Category: Americas

MIL-OSI USA: 2025-58 HAWAIʻI LEADS MULTISTATE LETTER URGING TRUMP ADMINISTRATION TO RESTORE TITLE X FUNDING
Source: US State of Hawaii

2025-58 HAWAIʻI LEADS MULTISTATE LETTER URGING TRUMP ADMINISTRATION TO RESTORE TITLE X FUNDING

Posted on May 1, 2025 in Latest Department News, Newsroom

STATE OF HAWAIʻI

KA MOKU ʻĀINA O HAWAIʻI

DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

KA ʻOIHANA O KA LOIO KUHINA

JOSH GREEN, M.D.
GOVERNOR

KE KIAʻĀINA

ANNE LOPEZ

ATTORNEY GENERAL

LOIO KUHINA

HAWAIʻI LEADS MULTISTATE LETTER URGING TRUMP ADMINISTRATION TO RESTORE TITLE X FUNDING

News Release 2025-58

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

May 1, 2025

HONOLULU – Attorney General Anne Lopez today led a coalition of 20 attorneys general in sending a letter to the Trump Administration to express serious concern with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) decision to withhold tens of millions of dollars in Title X funding.

Signed into law by President Richard Nixon, Title X is the nation’s only federal program dedicated to family planning for low-income and uninsured individuals. On March 31, HHS issued letters to a wide range of grant recipients that fund nearly 25% of all Title X clinics, indicating that these grantees’ Title X grants were being withheld.

In today’s letter, the attorneys general write that the withholding of funds will lead to more unintended pregnancies, more sexually transmitted infections (STIs), increased rates of undiagnosed HIV, increased rates of cervical cancer and a higher burden on over-stretched state budgets.

“Hawai‘i has been deprived of all Title X funding, jeopardizing our residents’ access to vital healthcare,” said Deputy Solicitor General Caitlyn Carpenter. “We know from prior experience what happens when the federal government interferes with Title X. People experience an increase in serious health harms and states bear higher burdens. We urge Secretary Kennedy to reverse course and fully fund these critical programs.”

According to the letter, if state and local governments are not able to make up for the federal shortfall, patients will see a reduction in services as clinics close and providers are terminated. The letter goes on to explain that this will fall particularly hard on poor and rural communities that are the primary beneficiaries of the Title X programs. In many areas, a Title X clinic is the only source of prenatal services and screening for STIs.

In the letter, the attorneys general write that:
- Recent history demonstrates that cutting Title X grantees will worsen care. In 2019, the Trump Administration changed the rules governing Title X, leading to a mass loss of healthcare providers. Nationwide, the number of Title X patients fell more than 60%, from 3.9 million to 1.5 million. This recent history demonstrates what happens — and how quickly — when the federal government slashes access to Title X. In total, the Guttmacher Institute estimates that as a direct result of HHS’s action in withholding funds, at least 834,000 patients, representing 30% of the total population served, will lose care in the first year alone.
- The states will be harmed by HHS’s decision. While the 2019 rule was in effect, many states were forced to make emergency appropriations to cover for the loss of providers. Title X programs are a critical component of vital public health infrastructure. An important example is the role of Title X programs in detecting and preventing STIs. Between 2006 and 2010, 18% of all women who were tested, treated, or received counseling for an STI did so at a Title X clinic, as did 14% of women tested for HIV. States are once again faced with a choice: dip once again into general funds to make up the difference, or deal with a surge in new STIs and unintended pregnancies.
- There is no justification for the terminations. Although HHS suggested Title X grantees violated federal civil rights laws, HHS has provided absolutely no evidence supporting this suggestion.
This letter is led by Attorney General Lopez and Attorney General Rob Bonta of California. Joining the letter are the attorneys general of Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington.

A copy of the letter can be found here.

* * *

Media Contacts:

Dave Day

Special Assistant to the Attorney General

Office: 808-586-1284

Email: [email protected]

Web: http://ag.hawaii.gov

Toni Schwartz
Public Information Officer
Hawai‘i Department of the Attorney General
Office: 808-586-1252
Cell: 808-379-9249
Email: [email protected]

Web: http://ag.hawaii.gov

MIL OSI USA News –
May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Donald Trump has cast a long shadow over the Australian election. Will it prove decisive?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Emma Shortis, Adjunct Senior Fellow, School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University

Donald Trump is everywhere, inescapable. His return to power in the United States was always going to have some impact on the Australian federal election. The question was how disruptive he would be.

The answer is very – but not in the ways we might have thought.

As soon as Trump was elected president, the political debate in Australia focused on whether Prime Minister Anthony Albanese or Opposition Leader Peter Dutton would be best suited to managing him – and keeping the US-Australia security alliance intact.

Initially, at least, this conversation was predictable.

The Coalition looked set to continue an ideological alignment with Trumpism that had flourished under the prime ministership of Scott Morrison. Dutton prosecuted the argument that given his party’s experience with the first Trump administration, it would be better placed than Labor to handle the second.

Albanese, meanwhile, appeared caught off guard by Trump’s victory and timid in his response.

But as has become all too clear, the second Trump administration is radically different from the first. That has rattled the right of Australian politics and worked to Labor’s advantage.

A turning point at the White House

In January, the Coalition announced that NT Senator Jacinta Nampijinpa Price had been appointed shadow minister for government efficiency – a direct importation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) being led by Elon Musk in the US.

In a barely disguised imitation of the Trump administration’s attacks on “diversity, equity and inclusion” (DEI) measures, members of the Coalition, including Price, singled out Welcome to Country ceremonies as evidence of the kind of “wasteful” spending it would cut.

When the Coalition seemed to be riding high in the polls, Dutton, too, nodded at “wokeism” and singled out young white men feeling “disenfranchised”.

Soon after, however, this began to change. The first few weeks of Trump’s second term were marked by a cascade of executive actions targeting trans people, climate action and immigration. Trump and his new appointees began the process of radically reshaping the United States and its role in the world.

In February, polling by the independent think tank The Australia Institute found Australians saw Trump as a bigger threat to world peace than Russian President Vladimir Putin or Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

And then Volodymyr Zelensky went to the White House.

The Ukrainian president was humiliated in an Oval Office meeting with Trump and Vice President JD Vance, laying bare how the administration was willing to treat the leader of an ally devastated by a war it hadn’t started.

Trump’s territorial threats towards Canada and Greenland, in addition to his dismissive statements about European allies, shattered the long-held assumptions about the US as a force for stability in the world.

MAGA ideology isn’t ‘pick and choose’

After this incident, Dutton was careful to distance himself from Trump’s abandonment of Ukraine. He even went so far as to say that leadership might require “standing up to your friends and to those traditional allies because our views have diverged”.

Similarly, influential Coalition powerbroker Peta Credlin wrote in The Australian:

it’s hard to see America made great again if the Trump administration’s message to the world is that the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must.

Therein lies the bind for the Coalition – an ideological alignment with “Make America Great Again” cannot be fully reconciled with a nationalism that puts Australian interests first.

MAGA ideology is all-or-nothing, not pick-and-choose.

During the election campaign, the Coalition attempted to walk the path of “pick-and-choose”. And Labor quite successfully used this against them. Assertions the opposition leader was nothing but a “Temu Trump”, or “DOGE-y Dutton”, stuck because they had at least a ring of truth to them.

The opposition’s pledge to dramatically reduce the size of the public service, for example, was clearly linked to Musk’s efforts at DOGE to take a chainsaw to the public service in the US. This idea has been deeply unpopular with Australian voters, and the Coalition has faced innumerable questions about it.

For all the talk of “shared values” and how essential the US alliance is to Australian security, this campaign shows that Australia is not like America.

Most Australians concerned about Trump’s impact

When Trump’s tariffs arrived on “Liberation Day” in early April, both leaders claimed they were best placed to negotiate.

Albanese insisted Australia had got one of the best results in the world, while Dutton asserted, without evidence, that he would be able to negotiate a better one.

More broadly, the Trump tariffs have contributed to a growing sense of unease in the electorate.

A recent YouGov poll found that 66% of Australians no longer believe the US can be relied on for defence and security. According to Paul Smith, the director of YouGov, this is a “fundamental change of worldview”.

In the same poll, 71% of Australians also said they were either concerned or very concerned Trump’s policies would make Australia worse off.

While neither party has signalled it would make a fundamental shift in Australia’s alliance with the US if elected, that doesn’t mean changes aren’t possible.

Independents and minor parties may well play a significant role in the formation of the next government. Some, like Zoe Daniel and Jacqui Lambie, are increasingly vocal about the risks the Trump administration poses to Australia.

A limit to Trumpism’s appeal

As election day approaches, many of the assumptions driving conventional Australian political thinking are under pressure.

Labor’s recovery in the polls, and the Liberals’ election win in Canada, suggest assumptions about the dangers of incumbency might have been misplaced. The dissatisfaction with incumbent governments last year may have had more to do with unresponsive political parties and systems.

There’s evidence emerging, instead, that in more responsive democracies with robust institutions like Australia and Canada, Trumpism does not have great appeal.

The idea that “kindness is not a weakness” may yet prove to be a winning political strategy.

Emma Shortis is Director of International and Security Affairs at The Australia Institute, an independent think tank.

– ref. Donald Trump has cast a long shadow over the Australian election. Will it prove decisive? – https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-has-cast-a-long-shadow-over-the-australian-election-will-it-prove-decisive-255422

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI: Patria Reports First Quarter 2025 Earnings Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

GRAND CAYMAN, Cayman Islands, May 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Patria (Nasdaq:PAX) reported today its unaudited results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025. The full detailed presentation of Patria’s first quarter 2025 results can be accessed on the Shareholders section of Patria’s website at https://ir.patria.com/.

Alex Saigh, Patria’s CEO, said: “Patria is off to a very exciting start to 2025 as fundraising totaled a record $3.2 billion, highlighting the expanded reach of our investment platforms and distribution capabilities, and putting us in a strong position to achieve our $6 billion fundraising target for the year. We also reported 1Q25 FRE of $42.6 million, or $0.27 per share, representing year-over-year growth of 21% and 16%, respectively, despite the volatility in the region. Also, FEAUM grew 6% sequentially and 46% year-over-year, and we generated over $700 million of organic net inflows, reflecting an annualized organic growth rate of 9%. While a looming trade war and rising global economic concerns create potential headwinds, we believe we are well positioned to generate the $200 to $225 million of FRE we are targeting for 2025 as the increased diversification of our platform is paying off in terms of fundraising and profitable organic growth, enhancing our confidence in the three-year targets we introduced at our Investor Day back on December 9^th.”

Financial Highlights (reported in $ USD)

IFRS results included $13.6 million of net income attributable to Patria in Q1 2025. Patria generated Fee Related Earnings of $42.6 million in Q1 2025, up 21% from $35.1 million in Q1 2024, with an FRE margin of 55.1%. Distributable Earnings were $36.8 million for Q1 2025, or $0.23 per share.

Dividends

Patria declared a quarterly dividend of $0.15 per share to record holders of common stock at the close of business on May 14th, 2025. This dividend will be paid on June 12th, 2025.

Conference Call

Patria will host its first quarter 2025 earnings conference call via public webcast on May 2^nd, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. ET. To register and join, please use the following link:

https://edge.media-server.com/mmc/p/ah6qnzkp/

For those unable to listen to the live broadcast, there will be a webcast replay on the Shareholders section of Patria’s website at https://ir.patria.com/ shortly after the call’s completion.

About Patria

Patria is a global alternative asset management firm focused on the mid-market segment, specializing in resilient sectors across select regions. We are the leading asset manager in Latin America and have a strong presence in Europe through our extensive network of General Partners relationships. Our on-the-ground presence combines investment leaders, sector experts, company managers, and strategic relationships, allowing us to identify compelling investment opportunities accessible only to those with local proficiency. With 36 years of experience and over $45 billion in assets under management, we consistently deliver attractive returns through long-term investments, while promoting inclusive and sustainable development in the regions where we operate. Further information is available at www.patria.com.

Asset Classes: Private Equity, Solutions (GPMS), Credit, Real Estate, Infrastructure, and Public Equities

Main sectors: Agribusiness, Power & Energy, Healthcare, Logistics & Transportations, Food & Beverage and Digital & Tech Services

Investment Regions: Latin America, Europe and US

Forward-Looking Statements

This press release may contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. You can identify these forward-looking statements by the use of words such as “outlook,” “indicator,” “believes,” “expects,” “potential,” “continues,” “may,” “will,” “could,” “should,” “seeks,” “approximately,” “predicts,” “intends,” “plans,” “estimates,” “anticipates” or the negative version of these words or other comparable words, among others. Forward-looking statements appear in a number of places in this press release and include, but are not limited to, statements regarding our intent, belief or current expectations. Forward-looking statements are based on our management’s beliefs and assumptions and on information currently available to our management. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and we do not undertake any obligation to update them in light of new information or future developments or to release publicly any revisions to these statements in order to reflect later events or circumstances or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events. Such forward-looking statements are subject to various risks and uncertainties. Accordingly, there are or will be important factors that could cause actual outcomes or results to differ materially from those indicated in these statements. Further information on these and other factors that could affect our financial results is included in filings we have made and will make with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission from time to time, including but not limited to those described under the section entitled “Risk Factors” in our most recent annual report on Form 20-F, as such factors may be updated from time to time in our periodic filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), which are accessible on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. These factors should not be construed as exhaustive and should be read in conjunction with the other cautionary statements that are included in our periodic filings.

Contact

Patria Shareholder Relations
E. PatriaShareholderRelations@patria.com
T. +1 917 769 1611

The MIL Network –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI: Precision Drilling Corporation Holding Virtual-Only 2025 Annual and Special Meeting of Shareholders on May 15

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

CALGARY, Alberta, May 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Precision Drilling Corporation (Precision) would like to remind shareholders that it is holding its 2025 Annual and Special Meeting of Shareholders (the Annual Meeting) on Thursday, May 15, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. MST. As previously announced, the Annual Meeting will be held in a virtual-only meeting format. The meeting format will provide all shareholders an equal opportunity to participate in the Annual Meeting regardless of their geographic location.

The Annual Meeting can be accessed by logging in online at http://meetnow.global/MWTY5VA. Registered shareholders and duly appointed proxyholders who participate in the Annual Meeting online will be able to listen to the Annual Meeting, ask questions and vote, all in real time, provided that they are connected to the internet. In all cases, shareholders must follow the instructions set out in their applicable proxy or voting instruction forms. Shareholders can vote by proxy in advance of the Annual Meeting as in prior years. Guests can listen to the Annual Meeting but will not be able to communicate or vote.

Additional information regarding shareholder participation in the Annual Meeting (including voting instructions) may be found in Precision’s Management Information Circular, dated April 2, 2025, which is available on our website (https://www.precisiondrilling.com/investors/financial-information-public-filings/). Additionally, detailed instructions for shareholders to participate in the meeting are provided in Precision’s Virtual AGM User Guide, available on our website by selecting “Investor Relations,” then “Webcasts & Presentations.”

If you have questions regarding your ability to participate or vote at the Annual Meeting, please contact Precision’s registrar and transfer agent, Computershare, at 1-800-564-6253.

About Precision

Precision is a leading provider of safe and environmentally responsible High Performance, High Value services to the energy industry, offering customers access to an extensive fleet of Super Series drilling rigs. Precision has commercialized an industry-leading digital technology portfolio known as Alpha^TM that utilizes advanced automation software and analytics to generate efficient, predictable, and repeatable results for energy customers. Our drilling services are enhanced by our EverGreen^TM suite of environmental solutions, which bolsters our commitment to reducing the environmental impact of our operations. Additionally, Precision offers well service rigs, camps and rental equipment all backed by a comprehensive mix of technical support services and skilled, experienced personnel.

Precision is headquartered in Calgary, Alberta, Canada and is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the trading symbol “PD” and on the New York Stock Exchange under the trading symbol “PDS”.

Additional Information

For more information about Precision, please visit our website at www.precisiondrilling.com or contact:

Lavonne Zdunich, CPA, CA
Vice President, Investor Relations
403.716.4500

800, 525 – 8th Avenue S.W.
Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2P 1G1
Website: www.precisiondrilling.com

The MIL Network –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: “The Tide of Change is Sweeping the Country” –President Trump 🇺🇸

Source: United States of America – The White House (video statements)

THIS VIDEO WILL GIVE YOU CHILLS

“The tide of change is sweeping the country. Sunlight is pouring over the entire world, and America has the chance to seize this opportunity like never before.” –President Donald J. Trump

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzTIbNokVTk

MIL OSI Video –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: President Trump Delivers Remarks at the University of Alabama Commencement

Source: United States of America – The White House (video statements)

Tuscaloosa, AL

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ZYvjXDZ-2E

MIL OSI Video –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Foreign Affairs Day Celebration – 9:30 AM

Source: United States of America – Department of State (video statements)

Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and Senior Bureau Official Lew Olowski deliver remarks at the Department of State’s 60th annual Foreign Affairs Day celebration, on May 2, 2025.

———-
Under the leadership of the President and Secretary of State, the U.S. Department of State leads America’s foreign policy through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance by advancing the interests of the American people, their safety and economic prosperity. On behalf of the American people we promote and demonstrate democratic values and advance a free, peaceful, and prosperous world.

The Secretary of State, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, is the President’s chief foreign affairs adviser. The Secretary carries out the President’s foreign policies through the State Department, which includes the Foreign Service, Civil Service and U.S. Agency for International Development.

Get updates from the U.S. Department of State at www.state.gov and on social media!
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/statedept
X: https://x.com/StateDept
Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/statedept
Flickr: https://flickr.com/photos/statephotos/

Subscribe to the State Department Blog: https://www.state.gov/blogs
Watch on-demand State Department videos: https://video.state.gov/
Subscribe to The Week at State e-newsletter: https://www.state.gov/department-email-updates/

State Department website: https://www.state.gov/
Careers website: https://careers.state.gov/
White House website: https://www.whitehouse.gov/
Terms of Use: https://state.gov/tou

#StateDepartment #DepartmentofState #Diplomacy

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOq__cvz85Y

MIL OSI Video –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Self-Deportation

Source: United States of America – Federal Government Departments (video statements)

We enforce federal immigration law, and you need to know:
If ICE removes you, you may never be allowed back.
If you self-deport now, you may be able to return as an immigrant or visitor someday — the legal way.
Learn more: ICE.gov/self-deportation

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LqrBfUQx9ek

MIL OSI Video –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Advance Technology – Border Security Expo | CBP

Source: United States of America – Federal Government Departments (video statements)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) participated at the annual Border Security Expo. Acting Executive Assistant Commissioner Diane J. Sabatino, Office of Field Operations, spoke about advancing technologies in border security and how CBP is implentanting them into the field for officers and agents.

Instagram ➤ https://instagram.com/CBPgov
Facebook ➤ https://facebook.com/CBPgov
Twitter ➤ https://twitter.com/CBP
Official Website ➤ https://www.cbp.gov

#cbp
#bordersecurity
#technology
#lawenforcement

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01crpGcJVJM

MIL OSI Video –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: How state agents target journalists while governments claim to protect them – stark warnings from Mexico and Honduras
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tamsin S. Mitchell, Visiting Researcher, Centre for Freedom of the Media, University of Sheffield

Humberto Padgett was reporting on the effects of drought in Cuitzeo, a rural area of central Mexico, when his car was intercepted by armed men on September 13 2024. They threatened him and stole the car, his identity papers and work equipment, including two bullet-proof jackets.

Padgett, a Mexican investigative journalist and author, was reporting on Mexico’s growing environmental worries for national talk radio station Radio Fórmula. It proved to be his last assignment for the station. Two days later, he tweeted:

Today I’m leaving journalism indefinitely. The losses I’ve suffered, the harassment and threats my family and I have endured, and the neglect I’ve faced have forced me to give up after 26 years of work. Thank you and good luck.

Padgett made this decision despite the fact he, like many other journalists in Mexico, has been enrolled in a government protection scheme for years – the Protection Mechanism for Journalists and Human Rights Defenders, set up in 2012. Several other Latin American countries have similar protection programmes, including Honduras since 2015.

These programmes offer journalists measures such as panic buttons and emergency phone alerts, police or private security patrols, and security cameras and alarm systems for their homes and offices. Some are provided with bodyguards – at times, Padgett has received 24-hour protection.

In Honduras, reporter Wendy Funes, founder of the online news site RI, was given a police bodyguard after being threatened while covering an extortion trial that linked the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), an international criminal gang, with the Honduran government of former president Juan Orlando Hernández, who is now serving a 45-year prison sentence in the US for drug trafficking and arms offences.

Yet even once journalists are enrolled in these government protection schemes, the attacks and threats continue. Shockingly, many come from state employees who, in both Mexico and Honduras, are thought to be responsible for almost half of all attacks on journalists. But the prospect of punishment is remote: at least 90% of attacks on journalists go unprosecuted and unpunished, meaning there is little deterrent for committing these crimes.

Both Mexico and Honduras currently have leftwing governments which have promised to protect journalists, following a long history of crimes against media professionals in both countries. Yet the risk to journalists posed by the state has worsened in recent years amid increasing use of spyware, online smear campaigns, and rising levels of anti-media rhetoric.

Journalists perceived as critical of the leadership are regularly accused of being corrupt, in the pay of foreign governments, and putting out fake news. Donald Trump’s vocal criticism of mainstream media since returning to power in the US is likely to have encouraged this anti-media hostility in Mexico and Honduras, as elsewhere in the world.

Many journalists there have developed strategies for self-protection, including setting up NGOs that support colleagues at risk. But while they are doing journalism in ways that make reporting safer, their work has been further threatened by the abrupt suspension of USAID and other US grants, which is heightening the dangers faced by journalists in Latin America and around the world.

Threats from the state

When I tell people about my research into how journalists in Latin America deal with the relentless violence and impunity, their first question is usually: “Oh, you mean drug cartels?” And indeed, both Padgett and Funes have received death threats for their investigations into cartels and other organised crime groups.

Padgett was once sent an unsolicited photo of a dismembered body in a morgue. He was beaten and kicked in the head by armed men who threatened to kill him and his family while he was reporting on drug dealing on a university campus in Mexico City in 2017. He wears a bullet-proof jacket – or did until it was stolen – and keeps his home address a closely guarded secret.

But cartels and gangs are only part of the story when it comes to anti-press violence and impunity in these countries. In many ways, the bigger story is the threat from the state. This has been a constant despite changes in government, whether right or left wing.

The Insights section is committed to high-quality longform journalism. Our editors work with academics from many different backgrounds who are tackling a wide range of societal and scientific challenges.

My research project and resulting book were inspired by my work providing advocacy, practical and moral support for journalists at risk in Latin America for an international NGO between 2007 and 2016. The extent of the risk posed by state agents – acting alone or in cahoots with organised crime groups – is clear from the many journalists I’ve spoken to in both Mexico and Honduras.

I first interviewed these reporters, and the organisations that assist them, in 2018, then again in 2022-23 (89 interviews in total), to chart how journalists struggle for protection and justice from the state in the face of growing challenges at both domestic and international level.

For both Padgett and Funes, the intimidation, threats and attacks from organised crime groups often followed them reporting on state agents and their alleged links with such groups. Organised crime groups have deeply infiltrated the fabric of society in many parts of Mexico and Honduras – including politics, state institutions, justice and law enforcement, particularly at a local level.

In Padgett’s case, the suspected cartel threats came after he published a book and investigation into links between state governments and drug cartels, including drug money for political campaigns in Tamaulipas and a surge in cartel-related violence in Morelos under a certain local administration.

Padgett had first joined the federal protection mechanism after he was attacked by police when filming a raid in central Mexico City in 2016. The police confiscated his phone and arrested him.

He was later assigned an around-the-clock bodyguard after the Mexico City prosecutor’s office made available his contact details and his risk assessment and protection plan – produced by the state programme that was supposed to safeguard him – for inclusion in the court file on the 2017 attack on him at the university. This meant the criminals behind the attack had full access to this information.

Being part of this protection programme did not stop the threats by state employees. In April 2024, while trying to report from the scene of the murder of a local mayoral candidate in Guanajuato state, Padgett was punched in the face by a police officer from the state prosecutor’s office, who also smashed his glasses and deleted his photos.

Years earlier, he had been subjected to a protracted legal battle by former Mexico state governor and presidential candidate Eruviel Ávila Villegas, who sued Padgett for “moral damages” to the tune of more than half a million US dollars. His offence? A 2017 profile which mentioned that the politician had attended parties where a bishop had sexually abused male minors.

Padgett eventually won the case – but only on appeal, thanks to a pro bono legal team, after 18 months of stress and travelling to attend the hearings. This is a part of a growing trend of “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (Slapps) in Mexico and Latin America, aimed at silencing journalists and other critical voices.

As Padgett put it: “[Even] once we manage to win, there are no consequences for the politicians who call us to a trial without merit – no consequences at all. Eruviel Ávila is still a senator for the PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party]” – and he was not even liable for costs.

Mexico’s federal government and army have also carried out illegal surveillance of the mobile phones of journalists and human rights defenders investigating federal government corruption and serious human rights violations on multiple occasions, including by using Pegasus spyware.

In Honduras, Funes is no stranger to state harassment either. In 2011, she was among around 100 journalists, many of them women, who were teargassed and beaten with truncheons by officers of the presidential guard and the national police during a peaceful protest against journalist murders.

In recent years, according to Funes, she and her team at RI have been targeted by cyberattacks and orchestrated smear campaigns on social media that have sought to tar them as being corrupt or associated with criminal gangs. She suspects the army is behind some of these attacks since RI has written in favour of demilitarising the police. Several RI team members have been stopped at army checkpoints; when they have denounced this on TikTok or Facebook, they have been flooded by negative comments.

Profile of investigative journalist Wendy Funes, winner of the 2018 Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression journalism award.

RI has also been attacked by government supporters unhappy with its critical coverage of the Honduras president Xiomara Castro’s leftwing administration. In August 2024, Funes was threatened with prosecution by the governor of Choluteca, southern Honduras, over RI’s investigation into alleged involvement by local government officials in migrant trafficking. And earlier in 2025, Funes and a human rights activist were subjected to misogynistic and sexist diatribes and threats by the head of customs for the same regional department, for demanding justice for a murdered environmental defender.

Almost half of all attacks on journalists in Mexico and Honduras are attributable to state agents, particularly at the local level. In Mexico, the NGO Article 19 has attributed 46% of all such assaults over the last decade to state agents including officials, civil servants and the armed forces.

In Honduras, according to the Committee for Free Expression (C-Libre), 45% of attacks on journalists in the first quarter of 2024 were attributed to state agents, up from 41% in 2021. These include the national police, the Military Public Order Police, officials and members of the government.

Impunity is a fact of life

One key reason for the failure of the journalist protection schemes in Mexico and Honduras is they lack the power to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for the attacks that caused the journalists to enter the programmes in the first place.

Padgett is yet to see justice, either for the attack on him by drug dealers at the university campus almost eight years ago or the results of the official investigation into the Mexico City prosecutor office’s apparent leaking of his contact details to the assailants. When he asked the prosecutor’s office for an update on its investigation in June 2024, he was told it had been closed two years earlier. His request for a copy of the file was denied.

When he went to the office to ask why, he was detained by police officers. “This is justice in Mexico City,” he said in a video he filmed during his arrest, adding:

Drug dealing is allowed. My personal data is leaked to the organised crime [group] that threatened to kill me and my family. Then the matter is shelved. I come to ask for my file and instead of giving it to me, they take me to court. That is the reality today.

News report by Al Jazeera English (February 2023)

Padgett lodged a complaint and, following “a tortuous judicial process”, eventually managed to get the investigation re-opened. But he says he has lost hope in the process and the justice system in general. Even something as simple as filing a report on the theft of his bullet-proof jacket during the armed attack in September 2024 has proved beyond the official responsible for the task, so the protection programme has not replaced it.

Funes says she reported one of the cyber-attacks on RI to the special prosecutor established by Honduras in 2018 to investigate crimes against journalists and human rights defenders. Funes provided the name and mobile phone number used by the hacker. However, she said the case was later closed for “lack of merit”.

Previously, the official investigation into the 2011 attack on her and other women journalists had also been quietly shelved after the evidence was “lost”. Funes says this put her off reporting subsequent incidents to the authorities:

What for? I just want them to protect me … why waste my time? Really, you get used to impunity, you normalise it.

There have been a few important advances in Mexico in recent years, including the successful prosecution of some of those behind the 2017 murder of two high-profile journalists, Javier Valdez and Miroslava Breach, but such cases remain the exception. Around 90% of attacks on journalists still go unprosecuted and unpunished by the state in both Mexico and Honduras, meaning there is little deterrent against these crimes.

Safer, better ways of working

Many of the journalists I have interviewed prioritise covering under-reported issues relating to human rights and democracy, corruption, violence and impunity. They use in-depth, investigative journalism to try to reveal the truth about what is happening in their countries – which is often obscured by the failings and corruption of the justice system and rule of law.

Many are developing safer, better ways of working, with three strategies having grown noticeably in recent years: building collaborations, seeking international support, and professionalising their ways of working.

Journalists from different media outlets often overcome professional rivalries to collaborate on sensitive and dangerous stories. In Mexico, members of some journalists’ collectives and networks alert each other of security risks on the ground, share and corroborate information, and monitor their members during risky assignments. Others travel as a group – when investigating the mass graves used by drug cartels, for example.

In Mexico and increasingly in Honduras, they publish controversial stories, such as on serious human rights violations involving the state, in more than one outlet simultaneously to reduce the chance of individual journalists being targeted in reprisal. Such collaborations build trust, solidarity and mutual support among reporters and editors – something that has traditionally been lacking in both countries.

Increasingly, international media partners also play an important role regarding the safety of Mexican and Honduran journalists and amplifying public awareness of the issues they report on – encouraging the mainstream media in their own countries to take notice and increasing pressure on their governments to act.

According to Jennifer Ávila, director of the Honduran investigative journalism platform ContraCorriente, transnational collaborations are a “super-important protection mechanism” because they give journalists access to external editors and legal assistance – as well as help leaving the country if necessary.

Read more:
As Mexico’s new president takes office, a renewed battle to contain cartel violence begins

International partners also bring increased resources. In Mexico and Honduras, as in other Latin American countries, the main source of funding is government advertising and other state financial incentives. But these come with expectations about influence over editorial policies and content, so are not an option for most independent outlets. Private advertising is also challenging for these and other reasons. So, most independent media outlets and journalistic projects are heavily dependent on US and European donors such as the National Endowment for Democracy (Ned), Ford Foundation and Open Society Foundations.

Much of Latin America has high levels of media concentration, with the mainstream media typically being owned by a handful of wealthy individuals or families with wider business interests – and close economic and political links to politicians and the state. Combined with the strings of government advertising, this often results in “soft” censorship of the content that these outlets publish. Some journalists are escaping this either by setting up their own media digital outlets, like Funes, or by going freelance – as Padgett has decided to do following the attack on him in Cuitzeo in 2024.

At the same time, there has been a widespread raising of standards through increased training in techniques such as journalistic ethics, making freedom of information requests, digital and investigative journalism, and covering elections. This all helps to promote “journalistic security” – using information as a “shield in such a way that no one can deny what you’re saying”, according to Daniela Pastrana of the NGO Journalists on the Ground (PdP). It also helps counter the perception – and in some cases, reality – of longstanding corruption in parts of the profession.

Hostile environment puts progress at risk

Despite the promise of transforming journalism through increasing collaboration, professionalisation and international support, the current outlook for journalists in Mexico and Honduras – and other countries in Latin America – is not encouraging. Hostile government rhetoric against independent reporters and media outlets is on the rise, despite the presidents of both Mexico and Honduras having pledged to protect journalists and freedom of expression.

In Honduras, the hostile rhetoric towards journalists is growing in the run-up to the presidential elections in November. According to Funes: “There is a violent public discourse from the government which is repeated by officials [and] prepares the ground for worse attacks on the press … This is dangerous.”

In both countries, such attitudes at the top are often replicated by local politicians and citizens, including online, with the threat of violent discourse leading to physical violence. This hostility appears likely to grow given the example of Donald Trump’s aggressive and litigious attitude towards journalists and the media in the United States.

Indeed, the policies of the second Trump administration are already jeopardising progress made in terms of transforming journalism in Mexico and Honduras. In late January 2025, the US government suspended international aid and shuttered USAID, amid unsubstantiated accusations of fraud and corruption.

According to the press freedom group Reporters Without Borders, the USAID freeze included more than US$268m (£216m) that had been allocated to support “independent media and the free flow of information” in 2025.

USAID has been a key funder of organisations such as the nonprofits Internews and Freedom House, which in turn have been vital to the development of independent and investigative journalism in Latin America through their support of new media outlets, journalistic projects and media freedom groups. Another important donor, Ned – a bipartisan nonprofit organisation largely funded by the US Congress – has had its funding frozen.

Ned’s chair, Peter Roskam, explains its legal action against the Trump funding cuts.

Uncertainty about future funding has led to the immediate suspension of operations and layoffs by many nonprofit media organisations in Mexico, Honduras and across the region. While this seismic shift in the Latin American media landscape reinforces the urgent need to diversify its sources of funding, there is no doubt that in the short and even medium term, it has dealt a serious blow to the development of free and independent journalism and the safety of all journalists.

In a region of increasingly authoritarian leaders, it is now a lot harder to hold them accountable for corruption, human rights violations, impunity and other abuses.

International impotence

Anti-press violence and impunity are global problems, with more than 1,700 journalists killed worldwide between 2006 and 2024 – around 85% of which went unpunished, according to Unesco.

Although international organisations, protection mechanisms and pressure can be important tools in the fight against anti-press violence and impunity, they are ultimately limited in impact due to their reliance on the state to comply. Some journalists in Mexico and Honduras suggest the impact of such international attention can even be counter-productive, due to their governments’ increasing hostility toward any criticism by international organisations, journalists and other perceived opponents.

Twenty years ago, Lydia Cacho, a renowned journalist and women’s rights activist, was arbitrarily detained and tortured in Puebla state, east-central Mexico, after publishing a book exposing a corruption and child sexual exploitation network involving authorities and well-known businessmen. Unable to get redress for her torture through the Mexican justice system, Cacho eventually took her case to the United Nations.

Finally, in 2018, the UN Human Rights Committee ruled that her rights had been violated and ordered the Mexican state to re-open the investigation into the attack, and to give her adequate compensation. This judgment has led to several arrests of state agents in Puebla, including a former governor and chief of the judicial police and several police officers, as well as a public apology from the federal government.

Journalist Lydia Cacho speaking at the 2020 Camden Conference.

But cases like Cacho’s are the exception. Securing rulings from international bodies requires resources and energy, the help of NGOs or lawyers – and can take years. What’s more, enforcement of international decisions relies on the state to comply.

While international pressure was key to persuading the Mexican and Honduran states to set up their government protection schemes for journalists and specialised prosecutors to investigate attacks against them, these institutions have generally proved ineffective.

Resourcing is always an issue: typically, protection mechanisms and prosecutors’ offices are underfunded and the staff are poorly trained. Some bodies have limited mandates, such as protection mechanisms that lack the power to investigate attacks on journalists. Sometimes, these failings are believed to be deliberate. According to Padgett, the Mexican journalist protection scheme has “political biases against those whom officials consider to be hostile to the regime”.

Indeed, many journalists and support groups suspect the Mexican and Honduran governments don’t really want these institutions to work. As the pro-democracy judge Guillermo López Lone commented about the repeated failure to secure convictions for crimes against journalists and human rights defenders in Honduras: “These are international commitments [made] due to pressure, but there is no political will.”

López Lone, who was illegally removed from his position after the 2009 coup in Honduras and only reinstated as a judge after a years-long struggle, including a ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, alleged that these institutions “play a merely formal role” in Honduras, because they have been “captured by the political interests of the current rulers, and by criminal networks”.

Similarly, according to Sara Mendiola, director of Mexico City-based NGO Propuesta Cívica, it’s not enough to talk about a lack of resources or training: “Even if you doubled the [state] prosecutors’ offices’ budgets, you’d still have the same impunity because the structures [that generate impunity] remain.”

Activism is a risky business

It’s clear that in both Mexico and Honduras, despite the governments’ stated commitment to freedom of expression, there is a deep-seated ambivalence about how important or desirable it is to protect journalists and media freedom.

The heart of this issue is the contradiction of the state as both protector and perpetrator – a state that does not want to, or is incapable of, constraining or investigating itself and its allies. This in turn is linked to longstanding structural problems of corruption, impunity and human rights violations, and a legacy of controlling the media dating to pre-democracy days.

Activism by journalists against this situation – another form of self-protection – takes various forms, including public protests and advocacy, and working for and setting up NGOs that support colleagues at risk. Increasingly, activism also involves the coming together of those who are the victims of violence.

In Mexico City, groups of journalists displaced from their homes by threats and attacks, many of whom end up without a job or income, have formed collectives and networks to provide mutual support and assist colleagues in similar circumstances. In Veracruz state, the Network in Memory of and Struggle for Killed and Disappeared Journalists was formed by the relatives of the many such journalists in 2022.

But activism is a risky business in Mexico and Honduras, opening journalists and their loved ones up to further repression and attacks by the state – and sometimes raising questions about their impartiality and credibility. While many journalists have taken part in activism out of necessity or desperation, in both countries their main source of optimism in the face of violence and impunity is journalism itself.

Journalism as the solution

Fortunately, journalists like Padgett don’t give up easily. After an eight-month hiatus following the attack in Cuitzeo and its aftermath, he now feels ready to go back to reporting.

Although he succeeded in getting the shelved investigation into the 2017 attack on him and subsequent data leak reopened, the lack of any action since means he’s decided to draw a line under this labyrinthine process. He is now looking for “alternative means of justice to compensate for the impunity”.

As a part of the reparations, he has been promised a formal apology from the Mexico City Prosecutor’s Office (similar to the apology received by Cacho). Such a ceremony is not justice and may largely be symbolic, but Padgett feels it will allow him to move on and focus on journalism again – this time as a freelancer. He is keen to make the point that Mexico remains “an extraordinary place to be a reporter”.

Despite the lack of state protection and all the other challenges, journalists like Padgett and Funes are determined to keep going – investigating their countries’ ills, probing the root causes, transforming their profession. Their commitment offers a ray of hope for the emergence of a truly free and independent media in Mexico, Honduras and beyond.

For you: more from our Insights series:
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This article draws on research which was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). Tamsin Mitchell’s new book, Human Rights, Impunity and Anti-Press Violence: How Journalists Survive and Resist, is published by Routledge.

– ref. How state agents target journalists while governments claim to protect them – stark warnings from Mexico and Honduras – https://theconversation.com/how-state-agents-target-journalists-while-governments-claim-to-protect-them-stark-warnings-from-mexico-and-honduras-255549
MIL OSI – Global Reports –
May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Leonardo Villar-Gómez: Speech – XVIII Asofondos Congress
Source: Bank for International Settlements

Good morning to all Asofondos Congress attendees. I extend a special greeting to my esteemed fellow panelists in this opening session: Mr. Juan David Correa, President of the Board of Directors of the Association; the Minister of Labor, Mr. Antonio Sanguino; and the Financial Superintendent, Mr. César Ferrari.

I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to Andrés Velasco and Daniel Wills, President and Technical Vice-President of Asofondos, respectively, as well as to all the members of the Association, for their kind invitation and the opportunity to participate in this vital forum.

On this occasion, I will first share Banco de la República‘s perspective on Colombia’s macroeconomic and monetary outlook. Additionally, I will conclude my remarks with reflections on the Bank’s role in administering the Contributory Pillar Savings Fund, established by the Congress of the Republic as part of the pension reform approved last year.

It is important to clarify that the views I will present today do not necessarily reflect the position of the Bank’s Board of Directors, nor do they represent the opinions of its individual members, who may hold differing interpretations on some issues I will address.

On the Bank’s autonomy and essential objectives

I would like to begin by addressing recent allegations directed at the Board of Directors, particularly some of its members, regarding alleged political motivations behind the decision made on Monday, March 31 to keep interest rates unchanged. My response to these claims is a strong reaffirmation of the institutional integrity of the Board, which operates strictly on technical grounds and within the clear constitutional mandate of safeguarding the purchasing power of the peso in tandem with general economic policy.

It is essential to emphasize that none of the Board Members, except for the Minister of Finance, represent any particular government or political opposition. The Constitution is unequivocal on this matter. Article 372 explicitly states: “The members of the Board of Directors shall exclusively represent the interests of the Nation.”

I have had the distinct honor of serving as member of the Board of Directors of Banco de la República for the past twelve years and, more recently, for over four years as Governor. I can state with absolute clarity and conviction that throughout these sixteen years, I have never witnessed any Board Member-or the Board as an institution-act with any motivation other than pursuing what is best for the country and its people. Our sole objective has always been to fulfill the constitutional mandate of preserving the purchasing power of the peso while ensuring that this goal aligns with the highest possible level of sustainable economic growth and employment.

In this endeavor, the Board has been fortunate to rely on what I consider to be the most highly qualified team of economists in the country. Every decision the Board makes is preceded by a comprehensive recommendation document prepared by this technical staff. While these recommendations are not necessarily adopted in full, they serve as a crucial point of reference, providing the strongest available evidence to guide Board Members in making informed decisions. Ultimately, each vote is cast with the highest level of diligence, in adherence to the constitutional mandate, and with an unwavering commitment to the nation’s best interests.

Over the past 25 years, throughout this century, the Board has implemented its mandate to preserve the currency’s purchasing power through an inflation-targeting strategy. This approach seeks to maintain inflation at approximately 3%, with a flexible exchange rate and a very short-term interest rate as the primary policy instrument.

When inflation exceeds the target, it becomes necessary to uphold a contractionary monetary policy to bring it back under control. However, the short-term economic cost of such a policy-reflected in reduced productive activity-can be more pronounced and prolonged under certain conditions. This occurs, for instance, when prices and wages are heavily indexed to past inflation. Similarly, factors that elevate country risk premiums-such as global uncertainty or political idiosyncrasies, such as rising public debt or fiscal deficits exceeding expectations-can further complicate monetary policy efforts.

Under these circumstances, the burden on monetary policy intensifies as it seeks to steer inflation back to its target while restoring the conditions necessary for more substantial and sustainable economic growth in the medium and long term.

Colombia’s recent adjustment process: a success story

The high policy interest rates maintained over the past three years reflect a deliberately restrictive monetary policy necessary in response to a significant inflationary shock-one that affected most economies worldwide between 2021 and 2023. Our policy response, characterized by elevated interest rates, entailed notable short-term costs regarding its impact on aggregate demand and productive activity. However, these costs were considerably lower than many had anticipated. Contrary to some forecasts, the economy did not enter a recession, and the observed slowdown in productive activity did not hinder the current unemployment rate from standing below pre-pandemic levels.

Concurrently, this restrictive monetary policy effectively contributed to a substantial reduction in inflation-more than eight percentage points-bringing it down from its peak of 13.4% to the current level of 5.3%. Additionally, the domestic demand imbalances that had manifested in a current account deficit exceeding 6% of GDP in 2022 were significantly corrected, reducing the deficit to just 1.8% of GDP by 2024. The technical staff now projects that this deficit will rise slightly to 2.4% of GDP in 2025, reflecting clear signs of recovery in domestic demand. Even so, the projected deficit remains well below its level three years ago, leaving the economy less reliant on external financing and less vulnerable to abrupt changes in domestic and international conditions-an especially important factor given our current uncertainties.

I believe that this macroeconomic adjustment process has been successful. It is particularly noteworthy that, within this context, we are witnessing an evident recovery in economic activity. Growth is expected to reach 2.8% in 2025, a rate that compares favorably with forecasts for many regional economies and more advanced economies, including the United States and several European nations.

According to data from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), domestic demand grew by 4.4% in real terms in the last quarter of 2024. Similar growth rates are expected in 2025, providing the foundation for the projected recovery in GDP. This improvement is also reflected in labor market indicators, including the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate recorded last February, which was the lowest for any month since April 2017.

Undoubtedly, the reduction in policy interest rates implemented by this Board between December 2023 and December 2024 played a key role in supporting the recovery of domestic demand, productive activity, and employment.

Why do interest rates remain relatively high?

At this point, it is essential to emphasize that our monetary policy interest rates remain at levels indicative of a contractionary monetary stance. Both nominal and real interest rates are currently higher than what the Bank’s technical staff considers neutral and desirable in the medium and long term-conditions in which inflationary pressures are absent and the economy grows close to its potential rate.

In this context, I would like to reiterate a point I have made publicly on multiple occasions: I consider that interest rates lower than those currently in place would be desirable. Moreover, I am convinced that there is consensus among all members of the Bank’s Board of Directors on this matter.

Why do we maintain interest rates that we deem contractionary and higher than what would be ideal in the medium and long term? The reason is that, despite our success in significantly reducing inflation from its peak in March 2023, the pace of disinflation in Colombia has been slower than in many other countries in the region and around the world, where inflation has already returned to the target ranges set by their central banks. This slower adjustment is primarily due to the high degree of price and wage indexation in Colombia and other idiosyncratic and circumstantial factors that have complicated the disinflation process.

Furthermore, the process of lowering interest rates-which we all wish to continue-had to be temporarily halted during the last two Board meetings in January and March. This decision was driven by a slowdown in the pace of inflation’s convergence toward the target, alongside factors that exerted upward pressure on inflation expectations and international interest rates relevant to Colombia’s external financing. Notably, the rise in long-term interest rates in global markets coincided with an increase in Colombia’s country risk spreads. The latter occurred in a context where fiscal deficit figures significantly exceeded forecasts, and public debt as a percentage of GDP was rising at a rate well above what is consistent with macroeconomic stability.

When comparing Colombia with other Latin American countries that, like us, follow a target inflation strategy, we observe that nations such as Perú, Uruguay, Paraguay/span>, and Costa Rica have made greater progress in reducing interest rates. This has been possible because inflation in these countries has already returned to the target ranges established by their respective central banks. In the case of Chile, inflation remains slightly above its target range due to specific factors related to public utility tariffs. However, inflation expectations suggest that by the end of 2025, Chile will be very close to its target of 3%-the same target set by Colombia.

The experiences of the region’s two largest economies, México and Brazil, are particularly relevant to our analysis. In México, inflation currently stands at 3.7%, within the target range of 3% ± 1 percentage point. This allowed the Mexican Central Bank to lower its monetary policy interest rate last week from 9.5% to 9%. It is worth noting, however, that even after this reduction, the real ex-post policy rate (the difference between the nominal rate and observed inflation) remains at 5.3% (9% – 3.7%), significantly higher than Colombia’s current level of 4.2% (9.5% – 5.3%).

The case of Brazil is particularly striking and serves as an important reference for the risks Colombia faces. Inflation in Brazil is currently at 5.1%, slightly lower than in Colombia. The Brazilian Central Bank had been making steady progress in lowering its monetary policy interest rate, reducing it from 13.75% in August 2023 (slightly above Colombia’s at the time) to 10.5% by mid-2024. However, concerns over the country’s fiscal situation in the latter half of 2024 led to a sharp depreciation of the real and rising inflation expectations. In response, the Central Bank was forced to rapidly reverse course, raising the policy rate from 10.5% to its current level of 14.25%. In real ex-post terms, this rate is nearly five percentage points higher than Colombia’s. Additionally, the Brazilian Central Bank has signaled to markets that further rate hikes may be necessary in the coming months. Fortunately, Colombia has not faced such a scenario recently, and clearly, avoiding such a situation remains a priority.

In Colombia, inflation remains above the 3% target set by the Central Bank. The technical staff’s central forecast for year-end 2025 places inflation above the tolerance range of ±1 percentage point around the target, as announced by the Board last November. If this projection materializes, 2025 would mark the fifth consecutive year in which the inflation target is not met. This would pose a challenge to the credibility of the inflation-targeting framework, which relies on the firm anchoring of inflation expectations as a key element of its effectiveness. Unfortunately, recent analysts’ surveys suggest that inflation expectations among many economic agents have risen in recent months and remain above the target level.

The combination of deteriorating inflation expectations, fiscal risks in Colombia, and uncertainty surrounding the global economy-exacerbated by the trade tensions triggered by the United States-led the majority of the Board to decide last Monday to maintain the pause in the process of reducing the policy interest rate. As stated in the press release following that meeting: “The decision to maintain the interest rate unchanged reflects a cautious approach to monetary policy, anticipating new information in the coming months that will provide further evidence on the feasibility of additional rate cuts. This decision reaffirms the Board’s commitment to achieving convergence with the inflation target in the context of recovering economic growth.” I believe this statement clearly conveys our expectations moving forward.

The role of Banco de la República in administering the pension system’s Contributory Pillar Savings Fund

Before concluding, I would like to address the role that Banco de la República will play in administering the pension systems’ Contributory Pillar Savings Fund (FAPC), as established by the reform approved last year by Congress.

As you know, Law 2381 of 2024 stipulates that, within the contributory pillar, pension contributions from all workers will include an average premium component administered by Colpensiones, covering contributions on incomes between 1 and 2.3 times the legal monthly minimum wage. Since a portion of these contributions currently goes to the individual savings component, this change will significantly increase the resources received by Colpensiones once the reform takes effect. However, in the long term, this situation will reverse, as Colpensiones’ pension obligations will eventually surpass the resources it collects.

To address this, the law mandates that the temporary surplus of funds received by Colpensiones-expected to last for two or three decades-be allocated to the Contributory Pillar Savings Fund (FAPC). Congress also determined that Banco de la República would be responsible for administering this Fund. The resources administered through the FAPC will be channeled into capital markets via professional asset managers, generating returns that will help the government meet future pension obligations.

Currently, even before the reform is enacted, Colpensiones operates with a significant deficit, requiring substantial transfers from the national government. These transfers are included in the annual national budget and contribute to the fiscal deficit. The creation of the FAPC, administered by Banco de la República, has been structured to ensure that its funding is adjusted in a way that neither affects the national government’s current pension expenditures nor undermines aggregate savings in the economy.

It is essential to underscore that the temporary surplus of resources allocated to the FAPC will be insufficient to meet future pension obligations. According to the projections outlined in the bill, the Fund is expected to be fully depleted by 2070, at which point the government will need to allocate additional resources to cover the resulting deficit. Ensuring the long-term sustainability of the pension system will likely require adjustments to key parameters, particularly in retirement ages and contribution rates. The necessity of these reforms remains unchanged and is in no way diminished by Banco de la República’s role as a financial resource manager.

A little over a month and a half ago, on February 13, I addressed this very auditorium during the Treasury Congress of the Banking Association, stressing the urgency of issuing the government decree regulating the FAPC’s operation. I noted that without the prompt issuance of this decree, it would be impossible to establish the fundamental elements necessary to begin administering the Fund on time, as mandated by law for July 1.

Banco de la República’s team worked intensively and constructively with officials from the Ministry of Finance and the Financial Regulation Unit (URF) throughout the last months of 2024, expecting that by year-end, the decree would be in place, allowing us to begin developing the institutional and financial framework required for the Fund’s timely launch. Unfortunately, the process has been significantly delayed. In late February, a version of the decree was released for public consultation, which contained multiple provisions that had not been previously disclosed to the Bank, some of which were inconsistent with the law. Consequently, we submitted a detailed letter on March 7 highlighting our many concerns. Fortunately, several of these observations were taken into account by the Ministry of Finance and the URF, for which we are grateful. A revised draft was published for further comments last Friday, March 28. However, as of yesterday, we had to submit another letter reiterating key concerns that had not yet been addressed, raising the possibility that the decree’s issuance could be further delayed or that it may not fully resolve our outstanding issues. I mention these dates to convey the pressing urgency we currently face in securing the regulatory framework needed to fulfill our legal mandate, which takes effect in less than three months.

Only once the regulatory decree is issued can we move forward with drafting and signing the FAPC administration contract between the government and the Bank. This will allow us to initiate the selection and hiring of the first administering entities responsible for overseeing the resources, which are expected to accumulate at a rate of approximately 1.4 trillion pesos per month starting July 1. Among many other matters, the contract must explicitly establish that Banco de la República will administer the FAPC’s resources in its capacity as the government’s fiscal agent, as it does with other funds. It will provide the necessary technical and operational infrastructure while ensuring a strict separation between the Fund’s resources and the Bank’s own, both in budgetary and accounting terms. Furthermore, the administration of these resources will adhere to principles of prudence and diligence, as is standard in fiduciary mandates, with responsibility over the means rather than specific financial outcomes.

The law establishes a Steering Committee as the highest authority of the FAPC, composed of three government representatives and four independent experts appointed by the Board of Directors of Banco de la República. However, the selection process for these four experts can only begin once the corresponding regulatory decree is in place. The draft decree published for public observations last Friday incorporated the Bank’s proposal for a transition period, during which the Bank could operate under provisional rules, investing resources in moderate-risk portfolios similar to those currently administered by the AFPs. Nonetheless, the challenge of establishing these delegated portfolios within such a short timeframe remains considerable.

Several regulatory elements still require definition. In particular, I want to highlight three pressing issues.
1. First, a provision included in the latest draft of the decree must be revised, as it allows for the use of savings accumulated in the FAPC to make payments under the contributory and semi-contributory pension frameworks. This pertains to the decumulation of the Fund, which should be explicitly regulated in a separate decree concerning generational sub-accounts-an essential regulation that is still pending. The law stipulates that this decree must undergo review and include a binding opinion from the Fund’s Steering Committee, which has not yet been established. Consequently, incorporating mechanisms for decumulating the Fund’s resources in the decree currently under discussion would not only be premature but also contrary to the law.
2. For Banco de la República, as administrator of the FAPC, it is essential to clarify which Government entity will be responsible for the Fund’s accounting and which will oversee the corresponding auditing functions. After the bill was approved in the Senate and debated in the House of Representatives, the Bank highlighted the need for such clarity. While many House and government representatives showed willingness to make the necessary adjustments, procedural constraints in the legislative process prevented them. Given these circumstances, the government must define these key accounting and resource oversight aspects through a regulatory decree.
3. Regarding hiring delegated administrators during the transition period, it is imperative that government regulations establish clear limits on their remuneration in strict accordance with the law. Specifically, compensation should be structured as a fee based on the balance administered rather than as a percentage of the base income for contributions, as proposed in the version published last Friday. The latter approach is inapplicable for resources that do not correspond to individual contributions. Additionally, certain sections of the draft decree contain inconsistencies regarding the nature of the FAPC, treating it as if it were a savings fund for individual contributions-an interpretation that does not align with its legal framework.
Banco de la República remains fully committed to collaborating with all relevant stakeholders to ensure a coordinated and efficient implementation of the new pension system and the successful launch of the Contributory Pillar Savings Fund. However, I must reiterate the urgency of establishing adequate regulations, without which we simply will not be able to fulfill the mandate assigned to us by law.

Thank you very much.
MIL OSI Economics –
May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: ASEAN and Canada reaffirm commitment to strengthen Strategic Partnership

Source: ASEAN

The 13th Meeting of ASEAN-Canada Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC), convened today at ASEAN Headquarters/ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, discussed the progress of ASEAN-Canada Relations, including the status of implementation of Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-Canada Enhanced Partnership (2021-2025), as well as possible areas of future cooperation between ASEAN and Canada to further advance ASEAN-Canada Strategic Partnership.

The Meeting was co-chaired by Permanent Representative of Lao PDR to ASEAN, H.E. Sitsangkhom Sisaketh, and Ambassador of Canada to ASEAN, H.E. Vicky Singmin, and attended by Permanent Representatives of ASEAN Member States and representative of the ASEAN Secretariat. Ambassador of Timor-Leste to ASEAN attended as Observer.

MIL OSI Economics –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Sanjay Malhotra: India – a partner in progress and prosperity

Source: Bank for International Settlements

I am very happy to be here amongst you in this historic location. I thank CII and USISPF for giving me this opportunity to be present here and share my thoughts. Both CII and USISPF have played important roles in fostering partnerships in trade, technology, investment and innovation between India and USA. I compliment them for their efforts in strengthening the bond between two important economies. In my remarks today, I wish to present my perspective on how India is poised to be a dynamic powerhouse of opportunities, innovation, and sustainable growth in the years to come.

The Indian economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience and dynamism. Over the past four years (2021-22 to 2024-25), it has recorded an average annual growth rate of 8.2 per cent. It was and continues to be the fastest-growing major economy in the world. This is a significant step up from the average growth rate of 6.6 per cent in the preceding decade (2010 to 2019).

Even this year, our growth is expected to remain robust at 6.5 per cent. This is despite the tremendous increase in uncertainty and volatility in global financial markets. While this rate is lower than in recent years and falls short of India’s aspirations, it remains broadly in line with past trends and the highest among major economies.

No wonder, over the last ten years, we have leapfrogged from the tenth largest economy to the fifth. In terms of purchasing power parity, we are already third. Even nominally, we are poised to become the third largest economy shortly. We aspire to become Viksit Bharat, i.e., a developed economy by 2047, when we complete 100 years of our independence. While there is indeed a scope for India’s growth trajectory to rise over the medium to long-term, I am sanguine of our continued success. There are a lot of positive factors that give me this confidence. Let me outline a few of these.

Policy continuity and stability

First and foremost, we are all aware of the research that shows that political and policy stability with certainty are prerequisites for long-term planning of investments to fuel growth in any economy. Our vibrant democracy has been able to ensure the same, especially since the initiation of economic reforms, despite change of political parties in government. Economic liberalisation focusing on market oriented policies has been a consistent theme across successive governments. While the pace and specific focus of reforms may have varied from time to time, the commitment to a more market-oriented economic structure has not changed. In a phased manner, almost all sectors have been opened up to 100% foreign direct investment (FDI). Almost 90% of the FDI is now under the automatic route. In the recent years, we have introduced a series of liberalisation measures to further open up the economy, particularly in key sectors such as Defence, Insurance, Petroleum & Natural Gas, Telecom, and Space.

MIL OSI Economics –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Darryl Chan: Global outlook – unlocking market potential through financial connectivity
Source: Bank for International Settlements

Mr Peng Yang (CEO, Ant International), distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

Good morning. To those of you who have travelled from far and wide, a very warm welcome to Hong Kong!

It gives me great pleasure to join you today for MO·MENTS 2025 organised by Ant International. This is a great gathering of forward-looking, innovative people who bring and share remarkable expertise, experience and ideas to shape the future of payments. Indeed, payments is shaping the future of finance by unlocking the many possibilities and immense potential.

The theme of this event is global connectivity.  In my discussion today, I will share with you the exciting journey Hong Kong is going through to promote connectivity in the payments space, both locally and globally.  Our objective is to achieve cheaper, faster, more transparent, and more accessible payment services.  Before going global, we started with local. There were two starting points: stored value facilities (or SVF in short) and faster payment system, or FPS.

In 2015, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) introduced a regime to regulate SVF operators who take the form of e-wallets or prepaid cards.  Today we have a robust SVF ecosystem of 15 operators. These operators serve a wide range of institutional and retail customers from mass market to more niched segments. In less than a decade, the number of SVF accounts have doubled, from around 40 million in end 2016 to 80 million in end 2024; and the total number of transactions has grown by almost 60%, from around 15 million per day in Q4 2016 to 24 million in Q4 2024.

The FPS is another success story.  Launched in 2018, it is a platform that supports full connectivity among banks and SVFs.  It provides real-time, 24×7 interbank transfers with just a few clicks on mobile devices.  Since its launch, FPS has experienced phenomenal growth.  It now has 16.4 million registrations in total, on the back of a local population of 7.5 million.

The SVF and FPS, working individually or in combination, provide a powerful tool that facilitates cheaper, faster payments and enhances user experience.  They promote not just financial inclusion but also the growth of e-commerce.

The use of SVF and FPS goes beyond Hong Kong.  For example, Hong Kong e-wallets can now be used at over 30 million merchants in Mainland China. Between 2021 and 2024, the number of cross-border transactions in the Mainland has grown by almost 50 times.

In the case of FPS, in 2023 the HKMA joined hands with the Bank of Thailand to link up FPS and Thailand’s PromptPay, enabling cross-border QR payments between the two jurisdictions.  Meanwhile, we are working closely with the People’s Bank of China to connect FPS with the Mainland’s Internet Banking Payment System.  Our plan is to formally roll out the link by the middle of this year.  Looking ahead, we are also exploring the possibility of further expanding the linkage of FPS with other fast payment systems in the region.

There is enough to keep us busy just by enhancing the interoperability and connectivity of the existing payment systems and networks. Yet we are keenly aware of the need to keep taps on developments that bring new dimensions to the form and functioning of money. Here I am referring to the emergence of central bank digital currency or CBDC, tokenised bank deposits, and stablecoins.

In terms of CBDC, our flagship project mBridge achieved the minimum viable product stage in 2024. It is a seamless cross-border wholesale CBDC platform co-founded by the HKMA and several other central banks. Supported by a comprehensive legal framework and a fit-for-purpose governance structure, the platform seeks to address the typical pain points in cross-border payments by enhancing efficiency and reducing costs through central bank digital money. Going forward, the project will continue to expand the participation of public and private institutions with a view to achieving greater network effect.

We also leverage on our CBDC research to support the development of the tokenisation market. Last year, the HKMA initiated Project Ensemble and established an Architecture Community to develop common industry standards that support interoperability between CBDC, tokenised money and tokenised assets. In August, we launched the Ensemble Sandbox, working with our securities regulator and the private sector to explore and experiment with tokenisation of financial assets and real-world assets. Currently, the use cases cover liquidity management, supply chain finance, green finance, and investment funds. We are pleased that Ant Group is an active participant of the Sandbox. Project Ensemble also goes beyond Hong Kong. We are partnering with other central banks including Thailand, Brazil and France to explore cross-border tokenisation use cases.

On stablecoin, we are in the final stage of passing the law that empowers the HKMA to license and supervise stablecoin issuers in Hong Kong. Together with other regulatory efforts governing the exchange, trading and custody of crypto assets, the stablecoin licensing regime is an important element to nurture a responsible and sustainable crypto ecosystem in Hong Kong.

Running in parallel to the legislative process, a stablecoin sandbox was set up last year to provide a controlled environment for potential issuers to test the various features and controls of their proposed schemes, as well as their use cases that cover supply chain, capital market activities, cross-border payments, and Web3.0 applications. The sandbox also enables the HKMA team to gain insights that inform the formulation of specific regulatory requirements and ensure they are fit-for-purpose.

Ladies and gentlemen, the payments industry has seen exponential growth in recent years and we should expect the momentum to sustain-if we do the right things. On this, I don’t think people in this room need to be convinced. Let me share some thoughts on how to capture those opportunities.

First is to make good use of technology. Technology is the key driver in this growth story and it keeps pushing the possibility frontier. Just imagine the potential of combining the ever growing computing power, artificial intelligence (A.I.), machine learning and big data.

What technology can deliver is amazing:
- in terms of making payment so much easier through one-click payment or voice-automated payments;
- in terms of capturing new customer demands such as buy-now-pay later or subscription payments; and
- in terms of tailoring payment service to the needs of individual customers.
What we need is to stretch our imagination and be innovative.

In the process, one thing we always need to bear in mind is the fundamental value proposition of payment services-how payments can be made easier, faster, cheaper, and equally important, more accessible. It is therefore heartening that we have a session today dedicated to inclusive growth.

Technology is a double-edged sword. One increasingly troubling aspect related to banking and payments is the prevalence of fraud and scams. In Hong Kong, more than 44,000 deception cases were reported last year, an increase of close to 12% year-on-year. In a way we are victim of our own success by making payments much faster and more convenient. This has now become one of the top challenges facing financial regulators across jurisdictions. If unchecked, it will seriously undermine public confidence in the safety of the banking and payments sector, not to mention the issue of how to apportion the loss.

The HKMA and the banking and payments industries have therefore been in close collaboration with law enforcement agencies to raise public awareness, share intelligence and good practices, and use Scameter data to alert potentially at-risk customers. This is a never ending battle, and technology can help address the risk. We look forward to payments operators leveraging A.I. and machine learning in fraud detection and prevention of money laundering. We at the HKMA stand ready to work with the industry in testing and deploying such technology.

My second point is about collaboration. Deglobalisation, reglobalisation, fragmentation-it may take on different names or different forms, but one thing is for sure, the global economy is entering uncharted waters, in search of the more stable state when the dust gets a little settled.

For an industry like payments that thrives on interoperability and connectivity, this is not good news. But the reshaping of the global economic order and the realignment of global supply chain can also mean new business opportunities for the payments sector:
- think about the possible shifts, within a relatively short timeframe, in trade patterns and trade flows;
- think about new relationships to be established between buyers and suppliers; and
- think about the new payment corridors across countries and regions that may involve more local currencies.
These changes call for more timely, in-depth collaboration between different players in the payments space to better support customers. And as long as payments remains a regulated space, we also need cross-border collaboration in the official sector, either through system linkage or policy coordination, to make this happen.

If I may quickly turn to my third point, which is the significance of operational resilience. With increased connectivity and collaboration, system outage or cyber incidents will have much pronounced consequences. It is crucial therefore, that operational resilience is a core objective and KPI. And always have a contingency plan ready should anything untoward happen.

Ladies and gentlemen, as we look to the future, we need to be resilient, be agile, embrace technology, and, most importantly, remain customer-centric. This should be the winning formula to unlock market potentials and promote a more efficient and inclusive financial ecosystem.

With that, I wish the event a great success. Thank you very much.
MIL OSI Economics –
May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Sweden procures new tactical transport aircraft

Source: Government of Sweden

Sweden is investing billions in the procurement of four new tactical transport aircraft. Together with the Netherlands and Austria, Sweden is purchasing C-390 aircraft from Brazilian manufacturer Embraer. As Sweden is joining an existing contract, delivery times will be shortened.

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI: BW Energy: 2025 Annual General Meeting – Notice
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

2025 Annual General Meeting – Notice

Notice is hereby given that the 2025 Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the Members of BW Energy Limited will be held at 18 Rebecca Road, Southampton, SN04, Bermuda, on 26 May 2025 at 09:30 a.m. (Bermuda time).

Please see the attached documents in relation to the Annual General Meeting:
1. Notice of the 2025 AGM
1. Form of Proxy
1. Chairman’s Letter
1. Recommendation from the Nomination Committee
For further information, please contact:

Brice Morlot, CFO BW Energy

+33.7.81.11.41.16

ir@bwenergy.com

About BW Energy: 

BW Energy is a growth E&P company with a differentiated strategy targeting proven offshore oil and gas reservoirs through low risk phased developments. The Company has access to existing production facilities to reduce time to first oil and cashflow with lower investments than traditional offshore developments. The Company’s assets are 73.5% of the producing Dussafu Marine licence offshore Gabon, 100% interest in the Golfinho and Camarupim fields, a 76.5% interest in the BM-ES-23 block, a 95% interest in the Maromba field in Brazil, a 95% interest in the Kudu field in Namibia, all operated by BW Energy. In addition, BW Energy holds approximately 6.6% of the common shares in Reconnaissance Energy Africa Ltd. and a 20% non-operating interest in the onshore Petroleum Exploration License 73 (“PEL 73”) in Namibia. Total net 2P+2C reserves and resources were 599 million barrels of oil equivalent at the start of 2025.  

This information is published in accordance with the disclosure requirements in Regulation EU 596/2014 (MAR) article 19, section 5-12 of the Norwegian Securities Trading Act, and the Oslo Rule Book II, as well as in accordance with Section 4-2 of the Norwegian Securities Trading Act.

Attachments

The MIL Network –
May 2, 2025

MIL-OSI: Shell Plc 1st Quarter 2025 Unaudited Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS



SUMMARY OF UNAUDITED RESULTS
Quarters				$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹		Reference
4,780	928	7,358	+415	Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders
5,577	3,661	7,734	+52	Adjusted Earnings	A
15,250	14,281	18,711	+7	Adjusted EBITDA	A
9,281	13,162	13,330	-29	Cash flow from operating activities
(3,959)	(4,431)	(3,528)		Cash flow from investing activities
5,322	8,731	9,802		Free cash flow	G
4,175	6,924	4,493		Cash capital expenditure	C
8,575	9,401	8,997	-9	Operating expenses	F
8,453	9,138	9,054	-7	Underlying operating expenses	F
10.4%	11.3%	12.0%		ROACE	D
76,511	77,078	79,931		Total debt	E
41,521	38,809	40,513		Net debt	E
18.7%	17.7%	17.7%		Gearing	E
2,838	2,815	2,911	+1	Oil and gas production available for sale (thousand boe/d)
0.79	0.15	1.14	+427	Basic earnings per share ($)
0.92	0.60	1.20	+53	Adjusted Earnings per share ($)	B
0.3580	0.3580	0.3440	—	Dividend per share ($)

1.Q1 on Q4 change

Quarter Analysis1

Income attributable to Shell plc shareholders, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected lower exploration well write-offs, lower operating expenses and higher Products margins.

First quarter 2025 income attributable to Shell plc shareholders also included a charge of $0.5 billion related to the UK Energy Profits Levy and impairment charges. These items are included in identified items amounting to a net loss of $0.8 billion in the quarter. This compares with identified items in the fourth quarter 2024 which amounted to a net loss of $2.8 billion.

Adjusted Earnings and Adjusted EBITDA2 were driven by the same factors as income attributable to Shell plc shareholders and adjusted for the above identified items.

Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was $9.3 billion and primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, partly offset by tax payments of $2.9 billion and working capital outflows of $2.7 billion. The working capital outflows mainly reflected accounts receivable and payable movements.

Cash flow from investing activities for the first quarter 2025 was an outflow of $4.0 billion, and included cash capital expenditure of $4.2 billion, and net other investing cash outflows of $0.9 billion which included the drawdowns on loan facilities provided at completion of the sale of The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC) in Nigeria, partly offset by divestment proceeds of $0.6 billion.

Net debt and Gearing: At the end of the first quarter 2025, net debt was $41.5 billion, compared with $38.8 billion at the end of the fourth quarter 2024. This reflects free cash flow of $5.3 billion, which included working capital outflows of $2.7 billion, more than offset by share buybacks of $3.3 billion, cash dividends paid to Shell plc shareholders of $2.2 billion, lease additions of $1.3 billion including those related to the Pavilion Energy Pte. Ltd. acquisition and interest payments of $0.8 billion. Gearing was 18.7% at the end of the first quarter 2025, compared with 17.7% at the end of the fourth quarter 2024, mainly driven by higher net debt.

SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

Shareholder distributions

Total shareholder distributions in the quarter amounted to $5.5 billion comprising repurchases of shares of $3.3 billion and cash dividends paid to Shell plc shareholders of $2.2 billion. Dividends declared to Shell plc shareholders for the first quarter 2025 amount to $0.3580 per share. Shell has now completed $3.5 billion of share buybacks announced in the fourth quarter 2024 results announcement. Today, Shell announces a share buyback programme of $3.5 billion which is expected to be completed by the second quarter 2025 results announcement.

This Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, together with supplementary financial and operational disclosure for this quarter, is available at www.shell.com/investors 3.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and depreciation, depletion and amortisation (DD&A) expenses.

3.Not incorporated by reference.

PORTFOLIO DEVELOPMENTS

Integrated Gas

In March 2025, we completed the previously announced acquisition of 100% of the shares in Pavilion Energy Pte. Ltd. (Pavilion Energy). Pavilion Energy, headquartered in Singapore, operates a global LNG trading business with contracted supply volume of approximately 6.5 million tonnes per annum (mtpa).

Upstream

In January 2025, we announced the start of production at the Shell-operated Whale floating production facility in the Gulf of America. The Whale development is owned by Shell (60%, operator) and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (40%).

In February 2025, we announced production restart at the Penguins field in the UK North Sea with a modern floating, production, storage and offloading (FPSO) facility (Shell 50%, operator; NEO Energy 50%). The previous export route for this field was via the Brent Charlie platform, which ceased production in 2021 and is being decommissioned.

In February 2025, we signed an agreement to acquire a 15.96% working interest from ConocoPhillips Company in the Shell-operated Ursa platform in the Gulf of America. The transaction completed on May 1, 2025 which increases Shell’s working interest in the Ursa platform from 45.3884% to 61.3484%.

In March 2025, we completed the sale of SPDC to Renaissance, as announced in January 2024.

In March 2025, we announced the Final Investment Decision (FID) for Gato do Mato, a deep-water project in the pre-salt area of the Santos Basin, offshore Brazil. The Gato do Mato Consortium includes Shell (operator, 50%), Ecopetrol (30%), TotalEnergies (20%) and Pré-Sal Petróleo S.A. (PPSA) acting as the manager of the production sharing contract (PSC).

Chemicals and Products

In January 2025, CNOOC and Shell Petrochemicals Company Limited (CSPC), a 50:50 joint venture between Shell and CNOOC Petrochemicals Investment Ltd, took an FID to expand its petrochemical complex in Daya Bay, Huizhou, south China.

In April 2025, we completed the previously announced sale of our Energy and Chemicals Park in Singapore to CAPGC Pte. Ltd. (CAPGC), a joint venture between Chandra Asri Capital Pte. Ltd. and Glencore Asian Holdings Pte. Ltd.

In April 2025, we agreed to sell our 16.125% interest in Colonial Enterprises, Inc. (“Colonial”) to Colossus AcquireCo LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P. and its institutional partners (collectively, “Brookfield”), for $1.45 billion. The transaction is subject to regulatory approvals and is expected to close in the fourth quarter of 2025.

Renewables and Energy Solutions

In January 2025, we completed the previously announced acquisition of a 100% equity stake in RISEC Holdings, LLC, which owns a 609-megawatt (MW) two-unit combined-cycle gas turbine power plant in Rhode Island, USA.

Page 2

SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

PERFORMANCE BY SEGMENT



INTEGRATED GAS
Quarters				$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹		Reference
2,789	1,744	2,761	+60	Income/(loss) for the period
306	(421)	(919)		Of which: Identified items	A
2,483	2,165	3,680	+15	Adjusted Earnings	A
4,735	4,568	6,136	+4	Adjusted EBITDA	A
3,463	4,391	4,712	-21	Cash flow from operating activities	A
1,116	1,337	1,041		Cash capital expenditure	C
126	116	137	+9	Liquids production available for sale (thousand b/d)
4,644	4,574	4,954	+2	Natural gas production available for sale (million scf/d)
927	905	992	+2	Total production available for sale (thousand boe/d)
6.60	7.06	7.58	-6	LNG liquefaction volumes (million tonnes)
16.49	15.50	16.87	+6	LNG sales volumes (million tonnes)

1.Q1 on Q4 change

Integrated Gas includes liquefied natural gas (LNG), conversion of natural gas into gas-to-liquids (GTL) fuels and other products. It includes natural gas and liquids exploration and extraction, and the operation of the upstream and midstream infrastructure necessary to deliver these to market. Integrated Gas also includes the marketing, trading and optimisation of LNG.

Quarter Analysis1

Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected lower exploration well write-offs ($277 million), partly offset by lower LNG liquefaction volumes (decrease of $68 million). The net effect of contributions from trading and optimisation and realised prices was in line with the fourth quarter 2024 despite higher unfavourable (non-cash) impact of expiring hedging contracts.

Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included favourable movements of $362 million due to the fair value accounting of commodity derivatives, that as part of Shell’s normal business are entered into as hedges for mitigation of economic exposures on future purchases, sales and inventory. These favourable movements compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included impairment charges of $339 million and a loss of $96 million related to sale of assets, partly offset by favourable movements of $109 million due to the fair value accounting of commodity derivatives.

Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

Cash flow from operating activities for the quarter was primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, and net cash inflows related to derivatives of $542 million, partly offset by tax payments of $773 million and working capital outflows of $687 million.

Total oil and gas production, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, increased by 2% mainly due to lower planned maintenance in Pearl GTL (Qatar), partly offset by unplanned maintenance and weather constraints in Australia. LNG liquefaction volumes decreased by 6% mainly due to unplanned maintenance and weather constraints in Australia.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

Page 3

SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS



UPSTREAM
Quarters				$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹		Reference
2,080	1,031	2,272	+102	Income/(loss) for the period
(257)	(651)	339		Of which: Identified items	A
2,337	1,682	1,933	+39	Adjusted Earnings	A
7,387	7,676	7,888	-4	Adjusted EBITDA	A
3,945	4,509	5,727	-13	Cash flow from operating activities	A
1,923	2,076	2,010		Cash capital expenditure	C
1,335	1,332	1,331	—	Liquids production available for sale (thousand b/d)
3,020	3,056	3,136	-1	Natural gas production available for sale (million scf/d)
1,855	1,859	1,872	—	Total production available for sale (thousand boe/d)

1.Q1 on Q4 change

The Upstream segment includes exploration and extraction of crude oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids. It also markets and transports oil and gas, and operates the infrastructure necessary to deliver them to the market.

Quarter Analysis1

Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected lower exploration well write-offs ($346 million), lower depreciation, depletion and amortisation expenses (decrease of $330 million), lower operating expenses ($194 million) and comparative favourable tax movements ($179 million), partly offset by lower volumes (decrease of $359 million).

Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included a charge of $509 million related to the UK Energy Profits Levy, partly offset by gains of $159 million from disposal of assets and gains of $95 million related to the impact of the strengthening Brazilian real on a deferred tax position. These charges and favourable movements compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included a loss of $161 million related to the impact of the weakening Brazilian real on a deferred tax position, and impairment charges of $152 million.

Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, partly offset by tax payments of $1,999 million and working capital outflows of $913 million.

Total production, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, decreased mainly due to the SPDC divestment, largely offset by new oil production.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

Page 4

SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS



MARKETING
Quarters				$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹		Reference
814	103	896	+688	Income/(loss) for the period
(49)	(736)	(7)		Of which: Identified items	A
900	839	781	+7	Adjusted Earnings	A
1,869	1,709	1,686	+9	Adjusted EBITDA	A
1,907	1,363	1,319	+40	Cash flow from operating activities	A
256	811	465		Cash capital expenditure	C
2,674	2,795	2,763	-4	Marketing sales volumes (thousand b/d)

1.Q1 on Q4 change

The Marketing segment comprises the Mobility, Lubricants, and Sectors and Decarbonisation businesses. The Mobility business operates Shell’s retail network including electric vehicle charging services and the Wholesale commercial fuels business which provides fuels for transport, industry and heating. The Lubricants business produces, markets and sells lubricants for road transport, and machinery used in manufacturing, mining, power generation, agriculture and construction. The Sectors and Decarbonisation business sells fuels, speciality products and services including low-carbon energy solutions to a broad range of commercial customers including the aviation, marine, and agricultural sectors.

Quarter Analysis1

Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected lower operating expenses (decrease of $69 million), and higher Marketing margins (increase of $54 million) mainly due to higher Lubricants unit margins and seasonal impact of higher volumes partly offset by lower Mobility margins due to seasonal impact of lower volumes and lower Sectors and Decarbonisation margins. These net gains were partly offset by unfavourable tax movements ($109 million).

Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included net losses of $61 million related to sale of assets. These losses compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included impairment charges of $458 million, and net losses of $247 million related to sale of assets.

Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, inflows relating to the timing impact of payments related to emission certificates and biofuel programmes of $540 million, and dividends (net of profits) from joint ventures and associates of $203 million. These inflows were partly offset by working capital outflows of $344 million and tax payments of $174 million.

Marketing sales volumes (comprising hydrocarbon sales), compared with the fourth quarter 2024, decreased mainly due to seasonality.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

Page 5

SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS



CHEMICALS AND PRODUCTS
Quarters				$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹		Reference
(77)	(276)	1,311	+72	Income/(loss) for the period
(581)	(99)	(458)		Of which: Identified items	A
449	(229)	1,615	+296	Adjusted Earnings	A
1,410	475	2,826	+197	Adjusted EBITDA	A
130	2,032	(349)	-94	Cash flow from operating activities	A
458	1,392	500		Cash capital expenditure	C
1,362	1,215	1,430	+12	Refinery processing intake (thousand b/d)
2,813	2,926	2,883	-4	Chemicals sales volumes (thousand tonnes)

1.Q1 on Q4 change

The Chemicals and Products segment includes chemicals manufacturing plants with their own marketing network, and refineries which turn crude oil and other feedstocks into a range of oil products which are moved and marketed around the world for domestic, industrial and transport use. The segment also includes the pipeline business, trading and optimisation of crude oil, oil products and petrochemicals, and Oil Sands activities (the extraction of bitumen from mined oil sands and its conversion into synthetic crude oil).

Quarter Analysis1

Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected higher Products margins (increase of $546 million) mainly driven by higher margins from trading and optimisation and higher refining margins. Adjusted Earnings also reflected higher Chemicals margins (increase of $115 million). In addition, the first quarter 2025 reflected lower operating expenses (decrease of $134 million). These net gains were partly offset by comparative unfavourable tax movements ($96 million).

In the first quarter 2025, Chemicals had negative Adjusted Earnings of $137 million and Products had positive Adjusted Earnings of $586 million.

Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included impairment charges of $277 million, and unfavourable movements of $202 million due to the fair value accounting of commodity derivatives, that as part of Shell’s normal business are entered into as hedges for mitigation of economic exposures on future purchases, sales and inventory. These charges and unfavourable movements compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included impairment charges of $224 million, partly offset by favourable deferred tax movements of $114 million..

Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, and inflows relating to the timing impact of payments relating to emission certificates and biofuel programmes of $125 million. These inflows were partly offset by working capital outflows of $1,081 million, and net cash outflows relating to commodity derivatives of $508 million.

Chemicals manufacturing plant utilisation was 81% compared with 75% in the fourth quarter 2024, mainly due to lower planned and unplanned maintenance.

Refinery utilisation was 85% compared with 76% in the fourth quarter 2024, mainly due to lower planned maintenance.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

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RENEWABLES AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS
Quarters				$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹		Reference
(247)	(1,226)	553	+80	Income/(loss) for the period
(205)	(914)	390		Of which: Identified items	A
(42)	(311)	163	+87	Adjusted Earnings	A
111	(123)	267	+190	Adjusted EBITDA	A
367	850	2,466	-57	Cash flow from operating activities	A
403	1,277	438		Cash capital expenditure	C
76	76	77	+1	External power sales (terawatt hours)2
184	165	190	+12	Sales of pipeline gas to end-use customers (terawatt hours)3

1.Q1 on Q4 change

2.Physical power sales to third parties; excluding financial trades and physical trade with brokers, investors, financial institutions, trading platforms, and wholesale traders.

3.Physical natural gas sales to third parties; excluding financial trades and physical trade with brokers, investors, financial institutions, trading platforms, and wholesale traders. Excluding sales of natural gas by other segments and LNG sales.

Renewables and Energy Solutions includes activities such as renewable power generation, the marketing and trading and optimisation of power and pipeline gas, as well as carbon credits, and digitally enabled customer solutions. It also includes the production and marketing of hydrogen, development of commercial carbon capture and storage hubs, investment in nature-based projects that avoid or reduce carbon emissions, and Shell Ventures, which invests in companies that work to accelerate the energy and mobility transformation.

Quarter Analysis1

Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected higher margins (increase of $99 million) mainly due to higher trading and optimisation in the Americas as a result of higher seasonal demand and volatility, lower operating expenses (decrease of $90 million) and comparative favourable tax movements ($89 million). Most Renewables and Energy Solutions activities were loss-making in the first quarter 2025, which was partly offset by positive Adjusted Earnings from trading and optimisation.

Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included a charge of $143 million related to the disposal of assets. These charges compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included impairment charges of $996 million mainly relating to renewable generation assets in North America, partly offset by favourable movements of $50 million due to the fair value accounting of commodity derivatives, that as part of Shell’s normal business are entered into as hedges for mitigation of economic exposures on future purchases, sales and inventory.

Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was primarily driven by net cash inflows relating to working capital of $380 million and Adjusted EBITDA, partially offset by outflows related to derivatives of $169 million.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

Additional Growth Measures


Quarters
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹
				Renewable power generation capacity (gigawatt):
3.5	3.4	3.2	+4	– In operation2
4.0	4.0	3.5	-1	– Under construction and/or committed for sale3

1.Q1 on Q4 change

2.Shell’s equity share of renewable generation capacity post commercial operation date. It excludes Shell’s equity share of associates where information cannot be obtained.

3.Shell’s equity share of renewable generation capacity under construction and/or committed for sale under long-term offtake agreements (PPA). It excludes Shell’s equity share of associates where information cannot be obtained.

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CORPORATE
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024		Reference
(483)	(335)	(354)	Income/(loss) for the period
(26)	45	14	Of which: Identified items	A
(457)	(380)	(368)	Adjusted Earnings	A
(261)	(24)	(92)	Adjusted EBITDA	A
(531)	16	(545)	Cash flow from operating activities	A

The Corporate segment covers the non-operating activities supporting Shell. It comprises Shell’s holdings and treasury organisation, headquarters and central functions, self-insurance activities and centrally managed longer-term innovation portfolio. All finance expense, income and related taxes are included in Corporate Adjusted Earnings rather than in the earnings of business segments.

Quarter Analysis1

Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected unfavourable currency exchange rate effects, partly offset by lower operating expenses.

Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

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OUTLOOK FOR THE SECOND QUARTER 2025

Full year 2024 cash capital expenditure was $21 billion. Our cash capital expenditure range for the full year 2025 is expected to be within $20 – $22 billion.

Integrated Gas production is expected to be approximately 890 – 950 thousand boe/d. LNG liquefaction volumes are expected to be approximately 6.3 – 6.9 million tonnes. Second quarter 2025 outlook reflects scheduled maintenance across the portfolio.

Upstream production is expected to be approximately 1,560 – 1,760 thousand boe/d. Production outlook reflects the SPDC divestment in March 2025 and the scheduled maintenance across the portfolio.

Marketing sales volumes are expected to be approximately 2,600 – 3,100 thousand b/d.

Refinery utilisation is expected to be approximately 87% – 95%. Chemicals manufacturing plant utilisation is expected to be approximately 74% – 82%. Second quarter 2025 utilisation outlook reflects the sale of the Energy and Chemicals Park in Singapore which was completed in April 2025.

Corporate Adjusted Earnings1 were a net expense of $457 million for the first quarter 2025. Corporate Adjusted Earnings are expected to be a net expense of approximately $400 – $600 million in the second quarter 2025.

1.For the definition of Adjusted Earnings and the most comparable GAAP measure see reference A.

FORTHCOMING EVENTS



Date			Event
May 20, 2025			Annual General Meeting
July 31, 2025			Second quarter 2025 results and dividends
October 30, 2025			Third quarter 2025 results and dividends

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UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED INTERIM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS



CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
69,234	66,281	72,478	Revenue1
615	(156)	1,318	Share of profit/(loss) of joint ventures and associates
302	683	907	Interest and other income/(expenses)2
70,152	66,807	74,703	Total revenue and other income/(expenses)
45,849	43,610	46,867	Purchases
5,549	5,839	5,810	Production and manufacturing expenses
2,840	3,231	2,975	Selling, distribution and administrative expenses
185	331	212	Research and development
210	861	750	Exploration
5,441	7,520	5,881	Depreciation, depletion and amortisation2
1,120	1,213	1,164	Interest expense
61,194	62,605	63,659	Total expenditure
8,959	4,205	11,044	Income/(loss) before taxation
4,083	3,164	3,604	Taxation charge/(credit)2
4,875	1,041	7,439	Income/(loss) for the period
95	113	82	Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest
4,780	928	7,358	Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders
0.79	0.15	1.14	Basic earnings per share ($)3
0.79	0.15	1.13	Diluted earnings per share ($)3

1.See Note 2 “Segment information”.

2.See Note 7 “Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements”.

3.See Note 3 “Earnings per share”.



CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
4,875	1,041	7,439	Income/(loss) for the period
			Other comprehensive income/(loss) net of tax:
			Items that may be reclassified to income in later periods:
1,711	(4,899)	(1,995)	– Currency translation differences1
6	(11)	(6)	– Debt instruments remeasurements
(25)	224	53	– Cash flow hedging gains/(losses)
(42)	(50)	(14)	– Deferred cost of hedging
74	(91)	(12)	– Share of other comprehensive income/(loss) of joint ventures and associates
1,723	(4,827)	(1,974)	Total
			Items that are not reclassified to income in later periods:
306	239	439	– Retirement benefits remeasurements
(16)	(50)	78	– Equity instruments remeasurements
(36)	46	10	– Share of other comprehensive income/(loss) of joint ventures and associates
254	235	528	Total
1,977	(4,592)	(1,445)	Other comprehensive income/(loss) for the period
6,852	(3,552)	5,994	Comprehensive income/(loss) for the period
105	50	56	Comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest
6,748	(3,602)	5,937	Comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders

1.See Note 7 “Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements”.

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CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
$ million
	March 31, 2025	December 31, 2024
Assets
Non-current assets
Goodwill	16,072	16,032
Other intangible assets1	11,365	9,480
Property, plant and equipment	183,712	185,219
Joint ventures and associates	24,236	23,445
Investments in securities	2,284	2,255
Deferred tax	6,989	6,857
Retirement benefits	10,266	10,003
Trade and other receivables	7,269	6,018
Derivative financial instruments²	400	374
	262,593	259,683
Current assets
Inventories	22,984	23,426
Trade and other receivables	48,247	45,860
Derivative financial instruments²	8,941	9,673
Cash and cash equivalents	35,601	39,110
	115,773	118,069
Assets classified as held for sale1	10,881	9,857
	126,654	127,926
Total assets	389,248	387,609
Liabilities
Non-current liabilities
Debt	65,120	65,448
Trade and other payables	5,487	3,290
Derivative financial instruments²	1,565	2,185
Deferred tax	13,257	13,505
Retirement benefits	6,756	6,752
Decommissioning and other provisions	20,313	21,227
	112,498	112,407
Current liabilities
Debt	11,391	11,630
Trade and other payables	60,870	60,693
Derivative financial instruments²	6,371	7,391
Income taxes payable	4,343	4,648
Decommissioning and other provisions	5,104	4,469
	88,079	88,831
Liabilities directly associated with assets classified as held for sale1	8,001	6,203
	96,080	95,034
Total liabilities	208,578	207,441
Equity attributable to Shell plc shareholders	178,813	178,307
Non-controlling interest	1,856	1,861
Total equity	180,670	180,168
Total liabilities and equity	389,248	387,609

1. See Note 7 “Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements”.

2. See Note 6 “Derivative financial instruments and debt excluding lease liabilities”.

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CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN EQUITY
	Equity attributable to Shell plc shareholders
$ million	Share capital1	Shares held in trust	Other reserves²	Retained earnings	Total	Non-controlling interest	Total equity
At January 1, 2025	510	(803)	19,766	158,834	178,307	1,861	180,168
Comprehensive income/(loss) for the period	—	—	1,967	4,780	6,748	105	6,852
Transfer from other comprehensive income	—	—	11	(11)	—	—	—
Dividends³	—	—	—	(2,179)	(2,179)	(86)	(2,265)
Repurchases of shares4	(8)	—	8	(3,513)	(3,513)	—	(3,513)
Share-based compensation	—	500	(663)	(405)	(567)	—	(567)
Other changes	—	—	—	23	22	(24)	(2)
At March 31, 2025	502	(304)	21,090	157,527	178,813	1,856	180,670
At January 1, 2024	544	(997)	21,145	165,915	186,607	1,755	188,362
Comprehensive income/(loss) for the period	—	—	(1,420)	7,358	5,937	56	5,994
Transfer from other comprehensive income	—	—	138	(138)	—	—	—
Dividends3	—	—	—	(2,210)	(2,210)	(68)	(2,278)
Repurchases of shares4	(7)	—	7	(3,502)	(3,502)	—	(3,502)
Share-based compensation	—	543	(426)	(392)	(275)	—	(275)
Other changes	—	—	—	8	8	(4)	4
At March 31, 2024	537	(455)	19,445	167,038	186,565	1,739	188,304

1. See Note 4 “Share capital”.

2. See Note 5 “Other reserves”.

3. The amount charged to retained earnings is based on prevailing exchange rates on payment date.

4. Includes shares committed to repurchase under an irrevocable contract and repurchases subject to settlement at the end of the quarter.

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CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
8,959	4,205	11,044	Income before taxation for the period
			Adjustment for:
636	665	576	– Interest expense (net)
5,441	7,520	5,881	– Depreciation, depletion and amortisation1
28	649	554	– Exploration well write-offs
127	288	(10)	– Net (gains)/losses on sale and revaluation of non-current assets and businesses
(615)	156	(1,318)	– Share of (profit)/loss of joint ventures and associates
523	1,241	738	– Dividends received from joint ventures and associates
854	131	(608)	– (Increase)/decrease in inventories
(2,610)	751	(195)	– (Increase)/decrease in current receivables
(907)	1,524	(1,949)	– Increase/(decrease) in current payables
(244)	111	1,386	– Derivative financial instruments
(100)	(58)	(61)	– Retirement benefits
(480)	(256)	(600)	– Decommissioning and other provisions
570	(856)	509	– Other1
(2,900)	(2,910)	(2,616)	Tax paid
9,281	13,162	13,330	Cash flow from operating activities
(3,748)	(6,486)	(3,980)	Capital expenditure
(413)	(421)	(500)	Investments in joint ventures and associates
(15)	(17)	(13)	Investments in equity securities
(4,175)	(6,924)	(4,493)	Cash capital expenditure
559	493	323	Proceeds from sale of property, plant and equipment and businesses
33	305	133	Proceeds from joint ventures and associates from sale, capital reduction and repayment of long-term loans
5	6	569	Proceeds from sale of equity securities
508	581	577	Interest received
506	1,762	857	Other investing cash inflows
(1,394)	(655)	(1,494)	Other investing cash outflows1
(3,959)	(4,431)	(3,528)	Cash flow from investing activities
80	65	(107)	Net increase/(decrease) in debt with maturity period within three months
			Other debt:
139	(13)	167	– New borrowings
(2,514)	(2,664)	(1,532)	– Repayments
(846)	(1,379)	(911)	Interest paid
326	(833)	(297)	Derivative financial instruments
(25)	(10)	(4)	Change in non-controlling interest
			Cash dividends paid to:
(2,179)	(2,114)	(2,210)	– Shell plc shareholders
(86)	(53)	(68)	– Non-controlling interest
(3,311)	(3,579)	(2,824)	Repurchases of shares
(768)	(309)	(462)	Shares held in trust: net sales/(purchases) and dividends received
(9,183)	(10,889)	(8,248)	Cash flow from financing activities
353	(985)	(379)	Effects of exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents
(3,509)	(3,142)	1,175	Increase/(decrease) in cash and cash equivalents
39,110	42,252	38,774	Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of period
35,601	39,110	39,949	Cash and cash equivalents at end of period

1.See Note 7 “Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements”.

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NOTES TO THE UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED INTERIM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

1. Basis of preparation

These unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements of Shell plc (“the Company”) and its subsidiaries (collectively referred to as “Shell”) have been prepared in accordance with IAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”) and adopted by the UK, and on the basis of the same accounting principles as those used in the Company’s Annual Report and Accounts (pages 240 to 312) for the year ended December 31, 2024, as filed with the Registrar of Companies for England and Wales and as filed with the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (the Netherlands) and Form 20-F (pages 223 to 296) for the year ended December 31, 2024, as filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, and should be read in conjunction with these filings.

The financial information presented in the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements does not constitute statutory accounts within the meaning of section 434(3) of the Companies Act 2006 (“the Act”). Statutory accounts for the year ended December 31, 2024, were published in Shell’s Annual Report and Accounts, a copy of which was delivered to the Registrar of Companies for England and Wales. The auditor’s report on those accounts was unqualified, did not include a reference to any matters to which the auditor drew attention by way of emphasis without qualifying the report and did not contain a statement under sections 498(2) or 498(3) of the Act.

Key accounting considerations, significant judgements and estimates

Future commodity price assumptions and management’s view on the future development of refining and chemicals margins represent a significant estimate and were subject to change in 2024. These assumptions continue to apply for impairment testing purposes in the first quarter 2025. As per the normal process outlined in the 2024 Annual Report and Accounts and Form 20-F, these assumptions are subject to review later this year.

The discount rates applied for impairment testing and the discount rate applied to provisions are reviewed on a regular basis. Both discount rates applied in the first quarter 2025 remain unchanged compared with 2024.

2. Segment information

With effect from January 1, 2025, segment earnings are presented on an Adjusted Earnings basis (Adjusted Earnings), which is the earnings measure used by the Chief Executive Officer, who serves as the Chief Operating Decision Maker, for the purposes of making decisions about allocating resources and assessing performance. This aligns with Shell’s focus on performance, discipline and simplification.

The Adjusted Earnings measure is presented on a current cost of supplies (CCS) basis and aims to facilitate a comparative understanding of Shell’s financial performance from period to period by removing the effects of oil price changes on inventory carrying amounts and removing the effects of identified items. Identified items are in some cases driven by external factors and may, either individually or collectively, hinder the comparative understanding of Shell’s financial results from period to period.

The segment earnings measure used until December 31, 2024 was CCS earnings. The difference between CCS earnings and Adjusted Earnings are the identified items. Comparative periods are presented below on an Adjusted Earnings basis.

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REVENUE AND ADJUSTED EARNINGS BY SEGMENT
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
			Third-party revenue
9,602	9,294	9,195	Integrated Gas
1,510	1,652	1,759	Upstream
27,083	27,524	30,041	Marketing
21,610	19,992	23,735	Chemicals and Products
9,417	7,808	7,737	Renewables and Energy Solutions
12	10	11	Corporate
69,234	66,281	72,478	Total third-party revenue1
			Inter-segment revenue
2,675	2,024	2,404	Integrated Gas
9,854	9,931	10,287	Upstream
1,849	984	1,355	Marketing
8,255	8,656	10,312	Chemicals and Products
1,164	1,879	1,005	Renewables and Energy Solutions
—	—	—	Corporate
			Adjusted Earnings
2,483	2,165	3,680	Integrated Gas
2,337	1,682	1,933	Upstream
900	839	781	Marketing
449	(229)	1,615	Chemicals and Products
(42)	(311)	163	Renewables and Energy Solutions
(457)	(380)	(368)	Corporate
5,670	3,766	7,804	Total Adjusted Earnings2
5,577	3,661	7,734	Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders
94	106	70	Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest

1.Includes revenue from sources other than from contracts with customers, which mainly comprises the impact of fair value accounting of commodity derivatives.

2.See Reconciliation of income for the period to Adjusted Earnings below.

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Cash capital expenditure is a measure used by the Chief Executive Officer for the purposes of making decisions about allocating resources and assessing performance.



CASH CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BY SEGMENT
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
			Capital expenditure
943	1,123	858	Integrated Gas
1,727	2,205	1,766	Upstream
252	798	427	Marketing
451	1,121	474	Chemicals and Products
358	1,214	421	Renewables and Energy Solutions
17	25	34	Corporate
3,748	6,486	3,980	Total capital expenditure
			Add: Investments in joint ventures and associates
174	214	184	Integrated Gas
197	(117)	244	Upstream
4	13	38	Marketing
7	271	26	Chemicals and Products
30	36	8	Renewables and Energy Solutions
1	4	—	Corporate
413	421	500	Total investments in joint ventures and associates
			Add: Investments in equity securities
—	—	—	Integrated Gas
—	(11)	—	Upstream
—	—	—	Marketing
—	—	—	Chemicals and Products
14	28	10	Renewables and Energy Solutions
—	—	3	Corporate
15	17	13	Total investments in equity securities
			Cash capital expenditure
1,116	1,337	1,041	Integrated Gas
1,923	2,076	2,010	Upstream
256	811	465	Marketing
458	1,392	500	Chemicals and Products
403	1,277	438	Renewables and Energy Solutions
19	30	37	Corporate
4,175	6,924	4,493	Total Cash capital expenditure

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RECONCILIATION OF INCOME FOR THE PERIOD TO ADJUSTED EARNINGS
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
4,780	928	7,358	Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders
95	113	82	Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest
4,875	1,041	7,439	Income/(loss) for the period
(15)	(75)	(360)	Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation
(2)	23	84	Add: Tax on current cost of supplies adjustment
(510)	(3,008)	(1,244)	Less: Identified items adjustment before taxation
301	(230)	(604)	Add: Tax on identified items adjustment
5,670	3,766	7,804	Adjusted Earnings
5,577	3,661	7,734	Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders
94	106	70	Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest

Identified items

The objective of identified items is to remove material impacts on net income/loss arising from transactions which are generally uncontrollable and unusual (infrequent or non-recurring) in nature or giving rise to a mismatch between accounting and economic results, or certain transactions that are generally excluded from underlying results in the industry.

Identified items comprise: divestment gains and losses, impairments and impairment reversals, redundancy and restructuring, fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts that gives rise to a mismatch between accounting and economic results, the impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on certain deferred tax balances, and other items.



Q1 2025	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation
Divestment gains/(losses)	(106)	(1)	154	(57)	(15)	(187)	—
Impairment reversals/(impairments)	(341)	—	(21)	10	(293)	(38)	—
Redundancy and restructuring	(44)	(1)	(15)	(9)	(13)	(9)	4
Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1	194	420	(1)	12	(258)	20	—
Other2	(212)	(70)	4	—	(101)	(46)	—
Total identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation	(510)	348	121	(44)	(679)	(260)	4
Less: Total identified items included in Taxation charge/(credit)	301	43	378	4	(99)	(54)	29
Identified items included in Income/(loss) for the period
Divestment gains/(losses)	(208)	—	8	(61)	(12)	(143)	—
Impairment reversals/(impairments)	(317)	—	(15)	6	(277)	(31)	—
Redundancy and restructuring	(24)	(1)	(5)	(1)	(12)	(7)	2
Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1	187	362	—	7	(202)	20	—
Impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on tax balances3	108	4	132	—	—	—	(28)
Other2	(558)	(59)	(377)	—	(77)	(45)	—
Impact on Adjusted Earnings	(811)	306	(257)	(49)	(581)	(205)	(26)
Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders	(811)	306	(257)	(49)	(581)	(205)	(26)

1.Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts: In the ordinary course of business, Shell enters into contracts to supply or purchase oil and gas products, as well as power and environmental products. Shell also enters into contracts for tolling, pipeline and storage capacity. Derivative contracts are entered into for mitigation of resulting economic exposures (generally price exposure) and these derivative contracts are carried at period-end

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market price (fair value), with movements in fair value recognised in income for the period. Supply and purchase contracts entered into for operational purposes, as well as contracts for tolling, pipeline and storage capacity, are, by contrast, recognised when the transaction occurs; furthermore, inventory is carried at historical cost or net realisable value, whichever is lower. As a consequence, accounting mismatches occur because: (a) the supply or purchase transaction is recognised in a different period; or (b) the inventory is measured on a different basis. In addition, certain contracts are, due to pricing or delivery conditions, deemed to contain embedded derivatives or written options and are also required to be carried at fair value even though they are entered into for operational purposes. The accounting impacts are reported as identified items.

2.Other identified items represent other credits or charges that based on Shell management’s assessment hinder the comparative understanding of Shell’s financial results from period to period.

3.Impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on tax balances represents the impact on tax balances of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments arising on: (a) the conversion to dollars of the local currency tax base of non-monetary assets and liabilities, as well as recognised tax losses (this primarily impacts the Integrated Gas and Upstream segments); and (b) the conversion of dollar-denominated inter-segment loans to local currency, leading to taxable exchange rate gains or losses (this primarily impacts the Corporate segment).



Q4 2024	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation
Divestment gains/(losses)	(288)	(99)	(66)	(216)	42	51	—
Impairment reversals/(impairments)	(2,554)	(523)	(183)	(493)	(288)	(1,065)	(1)
Redundancy and restructuring	(175)	(27)	(62)	(70)	(5)	(11)	(1)
Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1	209	136	(14)	58	(38)	67	—
Other1	(200)	—	(165)	(33)	(2)	—	—
Total identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation	(3,008)	(514)	(491)	(753)	(291)	(958)	(2)
Less: Total identified items included in Taxation charge/(credit)	(230)	(92)	160	(17)	(191)	(43)	(47)
Identified items included in Income/(loss) for the period
Divestment gains/(losses)	(321)	(96)	(51)	(247)	33	40	—
Impairment reversals/(impairments)	(2,170)	(339)	(152)	(458)	(224)	(996)	(1)
Redundancy and restructuring	(115)	(16)	(34)	(52)	(3)	(8)	(1)
Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1	184	109	(4)	46	(17)	50	—
Impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on tax balances1	(210)	(57)	(199)	—	—	—	46
Other1	(147)	(22)	(212)	(25)	113	—	—
Impact on Adjusted Earnings	(2,778)	(421)	(651)	(736)	(99)	(914)	45
Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders	(2,778)	(421)	(651)	(736)	(99)	(914)	45

1.For a detailed description, see the corresponding footnotes to the Q1 2025 identified items table above.

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Q1 2024	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation
Divestment gains/(losses)	10	(3)	27	(15)	(9)	10	—
Impairment reversals/(impairments)	(227)	(8)	(96)	(4)	(178)	59	—
Redundancy and restructuring	(74)	(1)	(13)	(20)	(18)	(15)	(6)
Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1	(1,079)	(1,068)	(2)	6	(416)	400	—
Other1	126	4	38	23	45	16	—
Total identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation	(1,244)	(1,075)	(46)	(11)	(575)	469	(6)
Less: Total identified items included in Taxation charge/(credit)	(604)	(157)	(385)	(4)	(118)	80	(20)
Identified items included in Income/(loss) for the period
Divestment gains/(losses)	(4)	(2)	10	(11)	(7)	6	—
Impairment reversals/(impairments)	(186)	(5)	(102)	(3)	(152)	77	—
Redundancy and restructuring	(53)	(1)	(9)	(15)	(14)	(11)	(4)
Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1	(896)	(887)	—	5	(319)	306	—
Impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on tax balances1	403	(27)	412	—	—	—	18
Other1	95	3	28	17	34	12	—
Impact on Adjusted Earnings	(641)	(919)	339	(7)	(458)	390	14
Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders	(641)	(919)	339	(7)	(458)	390	14

1.For a detailed description, see the corresponding footnotes to the Q1 2025 identified items table above.

The identified items categories above may include after-tax impacts of identified items of joint ventures and associates which are fully reported within “Share of profit/(loss) of joint ventures and associates” in the Consolidated Statement of Income, and fully reported as identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation in the table above. Identified items related to subsidiaries are consolidated and reported across appropriate lines of the Consolidated Statement of Income.

3. Earnings per share



EARNINGS PER SHARE
Quarters
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
4,780	928	7,358	Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders ($ million)

			Weighted average number of shares used as the basis for determining:
6,033.5	6,148.4	6,440.1	Basic earnings per share (million)
6,087.8	6,213.9	6,504.3	Diluted earnings per share (million)

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4. Share capital

ISSUED AND FULLY PAID ORDINARY SHARES OF €0.07 EACH

Number of shares

Nominal value
($ million)

At January 1, 2025

6,115,031,158

510

Repurchases of shares

(98,948,766)

(8)

At March 31, 2025

6,016,082,392

502

At January 1, 2024

6,524,109,049

544

Repurchases of shares

(88,893,999)

(7)

At March 31, 2024

6,435,215,050

537

At Shell plc’s Annual General Meeting on May 21, 2024, the Board was authorised to allot ordinary shares in Shell plc, and to grant rights to subscribe for, or to convert, any security into ordinary shares in Shell plc, up to an aggregate nominal amount of approximately €150 million (representing approximately 2,147 million ordinary shares of €0.07 each), and to list such shares or rights on any stock exchange. This authority expires at the earlier of the close of business on August 20, 2025, or the end of the Annual General Meeting to be held in 2025, unless previously renewed, revoked or varied by Shell plc in a general meeting.

5. Other reserves



OTHER RESERVES
$ million	Merger reserve	Share premium reserve	Capital redemption reserve	Share plan reserve	Accumulated other comprehensive income	Total
At January 1, 2025	37,298	154	270	1,417	(19,373)	19,766
Other comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders	—	—	—	—	1,967	1,967
Transfer from other comprehensive income	—	—	—	—	11	11
Repurchases of shares	—	—	8	—	—	8
Share-based compensation	—	—	—	(663)	—	(663)
At March 31, 2025	37,298	154	279	754	(17,394)	21,090
At January 1, 2024	37,298	154	236	1,308	(17,851)	21,145
Other comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders	—	—	—	—	(1,420)	(1,420)
Transfer from other comprehensive income	—	—	—	—	138	138
Repurchases of shares	—	—	7	—	—	7
Share-based compensation	—	—	—	(426)	—	(426)
At March 31, 2024	37,298	154	244	882	(19,132)	19,445

The merger reserve and share premium reserve were established as a consequence of Shell plc (formerly Royal Dutch Shell plc) becoming the single parent company of Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and The “Shell” Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c., now The Shell Transport and Trading Company Limited, in 2005. The merger reserve increased in 2016 following the issuance of shares for the acquisition of BG Group plc. The capital redemption reserve was established in connection with repurchases of shares of Shell plc. The share plan reserve is in respect of equity-settled share-based compensation plans.

6. Derivative financial instruments and debt excluding lease liabilities

As disclosed in the Consolidated Financial Statements for the year ended December 31, 2024, presented in the Annual Report and Accounts and Form 20-F for that year, Shell is exposed to the risks of changes in fair value of its financial assets and liabilities. The fair values of the financial assets and liabilities are defined as the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. Methods and assumptions used to estimate the fair values at March 31, 2025, are consistent with those used in the year ended December 31, 2024, though the carrying amounts of derivative financial instruments have changed since that date.

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The movement of the derivative financial instruments between December 31, 2024 and March 31, 2025 is a decrease of $732 million for the current assets and a decrease of $1,020 million for the current liabilities.

The table below provides the comparison of the fair value with the carrying amount of debt excluding lease liabilities, disclosed in accordance with IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures.



DEBT EXCLUDING LEASE LIABILITIES
$ million	March 31, 2025	December 31, 2024
Carrying amount1	48,023	48,376
Fair value2	44,240	44,119

1. Shell issued no debt under the US shelf or under the Euro medium-term note programmes during the first quarter 2025.

2. Mainly determined from the prices quoted for these securities.

7. Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements

Consolidated Statement of Income

Interest and other income



Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
302	683	907	Interest and other income/(expenses)
			Of which:
481	548	588	Interest income
1	25	23	Dividend income (from investments in equity securities)
(127)	(288)	10	Net gains/(losses) on sales and revaluation of non-current assets and businesses
(137)	267	66	Net foreign exchange gains/(losses) on financing activities
85	131	219	Other

Depreciation, depletion and amortisation



Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
5,441	7,520	5,881	Depreciation, depletion and amortisation
			Of which:
5,130	5,829	5,654	Depreciation
311	1,797	382	Impairments
(1)	(106)	(154)	Impairment reversals

Impairments recognised in the first quarter 2025 of $311 million pre-tax ($287 million post-tax) principally relate to Chemicals and Products.

Impairments recognised in the fourth quarter 2024 of $2,659 million pre-tax ($2,245 million post-tax), of which $1,797 million recognised in depreciation, depletion and amortisation and $863 million recognised in share of profit of joint ventures and associates, mainly relate to Renewables and Energy Solutions ($1,068 million pre-tax; $1,000 million post-tax), Integrated Gas ($532 million pre-tax; $345 million post-tax), Marketing ($495 million pre-tax; $459 million post-tax), Chemicals and Products ($315 million pre-tax; $247 million post-tax) and Upstream ($248 million pre-tax; $194 million post-tax).

Impairments recognised in the first quarter 2024 of $382 million pre-tax ($332 million post-tax) include smaller

impairments in various segments.

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Taxation charge/credit

Quarters

$ million

Q1 2025

Q4 2024

Q1 2024

4,083

3,164

3,604

Taxation charge/(credit)

Of which:

4,024

3,125

3,525

Income tax excluding Pillar Two income tax

Income tax related to Pillar Two income tax

As required by IAS 12 Income Taxes, Shell has applied the exception to recognising and disclosing information about deferred tax assets and liabilities related to Pillar Two income taxes.

Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income

Currency translation differences

Quarters

$ million

Q1 2025

Q4 2024

Q1 2024

1,711

(4,899)

(1,995)

Currency translation differences

Of which:

1,618

(5,028)

(1,983)

Recognised in Other comprehensive income

129

(12)

(Gain)/loss reclassified to profit or loss

Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet

Other intangible assets



$ million
	March 31, 2025	December 31, 2024
Other intangible assets	11,365	9,480

The increase in other intangible assets as at March 31, 2025 compared with December 31, 2024 is mainly related to initial recognition at fair value of favourable LNG, gas offtake and sales contracts. These were recognised following completion of the acquisition of Pavilion Energy Pte. Ltd. during the first quarter 2025. The fair value of unfavourable LNG, gas offtake and sales contracts acquired was recognised under trade and other payables.

Assets classified as held for sale



$ million
	March 31, 2025	December 31, 2024
Assets classified as held for sale	10,881	9,857
Liabilities directly associated with assets classified as held for sale	8,001	6,203

Assets classified as held for sale and associated liabilities at March 31, 2025 principally relate to Shell’s UK offshore oil and gas assets in Upstream, mining interests in Canada and an energy and chemicals park in Singapore, both in Chemicals and Products. Upon completion of the sale, Shell’s UK offshore assets will be derecognised in exchange for a 50% interest in a newly formed joint venture.

The major classes of assets and liabilities classified as held for sale at March 31, 2025, are Property, plant and equipment ($8,866 million; December 31, 2024: $8,283 million), Inventories ($1,003 million; December 31, 2024: $1,180 million), Decommissioning and other provisions ($3,228 million; December 31, 2024: $3,053 million), deferred tax liabilities ($2,823 million; December 31, 2024: $2,042 million), Trade and other payables ($1,000 million; December 31, 2024: $484 million) and Debt ($839 million; December 31, 2024: $624 million).

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Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows

Cash flow from operating activities – Other

Quarters

$ million

Q1 2025

Q4 2024

Q1 2024

570

(856)

509

Other

‘Cash flow from operating activities – Other’ for the first quarter 2025 includes $652 million of net inflows (fourth quarter 2024: $1,447 million net outflows; first quarter 2024: $188 million net inflows) due to the timing of payments relating to emission certificates and biofuel programmes in Europe and North America and $255 million in relation to reversal of currency exchange gains on Cash and cash equivalents (fourth quarter 2024: $672 million losses; first quarter 2024: $253 million losses).

Cash flow from investing activities – Other investing cash outflows

Quarters

$ million

Q1 2025

Q4 2024

Q1 2024

(1,394)

(655)

(1,494)

Other investing cash outflows

‘Cash flow from investing activities – Other investing cash outflows’ for the first quarter 2025 includes $818 million secured term loans provided to The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC) upon completion of the sale of SPDC. The first quarter 2024 includes $645 million of debt securities acquired in the Corporate segment.

8. Reconciliation of Operating expenses and Total Debt



RECONCILIATION OF OPERATING EXPENSES
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
5,549	5,839	5,810	Production and manufacturing expenses
2,840	3,231	2,975	Selling, distribution and administrative expenses
185	331	212	Research and development
8,575	9,401	8,997	Operating expenses

RECONCILIATION OF TOTAL DEBT

March 31, 2025

December 31, 2024

March 31, 2024

$ million

11,391

11,630

11,046

Current debt

65,120

65,448

68,886

Non-current debt

76,511

77,078

79,931

Total debt

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ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE (NON-GAAP) MEASURES

A.Adjusted Earnings, Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (“Adjusted EBITDA”) and Cash flow from operating activities

The “Adjusted Earnings” measure aims to facilitate a comparative understanding of Shell’s financial performance from period to period by removing the effects of oil price changes on inventory carrying amounts and removing the effects of identified items. These items are in some cases driven by external factors and may, either individually or collectively, hinder the comparative understanding of Shell’s financial results from period to period. This measure excludes earnings attributable to non-controlling interest when presenting the total Shell Group result but includes these items when presenting individual segment Adjusted Earnings as set out in the table below.

We define “Adjusted EBITDA” as “Income/(loss) for the period” adjusted for current cost of supplies; identified items; tax charge/(credit); depreciation, amortisation and depletion; exploration well write-offs and net interest expense. All items include the non-controlling interest component. Management uses this measure to evaluate Shell’s performance in the period and over time.



Q1 2025	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Income/(loss) for the period	4,875	2,789	2,080	814	(77)	(247)	(483)
Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation	(15)			52	(67)
Add: Tax on current cost of supplies adjustment	(2)			(14)	12
Less: Identified items	(811)	306	(257)	(49)	(581)	(205)	(26)
Less: Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest	95
Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to non-controlling interest	(1)
Add: Identified items attributable to non-controlling interest	—
Adjusted Earnings	5,577
Add: Non-controlling interest	94
Adjusted Earnings plus non-controlling interest	5,670	2,483	2,337	900	449	(42)	(457)
Add: Taxation charge/(credit) excluding tax impact of identified items	3,784	803	2,619	391	99	63	(191)
Add: Depreciation, depletion and amortisation excluding impairments	5,130	1,404	2,213	566	852	90	6
Add: Exploration well write-offs	28	—	29
Add: Interest expense excluding identified items	1,119	51	200	12	14	2	841
Less: Interest income	481	4	11	—	4	2	461
Adjusted EBITDA	15,250	4,735	7,387	1,869	1,410	111	(261)
Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation	(15)			52	(67)
Joint ventures and associates (dividends received less profit)	(178)	(286)	(159)	203	54	10	—
Derivative financial instruments	(38)	542	14	10	(508)	(169)	73
Taxation paid	(2,900)	(773)	(1,999)	(174)	63	52	(68)
Other	(206)	(68)	(386)	396	125	(17)	(257)
(Increase)/decrease in working capital	(2,663)	(687)	(913)	(344)	(1,081)	380	(19)
Cash flow from operating activities	9,281	3,463	3,945	1,907	130	367	(531)

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Q4 2024	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Income/(loss) for the period	1,041	1,744	1,031	103	(276)	(1,226)	(335)
Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation	(75)			(2)	(73)
Add: Tax on current cost of supplies adjustment	23			2	21
Less: Identified items	(2,778)	(421)	(651)	(736)	(99)	(914)	45
Less: Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest	113
Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to non-controlling interest	(7)
Add: Identified items attributable to non-controlling interest	—
Adjusted Earnings	3,661
Add: Non-controlling interest	106
Adjusted Earnings plus non-controlling interest	3,766	2,165	1,682	839	(229)	(311)	(380)
Add: Taxation charge/(credit) excluding tax impact of identified items	3,371	635	2,618	266	(198)	97	(46)
Add: Depreciation, depletion and amortisation excluding impairments	5,829	1,440	2,803	587	896	96	8
Add: Exploration well write-offs	649	277	372	—	—	—	—
Add: Interest expense excluding identified items	1,213	54	201	17	16	2	923
Less: Interest income	548	3	—	—	10	7	529
Adjusted EBITDA	14,281	4,568	7,676	1,709	475	(123)	(24)
Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation	(75)			(2)	(73)
Joint ventures and associates (dividends received less profit)	451	110	(22)	172	139	51	—
Derivative financial instruments	319	120	(28)	(8)	230	533	(527)
Taxation paid	(2,910)	(635)	(2,019)	(130)	36	(41)	(120)
Other	(1,461)	114	(486)	(1,227)	(313)	77	375
(Increase)/decrease in working capital	2,407	114	(611)	845	1,394	353	312
Cash flow from operating activities	13,162	4,391	4,509	1,363	2,032	850	16



Q1 2024	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Income/(loss) for the period	7,439	2,761	2,272	896	1,311	553	(354)
Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation	(360)			(153)	(207)
Add: Tax on current cost of supplies adjustment	84			30	54
Less: Identified items	(641)	(919)	339	(7)	(458)	390	14
Less: Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest	82
Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to non-controlling interest	(12)
Add: Identified items attributable to non-controlling interest	—
Adjusted Earnings	7,734
Add: Non-controlling interest	70
Adjusted Earnings plus non-controlling interest	7,804	3,680	1,933	781	1,615	163	(368)
Add: Taxation charge/(credit) excluding tax impact of identified items	4,124	996	2,522	358	338	—	(91)
Add: Depreciation, depletion and amortisation excluding impairments	5,654	1,410	2,727	535	870	106	6
Add: Exploration well write-offs	554	8	546	—	—	—	—
Add: Interest expense excluding identified items	1,163	42	169	12	17	1	922
Less: Interest income	588	—	10	—	14	4	560
Adjusted EBITDA	18,711	6,136	7,888	1,686	2,826	267	(92)
Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation	(360)			(153)	(207)
Joint ventures and associates (dividends received less profit)	(582)	(197)	(546)	93	56	13	—
Derivative financial instruments	306	(1,080)	(3)	(39)	(402)	1,978	(149)
Taxation paid	(2,616)	(467)	(1,802)	(175)	(19)	(244)	91
Other	(97)	45	(231)	393	(378)	(30)	104
(Increase)/decrease in working capital	(2,752)	275	421	(792)	(2,639)	481	(499)
Cash flow from operating activities	13,330	4,712	5,727	1,319	(349)	2,466	(545)

Identified items

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See Note 2 “Segment information” for details.

B. Adjusted Earnings per share

Adjusted Earnings per share is calculated as Adjusted Earnings (see Reference A), divided by the weighted average number of shares used as the basis for basic earnings per share (see Note 3).

C. Cash capital expenditure

Cash capital expenditure represents cash spent on maintaining and developing assets as well as on investments in the period. Management regularly monitors this measure as a key lever to delivering sustainable cash flows. Cash capital expenditure is the sum of the following lines from the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows: Capital expenditure, Investments in joint ventures and associates and Investments in equity securities.

See Note 2 “Segment information” for the reconciliation of cash capital expenditure.

D. Capital employed and Return on average capital employed

Return on average capital employed (“ROACE”) measures the efficiency of Shell’s utilisation of the capital that it employs.

The measure refers to Capital employed which consists of total equity, current debt, and non-current debt reduced by cash and cash equivalents.

In this calculation, the sum of Adjusted Earnings (see Reference A) plus non-controlling interest (NCI) excluding identified items for the current and previous three quarters, adjusted for after-tax interest expense and after-tax interest income, is expressed as a percentage of the average capital employed excluding cash and cash equivalents for the same period.



$ million	Quarters
	Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
Current debt	11,046	9,931	9,044
Non-current debt	68,886	71,610	76,098
Total equity	188,304	188,362	195,530
Less: Cash and cash equivalents	(39,949)	(38,774)	(42,074)
Capital employed – opening	228,286	231,128	238,598
Current debt	11,391	11,630	11,046
Non-current debt	65,120	65,448	68,886
Total equity	180,670	180,168	188,304
Less: Cash and cash equivalents	(35,601)	(39,110)	(39,949)
Capital employed – closing	221,580	218,134	228,286
Capital employed – average	224,933	224,630	233,442

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$ million	Quarters
	Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
Adjusted Earnings – current and previous three quarters (Reference A)	21,558	23,716	26,338
Add: Income/(loss) attributable to NCI – current and previous three quarters	441	427	295
Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to NCI – current and previous three quarters	25	14	(24)
Less: Identified items attributable to NCI (Reference A) – current and previous three quarters	18	18	(11)
Adjusted Earnings plus NCI excluding identified items – current and previous three quarters	22,005	24,139	26,620
Add: Interest expense after tax – current and previous three quarters	2,639	2,701	2,718
Less: Interest income after tax on cash and cash equivalents – current and previous three quarters	1,329	1,389	1,368
Adjusted Earnings plus NCI excluding identified items before interest expense and interest income – current and previous three quarters	23,315	25,452	27,971
Capital employed – average	224,933	224,630	233,442
ROACE on an Adjusted Earnings plus NCI basis	10.4%	11.3%	12.0%

E. Net debt and gearing

Net debt is defined as the sum of current and non-current debt, less cash and cash equivalents, adjusted for the fair value of derivative financial instruments used to hedge foreign exchange and interest rate risk relating to debt, and associated collateral balances. Management considers this adjustment useful because it reduces the volatility of net debt caused by fluctuations in foreign exchange and interest rates, and eliminates the potential impact of related collateral payments or receipts. Debt-related derivative financial instruments are a subset of the derivative financial instrument assets and liabilities presented on the balance sheet. Collateral balances are reported under “Trade and other receivables” or “Trade and other payables” as appropriate.

Gearing is a measure of Shell’s capital structure and is defined as net debt (total debt less cash and cash equivalents) as a percentage of total capital (net debt plus total equity).



$ million
	March 31, 2025		December 31, 2024		March 31, 2024
Current debt	11,391		11,630		11,046
Non-current debt	65,120		65,448		68,886
Total debt	76,511		77,078		79,931
Of which: Lease liabilities	28,488		28,702		26,885
Add: Debt-related derivative financial instruments: net liability/(asset)	1,905		2,469		1,888
Add: Collateral on debt-related derivatives: net liability/(asset)	(1,295)		(1,628)		(1,357)
Less: Cash and cash equivalents	(35,601)		(39,110)		(39,949)
Net debt	41,521		38,809		40,513
Total equity	180,670		180,168		188,304
Total capital	222,190		218,974		228,817
Gearing	18.7	%	17.7	%	17.7	%

F. Operating expenses and Underlying operating expenses

Operating expenses

Operating expenses is a measure of Shell’s cost management performance, comprising the following items from the Consolidated Statement of Income: production and manufacturing expenses; selling, distribution and administrative expenses; and research and development expenses.

Page 27

SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS



Q1 2025	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Production and manufacturing expenses	5,549	947	2,139	349	1,621	486	8
Selling, distribution and administrative expenses	2,840	38	42	2,053	442	153	111
Research and development	185	22	32	42	25	21	43
Operating expenses	8,575	1,006	2,213	2,444	2,088	661	162



Q4 2024	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Production and manufacturing expenses	5,839	982	2,470	270	1,632	480	5
Selling, distribution and administrative expenses	3,231	39	96	2,258	471	241	126
Research and development	331	40	69	73	46	37	66
Operating expenses	9,401	1,061	2,635	2,602	2,149	757	196



Q1 2024	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Production and manufacturing expenses	5,810	956	2,269	366	1,634	579	5
Selling, distribution and administrative expenses	2,975	62	58	2,188	420	158	89
Research and development	212	26	58	34	34	12	49
Operating expenses	8,997	1,044	2,385	2,587	2,088	749	144

Underlying operating expenses

Underlying operating expenses is a measure aimed at facilitating a comparative understanding of performance from period to period by removing the effects of identified items, which, either individually or collectively, can cause volatility, in some cases driven by external factors.

Quarters

$ million

Q1 2025

Q4 2024

Q1 2024

8,575

9,401

8,997

Operating expenses

(44)

(174)

(73)

Redundancy and restructuring (charges)/reversal

(101)

(88)

—

(Provisions)/reversal

—

130

Other

(121)

(262)

Total identified items

8,453

9,138

9,054

Underlying operating expenses

G. Free cash flow and Organic free cash flow

Free cash flow is used to evaluate cash available for financing activities, including dividend payments and debt servicing, after investment in maintaining and growing the business. It is defined as the sum of “Cash flow from operating activities” and “Cash flow from investing activities”.

Cash flows from acquisition and divestment activities are removed from Free cash flow to arrive at the Organic free cash flow, a measure used by management to evaluate the generation of free cash flow without these activities.

Page 28

SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS



Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
9,281	13,162	13,330	Cash flow from operating activities
(3,959)	(4,431)	(3,528)	Cash flow from investing activities
5,322	8,731	9,802	Free cash flow
597	805	1,025	Less: Divestment proceeds (Reference I)
45	1	—	Add: Tax paid on divestments (reported under “Other investing cash outflows”)
130	525	62	Add: Cash outflows related to inorganic capital expenditure1
4,899	8,453	8,839	Organic free cash flow2

1.Cash outflows related to inorganic capital expenditure includes portfolio actions which expand Shell’s activities through acquisitions and restructuring activities as reported in capital expenditure lines in the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows.

2.Free cash flow less divestment proceeds, adding back outflows related to inorganic expenditure.

H. Cash flow from operating activities excluding working capital movements

Working capital movements are defined as the sum of the following items in the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows: (i) (increase)/decrease in inventories, (ii) (increase)/decrease in current receivables, and (iii) increase/(decrease) in current payables.

Cash flow from operating activities excluding working capital movements is a measure used by Shell to analyse its operating cash generation over time excluding the timing effects of changes in inventories and operating receivables and payables from period to period.

Quarters

$ million

Q1 2025

Q4 2024

Q1 2024

9,281

13,162

13,330

Cash flow from operating activities

854

131

(608)

(Increase)/decrease in inventories

(2,610)

751

(195)

(Increase)/decrease in current receivables

(907)

1,524

(1,949)

Increase/(decrease) in current payables

(2,663)

2,407

(2,752)

(Increase)/decrease in working capital

11,944

10,755

16,082

Cash flow from operating activities excluding working capital movements

I. Divestment proceeds

Divestment proceeds represent cash received from divestment activities in the period. Management regularly monitors this measure as a key lever to deliver free cash flow.



Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
559	493	323	Proceeds from sale of property, plant and equipment and businesses
33	305	133	Proceeds from joint ventures and associates from sale, capital reduction and repayment of long-term loans
5	6	569	Proceeds from sale of equity securities
597	805	1,025	Divestment proceeds

Page 29

SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

CAUTIONARY STATEMENT

All amounts shown throughout this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report are unaudited. All peak production figures in Portfolio Developments are quoted at 100% expected production. The numbers presented throughout this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report may not sum precisely to the totals provided and percentages may not precisely reflect the absolute figures, due to rounding.

The companies in which Shell plc directly and indirectly owns investments are separate legal entities. In this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, “Shell”, “Shell Group” and “Group” are sometimes used for convenience to reference Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general. Likewise, the words “we”, “us” and “our” are also used to refer to Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general or to those who work for them. These terms are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular entity or entities. ‘‘Subsidiaries’’, “Shell subsidiaries” and “Shell companies” as used in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, refer to entities over which Shell plc either directly or indirectly has control. The terms “joint venture”, “joint operations”, “joint arrangements”, and “associates” may also be used to refer to a commercial arrangement in which Shell has a direct or indirect ownership interest with one or more parties. The term “Shell interest” is used for convenience to indicate the direct and/or indirect ownership interest held by Shell in an entity or unincorporated joint arrangement, after exclusion of all third-party interest.

Forward-Looking statements

This Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report contains forward-looking statements (within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) concerning the financial condition, results of operations and businesses of Shell. All statements other than statements of historical fact are, or may be deemed to be, forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are statements of future expectations that are based on management’s current expectations and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in these statements. Forward-looking statements include, among other things, statements concerning the potential exposure of Shell to market risks and statements expressing management’s expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions. These forward-looking statements are identified by their use of terms and phrases such as “aim”; “ambition”; ‘‘anticipate’’; “aspire”, “aspiration”, ‘‘believe’’; “commit”; “commitment”; ‘‘could’’; “desire”; ‘‘estimate’’; ‘‘expect’’; ‘‘goals’’; ‘‘intend’’; ‘‘may’’; “milestones”; ‘‘objectives’’; ‘‘outlook’’; ‘‘plan’’; ‘‘probably’’; ‘‘project’’; ‘‘risks’’; “schedule”; ‘‘seek’’; ‘‘should’’; ‘‘target’’; “vision”; ‘‘will’’; “would” and similar terms and phrases. There are a number of factors that could affect the future operations of Shell and could cause those results to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements included in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, including (without limitation): (a) price fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas; (b) changes in demand for Shell’s products; (c) currency fluctuations; (d) drilling and production results; (e) reserves estimates; (f) loss of market share and industry competition; (g) environmental and physical risks, including climate change; (h) risks associated with the identification of suitable potential acquisition properties and targets, and successful negotiation and completion of such transactions; (i) the risk of doing business in developing countries and countries subject to international sanctions; (j) legislative, judicial, fiscal and regulatory developments including tariffs and regulatory measures addressing climate change; (k) economic and financial market conditions in various countries and regions; (l) political risks, including the risks of expropriation and renegotiation of the terms of contracts with governmental entities, delays or advancements in the approval of projects and delays in the reimbursement for shared costs; (m) risks associated with the impact of pandemics, regional conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the conflict in the Middle East, and a significant cyber security, data privacy or IT incident; (n) the pace of the energy transition; and (o) changes in trading conditions. No assurance is provided that future dividend payments will match or exceed previous dividend payments. All forward-looking statements contained in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report are expressly qualified in their entirety by the cautionary statements contained or referred to in this section. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. Additional risk factors that may affect future results are contained in Shell plc’s Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024 (available at www.shell.com/investors/news-and-filings/sec-filings.html and www.sec.gov). These risk factors also expressly qualify all forward-looking statements contained in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report and should be considered by the reader. Each forward-looking statement speaks only as of the date of this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, May 2, 2025. Neither Shell plc nor any of its subsidiaries undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement as a result of new information, future events or other information. In light of these risks, results could differ materially from those stated, implied or inferred from the forward-looking statements contained in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report.

Shell’s net carbon intensity

Also, in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report we may refer to Shell’s “net carbon intensity” (NCI), which includes Shell’s carbon emissions from the production of our energy products, our suppliers’ carbon emissions in supplying energy for that production and our customers’ carbon emissions associated with their use of the energy products we sell. Shell’s NCI also includes the emissions associated with the production and use of energy products produced by others which Shell purchases for resale. Shell only controls its own emissions. The use of the terms Shell’s “net carbon intensity” or NCI is for convenience only and not intended to suggest these emissions are those of Shell plc or its subsidiaries.

Shell’s net-zero emissions target

Shell’s operating plan and outlook are forecasted for a three-year period and ten-year period, respectively, and are updated every year. They reflect the current economic environment and what we can reasonably expect to see over the next three and ten years. Accordingly, the outlook reflects our Scope 1, Scope 2 and NCI targets over the next ten years. However, Shell’s operating plan and outlook cannot reflect our 2050 net-zero emissions target, as this target is outside our planning period. Such future operating plans and outlooks could include changes to our portfolio, efficiency improvements and the use of carbon capture and storage and carbon credits. In the future, as society moves towards net-zero emissions, we expect Shell’s operating plans and outlooks to reflect this movement. However, if society is not net zero in 2050, as of today, there would be significant risk that Shell may not meet this target.

Forward-Looking non-GAAP measures

This Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report may contain certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures such as cash capital expenditure and Adjusted Earnings. We are unable to provide a reconciliation of these forward-looking non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile those non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside the control of Shell, such as oil and gas prices, interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, estimating such GAAP measures with the required precision necessary to provide a meaningful reconciliation is extremely difficult and could not be accomplished without unreasonable effort. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future periods which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are calculated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied in Shell plc’s consolidated financial statements.

The contents of websites referred to in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report do not form part of this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report.

We may have used certain terms, such as resources, in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) strictly prohibits us from including in our filings with the SEC. Investors are urged to consider closely the disclosure in our Form 20-F, File No 1-32575, available on the SEC website www.sec.gov.

Page 30

SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

This announcement contains inside information.

May 2, 2025


The information in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report reflects the unaudited consolidated financial position and results of Shell plc. Company No. 4366849, Registered Office: Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, England, UK.

Contacts:

– Sean Ashley, Company Secretary

– Media: International +44 (0) 207 934 5550; U.S. and Canada: https://www.shell.us/about-us/news-and-insights/media/submit-an-inquiry.html

LEI number of Shell plc: 21380068P1DRHMJ8KU70

Classification: Inside Information

Page 31

The MIL Network –

May 2, 2025

MIL-OSI: Middlefield Canadian Income PCC – Proposed Rollover into UCITS ETF

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

THIS ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN IT ARE NOT FOR RELEASE, PUBLICATION OR DISTRIBUTION, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN OR INTO, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (INCLUDING ITS TERRITORIES AND POSSESSIONS, ANY STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA), AUSTRALIA, CANADA, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, IN ANY MEMBER STATE OF THE EEA OR IN ANY OTHER JURISDICTION IN WHICH THE SAME WOULD BE UNLAWFUL.

This announcement is not an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to acquire, securities in the United States or in any other jurisdiction in which the same would be unlawful. Neither this announcement nor any part of it shall form the basis of or be relied on in connection with or act as an inducement to enter into any contract or commitment whatsoever.

The information contained within this announcement is deemed by the Company to constitute inside information as stipulated under the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 which forms part of domestic law in the United Kingdom pursuant to The European Union Withdrawal Act 2018, as amended by The Market Abuse (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.

Middlefield Canadian Income PCC (the “Company”)
Including Middlefield Canadian Income – GBP PC (the “Fund”), a cell of the Company
Registered No: 93546 Legal Entity Identifier: 2138007ENW3JEJXC8658

2 May 2025

Proposed Rollover into UCITS ETF

Middlefield Canadian Income PCC (the “Company”) and Middlefield Canadian Income – GBP PC (the “Fund”) today announce their intention to propose a transaction whereby shareholders in the Fund (the “Shareholders”) would have the option to receive shares in a newly established, actively managed, listed and London Stock Exchange traded fund in the form of an authorised UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) (the “ETF”) in exchange for their shareholding in the Fund (the “Transaction”). It is envisaged that the Transaction would involve the voluntary winding up of the Company and the Fund. The ETF would be managed by Middlefield Limited, the Company’s investment manager (“Middlefield”) and would offer continued exposure to the Company’s existing investment objective and policy. Advisory work on the structure of the Transaction is ongoing, and the Company will release an announcement with further details in due course.

Under the proposed terms of the Transaction, Shareholders who do not wish to continue their exposure to the Company’s existing investment objective and policy via the ETF (whether with respect to their entire shareholding, or part thereof) would be able to participate in an uncapped cash exit at close to the Company’s net asset value (“NAV”) per share, or elect to receive a combination of both shares in the ETF and cash.

As previously announced on 13 February 2025, the Company received a requisition notice from Saba Capital Management, L.P. (“Saba”) proposing that Shareholders be asked to consider, and, if thought fit, approve, the taking by the Company of all necessary steps to implement a scheme or process by which Shareholders would have the option of becoming shareholders of a UK-listed open-ended investment vehicle with a substantially similar strategy as that of the Company and managed by the Company’s existing manager (the “Requisition Notice”).

Following receipt of the Requisition Notice, the board of the Company (the “Board”) consulted with a number of the Company’s largest Shareholders, including Saba. Following constructive discussions, Saba agreed to withdraw the Requisition Notice for a period of 60 days to enable the Company and its advisers to formulate proposals that would best serve the interests of all Shareholders.

Further to the feedback received, the Board has concluded that the interests of Shareholders would be best served by proposing the Transaction and an alternative investment vehicle which would address the issue of limited liquidity in the Company’s shares and the discount to NAV at which the shares have been trading, whilst enabling those Shareholders who wish to retain exposure to high quality, Canadian and US large capitalisation businesses focusing on high levels of stable and increasing income, the option to do so. Further to ongoing discussions with the Company’s legal, tax and financial advisers and Middlefield, and having considered other potential closed-end fund rollover options, the Board has concluded that the ETF represents the most suitable rollover option for Shareholders.

The intention in proposing the ETF as an alternative investment option for Shareholders would be to create a cost-effective vehicle which is positioned to grow and which should benefit from a tight bid-offer spread, a total expense ratio (“TER”) lower than the Company’s current TER and a share price that trades close to or at the NAV per share of the ETF, whilst offering continued exposure to the Company’s existing investment objective and policy. ETFs trade at prices close to or at NAV due to the in-kind creation and redemption mechanism which underpins their structure and which is utilised by authorised participants to address any material surplus or deficit of ETF shares in the market.

The Company notes that over the last ten years, Middlefield has successfully rolled several of its Canadian closed-end funds into exchange traded funds listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. For the year ended 31 December 2024, three of the exchange traded funds managed by Middlefield were ranked among the Top 10 Best-Performing Canadian ETFs, as recognised by Morningstar*.

Saba has publicly expressed its support for enhanced liquidity options and, consistent with its earlier requisition, has indicated that it would vote in favour of the Transaction at any general meeting of Shareholders to be convened in due course to approve the Transaction.

The ETF

It is proposed that shares in the ETF would be admitted to trading on the London Stock Exchange’s main market for listed securities. In due course, the ETF may also seek listings on additional European exchanges to broaden investor access. The ETF would adopt the Company’s current investment objective and policy, maintaining a focus on delivering a high level of income and long-term capital growth through investment in a portfolio of larger capitalisation, high-yielding Canadian equities, with a focus on companies that consistently pay and grow their dividends. The ETF is expected to pay quarterly distributions at a level similar to the current dividends paid by the Company and to operate with a lower TER, targeted to be below 1 per cent. The Company uses short term borrowings to support its dividend policy. It is intended that the ETF may seek to use financial derivative instruments, such as total return equity swaps, to support its dividend policy with a similar effect to that provided by the use of borrowings by the Company.

Middlefield has appointed HANetf, a leading white-label provider of exchange traded products, to advise on the structuring and establishment of the ETF. HANetf has extensive experience in structuring, distributing and marketing exchange traded funds and will provide ongoing operational, administrative and marketing support to Middlefield in its capacity as the manager of the ETF. The set-up costs of the ETF will be borne by Middlefield.

Expected timetable

Subject to the satisfactory completion of ongoing advisory work, the ETF is expected to be established and a circular relating to the Transaction sent to Shareholders by August 2025. The Transaction would be subject to usual regulatory and tax approvals.

Michael Phair, the Chair of the Company and Fund, commented:

“The Board continues to have strong conviction in the Company’s investment proposition and its ability to deliver a high level of income and long-term capital growth. However, the Board has listened to feedback from Shareholders and recognises that the constrained liquidity and persistent discount to NAV remain impediments to new and further investment.

Accordingly, the Board is actively working on the terms of the Transaction, which, if approved, would provide Shareholders with an opportunity to continue their investment in the existing strategy through the ETF option, or the realisation of their investment at close to NAV, or a combination of both.”

For further information, please contact:

Middlefield Canadian Income – GBP PC via Investec Bank plc
Michael Phair (Chairman)

Investec Bank plc
Corporate Broker
Helen Goldsmith/David Yovichic/Denis Flanagan
Tel: 020 7597 4000

JTC Fund Solutions (Jersey) Limited
Secretary
Matt Tostevin/Hilary Jones/Jade Livesey
Tel: 01534 700 000

Burson Buchanan
PR Advisers
Charles Ryland/Henry Wilson
Tel: 020 7466 5000

* Middlefield Innovation Dividend ETF (Global Equity): over 5 years; Middlefield Sustainable Global Dividend ETF (Global Dividend & Income Equity): over 3, 5 and 10 years; Middlefield U.S. Equity Dividend ETF (US Dividend & Income Equity): over 5 years (source: Morningstar, Inc.) All rights reserved. The information contained herein: (1) is proprietary to Morningstar and/or its content providers; (2) may not be copied or distributed; and (3) is not warranted to be accurate, complete, or timely. Neither Morningstar nor its content providers are responsible for any damages or losses arising from any use of this information.

The MIL Network –

May 2, 2025

MIL-OSI: Shell plc publishes first quarter 2025 press release

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

London, May 2, 2025

“Shell delivered another solid set of results in the first quarter of 2025. We further strengthened our leading LNG business by completing the acquisition of Pavilion Energy, and high-graded our portfolio with the completion of the Nigeria onshore and the Singapore Energy and Chemicals Park divestments.

Our strong performance and resilient balance sheet give us the confidence to commence another $3.5 billion of buybacks for the next three months, consistent with the strategic direction we set out at our Capital Markets Day in March.”

Shell plc Chief Executive Officer, Wael Sawan

SOLID RESULTS; RESILIENT BALANCE SHEET; CONSISTENT DISTRIBUTIONS

Q1 2025 Adjusted Earnings¹ of $5.6 billion reflect strong performance across the business. CFFO excluding working capital was $11.9 billion for the quarter. Working capital outflow was $2.7 billion in Q1 2025.
Strengthened LNG trading and optimisation capabilities with the Pavilion Energy acquisition and high-graded the portfolio with the completion of the divestments of the Singapore Energy and Chemicals Park², and SPDC³ in Nigeria.
Disciplined capital allocation, with 2025 cash capex outlook of $20 – 22 billion.
Commencing another $3.5 billion share buyback programme for the next 3 months, making this the 14^th consecutive quarter of at least $3 billion in buybacks. Total shareholder distributions paid over the last 4 quarters were 45% of CFFO, consistent with the 40 – 50% of CFFO through the cycle distribution target announced at Capital Markets Day 2025.
Resilient balance sheet with gearing (including leases) of 19%.

$ million¹		Adj. Earnings	Adj. EBITDA	CFFO	Cash capex
Integrated Gas		2,483	4,735	3,463	1,116
Upstream		2,337	7,387	3,945	1,923
Marketing		900	1,869	1,907	256
Chemicals & Products⁴		449	1,410	130	458
Renewables & Energy Solutions		(42)	111	367	403
Corporate		(457)	(261)	(531)	19
Less: Non-controlling interest (NCI)		94
Shell	Q1 2025	5,577	15,250	9,281	4,175
Shell	Q4 2024	3,661	14,281	13,162	6,924

¹Income/(loss) attributable to shareholders for Q1 2025 is $4.8 billion. Reconciliation of non-GAAP measures can be found in the unaudited results, available at www.shell.com/investors.
² Completed on April 1, 2025.
³The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited.
⁴Chemicals & Products Adjusted Earnings at a subsegment level are as follows: Chemicals $(0.1) billion and Products $0.6 billion.

CFFO excluding working capital is $11.9 billion in Q1 2025 and reflects tax payments of $2.9 billion. Working capital outflow is $2.7 billion, consistent with outflows as we have seen in the first quarters of recent years.
Net debt of $41.5 billion includes the lease additions related to the Pavilion Energy acquisition as well as a drawdown on the loan facilities provided at the completion of the sale of SPDC in Nigeria.

$ billion¹	Q1 2024	Q2 2024	Q3 2024	Q4 2024	Q1 2025
Working capital	(2.8)	(0.3)	2.7	2.4	(2.7)
Divestment proceeds	1.0	0.8	0.2	0.8	0.6
Free cash flow	9.8	10.2	10.8	8.7	5.3
Net debt	40.5	38.3	35.2	38.8	41.5

¹ Reconciliation of non-GAAP measures can be found in the unaudited results, available at www.shell.com/investors.

Q1 2025 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE DRIVERS

INTEGRATED GAS

Key data	Q4 2024	Q1 2025	Q2 2025 outlook
Realised liquids price ($/bbl)	63	64	—
Realised gas price ($/thousand scf)	8.1	7.4	—
Production (kboe/d)	905	927	890 – 950
LNG liquefaction volumes (MT)	7.1	6.6	6.3 – 6.9
LNG sales volumes (MT)	15.5	16.5	—

Adjusted Earnings were higher than in Q4 2024, reflecting lower exploration well write-offs. Trading and optimisation results were in line with Q4 2024, despite higher unfavourable (non-cash) impact from expiring hedging contracts.
Q2 2025 production and liquefaction outlook reflects higher scheduled maintenance across the portfolio.

UPSTREAM

Key data	Q4 2024	Q1 2025	Q2 2025 outlook
Realised liquids price ($/bbl)	71	71	—
Realised gas price ($/thousand scf)	7.0	7.4	—
Liquids production (kboe/d)	1,332	1,335	—
Gas production (million scf/d)	3,056	3,020	—
Total production (kboe/d)	1,859	1,855	1,560 – 1,760

Adjusted Earnings were higher than in Q4 2024, reflecting lower depreciation following year-end reserves updates and lower well write-offs, partially offset by lower sales volumes.
Q2 2025 production outlook reflects scheduled maintenance and the completed sale of SPDC in March 2025.

MARKETING

Key data	Q4 2024	Q1 2025	Q2 2025 outlook
Marketing sales volumes (kb/d)	2,795	2,674	2,600 – 3,100
Mobility (kb/d)	2,041	1,964	—
Lubricants (kb/d)	77	87	—
Sectors & Decarbonisation (kb/d)	678	623	—

Adjusted Earnings were higher than in Q4 2024, supported by seasonally stronger margins in Lubricants.

CHEMICALS & PRODUCTS

Key data	Q4 2024	Q1 2025	Q2 2025 outlook¹
Refinery processing intake (kb/d)	1,215	1,362	—
Chemicals sales volumes (kT)	2,926	2,813	—
Refinery utilisation (%)	76	85	87 – 95
Chemicals manufacturing plant utilisation (%)	75	81	74 – 82
Global indicative refining margin ($/bbl)	5.5	6.2	—
Global indicative chemical margin ($/t)	138	126	—

¹Following the Singapore Energy and Chemicals Park divestment, IRM, ICM and associated sensitivities have been updated for Q2 2025; see the guidance tab of the Quarterly Databook, available at www.shell.com/investors.

Trading and optimisation results were significantly higher than in Q4 2024 and in line with contributions in Q2 and Q3 of 2024, while the Chemicals results continued to be impacted by a weak margin environment.
Q2 2025 outlook reflects the completed sale of the Energy and Chemicals Park in Singapore.

RENEWABLES & ENERGY SOLUTIONS

Key data	Q4 2024	Q1 2025
External power sales (TWh)	76	76
Sales of pipeline gas to end-use customers (TWh)	165	184
Renewables power generation capacity (GW)*	7.4	7.5
in operation (GW)	3.4	3.5
under construction and/or committed for sale (GW)	4.0	4.0

*Excludes Shell’s equity share of associates where information cannot be obtained.

Adjusted Earnings were higher than in Q4 2024, with higher seasonal demand and volatility driving higher trading and optimisation, particularly in the Americas.

CORPORATE

Key data	Q4 2024	Q1 2025	Q2 2025 outlook
Adjusted Earnings ($ billion)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.6) – (0.4)

UPCOMING INVESTOR EVENTS

May 20, 2025	Annual General Meeting
July 31, 2025	Second quarter 2025 results and dividends
October 30, 2025	Third quarter 2025 results and dividends

USEFUL LINKS

Results materials Q 1 202 5
Quarterly Databook Q 1 20 25
Webcast registration Q 1 20 25
Dividend announcement Q 1 20 25
C apital Mar kets Day 2025 materials

ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE (NON-GAAP) MEASURES
This announcement includes certain measures that are calculated and presented on the basis of methodologies other than in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) such as IFRS, including Adjusted Earnings, Adjusted EBITDA, CFFO excluding working capital movements, free cash flow, Divestment proceeds and Net debt. This information, along with comparable GAAP measures, is useful to investors because it provides a basis for measuring Shell plc’s operating performance and ability to retire debt and invest in new business opportunities. Shell plc’s management uses these financial measures, along with the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures, in evaluating the business performance.

This announcement may contain certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures such as Adjusted Earnings and divestments. We are unable to provide a reconciliation of these forward-looking non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile the non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside the control of the company, such as oil and gas prices, interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, estimating such GAAP measures with the required precision necessary to provide a meaningful reconciliation is extremely difficult and could not be accomplished without unreasonable effort. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future periods which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are estimated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied in Shell plc’s consolidated financial statements.

CAUTIONARY STATEMENT
The companies in which Shell plc directly and indirectly owns investments are separate legal entities. In this announcement, “Shell”, “Shell Group” and “Group” are sometimes used for convenience to reference Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general. Likewise, the words “we”, “us” and “our” are also used to refer to Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general or to those who work for them. These terms are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular entity or entities. “Subsidiaries”, “Shell subsidiaries” and “Shell companies” as used in this announcement refer to entities over which Shell plc either directly or indirectly has control. The terms “joint venture”, “joint operations”, “joint arrangements”, and “associates” may also be used to refer to a commercial arrangement in which Shell has a direct or indirect ownership interest with one or more parties. The term “Shell interest” is used for convenience to indicate the direct and/or indirect ownership interest held by Shell in an entity or unincorporated joint arrangement, after exclusion of all third-party interest.

This announcement contains forward-looking statements (within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) concerning the financial condition, results of operations and businesses of Shell. All statements other than statements of historical fact are, or may be deemed to be, forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are statements of future expectations that are based on management’s current expectations and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in these statements. Forward-looking statements include, among other things, statements concerning the potential exposure of Shell to market risks and statements expressing management’s expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions. These forward-looking statements are identified by their use of terms and phrases such as “aim”; “ambition”; “anticipate”; “aspire”; “aspiration”; ‘‘believe’’; “commit”; “commitment”; ‘‘could’’; “desire”; ‘‘estimate’’; ‘‘expect’’; ‘‘goals’’; ‘‘intend’’; ‘‘may’’; “milestones”; ‘‘objectives’’; ‘‘outlook’’; ‘‘plan’’; ‘‘probably’’; ‘‘project’’; ‘‘risks’’; “schedule”; ‘‘seek’’; ‘‘should’’; ‘‘target’’; “vision”; ‘‘will’’; “would” and similar terms and phrases. There are a number of factors that could affect the future operations of Shell and could cause those results to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements included in this announcement, including (without limitation): (a) price fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas; (b) changes in demand for Shell’s products; (c) currency fluctuations; (d) drilling and production results; (e) reserves estimates; (f) loss of market share and industry competition; (g) environmental and physical risks, including climate change; (h) risks associated with the identification of suitable potential acquisition properties and targets, and successful negotiation and completion of such transactions; (i) the risk of doing business in developing countries and countries subject to international sanctions; (j) legislative, judicial, fiscal and regulatory developments including tariffs and regulatory measures addressing climate change; (k) economic and financial market conditions in various countries and regions; (l) political risks, including the risks of expropriation and renegotiation of the terms of contracts with governmental entities, delays or advancements in the approval of projects and delays in the reimbursement for shared costs; (m) risks associated with the impact of pandemics, regional conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the conflict in the Middle East, and a significant cyber security, data privacy or IT incident; (n) the pace of the energy transition; and (o) changes in trading conditions. No assurance is provided that future dividend payments will match or exceed previous dividend payments. All forward-looking statements contained in this announcement are expressly qualified in their entirety by the cautionary statements contained or referred to in this section. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. Additional risk factors that may affect future results are contained in Shell plc’s Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024 (available at www.shell.com/investors/news-and-filings/sec-filings.html and www.sec.gov). These risk factors also expressly qualify all forward-looking statements contained in this announcement and should be considered by the reader. Each forward-looking statement speaks only as of the date of this announcement, May 2, 2025. Neither Shell plc nor any of its subsidiaries undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement as a result of new information, future events or other information. In light of these risks, results could differ materially from those stated, implied or inferred from the forward-looking statements contained in this announcement.
All amounts shown throughout this announcement are unaudited. The numbers presented throughout this announcement may not sum precisely to the totals provided and percentages may not precisely reflect the absolute figures, due to rounding.
Shell’s Net Carbon Intensity
Also, in this announcement, we may refer to Shell’s “net carbon intensity” (NCI), which includes Shell’s carbon emissions from the production of our energy products, our suppliers’ carbon emissions in supplying energy for that production and our customers’ carbon emissions associated with their use of the energy products we sell. Shell’s NCI also includes the emissions associated with the production and use of energy products produced by others which Shell purchases for resale. Shell only controls its own emissions. The use of the terms Shell’s “net carbon intensity” or NCI is for convenience only and not intended to suggest these emissions are those of Shell plc or its subsidiaries.

Shell’s Net-Zero Emissions Target
Shell’s operating plan and outlook are forecasted for a three-year period and ten-year period, respectively, and are updated every year. They reflect the current economic environment and what we can reasonably expect to see over the next three and ten years. Accordingly, the outlook reflects our Scope 1, Scope 2 and NCI targets over the next ten years. However, Shell’s operating plan and outlook cannot reflect our 2050 net-zero emissions target, as this target is outside our planning period. Such future operating plans and outlooks could include changes to our portfolio, efficiency improvements and the use of carbon capture and storage and carbon credits. In the future, as society moves towards net-zero emissions, we expect Shell’s operating plans and outlooks to reflect this movement. However, if society is not net zero in 2050, as of today, there would be significant risk that Shell may not meet this target.

The content of websites referred to in this announcement does not form part of this announcement.

We may have used certain terms, such as resources, in this announcement that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) strictly prohibits us from including in our filings with the SEC. Investors are urged to consider closely the disclosure in our Form 20-F, File No 1-32575, available on the SEC website www.sec.gov.

The financial information presented in this announcement does not constitute statutory accounts within the meaning of section 434(3) of the Companies Act 2006 (“the Act”). Statutory accounts for the year ended December 31, 2024 were published in Shell’s Annual Report and Accounts, a copy of which was delivered to the Registrar of Companies for England and Wales. The auditor’s report on those accounts was unqualified, did not include a reference to any matters to which the auditor drew attention by way of emphasis without qualifying the report and did not contain a statement under sections 498(2) or 498(3) of the Act.

The information in this announcement does not constitute the unaudited condensed consolidated financial statements which are contained in Shell’s first quarter 2025 unaudited results available on www.shell.com/investors.

CONTACTS

Media: International +44 207 934 5550; U.S. and Canada: C ontact form

The MIL Network –

May 2, 2025

MIL-OSI: Shell plc First Quarter 2025 Interim Dividend

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

London, May 2, 2025 − The Board of Shell plc (the “Company”) (XLON: SHEL, XNYS: SHEL, XAMS: SHELL) today announced an interim dividend in respect of the first quarter of 2025 of US$ 0.358 per ordinary share.

Details relating to the first quarter 2025 interim dividend

Per ordinary share (GB00BP6MXD84)	Q1 2025
Shell Shares (US$)	0.358

Shareholders will be able to elect to receive their dividends in US dollars, euros or pounds sterling.

An alternative ‘Electronic Election Entitlement’ (‘EEE’) process is available in CREST for dividends with options elections.

Absent any valid election to the contrary, persons holding their ordinary shares through Euroclear Nederland will receive their dividends in euros.

Absent any valid election to the contrary, shareholders (both holding in certificated and uncertificated form (CREST members)) and persons holding their shares through the Shell Corporate Nominee will receive their dividends in pounds sterling.

The pound sterling and euro equivalent dividend payments will be announced on June 9, 2025.

Per ADS (US7802593050)	Q1 2025
Shell ADSs (US$)	0.716

Cash dividends on American Depositary Shares (“ADSs”) will be paid, by default, in US dollars.

Each ADS represents two ordinary shares. ADSs are evidenced by an American Depositary Receipt (“ADR”) certificate. In many cases the terms ADR and ADS are used interchangeably.

Dividend timetable for the first quarter 2025 interim dividend

Event	Date
Announcement date	May 2, 2025
Ex- Dividend Date for ADSs	May 16, 2025
Ex- Dividend Date for ordinary shares	May 15, 2025
Record date	May 16, 2025
Closing of currency election date (see Note below)	June 2, 2025
Pound sterling and euro equivalents announcement date	June 9, 2025
Payment date	June 23, 2025

Note

A different currency election date may apply to shareholders holding shares in a securities account with a bank or financial institution ultimately holding through Euroclear Nederland. This may also apply to other shareholders who do not hold their shares either directly on the Register of Members or in the corporate sponsored nominee arrangement. Shareholders can contact their broker, financial intermediary, bank or financial institution for the election deadline that applies.

Taxation – cash dividends

If you are uncertain as to the tax treatment of any dividends you should consult your tax advisor.

Dividend Reinvestment Programmes (“DRIP”)

The following organisations offer Dividend Reinvestment Plans (“DRIPs”) which enable the Company’s shareholders to elect to have their dividend payments used to purchase the Company’s shares:

Equiniti Financial Services Limited (“EFSL”), for those holding shares (a) directly on the register as certificate holder or as CREST Member and (b) via the Shell Corporate Nominee;

ABN-AMRO NV (“ABN”) for Financial Intermediaries holding shares via Euroclear Nederland;

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPM”) for holders of ADSs; and

Other DRIPs may also be available from the intermediary through which investors hold their shares and ADSs.

These DRIP offerors provide their DRIPs fully on their account and not on behalf of the Company. Interested parties should contact the relevant DRIP offeror directly.

More information can be found at https://www.shell.com/drip

To be eligible to participate in the DRIPs for the next dividend, shareholders must make a valid dividend reinvestment election before the published date for the close of elections.

Enquiries
Media: International +44 (0) 207 934 5550; U.S. and Canada: https://www.shell.us/about-us/news-and-insights/media/submit-an-inquiry.html

Cautionary Note

The companies in which Shell plc directly and indirectly owns investments are separate legal entities. In this announcement “Shell”, “Shell Group” and “Group” are sometimes used for convenience to reference Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general. Likewise, the words “we”, “us” and “our” are also used to refer to Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general or to those who work for them. These terms are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular entity or entities. ‘‘Subsidiaries’’, “Shell subsidiaries” and “Shell companies” as used in this announcement refer to entities over which Shell plc either directly or indirectly has control. The terms “joint venture”, “joint operations”, “joint arrangements”, and “associates” may also be used to refer to a commercial arrangement in which Shell has a direct or indirect ownership interest with one or more parties. The term “Shell interest” is used for convenience to indicate the direct and/or indirect ownership interest held by Shell in an entity or unincorporated joint arrangement, after exclusion of all third-party interest.

Forward-Looking statements

This announcement contains forward-looking statements (within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) concerning the financial condition, results of operations and businesses of Shell. All statements other than statements of historical fact are, or may be deemed to be, forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are statements of future expectations that are based on management’s current expectations and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in these statements. Forward-looking statements include, among other things, statements concerning the potential exposure of Shell to market risks and statements expressing management’s expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions. These forward-looking statements are identified by their use of terms and phrases such as “aim”; “ambition”; ‘‘anticipate’’; “aspire”; “aspiration”; ‘‘believe’’; “commit”; “commitment”; ‘‘could’’; “desire”; ‘‘estimate’’; ‘‘expect’’; ‘‘goals’’; ‘‘intend’’; ‘‘may’’; “milestones”; ‘‘objectives’’; ‘‘outlook’’; ‘‘plan’’; ‘‘probably’’; ‘‘project’’; ‘‘risks’’; “schedule”; ‘‘seek’’; ‘‘should’’; ‘‘target’’; “vision”; ‘‘will’’; “would” and similar terms and phrases. There are a number of factors that could affect the future operations of Shell and could cause those results to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements included in this announcement, including (without limitation): (a) price fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas; (b) changes in demand for Shell’s products; (c) currency fluctuations; (d) drilling and production results; (e) reserves estimates; (f) loss of market share and industry competition; (g) environmental and physical risks, including climate change; (h) risks associated with the identification of suitable potential acquisition properties and targets, and successful negotiation and completion of such transactions; (i) the risk of doing business in developing countries and countries subject to international sanctions; (j) legislative, judicial, fiscal and regulatory developments including tariffs and regulatory measures addressing climate change; (k) economic and financial market conditions in various countries and regions; (l) political risks, including the risks of expropriation and renegotiation of the terms of contracts with governmental entities, delays or advancements in the approval of projects and delays in the reimbursement for shared costs; (m) risks associated with the impact of pandemics, regional conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the conflict in the Middle East, and a significant cyber security, data privacy or IT incident; (n) the pace of the energy transition; and (o) changes in trading conditions. No assurance is provided that future dividend payments will match or exceed previous dividend payments. All forward-looking statements contained in this announcement are expressly qualified in their entirety by the cautionary statements contained or referred to in this section. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. Additional risk factors that may affect future results are contained in Shell plc’s Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024 (available at www.shell.com/investors/news-and-filings/sec-filings.html and www.sec.gov). These risk factors also expressly qualify all forward-looking statements contained in this announcement and should be considered by the reader. Each forward-looking statement speaks only as of the date of this announcement, May 2, 2025. Neither Shell plc nor any of its subsidiaries undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement as a result of new information, future events or other information. In light of these risks, results could differ materially from those stated, implied or inferred from the forward-looking statements contained in this announcement.

Shell’s net carbon intensity

Also, in this announcement we may refer to Shell’s “net carbon intensity” (NCI), which includes Shell’s carbon emissions from the production of our energy products, our suppliers’ carbon emissions in supplying energy for that production and our customers’ carbon emissions associated with their use of the energy products we sell. Shell’s NCI also includes the emissions associated with the production and use of energy products produced by others which Shell purchases for resale. Shell only controls its own emissions. The use of the terms Shell’s “net carbon intensity” or NCI is for convenience only and not intended to suggest these emissions are those of Shell plc or its subsidiaries.

Shell’s net-zero emissions target

Forward-Looking non-GAAP measures

This announcement may contain certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures such as adjusted earnings and divestments. We are unable to provide a reconciliation of these forward-looking non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile those non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside the control of Shell, such as oil and gas prices, interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, estimating such GAAP measures with the required precision necessary to provide a meaningful reconciliation is extremely difficult and could not be accomplished without unreasonable effort. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future periods which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are calculated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied in Shell plc’s consolidated financial statements.

The contents of websites referred to in this announcement do not form part of this announcement.

LEI number of Shell plc: 21380068P1DRHMJ8KU70
Classification: Additional regulated information required to be disclosed under the laws of the United Kingdom

The MIL Network –

May 2, 2025

MIL-OSI: Golar entered into 20-year agreements for 5.95mtpa nameplate capacity in Argentina – one of the world’s largest FLNG development projects.
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Golar LNG Limited (“GLNG”, “Golar” or “the Company”) is pleased to announce the Final Investment Decision (“FID”) and fulfilment of all conditions precedent for the 20-year re-deployment charter of the FLNG Hilli Episeyo (“FLNG Hilli” or “Hilli”), first announced on July 5, 2024. The vessel will be chartered to Southern Energy S.A. (“SESA”), offshore Argentina. In addition, Golar and SESA have signed definitive agreements for a 20-year charter for the MKII FLNG, currently under conversion at CIMC Raffles shipyard in Yantai, China. The MKII FLNG charter remains subject to FID and the same regulatory approvals as granted to the FLNG Hilli project, expected within 2025.

Key commercial terms for the respective 20-year charter agreements include:
- FLNG Hilli (nameplate capacity of 2.45 MTPA): Expected contract start-up in 2027, net charter hire to Golar of US$ 285 million per year, plus a commodity linked tariff component of 25% of Free on Board (“FOB”) prices in excess of US$ 8/mmbtu.
- MKII FLNG (nameplate capacity of 3.5 MTPA): Expected contract start-up in 2028, net charter hire to Golar of US$ 400 million per year, plus a commodity linked tariff component of 25% of FOB prices in excess of US$ 8/mmbtu.
The two FLNG agreements are expected to add US$ 13.7 billion in earnings backlog to Golar over 20 years, before adjustments (based on US-CPI) to the charter hire and before commodity linked tariff upside. For every US$ 1/mmbtu above the US$ 8/mmbtu, the total upside for Golar will be approximately US$ 100 million when both FLNGs are in operation. Subject to a 3-year notice and payment of a fee, SESA may reduce the term of the agreement to 12 years for the FLNG Hilli and to 15 years for the MKII FLNG.

The commodity linked tariff component is upside oriented. Golar will make 25% of realized FOB prices above a threshold of US$ 8/mmbtu, with no cap to the upside for gas prices. Golar has also agreed to a mechanism where the charter hire can be partially reduced for FOB prices below US$ 7.5/mmbtu down to a floor of US$ 6/mmbtu. Under this mechanism, the maximum accumulated discount over the life of both contracts has a cap of US$ 210 million, and any outstanding discounted charter hire amounts will be repaid through an additional upside sharing if FOB prices return to levels above US$ 7.5/mmbtu. Golar is not exposed to further downside in the commodity linked FLNG charter mechanism.

SESA is a company formed to enable LNG exports from Argentina. SESA is owned by a consortium of leading Argentinian gas producers including Pan American Energy (30%), YPF (25%), Pampa Energia (20%) and Harbour Energy (15%), as well as Golar (10%). The gas producers have committed to supply their pro-rata share of natural gas to the FLNGs under Gas Sales Agreements (“GSA”) at a fixed price per mmbtu before adjustments (based on US-CPI). Golar’s 10% shareholding in SESA provides additional commodity exposure.

The project has received the full support of the National and Provincial Governments in Argentina that granted all necessary approvals including (i) the first ever unrestricted 30-year LNG export authorization in Argentina; (ii) qualification for the Incentive Regime for Large Investments (“RIGI”); and (iii) provincial approval by the province of Río Negro for the offshore and onshore Environmental Impact Assessments for FLNG Hilli.

The FLNGs will be located in close proximity of each other, offshore in the Gulf of San Matias Gulf in the province of Rio Negro, Argentina. The vessels will monetize gas from the Vaca Muerta formation, the world’s second largest shale gas resource, located onshore in the province of Neuquen, Argentina. FLNG Hilli will initially utilize spare volumes from the existing pipeline network. SESA intends to facilitate for a dedicated pipeline to be constructed from Vaca Muerta to the Gulf of San Matias to serve gas supply to the FLNGs. The project expects to benefit from significant operational efficiencies and synergies from two FLNGs in the same area.

Golar’s CEO, Karl Fredrik Staubo commented: “Golar is excited to partner with the leading gas producers in Argentina in establishing the country as an LNG exporter. The vast resources of the Vaca Muerta formation will provide the LNG market with a reliable long-term source of attractive LNG supplies, and a significant contribution to Argentina. For Golar, the project adds robust earnings backlog, attractive commodity upside potential in the FLNG tariff and strong partner alignment through our shareholding in SESA.”

About SESA:
Southern Energy S.A. is a company founded in 2024 for the purpose of LNG exports of Argentinian natural gas. SESA’s shareholders comprise Pan American Energy (30%), YPF (25%), Pampa Energia (20%), Harbour Energy (15%) and Golar LNG Ltd. (10%). SESA will be responsible for procuring natural gas from the domestic market, and facilitating the necessary infrastructure to bring the natural gas to the flange of the FLNGs in the Gulf of San Matias. SESA will also be responsible for the operations of the FLNGs with support from Golar, and for the marketing and sale of the LNG produced.

About Golar LNG Ltd:
Golar LNG Limited (“GLNG”) is a NASDAQ listed maritime LNG infrastructure company. Through its 79-year history, the company has pioneered maritime LNG infrastructure including the world’s first Floating LNG liquefaction terminal (FLNG) and Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) projects based on the conversion of existing LNG carriers. Today Golar is a leading pure play FLNG company, and the only proven provider of FLNG as a service.

FORWARD LOOKING STATEMENTS
This press release contains forward-looking statements (as defined in Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) which reflect management’s current expectations, estimates and projections about its operations. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, that address activities and events that will, should, could or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Words such as “may,” “could,” “should,” “would,” “expect,” “plan,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “forecast,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “propose,” “potential,” “continue,” “subject to” or the negative of these terms and similar expressions are intended to identify such forward-looking statements.

These statements are not guarantees of future performance and are subject to certain risks, uncertainties and other factors, some of which are beyond our control and are difficult to predict. Therefore, actual outcomes and results may differ materially from what is expressed or forecasted in such forward-looking statements. You should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this press release. Golar LNG Limited undertakes no obligation to update publicly any forward-looking statements whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, unless required by applicable law.

Hamilton, Bermuda
2 May 2025

Investor Questions: +44 207 063 7900
Karl Fredrik Staubo – CEO
Eduardo Maranhão – CFO
Stuart Buchanan – Head of Investor Relations

This information is subject to the disclosure requirements pursuant to Section 5-12 the Norwegian Securities Trading Act

The MIL Network –
May 2, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Keith Rankin Analysis – The Great World War 1914-1945: Germany, Russia, Ukraine

Analysis by Keith Rankin.

Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

On Anzac Day we remembered World War One and World War Two, or at least the peripheral little bits of those imperial wars that New Zealand was involved in. There was and is little context given to how New Zealand got involved with such far-away wars which need never have become world wars. There were the usual cliches about ‘our’ young men, invading the Ottoman Empire, somehow fighting for freedom and democracy; and, through making ‘supreme sacrifices’, establishing the invaders’ national identities. There was very little context about what these anti-German and anti-Japanese wars were really about, and on why we thought anybody could possibly benefit from Aotearoa New Zealand contributing in its own small way to their escalation.

The Great World War 1914-1945

If we step back, we can see that there was really only one very big war; best dubbed as The Great World War 1914-1945 (the GWW, which itself morphed into another in 1945, The Cold War 1945-1990).

The Great World War is really the 1914 to 1945 Russo-German War, embedded in a wider state of conflict that might be called The Great Imperial War.

The subsequent Cold War, essentially the ‘great hegemonic war’, reframed world war; from 1945 it was between the United States imperium and the Communist powers of Russia and China; it was a ‘proxy war’ rather than a passive-aggressive ‘cold war’. The years 1991 to 2021 may prove to have been an intermission, just as 1919 to 1939 was an intermission in the Great World War; and noting that, in the GWW, Russia and Germany became ‘Communist’ and ‘Nazi’ during that intermission. The most important early ‘hot’ conflict in the Cold War was the Korean War, a deadly proxy conflict – at its core between the ‘Anti-Communist’ United States and ‘Communist’ China – ending as a ‘score-draw’; an armistice in 1953 which took the hostile parties back to an almost identical position as to where they started in 1950. For the second phase of the Great Hegemonic War, the ‘Communist’ factor was waned; the prevailing ideology in the west in 2025 is a distorted form of self-congratulatory ‘democratic imperialism’, not unlike the prevailing ideology in the west in 1914.

By looking at 1914 to 1945 in this way, as a single albeit complex conflict, we can more easily see that the essence of the struggle was a conflict between the waxing German and Russian Empires; and that the central prizes of that conflict were the Russian imperial territories of Ukraine and the Caucasus, and the waning Ottoman Empire: food, oil and sea-access in the strategic pivot of central Eurasia.

All (except one) of the world’s ‘great’ empires of the early twentieth century became involved: the waxing empires of Germany, Russia, Japan, and the United States of America; and the waning empires of United Kingdom, France, Ottoman Türkiye, Austria-Hungary and Netherlands. And the would-be empire of Italy. (The exception was the empire of Portugal, a neutral party; in 1898 the United States had acquired Spain’s remnant empire.)

The Result of the Great World War

Wikipedia has page entries for every war ever fought in reality or mythology. And the Wikipedia format likes to give a binary result, as if a war was a series of football matches with a grand finale. Winners and losers. It’s not like that in reality: most wars formally end in an armistice; albeit an armistice in which one party – one nation or coalition of nations – has an advantage and is largely able to dictate terms.

The core war within the Great World War was the Russo-German War, which ended in 1945 with a victory to Russia; then Rusia was the imperium of the ‘Communist’ Soviet Union. The victor of the wider Great Imperial War was the United States; Imperator Americanus inherited a beaten-up world, much as Emperor Augustus inherited the Roman Empire in 27 BCE after about two decades of strife between warring would-be overlords.

The Great World War began in 1914, essentially as the Third Balkan War. The reasons this local war expanded from a part of the world politically and geographically distant from the British Empire – the empire of which New Zealand understood itself to be an integral part – related to a contested set of quasi-scientific socio-economic and supremacist utopias (which will only be addressed here in passing), and to a basic reality that an expansionist western ‘civilisation’ was confronting diminished returns.

Possibly the most important and least understood year of the whole GWW was 1918. The context here is that Russia – Germany’s new great foe, the Russian Empire – had been defeated late in 1917, following both a successful democratic revolution (the February Revolution) and a German-facilitated ‘Communist’ ‘Bolshevik’ coup d’etat (the October Revolution). The formality of Russian defeat – the Brest-Litovsk Treaty – was signed by Leon Trotsky in March 1918. The problem for Germany was that there was still an unresolved western front, there was a British naval blockade of Germany, and that the United States had been persuaded in 1917 to enter the war as an Entente power. Nevertheless, in March 1918, the Germans were winning on the western front having already settled the more-important eastern front; but Germany had no thought-through exit strategy. They were in no position to occupy Belgium, let alone France.

After the trench warfare stalemate that had characterised the western front for more than three years, it was Germany that broke through in the winter of 1917/18; indeed, Germany advanced to just-about big-gun-firing distance from Paris. The western powers were in a state of panic, as Germany redeployed soldiers from the eastern front to the west.

The United States had entered the war in France, but their soldiers were green and initially of little help against battle-hardened Germans. But the American soldiers, without realising the significance, had brought with them a secret weapon, influenza. (The deadly strain of influenza in 1918 – popularly known as the Spanish Flu – was almost certainly a hybrid of the Kansas strain and an Asian strain already in France.) The tide of the war only turned against Germany in August 1918, mainly due to economic limitations but also due in some part to soldiers getting very sick. The sickness had a bigger military impact on Germany, given that Germany’s soldiers (including one A. Hitler) were more hardened fighters than the Americans.

Germany went from winners to losers only in the last three months, from August to November 1918; it was like a basketball game in which defeat was snatched from the jaws of victory (or vice versa, from a western viewpoint!). But they were never losers in the absolute sense that they later were, in 1945. On 11 November 1918, Germany settled for an armistice in which they were on the back foot. It was not an absolute defeat, and should never have been seen as such. Nevertheless, that sensible armistice came to be treated by the Entente Powers (especially France, the United Kingdom and the United States) as an absolute victory; Germany, victor over Russia, was subsequently treated with great and unnecessary humiliation, creating the seeds for a resumption of the Great World War. Part of that humiliation was the stripping of the territories in the incipient Soviet Union that had been won by Germany (especially the loss of Ukraine); another important part was the imposition of a ‘Polish Corridor’, through Eastern Germany to the Baltic Sea at the then-German city of Danzig, physically dividing Germany.

A third humiliation was a set of reparations that were imposed using similar mercantilist logic to that which is upsetting the world economic order today; Germany was supposed to pay France in particular huge amounts of gold, but the only way Germany could acquire that gold was for Germany to run a trade surplus and for the Entente Powers to run trade deficits. But the ‘victorious’ powers wanted to run trade surpluses, not trade deficits; they wanted Germany to increase its debt to the west while claiming that they wanted Germany to pay off its debt to the west.

(Today, the United States wants its Treasury to accumulate treasure in the same way that it and France sought to do in the 1920s, not realising that the countries they want to extract ‘modern treasure’ from – China and the European Union – can only get that treasure if they run trade surpluses. The great ‘modern treasure’ mine is actually in Washington, not in Eurasia.)

One result of all this mercantilism imposed upon the 1920s’ world order by the liberal Entente powers was the Great Depression; that was probably the number-one catalyst towards the resumption of the Great World War in 1939 and the Russo-German War in 1941. This ‘liberal mercantilism’ was the first of the pseudo-scientific utopias to fail. Other aggravating factors were the intensification of the contradictions of the other two ‘scientific utopias’: the unachievable ‘Communist’ experiment in Russia, and the exacerbation of the supremacist eugenics which was widely subscribed to throughout Europe and which reached their apotheosis in Hitler’s Germany.

A defeated Russia played no part in the formal hostilities of the GWW in 1918. Likewise, when the Great World War resumed in 1939, Russia appeared to be on the sideline; though that’s another story. The true nature of the resumed GWW – known as World War Two in the west – became apparent in June 1941. The war continued for nearly four terrible years, with Soviet Russia prevailing over Nazi Germany in 1945, with some help from the western powers. Russia will celebrate Victory Day in a few days on 9 May; the end of the Russo-German War, though the Great World War continued until 15 August of that year. As regards the result of the Russo-German War, the western Entente powers were kingmakers rather than kings.

Overall, freedom and democracy were casualties of the GWW, not outcomes. By 1950, there were many more unfree people in the world, and few (India notwithstanding) who were more free than they had been in 1913. Indians’ post-GWW freedoms came at a huge cost in damaged and lost lives. And they were freedoms from Britain, not freedoms fought for by Britain.

Ukraine

Chief among the territories won-and-lost by Germany was Ukraine. Considered in its entirety, Ukraine was the number-one prize and the number-one battleground of the Great World War.

The territory of Ukraine had been occupied by Germany for five years: 1918, and 1941 to 1944. In 1918, Germany lost Ukraine because of events on the western front; in 1945 the Soviet Union recovered Ukraine on the battlefield. Soviet Russia was helped by three imperial nations throughout the active phases of the GWW; by the British, the French, and the Americans. Otherwise, Germany – the Prussian Empire – would have almost certainly prevailed in its quest for Ukraine, and the oilfields around the Caspian Sea (and possibly the so-called ‘Middle East’, though that may have been permanently lost to Germany in 1918).

With Ukraine once again being centre-stage in geopolitics – the contested ground between conflicting quasi-academic narratives – the world may be set for a resumption of both the Cold War (especially in its mercantilist Sino-American guise) and the Russo-German war. Together, these have the makings of ‘World War Three’; especially if we add in the Levantine conflict, the present supremacist conflict in the ‘Middle East’.

In the geopolitics of early 2025, the ‘elephant in the room’ is Friedrich Merz, who will (eventually!) become Chancellor of Germany on 6 May. Merz is a military hawk, who has already shown all the signs that he would like to take the Ukraine War to Russia (ref. Berlin Briefing, DW, 24 April 2015), and elite public opinion in Germany seems to be staunchly ‘pro-Ukraine’. In the event of a new global Great Depression – or the Geoeconomic Chaos Crisis that seems to be starting – could Merz become the new Führer, a ‘willing’ militarist leader of the Fourth Reich? At age 69 he’s a young man compared to Donald Trump, and he looks to be fighting fit. Germany has many of the same issues today that it had in 1910 and in 1930; a people seeking to re-flex their nationalist muscles while severely constrained, within their German and EU boundaries, in terms of natural resources. Will Merz try to shore up (and militarize) the flagging European Union, much as Trump has been trying (unsuccessfully to be sure) to unite the whole of the Americas under his triumphalist banner? (Q. How do you get to run a small superpower? A. Get yourself a large superpower, and wait.) The battle for Ukraine may have a while to run yet; possibly as a European ‘civil’ war, a new Russo-German War.

Anzac Day

My sense is that if there’s one thing that Aotearoa’s post-2023 leadership are even more attracted to than fiscal austerity, then that’s a good geopolitical scrap. We start to see war as glorious rather than ugly. We bring out all the false clichés and narratives, we extoll the likes of Winston Churchill, we self-suppress the inconvenient truth that war is a nasty, nasty, nasty business; indeed, we self-suppress this truth even when we see war’s brutality – or could see it if we choose to watch Freeview Channel 20 – unfolding every day.

Now that the 80th anniversary of the Great World War has nearly passed, Anzac Day risks becoming a day of martial geo-nationalism, and not a day of remembrance.

Anzac Day has already become a day of highly selective remembrance; probably it always was. I visited Würzburg (the German firebombed city that suffered more than any other on a per capita basis) in 1974, and I visited West and East Berlin (via Checkpoint Charlie) that same year. I visited Arras in 1975, near to where my father’s first cousin died in November 1918. I visited Derry and Belfast in 1976, cities in a then-active civil war zone. I visited the magnificently-sited Khartoum in 1978, now the capital-centre of the world’s most complicit and under-narrated tragedy. I visited Cassino in 1984, the 40th anniversary of the battles that pointlessly took so many lives, including Kiwi lives such as that of my mother’s first cousin. I visited Dandong and Seoul in 2008, gaining a first-hand insight into the Korean War, including a walk on the American-destroyed bridge and an oversight of the North Korean city of Sinuiju. (And I visited Port Arthur – Lüshun – key site and sight of the Russia-Japan War of 1905, with its natural harbour and its extant Russian train station.)

And in 2014, on the day after Anzac Day, I visited Nagasaki, site of the first plutonium bomb ever dropped over a city; and, that same month, I visited Ginza and Asakusa in Tokyo, rebuilt sites of the worst example every of a conventional fire holocaust; 100,000 mostly civilian deaths in one March night eighty years ago. (I was also lucky to get to walk through unbombed streets to the northwest of Ueno Park, getting a sense of what the neighbourhoods of Asakusa were once like.)

Lest we forget. Mostly, we have forgotten. (Including the worst of The Holocaust. Who commemorates Treblinka today? Or Minsk? Only Poland and Russia and Belarus.)

Our amnesia extends to one place New Zealanders fought in. This week Al Jazeera has done a series of news vignettes and a longer documentary, to remember the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War. This anniversary has not been prominent in New Zealand’s Anzac Day media-scape. (RNZ did run a Reuters-syndicated website-only story on 30 April: Vietnamese celebrate 50 years since end of Vietnam War. And, to its credit, TV3 News ran an overseas-sourced story yesterday, not a story about New Zealand’s largely-forgotten participation.) By-and-large, the still-living anti-Vietnam-War generation is now silent, apparently forgetful.

When martial narratives are not sufficiently contested, then wars – big wars – happen, almost by accident. That’s how the Great World War began in the first place.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: SPC Severe Thunderstorm Watch 208

Source: US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Note: The expiration time in the watch graphic is amended if the watch is replaced, cancelled or extended.Note: Click for Watch Status Reports.
SEL8

URGENT – IMMEDIATE BROADCAST REQUESTED
Severe Thunderstorm Watch Number 208
NWS Storm Prediction Center Norman OK
1055 PM CDT Thu May 1 2025

The NWS Storm Prediction Center has issued a

* Severe Thunderstorm Watch for portions of
Western, Central, and Eastern Oklahoma
North Texas

* Effective this Thursday night and Friday morning from 1055 PM
until 700 AM CDT.

* Primary threats include…
Scattered large hail and isolated very large hail events to 2.5
inches in diameter possible
Scattered damaging wind gusts to 70 mph possible
A tornado or two possible

SUMMARY…A broken band of thunderstorms will likely continue east
into the Watch tonight. Scattered storm development near a frontal
zone is forecast, in addition to upscale growth into an eastward
moving squall line. Large to very large hail will be possible with
the stronger cells. Severe gusts are possible with the more intense
portions of the squall line. A threat for a brief tornado cannot be
ruled out mainly across south-central Oklahoma into eastern Oklahoma
late tonight.

The severe thunderstorm watch area is approximately along and 85
statute miles north and south of a line from 45 miles west northwest
of Altus OK to 65 miles east of Mcalester OK. For a complete
depiction of the watch see the associated watch outline update
(WOUS64 KWNS WOU8).

PRECAUTIONARY/PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS…

REMEMBER…A Severe Thunderstorm Watch means conditions are
favorable for severe thunderstorms in and close to the watch area.
Persons in these areas should be on the lookout for threatening
weather conditions and listen for later statements and possible
warnings. Severe thunderstorms can and occasionally do produce
tornadoes.

&&

OTHER WATCH INFORMATION…CONTINUE…WW 205…WW 207…

AVIATION…A few severe thunderstorms with hail surface and aloft to
2.5 inches. Extreme turbulence and surface wind gusts to 60 knots. A
few cumulonimbi with maximum tops to 500. Mean storm motion vector
27035.

…Smith

SEL8

URGENT – IMMEDIATE BROADCAST REQUESTED
Severe Thunderstorm Watch Number 208
NWS Storm Prediction Center Norman OK
1055 PM CDT Thu May 1 2025

The NWS Storm Prediction Center has issued a

* Severe Thunderstorm Watch for portions of
Western, Central, and Eastern Oklahoma
North Texas

* Effective this Thursday night and Friday morning from 1055 PM
until 700 AM CDT.

* Primary threats include…
Scattered large hail and isolated very large hail events to 2.5
inches in diameter possible
Scattered damaging wind gusts to 70 mph possible
A tornado or two possible

SUMMARY…A broken band of thunderstorms will likely continue east
into the Watch tonight. Scattered storm development near a frontal
zone is forecast, in addition to upscale growth into an eastward
moving squall line. Large to very large hail will be possible with
the stronger cells. Severe gusts are possible with the more intense
portions of the squall line. A threat for a brief tornado cannot be
ruled out mainly across south-central Oklahoma into eastern Oklahoma
late tonight.

The severe thunderstorm watch area is approximately along and 85
statute miles north and south of a line from 45 miles west northwest
of Altus OK to 65 miles east of Mcalester OK. For a complete
depiction of the watch see the associated watch outline update
(WOUS64 KWNS WOU8).

PRECAUTIONARY/PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS…

REMEMBER…A Severe Thunderstorm Watch means conditions are
favorable for severe thunderstorms in and close to the watch area.
Persons in these areas should be on the lookout for threatening
weather conditions and listen for later statements and possible
warnings. Severe thunderstorms can and occasionally do produce
tornadoes.

&&

OTHER WATCH INFORMATION…CONTINUE…WW 205…WW 207…

AVIATION…A few severe thunderstorms with hail surface and aloft to
2.5 inches. Extreme turbulence and surface wind gusts to 60 knots. A
few cumulonimbi with maximum tops to 500. Mean storm motion vector
27035.

…Smith

Note: The Aviation Watch (SAW) product is an approximation to the watch area. The actual watch is depicted by the shaded areas.
SAW8
WW 208 SEVERE TSTM OK TX 020355Z – 021200Z
AXIS..85 STATUTE MILES NORTH AND SOUTH OF LINE..
45WNW LTS/ALTUS OK/ – 65E MLC/MCALESTER OK/
..AVIATION COORDS.. 75NM N/S /34NNE CDS – 35SSW FSM/
HAIL SURFACE AND ALOFT..2.5 INCHES. WIND GUSTS..60 KNOTS.
MAX TOPS TO 500. MEAN STORM MOTION VECTOR 27035.

LAT…LON 36130000 36099463 33649463 33660000

THIS IS AN APPROXIMATION TO THE WATCH AREA. FOR A
COMPLETE DEPICTION OF THE WATCH SEE WOUS64 KWNS
FOR WOU8.

Watch 208 Status Report Message has not been issued yet.

Note: Click for Complete Product Text.Tornadoes

Probability of 2 or more tornadoes

Low (20%)

Probability of 1 or more strong (EF2-EF5) tornadoes

Low (5%)

Wind

Probability of 10 or more severe wind events

Mod (50%)

Probability of 1 or more wind events > 65 knots

Low (20%)

Hail

Probability of 10 or more severe hail events

Mod (40%)

Probability of 1 or more hailstones > 2 inches

Mod (40%)

Combined Severe Hail/Wind

Probability of 6 or more combined severe hail/wind events

High (80%)

For each watch, probabilities for particular events inside the watch (listed above in each table) are determined by the issuing forecaster. The “Low” category contains probability values ranging from less than 2% to 20% (EF2-EF5 tornadoes), less than 5% to 20% (all other probabilities), “Moderate” from 30% to 60%, and “High” from 70% to greater than 95%. High values are bolded and lighter in color to provide awareness of an increased threat for a particular event.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Ending Taxpayer Subsidization Of Biased Media

US Senate News:

Source: The White House
class=”has-text-align-left”>By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1. Purpose. National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) receive taxpayer funds through the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB). Unlike in 1967, when the CPB was established, today the media landscape is filled with abundant, diverse, and innovative news options. Government funding of news media in this environment is not only outdated and unnecessary but corrosive to the appearance of journalistic independence.
At the very least, Americans have the right to expect that if their tax dollars fund public broadcasting at all, they fund only fair, accurate, unbiased, and nonpartisan news coverage. No media outlet has a constitutional right to taxpayer subsidies, and the Government is entitled to determine which categories of activities to subsidize. The CPB’s governing statute reflects principles of impartiality: the CPB may not “contribute to or otherwise support any political party.” 47 U.S.C. 396(f)(3); see also id. 396(e)(2).
The CPB fails to abide by these principles to the extent it subsidizes NPR and PBS. Which viewpoints NPR and PBS promote does not matter. What does matter is that neither entity presents a fair, accurate, or unbiased portrayal of current events to taxpaying citizens.
I therefore instruct the CPB Board of Directors (CPB Board) and all executive departments and agencies (agencies) to cease Federal funding for NPR and PBS.
Sec. 2. Instructions to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. (a) The CPB Board shall cease direct funding to NPR and PBS, consistent with my Administration’s policy to ensure that Federal funding does not support biased and partisan news coverage. The CPB Board shall cancel existing direct funding to the maximum extent allowed by law and shall decline to provide future funding.
(b) The CPB Board shall cease indirect funding to NPR and PBS, including by ensuring that licensees and permittees of public radio and television stations, as well as any other recipients of CPB funds, do not use Federal funds for NPR and PBS. To effectuate this directive, the CPB Board shall, before June 30, 2025, revise the 2025 Television Community Service Grants General Provisions and Eligibility Criteria and the 2025 Radio Community Service Grants General Provisions and Eligibility Criteria to prohibit direct or indirect funding of NPR and PBS. To the extent permitted by the 2024 Television Community Service Grants General Provisions and Eligibility Criteria, the 2024 Radio Community Service Grants General Provisions and Eligibility Criteria, and applicable law, the CPB Board shall also prohibit parties subject to these provisions from funding NPR or PBS after the date of this order. In addition, the CPB Board shall take all other necessary steps to minimize or eliminate its indirect funding of NPR and PBS.
Sec. 3. Instructions to Other Agencies. (a) The heads of all agencies shall identify and terminate, to the maximum extent consistent with applicable law, any direct or indirect funding of NPR and PBS.
(b) After taking the actions specified in subsection (a) of this section, the heads of all agencies shall identify any remaining grants, contracts, or other funding instruments entered into with NPR or PBS and shall determine whether NPR and PBS are in compliance with the terms of those instruments. In the event of a finding of noncompliance, the head of the relevant agency shall take appropriate steps under the terms of the instrument.
(c) The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall determine whether “the Public Broadcasting Service and National Public Radio (or any successor organization)” are complying with the statutory mandate that “no person shall be subjected to discrimination in employment . . . on the grounds of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.” 47 U.S.C. 397(15), 398(b). In the event of a finding of noncompliance, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall take appropriate corrective action.
Sec. 4. Severability. If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any agency, person, or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its provisions to any other agencies, persons, or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
                              DONALD J. TRUMP
THE WHITE HOUSE,
    May 1, 2025.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: National Day of Prayer, 2025

US Senate News:

Source: The White House
class=”has-text-align-center”>BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
From the earliest days of our Nation’s journey, America has been guided by the grace of Almighty God. Beginning with the opening prayer at the First Continental Congress in 1774, our faith has perpetually stood as the summit of our strength, the source of our unity, and the fount of our greatness. This National Day of Prayer, we thank God for His endless blessings ‑- and we ask Him to grant us fortitude, wisdom, and a renewed spirit of justice as we continue the work to save our country and restore our national promise.
Across every chapter of our grand American story — from General George Washington’s humble prayer at Valley Forge to Reverend Billy Graham’s legendary rallies in the heart of Manhattan to the somber National Prayer Service in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, our greatest leaders have always recognized the necessity of faith, prayer, and devotion to God. As President Washington famously stated in his seminal Farewell Address, “Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports.”
For these reasons, my Administration is fighting to defend America’s longstanding legacy of prayer, faith, and trust in God. As President, I proudly established Task Forces to eradicate religious bias by combatting anti-Semitic, anti-Christian, and additional forms of anti-religious bias. They are charged with the mandate to identify and eliminate all anti‑religious policies, practices, and conduct in executive departments and agencies. In addition, I established the White House Faith Office in order to strengthen our families and to protect our religious freedom. I will never waver in safeguarding the right to religious liberty and protecting God in our public square.
Nine months ago on July 13, 2024, my faith took on new meaning. An assassin’s bullet came within a quarter of an inch of ending my life. In that instant, as Secret Service crowded around and knocked me to the ground, I felt what seemed to be the supernatural hand of God. I believe that God spared my life for a reason — to save our country and restore America to greatness. It serves as a sacred reminder of our Creator’s infinite goodness, guidance, and grace.
Through America’s victories and defeats, triumphs and setbacks, and periods of peace and times of war, the divine force of prayer has unfailingly sustained our people, our culture, and our beloved Nation. It was faith that guided our ancestors across turbulent waters to Plymouth Rock. It was faith that inspired our Founding Fathers to put in writing those immortal words, “All men are created equal.” It is faith that freed our Nation from the clutches of tyranny nearly 250 years ago, and it is faith that has rescued our freedom from forces of evil time and time again.
This National Day of Prayer, we recognize that the true strength of the American spirit has always been found in churches, chapels, pews, parishes and synagogues, and the hearts and souls of our citizens of faith. Today and every day, we bow our heads in prayer to thank God for His countless gifts and to ask for His divine protection. Above all, we acknowledge that prayer is the foundation of our past, the guiding hand of our present, and the light of our future.
In 1988, the Congress, by Public Law 100-307, as amended, called on the President to issue each year a proclamation designating the first Thursday in May as a National Day of Prayer, “on which the people of the United States may turn to God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals.”
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim May 1, 2025, as a National Day of Prayer. I encourage all Americans to observe this day, reflecting on the blessings our Nation has received and the importance of prayer, with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities in their houses of worship, communities, and places of work, schools, and homes.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this first day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.
DONALD J. TRUMP

MIL OSI USA News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: National Fallen Firefighters Memorial Weekend, 2025

US Senate News:

Source: The White House
class=”has-text-align-center”>BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
Day and night, firefighters are on the front lines, rushing into danger and risking their lives to protect fellow citizens. Tragically, not every hero makes it home. The National Fallen Firefighters Memorial Weekend, held in Emmitsburg, Maryland, commemorates the volunteer and professional firefighters who, over the past year, have sacrificed their lives in the line of duty.
Thousands will gather to honor the lives and legacies of the fallen, to support the Fire Hero Families, to grieve and share memories, and to strengthen bonds between those who uniquely understand both the enduring pride and the profound loss of their loved ones. Across the country, brave men and women demonstrate heroism each day, willingly placing themselves in harm’s way for the benefit of others. We are indebted to every American who chooses this noble profession — this solemn calling — in spite of the inherent risks.
There are pivotal moments in American history in which the awe-inspiring bravery and professionalism of firefighters stand forever imprinted on our memory. On September 11, 2001, firefighters rushed into the smoke and flames of the twin towers following the horrific terrorist attacks. In January of this year, firefighters worked tirelessly to contain the fury of the deadly and destructive wildfires that raged through southern California. These phenomenal efforts make us proud and grateful for those who stand in the gap for our safety.
One firefighter will forever hold a profound place in my life — Corey Comperatore, who lost his life shielding his family from the barrage of assassin’s bullets that pierced the air during my rally last July in Butler, Pennsylvania. His bravery and selflessness on that fateful day exemplify the dedication and courage that define America’s cadre of firefighters.
The First Lady and I are grateful for the devotion of all who serve their communities and our country in this extraordinary way. Firefighters often enter our lives only when something has gone catastrophically wrong, yet they stand ready every day to protect our people and communities. This National Fallen Firefighters Memorial Weekend, we remember the American patriots who gave their lives in service to others, and pray for the courageous families who carry on in their absence.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim May 3 through May 4, 2025, as National Fallen Firefighters Memorial Weekend. On Sunday, May 4, 2025, in accordance with Public Law 107-51, the flag of the United States will be flown at half-staff at all Federal office buildings in honor of the National Fallen Firefighters Memorial Service.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this first day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.
DONALD J. TRUMP

MIL OSI USA News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Ends the Taxpayer Subsidization of Biased Media

US Senate News:

Source: The White House
ENDING TAXPAYER SUBSIDIZATION OF BIASED MEDIA: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order ending the taxpayer subsidization of National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS).
NPR and PBS receive tens of millions of dollars in taxpayer funds each year, primarily from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB).
The Order ceases federal funding to NPR and PBS to the maximum extent allowed by law.
It also ceases indirect funding to PBS and NPR by prohibiting local public radio and television stations and any other recipients of CPB funds from using taxpayer dollars to support these organizations.
The Order mandates that the CPB revise its 2025 General Provisions to explicitly prohibit direct or indirect funding to NPR and PBS.
It directs all federal agencies to terminate any direct or indirect funding to NPR and PBS and to review existing grants and contracts for compliance.
The Order instructs the FCC and relevant agencies to investigate whether NPR and PBS have engaged in unlawful discrimination.
EXPOSING BIAS IN PUBLIC BROADCASTING: NPR and PBS have fueled partisanship and left-wing propaganda with taxpayer dollars, which is highly inappropriate and an improper use of taxpayers’ money, as President Trump has stated.
Unlike in 1967, when CPB was established, today the media landscape is filled with abundant, diverse, and innovative news options, making government funding of news media outdated, unnecessary, and corrosive to journalistic independence.
Moreover, while the CPB is legally mandated to be “nonpolitical [in] nature” and not “contribute to or otherwise support any political party,” both NPR and PBS make significant in-kind contributions to the Democrat party and its political causes.
An NPR editor found that registered Democrats outnumbered Republicans 87 to zero in the newsroom’s editorial positions.
NPR’s President and CEO admitted that she regards “truth” as a harmful “distraction” from NPR’s objectives.
To illustrate its partisan capture, NPR management asked its editors to avoid the term “biological sex” when discussing transgender issues.
NPR has run stories defending looting and suggesting that crime fears are racist and has described its diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) practices as “inseparable” from its content.
NPR refused to cover the Hunter Biden laptop story, calling it a waste of time and a distraction, despite that it was highly relevant to the presidential election.
NPR repeatedly insisted COVID-19 did not originate in a lab and refused to explore the theory.
The FBI, CIA, and Department of Energy have all since deemed the lab-leak theory the likely cause.

NPR ran a Valentine’s Day feature around “queer animals,” in which it suggested the make-believe clownfish in “Finding Nemo” would’ve been better off as a female, that “banana slugs are hermaphrodites,” and that “some deer are nonbinary.”
Research shows that “congressional Republicans faced 85% negative coverage, compared to 54% positive coverage of congressional Democrats,” on PBS’s flagship news program.
Over a six-month period, PBS News Hour used versions of the term “far-right” 162 times, but “far-left” only 6 times.
A PBS station featured drag queen Lil Miss Hot Mess on a program meant for kids ages 3-8.
PBS produced a movie titled “Real Boy” which celebrates a transgender teen’s transition.
PBS show Sesame Street partnered with CNN for a town hall aimed presenting children with a one-sided narrative to “address racism” amid the Black Lives Matter riots.
PBS’s coverage of the 2024 Republican National Convention was 72% negative, while its coverage of the 2024 Democratic National Convention was 88% positive.
No media outlet has a Constitutional right to taxpayer subsidized operations, and it’s highly inappropriate for taxpayers to be forced to subsidize biased, partisan content.
SAFEGUARDING TAXPAYER DOLLARS: President Trump is working to ensure taxpayer dollars are no longer wasted on progressive pet projects, but rather used to benefit hardworking Americans.
President Trump established the “Department of Government Efficiency” to examine how to streamline the federal government, eliminate unnecessary programs, and reduce bureaucratic inefficiency.
President Trump launched a 10-to-1 deregulation initiative, ensuring every new rule is justified by clear benefits.
President Trump terminated DEI discrimination in the federal workforce, and in federal contracting and spending.
The Trump Administration is aggressively investigating Biden-era programs that wasted billions of taxpayer dollars on inefficient and politically-driven projects, including canceling unnecessary government contracts and grants that do not serve the national interest.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Loyalty Day and Law Day, U.S.A., 2025

US Senate News:

Source: The White House
class=”has-text-align-center”>BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
The rule of law is the capstone of our constitutional order and the crown jewel of the American way of life. Beginning with the ratification of the Constitution, people and nations near and far have looked to the United States as a guiding light of liberty and justice. As our Nation commemorates Law Day, U.S.A., and Loyalty Day, we reaffirm our loyalty to the Constitution, and we renew our pledge to preserve and protect our glorious inheritance of fairness, equality, and freedom against all threats, foreign and domestic.
For centuries, the world has revered America for its devotion to the timeless principle of equal justice under the law. Tragically, in recent years, our constitutional heritage faced an existential threat from a political class that abandoned justice in favor of political retribution. Under the previous administration, Federal law enforcement agencies outrageously allowed violent criminals to roam our streets with impunity while targeting parents, churchgoers, political opponents, and ordinary citizens. This weaponization of our Government is a threat to our sovereignty and is antithetical to our Nation’s most sacred principles, reminiscent of evil communist regimes.
This erosion of the American justice system ended the moment I took the oath of office. Under my leadership, our Federal law enforcement agencies are again being guided by the cornerstone American principles of fairness and impartiality — and the constitutional rights of every American citizen are being swiftly restored.
As we continue the work to restore justice in our courtrooms, order on our streets, and respect for our laws, we solemnly remember the more than 100 million victims of communism in the 20th century whose lives were viciously taken, and we stand in solidarity with the innumerable people across the world currently under captivity by communist leaders.
First proclaimed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1955, Loyalty Day was inaugurated to directly counter commemorations of May Day — which was frequently celebrated by communist groups — and to serve as a beacon of hope to all those still blighted by the horrors and injustices of communism and tyranny. To this day, America is a living reminder that the precepts of our Nation’s Founding will always transcend the evils wrought by communism and dictatorship. As President Ronald Reagan famously remarked in his 1989 Farewell Address, our Nation stands before the entire world as a “tall, proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, wind-swept, God-blessed, and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace.”
For nearly 250 years, the United States had proudly carried forth a grand tradition of legal and political thought stretching back to the earliest days of Western civilization. Today, we acknowledge that our commitment to the constitutional rule of law is our pride, our glory, and an enduring source of American greatness. We recognize that love of country requires loyalty to country — and that a Nation without the free and impartial rule of law is not a Nation at all. Above all, we vow to usher in a new era of justice, integrity, and honor in our culture, in our courtrooms, and in our halls of Government.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim May 1, 2025, as Loyalty Day, and in accordance with Public Law 87–20, as amended, as Law Day, U.S.A. I call on all Americans to observe this day by reflecting upon the importance of the rule of law in our Nation and displaying the flag of the United States in support of this national observance, as well as by learning more about the proud history of our Nation. I urge all Government officials to display the flag of the United States on all Government buildings and grounds on this day.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this first day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.
DONALD J. TRUMP

MIL OSI USA News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai meets Japan’s LDP Youth Division delegation

Source: Republic of China Taiwan

Details
2025-04-29
President Lai meets NBR delegation
On the morning of April 29, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation from the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). In remarks, President Lai stated that as Taiwan stands at the very frontline of defense of global democracy, we are actively implementing our Four Pillars of Peace action plan, which includes continuing to enhance our national defense capabilities, demonstrating our commitment to defending freedom and democracy. The president said he hopes to further advance national security and industrial cooperation between Taiwan and the United States. He also expressed hope that this will help boost economic resilience for both sides and establish each as a key pillar of regional security, elevating our relations to even higher levels. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I am delighted to meet with Admiral John Aquilino again today. I also warmly welcome NBR President Michael Wills and our distinguished guests from the bureau to Taiwan. I look forward to exchanging views with you all on Taiwan-US relations and the regional situation. During his tenure as commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Aquilino placed much attention on the Taiwan Strait issue. And the NBR has conducted a wealth of research and analysis focusing on matters of regional security. Thanks to all of your outstanding contributions and efforts, the international community has gained a better understanding of the role Taiwan plays in the Indo-Pacific region and in global democratic development. For this, I want to extend my deepest gratitude. Taiwan stands at the very frontline of defending global democracy and is located at a strategically important location in the first island chain. We are actively implementing our Four Pillars of Peace action plan, which includes continuing to enhance our national defense capabilities, building economic security, demonstrating stable and principled cross-strait leadership, and standing side-by-side with the democratic community to jointly demonstrate the strength of deterrence and safeguard regional peace and stability. At the beginning of this month, I announced an increase in military allowances for volunteer service members and combat troops. The government will also continue to reform national defense and enhance self-sufficiency in defense. In addition, we will prioritize special budget allocations to ensure that Taiwan’s defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP. These efforts continue to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities and demonstrate our commitment to defending freedom and democracy. As we mark the 46th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, we thank the US government for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan and strengthening the Taiwan-US partnership over the years. We believe that, in addition to engaging in military exchanges and cooperation, Taiwan and the US can build an even closer economic and trade relationship, boosting each other’s economic resilience and establishing each as a key pillar of regional security. I expect that your continued assistance will help advance national security and industrial cooperation between Taiwan and the US, elevating our relations to even higher levels. Once again, I welcome our distinguished guests to Taiwan and wish you a pleasant and successful trip. I hope that through this visit, you gain a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding of Taiwan’s economy and national defense. Admiral Aquilino then delivered remarks, thanking the Ministry of National Defense for the invitation and President Lai for receiving and spending time with them. Mentioning that this is his second visit in five months, he said he continues to be incredibly impressed with the president’s leadership and the actions he has taken to secure Taiwan and defend its people. Admiral Aquilino said that he has watched the efforts of the ministers on whole-of-society defense to demonstrate deterrence and added that the pace of the work is nothing short of inspiring. Admiral Aquilino noted that Taiwan’s thriving democracy is incredibly important to the peace and stability of the region. He stated that he, alongside the NBR, will continue to offer support, noting that President Wills and his team are an asset to Taiwan and the US that helps continue our close relationship and ensure peace and stability in the region.

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2025-04-28
President Lai meets Japanese Diet Member and former Minister of State for Economic Security Takaichi Sanae
On the afternoon of April 28, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Member of the Japanese House of Representatives and former Minister of State for Economic Security Takaichi Sanae. In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of Japan for repeatedly emphasizing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait at important international venues. The president expressed hope that in the face of China’s continually expanding red supply chains, Taiwan and Japan can continue to cooperate closely in such fields as semiconductors, energy, and AI technology to create non-red supply chains that enhance economic resilience and industrial competitiveness for both sides, and jointly pave the way for further prosperity and growth in the Indo-Pacific region. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: First, I would like to extend a warm welcome to Representative Takaichi as she returns for another visit to Taiwan. I am also very happy to have Members of the House of Representatives Kikawada Hitoshi and Ozaki Masanao, and Member of the House of Councillors Sato Kei all gathered together here to engage in these very important exchanges. Our visitors will be taking part in many exchange activities during this trip. Earlier today at the Indo-Pacific Strategy Thinktank’s International Political and Economic Forum, Representative Takaichi delivered a speech in which she clearly demonstrated the great importance she places upon the friendship between Taiwan and Japan. For this I want to express my deepest appreciation to each of our guests. The peoples of Taiwan and Japan have a deep friendship and mutual trust. We have a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights, but beyond that, we both have striven to contribute to regional peace and stability. I also want to thank the government of Japan for repeatedly emphasizing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait at important international venues. Tomorrow you will all make a trip to Kaohsiung to visit a bronze statue of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who once said, “If Taiwan has a problem, then Japan has a problem.” We will always remember the firm support and friendship he showed Taiwan. Since taking office last year, I have worked hard to improve Taiwan’s whole-of-society defense resilience and implement our Four Pillars of Peace action plan. By strengthening our national defense capabilities, building up economic security, demonstrating stable and principled cross-strait leadership, and deepening partnerships with democratic countries including Japan, we can together maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and across the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, in the face of China’s continually expanding red supply chains, we hope that Taiwan and Japan, as important economic and trade partners, can continue to cooperate closely in such fields as semiconductors, energy, and AI technology to create non-red supply chains that further enhance economic resilience and industrial competitiveness for both sides. Going forward, Taiwan will work hard to play an important role in the international community and contribute its key strengths. I hope that, with the support of our guests, Taiwan can soon accede to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and sign an economic partnership agreement (EPA) with Japan so that we can jointly pave the way for further prosperity and growth in the Indo-Pacific region. Lastly, I thank each of you once again for taking concrete action to support Taiwan. I am confident that your visit will help deepen Taiwan-Japan ties and create even greater opportunities for cooperation. Let us all strive together to keep propelling Taiwan-Japan relations forward. Representative Takaichi then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai and Taiwanese political leaders for the warm hospitality they extended to the delegation, and mentioning that the visiting delegation members are all like-minded partners carrying on the legacy of former Prime Minister Abe. July 8 this year will mark the third anniversary of the passing of former Prime Minister Abe, she said, and when the former prime minister unfortunately passed away, President Lai, then serving as vice president, was among the first to come offer condolences, for which she expressed sincere admiration and gratitude. Representative Takaichi stated that Taiwan and Japan are island nations that face the same circumstances and problems, and that Japan’s trade activities rely heavily on ocean transport, so once a problem arises nearby that threatens maritime shipping lanes, it will be a matter of life and death for Japan. Taiwan and Japan are similar, as once a problem arises, both will face food and energy security issues, and supply chains may even be threatened, she said. Regarding Taiwan-Japan cooperation, Representative Takaichi stated that both sides must first protect and strengthen supply chain resilience. President Lai has previously said that he wants to turn Taiwan into an AI island, she said, and in semiconductors, Taiwan has the world’s leading technology. Representative Takaichi went on to say that Taiwan and Japan can collaborate in the fields of AI and semiconductors, quantum computing, and dual-use industries, as well as in areas such as drones and new energy technologies to build more resilient supply chains, so that if problems arise, we can maintain our current standard of living with peace of mind. Representative Takaichi indicated that cooperation in the defense sector is also crucial, and that by uniting like-minded countries including Taiwan, the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, and even countries in Europe, we can build a stronger network to jointly maintain our security guarantees. Representative Takaichi expressed hope that Taiwan and Japan will continue to strengthen substantive non-governmental relations, including personnel exchange visits and information sharing, so that we can jointly face and respond to crises when they arise. Regarding the hope to sign a Taiwan-Japan EPA that President Lai had mentioned earlier, she also expressed support and said she looks forward to upcoming exchanges and talks. The visiting delegation also included Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Taipei Office Chief Representative Katayama Kazuyuki.

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2025-04-23
President Lai delivers remarks at International Holocaust Remembrance Day event
On the afternoon of April 23, President Lai Ching-te attended an International Holocaust Remembrance Day event and delivered remarks, in which he emphasized that peace is priceless, and war has no winners, while morality, democracy, and respect for human rights are powerful forces against violence and tyranny. The president stated that Taiwan will continue to expand cooperation with democratic partners and safeguard regional and global peace and stability, defending democracy, freedom, and human rights. He said we must never forget history, and must overcome our differences and join in solidarity to ensure that the next generations live in a world that is more just and more peaceful. Upon arriving at the event, President Lai heard a testimony from the granddaughter of a Holocaust survivor, followed by a rabbi’s recitation of the prayer “El Maleh Rachamim.” He then joined other distinguished guests in lighting candles in memory of the victims. A transcript of President Lai’s remarks follows: To begin, I want to thank the Israel Economic and Cultural Office (ISECO) in Taipei, German Institute Taipei, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs for co-organizing this deeply significant memorial ceremony again this year. I also want to thank everyone for attending. We are here today to remember the victims of the Holocaust, express sympathy for the survivors, honor the brave individuals who protected the victims, and acknowledge all who were impacted by this atrocity. It was deeply moving to hear Ms. [Orly] Sela share the story of how her grandmother, Yehudit Biksz, escaped the Nazi regime. I want to thank her specially for traveling so far to attend this event. From the 1930s through World War II, the Nazi regime sought to exclude Jewish people from society. In their campaign, they perpetrated systematic genocide driven by their ideology. Policies and directives under the authoritarian Nazi regime resulted in the deaths of approximately 6 million Jews. Millions of others were persecuted, including Romani people, persons with disabilities, the gay community, and anyone who disagreed with Nazi ideology. It is one of the darkest chapters in human history. Many countries, including Taiwan, have enacted anti-massacre legislation, and observe a remembrance day each year. Those occasions help us remember the victims, preserve historical memory, and most importantly, reinforce our resolve to fight against hatred and discrimination. Twenty-three years ago, Chelujan (車路墘) Church in Tainan founded the Taiwan Holocaust Memorial Museum. It is the first Jewish museum in Taiwan, and the second Holocaust museum in Asia. Its founding mission urges us to forget hatred and love one another; put an end to war and advocate peace. Many of the exhibition items come from Jewish people, connecting Taiwan closer with Israel and helping Taiwanese better understand the experiences of Jewish people. In this way, we grow to more deeply cherish peace. When I was mayor of Tainan, I took part in an exhibition event at Chelujan Church. I was also invited by the Israeli government to join the International Mayors Conference in Israel, where I visited the World Holocaust Remembrance Center. I will never forget how deeply that experience moved me, and as a result, peace and human rights became even more important issues for me. These issues are valued by Taiwan and our friends and allies. They are also important links connecting Taiwan with the world. Peace is priceless, and war has no winners. We will continue to expand cooperation with democratic partners and safeguard regional and global peace and stability. We will also continue to make greater contributions and work with the international community to defend democracy, freedom, and human rights. This year also marks the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. However, we still see wars raging around the world. We see a resurgence of authoritarian powers, which could severely impact global democracy, peace, and prosperous development. Today’s event allows for more than reflection on the past; it also serves as a warning for the future. We are reminded of the threats that hatred, prejudice, and extremism pose to humanity. But we are also reminded that morality, democracy, and respect for human rights are powerful forces against violence and tyranny. We must never forget history. We must overcome our differences and join in solidarity for a better future. Let’s work together to ensure that the next generations live in a world that is more just and more peaceful. Also in attendance at the event were Member of the Israeli Knesset (parliament) and Taiwan friendship group Chair Boaz Toporovsky, ISECO Representative Maya Yaron, and German Institute Taipei Deputy Director General Andreas Hofem.

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2025-04-23
President Lai pays respects to Pope Francis
On the morning of April 23, President Lai Ching-te visited the Taipei Archdiocesan Curia to pay respects in a memorial ceremony for His Holiness Pope Francis. As officiant of the ceremony, President Lai burned incense and presented flowers, fruits, and wine to pay his respects to Pope Francis. At the direction of the master of ceremonies, the president then bowed three times in front of Pope Francis’s memorial portrait, conveying his grief and deep respect for the late pope. After hearing of Pope Francis’s passing on April 21, President Lai promptly requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to express sincere condolences from the people and government of Taiwan to the Vatican. The president also instructed Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) to convey condolences to the Holy See’s Apostolic Nunciature in Taiwan.

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2025-04-23
President Lai meets US CNAS NextGen fellows
On the morning of April 23, President Lai Ching-te met with fellows from the Shawn Brimley Next Generation National Security Leaders Program (NextGen) run by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of the United States for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan over the years, supporting Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capabilities and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The president pointed out that we will promote our “Taiwan plus one” policy, that is, new arrangements for Taiwan plus the US, and form a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to expand investment and bring about even closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, allowing us to reduce the trade deficit and generate development that benefits both sides. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: Ms. Michèle Flournoy, chair of the CNAS Board of Directors, is a good friend of Taiwan, and she has made major contributions to Taiwan-US relations through her long-time efforts on various aspects of our cooperation. I am happy to welcome Chair Flournoy, who is once again leading a NextGen Fellowship delegation to Taiwan. CNAS is a prominent think tank focusing on US national security and defense policy based in Washington, DC. Its NextGen Fellowship has fostered talented individuals in the fields of national security and foreign affairs. This year’s delegation is significantly larger than those of the past, demonstrating the increased importance that the next generation of US leaders attach to Taiwan. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I extend my sincerest welcome to you all. The Taiwan Strait, an issue of importance for our guests, has become a global issue. There is a high degree of international consensus that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are indispensable elements in global security and prosperity. Facing military threats from China, Taiwan proposed the Four Pillars of Peace action plan. First, we are actively implementing military reforms, enhancing whole-of-society defense resilience, and working to increase our defense budget to more than 3 percent of GDP. Second, we are strengthening our economic resilience. As Taiwan’s economy must keep advancing, we can no longer put all our eggs in one basket. We are taking action to remain firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence and marketing worldwide. In these efforts, we are already seeing results. Third, we are standing side-by-side with other democratic countries to demonstrate the strength of deterrence and achieve our goal of peace through strength. And fourth, Taiwan is willing, under the principles of parity and dignity, to conduct exchanges and cooperate with China towards achieving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This April 10 marked the 46th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. We thank the US government for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan over the years, supporting Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capabilities and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. We look forward to Taiwan and the US continuing to strengthen collaboration on the development of both our defense industries as well as the building of non-red supply chains. This will yield even more results and further deepen our economic and trade partnership. The US is now the main destination for outbound investment from Taiwan. Moving forward, we will promote our “Taiwan plus one” policy, that is, new arrangements for Taiwan plus the US. And our government will form a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to expand investment. We hope this will bring Taiwan-US economic and trade cooperation even closer and, through mutually beneficial assistance, allow us to generate development that benefits both our sides while reducing our trade deficit. In closing, thank you once again for visiting Taiwan. We hope your trip is fruitful and leaves you with a deep impression of Taiwan. We also hope that going forward you continue supporting Taiwan and advancing even greater development for Taiwan-US ties. Chair Flournoy then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for making time to receive their delegation. Referring to President Lai’s earlier remarks, she said that it is quite an impressive group, as past members of this program have gone on to become members of the US Congress, leading government experts, and leaders in the think-tank world and in the private sector. She remarked that investing in this group is a wonderful privilege for her and that they appreciate President Lai’s agreeing to take the time to engage in exchange with them. Chair Flournoy emphasized that they are visiting Taiwan at a critical moment, when there is so much change and volatility in the geostrategic environment, a lot of uncertainty, and a lot of unpredictability. She stated that given our shared values, our shared passion for democracy and human rights, and our shared interests in peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, this is an important time for dialogue, collaboration, and looking for additional opportunities where we can work together towards regional peace and stability.

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2025-04-06
President Lai delivers remarks on US tariff policy response
On April 6, President Lai Ching-te delivered recorded remarks regarding the impact of the 32 percent tariff that the United States government recently imposed on imports from Taiwan in the name of reciprocity. In his remarks, President Lai explained that the government will adopt five response strategies, including making every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations, adopting a support plan for affected domestic industries, adopting medium- and long-term economic development plans, forming new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements, and launching industry listening tours. The president emphasized that as we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and expressed hope that all parties, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: My fellow citizens, good evening. The US government recently announced higher tariffs on countries around the world in the name of reciprocity, including imposing a 32 percent tariff on imports from Taiwan. This is bound to have a major impact on our nation. Various countries have already responded, and some have even adopted retaliatory measures. Tremendous changes in the global economy are expected. Taiwan is an export-led economy, and in facing future challenges there will inevitably be difficulties, so we must proceed carefully to turn danger into safety. During this time, I want to express gratitude to all sectors of society for providing valuable opinions, which the government regards highly, and will use as a reference to make policy decisions. However, if we calmly and carefully analyze Taiwan’s trade with the US, we find that last year Taiwan’s exports to the US were valued at US$111.4 billion, accounting for 23.4 percent of total export value, with the other 75-plus percent of products sold worldwide to countries other than the US. Of products sold to the US, competitive ICT products and electronic components accounted for 65.4 percent. This shows that Taiwan’s economy does still have considerable resilience. As long as our response strategies are appropriate, and the public and private sectors join forces, we can reduce impacts. Please do not panic. To address the reciprocal tariffs by the US, Taiwan has no plans to adopt retaliatory tariffs. There will be no change in corporate investment commitments to the US, as long as they are consistent with national interests. But we must ensure the US clearly understands Taiwan’s contributions to US economic development. More importantly, we must actively seek to understand changes in the global economic situation, strengthen Taiwan-US industry cooperation, elevate the status of Taiwan industries in global supply chains, and with safeguarding the continued development of Taiwan’s economy as our goal, adopt the following five strategies to respond. Strategy one: Make every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations using the following five methods: 1. Taiwan has already formed a negotiation team led by Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun (鄭麗君). The team includes members from the National Security Council, the Office of Trade Negotiations, and relevant Executive Yuan ministries and agencies, as well as academia and industry. Like the US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement, negotiations on tariffs can start from Taiwan-US bilateral zero-tariff treatment. 2. To expand purchases from the US and thereby reduce the trade deficit, the Executive Yuan has already completed an inventory regarding large-scale procurement plans for agricultural, industrial, petroleum, and natural gas products, and the Ministry of National Defense has also proposed a military procurement list. All procurement plans will be actively pursued. 3. Expand investments in the US. Taiwan’s cumulative investment in the US already exceeds US$100 billion, creating approximately 400,000 jobs. In the future, in addition to increased investment in the US by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, other industries such as electronics, ICT, petrochemicals, and natural gas can all increase their US investments, deepening Taiwan-US industry cooperation. Taiwan’s government has helped form a “Taiwan investment in the US” team, and hopes that the US will reciprocate by forming a “US investment in Taiwan” team to bring about closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, jointly creating a future economic golden age. 4. We must eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade. Non-tariff barriers are an indicator by which the US assesses whether a trading partner is trading fairly with the US. Therefore, we will proactively resolve longstanding non-tariff barriers so that negotiations can proceed more smoothly. 5. We must resolve two issues that have been matters of longstanding concern to the US. One regards high-tech export controls, and the other regards illegal transshipment of dumped goods, otherwise referred to as “origin washing.” Strategy two: We must adopt a plan for supporting our industries. For industries that will be affected by the tariffs, and especially traditional industries as well as micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises, we will provide timely and needed support and assistance. Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) and his administrative team recently announced a package of 20 specific measures designed to address nine areas. Moving forward, the support we provide to different industries will depend on how they are affected by the tariffs, will take into account the particular features of each industry, and will help each industry innovate, upgrade, and transform. Strategy three: We must adopt medium- and long-term economic development plans. At this point in time, our government must simultaneously adopt new strategies for economic and industrial development. This is also the fundamental path to solutions for future economic challenges. The government will proactively cooperate with friends and allies, develop a diverse range of markets, and achieve closer integration of entities in the upper, middle, and lower reaches of industrial supply chains. This course of action will make Taiwan’s industrial ecosystem more complete, and will help Taiwanese industries upgrade and transform. We must also make good use of the competitive advantages we possess in such areas as semiconductor manufacturing, integrated chip design, ICT, and smart manufacturing to build Taiwan into an AI island, and promote relevant applications for food, clothing, housing, and transportation, as well as military, security and surveillance, next-generation communications, and the medical and health and wellness industries as we advance toward a smarter, more sustainable, and more prosperous new Taiwan. Strategy four: “Taiwan plus one,” i.e., new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements: While staying firmly rooted in Taiwan, our enterprises are expanding their global presence and marketing worldwide. This has been our national economic development strategy, and the most important aspect is maintaining a solid base here in Taiwan. We absolutely must maintain a solid footing, and cannot allow the present strife to cause us to waver. Therefore, our government will incentivize investments, carry out deregulation, and continue to improve Taiwan’s investment climate by actively resolving problems involving access to water, electricity, land, human resources, and professional talent. This will enable corporations to stay in Taiwan and continue investing here. In addition, we must also help the overseas manufacturing facilities of offshore Taiwanese businesses to make necessary adjustments to support our “Taiwan plus one” policy, in that our national economic development strategy will be adjusted as follows: to stay firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence, strengthening US ties, and marketing worldwide. We intend to make use of the new state of supply chains to strengthen cooperation between Taiwanese and US industries, and gain further access to US markets. Strategy five: Launch industry listening tours: All industrial firms, regardless of sector or size, will be affected to some degree once the US reciprocal tariffs go into effect. The administrative teams led by myself and Premier Cho will hear out industry concerns so that we can quickly resolve problems and make sure policies meet actual needs. My fellow citizens, over the past half-century and more, Taiwan has been through two energy crises, the Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis, and pandemics. We have been able to not only withstand one test after another, but even turn crises into opportunities. The Taiwanese economy has emerged from these crises stronger and more resilient than ever. As we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and I hope that all parties in the legislature, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. Let us join together and give it our all. Thank you.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Doggett’s Bill to End Special Tax Exemptions for Huge Executive Bonuses

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Lloyd Doggett (D-TX)

Contact: Alexis.Torres@mail.house.gov

Washington, DC – Today, U.S. Representative Lloyd Doggett (D-Texas) introduced the Stop Subsidizing Multimillion Dollar Corporate Bonuses Act to close a major loophole in current corporate tax law that uses taxpayer dollars to fund lavish pay packages. The bill would specifically end special tax breaks for publicly traded companies that deduct the cost of any multimillion-dollar bonus paid to executives. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) is filing companion legislation in the Senate.

“The 2017 Trump-GOP Tax Scam left a perverse incentive for companies: the more you pay your executives, the less you’ll pay in taxes,” said Rep. Doggett. “By closing this loophole, we can hold corporate giants accountable. While they can pay their executives whatever they choose, American taxpayers shouldn’t be asked to shoulder the cost. Working families need a living wage, not to have their hard-earned money further enrich Wall Street millionaires.”

Under existing tax law, Section 162(m) prohibits publicly traded corporations from deducting more than $1 million in compensation paid to a small subset of their top executives: the CEO, the CFO, and the three highest non-CEO and non-CFO officers. Both Republican and Democratic administrations have signed laws based on earlier versions of this legislation to help curtail the abuse of this deduction. However, the full loophole is still not closed, and taxpayers continue to subsidize billions of dollars in extravagant compensation.

To address the widening income gap and help resolve corporate tax avoidance on exorbitant executive pay, this legislation increases the number of wealthy executives subject to section 162(m) from the top five to any employee compensated over $1 million. As of 2023, the CEO-to-worker pay ratio was 268-to-1, meaning it would take more than five career lifetimes for the average worker to match a CEO’s earnings in a single year. According to reports, Congressional Republicans have expressed interest in new restrictions on such tax breaks for publicly traded companies.

The Stop Subsidizing Multimillion Dollar Corporate Bonuses Act is cosponsored by Representatives Greg Casar (TX-35), Judy Chu (CA-28), Steve Cohen (TN-09); Rosa DeLauro (CT-03), Christopher DeLuzio (PA-17), Adriano Espaillat (NY-13), John Garamendi (CA-08), Jesús “Chuy” García (IL-04), Henry “Hank” Johnson (GA-04), Summer Lee (PA-12), Seth Magaziner (RI-02), Gwen Moore (WI-04), Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC), Jamie Raskin (MD-08), Andrea Salinas (OR-06), Jan Schakowsky (IL-09), Melanie Stansbury (NM-01), Mark Takano (CA-39), Rashida Tlaib (MI-12), Jill Tokuda (HI-02), and Bonnie Watson Coleman (NJ-12).

The bill is also supported by AFL-CIO, Public Citizen, Americans for Financial Reform, Take on Wall Street, Americans for Tax Fairness, MIT Professor and Nobel Prize recipient Simon Johnson, and the Institute for Policy Studies, Global Economy Project.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 2, 2025

Category: Americas

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