Source: International Monetary Fund
March 27, 2025
SPEAKER: Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF
MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to today’s IMF Press Briefing. It’s great to see you all, those of you here in person and, of course, our colleagues online as well.
I am Julie Kozak, Director of Communications at the IMF. And as usual, this program press briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States. I will start with two short announcements and then I’ll take your questions in person, on Webex, and via the Press Center.
First, the 2025 Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank Group will take place from Monday, April 21st, to Saturday, April 26th. The press registration to attend these meetings in person in Washington is now open, and you can register through www.imfconnect.org.
And second, I would like to announce that the Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, will be delivering her Curtain Raiser speech outlining the key issues facing the world economy. The speech and a related fireside chat will be held here at IMF headquarters on Thursday, April 17th. It will be open to registered media and via live streaming on our Press Center and IMF social media channels. And we will provide more details closer to the date.
And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions. For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when you are speaking. And I’m now over to you.
All right, let’s start with you. Thank you. Microphone here in the front.
QUESTIONER: Thank you very much, Julie. Minister Luis Caputo announced this morning in Argentina that the Argentine government had agreed with the IMF staff amount of $20 billion for the new program. I’m sure you know this was a very highly unusual announcement. I wanted to know first if this was coordinated with the IMF, if you had agreed with Mr. Caputo to release this information? Second, if you can confirm that the actual amount of the program that’s been discussed is $20 billion. Then the IMF has a lot of internal processes before a program is actually announced, so could this number change through that process? And if you can give us a sense of the timing before the actual staff-level agreement announcement and eventually the board meeting and that’s all. Thanks.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, very good. Thank you. Other questions on Argentina.
QUESTIONER: Mr. Caputo said the disbursement will be $20 billion. Will it be a single disbursement, just one single disbursement? Thank you, Julie.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Let’s go online.
QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Well, we are all referring to the speech of Caputo, which was a big surprise in Argentina at least. So one of the rumors that Minister Caputo denied was that the IMF was demanding a 30 percent devaluation. My question is, does the IMF believe an exchange rate correction is necessary? Thank you, Julie.
MS. KOZACK: Thank you.
QUESTIONER: Yes. Hi, Julie. Thank you. So my question is, first of all, if you can confirm how much of the $20 billion dollars are going to be freely available? And second, if there is any certainty at this stage of the negotiations whether the new program will include modifications to the current exchange rate regime, as the market and private sector seem to have considered in recent days? Thank you.
QUESTIONER: Good morning. Well, I would like to know if a scheme of exchange rate bands is being considered in this agreement and if the agreement implies an increase in depth with the IMF? And finally, if there is a technical agreement already done?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Anybody else want to come in on Argentina? Okay, let me go ahead and take these questions.
So first I want to just start by saying, and this is consistent with our previous statements, that Argentina has embarked on a truly impressive stabilization program. And the country has shown that it’s determined to steer the — the authorities have shown that they are determined to steer the economy toward a more sustainable path.
Since the end of 2023, inflation has declined thanks to a very large fiscal consolidation and steps to heal the Central Bank’s balance sheet. These measures have been complemented by deregulation, market reforms, and the elimination of distortions and some controls. The reforms are starting to bear fruit. Despite the sharp macroeconomic adjustment, economic activity is recovering strongly, real wages are increasing and poverty is declining. This decline in poverty also reflects, of course, a significant increase in social assistance to vulnerable groups. There is also a shared recognition between the Fund and the authorities that now is the time to move to the next steps of the authority’s stabilization plan.
In this regard, significant progress has been made in reaching understandings toward a new IMF supported program. And this has followed intense and productive discussion, and those include in-person meetings in Buenos Aires and also here in Washington, D.C. And at the Fund we have engaged at all levels.
What I can say now is that discussions on a new Fund supported program are very advanced and those discussions include discussions around a sizable financing package. The size of that package is ultimately to be determined by our Executive Board, but I can confirm that discussions are focusing on a sizable package.
As for our processes, we do have a set of processes that we always follow when engaging with country authorities on a program. And as part of these routine internal processes, we have also been engaging with our Executive Board. With respect to the policies that will be covered under the program, as we’ve noted in the past here, discussions are still ongoing on the specific policies that will be covered under the program.
What I can say is that to sustain the gains that have been achieved so far by the authorities, there is a shared recognition about the need to continue to adopt a consistent set of fiscal, monetary, and foreign exchange policies while fostering further and furthering growth enhancing reforms. And what I can also say is that we will keep you updated as discussions continue.
QUESTIONER: What about the amount?
MS. KOZACK: So with respect to the amount, the amount or the size of the program will be determined ultimately by our Executive Board. What I can say today is that discussions are focused on a sizable financing program.
And in terms of your question about single disbursement versus a phased disbursement, as with all of our programs, disbursements will come in tranches over the life of the program. But the exact phasing and the size of each tranche is also, of course, part of the discussions that are underway.
QUESTIONER: The number is okay?
MS. KOZACK: All I’m saying now is that the discussion is around a sizable financing program. That’s what I can say today.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie.
MS. KOZACK: Okay. Let’s go here.
QUESTIONER: Thank you so much, Julie. So I would like to ask you about the IMF prospects on the Russian economy. Does the IMF plan to update its outlook on Russian GDP growth in 2025 during its next review? What is the overall perspective on inflation easing signs? Does the IMF plan to highlight any changes in potential monetary policy from the Central Bank? And what is, from the IMF perspective, the current level of business activity in the Russian economy? Thanks.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. On Russia.
QUESTIONER: The Central Bank of Russia has maintained its key interest rate at 21 percent since October 2024 to combat inflation. How does the IMF assess the effectiveness of this high-interest rate policy in controlling inflation? And what are the IMF’s projections for Russia’s inflation trajectory in 2025 and what factors are expected to influence these trends? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: Great. Thank you very much. Are there any other questions on Russia? Okay.
What I can say about the Russian economy is that our assessment is that the Russian economy was affected by overheating in 2024 and growth was driven by private consumption, which was supported by a tight labor market, fast-growing wages, and buoyant credit from the banking system into the economy. This overheating also reflected strong corporate investment. Fiscal policy did play a role in driving growth.
In 2025, what I can say is, and here I’m quoting from the January WEO, and I can confirm that we will be updating the projections for Russia, as with all countries for the April WEO. But in January, we said we expected a slowdown in 2025 as the impact of tighter monetary policy took hold and the cyclical recovery ran its course, meaning that the boost to growth waned into 2025. So in January, we had growth slowing from 3.8 percent in 2024 to 1.4 percent in 2025. And again, that assessment will be updated as part of the WEO.
Now, with respect to inflation in particular, inflation in Russia remains high. It is well above the Central Bank of Russia’s target, which is 4 percent. And this partly reflects the tight labor market and also strong wage growth. Currently, we are not seeing signs of an easing of inflation, although the projections that we had in the January WEO did suggest an easing of price pressures in the coming year. And of course, just to reiterate that our assessment of Russia, the Russian economy, will be updated as part of the WEO.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. My question is on the inflation expectation at the global level, not only U.S. but also in Japan recently, inflation expectation raised substantially up. And how much are you concerned about such movement translating into the real inflation and, in the near future, given the tariff policies conducted by U.S. Administrations? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: Thank you. So what I can say on inflation at the global level, and this is, again, I’m going to be quoting here from our January and October WEOs. So what we expected at the time of our January WEO update was that global inflation would continue to decline. We expected in January that it would reach 4.2 percent in 2025 and 3.5 percent in 2026. And at that time, we expected that advanced economies would achieve their inflation targets earlier than emerging market economies.
Now, since that January update, what we have seen is greater than expected persistence in inflation. And so this is a key factor that will be taken into account as we are updating not only our growth projections in the April WEO, but also our inflation projections. And what this means for central banks and policymakers is, of course, that agile and proactive monetary policy is going to be needed to ensure that inflation expectations remain well anchored. And of course, we’ll have a full discussion of inflation developments at the time of the WEO.
QUESTIONER: Hi. Thanks, Julie. I’m wondering if you can weigh in a bit on President Trump’s announcement yesterday of universal car tariffs of 25 percent. This is going to send shock waves through a production system throughout the world that provides employment to millions of people, and supports economies all over. I know it’s early to gauge the exact impact of what this would mean, but I’m wondering if you can talk directionally about how this could start to impact countries, particularly emerging markets that are in that supply chain. Thanks.
MS. KOZACK: Thank you. Same topic, right?
QUESTIONER: Thank you. We have seen the impacts of the — sorry, let me start over again. So following up on what David said regarding the tariff, how do you see the impact on these on economies — on the African continent in particular? And also, you know, we are seeing more of nationalism and protectionism. It’s from the U.S., and it’s spreading around the world as well. So how concerned is the IMF regarding these.
QUESTIONER: Just to follow up. In terms of the WEO that you’re preparing, how will these tariff actions be filtered into that in terms of inflation projections as it raises costs, does the IMF sort of see these as a one-time jump up in price level or is it going to contribute to ongoing inflation? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: Same topic?
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. As a result of all the policy that we are witnessing right now, can the IMF rule out any risk of recession in the United States in 2025, 2026, or if we are not talking about annual decline, could you see any risks in quarter estimates?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, so let me say a few — respond to this set of questions.
What I can say today is, we’ve seen several new developments on the trade front over the past several weeks and of course yesterday we had announcements about tariffs on the auto sector. And the U.S. administration has also noted and announced that it will — that there will be new announcements coming next week on April 2nd.
What I can say today is that we are in the process of assessing the impact of all of these announcements, and we will continue to do that work in the context of our World Economic Outlook that will be released as I noted in April.
We have previously noted that for countries like Mexico and Canada that if sustained tariffs could have a significant effect on Mexico and Canada, a significant adverse impact on Mexico and Canada. For other regions and groups of countries, we’re in the process of undertaking that analysis at the moment.
What I can say about the way or the process by which this will be incorporated into the WEO, the way the process works is we will look at all of the announcements and economic developments and data up until as far as we can into the process. But at some point, there will need to be sort of a cutoff date after which we’re no longer able to incorporate new information. We’re not there yet. But at some point in the process there will be a date after which we just for production processes, need to kind of stop the churning of the data.
What the WEO will then have is a very clear exposition of what is incorporated into our baseline forecast, our main forecast. We’ll talk about the assumptions that are included and any policy announcements and actions that are included in the baseline forecast. Anything that occurs after our cut-off date will be discussed in qualitative terms or as part of the risks section of the report. But we will aim, of course, in that report to be very clear about what is incorporated into the forecast and what is not incorporated into the forecast. And of course, you will have an opportunity the week of the Annual Meetings to not only read the WEO, but we will have a press conference led by our Economic Counselor to answer detailed questions around the forecast. And we will also have the press conferences of our regional area department heads to talk to answer specific regional questions.
And just maybe on the question about the U.S. economy, just to say perhaps a few words. What I can say now is that the performance of the U.S. economy has been remarkably strong throughout the recent monetary policy tightening cycle. Activity and employment exceeded expectations, and the disinflation process proved less costly than most feared. And this was our assessment at the time of our January WEO. Since then, of course, there have been many developments. Large policy shifts have been announced, and the incoming data is signaling a slowdown in economic activity from the very strong pace in 2024. All of this said, recession is not part of our baseline.
Let’s now move online.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie, for taking my questions. My question is on Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s Central Bank Governor has hinted, also suggested that the heavily indebted state-owned enterprises should be listed in the Colombo Stock Exchange as part of a program to perform these enterprises. What is the IMF’s take on such a proposal given that the program also calls for extensive reforms in SEOs — I beg your pardon, SOEs? At the same time, $334 million was approved by the IMF Executive Board recently. Has that tranche been given to Sri Lanka? If not, why? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: Okay. Any other questions on Sri Lanka online? Okay, let me take this question on Sri Lanka.
So first, let me just step back on Sri Lanka. First, I’ll say that on Friday, February 28th, the IMF Executive Board approved the Third Review under the EFF (Extended Fund Facility) arrangement for Sri Lanka. And this provided the country with immediate access to $334 million of support. So, yes, once the Board approved that Third Review, the $334 million was made available to Sri Lanka to support its economic policies and reforms. And with this $334 million, it brings total financial support from the IMF to Sri Lanka to $1.34 billion.
What I can also add is that reforms in Sri Lanka are bearing fruit. The economic recovery is gaining momentum. Inflation remains low in Sri Lanka, revenue collection on the fiscal side is improving, and international reserves are continuing to accumulate. Economic growth reached 5 percent in 2024, and that was after two years of economic contraction. And we do expect the recovery to continue in 2025 in Sri Lanka. These are all very positive developments for Sri Lanka and for the people of Sri Lanka.
All of this said, the economy still does remain vulnerable, and therefore it is critical that the reform momentum be sustained to ensure that macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability are durably achieved.
And with respect to your specific question, I don’t have anything for you on that regarding the SOEs, but we’ll come back to you bilaterally.
I have one question here online from Shoaib Nizami from ARY News TV. And the question is, when will Pakistan receive Climate Resilience Funds? So before I turn to this, are there any other questions on Pakistan? Okay, let me talk a little bit about Pakistan then.
So again, just stepping back to explain where we are with Pakistan. On September 25th of 2024, the Executive Board approved a 37-month EFF arrangement for Pakistan, and it was for $7 billion. The First Review took place… the First Review mission took place recently, and a staff-level agreement on the First Review was reached on March 25th. And in addition to reaching a staff-level agreement on the EFF arrangement for the First Review, there was also a staff-level agreement reached on an RSF, a Resilience and Sustainability Facility, that was also reached on March 25th.
Under the EFF part – so I’m going to talk about both of them. So the EFF part, which is the First Review under the program, once approved by the IMF’s Executive Board, that would enable Pakistan to have access of about $1 billion for that disbursement. For the RSF over the length of the arrangement, again subject to approval by the IMF’s Executive Board, the staff-level agreement references an amount of $1.3 billion and that access will be over the life of the RSF, delivered in tranches.
Okay. Kyle, you had a question in the room.
QUESTIONER: Good morning. Kyle Fitzgerald with the National. So, following the recent staff visit to Lebanon, the IMF and Lebanon agreed to remain in close contact on a new economic reform program. I was just wondering if you could provide more clarity on what the next steps are and what a potential timeline for this looks like. Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, very good. With respect to Lebanon, I also have another question online which I am going to read out loud. It is from Sabine Oawais from Annahar (phonetic). There are two questions here. The first is when does the IMF anticipate the signing of a program with Lebanon? What prior actions must the Lebanese government take before reaching final agreement? The second is, given Lebanon’s ongoing economic challenges, what specific reforms does the IMF see as critical for stabilizing the country’s financial system and securing a sustainable recovery?
Before I respond on Lebanon, are there any other questions on Lebanon? Okay.
So on Lebanon, an IMF fact-finding mission visited Lebanon from March 10th to 13th. And on that mission, the staff welcomed the authority’s request for a new IMF-supported program to support the authority’s efforts to address Lebanon’s significant economic challenges. We have received, obviously, this request for a new program. We’re working with the authorities to help them develop their comprehensive economic reform program. The engagement and discussions with the Lebanese authorities are ongoing.
And in terms of what is needed, what I can say is that first and foremost what is needed is a comprehensive strategy for economic rehabilitation. This is going to be critical to restore growth, reduce unemployment and improve social conditions. The authority’s reform program is going to need to be focused on fiscal and debt sustainability, financial sector restructuring, international reserves are continuing to accumulate. Economic growth reached 5 percent in 2024, and that was after two years of economic contraction. And we do expect the recovery to continue in 2025 in Sri Lanka. These are all very positive developments for Sri Lanka and for the people of Sri Lanka.
All of this said, the economy still does remain vulnerable, and therefore it is critical that the reform momentum be sustained to ensure that macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability are durably achieved.
And with respect to your specific question, I don’t have anything for you on that regarding the SOEs, but we’ll come back to you bilaterally.
I have one question here online . And the question is, when will Pakistan receive Climate Resilience Funds? So, before I turn to this, are there any other questions on Pakistan? Okay, let me talk a little bit about Pakistan then.
So again, just stepping back to explain where we are with Pakistan. On September 25th of 2024, the Executive Board approved a 37-month EFF arrangement for Pakistan, and it was for $7 billion. The First Review took place… the First Review mission took place recently, and a staff-level agreement on the First Review was reached on March 25th. And in addition to reaching a staff-level agreement on the EFF arrangement for the First Review, there was also a staff-level agreement reached on an RSF, a Resilience and Sustainability Facility, that was also reached on March 25th.
Under the EFF part – so I’m going to talk about both of them. So the EFF part, which is the First Review under the program, once approved by the IMF’s Executive Board, that would enable Pakistan to have access of about $1 billion for that disbursement. For the RSF over the length of the arrangement, again subject to approval by the IMF’s Executive Board, the staff-level agreement references an amount of $1.3 billion and that access will be over the life of the RSF, delivered in tranches.
QUESTIONER: Good morning. So, following the recent staff visit to Lebanon, the IMF and Lebanon agreed to remain in close contact on a new economic reform program. I was just wondering if you could provide more clarity on what the next steps are and what a potential timeline for this looks like. MS. KOZACK: Okay, very good. With respect to Lebanon, I also have another question online which I am going to read out loud. There are two questions here. The first is when does the IMF anticipate the signing of a program with Lebanon? What prior actions must the Lebanese government take before reaching final agreement? The second is, given Lebanon’s ongoing economic challenges, what specific reforms does the IMF see as critical for stabilizing the country’s financial system and securing a sustainable recovery?
Before I respond on Lebanon, are there any other questions on Lebanon? So on Lebanon, an IMF fact-finding mission visited Lebanon from March 10th to 13th. And on that mission, the staff welcomed the authority’s request for a new IMF-supported program to support the authority’s efforts to address Lebanon’s significant economic challenges. We have received, obviously, this request for a new program. We’re working with the authorities to help them develop their comprehensive economic reform program. The engagement and discussions with the Lebanese authorities are ongoing.
And in terms of what is needed, what I can say is that first and foremost what is needed is a comprehensive strategy for economic rehabilitation. This is going to be critical to restore growth, reduce unemployment and improve social conditions. The authority’s reform program is going to need to be focused on fiscal and debt sustainability, financial sector restructuring, governance improvements, and reforms to state owned enterprises. And critically, it’s going to be important to enhance data provision, to improve transparency and to inform policymaking. And that is the latest update that I have on Lebanon. We’ll of course keep you updated and I just want to reassure that we are fully committed to working with the Lebanese authorities and the engagement is ongoing and constructive.
Let me go online. We have a few online before I come back to the room. And I have another question to read here, which is on Egypt. The question on Egypt is how do you assess the Egyptian economy right now, taking into consideration the impact of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East region?
So let me say a few words on Egypt, but before I do so, are there any other questions on Egypt? So on Egypt, first, I just want to start by saying that on March 10th, the IMF’s Executive Board concluded the 2025 Article IV consultation and completed the Fourth Review under the EFF arrangement. This enabled the authorities to draw $1.2 billion. The Executive Board at that time also approved the RSF arrangement, which paves the way for Egypt to access about $1.3 billion over the life of the RSF.
Now, with respect to the specific question, our projections for growth, and this is the question about the impact on the Egyptian economy of tensions, our projections for growth in inflation for the next fiscal year — Egypt uses fiscal year, so it’s a 2025-2026 fiscal year — indicate a growth rate of 4.1 percent. And this is an increase from 3.6 percent in the previous fiscal year. And on the inflation side, we expect inflation to continue a downward trajectory and reach 13.4 percent by the end of this period. We’ll be looking to update these projections for Egypt as part of our update in April of the World Economic Outlook. And of course, those projections will take into account any recent developments.
What I can say more broadly for Egypt is that the main economic impact on Egypt of the tensions in the region has been through disruptions in the Red Sea and the disruptions to revenues through the Suez Canal. Trade disruptions in the Red Sea in Egypt since December of 2023 have reduced foreign exchange inflows from the Suez Canal by about $6 billion in 2024 alone for Egypt. And the volume of transit trade is about one third of pre conflict levels. And so this has of course, adverse spillovers to growth in Egypt and also to fiscal revenues in Egypt. That is the main area that we’re focused on in terms of how Egypt is being affected by the tensions in the region. And of course, we’ll continue to closely monitor that as part of our deep and constructive engagement with Egypt.
QUESTIONER: Yes, thank you, Julie. Can you hear me all right?
MS. KOZACK: Yes, we can hear you.
QUESTIONER: Just a quick follow up on Argentina. You mentioned the amount of discussion will be sizable. I appreciate we can’t discuss what a final figure might be at this point, but can you confirm that Argentina has requested a loan package of around $20 billion or at least discussed a similar figure as Minister Caputo said this morning.
MS. KOZACK: Look, I’m not — just as with the other questions in terms of the ongoing discussions, I’m not going to get into the details of those discussions. They are ongoing. And I can simply confirm that the size of the final package for Argentina will be determined by our Executive Board and that the discussions are for a sizable financing package.
QUESTIONER: I want to look at the Caribbean specifically on this one. With the U.S. proposing to tariff Chinese vessels to the tune of $1.5 million docking to an extent in the U.S., what recommendations or how does the — what does the IMF foresee in terms of potential economic fallouts for Small Island States within the Caribbean region going forward? And this is in keeping with the tone of questions in the room there. Do you foresee any potential — or what recommendation would the IMF give to Small Island States, especially those in the Caribbean region, about potential inflation as you look towards the future and tariffs “here is the name of the game” from the United States?
MS. KOZACK: I’d say like with all of the other impacts of recent developments, we will be discussing this in our World Economic Outlook. But also, I think importantly for the Caribbean, we will have a discussion around regional developments by our Western Hemisphere Department. And that discussion will, of course, cover the specific impacts on the Caribbean.
What I can say today about the Caribbean is to just give a sense of where we stood in our latest forecast, which was in January of 2025. At that time we expected that growth in the region would be normalized. So, what we saw in the Caribbean was a kind of rapid recovery after the Pandemic. And now we’re seeing a normalization phase, or at least that was our assessment in January. And we expected real GDP growth to reach 2.4 percent in 2025, which would have been about the same as in 2024. What we saw on inflation again in January was that it had moderated significantly in 2023 and 2024 and that inflation in the Caribbean had returned to pre-Pandemic levels. So of course, we will then incorporate any of the recent developments in our revised forecast, which will be coming out in April, and we can have a — we’ll have a fuller picture at that time.
But just to say a few words on the policy advice, our policy advice for the Caribbean has been more broadly to continue to pursue sustainable fiscal policies to continue to rebuild policy buffers and to strengthen the resilience of domestic economies and institutions. We also encouraged Caribbean economies to accelerate investment in infrastructure and to implement necessary reforms to boost growth. And again, we will have a fuller update in January — I mean, sorry, in April.
I see some more questions coming online for me to read. I have a question online on Kenya. And the question says at the end of the Eighth Review, and I assume under the program, Ms. Gita Gopinath stated, Kenya’s economy remains resilient with growth above the regional average, inflation decelerating and external inflows supporting the shilling and a buildup of external buffers despite a difficult socioeconomic environment. What has changed since then that has prevented completion of the Final Review under the program?
So, before I move to Kenya, are there other questions on Kenya? QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. Yes, on Kenya, if there’s any details on, on why that last review was ditched as, as my colleague asked, and did they fail to meet any of their targets? And can we expect any update on, on a request of a new program? MS. KOZACK: Okay. I don’t see anything else on Kenya. So let me give this update on Kenya. So we did recently have an IMF staff team recently visited Kenya for a staff visit. We did issue a statement on March 17th and in that statement, what was noted is that the Kenyan authorities and the IMF reached an understanding that the Ninth Review under the EFF and ECF programs would not proceed.
Where we — what I can say more generally is that the authorities, policy, agenda, and reform programs have been supported by the IMF and they have helped improve Kenya’s economic resilience. As was stated in the first question, the external position has indeed strengthened over the past year and inflation has eased.
All of this said, fiscal challenges do remain amid continued revenue shortfalls and the materialization of additional spending pressures. And what this is going to require is a reassessment of the medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy to ensure that fiscal sustainability can be preserved. These challenges will require more time to resolve, and the IMF has therefore received a formal request for a new program from the authorities. And we are going to — we are, our team is engaging on this request of the authorities, and they remain closely in contact with the authorities. We’ll provide additional details as we have them. I can just add that we do remain committed to supporting Kenya’s efforts to realize its full economic potential.
QUESTIONER: So I was wondering if you could provide an update on Nigeria, Senegal, and Zambia. I know the Managing director met with the Finance Minister of Zambia yesterday. So if you have any update that you could provide regarding the debt restructuring. And on Senegal, there was a release that was issued yesterday by the IMF defining, confirming that there was a significant underreporting of the fiscal deficit. How did the IMF miss that information and how do you plan to ensure that it doesn’t happen? And are you looking to change your methodology?
MS. KOZACK: So, on Nigeria, what I can say is [that] the first Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, traveled to Abuja and Lagos on March 3rd and 4th. She met with Finance Minister Edun, Central Bank Governor Cardoso, as well as civil society groups and private sector leaders. And she also participated in an event with students at the University of Lagos. Our staff are planning to travel to Nigeria next week in preparation for the 2025 Article IV Consultation. The authorities’ policies to stabilize the economy and to promote growth are welcome, and they will, of course, need to be accompanied by targeted social transfers to support the most vulnerable populations.
We do recognize the extremely difficult situation that many Nigerians face. And for that reason, I just want to emphasize that completing the rollout of cash transfers to vulnerable households is an important priority for Nigeria, as is improving revenue mobilization domestically.
And that is the latest that I have on Argentina and not will — not Argentina, I’m looking at Rafael — on Nigeria, and we will have, of course, more after the mission completes its work.
MS. KOZACK: Now on Senegal, what I can say on Senegal is, you know, we are actively engaged with the Senegalese authorities and a staff team, which included experts from several different IMF departments, visited Senegal on March 18th through 26th. And they released the statement, of course, that you referred to at the end of that mission. The purpose of the mission was to advance efforts to resolve the recent misreporting case.
I think, as we have discussed here before, Senegal’s Court of Auditors released its final report on February 12. The Court confirmed that the fiscal deficit and public debt were under-reported over the period 2019 to 2023. And we’re also, our team is also working closely with the authorities to resolve those — that misreporting case and to look at what measures can be taken to ensure, of course, that it doesn’t happen going forward, what are the root causes, and what needs to be done to support Senegal as it seeks to move forward.
What I can also add is that we collaborate. The IMF collaborates closely with member countries in all of our engagements, but at the end of the day, it is the member country that is responsible for providing us with accurate and comprehensive data. While we are partners in the process, it is really the primary responsibility of the country authorities to ensure that the credibility and the quality of the data is accurate. And we do, of course, for countries that are finding shortcomings in data quality or data accuracy or who want to improve their data reporting, we do offer technical assistance through our experts to help support countries that are interested in improving their data provision.
QUESTIONER: Can I quickly ask, regarding that, about the technical support that you provide? How much — how many African countries are taking advantage of?
MS. KOZACK: It is a good question. I do not have the numbers in front of me, but we can certainly come back to you bilaterally. Overall, the continent of, you know — well, Sub-Saharan Africa, the region of Sub-Saharan Africa, is a heavy user of technical assistance services. How [many] of those are in the area of data and statistics, I do not know. But we can certainly come back to you bilaterally with that information
And then on Zambia, I don’t have an update here for you, but we can come back to you bilaterally on Zambia.
QUESTIONER: Okay. Thank you very much.
MS. KOZACK: Last question.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. And I am sorry for bothering you a third time in a row. It is about the Black Sea Grain Initiative. I presume that it is too early to assess, but from the IMF perspective, how can potential moratorium on strikes on the Black Sea between Russia and Ukraine contribute to global trade, food security, and overall, does the IMF monitor the current ongoing discussions on this topic? MS. KOZACK: Okay, very good. So, on this one, what I can say is, of course, we are closely monitoring the discussions around the Black Sea. I do not have a full assessment, of course, now. What I can say is that there is quite a bit of global trade that goes through the Black Sea. I think the number is about 7 percent. And also, we know that some of that global trade is concentrated in key food commodities like wheat. And to the extent that there is a, let us say, improvement in the ability for transit through the Black Sea, particularly with respect to important global food commodities, that should help ease food shortages globally.
With that, I’m going to bring this Press Briefing to a close. Thank you all for joining us today. As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States. A transcript will be made available later on IMF.org and as always, in the case of clarifications or additional queries, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at media@imf.org.
This concludes our Press Briefing for today, and I wish everyone a wonderful day. I look forward to seeing you next time and, of course, at the Spring Meetings. Thank you.
IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS
PRESS OFFICER: Brian Walker
Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org
@IMFSpokesperson