Source: The Conversation – UK – By Moign Khawaja, Lecturer, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University (DCU), Dublin City University
The rise of the self-styled Islamic State (IS) has been described as an “accident of history” which took place as a result of the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003.
The extremist organisation had existed as a mere “paper state” since its founding as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in October 2006. But the video release of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declaring himself the caliph on July 4 2014 marked a turning point in contemporary history.
IS subsequently published hundreds of videos, some of which shocked the world with their graphic violence. Ideological enemies of the caliphate were executed by beheading or being burned alive.
But while the violence mobilised global opposition to what the then-US president, Barack Obama, called IS’s “bankrupt” ideology, the group used video as its go-to medium for IS propaganda and recruitment.
The group’s official videos, generally described as “slick” and “Hollywood-esque”, heavily emphasised two vital aspects of its identity: Islamic and state. The Islamic aspect of IS has been debated at length by scholars – especially the question of how much they had to do with Islam, if at all. But little research has been done to investigate the statehood claim made by IS.
The fact IS termed itself as Islamic State, or ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah
(الدولة الإسلامية) in Arabic, demonstrated its claim to be a state in the truest sense of the word – not just to citizens living in the territory it controlled, but to its supporters and enemies worldwide.
IS also presented evidence of state-building activities in the form of official propaganda releases. These aimed not only to back up its statehood claims but to seek recognition from its subjects and supporters for the caliphate project.
For our book, Islamic State, Media and Propaganda: Performances of the ‘Visual Caliphate’, we conducted an in-depth visual analysis of 374 official IS videos. These were published between the caliphate’s establishment in July 2014 and its dismantlement in July 2017, and collected from various online IS channels before their takedown in mid-2015, when Twitter started suspending thousands of pro-IS accounts en-masse.
We looked at the videos IS produced through four different analyses.
1. Population
The population analysis reveals IS’s portrayal of itself as a vibrant Islamic society. IS depicted its people as a cohesive community living under shariah law, emphasising gendered roles and the Bay’ah citizenship agreement, which privileged Sunni Muslims while marginalising minorities.
This analysis highlights the disproportionate portrayal of men as fighters and breadwinners. Women, meanwhile, were largely invisible on screen, confined to domestic roles as wives and mothers. Young boys were groomed as future fighters while girls were portrayed as “pearls of chastity” and trained to raise the next generation of the caliphate.
Surprisingly, women did make a one-off appearance when they were shown fighting alongside men on the battlefield as the caliphate was on its last legs.
2. Territory
This analysis unravels three stages of IS’s expansionist territorial strategy. First, identify enemy targets and territory. Second, attack and defeat the enemy. Finally, project the victory to followers and opponents alike.
The videos also show IS exercising sovereignty over its territory – aiming to legitimise its rule in the eyes of its subjects, and encourage global supporters to emigrate, join and defend IS.
The group projected itself as a de facto sovereign state capable of capturing, controlling and defending its territory with the help of modern technology such as drones, maps and weaponry. It depicted any severe military setbacks it suffered as a divine test – and heavily downplayed their importance.
3. Governance
This showcases IS’s efforts to project itself as a modern state by documenting its governance practices, including law enforcement, public services and administration. IS presented itself as a revolutionary state that brought peace and security to a war-torn region.
The governance mode of analysis highlights IS’s theatrical performances of its ability to run a state. Videos showed civil servants working in offices as well as civilians engaging with the state institutions they ran. They regularly featured state symbols such as the IS flag and its gold dinar currency.
These displays of performative governance were made at a time when the caliphate was constantly pummelled by military operations conducted by both US- and Russia-led coalitions.
Despite its strict Salafi identity (an orthodox Islamic movement that advocates a return to the practices and beliefs of the first three generations of Muslims), IS presented itself as a modern state by deploying tools such as its own branding, currency, infrastructure and taxation.
4. Foreign policy
IS interactions with other states and non-state actors were presented as foreign policy. It rejected the modern international system, which it deemed un-Islamic, and refused to seek recognition from the international community. Instead, IS engaged in “rebel diplomacy” with other jihadi groups. The aim was to co-opt them into its global network of affiliates.
Our analysis reveals how IS used civilian casualties caused by coalition airstrikes to justify terror attacks abroad. It also selectively quoted Islamic texts to legitimise its actions, and took matters into its own hands when religious teachings did not fit its narrative.
An example of this was the horrific burning alive of Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh. According to a narrative attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, burning alive as a form of punishment is forbidden in Islam.
Our research underscores IS’s unique status as a jihadi organisation that came close to establishing a de facto state. This was an unprecedented feat in contemporary history, and shows how IS’s theatrical performances of statehood were carefully scripted and staged. Jihadi-led violence has subsided across the Middle East and North Africa since the territorial collapse of IS in 2017.
But it has risen in other regions of Asia and Africa, including Central Asia, East Africa and the Sahel region. So our findings can help in the understanding of how the blueprint of the caliphate might inspire and influence existing and future jihadi movements with statebuilding ambitions.
Moign Khawaja received funding from the Irish Research Council as part of the IRC-Government of Ireland Postdoctoral Research Fellowship.
– ref. How Islamic State used video to legitimise its caliphate – https://theconversation.com/how-islamic-state-used-video-to-legitimise-its-caliphate-252214