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Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Kaspersky identifies SideWinder Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) expanding attacks with new espionage tool

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    JOHANNESBURG, South Africa, October 16, 2024/APO Group/ —

    The Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) has detected that the SideWinder APT group is expanding its attack operations into the Middle East and Africa, utilising a previously unknown espionage toolkit called ‘StealerBot’. As part of its ongoing monitoring of APT activities, Kaspersky (www.Kaspersky.co.za) discovered that recent campaigns by the SideWinder APT group were targeting high-profile entities and strategic infrastructures in various countries in the Middle East, Turkiye, as well as in Morocco and Djibouti in Africa. The campaign in general remains active and may target other victims.

    SideWinder, also known as T-APT-04 or RattleSnake, is one of the most prolific APT groups that started operations in 2012. Over the years, it has primarily targeted military and government entities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, China, and Nepal, as well as other sectors and countries in South and Southeast Asia. Recently, Kaspersky observed new waves of attacks, which have expanded to impact high-profile entities and strategic infrastructure in the Middle East and Africa.

    Besides the geographical expansion, Kaspersky discovered that SideWinder is using a previously unknown post-exploitation toolkit called ‘StealerBot’. This is an advanced modular implant designed specifically for espionage activities, and currently used by the group as the main post-exploitation tool.

    “In essence, StealerBot is a stealthy espionage tool that allows threat actors to spy on systems while avoiding easy detection. It operates through a modular structure, with each component designed to perform a specific function. Notably, these modules never appear as files on the system’s hard drive, making them difficult to trace. Instead, they are loaded directly into the memory. At the core of StealerBot is the ‘Orchestrator’, which oversees the entire operation, communicating with the threat actor’s command-and-control server, and coordinating the execution of its various modules”, says Giampaolo Dedola, lead security researcher at Kaspersky’s GReAT.

    During its latest investigation, Kaspersky observed that StealerBot is performing a range of malicious activities, such as installing additional malware, capturing screenshots, logging keystrokes, stealing passwords from browsers, intercepting RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) credentials, exfiltrating files, and more.

    Kaspersky first reported on the group’s activities in 2018. This actor is known to rely on spear-phishing emails as its main infection method, containing malicious documents exploiting Office vulnerabilities and occasionally making use of LNK, HTML and HTA files that are contained in archives. The documents often contain information obtained from public websites, which is used to lure the victim into opening the file and believing it to be legitimate. Kaspersky observed several malware families being used within parallel campaigns, including both custom-made and modified, publicly available RATs.

    To mitigate threats related to APT activities, Kaspersky experts recommend equipping your organisation’s information security experts with the latest insights and technical details, such as from Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Portal (https://apo-opa.co/4h4twjX); use robust solutions for endpoints and to detect advanced threats on the network, such as Kaspersky Next and Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack Platform; educate employees to recognise cybersecurity threats such as phishing letters.

    Read more on Securelist (https://apo-opa.co/4h5gQJA).

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: GITEX GLOBAL 2024: Artificial Intelligence (AI) revolution unveiled to the world on “AI Super Tuesday”

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, October 16, 2024/APO Group/ —

    • International exhibitors presented the most groundbreaking innovations helping shape the future of society and industry
    • “Cybersecurity Day” next up as world’s largest and best-rated tech event reaches halfway stage on Wednesday

    Hot on the heels of a memorable first day where GITEX GLOBAL 2024 (http://apo-opa.co/4hlR7gj) opened the doors for its biggest-ever international edition, the entire global tech ecosystem experienced another action-packed agenda on Tuesday at Dubai World Trade Centre (DWTC).

    Taking place from 14-18 October, GITEX GLOBAL presents a record-breaking edition in its 44th year – welcoming over 6,500 exhibitors, 1,800 startups, 1,200 investors alongside governments from more than 180 countries.

    With five themed days locked in across the 2024 event programme, a technology taking the world by storm was the focal point as “AI Super Tuesday” presented the most groundbreaking innovations helping shape the future of society and industry.

    A technology with vast transformative potential

    As AI takes centre stage in drug discovery, the world could soon witness the most significant shift in medicine since the advent of modern pharmaceuticals. But with such rapid advancements, a mesmerising Tuesday session – ‘The Next Leap in Medicine: Are we on the Edge of a Breakthrough?’ – saw experts discuss whether AI transformation is fast approaching or further away than some anticipate.

    Dr. Shameer Khader, Global Head and Executive Director – Computational Biology Cluster, Precision Medicine and Computational Biology at global pharmaceutical company Sanofi, gave AI an emphatic endorsement. He said: “Drug discovery on average takes 10-15 years and one project around $1.5-2 billion in cost. Is that something sustainable? The model must change, and we should harness AI capabilities and value across the ecosystem. We should optimise every single process to reduce development costs, streamline the drug discovery lifestyle, and build data disease models and infrastructure.”

    In a special case study, audiences became acquainted with ‘BabyX’ – an interactive simulation of a lifelike infant through AI. This virtual animated baby learns and reacts like a human infant with a built-in virtual brain with detailed likeness to that of a human. Functioning through biological AI and an operating system called Brain Language, stimulated neurochemical reactions help BabyX decide how she will react – something that could prove revolutionary in the future AI economy.

    Elaborating on the significance of BabyX, Dr. Mark Sagar, its creator who co-founded New Zealand-based Soul Machines, pointed out the defining difference between human and AI intelligence, adding: “As humans, we learn from a young age though exploring the world and experimenting. Play is such a key part of making intelligence open-ended and inventive, but it’s one thing what’s missing from current AI. If we’re ever going to regulate general AI intelligence, we need to build cognitive architecture that yields intelligent behaviour through a comprehensive approach.”

    A catalyst for forward-facing collaboration

    Alongside the profound transformative potential of AI, GITEX GLOBAL’s status as a catalyst for collaboration and forward-facing projects was on full display. A number of exciting high-profile partnerships were officially unveiled at the world’s largest and best-rated tech event, with one involved KAOUN – the world-leading organiser of business events and trade fairs, leading all GITEX events outside the UAE.

    Tuesday saw KAOUN sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Digital Dubai Authority to grow the GITEX ecosystem, support Dubai’s internationalisation strategy, and explore new partnership opportunities. Additionally, AWS and e& entered into a $1 billion-plus agreement as part of new strategic alliance to deliver cloud solutions and supporting AI deployment and digital transformation across the region. 

    Tuesday casts spotlight on AI’s cross-sector impact and demands

    Elsewhere on the Super AI Tuesday agenda, another applauded show illustrated how high-performance computing is steering humanity’s quest for the next generation of aircraft. During ‘Quantum Maturation: Introducing The “Quantum Mobility Quest”’, companies were urged to move beyond the physical limits of present-day computing today and scale up future-focused solutions to unlock aviation’s vast potential.

    Isabell Gradert, Vice President of Central Research & Technology, Airbus, Germany, said: “Aviation is embedded in the tapestry of our global-leading industries and is one with the highest computation needs. Quantum computing is seen as the next big gamechanger in the aviation industry and has the potential to solve the most complex aerospace challenges and create a paradigm shift in the way aircrafts are built and flown. This is a very exciting time.”

    Additionally, audiences familiarised themselves with a wide of services and solutions being showcased by GITEX GLOBAL exhibitors. UAE-based Presight, the region’s leading big data analytics company powered by generative artificial intelligence (AI), unveiled its Intelli Platform, an AI-powered management and operations platform that lets cities, transport, energy, and infrastructure organisations immediately use Generative AI.

    AWS also cast a spotlight on AWS Bedrock, a fully managed service that enables enterprises to easily build, customise, and deploy generative AI applications using foundation models from top AI providers, all through the AWS platform.

    GITEX GLOBAL 2024 continues Wednesday as “Cybersecurity Day” welcomes an ensemble cast of thought leaders and experts to explore the emerging threats landscape, counter-infringement strategies, and tools organisations require in an increasingly digital world.

    GITEX Editions (https://apo-opa.co/4h8xBn9) also presents Intelligent Connectivity (https://apo-opa.co/4hayjAy) with visitors set to explore how industry leaders can bridge digital divides and harness emerging technology to drive innovation and economic growth. The World Future Economy Digital Leaders Summit (https://apo-opa.co/4hlR8kn) also continues with another star-studded cast of world-renowned experts and innovative minds.  

    GITEX GLOBAL is seamlessly connecting with the world’s largest network of tech events, including GITEX EUROPE Berlin, GITEX ASIA Singapore, GITEX AFRICA Morocco, and GITEX NIGERIA. These events are fostering collaboration and driving innovation to shape the tech landscape of tomorrow.

    More information on GITEX GLOBAL, please visit http://www.GITEX.com

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Applied Artificial intelligence (AI) and Deep Tech Innovations Take Centre Stage on Day Three of Expand North Star 2024

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, October 16, 2024/APO Group/ –With global participation continuing to flourish, the spotlight also turned towards Africa, where burgeoning tech ecosystems are paving the way for a new wave of entrepreneurs and innovators. H.E. Savannah Maziya, Minister, Ministry of Information, Communications & Technology, Eswatini, alongside other thought leaders, emphasised the importance of structured development to tackle unique market challenges and unlock Africa’s economic potential.   

    Celina Lee, CEO & Co-Founder, Zindi, South Africa, highlighted the trend of talent returning to Africa to start companies and create ecosystems that foster innovation and attract global corporations like Microsoft to set up labs in Ghana and Nairobi.   

    Speaking on the challenges facing Africa, Olatunbosun Alake, Honorable Commissioner, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Technology, Lagos State Government, Nigeria, said, “The greatest challenge in Africa is education. In Nigeria, if you look at the most educated parts, they show economic value, whereas in the north, where education levels are not as high, economic productivity is lower. There needs to be an African Renaissance of education funding across the board because if you drive education, educate, and enlighten people, people will change the environment.” 

    Across its four-day span, Expand North Star continues to shed light on the future of industries through defining events such as GITEX Impact, Fintech Surge, Future Blockchain Summit, and Marketing Mania. These events underscore how emerging technologies are transforming the way we live and are also playing a pivotal role in reshaping the future.  

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Autocratic nations are reaching across borders to silence critics – and so far nothing seems to stop them

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Francesca Lessa, Associate Professor in International Relations of the Americas, UCL

    Iranian journalist Pouria Zeraati survived an assassination attempt outside his home in Wimbledon, south London, in late March 2024. Eighteen months earlier, the London-based independent television channel Iran International, for which Zeraati worked, had temporarily relocated to Washington DC over threats that they believe come from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

    Both incidents are examples of how it seems that a government can target an individual or organisation based outside their borders, with terrifying results.

    According to the latest research from the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenberg, 71% of the world’s population lived in autocracies in 2023 – ten years ago it was 48%. But what’s also new is that autocracies – as well as some other nations – are increasingly reaching across their borders to target people living abroad, enforcing the idea that they can reach their critics wherever they live.

    This kind of state action, taken outside national borders, is known as transnational repression, and is becoming more widespread. The Chinese government is seen as the biggest perpetrator, sometimes using violence to close down criticism or protests against its regime, held in other countries.

    Countries reaching across borders

    More than 20% of the world’s governments are believed to have taken this kind of action outside their borders in the past ten years. These included assassinations, abductions, assaults, detentions and unlawful deportations, according to the NGO Freedom House. These are aimed at forcibly silencing exiled political activists, journalists, former regime insiders and members of ethnic or religious minorities.
    In 2023, 125 such incidents were committed by 25 countries.

    While the majority of countries committing such practices tend to be autocracies, a number of democracies have also taken action across borders, including Israel, Hungary, India and Turkey, according to the report. In 2023, six countries engaged in these practices for the first time, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador and Yemen.




    Read more:
    Why the growing number of foreign agent laws around the world is bad for democracy


    Freedom House recorded 1,034 physical attacks between 2014 and 2023, committed by 44 governments in 100 target countries. China, Turkey, Tajikistan, Russia and Egypt are the most prolific perpetrators, with China accounting for a quarter of all incidents.

    This type of terror tactic can take many forms. Freedom House has noted that governments increasingly cooperated to help target exiled dissidents. In 74% of the incidents of transnational repression that took place in 2021, both the origin and the host countries were rated “not free” by Freedom House.

    Awareness of this type of cross-border action is growing. Both human rights groups and academics are now systematically tracking attacks. And several governments, including the US and Australia, have committed to taking action to combat these practices. A bill was introduced in the US Senate in 2023 to specifically tackle transnational repression by foreign governments in the US and abroad.

    I studied the increasing levels of cooperation in transnational repression by different nations in a recent article published in International Studies Quarterly. We look at why states, which are normally reluctant to collaborate, do so when it comes to silencing dissidents abroad.




    Read more:
    Continuing crackdown on churches and NGOs moves Nicaragua further from democracy to authoritarianism


    Historical lessons?

    There are historical parallels between what happened during Operation Condor in South America and what’s happening today. Operation Condor was a system that Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay started using in late 1975 with the backing of the US. It was aimed at persecuting exiles. Operation Condor was the most sophisticated, institutionalised and coordinated scheme ever established to persecute citizens who had been forced to flee their homeland.

    Journalist Pouria Zeraati was attacked.

    Three factors were found to explain why this form of repression was able to be used at the time and why countries agreed to cooperate.

    First, politically active exiled dissidents constituted a threat to the reputation and survival of South America’s ruling juntas. They successfully named and shamed the region’s military regimes, discrediting their international public images given the human rights violations perpetrated and resulting in the US cutting funding to Uruguay in 1976 and Argentina in 1977.

    Second, these autocracies, which came to power between 1964 and 1976, drew inspiration from the US National Security Doctrine and the French School of Counterinsurgency. In both, security was considered more important than human rights.

    The history of Operation Condor.

    Finally, two countries catalysed efforts to cooperate in this kind of action. Chile pushed for the formal creation of Operation Condor in 1975. Argentina then expanded it to include Brazil, Peru and Ecuador between 1976 and 1978. This significantly widened Operation Condor’s scope for action to most of South America.

    Why Operation Condor is relevant?

    Operation Condor was the only regional organisation to be created to hunt down political opponents across borders. Lessons from this historical experience are relevant today.

    Cooperation in transnational repression in the last few years also occurs in regional clusters, as shown by research by academics and human rights groups. These groups of nations include, for instance, Belarus, Russia and Tajikistan, as well as Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

    In recent years these south-east Asian countries have closely collaborated to persecute, arbitrarily arrest and forcibly repatriate exiled activists and refugees, according to the media, the UN and international human rights NGOs.

    Second, one or more countries, predominantly Russia and Turkey, have worked together on efforts to repress critics over a significant period.

    Third, some regional organisations, of authoritarian nature, often enable cooperation in transnational repression, or at least create unsafe environments for migrating dissidents.

    The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Gulf Cooperation Council are examples, since they “have expanded their collective efforts against exiles”, according to some sources. SCO member states, especially Russia, China and Uzbekistan, have repeatedly used the organisation to pursue political opponents abroad and persecute them as criminals. This shows the organisation’s role as a platform for the diffusion and consolidation of authoritarian principles.

    Countries engaging in this kind of political repression today often wish to silence dissent wherever it occurs.

    These countries are acting in complete disregard of established principles of international law and international relations, such as sovereignty and the protection of refugees, and seem to be expanding their operations. It remains to be seen if there’s anything that the rest of the international community can do to reverse this terrifying trend, but at least it has started trying.

    Francesca Lessa’s projects “Operation Condor” and “Plancondor.org” received funding from the University of Oxford John Fell Fund, The British Academy/Leverhulme Trust, the University of Oxford ESRC Impact Acceleration Account, the European Commission under Horizon 2020, the Open Society Foundations, and UCL Public Policy through Research England’s QR-PSF funding. Lessa is also the Honorary President of the Observatorio Luz Ibarburu, a network of human rights NGOs in Uruguay.

    – ref. Autocratic nations are reaching across borders to silence critics – and so far nothing seems to stop them – https://theconversation.com/autocratic-nations-are-reaching-across-borders-to-silence-critics-and-so-far-nothing-seems-to-stop-them-233037

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Former Louisiana Sheriff’s Deputy Sentenced for Civil Rights Violation for Using Excessive Force Against Detainee

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    A former Louisiana sheriff’s office deputy was sentenced yesterday to 37 months in prison for assaulting a pretrial detainee.

    Javarrea Pouncy, 31, a former sergeant with the DeSoto Parish Sheriff’s Office (DPSO), previously pleaded guilty to one count of using excessive force against the detainee. During his plea, Pouncy admitted that, in September 2019, he and another DPSO deputy conducted a strip search of a detainee in the DeSoto Parish jail, as part of the detainee’s booking. Pouncy admitted further that, during the search, the deputies repeatedly punched the detainee in his head, face and body, even though the detainee did not pose a threat to either officer. As a result of the assault, the detainee was hospitalized and sustained a broken eye socket and broken nose, among other injuries.

    “The defendant pledged to protect and serve his community, but instead, he repeatedly punched a detainee without justification, leaving him bloodied and broken,” said Assistant Attorney General Kristen Clarke of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. “People in detention have the right to be treated humanely and not to be brutalized by excessive force. This sentence sends a clear message that we will not tolerate such abuses behind bars. The Justice Department will hold accountable officials who violate detainees’ civil rights.”

    “Pouncy took advantage of his position, the power that it yields and the prestige of the badge in committing this criminal act,” said U.S. Attorney Brandon B. Brown for the Western District of Louisiana. “Decency and order can co-exist with the preservation of an offender’s civil rights. Prosecutions such as these are critical to ensure that the good work of law enforcement officers is not hampered by the heinous acts of bad law enforcement officers.”

    “Yesterday, Pouncy faced the consequences of his unnecessary and violent actions toward someone he was supposed to protect,” said Assistant Director Chad Yarbrough of the FBI Criminal Investigative Division. “It’s a sad day when we have to investigate someone who took an oath to uphold the law. His actions undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system, and I want the public to know we will not tolerate it. The FBI is committed to investigating criminal misconduct, no matter who the subject is or what position they hold in their community.”

    The other deputy involved in the assault, DeMarkes Grant, previously pleaded guilty to one count of obstructing justice in connection with the assault. He was sentenced to 10 months in prison.

    The FBI New Orleans Field Office investigated the case.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Seth Reeg for the Western District of Louisiana and Trial Attorney Erin Monju of the Civil Rights Division’s Criminal Section prosecuted the case.

    MIL Security OSI –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK pushes for Middle East stability on ministerial visit to Egypt

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Minister for the Middle East Hamish Falconer visits Egypt to push for regional stability.

    • The UK announces £1 million of assistance to Egyptian health authority to support medically evacuated Palestinians from Gaza.
    • New UK-Egypt Memorandum of Understanding on food security signed, signalling the UK’s support for Egypt’s leading role in food production in the region.
    • Minister calls for urgent de-escalation and a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon in his first visit to the Middle East, with visit to Al Arish border crossing.

    Providing humanitarian support for civilians affected by the current conflict was the focus of the Minister for the Middle East’s, Hamish Falconer, first official visit to the region this week.

    Announcing a new package of support to assist civilians medically evacuated from Gaza to Egypt, the Minister pledged £1 million of UK assistance to the Egyptian Ministry of Health that will support medically evacuated civilians from Gaza who are receiving care in Egypt.

    Delivered through the World Health Organisation (WHO) in Egypt, the funding will provide vital medical supplies and medications, including chemotherapy and rehabilitative equipment, to those in need. It will also strengthen capacity to care for patients from Gaza with chronic diseases.

    Minister for the Middle East Hamish Falconer said:

    “As a key regional partner, Egypt plays a central role alongside the UK in working for stability and security across the Middle East and driving forward de-escalation efforts in both Gaza and Lebanon.  

    “The worsening humanitarian situation in Gaza continues to bring devastation to many lives, with many requiring life-saving support over the border in Egypt. That’s why, alongside our Egyptian partners, we are funding life-saving treatments and support for medically evacuated civilians from Gaza. 

    “At Al Arish, I saw that many tonnes of lifesaving aid continue to be denied entry into Gaza by Israel. As winter approaches, Israel can and must do more to ensure aid flows freely into Gaza and to facilitate the UN and humanitarian agencies to carry out their work safely.

    “I signed a new UK-Egypt Memorandum of Understanding on sustainable food security, launching a new partnership between our two countries to tackle a critical global challenge.”

    The announcement came during the Minister’s visit to Al-Arish, where he met with the North Sinai Governor to discuss aid flows into Gaza. Here, the Minister visited the Egyptian Red Crescent’s warehouse and Al-Arish General Hospital to see how UK funding to WHO Egypt will be used.

    The Minister also met with Egypt’s Foreign Minister, Badr Abdelatty where he thanked Egypt for its ongoing role in getting aid into Gaza and agreed the need to continue working together for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon. Minister Falconer also raised the consular case of Alaa Abd El-Fattah and called for quick progress on his release.

    As Egypt is a regional leader in ensuring sustainable food security for the Middle East and Africa, the Minister also agreed a landmark UK-Egypt Memorandum of Understanding on Food Security with Rania Al Mashat, Minister of International Cooperation and Alaa Farouk, Minister of Agriculture. The agreement includes technical assistance to advance sustainable agribusiness practice and increase crop yield in Egypt.

    Speaking on today’s funding announcement, World Health Organisation Representative to Egypt Dr Nima Abid said:

    “WHO values its long-standing partnership with the British government, and we are deeply grateful for this generous contribution from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.

    “This support will enable WHO, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and Population, to deliver critical supplies to Egyptian hospitals and equip healthcare workers to meet the urgent needs of medical evacuees from Gaza. I would also like to express my appreciation for the government of Egypt for its vital role in treating patients from Gaza and in facilitating their safe evacuation to other countries as well.”

    The UK continues to play a leading role in alleviating the suffering in Gaza and continues to provide significant funding to partners to support those most in need. The UK has already provided 78,000 shelter items, 76,000 wound care kits, and 1.3 million items of medicine.

    The UK trebled its aid commitment to the OPTs in the last financial year and this Government will maintain significant funding this financial year to support trusted aid
     agencies on the ground.

    The UK continues to call for an immediate ceasefire on all fronts and continues to push for urgent aid to enter Gaza and reach those most in need.

    Background

    • The FCDO currently advises against all but essential travel to the Egyptian desert west and south of the oases of Fayoum, Bahariya, Farafra, Dakhla and Kharga, except for:
    • The coastal areas between the Nile Delta and Marsa Matruh
    • The Marsa Matruh-Siwa road
    • The oasis town of Siwa
    • For further information on Egypt travel advice, visit https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/egypt

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

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    Updates to this page

    Published 16 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: FACT SHEET: U.S. Achievements in the Global Fight Against  Corruption

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    Corruption poses a grave and enduring threat to U.S. national interests and those of our partners. When officials abuse their entrusted power for personal or political gain, the interests of authoritarians and corrupt actors win – at the expense of citizens, honest businesses, and healthy societies. As the Biden-Harris Administration took office, this longstanding challenge had metastasized. In some countries, oligarchs were teaming up with foreign kleptocrats to warp policy and procurement decisions in exchange for kickbacks – with no accountability. Corrupt officials were laundering stolen assets through the U.S. and global financial systems, while local investigators were ill-equipped to follow the money. Reformers in countries saddled with corruption had scarce public resources to actually address development needs. The Biden-Harris Administration tacked these challenges starting Day One, to ensure democracy delivers and corrupt actors are held to account.
    The first National Security Study Memorandum of the Biden-Harris Administration established countering corruption as a “core U.S. national security interest,” leading to the issuance in December 2021 of the first United States Strategy on Countering Corruption. Since then, the United States has taken action at home and around the world to curb illicit finance, hold corrupt actors accountable, forge multilateral partnerships, and equip frontline leaders to take on transnational corruption. The result has been historic progress in protecting the U.S. financial system from money-laundering, including in the residential real estate sector, while enhancing corporate transparency. This Administration has mobilized record levels of foreign assistance dedicated to anti-corruption, including $339 million in Fiscal Year 2023 alone – almost double the yearly average during the previous four years. This new assistance has unlocked support for anti-corruption institutions, leveled the playing field for law-abiding businesses, enabled journalists to team up across borders, and more. Expanded law enforcement cooperation and capacity-building have generated convictions of corrupt actors as well as the seizure, forfeiture, and return of criminal proceeds, while new anti-corruption offices at the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) energized diplomatic and stakeholder engagement. The United States imposed sanctions on more than 500 individuals and entities for corruption and related activities, and established – for the first time in any jurisdiction globally – a new visa restriction for those who enable corrupt activity.
    U.S. progress on anti-corruption has produced concrete benefits for the American people and stakeholders around the world – enhancing prosperity, economic security, safety, and democracy, as outlined below. To bolster and sustain this work, the U.S. government has also modernized its approach to addressing corruption as a cross-cutting priority. Today, Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics Daleep Singh will highlight the benefits of this work to American businesses and workers at a White House anti-corruption roundtable with leaders from 15 major U.S. companies.
    Advancing economic opportunity abroad
    Improving the business enabling environment: U.S. assistance advanced governments’ capacity to prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute corruption, while encouraging anti-bribery compliance. State expanded its Fiscal Transparency Innovation Fund – to help willing partners improve budget transparency – while holding countries to account for progress in its Fiscal Transparency Report. In the past two years alone, a newly expanded State-Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) program facilitated U.S. collaboration with foreign counterparts on more than 50 transnational corruption and money laundering cases with a U.S. nexus. In coordination with State, experienced legal advisors from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) assisted foreign justice partners around the world in investigating and prosecuting corruption and money laundering cases, and recovering assets. And DOJ’s Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, in partnership with the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, has recovered more than $1.7 billion and returned or assisted in returning more than $1.6 billion for the benefit of the people harmed by the corruption.
    Enforcing our bans on foreign bribery and money-laundering – and pressing other countries to do the same: To enable honest companies to compete overseas, the United States upheld its commitments under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by enforcing its foreign bribery and related laws and working with partners to monitor other countries’ progress in implementing the Convention, which celebrated its 25th anniversary in 2024. Since the start of the Administration, DOJ has imposed more than $3.5 billion in total monetary sanctions under the Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA) in 16 corporate resolutions, and announced charges against more than 70 individuals. For instance, this April the former Comptroller General of Ecuador was convicted of money laundering relating to his receipt of over $10 million in bribes from, among others, the Brazil-based construction conglomerate Odebrecht S.A. The Securities and Exchange Commission continued civil enforcement of the FCPA, with approximately $1 billion in total monetary sanctions in 22 corporate resolutions, spanning conduct in 24 countries, since the start of the Administration. DOJ is also enforcing the recently enacted Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, which criminalizes demands for bribes by foreign officials from U.S. companies and others. In addition, this August DOJ announced a new Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program to uncover and prosecute corporate crime – with a particular focus on foreign and domestic corruption, as well as violations by financial institutions of their obligations to take steps to detect and deter money laundering.
    Seizing windows of opportunity: U.S. assistance has become more agile via the establishment of USAID’s Anti-Corruption Response Fund (providing flexible support to countries experiencing new opportunities or backsliding), the State-DOJ Global Anti-Corruption Rapid Response Fund (providing assistance and case mentoring to foreign partners on short notice), and USAID’s Democracy Delivers initiative (which has marshalled $500 million in funding from the United States and others to help reformers deliver, including on their anti-corruption commitments). These innovations, informed by USAID’s Dekleptification Guide, are enabling the U.S. government to more nimbly pivot toward environments where local momentum can be bolstered by outside assistance.
    Bolstering integrity in high-risk sectors: In April 2024, the United States and its partners launched the Blue Dot Network – a mechanism to certify infrastructure projects that have met global standards for quality and sustainability, including transparency in procurement and provisions to limit opportunities for corruption. The United States also supported the launch of PROTECT, a collective action project to address corruption risk in the supply chain for critical minerals.
    Strengthening corruption safeguards in the Indo-Pacific: In June, the United States and thirteen other partners held a signing ceremony, after concluding eight rounds of negotiations in record time, for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) Fair Economy Agreement. The Agreement aims to create a more transparent, predictable trade and investment environment across IPEF partners’ markets, including through binding obligations to prevent and combat corruption. The Department of Commerce (Commerce) and State are accelerating implementation by offering new anti-corruption technical assistance to IPEF partners, including workshops on procurement corruption.
    Dialoguing with the private sector: In 2021, State launched the Galvanizing the Private Sector as Partners in Combatting Corruption initiative, which connects companies and governments to strengthen business integrity and encourage governance reform. Commerce’s International Trade Administration organized the 2024 forum of the Business Ethics for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Small and Medium Enterprises Initiative – the world’s largest public-private partnership on ethical business conduct – at which stakeholders formalized policy recommendations on business integrity in public procurement.
    Protecting the U.S. financial system from abuse
    Expanding corporate transparency: To deter kleptocrats and criminals from laundering money through anonymous shell companies, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) operationalized a new filing system for certain companies operating in the United States to report their beneficial owners – the real people who own or control them – pursuant to the bipartisan Corporate Transparency Act. Treasury held hundreds of outreach events across all states and territories, reaching thousands of stakeholders, to enable companies to quickly and easily comply with this reporting requirement.
    Closing loopholes for money-laundering: Treasury finalized rules to close two major loopholes in the U.S. financial system: (1) to increase transparency in the U.S. residential real estate sector, to ensure that law-abiding homebuyers are not disadvantaged by individuals laundering their ill-gotten gains, and (2) to safeguard the investment adviser industry from illicit finance. Treasury also proposed a rule to modernize financial institutions’ anti-money-laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) programs, to make them more effective and risk-based. Together, these rulemakings represent historic advances for the U.S. AML/CFT regime, in line with international standards, that will help the United States urge other countries to undertake similar reforms to curb illicit finance. The Biden-Harris Administration has also called on Congress to close even more loopholes that facilitate money-laundering by passing the ENABLERS Act.
    Blocking assets and denying entry to corrupt actors: Since the start of the Administration, Treasury has designated more than 500 individuals and entities for corruption and related activities, across six continents. That includes blocking the assets of 20 individuals and 48 companies in Fiscal Year 2024 for corruption in Afghanistan, Guatemala, Guyana, Paraguay, Western Balkans, and Zimbabwe. In tandem, State publicly issued corruption-related visa restrictions for 76 foreign officials and family members in Fiscal Year 2024, and 292 over the course of the Administration. These actions have protected the U.S. financial system from corrupt actors and promoted accountability in domestic jurisdictions. For example, just one week after the U.S. issuance of a public visa restriction on former Director of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) Intelligence Services Osman Mehmedagic for significant corruption, he was arrested by BiH authorities for abuse of office.
    Taking aim at enablers of corruption: In December 2023, President Biden issued an historic Presidential Proclamation establishing a visa restriction for those who facilitate and enable significant corruption and their immediate family members. This new visa restriction complements existing commitments to use sanction and law enforcement capabilities to target private enablers of public corruption. Earlier this year, the FBI and DOJ secured a guilty plea and a criminal penalty of $661 million from Gunvor – one of the largest commodities trading firms in the world – for facilitating bribery of Ecuadorian officials and laundering those bribes through U.S. banks. In addition, USAID launched new activities to incentivize integrity within professions that serve as gatekeepers to the international financial system.
    Upholding international standards: The United States has helped lead efforts to expand anti-corruption work at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), including improving assessment tools, mitigating risks associated with “golden passport” programs, and highlighting how non-financial sectors can be abused by corrupt actors.
    Keeping America and our partners safe
    Addressing corruption risk in the security sector: Security sector corruption can divert essential supplies, empower malign actors, threaten the safety of U.S. service members, and undermine U.S. military missions writ large. In the past year, the Department of Defense (DOD) incorporated corruption risk into its security cooperation planning – subjecting certain proposals to further scrutiny and identifying risk mitigation measures as needed. State also created new resources to weigh corruption risk as part of security sector assistance decision-making. In addition, State’s Global Defense Reform Program and DOD’s institutional capacity building programs advanced more transparent, accountable, and professional defense institutions. DOD continued running a training course on combatting corruption for partner military commanders and civilian leaders.
    Tackling organized crime and corruption: Transnational criminal organizations often rely on corruption to enable their criminal activities and evade accountability – which fuels narcotrafficking into the United States, human smuggling, cybercrimes, and more. The U.S. government is deploying anti-corruption tools to target criminal networks and their financial enablers, in line with the 2023 White House Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.
    Standing up to Russia’s aggression: The United States has adapted to address the wartime needs of Ukraine’s anti-corruption stakeholders, as they close off a key vector for Russian dominance and advance Ukraine’s democratic future. In 2023, Ukrainian anti-corruption investigators and prosecutors achieved an 80 percent increase in prosecutions and a 50 percent increase in convictions, plus opened cases against high-ranking officials including the former head of the Ukrainian Supreme Court.  With U.S. support, Ukraine has advanced significant reforms on asset disclosure, launched a whistleblower portal, strengthened the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and enhanced transparency and integrity in reconstruction.
    Securing a greener future: The United States has integrated an anti-corruption lens across sectors, with particular emphasis on addressing corruption vulnerabilities that threaten a secure, just energy transition for all. This includes USAID support to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), increased mining transparency in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, and innovations that address transnational corruption in green energy mineral supply chains across 15 countries.
    Protecting global health: Corruption curtails the ability of states to respond to pandemics and undercuts access to basic healthcare. USAID is tackling this challenge by releasing cutting-edge guidance on anti-corruption in the health sector and launching integrated programming. For example, in Liberia the United States is working with the government to curb theft of pharmaceuticals through civil society monitoring, law enforcement trainings, and public awareness campaigns.
    Addressing the root causes of migration: Combating corruption is a core component of improving conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – so people do not feel compelled to leave their homes, in line with the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America. Recent U.S. actions have included training up to 27,000 justice sector stakeholders in those countries to more effectively address corruption.
    Defending democracy by rooting out corruption
    Tackling electoral corruption: When candidates can be bankrolled by foreign adversaries and institutions captured by kleptocrats, citizens lose faith in their governments—or even in democracy itself. In response, USAID has launched new programs to bolster electoral integrity, strengthen independent media, and increase the transparency of political finance in high-risk locations.
    Lifting up civil society and independent media: The U.S. government has substantially expanded support to frontline activists and journalists, including through the Global Anti-Corruption Consortium. In addition, a new State Department initiative is training hundreds of journalists in transnational corruption investigations, while USAID’s new investigative journalist networks in Asia and Southern Africa are building capacity to track corruption across sectors and across borders. The Secretary of State established a new award for Anti-Corruption Champions, which has honored dozens of courageous civil society leaders and embattled reformers. In 2022, the United States also hosted the largest regular gathering of civil society activists fighting corruption – the International Anti-Corruption Conference – in Washington, DC, with keynote remarks from APNSA Jake Sullivan.
    Protecting sovereignty: Authoritarian actors like Russia and the PRC use bribery to interfere in the policy, procurement, debt, and electoral processes of other countries – undermining both sovereignty and democracy. The United States is standing up to this tactic by building the resilience of frontline actors to detect and deflect foreign-backed strategic corruption, educating partners about the kleptocrats’ playbook, harnessing sanction tools to deter threats, and increasing collaboration between practitioners working on anti-corruption and those addressing foreign malign influence – both within the USG and with likeminded partners. For example, in June the United States joined with Canada and the UK to expose Russia’s use of corruption and covert financing, among other tactics, to undermine democratic processes in Moldova.
    Restoring trust in American democracy: The Biden-Harris Administration has established the strongest ethics standards of any U.S. presidency. On his first day in office, the President signed an Executive Order requiring administration officials to take a stringent ethics pledge, which extends lobbying bans, limits shadow lobbying, and makes ethics waivers more transparent. The Administration also restored longstanding democratic norms by protecting DOJ cases from political interference, releasing the President’s and Vice-President’s taxes, and voluntarily disclosing White House visitor logs. And in the last year, the Office of Government Ethics finalized rules updating the standards for ethical conduct and legal expense funds for executive branch employees.
    Protecting American democracy from malign finance: Just as we defend democracy around the world, the U.S. government is working to keep American democracy safe from foreign adversaries. Actions to curb money laundering in the United States can help reduce the ability of foreign and domestic actors to make illegal campaign contributions and evade U.S. election laws. President Biden has called on Congress to go even further by passing the DISCLOSE Act, which would curb the ability of foreign entities and special interests to use dark money loopholes to influence our elections.
    Revitalizing participation in the Open Government Partnership (OGP): The United States rejoined the Steering Committee of OGP – a platform for civil society and governments to forge joint commitments and learn from each other– and provided assistance for OGP’s work on anti-corruption. Domestically, the United States has turbocharged OGP implementation by creating the U.S. Open Government Secretariat at the General Services Administration, an Open Government Federal Advisory Committee, an Interagency Community of Practice – spanning federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and engaged with hundreds of stakeholders to exchange lessons and expand transparency, accountability, and public participation. The United States also launched the first-ever Request for Information to feed into the 6th U.S. OGP National Action Plan and announced development of a toolkit to help federal agencies more meaningfully engage with the public.
    Modernizing and coordinating U.S. government efforts to fight corruption
    Institutionalizing anti-corruption as an enduring priority: Over the past four years, Departments and Agencies have made substantial organizational improvements to elevate corruption concerns. For example:
    The State Department’s new Office of the Coordinator on Global Anti-Corruption leads the integration of anti-corruption priorities into bilateral and other policy processes, conducts targeted diplomatic engagements, and drives strategic planning, including through the Department’s senior-level Anti-Corruption Policy Board. In the past year, the Office jumpstarted implementation of the Combating Global Corruption Act and completed an analysis of anti-corruption assistance to inform future State Department decision-making.
    USAID’s new Anti-Corruption Center, within the newly established Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, serves as a hub of technical expertise and thought leadership – driving the integration of corruption considerations across USAID’s portfolio, supporting USAID Missions in developing localized approaches, managing a suite of programming focused on transnational corruption, and using its convening power and policy insights to forge strategic partnerships. Since 2022, USAID has released its first-ever Anti-Corruption Policy, which outlines a cross-sectoral approach to constraining opportunities for corruption, raising the costs of corruption, and incentivizing integrity – plus a host of tools to drive uptake across USAID.
    FBI’s International Corruption Unit expanded an agreement with the State Department to deploy six regional anti-corruption advisors to strategic locations around the world, where they organize regional working groups with local law enforcement officials, provide case-base mentorship, and facilitate coordination with the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre.

    Expanded interagency capacity has been complemented by the National Security Council’s establishment of a dedicated Director for Anti-Corruption position, for the first time, to ensure whole-of-government coordination and advance anti-corruption within key policy processes.
    Leading in multilateral fora: The United States has regained its leadership role in the international bodies that shape anti-corruption norms globally and can sustain momentum across time. In particular, the United States stepped into the presidency of the UN Convention against Corruption Conference of States Parties (UNCAC COSP), proudly hosting in December 2023 thousands of stakeholders in Atlanta, Georgia, led by the U.S. Representative to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield. As part of its commitment to championing the role of non-governmental actors in the fight against corruption, the United States facilitated record civil society participation in UNCAC working group meetings, hosted the first UNCAC Private Sector Forum, and supported inclusive implementation of UNCAC commitments in Latin America, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. The United States also participated in several peer reviews of our own anti-corruption practices over the last three years, and proudly made these results public. Alongside these multilateral fora, we convened the Global Forum on Asset Recovery action series to accelerate practitioner cooperation across the United States, Algeria, Honduras, Iraq, Moldova, Nigeria, Seychelles, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and Zambia.
    Understanding corruption dynamics: The Intelligence Community developed and disseminated new resources to bolster intelligence prioritization, collection and analysis on corrupt actors and their networks. USAID commissioned research on topics like countering corruption through social and behavioral change and State initiated an interagency anti-corruption learning agenda and a small grants program to support it.
    Deepening external partnerships: The United States convened a series of coordination meetings with other bilateral donors and philanthropies in order to harmonize our anti-corruption approaches and galvanized anti-corruption resources across the donor community through the Integrity for Development campaign. USAID’s Countering Transnational Corruption Grand Challenge for Development brought together technologists, businesses, activists, and others to collaboratively address concrete corruption challenges.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Banking: Inflation decreases to 1.5 percent in September 2024

    Source: Bank of Botswana

    Headline inflation decreased significantly from 3.9 percent in August to 1.5 percent in September 2024, breaching the lower bound of the medium-term objective range of 3 – 6 percent, and was notably lower than the 3.2 percent recorded in September 2023. The decrease in inflation between August and September 2024 was mainly due to the base effects associated with the increase in domestic fuel prices on 13 September 2023, which added 1.31 percentage points to headline inflation. Furthermore, inflation fell due to the reduction in domestic fuel prices effected on 11 September 2024, which subtracted 0.8 percentage points from headline inflation, as well as the deceleration in the rate of annual price change for most categories of goods and services.  Inflation for domestic tradeables increased from 4.1 percent to 4.3 percent between August and September 2024, due to the broad-based increase in food prices. However, inflation for imported tradeables decreased sharply from 5.2 percent to -0.2 percent during the same period, mainly on account of base effects associated with the upward adjustment of domestic fuel prices in September 2023 and the downward adjustment in domestic fuel prices in September 2024. As a result, all tradeables inflation decreased from 4.9 percent to 0.9 percent between August and September 2024. Inflation for non-tradeables declined slightly from 2.5 percent to 2.4 percent in the same period.

    Similarly, the 16 percent trimmed mean inflation and inflation excluding administered prices decreased from 3.7 percent and 3.2 percent to 1.5 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively, between August and September 2024.

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: African Development Bank Group Appoints Moono Mupotola as Deputy Director General for Southern Africa

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast, October 16, 2024/APO Group/ —

    The African Development Bank Group (www.AfDB.org) has appointed Moono Mupotola, as Deputy Director General for the Southern Africa Regional Development, Integration and BusinessDelivery Office, effective 16th October 2024. 

    Mupotola, a Zambian national, brings over 25 years of development experience across Africa to her new role. Her expertise spans infrastructure development, trade and regional integration. Since December 2020, until her appointment, she served as the Bank’s Country Manager for Zimbabwe where she has been instrumental in the Bank’s support for the country’s re-engagement with the international community and in its efforts to address outstanding debt and arrears obligations. 

    Mupotola’s career at the African Development Bank began in 2009, when she was appointed Division Manager for Regional Integration and Trade. She was appointed Director of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Regional Integration and Trade in 2015, and Director of Regional Integration Coordination Office in 2018. 

    Her oversight of the Lusophone Compact, a program supporting the private sector in six Portugues-speaking African countries, demonstrated her commitment to advancing regional integration. She also initiated several vital programs, including the Bank’s Africa Trade Fund, the Visa Openness Index, and the Regional Integration Index with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union Commission. 

    Mupotola managed the African Development Fund’s Regional Operations Envelope and oversaw the Bank’s regional project preparation facility. She led the Bank’s trade and regional integration agenda by supporting research, infrastructure projects, capacity-building programs and the reform of regulations and policies in regional member countries. 

    Before joining the African Development Bank Group, Mupotola held several senior positions. These included Regional Policy Specialist for the Food and Agriculture Organization in Zimbabwe, Trade Specialist at the Southern African Development Community Trade Hub in Botswana and Zimbabwe, and Division Head of Trade and Marketing at the Ministry of Agriculture in Namibia. She also served as a Researcher at the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit and a Banker at Zambia National Commercial Bank. 

    Mupotola holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics from Bennington College, Vermont, United States of America and an MPhil in Development and Sociology from Cambridge University, United Kingdom.  

    Commenting on her appointment, she said: “I am deeply honored by this opportunity and grateful to President Adesina for his trust and confidence in me. The role of Deputy Director General for the Southern Africa Regional Development, Integration and Business Delivery Office is challenging and exciting. I look forward to working efficiently with our teams and stakeholders to deliver on the Bank’s vision and High 5 priorities for sustainable development.” 

    Dr. Akinwumi A. Adesina, President of the African Development Bank Group, stated: “I am delighted to appoint Mrs. Moono Mupotola as Deputy Director General for the Southern Africa Regional Development, Integration and Business Delivery Office. Moono has extensive experience in regional operations, having served previously as Director of Regional Operations. She was subsequently assigned to Zimbabwe as Country Manager. Moono has demonstrated exceptional leadership, diplomatic acumen and strong execution capacity in working with the Government of Zimbabwe and all the development partners in advancing the structured dialogues for the arrears clearance for Zimbabwe, as well as major reforms. Her astute leadership and experience and in-depth knowledge of the countries in the Southern Africa region will significantly advance the work and partnerships with the African Development Bank Group in the region.” 

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Iranian Cyber Actors’ Brute Force and Credential Access Activity Compromises Critical Infrastructure Organizations

    Source: US Department of Homeland Security

    Summary

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE), the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to warn network defenders of Iranian cyber actors’ use of brute force and other techniques to compromise organizations across multiple critical infrastructure sectors, including the healthcare and public health (HPH), government, information technology, engineering, and energy sectors. The actors likely aim to obtain credentials and information describing the victim’s network that can then be sold to enable access to cybercriminals.

    Since October 2023, Iranian actors have used brute force, such as password spraying, and multifactor authentication (MFA) ‘push bombing’ to compromise user accounts and obtain access to organizations. The actors frequently modified MFA registrations, enabling persistent access. The actors performed discovery on the compromised networks to obtain additional credentials and identify other information that could be used to gain additional points of access. The authoring agencies assess the Iranian actors sell this information on cybercriminal forums to actors who may use the information to conduct additional malicious activity.

    This advisory provides the actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs). The information is derived from FBI engagements with entities impacted by this malicious activity.

    The authoring agencies recommend critical infrastructure organizations follow the guidance provided in the Mitigations section. At a minimum, organizations should ensure all accounts use strong passwords and register a second form of authentication.

    Download the PDF version of this report:

    For a downloadable list of IOCs, see:

    Technical Details

    Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 15. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section in Appendix A for a table of the actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.

    Overview of Activity

    The actors likely conduct reconnaissance operations to gather victim identity [T1589] information. Once obtained, the actors gain persistent access to victim networks frequently via brute force [T1110]. After gaining access, the actors use a variety of techniques to further gather credentials, escalate privileges, and gain information about the entity’s systems and network. The actors also move laterally and download information that could assist other actors with access and exploitation.

    Initial Access and Persistence

    The actors use valid user and group email accounts [T1078], frequently obtained via brute force such as password spraying [T1110.003] although other times via unknown methods, to obtain initial access to Microsoft 365, Azure [T1078.004], and Citrix systems [T1133]. In some cases where push notification-based MFA was enabled, the actors send MFA requests to legitimate users seeking acceptance of the request. This technique—bombarding users with mobile phone push notifications until the user either approves the request by accident or stops the notifications— is known as “MFA fatigue” or “push bombing” [T1621].

    Once the threat actors gain access to an account, they frequently register their devices with MFA to protect their access to the environment via the valid account:

    • In two confirmed compromises, the actors leveraged a compromised user’s open registration for MFA [T1556.006] to register the actor’s own device [T1098.005] to access the environment.
    • In another confirmed compromise, the actors used a self-service password reset (SSPR) tool associated with a public facing Active Directory Federation Service (ADFS) to reset the accounts with expired passwords [T1484.002] and then registered MFA through Okta for compromised accounts without MFA already enabled [T1556] [T1556.006].

    The actors frequently conduct their activity using a virtual private network (VPN) service [T1572]. Several of the IP addresses in the actors’ malicious activity originate from exit nodes tied to the Private Internet Access VPN service.

    Lateral Movement

    The actors use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement [T1021.001]. In one instance, the actors used Microsoft Word to open PowerShell to launch the RDP binary mstsc.exe [T1202].

    Credential Access

    The actors likely use open-source tools and methodologies to gather more credentials. The actors performed Kerberos Service Principal Name (SPN) enumeration of several service accounts and received Kerberos tickets [T1558.003]. In one instance, the actors used the Active Directory (AD) Microsoft Graph Application Program Interface (API) PowerShell application likely to perform a directory dump of all AD accounts. Also, the actors imported the tool [T1105] DomainPasswordSpray.ps1, which is openly available on GitHub [T1588.002], likely to conduct password spraying. The actors also used the command Cmdkey /list, likely to display usernames and credentials [T1555].

    Privilege Escalation

    In one instance, the actors attempted impersonation of the domain controller, likely by exploiting Microsoft’s Netlogon (also known as ”Zerologon”) privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) [T1068].

    Discovery

    The actors leverage living off the land (LOTL) to gain knowledge about the target systems and internal networks. The actors used the following Windows command-line tools to gather information about domain controllers [T1018], trusted domains [T1482], lists of domain administrators, and enterprise administrators [T1087.002] [T1069.002] [T1069.003]:

    • Nltest /dclist
    • Nltest /domain_trusts
    • Nltest /domain_trusts/all_trusts
    • Net group “Enterprise admins” /domain
    • Net group “Domain admins” /domain

    Next, the actors used the following Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) query in PowerShell [T1059.001]to search the AD for computer display names, operating systems, descriptions, and distinguished names [T1082].

                                               $i=0
                                               $D= [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()
                                               $L='LDAP://' . $D
                                               $D = [ADSI]$L
                                               $Date = $((Get-Date).AddDays(-90).ToFileTime())
                                               $str = '(&(objectcategory=computer)(operatingSystem=*serv*)(|(lastlogon>='+$Date+')(lastlogontimestamp>='+$Date+')))'
                                               $s = [adsisearcher]$str
                                               $s.searchRoot = $L.$D.distinguishedName
                                               $s.PropertiesToLoad.Add('cn') > $Null
                                               $s.PropertiesToLoad.Add('operatingsystem') > $Null
                                               $s.PropertiesToLoad.Add('description') > $Null
                                               $s.PropertiesToLoad.Add('distinguishedName') > $Null
                                               Foreach ($CA in $s.FindAll()) {
                                                             Write-Host $CA.Properties.Item('cn')
                                                             $CA.Properties.Item('operatingsystem')
                                                             $CA. Properties.Item('description')
                                                             $CA.Properties.Item('distinguishedName')
                                                             $i++
                                               }
                                               Write-host Total servers: $i

    Command and Control

    On one occasion, using msedge.exe, the actors likely made outbound connections to Cobalt Strike Beacon command and control (C2) infrastructure [T1071.001].

    Exfiltration and Collection

    In a couple instances, while logged in to victim accounts, the actors downloaded files related to gaining remote access to the organization and to the organization’s inventory [T1005], likely exfiltrating the files to further persist in the victim network or to sell the information online.

    Detection

    To detect brute force activity, the authoring agencies recommend reviewing authentication logs for system and application login failures of valid accounts and looking for multiple, failed authentication attempts across all accounts.

    To detect the use of compromised credentials in combination with virtual infrastructure, the authoring agencies recommend the following steps:

    • Look for “impossible logins,” such as suspicious logins with changing usernames, user agent strings, and IP address combinations or logins where IP addresses do not align to the user’s expected geographic location.
    • Look for one IP used for multiple accounts, excluding expected logins.
    • Look for “impossible travel.” Impossible travel occurs when a user logs in from multiple IP addresses with significant geographic distance (i.e., a person could not realistically travel between the geographic locations of the two IP addresses during the period between the logins). Note: Implementing this detection opportunity can result in false positives if legitimate users apply VPN solutions before connecting into networks.
    • Look for MFA registrations with MFA in unexpected locales or from unfamiliar devices.
    • Look for processes and program execution command-line arguments that may indicate credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the ntds.dit file from a domain controller.
    • Look for suspicious privileged account use after resetting passwords or applying user account mitigations.
    • Look for unusual activity in typically dormant accounts.
    • Look for unusual user agent strings, such as strings not typically associated with normal user activity, which may indicate bot activity.

    Mitigations

    The authoring agencies recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve organizations’ cybersecurity posture based on the actors’ TTPs described in this advisory. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA. The CPGs, which are organized to align to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, are a subset of cybersecurity practices, aimed at meaningfully reducing risks to both critical infrastructure operations and the American people. These voluntary CPGs strive to help small- and medium-sized organizations kick-start their cybersecurity efforts by prioritizing investment in a limited number of essential actions with high-impact security outcomes. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.

    • Review IT helpdesk password management related to initial passwords, password resets for user lockouts, and shared accounts. IT helpdesk password procedures may not align to company policy for user verification or password strength, creating a security gap. Avoid common passwords (e.g. “Spring2024” or “Password123!”).
    • Disable user accounts and access to organizational resources for departing staff [CPG 2.D]. Disabling accounts can minimize system exposure, removing options actors can leverage for entry into the system. Similarly, create new user accounts as close as possible to an employee’s start date.
    • Implement phishing-resistant MFA [CPG 2.H]. See CISA’s resources Phishing-Resistant Multifactor Authentication and More than a Password for additional information on strengthening user credentials.
    • Continuously review MFA settings to ensure coverage over all active, internet-facing protocols to ensure no exploitable services are exposed [CPG 2.W].
    • Provide basic cybersecurity training to users [CPG 2.I] covering concepts such as:
      • Detecting unsuccessful login attempts [CPG 2.G].
      • Having users deny MFA requests they have not generated.
      • Ensuring users with MFA-enabled accounts have MFA set up appropriately.
    • Ensure password policies align with the latest NIST Digital Identity Guidelines.
      • Meeting the minimum password strength [CPG 2.B] by creating a password using 8-64 nonstandard characters and long passphrases, when possible.
    • Disable the use of RC4 for Kerberos authentication.

    These mitigations apply to critical infrastructure entities across sectors.

    The authoring agencies also recommend software manufacturers incorporate secure by design principles and tactics into their software development practices to protect their customers against actors using compromised credentials, thereby strengthening the security posture of their customers.  For more information on secure by design, see CISA’s Secure by Design webpage and joint guide.

    Validate Security Controls

    In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring agencies recommend exercising, testing, and validating organization security programs against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

    To get started:

    1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 1 to Table 12).
    2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
    3. Test your technologies against the technique.
    4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
    5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
    6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

    The authoring agencies recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

    Contact Information

    Organizations are encouraged to report suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to:

    • CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center [report@cisa.gov or 1-844-Say-CISA (1-844-729-2472)] or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.
    • For NSA cybersecurity guidance inquiries, contact CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov.

    Disclaimer

    The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The authoring agencies do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the authoring agencies.

    Intrusion events connected to this Iranian group may also include a different set of cyber actors–likely the third-party actors who purchased access from the Iranian group via cybercriminal forums or other channels. As a result, some TTPs and IOCs noted in this advisory may be tied to these third-party actors, not the Iranian actors. The TTPs and IOCs are in the advisory to provide recipients the most complete picture of malicious activity that may be observed on compromised networks. However, exercise caution if formulating attribution assessments based solely on matching TTPs and IOCs.

    Version History

    October 2, 2024: Initial version.

    Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

    See Tables 1–12 for all referenced actors’ tactics and techniques in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

    Table 1: Reconnaissance
    Technique Title  ID Use
    Gather Victim Identity Information T1589 The actors likely gathered victim information.
    Table 2: Resource Development
    Technique Title  ID Use
    Obtain Capabilities: Tool T1588.002 The actors obtained a password spray tool through an open-source repository.
    Table 3: Initial Access
    Technique Title ID Use
    Valid Accounts T1078 The actors used password spraying to obtain valid user and group email account credentials, allowing them access to the network.
    Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts T1078.004 The actors used accounts hosted on Microsoft 365, Azure, and Okta cloud environments as additional methods for initial access.
    External Remote Services T1133 The actors exploited Citrix systems’ external-facing remote services as another method for gaining initial access to the system.
    Table 4: Execution
    Technique Title  ID Use
    Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 The actors used PowerShell commands to maintain and expand access.
    Table 5: Persistence
    Technique Title ID Use
    Account Manipulation: Device Registration T1098.005 The actors used PowerShell commands to maintain and expand access.
    Modify Authentication Process T1556 The actors used a public facing Active Directory Federation Service (ADFS) domain to reset the passwords of expired accounts.
    Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication T1556.006 The actors used an MFA bypass method, such as Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, providing the ability to modify or completely disable MFA defenses.
    Table 6: Privilege Escalation
    Technique Title ID Use
    Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1068 The actors attempted impersonation of the domain controller likely by exploiting CVE-2020-1472, Microsoft’s Netlogon Privilege Escalation vulnerability.
    Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Trust Modification T1484.002 The actors leveraged a public-facing ADFS password reset tool to reactivate inactive accounts, allowing the actor to authenticate and enroll their devices as any user in the AD managed by the victim tenant.
    Table 7: Defense Evasion
    Technique Title ID Use
    Indirect Command Execution T1202 The actors attempted impersonation of the Domain Controller likely by exploiting CVE-2020-1472, Microsoft’s Netlogon Privilege Escalation vulnerability.
    Table 8: Credential Access
    Technique Title ID Use
    Brute Force: Password Spraying T1110.003 The actors targeted applications, including Single Sign-on (SSO) Microsoft Office 365, using brute force password sprays and imported the tool DomainPasswordSpray.ps1.
    Credentials from Password Stores T1555 The actors used the command Cmdkey /list likely to display usernames and credentials.
    Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting T1558.003 The actors performed Kerberos Service Principal Name (SPN) enumeration of several service accounts and received Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) tickets.
    Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation T1621 The actors sent MFA requests to legitimate users.
    Table 9: Discovery
    Technique Title ID Use
    Remote System Discovery T1018 The actors used LOTL to return information about domain controllers.
    Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups T1069.002 The actors used LOTL to return lists of domain administrators and enterprise administrators.
    Permission Groups Discovery: Cloud Groups T1069.003 The actors used LOTL to return lists of domain administrators and enterprise administrators.
    System Information Discovery  T1082 The actors were able to query the AD to discover display names, operating systems, descriptions, and distinguished names from the computer.
    Account Discovery: Domain Account T1087.002 The actors used LOTL to return lists of domain administrators and enterprise administrators.
    Domain Trust Discovery T1482 The actors used LOTL to return information about trusted domains.
    Table 10: Lateral Movement
    Technique Title  ID Use
    Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol T1021.001 The actors used Microsoft Word to open PowerShell to launch RDP binary mstsc.exe.
    Table 11: Collection
    Technique Title ID Use
    Data from Local System T1005 The actors downloaded files related to remote access methods and the organization’s inventory.
    Table 12: Command and Control
    Technique Title ID Use
    Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001 The actors used msedge.exe to make outbound connections likely to Cobalt Strike Beacon C2 infrastructure.
    Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 The actors imported a tool from GitHub and used it to conduct password spraying.
    Protocol Tunneling T1572 The actors frequently conduct targeting using a virtual private network (VPN).

    Appendix B: Indicators of Compromise

    See Tables 13 to 15 for IOCs obtained from FBI investigations.

    Table 13: Malicious Files Associated with Iranian Cyber Actors
    Hash Description
    1F96D15B26416B2C7043EE7172357AF3AFBB002A Associated with malicious activity.
    3D3CDF7CFC881678FEBCAFB26AE423FE5AA4EFEC Associated with malicious activity.

    Disclaimer: The authoring organizations recommend network defenders investigate or vet IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking, as many cyber actors are known to change IP addresses, sometimes daily, and some IP addresses may host valid domains. Many of the IP addresses provided below are assessed VPN nodes and as such are not exclusive to the Iranian actors’ use. The authoring organizations do not recommend blocking these IP addresses based solely on their inclusion in this JCSA. The authoring organizations recommend using the below IP addresses to search for previous activity the actors may have conducted against networks. If positive hits for these IP addresses are identified, the authoring organizations recommend making an independent determination if the observed activity aligns with the TTPs outlined in the JCSA. The timeframes included in the table reflect the timeframe the actors likely used the IPs.

    Table 14: Network Indicators
    IP Address Date Range
    95.181.234.12 01/30/2024 to 02/07/2024
    95.181.234.25 01/30/2024 to 02/07/2024
    173.239.232.20 10/06/2023 to 12/19/2023
    172.98.71.191 10/15/2023 to 11/27/2023
    102.129.235.127 10/21/2023 to 10/22/2023
    188.126.94.60 10/22/2023 to 01/12/2024
    149.40.50.45 10/26/2023
    181.214.166.59 10/26/2023
    212.102.39.212 10/26/2023
    149.57.16.134 10/26/2023 to 10/27/2023
    149.57.16.137 10/26/2023 to 10/27/2023
    102.129.235.186 10/29/2023 to 11/08/2023
    46.246.8.138 10/31/2023 to 01/26/2024
    149.57.16.160 11/08/2023
    149.57.16.37 11/08/2023
    46.246.8.137 11/17/2023 to 01/25/2024
    212.102.57.29 11/19/2023 to 01/17/2024
    46.246.8.82 11/22/2023 to 01/28/2024
    95.181.234.15 11/26/2023 to 02/07/2024
    45.88.97.225 11/27/2023 to 02/11/2024
    84.239.45.17 12/04/2023 to 12/07/2023
    46.246.8.104 12/07/2023 to 02/07/2024
    37.46.113.206 12/07/2023
    46.246.3.186 12/07/2023 to 12/09/2023
    46.246.8.141 12/07/2023 to 02/10/2024
    46.246.8.17 12/09/2023 to 01/09/2024
    37.19.197.182 12/15/2023
    154.16.192.38 12/25/2023 to 01/24/2024
    102.165.16.127 12/27/2023 to 01/28/2024
    46.246.8.47 12/29/2023 to 01/29/2024
    46.246.3.225 12/30/2023 to 02/06/2024
    46.246.3.226 12/31/2023 to 02/03/2024
    46.246.3.240 12/31/2023 to 02/06/2024
    191.101.217.10 01/05/2024
    102.129.153.182 01/08/2024
    46.246.3.196 01/08/2024
    102.129.152.60 01/09/2024
    156.146.60.74 01/10/2024
    191.96.227.113 01/10/2024
    191.96.227.122 01/10/2024
    181.214.166.132 01/11/2024
    188.126.94.57 01/11/2024 to 01/13/2024
    154.6.13.144 01/13/2024 to 01/24/2024
    154.6.13.151 01/13/2024 to 01/28/2024
    188.126.94.166 01/15/2024
    89.149.38.204 01/18/2024
    46.246.8.67 01/20/2024
    46.246.8.53 01/22/2024
    154.16.192.37 01/24/2024
    191.96.150.14 01/24/2024
    191.96.150.96 01/24/2024
    46.246.8.10 01/24/2024
    84.239.25.13 01/24/2024
    154.6.13.139 01/26/2024
    191.96.106.33 01/26/2024
    191.96.227.159 01/26/2024
    149.57.16.150 01/27/2024
    191.96.150.21 01/27/2024
    46.246.8.84 01/27/2024
    95.181.235.8 01/27/2024
    191.96.227.102 01/27/2024 to 01/28/2024
    46.246.122.185 01/28/2024
    146.70.102.3 01/29/2024 to 01/30/2024
    46.246.3.233 01/30/2024 to 02/15/2024
    46.246.3.239 01/30/2024 to 02/15/2024
    188.126.89.35 02/03/2024
    46.246.3.223 02/03/2024
    46.246.3.245 02/05/2024 to 02/06/2024
    191.96.150.50 02/09/2024
    Table 15: Devices
    Device Type Description
    Samsung Galaxy A71 (SM-A715F) Registered with MFA
    Samsung SM-G998B Registered with MFA
    Samsung SM-M205F Registered with MFA

    MIL Security OSI –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Secretary-General’s remarks to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly on the Proposed Programme Budget for 2025

    Source: United Nations secretary general

    Excellencies, Distinguished delegates,

    I welcome this opportunity to introduce the proposed programme budget for 2025.

    I do so in a context of a multiplicity of challenges and with a strong sense of urgency.

    In a context of major global shocks, the United Nations is more needed than ever — with our unmatched convening power.

    The Pact for the Future, the Global Digital Compact and the Declaration on Future Generations represent a commitment towards updating and reforming international cooperation to make it more networked, effective, fair and inclusive.

    The 2025 programme budget proposal reflects in many ways, the priorities set out in these landmark agreements.

    The proposal renews our commitment to deliver on our mandates to advance peace, sustainable development, and human rights.

    At the same time, we will continue to work to cement our reforms, fostering a culture of continuous improvement.

    In the new digital age, the United Nations has an essential part to play.

    We reached a milestone with the Global Digital Compact which includes the first truly universal agreement on the international governance of Artificial Intelligence with the UN at its centre. 

    Madam Chair, distinguished delegates,

    In December 2022, the General Assembly lifted the trial period and formalized the change to an annual budget period.

    The format of the programme budget has stabilized. The programme plans reflect our increased results-orientation.
    Our 350 results frameworks continue to move further towards demonstrating the impact and positive change of our work on the ground. 

    The planned targets have become more ambitious.

    More than 65 percent of quantitative planned targets are now aiming to achieve a 10 percent or more increase in performance. This is an increase from less than 30 percent in the 2018-19 biennium, 45 percent for 2023, and 60 percent for 2024.

    We have reduced duplication in the strategies and deliverables, while maintaining the same level of programmatic information. 

    Every programme manager is expected to scrutinize every dollar spent and planned to be spent.

    And they must constantly review and adjust programmatic activities to achieve planned results.

    This will allow us to optimize resources for mandate delivery and focus even more effectively on results.

    Let me now turn to the overall resource requirements.

    To fully implement our mandates, we will require a total of $3.6 billion in 2025.

    Excluding Special Political Missions, this includes a total of 10,494 posts, representing a net increase of 115 posts required to implement new or strengthen existing mandates.

    The proposed budget also includes $711 million for the continuation of 36 Special Political Missions for 2025. 

    This reflects a decrease of $31 million from last year primarily because of the discontinuation of the field mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), and our investigative team to promote accountability for the crimes committed in Iraq by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD). 

    In line with the usual practice, you will consider later in the session additional proposals for construction, revised estimates and programme budget implications resulting from new or revised mandates. These include revised estimates in support of the implementation of the Pact of the Future, and for UNRWA.

    We continue to make every effort to find efficiencies while also recognizing that any further cuts to support departments risk jeopardizing policy, operational, or communication support to our programmatic work.

    Allow me to highlight five specific elements of our 2025 programme budget proposals:

    First, we propose to continue our investment in sustainable development.

    We propose an increase of approximately $4.5 million, the sixth consecutive annual increase for the development pillar.

    The Regular Programme of Technical Cooperation – or RPTC — will be a key recipient. 

    The increases will further strengthen the direct support provided to governments to help advance their development efforts.

    With the proposed increase of $2 million, resources for the RPTC will have grown by more than 45% since 2019.

    The proposed increase in the RPTC will be split evenly between all entities. 

    However, we propose an additional $0.5 million for the Economic Commission for Africa for technical assistance and advice to Member States on the 2030 Agenda and the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

    Our proposal also includes an increase of $1 million for the Development Account to enhance and expand targeted, country-level capacity development support and to broaden the dissemination of the projects’ results to more countries.

    We also seek increases of $0.6 million for the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa and $0.75 million for the Office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States.

    Further, we want to strengthen the UN development system through structural changes to help ensure sufficient and predictable funding — and enhanced accountability.

    The Resident Coordinator system has faced a chronic funding shortfall since day one.

    A sustainable and predictable funding mechanism, through partial financing from the regular budget, is essential. 

    My proposal for assessed funding is under review by this Committee.

    It is important to reach a decision on this topic.

    Member States’ expectations of the RC system are growing.

    The effects of the funding gap are felt every day.  For example, the recruitment for 78 posts across 52 countries has been suspended.

    We also seek to put the small System-Wide Evaluation Office on a firmer footing with regular budget funding.

    This will further enhance transparency and ensure effective, independent evaluation of the UN development system at the country level – the raison d’etre of the UNSDG System-Wide Evaluation Office.

    Second, human rights.

    The proposal includes an additional $8.3 million to support the work of the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic and ensure its functioning at full capacity in 2025. 

    We are also seeking an increase of $8 million for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for more effective implementation of mandates, especially at the regional level.

    Additionally, based on the recommendation of the ACABQ and the guidance from the General Assembly, we have included resource requirements that will arise from anticipated mandate renewals by the Human Rights Council later in the year.  

    By presenting these resource requirements now rather than separately later in the session, Member States have a more complete picture of the resources being sought for the Office. This will also reduce fragmentation and increase transparency. 

    Let me emphasize that this consolidation, which amounts to $28.8 million, does not represent an increase in resources – only a change in presentation.

    Third, boosting support for the unprecedented humanitarian challenges in Gaza, with approximately $3.5 million in additional resources.

    This includes an increase of nearly $2.5 million for UNRWA which complements the additional $30 million approved for 2024.

    UNRWA is a lifeline for Palestine refugees, and a crucial factor for regional stability.

    Fourth, advancing peace and security. 

    This includes an increase of $2.5 million for disarmament, including the establishment of 9 posts to implement activities requested by the General Assembly.

    We are also seeking an increase of $1 million for the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process to intensify its vital work.

    Following the landmark decision of the General Assembly, we will address persistent funding challenges of the Peacebuilding Fund due to its exclusive reliance on voluntary contributions — by approving a $50 million dollar grant for the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility of the Peacebuilding Fund starting in 2025.

    And fifth, strengthening our capacities in investigation and ethics. 
    We are seeking an approximately $2 million increase, for the creation of three temporary positions for the Ethics Office and ten for the Office of Internal Oversight Services.

    Madam Chair, distinguished delegates,

    With the structural aspects of the reforms now well consolidated, it is imperative to keep working together to achieve the cultural change for results.

    Our 2025 budget continues to strive towards our shared vision for UN 2.0, through a forward-thinking workforce culture, empowered by cutting-edge skills.

    Gender equality and geographical representation remain priorities.

    We are working nonstop to ensure that our workforce reflects the membership of the United Nations.

    The General Assembly decision to increase the number of geographical posts has enabled us to reduce the total countries that were un- or under-represented and over-represented. 120 countries are now within range compared to 103 in December 2023.  

    We are revising our strategy for equitable geographical distribution to focus on attracting more staff from countries that are un-or under-represented.  

    Through our RC system and UN Information Centres, we have launched targeted outreach strategies in those countries, namely in many of the developing countries that are under-represented. 

    In the same vein, we strive to expand opportunities for recruitment from as wide a geographical basis as possible for all posts.

    All these efforts are yielding results.  For example, at the start of the UN development system reform, 41% of Resident Coordinators were from the global South.  Today, this number has increased to 57%.

    We have successfully maintained gender parity at senior levels and, based on current projections, we will be able to reach parity at an Organizational level before 2028.

    But we must do more to achieve parity at every entity and every level.

    We are also working on the next phase of our system-wide disability inclusion strategy and making progress in our efforts to combat racism and racial discrimination at work.

    Madam Chair, distinguished delegates,

    The proposal before you reflects our ambition to respond to new threats and opportunities.

    For us to deliver on our promises, Member States must also honour their commitments to this Organization.

    Ultimately, the effectiveness of programme delivery and use of financial resources in 2025 will depend on the availability of cash.

    I hope that we can end the current trend of declining liquidity.

    The Organization started this year with only about $67 million in cash, compared to $700 million last year, making it extremely vulnerable to adverse changes in payment patterns of assessed contributions.

    On top of that, the Organization had to return $114 million as credits to Member States as part of the 2024 assessments, which meant that we would collect less than the budget approved for 2024, even if all Member States pay in full in 2024.

    The depletion of the regular budget liquidity reserves at the end of 2023 therefore necessitated imposing stringent cash-conservation measures from the very beginning of 2024. 

    Unless the liquidity reserves are replenished fully at the end of this year, cash conservation measures are again likely to constrain budget implementation in 2025. 

    This is why I have proposed that the General Assembly temporarily suspend the return of credits for 2023 against the 2025 assessment. 

    The credits will be held in a reserve and released to Member States as soon as conditions improve.  

    This is critical to both minimize the risk of negative impact on programme delivery and the ability to fulfill even non-discretionary commitments to personnel and third-party partners in 2025. 

    I once again urge Member States to meet their financial obligations in full and on time.

    I thank Member States that have paid in advance or earlier than before, and have made adjustments to their internal processes to continue to pay earlier.

    We will keep monitoring the situation and reach out to Member States to pay in full and inform us of their plans so we can adapt our spending based as needed.

    However, when programme delivery is repeatedly constrained by liquidity, past spending patterns become less reliable indicators of the real needs of the Organization.

    Madam Chair, distinguished delegates,

    The outcome of the Summit of the Future has opened pathways to new possibilities and opportunities towards securing a peaceful and livable future for everyone on our planet.

    Against this backdrop, I look forward to your support for my 2025 programme budget proposal.

    I welcome this opportunity to engage with you today and assure you that my senior managers will continue to support your deliberations on these proposals.

    Thank you.
     

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: World Food Day (October 16, 2024)

    Source: Republic of France in English
    The Republic of France has issued the following statement:

    On this World Food Day, France reaffirms its commitment to the fight against every form of food insecurity and malnutrition.

    In 2023, 281.6 million people faced high levels of food insecurity, 24 million more than in 2022. One hundred fifty million children under the age of five are suffering from delayed growth and 37 million are underweight.

    France is fully engaged in the fight against malnutrition, which affects health and education systems and economies worldwide.

    On March 27 and 28, 2025, Paris will host the Nutrition for Growth (N4G) summit, which will bring together members of the entire international nutrition community (governments, international organizations, civil society, companies, scientists) to undertake concrete, ambitious commitments to help combat all forms of malnutrition.

    In light of worsening food crises in conflict zones, particularly in Gaza and Sudan, France remains fully mobilized through financial support for international organizations and food aid projects. France is also the leading funder of the Grain from Ukraine program, which was launched in 2022 as a response to the impact of the Russian aggression on global food insecurity in seven countries : Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, Palestine, Djibouti, Malawi and Zambia.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Fostering security-related scientific cooperation with Romania through NATO’s SPS Programme

    Source: NATO

    On Wednesday (16 October 2024), members of NATO’s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) team were in Bucharest to announce an upcoming call for proposals on security-related scientific cooperation. The new call invites researchers from Romania, as well as other NATO and partner nations, to submit proposals for collaborative research activities.

    The information day was also an opportunity to mark Romania’s twentieth anniversary in NATO and highlight how Romania’s scientific community has contributed to NATO over the years. Dignitaries and researchers alike gathered to mark past and current successes of cooperation through the Science for Peace and Security Programme.

    Thanks to one project, medical specialists have been able to use telemedicine to remotely assist during major disasters, and another SPS project helped build operational capabilities for civil protection in Mauritania. One of the current SPS activities involving Romania helps strengthen the Republic of Moldova’s capacity to respond to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) incidents.

    The SPS information day was co-organized with the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitalization and the Military Technical Academy of the Ministry of Defence of Romania. 

    MIL Security OSI –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Nuer people have a sacred connection to birds – it can guide conservation in Ethiopia and South Sudan

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abebayehu Aticho, PhD student, researcher and conservationist, Jimma University

    The Nuer are a large pastoralist community living in western Ethiopia and South Sudan in east Africa. They rely on livestock keeping and have special beliefs and customs about how to live with nature. These are passed down from parents to children through the telling of stories.

    Uncommonly for east African pastoralists, the Nuer live in an expansive, low-lying floodplain. This Gambella region is shaped by the convergence of several rivers originating in the Ethiopian highlands. Its wetlands and lush greenery offer a unique habitat that supports both the Nuer and a wide variety of birds and other wildlife. The people have a centuries-old cultural connection with the local biodiversity.

    The Nuer are cattle herders who live in a region with many rivers. Peter Martell/AFP/Getty Images

    Our collaborative study involved Ethiopian and European scientists from diverse fields (such as ornithology, ethno-ornithology, biodiversity and nature conservation). We conducted interviews and 15 group discussions with Nuer people to understand their interaction with and knowledge of birds. The study included two districts and 400 households. We found a significant and seldom studied relationship with birds, which serve a range of purposes in Nuer life.

    Our study not only highlights the deep spiritual and cultural ties between the Nuer people and the avian world. It also underscores the importance of incorporating traditional ecological knowledge into contemporary conservation efforts.

    The Nuer’s relationship to birds can be a valuable model for sustainable human-wildlife interactions. It can contribute to the conservation of bird diversity and promote a more harmonious coexistence between humans and nature.

    The role of birds in Nuer life

    Ethiopia, known for its rich biodiversity, is home to 821 bird species and over 80 indigenous ethnic groups. Among these, the Nuer community stands out for its unique admiration of birds, viewing them as sacred beings.

    The Nuer use three interchangeable names for birds: gaatkuoth (sacred children of God), kuoth (bearers of spirit), and diit (symbols of human twins). These terms reflect spiritual beliefs and also influence cultural practices, such as naming twins after birds. This Nuer tradition connects the prolific nature of birds to human fertility.

    In our study, participants recognised 71 bird species as having unique cultural roles. The birds that live near Nuer villages have seven distinct uses. Ten species are used as bushmeat. Five are for traditional medicine. Eight are fish indicators – by meticulously observing species like the African fish eagle, African pygmy kingfisher, pied kingfisher or malachite kingfisher, people can identify areas with high fish populations.

    A flock of birds fly from the branches of trees in South Sudan. Ashraf Shazly/AFP/Getty Images

    Seven birds serve as omens – they signal potential dangers like the presence of wild animals. Three are used to create protective amulets. Three are used to indicate the change of seasons – for instance the return of migratory western yellow wagtails is a reliable sign that the sunny, dry season will be replacing the rainy, wet season. And 45 are hailed for their aesthetic beauty, often linked with a sense of place. The vibrant plumage, melodious songs and elegant flight patterns of birds like the black-crowned crane, blue-naped mousebird and purple heron create a spectacle that significantly enhances Nuer life.

    This intricate knowledge of birds is communal: over 90% of participants agreed on the uses of these bird species.

    Indigenous knowledge and sustainability

    One of the most striking things about the Nuer community is the sustainable practice embedded within their traditional systems. When birds are used as amulets, for example, only small, non-invasive parts of the bird, like feathers, are utilised. These are fashioned into necklaces or bracelets believed to offer protection from dangers like diseases. The birds are not killed or significantly harmed, which preserves their populations.

    A Nuer village. fabio lamanna/Getty

    There are strict limits on when and how birds can be used in Nuer society. The use of birds as bushmeat or for making traditional medicine is carefully controlled by elders and within family structures. Hunting is typically allowed only during severe food shortages. It’s often restricted to those in dire need, such as impoverished households. Families with a history of twins, who hold birds in special reverence, are not allowed to hunt them.

    These cultural practices help prevent overexploitation of bird species, conserving them for future generations. They ensure that the use of natural resources remains sustainable.

    It’s important to raise awareness about the conservation of birds, which are used for various purposes across Africa. Traditional medicine, bushmeat and the making of amulets has a direct impact on bird populations.

    Nuer traditions balance human needs with the preservation of bird life. Our study therefore offers a compelling case and model for the conservation of avian and indigenous cultural diversity in Africa.

    Why this matters

    It is, however, essential to acknowledge that the Nuer’s cultural practices are not immune to the pressures of modern society. As globalisation and development continue to encroach on traditional lands, the Nuer people will face increasing challenges in maintaining their sustainable practices.

    Threats such as habitat loss, climate change and illegal wildlife trading could jeopardise bird populations. In recent decades, the expansion of large-scale agriculture in the Gambella region has emerged as a driver of habitat loss and wildlife decline.

    A Nuer boy watches a flock of migrating birds. Peter Martell/AFP/Getty Images

    This makes the Nuer people’s traditional conservation practices even more relevant to future generations. By recognising and valuing their knowledge and practices, we can learn valuable lessons for broader conservation efforts.

    Indigenous territories, despite their relatively small size, often harbour extraordinary biodiversity. Recognising this, the United Nations’ Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework places indigenous-occupied areas among conservation priority areas at the forefront of biodiversity preservation strategies.

    It is crucial to help the Nuer community adapt to changing circumstances while preserving their cultural heritage and ensuring the sustainability of bird biodiversity.

    Changkuoth Puok Diet, a lecturer at Gambella University in Ethiopia, contributed to this article.

    – Nuer people have a sacred connection to birds – it can guide conservation in Ethiopia and South Sudan
    – https://theconversation.com/nuer-people-have-a-sacred-connection-to-birds-it-can-guide-conservation-in-ethiopia-and-south-sudan-239420

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: What is Temporary Protected Status? A global migration expert explains why the US offers some foreign nationals temporary protection

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Karen Jacobsen, Henry J. Leir Chair in Global Migration, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University

    Haitian students use mobile phones to record an exercise during an English class in Springfield, Ohio, on Sept. 13, 2024. Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images

    Former President Donald Trump and his running mate, U.S. Sen. JD Vance, have criticized the Biden administration’s decision to allow Haitian nationals who are in the U.S. to apply for permission to stay under a legal classification called Temporary Protected Status. Here is what this designation means and how it’s made:

    TPS permits foreign nationals who are already in the United States – even if they did not enter the country through an official or legal means – to remain for six, 12 or 18 months at a time if the situation in their home country is deemed too dangerous for them to return. Threats that prompt TPS designations include ongoing armed conflict, natural disasters, epidemics and other extraordinary and temporary conditions.

    The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security designates a foreign country for TPS when conditions there meet requirements spelled out in federal law. Once the secretary determines that the foreign country is safe for its nationals to return, their protected status expires and people who have been granted it are expected to return to their home country.

    Congress created TPS as part of the Immigration Act of 1990. Since then, administrations have used it to protect thousands of people from dozens of countries. The first nations to be designated, in March 1991, were Kuwait, Lebanon and Liberia.

    As of March 2024, there were 863,880 people from 16 countries under Temporary Protected Status in the U.S. Another 486,418 people had initial or renewal applications pending. An estimated 316,000 people may also be eligible under two new extensions since that date.

    TPS beneficiaries may not be detained by federal officials over their immigration status or deported from the United States. They can obtain work permits and apply for authorization to travel outside the U.S. and return to it.

    People who receive TPS don’t automatically become legal permanent residents. But they can petition for an adjustment of their immigration status, such as applying for permanent residency, a student visa or asylum. Applying for a change of immigration status does not necessarily mean their application will be approved.

    Humanitarian measures

    TPS is not the only tool administrations can use to protect people from countries facing disaster or conflict.

    For example, a Haitian person currently living in the U.S. is eligible for TPS under a designation that lasts through Feb. 3, 2026. In contrast, a Haitian who travels through Mexico and applies for entry to the U.S. at the border is not likely to be admitted.

    However, there is a third possibility for Haitians, known as parole. The federal government can give certain groups permission to enter or remain in the U.S. if it finds “urgent humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons” for doing so.

    People who enter through parole programs must have an approved financial supporter in the U.S., undergo a robust security vetting and meet other eligibility criteria. They typically can stay for one to two years, and may apply for authorization to work.

    One current parole program is for people from Latin American countries that are TPS designates. The U.S. government can grant advance permission to enter the U.S. to up to 30,000 Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans each month. People fleeing these countries – all of which have been designated for Temporary Protected Status – can seek authorization to travel from their homes to the U.S. for urgent humanitarian reasons, and then stay for a temporary period of parole for up to two years.

    Immigrant rights groups rally at the U.S. Capitol following a federal court ruling that threatened the legal standing of thousands with Temporary Protected Status, Sept. 15, 2020.
    Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

    I’ve studied global migration and asylum policy for 25 years. I see both TPS and parole as legal and carefully considered ways to support people from countries experiencing wrenching conflict, disorder and disaster who are seeking safety in the U.S. Doing away with these programs, as Trump sought to do during his term in office, would make it extremely difficult for people in great danger to escape.

    Neither TPS nor parole programs are automatic roads to citizenship or permanent residence. They are ways to provide humanitarian assistance to people in appalling circumstances, such as rampant gang violence in Haiti and economic hardship and political repression in Venezuela and Nicaragua.

    Certainly, cities need more resources to support large numbers of immigrants. But offering temporary protection to people whose home countries are not safe places to live is a long-standing – and, in my view, crucial – element of U.S. immigration policy.

    Karen Jacobsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. What is Temporary Protected Status? A global migration expert explains why the US offers some foreign nationals temporary protection – https://theconversation.com/what-is-temporary-protected-status-a-global-migration-expert-explains-why-the-us-offers-some-foreign-nationals-temporary-protection-240525

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Mozambique’s 2024 elections: 9 major challenges that will face the next president

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By David Matsinhe, Losophone Research Specialist/Adjunct Professor in African Studies, Carleton University

    The incoming president of Mozambique faces an array of interconnected problems deeply rooted in historical, socioeconomic and political dynamics. He must balance meeting immediate needs with long-term structural change.

    The 9 October 2024 general election was Mozambique’s seventh since multiparty elections were introduced in 1994. The results are expected to be announced within two weeks from the poll date. International media reports indicate that the ruling Frelimo and its presidential candidate Daniel Chapo are poised for a landslide victory.

    This is likely to be confirmed by the electoral commission even though local media have pointed to widespread and brazen ballot stuffing and fake observers, among other irregularities, in favour of Frelimo.

    Frelimo has been in power since independence in 1975.

    Can the resource-rich but impoverished nation of 35 million expect a redirection of policies and strategies under Chapo to address its multifaceted crises?

    Chapo (47) was born after independence and promises to act with integrity. But the old guard placed him in power to protect and promote their interests.

    Mozambique’s crises stem largely from systemic corruption under Frelimo. It has prioritised political elites over national welfare. Its decades of mismanagement, embezzlement and patronage have left institutions weak and unable to address pressing social and economic issues.

    The country is fragmented. The government has neglected the development of inclusive, accountable governance and equitable infrastructure. Regional disparities are the result. This is especially so in Cabo Delgado province, where disenfranchised citizens have become vulnerable to extremist groups.

    This lack of unity and long-term planning has created a fragile state unable to withstand mounting internal and external pressures.

    As a Mozambican social scientist and human rights specialist, I have spent my adult life wrestling with my country’s complex economic, social, cultural and political dynamics.




    Read more:
    9 million Mozambicans live below the poverty line – what’s wrong with the national budget and how to fix it


    Mozambique stands at a critical point. The new president must confront the deep-rooted challenges with determination and comprehensive reforms.

    In my view, the new leader faces nine key challenges. These are a deep economic crisis, an Islamic insurgency in the north, climate change, drug trafficking, unemployment, corruption, poor infrastructure, kidnappings and unpaid public sector salaries.

    Economic crisis

    Mozambique’s economy has deteriorated, primarily because of structural imbalances and a dependence on extractive industries. GDP growth has declined sharply, from 7% in 2014 to 1.8% in 2023.

    Slower growth has resulted in over 62% of Mozambicans living in poverty.

    A public debt crisis was worsened by the “hidden debt scandal”: the discovery in 2016 of US$2 billion in previously undisclosed debts the government had guaranteed without the knowledge of parliament.

    This has limited the state’s capacity to invest in education, health and sanitation.

    Economic revival must be accompanied by targeted interventions to promote inclusive growth. All Mozambicans must benefit from economic activities to alleviate poverty.

    Insurgency

    Since 2017, extremist groups have used local grievances and regional disenfranchisement to destabilise northern Mozambique. Over 4,000 people have died. Nearly a million have been displaced.

    The conflict is rooted in socio-economic inequalities, made worse by the extraction of natural gas and rubies. Global and local actors compete for control.

    The new president’s role in mediating this crisis requires nuance. He must address the historical marginalisation of Cabo Delgado while balancing military and developmental responses.




    Read more:
    Between state and mosque: new book explores the turbulent history of Islamic politics in Mozambique


    He must also write a new chapter in the country’s deplorable human rights record. This is marked by widespread violations of the right to life, physical integrity, freedom from arbitrary detention, and freedoms of expression, assembly and the press.

    Climate change crisis

    Climate change intersects with Mozambique’s vulnerabilities. The country has been repeatedly struck by increasingly devastating severe cyclones, such as Idai and Kenneth in 2019.

    Deforestation has made it more fragile, reducing its capacity to mitigate flood and erosion risks.

    The new president will need to put in place policies that incorporate mitigation and adaptation strategies. He will also need to secure multilateral cooperation.

    Drug trafficking

    Drug trafficking networks have entrenched themselves. Porous borders, weak governance structures and endemic corruption have made Mozambique a corridor for heroin and cocaine trafficking.

    The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that US$100 million worth of heroin passes through Mozambique annually. This fuels informal economies that sustain political patronage networks.

    Tackling the problem requires stronger state institutions. It also requires regional and global collaboration to disrupt the transnational flow of narcotics.

    Unemployment

    Joblessness stands at over 70%, affecting youth in particular. Youth disenfranchisement risks perpetuating cycles of poverty, social instability and potential radicalisation.

    Policies promoting vocational training and entrepreneurship are essential. So is investment in labour-intensive sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing.

    Corruption

    Pervasive corruption erodes public trust and stifles economic innovation. New efforts to combat corruption must go beyond superficial reforms. They must uproot the power structures that sustain these systems.

    Poor infrastructure

    Infrastructure is in disrepair. Urban roads are crumbling, public services are inadequate and electricity blackouts are frequent. Rural regions lack basic services such as clean water and healthcare.

    The next president will need to launch an ambitious infrastructure overhaul to improve living conditions and stimulate economic growth.

    Kidnappings

    Kidnappings, especially targeting the wealthy and business people, have created widespread fear and instability. The crime disrupts business operations and deters foreign investment, further harming economic growth.

    The high-profile nature of kidnappings suggests collusion between criminal networks and law enforcement as well as inefficiencies in the justice system.

    The persistence of kidnappings reflects broader governance issues. These include limited state capacity to respond effectively to organised crime.

    Unpaid public servants

    Delays in salary payments for public servants have worsened economic and social problems. The delays reduce public workers’ purchasing power. This has affected household consumption and local economies.

    Morale among employees is sapped, harming productivity and eroding trust in government institutions.




    Read more:
    Mozambique’s transgender history is on display in a powerful photo exhibition


    The new president must make public sector reforms. This includes auditing finances, improving revenue collection, enforcing fiscal discipline, promoting merit-based appointments, implementing probity laws, strengthening anti-corruption bodies, and diversifying the economy.

    The future of Mozambique rests on the ability of its next leader to address these profound and intertwined crises. It’s a huge task.

    Whoever it is will have to break from the Frelimo mould, reverse the damage done and set the country on a new path of clean governance, peace and inclusive economic growth.

    David Matsinhe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Mozambique’s 2024 elections: 9 major challenges that will face the next president – https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-2024-elections-9-major-challenges-that-will-face-the-next-president-240923

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Elite corruption has the power to ignite mass protests in Nigeria – why police corruption doesn’t

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jacob Lewis, Assistant Professor, School of Politics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Washington State University

    Nigerians took to the streets in August 2024 to voice their frustration at a series of government policies. These policies had been ostensibly designed to make Nigeria more attractive for outside investment.

    The removal of fuel subsidies and the removal of the economic peg between the Nigerian naira and the US dollar have sent the Nigerian economy into a tailspin.

    Many Nigerians rely on government subsidies to make ends meet. The economic policy changes have resulted in a big rise in inflation, adding to the challenges for ordinary Nigerians.

    As economic conditions have worsened, the prominence of government corruption has risen. Protests and riots have exploded in the streets across the country in the form of #EndBadGovernance protests that call out government graft and poor governance.

    Does government corruption drive protests and social movements? While some scholars have argued that it does, others have argued that corruption is often a catch-all term for frustration over broad economic and democratic grievances. Others have noted that in some cases, increased perceptions of corruption correlate with less protest.

    These contradictory results reveal an important puzzle: why does corruption only sometimes seem to generate mass uprisings? If, for example, corruption is enough to generate citizen uprisings, then why do we only rarely see unified anti-police protests in countries like Nigeria, where police corruption is rampant?

    I argue that one key to this puzzle is the way different types of corruption are associated with increased or decreased protest mobilisation.

    I am a political scientist whose work focuses in part on African social movements and issues of corruption. I approach this by merging large statistical models with political psychological approaches.

    I conducted research in 2021 on different types of corruption shaping protests. I found that elite corruption had the power to mobilise protest. But that other forms of corruption – such as corruption in the police force – were less likely to lead people to take protest action.

    The implication of my findings is that anti-corruption protests are an imperfect signal for understanding everyday corruption experiences. The fact that people aren’t protesting doesn’t mean there’s nothing to complain about.

    Why elite corruption sparks protest

    To explain why corruption sometimes corresponds with protest movements and other times does not, I think it is useful to consider two types of corruption. Elite corruption refers to forms of graft and venality performed by political elites who seek to either enrich themselves or reshape the political system to their advantage.

    Police corruption refers to acts of self-enrichment or abuse perpetrated by police officers, often during traffic stops or in the process of police procedure.

    My findings show that citizens are generally more likely to mobilise in response to elite corruption than police corruption. Why?

    First, elite corruption tends to be intertwined with macro-level economic crises and scandals.

    Second, elite corruption provides a universal point of focus for protesters across an entire nation, rather than the highly localised experiences of police and bureaucratic graft.

    Finally, anger over police corruption may be suppressed by the safety concerns associated with demonstrating against armed security forces.

    I tested this argument using two methods. First, drawing from a 2017 household survey experiment that I conducted in five Nigerian states, I examined whether exposure to vignettes describing either elite corruption or police corruption shaped a respondent’s self-reported willingness to participate in a protest.

    The elite corruption vignettes included self-dealing and system-changing forms of corruption perpetrated by political elites. The police corruption vignette focused on the solicitation of bribes and unfair detention of citizens by the police. I then asked respondents:

    Many Nigerians join groups that engage in protests, strikes, or demonstrations. Now I would like to ask you about how willing you would be to join a protest or demonstration.

    Respondents were able to select a response between 1 (“not at all willing”) to 5 (“very willing / I already do”).

    I found that individuals who received the elite corruption vignette were statistically more likely to state that they would join a protest or demonstration.

    I then expanded this analysis via a statistical regression that measured whether perceptions of elite and police corruption (sourced from the Afrobarometer dataset) correlated with different levels of observed conflict (sourced from the Social Conflict Analysis Database).

    I thought it was best to test whether the results of my survey experiment, which capture a moment in time, reflected a broader reality, or whether it was just a fluke.

    Using the Afrobarometer data, I identified regions where citizens expressed particularly high or low perceptions of elite and police corruption. Then, using the social conflict analysis data, I measured the number of protest events in those regions.

    I found that while elite corruption perceptions were positively correlated with an increased number of observed protest events, police corruption perceptions were not.

    Together, these methods suggest that it is not enough to argue that citizens will rise up against corrupt governments. Rather, the ways in which a government is corrupt matter.

    Turning back to the August 2024 protests, one might ask: why now? Why did Nigerians spend ten days protesting against corruption when there had been rampant corruption for so long?

    My research suggests that the nature of the corruption claims – specifically, anger over large-scale government graft – is what counts.

    Recent developments seem to support this.

    What’s changed

    First, corruption perceptions have spiked. In 2021, Afrobarometer polled 1,600 Nigerians, asking them whether levels of corruption had risen, stayed the same, or decreased in the past year. At the time, just over 35% stated that corruption had “increased a lot”. One year later, that number had nearly doubled, jumping to just under 65%.

    This drastic increase in perceived corruption reveals a broader lack of faith in the government and concern over the future of the country.

    Second, tipping points help with mobilisation. The protests in early August arose as the financial crisis crystallised and as a series of economic policies brought into sharp relief the economic disparities between the rich and the poor.

    The removal of fuel subsidies is a particularly touchy subject in Nigerian politics. In 2012, Nigerians took to the streets over the same issue, leading to a week-long “occupation” of major Nigerian cities by protesters.

    Implications

    Protests are a highly visible signal that citizens are frustrated; however, it is easy to overlook the possibility that citizens may be widely upset about a broad array of issues, but only willing to speak out in response to some of those issues.

    There is a knock-on consequence to this; namely, that police corruption has a more direct effect on the lives of Nigerians than elite corruption, but often goes unaddressed.

    Jacob Lewis receives funding from the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Anti-Defamation League, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. He consults with the Anti-Defamation League on survey-based research.

    – ref. Elite corruption has the power to ignite mass protests in Nigeria – why police corruption doesn’t – https://theconversation.com/elite-corruption-has-the-power-to-ignite-mass-protests-in-nigeria-why-police-corruption-doesnt-239760

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Gangs’stories : A glimpse of hard lives around the world

    Source: The Conversation – France – By Dennis Rodgers, Research Professor, Anthropology and Sociology, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)

    Gangs and gang members arguably constitute fundamental lenses through which to think about and consider the world we live in. They need to be understood in a balanced and nuanced manner, however, that goes beyond stereotyping and vilification. For the past five years, the GANGS project, a European Research Council-funded project led by Dennis Rodgers, has been studying global gang dynamics.

    Among the project’s various activities, researchers collected 31 gang member life histories from 23 countries around the world, to help us better understand the motivations, drivers, and events that can shape gang members’ choices and trajectories. Taken together, the stories offer a panorama of triumph and defeat, of ruin and redemption, of discrimination and emancipation, and highlight the frequent persistence of human beings, even in the most difficult of circumstances. The 31 stories will be published in different forms – including as an Open Access edited volume with Bloomsbury Press, and in two journal special issues – over the coming years. In the meantime, this special series for The Conversation offers a preliminary selection, each illustrating a key issue that has emerged from GANGS project research.


    Kieran Mitton tells us about the life of Gaz, a former Sierra Leonean gang member who became a poet and then a farmer. His remarkable trajectory is a testament to the way that gangster lives are by no means deterministic and that opportunities to leave the gang and change can present themselves in all sorts of ways at different moments in time.

    Ellen Van Damme offers us a portrait of Jennifer, the first female Honduran gang leader. Her story illustrates the frequently gendered nature of gangs, and the way that machismo and patriarchy constrain Jennifer’s life, even as a gang leader, highlighting the frequently fundamentally masculine essence of street gangs.

    Sally Atkinson-Sheppard worked closely with Sharif, who 10 years ago was her research assistant, to write the story of his journey from gang member in war-torn Bangladesh to human rights worker and advocate for street children’s rights today. His story is one of overcoming exceptional adversity and drawing on his past experiences to do good in the world today.

    Steffen Jensen recounts the story of Marwan, whose life is in many ways a reflection of contemporary South African history, as he has had to navigate the violence of apartheid, prison, the Cape Flat drug wars, and more. Central to his narrative are the binary notions of damnation and redemption, with gangs frequently the sources of both at different points in his life, highlighting the different ways in which they can influence life trajectories.

    Alistair Fraser and Angela Bartie present a portrait of 70-year-old Danny, a retired Glaswegian businessman who was a gang member in his youth, and that is based, uniquely, on interviews carried out over a 50-year period, in 1969, 2011, and 2022. They trace his changing self-reflexion about his past, highlighting how this mirrors the broader transformation of Glasgow from a “Mean City” in the 1950s to a thriving metropolis that was Europe’s Capital of Culture in 1990.

    From a very young age, Soraya was involved in drug trafficking in the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, a poor neighbourhood in Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, where Dennis Rodgers has worked for over 20 years. Known locally as “la Reina del Sur” (“the Queen of the South”), her story shows how rather than being empowering, her participation in the drugs trade reinforced forms of macho violence and patriarchal dynamics of domination.

    Dennis Rodgers received an Advanced Grant (no. 787935) from the European Research Council (https://erc.europa.eu) for a project on “Gangs, Gangsters, and Ganglands: Towards a Global Comparative Ethnography” (GANGS).

    – ref. Gangs’stories : A glimpse of hard lives around the world – https://theconversation.com/gangsstories-a-glimpse-of-hard-lives-around-the-world-227166

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Mozambique’s 2024 elections: 9 major challenges that will face the next president

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By David Matsinhe, Losophone Research Specialist/Adjunct Professor in African Studies, Carleton University

    The incoming president of Mozambique faces an array of interconnected problems deeply rooted in historical, socioeconomic and political dynamics. He must balance meeting immediate needs with long-term structural change.

    The 9 October 2024 general election was Mozambique’s seventh since multiparty elections were introduced in 1994. The results are expected to be announced within two weeks from the poll date. International media reports indicate that the ruling Frelimo and its presidential candidate Daniel Chapo are poised for a landslide victory.

    This is likely to be confirmed by the electoral commission even though local media have pointed to widespread and brazen ballot stuffing and fake observers, among other irregularities, in favour of Frelimo.

    Frelimo has been in power since independence in 1975.

    Can the resource-rich but impoverished nation of 35 million expect a redirection of policies and strategies under Chapo to address its multifaceted crises?

    Chapo (47) was born after independence and promises to act with integrity. But the old guard placed him in power to protect and promote their interests.

    Mozambique’s crises stem largely from systemic corruption under Frelimo. It has prioritised political elites over national welfare. Its decades of mismanagement, embezzlement and patronage have left institutions weak and unable to address pressing social and economic issues.

    The country is fragmented. The government has neglected the development of inclusive, accountable governance and equitable infrastructure. Regional disparities are the result. This is especially so in Cabo Delgado province, where disenfranchised citizens have become vulnerable to extremist groups.

    This lack of unity and long-term planning has created a fragile state unable to withstand mounting internal and external pressures.

    As a Mozambican social scientist and human rights specialist, I have spent my adult life wrestling with my country’s complex economic, social, cultural and political dynamics.


    Read more: 9 million Mozambicans live below the poverty line – what’s wrong with the national budget and how to fix it


    Mozambique stands at a critical point. The new president must confront the deep-rooted challenges with determination and comprehensive reforms.

    In my view, the new leader faces nine key challenges. These are a deep economic crisis, an Islamic insurgency in the north, climate change, drug trafficking, unemployment, corruption, poor infrastructure, kidnappings and unpaid public sector salaries.

    Economic crisis

    Mozambique’s economy has deteriorated, primarily because of structural imbalances and a dependence on extractive industries. GDP growth has declined sharply, from 7% in 2014 to 1.8% in 2023.

    Slower growth has resulted in over 62% of Mozambicans living in poverty.

    A public debt crisis was worsened by the “hidden debt scandal”: the discovery in 2016 of US$2 billion in previously undisclosed debts the government had guaranteed without the knowledge of parliament.

    This has limited the state’s capacity to invest in education, health and sanitation.

    Economic revival must be accompanied by targeted interventions to promote inclusive growth. All Mozambicans must benefit from economic activities to alleviate poverty.

    Insurgency

    Since 2017, extremist groups have used local grievances and regional disenfranchisement to destabilise northern Mozambique. Over 4,000 people have died. Nearly a million have been displaced.

    The conflict is rooted in socio-economic inequalities, made worse by the extraction of natural gas and rubies. Global and local actors compete for control.

    The new president’s role in mediating this crisis requires nuance. He must address the historical marginalisation of Cabo Delgado while balancing military and developmental responses.


    Read more: Between state and mosque: new book explores the turbulent history of Islamic politics in Mozambique


    He must also write a new chapter in the country’s deplorable human rights record. This is marked by widespread violations of the right to life, physical integrity, freedom from arbitrary detention, and freedoms of expression, assembly and the press.

    Climate change crisis

    Climate change intersects with Mozambique’s vulnerabilities. The country has been repeatedly struck by increasingly devastating severe cyclones, such as Idai and Kenneth in 2019.

    Deforestation has made it more fragile, reducing its capacity to mitigate flood and erosion risks.

    The new president will need to put in place policies that incorporate mitigation and adaptation strategies. He will also need to secure multilateral cooperation.

    Drug trafficking

    Drug trafficking networks have entrenched themselves. Porous borders, weak governance structures and endemic corruption have made Mozambique a corridor for heroin and cocaine trafficking.

    The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that US$100 million worth of heroin passes through Mozambique annually. This fuels informal economies that sustain political patronage networks.

    Tackling the problem requires stronger state institutions. It also requires regional and global collaboration to disrupt the transnational flow of narcotics.

    Unemployment

    Joblessness stands at over 70%, affecting youth in particular. Youth disenfranchisement risks perpetuating cycles of poverty, social instability and potential radicalisation.

    Policies promoting vocational training and entrepreneurship are essential. So is investment in labour-intensive sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing.

    Corruption

    Pervasive corruption erodes public trust and stifles economic innovation. New efforts to combat corruption must go beyond superficial reforms. They must uproot the power structures that sustain these systems.

    Poor infrastructure

    Infrastructure is in disrepair. Urban roads are crumbling, public services are inadequate and electricity blackouts are frequent. Rural regions lack basic services such as clean water and healthcare.

    The next president will need to launch an ambitious infrastructure overhaul to improve living conditions and stimulate economic growth.

    Kidnappings

    Kidnappings, especially targeting the wealthy and business people, have created widespread fear and instability. The crime disrupts business operations and deters foreign investment, further harming economic growth.

    The high-profile nature of kidnappings suggests collusion between criminal networks and law enforcement as well as inefficiencies in the justice system.

    The persistence of kidnappings reflects broader governance issues. These include limited state capacity to respond effectively to organised crime.

    Unpaid public servants

    Delays in salary payments for public servants have worsened economic and social problems. The delays reduce public workers’ purchasing power. This has affected household consumption and local economies.

    Morale among employees is sapped, harming productivity and eroding trust in government institutions.


    Read more: Mozambique’s transgender history is on display in a powerful photo exhibition


    The new president must make public sector reforms. This includes auditing finances, improving revenue collection, enforcing fiscal discipline, promoting merit-based appointments, implementing probity laws, strengthening anti-corruption bodies, and diversifying the economy.

    The future of Mozambique rests on the ability of its next leader to address these profound and intertwined crises. It’s a huge task.

    Whoever it is will have to break from the Frelimo mould, reverse the damage done and set the country on a new path of clean governance, peace and inclusive economic growth.

    – Mozambique’s 2024 elections: 9 major challenges that will face the next president
    – https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-2024-elections-9-major-challenges-that-will-face-the-next-president-240923

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Elite corruption has the power to ignite mass protests in Nigeria – why police corruption doesn’t

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jacob Lewis, Assistant Professor, School of Politics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Washington State University

    Nigerians took to the streets in August 2024 to voice their frustration at a series of government policies. These policies had been ostensibly designed to make Nigeria more attractive for outside investment.

    The removal of fuel subsidies and the removal of the economic peg between the Nigerian naira and the US dollar have sent the Nigerian economy into a tailspin.

    Many Nigerians rely on government subsidies to make ends meet. The economic policy changes have resulted in a big rise in inflation, adding to the challenges for ordinary Nigerians.

    As economic conditions have worsened, the prominence of government corruption has risen. Protests and riots have exploded in the streets across the country in the form of #EndBadGovernance protests that call out government graft and poor governance.

    Does government corruption drive protests and social movements? While some scholars have argued that it does, others have argued that corruption is often a catch-all term for frustration over broad economic and democratic grievances. Others have noted that in some cases, increased perceptions of corruption correlate with less protest.

    These contradictory results reveal an important puzzle: why does corruption only sometimes seem to generate mass uprisings? If, for example, corruption is enough to generate citizen uprisings, then why do we only rarely see unified anti-police protests in countries like Nigeria, where police corruption is rampant?

    I argue that one key to this puzzle is the way different types of corruption are associated with increased or decreased protest mobilisation.

    I am a political scientist whose work focuses in part on African social movements and issues of corruption. I approach this by merging large statistical models with political psychological approaches.

    I conducted research in 2021 on different types of corruption shaping protests. I found that elite corruption had the power to mobilise protest. But that other forms of corruption – such as corruption in the police force – were less likely to lead people to take protest action.

    The implication of my findings is that anti-corruption protests are an imperfect signal for understanding everyday corruption experiences. The fact that people aren’t protesting doesn’t mean there’s nothing to complain about.

    Why elite corruption sparks protest

    To explain why corruption sometimes corresponds with protest movements and other times does not, I think it is useful to consider two types of corruption. Elite corruption refers to forms of graft and venality performed by political elites who seek to either enrich themselves or reshape the political system to their advantage.

    Police corruption refers to acts of self-enrichment or abuse perpetrated by police officers, often during traffic stops or in the process of police procedure.

    My findings show that citizens are generally more likely to mobilise in response to elite corruption than police corruption. Why?

    First, elite corruption tends to be intertwined with macro-level economic crises and scandals.

    Second, elite corruption provides a universal point of focus for protesters across an entire nation, rather than the highly localised experiences of police and bureaucratic graft.

    Finally, anger over police corruption may be suppressed by the safety concerns associated with demonstrating against armed security forces.

    I tested this argument using two methods. First, drawing from a 2017 household survey experiment that I conducted in five Nigerian states, I examined whether exposure to vignettes describing either elite corruption or police corruption shaped a respondent’s self-reported willingness to participate in a protest.

    The elite corruption vignettes included self-dealing and system-changing forms of corruption perpetrated by political elites. The police corruption vignette focused on the solicitation of bribes and unfair detention of citizens by the police. I then asked respondents:

    Many Nigerians join groups that engage in protests, strikes, or demonstrations. Now I would like to ask you about how willing you would be to join a protest or demonstration.

    Respondents were able to select a response between 1 (“not at all willing”) to 5 (“very willing / I already do”).

    I found that individuals who received the elite corruption vignette were statistically more likely to state that they would join a protest or demonstration.

    I then expanded this analysis via a statistical regression that measured whether perceptions of elite and police corruption (sourced from the Afrobarometer dataset) correlated with different levels of observed conflict (sourced from the Social Conflict Analysis Database).

    I thought it was best to test whether the results of my survey experiment, which capture a moment in time, reflected a broader reality, or whether it was just a fluke.

    Using the Afrobarometer data, I identified regions where citizens expressed particularly high or low perceptions of elite and police corruption. Then, using the social conflict analysis data, I measured the number of protest events in those regions.

    I found that while elite corruption perceptions were positively correlated with an increased number of observed protest events, police corruption perceptions were not.

    Together, these methods suggest that it is not enough to argue that citizens will rise up against corrupt governments. Rather, the ways in which a government is corrupt matter.

    Turning back to the August 2024 protests, one might ask: why now? Why did Nigerians spend ten days protesting against corruption when there had been rampant corruption for so long?

    My research suggests that the nature of the corruption claims – specifically, anger over large-scale government graft – is what counts.

    Recent developments seem to support this.

    What’s changed

    First, corruption perceptions have spiked. In 2021, Afrobarometer polled 1,600 Nigerians, asking them whether levels of corruption had risen, stayed the same, or decreased in the past year. At the time, just over 35% stated that corruption had “increased a lot”. One year later, that number had nearly doubled, jumping to just under 65%.

    This drastic increase in perceived corruption reveals a broader lack of faith in the government and concern over the future of the country.

    Second, tipping points help with mobilisation. The protests in early August arose as the financial crisis crystallised and as a series of economic policies brought into sharp relief the economic disparities between the rich and the poor.

    The removal of fuel subsidies is a particularly touchy subject in Nigerian politics. In 2012, Nigerians took to the streets over the same issue, leading to a week-long “occupation” of major Nigerian cities by protesters.

    Implications

    Protests are a highly visible signal that citizens are frustrated; however, it is easy to overlook the possibility that citizens may be widely upset about a broad array of issues, but only willing to speak out in response to some of those issues.

    There is a knock-on consequence to this; namely, that police corruption has a more direct effect on the lives of Nigerians than elite corruption, but often goes unaddressed.

    – Elite corruption has the power to ignite mass protests in Nigeria – why police corruption doesn’t
    – https://theconversation.com/elite-corruption-has-the-power-to-ignite-mass-protests-in-nigeria-why-police-corruption-doesnt-239760

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: INTERPOL operation nets terror suspects, cash and illegal weapons

    Source: Interpol (news and events)

    16 October 2024

    LYON, France – An INTERPOL counter-terrorism operation to strengthen border security has enabled millions of crosschecks against international databases, resulting in 66 arrests, significant seizures and the identification of 81 individuals subject to INTERPOL notices and diffusions.
    Operation Neptune VI brought together law enforcement agencies from 14 countries with the goal of bolstering security measures and responses around the maritime routes across the Mediterranean Sea, as well as in airports and at land borders in the participating countries.
    The initiative, carried out in cooperation with WCO, FRONTEX and Europol, equipped teams with handheld devices and gave local authorities expanded access to INTERPOL databases.
    The operation focused on identifying and analysing the movement patterns of Foreign Terrorist Fighters and people with links to terrorism as well as criminal groups responsible for cross-border crimes such as drug trafficking, weapons smuggling and human trafficking.
    During Neptune VI, which ran for approximately two weeks in each country, officers on the ground also checked INTERPOL records of stolen vehicles and lost or stolen travel documents, which are both key assets for facilitating terrorist funding and mobility.
    By the end of the operation on 16 September 2024, more than 16 million crosschecks had been made against the various INTERPOL databases, generating 187 ‘hits’.
    A dozen arrests were made on the basis of INTERPOL Red Notices. Another 54 people were apprehended under national arrest warrants and for crimes detected at the border, including drugs and fraud offenses as well as the smuggling of gold, cash and weapons.

    Cyprus: Seizure displayed during Operation Neptune VI

    France: Documents being verified at the border

    France: Millions of database crosschecks were made during the international operation

    Iraq: Document verification during Operation Neptune VI

    Albania: The operation brought together law enforcement agencies from 14 countries

    Albania: Vehicle undercarriage check

    Albania: K9 inspection

    Algeria: Document inspection during Operation Neptune VI

    Algeria: Document check

    Bulgaria: The operation aimed to strengthen border security

    Red and Blue Notices to catch and track terror suspects

    One suspect detained as part of the operation was the subject of a Red Notice for a terror attack carried out 23 years ago on a church in Pakistan. The fugitive is being held by local authorities as extradition procedures are carried out.
    In another case, airport border police blocked entry to an individual who was the subject of an INTERPOL Blue Diffusion, issued in 2015.  The person had previously travelled to join ISIS through a European country.
    In contrast to a Red Notice which can form the basis for provisional arrest, a Blue Notice or diffusion is a request between INTERPOL member countries to collect additional information about a person’s identity, location or activities, in relation to a criminal investigation. During the Neptune VI operation, 29 subjects of Blue Notices and Diffusions were identified, allowing officers to track individuals with links to terrorism.

    In Montenegro, border police detained a traveller suspected of using a counterfeit passport. Utilizing INTERPOL’s secure global police communications system (I-24/7), they verified the document with the issuing authorities, confirming it was a forgery. It was also discovered that the suspect was wanted for attempted murder. A Red Notice was promptly issued, requesting the suspect’s arrest and extradition.

    Strengthened border controls lead to important seizures

    The arrests made during Neptune VI were just one facet of the operation’s broad success in strengthening border control. The initiative yielded significant seizures, including EUR 549,000 in undeclared cash, gold worth EUR 10 million, 25 kilograms of cannabis, 35 stolen vehicles, and several illegal rifles and ammunition.
    Additionally, Bulgarian border officials recovered two Glock pistols in the possession of an individual travelling with a fraudulent ID card. Notably, the pistol frames had been purchased as components in Central Europe, while the other parts had been falsely declared as exported to North America.

    Bulgaria: Two Glock pistols were seized

    Bulgaria: Database checking in progress

    Morocco: K9 Inspection during Operation Neptune VI

    Portugal: Document verification

    Portugal: The operation generated 187 ‘hits’ on INTERPOL databases

    Spain: A vehicle check point

    Spain: Overall 66 people were apprehended as part of Operation Neptune VI

    Spain: INTERPOL equipped local police with access to international databases

    Italy: The operation focused on identifying people with links to terrorism and cross-border crimes

    Italy: Inspection team carries out checks

    Italy: A search in progress

    Montenegro: K9 inspection of vehicles at border

    Montenegro: K9 vehicle inspection

    Morocco: Officers have access to INTERPOL’s international databases

    Greg Hinds, INTERPOL’s Counter-Terrorism Director said:
    “By working together and equipping law enforcement agencies with the frontline tools they need, we can disrupt the activities of terrorists and criminals and bring them to justice. The operation’s results demonstrate the importance of sharing intelligence and best practices among countries to combat the evolving threats of terrorism and organized crime.”
    Neptune VI is funded by Global Affairs Canada, WCO and Frontex.

    Participating countries:

    Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Montenegro, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, and Tunisia.

    MIL Security OSI –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese peacekeepers to South Sudan (Wau) pass UN assessment 2024-10-10 17:22:08 Recently, an assessment team from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) conducted the combat readiness capability assessment for the second half of 2024.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – Ministry of National Defense

      BEIJING, Oct. 10 — Recently, an assessment team from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) conducted the combat readiness capability assessment for the second half of 2024. The 14th Chinese Peacekeeping Horizontal Engineering Company to the UNMISS, which is stationed in Wau, South Sudan,  passed the assessment with excellent performance.

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    MIL OSI China News –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Secretary-General’s remarks to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly on the Proposed Programme Budget for 2025

    Source: United Nations – English

    xcellencies, Distinguished delegates,

    I welcome this opportunity to introduce the proposed programme budget for 2025.

    I do so in a context of a multiplicity of challenges and with a strong sense of urgency.

    In a context of major global shocks, the United Nations is more needed than ever — with our unmatched convening power.

    The Pact for the Future, the Global Digital Compact and the Declaration on Future Generations represent a commitment towards updating and reforming international cooperation to make it more networked, effective, fair and inclusive.

    The 2025 programme budget proposal reflects in many ways, the priorities set out in these landmark agreements.

    The proposal renews our commitment to deliver on our mandates to advance peace, sustainable development, and human rights.

    At the same time, we will continue to work to cement our reforms, fostering a culture of continuous improvement.

    In the new digital age, the United Nations has an essential part to play.

    We reached a milestone with the Global Digital Compact which includes the first truly universal agreement on the international governance of Artificial Intelligence with the UN at its centre. 

    Madam Chair, distinguished delegates,

    In December 2022, the General Assembly lifted the trial period and formalized the change to an annual budget period.

    The format of the programme budget has stabilized. The programme plans reflect our increased results-orientation.
    Our 350 results frameworks continue to move further towards demonstrating the impact and positive change of our work on the ground. 

    The planned targets have become more ambitious.

    More than 65 percent of quantitative planned targets are now aiming to achieve a 10 percent or more increase in performance. This is an increase from less than 30 percent in the 2018-19 biennium, 45 percent for 2023, and 60 percent for 2024.

    We have reduced duplication in the strategies and deliverables, while maintaining the same level of programmatic information. 

    Every programme manager is expected to scrutinize every dollar spent and planned to be spent.

    And they must constantly review and adjust programmatic activities to achieve planned results.

    This will allow us to optimize resources for mandate delivery and focus even more effectively on results.

    Let me now turn to the overall resource requirements.

    To fully implement our mandates, we will require a total of $3.6 billion in 2025.

    Excluding Special Political Missions, this includes a total of 10,494 posts, representing a net increase of 115 posts required to implement new or strengthen existing mandates.

    The proposed budget also includes $711 million for the continuation of 36 Special Political Missions for 2025. 

    This reflects a decrease of $31 million from last year primarily because of the discontinuation of the field mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), and our investigative team to promote accountability for the crimes committed in Iraq by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD). 

    In line with the usual practice, you will consider later in the session additional proposals for construction, revised estimates and programme budget implications resulting from new or revised mandates. These include revised estimates in support of the implementation of the Pact of the Future, and for UNRWA.

    We continue to make every effort to find efficiencies while also recognizing that any further cuts to support departments risk jeopardizing policy, operational, or communication support to our programmatic work.

    Allow me to highlight five specific elements of our 2025 programme budget proposals:

    First, we propose to continue our investment in sustainable development.

    We propose an increase of approximately $4.5 million, the sixth consecutive annual increase for the development pillar.

    The Regular Programme of Technical Cooperation – or RPTC — will be a key recipient. 

    The increases will further strengthen the direct support provided to governments to help advance their development efforts.

    With the proposed increase of $2 million, resources for the RPTC will have grown by more than 45% since 2019.

    The proposed increase in the RPTC will be split evenly between all entities. 

    However, we propose an additional $0.5 million for the Economic Commission for Africa for technical assistance and advice to Member States on the 2030 Agenda and the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

    Our proposal also includes an increase of $1 million for the Development Account to enhance and expand targeted, country-level capacity development support and to broaden the dissemination of the projects’ results to more countries.

    We also seek increases of $0.6 million for the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa and $0.75 million for the Office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States.

    Further, we want to strengthen the UN development system through structural changes to help ensure sufficient and predictable funding — and enhanced accountability.

    The Resident Coordinator system has faced a chronic funding shortfall since day one.

    A sustainable and predictable funding mechanism, through partial financing from the regular budget, is essential. 

    My proposal for assessed funding is under review by this Committee.

    It is important to reach a decision on this topic.

    Member States’ expectations of the RC system are growing.

    The effects of the funding gap are felt every day.  For example, the recruitment for 78 posts across 52 countries has been suspended.

    We also seek to put the small System-Wide Evaluation Office on a firmer footing with regular budget funding.

    This will further enhance transparency and ensure effective, independent evaluation of the UN development system at the country level – the raison d’etre of the UNSDG System-Wide Evaluation Office.

    Second, human rights.

    The proposal includes an additional $8.3 million to support the work of the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic and ensure its functioning at full capacity in 2025. 

    We are also seeking an increase of $8 million for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for more effective implementation of mandates, especially at the regional level.

    Additionally, based on the recommendation of the ACABQ and the guidance from the General Assembly, we have included resource requirements that will arise from anticipated mandate renewals by the Human Rights Council later in the year.  

    By presenting these resource requirements now rather than separately later in the session, Member States have a more complete picture of the resources being sought for the Office. This will also reduce fragmentation and increase transparency. 

    Let me emphasize that this consolidation, which amounts to $28.8 million, does not represent an increase in resources – only a change in presentation.

    Third, boosting support for the unprecedented humanitarian challenges in Gaza, with approximately $3.5 million in additional resources.

    This includes an increase of nearly $2.5 million for UNRWA which complements the additional $30 million approved for 2024.

    UNRWA is a lifeline for Palestine refugees, and a crucial factor for regional stability.

    Fourth, advancing peace and security. 

    This includes an increase of $2.5 million for disarmament, including the establishment of 9 posts to implement activities requested by the General Assembly.

    We are also seeking an increase of $1 million for the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process to intensify its vital work.

    Following the landmark decision of the General Assembly, we will address persistent funding challenges of the Peacebuilding Fund due to its exclusive reliance on voluntary contributions — by approving a $50 million dollar grant for the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility of the Peacebuilding Fund starting in 2025.

    And fifth, strengthening our capacities in investigation and ethics. 
    We are seeking an approximately $2 million increase, for the creation of three temporary positions for the Ethics Office and ten for the Office of Internal Oversight Services.

    Madam Chair, distinguished delegates,

    With the structural aspects of the reforms now well consolidated, it is imperative to keep working together to achieve the cultural change for results.

    Our 2025 budget continues to strive towards our shared vision for UN 2.0, through a forward-thinking workforce culture, empowered by cutting-edge skills.

    Gender equality and geographical representation remain priorities.

    We are working nonstop to ensure that our workforce reflects the membership of the United Nations.

    The General Assembly decision to increase the number of geographical posts has enabled us to reduce the total countries that were un- or under-represented and over-represented. 120 countries are now within range compared to 103 in December 2023.  

    We are revising our strategy for equitable geographical distribution to focus on attracting more staff from countries that are un-or under-represented.  

    Through our RC system and UN Information Centres, we have launched targeted outreach strategies in those countries, namely in many of the developing countries that are under-represented. 

    In the same vein, we strive to expand opportunities for recruitment from as wide a geographical basis as possible for all posts.

    All these efforts are yielding results.  For example, at the start of the UN development system reform, 41% of Resident Coordinators were from the global South.  Today, this number has increased to 57%.

    We have successfully maintained gender parity at senior levels and, based on current projections, we will be able to reach parity at an Organizational level before 2028.

    But we must do more to achieve parity at every entity and every level.

    We are also working on the next phase of our system-wide disability inclusion strategy and making progress in our efforts to combat racism and racial discrimination at work.

    Madam Chair, distinguished delegates,

    The proposal before you reflects our ambition to respond to new threats and opportunities.

    For us to deliver on our promises, Member States must also honour their commitments to this Organization.

    Ultimately, the effectiveness of programme delivery and use of financial resources in 2025 will depend on the availability of cash.

    I hope that we can end the current trend of declining liquidity.

    The Organization started this year with only about $67 million in cash, compared to $700 million last year, making it extremely vulnerable to adverse changes in payment patterns of assessed contributions.

    On top of that, the Organization had to return $114 million as credits to Member States as part of the 2024 assessments, which meant that we would collect less than the budget approved for 2024, even if all Member States pay in full in 2024.

    The depletion of the regular budget liquidity reserves at the end of 2023 therefore necessitated imposing stringent cash-conservation measures from the very beginning of 2024. 

    Unless the liquidity reserves are replenished fully at the end of this year, cash conservation measures are again likely to constrain budget implementation in 2025. 

    This is why I have proposed that the General Assembly temporarily suspend the return of credits for 2023 against the 2025 assessment. 

    The credits will be held in a reserve and released to Member States as soon as conditions improve.  

    This is critical to both minimize the risk of negative impact on programme delivery and the ability to fulfill even non-discretionary commitments to personnel and third-party partners in 2025. 

    I once again urge Member States to meet their financial obligations in full and on time.

    I thank Member States that have paid in advance or earlier than before, and have made adjustments to their internal processes to continue to pay earlier.

    We will keep monitoring the situation and reach out to Member States to pay in full and inform us of their plans so we can adapt our spending based as needed.

    However, when programme delivery is repeatedly constrained by liquidity, past spending patterns become less reliable indicators of the real needs of the Organization.

    Madam Chair, distinguished delegates,

    The outcome of the Summit of the Future has opened pathways to new possibilities and opportunities towards securing a peaceful and livable future for everyone on our planet.

    Against this backdrop, I look forward to your support for my 2025 programme budget proposal.

    I welcome this opportunity to engage with you today and assure you that my senior managers will continue to support your deliberations on these proposals.

    Thank you.
     

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Nuer people have a sacred connection to birds – it can guide conservation in Ethiopia and South Sudan

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abebayehu Aticho, PhD student, researcher and conservationist, Jimma University

    The pied kingfisher helps the Nuer to find parts of the river where there’s an abundance of fish. Henrik Karlsson/Getty Images

    The Nuer are a large pastoralist community living in western Ethiopia and South Sudan in east Africa. They rely on livestock keeping and have special beliefs and customs about how to live with nature. These are passed down from parents to children through the telling of stories.

    Uncommonly for east African pastoralists, the Nuer live in an expansive, low-lying floodplain. This Gambella region is shaped by the convergence of several rivers originating in the Ethiopian highlands. Its wetlands and lush greenery offer a unique habitat that supports both the Nuer and a wide variety of birds and other wildlife. The people have a centuries-old cultural connection with the local biodiversity.

    Our collaborative study involved Ethiopian and European scientists from diverse fields (such as ornithology, ethno-ornithology, biodiversity and nature conservation). We conducted interviews and 15 group discussions with Nuer people to understand their interaction with and knowledge of birds. The study included two districts and 400 households. We found a significant and seldom studied relationship with birds, which serve a range of purposes in Nuer life.

    Our study not only highlights the deep spiritual and cultural ties between the Nuer people and the avian world. It also underscores the importance of incorporating traditional ecological knowledge into contemporary conservation efforts.

    The Nuer’s relationship to birds can be a valuable model for sustainable human-wildlife interactions. It can contribute to the conservation of bird diversity and promote a more harmonious coexistence between humans and nature.

    The role of birds in Nuer life

    Ethiopia, known for its rich biodiversity, is home to 821 bird species and over 80 indigenous ethnic groups. Among these, the Nuer community stands out for its unique admiration of birds, viewing them as sacred beings.

    The Nuer use three interchangeable names for birds: gaatkuoth (sacred children of God), kuoth (bearers of spirit), and diit (symbols of human twins). These terms reflect spiritual beliefs and also influence cultural practices, such as naming twins after birds. This Nuer tradition connects the prolific nature of birds to human fertility.

    In our study, participants recognised 71 bird species as having unique cultural roles. The birds that live near Nuer villages have seven distinct uses. Ten species are used as bushmeat. Five are for traditional medicine. Eight are fish indicators – by meticulously observing species like the African fish eagle, African pygmy kingfisher, pied kingfisher or malachite kingfisher, people can identify areas with high fish populations.

    Seven birds serve as omens – they signal potential dangers like the presence of wild animals. Three are used to create protective amulets. Three are used to indicate the change of seasons – for instance the return of migratory western yellow wagtails is a reliable sign that the sunny, dry season will be replacing the rainy, wet season. And 45 are hailed for their aesthetic beauty, often linked with a sense of place. The vibrant plumage, melodious songs and elegant flight patterns of birds like the black-crowned crane, blue-naped mousebird and purple heron create a spectacle that significantly enhances Nuer life.

    This intricate knowledge of birds is communal: over 90% of participants agreed on the uses of these bird species.

    Indigenous knowledge and sustainability

    One of the most striking things about the Nuer community is the sustainable practice embedded within their traditional systems. When birds are used as amulets, for example, only small, non-invasive parts of the bird, like feathers, are utilised. These are fashioned into necklaces or bracelets believed to offer protection from dangers like diseases. The birds are not killed or significantly harmed, which preserves their populations.

    A Nuer village.
    fabio lamanna/Getty

    There are strict limits on when and how birds can be used in Nuer society. The use of birds as bushmeat or for making traditional medicine is carefully controlled by elders and within family structures. Hunting is typically allowed only during severe food shortages. It’s often restricted to those in dire need, such as impoverished households. Families with a history of twins, who hold birds in special reverence, are not allowed to hunt them.

    These cultural practices help prevent overexploitation of bird species, conserving them for future generations. They ensure that the use of natural resources remains sustainable.

    It’s important to raise awareness about the conservation of birds, which are used for various purposes across Africa. Traditional medicine, bushmeat and the making of amulets has a direct impact on bird populations.

    Nuer traditions balance human needs with the preservation of bird life. Our study therefore offers a compelling case and model for the conservation of avian and indigenous cultural diversity in Africa.

    Why this matters

    It is, however, essential to acknowledge that the Nuer’s cultural practices are not immune to the pressures of modern society. As globalisation and development continue to encroach on traditional lands, the Nuer people will face increasing challenges in maintaining their sustainable practices.

    Threats such as habitat loss, climate change and illegal wildlife trading could jeopardise bird populations. In recent decades, the expansion of large-scale agriculture in the Gambella region has emerged as a driver of habitat loss and wildlife decline.

    This makes the Nuer people’s traditional conservation practices even more relevant to future generations. By recognising and valuing their knowledge and practices, we can learn valuable lessons for broader conservation efforts.

    Indigenous territories, despite their relatively small size, often harbour extraordinary biodiversity. Recognising this, the United Nations’ Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework places indigenous-occupied areas among conservation priority areas at the forefront of biodiversity preservation strategies.

    It is crucial to help the Nuer community adapt to changing circumstances while preserving their cultural heritage and ensuring the sustainability of bird biodiversity.

    Changkuoth Puok Diet, a lecturer at Gambella University in Ethiopia, contributed to this article.

    Abebayehu Aticho works for both Jimma University and the Threatened Species Conservation Organisation (a small local NGO). He got funding for this study from the International Crane Foundation and Jimma University.

    Andrew Gosler has received grant funding in the past from the Arts and Humanities Research Council for the Ethno-ornithology World Atlas.

    Abebe Beyene, Desalegn Chala, Nils Christian Stenseth, and Shimelis Aynalem Zelelew do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Nuer people have a sacred connection to birds – it can guide conservation in Ethiopia and South Sudan – https://theconversation.com/nuer-people-have-a-sacred-connection-to-birds-it-can-guide-conservation-in-ethiopia-and-south-sudan-239420

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Mpox vaccine is safe and generates a robust antibody response in adolescents

    Source: US Department of Health and Human Services – 2

    News Release

    Wednesday, October 16, 2024

    NIH clinical trial addresses knowledge gap on vaccine use in adolescent populations

    WHAT:

    A National Institutes of Health (NIH)-funded clinical trial of an mpox vaccine in adolescents found it was safe and generated an antibody response equivalent to that seen in adults, according to a planned interim analysis of study data. Adolescents are among the population groups affected by mpox in the current Clade I mpox outbreak. The interim results of this trial were presented at the IDWeek2024 conference in Los Angeles.

    The first human case of mpox was recorded in 1970 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Two types of the virus that causes mpox have been identified. Clade I is endemic in Central Africa and can cause severe illness. Clade II, endemic in West Africa, caused the global mpox outbreak that began in 2022 and tends to result in milder illness. People with compromised immune systems, children, and those who are pregnant are especially vulnerable to severe mpox regardless of the virus clade. A large proportion of people affected in the current Clade I outbreak in the DRC and other African countries are adolescents and children. The modified vaccinia Ankara-Bavarian Nordic (MVA-BN) vaccine is approved in several countries for the prevention of mpox and smallpox in adults, but insufficient data are available to support licensure for people younger than 18 years.

    NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) is sponsoring a mid-stage study in the United States to evaluate the safety and immune response generated by two doses of MVA-BN in adolescents aged 12-17 years, comparing outcomes to those in adults aged 18-50 years. In a planned interim analysis, study investigators measured antibody levels two weeks after the second dose (study day 43) and monitored safety through 180 days after the second dose (study day 210). The analysis showed that the MVA-BN vaccine generated antibody levels in adolescents equivalent to those observed in adults at day 43 and found that the vaccine was well tolerated through study day 210. The overall frequency of adverse events was comparable between the study groups. Reports of dizziness were more common in adolescents than adults, but similar to the frequency of dizziness reported when other vaccines are administered in adolescents.

    According to the study team, the interim data support the safety and quality of the immune response generated by the MVA-BN vaccine in adolescents, findings relevant to the United States and other areas where mpox cases have occurred. The authors underscored the need to evaluate the MVA-BN vaccine in younger children to extend the evidence base to all people affected by mpox.

    NIH is grateful to the research sites and volunteers who participate in studies to improve the mpox response.

    For more information about this study, please visit ClinicalTrials.gov and use the identifier NCT05512949.

    NIAID conducts and supports research—at NIH, throughout the United States, and worldwide—to study the causes of infectious and immune-mediated diseases, and to develop better means of preventing, diagnosing and treating these illnesses. News releases, fact sheets and other NIAID-related materials are available on the NIAID website.

    About the National Institutes of Health (NIH): NIH, the nation’s medical research agency, includes 27 Institutes and Centers and is a component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. NIH is the primary federal agency conducting and supporting basic, clinical, and translational medical research, and is investigating the causes, treatments, and cures for both common and rare diseases. For more information about NIH and its programs, visit http://www.nih.gov.

    NIH…Turning Discovery Into Health®

    Reference

    CM Healy et al. Safety and Immunogenicity of Mpox Vaccination in Adolescents. IDWeek2024. Saturday, October 19, 2024.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI NGOs: MSF urges Polish authorities to retract announced suspension of right to seek asylum

    Source: Médecins Sans Frontières –

    • We are deeply concerned by the Polish government’s plan to suspend the right for people to seek asylum in Poland.
    • This is a major escalation in a series of actions to dehumanise migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.
    • MSF urges the Polish government to change their course of action and ensure migrants and refugees are protected in the country.

    Warsaw- Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is deeply concerned by the Polish government’s plan to suspend the right for people to seek asylum in Poland. Such a suspension will have predictable dramatic consequences for people seeking safety in Europe. MSF calls on the Polish authorities to drastically change course of action and take all necessary measures to ensure the protection and rights of refugees and migrants.

    Over the last days, the Polish government announced a strategy to reform the country’s migration policy, including the possibility of a temporary suspension of the right to seek asylum in Poland in order to “regain control” of borders and “ensure security”.https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/10/15/polish-government-approves-tough-new-migration-strategy-including-possibility-to-suspend-asylum/

    While the full details of the government’s plan are yet to be disclosed, MSF warns that such restrictive and punitive measures against people seeking safety, denying them legal pathways to protection, would only lead to more harmful border practices at the Poland-Belarus border and further expose already vulnerable people to life-threatening conditions.

    “The Polish government’s willingness to further restrict and suspend the right to seek asylum is extremely concerning and risks leading to more unchecked pushbacks and violence against people crossing the border,” says Uriel Mazzoli, MSF Head of Mission in Poland.

    “The new Polish government had an opportunity to reform the country’s asylum and reception system but has instead only deepened existing and dangerous political rhetoric, rooted in a ‘crisis’ narrative, further normalizing a militarized response, violent practices and denial of humanity to people seeking safety in the European Union,” says Mazzoli.

    Since November 2022, MSF teams have treated over 400 people, many of them stranded for weeks in uninhabitable forests and exposed to violent practices at the border. Given the extreme conditions of deprivation people experience in the border area, MSF patients suffer from a wide range of severe medical conditions ranging from exhaustion, hypothermia, dehydration, trench foot to mental health issues.

    In 2024, our teams have also witnessed a sharp increase in people carrying the scars of physical assaults, including bruises and dog bites. In July 2024, MSF teams treated for the first time injuries related to the use of rubber bullets being fired. Additionally, half of people MSF has seen in 2024 have reported having been pushed back, some of them several times.

    This latest announcement represents a further escalation of an already extremely hostile environment for people on the move and those providing humanitarian assistance to them. In June 2024, the Polish authorities imposed a ban on access to the border zone, which has prevented civil society and humanitarian organizations from accessing people in need in these areas. 

    Layers of barbed wire on the Poland-Belarus border at the river in Kozłowe Borki. Poland, January 2024.
    Jakub Jasiukiewicz/MSF

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    Despite official requests for unrestricted and independent access to the entire border region, MSF has been granted access to only a limited part of the buffer zone. This buffer is an exclusion zone along 60 kilometers of the country’s border with Belarus and includes key locations where most people on the move have been crossing the border since 2021.

    Not only does this ban prevent the delivery of essential assistance, but it also enables much of the violence reported by people we treat to take place out of sight.

    “The restrictions on humanitarian and medical aid at the Poland-Belarus border are already alarming, with entire zones where humanitarian workers are prevented access and a legislation that could favor the use of violence by state authorities,” says Mazzoli. “Delaying assistance and medical care to people at the border can have life-threatening consequences as many of the patients we see experience health issues that can rapidly deteriorate.”

    The suspension of territorial asylum will have far-reaching consequences on the capacity of people seeking safety in Poland to access medical care and protection. Worryingly so, such extraordinary measures are becoming the despicable new normal in the European Union (EU), where governments and institutions have increasingly seized upon the notion of ‘crisis’ as a reason to derogate from minimum standards and people’s rights.

    Over recent years, MSF teams have witnessed many examples of the detrimental consequences of policies that put border controls above human life across our projects in Greece, Libya, the Central Mediterranean Sea and Belgium. For too long now, EU member states have been waging a war on some of the world’s most vulnerable people under the guise of ‘instrumentalisation’ by third countries.
     
    MSF calls on the Polish authorities to retract the announced suspension of the right to seek asylum and to end this gross dehumanisation of refugees and migrants and the increasing militarisation of responses towards them.

    MSF activities in Poland:
    After a short intervention along the Poland–Belarus border region in 2021, MSF teams returned in the Podlasie region, near the border with Belarus, in November 2022. Since then, our medical team provides basic medical care through mobile teams in remote locations and organise emergency referrals and follow-up, in close cooperation with other organisations and civil society groups. Furthermore, since 2022, MSF supports the Polish Ministry of Health to offer medical and psychosocial care to patients with tuberculosis.

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    MIL OSI NGO –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Houston Man Guilty in $160 Million Medicare Fraud Scheme

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News (b)

    HOUSTON – A 59-year-old Houston man has been convicted of all 15 counts as charged for heading a massive Medicare fraud scheme involving the fraudulent billing of expensive topical creams, announced U.S. Attorney Alamdar S. Hamdani.  

    The jury deliberated for less than five hours before convicting Mohamad Mokbel following a 10-day trial. 

    From 2014 through 2021, Mohamad Mokbel led a company called 4M Pharmaceuticals which operated 14 pharmacies with straw owners. The jury heard evidence that Mokbel illegally purchased thousands of Medicare beneficiaries, including their identification number, personal health and physician information. Mokbel targeted elderly diabetic patients who are dependent on diabetic testing supplies to manage their blood sugar levels. Mokbel paid $16 to $40 per Medicare beneficiary.  

    To maximize reimbursements and without regard for medical necessity, Mokbel then directed 4M employees to use the Medicare beneficiaries’ patient data to run insurance claims to determine if Medicare or other insurance plans would cover and reimburse at a high rate for the topical creams, Omega-3 pills and other medications that Mokbel intended to sell through 4M pharmacies.

    At Mokbel’s direction, 4M employees would then fax pre-filled prescription requests to the patients’ doctors appearing to be for diabetic testing supplies with topical creams added at the bottom. They also included false representations that the patient was requesting a 4M Pharmacy fill their medications. In reality, Mokbel had previously purchased the patient’s personal information, the patient had not selected a 4M Pharmacy and the patient was often unaware the request was being made on their behalf. 

    Many doctors apparently took the representations in the fax at face value and did sign and send back the prefilled prescription requests to 4M. Mokbel’s call center in Houston and later in Egypt then contacted the patients and made false and misleading statements about the topical cream and their doctor’s order. Mokbel’s pharmacies then shipped out numerous topical creams, often on auto-refill, and excessively billed Medicare, Medicaid and private insurance plans. 

    Mokbel made over $200 million as a result of the scheme. 

    From 2015 through 2020, Mokbel also corruptly gave a series of bribe payments, ranging from $2,000 to $5,000 and totaling over $188,000 an employee of a pharmacy benefits manager – OptumRx – in exchange for favorable treatment for 4M pharmacies. They were credentialed and recredentialed with OptumRx which allowed them to enter into retail network agreements with OptumRx, participate in the Medicare Part D program and submit claims for prescriptions for Medicare beneficiaries. Mokbel also received information and advice about responding to audits and preventing and/or delaying OptumRX termination of many 4M pharmacies.

    U.S. District Judge Lee H. Rosenthal accepted the verdict and set sentencing for Jan. 7, 2025. At that time, Mokbel faces up to 20 years for conspiracy to commit mail fraud and health care fraud, 10 years for each of five counts of health care fraud, each of six counts of money laundering and one count of bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds as well as five years for

    conspiracy to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute and conspiracy to commit bribery. He could also be ordered to pay up to a total of $4 million in fines and possible restitution in excess of $160 million.      

    Previously released on bond, Mokbel was taken into custody pending sentencing.

    The FBI, IRS Criminal Investigation, Homeland Security Investigations, Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration and the Texas Attorney General Medicaid Fraud Control Unit conducted the investigation. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kathryn Leigh Olson and Adam Laurence Goldman are prosecuting the case.

    MIL Security OSI –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Bitget Wallet Becomes The Second Most Downloaded App Closing in on Binance

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VICTORIA, Seychelles, Oct. 16, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bitget Wallet, the leading Web3 non-custodial wallet, has seen nearly 6 million app downloads in September, becoming the second most downloaded crypto app worldwide trailing Binance and surpassing the majority of Web3 wallets and crypto exchanges in new user adoption. Bitget Wallet has also announced the milestone of surpassing 40 million users globally, increasing over 100% since March 2024. This significant growth positions Bitget Wallet as the fastest-growing decentralized wallet this year, and shows the growing demand for decentralized solutions, positioning them as primary entry points into Web3.

    Key Drivers Behind Explosive Growth

    Several key factors have fueled Bitget Wallet’s impressive growth. Its intuitive user interface and robust product features make decentralized finance accessible, particularly for first-time crypto users. The wallet seamlessly integrates all of Web3 in one app—including asset management, swaps, launchpads, crypto trading, staking, and a DApp explorer—into a single platform. A pivotal aspect of its growth this year has been the integration with TON ecosystem and Telegram, which has facilitated user access to wallet services directly within the popular messaging platform, bridging Web2 users into Web3. In Q3 alone, the wallet saw an incredible 4886% growth in TON onchain addresses. Additionally, Bitget Wallet has gained significant traction in emerging markets, allowing for a smooth onboarding experience for new users entering crypto space. Notably, Bitget Wallet saw the strongest user growth in Q3 recorded in regions like Africa with a staggering 413% increase, followed by South Asia at 126% and the Middle-East at 105%.

    Decentralized Wallets: The Future Gateway to Web3

    Bitget Wallet’s rapid expansion signifies a broader trend in the industry: decentralized wallets are emerging as essential gateways to Web3, increasingly competing with centralized exchanges in terms of user base and functionality. More wallets are now working directly with Web2 platforms, such as payment solutions and social messaging apps, to increase the usability of tokens directly from self-custodial wallets. However, the Web3 landscape still faces challenges, particularly in terms of user retention. While onboarding has become easier, retaining users within decentralized ecosystems can be difficult due to limited real-world use cases and complex user interfaces. Therefore, it is critical to develop user-friendly applications and facilitate seamless interactions to ensure long-term engagement in this evolving digital landscape.

    Seamless Integration of All Web3 Services in One App

    Since its founding in 2018, Bitget Wallet has established itself as a comprehensive Web3 hub. It supports 100+ blockchains, 20,000+ DApps and millions of tokens onchain, positioning it among the largest decentralized marketplaces. The wallet’s seamless swap feature allows for fast and cost-effective token exchanges, sourcing the best prices by aggregating liquidity from 100+ DEXes. In Q3, swap activity on Bitget Wallet grew 125%, while DApp activities increased 128%, and token transfers jumped by 175%, reflecting the rising adoption of decentralized financial services. Furthermore, its advanced tools—including full candlestick charts, Smart Money Alerts and hot token discovery—provide users with real-time, in-depth market insights to make informed trading decisions. With a focus on security, Bitget Wallet includes features such as keyless MPC wallet, on-chain fund tracking, and a $300 million user protection fund, ensuring a safe and user-friendly experience.

    A Vision for the Future of Web3

    Alvin Kan, COO of Bitget Wallet, remarked, “Surpassing 40 million users is a testament to our vision of making crypto accessible to everyone, everywhere. Bitget Wallet registered nearly 6 million downloads in a month, closing in on top exchanges signaling that decentralized wallets are catching up with centralized platforms, and we’re excited to be leading this shift. Our mission is clear: to provide a secure and user-friendly gateway to Web3 for the next billion users.” He added, “The future of Web3 depends on how effectively we bridge the gap between Web2 and Web3. By integrating with platforms like Telegram, we’re simplifying crypto adoption for mainstream users and creating tools that enable seamless interaction with decentralized platforms. Decentralized wallets will evolve to serve as one of the primary entry points for billions of new users exploring Web3 for the first time.”

    About Bitget Wallet

    Bitget Wallet stands as one of the world’s leading non-custodial Web3 wallets and decentralized ecosystem platform. With the Bitget Onchain Layer, the wallet is well-poised to develop a burgeoning DeFi ecosystem through co-creation and strategic incubation. Aside from a powerful Swap function, Bitget Wallet also offers multi-chain asset management, smart money insights, a native Launchpad, Inscriptions Center, and an Earning Center. Supporting over 100 major blockchains, 500,000+ tokens, and a wide array of DApps, Bitget Wallet is your top wallet for asset discovery and Web3 exploration.

    For more information, visit: Website | Twitter | Telegram | Discord

    Photos accompanying this announcement are available at:

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/6a37bd8e-f170-43d7-8fa3-eb6f0cbf64da

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/3f73fa7d-5f9f-4607-9f22-0dae149abbb4

    The MIL Network –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Narrowing the Digital Divide: Households with broadband, laptops and desktops rising

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Narrowing the Digital Divide: Households with broadband, laptops and desktops rising

    Today, we’re launching a refresh of the Microsoft Digital Equity Data Dashboard with current data from the FCC, the United States Census Bureau, Code.org, Broadband Now, and Microsoft to help federal, state, and local policymakers gain a better understanding of the factors contributing to the digital divide in communities across the United States. Originally launched in 2022 as part of our Airband Initiative, the dashboard provides critical data to help understand broadband gaps at the local level, allowing these decision makers to anchor their policies and programs in data and maximize investments in areas of highest need.  

    Today’s update allows tracking of historical broadband data to analyze trends and progress being made as a result of government and private sector investments. This includes the new data from the dashboard, which shows that all states, including Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, saw an increase in the number of households with broadband connections as well as an increase in the number of households with laptops or desktops. The greatest changes were in households earning less than $20,000. These households saw an average increase of over 10.8 percentage points in internet connectivity compared to previous metrics, meaning there are nearly 325,000 more households connected in this group. 

    We’ve long held the belief in the value of data, and this dashboard refresh is the latest step in our ongoing journey to help close the digital divide around the world. 

    Bridging the Rural Broadband Gap in the United States 

    In 2017, we launched the Microsoft Airband Initiative with a clear mission: to bridge the significant rural broadband gap in the United States. That year, government data showed that at least 23.4 million people across the United States did not have access to reliable high-speed internet, and this lack of access created significant barriers to education, healthcare, and economic opportunities. At the same time, it’s been shown that increasing access and usage of broadband in rural areas leads to higher property values, increased job and population growth, increased entrepreneurship, and lower unemployment rates. This stark reality illustrated by this data highlighted the urgent need for action to bridge the digital divide.  

    We set out to help solve the problem by bringing private sector investment and innovative technologies together with advocacy for regulatory support and financial frameworks to increase connectivity. Over the years, we have tried different approaches to bridging the digital divide, and we’ve learned a lot. We initially focused on TV White Spaces, believing this unique technology would extend reliable and affordable broadband to rural areas. As time went on, we determined that to make a tangible impact in rural communities, we couldn’t rely on specific technology, so we shifted to a technology neutral approach. Today, our partners are leveraging fiber, fixed wireless, satellite, and other disruptive technologies to drive broad networks deeper into rural areas. As a result, our partners have extended coverage to over 7.4 million people in rural communities across 41 states and territories in the United States.   

    But technology alone was not a solution. High costs, the absence of new and alternative technologies, and market and regulatory conditions all hampered efforts. The economic impact was substantial, not only hindering individual progress but also stifling the overall development of rural areas. So, we also used our corporate voice and joined forces with others to directly advocate for Congress to deploy targeted funding to combat the digital divide.  

    Targeted Funding to Combat the Digital Divide 

    In the U.S., none of the progress we’ve seen would be possible, without the vision of the U.S. Congress to proactively and significantly invest in broadband infrastructure programs. Our experiences since 2017 have made it clear that these government investments are necessary to drive deep impact. Bipartisan investments in digital infrastructure and inclusion through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) were a huge step forward in our journey to close the digital divide in the United States.  

    As a result of these government investments and public private partnerships, our internet service provider partners in the U.S. have received more than $725 million in government infrastructure funding awards to accelerate network expansion and drive broadband adoption across the country, with approximately 80% going to rural communities.  

    An example includes Microsoft partner, Nextlink Internet, which is leveraging government investment and partnership to bring meaningful connectivity to rural communities in the Midwest, Southwest, and Southeast regions of the United States. Federal infrastructure funding enabled Nextlink to extend their seven-state footprint to 11 states in total: Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.   

    Looking Forward Globally with a Clear Vision 

    Outside of the United States, our global partnerships have brought coverage to nearly 100 million previously unserved and underserved people. Internationally, we’re also seeing success from similar models of participating in government infrastructure programs, with the U.S. government leading the way. This includes significant investments and leadership from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) via the Digital Invest program and the Women in the Digital Economy Fund (Wi-DEF), as well as the United States Trade and Development Agency’s (USTDA) Digital Transformation with Africa initiative.  

    These partnerships have also enabled digital infrastructure and off-grid energy in unserved and underserved communities around the world. In Nigeria, for instance, providers like Tizeti are leveraging government investments to bring connectivity to schools, health clinics, and community anchor institutions. And communities are experiencing improved outcomes in education and healthcare as a result. If connectivity alone has enabled these outcomes, imagine what additional innovation AI could unlock. 

    But there are still 2.6 billion people who remain offline. Limited internet can exacerbate economic inequalities and inhibit access to social services, civic activities, and online learning resources. In places where we’re using AI to map global populations in real-time, we can provide early warnings that allow communities to better plan disaster recovery during times of crisis. Communities that remain offline do not get these early warnings and cannot act on them. As AI becomes more prevalent, communities that remain offline will not be able to fully access the benefits of this new technology. 

    To continue momentum, we are looking to the lessons we learned in the U.S. We must scale innovative technologies, expand connectivity and energy access, and leverage strategic partnerships. Governments, financial institutions, philanthropic institutions, and the private sector must come together to address critical financing barriers, invest in development finance, and expand digital infrastructure. 

    We’ve committed to reaching 250 million people with meaningful connectivity by the end of next year. Today, we’re calling for continued support and collaboration from all sectors to ensure no one is left behind. We call on all stakeholders to join us in this mission. 

    • Governments must create enabling regulatory environments that prioritize funding for digital infrastructure and support quick and efficient allocation of funding by federal, state, and local entities. 
    • The private sector must invest in innovative technologies and business models. 
    • Philanthropic organizations must continue to advocate for digital inclusion and develop initiatives anchored in the local community. 

    The journey to close the digital divide is a long one. Building out infrastructure takes time. It’ll take time for us to see some of the direct results of this work, but there is room for optimism. We are extremely grateful for the leadership and vision of the United States government, which is laying a blueprint for other countries to follow, as well as state and local leaders working to ensure these programs are successful. We encourage all policymakers to proceed efficiently so the benefits of these investments reach local communities sooner rather than later.  

    With continued collaboration and commitment, we can use the power of data, technology, and partnership to achieve our ambitious goals. We’re dedicated to making a lasting impact, and we are excited about the future. Let’s come together to bring the power of digital connectivity and transformation to people around the world. 

    Tags: Airband initiative, broadband, broadband access, connectivity, digital access, digital divide, digital inequity, Digital Inequity Dashboard, Internet access, rural broadband

    MIL OSI Economics –

    January 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO’s Special Representative for the Southern Neighbourhood visits Morocco

    Source: NATO

    NATO’s Special Representative for the Southern Neighbourhood, Javier Colomina, travelled to the Kingdom of Morocco on 15 October 2024 for his second visit to the region in this new capacity. He met with high-level officials to discuss the further development of the NATO-Morocco partnership and other issues of mutual interest.

    “Morocco is an important country in North Africa and the Middle East and a valuable interlocutor for NATO on security issues, particularly in the field of counter-terrorism,” the Special Representative said. Noting that Morocco is the first among the partners within NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue to conclude an Individually Tailored Partnership Programme of practical cooperation with the Alliance, Mr. Colomina highlighted the importance of the cooperation. “Morocco has always been an important contributor to peace and international security, particularly through its contributions to various missions and operations carried out by NATO,” he explained.

    “Our partnership is based on shared values and challenges,” he added, “and given the challenges that the region is facing – in particular, instability in the Sahel but also in the Middle East –  we need to cooperate even more closely and with more determination in support of international peace and mutual security.”

    MIL Security OSI –

    January 23, 2025
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