Source: African Development Bank Group
The African Development Bank, through the Fund for African Private Sector Assistance (FAPA), has awarded a $1 million grant to South Africa’s National Business Initiative (NBI) to strengthen efforts to build a dynamic, demand-led skills ecosystem that enables South Africans, particularly young people, to access emerging job…
Category: Africa
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MIL-OSI Economics: African Development Bank awards $1 million grant to support green skills development for South Africans, with focus on youth
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MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, July 3, 2025
Source: International Monetary Fund
July 3, 2025
SPEAKER: Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF
MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the IMF Press Briefing. It’s wonderful to see all of you, both those of you here in person and, of course, colleagues online as well. I’m Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department at the IMF. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States. I’ll start as usual with a few announcements and then take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.
Starting with the announcements, the First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, will participate in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meetings in Durban, South Africa, on July 17th to 18th.
Second, in the coming weeks, we will be releasing two flagship publications, our External Sector Report and the World Economic Outlook Update. These reports will offer fresh insights into current global economic trends and external imbalances. Stay tuned. We will share more details soon.
And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions. For those of you who are connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking. And now the floor is open.
QUESTIONER: Thank you so much. I have two questions on Ukraine. In its Eighth Review, the IMF highlighted that Ukraine needs to adopt a supplementary budget for 2025 and enact critical reforms to restore fiscal sustainability and implement the National Revenue Strategy. Could you please elaborate on this? What specific reforms should Ukraine implement and when? And secondly, could you also please inform us when the next review of Ukraine is scheduled? Thank you.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. How concerned is IMF about the Ukraine’s debt sustainability? Taking into account recent highlights in the IMF’s release. Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine? And no one online on Ukraine? Okay, let me go ahead and answer these questions on Ukraine.
So, first, just stepping back to remind everyone where we are on Ukraine. On June 30th, so just a few days ago, the IMF’s Executive Board completed the Eighth Review of the EFF arrangement with Ukraine that enabled a disbursement of U.S. $0.5 billion, and it brought total disbursements under the program to $10.6 billion. In that review, we found that Ukraine’s economy remains resilient. The authorities met all end-March quantitative performance criteria, a prior action, and two structural benchmarks that were needed to complete the review.
Now, with respect to the specific questions. On the supplementary budget, what I can say there is that from our discussions over time and from the program documents, restoring fiscal sustainability in Ukraine does require a sustained and decisive effort to implement the National Revenue Strategy. And that strategy includes modernization of the tax and customs system, including timely appointment of a customs head. It includes the reduction in tax evasion and harmonization of certain legislation with EU standards. And the idea behind this package of reforms is that these reforms, combined with improvements in public investment management frameworks and medium-term budget preparation, as well as fiscal risk management, altogether, these are going to be critical to helping Ukraine underpin growth and investment over the medium term.
With respect to the Ninth Review, right now we expect the Ninth Review to take place toward the end of the year. It will combine basically the Ninth and the Tenth Reviews together under this new schedule. And of course, we do remain closely engaged with the Ukrainian authorities.
And then on the question on debt, what I can say there is that Ukraine has been able to preserve macroeconomic stability despite very difficult circumstances and conditions under the Fund’s program. Given the risks to the outlook and the overall challenges that Ukraine continues to face, it is essential that reform momentum is sustained. And we talked about the measures for domestic revenue mobilization, which are critical, as well as how important they are for restoring debt sustainability over the medium term.
It is also important for Ukraine to complete the remaining elements of the debt restructuring in line with program objectives. And that will be essential for the full restoration of debt sustainability under the program.
QUESTIONER: Two questions. Had the IMF confirmed any involvement by President Alassane Ouattara of Cote d’ Ivoire in supporting Senegalese ongoing negotiations with the Fund, particularly considering the recent data misreporting issues? This is the first question.
The second one, what are the IMF’s views on Senegal’s debt sustainability after the recent leak of the 119 percent national debt, as opposed to 99.7 which was indicated in the recent audit of the nation’s finances? Do you trust the last numbers on debt, 119 percent of GDP, communicated by the Ministry of Finance? Are they reliable? Thank you very much.
QUESTIONER: Are there any other questions on Senegal? Okay, so let me step back and remind where we are on Senegal.
So our team remains closely engaged with the Senegalese authorities. As you know, a Staff Mission visited Dakar in March and April, just a few months ago, to advance resolution of the misreporting case, which was confirmed by the Court of Auditors and which, as you know, revealed underreporting of fiscal deficits and public debt over a number of years. And we’re working closely with the authorities on the design of corrective measures and actions to address the root causes of the misreporting that took place. And we’re also working closely with the authorities to strengthen capacity development.
What I can say with respect to the question on the debt numbers is we strongly welcome the new government’s commitment to transparency in revealing the discrepancies in the reported debt and the fiscal deficits. The authorities are conducting their own audit and that audit is ongoing. We understand that the audit is close to being finalized. And we’re waiting for its completion to better understand the challenges and how we can move forward. And so ultimately, as we wait for that report, we are going to refrain from commenting on any numbers. We’re waiting for the report, and we will remain very closely engaged.
And on your other question on President Ouattara, I don’t have any information for you at this time, but of course, we’ll keep you updated if we have anything to report on that.
QUESTIONER: Question about Russia. So, the Bank of Russia has recently indicated that it can cut key interest rates for another one percentage point if the inflationary pressure remains to ease in Russia. So, from the IMF standpoint, how – well-timed and appropriate will this step be, taking into account your view on the current economic situation in Russia? Thanks.
MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Russia? Okay, so let me start a little bit with our assessment of the economy, and then I’ll speak to your question on monetary policy.
So, in terms of how we see the Russian economy following last year’s overheating, what we see is that the Russian economy is now slowing sharply. Inflation is easing, but is still high. And Russia, like many countries, is affected by high risks and uncertainty. In our April WEO, we projected growth to slow to 1.5 percent in 2025. Recent developments since April suggest that growth may even be lower. And we will, like for many countries, we will be updating our forecast for Russia in the July WEO update, which will come in a few weeks.
With respect to monetary policy, as I said, inflation remains high. Annual inflation is above the Central Bank of Russia’s target. But based on our April forecast, we do expect inflation to come down and to decline over time. In April, we had expected inflation to return to target in the second half of 2027. And so, we see that for the Central Bank policymaking is going to need to balance the fact that inflation is still high, and that unemployment is still very low in Russia, with the fact that the economy is rapidly slowing and that risks are rising. So that will be the challenge for the Central Bank that we see in its making of monetary policy in the near future.
QUESTIONER: Julie, can I just follow up on that Russia question? So you said that because of the current conditions, can you just explain why your forecast is going to be revised downward for Russia’s growth?
MS. KOZACK: So, I want to be clear, we will provide the revised forecast in July as part of the WEO. What the team has been seeing is that some recent data suggests that growth may be lower than we had forecast. But I don’t want to preempt their actual forecast. What we see is that the slowdown that we see in Russia reflects a few things. First, tight policies. The other factors are cyclical factors. So, coming off of a period of overheating, you often see a cyclical slowdown. And that’s what we’re seeing in Russia. And also, the fact that oil prices are lower, which is also affecting Russia as well. And we also do see some impact on the economy from tightening sanctions.
QUESTIONER: A couple of questions on the U.S. Congress, as you know, is about to pass the, what they call the One Big Beautiful Bill, the sweeping budget tax spending policy bill, which is going to, by all accounts, increase the U.S. deficit by $3.4 trillion over 10 years. It contains major cuts to social programs such as Medicaid, which is going to be very hard on the poorest Americans. Just wondering if you can provide any perspective from the IMF on this bill. It kind of goes against everything that the IMF recommends that the U.S. do on the fiscal front, which is to bring deficits under control and tocreate more equality in the economy. So just wondering if you can shed some light on sort of how the IMF is going to view this, including your perspective on what it might do for financial markets with extra U.S. debt, perhaps increasing U.S. interest rates in real terms and forcing other countries to pay higher interest rates. Thanks.
MS. KOZACK: Are there any other questions on the U.S.? You have another question?
QUESTIONER: It’s a trade question.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, well, if it’s on the U.S., go for it.
QUESTIONER: So next week is the July 9th deadline for the U.S. to potentially raise tariff rates on many, many countries. As you know, the president had lowered those tariff rates temporarily. It’s likely that a lot of countries are going to see much higher interest rates. And I’m just wondering if you can comment on that and how it will affect whether that’s being factored into your WEO update, and the impact that will have on the global economy. Thanks.
QUESTIONER: Julie, a follow-up?
MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.
QUESTIONER: Just a follow-up to that question with regard to the U.S. and trade. Now, one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners is the U.S. Now, President Trump has already signaled deals with countries like Vietnam and India. But, for small economies like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, there is still uncertainty around it. So, given the uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking at changes in certain targets with these countries that are already in programs, or will there be any revisit to the financing already given to these countries? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start by saying, I think, to your first question, so at this stage, and as you noted, it’s fair to say there’s a consensus that the recent bill that was approved in the Senate and is now under discussion in the House would add to the fiscal deficit and it appears to run counter to reducing federal debt over the medium term. From the IMF side, we have been consistent in saying that the U.S. will need to reduce its fiscal deficit over time to put public debt-to-GDP on a decisive downward path. And since a fiscal consolidation will ultimately be needed to achieve or to put debt on a downward path, of course, the sooner that process starts to reduce the deficit, the more gradual the deficit reduction can be over time.
And of course, there are many different policy options that the U.S. has to reduce its deficit and debt. And it is, of course, important to build consensus within the United States about how it will address these chronic fiscal deficits. We’re currently examining the details of the legislation and the likely impact on the U.S. economy. We will be providing a broader update of our views in terms of the outlook for the U.S. and also, of course, for the global economy in the July WEO update, which, as I noted, will be coming in the next few weeks. And of course, we will take into account in the update all updated developments, including potential new policies or legislation.
And that goes a little bit to your other question on July 9th and the tariff deadline, to the extent possible and feasible, we will take into account as many of the trade deals or announcements that are made, and we will take those into account in our July WEO update. And we’re paying, of course, close attention to the situation globally.
As we’ve been saying, this is a moment for the global economy marked by high uncertainty. And so that uncertainty is something that is still with us. And we’re also taking the fact that we’re at a moment of high uncertainty into account in thinking about our forecasts for the global economy.
QUESTIONER: When will the Board will address the first revision of the agreement with Argentina? It’s a simple question.
MS. KOZACK: Okay. Other questions on Argentina?
QUESTIONER: Is there a concern in the IMF that the external deficit exceed $5 billion in the first quarter of this year?
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. Wanted to ask what the IMF is expecting in terms of Argentina’s ability to meet its reserves target, or whether the IMF will be considering a waiver to ask about the timing for the next $2 billion disbursement. And finally, how the YPF court order this week influences the outlook for Argentina and the need to build foreign reserves.
QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie. Good morning. I would like to address the question of my colleague. Do you think the court ruling of YPF will have significant implications for both, I mean, the company and Argentina’s economic stability?
QUESTIONER: Also, on the YPF issue, if that challenges in any way Argentina’s goal to return to international financial markets by the end of the year. And if you could comment on the mission that was in Buenos Aires’ findings last week.
QUESTIONER: A recent JP Morgan report recommended that selling LECAP bonds due to their increased risk because of the lack of reserve accumulation. Also, Argentina failed to rise to MSCI Emerging Market status. Is this a cause for concern for the IMF? Could it obstruct Argentina’s return to international markets in 2026 as the Staff Report indicates? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: All right, anyone else on Argentina? Okay, so maybe just stepping back for a moment. As you know, a recent IMF Staff Technical Mission visited Buenos Aires recently. The mission concluded on June 27th. And this mission was part of the First Review under the program under the new $20 billion EFF program. Discussions for the First Review continue, and they remain very productive.
What I can also add is that the program, as we’ve said before, it continues to deliver positive results. The transition to a more robust FX regime has been smooth. The disinflation process has resumed. The economy continues to expand. High-frequency indicators suggest that poverty is on a downward trend in Argentina. Argentina has also reaccessed international capital markets for the first time in seven years. And all of this progress, of course, under the program, is being underpinned by appropriately tight fiscal and monetary policies.
Discussions now are focused on policies to sustain the stabilization gains, including by continuing to rebuild buffers to address risks from a more complex external backdrop. Both the IMF Staff and the Argentine authorities are closely engaged on these issues, and it reflects the ongoing collaboration that we have with the authorities as well as a shared commitment to the success of the program.
On some of the more specific questions with respect to targets under the program and the potential for waivers, at this stage, given that the discussions are ongoing, I’m not going to speculate on the potential for waivers or the outcome of those discussions. But we will, of course, keep you updated in due course.
On the broader question of reserve accumulation, what I can add is that, as I mentioned, Staff and the authorities do have a shared commitment to the success of the program, which I noted. But I can add that this, of course, includes a shared recognition of the need to continue to build buffers against external risks. We’re closely engaged with the authorities on the issue.
On the question of YPF, we’re obviously paying close attention, monitoring this situation. However, as a matter of policy, we don’t comment on legal matters involving our member countries, and that includes this IMF case.
I need to apologize because a question was asked in the last round which I did not answer. So, I’m going to repeat the question, and then I’m going to answer it. The question is the U.S. is one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners and countries are racing to strike deals. President Trump already signaled a deal with India. Given this uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking to change targets or revisit financing? So here I think, they were asking really about program countries, and they mentioned Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and one other country.
So, what I can say on this one is that in all program countries, in all program contexts, the reason why we have reviews during the program is there’s a backward-looking part to the review, which is to assess whether the country has complied with the targets and the commitments that they have made. But the other part is what we call a forward-looking part. And that part really looks at what has happened to the economy, globally, what are the trends, and how should those be taken into account going forward. So to the extent that uncertainty or changes in trading relations or in the trading environment has an effect on the economy, which is significant enough to affect the program, of course, those will be taken into account. But it will be done on a case-by-case basis, tailored to the specific circumstances of every program country that we have.
Let’s continue then.
QUESTIONER: Do you know when the Board will meet?
MS. KOZACK: Ah, I apologize. So, with respect to the First Review, just in terms of the process, first, the discussions between the team and the authorities will need to come to a conclusion, and a Staff-Level Agreement would need to be reached. And once that happens, we will submit the documentation to our Board for review. So, I don’t yet have a timing for the Board meeting, but we will, of course, keep you informed as the discussions continue.
MS. KOZACK: I’m not going to speculate at all. I want to give time, of course, for the authorities and the team to complete the discussions, and we will abide by our process, the first step of which is a Staff-Level Agreement, and then we will submit the documents for consideration by the Executive Board.
QUESTIONER: Can I have a short follow-up? Do you expect Minister Caputo in the upcoming days in Washington D.C.?
MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say is that the discussions are continuing. There is a technical team here in Washington to have those discussions. But it’s a technical team.
MS. KOZACK: All right, let me go online.
QUESTIONER: I have a couple of questions on Egypt specifically. The first is we all in Egypt were expecting the Fifth Review to be completed before the end of fiscal year, which ends by end of June. So, could you please update us on the ongoing negotiations regarding the Fifth Review? My second one is on the RSF financing. We want to also know an update on that.
MS. KOZACK: Are there other questions on Egypt.
QUESTIONER: I have another question on Egypt. So, what are the current points of contention that delayed this disbursement of the fifth tranche? And do you think there is any room to extend the loan repayment due to the current challenges, especially that there were more effects that have affected Egypt recently, because of the war that happened during June? And I have another question on Syria. I don’t know if I could put it in now. Maybe you can answer that later on. How will lifting the sanctions change or expedite any program with the IMF regarding Syria?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, so let’s first see if there’s other questions on Egypt and I’ll answer on Egypt and then I’ll turn to Syria.
QUESTIONER: I just want to add to what my colleagues said before whether you’re able to confirm or say any more about reports recently that the Fifth and Sixth Reviews will be combined into one review that would then take place in September.
MS. KOZACK: Anyone else on Egypt?
So, on Egypt, an IMF team, as you know, visited Cairo in May, from May 6th to 18th, for discussions with the Egyptian authorities. The discussions were productive. Egypt continues to make progress under its macroeconomic reform program. And we can say that there’s been notable improvements in inflation and in the level of foreign exchange reserves, which have increased.
To move further and to really safeguard macroeconomic stability in Egypt and to bolster the country’s resilience to shocks, it is essential to deepen reforms, and this is particularly important to reduce the state footprint in the economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment. Some of the key policies that are under discussion and key priorities are advancing the state ownership policy and asset [divestment
diversification] program in sectors where the state has committed to withdraw. These steps are critical to really enabling the private sector to drive stronger and more sustainable growth in Egypt. And our commitment, of course, is strong to Egypt. We’re committed to supporting Egypt in building this resilience and in fostering growth.With respect to the reviews, the discussions suggest that more time is needed to finalize the key policy measures, particularly related to the state’s role in the economy and to ensure that the critical objectives of the program, the authority’s economic reform program, can be met. Our Staff team is continuing to work with the authorities on this goal. And for that reason, the Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the EFF will be combined. And the idea is for them to be combined into a discussion or a combined review for the fall. So that’s the rationale for combining the reviews. More time [is] needed.
And I think there was also a question on Egypt’s RSF and what I can say on thisis that as the RSF was approved recently for Egypt and as per the schedule approved by the board, the First Review of the RSF is aligned with the Sixth Review under the EFF.
QUESTIONER: Julie, would you allow me to follow up on something they’ve just said?
So, you said that the Fifth and the Sixth Review will be combined for the fall. Does this mean that the Fifth and the Sixth disbursements will be together? Could this be possible? Is this on the table?
MS. KOZACK: So, given that the discussions are still underway, a part of the discussions that will, of course, take place around combining the reviews will be to look at what are Egypt’s financing needs and around that, what should be the size of the disbursement around the combined Fifth and Sixth Review. So that’s all part of the discussions, the ongoing discussions that are taking place. So, it would be premature for me to speculate at this stage.
Okay, you had a question on Syria. So, let me see if anyone else has a question on Syria. I don’t see anyone else on Syria.
So, turning to Syria. So, as I think you know, an IMF team visited Syria from June 1st to 5th. And this was the first visit of an IMF team to Syria since 2009. The team was in Syria to assess the economic and financial conditions in Syria and discuss with the authorities their economic policy and capacity-building priorities. And all of this, of course, is to support the recovery of the Syrian economy.
As we’ve discussed here before, Syria faces enormous challenges following years of conflict that have caused, you know, immense human suffering. And the conflict has reduced the economy to a fraction of its former size. The lifting of sanctions can help facilitate Syria’s rehabilitation by supporting its reintegration into the global economy. And as part of our ongoing engagement with the Syrian authorities, we will, as needed, of course, you know, assess the implications of the lifting of sanctions on the Syrian economy.
So, again, that’s going to be part of the work of the team as they are putting together a picture of the Syrian economy, but also of the very important and deep capacity development needs that the Syrian authorities will have.
QUESTIONER: I just wanted to follow up on a colleague’s follow-up. The comments that you made a few minutes ago regarding Argentina having a technical team in Washington for discussions with the IMF. I just wanted to confirm my understanding. Were you saying that they have a — that there is currently a technical team in Washington, and can you tell us anything more about the dates of the meetings or anything beyond that technical team being currently in Washington, if I understood you correctly?
MS. KOZACK: So, I think all I can add to that is that I can confirm that there is a technical delegation in Washington, you know, from Argentina in Washington, visiting headquarters this week. And the goal is to advance discussions on the First Review under the program. I hope that clarifies.
QUESTIONER: Yes, I wanted to ask you on Mozambique — sorry, just pulling up my note here — which was that –excuse me. Regarding Mozambique, is it feasible to agree to a new program with Mozambique by year-end, as the president of that country is hoping, or do you have anything on any of the hurdles and the process there? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: I’m sort of looking. I don’t have anything off-hand in terms of an update on Mozambique. So, we’ll come back to you separately on Mozambique. I’m sorry about that.
All right, let’s go online. You had a question?
QUESTIONER: I have a quick follow-up on Ukraine and then another one. On Ukraine, when you are talking about combining the Ninth and Tenth Reviews, what would that mean also in terms of the disbursement? But you know, in the case of Egypt, you’re giving the authorities more time to execute reviews. What is the reason for combining them in the case of Ukraine?
And then, how many more reviews, I just don’t remember, how many more reviews were planned to get to the $15.5 billion? So, we’ve got $10.6 billion dispersed already. Like, how much is left to go, and how much of that notionally would come in the Ninth and Tenth Reviews?
And then separately, I just want to come back to the trade question and perhaps broaden it out a little bit. So, as the United States under the administration of Donald Trump is imposing quite significant tariffs on many, if not all, of its trading partners, that raises costs, obvious for everyone. At the same time, the government has also been reducing, significantly slashing its foreign aid for development systems. And you know, obviously, there’s a lot of concern about that. We’ve seen some reports recently from the Lancet that millions of people could die as a result of this money not being in — in those countries. That has follow-on consequences for all the countries whose, you know, economies you’re guiding and accompanying. And I just want to know if you — if you’ve done a sort of broader analysis about this trade environment. For many years, you have been warning about trade restrictions, and we are now fully into a period where trade restrictions seem to be increasing. So, just asking a broad question.
And then finally, we do have the G20 meeting coming up. The United States has not participated in the initial G20 meetings this year. What would it mean to the organization if the United States also chose to skip this July meeting? What is the importance of that as in that body?
QUESTIONER: So, on Ukraine, what I can say is the Ninth Review, as I said, we expect it to take place by the end of the year and it is going to combine the previously envisaged Ninth Review, which was scheduled for the fall, and the Tenth Review, which we expected to take place in the fourth quarter. And the team is going to remain closely engaged with Ukraine over this period. I don’t have more details on the reason that the reviews are being combined, but I believe the Staff Report has been published for Ukraine. And so, I would refer you to that document, which should have the relevant details.
On your broader question about the trade environment and the aid environment. I think if you think about it, or if we look back at it, you know, what has the IMF been saying? If we look back to the Spring Meetings, one of the main messages from the Managing Director’s Curtain Raiser and her global policy agenda, as well as our broader messages, was that it is very important for countries to, we were saying, kind of, or the Managing Director was saying to get their own house in order. So, there’s — and the message really behind that was that yes, the trade environment is shifting, and we see very significant shifts in the trade environment.
But there is a lot that countries can and need to do domestically related to their own reforms to build their own resilience. There’s a lot that countries can do in terms of policy, and that really relates in many countries to fiscal policy, which is about, because we’ve been talking about a low-growth, high-debt environment for some time. High uncertainty and weaker trade affects that environment. But the fact still remains that we have a low-growth and high-debt environment globally. So, for countries, that means taking measures to reduce the high debt problem.
That’s on the fiscal side. And that is a general piece of policy advice that we’ve given to many, many countries. And on the growth side, we are strongly encouraging countries to take measures to boost productivity and medium-term growth. So, this is really at the crux of our policy advice to countries.
And on the aid side, what we’ve been warning about for quite some time is that official development assistance, in general, has been on a declining downward trend for many, many years. And we see the impact of the decline in official development assistance in low-income countries. So, this is a broad trend that we observe globally across many countries, affecting low-income countries. But what it means for those countries is that they are going to have to both work with the IMF, other MDBs [multinational development banks], [and] donors who are still providing financing. But most importantly, those countries are going to need to look for ways to mobilize domestic resources so that they can fund many of their own development needs.
And so this is also part of, we call it a three-pillar approach where we look at the need for domestic reforms in countries, the need for assistance and stepped-up assistance from multilateral organizations to provide needed financing for countries, and of course ways to ultimately reduce the cost of financing and also looking to mobilize private financing for countries. So, there is a very rich and large agenda on this broad topic that we have been discussing for quite some time.
And on the G20, this is really a matter, I think, for the G20 presidency and for the — for the United States.
Let me look online.
QUESTIONER: So, I have like two questions regarding the finalizing the four-year Extended Credit Facility that is linked between the International Monetary Fund and the government of Ethiopia. So again, the IMF Staff has been paying a review visit to Ethiopia many times to review Ethiopia’s section and disperse the money. In this point, I have two questions. The first one is how does the IMF evaluate Ethiopia’s move and current achievement towards liberalizing its economy? And the second one is what are the parameters to indicate whether the mission is going on the right track, as the people of the country are facing heavy life burden?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Other questions on Ethiopia?
QUESTIONER: I noted [that] in the Third Review that came out late last night that most of the macroeconomic forecasts are looking up compared to the second. Apart from public debt-to-GDP, I can’t really figure out why. So, could you maybe walk me through that? And I have a separate question on Lebanon. Maybe we’ll take that later.
MS. KOZACK: Anything else on Ethiopia? All right. So, with respect to Ethiopia, the IMF Executive Board approved the 2025 Article IV consultation and the Third Review under the ECF on July 2nd, and that enabled Ethiopia to access about U.S. $260 million.
What I can add is that the completion of the review reflects both the assessment of the Staff and our Executive Board that Ethiopia’s strong adherence to the program and the program goals, and it also reflects continued confidence in the government’s reform agenda. The Ethiopian authorities have made significant progress in implementing some really important and fundamental reforms under the ECF. Key economic indicators such as inflation, fiscal balance, and external balance are all showing signs of stabilization. And that suggests that the country and the economy are kind of progressing on the right track.
With respect to your more detailed question, we will have to come back to you bilaterally. I’m not sure exactly why. I don’t know off the top of my head the answer to that, but we will come back to you on that one.
I know there’s a few more questions online, so let’s try to get to them.
QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Sorry. So, I wanted to — my question is regarding what is going on in Kenya. President Ruto announced that he planned to privatize some of the public assets. And I was wondering if you could provide any views from the IMF? I also wanted to ask you, next week, President Donald Trump will be meeting with several African leaders. Some of those countries have critical minerals. So perhaps the meeting we resolve around critical minerals. As you know, a lot of countries, the U.S., China, as well as European nations, are very interested in African critical minerals. So, I was wondering if you could share your view, giving what has happened in the past and the corruption around critical minerals and the mismanagement of the Fund received from the minerals. What is the IMF’s recommendation to nations across the African continent right now, on how to —
MS. KOZACK: I think we lost you.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, so, we lost you for a bit in the middle, but I think I got the gist of your question. So, let me now ask, does anyone else have a question on Kenya?
QUESTIONER: Yeah, I do. Hello?
MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.
QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask about that Diagnostic Mission. I know I’d asked you about it before, but now it’s completed, and does the IMF want that report to be made public, or does it expect it to be made public? I have a question on Barbados, too, but I’ll wait on that one.
MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start with Kenya. So, on Kenya, maybe just to remind everyone where we are on Kenya. Our Staff team is actively engaged with the authorities on recent developments. As you know, we’ve been discussing with them the timing of the next Article IV Mission and also their request for a new program.
And I will come to your question on the Government Diagnostics Mission in just a minute.
So, a big part of our work with Kenya now is this Government Diagnostics Mission. The Technical Mission just concluded on June 30th, and they released a short press release, which was just issued. This was kind of the first step of a process that we expect to take until the end of the year. So, collaboration on government diagnostics. It will continue over the next several months. A draft diagnostic assessment report is expected to be shared with the Kenyan authorities before the end of the year. So that first report will go to the authorities, and then the report will be published once consent is received from the authorities. So that is the process that we’ll have. But it will take quite some time to get that report prepared and ready. So, kind of hold this space. We’ll continue to work on it.
And then on your question on Kenya, what I can say is that we look forward to learning more details about the President’s statement that was made yesterday. What I can say more broadly is that our engagement with the Kenyan authorities on privatization has been focused on establishing a solid framework to ensure that transparency and good governance, with the aim to unlock potential benefits.
So again, our discussions have very much focused on having a framework, and if done well, we see potential benefits that could include, for example, increased efficiency of improved private investment, reducing the fiscal burden, and improving service delivery.
On your second question, I think the way I will approach it is to say that, and Kenya is an example of this in some ways, with this governance Diagnostic Mission that, of course, at the IMF, we are concerned about not only in Africa, but in all countries where it’s a — where corruption affects economic activity, we are concerned about governance. We have a strong governance program, and it includes a Government Diagnostic Mission. Government diagnostic assessments allow our experts to go and do a deep assessment of governance in a country, look at where governance weaknesses exist, and to recommend a path forward to improve governance and reduce corruption over time.
We recognize that in many of our member countries, governance and corruption issues do have a significant impact on economic activity, and we are very committed to working with our member countries to improve governance as an important part of enabling countries to achieve stronger growth and better livelihoods for their people.
And let me go — I have Jermine. You haven’t had a question yet, and I think we are over time. So, I am going to wrap up with you as the last question.
QUESTIONER: I have two questions pertaining to the Caribbean region, more specifically to the Citizenship by Investment programs. What’s IMF’s position regarding the decisions made by St. Kitts and Nevis and other territories to establish a regulatory body to oversee these programs?
MS. KOZACK: Go ahead.
QUESTIONER: Regarding the looming threat of visa waivers by the Schengen region, the European Union, regarding these particular passport holders, knowing that the CBI programs are the pillars of the economies of the region.
MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say on the CBI, the citizenship by investment programs, is that our position has been that we generally advocate for common CBI program standards across the region, including in the area of transparency. And this was noted in our 2024 Regional Consultation Report on the ECCU.
And with respect to specific countries such as Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia, for those specific countries, we have provided country-specific information, and the information on those can be found in the respective Article IV reports for those countries.
With respect to the question on the Schengen region, this is really a matter between the individual countries in the Caribbean and the countries in the Schengen region. It’s not really a matter for the IMF.
So, with that, given that we’ve taken more time than we normally allocate, I want to thank everyone very much for your participation today. As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States. As always, a transcript will be made later — available later on IMF.org. And of course, in case of any clarifications, additional queries, if you didn’t get a chance to ask your questions today, please do be in contact with my colleagues at media@imf.org, and we will be sure to give you a response. I wish you all a wonderful day and a wonderful long weekend, and I look forward to seeing you all next time. Thanks very much.
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IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS
PRESS OFFICER: Rahim Kanani
Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org
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MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, July 3, 2025
Source: IMF – News in Russian
July 3, 2025
SPEAKER: Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF
MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the IMF Press Briefing. It’s wonderful to see all of you, both those of you here in person and, of course, colleagues online as well. I’m Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department at the IMF. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States. I’ll start as usual with a few announcements and then take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.
Starting with the announcements, the First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, will participate in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meetings in Durban, South Africa, on July 17th to 18th.
Second, in the coming weeks, we will be releasing two flagship publications, our External Sector Report and the World Economic Outlook Update. These reports will offer fresh insights into current global economic trends and external imbalances. Stay tuned. We will share more details soon.
And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions. For those of you who are connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking. And now the floor is open.
QUESTIONER: Thank you so much. I have two questions on Ukraine. In its Eighth Review, the IMF highlighted that Ukraine needs to adopt a supplementary budget for 2025 and enact critical reforms to restore fiscal sustainability and implement the National Revenue Strategy. Could you please elaborate on this? What specific reforms should Ukraine implement and when? And secondly, could you also please inform us when the next review of Ukraine is scheduled? Thank you.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. How concerned is IMF about the Ukraine’s debt sustainability? Taking into account recent highlights in the IMF’s release. Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine? And no one online on Ukraine? Okay, let me go ahead and answer these questions on Ukraine.
So, first, just stepping back to remind everyone where we are on Ukraine. On June 30th, so just a few days ago, the IMF’s Executive Board completed the Eighth Review of the EFF arrangement with Ukraine that enabled a disbursement of U.S. $0.5 billion, and it brought total disbursements under the program to $10.6 billion. In that review, we found that Ukraine’s economy remains resilient. The authorities met all end-March quantitative performance criteria, a prior action, and two structural benchmarks that were needed to complete the review.
Now, with respect to the specific questions. On the supplementary budget, what I can say there is that from our discussions over time and from the program documents, restoring fiscal sustainability in Ukraine does require a sustained and decisive effort to implement the National Revenue Strategy. And that strategy includes modernization of the tax and customs system, including timely appointment of a customs head. It includes the reduction in tax evasion and harmonization of certain legislation with EU standards. And the idea behind this package of reforms is that these reforms, combined with improvements in public investment management frameworks and medium-term budget preparation, as well as fiscal risk management, altogether, these are going to be critical to helping Ukraine underpin growth and investment over the medium term.
With respect to the Ninth Review, right now we expect the Ninth Review to take place toward the end of the year. It will combine basically the Ninth and the Tenth Reviews together under this new schedule. And of course, we do remain closely engaged with the Ukrainian authorities.
And then on the question on debt, what I can say there is that Ukraine has been able to preserve macroeconomic stability despite very difficult circumstances and conditions under the Fund’s program. Given the risks to the outlook and the overall challenges that Ukraine continues to face, it is essential that reform momentum is sustained. And we talked about the measures for domestic revenue mobilization, which are critical, as well as how important they are for restoring debt sustainability over the medium term.
It is also important for Ukraine to complete the remaining elements of the debt restructuring in line with program objectives. And that will be essential for the full restoration of debt sustainability under the program.
QUESTIONER: Two questions. Had the IMF confirmed any involvement by President Alassane Ouattara of Cote d’ Ivoire in supporting Senegalese ongoing negotiations with the Fund, particularly considering the recent data misreporting issues? This is the first question.
The second one, what are the IMF’s views on Senegal’s debt sustainability after the recent leak of the 119 percent national debt, as opposed to 99.7 which was indicated in the recent audit of the nation’s finances? Do you trust the last numbers on debt, 119 percent of GDP, communicated by the Ministry of Finance? Are they reliable? Thank you very much.
QUESTIONER: Are there any other questions on Senegal? Okay, so let me step back and remind where we are on Senegal.
So our team remains closely engaged with the Senegalese authorities. As you know, a Staff Mission visited Dakar in March and April, just a few months ago, to advance resolution of the misreporting case, which was confirmed by the Court of Auditors and which, as you know, revealed underreporting of fiscal deficits and public debt over a number of years. And we’re working closely with the authorities on the design of corrective measures and actions to address the root causes of the misreporting that took place. And we’re also working closely with the authorities to strengthen capacity development.
What I can say with respect to the question on the debt numbers is we strongly welcome the new government’s commitment to transparency in revealing the discrepancies in the reported debt and the fiscal deficits. The authorities are conducting their own audit and that audit is ongoing. We understand that the audit is close to being finalized. And we’re waiting for its completion to better understand the challenges and how we can move forward. And so ultimately, as we wait for that report, we are going to refrain from commenting on any numbers. We’re waiting for the report, and we will remain very closely engaged.
And on your other question on President Ouattara, I don’t have any information for you at this time, but of course, we’ll keep you updated if we have anything to report on that.
QUESTIONER: Question about Russia. So, the Bank of Russia has recently indicated that it can cut key interest rates for another one percentage point if the inflationary pressure remains to ease in Russia. So, from the IMF standpoint, how – well-timed and appropriate will this step be, taking into account your view on the current economic situation in Russia? Thanks.
MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Russia? Okay, so let me start a little bit with our assessment of the economy, and then I’ll speak to your question on monetary policy.
So, in terms of how we see the Russian economy following last year’s overheating, what we see is that the Russian economy is now slowing sharply. Inflation is easing, but is still high. And Russia, like many countries, is affected by high risks and uncertainty. In our April WEO, we projected growth to slow to 1.5 percent in 2025. Recent developments since April suggest that growth may even be lower. And we will, like for many countries, we will be updating our forecast for Russia in the July WEO update, which will come in a few weeks.
With respect to monetary policy, as I said, inflation remains high. Annual inflation is above the Central Bank of Russia’s target. But based on our April forecast, we do expect inflation to come down and to decline over time. In April, we had expected inflation to return to target in the second half of 2027. And so, we see that for the Central Bank policymaking is going to need to balance the fact that inflation is still high, and that unemployment is still very low in Russia, with the fact that the economy is rapidly slowing and that risks are rising. So that will be the challenge for the Central Bank that we see in its making of monetary policy in the near future.
QUESTIONER: Julie, can I just follow up on that Russia question? So you said that because of the current conditions, can you just explain why your forecast is going to be revised downward for Russia’s growth?
MS. KOZACK: So, I want to be clear, we will provide the revised forecast in July as part of the WEO. What the team has been seeing is that some recent data suggests that growth may be lower than we had forecast. But I don’t want to preempt their actual forecast. What we see is that the slowdown that we see in Russia reflects a few things. First, tight policies. The other factors are cyclical factors. So, coming off of a period of overheating, you often see a cyclical slowdown. And that’s what we’re seeing in Russia. And also, the fact that oil prices are lower, which is also affecting Russia as well. And we also do see some impact on the economy from tightening sanctions.
QUESTIONER: A couple of questions on the U.S. Congress, as you know, is about to pass the, what they call the One Big Beautiful Bill, the sweeping budget tax spending policy bill, which is going to, by all accounts, increase the U.S. deficit by $3.4 trillion over 10 years. It contains major cuts to social programs such as Medicaid, which is going to be very hard on the poorest Americans. Just wondering if you can provide any perspective from the IMF on this bill. It kind of goes against everything that the IMF recommends that the U.S. do on the fiscal front, which is to bring deficits under control and tocreate more equality in the economy. So just wondering if you can shed some light on sort of how the IMF is going to view this, including your perspective on what it might do for financial markets with extra U.S. debt, perhaps increasing U.S. interest rates in real terms and forcing other countries to pay higher interest rates. Thanks.
MS. KOZACK: Are there any other questions on the U.S.? You have another question?
QUESTIONER: It’s a trade question.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, well, if it’s on the U.S., go for it.
QUESTIONER: So next week is the July 9th deadline for the U.S. to potentially raise tariff rates on many, many countries. As you know, the president had lowered those tariff rates temporarily. It’s likely that a lot of countries are going to see much higher interest rates. And I’m just wondering if you can comment on that and how it will affect whether that’s being factored into your WEO update, and the impact that will have on the global economy. Thanks.
QUESTIONER: Julie, a follow-up?
MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.
QUESTIONER: Just a follow-up to that question with regard to the U.S. and trade. Now, one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners is the U.S. Now, President Trump has already signaled deals with countries like Vietnam and India. But, for small economies like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, there is still uncertainty around it. So, given the uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking at changes in certain targets with these countries that are already in programs, or will there be any revisit to the financing already given to these countries? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start by saying, I think, to your first question, so at this stage, and as you noted, it’s fair to say there’s a consensus that the recent bill that was approved in the Senate and is now under discussion in the House would add to the fiscal deficit and it appears to run counter to reducing federal debt over the medium term. From the IMF side, we have been consistent in saying that the U.S. will need to reduce its fiscal deficit over time to put public debt-to-GDP on a decisive downward path. And since a fiscal consolidation will ultimately be needed to achieve or to put debt on a downward path, of course, the sooner that process starts to reduce the deficit, the more gradual the deficit reduction can be over time.
And of course, there are many different policy options that the U.S. has to reduce its deficit and debt. And it is, of course, important to build consensus within the United States about how it will address these chronic fiscal deficits. We’re currently examining the details of the legislation and the likely impact on the U.S. economy. We will be providing a broader update of our views in terms of the outlook for the U.S. and also, of course, for the global economy in the July WEO update, which, as I noted, will be coming in the next few weeks. And of course, we will take into account in the update all updated developments, including potential new policies or legislation.
And that goes a little bit to your other question on July 9th and the tariff deadline, to the extent possible and feasible, we will take into account as many of the trade deals or announcements that are made, and we will take those into account in our July WEO update. And we’re paying, of course, close attention to the situation globally.
As we’ve been saying, this is a moment for the global economy marked by high uncertainty. And so that uncertainty is something that is still with us. And we’re also taking the fact that we’re at a moment of high uncertainty into account in thinking about our forecasts for the global economy.
QUESTIONER: When will the Board will address the first revision of the agreement with Argentina? It’s a simple question.
MS. KOZACK: Okay. Other questions on Argentina?
QUESTIONER: Is there a concern in the IMF that the external deficit exceed $5 billion in the first quarter of this year?
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. Wanted to ask what the IMF is expecting in terms of Argentina’s ability to meet its reserves target, or whether the IMF will be considering a waiver to ask about the timing for the next $2 billion disbursement. And finally, how the YPF court order this week influences the outlook for Argentina and the need to build foreign reserves.
QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie. Good morning. I would like to address the question of my colleague. Do you think the court ruling of YPF will have significant implications for both, I mean, the company and Argentina’s economic stability?
QUESTIONER: Also, on the YPF issue, if that challenges in any way Argentina’s goal to return to international financial markets by the end of the year. And if you could comment on the mission that was in Buenos Aires’ findings last week.
QUESTIONER: A recent JP Morgan report recommended that selling LECAP bonds due to their increased risk because of the lack of reserve accumulation. Also, Argentina failed to rise to MSCI Emerging Market status. Is this a cause for concern for the IMF? Could it obstruct Argentina’s return to international markets in 2026 as the Staff Report indicates? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: All right, anyone else on Argentina? Okay, so maybe just stepping back for a moment. As you know, a recent IMF Staff Technical Mission visited Buenos Aires recently. The mission concluded on June 27th. And this mission was part of the First Review under the program under the new $20 billion EFF program. Discussions for the First Review continue, and they remain very productive.
What I can also add is that the program, as we’ve said before, it continues to deliver positive results. The transition to a more robust FX regime has been smooth. The disinflation process has resumed. The economy continues to expand. High-frequency indicators suggest that poverty is on a downward trend in Argentina. Argentina has also reaccessed international capital markets for the first time in seven years. And all of this progress, of course, under the program, is being underpinned by appropriately tight fiscal and monetary policies.
Discussions now are focused on policies to sustain the stabilization gains, including by continuing to rebuild buffers to address risks from a more complex external backdrop. Both the IMF Staff and the Argentine authorities are closely engaged on these issues, and it reflects the ongoing collaboration that we have with the authorities as well as a shared commitment to the success of the program.
On some of the more specific questions with respect to targets under the program and the potential for waivers, at this stage, given that the discussions are ongoing, I’m not going to speculate on the potential for waivers or the outcome of those discussions. But we will, of course, keep you updated in due course.
On the broader question of reserve accumulation, what I can add is that, as I mentioned, Staff and the authorities do have a shared commitment to the success of the program, which I noted. But I can add that this, of course, includes a shared recognition of the need to continue to build buffers against external risks. We’re closely engaged with the authorities on the issue.
On the question of YPF, we’re obviously paying close attention, monitoring this situation. However, as a matter of policy, we don’t comment on legal matters involving our member countries, and that includes this IMF case.
I need to apologize because a question was asked in the last round which I did not answer. So, I’m going to repeat the question, and then I’m going to answer it. The question is the U.S. is one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners and countries are racing to strike deals. President Trump already signaled a deal with India. Given this uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking to change targets or revisit financing? So here I think, they were asking really about program countries, and they mentioned Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and one other country.
So, what I can say on this one is that in all program countries, in all program contexts, the reason why we have reviews during the program is there’s a backward-looking part to the review, which is to assess whether the country has complied with the targets and the commitments that they have made. But the other part is what we call a forward-looking part. And that part really looks at what has happened to the economy, globally, what are the trends, and how should those be taken into account going forward. So to the extent that uncertainty or changes in trading relations or in the trading environment has an effect on the economy, which is significant enough to affect the program, of course, those will be taken into account. But it will be done on a case-by-case basis, tailored to the specific circumstances of every program country that we have.
Let’s continue then.
QUESTIONER: Do you know when the Board will meet?
MS. KOZACK: Ah, I apologize. So, with respect to the First Review, just in terms of the process, first, the discussions between the team and the authorities will need to come to a conclusion, and a Staff-Level Agreement would need to be reached. And once that happens, we will submit the documentation to our Board for review. So, I don’t yet have a timing for the Board meeting, but we will, of course, keep you informed as the discussions continue.
MS. KOZACK: I’m not going to speculate at all. I want to give time, of course, for the authorities and the team to complete the discussions, and we will abide by our process, the first step of which is a Staff-Level Agreement, and then we will submit the documents for consideration by the Executive Board.
QUESTIONER: Can I have a short follow-up? Do you expect Minister Caputo in the upcoming days in Washington D.C.?
MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say is that the discussions are continuing. There is a technical team here in Washington to have those discussions. But it’s a technical team.
MS. KOZACK: All right, let me go online.
QUESTIONER: I have a couple of questions on Egypt specifically. The first is we all in Egypt were expecting the Fifth Review to be completed before the end of fiscal year, which ends by end of June. So, could you please update us on the ongoing negotiations regarding the Fifth Review? My second one is on the RSF financing. We want to also know an update on that.
MS. KOZACK: Are there other questions on Egypt.
QUESTIONER: I have another question on Egypt. So, what are the current points of contention that delayed this disbursement of the fifth tranche? And do you think there is any room to extend the loan repayment due to the current challenges, especially that there were more effects that have affected Egypt recently, because of the war that happened during June? And I have another question on Syria. I don’t know if I could put it in now. Maybe you can answer that later on. How will lifting the sanctions change or expedite any program with the IMF regarding Syria?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, so let’s first see if there’s other questions on Egypt and I’ll answer on Egypt and then I’ll turn to Syria.
QUESTIONER: I just want to add to what my colleagues said before whether you’re able to confirm or say any more about reports recently that the Fifth and Sixth Reviews will be combined into one review that would then take place in September.
MS. KOZACK: Anyone else on Egypt?
So, on Egypt, an IMF team, as you know, visited Cairo in May, from May 6th to 18th, for discussions with the Egyptian authorities. The discussions were productive. Egypt continues to make progress under its macroeconomic reform program. And we can say that there’s been notable improvements in inflation and in the level of foreign exchange reserves, which have increased.
To move further and to really safeguard macroeconomic stability in Egypt and to bolster the country’s resilience to shocks, it is essential to deepen reforms, and this is particularly important to reduce the state footprint in the economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment. Some of the key policies that are under discussion and key priorities are advancing the state ownership policy and asset diversification program in sectors where the state has committed to withdraw. These steps are critical to really enabling the private sector to drive stronger and more sustainable growth in Egypt. And our commitment, of course, is strong to Egypt. We’re committed to supporting Egypt in building this resilience and in fostering growth.
With respect to the reviews, the discussions suggest that more time is needed to finalize the key policy measures, particularly related to the state’s role in the economy and to ensure that the critical objectives of the program, the authority’s economic reform program, can be met. Our Staff team is continuing to work with the authorities on this goal. And for that reason, the Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the EFF will be combined. And the idea is for them to be combined into a discussion or a combined review for the fall. So that’s the rationale for combining the reviews. More time [is] needed.
And I think there was also a question on Egypt’s RSF and what I can say on thisis that as the RSF was approved recently for Egypt and as per the schedule approved by the board, the First Review of the RSF is aligned with the Sixth Review under the EFF.
QUESTIONER: Julie, would you allow me to follow up on something they’ve just said?
So, you said that the Fifth and the Sixth Review will be combined for the fall. Does this mean that the Fifth and the Sixth disbursements will be together? Could this be possible? Is this on the table?
MS. KOZACK: So, given that the discussions are still underway, a part of the discussions that will, of course, take place around combining the reviews will be to look at what are Egypt’s financing needs and around that, what should be the size of the disbursement around the combined Fifth and Sixth Review. So that’s all part of the discussions, the ongoing discussions that are taking place. So, it would be premature for me to speculate at this stage.
Okay, you had a question on Syria. So, let me see if anyone else has a question on Syria. I don’t see anyone else on Syria.
So, turning to Syria. So, as I think you know, an IMF team visited Syria from June 1st to 5th. And this was the first visit of an IMF team to Syria since 2009. The team was in Syria to assess the economic and financial conditions in Syria and discuss with the authorities their economic policy and capacity-building priorities. And all of this, of course, is to support the recovery of the Syrian economy.
As we’ve discussed here before, Syria faces enormous challenges following years of conflict that have caused, you know, immense human suffering. And the conflict has reduced the economy to a fraction of its former size. The lifting of sanctions can help facilitate Syria’s rehabilitation by supporting its reintegration into the global economy. And as part of our ongoing engagement with the Syrian authorities, we will, as needed, of course, you know, assess the implications of the lifting of sanctions on the Syrian economy.
So, again, that’s going to be part of the work of the team as they are putting together a picture of the Syrian economy, but also of the very important and deep capacity development needs that the Syrian authorities will have.
QUESTIONER: I just wanted to follow up on a colleague’s follow-up. The comments that you made a few minutes ago regarding Argentina having a technical team in Washington for discussions with the IMF. I just wanted to confirm my understanding. Were you saying that they have a — that there is currently a technical team in Washington, and can you tell us anything more about the dates of the meetings or anything beyond that technical team being currently in Washington, if I understood you correctly?
MS. KOZACK: So, I think all I can add to that is that I can confirm that there is a technical delegation in Washington, you know, from Argentina in Washington, visiting headquarters this week. And the goal is to advance discussions on the First Review under the program. I hope that clarifies.
QUESTIONER: Yes, I wanted to ask you on Mozambique — sorry, just pulling up my note here — which was that –excuse me. Regarding Mozambique, is it feasible to agree to a new program with Mozambique by year-end, as the president of that country is hoping, or do you have anything on any of the hurdles and the process there? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: I’m sort of looking. I don’t have anything off-hand in terms of an update on Mozambique. So, we’ll come back to you separately on Mozambique. I’m sorry about that.
All right, let’s go online. You had a question?
QUESTIONER: I have a quick follow-up on Ukraine and then another one. On Ukraine, when you are talking about combining the Ninth and Tenth Reviews, what would that mean also in terms of the disbursement? But you know, in the case of Egypt, you’re giving the authorities more time to execute reviews. What is the reason for combining them in the case of Ukraine?
And then, how many more reviews, I just don’t remember, how many more reviews were planned to get to the $15.5 billion? So, we’ve got $10.6 billion dispersed already. Like, how much is left to go, and how much of that notionally would come in the Ninth and Tenth Reviews?
And then separately, I just want to come back to the trade question and perhaps broaden it out a little bit. So, as the United States under the administration of Donald Trump is imposing quite significant tariffs on many, if not all, of its trading partners, that raises costs, obvious for everyone. At the same time, the government has also been reducing, significantly slashing its foreign aid for development systems. And you know, obviously, there’s a lot of concern about that. We’ve seen some reports recently from the Lancet that millions of people could die as a result of this money not being in — in those countries. That has follow-on consequences for all the countries whose, you know, economies you’re guiding and accompanying. And I just want to know if you — if you’ve done a sort of broader analysis about this trade environment. For many years, you have been warning about trade restrictions, and we are now fully into a period where trade restrictions seem to be increasing. So, just asking a broad question.
And then finally, we do have the G20 meeting coming up. The United States has not participated in the initial G20 meetings this year. What would it mean to the organization if the United States also chose to skip this July meeting? What is the importance of that as in that body?
QUESTIONER: So, on Ukraine, what I can say is the Ninth Review, as I said, we expect it to take place by the end of the year and it is going to combine the previously envisaged Ninth Review, which was scheduled for the fall, and the Tenth Review, which we expected to take place in the fourth quarter. And the team is going to remain closely engaged with Ukraine over this period. I don’t have more details on the reason that the reviews are being combined, but I believe the Staff Report has been published for Ukraine. And so, I would refer you to that document, which should have the relevant details.
On your broader question about the trade environment and the aid environment. I think if you think about it, or if we look back at it, you know, what has the IMF been saying? If we look back to the Spring Meetings, one of the main messages from the Managing Director’s Curtain Raiser and her global policy agenda, as well as our broader messages, was that it is very important for countries to, we were saying, kind of, or the Managing Director was saying to get their own house in order. So, there’s — and the message really behind that was that yes, the trade environment is shifting, and we see very significant shifts in the trade environment.
But there is a lot that countries can and need to do domestically related to their own reforms to build their own resilience. There’s a lot that countries can do in terms of policy, and that really relates in many countries to fiscal policy, which is about, because we’ve been talking about a low-growth, high-debt environment for some time. High uncertainty and weaker trade affects that environment. But the fact still remains that we have a low-growth and high-debt environment globally. So, for countries, that means taking measures to reduce the high debt problem.
That’s on the fiscal side. And that is a general piece of policy advice that we’ve given to many, many countries. And on the growth side, we are strongly encouraging countries to take measures to boost productivity and medium-term growth. So, this is really at the crux of our policy advice to countries.
And on the aid side, what we’ve been warning about for quite some time is that official development assistance, in general, has been on a declining downward trend for many, many years. And we see the impact of the decline in official development assistance in low-income countries. So, this is a broad trend that we observe globally across many countries, affecting low-income countries. But what it means for those countries is that they are going to have to both work with the IMF, other MDBs [multinational development banks], [and] donors who are still providing financing. But most importantly, those countries are going to need to look for ways to mobilize domestic resources so that they can fund many of their own development needs.
And so this is also part of, we call it a three-pillar approach where we look at the need for domestic reforms in countries, the need for assistance and stepped-up assistance from multilateral organizations to provide needed financing for countries, and of course ways to ultimately reduce the cost of financing and also looking to mobilize private financing for countries. So, there is a very rich and large agenda on this broad topic that we have been discussing for quite some time.
And on the G20, this is really a matter, I think, for the G20 presidency and for the — for the United States.
Let me look online.
QUESTIONER: So, I have like two questions regarding the finalizing the four-year Extended Credit Facility that is linked between the International Monetary Fund and the government of Ethiopia. So again, the IMF Staff has been paying a review visit to Ethiopia many times to review Ethiopia’s section and disperse the money. In this point, I have two questions. The first one is how does the IMF evaluate Ethiopia’s move and current achievement towards liberalizing its economy? And the second one is what are the parameters to indicate whether the mission is going on the right track, as the people of the country are facing heavy life burden?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Other questions on Ethiopia?
QUESTIONER: I noted [that] in the Third Review that came out late last night that most of the macroeconomic forecasts are looking up compared to the second. Apart from public debt-to-GDP, I can’t really figure out why. So, could you maybe walk me through that? And I have a separate question on Lebanon. Maybe we’ll take that later.
MS. KOZACK: Anything else on Ethiopia? All right. So, with respect to Ethiopia, the IMF Executive Board approved the 2025 Article IV consultation and the Third Review under the ECF on July 2nd, and that enabled Ethiopia to access about U.S. $260 million.
What I can add is that the completion of the review reflects both the assessment of the Staff and our Executive Board that Ethiopia’s strong adherence to the program and the program goals, and it also reflects continued confidence in the government’s reform agenda. The Ethiopian authorities have made significant progress in implementing some really important and fundamental reforms under the ECF. Key economic indicators such as inflation, fiscal balance, and external balance are all showing signs of stabilization. And that suggests that the country and the economy are kind of progressing on the right track.
With respect to your more detailed question, we will have to come back to you bilaterally. I’m not sure exactly why. I don’t know off the top of my head the answer to that, but we will come back to you on that one.
I know there’s a few more questions online, so let’s try to get to them.
QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Sorry. So, I wanted to — my question is regarding what is going on in Kenya. President Ruto announced that he planned to privatize some of the public assets. And I was wondering if you could provide any views from the IMF? I also wanted to ask you, next week, President Donald Trump will be meeting with several African leaders. Some of those countries have critical minerals. So perhaps the meeting we resolve around critical minerals. As you know, a lot of countries, the U.S., China, as well as European nations, are very interested in African critical minerals. So, I was wondering if you could share your view, giving what has happened in the past and the corruption around critical minerals and the mismanagement of the Fund received from the minerals. What is the IMF’s recommendation to nations across the African continent right now, on how to —
MS. KOZACK: I think we lost you.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, so, we lost you for a bit in the middle, but I think I got the gist of your question. So, let me now ask, does anyone else have a question on Kenya?
QUESTIONER: Yeah, I do. Hello?
MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.
QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask about that Diagnostic Mission. I know I’d asked you about it before, but now it’s completed, and does the IMF want that report to be made public, or does it expect it to be made public? I have a question on Barbados, too, but I’ll wait on that one.
MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start with Kenya. So, on Kenya, maybe just to remind everyone where we are on Kenya. Our Staff team is actively engaged with the authorities on recent developments. As you know, we’ve been discussing with them the timing of the next Article IV Mission and also their request for a new program.
And I will come to your question on the Government Diagnostics Mission in just a minute.
So, a big part of our work with Kenya now is this Government Diagnostics Mission. The Technical Mission just concluded on June 30th, and they released a short press release, which was just issued. This was kind of the first step of a process that we expect to take until the end of the year. So, collaboration on government diagnostics. It will continue over the next several months. A draft diagnostic assessment report is expected to be shared with the Kenyan authorities before the end of the year. So that first report will go to the authorities, and then the report will be published once consent is received from the authorities. So that is the process that we’ll have. But it will take quite some time to get that report prepared and ready. So, kind of hold this space. We’ll continue to work on it.
And then on your question on Kenya, what I can say is that we look forward to learning more details about the President’s statement that was made yesterday. What I can say more broadly is that our engagement with the Kenyan authorities on privatization has been focused on establishing a solid framework to ensure that transparency and good governance, with the aim to unlock potential benefits.
So again, our discussions have very much focused on having a framework, and if done well, we see potential benefits that could include, for example, increased efficiency of improved private investment, reducing the fiscal burden, and improving service delivery.
On your second question, I think the way I will approach it is to say that, and Kenya is an example of this in some ways, with this governance Diagnostic Mission that, of course, at the IMF, we are concerned about not only in Africa, but in all countries where it’s a — where corruption affects economic activity, we are concerned about governance. We have a strong governance program, and it includes a Government Diagnostic Mission. Government diagnostic assessments allow our experts to go and do a deep assessment of governance in a country, look at where governance weaknesses exist, and to recommend a path forward to improve governance and reduce corruption over time.
We recognize that in many of our member countries, governance and corruption issues do have a significant impact on economic activity, and we are very committed to working with our member countries to improve governance as an important part of enabling countries to achieve stronger growth and better livelihoods for their people.
And let me go — I have Jermine. You haven’t had a question yet, and I think we are over time. So, I am going to wrap up with you as the last question.
QUESTIONER: I have two questions pertaining to the Caribbean region, more specifically to the Citizenship by Investment programs. What’s IMF’s position regarding the decisions made by St. Kitts and Nevis and other territories to establish a regulatory body to oversee these programs?
MS. KOZACK: Go ahead.
QUESTIONER: Regarding the looming threat of visa waivers by the Schengen region, the European Union, regarding these particular passport holders, knowing that the CBI programs are the pillars of the economies of the region.
MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say on the CBI, the citizenship by investment programs, is that our position has been that we generally advocate for common CBI program standards across the region, including in the area of transparency. And this was noted in our 2024 Regional Consultation Report on the ECCU.
And with respect to specific countries such as Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia, for those specific countries, we have provided country-specific information, and the information on those can be found in the respective Article IV reports for those countries.
With respect to the question on the Schengen region, this is really a matter between the individual countries in the Caribbean and the countries in the Schengen region. It’s not really a matter for the IMF.
So, with that, given that we’ve taken more time than we normally allocate, I want to thank everyone very much for your participation today. As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States. As always, a transcript will be made later — available later on IMF.org. And of course, in case of any clarifications, additional queries, if you didn’t get a chance to ask your questions today, please do be in contact with my colleagues at media@imf.org, and we will be sure to give you a response. I wish you all a wonderful day and a wonderful long weekend, and I look forward to seeing you all next time. Thanks very much.
* * * * *
IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS
PRESS OFFICER: Rahim Kanani
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https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/07/03/tr-070325-com-regular-press-briefing-july-3-2025
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MIL-OSI Russia: Islamic Republic of Mauritania: IMF Executive Board Completes Fourth Reviews of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility and the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement and Third Review of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility Arrangement
Source: IMF – News in Russian
July 3, 2025
- The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Fourth Reviews of Mauritania’s Extended Credit Facility and the Extended Fund Facility arrangements, and the Third Review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility Arrangement. The decisions allow for an immediate disbursement of SDR 36.16 million (about US$ [49.2] million).
- Rule-based fiscal consolidation, supported by robust tax collection, and flexibilization of the exchange rate —alongside ongoing reforms to monetary operations and banking supervision—have strengthened the Mauritanian economy resilience, amid heightened global uncertainties and regional security risks.
- A strong reform agenda, including the recent adoption by the parliament of key anti-corruption laws, should bolster governance and help promote private sector investments.
Washington, DC: The IMF Executive Board completed today the Fourth Reviews under the 42‑month blended Extended Credit Facility arrangement (ECF) and the Extended Fund Facility arrangement (EFF), and the Third Review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility arrangement (RSF). The ECF/EFF were approved by the IMF Executive Board in January 2023 (see PR 23/15) and the RSF was approved in December 2023 (see PR23/465). The completion of the reviews allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 36.16 million (about US$ 49.8 million) of which SDR 6.44 million (about US$ 8.9 million) under the ECF/EFF and SDR 29.72 million (about US$ 40.9 million) under the RSF, bringing the cumulative disbursements to SDR 125.9 million (about US$ 166.5 million).
The Mauritanian economy has proven resilient, notwithstanding heightened global uncertainty and increasing regional security risks, with economic activity estimated to have decelerated slightly to 5.2 percent in 2024. Following a further deceleration to 4.0 percent in 2025, growth is expected to remain favorable in the medium term, supported by the government infrastructure drive and by private investment. Inflation is expected to remain contained within the Central Bank’s target. The reforms in the areas of governance, monetary and financial sector, investment policies, and vocational training are expected to support efforts to diversify the economy away from the extractive industries.
Program performance has been strong, with all end-December 2024 quantitative targets met, and most of the structural benchmarks under the ECF/EFF implemented. Reforms under the RSF are also progressing.
At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Chair stated:
“Program performance under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangements has been strong. Supported by the authorities’ prudent and well-calibrated policies, Mauritania’s economy continued to grow in 2024, albeit at a slower pace than in 2023, while inflation decreased. The fiscal performance, including the implementation of a fiscal anchor, is supporting the authorities’ medium-term goal of stabilizing debt. The current account widened in 2024, but international reserves remained at comfortable levels.”
“The authorities’ prudent fiscal stance, underpinned by the fiscal anchor, helps insulate public spending from commodity price volatility and contributes to stabilizing debt. Continuing with this prudent fiscal policy, and complementing it with reforms in tax policy and administration, would create fiscal space for social spending and public investment while safeguarding the credibility of the medium-term budget framework.”
“With inflation easing, the Central Bank of Mauritania has begun lowering interest rates. Effective liquidity management, supported by continued development of monetary policy instruments, helps anchor inflation expectations while fostering the development of domestic debt markets. Continued reforms to deepen the foreign exchange market would enhance exchange rate flexibility and resilience to external shocks. Strengthening the banking sector’s resilience requires close monitoring of financial sector trends and consistent enforcement of prudential regulations.”
“Decisive implementation of structural reforms is essential to support higher, more inclusive and diversified, private-sector-led growth. Priorities include operationalizing recent governance reforms, strengthening accountability and transparency, developing human capital, promoting financial inclusion, and enhancing the business climate.”
“Effective implementation of the ECF and EFF arrangements, along with intensified reform efforts under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, will help Mauritania address its medium- and long-term challenges and secure additional financing. These programs aim to maintain adequate international reserves, strengthen macroeconomic policy frameworks, and promote sustainable growth, thereby supporting the country’s climate agenda, human capital development, and poverty reduction.”
Mauritania: Selected Economic Indicators, 2020–25
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
3rd Review
Est.
Projections
National accounts and prices
(Annual change in percent)
Real GDP
-0.4
0.7
6.8
6.5
4.6
5.2
4.0
Real extractive GDP
7.1
-19.2
18.3
9.4
-0.5
3.2
-1.0
Real non-extractive GDP
-1.7
6.0
3.8
5.9
5.7
5.6
5.1
Consumer prices (end of period)
1.8
5.7
11.0
1.6
3.0
1.5
3.5
Central government operations
(in percent of nonextractive GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
Revenues and grants
20.8
22.7
25.0
22.5
24.1
22.5
25.6
Nonextractive
16.6
16.2
18.2
17.0
18.9
18.1
19.9
Taxes
10.9
11.7
13.4
12.6
14.3
14.1
15.5
Extractive
2.1
4.2
5.1
3.7
3.4
3.2
3.8
Expenditure and net lending
18.5
20.8
28.7
25.0
25.4
23.9
26.1
Of which: Current
12.0
13.0
17.2
16.4
15.5
15.1
14.4
Capital
6.6
7.8
11.5
8.7
9.8
8.8
11.7
Primary balance (excl. grants)
1.2
0.5
-4.5
-3.3
-2.1
-1.6
-1.5
Overall balance (in percent of GDP)
2.2
1.9
-3.7
-2.5
-1.2
-1.4
-0.5
Public sector debt (in percent of GDP)
56.5
52.4
48.5
46.4
44.3
42.1
41.2
External sector
Current account balance (in percent of GDP)
-6.8
-8.6
-14.9
-8.8
-7.7
-9.5
-6.2
Excl. externally financed extractive capital goods imports
2.2
1.0
-0.8
-0.3
-1.4
-1.4
-0.2
Gross official reserves (in millions of US$, eop)
1,542
2,347
1,877
2,032
2,039
1,921
1846
In months of prospective non-extractive imports
6.7
8.2
6.2
6.4
6.5
6.4
5.9
External public debt (in millions of US$)
4,113
4,204
3,970
3,959
3921
3,980
4050
In percent of GDP
49.1
45.8
42.3
40.0
36.3
36.3
34.5
IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS
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https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/07/03/pr25240-mauritania-imf-comp-4th-rev-of-ext-arr-under-ecf-and-eff-arr-and-3rd-rev-of-rsf-arr
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‘Reservoir Dogs’ and ‘Kill Bill’ actor Michael Madsen dies at 67
Source: Government of India
Source: Government of India (4)
Michael Madsen, an actor who appeared in dozens of films including “Reservoir Dogs” and “Thelma & Louise,” has died at age 67, his representatives said on Thursday.
Madsen died of cardiac arrest at his home in Malibu, California, his manager, Ron Smith, said.
Born in Chicago, Madsen began acting in the early 1980s in projects that included the TV show “St. Elsewhere” and the movie “The Natural” on his way to racking up more than 300 on-screen credits.
He played Mr. Blonde in 1992 film “Reservoir Dogs” and appeared in several other movies from director Quentin Tarantino including “Kill Bill,” “The Hateful Eight” and “Once Upon a Time … in Hollywood.”
“In the last two years Michael Madsen has been doing some incredible work with independent film,” said a statement from Smith along with fellow manager Susan Ferris and publicist Liz Rodriguez.
He also was preparing to release a book called “Tears For My Father: Outlaw Thoughts and Poems,” which is currently being edited, they said.
(Reuters)
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MIL-OSI Africa: Protecting Libyan lives: Mine Action partners unite to address the threats of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) in Libya
Source: APO – Report:
.
The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) hosted yesterday a meeting for the Mine Action implementing partners, bringing together 22 participants, including national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The meeting, co-organized by the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC) and the Mine Action Programme, was joined by UNICEF, and representatives from the League of Arab States, Ghana, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Director of LibMAC, Khalil Elshelb, provided an update on the development of the Libyan Mine Action Strategy, announced on Mine Action Day last year as a key sector priority. The Libyan Mine Action Standards are currently under review—a crucial step in implementing the strategy—with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Mine Action Programme.
LibMAC identified Mezda, the Mashrou Al Mooz (Banana Project) area between Ain Zara and Alsabaa in Tripoli, and Khalij al-Bumbah in the east as priority zones due to high contamination levels. It also shared the results of a three-week response to recent clashes in Tripoli, which caused new UXO contamination across 14 neighborhoods. LibMAC tasked NGO Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) teams with response efforts. Awareness activities reached around 19,500 people, including more than 4,700 women and 3,800 children.
Chief of the Mine Action Programme, Fatma Zourrig, emphasized the need for stronger collaboration between international and national NGOs. She highlighted the importance of ensuring access to remote areas, supporting life-saving efforts, and expanding outreach to affected communities. Zourrig also reiterated the technical support offered by the Mine Action Programme and urged all stakeholders to take part in an upcoming capacity-mapping exercise, which will serve as a key advocacy tool for the sector.
Four international and three national NGOs presented activity updates from April to June 2026, covering progress in clearance and risk education. Discussions addressed key challenges, including reduced funding, limited non-technical staff capacity to identify minefields, and the dangers of individuals collecting metal objects—often remnants of war—for resale. This practice has contributed to an increase in UXO-related incidents and civilian casualties.
– on behalf of United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).
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MIL-OSI Africa: South Africa: Select Committee on Public Infrastructure Welcomes the Department’s Bold Reform Agenda for Infrastructure and Job Creation
Source: APO – Report:
.
The Select Committee on Public Infrastructure and Minister in the Presidency has welcomed the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure’s strategic and annual performance plans for the 2025/26 financial year.
The Chairperson of the committee, Mr Rikus Badenhorst, described the plans as a clear and credible turning point for infrastructure-led development in South Africa. He said: “This is not a mere tweak of the department, but a fundamental shift in how it understands and executes its core mandate. Minister Macpherson agenda marks a critical departure towards a department that is a catalyst for infrastructure-led growth, a partner in job creation, and a driver of economic recovery.”
Following a detailed presentation by the Minister of the department, Mr Dean Macpherson, the committee affirmed its support for the department’s renewed vision to serve as a catalyst for economic recovery, job creation, and inclusive growth. The plans are strongly aligned to the National Development Plan and Medium-Term Strategic Framework, and reflect an earnest commitment to reform, delivery and measurable impact.
At the centre of this renewed vision is the repositioning of the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) from a temporary job relief measure to a structured, skills-based employment pipeline. With a R7.2 billion allocation over the MTEF period, this reform aims to transform the EPWP into a credible contributor to long-term, dignified employment.
Mr Badenhorst said the shift from welfare to workforce is one of the most important interventions in restoring both human dignity and economic resilience, remarked. “We will monitor its implementation with keen interest,” emphasised Mr Badenhorst.
The committee also welcomed the department’s strategic focus on urban regeneration, repurposing hijacked and underutilised buildings, and optimising state assets for greater public value, particularly within inner-city precincts. This renewed developmental posture is essential to reversing years of stagnation, inefficiency and fiscal wastage.
Minister Macpherson was frank in his assessment of the department’s historic shortcomings, including systemic inefficiencies, audit deficiencies, and skills shortages. The committee commended the Minister’s openness, and noted the department’s new risk management framework as a strong response, particularly its intention to clamping down on tender irregularities, tighten controls on lease agreements, and combat collusion in the supply chain.
Committee members posed rigorous questions during the session, including queries about the R589 million allocation for infrastructure support, the need to strengthen capacity in the EPWP, and concerns about the alignment of budget allocations with strategic intent. Particular attention was given to the transition to digital systems and its impact on job security, as well as the Department’s plans to reduce its lease portfolio and address the long-standing maintenance backlog across government buildings.
In response, the department indicated its commitment to prudent asset management, exploring alternative ownership models, and ensuring that modernisation does not come at the expense of employment or service continuity.
Mr Badenhorst said to Minister Macpherson: “It is clear that you bring political will to the table. This committee will match it with rigorous oversight, constructive engagement, and institutional support. Together, we can turn this department, and indeed South Africa, into a construction site of progress.”
The committee reaffirmed its commitment to supporting the department’s reform trajectory, underscoring the centrality of infrastructure to the nation’s economic and social recovery.
– on behalf of Republic of South Africa: The Parliament.
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MIL-OSI Africa: International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Board Completes the Second Reviews Under the Extended Credit Facility and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility Arrangements with the Republic of Madagascar
Source: APO – Report:
.
- The IMF Executive Board completed the Second Reviews under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement for the Republic of Madagascar, allowing for an immediate disbursement of SDR 77.392 million (about US$107 million).
- Madagascar’s performance under the ECF and RSF has been satisfactory. The recent adoption of a recovery plan for the public utilities company (JIRAMA) and the continued implementation of the automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism will release space for critical development needs while helping improve energy supply.
- Recent weather-related events, reduction in official development assistance (ODA) and the U.S tariff hike risk setting Madagascar back; they constitute a wakeup call.
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the Second Reviews under the 36-month Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement and under the 36-month Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement. The ECF and RSF arrangements were approved by the IMF Executive Board in June 2024 (see PR24/232). The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this review.[1]
The completion of the reviews allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 36.66 million (about US$50 million) under the ECF arrangement and of SDR 40.732 million (about US$56 million) under the RSF arrangement.
Madagascar has been hit by a myriad of shocks this year, including weather-related events and the dual external shock of ODA reduction (by about 1 percent of GDP) and U.S. tariff hike (47 percent initially). These developments would take a toll on growth, considering the country’s high dependence on external financial support and the exposure of its vanilla sector and textile industry to the U.S. market. Growth in 2025 would be lower-than-previously expected at 4 percent.
The current account deficit widened to 5.4 percent of GDP in 2024, due to continued weak performance in some mining subsectors; it is expected to widen further (to 6.1 percent of GDP) this year, amidst challenging prospects in the textile industry and the vanilla sector.
Program performance has been satisfactory, with all end-December 2024 quantitative performance criteria and three out of four indicative targets having been met. M3 growth was within the bands of the Monetary Policy Consultation Clause. All but one structural benchmark for the review period were also met. On the RSF front, a new forest carbon framework that promotes private sector participation in the reforestation was adopted and the National Contingency Fund for disaster risk management was operationalized.
At the conclusion of the Executive Board discussion, Mr. Nigel Clarke, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement:
“Performance improved gradually over the first half year of the program, following delays related to mayoral elections; all but one of the end-December 2024 quantitative targets were met, and notable progress was achieved in the structural reform agenda. Recent weather-related and external shocks call for spending reprioritization, deliberate contingency planning in budget execution, and letting the exchange rate act as a shock absorber.
“The recent adoption of a recovery plan for the public utilities company (JIRAMA) is a step in the right direction. Its swift implementation will help address pervasive disruptions in the provision of electricity to households and businesses, while limiting calls on the State budget. The continued implementation of the automatic fuel pricing mechanism will also help contain fiscal risks with targeted measures to support the most vulnerable.
“Pressing ahead with domestic revenue mobilization efforts and enhancing public financial management and the public investment process remain key to fiscal sustainability. Early preparations for the 2026 budget will allow for stronger buy-in from domestic stakeholders; the budget should be anchored in a well-articulated medium-term fiscal strategy that accounts for the implementation of JIRAMA’s recovery plan and creates space for critical development spending.
“While inflation has receded slightly from its January peak, the central bank (BFM) should not loosen monetary policy until inflation is on a firm downward path. Further improvements in liquidity management, forecasting and communication will strengthen the implementation of the BFM’s interest-based monetary policy framework. Maintaining a flexible exchange rate will help absorb external shocks.
“A swift implementation of the authorities’ anti-corruption strategy (2025-2030), together with a homegrown action plan for implementing key recommendations from the IMF Governance Diagnostic Assessment (GDA), will improve transparency and the rule of law, support the authorities fight against corruption and protect the public purse.
“The authorities’ continued commitment to their reform agenda under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) will support climate adaptation in Madagascar and complement the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) in fostering overall socio-economic resilience.”
Table. Madagascar: Selected Economic Indicators
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
Est.
Proj.
(Percent change; unless otherwise indicated)
National Account and Prices
GDP at constant prices
4.2
4.2
4.2
4.0
4.0
GDP deflator
9.6
7.5
7.6
8.3
7.0
Consumer prices (end of period)
10.8
7.5
8.6
8.3
7.3
Money and Credit
Broad money (M3)
13.8
8.6
14.6
13.7
8.7
(Growth in percent of beginning-of-period money stock (M3))
Net foreign assets
0.8
18.2
9.8
1.5
1.4
Net domestic assets
13.0
-9.7
4.8
12.2
7.4
of which: Credit to the private sector
9.8
0.7
5.6
6.0
6.2
(Percent of GDP)
Public Finance
Total revenue (excluding grants)
9.5
11.5
11.4
11.2
12.0
of which: Tax revenue
9.2
11.2
10.9
10.7
11.7
Grants
1.3
2.3
2.3
0.7
0.4
Total expenditures
16.2
17.9
16.2
15.7
16.5
Current expenditure
10.8
10.9
9.6
9.7
9.5
Capital expenditure
5.4
7.0
6.6
6.0
7.0
Overall balance (commitment basis)
-5.5
-4.2
-2.6
-3.9
-4.1
Domestic primary balance1
-1.8
-0.3
1.3
0.3
1.4
Primary balance
-4.9
-3.5
-1.9
-2.9
-3.0
Total financing
4.7
4.2
2.7
4.3
4.3
Foreign borrowing (net)
2.4
3.0
2.6
3.5
3.7
Domestic financing
2.2
1.2
0.1
0.8
0.5
Fiscal financing need2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Savings and Investment
Investment
21.8
19.9
22.2
23.1
24.2
Gross national savings
16.8
15.9
16.9
17.0
18.2
External Sector
Exports of goods, f.o.b.
23.0
19.5
14.8
13.5
13.2
Imports of goods, c.i.f.
33.8
28.0
26.4
25.7
25.5
Current account balance (exc. grants)
-6.6
-6.3
-8.1
-6.8
-6.4
Current account balance (inc. grants)
-5.4
-4.1
-5.4
-6.1
-6.0
Public Debt
50.0
52.7
50.3
50.9
52.2
External Public Debt (inc. BFM liabilities)
36.1
37.8
36.7
38.5
40.4
Domestic Public Debt
13.9
14.8
13.6
12.4
11.7
(Units as indicated)
Gross official reserves (millions of SDRs)
1,601
1,972
2,189
2,297
2,337
Months of imports of goods and services
4.2
5.7
6.2
6.2
6.0
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars)
529
533
569
596
621
Sources: Malagasy authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
1. Primary balance excl. foreign-financed investment and grants.
2. A negative value indicates a financing gap to be filled by budget support or other financing still to be committed or identified.
[1] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/MDG page.
– on behalf of International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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MIL-OSI Africa: Cameroon’s hidden green treasures unveiled in a book
Source: APO – Report:
.
In a powerful moment for conservation, the book “Important Plant Areas of Cameroon” was officially launched on 18 June during UK – Cameroon Climate Week. This groundbreaking publication reveals a stunning yet sobering reality: over 850 endangered plant species are spread across 49 critical biodiversity hotspots in Cameroon.
Co-authored by experts from Cameroon’s Institute of Agricultural Research for Development (IRAD) National Herbarium, and the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, the book positions Cameroon as Africa’s most tropically diverse nation. From lush rainforests to arid deserts, the country’s ecosystems are as varied as they are vital. Yet, this rich biodiversity faces mounting threats. 10% of Cameroon’s plant species are now endangered, and the country holds the highest number of threatened trees on the continent.
The culprits? Expanding mining operations, aggressive logging, and the relentless spread of palm oil plantations are rapidly eroding Cameroon’s forests. These activities not only endanger plant life but also jeopardize the ecological balance of the entire Congo Basin.
British High Commissioner Matt Woods used the book’s launch to spotlight Cameroon’s critical role in global climate discussions. He urged the international community to amplify Cameroon’s voice at major forums like COP30 and called for stronger global support to safeguard the Congo Basin’s irreplaceable biodiversity.
Speaking during the book launch, the representative of Royal Botanical Gardens in Kew, Prof. Philip Stevenson said: “It’s been a fantastic week of new collaboration. We’ve been working with IRAD National Herbarium and developing opportunities to extend our reach and do more work here in Cameroon.”
This book is more than a catalogue of rare plants; it is a call to action. As the world grapples with climate change and biodiversity loss, Cameroon’s green treasures remind us of what’s at stake and what we still have the power to protect.
– on behalf of British High Commission – Yaounde.
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Every country respects India because of PM Modi, says spiritual leader Swami Chidanand Saraswati
Source: Government of India
Source: Government of India (4)
Spiritual leader Swami Chidanand Saraswati of Parmarth Niketan Ashram, Rishikesh, has praised Prime Minister Narendra Modi on receiving Ghana’s highest civilian honour, drawing a parallel between PM Modi’s leadership and that of Lord Ram.
Speaking to IANS, he lauded India’s foreign policy under PM Modi, stating that just as Lord Ram moved forward by embracing everyone, PM Modi too is carrying everyone along in his journey of nation-building.
“I have seen many Prime Ministers, but none like Narendra Modi,” he said. “He has brought immense respect and new heights to India. He has elevated the country’s stature globally. That is why the world honours him today. It’s not just that 24 countries have awarded him their highest national honours — it’s becoming a time when every country is beginning to respect India.”
Chidanand Saraswati emphasised that Prime Minister Modi himself has said these recognitions are not personal but rather an honour for the 1.4 billion people of India.
Praising India’s evolving foreign policy, he pointed out, “How many Indian Prime Ministers had visited Ghana before? In the last 30 years, PM Modi is the first to go there. He is giving importance even to smaller countries because he understands that India’s global influence in the future will depend on maintaining strong relationships with all nations. Just as Lord Ram embraced Shabari and Kevat and took everyone along wherever he went, PM Modi is doing the same — taking everyone forward with him.”
Reflecting on PM Modi’s commitment and discipline, Chidanand Saraswati recalled an earlier speech by him. “Around 20 years ago, when he was not yet Prime Minister, Modi gave a powerful one-hour speech on the Indian diaspora at the World Hindu Conference. The people of India were deeply moved. Even then, we saw his dedication to discipline, values, and patriotism.”
He added, “PM Modi is a true patriot, which gives him the energy to work 24 hours a day, seven days a week. That kind of drive is extraordinary and divine — not something an ordinary person can do.”
Swami Chidanand also noted the enthusiasm during PM Modi’s recent visits abroad. “In Trinidad, schools, colleges, and offices were shut so people could see and hear him. The whole country celebrated his visit. In Ghana too, we saw the deep respect he received. It’s not just Ghana — everywhere he goes, he is being awarded the highest honours. But PM Modi wants the world to recognise India, not himself. I believe India is fortunate to have such a leader. Wherever he goes, he brings honour to the country.”
He lauded the contributions of the Indian diaspora, stating, “Wherever Indians have gone, they have made the country proud. PM Modi leads all 1.4 billion Indians together, and our people across the globe are raising India’s profile every day.”
IANS
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MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Second Reviews Under the Extended Credit Facility and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility Arrangements with the Republic of Madagascar
Source: IMF – News in Russian
July 3, 2025
- The IMF Executive Board completed the Second Reviews under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement for the Republic of Madagascar, allowing for an immediate disbursement of SDR 77.392 million (about US$107 million).
- Madagascar’s performance under the ECF and RSF has been satisfactory. The recent adoption of a recovery plan for the public utilities company (JIRAMA) and the continued implementation of the automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism will release space for critical development needs while helping improve energy supply.
- Recent weather-related events, reduction in official development assistance (ODA) and the U.S tariff hike risk setting Madagascar back; they constitute a wakeup call.
Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the Second Reviews under the 36-month Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement and under the 36-month Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement. The ECF and RSF arrangements were approved by the IMF Executive Board in June 2024 (see PR24/232). The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this review.[1]
The completion of the reviews allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 36.66 million (about US$50 million) under the ECF arrangement and of SDR 40.732 million (about US$56 million) under the RSF arrangement.
Madagascar has been hit by a myriad of shocks this year, including weather-related events and the dual external shock of ODA reduction (by about 1 percent of GDP) and U.S. tariff hike (47 percent initially). These developments would take a toll on growth, considering the country’s high dependence on external financial support and the exposure of its vanilla sector and textile industry to the U.S. market. Growth in 2025 would be lower-than-previously expected at 4 percent.
The current account deficit widened to 5.4 percent of GDP in 2024, due to continued weak performance in some mining subsectors; it is expected to widen further (to 6.1 percent of GDP) this year, amidst challenging prospects in the textile industry and the vanilla sector.
Program performance has been satisfactory, with all end-December 2024 quantitative performance criteria and three out of four indicative targets having been met. M3 growth was within the bands of the Monetary Policy Consultation Clause. All but one structural benchmark for the review period were also met. On the RSF front, a new forest carbon framework that promotes private sector participation in the reforestation was adopted and the National Contingency Fund for disaster risk management was operationalized.
At the conclusion of the Executive Board discussion, Mr. Nigel Clarke, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement:
“Performance improved gradually over the first half year of the program, following delays related to mayoral elections; all but one of the end-December 2024 quantitative targets were met, and notable progress was achieved in the structural reform agenda. Recent weather-related and external shocks call for spending reprioritization, deliberate contingency planning in budget execution, and letting the exchange rate act as a shock absorber.
“The recent adoption of a recovery plan for the public utilities company (JIRAMA) is a step in the right direction. Its swift implementation will help address pervasive disruptions in the provision of electricity to households and businesses, while limiting calls on the State budget. The continued implementation of the automatic fuel pricing mechanism will also help contain fiscal risks with targeted measures to support the most vulnerable.
“Pressing ahead with domestic revenue mobilization efforts and enhancing public financial management and the public investment process remain key to fiscal sustainability. Early preparations for the 2026 budget will allow for stronger buy-in from domestic stakeholders; the budget should be anchored in a well-articulated medium-term fiscal strategy that accounts for the implementation of JIRAMA’s recovery plan and creates space for critical development spending.
“While inflation has receded slightly from its January peak, the central bank (BFM) should not loosen monetary policy until inflation is on a firm downward path. Further improvements in liquidity management, forecasting and communication will strengthen the implementation of the BFM’s interest-based monetary policy framework. Maintaining a flexible exchange rate will help absorb external shocks.
“A swift implementation of the authorities’ anti-corruption strategy (2025-2030), together with a homegrown action plan for implementing key recommendations from the IMF Governance Diagnostic Assessment (GDA), will improve transparency and the rule of law, support the authorities fight against corruption and protect the public purse.
“The authorities’ continued commitment to their reform agenda under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) will support climate adaptation in Madagascar and complement the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) in fostering overall socio-economic resilience.”
Table. Madagascar: Selected Economic Indicators
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
Est.
Proj.
(Percent change; unless otherwise indicated)
National Account and Prices
GDP at constant prices
4.2
4.2
4.2
4.0
4.0
GDP deflator
9.6
7.5
7.6
8.3
7.0
Consumer prices (end of period)
10.8
7.5
8.6
8.3
7.3
Money and Credit
Broad money (M3)
13.8
8.6
14.6
13.7
8.7
(Growth in percent of beginning-of-period money stock (M3))
Net foreign assets
0.8
18.2
9.8
1.5
1.4
Net domestic assets
13.0
-9.7
4.8
12.2
7.4
of which: Credit to the private sector
9.8
0.7
5.6
6.0
6.2
(Percent of GDP)
Public Finance
Total revenue (excluding grants)
9.5
11.5
11.4
11.2
12.0
of which: Tax revenue
9.2
11.2
10.9
10.7
11.7
Grants
1.3
2.3
2.3
0.7
0.4
Total expenditures
16.2
17.9
16.2
15.7
16.5
Current expenditure
10.8
10.9
9.6
9.7
9.5
Capital expenditure
5.4
7.0
6.6
6.0
7.0
Overall balance (commitment basis)
-5.5
-4.2
-2.6
-3.9
-4.1
Domestic primary balance1
-1.8
-0.3
1.3
0.3
1.4
Primary balance
-4.9
-3.5
-1.9
-2.9
-3.0
Total financing
4.7
4.2
2.7
4.3
4.3
Foreign borrowing (net)
2.4
3.0
2.6
3.5
3.7
Domestic financing
2.2
1.2
0.1
0.8
0.5
Fiscal financing need2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Savings and Investment
Investment
21.8
19.9
22.2
23.1
24.2
Gross national savings
16.8
15.9
16.9
17.0
18.2
External Sector
Exports of goods, f.o.b.
23.0
19.5
14.8
13.5
13.2
Imports of goods, c.i.f.
33.8
28.0
26.4
25.7
25.5
Current account balance (exc. grants)
-6.6
-6.3
-8.1
-6.8
-6.4
Current account balance (inc. grants)
-5.4
-4.1
-5.4
-6.1
-6.0
Public Debt
50.0
52.7
50.3
50.9
52.2
External Public Debt (inc. BFM liabilities)
36.1
37.8
36.7
38.5
40.4
Domestic Public Debt
13.9
14.8
13.6
12.4
11.7
(Units as indicated)
Gross official reserves (millions of SDRs)
1,601
1,972
2,189
2,297
2,337
Months of imports of goods and services
4.2
5.7
6.2
6.2
6.0
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars)
529
533
569
596
621
Sources: Malagasy authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
1 Primary balance excl. foreign-financed investment and grants.
2 A negative value indicates a financing gap to be filled by budget support or other financing still to be committed or identified.
[1] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/MDG page.
IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS
PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot
Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/07/03/pr-25239-madagascar-imf-completes-2nd-rev-under-ecf-and-rsf-arrang
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MIL-OSI USA: Old Glory on the Red Planet
Source: NASA
The United States flag adorns an aluminum plate mounted at the base of the mast, or “head,” of NASA’s Perseverance Mars rover. This image of the plate was taken on June 28, 2025 (the 1,548th day, or sol, of the mission), by the WATSON (Wide Angle Topographic Sensor for Operations and eNgineering) camera on the end of the rover’s robotic arm.
WATSON, part of an instrument called SHERLOC (Scanning Habitable Environments with Raman & Luminescence for Organics & Chemicals), was built by Malin Space Science Systems (MSSS) in San Diego and is operated jointly by MSSS and NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Southern California. JPL, which is managed for the agency by Caltech, built and manages operations of the Perseverance rover.
Learn more about Perseverance’s latest science. -
MIL-OSI Economics: Academic collaboration in focus as WTO Chairs Programme looks ahead to MC14
Source: WTO
Headline: Academic collaboration in focus as WTO Chairs Programme looks ahead to MC14
Since its launch in 2010, the WTO Chairs Programme has supported academic institutions in trade-related research, curriculum development and policy outreach. This year, the programme welcomed five new universities – from the Dominican Republic, Nigeria, Qatar, Togo and Vanuatu – bringing the total number of institutions in the network to 39 Chairs worldwide.
Opening the conference, WTO Deputy Director-General (DDG) Zhang thanked the programme’s donors – France, Austria and the Republic of Korea – and emphasized the WCP’s significance in contributing to trade policymaking and multilateral cooperation. “The WTO Chairs Programme is a powerful platform for empowering academic institutions in developing countries to elevate the role of academia in driving policy change and creating multilateral cooperation between the different stakeholders involved in international trade, as well as on a personal level between the members of the network,” he said.
France’s Permanent Representative to the WTO, Ms. Emmanuelle Ivanov-Durand, highlighted the importance of academic research: “Through research, we don’t just observe. We test, we compare, we adapt. And above all, we look together for concrete solutions to complex problems. It is this approach that gives full meaning to the academic work undertaken by the Chairs through the WTO Chairs Programme.”
Emphasizing the importance of technical assistance in enabling all members to participate effectively at the multilateral level, Austria’s Permanent Representative to the WTO, Ambassador Desirée Schweitzer, stated: “Through capacity-building initiatives such as the Chairs Programme, members can engage in rigorous analysis and make informed decisions on issues of trade, allowing them to participate meaningfully in the multilateral trading system.”
Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Geneva Ambassador Sung-yo Choi expressed hope that the WCP would continue to grow: “As multilateralism faces new challenges, the importance of a cooperative, rules-based system becomes even clearer. […] Korea, as part of this vibrant community [of the WCP network], remains firmly committed to supporting the values and vision this programme represents. And we hope it will continue to grow as a dynamic and respected pillar of the global trading system.”
Over the three-day conference, participants will discuss issues on the agenda for MC14, digital trade, fisheries subsidies, trade and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), trade finance and dispute settlement. They will also discuss avenues for collaboration within the WCP network to support multilateral work in those areas at MC14 and beyond.
Fireside chat with Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala
During a fireside chat with the WTO Director-General, participants discussed the challenges of navigating the global trade landscape and difficulties and opportunities offered by global and regional value chains, digital, innovation and green trade, and explored ways forward for developing economies and regions, with a focus on MSMEs, investment and businesses led by women.
Concerning the relevance of the WTO in the current global environment, DG Okonjo-Iweala issued a clarion call to the Chairs. “The WTO is beyond tariffs. Work on customs valuation, TRIPS, SPS and TBT remain strong. Rally your domestic business community to speak up in support. Many criticisms levelled at the WTO are legitimate and WTO members must listen – and the work of WCP Chairs can help identify potential solutions to the challenges members face, and find win-win outcomes,” she said.
More information on the WTO Chairs Programme is available here.Share
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MIL-OSI Economics: WTO announces new cohort of Young Trade Leaders for 2025
Source: World Trade Organization
Aim of the Young Trade Leaders Programme
The Young Trade Leaders Programme was launched in 2024 to bring young people closer to the work of the WTO. By creating a global network of enthusiastic young trade leaders, it aims at promoting a better understanding of the WTO’s role in supporting international trade.
The Young Trade Leaders are invited to bring fresh ideas about the role of trade and the WTO, while also having the opportunity to learn about the organization’s work and advance its mission.
More information on the programme is available here.
About the participants
Following a rigorous selection process, seven candidates were selected from more than 1,200 applications from around the world to form the second cohort of WTO Young Trade Leaders. The selected participants were chosen on the basis of their background and experience, and the strength of their application.
The selected candidates are:
- Atyia Al-Hammud, Ukraine, bachelor’s student in international relations
- Paola Flores Carvajal, Bolivia, industrial engineer specializing in supply chain management
- Serena Indij da Costa, Brazil, master’s student in development and economics
- Karo Harutyunyan, Armenia, bachelor’s student in economics and political science
- Olexa Heshima, Rwanda, consultant and business analyst
- Alexandra Kaiss, United States, lawyer specializing in international trade
- Aarushi Shrivastav, India, graduate in trade law
You can find more information on the participants here.
Benefits
Participants will have the opportunity to take advantage of training courses organized by the WTO, to benefit from WTO Secretariat advice and mentoring, and to receive support when organizing WTO-related activities in their home countries.
Participants will also travel to Geneva for the 2025 WTO Public Forum in September, where they will attend a full-day workshop and participate actively in Forum activities.
Share
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MIL-OSI NGOs: Gaza: Israel turns seeking aid into a deadly trap for starving Palestinians – further evidence of genocide
Source: Amnesty International –
Evidence suggests the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation was designed to deflect international pressure while serving as another tool in Israel’s campaign of genocide
Testimonies from healthcare workers and displaced people reveal a horrifying picture of acute starvation and desperation in Gaza
‘With no aid getting in, you feel like as a hospital you only patch up the wound but eventually it will burst again’ – Dr. Maarouf in Gaza
‘Not only has the international community failed to stop this genocide, but it has also allowed Israel to constantly reinvent new ways to destroy Palestinian lives in Gaza and trample on their human dignity’ – Agnès Callamard
Evidence gathered by Amnesty International shows that, more than a month after introducing its militarised aid distribution system, Israel continues to use the starvation of civilians as a weapon of war against Palestinians in the occupied Gaza Strip – deliberately imposing conditions intended to destroy Palestinian life, as part of its ongoing genocide.
Testimonies from medical staff, parents of malnourished children, and displaced Palestinians struggling to survive reveal a horrifying picture of acute starvation and desperation in Gaza.Their accounts provide further evidence of the catastrophic impact of Israel’s ongoing restrictions on life-saving aid, its deadly militarised aid system, mass forced displacement, relentless bombardment, and the systematic destruction of essential infrastructure.
By continuing to prevent the UN and other key humanitarian organisations from distributing certain essential items including food parcels, fuel and shelter within Gaza and by maintaining a deadly, dehumanising and ineffective militarised ‘aid’ scheme, Israeli authorities have turned aid-seeking into a booby trap for desperate starved Palestinians. They have also deliberately fueled chaos and compounded suffering instead of alleviating it. The aid delivered is also way below the humanitarian needs of a population that has been experiencing almost daily bombings for nearly two years.
Agnès Callamard, Secretary General of Amnesty International, said:
“Israel’s genocide has continued unabated in Gaza including creating a deadly mix of hunger and disease pushing the population past breaking point.
“In the month following Israel’s imposition of a militarised ‘aid’ scheme run by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, hundreds of Palestinians have been killed and thousands injured either near militarised distribution sites or en route to humanitarian aid convoys.
“As the occupying power, Israel has a legal obligation to ensure Palestinians in Gaza have access to food, medicine and other supplies essential for their survival. Instead, Israel has continued to restrict the entry of aid and impose its suffocating cruel blockade and even a full siege lasting nearly 80 days. This must end now. Israel must lift all restrictions and allow unfettered, safe, and dignified access to humanitarian aid throughout Gaza immediately.”
Amnesty interviewed 17 internally displaced people (10 women and seven men) as well as the parents of four children hospitalised for severe malnutrition, and four healthcare workers, across three hospitals in Gaza City and Khan Younis in May and June.
Devastating impact on children
Even before the imposition of a total siege on 2 March, slightly but insufficiently eased 78 days later, Israel’s deliberate and calculated decision to destroy Palestinians had a particularly devastating impact on young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women.
Since October 2023 at least 66 children have died as a direct result of malnutrition-related conditions. This figure does not include the many more children who have died as a result of preventable diseases exacerbated by malnutrition.
The victims include a four-month-old baby, Jinan Iskafi, who tragically died on 3 May due to severe malnutrition. According to her medical report, which was reviewed by Amnesty, Jinan was admitted to the Rantissi pediatric hospital due to severe dehydration and recurrent infections. She was diagnosed with Marasmus, a severe form of protein-energy malnutrition, chronic diarrhoea, and a suspected case of immunodeficiency. The pediatrician treating her told Amnesty that she required a specific lactose-free formula, which was not available due to the blockade.
Gaza’s decimated health sector, already overwhelmed with the volume of injuries, is struggling to deal with the influx of infants and children hospitalised for malnutrition. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as of 15 June, a total of 18,741 children were hospitalised for acute malnutrition since the beginning of the year.
The vast majority of children suffering from malnutrition, however, cannot reach any hospital due to displacement orders and heavy bombardment and ongoing military operations.
Numbers barely scratch the surface of the suffering in Gaza
Accounts from healthcare workers and displaced people paint an even more harrowing picture. Susan Maarouf, a nutritional expert at the Nutrition unit in the Patient Friend Benevolent Society hospital in Gaza City, supported by the organization MedGlobal, said that in June 2024 the hospital opened a dedicated department for children aged six months to five years to manage cases of severe malnutrition.
Maarouf said:
“Back then, Gaza City and the North Gaza governorate were hit by malnutrition [as a result of the tight blockade]. But this year for us, the situation began to drastically get worse again in April. Since then, out of approximately 200-250 children we have screened daily for malnutrition, nearly 15% showed signs associated with severe or moderate malnutrition.”
In the worst cases visible signs include pale skin, hair and nail loss, and alarming weight loss. She expressed the profound helplessness of offering nutritional advice amid severe shortages of food, with fruit, vegetables and eggs only available at exorbitant prices, if at all:
“In an ideal world, I would recommend the parents to provide the child with nutritious food, rich with protein. I would advise that they maintain a hygienic environment for their children; I would stress the importance of clean water… In our situation… any recommendation you give … sometimes you feel like you are rubbing salt into these parents’ wounds.”
Dr. Maarouf described the relentless cycle of malnutrition stating that in some cases children were re-hospitalised after being discharged:
“We treated one little girl, aged six, for nutritional oedema, she had severe protein deficiency when she came in early May; with the treatment we gave her she showed signs of improvement, including gaining weight, becoming livelier… unfortunately she was recently admitted again because her condition relapsed. Like most families in Gaza, her family is displaced, they live in a tent, they have to rely on the lentils or rice they get from the community kitchen. It’s a cycle. With no aid getting in, you feel like, as a hospital, you only patch up the wound but eventually it will burst again.”
Doctors have also warned that the lives of newborn babies are at risk amid acute shortages of baby formula milk, especially for children with lactose-intolerance or other allergies.
One doctor said:
“There is a milk crisis in Gaza overall. Also, we notice that new mothers, because they themselves are not eating properly or because of the panic, trauma and anxiety, are unable to breastfeed. So, to secure baby formula at all is a struggle. But if your child has allergies, it’s almost impossible to find special formula in any of Gaza’s hospitals and for infants the failure to secure special baby formula can be a death sentence.”
At Nasser hospital in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, Dr. Wafaa Abu Nimer confirmed the dire situation, reporting that by 30 June, nine children were still being treated for malnutrition-related complications at her facility alone. She described the scenes they have witnessed over the past two months as “really unprecedented” with severe cases of nutritional oedema or marasmus, muscle wasting. She also said that some are additionally suffering from injuries due to explosions from which they haven’t recovered.
Dr. Abu Nimer said that since Israel’s new aid distribution scheme began there has been no signs of improvement in the situation with hundreds of children screened for malnutrition on a daily basis in their pediatric emergency room. Mass displacement orders issued to the Khan Younis governorate in May made Nasser hospital out of reach for thousands of displaced families.
Dr. Abu Nimer described to Amnesty how the impact on children extends beyond the physical:
“One girl whose hair fell out almost completely as a result of nutritional oedema, kept asking me ‘doctor, will my hair grow again? Am I [still] beautiful?’. Even if these children recover completely, the scars will always remain with them. Medically we know that malnutrition amongst infants and small children may have long-term cognitive and developmental effects, but I don’t think enough attention is being given to the mental health and psychological impact [of starvation and war] on children and parents.”
She also conveyed the exhaustion felt by medical staff:
“We as doctors are also exhausted, we are malnourished ourselves, most of us are also displaced and live in tents, yet we do our best to offer medical care, provide nutrient supplements and as much support as we can. We try to save lives, we try to alleviate the suffering, but there is very little we can do after discharge.”
Weaponised aid
While Israeli authorities continue to impose their unlawful blockade on the entry of aid and commercial supplies into the occupied Gaza Strip, hundreds of aid trucks remain stuck outside Gaza, waiting for an Israeli permit to enter.
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that as of 16 June, 852 trucks for UN and international humanitarian organisations – the majority of which carry food supplies – remain stuck in Al-Arish in Egypt, yet to receive a permit from the Israeli authorities to enter Gaza. The partial easing of the total siege on 19 May did not include easing restrictions on certain critical supplies, such as fuel and cooking gas, which have not been allowed into Gaza since 2 March. Without fuel, there’s no electricity so vital life-saving medical equipment cannot function.
Only a trickle of the extremely limited aid allowed by Israel into Gaza reaches those in need. It is either distributed through the inhumane and deadly militarised scheme run by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, or it is offloaded by desperate starved civilians, and in some cases, organised gangs. This grim reality is compounded by Israel’s deliberate destruction or denial of access to life-sustaining infrastructure, including some of Gaza’s most fertile agricultural land and food production sources, like greenhouses and poultry farms.
The World Food Programme and local organisations were for the first time permitted to distribute flour in Gaza City on 26 June. The relatively smooth distribution that took place with thousands waiting their turn and no reported injuries is a damning indictment of Israel’s militarised Gaza Humanitarian Foundation scheme. All the evidence gathered, including testimonies which Amnesty is receiving from victims and witnesses, suggest that the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation was designed to placate international concerns while constituting another tool of Israel’s genocide.
Agnès Callamard added:
“Not only has the international community failed to stop this genocide, but it has also allowed Israel to constantly reinvent new ways to destroy Palestinian lives in Gaza and trample on their human dignity.
“States must cease their inertia and live up to their legal obligations. They must exercise all necessary pressure to ensure Israel lifts immediately and unconditionally its awful blockade and ends the genocide in Gaza. They must end any form of contribution to Israel’s unlawful conduct or risk complicity in atrocity crimes. This requires immediately suspending all military support to Israel, banning trade and investment that contribute to Israel’s genocide or other grave violations of international law.
“States should also adopt targeted sanctions, through international and regional mechanisms, against those Israeli officials most implicated in international crimes and cooperate with the International Criminal Court, including by implementing its arrest warrants.”
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MIL-OSI NGOs: Togo: Testimonies provide glimpse into violent repression of protests
Source: Amnesty International –
The Togolese authorities must put an end to unnecessary and excessive use of force against protesters, said Amnesty International, amid the latest violent crackdown on protests in the capital, Lomé, since 26 June.
The organization spoke with 18 victims and witnesses. Thirteen described a pattern of unlawful use of force and mistreatment by police and security forces against protesters and passers-by.
These cases must be independently and transparently investigated as a matter of urgency.
Marceau Sivieude, Amnesty International’s interim Regional Director for West and Central Africa
These protests, considered illegal by the authorities, are the latest in a series of demonstrations since the beginning of June against the repression of dissent, the high cost of living and changes to the constitution. Last month, Amnesty International documented allegations that protesters had been tortured or subjected to ill-treatment.
“In recent days, we have interviewed people who have alleged that men identified as security forces carried out unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, acts of torture and other ill-treatment, and several cases of abduction. These cases must be independently and transparently investigated as a matter of urgency,” said Marceau Sivieude, Amnesty International’s interim Regional Director for West and Central Africa.
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MIL-OSI USA: Remarks as prepared for delivery by Becky Pringle, President, National Education Association, to the 104th Representative Assembly
Source: US National Education Union
Oh, Freedom.
I am Becky Pringle. I am the great-granddaughter of people who were kidnapped from the Ghanaian region of West Africa and enslaved in Charlottesville, Virginia. I am the daughter of Haywood Harrison Board, a public school history teacher and Mildred Taylor Board, a Head Start food service worker. I am the widow of Nathan, a labor attorney, who loved and supported me, unconditionally. I am the proud mother of Nathan and Lauren and the grandmother of the beautiful and brilliant Carter and Mackenzie. I am an educator, who has spent 31 of my 70 years on this earth teaching middle school students the wonders of science. And now, I have the honor and privilege of being the president of the largest labor union in this country—the National Education Association.
Oh, Freedom is a Negro Spiritual that my family choir sang at our annual concerts at our church. During these long weeks when our spirits have been saddened, our consciousness outraged, our realities rattled . . . that song has stirred in my soul. I sang it out loud as the Supreme Court decisions were handed down last week; as lawsuits we had won were challenged. Oh, Freedom. I sing it while watching evil run rampant; while witnessing so much hurt and harm. But delegates, I also sing Oh, Freedom while watching millions rise up to say no; when decent people remind this nation of what is good, and right, and true; when morality carries the moment.
Oh, Freedom. It is a reminder . . . a clarion call for courage and determination . . . for the righteous indignation that must fuel our resistance and resolve. And when I look back at my family’s ties to that song, I know that the singing of it built community. Just like we are doing in this space—building a community of support and strength and love.
And, my community, I must express some radical gratitude. You continue to show up with courage in the midst of exhaustion. You defend truth and equity amid a vicious swirl of hatred and lies. You are the holders of hope and the keepers of dreams. You provide love and care to our students and to each other. NEA, thank you . . . for all you are, and for all you do.
Fellow delegates, as the highest governing body of the NEA, our country is depending on us—on this community—to lead the way . . . from dogmatism back to decency and democracy. NEA, we must lead the way from callousness and the castigation of society’s at-risk communities. It is up to us to lead the way toward the care, consideration and compassion that is everyone’s right.
We know well the obstacles we face—all of them designed to distract, divert, and divide as those in power blatantly and aggressively target immigrants, our Black, Brown, Indigenous, API, and LGBTQ+ communities, and anyone who dares to demand the safety and humanity that should be the inheritance of us all.
Those in power are trying to erase the truth of our history. They want to whitewash the past so our students are denied the full story of who we are. They want to silence all of the pain, all of the struggle. Even in the telling of the triumphs, their narration is incomplete. They want to stop our students from looking inward to see their own dignity, or outward to a diverse world filled with possibility and pride.
NEA, none of this, none of it is normal. And, it is not an accident. It is all despicably deliberate. This pitting of parents against educators, neighbors against neighbors, and communities against themselves. Scapegoating, othering, and blaming, instead of fixing the inequitable systems that are baked into this nation’s soil.
And as they blame and they ban, Donald Trump and his billionaire buddies are slashing already promised federal support, funneling public dollars into private hands that are already obscenely wealthy, gutting protections for trans students, and dismantling diversity, equity, and inclusion programs that lift up every student.
Notice I said the words: Diversity. Equity. Inclusion. We cannot allow this administration, or anyone else, to reduce these three sacred values to a simple, three-letter slur.
Diversity is our uniqueness, our strength. Equity means every student gets what they need, when they need it, and in the way that serves them best. Inclusion means all students are seen, valued, and respected; that they all have access to opportunities and support.
Delegates, we cannot allow fear to write the future. Diversity. Equity. Inclusion. Say the words, NEA! Say the words!
NEA, we know exactly why public education lies at the core of their attacks.
Because a public, free, universal education that is grounded in teaching critical thinking is a threat to authoritarianism. Because if they can control what our students learn, they can control what they believe, and then they can use those beliefs to manipulate reality and reason, and manifest confusion and cruelty.
That’s why they want to dismantle, defund, privatize, and voucherize public education. That’s why they want to demoralize the education professionals who have dedicated their lives to teaching and feeding, nurturing, counseling, and driving our students every day.
This is an intentional, coordinated campaign to strip away the very tools that challenge power, demand justice, and preserve democracy. As they work to destroy public education, and then profit from the wreckage, this administration wants to lock in policies that will take generations to undo.
Delegates, I need you to understand that we are in a prolonged fight—one that cannot end on the last day of this RA.
While you have been elected to lift up the voices of educators across our country and then decide the future of our union, your responsibility reaches well past these four days. It’s not only about what we deliberate, debate, and decide, and…learn. NEA, it is always about what we do.
We must use our power to take action that leads, action that liberates, action that lasts.
And, we cannot simply fight against, NEA. We must also fight forward: for our vision of a public school system where every student—every one—attends a school that is safe, welcoming, and plentiful in resources; a school where every student is celebrated for who they know themselves to be; a school that is steeped in excellence and care; where education justice is recognized as a birthright; where educators—you—are valued as the professionals you are.
NEA, I see you. In so many ways, you are already fighting forward to make that vision reality.
Just last month, in a historic vote for unionization, determined education support professionals in Kansas brought nearly 600 new members into the Lawrence Education Association. Their dedication unites all school employees into one powerful local, laying the groundwork for a statewide movement for dignity and respect.
Last fall—while we didn’t “win all the things”…yet—we can find strength and inspiration and learning in victories in Nebraska, Colorado, and Kentucky. In each of those states, public education was on the ballot. And every time—every time—voters said no to school vouchers.
And in legislative sessions this year, educators helped to beat back vouchers in Utah, Kansas, Mississippi and in North and South Dakota.
And not just that.
NEA-New Mexico wrapped a circle of protection around our immigrant students. They fought against using the standardized testing process to collect student immigration status—and they won.
Educators in Sackets Harbor, New York, mobilized their community and won the release of their students who were detained in an ICE raid.
NEA, this is the type of work that we must do all over this country.
And I will forever be proud of NEA’s response to the Department of Education’s dangerous, diabolical, and unconstitutional edict, which was designed to erase diversity, equity, and inclusion. NEA stood up. And we won. In three states, federal judges blocked implementation, ruling that what the department had done was a clear abuse of power.
As we continue and expand this work across our nation, we must take action guided by these seven important verbs: Educate. Communicate. Organize. Mobilize. Litigate. Legislate. Elect.
In many of the world’s cultures, spiritual systems, and creation stories, the number seven holds special significance. In the Lakota Sioux tradition, “Every decision we make must be done with consideration for the next seven generations.”
Our seven verbs hold similar long-term thinking. As we answer the call to fight back now, we must also fight forward for those who will follow us in our continuous struggle for justice.
Our multi-pronged strategy to protect our nation’s promise is designed to meet the multi-pronged attack on our democracy and our schools. Seven verbs…
We must EDUCATE. We will talk openly about what is happening to the world around us and what it portends for the future. As the rapid consolidation of power leads us down a treacherous and dark road toward authoritarian rule, we must be vigilant in teaching the lessons of history, and help not just our students, but our communities understand what is at stake and ensure they are able to fully imagine their world as it should be.
We must COMMUNICATE. We will use truth to cut through all of the noise and each of the lies. We will share all of the joyful and miraculous stories we have witnessed serving in our nation’s classrooms, on campuses, and worksites. Together, we will inspire, motivate, prepare, and compel others to join our movement and take action.
We must ORGANIZE, and we must build our power. Power to promote, protect, and strengthen public education. Power, expanded by partnerships that connect our work to the struggles for worker rights, wages, and protections. For fair taxes and economic justice. For reproductive freedom. That’s why we’ve allocated more money to organizing. It is the most powerful tool for creating change.
We must MOBILIZE. We will show up in school board elections, state capitals, marches, protests, at the ballot box—wherever our students’ futures are at stake, we will stand. Together.
We must LITIGATE. Whenever the rights of students and educators are denied, we will take our fight to the courts! Just since January, NEA has filed several suits and joined our allies in hundreds of other lawsuits on: diversity, equity, and inclusion; public education funding and support; and the closure of the Department of Education. We’ve worked to protect collective bargaining rights, the right to strike, and the right to engage in union advocacy. We’ve stood up for disability rights, the rights of students, educators, immigrants, the LGBTQ+ community, and constitutional rights to voting, speech, and assembly.
Every time they create an unjust policy, we will use every legal tool to challenge it.
And, we must LEGISLATE. From school board meetings and state houses to the halls of Congress, we will continue to call for laws that provide what’s best for our students. Together, we will continue to demand for educators the dignity, respect, and fair pay that every professional should have. We will create and support measures that invest in public schools. That’s why we’re fighting so hard against the Big, Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Bill that recently passed in the Senate—a bill that will allow taxpayer dollars to fund private schools that are allowed to hand pick students and freely discriminate; a bill that will slash Medicaid, school meals, healthcare.
And in November of 2026, we will hold lawmakers accountable!
We will ELECT. We must have leaders who believe in fully funded public education. Leaders who will stand with us in the battle for racial and social justice. Leaders who know educators deserve the freedom to teach and our students deserve the freedom to learn.
NEA, we are not simply reacting to a moment. We are building a strong, sustainable movement. A movement that votes. That holds leaders accountable. A movement of strong educator leaders who run for office—and win!
Educate. Communicate. Organize. Mobilize. Litigate. Legislate. Elect. NEA, I need you to remember these verbs. Action words. Then, I ask that you decide every day what you will do; which actions you will take!
Use your power to fuel our resistance and resolve; our righteous indignation and our renaissance!
Show me your power, NEA!
If you led a walk-in or rally, a march or a protest, stand up!
If you’ve joined with allies in acts of resistance, stand up!
Stand if you’ve said something or done something to defend our democracy.
Stand if you have fought for the survival of public education!
If you will make the commitment to protect every student . . . every family . . . every community . . . stand up!
Stand, NEA! Stand! Look around and see each other.
I see you NEA!
As you return to your seats, I ask you to relax into the poetry of Leslé Honoré. Allow her writing to lift your hearts, feed your spirit, and strengthen your resolve:
Hold your head high
Especially when the winds are heavy
Especially when the lies are loud . . . when the traps are set . . .
Especially when the truth is banned . . .
Hold your head high . . .
Dance in the rain you walking miracle…
You are the resistance
You are the victory
You are the history
And present
And future . . .
You are the wildest dream
Dreaming still for the dreamers yet to come
Hold your head high
You are
Living
Breathing
Hope
NEA, as you fight back: hold your head high!
There is power in what you do every day.
As you fight forward, hold your head high knowing there is hope in the future you are building.
Through your courage and your conviction, we will create a path for our children toward a world where life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is a promise fulfilled.
NEA, remember who you are and hold your head high!
You are brave. You are powerful. You are the NEA!
Hold your head high!
Hold your head high!
Oh Freedom!
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The National Education Association is the nation’s largest professional employee organization, representing more than 3 million elementary and secondary teachers, higher education faculty, education support professionals, school administrators, retired educators, students preparing to become teachers, healthcare workers, and public employees. Learn more at www.nea.org
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MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Spain, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend Measures Making Abortion More Accessible, Ask about Accountability for Past Rights Violations and Overcrowding in Migrant Reception Centres
Source: United Nations – Geneva
The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Spain on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Committee Experts commended revisions to the State’s abortion law promoting increased access, while raising issues concerning its efforts to address accountability for past human rights violations and overcrowding in offshore migrant reception centres.
A Committee Expert said there had been positive changes in legislation on sexual and reproductive health and voluntary termination of pregnancy, with the removal of requirements for parental consent and the mandatory three-day reflection period.
Another Committee Expert said serious human rights violations were committed during the Civil War and the Franco dictatorship. Did the 2022 law on democratic memory overturn the 1977 law on amnesty? How many high-ranking officials had been tried and sentenced for crimes committed during the dictatorship?
A Committee Expert said that in Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands, migrants had been forced to sleep on the streets due to the lack of capacity in reception centres. The Committee had also received disturbing reports about overcrowding and abuse of unaccompanied children in detention, particularly in the Canary Islands. What progress had been made in redistributing migrants held in the Canary Islands to other areas of Spain?
Marcos Gómez Martínez, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, presenting the report, said Spain remained firmly committed to the promotion and protection of human rights. Since the presentation of the previous report in 2015, Spain had adopted important legislative, institutional and political measures to strengthen the protection of human rights in the country, in particular civil and political rights.
Mr. Gómez Martínez said Law 20/2022 on Democratic Memory consolidated the right to truth, justice and reparation for the victims of the Civil War and the dictatorship. A national census of victims, a map of graves and a State plan for exhumations had been created, with the participation of the autonomous communities and civil society.
The delegation added that work was underway to create a DNA database of disappeared individuals. There was a unit in the Prosecutor’s Office that specialised in identifying the whereabouts of disappeared persons, and an information service for persons affected by the kidnapping of babies, which facilitated access to birth certificates and genetic records.
In response to the influx of arrivals to the Spanish islands, particularly in the Canary Islands, the Government was working to strengthen resources and support access to the asylum procedure, the delegation said. It had opened four large reception centres on the Canary Islands, and had moved some asylum seekers from the Canary Islands to Madrid to allow them to submit asylum applications. Detainment in migrant holding centres was a last resort.
In concluding remarks, Mr. Gómez Martínez thanked the Committee for the dialogue and the quality of its questions. The full guarantee of civil and political rights was an ongoing process. The Committee helped the State party to guarantee these rights domestically.
Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, said the dialogue had addressed key topics related to implementation of the Covenant. The Committee urged the State party to implement its recommendations to strengthen implementation of the Covenant.
The delegation of Spain was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation; Ministry of the Presidency, Justice and Relations with the Courts; Ministry of the Interior; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Equality; Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration; Ministry of Youth and Children; and the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva.
The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025. All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Meeting summary releases can be found here. The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.
The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m., Thursday 3 July to begin its consideration of the second periodic report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/2).
Report
The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Spain (CCPR/C/ESP/7).
Presentation of the Report
MARCOS GÓMEZ MARTÍNEZ, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, said Spain remained firmly committed to the promotion and protection of human rights. Since the presentation of the previous report in 2015, Spain had adopted important legislative, institutional and political measures to strengthen the protection of human rights in the country, in particular civil and political rights.
In June 2023, the second national human rights plan (2023-2027) was approved, which expanded the protection of political and civil rights; incorporated the equality of women and men, as well as non-discrimination; and advanced measures to guarantee the universality of human rights for all people. There was a structure responsible for monitoring and supervising implementation of the plan, which followed up on the opinions and recommendations of the human rights treaty bodies. The plan recognised the importance of the national human rights institution, the Ombudsman, as an independent institution, with its own resources and competences in the field of human rights monitoring.
Spain had made significant progress in the fight against discrimination. In 2023, a law was approved that guaranteed of the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people, eliminating the requirement of medical intervention for changing information on sex in the civic registry, as well as the age requirement. Conversion therapies and unnecessary surgical interventions on intersex people under 12 years of age were also prohibited.
Law 15/2022 facilitated the creation of the Independent Authority for Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination. The criminal framework against hate crimes had also been strengthened, expanding the recognised causes of discrimination, including age, social exclusion and ethnicity. The Attorney General’s Office had consolidated a network of prosecutors specialising in hate crimes and discrimination, and specific police units were created for prevention and investigation.
The Strategy for Equality, Inclusion and Participation of the Gitanos [Spanish Romani] (2021-2030) had been renewed, with specific measures addressing education, employment, health, housing, essential services, poverty, and gender equality. In addition, studies and awareness-raising campaigns on racism and xenophobia had been promoted, and the Spanish Observatory on Racism and Xenophobia had been strengthened, as had the Council for the Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination. Judicial mechanisms for dealing with victims of hate crimes had been strengthened, as well as the detection and reporting of hate speech on social networks, including a specific protocol to combat it online.
In 2024, Spain took a decisive step towards the effective recognition of the rights of persons with disabilities through the reform of article 49 of the Constitution. The new wording guaranteed that all persons with disabilities could exercise their rights in conditions of freedom and equality. In addition, in Spain the right to vote was fully guaranteed to all persons with disabilities.
Organic Law 10/2022 on the Comprehensive Guarantee of Sexual Freedom expanded prevention, care and reparation measures. Within the Ministry of the Interior, the National Office against Sexual Violence was created in 2023. Organic Law 1/2023 guaranteed access to voluntary termination of pregnancy free of charge, including for minors and women with disabilities. Organic Law 8/2021 on the comprehensive protection of children and adolescents against violence strengthened the framework for the protection of minors.
In July 2023, Spain approved the new protocol for the forensic medical examination of detainees. In 2022, the Ministry of the Interior created the National Office for Human Rights Guarantees, a body responsible for ensuring compliance with national and international standards against torture by the State security forces.
Spain’s prison population had decreased in recent years and detention conditions had improved, including through increased access to health and care for people with disabilities and a reduction of the use of mechanical restraints. Incommunicado detention was applied on an exceptional basis and could not be applied to minors under 16 years of age. In Temporary Stay Centres for Immigrants, specific modules had been set up for women and families, eliminating situations of overcrowding.
A contingency plan implemented since 2022 called on child protection services in all the country’s territories to take in unaccompanied minors. Royal Decree Law 2/2025 implemented urgent measures to guarantee the rights and best interests of migrant children and adolescents. The Government was preparing a Royal Decree that set minimum quality standards in terms of reception centres’ size, resources and accessibility.
Law 2/2023 regulated the protection of people who reported regulatory breaches and created the Independent Authority for the Protection of Whistleblowers. This was one of the actions included in the Action Plan for Democracy of 2024, which aimed to expand and improve the quality of Government information, and strengthen the transparency and accountability of the media, the legislative branch and the electoral system.
Law 20/2022 on Democratic Memory consolidated the right to truth, justice and reparation for the victims of the Civil War and the dictatorship. A national census of victims, a map of graves and a State plan for exhumations had been created, with the participation of the autonomous communities and civil society.
Spain reiterated its commitment to the international human rights system and to the effective implementation of the Covenant.
Questions by Committee Experts
A Committee Expert said reports revealed positive steps had been taken by the State party, however challenges remained in implementing the Convention. Was there an oversight mechanism assessing implementation of the Committee’s recommendations and Views? What was the jurisprudence of the State’s courts regarding the Committee’s Views? The Supreme Court had issued a decision asserting the binding nature of human rights treaty bodies’ Views. Was this decision being applied? Could the delegation give some examples of court cases that had referenced the Covenant?
The 2022 law on equality, which recognised the right of all persons to non-discrimination, had no bearing on the legislation on immigration, which inhibited access to public services for migrants. Would the State party address this issue? There had been major delays in the establishment of the proposed Authority for Equal Treatment; when would this be completed? What was the status of the proposed Organic Act against Racism?
The Criminal Code did not address hate crimes based on language, political opinion or economic status. How did the State party tackle such hate crimes? There had been a disturbing rise in hate crimes recently; how was the State party working to prosecute and prevent these crimes?
What remedies had the State party provided for newborns and intersex children subjected to unnecessary medical treatments? The State party had made steps forward in promoting self-determination of gender with the adoption of the recent law on the topic, however this did not recognise the rights of non-binary persons. Did the State party plan to amend the law to recognise non-binary persons? Had it considered expanding the options for declaring sex in the civil registry beyond simply “male” and “female”?
Another Committee Expert said that Spain had concluded its first national action plan on human rights. How did the consultative commission work with the Ombudsperson’s Office to assess implementation of the plan? The Ombudsperson’s Office had “A” status under the Paris Principles. What efforts had been made by the State to implement the recommendations of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions to strengthen the role of Ombudsperson? Was the Ombudsperson mandated to investigate complaints of torture and ill-treatment by security forces?
There had been positive changes in legislation on sexual and reproductive health and voluntary termination of pregnancy, with the removal of requirements for parental consent and the mandatory three-day reflection period. How did the State party promote access to abortions for women with disabilities and minority women? What measures would the State party take to address conscientious objections by doctors to abortions? How did the State party fight against obstetric violence?
Serious human rights violations were committed during the Civil War and the Franco dictatorship. Positive progress had been made with the 2022 law on democratic memory, but the right to truth, justice and reparation of the family members of victims had not been guaranteed and the Law of Amnesty of 1977 had not been overturned. Did the 2022 law overturn the 1977 law on amnesty? Were there efforts to overturn the law on State secrets related to the Franco dictatorship? There had been a proposal to create a DNA database of babies stolen during the dictatorship. How many high-ranking officials had been tried and sentenced for crimes committed during the dictatorship? What would the makeup of the proposed Truth Commission be, and how would it promote access to truth, justice and reparation for victims of historical human rights violations?
One Committee Expert welcomed the strategy for equality and inclusion for the Gitanos, and institutions set up to tackle discrimination and racism. The quality of education provided to Gitano people was lower than that of the rest of the population, and the community had lower employment levels. What measures were in place to address these issues? The Council for the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination had recommended increasing persons from diverse backgrounds in public institutions and measures to redress discrimination. Had the State party implemented these recommendations? What measures were in place to prevent discrimination against people of African descent?
Law enforcement officials reportedly continued to engage in discriminatory identity checks. Did the State party plan to adopt a law explicitly prohibiting racial and ethnic profiling? Challenges to proving discrimination resulted in underreporting of racial and ethnic profiling. Who investigated such reports and how were perpetrators held accountable? Internal accountability mechanisms lacked transparency and data was not publicly available. How were people disciplined for infractions?
The Committee was concerned by the reported increase in hate speech in Spain, particularly neo-fascist hate speech, and a reduction in the budgets of Government mechanisms to combat this phenomenon. How would the State party tackle this issue? The Committee was also concerned by the rise in hate crimes against minorities. The State party had launched several initiatives to tackle hate crimes, but their effects appeared to be limited. How was the State party collecting data on and working to ensure the implementation of measures to tackle hate crimes?
A Committee Expert welcomed Organic Law 10/2022 and other measures to tackle gender-based violence. There had been an increase in femicides, and women faced barriers in reporting violence. What measures were in place to ensure implementation of Law 10/2022? What resources had been allocated to services for victims of violence and programmes tackling gender-based violence? Were there oversight mechanisms that monitored the treatment of women in courts? How was the State party tackling online discrimination against women and gender biases in artificial intelligence tools?
Another Committee Expert welcomed recent amendments to the Criminal Code removing an article that justified forced sterilisation in certain circumstances. Had past cases of forced sterilisation been exempt from prosecution by this article? What measures had the State party taken to ensure specialised training for health workers related to the prohibition of forced sterilisation?
Acts of torture in Spain were subject to a statute of limitations if they did not qualify as crimes against humanity. Were there plans to amend the definition of torture to bring it in line with international standards and remove the statute of limitations? Time bars prevented many victims of past political violence in Basque accessing remedies and justice. How was this issue being addressed? What steps had been taken to identify and prosecute historic allegations of torture? The State party did not make video recordings of interrogations; would it consider making such recordings?
Responses by the Delegation
The delegation said Spain had implemented the recommendations in the Views issued by the Committee and all treaty bodies. The Views being implemented were referred to in the preambles of the relevant laws. The Supreme Court and lower courts applied the provisions of these Views in their interpretations of Spanish law. A July 2024 Royal Decree established a monitoring committee tasked with drafting follow-up reports on the implementation of the Views of treaty bodies.
The Ombudsperson had the mandate to submit recommendations to the Government related to complaints it received, including complaints from the Spanish autonomous communities.
There were no limitations on foreigners’ access to the police to report human rights violations. The immigration law suspended deportation procedures involving victims of trafficking and minors. Foreigners were assisted in criminal proceedings, and all victims were treated equally before the law, regardless of their migration status. New immigration regulations implemented this year protected foreign victims of crimes, who were permitted to live and work in Spain. There were specific norms for victims of sexual and gender-based violence and trafficking in persons.
Implementation of the law on racism and intolerance continued to be a priority. There had been delays in implementation of the draft law on equal treatment. The chair of the independent authority on equal treatment had been appointed and the body was fully operational.
A Royal Decree of 2024 promoted equality and non-discrimination of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals, and the Government planned to adopt State strategies for the inclusion of this group. A mechanism had been set up for reporting hate crimes against this community. Spanish laws prohibited conversion therapy. The State party had made progress in conducting a study on non-binary people.
Organic Law 1/2023 strengthened inclusion for women with disabilities. All women could access voluntary interruption of pregnancy from 16 years of age, including women with disabilities. The State party was promoting access to abortion services in autonomous communities. Each autonomous community needed to ensure that they had sufficient personnel to promote access to abortions. The Organic Law set out concrete measures to eradicate obstetric violence. Autonomous communities ensured that health care centres could report malpractice. Legal exceptions which allowed for sterilisation of persons with disabilities without their consent had been removed in 2020. Specialised training on legislation related to abortion and sterilisation was being provided to medical staff.
Spain had a decentralised governance structure, and the Central Government did not have the authority to address some issues that were the purview of autonomous community governments.
The law on democratic memory sought to ensure victims’ right to truth. It would be implemented in line with international law. The law on investigations into human rights violations occurring during the Civil War and dictatorship had established a Centre of Memory. Court cases involving crimes occurring during the Civil War had failed due to the statute of limitations. The Prosecutor’s Office had worked to create a DNA database of victims of these human rights violations. Autonomous communities’ laws on historical violations were being challenged by the State in the Constitutional Court. Spain had a law on transparency and a working group was seeking to expand transparency in access to information involving historic rights violations. Parliament was addressing cases of children stolen during the dictatorship, and the law on democratic memory recognised these rights of these children.
The State party had a national strategy on the Gitanos, which promoted social inclusion, equal opportunities and empowerment of this group, as well as their access to education, housing and healthcare services.
The State party had conducted an analysis on racism and xenophobia to inform related policies. It had established strategies promoting the inclusion of migrants. The national action plan on preventing racism and xenophobia ran until 2026 and had already achieved tangible results. The State party had been working with the European Commission to monitor and address online hate speech, and was drafting a strategy to address hate speech in sport. Artificial intelligence was used in social networks to fight discrimination; it had led to increased detections of hate speech. Data was collected on different forms of hate speech, including in sport. A working group was developing strategic plans promoting the inclusion of ethnic minorities. Spain had been issuing subsidies to civil society organizations working to prevent hate speech and hate crimes. The State party was promoting coordination between the police and other agencies to ensure the reporting of hate crimes.
The Ministry of Interior had a zero-tolerance policy for hate speech and hate crimes. There had been a rise in reports of these crimes, but this indicated that barriers to reporting had been addressed. Police officers had been trained in combatting hate speech. The State had implemented measures for protecting the Gitanos from hate speech.
There was a robust legal framework governing police checks. The police had committed to guaranteeing public security. There was an internal oversight body that investigated complaints related to racial profiling.
Some 1.5 billion euros had been invested in the State Pact, and responsibilities for its implementation had been delineated. Under the Pact, the State was working to combat all forms of violence against women. The Constitutional Court had granted all victims of sexual aggression the right to appeal court cases. There were 51 shelters for victims of violence, who also had access to compensation. Budget had been allocated to improving care in rural areas. Measures had been implemented to combat macho attitudes. There was a comprehensive victim protection system that ensured appropriate protections for victims. A campaign on psychological violence would be carried out by the State party this year. Systems had been set up within the Ministry of the Interior to address sexual and gender-based violence.
The definition of torture in the Criminal Code was not fully aligned with that of the Convention against Torture. However, the Code and other legislation sufficiently addressed the crime of torture, and did not need to be amended. The Code provided for the non-application of the statute of limitations for crimes of torture that were deemed to be crimes against humanity. The statute of limitations was 15 years; this was sufficient time for the prosecution to act. Police practices needed to be aligned with international standards.
Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts
One Committee Expert welcomed specific measures to address online hate speech and hate speech at sporting events. What measures were in place to address other forms of hate speech?
Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on the legal status of the Committee’s recommendations regarding compensation; national policies promoting sexual and reproductive health education; whether the 2022 law on memory brought an end to the amnesty imposed by the 1977 amnesty law; how the State party reconciled its obligations to guarantee access to justice and the concordia laws being adopted by the autonomous communities; measures to repeal amnesty laws to deal with enforced disappearance and to adopt a State plan for search and identification of the disappeared; and the legal framework on public access to archives on historic human rights violations.
Experts also asked questions on whether the State party was considering adopting a law on racial profiling; the functions to be carried out by the body mandated to implement the recommendations of treaty bodies; whether all foreigners who were victims of serious crimes were provided with residency permits; whether the State’s efforts to prevent forced sterilisation were sufficient; the role of the Office of Human Rights Guarantees in implementing international standards on preventing torture; and investigations into numerous reports of torture and excessive use of force in a 2017 incident in Catalonia.
Responses by the Delegation
The delegation said persons could go before the courts to claim financial compensation based on treaty bodies’ Views and recommendations.
Spain had an educational curriculum on sexual and reproductive health, which promoted mutual respect and the prevention of violence. The Ministry of Education and Health was also providing online training on sexual and reproductive health for teachers and families.
The concordia laws drafted by three autonomous communities had been challenged in the Constitutional Court.
Video recordings of interrogations could be used in certain kinds of investigations; however, they could not be used when they undermined investigations.
There had been a clear drop in hate speech crimes, from over 2,000 cases in 2023 to 1,900 in 2024. This had been influenced by training provided to public officials and civil society on hate speech. The number of cases of hate speech against the Gitanos had also fallen over this period. There were laws on police ethics; if police did not abide by these laws, they were sanctioned and could possibly be released from service.
The right to truth, reparation and non-repetition was enshrined in the law on democratic memory. A map of disappeared persons had been created, and work was underway to create a DNA database of disappeared individuals. There was a unit in the Prosecutor’s Office that specialised in identifying the whereabouts of disappeared persons. In one cemetery, the remains of up to 120 victims of human rights violations from the Civil War had been found. There was an information service for persons affected by the kidnapping of babies, which facilitated access to birth certificates and genetic records.
The police oversight body within the Ministry of Justice took actions in response to reports of police misconduct and conducted preventative activities. It complemented internal police oversight units.
A 2024 Royal Decree regulated the second national human rights plan, which included a measure establishing a commission for following up on the recommendations of human rights treaty bodies. It addressed all of Spain, including the autonomous communities.
Last year, the Constitutional Court decided that the 2022 law on democratic memory did not affect the 1977 amnesty law. The 1977 law provided a broad amnesty to those persons who were arrested under the dictatorship, as part of the transition from the dictatorship to a democracy. Court rulings extended the amnesty to victims of forced labour and military personnel. The prosecutor’s office was opening investigations into alleged cases of human rights violations which had taken place in the dictatorship-era. The aim of the investigations was to provide redress to victims. Thus far, around 7,000 human remains had been identified and more would be exhumed soon.
The Commission for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination was working with the private sector, unions and civil society to promote equality. It held events related to racism, conducted studies and aided victims of racial discrimination. Its funds had been increased in 2023, allowing it to expand its remit, which had led to an increase in reports of discrimination.
Legal amendments had been made to make forced sterilisation a crime in all circumstances. Since the amendments were enacted, there had been no reports of forced sterilisation. The Government had held an event in which it offered an apology to victims. The National Council for Disabilities was working to rectify this historic harm and support the sexual and reproductive health of women and girls with disabilities.
Questions by Committee Experts
A Committee Expert said the national preventive mechanism had identified material deficiencies in the oldest prisons, a dearth of psychiatric and healthcare professionals, and the use of mechanical subjugation. How had authorities responded to these observations? Electric shocks had been used against detainees as part of a study on aggressiveness. Why was this allowed and how would the State party prevent repetition?
Isolation was used in prisons, with prior authorisation for up to 14 days, with the possibility of extension. Why did the State party maintain this regime of incommunicado detention? Had it seriously considered the possibility of its elimination? Legislation allowed for incommunicado detention of minors aged 16 to 18. Would the State cease this practice? There were no laws establishing maximum time limits for incommunicado detention; would limits be established?
Were there alternatives to migratory detention? To what extent were they applied? What measures had the State party taken to respond to reports of ill-treatment of migrant children by officials in holding facilities?
One Committee Expert said Spain was a country of destination and transit for migrants. What was the nature and scope of the ongoing study on trafficking in persons? What challenges remained in harmonising regional legislation on trafficking? Was there a timeline for the adoption of the draft anti-trafficking law? What did it cover? Was the State party considering developing a more comprehensive national referral mechanism?
Spain had no formal age determination procedure for migrants. Would this be developed? There were reports of abuse in migrant reception centres and of minors being held with adults. How did the State party ensure that unaccompanied minors received legal assistance, protection and family reunification opportunities?
To what extent was legislation on slander and libel compatible with international standards? Was the State party considering decriminalising defamation? What was the rationale for maintaining the defamation law? The transparency law did not cover judicial bodies and did not impose penalties on public officials for non-compliance. Was the current legal system sufficient for securing transparency in public information? What measures were in place to promote increased application of the law?
Between 2017 and 2020, at least 65 Catalan politicians, activists, and public figures had reportedly been targeted with Pegasus spyware, allegedly linked to the National Intelligence Centre, and there had been no investigations into these reports. Did the State party intend to launch investigations into these allegations? The 2024 amnesty law granted amnesty to individuals involved in recent pro-independence activities in Catalonia. What progress had been made in applying the law? What was the impact of the recent Constitutional Court ruling on the law? Was the law compatible with international standards?
A Committee Expert said migrant intake facilities could detain migrants for up to 60 days. Did the State party provide consistent access to medical care and legal support for migrants in these centres? In Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands, migrants had been forced to sleep on the streets due to the lack of capacity in reception centres. The Committee had also received disturbing reports about overcrowding and abuse of unaccompanied children in detention, particularly in the Canary Islands. What progress had been made in redistributing migrants held in the Canary Islands to other areas of Spain?
There were long wait times for the assessment of asylum applications; there were over 240,000 applications pending as of 2024. How was this being addressed? There were pushbacks at the border preventing migrants from entering the State, forcing them to swim or jump fences. At least 15 migrants had died in an incident in a border area in 2014, and 23 had died in 2022. What measures were in place to prevent deaths of migrants and promote effective and timely investigations of deaths? When would the State party cease the practice of pushbacks? A 2022 agreement with Morocco authorised Spain to send migrants back to Morocco. How did the State party ensure that migrants who were sent back to Morocco had the right to apply for asylum?
Another Committee Expert said the public security act of 2015 had a dissuasive impact on the activities of journalists and human rights defenders. The Constitutional Court had issued a decision stating that the prohibition to film officials needed to be limited to cases where there was a threat to the official. What measures were in place to amend the law in line with the Constitutional Court’s ruling? Did the State party still use the dangerous practice of undercover police agents? The offence of glorification of terrorism had been used in 2024 against two Palestinian activists. What was the status of proposed reforms to restrict the application of this offence?
Limited progress had been made in combatting corruption in the judiciary. In 2025, after five years of deadlock, an agreement was reached on establishing the General Council of the Judiciary. Was fully operational? How would the State party ensure that it functioned independently? Judges and prosecutors had gone on strike this week to protest recent judicial reforms, fearing that it would harm their independence. What was the purpose of these reforms?
Responses by the Delegation
The delegation said there were shortages of medical professionals in prisons. Healthcare was the mandate of the autonomous communities, but the Central Government continued to provide resources to support healthcare. Remote doctors were always available, and the State coordinated with the police to facilitate transfers of inmates to hospitals in cases of medical emergencies. Rosters for nurses and other medical professionals in prisons had been 95 per cent completed.
Experimentation on inmates was prohibited, but voluntary scientific studies could be conducted in prisons. Mechanical subjugation, such as the use of handcuffs, straps and tranquilisers in extreme cases, was regulated in the law on penitentiaries. All guarantees were in place to ensure legality and proportionality in the use of these devices. These devices were used as a last resort.
The European Council had not established infractions related to Spain’s use of incommunicado detention. Persons in incommunicado detention needed to be visited twice daily by medical authorities and visits by consular authorities were not restricted. Legislation on incommunicado detention was fully aligned with European standards. The State’s isolation regime had received the support of the Council of Europe’s torture body. Typically, isolation was used for short periods of a few minutes or hours to prevent conflicts.
The Government had conducted a study on trafficking in persons in 2024; its results had been published online. The study identified that there were around 9,000 women in prostitution at risk of being trafficked. A draft bill had been developed that sought to prevent trafficking and ensure support for victims. A public hearing on the bill had been concluded, and it would go through the legislature in September. The bill would establish a national referral mechanism. Several training courses for the security forces promoted identification of trafficking victims using objective, streamlined criteria.
Detainment in migrant holding centres was a last resort, applied only in cases of irregular residency. Migrants could be held for up to 72 hours in these centres. The legal regime for these centres aligned with that of detention in police centres. Detainees had the right to food and drinks. The average occupation rate in these centres did not exceed 30 per cent.
Between November 2023 and January 2024, there had been a mass arrival of asylum seekers at Madrid Airport. Holding rooms at the airport were expanded and a room for women and girls was established. The Government had expedited the processing of asylum claims for these people.
There had been an influx of arrivals to the Spanish islands, particularly in the Canary Islands, during the last two years. In response, the Government was working to strengthen resources and support access to the asylum procedure. A specific plan to support minors had been developed. The Government had opened four large reception centres on the Canary Islands. One centre that opened in 2023 had housed more than 37,000 people to date.
The Government was committed to defending child migrants’ rights; it had developed a protection framework for these children. Royal Decree 2/2025 introduced measures to ensure the best interests of the child in cases of irregular migration, regulating when unaccompanied minors could be welcomed by autonomous communities. The State party was trying to redistribute these minors across the territory to ensure that the capacities of communities were not exceeded. A draft Royal Decree on minimum standards had been developed, which would ensure a basic level of care for migrant children, establish training for officials on migrant children’s rights and support migrants’ inclusion in communities. There were minors who wished to be considered as adults so that they could work in the country. Specialised prosecutors had established standard criteria for determining migrants’ age. A draft bill would amend civil procedures to establish a formal age determination process, including the assumption that migrants were minors until proven otherwise.
Spain worked in step with European instruments in regulating its border in national territories bordering Africa. Investigations into the cases of migrant deaths in 2022 were ongoing.
In 2020, the criteria evaluated by judges when determining acts that glorified terrorism were revised. In all prosecuted cases of acts of glorification of terrorism, limits on the freedom of expression had been exceeded.
The Organic Law on the protection of citizens’ safety was an administrative law that did not have a criminal aspect. There had been an increase an administrative sanctions after the implementation of this law, which related to restrictions on the freedom of movement implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. The law was currently being revised by the parliament.
There were women’s penitentiaries in Spain, and large prison facilities had wings that were exclusively for women. The penitentiary administration had developed programmes that supported women after their release from prison.
In June 2024, an agreement was reached on the appointment of magistrates to Spanish courts, which resulted in the filling of 120 vacancies. Strikes by prosecutors and judges were related to the appointment process. Individuals could lodge complaints with oversight mechanisms regarding issues with transparency in the judiciary. These mechanisms ensured that prosecutors and judges did not have links to political groups. Specialised units had been established in the prosecutor’s office that were fighting public corruption, and draft laws on transparency in the public administration had been developed.
Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts
Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on reasons why police officers found guilty of human rights violations had not had their medals withdrawn; the treatment of people of African descent in Spain; efforts to investigate human rights violations involving migrants at the border more seriously; the number of autonomous communities involved in accommodating unaccompanied minors; efforts to standardise the process of determining minority across regions and increase the efficiency of the assessment process for minors’ asylum applications; how the State party had given effect to the national preventive mechanism’s recommendations regarding mechanical constraints; the law that determined the maximum duration of solitary confinement; the justification for the incommunicado detention regime; why the Constitutional Court had empty posts; and reforms that would be made by the forthcoming Organic Law on the judiciary.
Responses by the Delegation
The delegation said legal provisions were in place that allowed for the withdrawal of medals from officers who were found guilty of human rights violations.
Tackling discrimination against people of African descent was a high priority for the State party. It had developed policies and awareness raising campaigns that promoted the rights of this group.
The Ministry of the Interior had moved some asylum seekers from the Canary Islands to Madrid to allow them to submit asylum applications. Deportations to Morocco were processed in line with Spanish law. Communities that shared a land border with Africa were saturated. The budget for asylum processing had been significantly increased recently but was still not sufficient. A draft bill had been developed to ensure that communities with the greatest demand were given greater priority in budgeting. The State presumed that migrants subject to age determination procedures were minors until proven otherwise.
Activities by undercover agents and “infiltrators” were regulated by State legislation. They were mandated to gather information that contributed to public safety.
There were around 300 cases in which had been necessary to use mechanical or chemical restraints between 2018 and 2025. The use of such restraints was always filmed.
Detainees who committed specific crimes, such as terrorist crimes or crimes related to organised crime, were subjected to the incommunicado detention regime. Some 390 people, including 15 women, had been subjected to the regime. There was a five-day maximum duration for such detention.
Closing Statements
MARCOS GÓMEZ MARTÍNEZ, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue and the quality of its questions. The full guarantee of civil and political rights was an ongoing process. The Committee helped the State party to guarantee these rights domestically.
CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, said that, over the past two days, the dialogue had addressed key topics related to implementation of the Covenant. The Committee commended progress in several areas, but was concerned by issues in other areas. It urged the State party to implement its recommendations to strengthen implementation of the Covenant. Mr. Soh closed by thanking the delegation for its participation and all those who had contributed to the dialogue.
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Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.CCPR25.014E
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MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – NGO funding through the LIFE programme – E-002493/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002493/2025/rev.1
to the Commission
Rule 144
Christine Singer (Renew), Joachim Streit (Renew), Engin Eroglu (Renew), Filip Turek (PfE), Georgiana Teodorescu (ECR), Malika Sorel (NI), Ondřej Krutílek (ECR), Fernand Kartheiser (NI), Petr Bystron (ESN), Roman Haider (PfE), Friedrich Pürner (NI), Petar Volgin (ESN), Nicolas Bay (ECR), Jan-Peter Warnke (NI), António Tânger Corrêa (PfE), Michael McNamara (Renew), François-Xavier Bellamy (PPE), Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI), Miriam Lexmann (PPE), Alexandr Vondra (ECR), Ciaran Mullooly (Renew), Mariusz Kamiński (ECR), Sander Smit (PPE), Céline Imart (PPE), Sebastian Tynkkynen (ECR), Katarína Roth Neveďalová (NI), Vasile Dîncu (S&D), Laurence Trochu (ECR), Marion Maréchal (ECR), Mathilde Androuët (PfE), René Aust (ESN), Hans Neuhoff (ESN), Jana Nagyová (PfE), Rada Laykova (ESN)Given the recent reports about work programmes, allegedly coordinated by the Commission and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which include political activities such as combating coal-fired power plants and free trade agreements, we request answers to the following questions:
- 1.To what extent are the work programmes submitted by funded NGOs made publicly accessible to enable independent review and oversight by the public and the relevant supervisory authorities?
- 2.What steps does the Commission plan to take to reform the awarding practices of the LIFE programme to avoid potential conflicts of interest and ensure the independence of the NGOs funded?
We would appreciate a swift response on this issue.
Submitted: 20.6.2025
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MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Report on the Muslim Brotherhood – E-002563/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002563/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Sophie Wilmès (Renew), Benoit Cassart (Renew), Urmas Paet (Renew), Olivier Chastel (Renew), Malik Azmani (Renew), Karin Karlsbro (Renew), Sandro Gozi (Renew), Hilde Vautmans (Renew), Lucia Yar (Renew), Nathalie Loiseau (Renew), João Cotrim De Figueiredo (Renew), Petras Auštrevičius (Renew)On 21 May 2025, a report requested by the French government entitled ‘The Muslim Brotherhood and Political Islamism in France’ was released.
Described as ‘damning’ by the French Minister of the Interior, the report highlights the threats posed by the Muslim Brotherhood in France, but also in Europe. Indeed, its influence is exerted through a network of organisations that are often located in close proximity to European institutions, to the point of becoming ‘regular interlocutors’. The report thus highlights a coordinated strategy of foreign interference through digital platforms, calling for increased vigilance to preserve democratic values in Europe. The creation of the ‘Special committee on the European Democracy Shield’ within the European Parliament was precisely intended to address the EU’s shortcomings in the area of malicious interference.
In this context:
- 1.How will the Democratic Shield address the threats mentioned in this report?
- 2.How does the Commission intend to engage in dialogue with the non-EU countries mentioned in relation to their alleged influence in Europe?
- 3.What tools already exist to counter this foreign interference? Has an assessment been carried out on the implementation and effectiveness of Regulation (EU) 2021/784 on combating the dissemination of terrorist content online?
Submitted: 25.6.2025
Last updated: 3 July 2025 -
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Intervention by the Madleen following a Frontex distress signal – clarification of practices and responsibilities – P-002629/2025
Source: European Parliament
Priority question for written answer P-002629/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Fabrice Leggeri (PfE)On 5 June 2025, the vessel Madleen, undertaking a private sea mission to Gaza, was apparently asked by Frontex to approach a boat of migrants in distress off the coast of Crete. According to Rima Hassan MEP, a passenger on board, the Madleen had been identified as being closest to the boat and had received a distress signal from Frontex.
Upon arrival, the vessel reportedly rescued four people who had jumped into the sea to get away from the Libyan Coast Guard, while the remaining migrants were rescued by another vessel and taken back to Libya.
In view of the above, I ask the Commission and Frontex:
- 1.Is it normal Frontex procedure to ask a civilian vessel engaged in a private or political initiative to intervene at sea, and is this practice regulated?
- 2.Can the Commission confirm the facts reported about the distress signal sent by Frontex and the Madleen’s intervention?
- 3.What is its legal and operational assessment of this chain of events, and is this situation compatible with international law, in particular the law of the sea, and with the EU’s commitments?
Submitted: 30.6.2025
Last updated: 3 July 2025 -
MIL-OSI Europe: Kenya’s largest hospital gets EIB Global support to bolster and green its energy supply
Source: European Investment Bank
EIB The European Investment Bank’s development arm (EIB Global) will help Kenya’s largest hospital expand and green its energy supply. EIB Global will advise Kenyatta National Hospital in Nairobi on the installation of a solar-power system.
The goal of the project is to meet growing demand for electricity at the hospital while increasing its energy independence and reducing its carbon footprint.
EIB Global will offer the assistance in partnership with German development agency (GIZ) through a grant of 7.3 million Kenyan shillings (€50,000) from a multi-donor initiative run by the World Bank and EIB for cities – the Cities Climate Finance Gap Fund. The support will cover technical studies and a financial assessment regarding the planned installation of the photovoltaic (PV) system.
The hospital, which is also the largest public health centre in East Africa, has a capacity of 2,400 beds and serves about 2 million patients annually. High grid costs in Kenya are straining the budget of the hospital and power outages are forcing it to rely on diesel generators that meet only about 65% of demand, leaving critically ill patients at risk.
“Our goal is a climate smart future,” said EIB Regional Hub for East Africa Head Edward Claessen. “We are committed to supporting Kenyatta National Hospital in its transition to green electricity. The forthcoming technical studies will lay the ground for successful implementation of the PV system.”
Under the support agreement, GIZ experts will carry out the technical and financial evaluations for implementation and maintenance of the solar-power system.
Kenyatta National Hospital intends to direct savings on energy bills resulting from the planned PV system to areas such as purchasing medical supplies, hiring more staff and upgrading facilities.
“We are grateful to the European Investment Bank, GIZ and the City Climate Finance Gap Fund for their support through this technical assistance programme,” said Kenyatta National Hospital Chief Executive Officer, Dr. Evanson Kamuri. “This collaboration marks a significant step forward in our commitment to sustainable healthcare delivery. By integrating energy efficiency and climate-smart solutions, Kenyatta National Hospital is not only enhancing operational resilience but also setting a benchmark for environmentally responsible healthcare infrastructure in the region.”
The EIB Global and GIZ support will lead to concrete recommendations to the hospital on attaining reliable and efficient power supply through the planned PV system. The studies will assess the hospital’s current energy-consumption patterns, evaluate the feasibility of integrating the planned PV system into the hospital power grid, provide financial modelling for installation and maintenance and address regulatory questions.
The European Investment Bank, through the Cities Climate Gap Fund support cities in the early stages of project development by assessing the actual challenges, understanding the risks and designing fit-for-purpose solutions that resonate with their goals for a climate- smart future.
Background information
About EIB Global
The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives.
EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm devoted to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance, and a key partner of Global Gateway. EIB Global aims to support €100 billion of investment by the end of 2027 — around one-third of the overall target of this EU initiative. Within Team Europe, EIB Global fosters strong, focused partnerships alongside fellow development finance institutions and civil society. EIB Global brings the EIB Group closer to people, companies and institutions through offices across the world. High-quality, up-to-date photos of the organisation’s headquarters for media use are available here.
About Gap Fund:
The Cities Climate Finance Gap Fund is a multi-donor fund, implemented by the World Bank and the EIB in collaboration with GIZ and other city networks. Gap Fund provides much-needed funding for early-stage technical assistance and capacity building so that cities from low- and middle-income countries can operationalise their climate action plans, develop robust project concepts, and access climate finance resources. Since its establishment in 2020, it has supported 183 cities in 67 countries.
On 20 September 2023, the governments of Germany and Luxembourg announced new funding of € 50 million for the City Climate Finance Gap Fund (Gap Fund) with an additional €5 million on the horizon, these resources will support the development of low-carbon and climate-resilient urban investments and will nearly double the fund’s capitalization, bringing it to €105 million, making it one of the largest early-stage technical assistance funds for cities and climate.
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MIL-OSI Africa: Eritrea: Activities to Share Experiences of Successful Youth
Source: APO
The Eritrean community in Sweden organized a program in Stockholm aimed at transferring the experiences of successful Eritrean youth.
The program, conducted by the Eritrean community in Husby-Kista-Akalla under the theme “From Asmara to Husby,” sought to showcase the efforts and achievements of Eritrean youth in education, nationalism, and the preservation of their culture and identity.
Mr. Yonas Tesfay noted that, thanks to the relentless efforts of the Eritrean communities, many youths have succeeded in various professions—including research, medicine, engineering, computer technology, banking, sports, politics, and the arts. He added that efforts will continue to expand similar initiatives to all Eritrean communities.
During the event, several professionals shared their experiences, including Dr. Haben Mogos: Ms. Sabela Temesgen, innovation and investment expert; Ms. Simona Abraham, television production expert; Mr. Simon Mateos, artist; Mr. Paulos Yohannes, athlete; Mr. Tedros Goitom, film editing expert; and Mr. Dejen Meles.
Founding members of the Husby-Kista-Akalla community, Mr. Gebrehiwet Abraham and Priest Ezra Gebremedhin also provided briefings on the establishment of the community, the stages it has passed through, and the benefits of communal gatherings in fostering nationalism.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Ministry of Information, Eritrea.
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MIL-OSI Africa: Morocco, Guatemala’s Foreign Ministers (FMs) Hail Outstanding Bilateral Ties Marked by ‘Very Positive’ Dynamic
Source: APO
Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, Mr. Nasser Bourita, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Guatemala, Mr. Carlos Ramiro Martínez Alvarado hailed the outstanding Morocco–Guatemala relations, which are marked by a very positive dynamic, on Thursday in Rabat.
At the end of their meeting, the two ministers highlighted the excellent ties of friendship and solidarity uniting the two nations and agreed on the need to continue these exchanges and to take stock of bilateral relations to bolster them.
They also underscored that international law is fundamentally based on respect for territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and the fulfillment of obligations under treaties and other sources of international law.
Furthermore, the two ministers exchanged views on regional and international issues, particularly the situation in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.
They also expressed their shared willingness to continue strengthening the bilateral legal framework to address areas of common interest for cooperation.
To this end, Ministers Mr. Bourita and Alvarado welcomed the signing of the Morocco–Guatemala Cooperation Roadmap for 2025–2027, as well as a Memorandum of Understanding in academic and diplomatic cooperation between the Moroccan Institute for Training, Research, and Diplomatic Studies and the Diplomatic Academy of Guatemala.
They also emphasized that multilateral cooperation remains essential to intensify efforts in areas of shared interest such as trade, food security, sustainable development—including access to energy, water and food, fuels and fertilizers—as well as climate change mitigation and adaptation, education, health, pandemic prevention and response, and the fight against terrorism and transnational crime, which are sources of insecurity and corruption.
The ministers also discussed the importance of implementing the SDGs in an integrated and holistic manner, particularly with the goal of eradicating poverty and combating climate change, while promoting sustainable land use and water management.
Concerning migration, which both countries face, Morocco and Guatemala commended the efforts made in this area, particularly within the framework of the Marrakech Pact, the Rabat Process, and the Los Angeles Declaration, reiterating their shared commitment to dynamic mobility that enables a safe, smooth, and orderly movement of people.
On the economic front, both countries highlighted the importance of launching projects aimed at decarbonizing the economy, which offers great potential for investors, especially in the field of renewable energy.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Kingdom of Morocco – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates.
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MIL-OSI Africa: Guatemala Considers Autonomy Initiative as ‘Only Serious, Credible and Realistic Basis’ for Resolving Moroccan Sahara Regional Dispute
Source: APO
The Republic of Guatemala affirmed on Thursday that the autonomy initiative put forward by Morocco in 2007 is “the only serious, credible and realistic basis to move towards a lasting agreement for a definitive settlement of this artificial conflict, in full respect of the Kingdom’s territorial integrity and its national sovereignty.”
This position was conveyed by Guatemala’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, during a press briefing following his meeting in Rabat with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, Mr. Nasser Bourita.
The Guatemalan top diplomat also expressed his country’s full support for the Kingdom’s efforts to reach a political, realistic, pragmatic, lasting and mutually acceptable solution to this regional dispute.
Morocco and Guatemala also underlined their commitment to the sacred principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
It is worth noting that the Republic of Guatemala was the first Latin American country to open a Consulate General in the city of Dakhla, in December 2022.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Kingdom of Morocco – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates.
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MIL-OSI Africa: Morocco: His Majesty (HM) the King Congratulates Belarus’ President on National Day
Source: APO
His Majesty King Mohammed VI addressed a message of congratulations to the President of the Republic of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, on the occasion of his country’s national day.
In this message, the Sovereign conveys to President Lukashenko His warmest congratulations, along with His best wishes for good health and happiness, and for further progress and prosperity to the people of Belarus.
“I avail myself of this opportunity to commend the relations based on close friendship and mutual esteem between our countries. I therefore look forward to continuing to work with Your Excellency to strengthen our ties and expand our cooperation, for the mutual benefit of our peoples,” HM the King writes.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Kingdom of Morocco – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates.
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MIL-OSI Africa: South Africa: Statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa on the passing of former Deputy President David Mabuza
Source: APO
I have learned with deep sadness of the passing of former Deputy President and former Premier of Mpumalanga, David Dabede Mabuza.
Deputy President Mabuza passed away today, Thursday, 3 July 2025, at a hospital following a short illness. He was 64 years of age.
On behalf of Government and the nation, I offer my profound condolences to the late Deputy President’s wife, Mrs Mabuza, and the children.
I extend my condolences to Deputy President Mabuza’s friends and the people of Mpumalanga whom he served as Premier from 2009 to 2018, and previously as a Member of the Executive Council of Mpumalanga across a range of portfolios.
My thoughts are also with Deputy President Mabuza’s comrades in his political home, the African National Congress, where he was elected as the organisation’s Deputy President in December 2017.
During his service as Deputy President of the Republic, Deputy President Mabuza applied his leadership and mobilisation abilities to his role as the Leader of Government Business in Parliament; leading the South African National Aids Council; coordinating anti-poverty initiatives in the form of Public Employment Programmes, Integrated Service Delivery and Enterprise Development.
Deputy President Mabuza also represented South Africa on global platforms and consolidated relations between South Africa and its closest partners.
As Deputy President, he chaired the Cabinet Committees of Governance, State Capacity and Institutional Development (GSCID) as well as Justice, Crime-Prevention and Security (JCPS).
We are saddened today by the loss of a leader who was grounded in activism at the early stages of his political career and who came to lead our nation and shape South Africa’s engagement with our continental compatriots and the international community in his role as Deputy President.
The former Deputy President deserves our appreciation for his deep commitment to the liberation struggle and to the nation’s development as an inclusive, prosperous, democratic state.
Further announcements will be made in due course on memorial arrangements and the honours with which the country will pay its final respects to the former Deputy President.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa.
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MIL-OSI Africa: Parliaments Take Centre Stage in Africa’s Peace and Security Agenda
Source: APO
As Africa contends with escalating insecurity, unconstitutional transitions, and protracted conflicts, parliamentary leaders are increasingly stepping into central roles in peace building and conflict resolution across the continent.
The upcoming Extraordinary General Assembly of the Conference of Speakers and Presidents of African Legislatures (CoSPAL), scheduled for 19 to 20 July in Kampala, is expected to consolidate these efforts by providing a platform for Speakers to advance legislative-led responses to Africa’s security challenges.
Speaking during a special pre-conference briefing held on Thursday, 03 July 2025, at the Parliament of Uganda for diplomats of African countries accredited to Uganda, Hon. Geofrey Ekanya, the Member of Parliament for Tororo North County, delivered a statement on behalf of the Speaker of Parliament, Anita Among.
He described the conference as “a crucial opportunity for African legislative leaders to come together and seek solutions to the myriad challenges affecting peace and security on the continent.”
The summit builds on recent initiatives by the Forum of Parliaments of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (FP-ICGLR), including a fact-finding mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) led by Speakers from member states.
Speaker Among and her Zambian counterpart, Rt Hon. Nelly Mutti, were part of the DRC mission.
“To further enrich their understanding of the conflict,” Among said, “the team met H.E. the President of the Republic of Uganda, who shared with them the historical perspective of the conflict and possible opportunities to find a lasting solution.”
The Speaker added that President Yoweri Museveni also offered insights into the causes of conflict in other African countries and ways these might be resolved.
The findings from that mission were later adopted during the 15th Plenary Assembly of FP-ICGLR in Angola in April 2025.
“In the final communiqué of this Assembly under Resolution Number 15, it was agreed to request the Conference of Speakers and Presidents of African Legislatures to convene an extraordinary meeting to consider the proposals by FP-ICGLR to address matters of peace and security on DRC and the African continent at large,” Speaker Among said.
The Government of Uganda accepted the request to host the event, which will take place at the Munonyo Commonwealth Resort, Kampala.
“This extraordinary conference provides a unique opportunity for Speakers and Presidents of African legislatures to convene, collaborate, and commit to actionable strategies for fostering peace and security on the continent,” she added.
The conference will aim to deepen understanding of contemporary security threats such as terrorism, electoral violence, unconstitutional transitions, and organised crime.
It will also focus on strengthening legislative oversight, promoting parliamentary diplomacy, sharing best practices, and fostering inter-parliamentary cooperation. “The theme is intended to bring African legislatures at the centre of conflict resolution because of their representative role,” Among noted.
Expected outcomes include a resolution calling for ceasefires in conflict-affected countries, support for regional peace efforts led by bodies like the African Union; ECOWAS; EAC; SADC; ICGLR; IGAD; and the Arab Maghreb Union and the establishment of a permanent African Speakers Centre on Peace and Security to be hosted in Uganda.
“The centre will serve as a permanent body for coordinating Speakers and Presidents of African Legislatures’ efforts across Africa in promoting peace, conflict resolution, and legislative actions,” she said.
The Government of Uganda has committed to providing all necessary logistical support, including VIP immigration clearance, airport transfers, and security for delegates.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Parliament of the Republic of Uganda.
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MIL-OSI Africa: Minister Blade Nzimande receives Cuban Ambassador to South Africa for a courtesy visit
Source: APO
Yesterday, 2 July, the Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation, Prof. Blade Nzimande, received Her Excellency, Mrs. Esther Armenteros, Cuban Ambassador to South Africa for a courtesy visit.
Over the past three decades, South Africa’s collaboration with Cuba evolved significantly in critical areas of human development such as public health, water resource management, and education.
Last year, South Africa and Cuba celebrated 30 years of Diplomatic relations. In the area of science, South Africa-Cuba co-operation goes back to 2001, when the first science, technology and innovation agreement was signed.
Flowing from this, between 2005 and 2007, South Africa invested more than 44 million rands in joint biotechnology and nanotechnology projects with Cuba, focusing on critical areas such as the development of cholera vaccines, monoclonal antibodies, and pre-clinical drug development, which included interventions against the Human Papilloma Virus.
These early joint projects brought together South African research facilities such as Mintek, iThemba Labs, and the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation, laying the groundwork for future cooperation in nuclear medicine and diagnostic technology.
Further to this, in 2015, a technical delegation from South Africa visited Cuba to study Cuba’s world-class biotechnology ecosystem.
In April this year, Minister Nzimande undertook a comprehensive visit to Cuba, whose key outcome was the signing of a Statement of Intent to renew the existing science, technology, and innovation agreement between Cuba and South Africa and to expand the areas of cooperation.
A further commitment was made by Minister Nzimande and his counterpart, Cuba’s Minister of Science, Technology and Environment, Mr. Armando Rodríguez Batista to ensure that the revival of the existing STI agreement is concluded by the end of this year.
Emphasising the importance of SA-Cuba STI cooperation, Minister Nzimande stated that “South Africa and Cuba share a commitment to use scientific knowledge to resolve their development challenges and to respond to the grand challenges of energy security, climate change and the urgent need to diversify our economies.”
“Cuba has unparalleled expertise in such areas as healthcare, biotechnology, and education with South Africa’s strengths in mining, renewable energy, astronomy and space sciences research and innovation. This provides a firm basis for continued cooperation and the development of sustainable solutions for both countries,” added the Minister.
Cooperation between South Africa and Cuba is also driven by a shared commitment to such values as peace, justice, multi-lateralism, the equitable development of all nations and a commitment to building a more just and humane world, through science.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Department of Science, Technology and Innovation, Republic of South Africa.
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MIL-OSI Africa: National Revenue Authority Board Pays Courtesy Call on Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio, Updates on Revenue Mobilization Efforts
Source: APO
His Excellency President Julius Maada Bio today received members of the Board of the National Revenue Authority (NRA) at State House, where the delegation briefed him on the authority’s ongoing activities and performance.
Board Chairman Mr. Kabineh Kallon, in his opening remarks, expressed gratitude to President Bio for granting them audience and congratulated him on his recent election as Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government. He noted that the visit was to update the President on the NRA’s work, acknowledging that despite the numerous challenges faced by the authority, it has remained committed to mobilizing revenue for the State.
Commissioner-General Madam Jeneba Kamara reaffirmed the NRA’s commitment to fulfilling its mandate. She acknowledged the operational challenges but assured the President that the authority is working diligently to enhance revenue collection and improve compliance across the board.
In his response, President Bio welcomed the NRA delegation and expressed appreciation for the briefing. He emphasized the critical importance of the NRA’s work to the country’s development.
“Your sole mandate is to mobilize revenue for the State. The State can only function effectively when it has the resources to do so,” the President stated. He described the NRA as the “breadbasket of the nation” and urged the Board to remain vigilant and proactive in generating income that can be used to finance national development priorities.
Board member Madam Memuna Rogers, also addressed the meeting, highlighting the progress and initiatives made in maximizing revenue mobilization. She further explained that the NRA had instituted enhanced compliance measures to encourage taxpayers to meet their obligations, a move that will be critical in meeting next year’s revenue targets.
The visit reaffirmed the NRA’s commitment to supporting national development through consistent and improved revenue generation.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of State House Sierra Leone.