Category: Asia Pacific

  • MIL-OSI Global: Money laundering plays a key role in every part of the illegal drugs industry – here’s how it works

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Mark Berry, Lecturer In Criminology, Bournemouth University

    R Mendoza/Shutterstock

    The global illicit drugs trade is estimated to be worth at least half a trillion US dollars each year. Drugs such as cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin generate large revenues all along their supply chains, from where the products (and precursor materials) are grown or made – principally Colombia and Bolivia, China, Afghanistan, and the “golden triangle” of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand – to wherever the finished drugs are consumed.

    Earnings in the illicit drug trade are variable. Few people will make the kind of money that once put the Mexican former cartel boss Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán on the Forbes list of global billionaires. But while drug “kingpins” are the industry’s biggest individual earners, they do not hold the majority of the drug money that is generated throughout the global supply chain.

    Despite their frequent glamorisation in film and TV portrayals, drug cartels are basically international logistics companies. They work with distributors in different countries who deliver the drugs to regional wholesalers, who in turn supply the local retailers (dealers) who sell drugs to individuals.

    Everyone along the supply chain takes their cut, with most people making much more modest incomes than the millionaire drug traffickers of narcocorrido lore. In our interviews with illicit drug entrepreneurs in the US and UK, we routinely spoke to sellers whose incomes ranged from pocket money to providing a moderately comfortable life.



    Illicit drug use is damaging large parts of the world socially, politically and environmentally. Patterns of supply and demand are changing rapidly. In our longform series Addicted, leading experts bring you the latest insights on drug use and production as we ask: is it time to declare a planetary emergency?


    Around 70% to 80% of the overall revenue generated by illicit drugs is shared among the many wholesale and street-level dealers in destination countries such as the UK and US, where the price per gram is at its highest. How this money moves and is used to sustain the illicit drug trade should be an important part of any worthwhile counter-narcotics strategy. But it rarely is.

    Professional money launderers

    The people and organisations responsible for laundering drug revenues – that is, transforming them into untraceable money that can easily be spent, or into assets that can be held or sold – often exist under the radar of law enforcement and the media.

    Yet the ways illicit drug money is laundered are hardly a mystery. Techniques include wire transfers to offshore bank accounts, investments in shell companies or deposits in cash businesses, and buying foreign currencies or (to a small extent) cryptocurrencies. In addition, the straightforward physical transportation of cash across national borders is an often-used method known as a “bulk cash transfer”.

    The largest players in the illicit drugs industry, such as international cartels, national distributors and large-scale wholesalers, often use professional money launderers – some of whom have seemingly reputable jobs in the financial sector. In one recent case, US financial regulators fined TD Bank US$3 billion (£2.4 billion) – a record penalty for a bank – for facilitating the laundering of millions of dollars of drug cartel money.

    Over six years, more than 90% of the bank’s transactions went unmonitored, enabling “three money laundering networks to collectively transfer more than US$670 million through TD Bank accounts”. Then-US attorney general Merrick Garland commented: “By making its services convenient for criminals, [TD Bank] became one.”

    Video: CBC News.

    Some money laundering networks are as global as the drug supply chains they service. In June 2024, the US Department of Justice’s (DoJ) multi-year “Operation Fortune Runner” investigation saw LA-based associates of Mexico’s Sinaloa drug cartel charged with conspiring with money-laundering groups linked to a Chinese underground banking network. According to the IRS’s head of criminal investigation, Guy Ficco:

    Drug traffickers generate immense amounts of cash through their illicit operations. This case is a prime example of Chinese money launderers working hand-in-hand with drug traffickers to try to legitimise profits generated by drug activities.

    According to the DoJ, “many wealthy Chinese nationals” barred from transferring large amounts to the US by the Chinese government’s capital flight restrictions seek informal alternatives to the conventional banking system – including via schemes to launder illicit drug money. The DoJ explained how this works:

    The China-based investor contacts an individual who has US dollars available to sell in the United States. This seller of US dollars provides identifying information for a bank account in China, with instructions for the investor to deposit Chinese currency (renminbi) in that account. Once the owner of the account sees the deposit, an equivalent amount of US dollars is released to the buyer in the United States.

    These arrangements are not unique to Chinese actors. Similar arrangements occur throughout the world, including schemes to leverage the black market peso exchange and the Hawala international money transfer system.

    Professional launderers are both creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in the global financial system. Such corruption allows suspicious transactions to occur without proper checks or oversight. This not only reduces transparency in the financial system but erodes public trust in it.

    How cartels launder their money

    International drug cartels and national wholesalers have a smaller markup on their transactions, compared with retailers. But because they are responsible for moving enormous quantities of illicit drugs, they still generate millions of dollars worth of revenue.

    The most prolific known drug distributors in US history, Margarito Flores Jr and his twin brother Pedro, delivered billions of dollars worth of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamines to their US and Canadian wholesale clients between 1998 and 2009. They were working for Guzmán and Ismeal “El Mayo” Zambada García, then leaders of the Sinaloa cartel, as well as the Mexican Beltrán Leyva brothers whose cartel bore their surname.

    Today, Margarito Flores Jr trains law enforcement across the US in the methods he and his brother used to traffic drugs and run their business. In January 2015, both men were sentenced to 14 years for drug trafficking – Margarito Flores Jr would later reach out to one of this article’s authors (R.V. Gundur) after reading his book, Trying to Make It: The Enterprises, Gangs, and People of the American Drug Trade, which includes a comprehensive account of the Flores crew’s activities.

    In a subsequent interview, he told us: “My brother and I estimate that, if we added up all of the money we sent back to Mexico over the decade we sold drugs, it was probably more than US$3.5 billion.”

    The billions they remitted to Mexico were used by Guzmán, Zambada and the Beltrán Levya brothers not only to expand their drug businesses, but to corrupt powerful figures such as Mexico’s former secretary of public security, Genaro García Luna.

    García Luna, who was Mexico’s highest-ranking law enforcement official from 2006 to 2012, was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison in October 2024 after being found guilty of taking millions of dollars in bribes from the Sinaloa cartel, as well as enabling the trafficking of more than a million kilograms of cocaine into the US. Flores explained to us:

    It’s important to understand that corruption impacts people at all levels of government. Our payoffs included local police and other people in the community, up to higher-positioned people in government. Lots of that money ended up funding the violent conflicts between cartels.

    While there has been widespread coverage of cartel drug money being laundered through high-profile businesses and banks such as Wachovia and HSBC, Flores suggested that “the money involved in the drug trade is a lot more than anybody really can understand”. The reason for this, he said, is that it’s very hard to track the flow of hard cash via lorries, boats, planes and even drones. Flores told us:

    It’s a misconception that everyone who makes a lot of money in drugs or other illegal business makes an effort to launder their money. My brother and I held much of what we earned in cash. We knew the government could eventually take everything [else].

    The twins were right: in time, that’s exactly what the US government did.

    ‘Everyday’ money laundering

    In our study of money laundering strategies used by people involved in the illicit drug trade in the UK and US, we found that street dealers do not typically undertake sophisticated laundering processes. Rather, they spend their cash on food and other routine living expenses. One independent UK drug dealer, whose experience was typical of many, used the money earned from his cocaine sales to buy groceries and pay bills for himself and his daughter.

    Spending money, even small amounts, gained through illegal activities is a money laundering offence – albeit one that is seldom prosecuted. As a result, these everyday activities that return illicit drug money to the legal economy are not well accounted for – even though the street value of drugs drives global market value estimates.

    Business-savvy street dealers can earn gross revenues that approach the earnings of high-paid white-collar workers. But they must disguise their earnings’ origins before they can spend them, of course, and various tactics are used to do this.

    Some dealers solicit close friends or family members to act as “strawmen”. These are people willing to put assets paid for by illicit drug money – such as cars, properties or even businesses – in their names on behalf of the dealer. Idris Elba’s character Stringer Bell in HBO’s The Wire was an accurate portrayal of someone investing in legal enterprises using illicit drug money.

    A guide to Stringer Bell’s character in The Wire. Video: Just an Observation.

    These strategies occur wherever illegal enterprise exists, and have done for well over a century. In the US, we interviewed wholesalers who had used family members to own houses and other properties on their behalf. This is done to mitigate against the risk of asset forfeiture should they be convicted of a crime. If an illicit enterprise can create a plausible beneficial owner who is not involved in crime, then the asset is harder to seize. This is why the Donald Trump administration’s recent suspension of beneficial owner oversight is problematic from a drug enforcement perspective.

    In liberal democracies, governments cannot investigate someone’s finances simply because they are related to criminals. The dirty money that is put into their accounts can also be disguised as legitimate income making it difficult to identify, although thorough investigations may uncover it.

    In the UK, we also talked to successful drug retailers who had set up local businesses in their own names. The EU’s law enforcement agency, Europol, has reported similar activities throughout Europe.

    Legal businesses are a common – and often hard-to-detect – vehicle to launder drug money. Bars, clubs, gyms, and hair, nail and tanning salons can be readily set up with drug money, as large cash infusions to establish a business are often not well scrutinised. These businesses are comparatively easy to run with significant cash flows, providing suitable cover for dirty money.

    For example, a beauty salon, especially one that offers high-value boutique services, could easily incorporate drug revenue into its financial accounts by reporting sales that do not occur. Tanning salons can be set up with little expense since they require only sunbeds and the rental of a property.

    Along with bars, clubs and salons, construction companies and restaurants stand out as other cash-intensive businesses with high volumes of transactions – characteristics that make good fronts for laundering money.

    It’s hard to spot a ‘dirty’ business

    There is no surefire way to tell whether a business is a laundering front. While some may look like enterprises struggling to stay afloat, others develop into viable operations that eventually no longer need dirty money to sustain them.

    Some drug dealers incorporate laundering practices within their legitimate jobs. Tradespeople such as electricians or plumbers, for example, can launder money by generating invoices for fake jobs, then reporting the income on their tax returns.

    In both the UK and US, tax authorities are not charged with evaluating the veracity of the funds reported, and are generally satisfied once tax is paid. In other words, they generally trust declared income as proof of legal business activity. Moreover, they, along with the police, lack the resources to investigate these businesses for money laundering.

    Through their legal businesses, many drug dealers pay significant taxes on their illegal revenue, and thus contribute to the economy.

    Paying income tax effectively renders this income laundered. It can be invested and used to set up other businesses, or to purchase cars and properties without suspicion. It can also bolster credit ratings, and improve access to legal financial services such as bank loans.

    Many small-time drug dealers start legal businesses in order to exit the illicit drug trade. We interviewed one cocaine dealer who had used his drug money to set up a retail electronics store; once it was successful, he stopped dealing. Similarly, the person behind a semi-legitimate nitrous oxide enterprise used his proceeds to set up a legitimate alcohol delivery service.

    Through self-laundering, these modest drug dealers transform their proceeds of crime into spendable cash – and may eventually leave criminality behind altogether.

    The (losing) battle against laundered money

    Across the world, anti-money laundering efforts against organised criminal gangs are notoriously ineffective.

    The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – an intergovernmental organisation formed in 1999 to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism – assesses financial regulators’ anti-money laundering controls all over the world. Countries designated as a risk that require monitoring are placed on the task force’s “grey list”, while severe, high-risk countries go on its “black list”. Being put on these lists can result in a withdrawal of international investment and implementation of sanctions by other countries.

    Although developing countries have often scored badly in their assessments, there has been some progress. While Kenya remained on the grey list in 2024, for example, it was found to have strengthened its measures to tackle both money laundering and terrorist financing. In the same year, though, Lebanon was added to the grey list over concerns on both counts.

    The FATF’s evaluation processes are designed to provide an objective assessment of whether a country has implemented its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing recommendations. However, the success of the FATF’s anti-money laundering controls remains unclear.

    Video: The Financial Action Task Force.

    Often lost in the criminal financing narrative is the role of bulk cash transfers. Even in a world that is moving to cashless transactions, cash generally remains the primary currency of both the illicit drug trade and corruption.

    The biggest and most successful drug traffickers have significant cash reserves which are used to pay workers, replace drugs that are lost or seized, accrue assets, and bribe key officials.

    Reflecting on his former illicit enterprise, Margarito Flores observed: “For every kilo of cocaine or heroin or methamphetamine we sold in the US, at least a kilo of cash went back to Mexico.” For deals in Europe, Flores said: “Given the markup the further away you trade, the amount of cash sent back could be even higher – I would estimate it to be a kilo and a half.”

    Flores described the ineptitude of law enforcement in policing cash that was leaving the US:

    No matter how careful we were, my brother and I lost a handful of loads of drugs heading north [from Mexico into the US]. Heading south was different: we just had the money put on tractor trailers and had it driven it across the border. We never lost a dollar. That’s where politicians don’t pay enough attention. That cash lets traffickers keep doing business.

    Focus on the money as well as the drugs

    So long as demand for illicit drugs exists, the industry will continue – and the revenue it generates will be laundered.

    We believe that to curb the drugs trade, enforcement strategies need to go beyond simply capturing drugs and focus much more on capturing the money. Governments should go after reserves held not only by drug cartels but high-level distributors, such as those who replaced the Flores twins, and also wholesalers. People like these – comparatively high earners in destination countries – are the backbone of the illicit drugs trade.

    Transnational law enforcement should prioritise detecting and seizing bulk cash transfers. These high-volume proceeds underwrite the wellbeing of drug trafficking organisations. Digital tools, such as machine learning and artificial intelligence, can be developed to create new techniques to track and trace suspicious transactions, although they alone won’t solve all laundering problems.

    Corruption of officials also remains a problem. Governments need to ensure their officials are well paid and sufficiently monitored in their roles – be they working in government, border control, banks, police departments or prisons. Unfortunately, the US has shirked its leadership in global anti-corruption efforts with the recent halting of the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which bans the bribing of foreign officials.




    Read more:
    Mexico’s drug corruption has more to do with US demand than crooked politicians


    Anti-money laundering efforts need to be consistently supported and required. Lamentably, the US has undermined its anti-money laundering toolkit by suspending the enforcement of beneficial ownership information reporting requirements. Establishing beneficial ownership helps financial institutions to identify parties that are hiding their financial interests, which can be an indication of money laundering or other criminal activity.

    Similarly, foreign investment in producer countries can strengthen their capacity to counter laundering by supporting intelligence infrastructure and improved training. Recent cuts to USAid and the reduction of US State Department efforts in these areas is another indication that the US will no longer lead in these domains.

    As cash businesses provide an easy mechanism for cleaning money, moving to a cashless society that uses digital transactions may help ensure that money is traceable. At the same time, cryptomarkets provide a minor, but potentially increasing, pathway to hiding dirty money digitally.

    Ultimately, we should recognise the decades-long “war on drugs” for what it is: a policy costing trillions of dollars that combined mass incarceration with insufficient public health investment, and which has harmed the very communities the illicit drug trade affects the most. It is a difficult balance, but the pathway forward needs to reorient the objectives regarding drugs: invest in people, then go after the money that keeps the cartels, distributors and wholesalers afloat.


    For you: more from our Insights series:

    To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. Subscribe to our newsletter.

    Mark Berry received funding from the Dawes Trust for a prestigious PhD scholarship to undertake work that informs the contents of this article.

    R.V. Gundur received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council to undertake work that informs the contents of this article. He is also a professional member of the International Compliance Association.

    The authors wish to thank Margarito Flores Jr (kingpintoeducator.com) for his help with this article.

    ref. Money laundering plays a key role in every part of the illegal drugs industry – here’s how it works – https://theconversation.com/money-laundering-plays-a-key-role-in-every-part-of-the-illegal-drugs-industry-heres-how-it-works-251288

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Choose compassion, reject cruelty to end HIV, says top UN rights official

    Source: United Nations 2

    Human Rights

    Global efforts to tackle the HIV/AIDS epidemic continue to remain insufficient, with deadly consequences, the UN Human Rights Council heard on Thursday.

    In a stark assessment of the current situation of the health crisis, Deputy UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif warned that more than nine million people do not receive treatment, while 4,000 girls and young women contract the virus every week.

    A staggering three-quarters of them live in sub-Saharan Africa, she noted, reminding Member States that while HIV is “entirely treatable and preventable…the world is off track in ending AIDS.

    Stigma fuelling crisis

    “Stigma and discrimination are preventing concrete progress and paving the way for a resurgence of infections,” Ms. Al-Nashif said.

    Together, we have the power and the responsibility to change this. When human rights are promoted, health is protected.

    Other speakers echoed the need for human rights-based approaches to ensure universal access to treatment. They warned that discrimination and harmful laws targeting marginalized communities hinder access to prevention, testing and care.

    Keep rights at the core

    Florence Riako Anam of the Global Network of People Living with HIV (GNP+) quoted Nelson Mandela, saying that HIV is “more than a disease – it is a human rights issue.”

    In many countries, criminalization, stigma and discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, drug use as well as sex work continue to obstruct HIV response efforts, with deadly consequences.

    GNP+, an NGO collecting data on stigma since 2008, has surveyed 100,000 people across 100 countries. The findings: nearly one in four respondents experienced HIV-related stigma.

    Break the barriers

    To end AIDS for good, we must dismantle the human rights-related barriers that prevent certain populations from accessing the services they need and tackle the deep gender inequalities and underlying inequities that drive starkly different health outcomes,” said Vuyiseka Dubula, Head of Community, Rights and Gender at the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

    Ms. Dubula, who lives with HIV in South Africa, noted that while global progress has been significant – new infections down by 61 per cent and AIDS-related deaths by 73 per cent in more than 100 countries over the last two decades—there is still much work to be done.

    “This is something to be proud of, but we can go even further in the next five years if we really are focused on ending HIV” Ms. Dubula said, referring to Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG3) on ensuring healthy lives for all.

    Compassion over cruelty

    Adeeba Kamarulzaman of the World Health Organization (WHO) Science Council and the Global Council on Inequality, AIDS and Pandemics echoed the need for more compassionate methods in tackling the epidemic.

    She pointed to Malaysia, her home country, which once faced a devastating HIV epidemic but has since made significant progress.

    In countries decriminalizing drug use, knowledge of HIV status is 15 per cent higher and HIV incidence is five per cent lower, she explained, adding that in places where sex work is decriminalized, infection rates are further reduced by 4.5 per cent.

    When we choose compassion over cruelty, when we invest in people instead of punishing them, we save lives,” Dr. Kamarulzaman said.

    Persistent discrimination

    Erika Castellanos, a transgender woman and Executive Director of Global Action for Trans Equality, spoke of her experience in Belize, where LGBTIQ+ people faced up to 10 years in jail before 2016. Even after the law was overturned, little has changed.

    “The stigma, discrimination and institutional barriers persist in the systems that deny us dignity, in the services that exclude us and in the societies that still see us as less than human,” said Ms. Castellanos, who has lived with HIV for 20 years.

    “I am here because of the hard work, sweat, blood and tears of countless people, many of whom did not survive this epidemic,” she told the Human Rights Council.

    I am alive – because of an HIV response that valued my life.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: UN emergency aid fund releases $110 million for neglected humanitarian crises

    Source: United Nations 2

    Humanitarian Aid

    Amid deep cuts to global humanitarian funding, the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund, CERF, on Thursday allocated $110 million to neglected crises across Africa, Asia and Latin America.

    The UN’s top aid official, Tom Fletcher, said that more than 300 million people urgently need assistance.

    But funding has been falling annually, and this year’s levels are projected to drop to a record low.

    Brutal funding cuts don’t mean that humanitarian needs disappear; today’s emergency fund allocation channels resources swiftly to where they’re needed most,” he said.

    One third of the CERF money will support Sudan and neighbouring Chad, which is home to many uprooted Sudanese.

    The funds will also bolster the aid response in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Honduras, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, Venezuela and Zambia.

    Part of the allocation will go towards life-saving initiatives to protect vulnerable people from climate shocks, too.

    Funding cuts impact aid for millions: UNICEF

    Funding cuts to overseas aid levels in multiple countries are severely limiting the UN Children Fund’s ability to reach millions of children in dire need, the agency’s Executive Director said on Thursday.

    UNICEF chief Catherine Russell highlighted cuts “by numerous donor countries follow two years of aid reductions at a time of unprecedented need.  Millions of children are affected by conflict, need to be vaccinated against deadly diseases such as measles and polio, and must be educated and kept healthy.”

    She added that needs are outpacing resources and despite introducing efficiencies and innovation to their work, UNICEF teams have stretched every contribution to its limit.

    “But there is no way around it, these new cuts are creating a global funding crisis that will put the lives of millions of additional children at risk.”

    Funded entirely by voluntary contributions, the UN children’s agency has helped save millions, making “historic progress”.

    Since 2000, global under-fives mortality has dropped by 50 per cent: “UNICEF implores all donors to continue to fund critical aid programs for the world’s children. We cannot fail them now,” Ms. Russell underlined.

    Afghanistan: Lives and livelihoods on the line

    Offering one snapshot of how cuts and shortfalls in aid are impacting one of the world’s most vulnerable nations, UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric highlighted conditions in Afghanistan.

    “Our humanitarian colleagues warn that Afghanistan continues to face a severe humanitarian crisis defined by decades of conflict, entrenched poverty, climate-induced shocks and rising protection risks, especially for women and girls,” he told reporters at the regular daily briefing in New York.  

    More than half of the population – or 23 million people – need humanitarian assistance in the country, which has been run by the Taliban since they seized power from the democratically elected Government in August 2021.

    Nearly 3.5 million children under five and more than a million pregnant and breastfeeding women are expected to become acutely malnourished, while explosive hazards continue to pose a lethal threat following decades of brutal civil conflict.

    An estimated 55 people are killed or injured by ordnance every month – most of them are children.

    Cuts already taking a toll

    Funding cuts are already significantly constraining the humanitarian community’s efforts to provide assistance to those most in need,” Mr Dujarric said.

    In the past month, more than 200 health facilities have closed, depriving 1.8 million people from essential health services.

    Malnutrition services for children have also been impacted.

    “Our humanitarian partners warn that aid funding cuts will cost both lives and livelihoods – and undermine development gains,” said the UN Spokesperson.  

    UN agencies and partners on the ground are urgently reprioritising programmes to ensure communities and areas most in need can be reached. 

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: ACT signs on to new school funding and reform agreement

    Source: Australian Ministers for Education

    The Albanese Government and Barr Government have today signed an updated school funding and reform agreement.

    As part of the updated agreement, the Commonwealth will provide additional funding, lifting its contribution to 25 per cent of the Schooling Resource Standard (SRS) by 2034.   

    This will see an estimated $72 million in additional Commonwealth funding to ACT public schools over the life of the agreement.

    This includes more individualised support for students, mandating evidenced-based teaching practices and more mental health support in schools.

    The Australian Government’s funding increase is conditional on the ACT maintaining its funding share for public schools at a minimum of 81.5 per cent of the SRS from 2030 to 2034. 

    This is not a blank cheque. 

    The funding is tied to reforms that will help students catch up, keep up and finish school, such as: 

    • Year 1 phonics and early years numeracy checks to identify students in the early years of school who need additional help
    • whole of school systems of supports and assessment tools that will enable targeted support to students and schools that need it most, including through small-group or catch-up tutoring to help students who fall behind
    • initiatives that support wellbeing for learning – including new approaches to addressing bullying and supporting complex behaviours
    • working with schools, communities and services providers to provide students with access to community coordinators and multi-disciplinary services
    • exploring ways to expand flexible education offerings to support students who need additional support to engage with learning
    • delivering Literacy and Numeracy coaching services, professional learning initiatives and access to quality assured curriculum resources for teachers across ACT public schools
    • initiatives to strengthen teacher and school leader wellbeing, with focus on teacher workload reduction and workforce attraction and retention.

    In addition, the following national targets are included: 

    • increasing the proportion of students leaving school with a Year 12 certificate by 7.5 percentage points (nationally) by 2030
    • reducing the proportion of students in the NAPLAN ‘Needs Additional Support’ proficiency level for reading and numeracy nationally by 10 per cent
    • increasing the proportion of students in the ‘Strong’ and ‘Exceeding’ proficiency levels for reading and numeracy by 10 per cent by 2030 and trend upwards for priority equity cohorts in the ‘Strong’ and ‘Exceeding’ proficiency levels nationally
    • increasing the Student Attendance Rate, nationally, to 91.4 per cent (2019 level) by 2030
    • increasing the engagement rate (completed or still enrolled) of initial teacher education students by 10 percentage points to 69.7 per cent by 2035.

    This means more help for students and more support for teachers.

    This agreement builds on the previous agreement with the ACT, signed in November last year.

    Quotes attributable to Australian Minister for Education Jason Clare:

    “This agreement lifts the Commonwealth’s contribution to 25 per cent of the Schooling Resource Standard for ACT public schools. 

    “This investment is tied to real, practical reforms to help students catch up, keep up and finish school.”

    Quotes attributable to ACT Minister for Education and Early Childhood Yvette Berry MLA:

    “Every ACT public school student deserves a great education, and a high-quality public education system is key to helping children and young people reach their full potential.

    “This updated funding agreement will mean extra resources for ACT students and teachers, ensuring ACT public schools will continue to be great places for students to learn and staff to work.”

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI USA: 2025-34 ATTORNEY GENERAL LOPEZ SECURES NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FOR DEFUNDING MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH INNOVATION RESEARCH

    Source: US State of Hawaii

    2025-34 ATTORNEY GENERAL LOPEZ SECURES NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FOR DEFUNDING MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH INNOVATION RESEARCH

    Posted on Mar 6, 2025 in Latest Department News, Newsroom

     

    STATE OF HAWAIʻI

    KA MOKU ʻĀINA O HAWAIʻI

     

    DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

    KA ʻOIHANA O KA LOIO KUHINA

     

    JOSH GREEN, M.D.
    GOVERNOR

    KE KIAʻĀINA

     

    ANNE LOPEZ

    ATTORNEY GENERAL

    LOIO KUHINA

    ATTORNEY GENERAL LOPEZ SECURES NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FOR DEFUNDING MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH INNOVATION RESEARCH

     

    News Release 2025-34

     

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                                                       

    March 5, 2025

    HONOLULU – Attorney General Anne Lopez and a coalition of 21 other attorneys general have secured a nationwide preliminary injunction in Massachusetts v. NIH. The order prevents the Trump Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) from cutting billions of dollars in funds that support cutting-edge medical and public health research at universities and research institutions across the country regardless of whether their states have joined the lawsuit.

    “As the court confirmed, the Trump administration’s attempt to cut lifesaving, essential scientific and medical research funding for public health institutions was as illegal as it was arbitrary,” said Attorney General Lopez. “Once again, the courts are sending a clear message that President Trump’s efforts to paralyze the government through arbitrary funding cuts are illegal. The people of Hawaiʻi rightfully expect that the federal administration will act lawfully, and my department will work to protect the interests of this state.”

    “We sincerely appreciate the Attorney General’s efforts to obtain this injunction,” said University of Hawaiʻi Vice President for Research and Innovation Vassilis Syrmos. “NIH’s proposed drastic reduction of our facilities and administrative rate would result in the elimination of approximately $16.5M in funding that the University of Hawaiʻi uses to support its research programs and graduate students, including debt service payments for facilities that support translational research and clinical trials. As our state’s only medical school, JABSOM is required to do research that benefits our population. The level and quality of research cannot be sustained with the proposed cuts. The negative impact on communities in Hawaiʻi and elsewhere that already experience the highest rates of chronic disease, more severe health conditions, and shortened life expectancies, will be severe.”

    The state of Hawaiʻi is represented in this litigation by Special Assistant to the Attorney General Dave Day and Solicitor General Kalikoʻonālani Fernandes, who added: “We are very pleased with this decision. The relief obtained in this case for the University of Hawaiʻi underscores the importance of standing up for the rule of law and the interests of Hawaiʻi against unlawful federal actions.”

    The preliminary injunction protects critical funds that facilitate biomedical research, like lab, faculty, infrastructure, and utility costs. Without them, the lifesaving and life-changing medical research in which the United States has long been a leader, could be compromised.

    On February 10, less than six hours after the coalition filed its lawsuit against the Administration, a judge in the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order against NIH, barring its attempts to cut the critical research funding. Today’s order takes the place of the temporary restraining order and prevents the Trump Administration from cutting this important category of funding as the case proceeds. It will remain in effect until a final ruling is made.

    The NIH is the primary source of federal funding for medical research in the United States. Medical research funding by NIH grants have led to innumerable scientific breakthroughs, including the discovery of treatment for cancers of all types and the first sequencing of DNA. Additionally, dozens of NIH-supported scientists have earned Nobel Prizes for their groundbreaking scientific work.

    Joining Hawaiʻi in this coalition are the attorneys general of Arizona, California, Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. This lawsuit is being co-led by the attorneys general of Massachusetts, Illinois, and Michigan.

    # # #

     

    Media contacts:

    Dave Day

    Special Assistant to the Attorney General

    Office: 808-586-1284

    Email: [email protected]        

    Web: http://ag.hawaii.gov

     

    Toni Schwartz
    Public Information Officer
    Hawai‘i Department of the Attorney General
    Office: 808-586-1252
    Cell: 808-379-9249
    Email: [email protected] 

    Web: http://ag.hawaii.gov

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc. Reports Q4 and Year-End 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc. (NASDAQ: SAMG) (the “Company” or “Silvercrest”) today reported the results of its operations for the quarter and year ended December 31, 2024.

    Business Update

    Silvercrest concluded 2024 with strong new client organic flows due to new strategic investments made over the past year that are already bearing fruit. The firm garnered $1.4 billion in Q4 and $1.5 billion during 2024 in new client assets under management (“AUM”) inflows, the best year for new organic client inflows since 2015. The fourth quarter was primarily bolstered by winning a successful seed investment in our new Global Value Equity strategy of $1.3 billion USD ($2.0 billion AUD) in partnership with CBUS, one of Australia’s largest superannuation funds. The increases during the quarter bode well for future revenue, and we remain highly optimistic about securing more significant organic net flows over the course of 2025 to increase our return on invested capital.

    Total AUM as of year-end 2024 reached $36.5 billion as of December 31, 2024, up 9.6% from $33.3 billion at year-end 2023. Discretionary AUM, which drives revenue, rose 6.4% to $23.3 billion from $21.9 billion. Overall, total asset flows and market increases were a net positive for the firm and will drive an increase in future revenue. Revenue for the year increased 5.3% to $123.7 million from $117.4 million, with Q4 revenue up 12.0% over Q4 2023, to $32.0 million from $28.5 million.

    Strategically, in addition to building the firm’s new Global Value Equity strategy, we have hired business development and market leads in Atlanta and Singapore. We have our full MAS license for doing business in Singapore. With significant European assets and growth opportunities, we will be pursuing more initiatives to better highlight Silvercrest in both the institutional and wealth markets. The firm also has invested in talent across the firm to drive new growth and successfully transition the business toward the next generation.

    Silvercrest developed new and stronger institutional consulting relationships during 2024, with new investment opportunities to develop our strategies. Our pipeline remains robust. As a result, we are optimistic about securing significant new organic flows. Importantly, the firm’s pipeline does not yet include mandates for our new Global Value Equity strategy which has a high capacity for significant new assets. We have worked hard over the past year to build the infrastructure, team, and strategy while undertaking business development. As with our third-quarter call, we envision more positive AUM flows and resulting revenue increases.

    As I have discussed throughout the past year, Silvercrest has never had more business opportunities. Those initiatives are beginning to bear results. We have made and will continue to make investments to drive future growth in the business. We expect to make more hires to complement our outstanding professional team to drive that future growth. Silvercrest continues to accrue a higher interim percentage of revenue for compensation for this purpose, and, as mentioned, we will continue to adjust compensation accruals to match these important investments in the business and will keep you informed of our plans and the progress of these investments.

    Fourth Quarter 2024 Highlights

    • Total AUM of $36.5 billion, inclusive of discretionary AUM of $23.3 billion and non-discretionary AUM of $13.2 billion at December 31, 2024.
    • Revenue of $32.0 million.
    • U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) consolidated net income and net income attributable to Silvercrest of $2.7 million and $1.6 million, respectively.
    • Basic and diluted net income per share of $0.17.
    • Adjusted Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (“EBITDA”)1 of $5.1 million.
    • Adjusted net income1 of $2.9 million.
    • Adjusted basic and diluted earnings per share1,2 of $0.21 and $0.20, respectively.

    The table below presents a comparison of certain GAAP and non-GAAP (“Adjusted”) financial measures and AUM.

       
    For the Three Months

    Ended December 31,
        For the Twelve Months
    Ended December 31,
     
    (in thousands except as indicated)   2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Revenue   $ 31,962     $ 28,542     $ 123,651     $ 117,410  
    Income (loss) before other income (expense), net   $ 1,957     $ (969 )   $ 17,627     $ 18,819  
    Net income (loss)   $ 2,684     $ (642 )   $ 15,709     $ 15,183  
    Net income (loss) margin     8.4 %     (2.2 )%     12.7 %     12.9 %
    Net income (loss) attributable to Silvercrest   $ 1,618     $ (411 )   $ 9,535     $ 9,094  
    Net income (loss) per basic share   $ 0.17     $ (0.05 )   $ 1.00     $ 0.96  
    Net income (loss) per diluted share   $ 0.17     $ (0.04 )   $ 1.00     $ 0.96  
    Adjusted EBITDA1   $ 5,070     $ 2,581     $ 26,101     $ 26,878  
    Adjusted EBITDA Margin1     15.9 %     9.0 %     21.1 %     22.9 %
    Adjusted net income1   $ 2,861     $ 1,049     $ 15,782     $ 16,104  
    Adjusted basic earnings per share1, 2   $ 0.21     $ 0.08     $ 1.15     $ 1.16  
    Adjusted diluted earnings per share1, 2   $ 0.20     $ 0.07     $ 1.10     $ 1.12  
    Assets under management at period end (billions)   $ 36.5     $ 33.3     $ 36.5     $ 33.3  
    Average assets under management (billions)3   $ 35.0     $ 32.3     $ 34.9     $ 31.1  
    Discretionary assets under management (billions)   $ 23.3     $ 21.9     $ 23.3     $ 21.9  
    ___________________
    1 Adjusted measures are non-GAAP measures and are explained and reconciled to the comparable GAAP measures in Exhibits 3 and 4.
    2 Adjusted basic and diluted earnings per share measures for the three and twelve months ended December 31, 2024 are based on the number of shares of Class A common stock and Class B common stock outstanding as of December 31, 2024. Adjusted diluted earnings per share are further based on the addition of unvested restricted stock units and non-qualified stock options to the extent dilutive at the end of the reporting period.
    3 We have computed average AUM by averaging AUM at the beginning of the applicable period and AUM at the end of the applicable period.


    AUM at $36.5 Billion

    Silvercrest’s discretionary assets under management increased by $1.4 billion, or 6.4%, to $23.3 billion at December 31, 2024, from $21.9 billion at December 31, 2023. The increase was attributable to market appreciation of $2.1 billion partially offset by net client outflows of $0.7 billion. Silvercrest’s total AUM increased by $3.2 billion, or 9.6%, to $36.5 billion at December 31, 2024, from $33.3 billion at December 31, 2023. The increase was attributable to market appreciation of $3.8 billion partially offset by net client outflows of $0.6 billion.

    Silvercrest’s discretionary assets under management increased by $0.7 billion, or 3.1%, to $23.3 billion at December 31, 2024, from $22.6 billion at September 30, 2024. The increase was attributable to net client inflows of $0.9 billion partially offset by market depreciation of $0.2 billion. Silvercrest’s total AUM increased by $1.4 billion, or 4.0%, to $36.5 billion at December 31, 2024, from $35.1 billion at September 30, 2024. The increase was attributable to market appreciation of $0.5 billion and net client inflows of $0.9 billion.

    Fourth Quarter 2024 vs. Fourth Quarter 2023

    Revenue increased by $3.4 million, or 12.0%, to $32.0 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024, from $28.5 million for the three months ended December 31, 2023. This increase was driven by net client inflows in discretionary assets under management partially offset by market depreciation.

    Total expenses increased by $0.5 million, or 1.7%, to $30.0 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024, from $29.5 million for the three months ended December 31, 2023. Compensation and benefits expense decreased by $0.8 million, or 3.4%, to $21.9 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024, from $22.7 million for the three months ended December 31, 2023. The decrease was primarily attributable to a decrease in bonuses of $1.7 million, partially offset by increases in salaries and benefits of $0.9 million primarily as a result of merit-based increases and newly hired staff. General and administrative expenses increased by $1.3 million, or 18.5%, to $8.1 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024, from $6.8 million for the three months ended December 31, 2023. This was primarily attributable to increases in portfolio and systems expense of $0.5 million, office expense of $0.2 million, recruiting costs of $0.1 million and professional fees of $0.5 million.

    Consolidated net income was $2.7 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024, as compared to consolidated net loss of $0.6 million for the same period in the prior year. Net income attributable to Silvercrest was $1.6 million, or $0.17 per basic and diluted share, for the three months ended December 31, 2024. Our Adjusted Net Income1 was $2.9 million, or $0.21 per adjusted basic share and $0.20 per adjusted diluted share,2 for the three months ended December 31, 2024.

    Adjusted EBITDA1 was $5.1 million, or 15.9% of revenue, for the three months ended December 31, 2024, as compared to $2.6 million or 9.0% of revenue for the same period in the prior year.

    Year Ended December 31, 2024 vs. Year Ended December 31, 2023

    Revenue increased by $6.2 million, or 5.3%, to $123.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, from $117.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. This increase was driven by market appreciation in discretionary assets under management partially offset by net client outflows.

    Total expenses increased by $7.4 million, or 7.5%, to $106.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, from $98.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. Compensation and benefits expense increased by $4.0 million, or 5.6%, to $76.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, from $72.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. The increase was primarily attributable to an increase in equity based compensation expense of $0.3 million due to an increase in the number of unvested restricted stock units and unvested non-qualified stock options outstanding, an increase in salaries and benefits expense of $2.5 million primarily as a result of merit-based increases and newly hired staff and an increase in the accrual for bonuses of $1.2 million. General and administrative expenses increased by $3.4 million, or 13.1%, to $29.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, from $26.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. The increase was primarily attributable to increases in professional fees of $1.1 million, portfolio and systems expenses of $0.8 million, occupancy and related costs of $0.3 million, trading errors of $0.3 million, recruiting expenses of $0.3 million, travel and entertainment expenses of $0.2 million, depreciation and amortization of $0.1 million, office expense of $0.1 million, publications and subscriptions costs of $0.1 million and sub-advisory and referral fees of $0.1 million. 

    Consolidated net income was $15.7 million, or 12.7% of revenue, for the year ended December 31, 2024, as compared to consolidated net income of $15.2 million, or 12.9% of revenue, for the same period in the prior year. Net income attributable to Silvercrest was $9.5 million, or $1.00 per basic and diluted share, for the year ended December 31, 2024. Our Adjusted Net Income1 was $15.8 million, or $1.15 per adjusted basic share and $1.10 per adjusted diluted share,2 for the year ended December 31, 2024.

    Adjusted EBITDA1 was $26.1 million, or 21.1% of revenue, for the year ended December 31, 2024, as compared to $26.9 million, or 22.9% of revenue, for the same period in the prior year.

    Liquidity and Capital Resources

    Cash and cash equivalents were $68.6 million at December 31, 2024, compared to $70.3 million at December 31, 2023. As of December 31, 2024, there was nothing outstanding under our term loan with City National Bank and nothing outstanding on our revolving credit facility with City National Bank.

    Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.’s total equity was $80.7 million at December 31, 2024. We had 9,376,280 shares of Class A common stock outstanding and 4,373,315 shares of Class B common stock outstanding at December 31, 2024.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    To provide investors with additional insight, promote transparency and allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the information used by management in its financial and operational decision-making, we supplement our consolidated financial statements presented on a basis consistent with GAAP with Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA Margin, Adjusted Net Income and Adjusted Earnings Per Share, which are non-GAAP financial measures of earnings. These adjustments, and the non-GAAP financial measures that are derived from them, provide supplemental information to analyze our operations between periods and over time. Investors should consider our non-GAAP financial measures in addition to, and not as a substitute for, financial measures prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    • EBITDA represents net income before provision for income taxes, interest income, interest expense, depreciation and amortization.
    • We define Adjusted EBITDA as EBITDA without giving effect to the Delaware franchise tax, professional fees associated with acquisitions or financing transactions, gains on extinguishment of debt or other obligations related to acquisitions, impairment charges and losses on disposals or abandonment of assets and leaseholds, client reimbursements and fund redemption costs, severance and other similar expenses, but including partner incentive allocations, prior to our initial public offering, as an expense. We believe that it is important to management and investors to supplement our consolidated financial statements presented on a GAAP basis with Adjusted EBITDA, a non-GAAP financial measure of earnings, as this measure provides a perspective of recurring earnings of the Company, taking into account earnings attributable to both Class A and Class B stockholders.
    • Adjusted EBITDA Margin is calculated by dividing Adjusted EBITDA by total revenue. We believe that it is important to management and investors to supplement our consolidated financial statements presented on a GAAP basis with Adjusted EBITDA Margin, a non-GAAP financial measure of earnings, as this measure provides a perspective of recurring profitability of the Company, taking into account profitability attributable to both Class A and Class B stockholders.
    • Adjusted Net Income represents recurring net income without giving effect to professional fees associated with acquisitions or financing transactions, losses on forgiveness of notes receivable from our principals, gains on extinguishment of debt or other obligations related to acquisitions, impairment charges and losses on disposals or abandonment of assets and leaseholds, client reimbursements and fund redemption costs, severance and other similar expenses, but including partner incentive allocations, prior to our initial public offering, as an expense. Furthermore, Adjusted Net Income includes income tax expense assuming a blended corporate rate of 26%. We believe that it is important to management and investors to supplement our consolidated financial statements presented on a GAAP basis with Adjusted Net Income, a non-GAAP financial measure of earnings, as this measure provides a perspective of recurring income of the Company, taking into account income attributable to both Class A and Class B stockholders.
    • Adjusted Earnings Per Share represents Adjusted Net Income divided by the actual Class A and Class B shares outstanding as of the end of the reporting period for basic Adjusted Earnings Per Share, and to the extent dilutive, we add unvested restricted stock units and non-qualified stock options to the total shares outstanding to compute diluted Adjusted Earnings Per Share. As a result of our structure, which includes a non-controlling interest, we believe that it is important to management and investors to supplement our consolidated financial statements presented on a GAAP basis with Adjusted Earnings Per Share, a non-GAAP financial measure of earnings, as this measure provides a perspective of recurring earnings per share of the Company as a whole as opposed to being limited to our Class A common stock.

    Conference Call

    The Company will host a conference call on March 7, 2025, at 8:30 am (Eastern Time) to discuss these results. Hosting the call will be Richard R. Hough III, Chief Executive Officer and President, and Scott A. Gerard, Chief Financial Officer. Listeners may access the call by dialing 1-844-836-8743 or for international listeners the call may be accessed by dialing 1-412-317-5723. A live, listen-only webcast will also be available via the investor relations section of www.silvercrestgroup.com. An archived replay of the call will be available after the completion of the live call on the Investor Relations page of the Silvercrest website at http://ir.silvercrestgroup.com/.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This release contains, and from time to time our management may make, forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, each as amended. For those statements, we claim the protection of the safe harbor for forward-looking statements contained in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks, uncertainties and assumptions. These statements are only predictions based on our current expectations and projections about future events. Important factors that could cause actual results, level of activity, performance or achievements to differ materially from those indicated by such forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to: incurrence of net losses; fluctuations in quarterly and annual results; adverse economic or market conditions; our expectations with respect to future levels of assets under management, inflows and outflows; our ability to retain clients; our ability to maintain our fee structure; our particular choices with regard to investment strategies employed; our ability to hire and retain qualified investment professionals; the cost of complying with current and future regulation coupled with the cost of defending ourselves from related investigations or litigation; failure of our operational safeguards against breaches in data security, privacy, conflicts of interest or employee misconduct; our expected tax rate; our expectations with respect to deferred tax assets, adverse economic or market conditions; incurrence of net losses; adverse effects of management focusing on implementation of a growth strategy; failure to develop and maintain the Silvercrest brand; and other factors disclosed under “Risk Factors” in our annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023, which is accessible on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s website at www.sec.gov. We undertake no obligation to publicly update or review any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of new information, future developments or otherwise, except as required by law.

    About Silvercrest

    Silvercrest was founded in April 2002 as an independent, employee-owned registered investment adviser. With offices in New York, Boston, Virginia, New Jersey, California and Wisconsin, Silvercrest provides traditional and alternative investment advisory and family office services to wealthy families and select institutional investors.

    Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.

    Contact: Richard Hough
    212-649-0601
    rhough@silvercrestgroup.com

     
    Exhibit 1
     
    Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (Unaudited and in thousands, except share and per share amounts or as noted)
     
        Year Ended December 31,  
        2024     2023  
        (Unaudited)        
    Revenue            
    Management and advisory fees   $ 119,316     $ 112,794  
    Family office services     4,335       4,616  
    Total revenue     123,651       117,410  
    Expenses            
    Compensation and benefits     76,663       72,619  
    General and administrative     29,361       25,972  
    Total expenses     106,024       98,591  
    Income before other (expense) income, net     17,627       18,819  
    Other (expense) income, net            
    Other (expense) income, net     203       76  
    Interest income     1,432       946  
    Interest expense     (144 )     (421 )
    Equity income from investments     1,154       73  
    Total other (expense) income, net     2,645       674  
    Income before provision for income taxes     20,272       19,493  
    Provision for income taxes     (4,563 )     (4,310 )
    Net income     15,709       15,183  
    Less: net income attributable to non-controlling interests     (6,174 )     (6,089 )
    Net income attributable to Silvercrest   $ 9,535     $ 9,094  
    Net income per share:            
    Basic   $ 1.00     $ 0.96  
    Diluted   $ 1.00     $ 0.96  
    Weighted average shares outstanding:            
    Basic     9,495,375       9,431,404  
    Diluted     9,532,525       9,464,339  
     
    Exhibit 2
    Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (Unaudited and in thousands, except share and per share amounts or as noted)
     
        For the Three Months Ended December 31,  
        2024     2023  
        (Unaudited)        
    Revenue            
    Management and advisory fees   $ 30,871     $ 27,349  
    Family office services     1,091       1,193  
    Total revenue     31,962       28,542  
    Expenses            
    Compensation and benefits     21,903       22,674  
    General and administrative     8,102       6,837  
    Total expenses     30,005       29,511  
    Income (loss) income before other income (expense), net     1,957       (969 )
    Other income (expense), net            
    Other income (expense), net     178       45  
    Interest income     422       525  
    Interest expense     (49 )     (107 )
    Equity income from investments     1,154       73  
    Total other income (expense), net     1,705       536  
    Income (loss) before provision for income taxes     3,662       (433 )
    Provision for income taxes     (978 )     (209 )
    Net income (loss)     2,684       (642 )
    Less: net (income) loss attributable to non-controlling interests     (1,066 )     231  
    Net income (loss) attributable to Silvercrest   $ 1,618     $ (411 )
    Net income (loss) per share:            
    Basic   $ 0.17     $ (0.05 )
    Diluted   $ 0.17     $ (0.04 )
    Weighted average shares outstanding:            
    Basic     9,450,344       9,368,579  
    Diluted     9,487,453       9,368,579  
     
    Exhibit 3
    Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.
    Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP (“Adjusted”) Adjusted EBITDA Measure
    (Unaudited and in thousands, except share and per share amounts or as noted)
     
    Adjusted EBITDA   For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year
    Ended December 31,
     
        2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Reconciliation of non-GAAP financial measure:                        
    Net (loss) income   $ 2,684     $ (642 )   $ 15,709     $ 15,183  
    Provision for income taxes     978       209       4,563       4,310  
    Delaware Franchise Tax     50       50       200       200  
    Interest expense     49       107       144       421  
    Interest income     (422 )     (525 )     (1,432 )     (946 )
    Depreciation and amortization     1,035       1,002       4,146       4,014  
    Equity-based compensation     542       580       1,916       1,627  
    Other adjustments (A)     154       1,800       855       2,069  
    Adjusted EBITDA   $ 5,070     $ 2,581     $ 26,101     $ 26,878  
    Adjusted EBITDA Margin     15.9 %     9.0 %     21.1 %     22.9 %

    (A) Other adjustments consist of the following:

        Three Months Ended
    December 31,
        Twelve Months Ended
    December 31,
        2024     2023     2024     2023
    Acquisition costs (a)   $       $       $       $ 5  
    Severance     140         52         393         71  
    Other (b)     14         1,748         462         1,993  
    Total other adjustments   $ 154       $ 1,800       $ 855       $ 2,069  
    (a) For the twelve months ended December 31, 2023, represents professional fees of $5 related to the acquisition of Cortina.
    (b) For the three months ended December 31, 2024, represents a Tax Receivable Agreement adjustment of ($78), an ASC 842 rent adjustment of $48 related to the amortization of property lease incentives, software implementation costs of $4, professional fees related to a transfer pricing project of $27 and data conversion costs of $13. For the twelve months ended December 31, 2024, represents a fair value adjustment to the Neosho contingent purchase price consideration of $12, an ASC 842 rent adjustment of $192 related to the amortization of property lease incentives, a Tax Receivable Agreement adjustment of ($78), sign on bonuses paid to certain employees of $188, professional fees of $53 related to a transfer pricing project, legal fees of $46, data conversion costs of $27 and software implementation costs of $22. For the three months ended December 31, 2023, represents a variable compensation payment of $1,667 related to the difference between the number of non-qualified stock options granted to an existing Class B unit holder as determined using the Black-Scholes method inclusive and exclusive of the expected annual dividend yield input, a Tax Receivable Agreement adjustment of ($38), an ASC 842 rent adjustment of $48 related to the amortization of property lease incentives, software implementation costs of $7, a fair value adjustment to the Neosho contingent purchase price consideration of $24, professional fees related to a transfer pricing project of $37 and legal fees related to the startup of a fund of $2. For the twelve months ended December 31, 2023, represents a variable compensation payment of $1,667 related to the difference between the number of non-qualified stock options granted to an existing Class B unit holder as determined using the Black-Scholes method inclusive and exclusive of the expected annual dividend yield input,  a Tax Receivable Agreement adjustment of $2, an ASC 842 rent adjustment of $192 related to the amortization of property lease incentives, moving costs of $35, software implementation costs of $35, professional fees related to a transfer pricing project of $37, legal fees related to the startup of a fund of $2, a fair value adjustment to the Neosho contingent purchase price consideration of $24 and a fair value adjustment to the Cortina contingent purchase price consideration of ($2).
     
    Exhibit 4
    Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.
    Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP (“Adjusted”)
    Adjusted Net Income and Adjusted Earnings Per Share Measures
    (Unaudited and in thousands, except per share amounts or as noted)
     
    Adjusted Net Income and Adjusted Earnings Per Share   Three Months Ended
    December 31,
        Year Ended
    December 31,
     
        2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Reconciliation of non-GAAP financial measure:                        
    Net income (loss)   $ 2,684     $ (642 )   $ 15,709     $ 15,183  
    Consolidated GAAP Provision for income taxes     978       209       4,563       4,310  
    Delaware Franchise Tax     50       50       200       200  
    Other adjustments (A)     154       1,800       855       2,069  
    Adjusted earnings before provision for income taxes     3,866       1,417       21,327       21,762  
    Adjusted provision for income taxes:                        
    Adjusted provision for income taxes (26% assumed tax rate)     (1,005 )     (368 )     (5,545 )     (5,658 )
                             
    Adjusted net income   $ 2,861     $ 1,049     $ 15,782     $ 16,104  
                             
    GAAP net income (loss) per share (B):                        
    Basic   $ 0.17     $ (0.05 )   $ 1.00     $ 0.96  
    Diluted   $ 0.17     $ (0.04 )   $ 1.00     $ 0.96  
                             
    Adjusted earnings per share/unit (B):                        
    Basic   $ 0.21     $ 0.08     $ 1.15     $ 1.16  
    Diluted   $ 0.20     $ 0.07     $ 1.10     $ 1.12  
                             
    Shares/units outstanding:                        
    Basic Class A shares outstanding     9,376       9,479       9,376       9,479  
    Basic Class B shares/units outstanding     4,373       4,431       4,373       4,431  
    Total basic shares/units outstanding     13,750       13,910       13,750       13,910  
                             
    Diluted Class A shares outstanding (C)     9,413       9,515       9,413       9,515  
    Diluted Class B shares/units outstanding (D)     4,945       4,820       4,945       4,820  
    Total diluted shares/units outstanding     14,358       14,335       14,358       14,335  
    (A) See A in Exhibit 3.
    (B) GAAP earnings per share is strictly attributable to Class A stockholders. Adjusted earnings per share takes into account earnings attributable to both Class A and Class B stockholders.
    (C) Includes 37,109 and 35,554 unvested restricted stock units at December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively.
    (D) Includes 205,079 and 240,998 unvested restricted stock units at December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively, and 366,293 and 147,506 unvested non-qualified options at December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively.
     
    Exhibit 5
    Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Financial Condition
    (Unaudited and in thousands)
     
        December 31,
    2024
        December 31,
    2023
     
    Assets            
    Cash and cash equivalents   $ 68,611     $ 70,301  
    Investments     1,354       219  
    Receivables, net     12,225       9,526  
    Due from Silvercrest Funds     945       558  
    Furniture, equipment and leasehold improvements, net     7,387       7,422  
    Goodwill     63,675       63,675  
    Operating lease assets     16,032       19,612  
    Finance lease assets     254       330  
    Intangible assets, net     16,644       18,933  
    Deferred tax asset     4,220       5,034  
    Prepaid expenses and other assets     3,085       3,964  
    Total assets   $ 194,432     $ 199,574  
    Liabilities and Equity            
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses   $ 1,953     $ 1,990  
    Accrued compensation     39,865       37,371  
    Borrowings under credit facility           2,719  
    Operating lease liabilities     22,270       26,277  
    Finance lease liabilities     262       336  
    Deferred tax and other liabilities     10,389       9,071  
    Total liabilities     74,739       77,764  
    Commitments and Contingencies (Note 10)            
    Equity            
    Preferred Stock, par value $0.01, 10,000,000 shares authorized; none issued and outstanding            
    Class A Common Stock, par value $0.01, 50,000,000 shares authorized; 10,450,559
    and 9,376,280 issued and outstanding, respectively, as of December 31, 2024;
    10,287,452 and 9,478,997 issued and outstanding, respectively, as of December 31, 2023
        104       103  
    Class B Common Stock, par value $0.01, 25,000,000 shares authorized; 4,373,315
    and 4,431,105 issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively
        42       43  
    Additional Paid-In Capital     56,369       55,809  
    Treasury stock, at cost, 1,074,279 and 808,455 shares as of December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively     (19,728 )     (15,057 )
    Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)     (43 )     (12 )
    Retained earnings     43,953       41,851  
    Total Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.’s equity     80,697       82,737  
    Non-controlling interests     38,996       39,073  
    Total equity     119,693       121,810  
    Total liabilities and equity   $ 194,432     $ 199,574  
     
    Exhibit 6
    Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.
    Total Assets Under Management
    (Unaudited and in billions)
     
    Total Assets Under Management:
     
        Three Months Ended
    December 31,
        % Change from December 31,  
        2024     2023     2023  
    Beginning assets under management   $ 35.1     $ 31.2       12.5 %
                       
    Gross client inflows     2.2       0.9       144.4 %
    Gross client outflows     (1.3 )     (1.3 )     0.0 %
    Net client flows     0.9       (0.4 )     325.0 %
                       
    Market appreciation     0.5       2.5       -80.0 %
    Ending assets under management   $ 36.5     $ 33.3       9.6 %
        Year Ended
    December 31,
        % Change from December 31,  
        2024     2023     2023  
    Beginning assets under management   $ 33.3     $ 28.9       15.2 %
                       
    Gross client inflows     5.1       5.4       -5.6 %
    Gross client outflows     (5.7 )     (4.8 )     18.8 %
    Net client flows     (0.6 )     0.6       -200.0 %
                       
    Market appreciation     3.8       3.8       0.0 %
    Ending assets under management   $ 36.5     $ 33.3       9.6 %
     
    Exhibit 7
    Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.
    Discretionary Assets Under Management
    (Unaudited and in billions)
     
    Discretionary Assets Under Management:
     
        Three Months Ended
    December 31,
        % Change from December 31,  
        2024     2023     2023  
    Beginning assets under management   $ 22.6     $ 20.5       10.2 %
                       
    Gross client inflows     1.8       0.7       157.1 %
    Gross client outflows     (0.9 )     (1.1 )     -18.2 %
    Net client flows     0.9       (0.4 )     325.0 %
                       
    Market (depreciation) appreciation     (0.2 )     1.8       -111.1 %
    Ending assets under management   $ 23.3     $ 21.9       6.4 %
        Twelve Months Ended
    December 31,
        % Change from December 31,  
        2024     2023     2023  
    Beginning assets under management   $ 21.9     $ 20.9       4.8 %
                       
    Gross client inflows     3.9       3.0       30.0 %
    Gross client outflows     (4.6 )     (4.1 )     12.2 %
    Net client flows     (0.7 )     (1.1 )     36.4 %
                       
    Market appreciation     2.1       2.1       0.0 %
    Ending assets under management   $ 23.3     $ 21.9       6.4 %
    Exhibit 8
    Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.
    Non-Discretionary Assets Under Management
    (Unaudited and in billions)
     
    Non-Discretionary Assets Under Management:
     
        Three Months Ended
    December 31,
        % Change from December 31,  
        2024     2023     2023  
    Beginning assets under management   $ 12.5     $ 10.7       16.8 %
                       
    Gross client inflows     0.4       0.2       100.0 %
    Gross client outflows     (0.4 )     (0.2 )     100.0 %
    Net client flows                 0.0 %
                       
    Market appreciation     0.7       0.7       0.0 %
    Ending assets under management   $ 13.2     $ 11.4       15.8 %
        Twelve Months Ended
    December 31,
        % Change from December 31,  
        2024     2023     2023  
    Beginning assets under management   $ 11.4     $ 8.0       42.5 %
                       
    Gross client inflows     1.2       2.4       -50.0 %
    Gross client outflows     (1.1 )     (0.7 )     57.1 %
    Net client flows     0.1       1.7       -94.1 %
                       
    Market appreciation     1.7       1.7       0.0 %
    Ending assets under management   $ 13.2     $ 11.4       15.8 %
     
    Exhibit 9
    Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.
    Assets Under Management
    (Unaudited and in billions)
     
        Three Months Ended
    December 31,
     
        2024     2023  
    Total AUM as of September 30,   $ 35.088     $ 31.187  
    Discretionary AUM:            
    Total Discretionary AUM as of September 30,   $ 22.639     $ 20.462  
    New client accounts/assets (1)     1.370       0.188  
    Closed accounts (2)     (0.011 )     (0.103 )
    Net cash inflow/(outflow) (3)     (0.458 )     (0.479 )
    Non-discretionary to Discretionary AUM (4)     (0.012 )     (0.002 )
    Market appreciation     (0.209 )     1.819  
    Change to Discretionary AUM     0.680       1.423  
    Total Discretionary AUM at December 31,     23.319       21.885  
    Change to Non-Discretionary AUM (5)     0.687       0.671  
    Total AUM as of December 31,   $ 36.455     $ 33.281  
       
    Twelve Months Ended

    December 31,
     
        2024     2023  
    Total AUM as of January 1,   $ 33.281     $ 28.905  
    Discretionary AUM:            
    Total Discretionary AUM as of January 1,   $ 21.885     $ 20.851  
    New client accounts/assets (1)     1.549       0.339  
    Closed accounts (2)     (0.527 )     (0.202 )
    Net cash inflow/(outflow) (3)     (1.714 )     (1.272 )
    Non-discretionary to Discretionary AUM (4)     (0.018 )     (0.032 )
    Market (depreciation)/appreciation     2.144       2.201  
    Change to Discretionary AUM     1.434       1.034  
    Total Discretionary AUM at December 31,     23.319       21.885  
    Change to Non-Discretionary AUM (5)     1.740       3.342  
    Total AUM as of December 31,   $ 36.455     $ 33.281  
    (1) Represents new account flows from both new and existing client relationships.
    (2) Represents closed accounts of existing client relationships and those that terminated.
    (3) Represents periodic cash flows related to existing accounts.
    (4) Represents client assets that converted to Discretionary AUM from Non-Discretionary AUM.
    (5) Represents the net change to Non-Discretionary AUM.
     
    Exhibit 10
    Silvercrest Asset Management Group Inc.
    Equity Investment Strategy Composite Performance1, 2
    As of December 31, 2024
    (Unaudited)
     
    PROPRIETARY EQUITY PERFORMANCE 1, 2   ANNUALIZED PERFORMANCE  
        INCEPTION   1-YEAR     3-YEAR     5-YEAR     7-YEAR     INCEPTION  
    Large Cap Value Composite   4/1/02     16.3       5.1       10.8       10.6       9.7  
    Russell 1000 Value Index         14.4       5.6       8.7       8.4       7.9  
                                       
    Small Cap Value Composite   4/1/02     10.1       4.3       8.8       7.1       10.3  
    Russell 2000 Value Index         8.1       1.9       7.3       6.1       7.9  
                                       
    Smid Cap Value Composite   10/1/05     15.7       2.6       7.6       7.0       9.5  
    Russell 2500 Value Index         11.0       3.8       8.4       7.2       7.8  
                                       
    Multi Cap Value Composite   7/1/02     16.1       2.6       9.2       8.5       9.7  
    Russell 3000 Value Index         14.0       5.4       8.6       8.3       8.4  
                                       
    Equity Income Composite   12/1/03     10.4       3.1       6.7       7.4       10.8  
    Russell 3000 Value Index         14.0       5.4       8.6       8.3       8.5  
                                       
    Focused Value Composite   9/1/04     16.7       (0.2 )     5.6       5.4       9.4  
    Russell 3000 Value Index         14.0       5.4       8.6       8.3       8.3  
                                       
    Small Cap Opportunity Composite   7/1/04     14.9       4.5       10.3       10.1       11.0  
    Russell 2000 Index         11.5       1.2       7.4       6.9       8.1  
                                       
    Small Cap Growth Composite   7/1/04     13.6       (2.9 )     11.1       11.8       10.6  
    Russell 2000 Growth Index         15.2       0.2       6.9       7.2       8.5  
                                       
    Smid Cap Growth Composite   1/1/06     20.9       (3.2 )     12.6       14.2       11.1  
    Russell 2500 Growth Index         13.9       0.0       8.1       8.8       9.5  
    1 Returns are based upon a time weighted rate of return of various fully discretionary equity portfolios with similar investment objectives, strategies and policies and other relevant criteria managed by Silvercrest Asset Management Group LLC (“SAMG LLC”), a subsidiary of Silvercrest. Performance results are gross of fees and net of commission charges. An investor’s actual return will be reduced by the advisory fees and any other expenses it may incur in the management of the investment advisory account. SAMG LLC’s standard advisory fees are described in Part 2 of its Form ADV. Actual fees and expenses will vary depending on a variety of factors, including the size of a particular account. Returns greater than one year are shown as annualized compounded returns and include gains and accrued income and reinvestment of distributions. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. This piece contains no recommendations to buy or sell securities or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell securities or investment services or adopt any investment position. This piece is not intended to constitute investment advice and is based upon conditions in place during the period noted. Market and economic views are subject to change without notice and may be untimely when presented here. Readers are advised not to infer or assume that any securities, sectors or markets described were or will be profitable. SAMG LLC is an independent investment advisory and financial services firm created to meet the investment and administrative needs of individuals with substantial assets and select institutional investors. SAMG LLC claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®).
    2 The market indices used to compare to the performance of Silvercrest’s strategies are as follows:
      The Russell 1000 Index is a capitalization-weighted, unmanaged index that measures the 1000 largest companies in the Russell 3000. The Russell 1000 Value Index is a capitalization-weighted, unmanaged index that includes those Russell 1000 Index companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower expected growth values.
      The Russell 2000 Index is a capitalization-weighted, unmanaged index that measures the 2000 smallest companies in the Russell 3000. The Russell 2000 Value Index is a capitalization-weighted, unmanaged index that includes those Russell 2000 Index companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower expected growth values.
      The Russell 2500 Index is a capitalization-weighted, unmanaged index that measures the 2500 smallest companies in the Russell 3000. The Russell 2500 Value Index is a capitalization-weighted, unmanaged index that includes those Russell 2000 Index companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower expected growth values.
      The Russell 3000 Value Index is a capitalization-weighted, unmanaged index that measures those Russell 3000 Index companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower forecasted growth.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: FormFactor Partners with Delft Circuits to Revolutionize Quantum Computing Interfacing

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LIVERMORE, Calif., March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — FormFactor, Inc. (NASDAQ: FORM), a leader in precision test and measurement solutions, and Delft Circuits, an innovator in high-density cryogenic cabling solutions, have teamed up to integrate Delft Circuits’ Cri/oFlex® product portfolio into FormFactor’s cryogenic test systems. This partnership addresses the growing demand for scalable, high-density interconnect solutions in quantum computing, enabling the industry to meet growing demands for computation power and efficient system interfacing.

    As quantum technology continues to evolve, systems must support higher channel densities to meet increasing computational requirements. FormFactor’s systems, currently equipped with 12 ISO-100 ports supporting up to 300 channels, will now integrate Delft Circuits’ high-density Cri/oFlex® cabling. This partnership enables up to 160 channels per port, with a total of 1920 channels, improving the overall performance and scalability of quantum systems, especially in environments where space and efficiency are critical.

    “Delft Circuits’ technology perfectly complements our systems, allowing us to offer our customers some of the highest channel densities in the industry while maintaining the precision and reliability FormFactor is known for,” said Thomas Fries, VP and GM, Emerging Growth Business Unit, FormFactor.

    Key Benefits of the Partnership:

    • Increased Channel Density: Delft Circuit’s Cri/oFlex® cabling provides up to 160 channels per port, enabling 1920 channels in total—driving the scalability needed for next-generation quantum computers.
    • Tailored for Space-Constrained Environments: Designed specifically for high-density interfacing in compact quantum computing fridges, facilitating seamless integration in limited spaces.
    • Scalable Pathway for Growth: Initial support for 80-160 channels with mK node and SMP-SMP jumpers, with future scalability to meet accelerating roadmaps.

    “Our partnership with FormFactor underscores the value of Cri/oFlex® technology in addressing the critical needs of quantum computing infrastructures. We are excited to bring our expertise to their robust portfolio and help advance the industry’s progress,” said Daan Kuitenbrouwer, Chief Commercial Officer and Founder at Delft Circuits.

    The collaboration is ideally positioned to transform quantum computing interfacing by offering a comprehensive solution that combines precision measurement with cutting-edge cabling technology—accelerating the scalability and reliability of next-generation quantum systems for researchers, developers, manufacturers, and infrastructure providers alike.

    About FormFactor
    FormFactor, Inc. (NASDAQ: FORM), is a leading provider of essential test and measurement technologies along the full IC life cycle – from characterization, modeling, reliability, and design debug, to qualification and production test. Semiconductor companies rely upon FormFactor’s products and services to accelerate profitability by optimizing device performance and advancing yield knowledge. The Company serves customers through its network of facilities in Asia, Europe, and North America. For more information, visit the Company’s website at www.formfactor.com.

    About Delft Circuits
    Delft Circuits is a leading provider of dedicated quantum hardware, dedicated to supplying the best hardware for the quantum engineer and industry. With a focus on designing and developing i/o cabling solutions, the company has established itself as a trusted partner for leading national laboratories, blue-chip corporations, and ambitious professors. With a beachhead market in the quantum industry, Delft Circuits has already realized hundreds of i/o modules for almost a hundred customers. As an independent, dedicated quantum hardware supplier, the company is committed to pioneering i/o for advanced technologies. Delft Circuits proprietary cabling solutions were referenced by DARPA as the world’s state of the art. Investors in Delft Circuits include QuVest Capital, Scholt Group and High Tech Gründerfonds (HTGF). For more information, please visit: https://www.delft-circuits.com

    Forward-Looking Statements:

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the “safe harbor” provisions of the federal securities laws. These statements are based on management’s current expectations and beliefs as of the date of this release, and are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, many of which are beyond the Company’s control, that could cause actual results to differ materially from those described in the forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements regarding the impact of this new partnership. Forward-looking statements may contain words such as “may,” “might,” “will,” “expect,” “plan,” “anticipate,” “forecast,” and “continue,” the negative or plural of these words and similar expressions, and include the assumptions that underlie such statements. The following factors, among others, could cause actual results to differ materially from those described in the forward-looking statements: changes in demand for the Company’s products; customer-specific demand; market opportunity; anticipated industry trends; the availability, benefits, and speed of customer acceptance or implementation of new products and technologies; and other factors, including those set forth in the Company’s most current annual report on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and other filings by the Company with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In addition, there are varying barriers to international trade, including restrictive trade and export regulations such as the US-China restrictions, dynamic tariffs, trade disputes between the U.S. and other countries, and national security developments or tensions, that may substantially restrict or condition our sales to or in certain countries, increase the cost of doing business internationally, and disrupt our supply chain. No assurances can be given that any of the events anticipated by the forward-looking statements within this press release will transpire or occur, or if any of them do so, what impact they will have on the results of operations or financial condition of the Company. Unless required by law, the Company is under no obligation (and expressly disclaims any such obligation) to update or revise its forward-looking statements whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise.

    FormFactor Investor Contact
    Stan Finkelstein
    Investor Relations
    (925) 290-4273
    ir@formfactor.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Global Bodies – IPU report: Parliamentary gender gap narrowed over the past 30 years but progress stalled in 2024

    Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union

    Geneva, Switzerland, Thursday 6 March 2025 – A new IPU report analysing three decades of women in national parliaments reveals that the percentage of seats held by women has risen from 11.3% in 1995 to 27.2% in 2025.

    The IPU report Women in parliament 1995-2025 commemorates 30 years since the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the landmark UN framework which set out a roadmap for gender equality and women’s rights. (ref. https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2025-03/women-in-parliament-1995-2025 )

    The report shows that, from 2000 to 2015, the proportion of women in parliament rose steadily. However, in recent years, this progress has slowed.

    And in 2024, despite a high number of elections with 73 chamber renewals globally, women’s parliamentary representation increased by only 0.3 percentage points, marking the slowest rate of progress since 2017.

    Parity achieved in six countries

    In 1995, no parliament had achieved gender parity.

    In 2025, six parliaments have parity or more women than men in their single or lower chambers (Rwanda, Cuba, Nicaragua, Mexico, Andorra and the United Arab Emirates).

    Regional differences

    The Americas have seen the most significant increase in women’s parliamentary participation, with a 22.7 percentage point gain across all chambers combined over 30 years. The region now has the highest average, with 35.4% of seats held by women.

    From leading the world 30 years ago for gender equality in parliament, Asia now lags behind; the region recorded the slowest growth with a gain of just 8.9 points since 1995.

    2024 elections: More diversity and prominence for gender issues

    Despite the current pushback against diversity in the United States, the November 2024 elections saw two Black women elected to the Senate for the first time and the first openly transgender person to be elected to Congress.

    The United Kingdom Parliament elected in 2024 is also the most ethnically diverse in the country’s history with Black, Asian and ethnic minorities, both men and women, comprising around 13% of the House of Commons.

    The report notes that gender issues, particularly abortion rights and issues of gender identity, had a polarizing effect on many of the elections last year, in some cases spurring an anti-feminist backlash and in others serving to mobilize female voters.

    Violence against women in politics

    The report also points to political violence against women in 2024 elections:

    Mexico’s 2024 election was one of its most violent, with an estimated 130 candidates, including 30 women, allegedly attacked, according to Data Cívica.

    In the Republic of Korea, a woman MP was physically attacked during the election campaign.

    In the United Kingdom, the 2024 election saw an “alarming rise” in candidate abuse according to a report by the country’s Electoral Commission, disproportionately affecting women.

    However, some countries, with IPU support, have taken noteworthy steps to address gender-based violence in elections and parliaments, including Australia and the United Republic of Tanzania.

    Proactive steps towards gender parity

    Countries which have taken steps towards ensuring greater gender balance have seen the most laudable progress.

    These steps include implementing well-designed quotas, making parliaments more gender-sensitive and addressing violence against women.

    The report underlines that two factors have made a significant difference in the share of women elected to parliaments: electoral systems – especially proportional representation or mixed systems – and gender quotas in any form.

    In countries with gender quotas in place, the proportion of women elected or appointed was 31.2% in 2024 compared to 16.8% in countries without.

    Quotes

    IPU President, Tulia Ackson: “True progress in women’s political representation requires political will, intentional steps and a long-term commitment. At a time when women’s rights are on the backfoot in some regions of the world, women’s leadership is more important than ever.”

    President of the IPU Forum of Women Parliamentarians, Cynthia López Castro: “The journey from 11% to 27% women in parliaments over 30 years shows us that change is possible, but also that our work is far from done as we aim for gender parity. We need to encourage the next generation to come forward and continue the fight.”

    IPU Secretary General, Martin Chungong: “IPU analysis shows that the gender glass ceiling in parliaments has cracked but is far from shattered. There has been progress but the backlash against women’s rights in some countries is extremely worrying. It will take both women and men to overcome these challenges and accelerate progress towards gender parity.”

    The IPU is the global organization of national parliaments. It was founded in 1889 as the first multilateral political organization in the world, encouraging cooperation and dialogue between all nations. Today, the IPU comprises 181 national Member Parliaments and 15 regional parliamentary bodies. It promotes peace, democracy and sustainable development. It helps parliaments become stronger, younger, greener, more innovative and gender-balanced. It also defends the human rights of parliamentarians through a dedicated committee made up of MPs from around the world.

    MIL OSI – Submitted News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Leveraging South-South and triangular cooperation: inclusive and technological innovations for urban health and disaster risk reduction

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    Time: 8:00 New York | 13:00 Geneva | 19:00 Bangkok | 21:00 Incheon 
    Date: 12, 19, 26 March 2025 (Wednesdays)
    (Three 120-minute online sessions and one post-course survey)
    Workshop Language: English with simultaneous interpretation in Arabic, Chinese, French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish and International Sign Language.

    Background

    Resilient and inclusive cities are key to achieving global commitments such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. These cities ensure no one is left behind by actively involving all community members, particularly marginalized groups like persons with disabilities, older persons, among others in resilience planning and decision-making. The Sendai Framework emphasizes that inclusive disaster risk reduction (DRR) is essential for effective risk management, while the 2030 Agenda highlights the importance of inclusivity in achieving Sustainable Development Goal 11, which aims to make cities inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable. The Pact for the Future (2024) further underscores the need to empower all individuals, regardless of their background, to contribute meaningfully to the design and implementation of urban resilience strategies.

    Technological solutions play a crucial role in disaster risk reduction and management by enhancing early warning systems, real-time monitoring, and rapid response capabilities. Countries and cities are increasingly adopting and sharing innovative solutions, such as satellite-based remote sensing, AI-powered predictive analytics, and IoT-enabled sensors, to detect hazards and improve disaster preparedness. Collaborative initiatives, including joint research, technology transfers, and capacity-building programs, enable developing countries to leverage cost-effective, context-specific innovations. Mobile applications, digital communication platforms, and drone technology—often co-developed through South-South and Triangular Cooperation—enhance response efforts, fostering resilience and data-driven decision-making across at-risk regions.

    In addition to these principles, South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) offers valuable opportunities to foster knowledge sharing, capacity building, and technology exchange among countries in the Global South. The Buenos Aires outcome document of BAPA+40 (2019) underscores the role of local authorities, women, and youth in advancing South-South and Triangular Cooperation and promoting inclusive societies to achieve sustainable development. By leveraging South-South and Triangular Cooperation, cities can adopt innovative solutions to address disaster risks, including the use of technology for early warning systems, data analytics, and inclusive infrastructure design. This approach aligns with global efforts, such as WHO’s Healthy Cities initiative, which integrates public health into urban planning to enhance resilience, inclusivity, and well-being. Through South-South and Triangular Cooperation, the use of technology, and a focus on inclusivity, cities can strengthen their disaster risk reduction capacities and better prepare for challenges such as climate change, urbanization, and other emerging risks.

    Since 2020, UNOSSC, UNDRR GETI, PAHO/WHO have jointly organized four certificate online training programmes. These programs focused on leveraging South-South and Triangular Cooperation, disaster risk reduction, and integrating health emergency response and preparedness into building resilient cities and societies, addressing various phases of the COVID-19 pandemic, including outbreak response, emergency management, and recovery. The training series has been highly successful, attracting over 9,800 live session participants and over 6,500 self-paced learners from 155 countries and territories.

    Building on its success, the fifth joint training will be held in March 2025 by UNDRR, UNOSSC and PAHO/WHO, aiming to provide a foundation for engaging multi-level governments and diverse stakeholders, particularly the most at-risk groups—such as women, older persons, and person with disabilities—in disaster risk reduction, health emergency, and disaster risk management. The course will emphasize the importance of a whole-of-society approach, the use of technology, and the facilitation of South-South and Triangular Cooperation in creating inclusive, resilient and healthy cities, featuring practical tools and examples.  

    Course Objective:

    This training serves as an introductory training for urban leaders, planners, and practitioners, aiming to:

    • Increase awareness and understanding for managing complex urban disaster risks, health emergencies, and disaster risk management, leveraging technology, and facilitating South-South and Triangular Cooperation;
    • Introduce useful concepts and tools to strengthen inclusion, especially the inclusion of persons with disabilities and older persons in urban disaster risk management;
    • Better prepare city stakeholders and engage them in making cities resilient and inclusive for future crises, health and non-health emergencies and uncertainties;
    • Facilitate learning through South-South and Triangular Cooperation and sharing of experience; 
    • Inspire and motivate whole-of-society to play a key and active role in securing resilient, inclusive and sustainable urban futures.

    Expected outcome:

    By the end of this training, participants shall be able to:

    • Describe disaster risk reduction, health emergency and disaster risk management, South-South and Triangular Cooperation, use of technology, and the whole-of-society approach for creating inclusive, resilient and healthy cities;
    • Apply concepts and tools such as the Disaster Resilience Scorecard for Cities – Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities, the Disability Inclusion in Hospital Disaster Risk Management Tool (INGRID-H), and health facilities strategic risk assessment;
    • Provide examples of good practices and relevant solutions by local government authorities and diverse stakeholders in inclusive and technology-driven disaster risk reduction, health emergency response preparedness, and South-South and Triangular Cooperation.

    Targeted Audience

    Local and national government officials in charge of disaster risk reduction and management, urban development and planning and public health emergency preparedness, national associations of municipalities, urban resilience and development practitioners, as well as civil society, private sector, and academia.

    The course is open to all participants from both developed and developing countries. Participants from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDs) are highly encouraged.

    No. of Trainees: 

    Maximum 1,000 participants can attend the live training sessions, on a first come first served basis. 

    Facilitators:

    Experts from UNDRR, UNOSSC, and PAHO with guest speakers representing various stakeholder groups, e.g., older persons, youth, women, person with disabilities, local and national governments, and academic network.

    Post-course Survey

    To enable evidence-based course evaluation, a post-course survey will be disseminated to participants to collect feedback on the course content and organization, as well as understanding participants’ development needs for follow-up and to facilitate future programmatic designing.

    Certificate:

    Certificate of participation will be given only to participants who attend all three training sessions live and complete a post-course survey. 

    Programme

    Date Program

    Wed, 12 Mar 2025

    8 AM NY EST

    9 PM KST

    (120 minutes)

    Session 1: Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Disaster Risk Reduction (led by UNDRR)

    • Welcome Remarks by UNOSSC, PAHO and UNDRR
    • Course introduction
    • Introduction to Disaster risk reduction (DRR), urban resilience and Making Cities Resilient 2030 (MCR2030)
    • Disability Inclusive Disaster Risk Reduction (DiDRR)
    • Practical tool for strengthening meaningful participation and accessibility of persons with disabilities in DRR
    • Case examples and experience sharing from local governments and stakeholders
    • Mini quiz

    Wed, 19 Mar 2025

    8 AM NY EST

    9 PM KST

    (120 minutes)

    Session 2: Older Persons and Disability Inclusive Urban Health Emergencies and Disaster Risk Management (led by PAHO/WHO)

    • Welcome & introduction
    • Mini quiz
    • Resilient Cities for All: Addressing Health Emergencies and Disaster Risks for the older persons
    • Disability Inclusion in Health Facilities Disaster Risk Management

    Wed, 26 Mar 2025

    8 AM NY EST

    9 PM KST

    (120 minutes)

    Session 3: Leveraging Technological Innovation for Urban Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (led by UNOSSC)

    • Welcome & introduction
    • Panel Presentations
    • Q&A and Panel conclusion
    • Training Wrap-up
    • Closing Remarks by UNOSSC, PAHO and UNDRR

    Organizers

    The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) Global Education and Training Institute (GETI) was established in 2010 to develop a new cadre of professionals in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation to build disaster resilient societies. GETI has a global mandate to provide capacity building support to mainstream disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation into sustainable development; convene and support inter-city learning to strengthen resilience (Making Cities Resilient); and to provide capacity building and best practice sharing support to national training institutions working on resilience issues. Based in Incheon, the Republic of Korea, UNDRR GETI is also the global secretariat of the Making Cities Resilient 2030 (MCR2030).

    The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) was established to promote, coordinate and support South-South and triangular cooperation (SSTC) globally and within the United Nations system. UNOSSC initiated the “Global South-South Development Center Phase II” (2025-2030), with full funding support from the Government of China, which aims to facilitate practical SSTC initiatives globally in advancing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

    Pan American Health Organization (PAHO/WHO) Health Emergencies Department works with countries of the American Region to increase the health sector resilience to emergencies and disasters. PAHO’s priority is to deliver rapid, predictable, and comprehensive support to Member States in terms of prevention, risk reduction, preparedness, surveillance, response, and early recovery in case of any threat to human health, including outbreaks or disasters caused by natural phenomena, biological, chemical or radiological agent, human activities, conflicts or any other hazard. When national capacities are overwhelmed, PAHO is ready to lead and coordinate the international health response to contain disasters, including outbreaks, and to provide effective relief and recovery to affected populations. 

    For more information, contact:

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0146/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Rasa Juknevičienė, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Riho Terras, Michael Gahler, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Andrzej Halicki
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0146/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

     having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted on 11 March 2022 at the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government,

     having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022,

     having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

     having regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact – Towards more effective civilian missions, approved by the Council on 22 May 2023,

     having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 on a European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine)[1],

     having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020[7],

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 April 2023 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents (COM(2023)0209),

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 on an EU Action Plan on Cable Security (JOIN(2025)0009),

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on a European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence (JOIN(2023)0009),

     having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States[8],

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024),

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan entitled ‘An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats’ (JOIN(2023)0008),

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

     having regard to the report by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2024 entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our priorities in 2024’,

     having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 by Ursula von der Leyen entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, published on 18 July 2024,

     having regard to the report by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’, published in April 2024, and in particular the section thereof entitled ‘Promoting peace and enhancing security: towards a Common Market for the defence industry’,

     having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and in particular Chapter Four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

     having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

     having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949,

     having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

     having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and to the NATO Vilnius Summit Communiqué issued by NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Vilnius on 11 July 2023,

     having regard to the joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

     having regard to the ninth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, submitted jointly by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the NATO Secretary General to the Council of the EU and the NATO Council on 13 June 2024,

     having regard to the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington on 10 July 2024,

     having regard to Ukraine’s victory plan presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to the European Council on 17 October 2024,

     having regard to the speeches and statements made at the Munich Security Conference on 14-16 February 2025,

     having regard to the statements made at the Leaders Meeting on Ukraine, held in London on 2 March 2025,

     having regard to the temporary halt of all United States military aid to Ukraine,

     having regard to the statement by the President of the Commission of 4 March 2025 on the defence package, the ReArm Europe Plan,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the security situation in Europe has seen an unprecedented deterioration over the past years; whereas there is a common understanding that Europe needs to be able to effectively address European security challenges and achieve a state of defence readiness;

    B. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a watershed moment in European history; whereas Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine is widely recognised as an attack on the European peace order established after the Second World War and on the global order as a whole;

    C. whereas despite previous signs and warnings, many countries have not taken the necessary defence measures; whereas the goal of committing 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP) to defence spending agreed by NATO members in 2014 is still not being met by all NATO members in the EU; whereas the gap between the 2 % goal and the actual defence spending by EU Member States amounts to EUR 1 770 billion over the 2006-2022 period[9]; whereas in 2024, 16 EU Member States that are also NATO allies were expected to exceed NATO’s 2 % defence investment guideline, compared to only nine in 2023;

    D. whereas as a result of these investment gaps, numerous reports, notably the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis of May 2022, have analysed a worrying capability gap in European defence;

    E. whereas the Draghi report highlighted a funding need of EUR 500 billion in European defence for the next decade and highlights a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence investment and limited access to financing as obstacles to a capable EDTIB; whereas the lending policy of the European Investment Bank (EIB) excludes the financing of ammunition and weapons, as well as equipment or infrastructure exclusively dedicated to military and police use;

    F. whereas the Niinistö report underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios, especially given the further deteriorating environment outside of the EU; whereas it insists that this preparedness is necessary for the EU and its Member States to signal to potential adversaries that they will not be able to outlast the EU; whereas it deplores the fact that the EU lacks a common plan in the event of armed aggression and underlines that the EU needs to rethink the way it defines its security;

    G. whereas Russia’s continued armament efforts and its cooperation with other authoritarian powers on armaments, vastly surpassing European stocks and production capacities, pose the most serious and unprecedented threat to world peace as well as to the security and territory of the EU and its Member States; whereas the Russian regime is strengthening its ties in particular with the autocratic leaderships of China, Iran and North Korea in order to achieve its objectives;

    H. whereas the EU is also facing the most diverse and complex range of non-military threats since its creation, exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including foreign information manipulation and interference, cyberattacks, attacks against underwater infrastructure, economic pressures, food and energy blackmailing, instrumentalisation of migration and subversive political influence; whereas the EU should take these kind of threats seriously in its defence and security policies;

    I. whereas the recent actions and statements by the US administration have further increased concerns about the future stance of the US vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the security of Europe;

    J. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated not only in eastern Europe, but also in countries in the EU’s southern neighbourhood partnership and beyond;

    K. whereas the disastrous impact of past or ongoing wars, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, north-eastern Africa and Libya poses serious risks to the EU’s security and its economic and trade interests; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with and remain an ongoing challenge for EU external border management and mitigation of illegal migration;

    L. whereas European security is linked to stability on the African continent, and the growing presence of non-European actors is testament to the lack of sufficient security and diplomatic engagement in the region to effectively counter the challenges and protect its strategic interests;

    M. whereas the Black Sea has shifted from a secondary to a primary military theatre for the EU and NATO, and, alongside the Baltic Sea, has become a pivotal strategic region for European security in countering the Russian threat;

    N. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important in terms of economic development and transport, while at the same time facing challenges linked to climate change and militarisation, as well as those resulting from increasing geopolitical competition and migration;

    O. whereas China, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods deployed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European security and interests; whereas China is also investing tremendously in its armed forces, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide, and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security as well as to the EU’s economic interests; whereas China has promoted an alternative narrative for many years, challenging human rights, democratic values and open markets in multilateral and international forums; whereas China’s increasing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in these organisations;

    P. whereas in 2023, Parliament and the Council concluded agreements on the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which, as short-term and emergency measures, aim to encourage the joint procurement of defence products, ramp up the European defence industry’s production capacity, and replenish depleted stocks;

    Q. whereas in 2024, the Commission proposed the establishment of a European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) and a European defence industry programme (EDIP), addressing, in particular, the improvement of EU defence capabilities and the governance, security of supply and integration of the Ukrainian defence technological and industrial base (DTIB) into its EU counterpart, the EDTIB;

    R. whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture and shared threat perception and assessment, as well as the development of solutions to be combined in doctrine and concepts;

    S. whereas in the light of the above challenges and analyses, the President of the European Commission tasked the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with drafting a white paper on the future of European defence, which is due to be published on 19 March 2025;

    1. Believes that the white paper on the future of European defence must put forward concrete measures and options to the members of the European Council so that truly groundbreaking and much needed efforts can be made, in the shortest possible time frames, which must address the following pressing needs: to urgently and substantially increase defence capabilities, overcome fragmentation in the European defence industry market, enhance the capacity of the EDTIB, promptly identify and implement pragmatic solutions for the considerable funding needs, deepen EU-NATO cooperation through a robust European pillar in NATO, and ensure an increase in our military support to Ukraine and other neighbouring countries that share our European values;

    2. Calls on Council President António Costa to immediately convene the European Council, based on the conclusions of the white paper, so that EU leaders can agree on immediate and far-reaching decisions to implement the European Defence Union as laid out in Article 42(2) TEU and elaborate on the measures identified in the white paper; urges both the Council and the Commission to identify clear and concrete priorities for the short, medium and long term, with a corresponding timeline of actions;

    3. Reiterates its previous calls to take seriously the direct and indirect threat of a Russian attack against the EU and to prepare urgently, without any further delay, to do the utmost to improve European military capacities in order to ensure that Europe is ready for the most extreme military contingencies; calls therefore for the threat analysis of the EU’s Strategic Compass to be updated and upgraded to a threat assessment and for the measures within the compass to be adapted accordingly, in order to reflect the threat magnitude in our threat environment;

    4. Strongly believes that Europeans must take on greater responsibility within NATO, especially when it comes to ensuring security on the European continent, and hence underlines that a strong and robust European pillar in NATO is the best way to foster our transatlantic security and ensure the security of all Europeans; recalls that a true transatlantic partnership means shared responsibility, joint efforts and equal burden-sharing;

    5. Stresses the importance of learning from Ukraine’s experience in countering Russian aggression and calls for immediate measures to enhance the security and defence of the EU’s north-eastern border with Russia and Belarus by establishing a comprehensive and resilient defence line across land, air and maritime domains to counter military and hybrid threats; emphasises the need to coordinate and integrate national efforts through EU regulatory and financial instruments to accelerate implementation;

    6. Stresses that Europe continues to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine as it courageously fights for our European way of life, and recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided; reiterates thus that the EU will support Ukraine for as long as it takes for Ukraine to win this war, as a forced surrender by Ukraine and acceptance of a ‘peace’ treaty on Putin’s terms could accelerate the timeline for Russia to shift its aggression toward the EU or NATO; urges the EU, accordingly, to develop a ‘Ukraine strategy’, outlining clear objectives for the support of Ukraine’s defence capabilities and the integration of the Ukrainian DTIB into the EDTIB, and to find the necessary resources to implement such a strategy, while supporting European defence industry activities in Ukraine in order to ramp up local production and enhance cooperation between Ukrainian and EU defence companies; underscores that such a Ukraine strategy must be an integral part of a ‘European defence’ strategy; calls on the EU Member States to commit at least 0.25 % of their GDP to military aid for Ukraine;

    7. Emphasises the need for a holistic approach to European security, ensuring that all EU policies incorporate defence and security dimensions, supported by both regulatory and financial instruments;

    8. Believes that the EU should develop economic cooperation contingency plans to prepare for mutual support in the event of large-scale security crises, and should deepen economic and defence industrial dialogues in relation to early warnings of hard, hybrid and cyberthreats, in order to foster mutual support planning, protection of critical infrastructure, maritime and underwater safety, and other forms of deeper defence industrial cooperation; calls, in cooperation with NATO, for an enhanced response to Russia’s hybrid war that aims at destabilising not only Ukraine but the whole European continent;

    Addressing capability gaps

    9. Underlines the need to urgently address the gaps in military equipment and ammunition by building on the success of the EDIRPA and ASAP programmes and to swiftly finalise EDIP so that, through common procurement, our common European and Ukrainian capabilities are increased and our stocks of crucial defence equipment and ammunition are replenished; welcomes EDIP’s potential to improve the defence capabilities of the EU and its Member States, to strengthen security of supply and to improve the effectiveness and coherence of EU efforts through new governance structures; stresses that EDIP’s financial envelope will fall well short of meeting the ambitions laid out in EDIP and calls, therefore, for additional funding sources to be identified immediately and to include exploring the possibility of reallocations within the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), notably with regard to European defence projects of common interest and to the Ukraine support instrument that currently lacks any funding; stresses, with regard to the threat assessment of a possible Russian attack on EU and NATO territory within the next few years, the urgent need for EDIP to be implemented swiftly and for additional and substantial funding to be provided for joint European defence efforts before the next MFF;

    10. Calls for the need for a significant increase in availability of strategic enablers in the air, maritime, underwater, space and cyber domains to be addressed without delay;

    11. Suggests that successful Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF) projects be prioritised along the lines of known capability gaps and that sufficient funding be ensured for projects that have proven to deliver; calls for the closure of PESCO projects that do not deliver results and/or do not provide added value in the closing of capability gaps and/or European defence readiness; stresses, in the light of the limited financial envelope of the EDF, that duplicated efforts, especially in crucial capability areas such as the hypersonic interceptor or future main battle tank systems, waste EU tax payers’ money, will prolong development efforts and thus increase the probability of procurement of such capabilities from the US, thus undermining the ambition laid out in EDIS;

    12. Calls for the architecture of the EU Defence Industrial Toolbox to be rationalised, as more financial resources alone will not ensure success, since it is even more important that these resources are spent in a more efficient and effective manner;

    13. Underlines the need to ensure coherence of output between the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP) and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and the NATO capability targets, without delay, to foster complementarity and to prevent dysfunctional duplications; calls for a concrete action plan to be drawn up, including a clear timeline for each priority in line with both the CDP and the NATO Defence Planning Process;

    14. Welcomes the proposal for European defence projects of common interest on the development of common capabilities which go beyond the financial means of an individual Member State, such as a European air shield, autonomous space access and space surveillance, transport and communication capabilities, sovereign digital infrastructures, sovereign cloud infrastructure, long-range precision strike capabilities and integrated air defence, as well as complex maritime and underwater protective assets; stresses that the EU’s efforts in missile defence need to be aligned and integrated with NATO support for the European Sky Shield Initiative, driven by EU Member States; stresses the need to ensure adequate funding, to be established well before 2028, in order to deliver results with regard to the threat analyses of a possible Russian attack against EU and NATO territory within the next few years;

    15. Calls for the establishment of EU-specific rapid response strategies for underwater infrastructure protection operating in alignment with NATO while maintaining EU autonomy; encourages investment in advanced detection and surveillance systems for underwater infrastructure monitoring;

    16. Calls for the EU to further accelerate the implementation of military mobility; believes that the EU has to move from ‘mobility’ to ‘military logistics’; stresses the need for significant investment in military mobility infrastructure to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, camps, fuel infrastructure through depots, ports, air, sea and rail transport platforms, railway lines, waterways, roads, bridges and logistic hubs; stresses that this must be done in cooperation with NATO by drafting a strategic plan for developing mobility;

    17. Underlines the need to quickly agree on additional common European military forces, given that the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) designed as a crisis management instrument provides only a limited European capability to react and support NATO efforts in the event of Russian aggression against EU and NATO territory; recommends, therefore, that the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 be revived and that the RDC be gradually extended to ultimately establish a European corps of 60 000 troops, which should be part of a permanent EU structure while being integrated into NATO’s force model;

    18. Recommends the establishment of a security of supply regime, including joint strategic stocks of raw materials and critical parts, to ensure the availability of raw materials and components needed for the production of defence products, and to allow production cycles to be ramped up faster and shortened;

    Fostering the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB)

    19. Calls for a significant increase in common procurement by EU Member States of required European defence equipment and capabilities; calls on the Member States to aggregate demand by procuring defence equipment jointly, with the possibility of granting the Commission a mandate to procure on their behalf, ideally ensuring a long-term planning horizon for the EDTIB, thus improving the EDTIB’s production capacities and the interoperability of the European armed forces, and making efficient use of taxpayers’ money through economies of scale;

    20. Underlines the outstanding success of the EU’s first joint procurement instrument, EDIRPA, by incentivising joint procurement by Member States; believes that there is a need to continue mechanisms similar to EDIRPA and ASAP while increasing the share of funding for joint procurements compared to support measures for research and development;

    21. Believes that the development of the EU’s joint capability should be based on risk analysis provided in threat assessments and on the impact of projects on mitigating the EU’s joint security risks;

    22. Believes that it is necessary to conduct systematic analyses of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine from a technology usage perspective, and analyses of the necessity of EU and NATO standards in comparison to how they affect the cost of technology and products compared to their usage effectiveness;

    23. Stresses that EDIP must actively facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises and new market entrants through simplified access to funding, reduced regulatory barriers, and dedicated support mechanisms for scaling up operations; emphasises that EDIP should be designed as a stepping stone towards greater European sovereignty in defence production;

    24. Highlights the need to support the development of pan-European value chains in EU defence cooperation by involving companies throughout the EU in the production of defence equipment and by distributing production facilities throughout the EU in order to improve security of supply, increase attractiveness of EU defence cooperation and, above all, enhance the resilience of the supply network, thus reducing our vulnerability in the event of an armed attack;

    25. Calls for the review and adaptation of current and future legislation with regard to negative effects on the EDTIB, especially concerning production capacities and security of supply; calls for an extended mapping, in cooperation with the EDTIB, to identify all horizontal hindrances in the current legislation; calls for a detailed action plan to be developed to resolve the issues as soon as possible; underlines the need to review, simplify and harmonise the current framework for export licences and intra-EU transfer licences, as well as for cross-certification of equipment, as one of the priorities to foster better cooperation within the market and among Member States;

    26. Strongly underlines the need to significantly increase our investment in emerging and disruptive technologies and structures in defence, taking care not to disperse our resources across too many projects, including cyber defence, outer space, complex underwater protective assets, novel materials and manufacturing, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cloud computing and sovereign cloud infrastructure, high-performance computing, the internet of things, robotics, biotechnology and nanotechnology;

    27. Calls on the Commission to leverage the full dual-use potential of space technologies, considering space as both a new operating domain and a critical enabler of multi-domain operations; underlines that the EU currently has a substantial gap in space capabilities compared to its main competitors and stresses that, in order to address this gap in space technologies, already existing flagship projects (i.e. Copernicus and Galileo) should be enhanced for defence applications; suggests, furthermore, that the EU should urgently pursue the development of its IRIS2 constellation, together with the development of further EU common projects, for example, for space domain awareness and space-based missile early-warning applications;

    28. Recalls the increasing threats of cyber warfare and underlines the need for the EU to establish an EU cyber defence coordination centre to monitor, detect and respond to cyberthreats in real time;

    29. Highlights the importance of the involvement of other industrial actors that do not undertake defence-related activities as potential partners in scaling up production when necessary;

    30. Calls for the EU to foster stronger collaboration between our armed forces, academia, industries and investors;

    Ensuring pragmatic sources of finance

    31. Calls on the Commission to bring forward a legislative proposal containing a binding commitment for Member States to reach a minimum threshold of 3 % of their GDP on defence expenditure by 2026, with the need to further increase it to 4 % by 2028 and to commit at least 0.5 % of their GDP to EU common defence; stresses that, in the light of three decades of underinvestment, the current threat to the EU requires much higher defence investment, while underlining that the EU budget can only complement but can never replace the efforts of the Member States in that regard; emphasises that national defence investment by Member States will continue to serve as the backbone of defence readiness, while EU funding and its role in harmonising and streamlining the processes may have an important impact in enhancing and multiplying these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to work and agree on specific ways and means to achieve a short- to long-term substantial increase in public and private investment in defence and security on the national and European levels;

    32. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement on the ReArm Europe Plan;

    33. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to activate the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact;

    34. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a new instrument providing EUR 150 billion in loans to Member States for joint defence investment;

    35. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of its plans to direct more funds towards defence-related investment, including making it possible for cohesion policy programmes to be used;

    36. Calls for a system of European defence bonds to be explored for financing large-scale military investments up front, ensuring urgent capability development; calls for clear allocation criteria prioritising joint capability development, research and innovation, and military mobility infrastructure; calls, along the same lines, for the use of unused ‘coronabonds’ for defence instruments to be explored;

    37. Underlines the role of public-private partnerships which are essential to finance defence investment; proposes, therefore, a dedicated EU instrument incentivising private investment in defence following the example of InvestEU;

    38. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of its plans to take action to mobilise private capital through an acceleration of the Savings and Investment Union and through the EIB; calls for an urgent revision of the EIB’s lending policy and immediate flexibility to remove current restrictions on financing ammunition, weapons and equipment or infrastructure dedicated to military use; stresses that this fundamental reform is necessary to unlock significant investment potential for the European defence sector, and to foster risk-sharing instruments to facilitate commercial bank lending to the sector; urges the EIB to take the necessary steps to facilitate private investment in defence, ensuring that the financial landscape supports the growing needs of the industry;

    39. Demands a review of past and new legislation and taxonomy to ensure that they are best suited to advance our European defence industry;

    40. Believes that environmental, social and governance criteria and taxonomy rules and their interpretation by rating agencies are an obstacle to ensuring increased public finance for defence and hence calls on the Commission to address this issue by, among other things, adapting the regulation on sustainability‐related disclosures in the financial services sector[10] with a view to explicitly ruling out a classification of the defence industry as sustainably or socially harmful;

    Supporting innovation

    41. Calls for the establishment of an EU agency, inspired by the US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, as part of the European Defence Agency, which should be solely responsible for supporting research in emerging and disruptive technologies, equipped with an adequate amount of venture capital; emphasises the need for expanded research and development funding to ensure participation by all Member States through the creation of specialised ‘hubs’;

    42. Believes in the need to increase the funding for academic research programmes to cooperate with the defence industry to ensure long-term in-depth research in defence;

    Finalising the common market for defence

    43. Urges Member States to stop invoking Article 346 TFEU as a means of avoiding the application of the Procurement Directive[11], thus undermining the common market for defence; calls on the Commission to close this loophole by immediately launching a review of this directive, as well as of the Intra-Community Transfer Directive[12], which is scheduled for the second half of 2025, and to recast both regulations as soon as possible with a view to strengthening the common market for defence, as well as to introducing flexibility with regard to crisis situations like those we are currently facing;

    44. Calls for the transformation of NATO standards into EU legislation in order to facilitate the interoperability of European armed forces while strengthening our capacity to negotiate these standards within NATO and to enforce the consistent implementation of these standard in practice;

    45. Presses for a common European certification scheme for weapons systems and a move beyond the current system of national certification in order to speed up the introduction of weapons systems into the armed forces of Member States;

    Fostering effective governance

    46. Deplores the lack of cohesion and effectiveness of EU defence structures and instruments resulting from the loose institutional connection between the Council and the Commission, which not only significantly limits the added value and the effectiveness of cooperation in the EU framework but also results in the ineffective use of taxpayers’ money;

    47. Calls for the creation of a permanent Council of EU defence ministers;

    48. Suggests that the Commissioner for Defence and Space should become the head of the European Defence Agency and should also be nominated as the coordinator for PESCO projects by recasting the respective Council decisions;

    49. Encourages the creation of a ‘defence readiness board’ as proposed in EDIP, led by the Defence Commissioner, which should meet frequently in different configurations, for example, EU defence ministers, national procurement directors and industry representatives;

    50. Believes that the Defence Commissioner should exercise supervision over the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff and military operations;

    51. Suggests that the funding for PESCO and the European Defence Agency be transferred into the common EU budget;

    52. Highlights the need for enhanced and effective parliamentary scrutiny in the area of defence, given its importance and the effects on other areas of increasing investment in defence; calls, therefore, for the establishment of an interinstitutional agreement ensuring Parliament’s access to classified information and the provision of physical infrastructure to that end, allowing for committee meetings to be conducted under the classification of EU restricted, or an even higher security classification;

    Fostering EU-NATO complementarity

    53. Calls for a true strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, in full respect of the agreed guiding principles of cooperation, as well as the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, and underlines that only together can we ensure our security and long-term prosperity;

    54. Underlines the need for an agreement on the exchange of classified information between the EU and NATO;

    55. Calls for the establishment of a regular joint armament conference between the EU and NATO in order to coordinate and align efforts with regard to capability development;

    56. Recalls the need to ensure frequent EU-NATO meetings and summits on political and experts levels, in an inclusive, non-discriminatory and reciprocal manner;

    57. Calls for the EU to reinforce the Structured Dialogue with NATO on the defence industry in order to enhance cooperation in key areas such as interoperability and standardisation;

    Fostering cooperation with non-EU partners

    58. Recalls that there is no alternative to strong and sustainable transatlantic cooperation and thus believes that every effort must be made to foster transatlantic cooperation in every field of the military and defence sectors, while recalling the need to foster European defence and develop our sovereignty;

    59. Underlines the need to enhance our partnership with like-minded countries, particularly those in Europe, such as the UK and Norway; calls for an EU-UK broad security pact, also covering key subjects such as energy, migration and critical minerals; points to the added value of fostering our relationships with global partners such as the US, Japan and Australia;

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    60. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the parliaments and governments of the EU Member States and NATO member countries.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0150/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0150/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the EU is currently under attack, with hybrid incidents inside its borders, a large-scale war in its neighbourhood, and a realignment of global powers, all presenting real risks to the security of the EU and its citizens and requiring immediate, ambitious and decisive action;

    B. whereas the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy are expected to present a white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025, which should serve as a roadmap for such action;

    1. Urges the EU to act immediately to ensure its ability to protect its citizens, deter its enemies, support its allies and become a powerful defender of the rules-based international order and the principles of the European security architecture; urges the EU and its Member States to define a coherent, comprehensive and actionable strategy to achieve this; expects the Commission to present a proposal for such a strategy in its white paper on the future of European defence;

    2. Is firmly convinced that a united EU can overcome all the challenges it faces and become a global power for peace, security, human rights and sustainable development, but that this requires a strong EU budget or additional European financial instruments, a reliable and sovereign industrial basis, a full spectrum of European military capabilities, including strategic enablers, and an integrated command allowing all national forces to act under a unified structure at the service of the EU, alone or in complementarity with other allied forces;

    3. Believes that the strategy must include a renewed threat assessment, reflecting the recent unprecedented changes in the EU’s geopolitical context, a plan for supporting Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression, as a key action to defend the EU’s values and protect its citizens and territory, a roadmap to close the capability gap, restore deterrence and enable autonomous EU action, and a plan to finance such vital transformations in the EU’s capacity to act;

    4. Stresses its firm commitment to continued close cooperation with NATO to reinforce deterrence, collective defence and interoperability; calls nonetheless for the development of a fully-capable European Pillar of NATO able to act autonomously whenever necessary;

    Assessing our threats and challenges

    5. Is convinced that the EU needs to define its foreign policy goals and strategic defence doctrine, identifying the most pressing challenges, systemic threats and rival actors, and to shape its defence strategy accordingly;

    6. Strongly believes that Europe is today facing the most profound military threat to its territorial integrity since the Second World War; believes that Russia and its allies are currently the most significant threat to our security and that of EU candidate countries and partners, and reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, however, that the instability in our southern neighbourhood, the rise in Chinese military power, the increased aggressiveness of some middle powers and the behaviour of the Trump administration, which appears ready to jeopardise transatlantic cooperation on common security and make a deal with the Russian aggressor at the expense of Ukrainian and European security, which are one and the same, must also be fully taken into consideration;

    7. Highlights the fact that on assessments by several European intelligence services, Russia will be ready to attack EU territory within 3 to 10 years, particularly if there is a ceasefire in its aggression against Ukraine that does not lead to a just and lasting peace; notes with deep concern that the Russian armed forces have grown in size and gained valuable battlefield experience, unlike any European forces with the exception of those of Ukraine, aims to have a 1.5 million-strong military by 2026 and has significantly ramped up its armaments production, making it an extremely worrisome threat for the EU’s security and for peace in Europe and globally;

    8. Strongly condemns Russia’s escalating hybrid warfare tactics within the EU and its neighbourhood, which encompass both non-physical and physical actions, including attacks on critical infrastructure and disruption of elections; highlights that Russia’s strategic doctrine includes significant conventional conflict in its conception and execution of hybrid war and conceives hybrid wars as the main line of future military development, rather than a temporary phenomenon; calls for the EU to immediately and significantly step up its ability to defend, attribute and punish hybrid warfare waged within its territory and that of candidate countries;

    9. Condemns all countries that are providing military equipment, financial support or any other form of assistance to Russia, thereby enabling and intensifying its ongoing aggression; warns of the very serious risks resulting from a widening of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; is deeply concerned that the involvement of Iran and North Korea will provide them with important lessons to modernise their military capabilities, and may accelerate their paths towards nuclearisation;

    10. Reaffirms its grave concerns about China’s increasing military investments and capabilities; expresses serious concerns about the renewed Chinese and Russian commitment to further strengthen their military ties and condemns China’s supplying of components and equipment to Moscow’s military industry;

    11. Notes with concern the increase in both intra and inter-state conflicts in the EU’s wider neighbourhood, in part driven by the hegemonic ambitions of several middle powers, the presence of aggressive non-state actors and by the fragility of several states; also notes that this leads to clear threats to the EU’s security, namely by fostering terrorism and increasing the destabilisation of populations, often forcing their displacement;

    12. Is deeply concerned by the recent actions of the Trump administration, which distance it from the values that have been at the core of its relationship with the EU, namely democracy, the rule of law, freedom of speech and support for the rules-based international order; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression, as well as the unilateral decision to end Russia’s international isolation and to propose a normalisation of relations between them; strongly condemns any attempt to blame Ukraine, the victim, for the actions of the aggressor, Russia; urges the US Government to maintain maximum pressure on Russia until the latter agrees to a just and lasting peace for Ukraine; rejects any attempt by the US Government to impose a new security architecture on the EU and its Member States, and reiterates that any negotiation of such a security architecture must take place with the EU at the table; is deeply concerned by the actions of the US Government towards NATO and the doubts raised regarding the United States’ commitment to the security of the European continent; supports the peace process for Ukraine launched by European leaders, together with Ukraine, on 2 March 2025 in London, which seeks a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, and must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for Russia’s war crimes and crime of aggression, Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine and credible security guarantees for Ukraine;

    13. Concurs with the assessment of the Strategic Compass that the EU is surrounded by instability and conflicts, but notes that in the meantime the situation has changed dramatically; believes that, altogether, these developments produce an encirclement of Europe that reduces its scope for the pursuit of democratically defined and autonomous interests and values, and that this requires an immediate response; recognises the evolving nature of global security threats and therefore calls for the EU to conduct more frequent threat assessments, as they are the precondition for a realistic and successful planning of capabilities and operations;

    Supporting Ukraine

    14. Urges the EU and its Member States, together with international partners and NATO allies, to immediately increase their military support to Ukraine in order to assist it in exercising its legitimate right to self-defence against the Russian war of aggression according to Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls, in this regard, for the swift adoption of the next military aid package, which should be the largest to date and reflect the level of ambition this juncture calls for; calls on the Member States, international partners and NATO allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets in Russian territory; calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support to Ukraine; calls on the Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately seize all frozen Russian assets in order to maintain and step up the EU’s response to Ukraine’s military needs;

    15. Urges the Member States to immediately engage in joint procurement of additional capabilities, in particular ammunition for air defence and artillery, as well as any capabilities in which US assistance has played a key role thus far; further urges them to plan in advance for a possible sudden stop in US military assistance;

    16. Welcomes the continued support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, which has already trained more than 60 000 Ukrainian troops, and calls on the mission to continue training as many troops as possible; stresses the importance of specific training modules aimed at developing the capacities of existing and future officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces across all levels and in accordance with their needs; emphasises that the mission should also act as a platform for the exchange of best practices that would ensure that European forces also benefit from the lessons learnt on the battlefield by the Ukrainian Armed Forces; calls on the Member States to further expand training operations for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including training operations in Ukrainian territory;

    17. Insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with, and the integration of, the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), which offers clear advantages for both sides, and calls for speedier integration of the Ukrainian defence industry; recalls the importance of the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) to that effect, and highlights the urgency of properly financing EDIPs Ukraine Support Instrument, which is currently not budgeted; calls on the Commission to include Ukraine and its defence industry in all its defence industrial programmes;

    18. Praises the ‘Danish Model’ for support to Ukraine, which consists of procuring defence capabilities produced directly in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to strongly support this model and to make full use of its potential, as there is an underutilisation of Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, estimated at around 50 %, and it brings many advantages to both sides, such as cheaper equipment, speedier and safer logistics as well as greater ease of training and maintenance;

    19. Calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war that must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for Russia’s war crimes and the crime of aggression, and Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

    Closing the capabilities gap and restoring deterrence

    20. Strongly believes that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not just a simple increase in ambition and action, but a complete overhaul of the way we act and invest in our security and defence, such that from now on we plan, innovate, develop, purchase, maintain and deploy capabilities together, in a coordinated and integrated fashion, while making full use of the complementary competences of all actors in Europe, including NATO;

    21. Calls on the Commission to come up with a complete programme for defence, including against hybrid attacks, ensuring that planning, research, development, procurement and management of capabilities are all done through a European lens, and that all EU funds are used as a stimulus to joint EU action, instead of perpetuating the present state of market fragmentation, divergent and incompatible capabilities, and superfluous and wasteful investments; considers EDIP to be a good step forward and as such calls for its swift adoption;

    22. Recognises that the starting point must be a realistic assessment of the current capabilities and capability gap; calls on the Commission, with the support of the European Defence Agency and in cooperation with NATO, to identify critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in the EU, in particular for strategic enablers, where the Member States have fallen behind and become dependent on non-European allies; furthermore, calls on the Commission to transform the capability gaps into clear industrial targets that can be the object of planning and programming and benefit from an industrial policy;

    23. Declares the EDTIB to be a strategic asset of the EU, and as such considers that the Commission should be tasked with its mapping and monitoring, so as to safeguard the EU’s strengths, reduce its vulnerabilities, avoid crises, and provide it with an effective and efficient industrial policy; calls on the Commission to draw on the EU Military Committee’s expertise in the definition of defence industries’ priorities and the formulation of defence initiatives in order to ensure alignment between industrial capabilities and military needs; recalls the importance of ensuring that the EDTIB is present in all Member States, distributing the burden and the benefits equitably, and preventing its disruption by a targeted attack on a particular area;

    24. Strongly believes that EU support for the production and procurement of defence products should focus on stimulating the EDTIB, increasing production volumes and ensuring the development of native European solutions for key capabilities, in particular for domains of action where we have so far relied on support from allies, and thus be oriented towards EU-based companies; rejects a scenario in which EU funds contribute to perpetuating or deepening dependences on non-European actors, whether for production of capabilities or their deployment; notes with concern that the vast majority of EU defence investment is diverted to defence industry players outside the EU; highlights that our investments should also contribute to bringing our European allies closer together, first and foremost Ukraine, but also Norway and the UK, finding synergies between complementary industrial strengths and bolstering the interoperability of our fighting forces; states, however, that joining common projects in defence and security requires a steadfast commitment to the EU’s values and norms and demands that any industrial partnerships with non-EU allies include strong safeguards on technology transfer and design authority, ensuring that we do not face restrictions on the use of the capabilities acquired; highlights that EU funds will provide opportunities for the defence industry, but also require a commitment to give priority to orders linked to ensuring European security and defence, in particular in times of crisis;

    25. Urges the Member States to radically change the way they procure defence products, choosing common procurement by default, and to consider tasking the Commission with undertaking joint procurement on their behalf; considers that all products procured in the EU, particularly those supported by EU funds, must respect strong safeguards on technology transfer and design authority;

    26. Welcomes all measures that allow a faster and more effective ramp-up of production of defence products in Europe, in particular those that are most needed for a land war; calls for a change in paradigm from a ‘flow’ approach to a ‘stock’ approach, with stock piles of materiel ready for a sustained increase in demand; notes, in this regard, the advantages offered by mechanisms such as advance purchase agreements, the establishment of ‘ever-warm’ facilities and the creation of defence readiness pools; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in developing wartime economic cooperation contingency plans with close partners to prepare for mutual support in the case of large-scale security crises involving them directly, and to deepen wartime economic dialogues with European and global partners;

    27. Highlights that the EDTIB cannot thrive without a true single market for defence; emphasises, in this regard, the need for an effective regulatory framework aimed at encouraging innovation and cross-border cooperation in production, procurement and investment; insists on the need to remove barriers to market entry for defence products across the EU and calls on the Commission to act upon the results of the reviews of the Directives on the transfer of defence-related products[1] and defence procurement[2], considering the obstacles and costs imposed by the current fragmented framework for certification of defence products; calls on the Commission to propose a regulation for common rules on the certification of defence products and the creation of a European defence certification authority; underlines at the same time the importance of maintaining fruitful competition between different undertakings in the single market for defence; calls on the Commission to propose a regulation on the standardisation of defence products with binding industrial standards, taking advantage of the lessons learnt from the implementation of NATO defence standards;

    28. Stresses the need for greater transparency and convergence at the national and European levels on arms exports; points out the need for the Member States to respect the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, while acknowledging their competences in their defence acquisition policies;

    29. Underlines the importance of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in improving and harmonising the EU’s defence capabilities; reiterates its regret that Member States continue to not make full use of the PESCO framework; reiterates its call on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States, and with the involvement of the Commission, to assess projects and their potential regularly and comprehensively with a view to streamlining the current set of projects to a small set of priority projects; believes that priority projects must focus on reducing our dependencies regarding strategic enablers, such as battlefield command and control (C2), aerial and satellite intelligence, surveillance and recognition, satellite communication, air defence and suppression of enemy air defences, military mobility, strategic and tactical air transport and aerial refuelling, missile and deep strike capabilities, drone and anti-drone technologies, combat engineering and wet-gap crossing, and airborne electronic attack; believes that these could be European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI); regrets that Parliament is not in a position to properly scrutinise PESCO projects and calls for a change of paradigm for the governance of EDPCIs, such that Parliament is adequately involved; reiterates its call on the Member States to provide an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year;

    30. Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drones package, focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, containing plans and funds to stimulate research and development, which should learn from the Ukrainian experience and be open to the participation of Ukraine’s highly innovative companies, as well as an industrial programme dedicated to the joint development, production and procurement of drones and anti-drone systems, and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts;

    31. Calls on the Commission to step up the ambition of the European Defence Fund, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and to better align its work programme with the capability planning exercises; recalls that the EU’s investment in defence research and innovation is much lower than that of its industrial competitors; considers that part of the investment from the European Defence Fund (EDF) should be designed to foster partnerships between academia, ministries of defence and the defence industry, and to the creation of dedicated research centres for defence; highlights the importance of promoting the participation of the most innovative high-tech companies from the civilian sector in the EDF;

    32. Recalls that the EDTIB is currently facing a shortage of skilled workers, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a strategy to train, upskill and reskill workers; considers that funding from defence programmes must be paired with requirements regarding benefits for workers and communities where the investments are located, making the European defence industry a source of high-quality jobs and earning the EDTIB broad support from the population;

    33. Calls for the EU and its Member States to quickly improve the state of military mobility and logistics, removing all unnecessary obstacles that slow down the speed at which the EU can react to threats and deploy its forces;

    34. Calls for the EU to develop a comprehensive set of instruments to detect, prevent and react to hybrid attacks and threats and protect the Union’s citizens and assets, including critical infrastructure, but also democratic institutions and processes; reiterates its call on the Member States, the European External Action Service and the Commission to consider the creation of a well-resourced and independent structure tasked with identifying, analysing and documenting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threats against the EU as a whole to increase situational awareness and threat intelligence sharing, and develop attribution capabilities and countermeasures in relation to FIMI;

    35. Stresses the importance of enhanced intelligence sharing and information exchange among the Member States and EU institutions, including Parliament, to improve situational awareness and to be able to better anticipate and counter threats to collective security and define common lines of action under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), particularly in the area of crisis management; calls on the Member States to use the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) as an effective intelligence-sharing body to share intelligence securely, formulate a common strategic culture and provide strategic information to better anticipate and respond to crises within and outside the EU; reiterates its call for the deployment of intelligence-gathering capacities in all CSDP missions and operations, which would provide information to the EU INTCEN, EU military staff, the EU’s Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability;

    36. Welcomes the Niinistö report and its recommendations for strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and resilience; supports the adoption of a whole-of-society approach to resilience, involving the active engagement of the EU institutions, the Member States, civil society and individual citizens in strengthening the Union’s security framework; urges the EU to increase the alignment of existing EU instruments and policies, as well as that between EU and national policies, pioneering a ‘preparedness in all policies’ approach to security and defence, ensuring they do not generate contradictory obligations or jeopardise overall defence objectives, especially during a security crisis; expects the upcoming EU strategy on preparedness to offer details of the implementation of the report;

    Enabling autonomous EU action

    37. Recalls that the Strategic Compass provides the EU and its Member States with a framework for strengthening the EU’s security and defence and for advancing towards a common forward-looking strategic culture; reiterates that the Strategic Compass’s ambitious aims and milestones can only be achieved with the corresponding political will, adequate financial contributions and openness to cooperation where necessary; calls for the Member States to take all the necessary steps and decisions and fully implement the Strategic Compass; reiterates its call to strengthen the EU-s MPCC, establishing it as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations and providing it with adequate premises, staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations, including those of the Rapid Deployment Capacity; insists that the Rapid Deployment Capacity must achieve full operational capability in the first half of 2025 at the latest, with at least 5 000 troops; calls on the Member States to urgently pursue a more ambitious pace and scale of command integration and joint operational capability, with the goal of enabling the EU to conduct large-scale operations independently, without reliance on non-EU countries for any capability, including strategic enablers; stresses that the EU and its Member States cannot develop consistent foreign and defence policies without strong support for democratic and agile structures and decision-making processes; underlines that further institutional discussions on removing the unanimity requirement to enhance cooperation should be explored;

    38. Underlines that in the current geopolitical context, the need for continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on mutual assistance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, regardless of whether or not they are NATO members, is of utmost importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to present concrete steps towards developing a true EU solidarity policy, including by clarifying the practical arrangements in the event of a Member State triggering Article 42(7) TEU;

    39. Notes that EU candidate countries are frequently the target of destabilisation campaigns, and thus calls for the EU to ensure them greater support, in order to preserve stability and security and increase defence cooperation, especially in the fight against disinformation and hybrid warfare; is concerned that otherwise it will act as an invitation to Russia to invade them before they finally join the EU;

    40. Reiterates the importance of EU-NATO cooperation, as NATO remains, for those states that are members of it, an important pillar of their collective defence, such that EU-NATO cooperation should continue, in particular in areas such as information exchange, planning, military mobility and exchange of best practices; highlights that all EU-NATO cooperation must be mutually beneficial and inclusive and respect the EU’s capacity to act autonomously; remains concerned, in this respect, that Türkiye, a NATO member and EU candidate country, excludes Cyprus from cooperation with NATO, hampering an enhanced relationship between the EU and NATO;

    41. Underlines the need for a strong EU defence pillar within NATO, able to act autonomously from, and in complementarity with, NATO, turning the transatlantic alliance into a more equal partnership, and granting the necessary security guarantees to the EU, its Member States and whoever else they deem it necessary to extend them to;

    42. Considers it essential to formalise a security and defence partnership with the United Kingdom as a means of strengthening European security and the European pillar of NATO, in particular in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines, in this regard, the importance of closer cooperation on information and intelligence sharing, military mobility, security and defence initiatives, crisis management, cyber defence, hybrid threats, FIMI and in jointly addressing shared threats;

    43. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that all instruments of external action, including development aid and cooperation, are aligned with the EU’s security objectives, fostering resilient societies by promoting inclusive economic growth, good governance and human rights; emphasises the crucial role that diplomacy and development cooperation play alongside military efforts in ensuring long-term international security; underscores that sustainable peace cannot be achieved through military measures alone, but requires comprehensive strategies that address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, governance failures and climate change;

    Financing our security and defence

    44. Considers that, in order to be able to protect its citizens, deter its enemies, support its allies and become a powerful actor in the defence of a rules-based international order, the EU requires an immediate, substantial and sustained investment in security and defence, in particular at EU level, using a mix of public and private funds and incentivising better spending and better collective action; calls for the EU and the Member States to urgently agree on concrete financial solutions to finance security and defence-related investments; welcomes the ReArmEU initiative by the Commission as an important first step towards swift action;

    45. Recalls that the Commission has estimated the funding needed at EUR 500 billion over the next 10 years (2025-2034), including EUR 400 billion to strengthen Member States’ defence capabilities and EUR 100 billion to support Ukraine; notes higher estimates, such as a Bruegel study referring to EUR 250 billion annually in the event that the United States withdraws its military presence from Europe; highlights that the cost of isolated action is much higher than the cost of joint action, and that the EU and its Member states can also increase their preparedness by making current investment more efficient and coordinated; highlights that the cost of non-preparedness and the consequent loss of autonomy and potential military defeat is much higher than the cost of acting decisively now;

    46. Strongly supports increased investments in our security and defence to ensure that the EU and its Member States are able to face all types of threats, from hybrid to conventional, and establish strong deterrence, while reducing dependences; notes that insecurity, social exclusion and poverty are persistently weaponised by our enemies, as they make large swaths of people more vulnerable to hostile propaganda and anti-democratic narratives; demands therefore that the increased investments in our security and defence come on top of the important investments in social cohesion and welfare, and not instead of them; calls instead for a comprehensive EU investment strategy, based on a permanent fiscal capacity that addresses both vulnerabilities in military capabilities and in the social fabric, empowering us to fight all threats to our values, social model, security and defence; underlines that this pressing investment requires raising public financial resources quickly and in substantial volumes and that this should be based on the principle of social solidarity and a fair redistribution of wealth within our European societies; calls therefore on the Commission to propose new own resources and taxes on the stakeholders benefiting from the current economic and security situation, notably through windfall profits, in order to ensure a fair and sustainable contribution to our collective resilience; recalls that investing in security and defence brings many additional benefits for European society besides greater security and autonomy, and contributes to the desire to make the EU’s economy more competitive;

    47. Warns that simply increasing national defence spending without addressing coordination issues, redundant efforts, and misaligned strategies could be counterproductive as it may exacerbate force integration challenges and drive up procurement costs for all Member States by intensifying competition between them; is therefore concerned by the Commission’s proposals in ReArmEU to activate the escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence investments, which would change the fiscal rules without creating more fiscal space and without accompanying it with proposals for increased coordinated or joint spending; recalls that any exemption should take into account the need to avoid moral hazard and avoid rewarding countries with long-standing inadequacies in their security and defence spending; demands that the Commission and the Member States design any exemptions for defence spending ramp-up in a way that incentivises coordinated spending and ensures the definition of such investments takes into account all threats, including hybrid, and the need to improve military mobility, resilience and security of communications and the availability of skilled workers;

    48. Calls therefore for the bulk of the effort to serve EU-level action; regrets that the Commission’s ReArmEU initiative is mostly based on national expenditure; furthermore calls for the EU and its Member States to give prominent coordination roles to the Commission and the European Defence Agency in new financing instruments, which should be coupled with a complete programme for defence, including against hybrid attacks, ensuring that planning, development, procurement and management of capabilities is done together, in groupings of significant numbers of Member States, and often with the Commission and the European Defence Agency acting on their behalf;

    49. Recognises that the present multiannual financial framework (MFF) is unable to provide sufficient resources for security and defence, and rejects any increases in security and defence spending in the present and future MFFs at the expense of cohesion policy funds, as proposed by the Commission in its ReArmEU initiative; calls on the Commission and the Member States to adapt the cohesion policy funds to a new geopolitical reality, shifting from a reactive, crisis-response stance to a more proactive policy focused on resilience; underlines that the EU budget alone cannot fill the defence spending gap, but has an important role to play; calls for additional EU-wide and European solutions to bridge the gap until the next MFF; highlights the importance of future MFFs in transforming the current immediate increases in security and defence into structural and sustainable EU-level efforts to ensure the EU’s security and defence;

    50. Notes the proposals to make use of readily available sources of capital to finance security and defence, namely the unspent funds of NextGenerationEU and potential financial lines from the European Stability Mechanism, similar to the programme put together during the response to the COVID-19 pandemic; believes that these options could be explored, but would fall short of the needs estimated by the Commission;

    51. Calls therefore on the Commission to raise common debt to provide the Union with the fiscal capacity to borrow in exceptional and crises situations, present and future, taking into account the experience and lessons learnt from NextGenerationEU, as we are now experiencing a pressing need to boost security and defence to protect the EU’s citizens, restore deterrence and support our allies, first and foremost Ukraine; notes additional ideas to create a rearmament bank or a special purpose vehicle with pooled national guarantees to ensure Member States have easier access to markets; underlines that the meaningful involvement of Parliament as one arm of the budgetary authority in the governance of future EU defence spending is a sine qua non; reiterates that the governance of whatever instrument is used should be such that it gives rise to a European defence programme that uses the funds to solve coordination problems in planning, developing, procuring, maintaining and deploying capabilities, reduces dependencies from non-European countries, supports the EDTIB and ultimately enables the EU and its close allies to act autonomously and in a coordinated manner;

    52. Recognises the importance of mobilising private capital into security and defence; recalls, however, that, as governments remain the sole procurers of military capabilities, private capital will not replace public capital in the security and defence sector; calls on the Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to consider an investment guarantee programme, similar to InvestEU, to assist in this effort; calls on the EIB to re-evaluate the list of excluded activities, to adjust its lending policy to increase the volume of available funding in the field of security and defence, and to investigate earmarked debt issuance for funding security and defence projects; calls for more consistent support for companies by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and simplifying procedures, in particular by increasing information-sharing between public authorities, upholding the once-only principle and making full use of digital technologies; calls for the EU to start preparing emergency procedures for projects established in response to major crises or wars;

     

    °

    ° °

    53. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the EU security and defence agencies, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0145/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0145/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 24(1), 42, 43 and 45 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

     having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[1],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[2],

     having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence,

     having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States[3],

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 entitled ‘European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’ (JOIN(2023)0009),

     having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

     having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to Special Report 04/2025 of the European Court of Auditors of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility: Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’,

     having regard to the three Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

     having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by the NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

     having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius,

     having regard to the opening remarks made by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in Brussels at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting of 12 February 2025,

     having regard to the talks held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 18 February 2025 between US and Russian negotiators,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the Commission announced the release of a white paper on the future of European defence, co-authored by Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius and Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, by 19 March 2025; whereas this document will be the first of its kind produced by the EU and emulates similar documents published by Member States;

    B. whereas the white paper must respect the limits set by the TEU in terms of foreign policy and defence and it must take note of the international context and the strategic environment in order to provide a perspective and proposals that will enable the strengthening of Europe’s security;

    C. whereas the white paper on the future of European defence will provide the framework for future defence projects and regulations and will be a key point of reference for incoming negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework;

    D. whereas the international order is profoundly destabilised and is restructuring; whereas the international rules and organisations that emerged from the Second World War and then from the end of the Cold War are in crisis; whereas international relations are increasingly characterised by uncertainty, and the tendency to resort to armed force to resolve international disagreements is growing;

    E. whereas Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has profoundly destabilised the security order in Europe; whereas this unilateral aggression has accelerated the integration of Sweden and Finland into NATO; whereas this war has considerably deteriorated relations and exchanges between Russia and the countries of Europe;

    F. whereas the war in Ukraine has highlighted the chronic underinvestment by Member States in their armed forces; whereas the stocks of arms and ammunition in Europe are largely insufficient; whereas certain critical military capabilities are not possessed by any European military; whereas the infrastructure that is essential for the security and proper functioning of European societies and economies is vulnerable; whereas some Member States have encountered significant difficulties in deploying and transporting military resources within the EU itself;

    G. whereas the relations between the United States and China will structure, to a large extent, the future of international relations in the 21st century; whereas the United States no longer has the will to maintain the same level of military involvement in Europe; whereas the US Secretary of Defence has expressly spoken of a ‘division of labour’ between allies, with the Americans prioritising the Pacific region, while emphasising that Europeans must be responsible for the defence of Europe and must increase their capabilities accordingly;

    H. whereas the European Union is composed of 27 sovereign states, with each having the sovereign right to determine its own foreign and defence policy;

    I. whereas it is in the interest of the Member States to adopt a common policy on matters of common interest to them; whereas enhanced cooperation on defence matters is mutually beneficial if it improves the security of the Member States against any direct aggression or if it increases their capacity to respond to any threat to their territorial integrity, sovereignty or prosperity;

    J. whereas the European defence market is too fragmented; whereas for a single armament type, there can be several or even dozens of different varieties of equipment in the EU, representing a collective loss of resources because of duplication, and preventing economies of scale;

    K. whereas Article 24(1) TEU stipulates that decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy are taken unanimously by the Council; whereas Article 24(1) TEU also stipulates that the EU cannot adopt legislative acts on foreign affairs and defence; whereas Article 36 TEU stipulates that Parliament has a consultative role;

    L. whereas, on 30 January 2025, 19 EU countries sent a letter to the European Investment Bank calling for it ‘to play an even stronger role in providing investment funding and leveraging private funding for the security and defence sector’;

    1. Stresses that diplomatic and defence policy issues are primarily the prerogative of the Member States, which remain the most relevant and the only legitimate political units in the international order; respects the right of every Member State to determine its own foreign and security policy; insists on the importance of maintaining the principle of unanimity in the Council for all decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy;

    2. Underlines that strengthening the Member States’ militaries, based on threats, is necessary to compensate for the security deficit caused by decades of underinvestment and the gradual disengagement of the United States; emphasises that this rearmament policy led by the Member States must not aim to escalate tensions in Europe, but rather aim to reach a level that will deter any hostile actions, establish a continental balance and maintain peace;

    3. Notes that the United States remains the EU’s main military ally and is an essential member of NATO; insists that, irrespective of the political orientation of the White House, US foreign policy will continue to make the Asia-Pacific region a geostrategic priority and to perceive Europe as a secondary theatre; stresses that Member States must no longer subcontract their security and defence to other powers;

    4. Underlines that NATO is a crucial partner in the collective defence architecture in Europe; takes note of the ambition of building a European pillar within NATO; considers that a greater contribution from European states within the alliance must, for the sake of consistency, result in a more balanced distribution of command posts in favour of European military personnel; stresses that stepping up the defence capabilities of European states can go hand in hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation with due respect for the neutrality of the EU Member States that are not part of the NATO alliance;

    5. Highlights the need to overcome the fragmentation of the EU’s internal market for defence products through greater cooperation between Member States and to collectively work on the interoperability of military capabilities; calls on the Member States to encourage cross-border defence procurement in order to strengthen intra-European industrial cooperation and achieve the objective of European strategic autonomy;

    6. Stresses that greater cooperation in the defence sector must actively involve defence SMEs, not only large defence actors, and serve as a platform for SME development, providing greater opportunities for them to contribute to the EU’s technological base and enhance European strategic autonomy;

    7. Notes, however, that the strengthening of the European defence industry must not result in the attribution of new competences to the Commission, which would be in breach of the Treaties and would undermine the sovereignty of Member States without increasing efficacy; reiterates, therefore, that decision-making regarding military requirements, the prioritisation of capability development and the purchase of defence products should remain within the remit of Member States; underlines that, despite the need for increased cooperation in the field of defence, such as on joint procurement and joint production, the Member States must retain full sovereignty over their arms export policies;

    8. Calls for the co-legislators to establish the principle of a European preference in future European defence regulations, including in the European defence industrial plan, so that European funds benefit European companies on European soil, which will enhance our industrial defence capabilities and will reduce our dependences on non-EU countries; recalls that this regulation must in no way restrict the freedom of the Member States to determine their own arms procurement and import/export policy;

    9. Calls on the NATO-affiliated Member States to cooperate in order to identify and fill critical capability gaps by building on and complementing NATO’s Defence Planning Process targets, which are required for sustained full-spectrum operations, including space systems and launchers, long-range missiles, integrated air and missile defence systems, ammunition production, artificial intelligence (AI), maritime drone capability, command and control capability, electronic warfare systems and air-to-air refuelling capacity;

    10. Calls on non-neutral Member States to adequately invest in their infrastructure to guarantee optimal military mobility across Europe in line with their respective military agreements and alliances;

    11. Emphasises the importance for European states to have the capacity and a framework to act independently within the NATO framework where possible and outside of the NATO framework if necessary; points out that the Rapid Deployment Capacity, an inter-state initiative under the control of the Member States, only comprised of 5 000 troops, does not allow for the possibility of engagement in a context of intense combat; reaffirms that it is in the Member States’ interest to strengthen their ability to fight together by conducting joint training and exercises that enhance the interoperability of the various national instruments;

    12. Expresses the need to consider European defence in all its dimensions, including land, air, naval, space and cybernetic; notes that contemporary strategic issues have a growing naval dimension and that the powers challenging the international order are deploying naval capabilities at regional level; stresses the importance of European cooperation at sea and welcomes the current progress of Operation Aspides, the lessons from which must be put to good use; stresses that European strategic autonomy has a maritime and naval dimension, and that European navies should cooperate more closely to ensure the protection of their maritime areas, as well as their underwater or surface infrastructure; stresses that the principle of freedom of navigation must be protected and calls, therefore, for an increase in surveillance and the ability to react quickly in the event of threats arising in European seas;

    13. Notes that space will increasingly become a key aspect of power and sovereignty; underlines that the Member States must maintain and guarantee their independent access to space; welcomes the launch of Ariane 6, but is concerned by the accumulated delays; draws attention to the need for the space sector to be industrialised to increase the number of rockets launched to put European satellites into orbit; welcomes the launch of the European satellite constellation IRIS², which should enable secure communications solutions for sovereign and military issues by 2030; emphasises the need for the future EU space law not to hamper the competitiveness of European companies and to apply constraints on non-EU players; notes the importance of Galileo, Europe’s global navigation satellite system;

    14. Underlines that, unlike the United States (Buy America Act) and China (Government Procurement Law), the European space industry is not shielded from international competition and does not benefit from a European preference; calls on the Member States and the Commission to implement a European preference in space industry procurement and promote innovation, research and development; stresses that the European Space Agency’s principle of geographical return hampers innovative European SMEs and start-ups from receiving adequate funding and contributes to the fragmentation of the European space industry; calls on the European Space Agency to abolish the principle of geographical return and adopt an innovative and efficiency-based approach to space procurement rather than a geographically driven one;

    15. Underlines that the strengthening of European defence capabilities will require significant financing; calls on banks, pension funds, insurance companies and other actors in the Member States to simplify and significantly increase the financing of projects and companies operating in the field of defence; insists that in the context of the urgent need to increase defence spending, financial institutions should not consider investments in the field of defence to be damaging for their reputation; rejects, however, the idea of issuing joint debt, such as defence Eurobonds, to support defence spending;

    16. Notes the growing importance of AI in warfare, particularly in the development of drones and autonomous weapons; recognises the indigenous AI advances in warfare made by Ukraine and Israel, demonstrating that the Member States are equally capable of developing similar capabilities; highlights that recent breakthroughs, such as the one made by the Chinese AI computing start-up DeepSeek, demonstrate the feasibility of cost-competitive AI systems; calls on the Member States to accelerate the development of AI capabilities; underlines that the AI Act[4], set to be implemented in 2025, creates uncertainty regarding the production and development of dual-use AI systems, an ambiguity that could hinder the development of essential defence industry products; calls for this issue to be clarified to ensure that the European defence industry is not disadvantaged compared to its American and Chinese counterparts;

    17. Stresses that a strong civilian manufacturing industry, particularly in the steelmaking, automotive, aerospace and shipbuilding sectors, is essential for deterrence and for maintaining long-term military and industrial capabilities in the event of conflict; notes the decline of these industries since the 1990s, especially in western Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to safeguard the manufacturing industries that are vital to national security, including through the use of tariffs; urges the Commission to revise the Green Deal and revoke the net-neutrality goal, since it destroys manufacturing competitiveness and is responsible for the deindustrialisation of key industries in the Member States; stresses that the relocation of essential manufacturing industries to non-EU countries is counterproductive both in terms of global environmental impact and national security;

    18. Expresses concern over the growing dependence of the European defence industry on foreign components, particularly rare earths and semiconductors, which are essential for advanced military technologies; calls on the Member States to intensify efforts to develop domestic rare earth mining and semiconductor manufacturing capabilities to safeguard the autonomy of the European defence industry in the event of conflicts or severe supply chain disruptions;

    19. Welcomes the Dutch Government’s decision to tighten export control rules on advanced lithography systems, which are essential for semiconductor production; stresses that EU technological transfers to non-EU countries have significantly contributed to the rise of foreign competition and the deindustrialisation of Europe; encourages the Member States to impose stricter export controls on critical dual-use technologies and manufacturing products;

    20. Notes that 80 % of EU data is stored and managed in the United States and other non-EU countries, where it may be subject to extraterritorial intervention under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the CLOUD Act, or China’s Data Security Law; stresses that protecting critical industrial and government data is essential to ensuring national security; welcomes the Swiss Government Cloud programme as a step toward cloud sovereignty and encourages the Member States to implement similar initiatives; encourages the Member States to strengthen regulations on telecommunications service providers, which are predominantly based outside Europe, creating a significant dependence on external actors;

    21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, the Commission, the European Council and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0144/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0144/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the EU,

     having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42 thereof,

     having regard to Title III, Article 3 of the Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon,

     having regard to the announced publication of the white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025,

     having regard to the Helsinki Accords,

     having regard to the various European defence projects of recent years,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas, in line with the Treaties, the CSDP is part of the CFSP and is considered a policy framework through which Member States can develop a European strategic culture of security and defence, address conflicts and crises together, protect the Union and its citizens and strengthen international peace and security;

    B. whereas Article 42(2) TEU states that the Union’s CSDP must be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty;

    C. whereas NATO is largely dominated by the United States, and NATO membership entails a mandatory complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems, hence impeding the strategic and operational autonomy of Member States and other European countries;

    D. whereas at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, the US Government pushed for Ukrainian NATO membership against the opinion of several Member States; whereas following the Russian invasion, the United States pushed EU Member States to systematically increase the quantity and quality of arms deliveries to Ukraine;

    E. whereas different Member States have different military and security policies, including policies of military neutrality;

    F. whereas the United States saw windfall benefits from the Ukraine war through an increase of US shale gas exports to the European Union; whereas the US Government now unjustly wishes to control Ukrainian mineral resources and negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine with Putin, without involving Ukraine and the European Union;

    G. whereas unlike nuclear weapon states such as India and the People’s Republic of China, NATO and Russia refuse to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy, whereby they would formally refrain from using nuclear weapons, except in retaliation to an attack by an enemy power using weapons of mass destruction;

    H. whereas the US Government has launched a high number of wars and military operations that violated international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; whereas, in light of 2024 advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the United States’ ongoing military support for Israel might make it complicit in genocide and illegal occupation; whereas the participation of EU Member States in violations of international law, including in wars of aggression and military invasions contrary to international law against countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, have undermined global adherence to the principles of international law;

    I. whereas the United States has forwardly deployed new B61-12 gravity bombs on the territory of EU Member States, increasing the risk that these Member States will fall victim to preventive or retaliatory strikes related to US foreign policy;

    J. whereas Russia’s repeated acts of war and aggression, starting with the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as an increasing number of acts of sabotage on critical infrastructure, have been factors in creating and exacerbating tensions;

    K. whereas Article 41(2) TEU prohibits charging expenditure arising from operations with military or defence implications to the Union budget;

    L. whereas the Commission has nevertheless launched several European defence projects over the last few years, including the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and, most recently, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP);

    M. whereas according to 2023 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute figures, EU Member States, together with the United Kingdom, already spend more nominally on defence than all other countries in the world combined, with the exception of the United States;

    N. whereas in April 2021, the Commission estimated that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion every year;

    O. whereas the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) is planning to shut down more than four out of five of its hubs worldwide, reducing its diplomatic presence from around 100 delegations to 18 hubs;

    P. whereas in 2024, EU leaders agreed to cut EUR 2 billion from the EU’s external action budget in the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027; whereas several Member States, such as France and Belgium, have also made cuts and reforms to their diplomacy services;

    Q. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed a new common instrument to boost military spending across the EU to unlock up to EUR 800 billion of additional defence spending over the coming years;

    R. whereas even the military spending of the United States, which maintains over 700 military installations in over 70 countries, does not exceed 3.46 % of its GDP;

    S. whereas, nevertheless, the US Government, certain Member States and NATO and Commission officials are pushing for a further massive increase in defence expenditure, from an average of 1.9 % of GDP to 5 %;

    T. whereas even the military-oriented Niinisto Report, entitled ‘Safer Together –Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ highlights the fact that threats to the security of European citizens, including increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events, such as megadroughts, floods and heatwaves, and the risk of new pandemics, would require massive investment in public services;

    U. whereas while the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness highlights the need for massive investment in a variety of sectors, including energy, pharmaceuticals and transport, the Commission has placed seven Member States under an excessive deficit procedure, pushing for harsh austerity and structural reforms in social and public expenses;

    V. whereas a further massive increase in military expenditure will instead lead to cuts in public services, and in social, climate and environmental spending throughout Europe, endangering the social and human security of European citizens;

    W. whereas the Commission is nonetheless considering the suspension of economic governance rules for military expenses;

    X. whereas the Commission has failed to present a fully autonomous assessment of European defence needs and priorities, relying instead on NATO assessments of critical gaps in defence capability;

    Y. whereas Türkiye, a NATO member, illegally occupies 37 % of Cyprus, an EU Member State;

    Z. whereas in international relations theory the ‘security dilemma’ refers to a phenomenon whereby actions, such as arms procurement, taken by a state actor to increase its own security provokes reactions from other states, such as increased arms procurement or preventive attacks, that ultimately lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security;

    AA. whereas the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, concluded in Helsinki between the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and all of the countries of Europe, except Albania, played an important role in easing tensions between East and West during the Cold War;

    AB. whereas the Cold War collective security acquis has been systematically undermined by the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Open Skies Treaty, systematically followed by Russian withdrawals, and by the Russian withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

    AC. whereas a new European security architecture will have to apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems and offer security guarantees to all parties in order to avoid Europe being divided once again into two diametrically opposed blocs;

    Towards a European collective security architecture

    1. Recalls that the Treaties consider the CSDP part of the CFSP; asks, therefore, that any defence initiative at EU level be subordinated to a clear foreign and security policy and strategy for peace on the European continent;

    2. Rejects the militarisation of the EU and any belligerent objectives of the CSDP;

    3. Notes with great concern the diminishing respect for international and humanitarian law by parties all around the world, with Israel, Russia and the United States being flagrant examples; reiterates the need for European independence in shaping foreign and defence policy;

    4. Considers that in light of the United States’ past and ongoing violations of international law and the negative impact of US military interventions on neighbouring regions, the foreign, security and defence policy of the Union and Member States can no longer be aligned with the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); calls, therefore, on the European Council to start the process of revising the EU Treaties to remove this requirement from the TEU;

    5. Recalls that NATO and the EU are distinct organisations which serve very different purposes and whose membership is not even identical; regrets the conflation of NATO, a military alliance, with the EU;

    6. Is extremely worried by the fact that there are still more than 13 000 nuclear weapons scattered around the world, many of which can be deployed within minutes and could cause the end of humankind; notes with concern that despite a stated commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NATO’s nuclear member states invested USD 271 billion in nuclear weapons modernisation and maintenance between 2019 and 2023, while in 2023 China and Russia were the second and third largest spenders, with budgets of USD 11.9 billion and USD 8.3 billion respectively;

    7. Believes that NATO’s refusal to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy on nuclear weapons and the forward deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe increases the risk of Europe becoming a target of nuclear strikes; demands, therefore, the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the territory of Member States; is deeply concerned about nuclear threats to European security, including veiled warnings about the use of tactical nuclear weapons and Russia’s lowering of its threshold for using nuclear weapons;

    8. Urges the Member States to work on a new long-term collective security architecture for Europe inspired by the principles of the Helsinki process and including the concept of mutual security guarantees; notes that a fundamental aspect of such an approach is respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and a commitment to international law;

    9. Insists that a new European security architecture apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems, and offer security guarantees to all parties;

    10. Calls on the Commission, in light of multiple threats ranging from climate-related catastrophes to pandemics, to abandon a narrow focus on military security and develop a policy centred on human security as defined in United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/290, which states that ‘human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people’ and calls for ‘people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people’;

    11. Calls on the Commission and Member States to seek inspiration from Austria, which has enshrined neutrality in its constitution, committing not to join military alliances and not to permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on its territory;

    12. Calls on the Commission and Member States to also look to the example set by Ireland, with its tradition of military neutrality; recalls that this tradition includes an active approach towards peace support operations and crisis management, contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, work for human rights and development, and efforts to promote disarmament and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction;

    13. Regrets the attacks on Irish neutrality and recalls that the people of Ireland were guaranteed continued military neutrality, underpinned by a commitment to only undertake operations with a United Nations mandate, ahead of their ratification of the Lisbon Treaty;

    14. Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member, to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, an EU Member State, and to work constructively towards finding a viable and peaceful solution based on the relevant UN resolutions;

    15. Calls for unanimity voting on defence issues to be maintained within the Council to promote consensus-based solutions that foster much-needed unity;

    Diplomacy as the cornerstone of European security

    16. Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;

    17. Recalls that conflict prevention is paramount to any security and defence strategy; underlines the fact that diplomacy prevents and ends wars, and that every euro invested in conflict prevention saves around EUR 16 later on;

    18. Believes that, given the deteriorating security situation on several fronts and increasing geopolitical tensions, preventive diplomacy requires sustained and enhanced attention; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to immediately reverse the cutbacks made to diplomatic representations;

    19. Believes that its systematic alignment with US foreign policy, most recently with regard to Israeli war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices against Palestinians, has dramatically reduced the EU’s global diplomatic credibility and therefore worsened its security situation;

    20. Recalls that the participation of EU Member States in illegal military operations and the support for violations of international law abroad gravely endangers the security of EU citizens; urges the Commission and Member States to explore a non-aligned foreign and security policy stance based on the principles of the UN Charter, including peaceful conflict resolution, diplomacy and multilateralism;

    21. Believes that Europe has much to gain from diversifying its relations and maintaining diplomatic connections with as many countries as possible around the world;

    Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

    22. Is deeply concerned that world military expenditure continues to rise to new record levels; highlights the fact that an arms race will not create security for European citizens, but instead, in line with the security dilemma, heighten the risk of violent conflict; calls on the Commission to actively promote new arms control treaties;

    23. Recalls that the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction made non-proliferation a central goal of the EU’s CFSP, stating that ‘our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation of concern worldwide’; calls, therefore, on Member States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

    24. Notes that arms exports, also of small and light weapons, can fuel conflict and global terrorism and destabilise entire regions, states and societies, thereby thwarting sustainable development and crisis management efforts; calls on the Commission and Member States to strictly apply Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment in order to avoid a worsening of the security situation in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood;

    25. Calls for the creation of a Directorate-General for Disarmament and Arms Control at the Commission;

    26. Demands an immediate arms embargo against Israel and any other country directly or indirectly involved in armed conflict, except in the case of those that are the victim of invasion by others, in order to stop EU complicity in war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices, whether perpetrated by Israel or any other country; calls on the Commission and Member States to base their foreign and security policy on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

    Defence expenditure

    27. Urges the Commission and Member States to offer full transparency and a critical audit of the current defence expenditure within the Union, detailing why it estimates that European countries would be unable to defend themselves with budgets already vastly superior to those of most of the world’s countries;

    28. Notes with concern that the Commission has presented a new EUR 150 billion common defence fund; believes that an increase in defence spending is not the solution to finding a lasting peace and that cuts in the EU structural funds should not be used for this purpose, given how vital these funds are to the development of local communities across the EU;

    29. Notes that the share of GDP is not an adequate measure for the efficiency and impact of defence expenditure; calls on the Commission and Member States not to enter an arms race through a massive increase in defence budgets at the expense of both human and social security;

    30. Regards the NATO demand for complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems as incompatible with European strategic autonomy; regrets that the Commission and the Council have failed to present a detailed assessment of European critical defence capability gaps; calls on both institutions to present such an assessment, including specific priorities, before considering increased defence expenditure; recalls that these should focus on defensive tasks, not on building capacities for military intervention all over the world;

    31. Recalls Commission estimates that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save up to EUR 100 billion every year; calls, in this regard, for inspiration to be drawn from existing intra-European cooperation structures, such as BACA, the Belgian-Dutch Naval cooperation BeNeSam and the Nordic Defence Cooperation, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, which have increased the efficiency of the participating nations’ national defence, and to explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions;

    32. Considers that the military cooperation commitments that may be assumed in collective security organisations should be considered in light of strict respect for the UN Charter;

    33. Rejects the allocation of appropriations on the EU budget to the EU’s militarisation; calls for the reallocation of EU budget funds earmarked for the ongoing militarisation of the EU and its programmes to respond to the social and economic needs of citizens and promote cohesion between Member States;

    34. Highlights the fact that there can be neither autonomy nor security without digital sovereignty; calls on the Commission to prioritise the development of a democratic, public-led digital stack that includes digital infrastructure as a service, and universal platforms, such as search engines and foundation AI models, governed by new public institutions with public and civil society representation;

    35. Calls for heightened cooperation between Member States on sectoral issues of critical infrastructure protection, such as submarine cables;

    Defence industry

    36. Recalls that over the past three years, the EU has adopted a number of new initiatives on defence, and that the new Commissioner for Defence and Space believes that an additional investment of EUR 500 billion is needed in the coming decade, though other sources speak of EUR 700 billion;

    37. Recalls that the previous EU programmes have been implemented with a lack of transparency with regard to the application of EU ethical guidelines, and that decision-making is extremely opaque and heavily influenced by arms industry lobbyists;

    38. States that without ethics in investment choices, the EU will contribute to the creation of a more dangerous and lawless world order, where imperialist powers can disregard international law without facing consequences, while countries of the global south are exploited for their resources;

    39. Calls, in addition, for the EU to adopt a policy of transparent, mission-oriented military spending, with more conscious spending at the service of a defined foreign policy to ensure greater efficiency;

    40. Recalls that under Article 41(2) TEU expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications may not be charged to the EU budget; calls for a strict application of this article; demands a retroactive review of corresponding defence funds and budget lines and for their termination where needed;

    41. Expresses deep concern about the increased subsidies and public support for the military-industrial complex amid record total global military expenditure of USD 2 443 billion in 2023, making 2023 the ninth consecutive year in which military expenditure increased;

    42. Demands that European public money go to European companies and emphasises that public European companies should, by definition, remain in Europe, while private companies can relocate their activities if they so wish;

    43. Observes that leading arms companies have benefited shamelessly from the war in Ukraine; notes that Lockheed Martin alone distributed USD 6.8 billion of cash to shareholders in dividends and share repurchases in 2024; demands that windfall profits be taxed to finance climate adaptation, public health and housing, which are also components of a broader understanding of security;

    44. Considers that the use of public money should systematically correspond to a proportional public return on investment and not finance corporate profit;

    45. Stresses that focusing our resources, notably research and development spending, on the military sector will also slow down the development of other strategic industries with civilian purposes, such as renewable energy or pharmaceuticals;

    46. Adds that military spending does not address any of the major social or environmental challenges, and that, worse still, it reinforces polluting and energy-consuming industrial models, thus increasing pressure on resources and the climate, particularly critical materials;

    47. Believes that a massive increase in purchases of US-made goods would not only be detrimental to the European economy but would equally prolong Europe’s military dependence on the United States, while creating new industrial and technological constraints;

    48. Demands that the defence industry continue to be excluded from qualifying for the sustainability criteria with regard to investment;

    49. Calls for EIB financing to be strictly limited to civilian projects, excluding dual-use items;

    Reprioritising public services and social spending

    50. Is deeply concerned that militarisation, and specifically the ReArm Europe plan, is being used to further attack public services across the EU, which are already facing the suffocating effects of austerity measures imposed by the Commission;

    51. Is appalled by the fact that the Commission is willing to bend fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact to finance military spending, but considers it impossible to raise spending to fund crumbling public services and support social and economic upward convergence in Member States;

    52. Firmly insists that health, education, green mobility, climate adaptation, climate mitigation, biodiversity, food security and digital transition are elements of human security and should be considered priorities that require investments rather than budgetary cuts;

    53. Calls, in line with the concept of human security, for a reprioritisation of public services and social welfare spending, as well as for investments in fighting climate change, as imperative prerequisites for guaranteeing that people live in a safe and secure environment;

    °

    ° °

    54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – IMEC’s strategic importance and development challenges – E-000876/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000876/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Afroditi Latinopoulou (PfE)

    The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a critical initiative to strengthen geo-economic connectivity between Asia, the Middle East and Europe, with the aim of diversifying trade routes and reducing the EU’s dependence on China and the Suez Canal.

    The agreement to implement the corridor was signed at the G20 in 2023, with the participation of the EU and the US. The IMEC acts as a Western counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which creates problems for European countries hosting Chinese strategic investments. The European Union must address the critical issues of political stability and financing for part of the project in order to ensure its sustainability.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.What measures has the Commission put in place to accelerate the implementation of the IMEC and the necessary port/railway infrastructure?
    • 2.How does the Commission plan to protect the corridor from external crises, such as the blockade of the Red Sea by the Houthis?
    • 3.Given the potential of the BRI in Europe and the strategic importance of the IMEC, how will the Commission ensure that the corridor does not become economically dependent on third powers, such as Türkiye or Iran, thereby strengthening the interests of European states?

    Submitted: 27.2.2025

    Last updated: 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: Amphibious Transport Dock – LPD

    Source: United States Navy

    Description Amphibious transport dock ships are warships that embark, transport and land elements of a landing force for a variety of expeditionary warfare missions.
     
    Features LPDs are used to transport and land Marines, their equipment, and supplies by embarked Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) or conventional landing craft and amphibious assault vehicles (AAV) augmented by helicopters or vertical take-off and landing aircraft (MV 22). These ships support amphibious assault, special operations, or expeditionary warfare missions and serve as secondary aviation platforms for amphibious operations.
     
    Background The LPD 17 San Antonio class is the functional replacement for over 41 ships including the LPD 4 Austin class, LSD 36 Anchorage class, LKA 113 Charleston class, and LST 1179 Newport class amphibious ships. The newly designated LPD Flight II ships (formerly LX(R)) will be the functional replacement for the LSD 41/49 Whidbey Island Class. The San Antonio class provides the Navy and Marine Corps with modern, sea-based platforms that are networked, survivable, and built to operate in the 21st century, with the MV-22 Osprey, the upgraded Amphibious Assault Vehicle, and future means by which Marines are delivered ashore. Construction on USS San Antonio (LPD 17), the first ship of the class, commenced in June 2000 and was delivered to the Navy in July 2005. USS New York (LPD 21) was the first of three LPD 17class ships built in honor of the victims of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The ship’s bow stem was cast using 7.5 tons of steel salvaged from the World Trade Center. The Navy named the eighth and ninth ships of the class Arlington and Somerset, in honor of the victims of the attacks on the Pentagon and United Flight 93, respectively. Materials from those sites were also incorporated into the construction of each ship. USS Portland (LPD 27), the eleventh ship of the class, delivered in 2017. LPDs 28 and 29 are currently under construction at Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) on the Gulf Coast. As the 12th and 13th San Antonio class ships, LPDs 28 and 29 will perform the same missions as the previous 11 ships of the class while incorporating technically feasible cost reduction initiatives and class lessons learned. In 2018, the Navy made the decision to transition the LX(R) effort to a second flight of the LPD 17 design. LPD 30 will be the first of 13 planned LPD Flight II ships, for a total complement of 26 ships in the LPD 17 class.
     
    General Characteristics, San Antonio Class LPD Flights I and II
    Builder: Huntington Ingalls Industries
    Propulsion: Four sequentially turbocharged marine Colt-Pielstick Diesels, two shafts, 41,600 shaft horsepower
    Length: 684 feet
    Beam: 105 feet
    Displacement: Approximately 24,900 long tons (25,300 metric tons) full load
    Draft: 23 feet
    Speed: In excess of 22 knots (24.2 mph, 38.7 kph)
    Crew: Ship’s Company: 383 Sailors and 3 Marines. Embarked Landing Force: Flight I: 699 with surge capacity of 800; LPD 28/29:650; Flight II: 631.
    Armament: Two Mk 46 30 mm Close in Guns, fore and aft; two Rolling Airframe Missile launchers, fore and aft: ten .50 caliber machine guns
    Aircraft: Launch or land two CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters or two MV-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft or up to four AH-1Z or UH-1Y or MH-60 helicopters
    Landing/Attack Craft: Two LCACs or one LCU; and 14 Amphibious Assault Vehicles
     
    Ships:
    USS San Antonio (LPD 17), Norfolk, Virginia
    USS New Orleans (LPD 18), Sasebo, Japan
    USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19), Norfolk, Virginia
    USS Green Bay (LPD 20), Sasebo, Japan
    USS New York (LPD 21), Mayport, Florida
    USS San Diego (LPD 22), San Diego, California
    USS Anchorage (LPD 23), San Diego, California
    USS Arlington (LPD 24), Norfolk, Virginia
    USS Somerset (LPD 25), San Diego, California
    USS John P. Murtha (LPD 26), San Diego, California
    USS Portland (LPD 27), San Diego, California
    Fort Lauderdale (LPD 28) – Under construction
    Richard M. McCool (LPD 29) – Under construction
    Harrisburg (LPD 30) – Under construction
    Pittsburgh (LPD 31)

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Things to do in Tāmaki Makaurau this Autumn

    Source: Auckland Council

    Autumn is here, but there’s still a few more days before the golden weather is set to end, and the good news is you don’t have to spend a lot of money to have a memorable time in Tāmaki Makaurau. As the leaves turn golden and the air gets crisp, there’s no better time to embrace the beauty of the season.

    From breathtaking walking trails and cosy indoor experiences for the odd rainy day, to playgrounds that offer more than just swings and slides, Auckland Council has your ultimate autumn bucket list sorted for you and your whānau.

    Explore our stunning regional parks and pathways

    Autumn is the perfect season to venture into Auckland’s 28 regional parks, where you can witness nature’s changing colours and soak up some of the best views in the region. A few of the top activities to enjoy include:

    Have your pick of scenic trails at Atiu Creek Regional Park.


    Our regional park picks for autumn:

    Ātiu Creek Regional Park  Bike tracks and a stunning view of the Kaipara Harbour make this a must visit.

    Shakespear Regional Park  Perfect for scenic hikes and birdwatching, this open sanctuary is accessible via Whangaparāoa Road in Army Bay.

    Waharau Regional Park Enjoy farmland, river banks and forest for camping, picnics, walking and mountain biking.


    Some tracks in regional parks might be closed to help stop Kauri Dieback. Be sure to check the Auckland Council website before you go to see if your destination is affected.

    Take in the breath-taking landscapes of Waharau Regional Park.

    Playgrounds closer to home

    Before the days get too short, make the most of letting the kids run wild at some of Auckland’s best playgrounds. Whether they love climbing, sliding, or biking, these spots have something for all ages:

    Waterview Reserve – Waterview Reserve is a fantastic park to visit with a range of activities for kids of all ages. Nestled in between West and Central Auckland, it features a basketball court, playground and water play area.

    Birkenhead War Memorial Park – For all your extreme sports enthusiasts, this awesome park features a skate park and BMX pump track. Additionally, there are picnic tables for a family get together, and walking tracks inside the park as well.

    Aorere Park – Located in the heart of Māngere East, Aorere Park playground is divided into separate areas for children of different age groups. There is also a basketball court and fitness equipment to enjoy while the kids are playing.

    Read about our upgraded South Auckland playgrounds, or some hidden parks in the Central Auckland area. 

    Kids will love playing in the revamped Aorere Park playground.

    See Tāmaki Makaurau from our gorgeous cycle paths

    Autumn’s cooler weather is the perfect time to get on a bike and enjoy the scenic views from our many cycle paths. From the Te Ara Tahuna path to Narrow Neck’s costal scenery, there is plenty to enjoy on your travels.

    Discover more of the best family-friendly bike rides in Auckland.

    Te Ara Tahuna Ōrewa Estuary Path.

    Try a new hobby

    Autumn represents the change from old to new, and so can you by starting a new hobby or learning a new skill.

    From participating in one of the many music workshops run at our community centres across Auckland, or learning to repurpose your used items into new treasures via the Re-Creators workshops, there is plenty to learn in the Autumn season.

    Find workshops, courses, and other ways to upskill on OurAuckland.

    Join in to learn Ukulele at one of our community centres across Auckland.

    Embrace the new season and learn new skills with services provided by Auckland Council.

    Indoor escapes for chilly days

    In the (hopefully unlikely!) event the weather turns cool and rainy as we move into Autumn, there are plenty of indoor activities to keep the whānau entertained:

    Life drawing at Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki.

    New Lynn Library.

    Check out free & affordable events

    Auckland is packed with free and budget-friendly events throughout autumn. Keep an eye out for food markets, cultural festivals, and live performances that make the most of the cooler season via OurAuckland.

    Embrace the colours of autumn!

    With so many activities to choose from, there’s no shortage of ways to enjoy autumn in Tāmaki Makaurau. Whether you’re looking for adventure, relaxation, or family fun, get out there and make the most of this beautiful season!

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Strategic Approach to Immunisation in New Zealand 2025–2030

    Source: New Zealand Ministry of Health

    Immunisation is a highly successful public health intervention. It safeguards individuals, whānau and communities against a range of potentially devastating diseases, and is a critical way of preventing and controlling infectious disease outbreaks. An accessible and effective immunisation system maximises immunisation uptake and coverage, improving the health of the population and enabling pae ora – healthy futures.

    The Strategic Approach to Immunisation in New Zealand 2025–2030 (the strategic approach) provides a renewed vision and strategic direction for the immunisation system for the next five years. It incorporates key lessons learned from our experience during the COVID-19 pandemic, and sets out high-level objectives and goals for the immunisation system to better protect individuals, whānau and communities against vaccine-preventable diseases.

    The strategic approach acknowledges that people have different needs and so individuals require different approaches to improve immunisation outcomes. It recognises the impact of social, economic, environmental and other factors on immunisation coverage, and focuses on working in partnership with stakeholders to address inequities in vaccination coverage and to achieve a highly effective immunisation system.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: PM chairs a high-level meeting to review the progress of Cooperative sector

    Source: Government of India

    PM chairs a high-level meeting to review the progress of Cooperative sector

    PM emphasizes the need for partnerships with global cooperative organizations to expand the Indian cooperative sector

    PM stressed on promoting organic products through cooperative organizations with special focus on export markets

    PM recommends the use of Agristack to expand agriculture and related activities in Cooperative Sector

    PM highlights the importance of integrating UPI with RuPay KCC cards to facilitate financial transactions

    PM proposes introduction of cooperative courses in schools and educational institutions

    National Cooperation Policy 2025 draft discussed in the meeting; it realises the vision of ‘Sahkar Se Samruddhi’

    National Cooperation Policy focuses on accelerating rural economic development, while prioritizing women and youth

    Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 5:30PM by PIB Delhi

    Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi chaired a high-level meeting to review the progress of the cooperative sector earlier today at 7 LKM. Discussions were held on promoting “Sahkar Se Samruddhi” bringing transformation through technological advancements in the sector, plans to increase the participation of youth and women in cooperatives, and the various initiatives of the Ministry of Cooperation.

    Prime Minister emphasized the need for partnerships with global cooperative organizations to expand the Indian cooperative sector and stressed promoting organic products through cooperative organizations. He also suggested focusing on export markets and developing a soil testing model through cooperatives to improve agricultural practices. Prime Minister highlighted the importance of integrating UPI with RuPay KCC cards to facilitate financial transactions and emphasized the need for healthy competition among cooperative organizations.

    Prime Minister also emphasized the importance of documenting the assets of cooperative organizations to ensure transparency. He suggested promoting cooperative farming as a more sustainable agricultural model. He recommended the use of digital public infrastructure (Agristack) to expand agriculture and related activities in Cooperative Sector, providing farmers with better access to services. In the context of education, Prime Minister proposed introducing cooperative courses in schools, colleges, and IIMs, as well as promoting successful cooperative organizations to inspire future generations. He further added that young graduates should be encouraged to contribute, and Cooperative organisations should be ranked based on their performance, so as to promote competition and growth simultaneously.

    During the meeting PM was briefed about National Cooperation Policy and key achievements of the Ministry of Cooperation over the past three and a half years. Realising the vision of ‘Sahkar Se Samruddhi’, the Ministry has formulated a draft of the National Cooperation Policy 2025 through an extensive consultation process. The objective of  National Cooperation Policy 2025 policy is to facilitate the systematic and holistic development of the cooperative sector, with a focus on accelerating rural economic development, while prioritizing women and youth. It aims to promote a cooperative-based economic model and establish a robust legal and institutional framework. Furthermore, the policy endeavours to deepen the grassroots impact of cooperatives and significantly enhance the contribution of the cooperative sector to the overall development of the country.

    Since its inception, the Ministry has undertaken 60 initiatives across seven key areas to promote and strengthen the cooperative movement. These initiatives include the digitization of cooperative institutions through the National Cooperative Database and Computerization Projects, as well as the strengthening of Primary Agricultural Credit Societies (PACS). Additionally, the Ministry has focused on enhancing the efficiency and sustainability of cooperative sugar mills.

    The Government of India has implemented various schemes for cooperative societies through a “whole of government approach,” integrating over 15 schemes from more than 10 ministries at the PACS level. As a result, there has been diversification in cooperative businesses, additional income generation, increased opportunities for cooperatives, and improved accessibility of government schemes in rural areas. Annual targets have also been set for the formation of these cooperatives. To promote cooperative education, training and research and to provide skilled professionals, a Bill to convert IRMA Anand into “Tribhuvan Cooperative University” and make it an Institution of National Importance has been introduced in the Parliament.

    Prime Minister was briefed on the growth of cooperatives and their vital role across various sectors. Cooperative sector’s contribution to India’s economy, particularly in agriculture, rural development, and economic inclusion was highlighted. During the meeting it was highlighted that presently, one-fifth of the country’s population is associated with the cooperative sector, which includes over 8.2 lakh cooperative institutions spanning more than 30 sectors, with a membership exceeding 30 crore individuals. Cooperatives play a crucial role in several areas of the economy.

    The meeting was attended by Home and Cooperation Minister, Shri Amit Shah; Secretary, Ministry of Cooperation, Dr. Ashish Kumar Bhutani; the Principal Secretary to PM, Dr. P.K. Mishra, Principal Secretary-2 to PM Shri Shaktikanta Das; Advisor to PM, Shri Amit Khare and other senior officials.

     

    ***

    MJPS/VJ

    (Release ID: 2108847) Visitor Counter : 63

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: HKPF holds 2025 Bank Staff Recognition Ceremony to commend banking industry for combatting deception (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         The Hong Kong Police Force held the 2025 Bank Staff Recognition Ceremony today (March 6) to commend the banking industry for their exceptional contributions to combatting deception cases. Eighteen banks and nine bank staff received corporate awards and the Spotlight Award respectively. In addition, a total of 368 bank staff were honored with certification for assisting Police in identifying and preventing 425 scam cases in 2024.     Addressing the ceremony, the Commissioner of Police, Mr Siu Chak-yee, highlighted that global losses due to deception cases exceeded US$2 trillion over the past two years. In Hong Kong, 44 480 deception cases were recorded in 2024, marking an 11.7 per cent increase compared to 2023. This growth rate was significantly lower than the 40 per cent surge seen in previous years. Meanwhile, the total losses slightly decreased by HK$30 million, reflecting the preliminary success of the anti-deception initiatives and multi-stakeholder measures implemented over the past three years.       He pointed out that since the establishment of the Anti-Deception Coordination Centre (ADCC) in 2017, the Police and the banking sector have jointly prevented 1 340 deception cases, arrested 818 scammers and recovered over HK$14 billion in crime proceeds up to December 2024. He added that citizens who fall victim to scams not only lose money but also suffer enduring psychological trauma. He called for continued cross-sector collaboration to combat deception at its origin.     Key initiatives implemented in 2024 in cooperation between the Police and the banking industry include:  (1) Faster Payment System (FPS) High Risk Alert has been extended from the FPS to online banking, counters and automated teller machines, covering major transaction channels. Over 600 000 risk alerts were issued throughout the year.  (2) The “Upstream Scam Intervention” initiative has prevented losses exceeding HK$199 million. The programme, now covering 28 retail banks, proactively engaged potential victims and successfully halted 3 051 deception cases.  (3) In a collaborative effort to combat cross-border money laundering syndicates, the ADCC joined with ten banks to launch an arrest operation codenamed “DEEPATTACK”. It dismantled money laundering syndicates operating in Hong Kong and the Mainland, resulting in 14 arrests, thwarting 103 ongoing deception cases and preventing an additional HK$24 million in losses.(4) The Financial Intelligence Evaluation Sharing Tool (FINEST) platform, introduced by the Police and the banking industry in June 2023, enables real-time sharing of suspicious transaction data and enhances efficiency in detecting fraud and money laundering. With participating banks expanded from five to 10, FINEST has processed over 580 intelligence reports and disrupted cross-border criminal networks and stooge accounts.       Mr Siu emphasised that, Police will continue to work in close collaboration with the banking sector to fortify anti-deception measures, safeguard public assets and uphold Hong Kong’s status as an international financial hub. Gratitude was also expressed to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), the Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) and industry partners for their unwavering support.       In the ceremony, 11 corporate awards were presented, including Anti-Scam Excellence Award (Gold, Silver, Bronze), Exemplary Efforts in Upstream Scam Intervention Award, Award for Frontline Bank Staff Scam Intervention, Effective Collaboration with Police “Scam Response Team” Award, Effective Publicity and Education Award, Effective Regtech Application Award, and the newly introduced awards: Anti-Money Laundering Excellence Award, Outstanding STR Case Award, Award for Real Time Monitoring, Award for no. of Stooge Account Decrease and Anti-Scam Excellence Award for Digital Banks (Gold, Silver, Bronze), in recognition of banks which assisted Police in the prevention and proactive detection of deception cases (the awardees are listed in the Annex).     The officiating guests also included the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Operations), Mr Chow Yat-ming; the Director of Crime and Security, Mr Yip Wan-lung; the Assistant Commissioner of Police (Crime), Ms Chung Wing-man; the Executive Director of the HKMA, Mr Raymond Chan, and the representative of the HKAB, Mr Stanley Wu. 

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: DARPG to deepen collaboration with Right to Services Commissioners of 10 States for improving service delivery and effective redressal of public grievances in pursuance of directions of Hon’ble Prime Minister in Pragati Meeting dated 5.3.2025

    Source: Government of India (2)

    DARPG to deepen collaboration with Right to Services Commissioners of 10 States for improving service delivery and effective redressal of public grievances in pursuance of directions of Hon’ble Prime Minister in Pragati Meeting dated 5.3.2025

    Next Gen Technology options to be adopted for Integration of RTS Portals of States with CPGRAMS portal and Reverse Integration through Web API’s to be pursued

    Citizen Grievances on CPGRAMS portal for improving Service Delivery of State Governments to be mapped and shared with Right to Services Commissioners for notifying such services/ digitization of the services

    Best practices in Improving Service Delivery through the Right to Service Commissioners to be documented

    Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 5:00PM by PIB Delhi

    In pursuance of the Prime Minister of India Sh Narendra Modi’s directions in PRAGATI review meeting dated 26.12.2024, the Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances has deepened its collaboration with the Right to Services Commissioners from 10 States for improving service delivery and effective redressal of public grievances.

    As part of this initiative, the DARPG will undertake the following activities:

    1. Next Gen Technology options to be adopted for Integration of RTS Portals of States with CPGRAMS portal and Reverse Integration through Web API’s to be pursued
    2. Citizen Grievances on CPGRAMS portal for improving Service Delivery of State Governments to be mapped and shared with Right to Services Commissioners for notifying such services/ digitization of the services
    3. Best practices in Improving Service Delivery through the Right to Service Commissioners to be documented

    The Right to Services Commissioners said there exists an inverse relationship between efficiency in service delivery and number of grievances received in CPGRAMS portal. They deliberated on efficient ways of improving service delivery with focus on categories of grievances lodged in CPGRAMS portal pertaining to service delivery. The Administrative Staff College of India (ASCI) as knowledge partner of CPGRAMS introduce the new andragogy for capacity building of Grievance Redressal Officers to enable reskilling and upskilling of officers.   It is envisaged that greater synergy between CPGRAMS and the RTS Commissioners of States will represent a significant step in building citizen satisfaction in grievance redressal in States/ UT’s of India.

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    NKR/PSM

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: DARPG organizes capacity building workshop on newly operationalized Review Meeting Module on 05th March, 2025

    Source: Government of India (2)

    DARPG organizes capacity building workshop on newly operationalized Review Meeting Module on 05th March, 2025

    The workshop was organized in line with the direction of the Hon’ble Prime Minister from the Pragati Review Meeting on 26th December, 2024, for senior level reviews for timely and quality redressal of public grievances

    75 officials from various Central Ministries/Departments participated in the workshop at CSOI, K.G. Marg, Delhi

    Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 4:57PM by PIB Delhi

    In pursuit of the directions of the Prime Minister of India Sh Narendra Modi in the PRAGATI Meeting dated 26th December, 2024, to facilitate a senior level review of PG cases in each Ministry/Department, Cabinet Secretary addressed a DO letter to all Secretaries on 30th January, 2025, directing all the Secretaries/ Senior Level Officials to the Government of India, to take review of public grievances in their respective Ministry/Department.

    In this regard, a dedicated module in the CPGRAMS Portal has been operationalized by DARPG for the Nodal Grievance Redressal Officers and an OM has been sent to all Ministries/Departments by Secretary, DARPG dated 14th February, 2025. DARPG conducted a 3-hour capacity-building workshop on 5th March, 2025 at CSOI, K.G. Marg, for Nodal Grievance Officers on the newly operationalized Review Meeting Module. The module enables Secretary/ Senior Officer level reviews of public grievances, ensuring effective redressal and maximizing citizen satisfaction.

    The capacity building session facilitated knowledge sharing and clarified operational aspects, enabling Nodal Grievance Officers to navigate the system seamlessly for improved grievance review, aligning with the Prime Minister’s Pragati Review Meeting held on December 26, 2024.

     

     

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    NKR/PSM

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: IWAI signs MoU with J&K to boost river cruise tourism

    Source: Government of India

    IWAI signs MoU with J&K to boost river cruise tourism

    MoU signed on the sidelines of Chintan Shivir being held in Srinagar in presence of Union Minister Shri Sarbananda Sonowal

    Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 4:29PM by PIB Delhi

    The Inland Waterways Authority of India (IWAI) under the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Government of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), to boost river cruise tourism on three National Waterways in J&K.

    The MoU was signed on the sidelines of Chintan Shivir being held in Srinagar in the presence of Union Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Shri Sarbananda Sonowal and Minister of State for Ports, Shipping and Waterways Shri Shantanu Thakur.  Minister of Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs, Transport, Science and Technology, Information Technology, Youth Services and Sports, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Shri Satish Sharma; Secretary, Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Shri T.K. Ramachandran; Chairman, IWAI, Shri Vijay Kumar along with other dignitaries were also present on the occasion.

    The Inland Waterways Authority of India has been actively promoting cruise tourism in India and the agreement with the Government of Jammu and Kashmir aims to further boost tourism, generate employment, boost economic growth and provide a new mode of leisure/budget tourism on rivers in Jammu and Kashmir.

    Of the 111 national waterways in the country, Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir has three declared national waterways, i.e., River Chenab (NW-26), River Jhelum (NW-49) and River Ravi (NW-84). With the vision to promote river cruise tourism, various cruise circuits were announced for development – spanning from Kashmir to Kerala and Assam to Gujarat – in the recently concluded Second Meeting of Inland Waterways Development Council (IWDC). Within a period of two months, IWAI took a significant step to develop river cruise tourism in the UT of Jammu and Kashmir for an approximate cost of Rs 100 crore.

    Under the framework of MoU; the IWAI will provide waterside infrastructure, i.e., ten floating jetties and landside infrastructure comprising of waiting hall and other amenities for cruise passengers. Out of ten, two floating jetties will be installed at Akhnoor and Reasi (near Jammu) the declared portion of River Chenab (NW-26); seven floating jetties at Pantha Chowk, Zero Bridge, Amira Kadal, Shah-e-Hamdan, Safa Kadal/Chattabal Shrine, Sumbal Bridge and Gund Prang (in Srinagar and Bandipora) River Jhelum (NW-49) and one jetty at Sohar on River Ravi (NW-84).  Additionally, IWAI will develop navigational fairway by executing dredging wherever required, provide navigational aids and conduct regular hydrographic surveys for safe plying of vessels in these waterways.

    The J&K government will provide land for construction of landside facilities, facilitate all statutory clearances and appoint cruise operators in identified sectors of the three National Waterways.  The IWAI will also provide any technical assistance required by Government of J&K.

    Under the dynamic leadership of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and the able guidance of Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways Shri Sarbananda Sonowal, IWAI has been making several infrastructural interventions to develop waterways as a robust engine of growth.  With its concerted efforts, IWAI is expanding its footprint throughout the country and is presently working towards capacity augmentation of NW 1, NW 2, NW 3 and NW 16 among other waterways by means of developing IWT terminals, fairways through end-to-end dredging contracts, navigational aids like night navigation facility, navigational locks among others.

    With proactive steps like developing cruise terminals and related infrastructure, IWAI is working towards promoting river cruise tourism by utilising the immense potential of rivers in the country.  The Authority has rolled out initiatives to boost cruise tourism on River Ganga and River Brahmaputra. The success of world’s longest cruise MV Ganga Vilas underlines the same. The partnership between IWAI and Jammu and Kashmir government is an exciting initiative that promises to promote sustainable tourism practices while stimulating local economic growth and enhancing tourist experience.

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    G.D. Hallikeri / Henry

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India is shaping its digital future with a strong focus on Digital Public Infrastructure, AI, semiconductor and electronics manufacturing: Prime Minister

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 4:12PM by PIB Delhi

    The Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi remarked that India is shaping its digital future with a strong focus on Digital Public Infrastructure, AI, semiconductor and electronics manufacturing. Urging everyone to read an article written by Union Minister Shri Ashwini Vaishnaw, the Prime Minister’s Office handle in a post on X said:

    “Union Minister Shri @AshwiniVaishnaw elaborates on how India is shaping its digital future with a strong focus on Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), AI, semiconductor and electronics manufacturing. Do read!”

     

     

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    MJPS/SR

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Union Finance Minister and MoS, Finance launch the New Credit Assessment Model for MSMEs as announced in Union Budget 2024-25

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Union Finance Minister and MoS, Finance launch the New Credit Assessment Model for MSMEs as announced in Union Budget 2024-25

    The Model will leverage digitally fetched and verifiable data to devise automated MSME Loan appraisal for MSMEs

    Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 4:11PM by PIB Delhi

    In the Post Budget interaction at Vishakhapatnam today, the Union Finance and Corporate Affairs Minister, Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman and Minister of State, Finance Shri Pankaj Chaudhary launched the New Credit Assessment Model based on the scoring of digital footprints of MSMEs. It was announced in the Union Budget 2024-25 that Public sector banks (PSBs) will build their in-house capability to assess MSMEs for credit, instead of relying on external assessment. PSBs will develop a new credit assessment model, based on the scoring of digital footprints of MSMEs in the economy.

    This credit assessment model will leverage the digitally fetched and verifiable data available in the ecosystem and devise automated journeys for MSME Loan appraisal using objective decisioning for all loan applications and model-based limit assessment for both Existing to Bank (ETB) as well as New to Bank (NTB) MSME borrowers.

    The digital footprints used by the model may include Name and Pan authentication using NSDL, Mobile and email verification using OTP, API fetch of GST data through service providers, Bank Statement Analysis using account aggregator, ITR upload and verification, API enabled commercial and consumer bureau fetch and due diligence using CICs, fraud checks, Hunter checks through APIs, among others.

    The benefits to MSMEs by use of this model includes submission of application from anywhere through online mode, reduced paperwork and Branch visit, instant in-principle sanction through digital mode, seamless processing of credit proposals, end to end straight through process (STP), reduced turnaround time (TAT), Credit decision based on objective data/ Transactional behaviour and credit history, no Physical collateral securities for loans covered under CGTMSE, among others.

    The credit assessment model for MSMEs based on digital footprints is expected to be a significant improvement over the traditional assessment of credit eligibility based only on asset or turnover criteria. That will also cover MSMEs without a formal accounting system.

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    NB/AD

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India’s AI Revolution

    Source: Government of India (2)

    India’s AI Revolution

    A Roadmap to Viksit Bharat

    Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 4:09PM by PIB Delhi

    Introduction

    India is undergoing a remarkable transformation in Artificial Intelligence, driven by the visionary leadership of PM Modi. For the first time in India’s history, the government is actively shaping an AI ecosystem where computing power, GPUs, and research opportunities are accessible at an affordable cost.

    Unlike in the past, AI in India is no longer confined to a privileged few or dominated by global tech giants. Through forward-looking policies, the Modi government is empowering students, startups, and innovators with world-class AI infrastructure, fostering a truly level playing field. Initiatives such as the IndiaAI Mission and the establishment of Centres of Excellence for AI are strengthening the country’s AI ecosystem, paving the way for innovation and self-reliance in this critical sector.

    These efforts align with the vision of Viksit Bharat by 2047, where India aspires to become a global AI powerhouse, leveraging cutting-edge technology for economic growth, governance, and societal progress.

    AI Compute and Semiconductor Infrastructure

    India is rapidly building a strong AI computing and semiconductor infrastructure to support its growing digital economy. With the approval of the IndiaAI Mission in 2024, the government allocated ₹10,300 crore over five years to strengthen AI capabilities. A key focus of this mission is the development of a high-end common computing facility equipped with 18,693 Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), making it one of the most extensive AI compute infrastructures globally. This capacity is nearly nine times that of the open-source AI model DeepSeek and about two-thirds of what ChatGPT operates on.

    Here are the key developments:

    • Scaling AI Compute Infrastructure: The initial phase of the mission has already made 10,000 GPUs available, with the remaining units to be added soon. This will enable the creation of indigenous AI solutions tailored to Indian languages and contexts.
    • Opening Access to High-Performance Computing: India has also pioneered the launch of an open GPU marketplace, making high-performance computing accessible to startups, researchers, and students. Unlike many countries where AI infrastructure is controlled by large corporations, this initiative ensures that small players have an opportunity to innovate.
    • Robust GPU Supply Chain: The government has selected 10 companies to supply the GPUs, ensuring a robust and diversified supply chain.
    • Indigenous GPU Capabilities: To further strengthen domestic capabilities, India aims to develop its own GPU within the next three to five years, reducing reliance on imported technology.
    • Affordable Compute Access: A new common compute facility will soon be launched, allowing researchers and startups to access GPU power at a highly subsidised rate of ₹100 per hour, compared to the global cost of $2.5 to $3 per hour.
    • Strengthening Semiconductor Manufacturing: In parallel, India is advancing semiconductor manufacturing, with five semiconductor plants under construction. These developments will not only support AI innovation but also reinforce India’s position in the global electronics sector.

     

    Advancing AI with Open Data and Centres of Excellence (CoE)

    Recognising the importance of data in AI development, the Modi government has launched the IndiaAI Dataset Platform to provide seamless access to high-quality, non-personal datasets. This platform will house the largest collection of anonymised data, empowering Indian startups and researchers to develop advanced AI applications. By ensuring diverse and abundant datasets, this initiative will drive AI-driven solutions across key sectors, enhancing innovation and accuracy.

    • IndiaAI Dataset Platform for Open Data Access: The platform will enable Indian startups and researchers to access a unified repository of high-quality, anonymised datasets, reducing barriers to AI innovation.
    • Boosting AI Model Accuracy with Diverse Data: By providing large-scale, non-personal datasets, the initiative will help reduce biases and improve the reliability of AI applications across domains such as agriculture, weather forecasting, and traffic management.
    • Centres of Excellence: The government has established three AI Centres of Excellence (CoE) in Healthcare, Agriculture, and Sustainable Cities in New Delhi. The Budget 2025 further announced a new CoE for AI in education with an outlay of ₹500 crore, making it the fourth such centre.
    • Skilling for AI-Driven Industries: Plans are in place for five National Centres of Excellence for Skilling, which will equip youth with industry-relevant expertise. These centres will be set up in collaboration with global partners to support the ‘Make for India, Make for the World’ vision in manufacturing and AI innovation.

     

    India’s AI Models & Language Technologies

    The government is facilitating the development of India’s own foundational models, including Large Language Models (LLMs) and problem-specific AI solutions tailored to Indian needs. To foster AI research, multiple Centres of Excellence have also been set up.

    • India’s Foundational Large Language Models: IndiaAI has launched an initiative to develop indigenous foundational AI models, including LLMs and Small Language Models (SLMs), through a call for proposals.
    • Digital India BHASHINI: An AI-led language translation platform designed to enable easy access to the internet and digital services in Indian languages, including voice-based access, and support content creation in Indian languages.
    • BharatGen: The world’s first government-funded multimodal LLM initiative, BharatGen was launched in 2024 in Delhi. It aims to enhance public service delivery and citizen engagement through foundational models in language, speech, and computer vision. BharatGen involves a consortium of AI researchers from premier academic institutions in India.
    • Sarvam-1 AI Model: A large language model optimised for Indian languages, Sarvam-1 has 2 billion parameters and supports ten major Indian languages. It is designed for applications such as language translation, text summarisation, and content generation.
    • Chitralekha: An open-source video transcreation platform developed by AI4Bhārat, Chitralekha enables users to generate and edit audio transcripts in various Indic languages.
    • Hanooman’s Everest 1.0: A multilingual AI system developed by SML, Everest 1.0 supports 35 Indian languages, with plans to expand to 90.

     

    AI Integration with Digital Public Infrastructure

    India’s Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) has redefined digital innovation by combining public funding with private sector-led innovation. Platforms like Aadhaar, UPI, and DigiLocker serve as the foundation, while private entities build application-specific solutions on top of them. This model is now being enhanced with AI, integrating intelligent solutions into financial and governance platforms. The global appeal of India’s DPI was evident at the G20 Summit, where several countries expressed interest in adopting similar frameworks. Japan’s patent grant to India’s UPI payment system further underscores its scalability.

    For Mahakumbh 2025, AI-driven DPI solutions played a crucial role in managing the world’s largest human gathering. AI-powered tools monitored real-time railway passenger movement to optimise crowd dispersal in Prayagraj. The Bhashini-powered Kumbh Sah’AI’yak Chatbot enabled voice-based lost-and-found services, real-time translation, and multilingual assistance. Its integration with Indian Railways and UP Police streamlined communication, ensuring swift issue resolution. By leveraging AI with DPI, Mahakumbh 2025 set a global benchmark for tech-enabled, inclusive, and efficient event management.

    AI Talent & Workforce Development

    India’s workforce is at the heart of its digital revolution. The country is adding one Global Capability Center (GCC) every week, reinforcing its status as a preferred destination for global R&D and technological development. However, sustaining this growth will require continuous investment in education and skill development. The government is addressing this challenge by revamping university curricula to include AI, 5G, and semiconductor design, aligning with the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020. This ensures that graduates acquire job-ready skills, reducing the transition time between education and employment.

    • AI Talent Pipeline & AI Education: Under the IndiaAI Future Skills initiative, AI education is being expanded across undergraduate, postgraduate, and Ph.D. programs. Fellowships are being provided to full-time Ph.D. scholars researching AI in the top 50 NIRF-ranked institutes. To enhance accessibility, Data and AI Labs are being established in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, with a model IndiaAI Data Lab already set up at NIELIT Delhi.
    • India Ranks 1st in Global AI Skill Penetration: According to the Stanford AI Index 2024, India ranks first globally in AI skill penetration with a score of 2.8, ahead of the US (2.2) and Germany (1.9). AI talent concentration in India has grown by 263% since 2016, positioning the country as a major AI hub. India also leads in AI Skill Penetration for Women, with a score of 1.7, surpassing the US (1.2) and Israel (0.9).
    • AI Innovation: India has emerged as the fastest-growing developer population globally and ranks second in public generative AI projects on GitHub. The country is home to 16% of the world’s AI talent, showcasing its growing influence in AI innovation and adoption.
    • AI Talent Hubs: The India Skills Report 2024 by Wheebox forecasts that India’s AI industry will reach USD 28.8 billion by 2025, with a CAGR of 45%. The AI-skilled workforce has seen a 14-fold increase from 2016 to 2023, making India one of the top five fastest-growing AI talent hubs, alongside Singapore, Finland, Ireland, and Canada. The demand for AI professionals in India is projected to reach 1 million by 2026.

    AI Adoption & Industry Growth

    India’s Generative AI (GenAI) ecosystem has seen remarkable growth, even amid a global downturn. The country’s AI landscape is evolving from experimental use cases to scalable, production-ready solutions, reflecting its growing maturity.

    • Businesses Prioritising AI Investments: According to BCG, 80% of Indian companies consider AI a core strategic priority, surpassing the global average of 75%. Additionally, 69% plan to increase their tech investments in 2025, with one-third allocating over USD 25 million to AI initiatives.
    • GenAI Startup Funding: According to a November 2024 report by National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), Indian GenAI startup funding surged over six times quarter-on-quarter, reaching USD 51 million in Q2FY2025, driven by B2B and agentic AI startups.
    • AI Transforming Workplaces: The Randstad AI & Equity Report 2024 states that seven in 10 Indian employees used AI at work in 2024, up from five in 10 a year earlier, showcasing AI’s rapid integration into workplaces.
    • AI Empowering Small & Medium Businesses (SMBs): AI-driven technologies, such as autonomous agents, are helping SMBs scale efficiently, personalise customer experiences, and optimise operations. According to Salesforce, 78% of Indian SMBs using AI reported revenue growth, while 93% stated AI has contributed to increased revenues.
    • Rapid Expansion of India’s AI Economy: As per the BCG-NASSCOM Report 2024, India’s AI market is projected to grow at a CAGR of 25-35%, reinforcing its potential for innovation and job creation. While AI automates routine tasks, it is simultaneously generating new opportunities in data science, machine learning, and AI-driven applications.
    • AI Startup Support Ecosystem: India hosts 520+ tech incubators and accelerators, ranking third globally in active programs. 42% of these were established in the past five years, catering to the evolving needs of Indian startups. AI-focused accelerators like T-Hub MATH provide crucial mentorship in product development, business strategy, and scaling. In early 2024, MATH supported over 60 startups, with five actively discussing funding, highlighting India’s growing AI startup landscape.

     

    A Pragmatic AI Regulation Approach

    India’s pragmatic AI regulation balances innovation and accountability, steering clear of overregulation that could stifle growth and unchecked market-driven governance that may create monopolies. Instead of relying solely on legislation, India is investing in AI-driven safeguards, funding top universities and IITs to develop solutions for deep fakes, privacy risks, and cybersecurity threats. This techno-legal approach ensures AI remains a force for inclusive growth, fostering an ecosystem where innovation thrives while ethical concerns are proactively addressed.

    Conclusion

    India’s rapid advancements in artificial intelligence, underpinned by strategic government initiatives, have positioned the country as a global AI powerhouse. By expanding AI compute infrastructure, fostering indigenous AI models, enhancing digital public infrastructure, and investing in talent development, India is creating an inclusive and innovation-driven ecosystem. The emphasis on open data, affordable access to high-performance computing, and AI-driven solutions tailored to local needs ensures that the benefits of AI reach businesses, researchers, and citizens alike. As AI adoption accelerates across industries, India’s proactive approach is not only strengthening its digital economy but also paving the way for self-reliance in critical technologies. With a clear vision for the future, India is set to become a leader in AI innovation, shaping the global AI landscape in the years to come.

    Source: Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology

    Click to see in PDF

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    Santosh Kumar/ Ritu Kataria/ Saurabh Kalia

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Jan Aushadhi Mitra Registration Campaign: 6th day of celebrations for Jan Aushadhi Diwas 2025

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Jan Aushadhi Mitra Registration Campaign: 6th day of celebrations for Jan Aushadhi Diwas 2025

    Aao Jan Aushadhi Mitra Banein: individuals can contribute to providing essential generic medicines and support to vulnerable populations during times of crisis

    ‘Jan Aushadhi Mitra’ to educate citizens about the significant savings though Jan Aushadhi medicines, promoting the core message:

    ‘Jan Aushadhi – Low price – Best medicine’

    Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 5:06PM by PIB Delhi

    The sixth day of 7th Jan Aushadhi Diwas 2025 was celebrated with the nationwide implementation of the “Jan Aushadhi Mitra” campaign. This initiative aims to strengthen community engagement and spread awareness about the benefits of Pradhan Mantri Bhartiya JanAushadhi Pariyojana across the country.

    The “Jan Aushadhi Mitra” programme will focus on educating citizens about the significant price difference between Jan Aushadhi medicines and branded alternatives, highlighting the substantial savings achieved through the Pariyojana. Volunteers associated as “Jan Aushadhi Mitras,” will play a crucial role in disseminating information and promoting the core message: “जन औषधि – दाम कम – दवाई उत्तम”

    This program is designed to reach those in distress, including the elderly and infirm, who may find it challenging to access Jan Aushadhi Kendras. By registering as a volunteer for “Aao Jan Aushadhi Mitra Banein,” individuals can contribute to providing essential generic medicines and support to vulnerable populations during times of crisis. More than 3000 Jan Aushadhi Mitras registered on first day. The Campaign will run till 9th March 2025. 

    At the initiative of the Prime Minister, the 7th of March is celebrated every year as “Jan Aushadhi Diwas” with a view to enhance awareness about the scheme and promote generic medicines. As in earlier years, week-long events have been planned at various locations across the country from the 1st to the 7th of March 2025.

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    MV/AKS

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: “M” Mark status awarded to LIV Golf Hong Kong 2025 and 2025 Cathay/HSBC Hong Kong Sevens

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    “M” Mark status awarded to LIV Golf Hong Kong 2025 and 2025 Cathay/HSBC Hong Kong Sevens
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    The following is issued on behalf of the Major Sports Events Committee:     The Major Sports Events Committee (MSEC) has awarded “M” Mark status to LIV Golf Hong Kong 2025 (March 7 to 9) and the 2025 Cathay/HSBC Hong Kong Sevens (March 28 to 30).     The Chairman of the MSEC, Mr Wilfred Ng, said today (March 6), “LIV Golf returns to Hong Kong this year and will take place at the Fanling Golf Course of the Hong Kong Golf Club, which fully demonstrates Hong Kong’s strength in hosting international sports events. As for the Hong Kong Sevens, it has been moved to the 50 000-seat Kai Tak Stadium this year for the very first time. These two events not only highlight Hong Kong’s status as a hub for major international sports events but also contribute to Hong Kong’s event economy.”     ???The “M” Mark System aims to encourage and help local National Sports Associations and private or non-government organisations to organise more major international sports events and nurture them into sustainable undertakings. Sports events meeting the assessment criteria will be considered for “M” Mark status by the MSEC. Funding support will also be provided to some events.     For details of “M” Mark events, please visit www.mevents.org.hk.

    Ends/Thursday, March 6, 2025Issued at HKT 19:46

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: HKETO, Brussels celebrates Chinese New Year in Madrid and Barcelona (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    HKETO, Brussels celebrates Chinese New Year in Madrid and Barcelona (with photos)
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    The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Brussels (HKETO, Brussels) hosted Chinese New Year receptions in Madrid and Barcelona, Spain, on March 3 and 4 (Spanish time) respectively, concluding the series of celebration for the Year of the Snake.     The reception in Barcelona was officiated by the Secretary for Innovation, Technology and Industry, Professor Sun Dong, who led a delegation of representatives from Hong Kong’s innovation and technology (I&T) sector to attend the Mobile World Congress (MWC) 2025 in Barcelona. The visit aimsto strengthen ties and co-operation between Hong Kong and Spain in the field of I&T, promote Hong Kong’s I&T advantages, and explore overseas business opportunities for Hong Kong’s I&T sector.     At the reception, the Special Representative for Hong Kong Economic and Trade Affairs to the European Union, Ms Shirley Yung, highlighted in her welcoming remarks that under “one country”, Hong Kong has convenient and often priority access to the huge Mainland market, while maintaining the qualities of an international city under “two systems”.      “These distinct advantages are recognised in the latest international ranking, in which Hong Kong is ranked among the world’s top three international financial centres,” Ms Yung added.     At the reception in Madrid, HKETO, Brussels took the opportunity to showcase Hong Kong’s unique East-meets-West culture by staging a music performance featuring two Hong Kong flutists and one German cellist, who performed both classical Chinese and Spanish music, as well as contemporary Hong Kong pop.     The two receptions in Madrid and Barcelona attracted over 200 guests from the sectors of government, business, culture, academia and media in Spain. They were co-organised with Invest Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC) and with the support of the Spain Hong Kong Business Association.     The MWC is one of the world’s leading technology fairs where tens of thousands of technology experts and companies gather. This year, the Hong Kong delegation include heads of the Hong Kong Science and Technology Parks Corporation (HKSTPC), Cyberport, the Hong Kong Applied Science and Technology Research Institute, and the Hong Kong Microelectronics Research and Development Institute, as well as representatives of 24 Hong Kong I&T enterprises and institutions. The HKSTPC and the HKTDC co-ordinate the participation of the I&T representatives in the Hong Kong Tech Pavilion at the MWC.

    Ends/Thursday, March 6, 2025Issued at HKT 20:47

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: HKSAR Government spokesman’s response to media enquiries

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    HKSAR Government spokesman’s response to media enquiries
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    In response to media enquiries on the report issued by S&P yesterday (March 5) on Hong Kong’s banks and property market, a spokesman for the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) gave a reply as follows:           We disagree with the observation that there is an oversupply of residential properties. The vacancy rate of private flats was 4.5 per cent at end-2024, on par with the long-term average of the previous 20 years (2004-2023). Flat rentals also sustained a solid increase. These data show that housing demand is currently keen.           Benefiting from the general downtrend in interest rates, continued economic growth, and more talents arriving in Hong Kong, the residential property market should see stable development this year. The Government will continue to closely monitor market developments and strive to maintain the steady development of the residential property market in a prudent and pragmatic manner.           As for non-residential properties, the Government has already rolled out measures to stabilise the market. Having considered the high vacancy rate of offices in recent years and the relatively ample supply in the next few years, the Government will not roll out any commercial sites for sale in the coming year, so as to allow the market to absorb the existing supply. The Government will also consider rezoning some of the commercial sites, which are expected to be available for sale in the next few years, into residential use and allowing greater flexibility of land use.           Property lending for the Hong Kong banking system amounted to HK$3.4 trillion as of end-December 2024, accounting for about one-third of the total loans. Among the property-related lending, 56 per cent were residential mortgage loans, while the remaining 44 per cent were loans for local property development and investment. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) closely monitors the robust development of the banking system. Notwithstanding the uncertainties in the global macroeconomic environment, the credit quality and risks of the banking sector remain manageable.           For residential mortgage loans (RMLs), as of end-January 2025, the overall delinquency ratio of mortgage loans was only 0.12 per cent while the delinquency ratio of RMLs in negative equity remained stable at 0.15 per cent as of end-December 2024, showing that the vast majority of mortgage borrowers are able to repay their loans on time. Under the HKMA’s countercyclical macroprudential measures, Hong Kong’s property market has remained stable, with an average loan-to-value ratio of 60 per cent and a low debt-servicing ratio of around 40 per cent. Following the US Federal Reserve’s interest rate cuts, major banks in Hong Kong have lowered their best lending rates by a total of 0.625 per cent over the past year, resulting in lower mortgage rates. Residential property prices in Hong Kong have shown signs of stabilising in recent months, and the report by S&P on March 5 2025 also expects Hong Kong’s property prices to stabilise in 2025.           For local property development and investment loans, we agree with S&P’s view that Hong Kong banks are able to manage the strains arising from the commercial real estate (CRE) sector:

    A significant portion of Hong Kong banks’ exposures to local property development and investment loans are to the larger players with relatively good financial health. As for the exposures to local small and medium-sized property developers and investors, including some with weaker financial conditions or higher debt-to-equity ratios, banks have already taken credit risk mitigating measures early on and most of these loans are secured.
    Overall, credit risks associated with local property development and investment loans are manageable and there is no concentration of risks at individual borrower level and banks have also undertaken credit risk mitigation measures.
    Although the banking system’s classified loan ratio has gradually edged up to the long-term average level of about 2 per cent, the overall asset quality of the banking system is manageable and provisions remain sufficient. As of end-December 2024, the provision coverage ratio (i.e., the total of general and specific provisions as a percentage of non-performing loans) was around 65 per cent. Taking into account and deducting the market value of collateral from the non-performing loans, the provision coverage ratio would be around 145 per cent.

    As for the small- and medium-sized banks mentioned in S&P’s report, they have also been taking appropriate credit risk mitigation measures, such as collateralisation, in accordance with the HKMA’s guidelines. In addition, banks in Hong Kong have strong capital positions (with a total capital adequacy ratio of 21.8 per cent as of end-December 2024) and good profitability to withstand the extreme scenario of large volatility in property prices.

    Ends/Thursday, March 6, 2025Issued at HKT 22:14

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: London ETO greets Year of Snake in Norway (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    London ETO greets Year of Snake in Norway (with photos)
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    The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, London (London ETO) and the Norway-Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce hosted a Year of the Snake reception in Oslo, Norway, on March 5 (Oslo time).     The Director-General of the London ETO, Mr Gilford Law, delivered a virtual welcome speech at the reception. He highlighted that Hong Kong is an unparalleled destination for businesses and investors, thanks to its free and open investment environment, as well as its simple and low tax system. Mr Law said, “The number of companies in Hong Kong with overseas or Mainland parent companies rose to 9 960 in 2024, while the number of start-ups in Hong Kong increased to 4 694, both reaching record highs. These figures demonstrate that Hong Kong is becoming increasingly attractive to businesses and remains an ideal place for Mainland and overseas enterprises to set up or expand their operations. ”      Mr Law added, “On top of attracting businesses, Hong Kong is also attracting tourists with its dynamic calendar of world-class events. In 2024, Hong Kong welcomed close to 45 million international visitors, a 31 per cent increase from 2023. Stepping into 2025, Hong Kong, as the ‘Events Capital of Asia’, is set to host an array of high-profile business, sports, arts, and cultural events.”     The reception was well attended by over 80 guests in Norway from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the business, academic and cultural sectors. The London ETO will continue to celebrate the Year of the Snake among the countries under its purview.

    Ends/Thursday, March 6, 2025Issued at HKT 23:33

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News