Australian statement as delivered by Vanessa Wood, Ambassador for Arms Control and Counter-Proliferation

Thank you all for joining us today. And thanks to my colleague Ambassador Larsen for his introduction.

As many of you may recall, and as Ambassador Larsen noted in his introductory remarks, the AUKUS partners held a side event on naval nuclear propulsion at the 2023 and 2024 NPT PrepCom meetings. Following on from the updates provided at last year’s side event, I would like to further update you on progress with Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion (NNP) programme.

First, an overview of the Optimal Pathway.

What we call the ‘Optimal Pathway’ is a phased approach for Australia to acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.

Phase 1 of the Optimal Pathway is currently underway, focused on building capacity and familiarity for Australia to safely operate and steward nuclear-powered submarines. This phase is supported by increased port visits to Australia by UK and US nuclear-powered submarines – which are already occurring.

Under Phase 2, from the early 2030s Australia plans to acquire three Virginia-class submarines from the US – with an option to seek approval for a further two boats, if needed. Our objective is to ensure there is no capability gap during the retirement of Australia’s existing fleet of diesel-electric submarines.

We will simultaneously progress Phase 3 to develop next generation submarines known as SSN-AUKUS, a UK design incorporating technology from all three AUKUS partners. The United Kingdom will deliver its first British-built SSN-AUKUS in the late 2030s, and the first Australian-built SSN-AUKUS will be completed in the early 2040s.

It is important to highlight two points. First, this is a replacement capability for our existing submarines. Australia is transitioning from six diesel-electric submarines to eight conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. It is a sovereign decision Australia has taken in response to more challenging strategic circumstances in our region.

Second, this is about acquiring a naval nuclear propulsion capability. The submarines will be conventionally armed. The only nuclear element is the propulsion system.

Now to briefly address naval nuclear propulsion in the context of Australia’s obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 

Australia’s NNP programme is fully consistent with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations and commitments, including under the NPT, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) and our safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

NNP was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT. Indeed, a mechanism was provided for this in Article 14 of the IAEA’s model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). As IAEA Director General Grossi has stated, Article 14 was developed with the specific intent to address the use of nuclear material for NNP – whether produced domestically or imported.

The model CSA – which contains this Article – was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1971. This is the basis for CSAs agreed with Member States over more than 50 years, including Australia’s CSA.

The NPT, the IAEA Statute, the CSA and, in Australia’s case also the Additional Protocol (AP), provide a firm legal basis and obligation for the IAEA Director General and Secretariat to engage directly with Member States – and confidentially to protect sensitive information – in the development and implementation of safeguards.

Australia’s non-proliferation approach for NNP is being developed on this basis and it will operate within the framework of Australia’s CSA and AP.

As part of developing a non-proliferation approach for Australia’s NNP programme, we commenced formal technical consultations with the IAEA Secretariat in May 2023. These consultations are ongoing. Topics being discussed in the consultations include:

Legal and technical aspects of an Article 14 arrangement for Australia, including the arrangement’s structure and content;

Provisions for advance notification, reporting and verification prior to the entry of nuclear material into an Article 14 arrangement;

The circumstances under which the Article 14 arrangement applies, its duration and the point at which safeguards under Australia’s CSA and AP re-apply;

Ways to facilitate verification and monitoring activities, as well as additional voluntary transparency measures;

And discussions regarding the structure of material balance areas, facilities and sites at relevant locations in Australia, within the framework of Australia’s CSA and AP.

Our consultations follow the longstanding practice of the IAEA engaging bilaterally with Member States on their own safeguards and verification arrangements, in accordance with the Agency’s statutory mandate and authority, which I touched upon earlier. All IAEA Member States share a strong interest in protecting their fundamental right to engage bilaterally, and in-confidence, with the IAEA on the establishment and implementation of their safeguards and verification arrangements.

Turning to Australia’s approach to non-proliferation.

We are working to make sure Australia’s Article 14 arrangement sets the highest non-proliferation standard. But to be clear, this does not mean we intend to create or impose a model arrangement on others.

The objective is to develop a robust approach that ensures that the IAEA continues to meet its technical safeguards verification objectives for Australia throughout the submarines’ lifecycle. That is, for the IAEA to have confidence that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material; no misuse of nuclear facilities; and no undeclared nuclear material or activities.

This is what we see as fundamental to our non-proliferation approach.

In developing an Article 14 arrangement, the IAEA will need to account for factors that are specific to Australia’s NNP program. In Australia’s case, a number of these program-specific factors also offer important non-proliferation advantages. For example: 

Australia will not undertake enrichment, reprocessing or fuel fabrication for NNP;

Australia will receive the nuclear fuel for propulsion in complete, welded power units: and;

The nuclear fuel Australia will receive cannot be used in nuclear weapons without further chemical processing – requiring facilities that Australia does not have and will not seek.

Our commitment to the non-proliferation regime is reflected in the trilateral AUKUS Agreement for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion (ANNPA), which entered into force on 17 January this year. ANNPA stipulates the transfer of nuclear material and equipment from the UK and the US to Australia can occur only after Australia has an Article 14 arrangement in place with the IAEA.  My American colleague, Paul, will address this topic in more detail.

We support the IAEA Director General’s commitment that, once Australia’s Article 14 arrangement is developed, it will be transmitted to the IAEA Board for appropriate action, guided by the Director General’s technical assessment of the arrangement’s non-proliferation provisions.

In November last year, IAEA Director General Grossi issued his third report on Australia’s NNP programme (the previous reports were issued in 2022 and 2023). At our request, this report, and the previous two reports, have been published on the IAEA website. I commend the reports to all who are interested in how the IAEA and Australia have been working together to support the non-proliferation element of Australia’s NNP program. 

The Director General’s report confirms we have kept the Secretariat informed of all relevant developments and have continued to fulfil all reporting requirements under Australia’s CSA, AP and subsidiary arrangements, in keeping with our impeccable non-proliferation record. The report outlines relevant developments since 2023 including:

That the Agency has continued to conduct its independent verification activities in relation to Australia’s NNP programme within the framework of Australia’s safeguards agreements, and

How Australia has been supporting this work, including by facilitating the IAEA’s collection of environmental samples, and enabling a transparency visit to a naval base that will be used for the maintenance of nuclear-powered submarines.

To recap other key developments since our last side event at the 2024 PrepCom:

In October 2024, we announced a plan to establish a naval shipbuilding and sustainment precinct at Henderson in Western Australia. In due course, this will be the home of depot-level maintenance and contingency docking of Australia’s future conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.

In late August-early September 2024, a maintenance activity was conducted on a US Virginia class nuclear-powered submarine at HMAS Stirling naval base in Western Australia. Australian personnel participated in planned maintenance and repairs on the non-nuclear components of the submarine. This marked a significant step forward in supporting Australia’s development of necessary workforce skills. Australia engaged with the IAEA to ensure transparency ahead of this activity.

In conclusion, I want to express my thanks for your attendance at this event, and your interest in this matter. This is the third side event we have convened in the context of the NPT PrepCom process, as part of our continued commitment to engage regularly and transparently on Australia’s NNP program. 

AUKUS partners will keep providing updates on relevant developments at the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference – as we have done consistently since AUKUS was announced in September 2021.

We fully support the Director General’s commitment to continue to report to the IAEA Board of Governors on Australia’s NNP program, as he judges appropriate. We welcome constructive discussions in the Board based on his reports.

An important recent development is the entry into force of the ANNPA, which my American colleague Paul will discuss next.

Thank you.

US statement as delivered by Paul Watzlavick, Senior Bureau Official, Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation

Thank you, Ambassador Wood.

As you just heard from my Australian colleague, the entry into force of the AUKUS Naval Nuclear Propulsion Agreement (ANNPA) in January was an important step toward Australia’s acquisition of a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered, submarine capability. Specifically, ANNPA permits the continued communication and exchange of information related to naval nuclear propulsion, as well as the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion plants, related equipment, and material to Australia for a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability. ANNPA cements AUKUS partners’ non-proliferation commitments in accordance with the NPT by making them legally binding on Australia, the United Kingdom, and United States. As we have prioritised since the start of the AUKUS partnership in 2021, this is yet another way that we are demonstrating our commitment to setting the highest standard of non-proliferation in an open and transparent manner.

Significantly, ANNPA reaffirms partners’ respective commitments under the NPT: those of the US and UK as Nuclear Weapon States, and those of Australia as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State. ANNPA allows the US and UK to provide information, material, and equipment to Australia solely for a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability, not for nuclear weapons. Additionally, ANNPA reaffirms Australia’s commitment as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State to not receive the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control of nuclear weapons. Under the Agreement, Australia is prohibited from enriching uranium, producing nuclear fuel, or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel for naval nuclear propulsion. ANNPA also makes clear that the United Kingdom and United States will only provide Australia with nuclear fuel in complete, welded power units. Ambassador Kitsell will go into further detail on this point later.

I would now like to cover some of the major provisions of ANNPA, which provides a legal framework to enable the parties to continue sharing naval nuclear propulsion information and for the United States and United Kingdom to transfer nuclear material and equipment to Australia. Most importantly, ANNPA requires that a satisfactory arrangement meeting the highest non-proliferation standard under Article 14 of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement be in place between Australia and the IAEA before any transfer of nuclear material under the Agreement. The safeguards arrangement must not only be satisfactory to Australia and the IAEA in this regard, but the AUKUS partners must have a shared view that safeguards arrangement meets the highest non-proliferation standard. The AUKUS partners have affirmed that they understand that this means that the Article 14 arrangement must allow the IAEA to fulfil its core technical objectives at all stages of the lifecycle of Australia’s conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine programme.

Despite the AUKUS partners’ continued dedication to non-proliferation, ANNPA has been the subject of deliberate disinformation. To be clear:

First, ANNPA requires Australia and the IAEA to reach an agreement on safeguards. ANNPA authorizes the transfer of nuclear material only when a satisfactory safeguards and verification arrangement is in place between Australia and the IAEA.

Second, neither ANNPA – nor any provisions within it – constitute a substitute or alternative for IAEA safeguards. Indeed, claims that the Agreement allows the Parties applying our own verification mechanisms instead are incorrect. The Article (VII.E) in question is commonly contained in agreements for civil nuclear cooperation – including in most from the US, UK, and Australia – and provides a mechanism to ensure that safeguards measures, obligations, principles, procedures and assurances will continue to be applied in all circumstances. We believe that not having such a mechanism would be irresponsible.

Third, ANNPA’s requirements are consistent with Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. ANNPA obligates the partners to protect naval nuclear propulsion information and related classified information from disclosure, including disclosure to the IAEA, but the partners are committed to developing a safeguards and verification arrangement that protects such information from disclosure while allowing the IAEA to complete its technical objectives. As noted, this is consistent with Article 14 of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which specifically provides that such arrangements with the IAEA “shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.” Importantly, the ANNPA specifically obliges the UK and US to ensure that Australia provides the IAEA with other information and access necessary to fulfil Australia’s safeguards obligations to the IAEA.

We value sessions such as this one to openly offer clarity on how we are developing our approach consistent with our respective international obligations. I have spoken to you about an important step in our partnership, the ANNPA, and will now turn to Ambassador Kitsell to cover wider areas of misinformation that have unfortunately persisted about the AUKUS partnership.

UK statement as delivered by Corinne Kitsell, Ambassador and UK Permanent Representative to IAEA and CTBTO

Thank you, Paul.

It is excellent to see so many delegates in the room for this discussion, and a pleasure to join my US and Australian colleagues on this panel.  You’ve already heard from Ambassador Wood and Mr Watzlavick about the AUKUS programme, our non-proliferation approach, and how the entry into force of the ANNPA bolsters our non-proliferation commitments. 

My aim today is to address some common misconceptions about the AUKUS endeavour. I hope to offer clarity and reassurance on some of the issues we are asked most frequently. 

AUKUS is still a relatively new partnership, and it is natural and expected that there are questions about the work we are undertaking. That is why, since AUKUS began in September 2021, all three partners have engaged openly and transparently with the international community.

My aim today is to ensure you are equipped with the facts about the work we are undertaking in relation to nuclear non-proliferation and to ensure our dialogue, at this meeting and others, remains grounded in truth. This includes underlining four important points, that: 

First, AUKUS is fully in line with our respective international obligations;

Second, the transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) between Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) does not contravene the NPT;

Third, Australia’s Article 14 arrangement will not remove nuclear material from IAEA oversight, and;

Fourth, why attempts to legitimise a parallel intergovernmental discussion on AUKUS should be rejected.

First, AUKUS is fully in line with all three partners’ respective international obligations. Including the NPT and Australia’s obligations under the Treaty of Rarotonga. Some have made claims to the contrary, often based on conjecture or disregard for our commitment to our international obligations. Accordingly, it is worth reiterating again that our cooperation under AUKUS has nothing to do with nuclear weapons. 

Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines will use nuclear material solely as a power source for propulsion. All three AUKUS partners take our obligations under the NPT extremely seriously. As per Article 2 of the Treaty, Australia does not have and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Consistent with their obligations under Article 1, neither the UK nor the US will provide any assistance, encouragement or inducement for Australia to do so. 

Relatedly, we recognise that there is interest in the safety of nuclear-powered vessels. Some have also inquired about the management of spent fuel from Australia’s submarine programme. I can reassure you that nuclear safety and stewardship are fundamental to our cooperation under AUKUS. For over 60 years, the UK and the US have operated more than 500 naval nuclear reactors. Collectively, they have travelled over 240 million kilometres without a reactor accident or release of radioactive material that adversely affected human health or the environment. Our approach to AUKUS is underpinned by this unmatched safety record, as well as Australia’s experience operating nuclear research reactors and conducting nuclear science activities. 

Claims that AUKUS will undermine the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone – either in terms of the presence of nuclear weapons or the dumping of radioactive waste at sea – are incorrect. Naval nuclear propulsion is not prohibited by the Treaty of Rarotonga, and Australia’s acquisition of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability is entirely consistent with the Treaty. As a responsible nuclear steward, Australia will be responsible for the management, disposition, storage, and disposal of any spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from their programme. The Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Act 2024 also reaffirms that Australia will not manage, store, or dispose of spent nuclear fuel or reactors from decommissioned UK or US submarines. 

Second, Australia’s submarine fuel will be subject to a robust package of safeguards and verification measures. We know that much has been made of the fact that Australia’s submarines will be powered by Highly Enriched Uranium. Let me be clear – the HEU fuel that will power Australia’s submarines will be subject to a robust package of safeguards and verification measures developed in consultation with the IAEA. The fuel for Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines will be provided to Australia by the UK and US in complete, welded power units that will not require refuelling in their lifetime. This has several advantages, including:

Eliminating the need for Australia to enrich uranium;

Reducing the production of spent fuel, and;

Avoiding the need to maintain a stockpile of fresh nuclear fuel.

Removing nuclear material from these sealed units is a complex and highly visible process. This would also render the power unit, and hence the submarine, inoperable. There is no incentive for Australia to pursue such a course of action.

Additionally, the nuclear fuel Australia will receive cannot be used in nuclear weapons without further chemical processing. This would require facilities that Australia does not have and will not seek. The IAEA will be able to verify the absence of these facilities, including by use of Australia’s Additional Protocol.

Separately, you may have heard that the transfer of HEU from a NWS to a NNWS is unprecedented or contravenes the NPT. Both claims are incorrect. The transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level among States Parties is not prohibited by the NPT, provided the transfer is carried out in accordance with relevant safeguards obligations. Such transfers can and do take place between Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Like many Member States here, AUKUS partners remain fully committed to HEU minimisation for civilian nuclear applications.

Third, naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT and will not remove nuclear material from IAEA oversight. As Ambassador Wood has already made clear, naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT and discussed during the negotiations to develop the model CSA. This has been repeatedly confirmed by the IAEA Secretariat, including by Director General Grossi in September 2022 and March 2023.  Article 14 is the specific provision included in the IAEA’s model CSA to provide a mechanism for activities including naval nuclear propulsion.

The development and use of this technology, and the application of Article 14, is therefore not a ‘loophole’ – and calling it such is often a deliberate attempt to mislead. As DG Grossi noted in May 2023, and I quote, “the Agency’s role in this process is foreseen in the existing legal framework and falls strictly within its statutory competences”.

And let me be clear, Australia’s Article 14 arrangement will not remove nuclear material from IAEA oversight. The Agency will be enabled to continue meeting its technical objectives throughout the lifecycle of Australia’s submarines. Verifying that there has been no diversion of nuclear material; no misuse of nuclear facilities; and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia. 

Fourth, the IAEA has the authority to negotiate directly and in-confidence with Member States. The IAEA has the clear authority under its Statute, and extensive precedent, to negotiate directly and in-confidence with individual Member States on the establishment and application of safeguards and verification arrangements.

You may encounter attempts to legitimise a so-called intergovernmental discussion on AUKUS. If you do, we urge you to remember the following: Australia’s current engagement with the IAEA is not a new phenomenon. As DG Grossi has stated, the IAEA already conducted bilateral discussions with another Member State on an Article 14 arrangement in the past. Many will be aware that the IAEA is also engaging with Brazil on an arrangement for the use of nuclear material under safeguards in naval nuclear propulsion under Article 13 of the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement. 

The international safeguards system relies on the IAEA’s ability to carry out its verification mission independently and impartially – free from political deliberations. Interference would politicise the IAEA’s independence, mandate, and technical authority, and establish a deeply harmful precedent.

Any suggestion that the IAEA Board of Governors, or the opportunity for proper deliberation, will somehow be bypassed in the case of AUKUS is also false. DG Grossi has committed to report, as appropriate, on naval nuclear propulsion programmes to the Board, as he last did last in November 2024. AUKUS partners welcome discussion of such programmes at the Board, under apolitical agenda items put forward by the DG and informed by his reporting. Once Australia and the IAEA Secretariat have agreed an Article 14 arrangement, it will be transmitted to the Board for appropriate action. AUKUS partners fully support this. 

To summarise, Australia, the UK, and US strongly support the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. We remain committed to setting the highest non-proliferation standard for naval nuclear propulsion under an Article 14 arrangement. I hope you will leave here today clear in the knowledge that AUKUS is fully in line with our international obligations, including those in the NPT, and confident in the principles and legitimacy of our approach and our engagement with the IAEA. We will continue to engage openly and transparently with the international community on good faith queries. In that spirit, I will pass back to Ambassador Larsen for any questions from the audience.