the Council (COM(2024)0701),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 March 2023 entitled ‘Fiscal policy guidance for 2024’ (COM(2023)0141),

– having regard to the Commission report of 19 June 2024 prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (COM(2024)0598),

– having regard to the Council Recommendation of 12 April 2024 on the economic policy of the euro area [11],

– having regard to the European Fiscal Board assessment of 3 July 2024 on the fiscal stance appropriate for the euro area in 2025,

– having regard to the Eurogroup statement of 15 July 2024 on the fiscal stance for the euro area in 2025,

– having regard to the European Fiscal Board’s 2024 annual report, published on 2 October 2024,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 June 2024 entitled ‘2024 European Semester – Spring Package’ (COM(2024)0600),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘2025 European Semester – Autumn package’ (COM(2024)0700),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640), to the Paris Agreement adopted on 12 December 2025 in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and to the UN Sustainable Development Goals,

– having regard to the Eighth Environment Action Programme to 2030,

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation of 17 November 2017 on the European Pillar of Social Rights [12] and to the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 entitled ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan’ (COM(2021)0102),

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on access to decent and affordable housing for all [13],

– having regard to the document by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the European Commission, of 18 July 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s choice – Political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029’, and to the statement made by Valdis Dombrovskis, Commissioner for Economy and Productivity, Implementation and Simplification, at his confirmation hearing on 7 November 2024,

– having regard to International Monetary Fund working paper 24/181 of August 2024 entitled ‘Taming Public Debt in Europe: Outlook, Challenges, and Policy Response’,

– having regard to the International Monetary Fund’s Fiscal Monitor entitled ‘Putting a Lid on Public Debt’ of October 2024,

– having regard to Special Report 13/2024 of the European Court of Auditors entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’,

– having regard to the in-depth analysis entitled ‘The new economic governance framework: implications for monetary policy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 20 November 2024 [14],

– having regard to the in-depth analysis entitled ‘Economic Dialogue with the European Commission on EU Fiscal Surveillance’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 1 December 2024 [15],

– having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European Competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0022/2025),

A. whereas the European Semester plays an essential role in coordinating economic and budgetary policies in the Member States, and thus preserves the macroeconomic stability of the economic and monetary union;

B. whereas the European Semester aims to promote sustainable, inclusive and competitive growth, employment, macroeconomic stability and sound public finances throughout the entire EU, with a view to ensuring the sustained upward convergence of the economic, social and environmental performance of the Member States;

C. whereas the 2024 European Semester marked the first implementation cycle of the new economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, guiding the EU and its Member States through a transitional phase;

D. whereas the 2024 Council Recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area calls on the Member States to take action, both individually and collectively, to strengthen competitiveness, boost economic and social resilience, preserve macro-financial stability and sustain a high level of public investment to support the green and digital transitions; whereas fiscal stability is a basis for both sustainable high social standards in the EU and the competitiveness of the EU;

E. whereas the main objectives of the new economic governance framework are to strengthen debt sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth in all Member States, as well as enabling all Member States to undertake the necessary reforms and investments in the EU’s common priorities, which include (i) a fair green and digital transition, (ii) social and economic resilience including the European pillar of social rights, (iii) energy security, and (iv) the build-up of defence capabilities; whereas disparities in fiscal capacity among Member States hinder equitable investment in strategic priorities and weaken cohesion within the single market;

F. whereas reference values of up to 3 % of government deficit to GDP and 60 % of public debt to GDP are defined by the TFEU; whereas the EU’s headline deficit and government debt-to-GDP ratio remain above the reference values; whereas both the headline deficit and government debt-to-GDP ratio vary across the EU, with significantly divergent situations in different Member States;

G. whereas excessive deficit procedures were opened, or kept open, for eight Member States in 2024; whereas some Member States were not subject to an excessive deficit procedure, despite having a deficit above 3 % of GDP in 2023, as decided by the Council and the Commission after a balanced assessment of all the relevant factors;

H. whereas no procedure concerning macroeconomic imbalances has been opened by the Council since the establishment of this procedure in 2011; whereas, in accordance with its Alert Mechanism Report, the Commission will conduct an in-depth review of 10 countries identified as experiencing macroeconomic imbalances or excessive imbalances in 2025;

I. whereas the success of a framework relies heavily on its proper, transparent and effective implementation from the outset, while taking into account the Member States’ starting points and the individual challenges they face;

J. whereas the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural and draft budgetary plans is a precondition for the effective implementation and credibility of the new rules; whereas the first national fiscal and budgetary plans have already been assessed by the Council; whereas the equal treatment of the Member States and compliance with the requirements outlined in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 as regards the fiscal plans are necessary for the effective implementation of the framework;

K. whereas the economic outlook for the EU remains highly uncertain and there is a growing risk of future events or situations that will negatively affect the economy; whereas Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the conflicts in the Middle East are aggravating geopolitical risks and highlighting Europe’s energy vulnerability; whereas a rise in protectionist measures by trading partners may affect world trade, with negative repercussions for the EU economy; whereas current geopolitical tensions have demonstrated the need for the EU to further strengthen its open strategic autonomy and remain competitive in the global market, while ensuring that no one is left behind;

L. whereas the implementation of the revised economic governance framework is expected to lead to a restrictive fiscal stance for the euro area, as a whole, of 0.5 % of GDP in 2024 and 0.25 % of GDP in 2025; whereas political discussion is needed to ensure appropriate public investment levels following the expiry of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) in 2026;

M. whereas the Draghi report points out that the gap between the EU and the United States in the level of GDP at 2015 prices has gradually widened, from slightly more than 15 % in 2002 to 30 % in 2023, and estimates the necessary additional annual investment by the EU at EUR 800 billion, including EUR 450 billion for the energy transition;

N. whereas the new Commission has set the goal of being an ‘investment Commission’; whereas discussions on addressing the significant investment gap and reducing borrowing costs are needed in the EU; whereas the framework, where appropriate, should be strengthened by EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

O. whereas the Member States need to have the necessary control and audit mechanisms to ensure respect for the rule of law and to protect the EU’s financial interests, in particular to prevent fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest and to ensure transparency;

P. whereas it is important to increase the share of ‘fully implemented’ country-specific recommendations (CSRs) and to link them more closely to the respective country reports in order to contribute to more effective economic governance;

1. Notes that in the last few years, the EU has demonstrated a high degree of resilience and unity in the face of major shocks, thanks, among other things, to a coordinated policy response involving all the EU institutions, including a flexible approach to the use of new and existing instruments; further recalls that promoting long-term sustainable growth means promoting a balance between responsible fiscal policies, structural reforms and investments that together increase efficiency, productivity, employment and prosperity, and also entails boosting competitiveness, fostering the single market, developing economic growth policies and revising the regulatory framework to attract investments; stresses the fundamental need for sustainable, inclusive and competitive economic growth;

2. Notes that economic policy coordination is fundamentally necessary for a successful economic and monetary union; recalls that the European Semester is the well-established framework for coordinating fiscal, economic, employment and social policies across the EU, in line with the Treaties, while respecting the defined national competences;

3. Notes the Commission’s commitment to ensure that the European Semester drives policy coordination for competitiveness, sustainability and social fairness, as well as the integration of the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the European pillar of social rights; notes that the European Green Deal remains a core deliverable for the Commission;

4. Highlights the fact that an integrated, coordinated, targeted and horizontal industrial policy is vital to increase investments in the EU’s innovation capacity, while bolstering competitiveness and the integrity of the single market;

5. Highlights that public and private investments are crucial for the EU’s ability to cope with existing challenges, including developing the EU’s innovation capacity and implementing the just green and digital transitions, and that they will increase the EU’s resilience, long-term competitiveness and open strategic autonomy; calls attention to the need for strategic investments in energy interconnections, low-carbon energies (such as renewables) and energy efficiency to, among other things, (i) make the EU independent from imported fossil fuels and prevent the possible inflationary effects of dependence on these, (ii) modernise production systems and (iii) promote social cohesion; recalls that the materialisation of climate-change-related physical risks can greatly affect public finances, as demonstrated by the floods in Valencia in October 2024 and the cyclone in Mayotte in December 2024; calls on the Member States to make the necessary investments to improve climate change mitigation and adaptation and enhance the resilience of the EU economy;

6. Calls on the Commission to come up with initiatives, on the basis of the Budapest Declaration; to make the EU more competitive, productive, innovative and sustainable, by building on economic, social and territorial cohesion and ensuring convergence and a level playing field both within the EU and globally; notes the development of a new competitiveness coordination tool; expects the Commission to clarify how this tool will interact with the European Semester; stresses the importance of supporting micro, small and medium-sized enterprises as key drivers of economic growth and employment within the EU;

7. Stresses the need to foster a dynamic entrepreneurial ecosystem that supports innovators, recognising their critical role in driving global competitiveness, economic resilience, job creation and open strategic autonomy;

8. Welcomes the Commission’s recommendations regarding the economic policy of the euro area, urging the Member States to enhance competitiveness and foster productivity through improved access to funding for businesses, reduced administrative burdens, and public and private investment in areas of EU common priorities, which include (i) a fair green and digital transition, (ii) social and economic resilience including the European pillar of social rights, (iii) energy security, and (iv) the build-up of defence capabilities;

9. Welcomes the Commission’s recommendation that, when defining fiscal strategies, euro area Member States should aim to improve the quality and efficiency of public expenditure and public revenue, which are essential for ensuring the sustainability of public finances, while minimising detrimental and distortive impacts on economic growth; stresses that this could be achieved by, among other things, increasing European coordination and reducing tax avoidance and tax evasion; welcomes the Draghi report’s conclusion that a coordinated reduction of labour income taxation for low- to middle-income workers is needed to promote EU competitiveness; recalls the Member States’ competence in tax policy; invites the Member States to redirect the tax burden from income to less distortive tax bases;

10. Highlights the need to create fiscal buffers to address fiscal sustainability challenges, ensuring sufficient resources for investment and for dealing with potential future shocks and crises; stresses the importance of promoting competitive, sustainable and inclusive growth in supporting long-term fiscal stability and resilience;

Economic prospects for the EU

11. Expresses concern that, according to the Commission’s autumn 2024 economic forecast, EU GDP is expected to grow by 0.9 % (0.8 % in the euro area) in 2024, by 1.5 % (1.3 % in the euro area) in 2025 and by 1.8% (1.6% in the euro area) in 2026; recalls that these figures reflect a gradual recovery, but also limited economic expansion compared to previous economic cycles; notes that the economic outlook for the EU remains highly uncertain, with risks more likely to negatively affect economic growth;

12. Notes that the public debt ratio is projected to increase to 83.0 % in the EU and 89.6 % in the euro area in 2025 and to 83.4 % in the EU and 90 % in the euro area in 2026, when the output gap will be virtually closed both in the EU and in the euro area, and that this is higher than the levels in 2024 (82.4 % for the EU and 89.1 % for the euro area);

13. Recalls that developments in public debt ratios vary from country to country; points out that policy uncertainty and geopolitical risks can contribute significantly to increasing the cost of borrowing on the financial markets for the Member States; notes that unsustainable debt levels could undermine economic stability and decrease the Member States’ economic resilience and capacity to respond to crises; highlights that in 2024 and 2025, 11 euro area Member States are expected to have debt ratios above the Treaty reference value of 60 %, with 5 remaining above 100 %;

14. Notes that according to the Commission’s 2024 autumn economic forecast, the general government deficit in the EU and the euro area is expected to decline to 3.1 % and 3 % of GDP, respectively, in 2024, and to decrease further to 3 % and 2.9 % of GDP in 2025 and 2.9 % and 2.8 % of GDP in 2026; stresses that 10 EU Member States are expected to post a deficit above the Treaty reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2024; points out that this number will remain stable in 2025, and that in 2026, most Member States are forecast to have weaker budgetary positions than before the pandemic (2019), with 9 of them still posting deficits of above 3 %;

15. Notes that eight Member States have excessive deficits; recalls that the Council has taken remedial action and calls on the Member States concerned to take steps to reduce excessive deficits while minimising the socio-economic impact; recalls the importance of consistency in applying the excessive deficit procedure to the Member States;

16. Notes that according to the Commission’s autumn 2024 economic forecast, inflation is projected to fall from 2.6 % in 2024 to 2.4 % in 2025 and 2 % in 2026 in the EU, and from 2.4 % in 2024 to 2.1 % in 2025 and 1.9 % in 2026 in the euro area; recalls that although this reduction is a positive development, core inflation remains relatively high, which points to persistent inflationary pressures; notes that fiscal policy, while safeguarding fiscal sustainability, can support monetary policy in reducing inflation, and should provide sufficient space for additional investments and support long-term growth;

17. Notes that the Commission has not been able to present the Annual Sustainable Growth Survey, the Alert Mechanism Report, the draft euro area recommendation and the draft joint employment report at the same time;

18. Observes that according to the Commission’s 2025 Alert Mechanism Report, in-depth reviews will be prepared in 2025 for the nine countries that were identified as experiencing imbalances or excessive imbalances in 2024, while another in-depth review should be undertaken for another Member State, as it presents particular risks of newly emerging imbalances;

19. Underlines that housing is directly interconnected with the macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, with damaging implications for economic resilience, dynamism and social progress and for regional and intra-EU mobility; is concerned that in some Member States, house prices are likely to increase and may become hard to curb in the absence of a holistic strategy;

Revised EU economic governance framework and its effective implementation

20. Recalls that the reform aims to make the framework simpler, more transparent and more effective, with greater national ownership and better enforcement, while differentiating between Member States on the basis of their individual starting points, representing a step forward in ending the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in view of the country-specific fiscal sustainability considerations embodied in the net expenditure path; recalls, furthermore, that the reform aims to strengthen fiscal sustainability through gradual and tailor-made adjustments complemented by reforms and investments and to promote countercyclical fiscal policies;

21. Acknowledges that the new fiscal rules provide greater flexibility and incentives linked to the investments and national reforms required to address the economic, social and geopolitical challenges facing the EU; acknowledges that financial resources and contributions from national budgets differ from one Member State to another; welcomes the fact that the net expenditure indicator excludes all national co-financing in EU-funded programmes, providing increased fiscal space for Member States to invest in the EU’s common priorities, as laid down in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, thus helping to strengthen synergies between the EU and national budgets, thereby reducing fragmentation and increasing the overall efficiency of public spending in some areas, such as defence;

22. Highlights that the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) plays a key role in the reformed EU fiscal rules; is of the opinion that the discretionary role of the Commission in the DSA requires the relevant assessments to be fully transparent, predictable, replicable and stable; calls on the Commission to address possible methodological improvements, such as assessing spillover effects between Member States, and to duly inform Parliament in this regard;

23. Notes the Commission’s inconsistent application of the fiscal rules framework in the past, and the Member States’ uneven compliance with the rules; stresses that it is essential for the new framework to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; affirms that a successful framework relies heavily on proper, transparent and effective implementation from the outset, while taking into account the Member States’ starting points and the individual challenges they face; takes note of the changes introduced in the new framework to improve the credibility of the financial sanctions regime;

24. Encourages the Member States to align the technical definition of their national operational indicator to the European primary net expenditure indicator;

25. Emphasises the role of Parliament and of independent fiscal authorities in the EU’s economic governance framework; underlines the discretionary power of the Commission in developing the medium-term fiscal-structural plans; emphasises the need for increased scrutiny of the Commission by Parliament and by the European Fiscal Board, as envisioned in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, and for an increase in the flow of information towards Parliament to enable its effective oversight;

National medium-term fiscal-structural and budgetary plans

26. Notes that not all Member States were able to submit their national medium-term fiscal-structural and draft budgetary plans on time; notes that, as a result of general elections and the formation of new governments, five Member States have not yet submitted their national medium-term fiscal-structural plans and two Member States have not yet submitted their draft budgetary plans, while one Member State has not submitted its draft budgetary plan for other unspecified reasons; calls on these Member States to submit the relevant plans as soon as possible; underlines that the timely submission of these plans is a precondition for the effective implementation and credibility of the new rules; reaffirms the importance of the timely submission of draft budgetary plans to translate commitments outlined in fiscal plans into concrete policies following approval of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans;

27. Recalls that the reforms and investments outlined in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans should align with the EU’s common priorities as laid down in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263; emphasises that, under the new framework, the Commission should pay particular attention to these priorities when assessing the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans;

28. Acknowledges that 21 of the 22 national medium-term fiscal-structural plans that have been reviewed so far received a positive evaluation; notes that the new framework allows Member States to use assumptions that differ from the Commission’s DSA if these differences are explained and duly justified in a transparent manner and are based on sound economic arguments in the technical dialogue with the Member States; observes, however, that in the plans submitted by five Member States, the Commission found insufficiently justified inconsistencies and deviations from the DSA framework in macroeconomic assumptions related to potential GDP and/or the GDP deflator; stresses that such deviations and risks of backloading could potentially threaten future fiscal sustainability; notes that in the plans submitted by three Member States, the Commission acknowledges a concentration of the fiscal adjustment towards the end of the period; calls on the Commission to ensure that any such concentration of the adjustment meets the requirements set out in the regulation and calls on it to prevent procyclical policies;

29. Takes note of the fact that only seven Member States have sought an opinion from their relevant independent fiscal institution, which provides an important additional scrutiny dimension; notes with caution that some independent fiscal institutions gave a negative opinion on their Member State’s national fiscal plan; stresses that nine Member States did not meet their obligation to conduct political consultations with civil society, social partners, regional authorities and other relevant stakeholders prior to submitting their national plans; further regrets the fact that several Member States have not involved their national parliaments in the approval process for the plans and have not reported whether the required consultations with national parliaments took place as laid down in the new framework;

30. Observes that five Member States have requested an extension of the adjustment period; emphasises that any such extension should be based on a set of investment and reform commitments that, taken all together, improve the potential growth and resilience of the economy, support fiscal sustainability, address the EU’s common priorities and the relevant CSRs and have been assessed as meeting the conditions outlined in the regulation for such an extension; notes that the reforms and investments used to justify this extension rely considerably on reforms already approved under the RRF; highlights the importance of and need for reforms and investments that contribute positively to the potential GDP growth of the Member States; calls on the Commission to effectively evaluate ex post the impact of agreed investments and reforms in terms of supporting fiscal sustainability, enhancing the growth potential of the economy, addressing the EU’s common priorities and the CSRs and ensuring the required level of nationally financed public investment;

31. Notes the Commission’s assessment that only 8 of the 17 draft budgetary plans presented are in line with fiscal recommendations stemming from the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan; regrets the fact that 7 plans were assessed as not being fully in line with the recommendations, 1 as non-compliant and 1 as at risk of not being in line with the recommendations; is concerned that six Member States have presented draft budgetary plans with annual or cumulative expenditure growth above their prescribed ceilings;

Fiscal stance and the role of fiscal policy in the provision of European public goods

32. Notes the Commission’s projection that the implementation of the revised governance framework is expected to lead to a reduction of the primary structural balance for the euro area as a whole of 0.5 % of GDP in 2024 and 0.25 % of GDP in 2025; notes the Commission’s assessment that this is in line with the process of enhancing fiscal sustainability and support the ongoing disinflationary process as economic uncertainty remains high; notes that GDP growth will continue to support fiscal consolidation throughout the EU; calls for fiscal policies that restore stability while promoting innovation, industrial competitiveness and long-term economic growth; stresses the need to create additional fiscal space to tackle future challenges and potential crises while preserving a sufficient level of investment to support and foster sustainable and inclusive growth, industrialisation and prosperity for all;

33. Considers that the effective implementation of the fiscal rules, although necessary, is not in itself sufficient to achieve the optimal fiscal stance at all times and ensure a high standard of living for all Europeans; notes that the fiscal stance is still projected to differ greatly from one Member State to another in 2025; calls on the Commission to explore ideas for a mechanism that helps ensure that the cyclical position of the EU as a whole is appropriate for the macroeconomic outlook at all times;

34. Recalls that, according to the Commission, the fiscal drag in 2025 will be partly offset by a slight expansion in investment, financed both by national budgets and by RRF grants and other EU funds; emphasises the RRF’s role in addressing EU investment needs, noting that it will expire by the end of 2026, which might lead to a decrease in public investment in common European priorities;

35. Calls on the Commission to initiate discussions on addressing the significant investment gap in the EU and to reduce borrowing costs, strengthen financial stability and enable strategic investments in line with the EU’s objectives and for the provision of European public goods, such as defence capabilities to match needs in a context of growing threats and security challenges; calls for full use to be made of the efficiency gains that may stem from the provision of European public goods at EU scale through the effective coordination of investment priorities among Member States; believes that this framework, where appropriate, should be strengthened by EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

36. Recalls that any EU funding must be accompanied by robust controls ensuring transparency, accountability and the efficient use of funds, so as to avoid unjustified increases in public spending;

37. Encourages the Member States to promote investment spending that produces a positive rate of return; acknowledges the Draghi report’s assessment that around four fifths of productive investments will be undertaken by the private sector in the EU, while public investment will also play a catalysing role; welcomes the Commission initiative to propose a competitiveness fund under the new multiannual financial framework and calls on it to make full use of financial guarantees to leverage private investment; stresses that the Member States must step up their efforts, in particular budgetary efforts, to accelerate innovation, digitalisation, education, training and decarbonisation, to strengthen European competitiveness and to reduce dependencies;

Country-specific recommendations

38. Notes that the share of ‘fully implemented’ CSRs has dropped from 18.1 % (in the period 2011-2018) to 13.9 % (in the period 2019-2023); recalls that implementing CSRs, including with regard to the efficiency of public spending, is a key part of ensuring fiscal sustainability and addressing macroeconomic imbalances; advocates a more efficient implementation of the CSRs and the relevant reforms; calls for ways of increasing the share of ‘fully implemented’ CSRs to be explored; calls on the Commission to link the CSRs more closely to the respective country reports; calls for the impact of reforms and the progress towards reducing identified investment gaps to be evaluated; calls for greater transparency in the preparation of CSRs;

39. Reiterates, in this regard, that CSRs should be enhanced by focusing on a limited set of challenges, in particular specific Member States’ structural challenges and the EU’s common priorities, with a view to promoting sound and inclusive economic growth, enhancing competitiveness and macroeconomic stability, promoting the green and digital transitions and ensuring social and intergenerational fairness;

40. Recalls the Member States’ commitment to address, in their national fiscal plans, the relevant CSRs in both their economic and social dimensions, as expressed under the European Semester; notes that the Commission has found unaddressed CSRs in the national fiscal plans;

41. Highlights the importance of the CSRs in tackling the longer-term drivers of fiscal sustainability, including the sustainability and proper provision of public pension systems, the healthcare and long-term care systems in the face of demographic challenges such as ageing populations, and preparedness for adverse developments, including climate-change-related physical risks; stresses the relevance of CSRs in addressing the stability of the housing market in order to contribute to the economic resilience of the EU;

°

° °

42. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Situation of EU journalists in the illegally occupied territory of Western Sahara – E-000605/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-000605/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Ana Miranda Paz (Verts/ALE)

Francisco Carrión, a Spanish journalist, was expelled from Western Sahara in February 2024 while covering the situation in this territory illegally occupied by Morocco. Carrión had travelled to Dakhla for reporting purposes and according to his account, he was detained, interrogated and eventually forced to board a flight back to Spain. Carrión stated that an officer told him his expulsion was due to what he had written about the King of Morocco. In addition, another Spanish journalist, José Carmona, was deported a week and a half earlier. Their expulsion reflects Morocco’s ongoing restrictions on press freedom in Western Sahara, where journalists, politicians and activists face censorship.

Taking these cases into account, along with Parliament’s resolution of 11 July 2023 on the protection of journalists around the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter:

1.What will the Commission do to ensure that journalists are protected while performing their duties?

2.What will the Commission do in the face of these breaches of freedom of expression?

Submitted: 10.2.2025
Last updated: 27 February 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
February 28, 2025

MIL-OSI: Golar LNG Limited Preliminary fourth quarter and financial year 2024 results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Highlights and subsequent events

Golar LNG Limited (“Golar” or “the Company”) reports Q4 2024 net income attributable to Golar of $3 million inclusive of $29 million of non-cash items¹, and Adjusted EBITDA¹ of $59 million.

Full year 2024 net income attributable to Golar of $50 million inclusive of $131 million of non-cash items¹, and Adjusted EBITDA¹ of $241 million.

Total Golar Cash¹ of $699 million.

Acquired all remaining minority interests in FLNG Hilli.

FLNG Hilli maintained market-leading operational track record and exceeded 2024 production target.

Pampa Energia S.A., Harbour Energy plc and YPF joined Southern Energy S.A. (“SESA”), creating a consortium of leading Argentinian gas producers planning to use FLNG Hilli under definitive agreements announced in July 2024.

FLNG Gimi commissioning commenced and first LNG produced, after receiving first gas from the GTA field.

MKII FLNG conversion project on schedule (9% complete) and Fuji LNG arrived at the shipyard for conversion works.

Sold shareholding in Avenir LNG Limited (“Avenir”) for net proceeds of $39 million.

Completed exit from LNG shipping with sale of the LNG carrier, Golar Arctic for $24 million.

Declared dividend of $0.25 per share for the quarter.

FLNG Hilli: Maintained her market leading operational track record and exceeded her contracted 2024 production volume resulting in the recognition of $0.5 million of 2024 over production accrued revenue. Q4 2024 Distributable Adjusted EBITDA¹ was $68 million excluding overproduction revenue. FLNG Hilli has offloaded 128 cargoes to date.

In December 2024, Golar acquired all remaining third party minority ownership interests in FLNG Hilli for $60 million in cash and a $30 million increase in Golar’s share of contractual debt. The acquisitions included a total of 5.45% common units, 10.9% Series A shares and 10.9% Series B shares. The transaction was equivalent to ~8% of the full FLNG capacity. Following this, Golar has a 100% economic interest in FLNG Hilli.

The acquisition is immediately accretive to Golar’s cash flow. Annual Adjusted EBITDA¹ from the base tolling fee is expected to increase by approximately $7 million. The Brent oil linked commodity element of the current FLNG Hilli charter will increase from $2.7 million to $3.1 million in annual Adjusted EBITDA¹ attributable to Golar per dollar for Brent oil prices between $60/bbl and the contractual ceiling. The TTF linked component of the current tariff will similarly increase annual Adjusted EBITDA¹ generation attributable to Golar from $3.2 million to $3.7 million per $/MMBtu of European TTF gas prices above a floor price that delivers a base annual TTF fee of $5 million. The acquisition of the minority ownership interests is also accretive to Golar’s Adjusted EBITDA backlog¹, with an ~8% shareholding of the 20-year charter in Argentina starting in 2027^* increasing the backlog by approximately $0.5 billion, before commodity exposure.

Golar expects to release significant capital from a contemplated refinancing of FLNG Hilli following completion of the conditions precedent in the SESA 20-year charter.

FLNG Gimi: Following the commercial reset with bp announced in August 2024, accelerated commissioning commenced in October 2024 using gas from a LNG carrier. In January 2025, gas from the carrier was replaced by feedgas from the bp operated FPSO which allowed full commissioning to commence. This milestone triggered the final upward adjustment to the Commissioning Rate under the commercial reset. LNG is now being produced, and subject to receipt of sufficient feed gas, the first LNG export cargo is expected within Q1 2025. Assuming all conditions are met, the Commercial Operations Date (“COD”) is expected within Q2 2025. COD will trigger the start of the 20-year Lease and Operate Agreement that unlocks the equivalent of around $3 billion of Adjusted EBITDA backlog¹ (Golar’s share) and recognition of contractual payments comprised of capital and operating elements in both the balance sheet and income statement.

A debt facility to refinance FLNG Gimi is in an advanced stage, with credit approvals now received. The transaction is subject to customary closing conditions and third party stakeholder approvals.

MKII FLNG 3.5MTPA conversion: Conversion work on the $2.2 billion MK II FLNG (“MK II”) is proceeding to schedule. After discharging her final cargo as an LNG carrier in January 2025, the conversion vessel Fuji LNG entered CIMC’s Yantai yard in February 2025. Golar has spent $0.6 billion to date, all of which is equity funded. The MK II is expected to be delivered in Q4 2027 and be the first available FLNG capacity globally.

As part of the EPC agreement, Golar also has an option for a second MK II conversion slot at CIMC for delivery within 2028.

FLNG business development: In July 2024, Golar announced that it had entered into definitive agreements for the deployment of an FLNG in Argentina. In October 2024, Golar received a notice reserving FLNG Hilli for the 20-year charter. During November 2024, Pampa Energia joined the SESA project with a 20% equity stake, in December 2024 Harbour Energy joined with a 15% equity stake and in February 2025 YPF joined with a 15% equity stake. Pan American Energy (“PAE”) remains with a 40% equity stake and Golar with its 10% equity stake. SESA will be responsible for sourcing Argentine natural gas to the FLNG, chartering and operating FLNG Hilli and marketing and selling LNG globally. The addition of leading natural gas and oil producers in Argentina further strengthens both the project and Golar’s charter counterparty.

Following the end of FLNG Hilli’s current charter in July 2026 offshore Cameroon, FLNG Hilli will undergo vessel upgrades to maintain 20-years of continuous operations offshore. Operations in Argentina are expected to commence in 2027. FLNG Hilli is expected to generate an annual Adjusted EBITDA¹ of approximately $300 million, plus a commodity linked element in the FLNG tariff and commodity exposure through Golar’s 10% equity stake in SESA.

The project remains subject to defined conditions precedent (“CP”), including an export license, environmental assessment and Final Investment Decision (“FID”) by SESA. Workstreams for each CP are advancing according to schedule and are expected to be concluded within Q2 2025.

Golar’s position as the only proven service provider of FLNG globally, our market leading capex/ton and operational uptime continues to drive interest in our FLNG solutions. The MKII under construction is now the focus of multiple commercial discussions. Advanced discussions are taking place in the Americas, West Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Once a charter is secured for the MKII under construction, we aim to FID our 4^th FLNG unit. In addition to the option for a second MKII at CIMC Raffles shipyard, we are now in discussions with other capable shipyards for this potential 4^th unit, focused on design, liquefaction capacity, capex/ton and delivery.

Other/shipping: Operating revenues and costs under corporate and other items are comprised of two FSRU operate and maintain agreements in respect of the LNG Croatia and Italis LNG. The non-core shipping segment was comprised of the LNGC Golar Arctic, and Fuji LNG. During February 2025, Fuji LNG entered CIMC’s yard for her FLNG conversion and Golar Arctic was sold for $24 million. This concludes Golar’s 50-year presence in the LNG shipping business.

In January 2025, Golar also agreed to sell its non-core 23.4% interest in Avenir. The transaction closed in February 2025 upon receipt of $39 million of net proceeds.

Shares and dividends: As of December 31, 2024, 104.5 million shares are issued and outstanding. Golar’s Board of Directors approved a total Q4 2024 dividend of $0.25 per share to be paid on or around March 18, 2025. The record date will be March 11, 2025.

Financial Summary

(in thousands of $)	Q4 2024	Q4 2023	% Change	YTD 2024	YTD 2023	% Change
Net income/(loss) attributable to Golar LNG Ltd	3,349	(32,847)	(110)%	49,694	(46,793)	(206)%
Total operating revenues	65,917	79,679	(17)%	260,372	298,429	(13)%
Adjusted EBITDA ¹	59,168	114,249	(48)%	240,500	355,771	(32)%
Golar’s share of contractual debt ¹	1,515,357	1,221,190	24%	1,515,357	1,221,190	24%

Financial Review

Business Performance:

	2024		2023
	Oct-Dec	Jul-Sep	Oct-Dec
(in thousands of $)	Total	Total	Total
Net income/(loss)	15,037	(35,969)	(31,071)
Income taxes	(504)	208	332
Income/(loss) before income taxes	14,533	(35,761)	(30,739)
Depreciation and amortization	13,642	13,628	12,794
Impairment of long-term assets	22,933	—	—
Unrealized loss on oil and gas derivative instruments	14,269	73,691	126,909
Other non-operating loss	7,000	—	—
Interest income	(9,866)	(8,902)	(11,234)
Interest expense, net	—	—	(1,107)
(Gains)/losses on derivative instruments	(8,711)	14,955	16,542
Other financial items, net	1,153	470	(157)
Net income from equity method investments	4,215	948	1,241
Adjusted EBITDA ⁽¹⁾	59,168	59,029	114,249

	2024
	Oct-Dec				Jul-Sep
(in thousands of $)	FLNG	Corporate and other	Shipping	Total	FLNG	Corporate and other	Shipping	Total
Total operating revenues	56,396	6,025	3,496	65,917	56,075	6,212	2,520	64,807
Vessel operating expenses	(19,788)	(5,048)	(3,073)	(27,909)	(20,947)	(7,403)	(3,373)	(31,723)
Voyage, charterhire & commission expenses	—	—	(446)	(446)	—	—	(888)	(888)
Administrative expenses	(264)	(7,240)	(1)	(7,505)	(568)	(6,498)	(7)	(7,073)
Project expenses	(3,624)	(1,236)	—	(4,860)	(1,249)	(1,894)	—	(3,143)
Realized gains on oil derivative instrument ⁽²⁾	33,502	—	—	33,502	37,049	—	—	37,049
Other operating income	469	—	—	469	—	—	—	—
Adjusted EBITDA ⁽¹⁾	66,691	(7,499)	(24)	59,168	70,360	(9,583)	(1,748)	59,029

(2) The line item “Realized and unrealized (loss)/gain on oil and gas derivative instruments” in the Unaudited Consolidated Statements of Operations relates to income from the Hilli Liquefaction Tolling Agreement (“LTA”) and the natural gas derivative which is split into: “Realized gains on oil and gas derivative instruments” and “Unrealized (loss)/gain on oil and gas derivative instruments”.

	2023
	Oct-Dec
(in thousands of $)	FLNG	Corporate and other	Shipping	Total
Total operating revenues	72,433	5,510	1,736	79,679
Vessel operating expenses	(16,510)	(4,765)	(2,005)	(23,280)
Voyage, charterhire & commission (expenses)/income	(133)	—	(900)	(1,033)
Administrative income/(expenses)	29	(7,031)	(1)	(7,003)
Project development expenses	(958)	380	(99)	(677)
Realized gains on oil derivative instrument	53,520	—	—	53,520
Other operating income	13,043	—	—	13,043
Adjusted EBITDA ⁽¹⁾	121,424	(5,906)	(1,269)	114,249

Golar reports today Q4 2024 net income of $3 million, before non-controlling interests, inclusive of $29 million of non-cash items¹, comprised of:

A $23 million impairment of LNG carrier, Golar Arctic;

TTF and Brent oil unrealized mark-to-market (“MTM”) losses of $14 million; and

A $8 million MTM gain on interest rate swaps.

The Brent oil linked component of FLNG Hilli’s fees generates additional annual cash of approximately $3.1 million for every dollar increase in Brent Crude prices between $60 per barrel and the contractual ceiling. Billing of this component is based on a three-month look-back at average Brent Crude prices. During Q4, we recognized a total of $34 million of realized gains on FLNG Hilli’s oil and gas derivative instruments, comprised of a:

$14 million realized gain on the Brent oil linked derivative instrument;

$12 million realized gain on the hedged component of the quarter’s TTF linked fees; and

$8 million realized gain in respect of fees for the TTF linked production.

Further, we recognized a total of $14 million of non-cash losses in relation to FLNG Hilli’s oil and gas derivative assets, with corresponding changes in fair value in its constituent parts recognized on our unaudited consolidated statement of operations as follows:

$12 million loss on the economically hedged portion of the Q4 TTF linked FLNG production; and

$2 million loss on the Brent oil linked derivative asset.

Balance Sheet and Liquidity:

As of December 31, 2024, Total Golar Cash¹ was $699 million, comprised of $566 million of cash and cash equivalents and $133 million of restricted cash.

Golar’s share of Contractual Debt¹ as of December 31, 2024 is $1,515 million. Deducting Total Golar Cash¹ of $699 million from Golar’s share of Contractual Debt¹ leaves a debt position net of Total Golar Cash of $816 million.

Assets under development amounts to $2.2 billion, comprised of $1.7 billion in respect of FLNG Gimi and $0.5 billion in respect of the MKII. The carrying value of LNG carrier Fuji LNG, currently included under Vessels and equipment, net will be transferred to Assets under development in Q1, 2025.

Following agreement by the consortium of lenders who provide the current $700 million FLNG Gimi facility, Golar drew down the final $70 million tranche of this facility in November 2024. Of the $1.7 billion FLNG Gimi investment as of December 31, 2024, inclusive of $297 million of capitalized financing costs, $700 million was funded by the current debt facility. Both the FLNG Gimi investment and outstanding Gimi debt are reported on a 100% basis. All capital expenditure in connection with the 100% owned MK II is equity funded.

Non-GAAP measures

In addition to disclosing financial results in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (US GAAP), this earnings release and the associated investor presentation contains references to the non-GAAP financial measures which are included in the table below. We believe these non-GAAP financial measures provide investors with useful supplemental information about the financial performance of our business, enable comparison of financial results between periods where certain items may vary independent of business performance, and allow for greater transparency with respect to key metrics used by management in operating our business and measuring our performance.

This report also contains certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures for which we are unable to provide a reconciliation to the most comparable GAAP financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile those non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside of our control, such as oil and gas prices and exchange rates, as such items may be significant. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future events which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are calculated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied to Golar’s unaudited consolidated financial statements.

These non-GAAP financial measures should not be considered a substitute for, or superior to, financial measures and financial results calculated in accordance with GAAP. Non-GAAP measures are not uniformly defined by all companies and may not be comparable with similarly titled measures and disclosures used by other companies. The reconciliations as at December 31, 2024 and for the year ended December 31, 2024, from these results should be carefully evaluated.

Non-GAAP measure	Closest equivalent US GAAP measure	Adjustments to reconcile to primary financial statements prepared under US GAAP	Rationale for adjustments
Performance measures
*Adjusted EBITDA*	Net income/(loss)	+/- Income taxes + Depreciation and amortization + Impairment of long-lived assets +/- Unrealized (gain)/loss on oil and gas derivative instruments +/- Other non-operating (income)/losses +/- Net financial (income)/expense +/- Net (income)/losses from equity method investments +/- Net loss/(income) from discontinued operations	Increases the comparability of total business performance from period to period and against the performance of other companies by excluding the results of our equity investments, removing the impact of unrealized movements on embedded derivatives, depreciation, impairment charge, financing costs, tax items and discontinued operations.
*Distributable Adjusted EBITDA*	Net income/(loss)	+/- Income taxes + Depreciation and amortization + Impairment of long-lived assets +/- Unrealized (gain)/loss on oil and gas derivative instruments +/- Other non-operating (income)/losses +/- Net financial (income)/expense +/- Net (income)/losses from equity method investments +/- Net loss/(income) from discontinued operations – Amortization of deferred commissioning period revenue – Amortization of Day 1 gains – Accrued overproduction revenue + Overproduction revenue received – Accrued underutilization adjustment	Increases the comparability of our operational FLNG Hilli from period to period and against the performance of other companies by removing the non-distributable income of FLNG Hilli, project development costs, the operating costs of the Gandria (prior to her disposal) and FLNG Gimi.
Liquidity measures
*Contractual debt ¹*	Total debt (current and non-current), net of deferred finance charges	+/-Variable Interest Entity (“VIE”) consolidation adjustments +/-Deferred finance charges	During the year, we consolidate a lessor VIE for our Hilli sale and leaseback facility. This means that on consolidation, our contractual debt is eliminated and replaced with the lessor VIE debt. Contractual debt represents our debt obligations under our various financing arrangements before consolidating the lessor VIE. The measure enables investors and users of our financial statements to assess our liquidity, identify the split of our debt (current and non-current) based on our underlying contractual obligations and aid comparability with our competitors.
*Adjusted net debt*	Adjusted net debt based on GAAP measures: -Total debt (current and non-current), net of deferred finance charges – Cash and cash equivalents – Restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current) – Other current assets (Receivable from TTF linked commodity swap derivatives)	Total debt (current and non-current), net of: +Deferred finance charges +Cash and cash equivalents +Restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current) +/-VIE consolidation adjustments +Receivable from TTF linked commodity swap derivatives	The measure enables investors and users of our financial statements to assess our liquidity based on our underlying contractual obligations and aids comparability with our competitors.
*Total Golar Cash*	Golar cash based on GAAP measures: + Cash and cash equivalents + Restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current)	-VIE restricted cash and short-term deposits	We consolidate a lessor VIE for our sale and leaseback facility. This means that on consolidation, we include restricted cash held by the lessor VIE. Total Golar Cash represents our cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current) before consolidating the lessor VIE. Management believe that this measure enables investors and users of our financial statements to assess our liquidity and aids comparability with our competitors.

(1) Please refer to reconciliation below for Golar’s share of Contractual Debt

Adjusted EBITDA backlog: This is a non-GAAP financial measure and represents the share of contracted fee income for executed contracts or definitive agreements less forecasted operating expenses for these contracts/agreements. Adjusted EBITDA backlog should not be considered as an alternative to net income / (loss) or any other measure of our financial performance calculated in accordance with U.S. GAAP.

Non-cash items: Non-cash items comprised of impairment of long-lived assets, release of prior year contract underutilization liability, mark-to-market (“MTM”) movements on our TTF and Brent oil linked derivatives, listed equity securities and interest rate swaps (“IRS”) which relate to the unrealized component of the gains/(losses) on oil and gas derivative instruments, unrealized MTM (losses)/gains on investment in listed equity securities and gains on derivative instruments, net, in our unaudited consolidated statement of operations.

Abbreviations used:

FLNG: Floating Liquefaction Natural Gas vessel
FSRU: Floating Storage and Regasification Unit
MKII FLNG: Mark II FLNG
FPSO: Floating Production, Storage and Offloading unit

MMBtu: Million British Thermal Units
mtpa: Million Tons Per Annum

Reconciliations – Liquidity Measures

Total Golar Cash

(in thousands of $)	December 31, 2024	September 30, 2024	December 31, 2023
Cash and cash equivalents	566,384	732,062	679,225
Restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current)	150,198	92,025	92,245
Less: VIE restricted cash and short-term deposits	(17,472)	(17,463)	(18,085)
Total Golar Cash	699,110	806,624	753,385

Contractual Debt and Adjusted Net Debt

(in thousands of $)	December 31, 2024	September 30, 2024	December 31, 2023
Total debt (current and non-current) net of deferred finance charges	1,451,110	1,422,399	1,216,730
VIE consolidation adjustments	242,811	233,964	202,219
Deferred finance charges	22,686	24,480	23,851
Total Contractual Debt	1,716,607	1,680,843	1,442,800
Less: Keppel’s and B&V’s share of the FLNG Hilli contractual debt	—	(30,884)	(32,610)
Less: Keppel’s share of the Gimi debt	(201,250)	(184,625)	(189,000)
Golar’s share of Contractual Debt	1,515,357	1,465,334	1,221,190
Less: Total Golar Cash	(699,110)	(806,625)	(753,385)
Less: Receivables from the remaining unwinding of TTF hedges	—	(12,360)	(57,020)
Golar’s Adjusted Net Debt	816,247	646,349	410,785

Please see Appendix A for a capital repayment profile for Golar’s contractual debt.

Forward Looking Statements

This press release contains forward-looking statements (as defined in Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) which reflects management’s current expectations, estimates and projections about its operations. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, that address activities and events that will, should, could or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Words such as “if,” “subject to,” “believe,” “assuming,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “project,” “plan,” “potential,” “will,” “may,” “should,” “expect,” “could,” “would,” “predict,” “propose,” “continue,” or the negative of these terms and similar expressions are intended to identify such forward-looking statements. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and are based upon various assumptions, many of which are based, in turn, upon further assumptions, including without limitation, management’s examination of historical operating trends, data contained in our records and other data available from third parties. Although we believe that these assumptions were reasonable when made, because these assumptions are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies which are difficult or impossible to predict and are beyond our control, we cannot assure you that we will achieve or accomplish these expectations, beliefs or projections. Therefore, actual outcomes and results may differ materially from what is expressed or forecasted in such forward-looking statements. You should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this press release. Unless legally required, Golar undertakes no obligation to update publicly any forward-looking statements whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. Other important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements include but are not limited to:

our ability and that of our counterparty to meet our respective obligations under the 20-year lease and operate agreement (the “LOA”) with BP Mauritania Investments Limited, a subsidiary of BP p.l.c (“bp”), entered into in connection with the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim Project (the “GTA Project”), including the commissioning and start-up of various project infrastructure. Delays could result in incremental costs to both parties to the LOA, delay floating liquefaction natural gas vessel (“FLNG”) commissioning works and the start of operations for our FLNG Gimi (“FLNG Gimi”);

our ability to meet our obligations under our commercial agreements, including the liquefaction tolling agreement (the “LTA”) entered into in connection with the FLNG Hilli Episeyo (“FLNG Hilli”);

our ability to meet our obligations with Southern Energy S.A. SESA in connection with the recently signed agreement on FLNG deployment in Argentina, and SESAs ability to meet its obligations with us;

the ability to secure a suitable contract for the MK II within the expected timeframe, including the impact of project capital expenditures, foreign exchange fluctuations, and commodity price volatility on investment returns and potential changes in market conditions affecting deployment opportunities;

changes in our ability to obtain additional financing or refinance existing debts on acceptable terms or at all, or to secure a listing for our 2024 Unsecured Bonds;

Global economic trends, competition, and geopolitical risks, including U.S. government actions, trade tensions or conflicts such as between the U.S. and China, related sanctions, a potential Russia-Ukraine peace settlement and its potential impact on LNG supply and demand;

a material decline or prolonged weakness in tolling rates for FLNGs;

failure of shipyards to comply with schedules, performance specifications or agreed prices;

failure of our contract counterparties to comply with their agreements with us or other key project stakeholders;

increased tax liabilities in the jurisdictions where we are currently operating or expect to operate;

continuing volatility in the global financial markets, including but not limited to commodity prices, foreign exchange rates and interest rates;

changes in general domestic and international political conditions, particularly where we operate, or where we seek to operate;

changes in our ability to retrofit vessels as FLNGs, including the availability of vessels to purchase and in the time it takes to build new vessels or convert existing vessels;

continuing uncertainty resulting from potential future claims from our counterparties of purported force majeure (“FM”) under contractual arrangements, including but not limited to our future projects and other contracts to which we are a party;

our ability to close potential future transactions in relation to equity interests in our vessels or to monetize our remaining equity method investments on a timely basis or at all;

increases in operating costs as a result of inflation, including but not limited to salaries and wages, insurance, crew provisions, repairs and maintenance, spares and redeployment related modification costs;

claims made or losses incurred in connection with our continuing obligations with regard to New Fortress Energy Inc. (“NFE”), Energos Infrastructure Holdings Finance LLC (“Energos”), Cool Company Ltd (“CoolCo”) and Snam S.p.A. (“Snam”);

the ability of Energos, CoolCo and Snam to meet their respective obligations to us, including indemnification obligations;

changes to rules and regulations applicable to FLNGs or other parts of the natural gas and LNG supply chain;

changes to rules on climate-related disclosures as required by the European Union or the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”), including but not limited to disclosure of certain climate-related risks and financial impacts, as well as greenhouse gas emissions;

actions taken by regulatory authorities that may prohibit the access of FLNGs to various ports and locations; and

other factors listed from time to time in registration statements, reports or other materials that we have filed with or furnished to the Commission, including our annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2023, filed with the Commission on March 28, 2024 (the “2023 Annual Report”).

As a result, you are cautioned not to rely on any forward-looking statements. Actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. The Company undertakes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise unless required by law.

Responsibility Statement

We confirm that, to the best of our knowledge, the unaudited consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2024, which have been prepared in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States give a true and fair view of Golar’s unaudited consolidated assets, liabilities, financial position and results of operations. To the best of our knowledge, the report for the year ended December 31, 2024, includes a fair review of important events that have occurred during the period and their impact on the unaudited consolidated financial statements, the principal risks and uncertainties and major related party transactions.

Our actual results for the quarter and year ended December 31, 2024 will not be available until after this press release is furnished and may differ from these estimates. The preliminary financial information presented herein should not be considered a substitute for the financial information to be filed with the SEC in our Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024 once it becomes available. Accordingly, you should not place undue reliance upon these preliminary financial results.

February 27, 2025
The Board of Directors
Golar LNG Limited
Hamilton, Bermuda
Investor Questions: +44 207 063 7900
Karl Fredrik Staubo – CEO
Eduardo Maranhão – CFO

Stuart Buchanan – Head of Investor Relations

Tor Olav Trøim (Chairman of the Board)
Dan Rabun (Director)
Thorleif Egeli (Director)
Carl Steen (Director)
Niels Stolt-Nielsen (Director)
Lori Wheeler Naess (Director)
Georgina Sousa (Director)

This information is subject to the disclosure requirements pursuant to Section 5-12 the Norwegian Securities Trading Act

The MIL Network –

February 28, 2025

MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UN Human Rights Council 58: UK Statement at the Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on Eritrea

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Speech

UN Human Rights Council 58: UK Statement at the Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on Eritrea

UK Statement at the 58 Human Rights Council during the Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on Eritrea. Delivered by a UK spokesperson.

Thank you Mr President,

We thank the Special Rapporteur for his update and share his deep concern about the human rights situation in Eritrea.

And we express our disappointment. Despite Eritrea’s membership on this Council, it has not improved its own Human Rights record, nor made any progress in engaging with the Special Rapporteur.

We reiterate the urgent need for Eritrea to reform its national service. Eritrea should take steps to regularise the duration of national service and increase the exemptions to it. This would enable young people to determine their own career path, as well as restoring their trust in the government.

We also call upon Eritrea to address concerns surrounding transnational oppression. Reports of refugees being harassed and facing intimidation, including in the UK, are completely unacceptable. We will not hesitate to prosecute any perpetrators.

Finally, we call for all those arbitrarily detained in Eritrea to be released, and for concrete steps to protect freedom of expression to be urgently taken. A free and open society is the bedrock of stability and prosperity.

Special Rapporteur, what is your assessment of the state of civic space in Eritrea and what are your recommendations to address this?

Updates to this page

Published 27 February 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

February 28, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Relatives of slain PNG police officer block Highlands Highway over unresolved killing

By Scott Waide, RNZ Pacific PNG correspondent

The family of a Papua New Guinea police constable, killed in an ambush last month, has blocked a section of the Highlands Highway in Goroka, Eastern Highlands Province, demanding justice for his death.

Constable Harry Gorano succumbed to his injuries in intensive care two weeks ago after spending three weeks in a coma.

He was attacked alongside colleagues in the Southern Highlands in January, during which fellow officer Constable Noel Biape was fatally shot.

Gorano’s relatives, frustrated by the lack of arrests in the case, staged the roadblock early today, halting traffic on a key transit route.

They have repeatedly called for authorities to arrest those responsible for the ambush.

Additional personnel have been deployed to Goroka to assist local officers in managing tensions.

Forces in neighboring regions have also been placed on standby amid concerns that the protest could spark broader unrest.

The incident highlights the ongoing risks faced by PNG’s police force.

Since 2017, more than 20 officers have been killed in the line of duty, with many perpetrators still at large.

Investigations into Constable Gorano’s death remain ongoing.

Protesters block a section of the Highlands Highway outside Goroka. Image: RNZ Pacific/Lae-Morope Crime Alert via WhatsApp

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Family of late constable urges authorities to fast-track investigation

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

February 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: African Leaders Unite to Mobilize African Investment and Financing for Implementing Agenda 2063
Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, February 27, 2025/APO Group/ —

On the sidelines of the 38^th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, African Heads of State, Government and Business Leaders convened for a Presidential Breakfast Dialogue to address the continent’s financing and investment gaps. The event was held under the theme “Africa at the Forefront: Mobilizing African Investment and Financing for Implementing Agenda 2063”.

The dialogue, which was hosted by His Excellency John Dramani Mahama, President of the Republic of Ghana and Champion on African Union Financial Institutions, in collaboration with the African Union Commission (AUC) and the Alliance of African Multilateral Financial Institutions (AAMFI), reaffirmed the continent’s commitment to accelerating self-reliant, sustainable economic development.

In his keynote address, President Mahama emphasized the urgency of strengthening Africa’s financial independence through domestic resource mobilization, concessional financing, and strategic public-private partnerships. “Africa must harness its own financial and investment capacities to drive the transformative vision of Agenda 2063. We cannot continue to rely on external financing mechanisms that do not align with our long-term development goals,” he stated.

Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Director General, World Trade Organization (WTO) emphasized the need for Africans to take charge of their own development by shifting mindsets and strengthening financial self-sufficiency.

She Said, “The Africa Club is a crucial step toward looking inward and harnessing our own potential. However, we need to focus on four key priorities for Africa’s financial and economic transformation: Firstly, strengthening African financial institutions – If we are to finance our continent’s development, we must capitalize our own financial institutions, including national development banks, ensuring they have the resources to support Africa’s needs. Secondly, let’s address debt challenges to attract investment – we must focus on attracting and retaining investment, including foreign direct investment (FDI), and implementing coordinated strategies to leverage equity financing. Instead of relying on aid, Africa should push for partnerships that channel financial resources into investments. Thirdly, let’s leverage domestic resources – with over $250 billion in pension funds on the continent, we must tap into these resources for development. Strengthening our capital markets, integrating African financial institutions, and utilizing diaspora bonds can significantly boost Africa’s financial resilience. Lastly, let’s drive trade and economic growth – sustainable financing hinges on Africa’s ability to grow its economies, trade more, and add value to its products. Without economic expansion, the resources needed to bridge financing gaps will remain out of reach.”

Speaking during the dialogue, H.E. Dr. Monique Nsanzabaganwa, Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission, highlighted Africa’s immense potential and the critical role of collaboration. “This is an exciting time for Africa, which has been stretching and renewing itself economically, politically, and socially in recent years. Only the grumpiest pessimists will bet against this new era of ‘Africa Time’ for its economic and social transformation as envisioned under Agenda 2063.”

Dr. Nsanzabaganwa urged investors to seize the opportunities within Africa’s evolving economic landscape. “You will be right to have faith and believe in investing in Africa. The continent is perceived as the ‘new frontier,’ the ‘future paradise’ that sharpens a race to markets by an increasing number of investors.”

Speaking on behalf of AAMFI, Prof. Benedict O. Oramah, Chairperson of AAMFI’s Governing Council and President of Afreximbank, underscored the significance of African financial institutions leading the charge in development finance. “AAMFI represents Africa’s collective financial strength, and through coordinated action, we will mobilize resources at scale to achieve Agenda 2063,” he stated. He further emphasized Africa’s need for financial solidarity in debt resolution: “We have developed a platform that will make it possible to jointly invest in projects that are impactful to the continent. There is no reason why the bridge across Congo Brazzaville and Congo Kinshasa should not be built, the cost is a mere US$500 million; there is no reason why railways cannot be built across Africa, at best they cost about US$1-2Bn. We cannot call for a reform of the international financial architecture on weak legs, no one will listen to us if they view us as mere beggars. We must rely on our own institutions and use this platform to leverage our individual and collective resources to transform our continent. Let’s strengthen our alliance to meet our set objectives.”

The dialogue featured a high-level panel of distinguished leaders and finance experts, including: Dr. Donald Kaberuka, African Union (AU) High Representative for Financing of the Union and the Peace Fund; Samaila Zubairu, 1^st Vice Chairperson, AAMFI and President & CEO of Africa Finance Corporation (AFC); Dr. Corneille Karekezi, 2^nd Vice Chairperson AAMFI and Group Managing Director & CEO, African Reinsurance Corporation; Ahunna Eziakonwa, Assistant Administrator and Regional Director for Africa, UNDP; and H.E. Amb. Albert Muchanga, Commissioner for Economic Development, Trade, Tourism, Industry, and Minerals, African Union Commission.

Discussions centered on innovative strategies for mobilizing African capital, strengthening financial institutions, and leveraging the role of African Multilateral Financial Institutions (AMFIs) in financing critical development sectors such as infrastructure, industrialization, and trade.

The event also witnessed special investment announcements:
- African Trade Transformation Fund (ATTF), a groundbreaking USD5 billion concessional finance window initiative by Afreximbank to provide concessional financing to unlock new opportunities for African businesses and governments.
- Shelter Afrique Development Bank (ShafDB) introduced the Catalytic Capital Replenishment Fund to bridge the housing and urban infrastructure gap in Africa which is reported to be a 53-million-unit deficit requiring $1.3 trillion to bridge.
- The African Reinsurance Corporation (Africa Re) Group has pledged $1 million to the African Union Peace Fund. Additionally, the Corporation donated $500,000 to the Africa CDC during the COVID-19 pandemic and has now authorized the use of the balance for Mpox response efforts. The Group Managing Director further stated that Africa Re has committed 2% of its net profits to the African Re Foundation, which will allocate funds to support various initiatives across the continent, including disaster risk financing.
- The African Solidarity Fund (ASF) established two key partnerships: a $320 million Guarantee Line to enhance access to housing credit and a $240 million Credit Line Guarantee to support women and youth empowerment, fostering entrepreneurship in the WAEMU.
- Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) launched a Debt for Equity initiative to support the capitalization of African Multilateral Financial Institutions by mobilizing resources from the Arab world towards sub-Saharan Africa.
African Heads of State & Government, including leaders from Angola, Nigeria, Mauritania, Rwanda, Zambia, Libya, Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, and Equatorial Guinea, reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening Africa’s financial ecosystem and supporting the growth of AAMFIs as key instruments of economic transformation.

The event concluded with a unified call to action for African governments, financial institutions, and the private sector to strengthen coordination and build strategic partnerships to accelerate Africa’s development by His Excellency Ambassador Albert Muchanga, Commissioner for Trade and Industry at the African Union Commission.

MIL OSI Africa –
February 28, 2025
MIL-OSI: MEXC Launches Campaign for ENA & USDe with $1,000,000 Rewards

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

VICTORIA, Seychelles, Feb. 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — MEXC, the world’s leading cryptocurrency trading platform, announced the listing of the Ethena USDe (USDE) in the Innovation Zone and open USDE-related trading pairs. To celebrate the launch, MEXC is introducing USDe & ENA-related events for all users with a $1,000,000 reward pool.

MEXC Backs Decentralized Stable Assets with USDe Listing

Since their inception, stablecoins have played an important role in the crypto ecosystem. However, many face limitations due to dependence on centralized custodians and traditional banking infrastructure. USDe, issued by the Ethereum-based DeFi platform Ethena (ENA), addresses these challenges. It is a fully decentralized synthetic USD asset that uses delta-neutral hedging to maintain a soft peg to the U.S. dollar without the need for overcollateralization or central custody. Unlike typical stablecoins, USDe employs smart contracts to automatically open and close perpetual short positions, ensuring scalability and stability.

As a global leader in digital asset trading, MEXC’s listing of USDe and USDE-related trading pairs highlights the growing importance of decentralized stable assets in the evolving DeFi landscape. This initiative reaffirms MEXC’s commitment to supporting innovative blockchain solutions and promoting decentralized finance. By providing strong liquidity and broad market coverage, MEXC creates the ideal environment for projects like USDe to thrive and unlock new possibilities in the digital economy. MEXC also offers users the chance to participate in a $1,000,000 reward pool through four major activities. This initiative enables users to engage with cutting-edge DeFi projects, explore innovative stable assets like USDe, and actively contribute to the growth of the broader DeFi ecosystem.

Celebrate the ENA & USDe Campaign with a $1,000,000 Prize Pool

MEXC, known for quickly listing trending tokens, expands its offerings with USDe (USDE). The USDE/USDT trading market officially launched in the Innovation Zone on February 27, 2025, at 10:00 (UTC), followed by ENA/USDE, BTC/USDE, ETH/USDE, SOL/USDE, and XRP/USDE at 11:00 (UTC).
To celebrate this significant listing, MEXC has designed a series of events that cater to both new and experienced traders. Users can enjoy zero-fee trading across select USDE and ENA trading pairs, creating an optimal environment for market participants to explore these assets. USDE holders can earn attractive yields of up to 10% APR simply by holding the token, with no additional staking or locking required. Meanwhile, new users joining the ENA staking program can enjoy up to 400% APR, further maximizing their earnings. The platform is also introducing exclusive staking pools, with particularly appealing rates for new users.

Additionally, active traders can participate in trading competitions with a substantial prize pool of 300,000 USDT in Futures bonuses, rewarding various levels of trading activity. In a move to further support stablecoin adoption, MEXC has also purchased $20 million in USDe, reinforcing its commitment to expanding the stablecoin ecosystem.

Beyond Trading: Earn Passive Income on MEXC

In addition to listing a wide range of tokens and trading pairs, MEXC provides various financial products designed to help crypto holders generate passive income. Flexible and fixed-term savings plans allow deposits of supported tokens to earn interest. Flexible savings incur no lock-up period and deliver daily interest, while fixed-term savings require a set commitment but offer higher potential returns. Through these offerings, MEXC continues to expand its ecosystem, providing a multifaceted approach to digital asset growth that caters to both new and experienced market participants.

Your Easiest Way to Trending Tokens

MEXC aims to become the go-to platform offering the widest range of valuable crypto assets. The platform has grown its user base to 30 million by providing a diverse selection of tokens, high-frequency airdrops, and simple participation processes. In 2024, MEXC launched a total of 2,376 new tokens, including 1,716 initial listings and 605 memecoins, with total airdrop rewards exceeding $136 million.

About MEXC
Founded in 2018, MEXC is committed to being “Your Easiest Way to Crypto”. Serving over 32 million users across 170+ countries, MEXC is known for its broad selection of trending tokens, frequent airdrop opportunities, and low trading fees. Our user-friendly platform is designed to support both new traders and experienced investors, offering secure and efficient access to digital assets. MEXC prioritizes simplicity and innovation, making crypto trading more accessible and rewarding.

MEXC Official Website｜ X ｜ Telegram ｜How to Sign Up on MEXC

Contact:
Lucia Hu
PR Manager
lucia.hu@mexc.com

Disclaimer: This content is provided by MEXC. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice. Investing in crypto and mining related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector–including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining–complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed. Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release.

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/9ce22b33-25e4-47d2-a488-573f3084696d

The MIL Network –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI: Threats, political repatriations and kidnap dominate the crisis management landscape, according to Willis
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

LONDON, Feb. 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — 26% of all incidents reported by clients last year to Alert:24 – the in-house risk advisory and crisis support service provided by Willis, a WTW business – were related to threats against individuals or client assets. Closely following, at 21% each, were emergency political repatriations of employees or family members and kidnaps for ransom, according to its latest Crisis Management Annual Review.

In a record year for the number of elections in 2024, incumbents in many of the world’s leading democracies faced significant declines in vote share, with nearly 80% losing ground compared to previous elections. The trend was driven by poor economic performance, with high inflation being a major concern for voters. While some incumbents formed minority coalitions to stay in power, many were ousted. The year saw significant protests and political turmoil in both free and authoritarian countries.

Looking ahead to 2025, rising populism, divisive rhetoric, and socio-economic tensions will drive continued violence and unrest in Europe, but the security agenda will remain dominated by terrorism threats and geopolitical challenges. Acts of violence directed against European officials surged in 2024, a trend which is expected to continue in 2025. Terrorism in North America and Europe will highly likely continue to stem from lone-wolf actors inspired by radical ideologies and involve low sophistication tactics and techniques.

Civil unrest and political violence are also a possibility amid growing social tensions in the US.

In Asia-Pacific, the threat of active assailant incidents has come to the fore over the past year and will remain a trend to watch.

Other key takeaways include:
- Persistent trends: In the US, the number of active assailant attacks remains higher than the pre-COVID-19 average, with a continued prevalence of workplace violence and mass shootings. The threat of lone-wolf terrorism also persists, with radicalization taking place online. In Latin America, organized crime continues to be pervasive, with highly operational criminal enterprises often intertwining with political structures to advance their interests and destabilize democratic institutions. Consequently, there has been a surge in kidnapping, in particular express kidnappings, with notifications to the Crisis Support Team for this type of incident originating in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.
- Sustained level of conflict: Overall, client incident notifications reduced by 21% in 2024 in comparison to the prior year, reflecting a 2023 characterized by a sustained level of conflict and catastrophes. While major events, such as the conflict between Israel and Hamas and the Sudanese Civil War, continue to fuel demand for risk mitigation services to protect operations, assets and personnel in affected areas, no new crises of a similar scale have emerged in 2024.
- Regional distribution of incidents: Africa led the tally with 27% of total incidents reported to Alert:24 by clients, all of them in Sub-Saharan Africa, with no single country accounting for a disproportionate share. Latin America was not far behind, more than doubling its share of incidents from 13% to 24%. Haiti was particularly notable as it accounted for approximately 20% of the events in Latin America, after not having registered any incidents during the previous year. Europe saw a reduction of total incidents from 14% to 8%.
Overall, the past few years have seen instances of political unrest that have significantly impacted the shape of global commerce. Much uncertainty lies ahead across the world, as even just one event could have resounding global trade repercussions. Those organizations able to quickly identify and rapidly respond to changes in political risks to their global supply chains are likely to have a competitive advantage over their peers.

Jo Holliday, global head of crisis management, said: “We continue to see clients impacted by a wide range of incident types across a broad geographical footprint, impacting both their people and physical assets. Looking ahead, political instability and the consequences of it are likely to continue and those clients that accurately assess, manage and then act on it are likely to navigate the volatile risk environment more effectively. Combining relevant insight and research, risk identification and quantification analytics as well as proactive crisis management is crucial for companies looking to ensure stability and resilience and are key to navigating these challenging times effectively.”

The report can be downloaded here.

About WTW

At WTW (NASDAQ: WTW), we provide data-driven, insight-led solutions in the areas of people, risk and capital. Leveraging the global view and local expertise of our colleagues serving 140 countries and markets, we help organizations sharpen their strategy, enhance organizational resilience, motivate their workforce and maximize performance.

Working shoulder to shoulder with our clients, we uncover opportunities for sustainable success—and provide perspective that moves you.

Learn more at wtwco.com.

Media contact

Sarah Booker:
Sarah.Booker@wtwco.com / +44 7917 722040

The MIL Network –
February 27, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Eugene Doyle: Yellow Peril! Red Peril! ‘We cannot hide anymore’. Chinese warships in the Tasman Sea.

Report by Dr David Robie – Café Pacific. –

COMMENTARY: By Eugene Doyle

The Western media went into overdrive this week to work the laconic Kiwis into a mild frenzy over three Chinese naval vessels conducting exercises in the Tasman Sea a few thousand kilometres off our shores.

What was really behind this orchestrated campaign?

The New Zealand government led the rhetorical charge over the Hengyang, the Zunyi and the Weishanhu in mare nostrum (“Our Sea”, as the Romans liked to call the Mediterranean).

“We cannot hide at this end of the world anymore,” Defence Minister Judith Collins said in light of three Chinese boats in the Tasman.

Warrior academics were next . “We need to go to the cutting edge, and we need to do that really, really fast,” the ever-reliable China hawk Anne-Marie Brady of Canterbury University said, telling 1 News the message of the live-firing exercises was that China wants to rule the waves.

The British Financial Times chimed in with a warning that “A confronting strategic future is arriving fast”.

Could this have anything to do with the fact we are fast approaching the New Zealand government’s 2025 budget and that they — and their Australian, US and UK allies — are intent on a major increase in Kiwi defence funding, moving from around 1.2 percent of GDP to possibly two percent? A long-anticipated Defence Capability Review is also around the corner and is likely to come with quite a shopping list of expensive gear.

The New Zealand government led the rhetorical charge over the Hengyang, the Zunyi and the Weishanhu in mare nostrum (“Our Sea”, as the Romans liked to call the Mediterranean). Image: www.solidarity.co.nz

What’s good for the goose . . .
It is worth pointing out that New Zealand and Australian warships sailed through the contested Taiwan Strait and elsewhere in the South China Sea as recently as September 2024. What’s good for the goose is good for the Panda.

And, of course, at any one time about 20 US nuclear submarines are prowling in the deep waters of the Pacific Ocean and South China Sea. Each can carry missiles the equivalent of over 1000 Hiroshima bombs — truly apocalyptic.

Veteran New Zealand peace campaigner Mike Smith (a friend) was not in total disagreement with the hawks when it came to the argy-bargy in the Tasman.

“The emergence apparently from nowhere of a Chinese naval expedition in our waters I think may be intended to demonstrate that they have a large and very capable blue water navy now and won’t be penned in by AUKUS submarines when and if they arrive off their coast.

“I think the main message is to the Australians: if you want to homebase nuclear-capable B-52s we have more than one way to come at you. That was also the message of the ICBM they sent into the Pacific: Australia is no longer an unsinkable aircraft carrier.”

According to the Asia Times, China fired the ICBM — the first such shot into the Pacific by China — just days after HMNZS Aotearoa sailed through the Taiwan Strait with Australian vessel HMAS Sydney.

Smith says our focus should be on building positive relationships in the Pacific on our terms. “Buying expensive popguns will not save us.”

China Scare a page out of Australia’s Red Scare playbook
For people good at pattern recognition this week’s China Scare was obviously a page or two out of the same playbook that duped a majority of Australians into believing China was going to invade Australia. They were lulled into a false sense of insecurity back in 2021 — the mediascape flooded with Red Alert, China panic stories about imminent war with the rising Asian power.

As a sign of how successful the mainstream media can be in generating fear that precedes major policy shifts: research by Australia’s Institute of International & Security Affairs showed that more Australians thought that China would soon attack Australia than Taiwanese believed China would attack Taiwan!

Once the population was conditioned, they woke one morning in September 2021 with the momentous news that Australia had ditched a $90 billion submarine defence deal with France and the country was now part of a new anti-Chinese military alliance called AUKUS. This was the playbook that came to mind last week.

There are strong, rational arguments that could be made to increase our spending at this time. But I loathe and decry this kind of manipulation, this manufacturing of consent.

I also fear what those billions of dollars will be used for. Defending our coastlines is one thing; joining an anti-Chinese military alliance to please the US is quite another.

Prime Minister Luxon has called China — our biggest trading partner — a strategic competitor. He has also suggested, somewhat ludicrously, that our military could be a “force multiplier” for Team AUKUS.

We are hitching ourselves to the US at the very time they have proven they treat allies as vassals, threatened to annex Greenland and the Panama Canal, continue to commit genocide in Gaza, and are now imposing an unequal treaty on Ukraine.

[embedded content]
Australia’s ABC News on Foreign Minister Winston Peter’s talks in China. Video: ABC

Whose side – or calmer independence?
Whose side should we be on? Or should we return to a calmer, more independent posture?

And then there’s the question of priorities. The hawks may convince the New Zealand population that the China threat is serious enough that we should forgo spending money on child poverty, fixing our ageing infrastructure, investing in health and education and instead, as per pressure from our AUKUS partners, spend some serious coin — billions of dollars more — on defence.

Climate change is one battle that is being fought and lost. Will climate funding get the bullet so we can spend on military hardware? That would certainly get a frosty reaction from Pacific nations at the front edge of sea rise.

The government in New Zealand is literally taking the food out of children’s mouths to fund weapons systems. The Ka Ora, Ka Ako programme provides nutritious lunches every day to a quarter of a million of New Zealand’s most needy children.

Its funding has recently been slashed by over $100 million by the government despite its own advisors telling it that such programmes have profound long-term wellbeing benefits and contribute significantly to equity. In the next breath we are told we need to boost funding for our military.

The US appears determined to set itself on a collision course with China but we don’t have to be crash test dummies sitting alongside them. Prudence, preparedness, vigilance and risk-management are all to be devoutly wished for; hitching our fate to a hostile US containment strategy is bad policy both in economic and defence terms.

In the absence of a functioning media — one that showcases diverse perspectives and challenges power rather than works hand-in-glove with it — populations have been enlisted in the most abhorrent and idiotic campaigns: the Red Peril, the Jewish Peril and the Black Peril (in South Africa and the southern states of the USA), to name three.

Our media-political-military complex is at it again with this one — a kind of Yellow Peril Redux.

New Zealand trails behind both Australia and China in development assistance to the Pacific. If we wish to “counter” China, supporting our neighbours would be a better investment than encouraging an unwinnable arms race.

In tandem, I would advocate for a far deeper diplomatic and cultural push to understand and engage with China; that would do more to keep the region peaceful and may arrest the slow move in China towards seeking other markets for the high-quality primary produce that an increasingly bellicose New Zealand still wishes to sell them.

Let’s be friends to all, enemies of none. Keep the Pacific peaceful, neutral and nuclear-free.

Eugene Doyle is a community organiser and activist in Wellington, New Zealand. He received an Absolutely Positively Wellingtonian award in 2023 for community service. His first demonstration was at the age of 12 against the Vietnam War. This article was first published at his public policy website Solidarity and he is a regular contributor to Asia Pacific Report and Café Pacific.

This article was first published on Café Pacific.

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: President Ramaphosa addresses the Basic Education Sector Lekgotla in Boksburg

Source: Republic of South Africa (video statements)

President Ramaphosa addresses the Basic Education Sector Lekgotla in Boksburg

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VShDsIYVpFU

MIL OSI Video –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Diamond Mining Drives Angola’s Economic Growth Agenda

Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

CAPE TOWN, South Africa, February 27, 2025/APO Group/ —

Angola is aiming to increase diamond production to 17.53 million carats by 2027 as part of its National Development Plan 2023–2027, planning to leverage mining revenues to boost food security, employment creation and poverty reduction.

The country expects diamond revenue to rise from $1.4 billion in 2024 to $2.1 billion in 2025, increasing the sector’s contribution to the country’s GDP. With over 24 operational diamond mines, 54 exploration projects and strong governmental support for industry expansion, Angola’s diamond sector presents an opportunity for economic transformation.

The upcoming African Mining Week (AMW) – Africa’s premier event for the mining sector – will showcase lucrative diamond prospects in both well-established and emerging markets across Africa, including in Angola.

Unlocking Angola’s Untapped Potential

Recent discoveries, project launches and foreign investments underscore Angola’s potential as a global diamond mining powerhouse. According to state diamond firm ENDIAMA, the country holds over 732 million carats (https://apo-opa.co/4gU61Zy) of untapped diamond reserves valued at more than $140 billion. To capitalize on these resources, ENDIAMA will launch a diamond production and processing pilot at the Luachimba facility in 2025, reinforcing the sector’s contribution to sustainable development. Additionally, mine development and feasibility studies at the Xamacanda facility are underway as ENDIAMA seeks to expand independent production.

Strategic Investments and Global Partnerships

In November 2024, Maden International Group, a subsidiary of the Sovereign Fund of the Sultanate of Oman, entered the Angolan market by acquiring stakes in Catoca and Luele Mines from Russia’s Alrosa. The milestone introduces fresh capital and expertise, potentially unlocking Angola’s greater diamond production and GDP expansion. Further affirming Angola’s potential, De Beers announced in October 2024 the discovery of eight new diamond project targets as part of its ongoing exploration activities. The discovery follows a strategic partnership with ENDIAMA, Angola’s National Agency of Mineral Resources, Sodiam and the Institution of Geologists in Angola, to conduct airborne surveys, drilling and testing of new kimberlite targets. Angola is also assessing new diamond and critical mineral prospects in partnership with Rio Tinto.

High-Grade Diamond Discoveries

In August 2024, Lucapa Diamond Company discovered a 176-carat diamond at the Lulo Mine – one of the world’s largest – marking the fifth diamond over 100 carats found at the site in 2024. The discovery underscores Angola’s potential for high-grade diamond production, following 20 significant discoveries at Lulo in 2022.

Amid these market developments, AMW represents an ideal platform for global investors and mining stakeholders to connect with Angolan regulatory authorities and projects to explore the country’s vast diamond potential. AMW will facilitate investment discussions, deal signings and strategic partnerships, reinforcing Angola’s position as one of the world’s highly attractive diamond investment destinations.

African Mining Week serves as a premier platform for exploring the full spectrum of mining opportunities across Africa. The event is held alongside the African Energy Week: Invest in African Energy 2025 conference (https://apo-opa.co/4ieTYqQ) from October 1 -3. in Cape Town. Sponsors, exhibitors and delegates can learn more by contacting sales@energycapitalpower.com

MIL OSI Africa –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: MINISTER NTSHAVHENI BRIEFS THE MEDIA ON THE OUTCOMES OF THE CABINET MEETING HELD ON 26 FEBRUARY 2025

Source: Republic of South Africa (video statements-2)

MEDIA ADVISORY

MINISTER NTSHAVHENI BRIEFS THE MEDIA ON THE OUTCOMES OF THE CABINET MEETING HELD ON 26 FEBRUARY 2025

Minister in The Presidency, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, briefs members of the media on the outcomes of the Cabinet meeting held on Wednesday, 26 February 2025.

The media briefing will take place as follows:

Date: Thursday, 27 February 2025
Time: 11h00
Venue: Imbizo Media Centre, 120 Plein Street, Parliament, Cape Town.

Live Streaming details:

Facebook: http://facebook.com/GovernmentZA
Twitter: http://twitter.com/GovernmentZA
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/user/GovernmentZA

Enquiries: Nomonde Mnukwa – Acting Government Spokesperson Cell: 083 653 7485

Issued by Government Communication and Information System
26 February 2025

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sdhWejxOV10

MIL OSI Video –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Minister Ntshavheni, briefs members of the media on the outcomes of the Cabinet meeting

Source: Republic of South Africa (video statements-2)

Minister in The Presidency, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, briefs members of the media on the outcomes of the Cabinet meeting held on Wednesday, 26 February 2025.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4fj6jhkcc4Y

MIL OSI Video –

February 27, 2025

MIL-OSI: Subsea 7 S.A. Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Luxembourg – 27 February 2025 – Subsea 7 S.A. (Oslo Børs: SUBC, ADR: SUBCY, ISIN: LU0075646355, the Company) announced today results of Subsea7 Group (the Group, Subsea7) for the fourth quarter and full year which ended 31 December 2024. Unless otherwise stated the comparative period is the full year which ended 31 December 2023.

Highlights

Full year Adjusted EBITDA of $1,090 million, up 53% on the prior year, equating to a margin of 16%
Fourth quarter Adjusted EBITDA of $315 million, up 29% on the prior year period, equating to a margin of 17%
Robust free cash flow of $408 million in the fourth quarter, leading to a reduction in net debt (including lease liabilities) of $256 million compared to the third quarter
Fourth quarter order intake of $2.3 billion, a book-to-bill ratio of 1.2
A high-quality backlog of $11.2 billion implies over 80% visibility on 2025 revenue guidance and supports the outlook for Adjusted EBITDA margin expansion to 18 to 20%
Dividend of approximately $350 million proposed, subject to shareholder approval, for payment in two equal instalments in 2025

	Fourth Quarter		Year Ended
For the period (in $ millions, except Adjusted EBITDA margin and per share data)	Q4 2024 Unaudited	Q4 2023 Unaudited	2024 Audited	2023 Audited
Revenue	1,869	1,631	6,837	5,974
Adjusted EBITDA^(a)	315	245	1,090	714
Adjusted EBITDA margin^(a)	17%	15%	16%	12%
Net operating income	126	55	446	105
Net income/(loss)	26	(11)	217	10

Earnings per share – in $ per share
Basic	0.07	(0.06)	0.68	0.05
Diluted^(b)	0.07	(0.06)	0.67	0.05

At (in $ millions)			2024 31 Dec	2023 31 Dec
Backlog^(a)			11,175	10,587
Book-to-bill ratio^(a)			1.2x	1.2x
Cash and cash equivalents			575	751
Borrowings			(722)	(845)
Net debt excluding lease liabilities^(a)			(147)	(94)
Net debt including lease liabilities^(a)			(602)	(552)

(a) For explanations and reconciliations of Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA margin, Backlog, Book-to-bill ratio and Net debt refer to the ‘Alternative Performance Measures’ section of the Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements.

(b) For the explanation and a reconciliation of diluted earnings per share refer to Note 7 ‘Earnings per share’ to the Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements.

John Evans, Chief Executive Officer, said:

Subsea7 delivered another strong performance in the fourth quarter of 2024, building on the momentum already achieved over the past two years. With a quarterly Adjusted EBITDA of $315 million and a full year result of approximately $1.1 billion, we exceeded the top end of the guidance range we set out a year ago.

During the quarter we recorded order intake of $2.3 billion, resulting in a year end backlog of $11.2 billion. With $5.8 billion for execution in 2025 we are confident in the Group’s ability to generate strong Adjusted EBITDA and cash flow in the year ahead.

Interactions with clients remain constructive and high tendering activity continues to support our positive outlook. Against this backdrop the Board of Directors has proposed that in 2025, we return approximately $350 million in the form of a cash dividend. Since 2012, Subsea7 has returned approximately $2.5 billion to shareholders and this year’s commitment underscores our commitment to capital discipline and focus on delivering for all our stakeholders.

Fourth quarter project review
During the fourth quarter, Subsea7 continued to execute a portfolio of major projects in Brazil, where Seven Vega was active on the Mero 3 project, while Seven Cruzeiro installed umbilicals and Seven Merlin provided support. The pipelay support vessels (PLSVs) also achieved high utilisation. In the US, Seven Navica installed risers at Sunspear, and Seven Seas worked at Shenandoah and Cypre. Seven Borealis, Seven Pacific and Seven Arctic were active in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Angola. Finally, in Norway, we made good progress in the fabrication of pipelines and bundles for the Yggdrasil project at our Vigra and Wick spoolbases.

The Renewables business performed strongly and delivered an Adjusted EBITDA margin of 21%. Seaway Alfa Lift and Seaway Strashnov were active on the Dogger Bank B project, installing monopiles and transition pieces. Having achieved good and predictable cycle times for monopile installation, our scope is nearing completion and we will mobilise to the Dogger Bank C project in April. During the quarter our cable lay activities centred on Taiwan where we were active on the Yunlin, Zhong Neng and Hai Long projects. In the US, Seaway Aimery installed cables at the Revolution project. Utilisation of the heavy transportation vessels was high.

Fourth quarter financial review
Revenue was $1.9 billion an increase of 15% compared to the prior year period. Adjusted EBITDA of $315 million equated to a margin of 17%, up from 15% in Q4 2023. This reflected another strong quarter of double-digit margins in Renewables and a robust performance in Subsea and Conventional.

Depreciation, amortisation and impairment charges were $189 million, resulting in net operating income of $126 million compared to $55 million in the prior year period. Net finance costs of $19 million and a net foreign exchange loss of $67 million, resulted in net income for the quarter of $26 million compared with a net loss of $11 million in the prior year period.

Net cash generated from operating activities in the fourth quarter was $487 million, including a $251 million improvement in net working capital, equating to a cash conversion of 1.6 times. Net cash used in investing activities was $69 million mainly related to purchases of property, plant and equipment and intangible assets. Net cash used in financing activities was $271 million including lease payments of $59 million. Overall, cash and cash equivalents increased by $135 million to $575 million at 31 December 2024 and net debt was $602 million, including lease liabilities of $455 million.

Fourth quarter order intake was $2.3 billion comprising new awards of $1.8 billion and escalations of $0.5 billion resulting in a book-to-bill ratio of 1.2 times. Backlog at the end of December was $11.2 billion, of which $5.8 billion is expected to be executed in 2025, $3.4 billion in 2026 and $2.0 billion in 2027 and beyond.

Commitment to shareholder returns
At the Annual General Meeting on 8 May 2025, the Board of Directors will propose that shareholders approve a cash dividend of NOK 13.00 per share, equating to approximately $350 million, payable in two equal instalments in May and November 2025. This represents a year-on-year increase of 40% in returns to shareholders and is equivalent to an approximate yield of 7% related to the cash dividend.

Outlook
We anticipate that revenue in 2025 will be between $6.8 billion and $7.2 billion, while the Adjusted EBITDA margin is expected to be within a range from 18% to 20%. We continue to expect margins to exceed 20% in 2026, based upon our firm backlog of contracts and the prospects in our tendering pipeline.

Driven by structural factors including economic development and energy security, the outlook for long-term energy demand growth remains positive. Subsea7’s exposure to both the hydrocarbon and renewable sectors leaves the Group well placed to benefit from this structural energy trend. Our focus on late-cycle, long-duration developments adds resilience to our strategy, while our track record for project execution and strong balance sheet support a market-leading position that benefits the Group, our customers and our shareholders.

Proposed Combination of Subsea7 and Saipem
On 23 February 2025, Subsea 7 S.A. announced an agreement in principle on the key terms of the proposed merger with Saipem S.p.A. In accordance with the memorandum of understanding signed between Saipem S.p.A. and Subsea 7 S.A., Subsea 7 S.A. shareholders will receive 6.688 Saipem S.p.A. shares for each Subsea 7 S.A. share held, and an extraordinary dividend for an amount equal to €450 million will be distributed immediately prior to completion. Subsea 7 S.A. and Saipem S.p.A. shareholders will own 50% each of the issued share capital of the combined company. The completion of the proposed combination is anticipated to occur in the second half of 2026, following completion of confirmatory due diligence, the approval of the final terms of the proposed combination by the Board of Directors of Subsea 7 S.A. and Saipem S.p.A., the execution of a satisfactory merger agreement, and relevant corporate and regulatory approvals.

Kristian Siem, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the largest shareholder of Subsea7, as well as the management of Subsea7 share a conviction that there is compelling logic in creating a global leader in energy services, particularly considering the growing size of clients’ projects. Saipem and Subsea7 are highly complementary in terms of market offerings and geographies. The combination would enhance value for shareholders, clients and other stakeholders, both in the current market and in the long term.

Conference Call Information
Date: 27 February 2025
Time: 12:00 UK Time, 13:00 CET
Access the webcast at subsea7.com or https://edge.media-server.com/mmc/p/aexdnm2p/
Register for the conference call https://register.vevent.com/register/BIec54517b2a53403badecf6512dc8b41a

Attachments

The MIL Network –

February 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Economics: Development Asia: Enhancing Vaccine Regulation for Pandemic Preparedness
Source: Asia Development Bank

Strengthening regulatory frameworks is critical in ensuring that vaccines are quickly approved and distributed. Using a systematic approach, gaps in key areas of the regulatory system can be identified, prioritized, and effectively addressed through regulatory capacity building and education of regulatory professionals.

The World Health Organization Global Benchmarking Tool was developed to evaluate regulatory systems objectively and systematically, identify strengths and areas for improvement, guide interventions, and monitor progress in strengthening the regulatory system. Consistent and regular training of national regulators can also complement regulatory systems strengthening efforts by focusing on the identified gaps.

The diverse and fragmented regulatory environment in Asia and the Pacific calls for regulatory convergence[1] and cooperation to facilitate timely and equitable access in the region. Stable, well-functioning national regulatory authorities in the region listed as WHO Maturity Level 3 and 4 and WHO Listed Authorities, such as those in the People’s Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam, could foster regional regulatory cooperation and serve as reference agencies for lower-resourced regulatory agencies.

Such cooperation could be facilitated by formalized processes and relationships such as memoranda of understanding. For example, Singapore’s Health Sciences Authority has adopted a confidence-based regulatory approach that leverages the decisions of established and trusted regulatory agencies through formal recognition mechanisms and has expedited reviews without compromising the robustness of regulatory decisions. This has reduced approval timelines to 90 working days from 270 working days for the Health Sciences Authority’s full evaluation route under its verification evaluation system.

Confidence-based approaches can be adopted in various stages of the vaccine life cycle. The ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Good Manufacturing Practice Inspection enables member states to leverage on the regulatory inspections performed by other member states. It is legally binding for member states to recognize one another’s good manufacturing practice certificates, benchmarked against the international Pharmaceutical Inspection Cooperation Scheme.

Regulatory cooperation can range from legally-binding mechanisms in the form of mutual recognition agreements and reliance mechanisms to other forms of cooperation such as joint collaborative assessments, report sharing and work sharing. Work sharing can promote mutual learning and the sharing of best practices among participating national regulatory authorities and can encourage regulatory convergence. For industry, the work-sharing model can be commercially attractive, providing simultaneous access to multiple countries and shorten timelines with the consolidation of questions.

While cooperation on vaccine regulation is still nascent, there are other examples of regulatory cooperative mechanisms. Work sharing is practiced by Access Consortium, comprising the national regulatory authorities of Australia, Canada, Singapore, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. A similar coalition is the Opening Procedures at EMA to Non-EU authorities (OPEN) initiative, led by the EMA, which partners Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and WHO in joint assessments. In Asia and the Pacific, the Indo-Pacific Regulatory Strengthening Program, comprising Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, and Viet Nam, and supported by Australia, successfully expedited approval of the antimalarial tafenoquine in Thailand in 2019 in its joint review.

While the work-sharing model has its advantages, the following points also need to be considered:
- Participating national regulatory authorities may have different priority drug lists and approval timelines.
- Participating national regulatory authorities may have different technical requirements.
- Lack of clarity in regulatory decisions could impact company filing strategies.
Convergence of regulatory requirements can further contribute to successful work-sharing collaborations. One way to incentivize the alignment of key regulatory requirements is the creation of a consensus on indicators that measure overall efficiency of the work-sharing pathway, which participating countries can jointly work towards. Regional regulatory convergence efforts include the APEC Action Plan on Vaccination Across the Life-Course, which sets key policy targets to achieve by 2030. Priorities for alignment include post-approval change management, labeling, and packaging.
MIL OSI Economics –
February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI: Bitget Wallet Introduces Smart Authorization Detection to Safeguard Assets

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

VICTORIA, Seychelles, Feb. 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bitget Wallet, a leading Web3 non-custodial wallet, has launched an upgraded authorization detection feature to give users greater control over their assets and enhance security. This upgrade allows users to review all past DApp and token approvals, identify potential risks, and revoke unsafe permissions with a single tap.

At a time when security concerns are growing in the crypto space, Bitget Wallet reinforces its commitment to providing a safer, more transparent Web3 experience. Many users unknowingly grant excessive permissions that allow DApps to access their assets indefinitely, increasing security risks. Bitget Wallet’s enhanced tool helps users detect these risks by categorizing authorizations as Low, Medium, or High risk. Common high-risk approvals include unlimited token transfers, staking or withdrawal permissions, contract upgrade backdoors, and NFT transfer rights. By updating to version V8.29, users can access the “Approval Detection” feature from the wallet’s homepage to scan and revoke unnecessary or risky authorizations, reducing the chances of unauthorized asset movement.

As a non-custodial wallet, Bitget Wallet ensures users have full control over their private keys, eliminating counterparty risks associated with centralized platforms. To enhance security, Bitget Wallet employs Multi-Party Computation (MPC) technology, which distributes private key shares across multiple entities, preventing single points of failure. Additionally, it integrates the Double Encryption Storage Mechanism (DESM) for an extra layer of private key protection. To further safeguard transactions, Bitget Wallet’s GetShield security engine continuously scans DApps, smart contracts, and websites, detecting phishing attacks, malicious addresses, and fraudulent contracts before users interact with them.

Bitget Wallet also collaborates with leading security firms like CertiK, SlowMist, and GoPlus Security, ensuring comprehensive code audits, risk monitoring, and proactive threat detection. Beyond advanced security infrastructure, it offers financial protection through its industry-leading Protection Fund, initially established at $300 million and now valued at $625 million, backed by 6,500 BTC in onchain reserves. This fund serves as a safety net for users in the event of a platform-related security incident. By integrating robust security technology, proactive risk detection, and a transparent protection fund, Bitget Wallet delivers one of the most secure Web3 experiences available today.

“The recent industry events highlight the importance of true self-custody and strong security measures,” said Alvin Kan, COO of Bitget Wallet. “Security has always been our top priority. We are committed to empowering users with full control over their assets while providing robust security tools and financial protection. With our upgraded authorization detection, MPC technology, and Protection Fund, we continue to set the standard for a safer and more resilient Web3 experience.”

About Bitget Wallet
Bitget Wallet is the home of Web3, uniting endless possibilities in one non-custodial wallet. With over 60 million users, it offers comprehensive onchain services, including asset management, instant swaps, rewards, staking, trading tools, live market data, a DApp browser, an NFT marketplace and crypto payment. Supporting over 100 blockchains, 20,000+ DApps, and 500,000+ tokens, Bitget Wallet enables seamless multi-chain trading across hundreds of DEXs and cross-chain bridges, along with a $300+ million protection fund to ensure safety of users’ assets. Experience Bitget Wallet Lite to start a Web3 journey.

For more information, visit: X | Telegram | Instagram | YouTube | LinkedIn | TikTok | Discord | Facebook
For media inquiries, please contact media.web3@bitget.com

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/65645222-e7fe-472d-a62b-6e21f0a2717f

The MIL Network –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: President Cyril Ramaphosa in conversation with Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs Richard Gnodde.

Source: Republic of South Africa (video statements)

President Cyril Ramaphosa in conversation with Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs Richard Gnodde.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBhPaXtswaQ

MIL OSI Video –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI: Bitget Updates Proof of Reserves for February 2025, Reserve Ratios Increase to 186%

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

VICTORIA, Seychelles, Feb. 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bitget, the world’s leading cryptocurrency exchange and Web3 company, has released their proof-of-reserves report for February 2025. The newest snapshot shows the updated data highlights an increase of reserves to 186% up from its commitment of 100%. Bitget’s latest proof of reserves reaffirms its financial stability and transparency, showcasing a strong total reserve ratio.

The exchange holds substantial reserves across major assets, ensuring more than full backing of user funds. The breakdown reveals a 322% reserve ratio for Bitcoin, with over 19,393 BTC held against user liabilities of 6,030 BTC. Similarly, Ethereum reserves stand at 173%, with holdings of 199,433 ETH exceeding the 115,051 ETH in user assets. Stablecoin reserves are also robust, with USDT at 138% and USDC at 121%, showing strong backing.

The Merkle root hash verification adds an extra layer of transparency, allowing users to independently verify their assets within Bitget’s system. With 35 million records included in the Merkle tree, the exchange continues to prioritize accountability. The report highlights Bitget’s commitment to safeguarding user assets while maintaining operational integrity. By consistently holding reserves well above liabilities, Bitget reinforces trust in its financial health, positioning itself as a secure and reliable platform for crypto traders and investors.

The updated PoR showcases Bitget’s efforts in maintaining more than industry standard 100% reserves, which effectively guarantees that users’ assets are safe. The platform is capable of covering user withdrawals, even if all user assets are withdrawn.

In addition to maintaining a higher than industry standard PoR, Bitget insures its users further with a $300M Protection Fund, now valued over $570 million according to its latest protection fund report. This gives the platform an extra layer of resilience against cybersecurity threats.

For real-time PoR tracking, please visit here.

About Bitget

Established in 2018, Bitget is the world’s leading cryptocurrency exchange and Web3 company. Serving over 100 million users in 150+ countries and regions, the Bitget exchange is committed to helping users trade smarter with its pioneering copy trading feature and other trading solutions, while offering real-time access to Bitcoin price, Ethereum price, and other cryptocurrency prices. Formerly known as BitKeep, Bitget Wallet is a world-class multi-chain crypto wallet that offers an array of comprehensive Web3 solutions and features including wallet functionality, token swap, NFT Marketplace, DApp browser, and more.

Bitget is at the forefront of driving crypto adoption through strategic partnerships, such as its role as the Official Crypto Partner of the World’s Top Football League, LALIGA, in EASTERN, SEA and LATAM market, as well as a global partner of Turkish National athletes Buse Tosun Çavuşoğlu (Wrestling world champion), Samet Gümüş (Boxing gold medalist) and İlkin Aydın (Volleyball national team), to inspire the global community to embrace the future of cryptocurrency.

For more information, visit: Website | Twitter | Telegram | LinkedIn | Discord | Bitget Wallet

For media inquiries, please contact: media@bitget.com

Risk Warning: Digital asset prices are subject to fluctuation and may experience significant volatility. Investors are advised to only allocate funds they can afford to lose. The value of any investment may be impacted, and there is a possibility that financial objectives may not be met, nor the principal investment recovered. Independent financial advice should always be sought, and personal financial experience and standing carefully considered. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. Bitget accepts no liability for any potential losses incurred. Nothing contained herein should be construed as financial advice. For further information, please refer to our Terms of Use.

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/7e6e37dd-29ad-4275-b259-d9650b21488f

The MIL Network –

February 27, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: What’s the difference between burnout and depression?
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Gordon Parker, Scientia Professor of Psychiatry, UNSW Sydney

Yuri A/Shutterstock

If your summer holiday already feels like a distant memory, you’re not alone. Burnout – a state of emotional, physical and mental exhaustion following prolonged stress – has been described in workplaces since a 5th century monastery in Egypt.

Burnout and depression can look similar and are relatively common conditions. It’s estimated that 30% of the Australian workforce is feeling some level of burnout, while almost 20% of Australians are diagnosed with depression at some point in their lives.

So what’s the difference between burnout and depression?

Depression is marked by helplessness and burnout by hopelessness. They can have different causes and should also be managed differently.

What is burnout?

The World Health Organization defines burnout as an “occupational phenomenon” resulting from excessively demanding workload pressures. While it is typically associated with the workplace, carers of children or elderly parents with demanding needs are also at risk.

Our research created a set of burnout symptoms we captured in the Sydney Burnout Measure to assist self-diagnosis and clinicians undertaking assessments. They include:
- exhaustion as the primary symptom
- brain fog (poor concentration and memory)
- difficulty finding pleasure in anything
- social withdrawal
- an unsettled mood (feeling anxious and irritable)
- impaired work performance (this may be result of other symptoms such as fatigue).
People can develop a “burning out” phase after intense work demands over only a week or two. A “burnout” stage usually follows years of unrelenting work pressure.

What is depression?

A depressive episode involves a drop in self-worth, increase in self-criticism and feelings of wanting to give up. Not everyone with these symptoms will have clinical depression, which requires a diagnosis and has an additional set of symptoms.

Clinically diagnosed depression can vary by mood, how long it lasts and whether it comes back. There are two types of clinical depression:
1. melancholic depression has genetic causes, with episodes largely coming “out of the blue”
2. non-melancholic depression is caused by environmental factors, often triggered by significant life events which cause a drop in self-worth.
When we created our burnout measure, we compared burnout symptoms with these two types of depression.

Burnout shares some features with melancholic depression, but they tend to be general symptoms, such as feeling a loss of pleasure, energy and concentration skills.

We found there were more similarities between burnout and non-melancholic (environmental) depression. This included a lack of motivation and difficulties sleeping or being cheered up, perhaps reflecting the fact both have environmental causes.

Looking for the root cause

The differences between burnout and depression become clearer when we look at why they happen.

Personality comes into play. Our work suggests a trait like perfectionism puts people at a much higher risk of burnout. But they may be less likely to become depressed as they tend to avoid stressful events and keep things under control.

Excessive workloads can contribute to burnout.
tartanparty/Shutterstock

Those with burnout generally feel overwhelmed by demands or deadlines they can’t meet, creating a sense of helplessness.

On the other hand, those with depression report lowered self-esteem. So rather than helpless they feel that they and their future is hopeless.

However it is not uncommon for someone to experience both burnout and depression at once. For example, a boss may place excessive work demands on an employee, putting them at risk of burnout. At the same time, the employer may also humiliate that employee and contribute to an episode of non-melancholic depression.

What can you do?

A principal strategy in managing burnout is identifying the contributing stressors. For many people, this is the workplace. Taking a break, even a short one, or scheduling some time off can help.

Australians now have the right to disconnect, meaning they don’t have to answer work phone calls or emails after hours. Setting boundaries can help separate home and work life.

Read more:
Australians now have the right to disconnect – but how workplaces react will be crucial

Burnout can be also be caused by compromised work roles, work insecurity or inequity. More broadly, a dictatorial organisational structure can make employees feel devalued. In the workplace, environmental factors, such as excessive noise, can be a contributor. Addressing these factors can help prevent burnout.

As for managing symptoms, the monks had the right idea. Strenuous exercise, meditation and mindfulness are effective ways to deal with everyday stress.

Regular exercise can help manage symptoms of burnout.
alexei_tm/Shutterstock

Deeper contributing factors, including traits such as perfectionism, should be managed by a skilled clinical psychologist.

For melancholic depression, clinicians will often recommend antidepressant medication.

For non-melancholic depression, clinicians will help address and manage triggers that are the root cause. Others will benefit from antidepressants or formal psychotherapy.

While misdiagnosis between depression and burnout can occur, burnout can mimic other medical conditions such as anemia or hypothyroidism.

For the right diagnosis, it’s best to speak to your doctor or clinician who should seek to obtain a sense of “the whole picture”. Only then, once a burnout diagnsois has been affirmed and other possible causes ruled out, should effective support strategies be put in place.

If this article has raised issues for you, or if you’re concerned about someone you know, call Lifeline on 13 11 14.

Gordon Parker receives funding from the University of of NSW.

– ref. What’s the difference between burnout and depression? – https://theconversation.com/whats-the-difference-between-burnout-and-depression-250043
MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –
February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: What’s the difference between burnout and depression?
Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Gordon Parker, Scientia Professor of Psychiatry, UNSW Sydney

Yuri A/Shutterstock

If your summer holiday already feels like a distant memory, you’re not alone. Burnout – a state of emotional, physical and mental exhaustion following prolonged stress – has been described in workplaces since a 5th century monastery in Egypt.

Burnout and depression can look similar and are relatively common conditions. It’s estimated that 30% of the Australian workforce is feeling some level of burnout, while almost 20% of Australians are diagnosed with depression at some point in their lives.

So what’s the difference between burnout and depression?

Depression is marked by helplessness and burnout by hopelessness. They can have different causes and should also be managed differently.

What is burnout?

The World Health Organization defines burnout as an “occupational phenomenon” resulting from excessively demanding workload pressures. While it is typically associated with the workplace, carers of children or elderly parents with demanding needs are also at risk.

Our research created a set of burnout symptoms we captured in the Sydney Burnout Measure to assist self-diagnosis and clinicians undertaking assessments. They include:
- exhaustion as the primary symptom
- brain fog (poor concentration and memory)
- difficulty finding pleasure in anything
- social withdrawal
- an unsettled mood (feeling anxious and irritable)
- impaired work performance (this may be result of other symptoms such as fatigue).
People can develop a “burning out” phase after intense work demands over only a week or two. A “burnout” stage usually follows years of unrelenting work pressure.

What is depression?

A depressive episode involves a drop in self-worth, increase in self-criticism and feelings of wanting to give up. Not everyone with these symptoms will have clinical depression, which requires a diagnosis and has an additional set of symptoms.

Clinically diagnosed depression can vary by mood, how long it lasts and whether it comes back. There are two types of clinical depression:
1. melancholic depression has genetic causes, with episodes largely coming “out of the blue”
2. non-melancholic depression is caused by environmental factors, often triggered by significant life events which cause a drop in self-worth.
When we created our burnout measure, we compared burnout symptoms with these two types of depression.

Burnout shares some features with melancholic depression, but they tend to be general symptoms, such as feeling a loss of pleasure, energy and concentration skills.

We found there were more similarities between burnout and non-melancholic (environmental) depression. This included a lack of motivation and difficulties sleeping or being cheered up, perhaps reflecting the fact both have environmental causes.

Looking for the root cause

The differences between burnout and depression become clearer when we look at why they happen.

Personality comes into play. Our work suggests a trait like perfectionism puts people at a much higher risk of burnout. But they may be less likely to become depressed as they tend to avoid stressful events and keep things under control.

Excessive workloads can contribute to burnout.
tartanparty/Shutterstock

Those with burnout generally feel overwhelmed by demands or deadlines they can’t meet, creating a sense of helplessness.

On the other hand, those with depression report lowered self-esteem. So rather than helpless they feel that they and their future is hopeless.

However it is not uncommon for someone to experience both burnout and depression at once. For example, a boss may place excessive work demands on an employee, putting them at risk of burnout. At the same time, the employer may also humiliate that employee and contribute to an episode of non-melancholic depression.

What can you do?

A principal strategy in managing burnout is identifying the contributing stressors. For many people, this is the workplace. Taking a break, even a short one, or scheduling some time off can help.

Australians now have the right to disconnect, meaning they don’t have to answer work phone calls or emails after hours. Setting boundaries can help separate home and work life.

Read more:
Australians now have the right to disconnect – but how workplaces react will be crucial

Burnout can be also be caused by compromised work roles, work insecurity or inequity. More broadly, a dictatorial organisational structure can make employees feel devalued. In the workplace, environmental factors, such as excessive noise, can be a contributor. Addressing these factors can help prevent burnout.

As for managing symptoms, the monks had the right idea. Strenuous exercise, meditation and mindfulness are effective ways to deal with everyday stress.

Regular exercise can help manage symptoms of burnout.
alexei_tm/Shutterstock

Deeper contributing factors, including traits such as perfectionism, should be managed by a skilled clinical psychologist.

For melancholic depression, clinicians will often recommend antidepressant medication.

For non-melancholic depression, clinicians will help address and manage triggers that are the root cause. Others will benefit from antidepressants or formal psychotherapy.

While misdiagnosis between depression and burnout can occur, burnout can mimic other medical conditions such as anemia or hypothyroidism.

For the right diagnosis, it’s best to speak to your doctor or clinician who should seek to obtain a sense of “the whole picture”. Only then, once a burnout diagnsois has been affirmed and other possible causes ruled out, should effective support strategies be put in place.

If this article has raised issues for you, or if you’re concerned about someone you know, call Lifeline on 13 11 14.

Gordon Parker receives funding from the University of of NSW.

– ref. What’s the difference between burnout and depression? – https://theconversation.com/whats-the-difference-between-burnout-and-depression-250043
MIL OSI – Global Reports –
February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI China: UK PM makes defense pledge before US trip

Source: China State Council Information Office

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer delivers a speech during 2024 Labour Party Conference in Liverpool, Britain, Sept. 24, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

United Kingdom Prime Minister Keir Starmer was set to meet United States President Donald Trump in Washington on Thursday after having pledged to increase British defense spending in the face of what he called a “generational” security challenge.

The decision to raise military expenditure to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2027, and 3 percent by 2033, was announced on Tuesday, with Starmer saying he had “hard choices” to make in ensuring that the “defense and security of the British people must always come first”.

But his decision to partly fund it by a cut in overseas aid has been criticized by charities and some members of his own governing Labour Party.

“Through those choices, as hard as they are, we must also seek unity — a whole society effort that will reach into the lives, the industries, and the homes of the British people,” Starmer explained.

The timing of the announcement was notable, coming as it did just before his visit to the White House and at a time when security links between Europe and the U.S. are under great strain.

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth welcomed Starmer’s decision, calling it a “strong step from an enduring partner”.

Trump has long been critical of European members of the NATO military alliance for not contributing enough to the communal defense budget. The current requirement, met by most members, is for 2 percent of GDP to be spent on defense, but Trump has said it should be as high as 5 percent, even though the U.S. itself is currently only the third-highest proportionally contributing member nation, with 3.37 percent of its GDP.

According to data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, in 2023 the UK was the world’s fifth-largest international aid donor.

Writing in The Guardian newspaper, Foreign Minister David Lammy insisted the “most vital programs in the world’s worst conflict zones of Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan” would not be affected, “but there can be no hiding from the fact that many programs doing vital work will have to be put on hold”.

Former Labour Party foreign secretary David Miliband, who is now head of the International Rescue Committee charity, called the aid cut “a blow to Britain’s proud reputation as a global humanitarian and development leader”, while Nick Dearden, director of campaign group Global Justice Now, said it was “a day of shame for Britain” with the move being taken “to appease Trump”.

The United Nations children’s agency UNICEF and the charity Oxfam were also heavily critical of the decision, while Labour Party member of parliament Sarah Champion, who is chair of the parliamentary International Development Select Committee, spoke out against her own party leader, saying: “Aid vs defense isn’t a realistic narrative for keeping the world safe.”

MIL OSI China News –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Hamas hands over bodies of 4 Israeli hostages to ICRC in Gaza

Source: China State Council Information Office

Al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, handed over the bodies of four Israeli hostages on Wednesday night to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a source with Hamas told Xinhua.

Al-Qassam Brigades handed over the bodies to the ICRC team, and the team will deliver them to the Israeli army through Kerem Shalom crossing in the southern Gaza Strip, the source said.

In return, Israel is expected to release more than 600 Palestinian detainees, including women and children, as part of the first phase of the agreement.

Hundreds of Palestinian families of the prisoners have already gathered in Gaza Strip and the West Bank to welcome their freed relatives, witnesses said.

The exchange follows an agreement between Hamas and Israel, brokered by Egypt, to resolve the dispute over the delayed release of Palestinian prisoners.

MIL OSI China News –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Israel begins to release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners

Source: China State Council Information Office

A released Palestinian prisoner gestures while getting off a bus in the West Bank city of Ramallah, Feb. 8, 2025. [Photo/Photo]

Israeli authorities on Thursday began releasing more than 600 Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails as part of the Gaza ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel, according to Palestinian sources.

Palestinian sources told Xinhua that buses carrying the prisoners departed from Ofer Prison in the central West Bank, heading toward a reception center in the Beitunia area.

The Hamas-linked Prisoners’ Information Office said that the seventh and eighth batches of prisoner releases were merged, bringing the total number to 642.

This release is part of the first phase of the deal brokered by Egypt and Qatar, with support from the United States. Hamas described this release as the largest so far under the ceasefire arrangement.

“We are witnessing one of the achievements of the Palestinian people with the release of the seventh and eighth batches of prisoners, which is the largest so far within the ceasefire agreement arrangements,” Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem said in a press statement.

He added that Hamas prioritizes the release of Palestinian prisoners in any exchange deal. He also noted that the group had responded to mediators’ requests regarding new mechanisms for exchanging bodies, ensuring Israel’s commitment to the process.

On Tuesday, Hamas announced it had resolved a dispute over the delayed release of Palestinian prisoners, which was originally scheduled for last Saturday. The resolution followed talks between a Hamas delegation and Egyptian officials in Cairo.

The delay occurred after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded assurances from mediators that there would be no repeat of what he described as “provocative military parades” organized by Hamas during previous handover operations, which he considered “insulting to the rights of Israeli hostages.”

MIL OSI China News –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI: Minim Martap Project Update

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

PERTH, Australia, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Canyon Resources Limited (ASX: CAY) (‘Canyon’ or the ‘Company’) is pleased to provide an update on key development workstreams at the Company’s flagship Minim Martap Bauxite Project (‘Minim Martap’ or ‘the Project’), located in Cameroon, as the Company continues to make rapid progress toward production.

Minim Martap ranks among the world’s richest bauxite deposits, underpinned by an Ore Reserve of 109Mt at 51.1% total Al₂O₃ and 2.0% total SiO₂ and a JORC Mineral Resource Estimate of 1,027Mt at 45.3% total Al₂O₃ and 2.7% total SiO₂

The Definitive Feasibility Study (DFS) remains on schedule for completion in Q3 2025, with a focus on optimising operational efficiencies, ensuring sustainable economics and confirming the preferred pathway to production. The Company remains confident that the DFS will reinforce the viability of Minim Martap as a world-class bauxite project. Concurrently, discussions with select debt providers are progressing positively, as Canyon seeks to secure an optimal funding structure in alignment with strategic objectives and results from the DFS.

As part of the DFS, Canyon is currently evaluating the implementation of a two-stage development strategy, aimed at accelerating production through a phased ramp-up to enable a first bauxite shipment in 2026. This approach would enable earlier revenue generation, strengthen supply chain relationships and strategically position Minim Martap for future growth as rail capacity expands. In addition to this process, Canyon has engaged several internationally recognised consultants to refine and optimise the existing rail infrastructure required for the transport of the bauxite ore. Detailed assessments are now underway to enhance logistical efficiency and explore capacity expansion strategies that will support long-term operational growth.

As part of project execution planning, Canyon is working with leading mining equipment vendors to define procurement schedules and delivery timelines, ensuring timely access to critical mining equipment, which will be essential for meeting targeted production timelines and targets and maintaining operational efficiency. The Company remains focused on aligning equipment availability with its potential staged development strategy to support seamless project execution.

Discussions with potential offtake partners are advancing well, with negotiations reflecting strong market interest in Minim Martap’s high-quality bauxite product and supporting the Company’s efforts to secure long-term sales agreements. Establishing these strategic partnerships is a key step in de-risking the Project, working through the relevant financing discussions and ensuring an efficient pathway towards commencement of operations.

Bauxite market fundamentals and pricing has strengthened over the past 12 months, with the CIF China price for 45% Al₂0₃ and 3% total SiO₂ ex Guinea reported to be approximately $US 100/DMT in February 2025. The product from Minim Martap with a proved or reserve grade 51.1% total Al₂0₃ and total SiO₂ should achieve a considerable premium price compared to a 45% Al₂O₃ and SiO₂ bauxite product.

Lastly, Canyon continues to focus on building out its project team and management team to ensure the Company is well-positioned during the next phase of development growth, as Canyon works toward becoming a near-term bauxite producer.

Mr Jean-Sebastien Boutet, Canyon Chief Executive Officer commented: “Progress at our world-class Minim Martap Project continues as planned, reinforcing our confidence in our timeline towards production. Notably, the analysis of a potential two-staged development strategy has been particularly promising, offering the opportunity for fast-tracked production and revenue generation, while strategically positioning the Company to capitalise on expanding rail capacity and the establishment of key supply chain relationships.

“Our team remains committed to transforming the Minim Martap Bauxite Project into a world-class operation that delivers sustainable, long-term value for shareholders and stakeholders alike. We will continue to provide timely updates as we achieve key milestones and advance toward production.”

This announcement has been approved for release by the Canyon Resources’ Board of Directors.








The MIL Network –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the First Review Under the Extended Credit Facility and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility with the Republic of Madagascar
Source: IMF – News in Russian

February 26, 2025
- The IMF Executive Board today completed the First Reviews under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement for the Republic of Madagascar, allowing for an immediate disbursement of US$101 million.
- Madagascar’s performance under the ECF and RSF programs has been adequate albeit uneven. The implementation of an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism will create fiscal space for social spending and investment. The reform of JIRAMA remains a priority.
Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the First Reviews under the 36-month Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement and under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement. The ECF and RSF arrangements were approved by the IMF Executive Board in June 2024.

The completion of the reviews allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 36.7 million (about US$48 million) under the ECF arrangement and of SDR 40.7 million (about US$53 million) under the RSF arrangement.

At the conclusion of the Executive Board discussion, Mr. Nigel Clarke, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement:

“Madagascar continues to face important development needs amid its high poverty rate and vulnerability to climate shocks. A faster pace of reform is needed to spur growth, which remains well below its medium-term potential. Program performance at end-June 2024 was broadly assessed as mixed, stressing the need for continued strong political ownership to support program implementation.

“The continued implementation of the automatic fuel pricing mechanism will help contain fiscal risks and create space for more public investment and social spending. In addition, further efforts are needed to continue improving domestic revenue mobilization and firmly secure the financial recovery of JIRAMA.

“Reinforcing public financial and investment management processes is critical to improve budget execution and traceability. Better cash flow projections and management should facilitate spending and limit the accumulation of arrears. Continued improvements in governance, building on the ongoing Governance Diagnostic Assessment, and the implementation of the newly published Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2025-30 will support efforts to fight corruption and promote transparency.

“The central bank (BFM) should stand ready to raise its policy rates to keep inflation on a downward path. Further improvements in the liquidity management framework and better communication about monetary policy decisions would bolster BFM’s credibility.

“Further building adaptation and resilience to climate shocks as well as mobilizing climate finance should continue to be a key priority. The new decree on environmental and social impact assessments provides a framework to evaluate and select investment projects, which should be applied to new investments, including road projects.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/26/pr-2547-madagascar-imf-completes-the-1st-rev-under-ecf-rsf

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February 27, 2025

Category: Africa

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

UN Human Rights Council 58: UK Statement at the Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on Eritrea

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What is burnout?

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Looking for the root cause

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What is burnout?

What is depression?

Looking for the root cause

What can you do?

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