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Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI Video: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine & other topics – Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon briefing by Farhan Haq, Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:

    – Secretary-General
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – Sudan
    – Central African Republic
    – Air Pollution
    – Female Genital Mutilation
    – Financial Contribution

    SECRETARY-GENERAL
    This morning, in a press encounter, the Secretary-General made a special appeal for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ahead of a summit tomorrow with the leaders from the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community in Tanzania. He added that next week in Addis Ababa, he will take part in a Summit-level meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council where the crisis will be front and centre.
    The Secretary-General said his message is clear: Silence the guns. Stop the escalation. Respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Uphold international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
    The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Tom Fletcher, accompanied a UN aid convoy into the Gaza Strip today, where the UN and its partners continue responding to immense needs as part of a prepared scaling up of our operations.
    In northern Gaza, Mr. Fletcher toured two hospitals – Al Shifa in Gaza City and Al Awda in Jabalya – where he met with patients, staff and management. Leaving the Al Awda hospital, Mr. Fletcher spoke with survivors and returnees in Jabalya who are trying to rebuild their lives amid the rubble.
    The Under-Secretary-General also visited the only operational water well in North Gaza governorate. This well, which is run by theUnite d Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) serves as a crucial lifeline for clean water, given the extensive destruction of Gaza’s water infrastructure. From the north of the Strip, the Under-Secretary-General crossed the Netzarim area into Deir al Balah in central Gaza.
    Throughout his visit, Mr. Fletcher held discussions with humanitarian workers from local and international non-governmental organizations, as well as UN agencies, stressing the need to seize the opportunities presented by the ceasefire to sustain and expand relief efforts.
    Partners of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) supporting water, sanitation and hygiene services report that they are distributing 2,500 cubic metres of safe drinking water daily across Gaza and North Gaza governorates, serving 411,000 people. One of our partners is also providing cleaning services at 17 displacement sites in northern Gaza, benefiting nearly 12,000 people.
    Water, sanitation and hygiene partners are carrying out assessments in locations across the Strip to repair water wells, install dosing pumps, and set up water filling points.
    While some repairs are already underway, further progress hinges on teams being able to clear debris and carry out assessments of explosive hazards.
    Meanwhile in the West Bank, OCHA reports that Israeli forces’ operations are intensifying in Jenin, Tulkarm and Tubas, severely restricting Palestinians’ access to essential assistance, including water, food, medicine and supplies for infants.
    In Tubas governorate, Israeli forces have been operating in the El Far’a refugee camp for five consecutive days. They have imposed a curfew, reportedly prohibiting residents from leaving their homes. They also bulldozed roads and damaged water networks, forcing residents to rely on collecting rainwater.

    SUDAN
    The Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, Clementine Nkweta-Salami, today warned that South Kordofan and Blue Nile States are on the brink of catastrophe, as the violence there continues to escalate at an alarming rate.
    As of yesterday, the civilian death toll following recent shelling in South Kordofan’s capital Kadugli had increased to 80, with some three dozen others injured.
    In a statement, Ms. Nkweta-Salami condemned the reported use of women and children as human shields in Kadugli, as well as the obstruction of humanitarian aid and the detention of civilians, including children.
    The western Nuba Mountains, which extend into South Kordofan and West Kordofan States, are among the areas in which famine has been identified by the Famine Review Committee of the International Food Security Phase Classification system, or IPC.
    Ms. Nkweta-Salami stressed that humanitarian needs also remain critical in Blue Nile State, amid reports of mass mobilization for conflict. She also called on all sides to the conflict in Sudan to de-escalate tensions, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, and allow humanitarian organizations safe and unrestricted access to those in desperate need.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/ossg/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=06+February+2025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MYbKGAp7Y0

    MIL OSI Video –

    February 8, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UN HRC Special Session: Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    UK Statement for the UN Human Rights Council Special Session on the situation in the DRC. Delivered by the UK’s Permanent Representative to the WTO and UN, Simon Manley.

    Thank you Mr President.

    Let me begin by commending the Minister and her Ambassador for convening this special session. We welcome its broad support from across the African Continent.

    The situation in eastern DRC has received far too little attention for far too long. We condemn the recent offensive by M23 and Rwandan Defence Forces, which has worsened an already dire humanitarian situation.

    We call on all parties to ensure unimpeded humanitarian access to allow the delivery of life-saving assistance. In particular, the UK calls on M23 and Rwanda to re-open Goma airport as a matter of utmost urgency.

    The scale of sexual and gender-based violence across eastern DRC is horrific. We are appalled by reports of the brutal rape and murder of hundreds of women in Goma’s Munzenze Prison.

    We must respond robustly and collectively to ensure a thorough investigation and bring an end to impunity.  

    The UK is convinced of the need to use all available Council mechanisms to address the human rights situation.

    Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 7 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    February 8, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Sunderland resident found guilty of fly-tipping

    Source: City of Sunderland

    A Sunderland resident has been left with a court bill of nearly £1,000 after being caught on CCTV fly-tipping household waste and three sofas at the rear of his property.

    Malik Yansane, of Athol Road, was found guilty following a trial at South Tyneside Magistrates’ Court of offences under Section 33(1)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.

    The court heard how shortly after 8am on Friday 28 October 2022, Mr Yansane was observed on CCTV removing waste from his property and leaving it in the street. A Street Watch CCTV camera had been set up by the council as part of ongoing work to deter fly-tipping.

    Despite clear warning signs about CCTV surveillance, Mr. Yansane deliberately left three sofas directly beneath a post-mounted camera monitoring the area.

    The court heard how, following a report of fly-tipping, Sunderland City Council’s Neighbourhood Enforcement Team attended the rear of Athol Road, where they discovered a significant illegal waste deposit. Alongside the three sofas, officers found a child’s bouncer chair, a plastic container, black bin bags, and boxes, all discarded in plain sight of the camera.

    Officers swiftly launched an investigation, searching the waste for evidence before arranging its immediate removal.

    As part of an investigation, Mr Yansane attended an interview with council officers and confirmed it was him on the camera evidence and he admitted to illegally dumping waste behind his property.

    Mr Yansane was offered the opportunity to pay a £300 Fixed Penalty Notice instead of facing prosecution. He received the notice on Wednesday 18 January 2023 and was told to pay within ten days.

    On Tuesday 31 January and Wednesday 8 February 2023, he received postal reminders that if he didn’t pay, legal action would be considered. The penalty was not paid and the council began court proceedings.

    The case was heard on Tuesday 4 February 2025 and Mr Yansane, who was representing himself, conceded that he had admitted in interview and that he had placed the items in the back lane and did not have any permissions, permits or licence to do so. He had also made no arrangements for anyone to collect the items and he had himself previously reported fly-tipping near his property.

    Magistrates found him guilty of fly-tipping and ordered him to pay a £300 fine, £245.21 to cover clean-up costs, and £450 for legal and investigation fees. In total, Mr Yansane was ordered to pay £995.21.

    Sunderland City Council’s Cabinet Member for Environment, Transport and Net Zero, Councillor Lindsey Leonard said: “This case shows that fly-tipping will not be tolerated. If you illegally dump waste, we will investigate, take legal action, and bring offenders to court.

    “Sunderland City Council is dedicated to keeping our community clean, and we encourage residents to dispose of their waste properly.”

    Residents are encouraged to report any fly-tipping or waste disposal issues directly to Sunderland City Council. You can do this online at www.sunderland.gov.uk/report-it or by calling 0191 520 5550.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    February 8, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: Minister Maropene Ramokgopa Hosts Media Engagement Session On Progress Towards MTDP 2024–2029

    Source: Republic of South Africa (video statements-2)

    Minister Maropene Ramokgopa Hosts Media Engagement Session On Progress Towards The Medium-Term Development Plan (Mtdp) 2024–2029

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KAEz_v3cf1M

    MIL OSI Video –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: DRC conflict: talks have failed to bring peace. Is it time to try sanctions?

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Patrick Hajayandi, Research Affiliate, University of Pretoria

    The crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) escalated at the end of January 2025 when Goma, the capital of the province of North Kivu, fell to Rwanda-backed M23 rebels.

    The civilian population is paying a heavy price as a result of ongoing violence, despite a series of initiatives aimed at creating conditions for peace. Since the re-emergence of the M23 in November 2021, violent clashes with the Congolese army have led to thousands of deaths and displaced more than one million people in North Kivu province alone.

    Patrick Hajayandi, whose research focuses on peacebuilding and regional reconciliation, examines previous attempts at finding peace in eastern DRC – and what needs to happen next.

    What efforts have been made by the DRC and Rwanda to ease tensions?

    The eastern DRC has become the site of renewed tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa. Rwanda lies to the east of the DRC. The two nations share a border of about 217 kilometres.

    Kigali accuses the DRC of hosting the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, the largest illegal armed group operating in the conflict area. Better known by its French acronym, FDLR, the group has stated its intention to overthrow the Rwandan government.

    On the other hand, Kinshasa accuses Rwanda of supporting and arming the M23, which seeks to control the two Kivu provinces, North and South. The involvement of the Rwandan Defence Forces in direct combat alongside the M23, corroborated by UN experts, has escalated the spread of violence.

    Despite current tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali, a few years ago the two governments engaged in collaborative efforts to solve the problem posed by the numerous armed groups operating in eastern DRC.

    Such efforts included two joint operations with Congolese and Rwandan forces aimed at neutralising the FDLR. These joint operations in 2008 and 2009 were known as Operation Kimia and Umoja Wetu. In 2019 and 2020, soon after he took power, President Felix Tshisekedi allowed the Rwandan army to conduct operations against the FDLR in Congolese territory.

    However, in recent years, relations have soured badly between Kinshasa and Kigali. This has led to regional efforts to broker peace.

    Why has it been so difficult for regional actors to broker peace in the DRC?

    The first complicating factor relates to the different roles that regional actors play in the DRC.

    The involvement of a multitude of countries points to the complexity underlying the conflict and the diverse geopolitical interests. The DRC shares a border with nine countries: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

    In 2022, the African Union asked Angolan president João Lourenço to mediate between the DRC and Rwanda. The process he oversees is known as the Luanda Process and seeks to defuse the escalation of violence across the region. In particular, it has sought to reduce tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa.

    The East African Community is directly involved in peace initiatives to restore peace in DRC. It has appointed former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta to lead what is called the Nairobi Process.




    Read more:
    DRC-Rwanda crisis: what’s needed to prevent a regional war


    The DRC has rebuffed the East African Community’s reconciliation efforts. And Rwanda recently criticised both processes, suggesting the country had lost confidence in the ability of Lourenço and Kenyatta to find a solution.

    In May 2023, the Southern African Development Community, of which the DRC is a member state, deployed a peace mission. This followed the exit of troops from the East African Community.

    Other countries play different roles directly or indirectly in various missions in the DRC. Burundi is supporting military operations there under the framework of bilateral agreements in the defence sector. Uganda also deployed troops, ostensibly in pursuit of jihadist-backed armed rebels three years ago. However, this deployment has been a destabilising factor, with Kampala facing accusations of supporting the M23.

    What have been the main hurdles in the way of these initiatives?

    The East African Community Regional Force was deployed to pursue peace in eastern DRC as part of the Nairobi Process. However, this mission was cut short due to four main challenges:

    • differences over mission objectives: the DRC government believed that the East African Community Regional Force would militarily confront M23 rebels. But the force had different objectives. As indicated by its commander, the deployment was to focus on overseeing the implementation of a political agreement, not run a military confrontation.

    • contrasting views among the leaders of the East African Community member states on how to address the DRC’s crisis: the DRC and Rwanda are both members of the community. Rwanda is vocal about stopping the persecution of Congolese Tutsi in the DRC. However, there is a growing perception that Rwanda is supporting the M23 as a proxy force to allow it to control mineral resources. This has stalled reconciliation efforts.

    • a lack of financial support for the talks: the African Union and regional bodies don’t have enough funding to support the interventions required to make meaningful progress.

    The Luanda Process has not been able to bring tangible results either. The reasons for this failure include bad faith from the parties involved. This was reflected in the continued capture of territories by Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, despite a July 2024 ceasefire.

    After the January 2025 seizure of Goma and wave of deaths and displacement that followed, the M23 declared another ceasefire. Whether it will hold remains to be seen.

    Rwanda’s behaviour in the ongoing conflict is complicating peace efforts. Kigali continues to deny supporting the M23 armed group. But it is participating in negotiations that involve the M23 and the DRC government. These contradictions make it difficult to know exactly who must be held responsible when, for example, a ceasefire is violated.

    What’s required to give peace in the DRC a chance?

    The current peace initiatives have been ineffective; they are routinely violated. What is needed is real pressure on the actors involved in spreading violence, forcing them to halt their destructive activities.

    Congolese Nobel Prize winner Denis Mukwege, for example, has called for diplomatic and economic measures to end the aggression in the DRC. This would mean implementing sanctions and aid conditionalities in both Kigali and Kinshasa against the military and political leaders orchestrating violence against civilian populations.

    Interventions should also include addressing structural causes of the conflict in the DRC, including resource exploitation.

    There is also a need to address impunity as an essential step towards lasting peace. Rwanda must not continue to support an armed group that is attacking a neighbour. Kigali needs to be held accountable. International pressure is essential in halting attacks. The DRC government must also play its role as a guarantor of security for all its citizens.

    Patrick Hajayandi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. DRC conflict: talks have failed to bring peace. Is it time to try sanctions? – https://theconversation.com/drc-conflict-talks-have-failed-to-bring-peace-is-it-time-to-try-sanctions-248792

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: DRC conflict: talks have failed to bring peace. Is it time to try sanctions?

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Patrick Hajayandi, Research Affiliate, University of Pretoria

    The crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) escalated at the end of January 2025 when Goma, the capital of the province of North Kivu, fell to Rwanda-backed M23 rebels.

    The civilian population is paying a heavy price as a result of ongoing violence, despite a series of initiatives aimed at creating conditions for peace. Since the re-emergence of the M23 in November 2021, violent clashes with the Congolese army have led to thousands of deaths and displaced more than one million people in North Kivu province alone.

    Patrick Hajayandi, whose research focuses on peacebuilding and regional reconciliation, examines previous attempts at finding peace in eastern DRC – and what needs to happen next.

    What efforts have been made by the DRC and Rwanda to ease tensions?

    The eastern DRC has become the site of renewed tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa. Rwanda lies to the east of the DRC. The two nations share a border of about 217 kilometres.

    Kigali accuses the DRC of hosting the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, the largest illegal armed group operating in the conflict area. Better known by its French acronym, FDLR, the group has stated its intention to overthrow the Rwandan government.

    On the other hand, Kinshasa accuses Rwanda of supporting and arming the M23, which seeks to control the two Kivu provinces, North and South. The involvement of the Rwandan Defence Forces in direct combat alongside the M23, corroborated by UN experts, has escalated the spread of violence.

    Despite current tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali, a few years ago the two governments engaged in collaborative efforts to solve the problem posed by the numerous armed groups operating in eastern DRC.

    Such efforts included two joint operations with Congolese and Rwandan forces aimed at neutralising the FDLR. These joint operations in 2008 and 2009 were known as Operation Kimia and Umoja Wetu. In 2019 and 2020, soon after he took power, President Felix Tshisekedi allowed the Rwandan army to conduct operations against the FDLR in Congolese territory.

    However, in recent years, relations have soured badly between Kinshasa and Kigali. This has led to regional efforts to broker peace.

    Why has it been so difficult for regional actors to broker peace in the DRC?

    The first complicating factor relates to the different roles that regional actors play in the DRC.

    The involvement of a multitude of countries points to the complexity underlying the conflict and the diverse geopolitical interests. The DRC shares a border with nine countries: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

    In 2022, the African Union asked Angolan president João Lourenço to mediate between the DRC and Rwanda. The process he oversees is known as the Luanda Process and seeks to defuse the escalation of violence across the region. In particular, it has sought to reduce tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa.

    The East African Community is directly involved in peace initiatives to restore peace in DRC. It has appointed former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta to lead what is called the Nairobi Process.


    Read more: DRC-Rwanda crisis: what’s needed to prevent a regional war


    The DRC has rebuffed the East African Community’s reconciliation efforts. And Rwanda recently criticised both processes, suggesting the country had lost confidence in the ability of Lourenço and Kenyatta to find a solution.

    In May 2023, the Southern African Development Community, of which the DRC is a member state, deployed a peace mission. This followed the exit of troops from the East African Community.

    Other countries play different roles directly or indirectly in various missions in the DRC. Burundi is supporting military operations there under the framework of bilateral agreements in the defence sector. Uganda also deployed troops, ostensibly in pursuit of jihadist-backed armed rebels three years ago. However, this deployment has been a destabilising factor, with Kampala facing accusations of supporting the M23.

    What have been the main hurdles in the way of these initiatives?

    The East African Community Regional Force was deployed to pursue peace in eastern DRC as part of the Nairobi Process. However, this mission was cut short due to four main challenges:

    • differences over mission objectives: the DRC government believed that the East African Community Regional Force would militarily confront M23 rebels. But the force had different objectives. As indicated by its commander, the deployment was to focus on overseeing the implementation of a political agreement, not run a military confrontation.

    • contrasting views among the leaders of the East African Community member states on how to address the DRC’s crisis: the DRC and Rwanda are both members of the community. Rwanda is vocal about stopping the persecution of Congolese Tutsi in the DRC. However, there is a growing perception that Rwanda is supporting the M23 as a proxy force to allow it to control mineral resources. This has stalled reconciliation efforts.

    • a lack of financial support for the talks: the African Union and regional bodies don’t have enough funding to support the interventions required to make meaningful progress.

    The Luanda Process has not been able to bring tangible results either. The reasons for this failure include bad faith from the parties involved. This was reflected in the continued capture of territories by Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, despite a July 2024 ceasefire.

    After the January 2025 seizure of Goma and wave of deaths and displacement that followed, the M23 declared another ceasefire. Whether it will hold remains to be seen.

    Rwanda’s behaviour in the ongoing conflict is complicating peace efforts. Kigali continues to deny supporting the M23 armed group. But it is participating in negotiations that involve the M23 and the DRC government. These contradictions make it difficult to know exactly who must be held responsible when, for example, a ceasefire is violated.

    What’s required to give peace in the DRC a chance?

    The current peace initiatives have been ineffective; they are routinely violated. What is needed is real pressure on the actors involved in spreading violence, forcing them to halt their destructive activities.

    Congolese Nobel Prize winner Denis Mukwege, for example, has called for diplomatic and economic measures to end the aggression in the DRC. This would mean implementing sanctions and aid conditionalities in both Kigali and Kinshasa against the military and political leaders orchestrating violence against civilian populations.

    Interventions should also include addressing structural causes of the conflict in the DRC, including resource exploitation.

    There is also a need to address impunity as an essential step towards lasting peace. Rwanda must not continue to support an armed group that is attacking a neighbour. Kigali needs to be held accountable. International pressure is essential in halting attacks. The DRC government must also play its role as a guarantor of security for all its citizens.

    – DRC conflict: talks have failed to bring peace. Is it time to try sanctions?
    – https://theconversation.com/drc-conflict-talks-have-failed-to-bring-peace-is-it-time-to-try-sanctions-248792

    MIL OSI Africa –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Rebels are continuing their march in eastern Congo – what is their long-term goal?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Amani Kasherwa, School of Nursing, Midwifery and Social Work, The University of Queensland

    In late January, a rebel group that has long caused mayhem in the sprawling African nation of Democratic Republic of Congo took control of Goma, a major city of about 2 million people on the border with Rwanda in the country’s east.

    Nearly 3,000 people were killed in one of the deadliest weeks in the history of this mineral-rich country. The dead include 100 female prisoners who were reportedly raped by male inmates at a prison and then burned alive.

    As someone born and raised in the region, I’ve witnessed first-hand the devastating impact of this protracted war on communities. I’ve been in contact with residents in Goma, who have described unprecedented chaos – looting, criminality and a breakdown of essential services. One resident said:

    I’m feeling unsafe in my own house. Last night live bullets penetrated my kitchen, and thank God none of us were there at the time.

    More violence may lay ahead. The M23 rebel group, backed by neighbouring Rwanda, is marching south towards Bukavu, another major city, the provincial capital of South Kivu.

    Though unlikely, it has vowed to topple the government of President Felix Tshisekedi in the capital, Kinshasa, some 2,600 kilometres away.

    Tshisekedi has ruled out entering into dialogue with the rebel group, saying his government would not be “humiliated or crushed”.

    What is M23?

    Founded in 2012, M23 claims to protect the Tutsi ethnic minority group in Congo from discrimination, but it has recently begun pursuing broader political and economic ambitions. It is believed to have about 6,500 fighters, supported by another 4,000 troops from Rwanda.

    Last year, the group was restructured to include other Rwanda-backed militias and politicians in the region. Together, they formed the River Congo Alliance, led by Corneille Nangaa, the former head of Congo’s electoral body. It now appears the group has “longer-term objectives in holding and potentially expanding their territorial control”, one analyst says.

    A military court has issued an arrest warrant for Nangaa this week, alleging he is behind massacres in eastern Congo.

    Congo has one of the richest reserves of critical minerals in the world, including cobalt, copper, coltan, uranium and gold. M23’s advances have given it control over many lucrative mines and supply lines to Rwanda.

    In May 2024, M23 seized the mine in Rubaya, one of the world’s largest coltan reserves, which generates more than US$800,000 (A$1.2 million) in revenue a month.

    As of this week, M23 has also gained control over mining sites in North and South Kivu regions, where children and young people are forced to work in life-threatening conditions. Others have been recruited as child soldiers.

    Potential for a regional conflict

    The current situation echoes the tumult caused in 2012 when M23 briefly seized Goma. Back then, the international community reacted more diligently, suspending around US$200 million (A$318 million) in aid to Rwanda. US President Barack Obama personally called Rwandan President Paul Kagame, urging him to stop supporting the rebel group.

    In contrast, the current offensive has been met with a less coordinated international response.

    The resurgence of M23 has been largely attributed to the failure of regional peace talks, notably the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes.

    Rwanda has leveraged the legacy of the 1994 genocide to secure a continuous flow of Western aid, enabling its involvement in proxy wars in the Congo with little to no repercussions.

    Its involvement in supporting M23 is well documented, with evidence from reports by UN expert groups showing the group is receiving weapons, troops and logistical aid from the country.

    Uganda is also believed to be supporting the rebels, while Burundi is backing the Congolese government.

    This has many worried the current fighting could spiral into a regional conflict.

    What the world can do

    The ongoing crisis in Congo has been catastrophic for the local population, with more than 6.9 million people internally displaced and 1.1 million people fleeing to neighbouring countries.

    The crisis has disproportionately affected women and children. It has caused shortages of water, electricity and food supplies and the collapse of medical care, particularly for newborns and critically ill patients. There are also concerns about a new Ebola outbreak in the region.

    Rebel bombings, some launched from Rwanda, have targeted refugee camps, schools and hospitals. According to the UN and human rights groups, M23 is responsible for a massacre in the village of Kishishe, resulting in scores of killings and mass rapes.

    The international community has long ignored this region, providing only a bare minimum of aid to help the millions in need.

    An immediate ceasefire and massive influx of humanitarian aid are urgently needed. But a lasting peace will remain elusive if the main actors don’t address the root causes of the conflict and work towards sustainable, structural solutions that go beyond military interventions.

    In the past, Amani Kasherwa received funding from the Open Society Foundation for his academic research on the role of youth organisations in the peacebuilding process in the African Great Lakes Region (including DR Congo and Burundi).

    – ref. Rebels are continuing their march in eastern Congo – what is their long-term goal? – https://theconversation.com/rebels-are-continuing-their-march-in-eastern-congo-what-is-their-long-term-goal-248672

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: More Mideast countries reject Trump’s Gaza relocation plan

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    A Palestinian child is seen on a destroyed building in Jabalia refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip, on Jan. 29, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    More countries in the Middle East on Thursday voiced their rejection of a proposal by U.S. President Donald Trump to take control of the Gaza Strip and relocate its residents elsewhere.

    On Tuesday, Trump suggested that the United States will take over Gaza and redevelop it after Palestinians are relocated elsewhere. He made these remarks in a joint press conference at the White House with visiting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

    Many Arab and Muslim countries have voiced their opposition to the idea of displacing the Gazans from their homeland.

    The Palestinian presidency on Thursday said that Palestine and its land, history, and holy sites are not for sale, emphasizing that the rights of the Palestinian people are neither negotiable nor subject to compromise.

    In a press statement, Nabil Abu Rudeineh, the spokesman of the Palestinian presidency, said, “The Palestinian people, who have made immense sacrifices in defense of their national rights, will not relinquish even an inch of their land, including the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.”

    Any proposed solutions, he insisted, must align with international legitimacy and the Arab Peace Initiative.

    Egypt reaffirmed its commitment on Thursday to collaborate with international partners and allies to implement plans for Gaza’s early recovery, rubble removal, and reconstruction within a specific timeframe.

    This plan will be implemented as the Palestinians will remain in the Gaza Strip, who refuse to be displaced, according to a statement by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry.

    The statement also rejected “any proposal or vision” that seeks to resolve the Palestinian issue by uprooting the Palestinian people, displacing them from their historical land, or seizing that land, whether temporarily or permanently, while affirming that Egypt will not be “party to any such actions.”

    Algeria on Thursday strongly condemned the proposal aimed at displacing Gaza residents, warning that such moves are part of a broader scheme to undermine the Palestinian national cause.

    In a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algeria reiterated its firm stance that achieving lasting peace in the Middle East is inseparable from upholding the rights of the Palestinian people to an independent state.

    Algeria underscored its support for the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state based on the two-state solution, considering it “the only just and permanent resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”

    The Libyan Foreign Ministry on Thursday also rejected any attempt to displace Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and the occupied West Bank.

    “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the State of Libya confirms its firm and supportive position on the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people … foremost among which is the right of the Palestinian people to establish their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital,” the ministry said in a statement.

    “Libya stresses its absolute rejection of any practices aimed at the forced displacement or arbitrary expulsion of Palestinians, changing the demographic composition of the occupied territories, or imposing racist policies that perpetuate the occupation and violate the most basic human rights,” the statement noted.

    It condemned any “acts of violence targeting civilians or acts used as a pretext to perpetuate the occupation and undermine the chances of achieving a just peace.”

    On Wednesday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan rejected the proposal during a joint press conference in Ankara with his visiting German counterpart, Frank-Walter Steinmeier.

    “Everyone has a great responsibility in maintaining the ceasefire in Gaza. As the international community, we must continue our efforts for a two-state solution,” Erdogan emphasized.

    In response to Trump’s proposal, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that “neither the region nor we (as Türkiye) can accept such a situation.”

    “The very thought of it is a pointless endeavor. We oppose any initiatives that seek to exclude the people of Gaza from the equation,” Fidan said during a live televised speech.

    “Obviously, it is completely unacceptable, and by no means can it bring peace to the region,” Gulru Gezer, a former Turkish diplomat and foreign policy analyst, told Xinhua on Thursday. “On the contrary, it will only bring greater chaos, not only to Palestine and Israel but to the broader Middle East.”

    During a meeting on Thursday with Palestinian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Mustafa, Arab League (AL) Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul-Gheit reiterated the U.S. proposal for displacing the Gazans was rejected by Arab countries, according to a statement by the AL.

    During the meeting, Aboul-Gheit urged to speed up reconstruction of the Gaza Strip to block the path to the displacement of Gazans.

    “The Palestinian people will not allow the repetition of cleansing Palestinians under the pretext of voluntary or forced exit,” the statement added.

    MIL OSI China News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Volcano Watch — An assembly of volcano scientists to gather in Hilo

    Source: US Geological Survey

    Volcano Watch is a weekly article and activity update written by U.S. Geological Survey Hawaiian Volcano Observatory scientists and affiliates. Today’s article is by HVO geologist Kendra J. Lynn.

    This cartoon schematic depicts the Kīlauea 2018 lower East Rift Zone eruption and coincident summit collapse. It is the logo for the American Geophysical Union Chapman Meeting on Caldera-Forming Eruptions at Basaltic Volcanoes, to be held in Hilo, Hawaii, from February 9-14, 2025. More info: https://www.agu.org/chapman-basaltic-caldera-forming-eruptions.

    Next week, during February 9-14, volcano scientists from around the world are gathering in Hilo, united by the common goal of understanding caldera-forming eruptions at basaltic volcanoes. 

    The occasion for the assembly is the American Geophysical Union Chapman Conference on Caldera-forming Eruptions at Basaltic Volcanoes: Insights and Puzzles from Kīlauea 2018 and Beyond. The meeting is directly aligned with the U.S. Geological Survey’s Volcano Hazards Program mission—“to enhance public safety and minimize social and economic disruption from volcanic unrest and eruption.”

    Basaltic caldera-forming rift eruptions, like the 2018 eruption of Kīlauea, represent an underappreciated hazard for many global communities, but also a chance to better understand some of Earth’s most active volcanoes. A handful of these eruptions have been documented globally in the last half-century, including at Miyakejima (Japan), Piton de la Fournaise (La Réunion), and Bárðarbunga (Iceland). Kīlauea’s 2018 eruption was its most impactful in centuries, was documented in remarkable detail, and it involved more than one cubic kilometer of basaltic lava flows, a magnitude-6.9 flank earthquake, and a major summit collapse. 

    Observations from Kīlauea and similar eruptions around the globe offer an unprecedented opportunity to understand calderas and associated rift systems and the dynamics of their interplay, but a community-driven synthesis has been lacking, and numerous fundamental scientific questions remain. The experts who will gather on the Island of Hawaiʻi will assess current understanding, share insights, and map out work on critical outstanding issues. Resulting insights should prove valuable when the next large basaltic caldera collapse takes place somewhere on Earth.

    This conference will bring together an interdisciplinary assembly of volcano scientists to contrast observations from historic global caldera-rift eruptions, establish the state-of-the-art understanding, identify important questions, and initiate lasting new research efforts. We will address the causes of these eruptions, the dynamics of basaltic caldera collapses, the interaction between summit calderas and rift zones, the geometry and physical properties of magma storage, and the challenges in forecasting associated hazards. 

    A significant investment in research and monitoring of Hawaii’s volcanoes was made through the Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act of 2019 (H.R. 2157), which provided Supplemental funding to USGS for recovery and rebuilding activities in the wake of the 2018 Kīlauea eruption. Results from recent large-scale science experiments at Kīlauea supported by this funding will be shared and discussed at the Chapman. Field trips will give participants an opportunity to visit important sites on the volcano. Finally, teams will be formed to discuss science questions in detail and establish priorities for additional work following the meeting.

    The conference is being organized by U.S. Geological Survey and academic volcano researchers, bringing over 150 scientists together for presentations, discussions, workshops, and field trips. Participants represent 15 countries outside the United States and will include presentations about volcanoes around the world. Roughly 25% of presenters are undergraduate or graduate students, representing a new generation of volcano scientists tackling our field’s biggest challenges. We are very excited that several University of Hawai‘i at Hilo and Mānoa students will be presenting their research at the meeting. Additionally, partners from Hawai‘i County Civil Defense, Hawai‘i Volcanoes National Park, the Hawaiian Volcano Education & Resilience Institute, the Pacific Tsunami Museum, and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center will participate. 

    During the week of the conference, winning art and haiku submissions from the USGS Hawaiian Volcano Observatory (HVO) Volcano Awareness Month competition will be on display. In addition, a public After Dark in the Park presentation by Icleandic Meteorological Office scientist Gro Pederson will summarize the ongoing volcanic crisis on Reykjanes Peninsula, Southwest Iceland on February 6 in the Kīlauea Visitor Center Auditorium in Hawai‘i Volcanoes National Park. Dr. Pederson is a former USGS HVO volunteer, and her presentation will highlight parallels between Hawaiian and Icelandic volcanoes and their hazards to our communities. 

    We look forward to a productive week learning from our colleagues and partners. E komo mai to the assembly of volcanologists that is soon to arrive!

    Volcano Activity Updates

    Kīlauea is not erupting. Its USGS Volcano Alert level is WATCH.

    The summit eruption at Kīlauea volcano that began in Halemaʻumaʻu crater on December 23 continued over the past week, with one eruptive episode. Episode 8 was active from the evening of February 3 until the evening of February 4. Kīlauea summit has been inflating since episode 8 ended. Resumption of eruptive activity is possible between February 8-11 if summit inflation continues at current rate. Sulfur dioxide emission rates are elevated in the summit region during active eruption episodes. No unusual activity has been noted along Kīlauea’s East Rift Zone or Southwest Rift Zone. 

    Mauna Loa is not erupting. Its USGS Volcano Alert Level is at NORMAL.

    No earthquakes were reported felt in the Hawaiian Islands during the past week.

    HVO continues to closely monitor Kīlauea and Mauna Loa.

    Please visit HVO’s website for past Volcano Watch articles, Kīlauea and Mauna Loa updates, volcano photos, maps, recent earthquake information, and more. Email questions to askHVO@usgs.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Stafford man convicted by federal jury for brutally assaulting a deaf passenger during a flight

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    ALEXANDRIA, Va. – A federal jury convicted a Stafford man today on charges relating to his assault of a fellow passenger on a flight from San Francisco to Dulles International Airport in Virginia.

    According to court records and evidence presented at trial, on Oct. 28, 2024, Everett Chad Nelson, 44, was a passenger on United Airlines flight 2247. Without provocation, Nelson approached a sleeping, deaf passenger over twenty rows ahead of his seat, entered the passenger’s row, and began brutally punching the passenger in the face. Nelson punched the victim repeatedly and rapidly, using both hands, and landing forceful, violent blows on the victim’s cheeks, nose, and forehead.  Nelson caused serious bodily injury to the victim, breaking his nose and leaving the victim with injuries that have required months of medical treatment.

    Another passenger, sitting a few rows ahead, heard the commotion, saw the altercation, ran towards the assault and restrained Nelson. The flight crew relocated Nelson and secured him for the remainder of the flight. Nelson was arrested by the FBI upon the flight’s arrival at Dulles.

    Nelson faces up to 10 years in prison, and sentencing will be set for a later date. Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Erik S. Siebert, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, and Sanjay Virmani, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Washington Field Office’s Counterterrorism Division, made the announcement after U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema accepted the verdict.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Daniel K. Amzallag and Heather D. Call are prosecuting the case.

    A copy of this press release is located on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Related court documents and information are located on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 1:24-cr-251.

    MIL Security OSI –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: IMF Press Briefing Transcript – Julie Kozack

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    February 6, 2025

    INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND PRESS BRIEFING

    Washington, D.C. Thursday, February 6, 2025

    P R O C E E D I N G S

    1. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone. It’s great to see you all, here in person and online. Welcome to the first IMF press briefing for 2025. I’m Julie Kozak, Director of the Communication Department. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. U.S. Eastern Time. I’ll start with a few announcements and then I’ll move to take your questions in person, on WebEx, and via the Press Center.

       First, Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva will travel to Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. The Managing Director will visit Ethiopia on February 8th and 9th to meet Prime Minister Abiy and his team, and this visit will take stock of the economic reforms and progress that is being made by the country. She will also meet with stakeholders, including representatives of the private sector.

    The Managing Director will also travel to the United Arab Emirates to participate in the Arab Fiscal Forum on February 10th and the World Government Summit on February 11th where she will deliver keynote remarks. On February 16th and 17th, the Managing Director will participate in a two-day conference in Saudi Arabia on building resilience of emerging market economies. The conference is co-organized by the IMF and the Saudi Finance Ministry.

    The First Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath will travel to Japan to join the Article IV mission. She will participate in meetings with the authorities and hold a press conference on February 7th at 10:30 a.m. Tokyo time.

    Finally, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan to participate in a jointly organized IMF-JICA conference on Economic and Fiscal Policy Challenges and Prospects for Asia. And this is scheduled for February 12 and 13.

    And with that I will now open the floor for your questions. For those connecting virtually, please do turn on both your camera and the microphone when speaking. Let’s get started.

    QUESTIONER: Hi,I was just wondering, you mentioned Ethiopia. How concerned are you about sort of countries with large IMF programs which also receive a substantial amount of support from USAID, considering the recent executive order, countries like Ethiopia and Ukraine, for example. Thanks.

    KOZACK: Thanks very much. So with respect to your question, you know we are closely following the announcements and developments regarding USAID. At this stage it’s too early to gauge the precise impact on the countries that it supports. We’ll wait for clarity on the next steps, including any changes to the scope of the work of USAID.

    QUESTIONER: So, the IMF mission is going to start working in Ukraine this month. Could you specify please what main issues will the Fund plan to focus on during the Seventh Review of the EFF program. And the second question is about the pension reform in Ukraine. Ukrainian government committed to starting this reform this year. Could you elaborate on what key changes the IMF expects from Ukraine on this area? Thank you.

    KOZACK: Are there any other questions on Ukraine?

    QUESTIONER: So, according to latest information, the review of the EFF is scheduled to begin this month. When the decision on the disbursement is going to be made and what amount of funds are going to be provided with this fund? And the follow-up, how much money is left in the EFF according to the current situation? Are there any plans to expand this program? Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: Just to follow up on the question about Ethiopia. Obviously, the USAID cuts also affect Ukraine pretty significantly. And I wonder, you know, both in those cases and in all cases involving USAID funding, whether you are working with the US ED here and sort of sending a message about the impact. So, whether you’ve kind of figured it out across the enterprise and across all the countries that the IMF works with as well. Thanks.

    KOZACK: Anything else on Ukraine online? Okay. So, on Ukraine, just to remind everyone of the context. So, on December 20th, the IMF’s Executive Board approved the Sixth Review of the EFF program. That enabled the disbursement of $1.1 billion and that brought total disbursements under the program to $9.8 billion. And the total size of the program, I believe, was $15.6 billion. So, the difference between those two is what would be remaining. At that time, the Board assessed that program performance remained strong. The authorities had met all of the benchmarks and prior actions for the review.

    With respect to the next mission, the technical work for the upcoming review is underway. The mission dates are in the process of being finalized, and once we have them, we’ll be sure to communicate that. During this upcoming mission, the IMF staff will engage with the authorities on fiscal policy, including progress on revenue mobilization, monetary policies for 2025, and also progress in ensuring that debt sustainability and fiscal sustainability are restored. Staff will also be reviewing governance reforms, which remain a key pillar for the program. Based on the approved calendar of disbursements, subject to completion of the next review and, of course, subject to Board approval, Ukraine would have access to about $900 million for that next review.

    With respect to pension reform, the government has committed to launch pension reforms this year in 2025, and they would be spearheaded by the Ministry of Social Policy. And those reforms are supported by external partners, notably the World Bank. What I can also add is that the authorities are in the process of developing a comprehensive set of proposals for pension reforms, but it’s too early to tell exactly what will be included in those proposals and what the changes may be.

    And on the second question, I don’t really have much to add to what I already said, other than obviously we’re paying close attention and we’re awaiting further details.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Thank you for taking my question. Just on Syria, can you give us an update if the IMF has made any contact with the new government and if there are any plans to provide a loan package to the country? Thank you.

    KOZACK: We’re closely monitoring, obviously, the situation in Syria, and we stand ready to support the international community’s efforts to assist Syria’s reconstruction as needed and when conditions allow. With respect to our engagement, we have not had a meaningful engagement with Syria since 2009, which was the time of the last Article IV Consultation, and this has been due to the difficult security situation in the country.

    QUESTIONER: I have two questions, and they’re Caribbean-related questions. Can you provide a breakdown of the growth projections for the Caribbean region, more specifically, focusing on St. Kitts and Nevis, and what factors are driving the projected growth or decline outlook for the region, more specifically, the Caribbean region?

    KOZACK: Okay. All right, let me step back and give a little bit of an overview of where we stand, what our view is on the Caribbean. So, following the rapid recovery after the Pandemic, real GDP growth in the region has normalized in recent years. Average GDP growth for the region, and this is excluding Guyana and Haiti, is estimated at 2.2 percent for 2023, 2.4 percent for 2024. And growth, our projection is for growth to remain relatively stable at 2.4 percent in 2025.

    Broadly speaking, there are sort of two groups of countries in the Caribbean. So, we look at tourism-dependent economies, and there we see that growth in tourism economies has slowed as tourism arrivals have returned to pre-Pandemic levels. And then for commodity-exporting countries, they have faced challenges in the energy sector but have overall benefited from robust performance in their non-energy sector, and that has been driven by supportive and economic policies.

    I can also add that inflation in most Caribbean countries has moderated significantly over the past few years, and the decline was due to lower global commodity prices and easing of supply chain disruptions. And we expect inflation to remain moderate in the years to come.

    QUESTIONER: My question is on the comment by Managing Director Georgieva in Davos. MD mentioned in Davos clearly that more cooperation in the regional levels might be needed in the future in such a fragmented world and IMF would support such a movement. And could you give me some more detailed plans?

    KOZACK: Thanks very much for the question. What the Managing Director noted in Davos is that we are seeing shifting patterns in global cooperation, in trade, and in other areas, including financial and capital flows. And of course, as a global institution, what will be important for us is as we engage with our membership, right, to take all of this into account to ensure that we can give our members the best policy advice within our mandate of economic and financial stability.

    QUESTIONER: Thanks so much, Julie. I wanted to ask you very broadly about the changes that are happening in the United States and the tariffs that President Trump has announced. Now the implementation of the tariffs on Canada and Mexico has been delayed to March 1st. And, you know, it’s not clear what will happen there exactly. But one of the, you know, the tariffs on China have stayed in place. China has now announced tariffs that will kick in on February 10th. The IMF has warned repeatedly against rising protectionism and also kind of cataloged the thousands of trade restrictions that have been put in place and growing over time since COVID. Can you just walk us through what your perception is right now? The markets have been really all over the place, you know, sort of up and down depending on the day’s mood. Do you see this period of trade uncertainty that you warned about in the WEO, kind of really affecting and dampening global growth prospects? Thanks.

    KOZACK: Thanks very much. Let me see if anyone else has questions on this broad topic.

    QUESTIONER: Thank you. Yeah, I was just wondering, just to follow on the previous question, how you sort of think about the unpredictability of of these tariffs or the discussions around the tariffs, the uncertainty that that kind of brings up, and potentially how that could affect monetary policy. We’ve seen a lot of analysts talking about how they no longer expect the Fed to cut, or they expect the Fed to cut maybe only once this year. I’m just sort of wondering how you’re kind of in real time or as close to real time as you can, sort of taking on board that unpredictability when you think about the U.S. economy and the impacts for global growth. Thanks.

    KOZACK: Great. And you also had a question.

    QUESTIONER: Yes. Just following up with my colleagues. What sort of study, if any, has the IMF undertaken to better understand the global ramifications of these tariffs? We know they’re on pause for another 30 days or so or less. And what sort of impact would small states that are heavily dependent on the United States feel going forward?

    KOZACK: And let me go online to see if anyone online has a question along these lines.

    QUESTIONER: It is very similar. Just wondering the fact that it’s not just tariffs that have imposed on China, but the threat of tariffs on countries across the EU, Canada, and Mexico, and what effect that has on the global outlook. Thank you.

    KOZACK: Okay. Thank you. Anyone else online want to come in on this topic? Okay. So, what I can say on this issue is we’re following the announcements by the U.S. with respect to tariffs on Chinese goods and potentially Canadian and Mexican goods. We’re following these announcements. We believe that it’s in the interest of all to find a constructive way forward to resolve this issue.

    With respect to the assessment, assessing the full impact of these measures of tariffs, it’s actually going to depend on several factors, and let me lay those out. One of those factors is going to be the responses of the countries concerned. Another factor will be how firms and consumers react. And finally, how the measures evolve over time will also have an impact.

    So, at this stage, that’s what I can share with you. We will, of course, have more information over time and in due course as the situation evolves.

    QUESTIONER: Julie, I’m sorry, I think the question is, like, can you say something about what uncertainty does to the global economy? I mean, you’ve talked about this in WEO’s before, but do you see this as a period of heightened uncertainty now that Trump has taken office? And, you know, what is the impact of that uncertainty on things like investment and all this, you know, the sort of categories of economic indicators that we look at?

    KOZACK: So, I think what I can say is, of course, I would refer you to the WEO for some of those analysis. And again, assessing the full impact of this will include all of the factors that I just laid out. And we would take into account issues related to uncertainty, market reactions, et cetera, in an assessment that we will ultimately undertake as the situation evolves and once we have more information.

    Let me now go online. I see a couple of hands up. So, if you’re online, please go ahead and jump in.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Thank you for taking my question. Well, has the letter of intent between the IMF and Argentina been prepared? Or let me ask in a different way. Are the negotiations between Argentina and the IMF already in the final stage?

    KOZACK: Thanks. Other questions on Argentina?

    QUESTIONER: Could you give me any updates on the negotiations of the new agreement and what are the most challenging issues they are facing right now? And also yesterday, Minister Luis Caputo said a new agreement will not imply a devaluation of the peso or the exit of the exchange restrictions the next day. Does the IMF agree with this statement?

    KOZACK: Thanks. Others on Argentina?

    QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie. I was wondering also if you could give some input regarding the meetings that the mission in Buenos Aires had, if they have only been talking to government officials or if they are also contacting unions and other opposition representatives. And also, the new crawling peg of 1 percent has started this February. I was wondering if that was a matter of discussion between the staff and the government.

    KOZACK: Thanks, other questions?

    QUESTIONER: Yes, thank you, Julie. So, my question is also on the crawling peg. So, is the IMF concerned about the greater exchange rate delay generated by this reduction of the crawling peg from 2 percent to 1 percent started the 1st of February?

    KOZACK: Any other questions on Argentina? Okay, I hear two more. Please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie, I wanted to know if Argentina has already paid a debt due on February 1st or when is it expected to do so? And if there is a meeting plan between Argentina authorities and the IMF network staff in Washington.

    KOZACK: Thank you. Next.

    QUESTIONER: Good morning. The question is if Argentina and the IMF comes to a new agreement, should it be like we are talking here in Argentina about $5 million? It will be for anything special, for example, to leave what we call cepo, or it depends on the Argentine authorities.

    KOZACK: Any other questions on Argentina? Okay, I do not see anyone coming in.

    So, on Argentina, what I can share is first that, as the Managing Director highlighted after her meeting with President Milei last month, we recognize Argentina’s tremendous progress in reducing inflation, stabilizing the economy, returning to growth, and with poverty finally starting to decline. We continue to engage constructively with the Argentine authorities. And a staff mission did recently visit Buenos Aires to advance discussions on a new program. The new program will aim to build on the gains that have been achieved so far, while also addressing the remaining challenges that the country faces. Constructive and frequent discussions continue, and we will provide further details on next steps when we have them.

    I can also just add that to sustain early gains, there is a shared recognition between the Fund staff and the Argentine authorities about the need to continue to adopt a consistent set of fiscal, monetary, and foreign exchange policies while furthering growth-enhancing reforms. I also know that you have a lot of interest, and there were a lot of detailed questions here, but given that the discussions are continuing and there has been good progress so far, we do want to ensure that there is space for staff and the authorities to continue these constructive discussions. And of course, we will communicate more when we have further details.

    Okay, let us go online because I see a few hands up.

    QUESTIONER: My question is, when do we expect Board of Directors to discuss Egypt Fourth Review?

    KOZACK: Do we have other questions on Egypt?

    QUESTIONER: Hi, I’d like to ask, in addition to that, when the board does discuss Egypt’s Fourth Review, will it also be discussing an additional RSF for Egypt? There have been some reports that Egypt is in line to receive as much as $1 billion.

    KOZACK: Other questions?

    QUESTIONER:  I just wanted to ask, in terms of the assessment of Egypt, but also other countries in the region, to what extent you are calculating additional costs and spending needs that have to do with Gaza and with the potential absorption of Palestinian refugees that has been proposed.

    KOZACK: Okay, any other questions on Egypt? I see I have two questions that have come through the press center, which I will read aloud. So, the first is when will the IMF’s Executive Board complete the Fourth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Egypt?

    The second question is regarding the Executive Board’s approval of the Fourth Review of Egypt’s program, could it be this month? Does the IMF have updates on your projections for Egypt’s economy in light of regional updates?

    Let me share with you where we are on Egypt. On December 24, the IMF staff and the Egyptian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Fourth Review of the EFF. This review is subject to approval of our Executive Board and subject to that approval, Egypt would have access to about $1.2 billion. Preparations for Board consideration are underway, and the Board meeting is expected to take place in the coming weeks.

    In light of the difficult external conditions and challenging domestic environment, the IMF staff and the Egyptian authorities agreed to recalibrate the fiscal consolidation path, and this was agreed in December, I would highlight, to create fiscal space for critical social programs benefiting vulnerable groups and the middle class while ensuring debt sustainability.

    Looking forward, reform priorities comprise lowering inflation, sustaining exchange rate flexibility, and liberalized access to foreign exchange. In addition, the program aims to boost domestic revenues. It aims to improve the business environment. It aims to accelerate disinvestment or divestment rather and leveling [of] the playing field between state-owned enterprises and the private sector. And of course, it also aims to enhance governance and transparency.

    With respect to the question on the RSF, a policy package of reforms will be considered by the Fund’s Executive Board along with the Fourth Review of Egypt’s program.

    And lastly, there is no connection at the moment between some of the announcements in Gaza and the and the Egypt program.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, I wonder if I can just clarify. On the RSF, you say a policy package of reforms that also presumably comes with some additional funding. Can you confirm whether the amount of up to $1 billion is accurate?

    KOZACK: I can’t confirm now the precise amount of the RSF, but of course as we have more information, we will provide that.

    QUESTIONER: Thank you so much.

    KOZACK: Let us go online. I see another hand online and then we will come back. Just one follow up, a follow up. Go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: You cannot confirm the amount of the RSF. So just so we are clear, are you confirming that there are discussions around an RSF? Thanks.

    KOZACK: Yes, there’s discussions on an RSF and the intention is to present the RSF with its package of reforms to our Executive Board at the same time as we present the Fourth Review of the EFF.

    QUESTIONER: Question about Rwanda and Eastern Congo. I wanted to know, I know that the IMF has programs with both Rwanda and the DRC. And I wanted to know, you know, given the M23 incursion, the fall of Goma, how the programs can react to it, if there is anything you can say about that. And also, obviously, in El Salvador, they changed their cryptocurrency law, but it is also reported that they recently bought 50 bitcoins. So, some people are for the kind of national treasury. Some people are confused in terms of what the contours of the limitations put on. And I wonder if you could comment on that. Thanks a lot.

    KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Any other questions on these countries? DRC, Rwanda, El Salvador?

    Okay, let me start with DRC and I want to start by saying that, you know, we are deeply saddened by the loss of lives and the humanitarian crisis in the Eastern part of DRC. We are closely monitoring the situation, including its potential impact on neighboring countries and the region. And of course, we are also closely monitoring with respect to potential impact on our program.

    With respect to Rwanda, what I can say on Rwanda is simply that the country continues to demonstrate a robust commitment to advancing policy reforms. And In December of 2024, our Executive Board concluded the Fourth Review of Rwanda’s programs.

    With respect to El Salvador, just to step back and remind, IMF staff and the Salvadorian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on December 18th for a new arrangement, a new EFF arrangement. The arrangement would be for about $1.4 billion to support the government’s reform agenda, and this agreement is subject to approval by the IMF’s Executive Board.

    I can also add that as explained in the press release that we issued following the staff-level agreement, the new Fund supported program aims to reduce the potential risks of the bitcoin project. Once in place, purchases of bitcoin will be confined under the program as agreed.

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. Good morning, everyone. A few things. In Zimbabwe, when you expect a deal for the Staff Monitored Program? And on Lebanon, have you had any contact with the new government? Are there any signs that you are going to be able to work with them? Also on Senegal, can you give us any update on the resolution of the suspension of the financing program there? And lastly, are there any concerns of a drop in the commitment of funding from the U.S.? The 2025 project calls for the U.S. to stop putting money into the World Bank and the IMF. So, are you guys concerned about that?

    KOZACK: Okay, thanks. Starting with Zimbabwe, I do not have an update for you for today on Zimbabwe, but we will come back to you bilaterally.

    On Lebanon, what I can share is that, you know, we welcome the election of General Aoun as president of Lebanon, and we look forward to working with him and his new government to address the challenges facing the Lebanese economy. And just to remind, Lebanon continues to face profound economic challenges, and the conflict had exacerbated an already fragile macroeconomic and social situation. The election of the president, the formation of a new government, as well as the ceasefire, are critical to support policy actions and reforms that would allow the gradual return to the normalization of economic activity in Lebanon.

    And what I can share on Senegal is that we are actively engaged in discussions with the authorities on addressing the misreporting case. Senegal’s Court of Auditors is expected to issue its final report this month. In parallel, IMF staff are working closely with the authorities to identify their capacity development needs and to implement corrective measures needed to address the root causes of the misreporting. These efforts are aimed at enhancing transparency, strengthening accountability, and preventing a recurrence of similar misreporting in the future.

    And I think, on your final question, all I can say here is that the United States is the IMF’s largest shareholder, and it plays an extremely valuable role in helping ensure global financial stability. We have a long history of working with successive U.S. administrations, and we look forward to continuing to do so.

    QUESTIONER: Thanks, Julie. Thank you for taking my question. When do you think we can expect the Executive Board’s approval on the next tranche for the Island Nation? And if there is any delay, what sort of reason is there? Is there more for the government to do? And secondly, the budget for the country is expected in a few weeks. Has the IMF given any input on preparing this budget, given the fact that the country is still in the EFF program?

    KOZACK: Thanks. So, your question was on Sri Lanka? And yes, I see you nodding. So, if anyone else has questions on Sri Lanka, I can take them now. Okay. If not, let me go ahead with Sri Lanka.

    So, on Sri Lanka on November 23rd, IMF staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Third Review of Sri Lanka’s EFF program. Once approved by the IMF’s Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $333 million in financing. And we expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.

    Here, I would also just like to take the opportunity to emphasize that Sri Lanka’s ambitious reform agenda is delivering commendable outcomes. The economy expanded by 5.5 percent in the fourth — third quarter of 2024. Average headline and core inflation remain contained well below the target during the fourth quarter of 2024. And international reserves increased to $6.1 billion at the end of 2024.

    With respect to the specific question on the budget, what I can share is that the staff-level agreement that I mentioned, which was reached in November, will be presented to the Executive Board or is subject to Executive Board approval, but it’s also contingent upon, among other things, implementation by the authorities of prior actions, including submission of the 2025 budget that is consistent with parameters identified under the program.

    QUESTIONER: Most of the questions we had have been touched upon, and I would just reinforce as well what colleagues had said earlier about trying to get a sense of what all this uncertainty around tariffs will mean. I know there is a tendency to talk about the policies once they are implemented and the impact. But given the fact that policies get announced and withdrawn and swung around, it seems like the uncertainty has more of the impact than the actual policy. But all that seems to be covered. I will get to — actually, the only outstanding question we have now is if you could update us on the status of the Mozambique program and if there is a risk to that program’s existence right now, given what is going on. That is for our Africa colleagues. Everything else was covered. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.

    1. KOZACK: Thank you very much. So, on Mozambique, what I can share is that the Article IV Consultation and the Fourth Review of the Extended Credit Facility, or ECF, were completed back in July of 2024. An IMF team will visit Maputo in the coming weeks to engage with the new government. We do remain engaged to support the country’s efforts toward remaining macroeconomic stability, accelerating growth and making growth more inclusive, in line with the arrangements. But given that there is a mission in the coming weeks, we will have more to report toward the end of that engagement.

    QUESTIONER: Julie, regarding Russia, are there any developments concerning the postponed mission to Russia to evaluate progress in economy that was stopped in September due to necessity to gather additional information and make additional analysis. Anything we should expect this year, probably? Thank you.

    KOZACK: Unfortunately, I don’t yet have an update for you or a timeline for the Article IV.

    QUESTIONER: One final question. Thank you. Sorry, Julie, I’m going to try again with a sort of a similar question. But, you know, we are seeing a fundamental shift in the global and potentially in the support that is available for developing countries. The United States has ended foreign assistance. It has frozen funding for the World Food Program. It is pulling out of and talking about pulling out of the World Health Organization. These are institutions that are part, writ large, of the Bretton Woods system in which the IMF is such a key player.

    So, I do not think it’s unfair of us to be asking for some guidance from you about how you at an institution like the IMF are approaching this period of time that is marked by uncertainty, not just for the markets or for global trade, but also for the institutions themselves. And, you know, we have seen some initial reports that Elon Musk’s DOGE employees or people who work with DOGE are starting to look at the World Bank and other institutions.

    And I, you know, so I guess we want to hear something from you that is a little bit broader about the time that we’re in and what it means, because it obviously has implications for other countries, too, if they’re going to fill the gap in the developing thing. And, you know, you have been warning for years that the developing economies face a kind of perfect storm of different difficult circumstances. This seems like it adds to, to it. Thanks.

    KOZACK: Thanks very much. Look, what I can say now is really what I’ve been saying. I really do not have much to add other than that we are a global institution. We have a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally and just ultimately support growth and employment in the world economy. We are continuing as an institution to remain laser-focused, of course, on that mandate. And we, as a global institution, take our responsibility to serve our membership very, very seriously. And we will continue to do everything that we need to do to serve our membership in the best possible way. You know, we do, as I said, have a long history of working with successive U.S. administrations, and we look forward to continuing to do so as an institution for which the U.S. is our largest shareholder.

    And with this, I’m going to bring this press briefing to an end. Thank you all for your participation today. As a reminder, this briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time today. A transcript will be made available later on IMF.org, and as usual, in case of clarifications, additional queries, or anything else, please reach out to my colleagues at media@mf.org.

    This does conclude our first press briefing of the year. I wish everyone a wonderful day and I do look forward to seeing you next time. Thank you all so much for joining, and please be safe given the weather outside here in D.C. Thank you, everyone.

    * * * * *

    IMF Communications Department
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    MIL OSI Economics –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Press Briefing Transcript – Julie Kozack

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    February 6, 2025

    INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND PRESS BRIEFING

    Washington, D.C. Thursday, February 6, 2025

    P R O C E E D I N G S

    1. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone. It’s great to see you all, here in person and online. Welcome to the first IMF press briefing for 2025. I’m Julie Kozak, Director of the Communication Department. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. U.S. Eastern Time. I’ll start with a few announcements and then I’ll move to take your questions in person, on WebEx, and via the Press Center.

       First, Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva will travel to Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. The Managing Director will visit Ethiopia on February 8th and 9th to meet Prime Minister Abiy and his team, and this visit will take stock of the economic reforms and progress that is being made by the country. She will also meet with stakeholders, including representatives of the private sector.

    The Managing Director will also travel to the United Arab Emirates to participate in the Arab Fiscal Forum on February 10th and the World Government Summit on February 11th where she will deliver keynote remarks. On February 16th and 17th, the Managing Director will participate in a two-day conference in Saudi Arabia on building resilience of emerging market economies. The conference is co-organized by the IMF and the Saudi Finance Ministry.

    The First Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath will travel to Japan to join the Article IV mission. She will participate in meetings with the authorities and hold a press conference on February 7th at 10:30 a.m. Tokyo time.

    Finally, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan to participate in a jointly organized IMF-JICA conference on Economic and Fiscal Policy Challenges and Prospects for Asia. And this is scheduled for February 12 and 13.

    And with that I will now open the floor for your questions. For those connecting virtually, please do turn on both your camera and the microphone when speaking. Let’s get started.

    QUESTIONER: Hi,I was just wondering, you mentioned Ethiopia. How concerned are you about sort of countries with large IMF programs which also receive a substantial amount of support from USAID, considering the recent executive order, countries like Ethiopia and Ukraine, for example. Thanks.

    KOZACK: Thanks very much. So with respect to your question, you know we are closely following the announcements and developments regarding USAID. At this stage it’s too early to gauge the precise impact on the countries that it supports. We’ll wait for clarity on the next steps, including any changes to the scope of the work of USAID.

    QUESTIONER: So, the IMF mission is going to start working in Ukraine this month. Could you specify please what main issues will the Fund plan to focus on during the Seventh Review of the EFF program. And the second question is about the pension reform in Ukraine. Ukrainian government committed to starting this reform this year. Could you elaborate on what key changes the IMF expects from Ukraine on this area? Thank you.

    KOZACK: Are there any other questions on Ukraine?

    QUESTIONER: So, according to latest information, the review of the EFF is scheduled to begin this month. When the decision on the disbursement is going to be made and what amount of funds are going to be provided with this fund? And the follow-up, how much money is left in the EFF according to the current situation? Are there any plans to expand this program? Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: Just to follow up on the question about Ethiopia. Obviously, the USAID cuts also affect Ukraine pretty significantly. And I wonder, you know, both in those cases and in all cases involving USAID funding, whether you are working with the US ED here and sort of sending a message about the impact. So, whether you’ve kind of figured it out across the enterprise and across all the countries that the IMF works with as well. Thanks.

    KOZACK: Anything else on Ukraine online? Okay. So, on Ukraine, just to remind everyone of the context. So, on December 20th, the IMF’s Executive Board approved the Sixth Review of the EFF program. That enabled the disbursement of $1.1 billion and that brought total disbursements under the program to $9.8 billion. And the total size of the program, I believe, was $15.6 billion. So, the difference between those two is what would be remaining. At that time, the Board assessed that program performance remained strong. The authorities had met all of the benchmarks and prior actions for the review.

    With respect to the next mission, the technical work for the upcoming review is underway. The mission dates are in the process of being finalized, and once we have them, we’ll be sure to communicate that. During this upcoming mission, the IMF staff will engage with the authorities on fiscal policy, including progress on revenue mobilization, monetary policies for 2025, and also progress in ensuring that debt sustainability and fiscal sustainability are restored. Staff will also be reviewing governance reforms, which remain a key pillar for the program. Based on the approved calendar of disbursements, subject to completion of the next review and, of course, subject to Board approval, Ukraine would have access to about $900 million for that next review.

    With respect to pension reform, the government has committed to launch pension reforms this year in 2025, and they would be spearheaded by the Ministry of Social Policy. And those reforms are supported by external partners, notably the World Bank. What I can also add is that the authorities are in the process of developing a comprehensive set of proposals for pension reforms, but it’s too early to tell exactly what will be included in those proposals and what the changes may be.

    And on the second question, I don’t really have much to add to what I already said, other than obviously we’re paying close attention and we’re awaiting further details.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Thank you for taking my question. Just on Syria, can you give us an update if the IMF has made any contact with the new government and if there are any plans to provide a loan package to the country? Thank you.

    KOZACK: We’re closely monitoring, obviously, the situation in Syria, and we stand ready to support the international community’s efforts to assist Syria’s reconstruction as needed and when conditions allow. With respect to our engagement, we have not had a meaningful engagement with Syria since 2009, which was the time of the last Article IV Consultation, and this has been due to the difficult security situation in the country.

    QUESTIONER: I have two questions, and they’re Caribbean-related questions. Can you provide a breakdown of the growth projections for the Caribbean region, more specifically, focusing on St. Kitts and Nevis, and what factors are driving the projected growth or decline outlook for the region, more specifically, the Caribbean region?

    KOZACK: Okay. All right, let me step back and give a little bit of an overview of where we stand, what our view is on the Caribbean. So, following the rapid recovery after the Pandemic, real GDP growth in the region has normalized in recent years. Average GDP growth for the region, and this is excluding Guyana and Haiti, is estimated at 2.2 percent for 2023, 2.4 percent for 2024. And growth, our projection is for growth to remain relatively stable at 2.4 percent in 2025.

    Broadly speaking, there are sort of two groups of countries in the Caribbean. So, we look at tourism-dependent economies, and there we see that growth in tourism economies has slowed as tourism arrivals have returned to pre-Pandemic levels. And then for commodity-exporting countries, they have faced challenges in the energy sector but have overall benefited from robust performance in their non-energy sector, and that has been driven by supportive and economic policies.

    I can also add that inflation in most Caribbean countries has moderated significantly over the past few years, and the decline was due to lower global commodity prices and easing of supply chain disruptions. And we expect inflation to remain moderate in the years to come.

    QUESTIONER: My question is on the comment by Managing Director Georgieva in Davos. MD mentioned in Davos clearly that more cooperation in the regional levels might be needed in the future in such a fragmented world and IMF would support such a movement. And could you give me some more detailed plans?

    KOZACK: Thanks very much for the question. What the Managing Director noted in Davos is that we are seeing shifting patterns in global cooperation, in trade, and in other areas, including financial and capital flows. And of course, as a global institution, what will be important for us is as we engage with our membership, right, to take all of this into account to ensure that we can give our members the best policy advice within our mandate of economic and financial stability.

    QUESTIONER: Thanks so much, Julie. I wanted to ask you very broadly about the changes that are happening in the United States and the tariffs that President Trump has announced. Now the implementation of the tariffs on Canada and Mexico has been delayed to March 1st. And, you know, it’s not clear what will happen there exactly. But one of the, you know, the tariffs on China have stayed in place. China has now announced tariffs that will kick in on February 10th. The IMF has warned repeatedly against rising protectionism and also kind of cataloged the thousands of trade restrictions that have been put in place and growing over time since COVID. Can you just walk us through what your perception is right now? The markets have been really all over the place, you know, sort of up and down depending on the day’s mood. Do you see this period of trade uncertainty that you warned about in the WEO, kind of really affecting and dampening global growth prospects? Thanks.

    KOZACK: Thanks very much. Let me see if anyone else has questions on this broad topic.

    QUESTIONER: Thank you. Yeah, I was just wondering, just to follow on the previous question, how you sort of think about the unpredictability of of these tariffs or the discussions around the tariffs, the uncertainty that that kind of brings up, and potentially how that could affect monetary policy. We’ve seen a lot of analysts talking about how they no longer expect the Fed to cut, or they expect the Fed to cut maybe only once this year. I’m just sort of wondering how you’re kind of in real time or as close to real time as you can, sort of taking on board that unpredictability when you think about the U.S. economy and the impacts for global growth. Thanks.

    KOZACK: Great. And you also had a question.

    QUESTIONER: Yes. Just following up with my colleagues. What sort of study, if any, has the IMF undertaken to better understand the global ramifications of these tariffs? We know they’re on pause for another 30 days or so or less. And what sort of impact would small states that are heavily dependent on the United States feel going forward?

    KOZACK: And let me go online to see if anyone online has a question along these lines.

    QUESTIONER: It is very similar. Just wondering the fact that it’s not just tariffs that have imposed on China, but the threat of tariffs on countries across the EU, Canada, and Mexico, and what effect that has on the global outlook. Thank you.

    KOZACK: Okay. Thank you. Anyone else online want to come in on this topic? Okay. So, what I can say on this issue is we’re following the announcements by the U.S. with respect to tariffs on Chinese goods and potentially Canadian and Mexican goods. We’re following these announcements. We believe that it’s in the interest of all to find a constructive way forward to resolve this issue.

    With respect to the assessment, assessing the full impact of these measures of tariffs, it’s actually going to depend on several factors, and let me lay those out. One of those factors is going to be the responses of the countries concerned. Another factor will be how firms and consumers react. And finally, how the measures evolve over time will also have an impact.

    So, at this stage, that’s what I can share with you. We will, of course, have more information over time and in due course as the situation evolves.

    QUESTIONER: Julie, I’m sorry, I think the question is, like, can you say something about what uncertainty does to the global economy? I mean, you’ve talked about this in WEO’s before, but do you see this as a period of heightened uncertainty now that Trump has taken office? And, you know, what is the impact of that uncertainty on things like investment and all this, you know, the sort of categories of economic indicators that we look at?

    KOZACK: So, I think what I can say is, of course, I would refer you to the WEO for some of those analysis. And again, assessing the full impact of this will include all of the factors that I just laid out. And we would take into account issues related to uncertainty, market reactions, et cetera, in an assessment that we will ultimately undertake as the situation evolves and once we have more information.

    Let me now go online. I see a couple of hands up. So, if you’re online, please go ahead and jump in.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Thank you for taking my question. Well, has the letter of intent between the IMF and Argentina been prepared? Or let me ask in a different way. Are the negotiations between Argentina and the IMF already in the final stage?

    KOZACK: Thanks. Other questions on Argentina?

    QUESTIONER: Could you give me any updates on the negotiations of the new agreement and what are the most challenging issues they are facing right now? And also yesterday, Minister Luis Caputo said a new agreement will not imply a devaluation of the peso or the exit of the exchange restrictions the next day. Does the IMF agree with this statement?

    KOZACK: Thanks. Others on Argentina?

    QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie. I was wondering also if you could give some input regarding the meetings that the mission in Buenos Aires had, if they have only been talking to government officials or if they are also contacting unions and other opposition representatives. And also, the new crawling peg of 1 percent has started this February. I was wondering if that was a matter of discussion between the staff and the government.

    KOZACK: Thanks, other questions?

    QUESTIONER: Yes, thank you, Julie. So, my question is also on the crawling peg. So, is the IMF concerned about the greater exchange rate delay generated by this reduction of the crawling peg from 2 percent to 1 percent started the 1st of February?

    KOZACK: Any other questions on Argentina? Okay, I hear two more. Please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie, I wanted to know if Argentina has already paid a debt due on February 1st or when is it expected to do so? And if there is a meeting plan between Argentina authorities and the IMF network staff in Washington.

    KOZACK: Thank you. Next.

    QUESTIONER: Good morning. The question is if Argentina and the IMF comes to a new agreement, should it be like we are talking here in Argentina about $5 million? It will be for anything special, for example, to leave what we call cepo, or it depends on the Argentine authorities.

    KOZACK: Any other questions on Argentina? Okay, I do not see anyone coming in.

    So, on Argentina, what I can share is first that, as the Managing Director highlighted after her meeting with President Milei last month, we recognize Argentina’s tremendous progress in reducing inflation, stabilizing the economy, returning to growth, and with poverty finally starting to decline. We continue to engage constructively with the Argentine authorities. And a staff mission did recently visit Buenos Aires to advance discussions on a new program. The new program will aim to build on the gains that have been achieved so far, while also addressing the remaining challenges that the country faces. Constructive and frequent discussions continue, and we will provide further details on next steps when we have them.

    I can also just add that to sustain early gains, there is a shared recognition between the Fund staff and the Argentine authorities about the need to continue to adopt a consistent set of fiscal, monetary, and foreign exchange policies while furthering growth-enhancing reforms. I also know that you have a lot of interest, and there were a lot of detailed questions here, but given that the discussions are continuing and there has been good progress so far, we do want to ensure that there is space for staff and the authorities to continue these constructive discussions. And of course, we will communicate more when we have further details.

    Okay, let us go online because I see a few hands up.

    QUESTIONER: My question is, when do we expect Board of Directors to discuss Egypt Fourth Review?

    KOZACK: Do we have other questions on Egypt?

    QUESTIONER: Hi, I’d like to ask, in addition to that, when the board does discuss Egypt’s Fourth Review, will it also be discussing an additional RSF for Egypt? There have been some reports that Egypt is in line to receive as much as $1 billion.

    KOZACK: Other questions?

    QUESTIONER:  I just wanted to ask, in terms of the assessment of Egypt, but also other countries in the region, to what extent you are calculating additional costs and spending needs that have to do with Gaza and with the potential absorption of Palestinian refugees that has been proposed.

    KOZACK: Okay, any other questions on Egypt? I see I have two questions that have come through the press center, which I will read aloud. So, the first is when will the IMF’s Executive Board complete the Fourth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Egypt?

    The second question is regarding the Executive Board’s approval of the Fourth Review of Egypt’s program, could it be this month? Does the IMF have updates on your projections for Egypt’s economy in light of regional updates?

    Let me share with you where we are on Egypt. On December 24, the IMF staff and the Egyptian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Fourth Review of the EFF. This review is subject to approval of our Executive Board and subject to that approval, Egypt would have access to about $1.2 billion. Preparations for Board consideration are underway, and the Board meeting is expected to take place in the coming weeks.

    In light of the difficult external conditions and challenging domestic environment, the IMF staff and the Egyptian authorities agreed to recalibrate the fiscal consolidation path, and this was agreed in December, I would highlight, to create fiscal space for critical social programs benefiting vulnerable groups and the middle class while ensuring debt sustainability.

    Looking forward, reform priorities comprise lowering inflation, sustaining exchange rate flexibility, and liberalized access to foreign exchange. In addition, the program aims to boost domestic revenues. It aims to improve the business environment. It aims to accelerate disinvestment or divestment rather and leveling [of] the playing field between state-owned enterprises and the private sector. And of course, it also aims to enhance governance and transparency.

    With respect to the question on the RSF, a policy package of reforms will be considered by the Fund’s Executive Board along with the Fourth Review of Egypt’s program.

    And lastly, there is no connection at the moment between some of the announcements in Gaza and the and the Egypt program.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, I wonder if I can just clarify. On the RSF, you say a policy package of reforms that also presumably comes with some additional funding. Can you confirm whether the amount of up to $1 billion is accurate?

    KOZACK: I can’t confirm now the precise amount of the RSF, but of course as we have more information, we will provide that.

    QUESTIONER: Thank you so much.

    KOZACK: Let us go online. I see another hand online and then we will come back. Just one follow up, a follow up. Go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: You cannot confirm the amount of the RSF. So just so we are clear, are you confirming that there are discussions around an RSF? Thanks.

    KOZACK: Yes, there’s discussions on an RSF and the intention is to present the RSF with its package of reforms to our Executive Board at the same time as we present the Fourth Review of the EFF.

    QUESTIONER: Question about Rwanda and Eastern Congo. I wanted to know, I know that the IMF has programs with both Rwanda and the DRC. And I wanted to know, you know, given the M23 incursion, the fall of Goma, how the programs can react to it, if there is anything you can say about that. And also, obviously, in El Salvador, they changed their cryptocurrency law, but it is also reported that they recently bought 50 bitcoins. So, some people are for the kind of national treasury. Some people are confused in terms of what the contours of the limitations put on. And I wonder if you could comment on that. Thanks a lot.

    KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Any other questions on these countries? DRC, Rwanda, El Salvador?

    Okay, let me start with DRC and I want to start by saying that, you know, we are deeply saddened by the loss of lives and the humanitarian crisis in the Eastern part of DRC. We are closely monitoring the situation, including its potential impact on neighboring countries and the region. And of course, we are also closely monitoring with respect to potential impact on our program.

    With respect to Rwanda, what I can say on Rwanda is simply that the country continues to demonstrate a robust commitment to advancing policy reforms. And In December of 2024, our Executive Board concluded the Fourth Review of Rwanda’s programs.

    With respect to El Salvador, just to step back and remind, IMF staff and the Salvadorian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on December 18th for a new arrangement, a new EFF arrangement. The arrangement would be for about $1.4 billion to support the government’s reform agenda, and this agreement is subject to approval by the IMF’s Executive Board.

    I can also add that as explained in the press release that we issued following the staff-level agreement, the new Fund supported program aims to reduce the potential risks of the bitcoin project. Once in place, purchases of bitcoin will be confined under the program as agreed.

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. Good morning, everyone. A few things. In Zimbabwe, when you expect a deal for the Staff Monitored Program? And on Lebanon, have you had any contact with the new government? Are there any signs that you are going to be able to work with them? Also on Senegal, can you give us any update on the resolution of the suspension of the financing program there? And lastly, are there any concerns of a drop in the commitment of funding from the U.S.? The 2025 project calls for the U.S. to stop putting money into the World Bank and the IMF. So, are you guys concerned about that?

    KOZACK: Okay, thanks. Starting with Zimbabwe, I do not have an update for you for today on Zimbabwe, but we will come back to you bilaterally.

    On Lebanon, what I can share is that, you know, we welcome the election of General Aoun as president of Lebanon, and we look forward to working with him and his new government to address the challenges facing the Lebanese economy. And just to remind, Lebanon continues to face profound economic challenges, and the conflict had exacerbated an already fragile macroeconomic and social situation. The election of the president, the formation of a new government, as well as the ceasefire, are critical to support policy actions and reforms that would allow the gradual return to the normalization of economic activity in Lebanon.

    And what I can share on Senegal is that we are actively engaged in discussions with the authorities on addressing the misreporting case. Senegal’s Court of Auditors is expected to issue its final report this month. In parallel, IMF staff are working closely with the authorities to identify their capacity development needs and to implement corrective measures needed to address the root causes of the misreporting. These efforts are aimed at enhancing transparency, strengthening accountability, and preventing a recurrence of similar misreporting in the future.

    And I think, on your final question, all I can say here is that the United States is the IMF’s largest shareholder, and it plays an extremely valuable role in helping ensure global financial stability. We have a long history of working with successive U.S. administrations, and we look forward to continuing to do so.

    QUESTIONER: Thanks, Julie. Thank you for taking my question. When do you think we can expect the Executive Board’s approval on the next tranche for the Island Nation? And if there is any delay, what sort of reason is there? Is there more for the government to do? And secondly, the budget for the country is expected in a few weeks. Has the IMF given any input on preparing this budget, given the fact that the country is still in the EFF program?

    KOZACK: Thanks. So, your question was on Sri Lanka? And yes, I see you nodding. So, if anyone else has questions on Sri Lanka, I can take them now. Okay. If not, let me go ahead with Sri Lanka.

    So, on Sri Lanka on November 23rd, IMF staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Third Review of Sri Lanka’s EFF program. Once approved by the IMF’s Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $333 million in financing. And we expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.

    Here, I would also just like to take the opportunity to emphasize that Sri Lanka’s ambitious reform agenda is delivering commendable outcomes. The economy expanded by 5.5 percent in the fourth — third quarter of 2024. Average headline and core inflation remain contained well below the target during the fourth quarter of 2024. And international reserves increased to $6.1 billion at the end of 2024.

    With respect to the specific question on the budget, what I can share is that the staff-level agreement that I mentioned, which was reached in November, will be presented to the Executive Board or is subject to Executive Board approval, but it’s also contingent upon, among other things, implementation by the authorities of prior actions, including submission of the 2025 budget that is consistent with parameters identified under the program.

    QUESTIONER: Most of the questions we had have been touched upon, and I would just reinforce as well what colleagues had said earlier about trying to get a sense of what all this uncertainty around tariffs will mean. I know there is a tendency to talk about the policies once they are implemented and the impact. But given the fact that policies get announced and withdrawn and swung around, it seems like the uncertainty has more of the impact than the actual policy. But all that seems to be covered. I will get to — actually, the only outstanding question we have now is if you could update us on the status of the Mozambique program and if there is a risk to that program’s existence right now, given what is going on. That is for our Africa colleagues. Everything else was covered. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.

    1. KOZACK: Thank you very much. So, on Mozambique, what I can share is that the Article IV Consultation and the Fourth Review of the Extended Credit Facility, or ECF, were completed back in July of 2024. An IMF team will visit Maputo in the coming weeks to engage with the new government. We do remain engaged to support the country’s efforts toward remaining macroeconomic stability, accelerating growth and making growth more inclusive, in line with the arrangements. But given that there is a mission in the coming weeks, we will have more to report toward the end of that engagement.

    QUESTIONER: Julie, regarding Russia, are there any developments concerning the postponed mission to Russia to evaluate progress in economy that was stopped in September due to necessity to gather additional information and make additional analysis. Anything we should expect this year, probably? Thank you.

    KOZACK: Unfortunately, I don’t yet have an update for you or a timeline for the Article IV.

    QUESTIONER: One final question. Thank you. Sorry, Julie, I’m going to try again with a sort of a similar question. But, you know, we are seeing a fundamental shift in the global and potentially in the support that is available for developing countries. The United States has ended foreign assistance. It has frozen funding for the World Food Program. It is pulling out of and talking about pulling out of the World Health Organization. These are institutions that are part, writ large, of the Bretton Woods system in which the IMF is such a key player.

    So, I do not think it’s unfair of us to be asking for some guidance from you about how you at an institution like the IMF are approaching this period of time that is marked by uncertainty, not just for the markets or for global trade, but also for the institutions themselves. And, you know, we have seen some initial reports that Elon Musk’s DOGE employees or people who work with DOGE are starting to look at the World Bank and other institutions.

    And I, you know, so I guess we want to hear something from you that is a little bit broader about the time that we’re in and what it means, because it obviously has implications for other countries, too, if they’re going to fill the gap in the developing thing. And, you know, you have been warning for years that the developing economies face a kind of perfect storm of different difficult circumstances. This seems like it adds to, to it. Thanks.

    KOZACK: Thanks very much. Look, what I can say now is really what I’ve been saying. I really do not have much to add other than that we are a global institution. We have a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally and just ultimately support growth and employment in the world economy. We are continuing as an institution to remain laser-focused, of course, on that mandate. And we, as a global institution, take our responsibility to serve our membership very, very seriously. And we will continue to do everything that we need to do to serve our membership in the best possible way. You know, we do, as I said, have a long history of working with successive U.S. administrations, and we look forward to continuing to do so as an institution for which the U.S. is our largest shareholder.

    And with this, I’m going to bring this press briefing to an end. Thank you all for your participation today. As a reminder, this briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time today. A transcript will be made available later on IMF.org, and as usual, in case of clarifications, additional queries, or anything else, please reach out to my colleagues at media@mf.org.

    This does conclude our first press briefing of the year. I wish everyone a wonderful day and I do look forward to seeing you next time. Thank you all so much for joining, and please be safe given the weather outside here in D.C. Thank you, everyone.

    * * * * *

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER:

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/06/020625-tr-imf-press-briefing-julie-kozack

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Speakers Call for Culture of Collaboration, Renewed Solidarity to Achieve Sustainable Development, as Economic and Social Council Begins Coordination Segment

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    Note: Full coverage of today’s meetings of the Economic and Social Council will be available Friday, 7 February.

    The United Nations must celebrate its many successes as much as it acknowledges its failures, the Economic and Social Council heard today as speakers at its 2025 Coordination Segment called for a culture of collaboration and renewed solidarity.

    This year, the two-day Segment, which includes panel discussions and interactive dialogues, will focus on the theme of “Advancing sustainable, inclusive, science- and evidence-based solutions for the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs for leaving no one behind.” 

    The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represent the “common sense of humanity”, and people around the world care about them, Bob Rae (Canada), President of the 54-member Council, said in his opening remarks.  Stressing the need to build on previous successes, he hailed the many partnerships between Member States and various multilateral institutions, such as the Spotlight Initiative, which has protected over 21 million girls and women from gender-based violence; the Global Ghost Gear Initiative, which engages over 130 stakeholders to tackle abandoned fishing gear to reduce marine pollution; and the Infrastructure for Resilient Island States initiative, which aims to strengthen resilience against climate and disaster risks. 

    The people who created the Organization were living with war, depression, tariff wars, economic protectionism and poverty, he added.  The vision of the United Nations was not only political but also economic and social.  Commitment to a multilateral organization like the UN — whose budget in 2024 was $75 billion — does not take away a State’s freedom; rather, it broadens the sovereignty of each country, he stressed. 

    “The stakes could not be higher,” said Guy Ryder, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Policy, who noted that only 17 per cent of the Goals are on course, while many critical targets are regressing.  Meanwhile, conflicts are intensifying, inequalities are widening, the climate crisis is escalating, and unregulated technology continues to disrupt societies. The international community must unlock the scale and quality of financing needed to drive investments, alleviate the debt burden that stifles many countries, and protect economies from the external shocks, he stressed.  The Pact for the Future provides a blueprint for this, he said, adding that reform of the international financial architecture is crucial to fulfil the promise of the SDGs.

    Also addressing the Segment was Anatolio Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea), Council Vice-President, who said:  “The United Nations cannot do more than what we allow it to do.”  Progress on the SDGs has stagnated, or even reversed course, with only 17 per cent of assessed targets on track for achievement by 2030. “We cannot afford to let this trend continue,” he said, calling on the international community to “bridge divides, mobilize resources and implement transformative solutions”.  Highlighting the role of the Economic and Social Council and its many subsidiary bodies, he noted that the Segment has the valuable role of leveraging their insights. 

    Conversation with Regional Commissions, Functional Commissions and Expert Bodies

    Following opening remarks, the Council held a conversation with the Executive Secretaries of the regional commissions and Chairs of functional commissions and expert bodies, which focused on “Accelerating the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, including by leveraging the outcomes of the Summit of the Future”.

    …

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Local News – Aniva residency offers creative space for Pacific artists – Porirua City

    Source: Porirua City Council

    Porirua’s Pātaka Art + Museum and Creative New Zealand are on the lookout for an artist to take up the Aniva Artist in Residency programme opportunity for 2025.
    The programme offers an Aotearoa-based Pacific artist or practitioner who identifies as LGBTQIA+/MVPFAFF- a paid, three-month residency to create a new body of work. Applications are being accepted between 7 February and 17 March.
    South Auckland interdisciplinary artist Moe Laga (she/they) was the Creative New Zealand Pacific Aniva Artist in Residence for 2024.
    During her residency, Moe created the performance piece Fetū/Fetu’u: The Stars/Curses, which chronicled her experiences as a Samoan Fa’fafine born in Aotearoa, grappling with the complexities of life.
    Moe performed this piece in October at the end of her residency, and it has been included in the upcoming Performance Arcade live art event, to be staged on the Wellington waterfront from 19-21 February.
    Pātaka Director Ana Sciascia says they were honoured to have such a body of work created during the residency.
    “Moe’s performance was reflective, intimate and intensely moving. It was a stunning arrangement of poetry, video, choreography, and a sublime curated playlist.
    “I am thrilled that Fetū/Fetu’u: The Stars/Curses will receive a second outing at this year’s Performance Arcade.”
    Moe says the residency provided her with the perfect opportunity to develop new ideas that had been in the back of her mind but not yet fully explored.
    “It allowed me to experiment with various mediums and explore innovative ways of storytelling.”
    This residency was first offered in 2021 and awarded to Saviiey Aliiva’a Nua (she/her) – a Porirua-based community artist. She is also the chairwoman and director of Ngā Uri o Whiti Te Rā Mai Le Moana Trust.
    The opportunity for artists to develop their arts practice and engage with the Porirua arts community is made possible through Creative New Zealand’s Pacific Arts Strategy, which enables connection and investment in Pacific arts for the benefit of Aotearoa.
    This year Creative New Zealand is also offering the Aniva Residency at the Govett-Brewster/Len Lye Centre and Puke Ariki Museum in New Plymouth.
    Creative New Zealand Manager Pacific Arts Cultivation Ali Foa’i says they are thrilled to continue the partnership with Pātaka to again provide the residency for 2025.
    “Aniva has opened up more opportunities for previous recipients.”
    As well as Moe’s upcoming performance at the Performance Arcade, 2023 recipient Manu Vaea had an exhibition at Auckland Art Gallery and Wheke Fortress following their residency.
    To read the full guidelines for the Creative New Zealand Pacific Aniva Artist Residency 2025 or to apply for the residency, go to the Pātaka website:  https://pataka.org.nz/whats-on/events/aniva-residency-offers-creative-space-for-pacific-artists/
    DEFINITIONS
    MVPFAFF (Pacific LGBTQiA+)
    M for Mahu in Tahiti and Hawai’i.
    V for Vaka sa lewa lewa in Fiji.
    P for Palopa in Papua New Guinea.
    F for Fa’afafine in Samoa and American Samoa.
    A for Akava’ine in the Cook Islands.
    F for Fakaleiti or leiti in the Kingdom of Tonga.
    F for Fakafifine in Niue.
    LGBTQIA+
    L for Lesbian
    G for Gay
    B for Bisexual
    T for Transexual
    Q for Queer, Queer Gender
    I for Intersex
    A for Agender, Asexual
    + for other Queer identifying community.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Man Who Fired Shots Into the Air Outside San Angelo Home Sentenced to 2.5 Years for Gun Crime

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    A man who fired shots outside a San Angelo residence was sentenced to 30 months in prison for a federal gun crime, announced Acting U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Texas Chad Meacham.

    Edgar Eduardo Gamez-Rodriguez, a 22-year-old citizen of Mexico, was indicted in September 2024 and pleaded guilty in October 2024 to illegal alien in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced Thursday by U.S. District Judge James Wesley Hendrix.

    According to a plea papers, at around 5:05 a.m. on Oct. 1, 2023, law enforcement responded to a call of “shots fired” outside a home in San Angelo. Witnesses, who were attending a party there, reported that Mr. Gamez-Rodriguez had fired several rounds from a handgun into the air.

    A sheriff’s office incident report details how Mr. Gamez-Rodriguez – intoxicated and irate at having his keys taken away – pulled out his gun, racked the slide, and pointed it straight at two musicians who’d been hired to play at the party. He climbed into his vehicle, then fired four to six shots into the air before driving off, according to multiple witnesses. He later allegedly told a partygoer he “knows people” who could “shoot up” the house.

    According to plea papers, law enforcement later executed a search warrant at Mr. Gamez-Rodriguez’s residence, where they recovered a Taurus 9mm semi-automatic handgun along with two 9mm magazines. In the drawer where the gun and ammunition were stored, they found an employment contract with Mr. Gamez-Rodriguez’s signature and the keys to his vehicle.

    Officers also reviewed Mr. Gamez-Rodriguez’s facebook profile photo, which showed him holding a black handgun.

    A query of the defendant’s immigration records showed that he was a citizen of Mexico based on his birth in Acuna, Coahuila, Mexico. Mr. Gamez-Rodriguez had never been given permission to enter or remain in the United States, and had been removed to Mexico previously via Laredo.

    After serving his sentence, Mr. Gamez-Rodriguez will once again face deportation proceedings.

    Homeland Security Investigation’s Dallas Field Office and the Tom Green County Sheriff’s Office conducted the investigation with the assistance of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives. Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeff Haag prosecuted the case. 

    MIL Security OSI –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: ‘She had a syringe, razor blade, and bandages’: Surviving genital mutilation

    Source: United Nations 4

    Zeinaba Mahr Aouad, a 24-year-old woman from Djibouti, remembers the day when, as a ten-year-old, an unexpected visitor came to her house: “She had a syringe, a razor blade and bandages.”

    The woman was there to carry out a brutal, unnecessary and – since 1995 in the Horn of Africa country – illegal operation known as female genital mutilation, which involves sewing up a girl’s vagina and cutting out her clitoris.

    Even as Zeinaba’s traumatic experience has clouded her memories of that day, she still remembers the sensation of intense pain once the effects of the anaesthetic had worn off.

    Difficult to walk

    “I had trouble walking and when I urinated, it burned,” she said.

    Her mother told her it was nothing to worry about and spoke of the degrading procedure in terms of the importance of tradition.

    Like many victims of FGM, Zeinaba came from a vulnerable and poor background, living in a single room with her mother and two sisters in a rundown neighbourhood of Djibouti City.

    “There was just a TV, suitcases where we stored our clothes and mattresses on which we slept,” she remembered.

    Her mother sold flatbread to passersby, while Zeinaba played with a skipping rope with friends. “We also just played in the dirt.”

    230 million mutilations

    © Neuvième-UNFPA Djibouti

    Zeinaba Mahr Aouad, 24, a resident of Djibouti, survied female genital mutilation when she was 10. Now a volunteer for the “Elle & Elles” network, with the support of UNFPA, she canvasses her neighborhood and others to convince residents to end the practice.

    Some 230 million women and girls worldwide have undergone mutilations according to data released by the UN’s sexual and reproductive health agency, UNFPA, and it is on the increase as ever younger children, sometimes below five years old, go under the knife.

    “A baby doesn’t talk,” explained Dr. Wisal Ahmed, an FGM specialist at UNFPA.

    It’s often thought of as a one-time procedure, but in reality, it involves a lifetime of painful procedures that continue into adulthood.

    “The woman is cut again to have sex, then sewn back together, then reopened for childbirth and closed again to narrow the orifice once more,” said Dr. Ahmed.

    Tackling harmful traditions

    UNFPA and its international partners have worked to put a definitive end to FGM and although these efforts have contributed to a steady decline in the rates at which the procedure is performed over the past 30 years, the global increase in population means the number of women affected is actually growing.

    UNFPA continues to work with communities that still engage in the practice about the short and long-term effects.

    The agency’s work has been supported across the world over a number of years by the US Government, which has recognized FGM as a human rights violation. 

    It is not a problem which affects just developing countries. According to US State Department figures, in the US itself, approximately 513,000 women and girls have undergone or are at risk of FGM.

    Support from men

    In Djibouti, in 2023, the US provided around $44 million in foreign assistance.

    UNFPA confirmed that FGM programmes supported by the United States have not yet been impacted by the current stop work orders, adding that “US support to UNFPA over the last four years resulted in an estimated 80,000 girls avoiding female genital mutilation.”

    © UNFPA/ROAS/Aisha Zubair

    UNFPA supports awareness raising campaigns about FGM in Africa, including in Somalia (pictured).

    Local networks

    Zeinaba Mahr Aouad now works as a volunteer for a local network launched by UNFPA in 2021, which numbers over 60 women and provides support to local women’s health and rights activists.

    She also visits underprivileged areas of Djibouti to raise awareness among young people and future parents, both women and men, of the harmful effects of FGM.

    “Because it’s not just the woman who participates in these practices: without the agreement of the man by her side, it couldn’t be done”, she said.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: APA Corporation Declares Cash Dividend on Common Shares

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    HOUSTON, Feb. 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The board of directors of APA Corporation (Nasdaq: APA) has declared a regular cash dividend on the company’s common shares.

    The dividend on common shares is payable May 22, 2025, to stockholders of record on April 22, 2025, at a rate of 25 cents per share on the corporation’s common stock.

    About APA
    APA Corporation owns consolidated subsidiaries that explore for and produce oil and natural gas in the United States, Egypt and the United Kingdom and that explore for oil and natural gas offshore Suriname and elsewhere. APA posts announcements, operational updates, investor information and press releases on its website, www.apacorp.com.

    Contacts
    Investor: (281) 302-2286 Ben Rodgers
    Media: (713) 296-7276 Alexandra Franceschi
    Website: www.apacorp.com

    APA-F

    The MIL Network –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s push to shut down USAID shows how international development is also about strategic interests

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Nelson Duenas, Assistant Professor of Accounting, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

    The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is on the verge of being shut down by United States President Donald Trump’s administration.

    On Feb. 4, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the agency would be taken over by the State Department. He stated that “all USAID direct hire personnel will be placed on administrative leave globally.”

    This move comes after Trump and his officials have heavily criticized the role and ineffectiveness of the agency. Trump said USAID had “been run by a bunch of radical lunatics, and we’re getting them out,” while Tesla CEO and special government employee Elon Musk said it was “time for it to die.”

    The closure of USAID will have significant consequences for many countries in the Global South. USAID is one of the largest development agencies in the world and funds programs that benefit millions of people, from supporting peace agreements in Colombia to fighting the spread of HIV in Uganda.

    Around US$40 billion is allocated annually from the U.S. federal budget for humanitarian and development aid. If USAID is dismantled, it raises questions about how these funds will be redirected and the long-term impacts it will have on global development efforts.

    A geopolitical fallout?

    The potential dismantling of USAID has raised concerns among international development experts about a potential geopolitical fallout that could create unintended consequences for the U.S. itself.

    Global issues, such as human security and climate change, are expected to be heavily affected. The U.S. also risks losing influence in the fight for soft power since dismantling USAID could leave behind a power vacuum. Other countries like Russia or China may occupy the space left by what was the largest international aid program in the world.




    Read more:
    USAid shutdown isn’t just a humanitarian issue – it’s a threat to American interests


    This shift could result in the U.S. losing its influence in regions like Africa, South America and Asia, where the country distributed aid to a number of non-governmental organizations, aid agencies and non-profits.

    While the future of U.S. foreign assistance remains uncertain, other world powers have a role to play. European donors, despite some limitations in resources, remain committed to the 2030 Sustainable Development agenda.

    Beyond humanitarianism

    If the agency is shut down, it may be widely condemned on moral and humanitarian grounds. However, its closure would respond to a logic of strategic and ideological interests that has long shaped the international development system. This a key finding from my longstanding field research with organizations that receive funding, not only from USAID, but also from Canadian and European donors.

    International development largely unfolded in the aftermath of the Second World War when global powers competed to establish a new world order. This led to the creation of international agreements and multilateral institutions, with major industrialized nations emerging as the primary donors of foreign aid.

    While many international initiatives, like the Millennium Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, have guided development as we know it, the governments of main donor countries have their own interests in mind when providing aid.

    In my research, I have interviewed many people involved in the foreign aid chain, including directors and offices of international non-governmental organizations and governmental co-operation agencies. Many said development relationships are shaped by both the interests of donors and those of recipient populations and organizations.

    While these relationships may be based on humanitarian objectives, such as disaster relief or human rights advocacy, they can also be influenced by ideological, geopolitical, economic and social agendas.

    In this context, the American move to eliminate USAID could be seen as one that prioritizes national security and economic goals over traditional global humanitarian concerns. Governments steer the wheel of international development according to their political ideologies and interests, regardless of the shock this may generate among citizens.

    Canada’s role in all this

    The U.S. is not the only country re-evaluating its international development policy. Sweden, another major country in the foreign aid sphere, is also changing its co-operation strategy following changes in its government and criticism of the NGOs that deploy their development assistance.

    Canada’s role in this unfolding situation remains uncertain. With the resignation of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as head of the Liberal Party and the upcoming federal election, it’s unclear what will happen to Canada’s international development strategy going forward.

    Under Stephen Harper, the country’s international development strategy was closely tied to expanding trade with developing countries based on maximizing the value of extractive economies and a strong defence policy. This approach aimed to bring value not only to the recipient country of aid, but to Canada as well.

    When Trudeau took office, Canada’s development strategy turned to a more progressive agenda centred on peace keeping, feminist approaches and humanitarian programs.

    Will Canada continue to champion human rights, human security and progressive agendas? Or will Canada reduce funds for foreign assistance, which seems to be the wish of many of its citizens?

    The answer to these questions will depend on the direction that our political leaders decide to take, and the sentiments of citizens. Still, Canada’s approach to development aid will probably remain in a trade-off between moral imperatives of humanitarianism and strategic national interests.

    Nelson Duenas receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)
    Nelson Duenas is a researcher associated to l’Observatoire canadien sur les crises et l’action humanitaires

    – ref. Trump’s push to shut down USAID shows how international development is also about strategic interests – https://theconversation.com/trumps-push-to-shut-down-usaid-shows-how-international-development-is-also-about-strategic-interests-249118

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Kennedy: America won’t forget if UK gives away Chagos Islands with US military base

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator John Kennedy (Louisiana)

    Watch Kennedy’s comments here.

    WASHINGTON – Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.) warned the United Kingdom that it could damage its relationship with the United States if it threatens the future of the joint U.S.-U.K. military base on the island of Diego Garcia by ceding sovereignty of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius.

    Key excerpts of the speech are below:

    “Do you know who is loving all of this? China, because China has a close relationship with Mauritius. And do you know what? It is going to get a lot closer.

    “This is insane. This is cell-deep stupid. This is bone-deep, down-to-the-marrow stupid. Because the United Nations wants the United Kingdom to feel guilty, they want to give our military base and their military base to Mauritius. Now, the prime minister of the United Kingdom can stop this.”

    . . .

    “Please, Mr. Prime Minister, don’t do this. Don’t do this. We will stand with you in telling the United Nations, who is upset with you, to go fill out a hurt feelings report because we are not doing it. We will stand with you. Please say no. Don’t give our military base away. It is going to really hurt the relationship between the United States of America and the United Kingdom.”

    Background

    • The U.K. had previously announced on Oct. 3, 2024, that it had reached a deal with Mauritius to cede the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands. This deal between the U.K. and Mauritius would jeopardize the security of a key U.S.-U.K. military base on Deigo Garcia by potentially exposing the island to Chinese espionage efforts, according to a report from the Policy Exchange.
    • Negotiations between the U.K. and Mauritius followed a years-long pressure campaign from the United Nations to get England out of the Chagos Islands. The Biden administration also reportedly pressured the U.K. to enter the deal with Mauritius before the American and Mauritian elections took place—an idea Prime Minister Keir Starmer initially endorsed. 
    • On Oct. 23, 2024, Kennedy wrote to then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken seeking answers about the Biden administration’s involvement in the deal between the U.K. and Mauritius.
    • Kennedy also penned this op-ed in Oct. 2024 arguing that the Biden administration owes the American people an explanation for its decision to allow this deal between the U.K. and Mauritius to move forward.
    • On Jan. 15, 2025, Starmer announced that he wanted President Trump and his administration to weigh in on any deal struck between the U.K. and Mauritius regarding the transfer of the Chagos Islands, including the transfer of the U.S.-U.K. shared military base on the island of Diego Garcia. 
    • Kennedy published this op-ed in Jan. 2025 welcoming the U.K.’s change of heart after Starmer announced that he would include the Trump administration in the ongoing negotiations with Mauritius.
    • Former Rep. Mike Waltz (R-Fla.), President Trump’s nominee for National Security Advisor, has criticized the deal, saying, “Should the U.K. cede control of the Chagos to Mauritius, I have no doubt that China will take advantage of the resulting vacuum.”
    • Secretary of State Marco Rubio has similarly condemned the deal and said it “poses a serious threat to our national security interests in the Indian Ocean and threatens critical U.S. military posture in the region.”

    Watch Kennedy’s full speech here.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: ‘Step Up the Pace’ and end female genital mutilation, UN says

    Source: United Nations 4

    6 February 2025 Health

    As the world marks the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation on Thursday, the United Nations is warning that without urgent action, a staggering 27 million more girls could undergo the procedure by 2030.

    Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) refers to all procedures involving the partial or total removal of female external genitalia or other injuries to female genital organs for non-medical reasons, according to the World Health Organization (WHO).

    “More than 230 million girls and women alive today are survivors of this abhorrent practice,” said UN Secretary-General António Guterres in his message for the day, describing it as “one of the most brutal manifestations of gender inequality”.

    The UN sexual and reproductive health agency (UNFPA), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Health Organization reaffirmed that FGM has no health benefits, with lifelong consequences including severe infections, complications in childbirth, chronic pain and psychological trauma.

    “Eradicating this vicious human rights violation is urgent, and it is possible,” Mr. Guterres emphasised.

    Progress and challenges

    Since 2008, the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on the Elimination of FGM, in collaboration with WHO, has provided prevention and protection services to nearly seven million girls and women.

    The initiative has also mobilised 12,000 grassroots organizations and trained 112,000 community and frontline workers. Additionally, 48 million people have publicly declared their commitment to ending the practice.

    Despite these efforts, the road to elimination remains steep. Only seven of the 31 countries with available data are on track to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) target of ending genital mutilation by 2030.

    Meanwhile, in The Gambia, attempts to repeal the ban on genital mutilation threaten to reverse years of progress, underscoring the fragility of existing gains.

    ‘Step Up the Pace’

    This year’s theme, Step Up the Pace, serves as a call to accelerate global efforts to eliminate genital mutilation and dismantle the harmful gender and social norms that perpetuate it.

    “We must strengthen global movements to break down harmful attitudes, beliefs and gender stereotypes,” said Mr. Guterres.

    A key part of this effort is The Pact for the Future, adopted by UN Member States last September. This global commitment aims to tackle gender discrimination and harmful social norms, ensuring that laws and policies align with efforts to end FGM worldwide.

    Soundcloud

    Cost of inaction

    Failure to end FGM has dire social, economic and health consequences. According to WHO, treating health complications from genital mutilation costs healthcare systems $1.4 billion annually.

    Meanwhile, the mental and emotional toll on survivors can last a lifetime, impacting their education, employment and overall well-being.

    With less than five years left to reach the 2030 target, the UN is calling for stronger alliances, increased investment and sustained advocacy.

    “Let’s join forces to make female genital mutilation history and ensure a brighter, healthier, and more just future for all women and girls everywhere,” Mr. Guterres concluded.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI NGOs: DR Congo: Summit must stop atrocities of war and hold criminals to account

    Source: Amnesty International –

    ‘Failure to seize this moment will only embolden the perpetrators and increase the likelihood of further atrocities’ – Agnès Callamard

    A joint summit on 7 and 8 February will be held for the heads of state and government of the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community on the escalation of fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

    Agnès Callamard, Amnesty International’s Secretary General, said:

    “This special summit on the grave situation in the DRC is well overdue. The catastrophic human rights consequences of the country’s armed conflicts have gone on for far too long. Now hundreds of thousands of women, children and men have once again been forced to flee the fighting, enduring dire conditions and desperately trying to stay alive.

    “States and intergovernmental organisations including the East African Community, Southern African Development Community, African Union, United Nations and European Union should intensify their engagement at this watershed moment, expose enablers of the current attacks in Goma and beyond, and make it clear that all those suspected of criminal responsibility for the ongoing atrocities will be held to account in fair trials.

    “It is time to ensure accountability for nearly 30 years of crimes under international law committed in the DRC. Failure to seize this moment will only embolden the perpetrators and increase the likelihood of further atrocities.”

    Renewed onslaught of violence

    On 18 January, the M23 armed group, backed by Rwandan forces, launched a military operation to expand its territory, violating a ceasefire agreement between Rwanda and the DRC established through the Luanda Peace Process. Since then, the M23 and the Rwandan Defence Force have captured several towns and cities, including the North Kivu capital of Goma. 

    On 27 January, Amnesty called on the DRC’s regional and international partners to exert pressure on all warring parties in the east of the country – including the Rwandan-backed M23 fighters, the Rwandan and Congolese armies, and their allies – to prioritise the protection of civilians in the aftermath of the recent fighting in Goma.

    Amnesty report into explosive weapon use

    Between January and July 2024 in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo the Rwandan-backed M23 armed group and the Congolese army launched explosive weapons, with wide area effects, into densely populated areas more than 150 times over a seven-month period.

    The attacks, which killed more than 100 civilians and wounded hundreds, violated international humanitarian law and are likely constitute war crimes.

    Amnesty interviewed 60 people, visited several strike sites and analysed dozens of verified photos, videos and statements from the warring parties and others. They documented the M23 and Congolese army repeatedly using ground-launched unguided rockets, including 122mm Grad rockets. These weapons systems are inherently inaccurate and their use in populated areas poses an extremely high risk of civilian casualties.   

    The report can be found here.

    MIL OSI NGO –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Tunisia: Authorities step up crackdown on LGBTI individuals with wave of arrests

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Authorities in Tunisia have stepped up their crackdown on LGBTI individuals, carrying out dozens of arrests over recent months, said Amnesty International today.

    Between 26 September 2024 and 31 January 2025 at least 84 people in the cities of Tunis, Hammamet, Sousse and El Kef – mainly gay men and trans women – were arrested, arbitrarily detained and unjustly prosecuted solely based on their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity, according to the Tunisian NGO Damj Association for Justice and Equality.

    “The recent spike in arrests targeting LGBTI people is an alarming setback for human rights in Tunisia. No one should face arrest, prosecution or imprisonment based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. Instead of harassing individuals based on gender stereotypes and deeply entrenched homophobic attitudes, the Tunisian authorities must immediately and unconditionally release anyone detained because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity and introduce safeguards to protect the rights of LGBTI people,” said Diana Eltahawy, Deputy Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International.

    Amnesty International interviewed four LGBTI rights activists and three lawyers representing individuals arrested between September and December 2024 for their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity. The organization also reviewed legal documents, and official statements.

    The recent spike in arrests targeting LGBTI people is an alarming setback for human rights in Tunisia. No one should face arrest, prosecution or imprisonment based on their sexual orientation or gender identity.

    Diana Eltahawy, Amnesty International

    Wave of arrests

    The wave of arrests followed a large-scale online campaign that began on 13 September 2024, which saw homophobic and transphobic hate speech and discriminatory rhetoric against LGBTI activists and organizations spreading across hundreds of social media pages, including those espousing support for the Tunisian President Kais Said. Traditional media outlets also broadcast inflammatory messages by popular TV and radio hosts attacking LGBTI organizations, calling for their dissolution and for the arrests of LGBTI activists.

    Saif Ayadi, queer activist and head of programs at Damj, fears that the actual number of LGBTI people arrested and prosecuted is higher than the numbers Damj was able to document. He explained: “Our numbers are based on the direct assistance we provide to members of the community including legal assistance; it is not exhaustive. We estimate the real number to be at least three times higher because when we used to have access to official numbers of prosecutions a few years ago, we found that the on average our documentation only covers at most a third of the people affected.”

    Gay men and transgender people in Tunisia are often arrested based on gender stereotypes, behaviour or physical appearance. According to lawyers who represent LGBTI individuals, frequently digital evidence unlawfully seized from their devices after the arrests is used to prosecute them. Most of those arrested, report to their lawyers having their phones confiscated and illegally searched by police officers.

    The criminalization of consensual same-sex relations makes LGBTI people vulnerable to violence and abuse by the police, who often exploit their fear of arrest and prosecution and subject them to blackmail, extortion and, at times, sexual abuse. In some cases, those arrested were victims of entrapment and phishing on social media and dating applications by security officers. Some individuals reported to Damj being entrapped by security forces impersonating LGBTI people on social media and same-sex dating applications, to extort and blackmail them including through threats of outing, doxxing or arrest including for “soliciting prostitution online”. Lawyers have also reported on an increase in police raids without warrants on homes of LGBTI people during 2024.

    Abusive prosecutions on “morality” and “indecency” grounds

    Those arrested have been detained and prosecuted under Article 230, which criminalizes same-sex relations (for “sodomy and lesbianism”), and/or Articles 226 and 226 bis of the Penal Code, which criminalize “indecency” and acts deemed to be offensive to “public morals”. Article 230 provides for up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine while Articles 226 and 226 bis provide for up to six months’ imprisonment.

    “Articles in the penal code that criminalize ‘public indecency’ or acts deemed to be ‘against good morals or public morality’ are particularly dangerous as they are overly broad, vague and do not meet the principle of legality, allowing for a wide scope of interpretation and inconsistency. These overbroad provisions and their subjective and discretionary application allow law enforcement to carry out sweeping arrests of individuals simply for failing to adhere to gender norms or having a non-conforming gender appearance or expression,” said Diana Eltahawy.

    On 27 October 2024, the justice ministry issued a statement condemning the increasing use of social media platforms such as TikTok and Instagram to spread content “contrary to public morals”, urging prosecutors to “take necessary judicial measures and launch investigations against anyone producing, displaying or publishing data, images and video clips with content that undermines moral values”. According to Damj, the ministry’s statement sparked a campaign against LGBTI individuals.

    A few days after this statement, five content creators, including Khoubaib, who is gender non-conforming, were arrested and charged with “public indecency, dissemination of content contrary to good morals” among other charges. They were convicted and sentenced on 31 October 2024 to prison terms of up to four and a half years. Upon their appeal, on 5 February, the convictions were upheld and four were released after their sentences were reduced. The fifth defendant who is gender non-confirming remains imprisoned as he was sentenced to a two-year prison term and a 1,000 dinar fine under Article 234 of the penal code for “violating morals by inciting minors to debauchery ” over videos that he created and posted on social media.

    Forced anal ‘examinations’ amounting to torture

    Men accused of engaging in same-sex relations are routinely subjected to forced anal “examinations” by medical doctors. Amnesty International considers forced anal examinations a form of torture. The Tunisian authorities must halt all such examinations immediately.

    On 3 December 2024, the El Kef Court of First Instance sentenced two men to one year imprisonment under Article 230. Both were subjected to forced anal examinations to obtain “proof” of same-sex sexual activity.

    Targeting to LGBTI activists

    LGBTI activists and associations have also faced increasing harassment by authorities. Queer activists Saif Ayadi, Assala Madoukhi and Mira Ben Salah were summoned for questioning several times, most recently in October and November 2024.  Police interrogated them about their activism, their work with civil society organizations and their participation in protests. Mira Ben Salah, who is a trans activist and the coordinator of Damj’s office in Sfax, was subject to repeated interrogation in relation to the organization’s work, including with migrants and refugees. Mira is facing multiple charges in connection with her work with Damj and is awaiting the outcome of the investigation.

    In July 2023 and February 2024, Mira Ben Salah filed complaints with the Public Prosecutor at the Court of First Instance in Sfax over her repeated harassment by police. She told Amnesty international: “I have been summoned and questioned so many times because of my work and my activism but when I filed complaints for harassment, threats and violence that I faced they don’t call me to testify nor take my complaints seriously.”  She added that while the authorities’ investigation against her was progressing swiftly, the investigation into her own complaints has not made any progress.

    MIL OSI NGO –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The dangerous possibility of a Turkish-Syrian maritime zone agreement – P-000006/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The fall of Assad’s criminal regime marks a historic moment for the Syrian people. The European Council of 19 December 2024[1] stressed the historic opportunity to reunite and rebuild the country and underlined the importance of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people, in line with the core principles of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2254.

    In this respect, the EU supports the work of the UN Special Envoy for Syria. Syria’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within secure borders should be fully respected, in accordance with international law.

    This was also the agreement reached in Aqaba[2] on 14 December 2024 on common principles[3] for the international community’s engagement in support of the Syrian people in this unprecedented transition.

    The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye.

    In this context, the EU continues to expect Türkiye to respect the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of all Member States, in accordance with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea[4] and to unequivocally commit to and promote good neighbourly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice.

    The European Council conclusions of 12 December 2019[5] clearly stated that the Türkiye-Libya memorandum of understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea[6] infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States.

    • [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf
    • [2] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/press-statement-eu-high-representative-foreign-affairs-and-security-policy-following-international_en
    • [3] https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/syria/news/2024/article/joint-statement-on-syria-14-dec-2024
    • [4] https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
    • [5] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/41768/12-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf
    • [6] https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/Turkey_11122019_(HC)_MoU_Libya-Delimitation-areas-Mediterranean.pdf
    Last updated: 6 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Next meeting: 13 February 2025 – ordinary meeting – Delegation to the Africa-EU Parliamentary Assembly

    Source: European Parliament

    On Thursday, 13 February 2025 (10.00-11.30), the DAFR delegation will hold a meeting in Strasbourg (DE MADARIAGA S5) on the risk of the regionalisation of the conflict in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
    The meeting will be webstreamed.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Meeting of Wednesday 12 February 2025, Strasbourg – Delegation for relations with the Maghreb countries and the Arab Maghreb Union, including the EU-Morocco, EU-Tunisia and EU-Algeria Joint Parliamentary Committees

    Source: European Parliament

    The next DMAG meeting will take place on 12 February 2025, from 17.00 to 18.30, in Strasbourg, room CHURCHILL 200.
    The Delegation will hold an exchange of views on the situation in Algeria and the EU-Algeria relations, with H.E. Mr Diego Mellado, Head of the EU Delegation in Algeria.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Final draft agenda – Tuesday, 11 February 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    Final draft agenda
    Strasbourg
    Monday, 10 February 2025 – Thursday, 13 February 2025  
    Tuesday, 11 February 2025   Version: Thursday, 6 February 2025, 13:39

    09:00 – 11:50   Debates     
    Council (including replies) 20′
    Commission (including replies) 20′
    “Catch the eye”   (2×5′) 10′
    Members 104′
    13:00 – 22:00   Debates (or at the end of the votes)     
    Council (including replies) 50′
    Commission (including replies) 65′
    Author (committee) 5′
    “Catch the eye”   (7×5′) 35′
    Members 239′

    32 Continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression
    17 European Central Bank – annual report 2024
    Anouk Van Brug (A10-0003/2025) 
        – Amendments Wednesday, 5 February 2025, 13:00
    50 Escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo
        – Motion for a resolution Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00
        – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 19:00
        – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 20:00
        – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 16:00
    Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes
    Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 7 February 2025, 12:00
    Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00
    Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 19:00
    Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Final draft agenda – Wednesday, 12 February 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    29 Objection pursuant to Rule 115(2) and (3): Genetically modified maize DP910521     – Amendments Wednesday, 5 February 2025, 13:00 28 Objection pursuant to Rule 115(2) and (3): Genetically modified maize MON 95275     – Amendments Wednesday, 5 February 2025, 13:00 42 Recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 10 February 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 14:00 44 Repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 10 February 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 14:00 45 Continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 10 February 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 14:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 7 February 2025, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Final draft agenda – Thursday, 13 February 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    42 Recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 10 February 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 14:00 44 Repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 10 February 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 14:00 45 Continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 10 February 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 14:00 27 Further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia     – Motions for resolutions Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 11:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 12:00     – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 19:00 50 Escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo     – Motion for a resolution Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 19:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 20:00     – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 16:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 7 February 2025, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s push to shut down USAID shows how international development is all about strategic interests

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Nelson Duenas, Assistant Professor of Accounting, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

    The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is on the verge of being shut down by United States President Donald Trump’s administration.

    On Feb. 4, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the agency would be taken over by the State Department. He stated that “all USAID direct hire personnel will be placed on administrative leave globally.”

    This move comes after Trump and his officials have heavily criticized the role and ineffectiveness of the agency. Trump said USAID had “been run by a bunch of radical lunatics, and we’re getting them out,” while Tesla CEO and special government employee Elon Musk said it was “time for it to die.”

    The closure of USAID will have significant consequences for many countries in the Global South. USAID is one of the largest development agencies in the world and funds programs that benefit millions of people, from supporting peace agreements in Colombia to fighting the spread of HIV in Uganda.

    Around US$40 billion is allocated annually from the U.S. federal budget for humanitarian and development aid. If USAID is dismantled, it raises questions about how these funds will be redirected and the long-term impacts it will have on global development efforts.

    A geopolitical fallout?

    The potential dismantling of USAID has raised concerns among international development experts about a potential geopolitical fallout that could create unintended consequences for the U.S. itself.

    Global issues, such as human security and climate change, are expected to be heavily affected. The U.S. also risks losing influence in the fight for soft power since dismantling USAID could leave behind a power vacuum. Other countries like Russia or China may occupy the space left by what was the largest international aid program in the world.




    Read more:
    USAid shutdown isn’t just a humanitarian issue – it’s a threat to American interests


    This shift could result in the U.S. losing its influence in regions like Africa, South America and Asia, where the country distributed aid to a number of non-governmental organizations, aid agencies and non-profits.

    While the future of U.S. foreign assistance remains uncertain, other world powers have a role to play. European donors, despite some limitations in resources, remain committed to the 2030 Sustainable Development agenda.

    Beyond humanitarianism

    If the agency is shut down, it may be widely condemned on moral and humanitarian grounds. However, its closure would respond to a logic of strategic and ideological interests that has long shaped the international development system. This a key finding from my longstanding field research with organizations that receive funding, not only from USAID, but also from Canadian and European donors.

    International development largely unfolded in the aftermath of the Second World War when global powers competed to establish a new world order. This led to the creation of international agreements and multilateral institutions, with major industrialized nations emerging as the primary donors of foreign aid.

    While many international initiatives, like the Millennium Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, have guided development as we know it, the governments of main donor countries have their own interests in mind when providing aid.

    In my research, I have interviewed many people involved in the foreign aid chain, including directors and offices of international non-governmental organizations and governmental co-operation agencies. Many said development relationships are shaped by both the interests of donors and those of recipient populations and organizations.

    While these relationships may be based on humanitarian objectives, such as disaster relief or human rights advocacy, they can also be influenced by ideological, geopolitical, economic and social agendas.

    In this context, the American move to eliminate USAID could be seen as one that prioritizes national security and economic goals over traditional global humanitarian concerns. Governments steer the wheel of international development according to their political ideologies and interests, regardless of the shock this may generate among citizens.

    Canada’s role in all this

    The U.S. is not the only country re-evaluating its international development policy. Sweden, another major country in the foreign aid sphere, is also changing its co-operation strategy following changes in its government and criticism of the NGOs that deploy their development assistance.

    Canada’s role in this unfolding situation remains uncertain. With the resignation of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as head of the Liberal Party and the upcoming federal election, it’s unclear what will happen to Canada’s international development strategy going forward.

    Under Stephen Harper, the country’s international development strategy was closely tied to expanding trade with developing countries based on maximizing the value of extractive economies and a strong defence policy. This approach aimed to bring value not only to the recipient country of aid, but to Canada as well.

    When Trudeau took office, Canada’s development strategy turned to a more progressive agenda centred on peace keeping, feminist approaches and humanitarian programs.

    Will Canada continue to champion human rights, human security and progressive agendas? Or will Canada reduce funds for foreign assistance, which seems to be the wish of many of its citizens?

    The answer to these questions will depend on the direction that our political leaders decide to take, and the sentiments of citizens. Still, Canada’s approach to development aid will probably remain in a trade-off between moral imperatives of humanitarianism and strategic national interests.

    Nelson Duenas receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)
    Nelson Duenas is a researcher associated to l’Observatoire canadien sur les crises et l’action humanitaires

    – ref. Trump’s push to shut down USAID shows how international development is all about strategic interests – https://theconversation.com/trumps-push-to-shut-down-usaid-shows-how-international-development-is-all-about-strategic-interests-249118

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: UN Chief on DRC – Security Council Media Stakeout | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Press briefing by UN Secretary-General António Guterres on DRC.

    Good morning.

    I wanted to say a few words about the deeply concerning situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    We are at a pivotal moment and it is time to rally together for peace.

    Tomorrow, leaders from the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community will take part in a Summit in Tanzania.

    The focus will be addressing the crisis in the face of the offensive by the M23, supported by the Rwandan Defence Forces.

    Next week, in Addis Ababa, I will take part in a Summit-level meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council where this crisis will be also front and centre.

    In advance of these crucial gatherings, I want to make a special appeal for peace.

    Thousands of people have been killed – including women and children – and hundreds of thousands have been forced from their homes in the eastern DRC.

    We also see the continued threat by other armed groups, either Congolese or foreign.

    All of this is having an enormous human toll.

    We have countless reports of human rights abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence, forced recruitment, and the disruption of lifesaving aid.

    The humanitarian situation in and around Goma is perilous.

    Hundreds of thousands of people are on the move, with many of the previous sites hosting displaced people north of the city now looted, destroyed or abandoned.

    Healthcare facilities are overwhelmed.

    And other basic services – including schools, water, electricity, phone lines and the internet – are severely limited.

    Meanwhile, the conflict continues to rage in South Kivu and risks engulfing the entire region.

    I want to pay tribute to all those who have lost their lives, including MONUSCO blue helmets and regional forces.

    And I express my solidarity with the Congolese people who find themselves yet again the victims of a seemingly endless cycle of violence.

    As the Summit in Tanzania gets underway, and as I prepare to leave for Addis Ababa, my message is clear:

    Silence the guns.

    Stop the escalation.

    Respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    Uphold international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

    There is no military solution.

    It is time for all the signatories of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the region to honour their commitments.

    It is time for mediation. It is time to end this crisis. It is time for peace.

    The stakes are too high.

    We need the active and constructive role of all players — namely neighbouring countries, subregional organizations, the African Union and the United Nations.

    Let us all act together for peace.

    Thank you.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9wzsinL2SRw

    MIL OSI Video –

    February 7, 2025
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