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Category: Asia

  • MIL-Evening Report: Hundreds of livestock breeds have gone extinct – but some Australian farmers are keeping endangered breeds alive

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Catie Gressier, Adjunct Research Fellow in Agriculture and Environment, The University of Western Australia

    Berkshire pigs JWhitwell/Shutterstock

    It took thousands of years to develop the world’s extraordinary range of domesticated farm animals – an estimated 8,800 livestock breeds across 38 farmed species.

    But this diversity is dwindling fast. Advances in selective breeding and artificial insemination have fuelled the global spread of a small number of profitable livestock types. Their popularity has left ever more heritage breeds at risk of extinction.

    Why does this matter? Each breed represents vital genetic diversity for the livestock species on which we rely, known as agrobiodiversity. As the number of breeds shrink, we lose their genetics forever.

    There are bright spots amid the decline. Hundreds of passionate farmers are working hard to keep heritage breeds alive around Australia. As my new book shows, they do it primarily for love.

    Which livestock breeds are disappearing – and why?

    Cattle have experienced the highest number of extinctions, with at least 184 breeds lost globally.

    Of all chicken breeds, one in ten is now extinct, and a further 30% are endangered.

    Sheep are also rapidly losing diversity, with 160 breeds now extinct. The rise of synthetic materials has endangered the remaining breeds producing carpet wool in New Zealand and Australia, including the unique Tasmanian Elliottdale.

    The fleece of Elliotdale sheep has been used to make woollen carpets.
    Sue Curliss, CC BY-NC-ND

    Pigs fare little better. Australia’s 2.5 million pigs are predominantly Large White, Landrace and Duroc crossbreeds, while none of the eight remaining purebred pig breeds in Australia currently has more than 100 sows registered with the Rare Breeds Trust. While not all sows are registered, we know breeds such as Tamworths are at dangerously low numbers.

    How did this happen? Over the past century, the goal of animal husbandry has shifted from breeding hardy, multipurpose animals to increasing performance for economic gain. For livestock, performance means more of what humans value, such as pigs with extra ribs, prolific egg-laying hens and sheep with finer wool.

    Huge sums have been spent on selective breeding and artificial insemination technologies. This, in turn, has made it possible for a small number of profitable livestock types to be farmed globally.

    For instance, when you buy a roast chicken, it will likely be one of just two types of fast-growing broilers (meat chickens), the Ross or the Cobb. Their genetics are developed and trademarked by two multinational agribusinesses who dominate the global broiler market.

    Chicken breed numbers have shrunk too, risking rare breeds such as Transylvanian naked neck cockerel bantams.
    Scott Carter, CC BY-NC-ND

    It’s hard to overstate how big the increases in production have been from reproductive technologies. In the dairy industry, for instance, milk yield per cow has doubled in the past 40 years. These volumes are around six times greater now than a century ago.

    Holsteins, the top dairy breed, have become globally dominant. Almost 1.4 million of Australia’s 1.65 million dairy cows are Holsteins. But as Holstein numbers soar, other breeds dwindle. Many farmers have simply stopped rearing other breeds, leading to many becoming endangered or extinct.

    For Holsteins themselves, this has come with a cost. Selective breeding for high milk volume has meant Holsteins suffer more medical issues such as metabolic diseases and frequent mastitis. They also have reduced fertility and longevity.

    Researchers have found 99% of Holstein bulls produced by artificial insemination in the United States are descended from just two sires. This wide dissemination of limited bloodlines has led to the spread of genetic defects.

    Holstein cows produce much more milk – but there’s a cost.
    VanderWolf Images/Shutterstock

    What is at stake?

    Our food systems face growing threats. Genetic diversity provides a safeguard for livestock species against lethal animal diseases such as H5N1 bird flu and African swine fever.

    If we rely on just a few breeds, we risk a wipe out. The Irish potato famine is a catastrophic example. In the 1800s, Irish farmers took up the “lumper” variety of potatoes to feed a growing population. But when fungal rot struck in the 1840s, it turned most of the crop to mush – and led to mass starvation.

    Some breeds have very useful traits, such as resistance to particular pests and diseases.

    Chickens and other birds die in swathes if infected by Newcastle disease, one of the most serious bird viruses. But breeds such as the hardy Egyptian Fayoumi survive better, while the European Leghorn – whose genetics are used in commercial egg-laying breeds – is highly susceptible.

    Local breeds can also have better resistance to endemic pests. The Indian zebu humped cattle breed, for example, is less prone to tick infestation than crossbreeds.

    Climate change is also making life harder for livestock, and some breeds are better adapted to heat than others.

    For different cultural groups, local heritage breeds also have unique symbolic and culinary value.

    While it’s well-known eating less meat would benefit ecosystems, animal welfare and human health, eating meat remains entrenched in our diets and the economy. Pursuing more sustainable and higher-welfare approaches to livestock production is crucial.

    Some Aussie farmers love heritage breeds

    A cohort of Australian farmers is working hard to conserve dozens of endangered livestock breeds such as Large Black pigs, Shropshire sheep and Belted Galloway cattle.

    A rare Belted Galloway cow with a one week old calf.
    Scott Carter, CC BY-NC-ND

    But these farmers are hampered by our reluctance as consumers to pay more to cover the cost of raising slower-growing breeds in free-range environments. Not only that, but meat processors are increasingly closing their doors to small-scale producers.

    Why persevere? For four years, I’ve conducted ethnographic research with Australia’s heritage breed farmers. I found they were motivated by one of the most powerful conservation tools we have: love.

    Of his endangered English Leicester sheep, one farmer told me:

    I consider them to be family; they have been our family for over 150 years. I talk to them, and the rams in particular talk to me. Sorry if I sound like a silly old man, but you must talk to them. I gave myself a 60th birthday present by commissioning a large portrait of an English Leicester head, which hangs in our kitchen (I do not have a painting of my wife).

    Love doesn’t often feature in agricultural research. But it is an important force. We know from wildlife conservation that humans will act to save what they love. This holds for livestock, too.

    What can you do? If you eat meat or work with wool, seek out rare breeds and join organisations such as the Rare Breeds Trust of Australia and the Australian Food Sovereignty Alliance who back farmers supporting breed diversity.

    Catie Gressier receives funding from the Australian Research Council’s Discovery Project scheme as well as the European Research Council. She is affiliated with the Rare Breeds Trust of Australia and the Australian Food Sovereignty Alliance.

    – ref. Hundreds of livestock breeds have gone extinct – but some Australian farmers are keeping endangered breeds alive – https://theconversation.com/hundreds-of-livestock-breeds-have-gone-extinct-but-some-australian-farmers-are-keeping-endangered-breeds-alive-250393

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Luxon meets Modi: why a ‘good’ NZ-India trade deal is preferable to a ‘perfect’ one

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Chris Ogden, Associate Professor in Global Studies, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

    Some have said Christopher Luxon’s pledge to get a free trade deal between New Zealand and India over the line in his first term as prime minister was overly optimistic. But not all trade deals are the same, and Luxon may yet get to claim bragging rights.

    Already he is managing expectations, saying a “good” deal will be better than waiting a long time for a “perfect” one. And with formal negotiations confirmed not long after Luxon touched down in New Delhi, we can perhaps expect genuine movement.

    At the same time, India’s negotiating style is notoriously rigid, with its bilateral investment treaty model having proved a stumbling block to deals with many other nations or blocs, including the United Kingdom and European Union.

    New Zealand first held formal negotiations with India over a decade ago. But talks derailed in 2015 over the inclusion of dairy products in any agreement. We can be fairly sure this will be the compromise Luxon’s government is ready to make now.

    One model might be Australia’s Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement, which leaves out dairy, too. And New Zealand was able to sign a free trade deal with China in 2008 that excluded diary, with those restrictions removed in a 2022 upgrade.

    Beyond the economic implications, of course, lie domestic political calculations. Luxon needs a win to counter flatlining poll numbers and speculation about his leadership future. Good news in India offers just that.

    Playing the Indo-Pacific card

    Using diplomatic language that plays up New Zealand being part of the Indo-Pacific region – rather than the traditional Western alliance – will be essential.

    New Zealand – despite its relatively small size – is still a significant regional player, with the Indo-Pacific’s fourth highest GDP per capita.

    In the context of an imminent “Asian Century”, and the region becoming a crucial zone for economic and military power, New Zealand also provides a strategic pathway into the Pacific, where India is becoming increasingly involved.

    All of this will influence Luxon’s keynote address today at the 10th Raisina Dialogue, India’s flagship multilateral conference on global politics and economics. He is the first leader not governing a European country to make such a speech, and is also the chief guest at the dialogue.

    Luxon is already on the record as saying New Zealand and India are “very aligned” on Indo-Pacific security and concerns over Chinese regional influence, with scope for more joint defence exercises. This linkage between security and trade mirrors Wellington’s recent relations with Beijing, which have become increasingly difficult to navigate.

    Solid foundations

    But there is a long way to go. In 2024, India-New Zealand trade was worth a combined NZ$3.14 billion – a fraction of the $208.46 billion generated by trade with China in the same year.

    Nevertheless, Luxon and his ministers have made undeniable progress. His “recalibration of a relationship that has long been neglected” bore fruit in October last year when he met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the ASEAN summit, and the countries announced their intention to take the relationship to “greater heights”.

    The previous Labour government helped set the scene with a succession of high-level diplomatic visits and parliamentary exchanges. In 2023, the Indian government described relations with New Zealand as having “an upward trajectory”.

    And there are clearly good foundations to build on – especially the 292,000 people of Indian ethnicity in New Zealand, who contribute US$10 billion to the New Zealand economy.

    Great expectations

    Trade is ripe for expansion, too. New Zealand primarily exports wool, iron and steel, aluminium, fruits and nuts, wood pulp and recovered paper, and imports Indian pharmaceuticals, machinery, precious metals and stones, textiles, vehicles and clothing.

    There’s potential to grow trade with India in tourism (especially attractive to India’s growing middle class), and collaboration on space technology, renewable energy and agritech.

    There were 8,000 Indian students in New Zealand last year, a number that may well grow given a relative drop in student numbers from China. With the US and UK becoming more hostile to immigration, New Zealand can offer a relatively safe and tolerant alternative.

    In many ways, India is the new China. In 2023, India’s GDP was US$14.54 trillion, making it the world’s fourth largest economy. New Delhi is on the cusp of becoming a great power, and is being courted by all countries, big and small.

    As such, while Luxon has momentum on a trade deal, he is also part of a long queue. Given the relative power imbalance between the two countries, the weight of expectation sits squarely on his shoulders.

    Chris Ogden is a Senior Research Fellow with The Foreign Policy Centre, London.

    – ref. Luxon meets Modi: why a ‘good’ NZ-India trade deal is preferable to a ‘perfect’ one – https://theconversation.com/luxon-meets-modi-why-a-good-nz-india-trade-deal-is-preferable-to-a-perfect-one-252036

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI China: Detectives from another era grab attention

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    When a movie presents tragic history in a comedic way, it goes beyond entertainment to convey profound meaning. Detective Chinatown 1900 is one such cinematic endeavor.

    Set in San Francisco in 1900, the film follows detectives Qin Fu and Ah Gui as they investigate the murder of an American woman in Chinatown. Starring Chow Yun-fat, Wang Baoqiang and Liu Haoran, this fourth installment of the Detective Chinatown franchise premiered during the Spring Festival holiday, quickly capturing public attention.

    Praising the movie for its seamless blend of mystery and humor, Georges Chamchoum, an Emmy Award-winning film director and producer, says that the film effectively employs over-the-top acting and comedic elements to depict the harsh realities of historical racism.

    “I believe the story resonates with a broad audience, including American viewers, as it vividly portrays the racism of that era,” Chamchoum told China Daily at a recent special screening hosted by the Asian World Film Festival in Culver City in the United States.

    Co-directed by Chen Sicheng and Dai Mo, the film explores issues of race, immigration and national identity. Despite the invaluable contribution of Chinese immigrants to the development of the US during the Gold Rush, and the construction of the Pacific Railway, they faced discrimination and were even labeled the “yellow peril”, and the subject of derogatory rumors. The film highlights the rhetoric surrounding the Chinese Exclusion Act and its exploitation by one of the film’s characters, a mayoral candidate named Grant, who attempts to frame Chinese laborers in order to drive them out of the US.

    Although the film treats these serious historical themes with a touch of caricature, its subtext regarding racial discrimination remains “significant”, according to Chamchoum.

    For Chow, the role of Bai Xuanling was a long-awaited opportunity. Speaking to Chinese media, the actor said that he had been offered a similar role in the 1990s when he first arrived in Hollywood seeking opportunities. The late director King Hu had given him the script for The Battle of Ono, a film about Chinese laborers building American railways during the late Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). However, Hu died before the project could be realized.

    Three decades later, Chow finally found his dream role in Detective Chinatown 1900. The film dramatically portrays the real-life injustices suffered by Chinese immigrants through its fictitious plot in which San Francisco elites fabricate a “Chinese Jack the Ripper” to justify dismantling Chinatown.

    One of the most powerful scenes in the film has Chow’s character Bai delivering a passionate courtroom monologue in English. Facing an all-American jury, he exposes the discrimination endured by Chinese immigrants, despite their critical role in the growth of the US. The moment has been widely discussed for its emotional impact and historical significance.

    “I think a lot of Americans didn’t know this history before, but the film brings it back to life and explains it to younger audiences, and I was so proud of those Chinese workers,” Miriam Ajibekova, an audience member, told China Daily.

    Detective Chinatown 1900 is more than just an action-comedy mystery; it is a cultural bridge between China and the US, according to Chamchoum. Chen who studied in Hollywood has successfully merged Chinese and American cultural elements in the Detective Chinatown series through international collaborations. The latest installment features Hollywood actor John Cusack in the role of mayoral candidate Grant.

    The film’s composer, Nathan Wang, a University of Southern California-trained musician born in the US, shared his experiences of working on the film after the special screening. “We recorded the pipa (a four-stringed lute), guzheng (plucked zither), and erhu (a two-stringed fiddle) here in LA and layered them with Western orchestration,” says the composer, who worked with German film composer Hans Zimmer on Kung Fu Panda 3.

    Wang adds that he took pride in writing a score that blends Western orchestral elements with traditional Chinese instruments.

    The film was shot in Shandong province at the Laoling Film Studio in Laoling county-level city, Dezhou, where a replica of 1900s San Francisco Chinatown was built. Covering a 200,000-square-meter area, the set took seven months to complete, adding to the film’s authenticity.

    “The production value is incredible,” Chamchoum says, expressing hope for further collaborations between Chinese and American filmmakers.

    Detective Chinatown 1900 is among the flagship Chinese films released internationally during Spring Festival, China’s most profitable box-office period. The film opened to 460 million yuan ($64 million) on its first day, Jan 29, the first day of Chinese New Year, and grossed 3.4 billion yuan in early March. The three preceding films in the franchise amassed over 8.74 billion yuan before the latest installment.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: 18th Asian Film Awards ceremony held in Hong Kong

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    The 18th Asian Film Awards were announced here in China’s Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on Sunday night.

    This year’s Asian Film Awards showcased 30 exceptional films from 25 countries or regions, competing for 16 awards. The nominated works were diverse in genre and the competition was intense.

    Chinese actress Tang Wei was honored with the Excellence in Asian Cinema Award. Sean Lau, actor from China’s Hong Kong, was awarded Best Actor. Action film “Twilight of the Warriors: Walled In” from China’s Hong Kong won two awards including Best Editing and Best Production Design. Chu Wan Pin, composer from China’s Hong Kong, was awarded the Best Original Music for the film “the Last Dance.”

    Japanese actor Koji Yakusho was honored with the Lifetime Achievement Award.

    Established in 2007, the Asian Film Awards aimed to showcase outstanding Asian films to global audiences. Since 2014, they have been hosted by the Asian Film Awards Academy, jointly founded by international film festivals of Hong Kong, Busan and Tokyo.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Hong Kong’s visitor arrivals up 7 pct in first two months

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Hong Kong registered 8.4 million visitor arrivals in the first two months of 2025, up 7 percent year on year, the Hong Kong Tourism Board (HKTB) said.

    Among them, approximately 6.5 million visitor arrivals were from the mainland, up 4 percent from last year. Visitor arrivals from elsewhere jumped significantly, hitting 1.91 million and representing a 20 percent increase from last year, the HKTB data showed.

    Short-haul markets have shown particularly strong performance, with 1.13 million visitor arrivals recorded in the reporting months, up 26 percent. Notably, travelers from the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea all increased over 30 percent.

    In the long-haul sector, around 500,000 arrivals were made from overseas, reflecting a 20 percent increase, with Australia leading the way at an impressive growth rate of 34 percent.

    To enhance experience for travelers, the tourism board has launched a new program platform titled “Hong Kong Great Outdoors,” designed to introduce global visitors to the city’s scenic hiking trails, outlying islands, and geological parks.

    The recent budget proposal from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government for the fiscal year 2025/2026 included a significant allocation of 1.235 billion Hong Kong dollars (158.8 million U.S. dollars) to the tourism board, aimed at realizing the concept of “tourism is everywhere” and implementing the Development Blueprint for Hong Kong’s Tourism Industry 2.0. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Shanghai sees record single-day arrival of foreign tourists via cruise ships

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    The Shanghai Wusongkou International Cruise Terminal welcomed a record number of foreign tourists on Sunday, as two large international cruise ships docked at the port.

    The ships, AIDAstella of AIDA Cruises and Spectrum of the Seas belonging to Royal Caribbean International, brought nearly 4,800 foreign tourists to the east China metropolis, marking the highest single-day arrival of international visitors since this Shanghai terminal opened in 2011.

    AIDAstella made its maiden call at the terminal on Sunday. Operated by AIDA Cruises, which primarily serves European markets, the ship is carrying approximately 2,200 foreign tourists, mainly from Germany and Poland, on a 14-day voyage that starts from Bangkok and stops at Vietnam, Japan, and China’s Hong Kong, Taiwan and Shanghai.

    Elizabeth, a tourist from Poland, said: “This is my first time in China, and I’m traveling with my family. I’m looking forward to this trip.” She added that she plans to go to the Great Wall in Beijing on her next trip.

    During their stay, tourists will visit Shanghai’s landmarks, including the Bund, Yuyuan Garden and Oriental Pearl Tower. They will also take trips to nearby cities like Suzhou in east China’s Jiangsu Province.

    Spectrum of the Seas, which operates from Wusongkou as its home port, is carrying about 2,600 foreign tourists on this cruise. Angela Stephen, senior vice president of Royal Caribbean’s international business, praised the terminal’s excellent facilities and beautiful surroundings, emphasizing the company’s confidence in the Chinese cruise market.

    Notably, the growing popularity of “China Travel” has fueled a surge in Shanghai’s cruise tourism market. Upcoming cruise ship visits include Mein Schiff 6 of TUI Cruises both this month and in April, while Costa Serena of Costa Cruises will return to the Chinese market in June.

    Shanghai is leveraging its cruise tourism potential by developing diverse travel products, aiming to establish itself as the premier destination for inbound cruise tourism in China. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australia’s defence – navigating US-China tensions in changing world

    SPECIAL REPORT: By Peter Cronau for Declassified Australia

    Australia is caught in a jam, between an assertive American ally and a bold Chinese trading partner. America is accelerating its pivot to the Indo-Pacific, building up its fighting forces and expanding its military bases.

    As Australia tries to navigate a pathway between America’s and Australia’s national interests, sometimes Australia’s national interest seems to submerge out of view.

    Admiral David Johnston, the Chief of the Australia’s Defence Force, is steering this ship as China flexes its muscle sending a small warship flotilla south to circumnavigate the continent.

    He has admitted that the first the Defence Force heard of a live-fire exercise by the three Chinese Navy ships sailing in the South Pacific east of Australia on February 21, was a phone call from the civilian Airservices Australia.

    “The absence of any advance notice to Australian authorities was a concern, notably, that the limited notice provided by the PLA could have unnecessarily increased the risk to aircraft and vessels in the area,” Johnston told Senate Estimates .

    Johnston was pressed to clarify how Defence first came to know of the live-fire drill: “Is it the case that Defence was only notified, via Virgin and Airservices Australia, 28 minutes [sic] after the firing window commenced?”

    To this, Admiral Johnston replied: “Yes.”

    If it happened as stated by the Admiral — that a live-fire exercise by the Chinese ships was undertaken and a warning notice was transmitted from the Chinese ships, all without being detected by Australian defence and surveillance assets — this is a defence failure of considerable significance.

    Sources with knowledge of Defence spoken to by Declassified Australia say that this is either a failure of surveillance, or a failure of communication, or even more far-reaching, a failure of US alliance cooperation.

    And from the very start the official facts became slippery.

    What did they know and when did they know it
     The first information passed on to Defence by Airservices Australia came from the pilot of a Virgin passenger jet passing overhead the flotilla in the Tasman Sea that had picked up the Chinese Navy VHF radio notification of an impending live-fire exercise.

    The radio transmission had advised the window for the live-fire drill commenced at 9.30am and would conclude at 3pm.

    We know this from testimony given to Senate Estimates by the head of Airservices Australia. He said Airservices was notified at 9.58am by an aviation control tower informed by the Virgin pilot. Two minutes later Airservices issued a “hazard alert” to commercial airlines in the area.

    The Headquarters of the Defence Force’s Joint Operations Command (HJOC), at Bungendore 30km east of Canberra, was then notified about the drill by Airservices at 10.08am, 38 minutes after the drill window had commenced.

    When questioned a few days later, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese appeared to try to cover for Defence’s apparent failure to detect the live-fire drill or the advisory transmission.

    “At around the same time, there were two areas of notification. One was from the New Zealand vessels that were tailing . ..  the [Chinese] vessels in the area by both sea and air,” Albanese stated. “So that occurred and at the same time through the channels that occur when something like this is occurring, Airservices got notified as well.”

    But the New Zealand Defence Force had not notified Defence “at the same time”. In fact it was not until 11.01am that an alert was received by Defence from the New Zealand Defence Force — 53 minutes after Defence HQ was told by Airservices and an hour and a half after the drill window had begun.

    The Chinese Navy’s stealth guided missile destroyer Zunyi, sailing south in the Coral Sea on February 15, 2025, in a photograph taken from a RAAF P-8A Poseidon surveillance plane. Image: Royal Australian Air Force/Declassified Australia

    Defence Minister Richard Marles later in a round-about way admitted on ABC Radio that it wasn’t the New Zealanders who informed Australia first: “Well, to be clear, we weren’t notified by China. I mean, we became aware of this during the course of the day.

    “What China did was put out a notification that it was intending to engage in live firing. By that I mean a broadcast that was picked up by airlines or literally planes that were commercial planes that were flying across the Tasman.”

    Later the Chinese Ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, told ABC that two live-fire training drills were carried out at sea on February 21 and 22, in accordance with international law and “after repeatedly issuing safety notices in advance”.

    Eyes and ears on ‘every move’
     It was expected the Chinese-navy flotilla would end its three week voyage around Australia on March 7, after a circumnavigation of the continent. That is not before finally passing at some distance the newly acquired US-UK nuclear submarine base at HMAS Stirling near Perth and the powerful US communications and surveillance base at North West Cape.

    Just as Australia spies on China to develop intelligence and targeting for a potential US war, China responds in kind, collecting data on US military and intelligence bases and facilities in Australia, as future targets should hostilities commence.

    The presence of the Chinese Navy ships that headed into the northern and eastern seas around Australia attracted the attention of the Defence Department ever since they first set off south through the Mindoro Strait in the Philippines and through the Indonesian archipelago from the South China Sea on February 3.

    “We are keeping a close watch on them and we will be making sure that we watch every move,” Marles stated in the week before the live-fire incident.

    “Just as they have a right to be in international waters . . .  we have a right to be prudent and to make sure that we are surveilling them, which is what we are doing.”

    Around 3500 km to the north, a week into the Chinese ships’ voyage, a spy flight by an RAAF P-8A Poseidon surveillance plane on February 11, in a disputed area of the South China Sea south of China’s Hainan Island, was warned off by a Chinese J-16 fighter jet.

    The Chinese Foreign Ministry responded to Australian protests claiming the Australian aircraft “deliberately intruded” into China’s claimed territorial airspace around the Paracel Islands without China’s permission, thereby “infringing on China’s sovereignty and endangering China’s national security”.

    Australia criticised the Chinese manoeuvre, defending the Australian flight saying it was “exercising the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in international waters and airspace”.

    Two days after the incident, the three Chinese ships on their way to Australian waters were taking different routes in beginning their own “right to freedom of navigation” in international waters off the Australian coast. The three ships formed up their mini flotilla in the Coral Sea as they turned south paralleling the Australian eastern coastline outside of territorial waters, and sometimes within Australia’s 200-nautical-mile (370 km) Exclusive Economic Zone.

    “Defence always monitors foreign military activity in proximity to Australia. This includes the Peoples Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) Task Group.” Admiral Johnston told Senate Estimates.

    “We have been monitoring the movement of the Task Group through its transit through Southeast Asia and we have observed the Task Group as it has come south through that region.”

    The Task Group was made up of a modern stealth guided missile destroyer Zunyi, the frigate Hengyang, and the Weishanhu, a 20,500 tonne supply ship carrying fuel, fresh water, cargo and ammunition. The Hengyang moved eastwards through the Torres Strait, while the Zunyi and Weishanhu passed south near Bougainville and Solomon Islands, meeting in the Coral Sea.

    This map indicates the routes taken by the three Chinese Navy ships on their “right to freedom of navigation” voyage in international waters circumnavigating Australia, with dates of way points indicated — from 3 February till 6 March 2025. Distances and locations are approximate. Image: Weibo/Declassified Australia

    As the Chinese ships moved near northern Australia and through the Coral Sea heading further south, the Defence Department deployed Navy and Air Force assets to watch over the ships. These included various RAN warships including the frigate HMAS Arunta and a RAAF P-8A Poseidon intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance plane.

    With unconfirmed reports a Chinese nuclear submarine may also be accompanying the surface ships, the monitoring may have also included one of the RAN’s Collins-class submarines, with their active range of sonar, radar and radio monitoring – however it is uncertain whether one was able to be made available from the fleet.

    “From the point of time the first of the vessels entered into our more immediate region, we have been conducting active surveillance of their activities,” the Defence chief confirmed.

    As the Chinese ships moved into the southern Tasman Sea, New Zealand navy ships joined in the monitoring alongside Australia’s Navy and Air Force.

    The range of signals intelligence (SIGINT) that theoretically can be intercepted emanating from a naval ship at sea includes encrypted data and voice satellite communications, ship-to-ship communications, aerial drone data and communications, as well as data of radar, gunnery, and weapon launches.

    There are a number of surveillance facilities in Australia that would have been able to be directed at the Chinese ships.

    Australian Signals Directorate’s (ASD) Shoal Bay Receiving Station outside of Darwin, picks up transmissions and data emanating from radio signals and satellite communications from Australia’s near north region. ASD’s Cocos Islands receiving station in the mid-Indian ocean would have been available too.

    The Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) over-the-horizon radar network, spread across northern Australia, is an early warning system that monitors aircraft and ship movements across Australia’s north-western, northern, and north-eastern ocean areas — but its range off the eastern coast is not thought to presently reach further south than the sea off Mackay on the Queensland coast.

    Of land-based surveillance facilities, it is the American Pine Gap base that is believed to have the best capability of intercepting the ship’s radio communications in the Tasman Sea.

    Enter, Pine Gap and the Americans
     The US satellite surveillance base at Pine Gap in Central Australia is a US and Australian jointly-run satellite ground station. It is regarded as the most important such American satellite base outside of the USA.

    The spy base – Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap (JDFPG) – showing the north-eastern corner of the huge base with some 18 of the base’s now 45 satellite dishes and covered radomes visible. Image: Felicity Ruby/Declassified Australia

    The role of ASD in supporting the extensive US surveillance mission against China is increasingly valued by Australia’s large Five Eyes alliance partner.

    A Top Secret ‘Information Paper’, titled “NSA Intelligence Relationship with Australia”, leaked from the National Security Agency (NSA) by Edward Snowden and published by ABC’s Background Briefing, spells out the “close collaboration” between the NSA and ASD, in particular on China:

    “Increased emphasis on China will not only help ensure the security of Australia, but also synergize with the U.S. in its renewed emphasis on Asia and the Pacific . . .   Australia’s overall intelligence effort on China, as a target, is already significant and will increase.”

    The Pine Gap base, as further revealed in 2023 by Declassified Australia, is being used to collect signals intelligence and other data from the Israeli battlefield of Gaza, and also Ukraine and other global hotspots within view of the US spy satellites.

    It’s recently had a significant expansion (reported by this author in The Saturday Paper) which has seen its total of satellite dishes and radomes rapidly increase in just a few years from 35 to 45 to accommodate new heightened-capability surveillance satellites.

    Pine Gap base collects an enormous range and quantity of intelligence and data from thermal imaging satellites, photographic reconnaissance satellites, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites, as expert researchers Des Ball, Bill Robinson and Richard Tanter of the Nautilus Institute have detailed.

    These SIGINT satellites intercept electronic communications and signals from ground-based sources, such as radio communications, telemetry, radar signals, satellite communications, microwave emissions, mobile phone signals, and geolocation data.

    Alliance priorities
     The US’s SIGINT satellites have a capability to detect and receive signals from VHF radio transmissions on or near the earth’s surface, but they need to be tasked to do so and appropriately targeted on the source of the transmission.

    For the Pine Gap base to intercept VHF radio signals from the Chinese Navy ships, the base would have needed to specifically realign one of those SIGINT satellites to provide coverage of the VHF signals in the Tasman Sea at the time of the Chinese ships’ passage. It is not known publicly if they did this, but they certainly have that capability.

    However, it is not only the VHF radio transmission that would have carried information about the live-firing exercise.

    Pine Gap would be able to monitor a range of other SIGINT transmissions from the Chinese ships. Details of the planning and preparations for the live-firing exercise would almost certainly have been transmitted over data and voice satellite communications, ship-to-ship communications, and even in the data of radar and gunnery operations.

    But it is here that there is another possibility for the failure.

    The Pine Gap base was built and exists to serve the national interests of the United States. The tasking of the surveillance satellites in range of Pine Gap base is generally not set by Australia, but is directed by United States’ agencies, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) together with the US Defense Department, the National Security Agency (NSA), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

    Australia has learnt over time that US priorities may not be the same as Australia’s.

    Australian defence and intelligence services can request surveillance tasks to be added to the schedule, and would have been expected to have done so in order to target the southern leg of the Chinese Navy ships’ voyage, when the ships were out of the range of the JORN network.

    The military demands for satellite time can be excessive in times of heightened global conflict, as is the case now.

    Whether the Pine Gap base was devoting sufficient surveillance resources to monitoring the Chinese Navy ships, due to United States’ priorities in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Africa, North Korea, and to our north in the South China Sea, is a relevant question.

    It can only be answered now by a formal government inquiry into what went on — preferably held in public by a parliamentary committee or separately commissioned inquiry. The sovereign defence of Australia failed in this incident and lessons need to be learned.

    Who knew and when did they know
     If the Pine Gap base had been monitoring the VHF radio band and heard the Chinese Navy live-fire alert, or had been monitoring other SIGINT transmissions to discover the live-fire drill, the normal procedure would be for the active surveillance team to inform a number of levels of senior officers, a former Defence official familiar with the process told Declassified Australia.

    Inside an operations room at the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) head office at the Defence complex at Russell Hill in Canberra. Image: ADF/Declassified Australia

    Expected to be included in the information chain are the Australian Deputy-Chief of Facility at the US base, NSA liaison staff at the base, the Australian Signals Directorate head office at the Defence complex at Russell Hill in Canberra, the Defence Force’s Headquarters Joint Operations Command, in Bungendore, and the Chief of the Defence Force. From there the Defence Minister’s office would need to have been informed.

    As has been reported in media interviews and in testimony to the Senate Estimates hearings, it has been stated that Defence was not informed of the Chinese ships’ live-firing alert until a full 38 minutes after the drill window had commenced.

    The former Defence official told Declassified Australia it is vital the reason for the failure to detect the live-firing in a timely fashion is ascertained.

    Either the Australian Defence Force and US Pine Gap base were not effectively actively monitoring the Chinese flotilla at this time — and the reasons for that need to be examined — or they were, but the information gathered was somewhere stalled and not passed on to correct channels.

    If the evidence so far tendered by the Defence chief and the Minister is true, and it was not informed of the drill by any of its intelligence or surveillance assets before that phone call from Airservices Australia, the implications need to be seriously addressed.

    A final word
     In just a couple of weeks the whole Defence environment for Australia has changed, for the worse.

    The US military announces a drawdown in Europe and a new pivot to the Indo-Pacific. China shows Australia it can do tit-for-tat “navigational freedom” voyages close to the Australian coast. US intelligence support is withdrawn from Ukraine during the war. Australia discovers the AUKUS submarines’ arrival looks even more remote. The prime minister confuses the limited cover provided by the ANZUS treaty.

    Meanwhile, the US militarisation of Australia’s north continues at pace. At the same time a senior Pentagon official pressures Australia to massively increase defence spending. And now, the country’s defence intelligence system has experienced an unexplained major failure.

    Australia, it seems, is adrift in a sea of unpredictable global events and changing alliance priorities.

    Peter Cronau is an award-winning, investigative journalist, writer, and film-maker. His documentary, The Base: Pine Gap’s Role in US Warfighting, was broadcast on Australian ABC Radio National and featured on ABC News. He produced and directed the documentary film Drawing the Line, revealing details of Australian spying in East Timor, on ABC TV’s premier investigative programme Four Corners. He won the Gold Walkley Award in 2007 for a report he produced on an outbreak of political violence in East Timor. This article was first published by Declassified Australia and is republished here with the author’s permission.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Family Court Judges appointed

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Attorney-General Judith Collins today announced the appointment of two new Family Court Judges.  

    The new Judges will take up their roles in April and May and fill Family Court vacancies at the Auckland and Manukau courts.

    Annette Gray

    Ms Gray completed her law degree at Victoria University before joining Phillips Fox in 1987. She then moved to Buddle Findlay, where she worked in the family and medical areas, before joining specialist family law practice Jan Clark Law in Porirua in 1994.

    Ms Gray spent a year with Volunteer Service Abroad in Solomon Islands in 1999, returning to Wellington in 2000 and setting up practice as a specialist family lawyer. Since 2007 she has been principal of Buchanan Gray.

    She is a District Inspector under the Mental Health Act and is a member of the panel of legal counsel for Hague Convention cases.

    Judge Gray will sit in Auckland and will be sworn in on 16 April.

    Annette Page

    Ms Page was admitted to the bar in 1997 and commenced her legal career as a junior barrister working with Marie Dyhrberg KC before joining Smith and Partners in Waitākere, practising a broad range of litigation work in the District and High courts. 

    She has been a barrister sole since 2010, practising in all areas of family law.  

    Ms Page has held several roles within the New Zealand Law Society and is presently the Waitākere regional representative of the Family Law Section.

    Judge Page will sit in Manukau and will be sworn in on 1 May.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

  • MIL-OSI: Qifu Technology Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Unaudited Financial Results and Raises Semi-Annual Dividend

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SHANGHAI, China, March 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Qifu Technology, Inc. (NASDAQ: QFIN; HKEx: 3660) (“Qifu Technology” or the “Company”), a leading AI-empowered Credit-Tech platform in China, today announced its unaudited financial results for the fourth quarter and full year ended December 31, 2024 and raised semi-annual dividend.

    Fourth Quarter 2024 Business Highlights

    • As of December 31, 2024, our platform has connected 162 financial institutional partners and 261.2 million consumers*1 with potential credit needs, cumulatively, an increase of 11.0% from 235.4 million a year ago.
    • Cumulative users with approved credit lines*2 were 56.9 million as of December 31, 2024, an increase of 11.8% from 50.9 million as of December 31, 2023.
    • Cumulative borrowers with successful drawdown, including repeat borrowers was 34.4 million as of December 31, 2024, an increase of 13.1% from 30.4 million as of December 31, 2023.
    • In the fourth quarter of 2024, financial institutional partners originated 24,814,923 loans*3 through our platform.
    • Total facilitation and origination loan volume*4 reached RMB89,885 million, an increase of 0.4% from RMB89,561 million in the same period of 2023 and an increase of 9.0% from RMB82,436 million in the prior quarter. RMB47,796 million of such loan volume was under capital-light model, Intelligence Credit Engine (“ICE”) and total technology solutions*5, representing 53.2% of the total, an increase of 23.2% from RMB38,798 million in the same period of 2023 and an increase of 5.3% from RMB45,396 million in the prior quarter.
    • Total outstanding loan balance*6 was RMB137,014 million as of December 31, 2024, a decrease of 5.7% from RMB145,270 million as of December 31, 2023 and an increase of 7.3% from RMB127,727 million as of September 30, 2024. RMB79,599 million of such loan balance was under capital-light model, “ICE” and total technology solutions, an increase of 8.6% from RMB73,268 million as of December 31, 2023 and an increase of 7.5% from RMB74,078 million as of September 30, 2024.
    • The weighted average contractual tenor of loans originated by financial institutions across our platform in the fourth quarter of 2024 was approximately 10.00 months, compared with 11.47 months in the same period of 2023.
    • 90 day+ delinquency rate*7 of loans originated by financial institutions across our platform was 2.09% as of December 31, 2024.
    • Repeat borrower contribution*8 of loans originated by financial institutions across our platform for the fourth quarter of 2024 was 93.9%.

    1 Refers to cumulative registered users across our platform.
    2 “Cumulative users with approved credit lines” refers to the total number of users who had submitted their credit applications and were approved with a credit line at the end of each period.
    3 Including 2,799,208 loans across “V-pocket”, and 22,015,715 loans across other products.
    4 Refers to the total principal amount of loans facilitated and originated during the given period. Retrospectively excluding the impact of discontinued service, which did not have and is not expected to have a material impact on our overall business, financial condition, and results of operations.
    5 “ICE” is an open platform primarily on our “Qifu Jietiao” APP (previously known as “360 Jietiao”), we match borrowers and financial institutions through big data and cloud computing technology on “ICE”, and provide pre-loan investigation report of borrowers. For loans facilitated through “ICE”, the Company does not bear principal risk.
    Under total technology solutions, we have been offering end-to-end technology solutions to financial institutions based on on-premise deployment, SaaS or hybrid model since 2023.
    6 “Total outstanding loan balance” refers to the total amount of principal outstanding for loans facilitated and originated at the end of each period, excluding loans delinquent for more than 180 days. Retrospectively excluding the impact of discontinued service, which did not have and is not expected to have a material impact on our overall business, financial condition, and results of operations.
    7 “90 day+ delinquency rate” refers to the outstanding principal balance of on- and off-balance sheet loans that were 91 to 180 calendar days past due as a percentage of the total outstanding principal balance of on- and off-balance sheet loans across our platform as of a specific date. Loans that are charged-off and loans under “ICE” and total technology solutions are not included in the delinquency rate calculation.
    8 “Repeat borrower contribution” for a given period refers to (i) the principal amount of loans borrowed during that period by borrowers who had historically made at least one successful drawdown, divided by (ii) the total loan facilitation and origination volume through our platform during that period.

    Fourth Quarter 2024 Financial Highlights

    • Total net revenue was RMB4,482.3 million (US$614.1 million), compared to RMB4,370.2 million in the prior quarter.
    • Net income was RMB1,912.7 million (US$262.0 million), compared to RMB1,798.8 million in the prior quarter.
    • Non-GAAP*9 net income was RMB1,972.4 million (US$270.2 million), compared to RMB1,825.1 million in the prior quarter.
    • Net income per fully diluted American depositary share (“ADS”) was RMB13.24 (US$1.82), compared to RMB12.18 in the prior quarter.
    • Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS was RMB13.66 (US$1.87), compared to RMB12.35 in the prior quarter.

    9 Non-GAAP income from operations, Non-GAAP net income, Non-GAAP operating margin, Non-GAAP net income margin and Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS are Non-GAAP financial measures. For more information on these Non-GAAP financial measures, please see the section of “Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures Statement” and the table captioned “Unaudited Reconciliations of GAAP and Non-GAAP Results” set forth at the end of this press release.

    Full Year 2024 Operational Highlights

    • Total loan facilitation and origination volume*4 in 2024 was RMB321,969 million, representing a decrease of 12.8% from RMB369,132 million in 2023. Loan facilitation volume*4 under Platform Services was RMB170,589 million, an increase of 3.8% from RMB164,321 million in 2023.
    • The weighted average contractual tenor of loans facilitated and originated was 10.05 months in full year 2024, compared with 11.21 months in 2023.
    • Repeat borrower contribution was 93.1% in full year 2024, compared with 91.6% in 2023.

    Full Year 2024 Financial Highlights

    • Total net revenue was RMB17,165.7 million (US$2,351.7 million), compared to RMB16,290.0 million in 2023.
    • Net income was RMB6,248.1 million (US$856.0 million), compared to RMB4,268.6 million in 2023.
    • Non-GAAP net income was RMB6,415.7 million (US$879.0 million), compared to RMB4,454.2 million in 2023.
    • Net income per fully diluted ADS was RMB41.28 (US$5.66), compared to RMB26.08 in 2023.
    • Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS was RMB42.39 (US$5.81), compared to RMB27.22 in 2023.

    Mr. Haisheng Wu, Chief Executive Officer and Director of Qifu Technology, commented, “Although 2024 was a challenging year as macro-economic headwinds persisted, we have made timely adjustments to our operations throughout the year and focused our effort on improving the quality and sustainability of our business. With consistent execution, we closed the year with strong operational and financial results. Throughout 2024, we proactively expanded the scope of our platform services, which makes our business model more resilient and forms a solid foundation for high quality growth in 2025.

    Approximately 58% of the year-end loan balance was under the capital-light model, ICE and total technology solutions. The strong contribution from non-credit risk bearing services helped us mitigate some risks in a challenging environment and demonstrated the efficiency of our platform services. In 2024, we further diversified our user acquisition channels and in the fourth quarter, approximately 47% of our new credit line users were acquired through embedded finance channels. Meanwhile, we continued to solidify our relationships with financial institution partners. With record-setting ABS issuance, we further optimized our funding structure.

    While we started to see some tentative signs of improvement in user activities late in 2024, we will continue to take a prudent approach in our business planning in 2025. We will remain focused on quality growth and further empower our partners and users through our open platform. With the increasing maturity and efficiency of large language models, we expect to allocate more resources to the application of AI across the credit scenarios in the future. We believe such efforts will enable us to better navigate through the current environment and position us well to capture long-term opportunities through innovative technologies, enhanced products and collaborative models.”

    “We are pleased to report another quarter of solid financial results and close the year on a strong note in a still uncertain macro environment. For 2024, total revenue was RMB17.17 billion and Non-GAAP net income was RMB6.42 billion,” Mr. Alex Xu, Chief Financial Officer, commented. “Meanwhile, we generated a record-breaking RMB9.34 billion cash from operations in 2024. Our strong financial positions not only allow us to consistently execute our strategy and support business initiatives, but also enable us to further enhance returns to our shareholders by actively executing 2025 share repurchase plan and significantly raising semi-annual dividends.”

    Mr. Yan Zheng, Chief Risk Officer, added, “Despite facing macro uncertainties, we significantly reduced our overall portfolio risks through 2024 by decisively tightening risk standards early in the year. Overall risk performance reached the best level for the year in the fourth quarter. Among key leading indicators, Day-1 delinquency rate*10 was 4.8% in the fourth quarter, and 30-day collection rate*11 was 88.1%. We feel comfortable with current risk levels and expect to see relatively stable risk performance in the coming quarters as we seek growth opportunities in a changing environment in 2025.”

    10 “Day-1 delinquency rate” is defined as (i) the total amount of principal that became overdue as of a specified date, divided by (ii) the total amount of principal that was due for repayment as of such specified date.
    11 “30-day collection rate” is defined as (i) the amount of principal that was repaid in one month among the total amount of principal that became overdue as of a specified date, divided by (ii) the total amount of principal that became overdue as of such specified date.

    Fourth Quarter 2024 Financial Results

    Total net revenue was RMB4,482.3 million (US$614.1 million), compared to RMB4,495.5 million in the same period of 2023, and RMB4,370.2 million in the prior quarter.

    Net revenue from Credit Driven Services was RMB2,889.5 million (US$395.9 million), compared to RMB3,248.3 million in the same period of 2023, and RMB2,901.0 million in the prior quarter.

    Loan facilitation and servicing fees-capital heavy were RMB363.0 million (US$49.7 million), compared to RMB481.2 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB258.7 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential changes were primarily due to the changes in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume.

    Financing income*12 was RMB1,667.3 million (US$228.4 million), compared to RMB1,485.4 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB1,744.1 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year increase was primarily due to the growth in average outstanding balance of the on-balance-sheet loans.

    Revenue from releasing of guarantee liabilities was RMB761.8 million (US$104.4 million), compared to RMB1,211.8 million in the same period of 2023, and RMB794.6 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to the decrease in average outstanding balance of off-balance-sheet capital-heavy loans during the period.

    Other services fees were RMB97.4 million (US$13.3 million), compared to RMB69.8 million in the same period of 2023, and RMB103.7 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year increase reflected the increase in late payment fees under the credit driven services due to improvement in collection rates of late paid loans.

    Net revenue from Platform Services was RMB1,592.8 million (US$218.2 million), compared to RMB1,247.2 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB1,469.1 million in the prior quarter.

    Loan facilitation and servicing fees-capital light were RMB515.1 million (US$70.6 million), compared to RMB697.0 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB574.6 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential decreases were primarily due to the decreases in capital-light loan facilitation volume.

    Referral services fees were RMB907.2 million (US$124.3 million), compared to RMB446.5 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB763.1 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential increases were mainly due to the increases in loan facilitation volume through ICE.

    Other services fees were RMB170.5 million (US$23.4 million), compared to RMB103.8 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB131.4 million in the prior quarter.

    Total operating costs and expenses were RMB2,591.9 million (US$355.1 million), compared to RMB3,215.9 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB2,081.0 million in the prior quarter.

    Facilitation, origination and servicing expenses were RMB734.7 million (US$100.6 million), compared to RMB731.8 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB707.9 million in the prior quarter.

    Funding costs were RMB126.8 million (US$17.4 million), compared to RMB161.0 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB146.8 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to the lower average costs of ABS and trusts. The sequential decrease was mainly due to the decline in funding from ABS and trusts and lower average costs.

    Sales and marketing expenses were RMB523.9 million (US$71.8 million), compared to RMB551.6 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB419.9 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year decrease was primarily due to improved efficiency in acquiring new customers. The sequential increase was primarily due to a more proactive customer acquisition effort and seasonal factors.

    General and administrative expenses were RMB156.1 million (US$21.4 million), compared to RMB108.0 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB92.0 million in the prior quarter.

    Provision for loans receivable was RMB598.4 million (US$82.0 million), compared to RMB639.9 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB477.5 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential changes reflected the Company’s consistent approach in assessing provisions commensurate with its underlying loan profile and changes in loan origination volume of on-balance-sheet loans.

    Provision for financial assets receivable was RMB63.3 million (US$8.7 million), compared to RMB148.2 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB64.4 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to the decline in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume and reflected the Company’s consistent approach in assessing provisions commensurate with its underlying loan profile. The sequential decrease was mainly due to reversal of prior quarters’ provision in the quarter, offsetting by the increase in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume.

    Provision for accounts receivable and contract assets was RMB77.5 million (US$10.6 million), compared to RMB91.1 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB108.8 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential decreases reflected the Company’s consistent approach in assessing provisions commensurate with its underlying loan profile.

    Provision for contingent liability was RMB311.4 million (US$42.7 million), compared to RMB784.3 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB63.6 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential changes reflected the Company’s consistent approach in assessing provisions commensurate with its underlying loan profile as well as the changes in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume.

    Income from operations was RMB1,890.3 million (US$259.0 million), compared to RMB1,279.6 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB2,289.2 million in the prior quarter.

    Non-GAAP income from operations was RMB1,950.0 million (US$267.2 million), compared to RMB1,322.1 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB2,315.5 million in the prior quarter.

    Operating margin was 42.2%. Non-GAAP operating margin was 43.5%.

    Income before income tax expense was RMB1,932.7 million (US$264.8 million), compared to RMB1,330.9 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB2,356.9 million in the prior quarter.

    Income taxes expense was RMB20.0 million (US$2.7 million), compared to RMB 223.2 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB558.1 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential changes were mainly due the writeback of withholding taxes related to the Company’s dividend and share repurchase plans, as the Company became eligible to a lower tax rate in the fourth quarter.

    Net income was RMB1,912.7 million (US$262.0 million), compared to RMB1,107.7 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB1,798.8 million in the prior quarter.

    Non-GAAP net income was RMB1,972.4 million (US$270.2 million), compared to RMB1,150.3 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB1,825.1 million in the prior quarter.

    Net income margin was 42.7%. Non-GAAP net income margin was 44.0%.

    Net income attributed to the Company was RMB1,916.6 million (US$262.6 million), compared to RMB1,111.7 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB1,802.9 million in the prior quarter.

    Non-GAAP net income attributed to the Company was RMB1,976.4 million (US$270.8 million), compared to RMB1,154.3 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB1,829.2 million in the prior quarter.

    Net income per fully diluted ADS was RMB13.24 (US$1.82).

    Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS was RMB13.66 (US$1.87).

    Weighted average basic ADS used in calculating GAAP net income per ADS was 142.94 million.

    Weighted average diluted ADS used in calculating GAAP and non-GAAP net income per ADS was 144.71 million.

    12 “Financing income” is generated from loans facilitated through the Company’s platform funded by the consolidated trusts and Fuzhou Microcredit, which charge fees and interests from borrowers.

    Full Year 2024 Financial Results

    Total net revenue was RMB17,165.7 million (US$2,351.7 million), compared to RMB16,290.0 million in 2023.

    Net revenue from Credit Driven Services was RMB11,719.0 million (US$1,605.5 million), compared to RMB11,738.6 million in 2023.

    Loan facilitation and servicing fees-capital heavy were RMB1,016.5 million (US$139.3 million), compared to RMB1,667.1 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was primarily due to a decline in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume.

    Financing income was RMB6,636.5 million (US$909.2 million), compared to RMB5,109.9 million in 2023. The year-over-year increase was primarily due to the growth in average outstanding balance of on-balance-sheet loans.

    Revenue from releasing of guarantee liabilities was RMB3,695.0 million (US$506.2 million), compared to RMB4,745.9 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to decrease in average outstanding balance of off-balance-sheet capital-heavy loans during the period.

    Other services fees were RMB371.0 million (US$50.8 million), compared to RMB215.6 million in 2023. The year-over-year increase was mainly due to an increase in late payment fees in connection with improvement in collection rate of late paid loans under the credit driven services.

    Net revenue from Platform Services was RMB5,446.6 million (US$746.2 million), compared to RMB4,551.5 million in 2023.

    Loan facilitation and servicing fees-capital light were RMB2,116.8 million (US$290.0 million), compared to RMB3,214.0 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was primarily due to a decline in loan facilitation volume under the capital-light model.

    Referral services fees were RMB2,842.6 million (US$389.4 million), compared to RMB950.0 million in 2023. The year-over-year increase was primarily due to an increase in the loan facilitation volume through ICE.

    Other services fees were RMB487.2 million (US$66.7 million), compared to RMB387.5 million in 2023.

    Total operating costs and expenses were RMB9,637.1 million (US$1,320.3 million), compared to RMB11,433.1 million in 2023.

    Facilitation, origination and servicing expenses were RMB2,900.7 million (US$397.4 million), compared to RMB2,659.9 million in 2023. The year-over-year increase was primarily due to higher collection fees.

    Funding costs were RMB590.9 million (US$81.0 million), compared to RMB645.4 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to the lower average cost of ABS and trusts, partially offset by the growth in funding from ABS and trusts.

    Sales and marketing expenses were RMB1,725.9 million (US$236.4 million), compared to RMB1,939.9 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to our prudent customer acquisition approach and lower unit customer acquisition cost.

    General and administrative expenses were RMB449.5 million (US$61.6 million), compared to RMB421.1 million in 2023.

    Provision for loans receivable was RMB2,773.3 million (US$379.9 million), compared to RMB2,151.0 million in 2023. The year-over-year increase was mainly due to the growth in loan origination volume of on-balance-sheet loans.

    Provision for financial assets receivable was RMB296.9 million (US$40.7 million), compared to RMB386.1 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to a decline in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume.

    Provision for accounts receivable and contract assets was RMB421.5 million (US$57.7 million), compared to RMB175.8 million in 2023. The year-over-year increase reflected the Company’s consistent approach in assessing provisions commensurate with its underlying loan profile.

    Provision for contingent liability was RMB478.4 million (US$65.5 million), compared to RMB3,053.8 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to a decline in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume and the reversal of prior provision as loans facilitated in previous period performed better than expected.

    Income from operations was RMB7,528.6 million (US$1,031.4 million), compared to RMB4,857.0 million in 2023.

    Non-GAAP income from operations was RMB7,696.2 million (US$1,054.4 million), compared to RMB5,042.6 million in 2023.

    Operating margin was 43.9%. Non-GAAP operating margin was 44.8%.

    Income before income tax expense was RMB7,892.4 million (US$1,081.3 million), compared to RMB5,277.5 million in 2023.

    Income taxes expense was RMB1,644.3 million (US$225.3 million). Effective tax rate was 20.4%, compared to 18.5% in 2023. The increase in effective tax rate was mainly due to withholding taxes related to the Company’s dividend and share repurchase plan.

    Net income attributed to the Company was RMB6,264.3 million (US$858.2 million), compared to RMB4,285.3 million in 2023.

    Non-GAAP net income attributed to the Company was RMB6,431.9 million (US$881.2 million), compared to RMB4,470.9 million in 2023.

    Net income margin was 36.4%. Non-GAAP net income margin was 37.4%.

    Net income per fully diluted ADS was RMB41.28 (US$5.66).

    Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS was RMB42.39 (US$5.81).

    Weighted average basic ADS used in calculating GAAP net income per ADS was 149.01 million.

    Weighted average diluted ADS used in calculating GAAP and non-GAAP net income per ADS was 151.72 million.

    30 Day+ Delinquency Rate by Vintage and 180 Day+ Delinquency Rate by Vintage

    The following charts and tables display the historical cumulative 30 day+ delinquency rates by loan facilitation and origination vintage and 180 day+ delinquency rates by loan facilitation and origination vintage for all loans facilitated and originated through the Company’s platform. Loans under “ICE” and total technology solutions are not included in the 30 day+ charts and the 180 day+ charts:

    http://ml.globenewswire.com/Resource/Download/2a5d124f-5f90-4a71-a264-908b101a7e87

    http://ml.globenewswire.com/Resource/Download/95f56823-ce1f-4ade-baf5-cdc0bcf8526c

    Semi-Annual Dividend for the Second Half of 2024

    The board of directors of the Company (the “Board”) has approved a dividend of US$0.35 per Class A ordinary share, or US$0.70 per ADS for the second half of 2024 to holders of record of Class A ordinary shares and ADSs as of the close of business on April 23, 2025 Hong Kong Time and New York Time, respectively, in accordance with the Company’s dividend policy. For holder of Class A ordinary shares, in order to qualify for the dividend, all valid documents for the transfers of shares accompanied by the relevant share certificates must be lodged for registration with the Company’s Hong Kong branch share registrar, Computershare Hong Kong Investor Services Limited, at Shops 1712-1716, 17th Floor, Hopewell Centre, 183 Queen’s Road East, Hong Kong no later than 4:30 p.m. on April 23, 2025 (Hong Kong Time). The payment date is expected to be on May 28, 2025 for holders of Class A ordinary shares and around June 2, 2025 for holders of ADSs.

    Update on Share Repurchase

    On March 12, 2024, the Board approved a share repurchase plan (the “2024 Share Repurchase Plan”) whereby the Company is authorized to repurchase its ADSs or Class A ordinary shares with an aggregate value of up to US$350 million during the 12-month period from April 1, 2024.

    In the fourth quarter, the Company had in aggregate purchased approximately 3.1 million ADSs in the open market for a total amount of approximately US$107 million (inclusive of commissions) at an average price of US$34.5 per ADS. As of December 30, 2024, the Company had utilized substantially all of the total authorized value for the 2024 Share Repurchase Plan.

    On November 19, 2024, the Board approved a new share repurchase plan (the “2025 Share Repurchase Plan”) whereby the Company is authorized to repurchase up to US$450 million worth of its ADSs or Class A ordinary shares over the next 12 months starting from January 1, 2025.

    As of March 14, 2025, the Company had in aggregate purchased approximately 2.2 million ADSs in the open market for a total amount of approximately US$86 million (inclusive of commissions) at an average price of US$39.7 per ADS pursuant to the 2025 Share Repurchase Plan.

    Business Outlook

    As macro-economic uncertainties persist, the Company intends to maintain a prudent approach in its business planning for 2025. Management will continue to focus on enhancing efficiency of the Company’s operations. As such, for the first quarter of 2025, the Company expects to generate a net income between RMB1.75 billion and RMB1.85 billion and a non-GAAP net income*13 between RMB1.80 billion and RMB1.90 billion, representing a year-on-year growth between 49% and 58%. This outlook reflects the Company’s current and preliminary views, which is subject to material changes.

    13 Non-GAAP net income represents net income excluding share-based compensation expenses.

    Conference Call Preregistration

    Qifu Technology’s management team will host an earnings conference call at 7:30 AM U.S. Eastern Time on Monday, March 17, 2025 (7:30 PM Beijing Time on the same day).

    All participants wishing to join the conference call must pre-register online using the link provided below.

    Registration Link: https://s1.c-conf.com/diamondpass/10045854-hg6t5r.html

    Upon registration, each participant will receive details for the conference call, including dial-in numbers and a unique access PIN. Please dial in 10 minutes before the call is scheduled to begin.

    Additionally, a live and archived webcast of the conference call will be available on the Investor Relations section of the Company’s website at https://ir.qifu.tech.

    About Qifu Technology

    Qifu Technology is a leading AI-empowered Credit-Tech platform in China. By leveraging its sophisticated machine learning models and data analytics capabilities, the Company provides a comprehensive suite of technology services to assist financial institutions and consumers and SMEs in the loan lifecycle, ranging from borrower acquisition, preliminary credit assessment, fund matching and post-facilitation services. The Company is dedicated to making credit services more accessible and personalized to consumers and SMEs through Credit-Tech services to financial institutions.

    For more information, please visit: https://ir.qifu.tech.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures Statement

    To supplement our financial results presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP, we use Non-GAAP financial measure, which is adjusted from results based on U.S. GAAP to exclude share-based compensation expenses. Reconciliations of our Non-GAAP financial measures to our U.S. GAAP financial measures are set forth in tables at the end of this earnings release, which provide more details on the Non-GAAP financial measures.

    We use Non-GAAP income from operation, Non-GAAP operating margin, Non-GAAP net income, Non-GAAP net income margin, Non-GAAP net income attributed to the Company and Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS in evaluating our operating results and for financial and operational decision-making purposes. Non-GAAP income from operation represents income from operation excluding share-based compensation expenses. Non-GAAP operating margin is equal to Non-GAAP income from operation divided by total net revenue. Non-GAAP net income represents net income excluding share-based compensation expenses. Non-GAAP net income margin is equal to Non-GAAP net income divided by total net revenue. Non-GAAP net income attributed to the Company represents net income attributed to the Company excluding share-based compensation expenses. Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS represents net income excluding share-based compensation expenses per fully diluted ADS. Such adjustments have no impact on income tax. We believe that Non-GAAP income from operation, Non-GAAP operating margin, Non-GAAP net income, Non-GAAP net income margin, Non-GAAP net income attributed to the Company and Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS help identify underlying trends in our business that could otherwise be distorted by the effect of certain expenses that we include in results based on U.S. GAAP. We believe that Non-GAAP income from operation and Non-GAAP net income provide useful information about our operating results, enhance the overall understanding of our past performance and future prospects and allow for greater visibility with respect to key metrics used by our management in its financial and operational decision-making. Our Non-GAAP financial information should be considered in addition to results prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP, but should not be considered a substitute for or superior to U.S. GAAP results. In addition, our calculation of Non-GAAP financial information may be different from the calculation used by other companies, and therefore comparability may be limited.

    Exchange Rate Information

    This announcement contains translations of certain RMB amounts into U.S. dollars at specified rates solely for the convenience of the reader. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from RMB to U.S. dollars are made at a rate of RMB 7.2993 to US$1.00, the exchange rate set forth in the H.10 statistical release of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as of December 31, 2024.

    Safe Harbor Statement

    Any forward-looking statements contained in this announcement are made under the “safe harbor” provisions of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements can be identified by terminology such as “will,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “future,” “intends,” “plans,” “believes,” “estimates” and similar statements. Among other things, the business outlook and quotations from management in this announcement, as well as the Company’s strategic and operational plans, contain forward-looking statements. Qifu Technology may also make written or oral forward-looking statements in its periodic reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), in announcements made on the website of The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the “Hong Kong Stock Exchange”), in its annual report to shareholders, in press releases and other written materials and in oral statements made by its officers, directors or employees to third parties. Statements that are not historical facts, including the Company’s business outlook, beliefs and expectations, are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements involve inherent risks and uncertainties. A number of factors could cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in any forward-looking statement, which factors include but not limited to the following: the Company’s growth strategies, the Company’s cooperation with 360 Group, changes in laws, rules and regulatory environments, the recognition of the Company’s brand, market acceptance of the Company’s products and services, trends and developments in the credit-tech industry, governmental policies relating to the credit-tech industry, general economic conditions in China and around the globe, and assumptions underlying or related to any of the foregoing. Further information regarding these and other risks and uncertainties is included in Qifu Technology’s filings with the SEC and announcements on the website of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. All information provided in this press release is as of the date of this press release, and Qifu Technology does not undertake any obligation to update any forward-looking statement, except as required under applicable law.

    For more information, please contact:

    Qifu Technology
    E-mail: ir@360shuke.com

    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (Amounts in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and U.S. dollars (“USD”)
    except for number of shares and per share data, or otherwise noted)
           
      December 31, December 31, December 31,
      2023 2024 2024
      RMB RMB USD
    ASSETS      
    Current assets:      
    Cash and cash equivalents 4,177,890 4,452,416 609,978
    Restricted cash 3,381,107 2,353,384 322,412
    Short term investments 15,000 3,394,073 464,987
    Security deposit prepaid to third-party guarantee companies 207,071 162,617 22,278
    Funds receivable from third party payment service providers 1,603,419 462,112 63,309
    Accounts receivable and contract assets, net 2,909,245 2,214,530 303,389
    Financial assets receivable, net 2,522,543 1,553,912 212,885
    Amounts due from related parties 45,346 8,510 1,166
    Loans receivable, net 24,604,487 26,714,428 3,659,862
    Prepaid expenses and other assets 329,920 1,464,586 200,647
    Total current assets 39,796,028 42,780,568 5,860,913
    Non-current assets:      
    Accounts receivable and contract assets, net-noncurrent 146,995 27,132 3,717
    Financial assets receivable, net-noncurrent 596,330 170,779 23,397
    Amounts due from related parties 4,240 51 7
    Loans receivable, net-noncurrent 2,898,005 2,537,749 347,670
    Property and equipment, net 231,221 362,774 49,700
    Land use rights,net 977,461 956,738 131,073
    Intangible assets 13,443 11,818 1,619
    Goodwill 41,210 42,414 5,811
    Deferred tax assets 1,067,738 1,206,325 165,266
    Other non-current assets 45,901 36,270 4,969
    Total non-current assets 6,022,544 5,352,050 733,229
    TOTAL ASSETS 45,818,572 48,132,618 6,594,142
           
    LIABILITIES AND EQUITY      
    Current liabilities:      
    Payable to investors of the consolidated trusts-current 8,942,291 8,188,454 1,121,814
    Accrued expenses and other current liabilities 2,016,039 2,492,921 341,529
    Amounts due to related parties 80,376 67,495 9,247
    Short term loans 798,586 1,369,939 187,681
    Guarantee liabilities-stand ready 3,949,601 2,383,202 326,497
    Guarantee liabilities-contingent 3,207,264 1,820,350 249,387
    Income tax payable 742,210 1,040,687 142,574
    Other tax payable 163,252 109,161 14,955
    Total current liabilities 19,899,619 17,472,209 2,393,684
    Non-current liabilities:      
    Deferred tax liabilities 224,823 439,435 60,202
    Payable to investors of the consolidated trusts-noncurrent 3,581,800 5,719,600 783,582
    Other long-term liabilities 102,473 255,155 34,956
    Total non-current liabilities 3,909,096 6,414,190 878,740
    TOTAL LIABILITIES 23,808,715 23,886,399 3,272,424
    TOTAL QIFU TECHNOLOGY INC EQUITY 21,937,483 24,190,043 3,314,022
    Noncontrolling interests 72,374 56,176 7,696
    TOTAL EQUITY 22,009,857 24,246,219 3,321,718
    TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 45,818,572 48,132,618 6,594,142
           
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (Amounts in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and U.S. dollars (“USD”)
    except for number of shares and per share data, or otherwise noted)
                   
      Three months ended December 31,   Year ended December 31,
      2023 2024 2024   2023 2024 2024
      RMB RMB USD   RMB RMB USD
    Credit driven services 3,248,263   2,889,500   395,860     11,738,560   11,719,027   1,605,500  
    Loan facilitation and servicing fees-capital heavy 481,195   362,958   49,725     1,667,119   1,016,514   139,262  
    Financing income 1,485,446   1,667,340   228,425     5,109,921   6,636,511   909,198  
    Revenue from releasing of guarantee liabilities 1,211,787   761,827   104,370     4,745,898   3,695,017   506,215  
    Other services fees 69,835   97,375   13,340     215,622   370,985   50,825  
    Platform services 1,247,240   1,592,752   218,206     4,551,467   5,446,629   746,185  
    Loan facilitation and servicing fees-capital light 696,985   515,062   70,563     3,213,955   2,116,797   290,000  
    Referral services fees 446,486   907,207   124,287     950,016   2,842,637   389,440  
    Other services fees 103,769   170,483   23,356     387,496   487,195   66,745  
    Total net revenue 4,495,503   4,482,252   614,066     16,290,027   17,165,656   2,351,685  
    Facilitation, origination and servicing 731,787   734,659   100,648     2,659,912   2,900,704   397,395  
    Funding costs 161,016   126,841   17,377     645,445   590,935   80,958  
    Sales and marketing 551,590   523,936   71,779     1,939,885   1,725,877   236,444  
    General and administrative 108,037   156,061   21,380     421,076   449,505   61,582  
    Provision for loans receivable 639,886   598,353   81,974     2,151,046   2,773,323   379,944  
    Provision for financial assets receivable 148,198   63,251   8,665     386,090   296,857   40,669  
    Provision for accounts receivable and contract assets 91,105   77,450   10,611     175,799   421,481   57,743  
    Provision for contingent liabilities 784,323   311,372   42,658     3,053,810   478,404   65,541  
    Total operating costs and expenses 3,215,942   2,591,923   355,092     11,433,063   9,637,086   1,320,276  
    Income from operations 1,279,561   1,890,329   258,974     4,856,964   7,528,570   1,031,409  
    Interest income, net 46,970   74,951   10,268     217,307   237,015   32,471  
    Foreign exchange (loss) gain (815 ) 2,680   367     2,356   1,512   207  
    Other income, net 5,209   (35,251 ) (4,829 )   230,936   125,325   17,169  
    Investment loss –   –   –     (30,112 ) –   –  
    Income before income tax expense 1,330,925   1,932,709   264,780     5,277,451   7,892,422   1,081,256  
    Income taxes expense (223,237 ) (20,042 ) (2,746 )   (1,008,874 ) (1,644,306 ) (225,269 )
    Net income 1,107,688   1,912,667   262,034     4,268,577   6,248,116   855,987  
    Net loss attributable to noncontrolling interests 4,052   3,970   544     16,759   16,198   2,219  
    Net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of the Company 1,111,740   1,916,637   262,578     4,285,336   6,264,314   858,206  
    Net income per ordinary share attributable to ordinary shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc.
    Basic 3.51   6.70   0.92     13.36   21.02   2.88  
    Diluted 3.44   6.62   0.91     13.04   20.64   2.83  
                   
    Net income per ADS attributable to ordinary shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc.
    Basic 7.02   13.40   1.84     26.72   42.04   5.76  
    Diluted 6.88   13.24   1.82     26.08   41.28   5.66  
                   
    Weighted average shares used in calculating net income per ordinary share
    Basic 316,325,750   285,872,913   285,872,913     320,749,805   298,012,150   298,012,150  
    Diluted 323,305,948   289,427,077   289,427,077     328,508,945   303,449,864   303,449,864  
                   
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (Amounts in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and U.S. dollars (“USD”)
    except for number of shares and per share data, or otherwise noted)
                   
      Three months ended December 31,   Year ended December 31,
      2023 2024 2024   2023 2024 2024
      RMB RMB USD   RMB RMB USD
    Net cash provided by operating activities 2,351,791   3,051,606   418,067     7,118,350   9,343,311   1,280,027  
    Net cash used in investing activities (1,885,694 ) (945,611 ) (129,548 )   (11,147,789 ) (7,994,081 ) (1,095,184 )
    Net cash (used in) provided by financing activities (911,621 ) (1,873,516 ) (256,671 )   1,066,458   (2,114,463 ) (289,680 )
    Effect of foreign exchange rate changes (877 ) 31,464   4,311     9,615   12,036   1,649  
    Net (decrease) increase in cash and cash equivalents (446,401 ) 263,943   36,159     (2,953,366 ) (753,197 ) (103,188 )
    Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash, beginning of period 8,005,398   6,541,857   896,231     10,512,363   7,558,997   1,035,578  
    Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash, end of period 7,558,997   6,805,800   932,390     7,558,997   6,805,800   932,390  
                   
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive (Loss)/Income
    (Amounts in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and U.S. dollars (“USD”)
    except for number of shares and per share data, or otherwise noted)
           
      Three months ended December 31,
      2023 2024 2024
      RMB RMB USD
    Net income 1,107,688   1,912,667 262,034
    Other comprehensive income, net of tax of nil:      
    Foreign currency translation adjustment (3,606 ) 145,610 19,948
    Other comprehensive (loss) income (3,606 ) 145,610 19,948
    Total comprehensive income 1,104,082   2,058,277 281,982
    Comprehensive loss attributable to noncontrolling interests 4,052   3,970 544
    Comprehensive income attributable to ordinary shareholders 1,108,134   2,062,247 282,526
           
           
      Year ended December 31,
      2023 2024 2024
      RMB RMB USD
    Net income 4,268,577   6,248,116 855,987
    Other comprehensive income, net of tax of nil:      
    Foreign currency translation adjustment 17,118   46,534 6,375
    Other comprehensive income 17,118   46,534 6,375
    Total comprehensive income 4,285,695   6,294,650 862,362
    Comprehensive loss attributable to noncontrolling interests 16,759   16,198 2,219
    Comprehensive income attributable to ordinary shareholders 4,302,454   6,310,848 864,581
    Unaudited Reconciliations of GAAP and Non-GAAP Results
    (Amounts in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and U.S. dollars (“USD”)
    except for number of shares and per share data, or otherwise noted)
           
      Three months ended December 31,
      2023 2024 2024
      RMB RMB USD
    Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Net Income to Net Income      
    Net income 1,107,688   1,912,667   262,034
    Add: Share-based compensation expenses 42,572   59,720   8,182
    Non-GAAP net income 1,150,260   1,972,387   270,216
    GAAP net income margin 24.6 % 42.7 %  
    Non-GAAP net income margin 25.6 % 44.0 %  
           
    Net income attributable to shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. 1,111,740   1,916,637   262,578
    Add: Share-based compensation expenses 42,572   59,720   8,182
    Non-GAAP net income attributable to shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. 1,154,312   1,976,357   270,760
    Weighted average ADS used in calculating net income per ordinary share for both GAAP and non-GAAP EPS -diluted 161,652,974   144,713,538   144,713,538
    Net income per ADS attributable to ordinary shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. -diluted 6.88   13.24   1.82
    Non-GAAP net income per ADS attributable to ordinary shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. -diluted 7.14   13.66   1.87
           
    Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Income from operations to Income from operations      
    Income from operations 1,279,561   1,890,329   258,974
    Add: Share-based compensation expenses 42,572   59,720   8,182
    Non-GAAP Income from operations 1,322,133   1,950,049   267,156
    GAAP operating margin 28.5 % 42.2 %  
    Non-GAAP operating margin 29.4 % 43.5 %  
           
           
      Year ended December 31,
      2023 2024 2024
      RMB RMB USD
    Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Net Income to Net Income      
    Net income 4,268,577   6,248,116   855,987
    Add: Share-based compensation expenses 185,604   167,613   22,963
    Non-GAAP net income 4,454,181   6,415,729   878,950
    GAAP net income margin 26.2 % 36.4 %  
    Non-GAAP net income margin 27.3 % 37.4 %  
           
    Net income attributable to shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. 4,285,336   6,264,314   858,206
    Add: Share-based compensation expenses 185,604   167,613   22,963
    Non-GAAP net income attributable to shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. 4,470,940   6,431,927   881,169
    Weighted average ADS used in calculating net income per ordinary share for both GAAP and non-GAAP EPS -diluted 164,254,473   151,724,932   151,724,932
    Net income per ADS attributable to ordinary shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. -diluted 26.08   41.28   5.66
    Non-GAAP net income per ADS attributable to ordinary shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. -diluted 27.22   42.39   5.81
           
    Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Income from operations to Income from operations      
    Income from operations 4,856,964   7,528,570   1,031,409
    Add: Share-based compensation expenses 185,604   167,613   22,963
    Non-GAAP Income from operations 5,042,568   7,696,183   1,054,372
    GAAP operating margin 29.8 % 43.9 %  
    Non-GAAP operating margin 31.0 % 44.8 %  
           

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: No limitations on arena event hours

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    The Environmental Protection Department said today that no restrictions have been imposed with regard to operating hours for events held at the Kai Tak Arena, and emphasised that there are no limitations on activities extending beyond midnight.

     

    In response to media enquiries about noise control, the department said all events held at the arena – including sports events and music performances – are conducted indoors and involve central air conditioning. It explained that the relevant Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report had therefore concluded that noise levels would not exceed limits.

     

    The department added that it had also taken noise measurements near the venue during rehearsal concerts. It said the results showed that noise reduction apparatus installed at the venue is effective and meets the expectations required by the EIA report, with noise levels being in compliance with legal standards.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Deputy President leads working visit to Japan

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Sunday, March 16, 2025

    Deputy President Paul Mashatile will on Sunday undertake a working visit to Tokyo, in Japan.

    The Presidency said the visit, from 16 – 19 March 2025, is aimed at “reaffirming the strong cooperation between” the countries in areas of mutual interest.

    “The two countries enjoy well established diplomatic relations, and the year 2025 marks 115 years of such relations. The working visit by the Deputy President underscores South Africa’s strong commitment and the importance that South Africa attaches to the relationship with Japan.

    “During the working visit, the Deputy President and his delegation will meet with the Japanese Government and private sector stakeholders to advance South Africa’s key economic growth drivers, such as manufactured-led growth and increasing South Africa’s exports,” the Presidency said in a statement on Saturday.

    The Deputy President will be accompanied by Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Tandi Moraka; Minister of Sport, Arts and Culture, Gayton McKenzie, Minister of Higher Education, Dr Nobuhle Nkabane; Minister of Agriculture, John Steenhuisen, Trade Industry and Competition Minister, Parks Tau; and Science, Technology and Innovation Deputy Minister,  Nomalungelo Gina. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s English language order upends America’s long multilingual history

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Mark Turin, Associate professor, Department of Anthropology, University of British Columbia

    Across its nearly 250-year history, the United States has never had an official language. On March 1, U.S. President Donald Trump changed that when he signed an executive order designating English as the country’s sole official language. The order marks a fundamental rupture from the American goverment’s long-standing approach to languages.

    “From the founding of our Republic, English has been used as our national language,” Trump’s order states. “It is in America’s best interest for the federal government to designate one — and only one — official language.”

    This new order also revokes a language-access provision contained in an earlier executive order from 2000 that aimed to improve access to services for people with limited English. Federal agencies now seem to have no obligation to provide vital information in other languages.

    Despite some reactions in the New York Times, Washington Post and elsewhere, it remains unclear whether Trump’s executive order will face legal or political challenges. Amid continual attacks from the Trump administration on established norms, this decree may pass with relatively little resistance, despite a deeper meaning that extends far beyond language.

    Multilingual realities and monolingual fantasies

    The U.S. has a long multilingual history, beginning with the hundreds of Indigenous languages indelibly linked to these lands. The secondary layer are colonial languages and their variants, including French in Louisiana and Spanish in the Southwest. In all historical periods, immigrant languages from around the world have added substantially to the linguistic mix that makes up the U.S.

    Today, New York is one of world’s most linguistically diverse cities, with other U.S. coastal cities not far behind. According to data from the Census Bureau, one-fifth of all Americans can speak two or more languages. The social, economic and cognitive benefits of bilingualism are well-established, and there is no data to support the assertion that speaking more than one language threatens the integrity of the nation state.

    A building in Jackson Heights, Queens, New York City, which hosts speakers of diverse South Asian languages and their associations, April 17, 2017.
    (Ross Perlin)

    English has long functioned as a pragmatic lingua franca for the U.S. Yet an American tendency towards ideological monolingualism is gathering momentum.

    The emergence of Spanish as the nation’s second language, with well over 40 million speakers, has generated a particular anxiety. During the last few decades, more than 30 American states have enshrined English as an official language.

    Linguistic insecurity

    The March 1 executive order is a crowning achievement for the “English-only movement.” Trump has tapped directly into this sentiment and its xenophobic preoccupations, rooted in white fragility and white supremacy.

    In 2015, during his first bid for the Oval Office, Trump reprimanded Jeb Bush, the bilingual former governor of Florida, during a televised debate, stating: “This is a country where we speak English, not Spanish.”

    Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference in February 2024, Trump gave voice to his own linguistic insecurity:

    “We have languages coming into our country. We don’t have one instructor in our entire nation that can speak that language…These are languages — it’s the craziest thing — they have languages that nobody in this country has ever heard of. It’s a very horrible thing.”

    Beyond the brazen untruths and intentional exaggerations, such statements only reflect weakness and fear. The March 1 executive order states that “a nationally designated language is at the core of a unified and cohesive society.”

    It is in fact a sign of strength that Americans have not needed such a mandate until now, effectively navigating their complex multilingual reality without top-down legislation.

    English around the world

    It’s instructive to compare the language policy of the U.S. with other settler colonial contexts where English is dominant.

    In neighbouring Canada, the 1969 Official Languages Act grants equal status to English and French — two languages that were brought European migrants — and requires all federal institutions to provide services in both languages on request. Revealingly, only 50 years later did Canada finally pass an Indigenous Languages Act granting modest recognition to the original languages of the land.

    While Australia’s constitution specifies no official language, the government promotes English as the “national language,” and then offers to translate some web pages into other languages.

    Navigating the distinction between de facto and de jure, New Zealand has taken a more considered approach. Recognizing that English is unthreatened and secure, even without legal backing, New Zealand legislators have focused their attention elsewhere. Te reo Māori was granted official language status in 1987, followed by New Zealand Sign Language in 2006.

    Even the colonial centre and origin point for the global spread of English, the United Kingdom assumes a nuanced position on language policy. Welsh and Irish have both received some official recognition, while in Scotland, the Bòrd na Gàidhlig continues to advocate for official recognition of Gaelic.

    Principle and practice

    Trump’s recent executive order is both practical and symbolic.

    Practically, it remains unclear what the order means for Spanish in Puerto Rico, the Indigenous languages of Hawaii and Alaska — which have received official recognition — for American Sign Language and for all the multilingual communities that make up the nation.

    Language access can be a matter of life or death.

    Interpretation in courts, hospitals and schools is a fundamental human right. No one should be barred from accessing vital services simply because they don’t speak English, whether that’s when dealing with a judge, a doctor or a teacher. The consequences of government agencies abandoning their already limited efforts at translation and interpretation could have huge ramifications.

    Symbolically, Trump’s order is red meat for his MAGA followers. Associating national integrity with the promotion of one language above others might seem to reflect American exceptionalism, but it in fact destroys the cultural and linguistic diversity that makes the U.S. exceptional.

    Ironically, this executive order brings the U.S. into alignment with most of the world’s other nation-states — albeit not the ones that speak English as their first language — which seek to impose the standardized language of an ethnic majority on all of their citizens. The consequences can be both polarizing and homogenizing.

    Most of the world’s people are resolutely multilingual and are only becoming more so. Americans will not stop speaking, writing and signing in languages other than English because of an executive order. The linguistic dynamism of the U.S. is essential to the country’s social fabric. It should be nurtured and defended.

    Mark Turin receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and Tokyo College, the University of Tokyo.

    Ross Perlin has received funding from the National Science Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities.

    – ref. Trump’s English language order upends America’s long multilingual history – https://theconversation.com/trumps-english-language-order-upends-americas-long-multilingual-history-252163

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Donald Trump thinks some accents are ‘beautiful,’ but what makes them so?

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Nicole Rosen, Professor and Canada Research Chair in Language Interactions, University of Manitoba

    United States President Donald Trump has recently been commenting on accents while meeting foreign leaders and taking questions from foreign journalists. Trump praised British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s “beautiful” accent, saying he would have been president 20 years ago if he’d had that accent.

    He didn’t answer an Afghan journalist’s question, saying her accent was “beautiful” but that he didn’t understand it, and he completely dismissed the question of a journalist from India during a joint news conference with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, saying he didn’t understand his accent before abruptly moving on.

    What is a “beautiful” accent, and what makes one hard to understand? There is much evidence showing that opinions on language are not based in any objective standards of beauty or aesthetics, but rather on our attitudes about the people speaking them.

    Accent attitudes reflect our biases

    Consider long-standing attitudes regarding the southern American accent. Some might automatically assess an accent from Tennessee or Kentucky as sounding less smart than one from Michigan or California. However, there is no scientific relationship between accent and intelligence; these stereotypes are learned behaviour.

    Research shows young children of about five or six, for example, do not discriminate between U.S. northern and southern accents. As they get older, they start to develop the same attitudes of the adults around them, and by age 10 they start to find that northern-accented speakers sound “smarter” and more “in charge” than southern-accented speakers.

    Many negative stereotypes about accents and the people who have them are often based in racism or classism. Take, for example, the following quote from American writer Edward Larocque Tinker’s 1935 essay on “Gombo,” the dialect of French spoken by the Black population in Louisiana:

    “French, which had taken centuries to develop into a most subtle intricate form — the height of sophistication — was far too complex for these simple savages to learn. So they did their poor, primitive best and contrived a queer, simplified ‘pidgin’ French dialect of their own.”

    It is quite clear this judgment is not based in scientific fact, but rather on racist attitudes toward Black people. Today, language attitudes may be more subtle in their racism or classism, but they persist, using our biases about a group of people to affect how we feel about their way of speaking.

    How people judge accents

    Studies show that speakers tend to rate their own dialects as very pleasant. Research also shows that when people are unfamiliar with accents, they tend to not discriminate between them. In other words, when unfamiliar listeners have no knowledge about an accent or its place of origin, they rate accents equally.

    When speakers are familiar with an accent or dialect, however, they use their social knowledge to make judgments about the esthetics, determining which is more pleasing than another. This means that it’s not always the actual phonetic aspects of the language that drive our preferences, but rather social knowledge about the people who speak with that accent that we are assessing.

    In terms of foreign accents in particular, our native language shapes the way we categorize the sounds of other languages. When languages have unfamiliar sounds, our brains need a little more time to process the correspondences between the foreign accent and our own so we can accurately categorize the sounds in the foreign-accented speech. Understanding different accents is a skill that develops over time, and greater exposure to speakers with a particular accent helps us understand that accent more easily.

    Processing accents is more demanding for the brain. For example, in a noisy room, our brains might have to work more than usual to separate out the sounds in order to hear. On the telephone or when the speaker is wearing a mask, the listener doesn’t have access to cues such as lip movements. Older adults with hearing loss also have a harder time understanding foreign accents, as do people with dementia.

    The attitude we have about foreign accents is affected by our social knowledge of a person, their accent and where they come from. Having more frequent and positive associations with people from a particular region will make us more likely to find the accent pleasing and worth deciphering. Our ability to understand reflects the cognitive load that our brain is put through in order to categorize the different sounds that we are hearing.

    Putting these two together, it is easy to see how the historical prestige associated with European accents, as well as the political power of leaders like Emmanuel Macron of France, Starmer from the United Kingdom or Modi of India would be reflected in Trump’s positive attitude towards them.

    Similarly, he might consider a foreign journalist’s position on the world stage to be far less worth doing the cognitive work necessary to understand them.

    Fundamentally, there is no objective criteria for determining the “beauty” of someone’s accent. Our attitudes towards particular accents are often much more rooted in our biases and how we see others in our world.

    Nicole Rosen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Donald Trump thinks some accents are ‘beautiful,’ but what makes them so? – https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-thinks-some-accents-are-beautiful-but-what-makes-them-so-251458

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: NZ & India launch Comprehensive FTA negotiations

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and Trade and Investment Minister Todd McClay today announced New Zealand and India have formally launched negotiations on a Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement.

    Mr McClay held extensive discussions with his Indian counterpart Piyush Goyal in New Delhi today, where they agreed to launch negotiations.

    “This announcement is a major breakthrough in the economic relationship between India and New Zealand,” Christopher Luxon says.

    “When we came into Government 16 months ago, we made it clear that closer economic ties with India was a key priority.

    “Currently the fifth-largest economy in the world, with a population of 1.4 billion people, India holds significant potential for New Zealand and will play a pivotal role in doubling New Zealand’s exports by value over the next ten years.

    “This announcement comes off the back of a major lift in political engagement with India. Todd McCay has visited five times and had eight meetings with his Indian counterpart. Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters has also visited, and I had a highly productive meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi last year.

    A Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement is only one part of the Government’s commitment to stepping up all facets of the New Zealand-India relationship.

    Trade and Investment Minister Todd McClay says alongside trade agreement negotiations, New Zealand will continue to invest in stronger, deeper, more sustainable connections with India across all pillars of the relationship, including our political, defence and security, sporting, environmental, and people-to-people connections.

    “One in four Kiwi jobs rely on trade and last year our export revenue added $100 billion to the economy. Strong agreements and relationships like this ensure every New Zealander has good job opportunities, higher wages and access to world-class public services,” Mr McClay says.

    Negotiations will start next month.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Middle Eastern monarchies in Sudan’s war: what’s driving their interests

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Federico Donelli, Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

    The civil war in Sudan that began in April 2023 involves several external actors. The conflict pits the Sudanese Armed Forces against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in a quest for political and economic power. The situation has created one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Various foreign states have picked a side to support. They include Chad, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

    In particular, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are providing financial and military support to the warring parties, although they have denied it. Political scientist Federico Donelli, who has studied the influence of these Gulf monarchies in Sudan, unpacks the implications of their intervention.

    How did the UAE and Saudi Arabia get involved in Sudan?

    Domestic factors within Sudan were the primary triggers for the outbreak of the civil war. Framing the Sudanese conflict as a proxy war may underestimate or overlook important internal variables.

    But it’s also important to highlight the indirect involvement of other states. In the Horn of Africa region, Sudan has interacted the most with Middle Eastern states over the past two decades. Among these states, two Gulf monarchies – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – stand out.

    Political relations between Saudi Arabia and Sudan date back to the independence of the Sudanese state in 1956. And people-to-people links have flourished over centuries. This is largely because Sudan is geographically close to Saudi and the two Muslim holy cities of Mecca (Makkah) and Medina.

    The case of the UAE is different. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the Emirates have expanded their economic and financial influence in Africa, investing in niche sectors such as port logistics. Sudan in particular came to the fore for the Emirates at the end of the 2010s when regional balances shifted before and after the Arab uprisings.

    Between 2014 and 2015, Saudi Arabia and UAE influence in Sudanese politics increased under President Omar al-Bashir. Both monarchies wanted to counter Iran’s ability to project power into the Red Sea and in Yemen. In 2015, after breaking off relations with Iran, Sudan contributed 10,000 troops to a Saudi-led military operation in Yemen to fight Houthi rebels. Both the Sudanese army and paramilitary forces took part, and personal links were forged.

    In the post-Bashir era that began in 2019, Saudi and UAE influence has continued to grow, thanks to those direct links.

    In general, both monarchies are status seekers. In a changing international context, Sudan is a testing ground for their ability to influence and shape future political settlements.

    Seeing the post-2019 transition as an opportunity to influence Sudan’s regional standing, the two monarchies chose to support different factions within Sudan’s security apparatus. This external support exacerbated internal competition.

    Riyadh, in conjunction with Egypt, maintained close ties with army leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Abu Dhabi aligned itself with the head of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Dagalo, or Hemedti.

    Since 2019, the relationship between the UAE and Saudi Arabia has changed. After more than a decade of strategic convergence, especially on regional issues, the two Gulf monarchies began to diverge on issues like their view on political Islam. This divergence has been evident in various crisis scenarios, including in Sudan.

    Although both countries jointly supported the initial Sudanese transition after Bashir’s ouster, the deterioration of relations between Hemedti and al-Burhan created conditions for a showdown between the two monarchies.

    However, the conflict in Sudan didn’t break out because of the rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. But Sudan’s local actors felt able to go to war because they were aware of external support. And once the conflict broke out, both monarchies were reluctant to withdraw local support lest they appear weak in the eyes of their regional counterpart.

    Why is Sudan important to these countries?

    My recent study with political scientist Abigail Kabandula shows that the UAE and Saudi Arabia gradually increased their presence in Sudan after the 2011 Arab uprisings. The fall of some regimes, including Egypt, made the two Gulf monarchies fear that instability could entangle them.

    Our analysis identifies two main reasons for the two countries’ influence in Sudan:

    • changes to the regional power structure

    • the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa.

    The US pivot to Asia – shifting resources from the Middle East to the Pacific – and the Arab Spring protests increased uncertainty among Gulf states. This led to a realignment of regional power dynamics and the formation of rival blocs. As a result, the UAE and Saudi Arabia sought closer ties with African countries. In Sudan, the relationship has developed through both military and political engagement.

    Our analysis shows an increase in both countries’ interest in Sudan between 2012 and 2020. However, our research also highlighted some key differences in their growing influence.

    In the early years after the Arab uprisings, the UAE’s influence grew rapidly, driven by concerns about the spread of protests. This was particularly important given Sudan’s proximity to Egypt.

    Saudi Arabia maintained a more stable level of influence from 2010 to 2020. This was despite Riyadh also initially fearing the spread of the protests.

    Both Gulf states were wary of al-Bashir’s growing ties with Turkey and Qatar, which they feared would strengthen a pro-Islamist bloc in the region. However, after Bashir’s overthrow in 2019, their approaches began to diverge.

    The two Gulf monarchies view Sudan as a key country because of its geographical location.

    Sudan is situated between two major regions – the Sahel and the Red Sea – characterised by instability and conflict. These regions face interconnected challenges: political instability, poverty, food insecurity, and internal and external wars. They also face population displacement, transnational crime and the threat of jihadist groups.

    Moreover, Sudan is an important link between the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa. The country is a crossroads, influencing current and future geostrategic dynamics in the region.

    The Gulf monarchies, including Qatar, have also invested heavily – between US$1.5 billion and US$2 billion – in Sudan’s agri-food sector, which is vital to their food security. Sudan, with its abundant water resources, offers a large amount of fertile land, making it attractive to Gulf companies.

    What can we expect to see next?

    Similar to other current global crises – such as those in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Democratic Republic of Congo – the conflict in Sudan seems difficult to resolve through negotiations. Two main factors contribute to this difficulty.

    First, both parties see the victory of one side as entirely dependent on the defeat of the other. Such logic leaves no room for a win-win solution. Second, the current international context supports the continuation of hostilities. The global shifting balance of power provides both warring parties with opportunities for external support. This complicates efforts to find a peaceful solution.

    There are now two centres of power and governance in the country. It is likely that this division will become more pronounced.

    – Middle Eastern monarchies in Sudan’s war: what’s driving their interests
    – https://theconversation.com/middle-eastern-monarchies-in-sudans-war-whats-driving-their-interests-251825

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: The first fossil thrips in Africa: this tiny insect pest met its end in a volcanic lake 90 million years ago

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sandiso Mnguni, Honorary Research Associate, University of the Witwatersrand

    Thrips are tiny insects – their sizes range between 0.5mm and 15mm in length and many are shorter than 5mm. But the damage they cause to crops is anything but small. A 2021 research paper found that in Indonesia “the damage to red chilli plants caused by thrips infestation ranges now from 20% to 80%”. In India, various thrips infestations in the late 2010s and early 2020s “damaged 40%-85% of chilli pepper crops in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana”.

    In Africa, a number of thrips species feed on sugarcane and have been known to damage nearly 30% of the crop in a single hectare of a farm. High rates of destruction have been recorded in Tanzania and Uganda on onion and tomato crops.

    Now it’s emerged that thrips are hardly new to the African continent and the southern hemisphere more broadly. South Africa’s first and only Black palaeoentomologist, Sandiso Mnguni, who studies fossil insects, recently described a fossil thrips from Orapa Diamond Mine in Botswana that’s more than 90 million years old. He discussed his unique fossil find with The Conversation Africa.

    What are thrips and how do they cause damage?

    Thrips, also known as thunderflies, thunderbugs or thunderblights, are small, slender and fragile insects. They can be identified by their typically narrow, strap-like, fringed and feathery wings. Over time, they have also evolved distinctive asymmetrical rasping-sucking mouthparts consisting of a labrum, labium, maxillary stylets and left mandible. Most species use these to feed primarily on fungi. Some feed on plants and eat the tender parts of certain crops like sugarcane, tomatoes, pepper, onions, avocado, legumes and citrus fruits, focusing on the buds, flowers and young leaves.

    This, along with their habit of accidentally distributing fungal spores while feeding or hunting, makes them destructive crop pests. They tend to feed as a group in large numbers, causing distinctive silver or bronze scarring on the surfaces of stems or leaves.

    However, not all thrips are harmful. A small fraction of the 6,500 species that have already been described so far are pollinators of flowering plants; and a handful are predators or natural enemies of moths and other smaller animals such as mites.

    Larva, pupa and adult Weeping fig thrips (Gynaikothrips uzeli) fcafotodigital

    Tell us about the fossil thrips you’ve discovered

    This is the first time that a fossil thrips has been recorded anywhere in Africa – or the entire southern hemisphere.

    The Orapa Diamond Mine in Botswana is one of the most important fossil deposits on the continent. It’s about 90 million years old, dating back to the Cretaceous period.

    Read more: Fossil beetles found in a Botswana diamond mine help us to reconstruct the distant past

    The deposit is situated 960 metres above sea level in the Kalahari Desert, about 250km due west of Francistown in Botswana, and 824km away from Johannesburg in South Africa. It was first discovered in 1967 and started producing carat diamonds in 1971.

    Roughly 90 million years go, steam and gas caused a double eruption of diamondiferous kimberlites. These are vertical, deep-source volcanic pipes that form when magma rapidly rises from the Earth’s mantle, carrying diamonds and other minerals up to the surface. They create a distinctive rock formation that gets studied by geologists. This explosive volcanic eruption formed a deep crater lake at the centre of the mine.

    Mining excavations during the 1980s and earlier uncovered and exposed fine-grained sedimentary rocks containing well preserved fossil plants and insects. These have already been studied by many researchers in the past. At the time, geology and palaeontology researchers from what was then the Bernard Price Institute, which has since been renamed the Evolutionary Studies Institute, at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, were invited to collect the fossil material.

    Although some of the material has been studied in the past, the fossil thrips hadn’t yet been put under the microscope. And that’s just what we did. By using its body characteristics and comparing it to living thrips, we can say for sure that it’s a thrips. But we didn’t give it a formal scientific name because it doesn’t have enough characteristics to classify it at the species level and describe it either as a new species or one that still exists today.

    We think that the thrips either flew into the palaeolake that was formed by the volcanic eruption or was transported there through grass from a bird’s nest.

    Why is this useful to know?

    This discovery sheds light on the biodiversity and biogeography of thrips and many other groups of insects during a time when we know flowering plants that heavily relied on insect pollination were rapidly diversifying. This plant-insect reciprocal interaction goes back to the Devonian period, a time when there was a large super-continent called Gondwana. That’s when the first land plants evolved and dominated the Earth, and inadvertently led to many groups of insects, including thrips, diversifying to keep up with drastic changes in their preferred plant diets and habitats due to the dramatic environmental and climatic changes.

    Read more: Fossil insects help to reconstruct the past: how I ended up studying them (and you can too)

    The fossil find also contributes to a more accurate documentation of life on Earth during the Cretaceous and helps scientists in reconstructing the past environment and climate in Botswana.

    Hopefully there are more fossil insects waiting to be discovered in Botswana and elsewhere in Africa, to keep improving our picture of this long-ago world, and preserve the heritage of our continent.

    – The first fossil thrips in Africa: this tiny insect pest met its end in a volcanic lake 90 million years ago
    – https://theconversation.com/the-first-fossil-thrips-in-africa-this-tiny-insect-pest-met-its-end-in-a-volcanic-lake-90-million-years-ago-249077

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Former US envoy slams air attacks on Houthis – NZ protesters recite poetry

    Asia Pacific Report

    A former US diplomat, Nabeel Khoury, says President Donald Trump’s decision to launch attacks against the Houthis is misguided, and this will not subdue them.

    “For our president who came in wanting to avoid war and wanting to be a man of peace, he’s going about it the wrong way,” he said.

    “There are many paths that can be used before you resort to war.” Khoury told Al Jazeera.

    The danger to shipping in the Red Sea was “a justifiable reason for concern”, Khoury told Al Jazeera in an interview, but added that it was a problem that could be resolved through diplomacy.

    Ansar Allah (Houthi) media sources said that at least four areas had been razed by the US warplanes that targeted, in particular, a residential area north of the capital, Sanaa, killing 31 people.

    The Houthis, who had been “bombed severely all over their territory” in the past, were not likely to be subdued through “a few weeks of bombing”, Khoury said.

    “If you think that Hamas, living and fighting on a very small piece of land, totally surrounded by land, air and sea, and yet, 17 months of bombardment by the Israelis did not get rid of them.

    ‘More rugged space’
    “The Houthis live in a much more rugged space, mountainous regions — it would be virtually impossible to eradicate them,” Khoury said.

    “So there is no military logic to what’s happening, and there is no political logic either.”

    Providing background, Patty Culhane reported from Washington that there were several factual errors in the justification President Trump had given for his order.

    “It’s important to point out that the Houthi attacks have stopped since the ceasefire in Gaza [on January 19], although the Houthis were threatening to strike again,” she said.

    “His other justification is saying that no US-flagged vessel has transited the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden safely in more than a year.

    “And then he says another reason is because Houthis attacked a US military warship.

    “That happened when Trump was not president.”

    Down to 10,000 ships
    She said the White House was now putting out more of a communique, “saying that before the attacks, there were 25,000 ships that transited the Red Sea annually. Now it’s down to 10,000 so, obviously, sort of shooting down the president’s concept that nobody is actually transiting the region.

    “And it did list the number of attacks. The US commercial ships have been attacked 145 times since 2023 in their list.”

    Meanwhile, at least nine people, including three journalists, have been killed and several others wounded in an Israeli drone attack on relief aid workers at Beit Lahiya in northern Gaza, according to Palestinian media.

    The attack reportedly targeted a relief team that was accompanied by journalists and photographers. At least three local journalists were among the dead.

    The Palestinian Journalists’ Protection Centre said in a statement that Israel had killed “three journalists in an airstrike on a media team documenting relief efforts in northern Gaza”, reports

    “The journalists were documenting humanitarian relief efforts for those affected by Israel’s genocidal war,” the statement added, according to Anadolu.

    In a statement, the Israeli military claimed it struck “two terrorists . . .  operating a drone that posed a threat” to Israeli soldiers in the area of Beit Lahiya.

    “Later, a number of additional terrorists collected the drone operating equipment and entered a vehicle. The [Israeli military] struck the terrorists,” it added, without providing any evidence about its claims.

    ‘Liberation’ poetry
    In Auckland on Saturday, protesters at the Aotearoa New Zealand’s weekly “free Palestine” rallies gave a tribute to poet Mahmoud Darwish — the “liberation voice of Palestine” — by reciting peace and justice poetry and marked the sixth anniversary of the Christchurch mosque massacre when a lone white terrorist gunned down 51 people at Friday prayers.

    This was one of more than 20 Palestinian solidarity events happening across the motu this weekend.

    Two of the pro-Palestine protesters hold West Papuan and Palestinian flags – symbolising indigenous liberation – at Saturday’s rally in Auckland. Image: APR

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Middle Eastern monarchies in Sudan’s war: what’s driving their interests

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Federico Donelli, Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

    The civil war in Sudan that began in April 2023 involves several external actors. The conflict pits the Sudanese Armed Forces against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in a quest for political and economic power. The situation has created one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Various foreign states have picked a side to support. They include Chad, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

    In particular, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are providing financial and military support to the warring parties, although they have denied it. Political scientist Federico Donelli, who has studied the influence of these Gulf monarchies in Sudan, unpacks the implications of their intervention.

    How did the UAE and Saudi Arabia get involved in Sudan?

    Domestic factors within Sudan were the primary triggers for the outbreak of the civil war. Framing the Sudanese conflict as a proxy war may underestimate or overlook important internal variables.

    But it’s also important to highlight the indirect involvement of other states. In the Horn of Africa region, Sudan has interacted the most with Middle Eastern states over the past two decades. Among these states, two Gulf monarchies – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – stand out.

    Political relations between Saudi Arabia and Sudan date back to the independence of the Sudanese state in 1956. And people-to-people links have flourished over centuries. This is largely because Sudan is geographically close to Saudi and the two Muslim holy cities of Mecca (Makkah) and Medina.

    The case of the UAE is different. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the Emirates have expanded their economic and financial influence in Africa, investing in niche sectors such as port logistics. Sudan in particular came to the fore for the Emirates at the end of the 2010s when regional balances shifted before and after the Arab uprisings.

    Between 2014 and 2015, Saudi Arabia and UAE influence in Sudanese politics increased under President Omar al-Bashir. Both monarchies wanted to counter Iran’s ability to project power into the Red Sea and in Yemen. In 2015, after breaking off relations with Iran, Sudan contributed 10,000 troops to a Saudi-led military operation in Yemen to fight Houthi rebels. Both the Sudanese army and paramilitary forces took part, and personal links were forged.

    In the post-Bashir era that began in 2019, Saudi and UAE influence has continued to grow, thanks to those direct links.

    In general, both monarchies are status seekers. In a changing international context, Sudan is a testing ground for their ability to influence and shape future political settlements.

    Seeing the post-2019 transition as an opportunity to influence Sudan’s regional standing, the two monarchies chose to support different factions within Sudan’s security apparatus. This external support exacerbated internal competition.

    Riyadh, in conjunction with Egypt, maintained close ties with army leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Abu Dhabi aligned itself with the head of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Dagalo, or Hemedti.

    Since 2019, the relationship between the UAE and Saudi Arabia has changed. After more than a decade of strategic convergence, especially on regional issues, the two Gulf monarchies began to diverge on issues like their view on political Islam. This divergence has been evident in various crisis scenarios, including in Sudan.

    Although both countries jointly supported the initial Sudanese transition after Bashir’s ouster, the deterioration of relations between Hemedti and al-Burhan created conditions for a showdown between the two monarchies.

    However, the conflict in Sudan didn’t break out because of the rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. But Sudan’s local actors felt able to go to war because they were aware of external support. And once the conflict broke out, both monarchies were reluctant to withdraw local support lest they appear weak in the eyes of their regional counterpart.

    Why is Sudan important to these countries?

    My recent study with political scientist Abigail Kabandula shows that the UAE and Saudi Arabia gradually increased their presence in Sudan after the 2011 Arab uprisings. The fall of some regimes, including Egypt, made the two Gulf monarchies fear that instability could entangle them.

    Our analysis identifies two main reasons for the two countries’ influence in Sudan:

    • changes to the regional power structure

    • the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa.

    The US pivot to Asia – shifting resources from the Middle East to the Pacific – and the Arab Spring protests increased uncertainty among Gulf states. This led to a realignment of regional power dynamics and the formation of rival blocs. As a result, the UAE and Saudi Arabia sought closer ties with African countries. In Sudan, the relationship has developed through both military and political engagement.

    Our analysis shows an increase in both countries’ interest in Sudan between 2012 and 2020. However, our research also highlighted some key differences in their growing influence.

    In the early years after the Arab uprisings, the UAE’s influence grew rapidly, driven by concerns about the spread of protests. This was particularly important given Sudan’s proximity to Egypt.

    Saudi Arabia maintained a more stable level of influence from 2010 to 2020. This was despite Riyadh also initially fearing the spread of the protests.

    Both Gulf states were wary of al-Bashir’s growing ties with Turkey and Qatar, which they feared would strengthen a pro-Islamist bloc in the region. However, after Bashir’s overthrow in 2019, their approaches began to diverge.

    The two Gulf monarchies view Sudan as a key country because of its geographical location.

    Sudan is situated between two major regions – the Sahel and the Red Sea – characterised by instability and conflict. These regions face interconnected challenges: political instability, poverty, food insecurity, and internal and external wars. They also face population displacement, transnational crime and the threat of jihadist groups.

    Moreover, Sudan is an important link between the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa. The country is a crossroads, influencing current and future geostrategic dynamics in the region.

    The Gulf monarchies, including Qatar, have also invested heavily – between US$1.5 billion and US$2 billion – in Sudan’s agri-food sector, which is vital to their food security. Sudan, with its abundant water resources, offers a large amount of fertile land, making it attractive to Gulf companies.

    What can we expect to see next?

    Similar to other current global crises – such as those in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Democratic Republic of Congo – the conflict in Sudan seems difficult to resolve through negotiations. Two main factors contribute to this difficulty.

    First, both parties see the victory of one side as entirely dependent on the defeat of the other. Such logic leaves no room for a win-win solution. Second, the current international context supports the continuation of hostilities. The global shifting balance of power provides both warring parties with opportunities for external support. This complicates efforts to find a peaceful solution.

    There are now two centres of power and governance in the country. It is likely that this division will become more pronounced.

    Federico Donelli is Senior Research Associate at the Istituto di Studi di Politica Internazionale, ISPI (Milan) and Non-Resident Fellow at the Orion Policy Institute, OPI (Washington, DC).

    – ref. Middle Eastern monarchies in Sudan’s war: what’s driving their interests – https://theconversation.com/middle-eastern-monarchies-in-sudans-war-whats-driving-their-interests-251825

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: The first fossil thrips in Africa: this tiny insect pest met its end in a volcanic lake 90 million years ago

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sandiso Mnguni, Honorary Research Associate, University of the Witwatersrand

    The fossil thrips discovered in the Orapa Diamond Mine. Dr Sandiso Mnguni, CC BY-NC-ND

    Thrips are tiny insects – their sizes range between 0.5mm and 15mm in length and many are shorter than 5mm. But the damage they cause to crops is anything but small. A 2021 research paper found that in Indonesia “the damage to red chilli plants caused by thrips infestation ranges now from 20% to 80%”. In India, various thrips infestations in the late 2010s and early 2020s “damaged 40%-85% of chilli pepper crops in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana”.

    In Africa, a number of thrips species feed on sugarcane and have been known to damage nearly 30% of the crop in a single hectare of a farm. High rates of destruction have been recorded in Tanzania and Uganda on onion and tomato crops.

    Now it’s emerged that thrips are hardly new to the African continent and the southern hemisphere more broadly. South Africa’s first and only Black palaeoentomologist, Sandiso Mnguni, who studies fossil insects, recently described a fossil thrips from Orapa Diamond Mine in Botswana that’s more than 90 million years old. He discussed his unique fossil find with The Conversation Africa.

    What are thrips and how do they cause damage?

    Thrips, also known as thunderflies, thunderbugs or thunderblights, are small, slender and fragile insects. They can be identified by their typically narrow, strap-like, fringed and feathery wings. Over time, they have also evolved distinctive asymmetrical rasping-sucking mouthparts consisting of a labrum, labium, maxillary stylets and left mandible. Most species use these to feed primarily on fungi. Some feed on plants and eat the tender parts of certain crops like sugarcane, tomatoes, pepper, onions, avocado, legumes and citrus fruits, focusing on the buds, flowers and young leaves.

    This, along with their habit of accidentally distributing fungal spores while feeding or hunting, makes them destructive crop pests. They tend to feed as a group in large numbers, causing distinctive silver or bronze scarring on the surfaces of stems or leaves.

    However, not all thrips are harmful. A small fraction of the 6,500 species that have already been described so far are pollinators of flowering plants; and a handful are predators or natural enemies of moths and other smaller animals such as mites.

    Larva, pupa and adult Weeping fig thrips (Gynaikothrips uzeli)
    fcafotodigital

    Tell us about the fossil thrips you’ve discovered

    This is the first time that a fossil thrips has been recorded anywhere in Africa – or the entire southern hemisphere.

    The Orapa Diamond Mine in Botswana is one of the most important fossil deposits on the continent. It’s about 90 million years old, dating back to the Cretaceous period.



    Read more:
    Fossil beetles found in a Botswana diamond mine help us to reconstruct the distant past

    The deposit is situated 960 metres above sea level in the Kalahari Desert, about 250km due west of Francistown in Botswana, and 824km away from Johannesburg in South Africa. It was first discovered in 1967 and started producing carat diamonds in 1971.

    Roughly 90 million years go, steam and gas caused a double eruption of diamondiferous kimberlites. These are vertical, deep-source volcanic pipes that form when magma rapidly rises from the Earth’s mantle, carrying diamonds and other minerals up to the surface. They create a distinctive rock formation that gets studied by geologists. This explosive volcanic eruption formed a deep crater lake at the centre of the mine.

    Mining excavations during the 1980s and earlier uncovered and exposed fine-grained sedimentary rocks containing well preserved fossil plants and insects. These have already been studied by many researchers in the past. At the time, geology and palaeontology researchers from what was then the Bernard Price Institute, which has since been renamed the Evolutionary Studies Institute, at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, were invited to collect the fossil material.

    Although some of the material has been studied in the past, the fossil thrips hadn’t yet been put under the microscope. And that’s just what we did. By using its body characteristics and comparing it to living thrips, we can say for sure that it’s a thrips. But we didn’t give it a formal scientific name because it doesn’t have enough characteristics to classify it at the species level and describe it either as a new species or one that still exists today.

    We think that the thrips either flew into the palaeolake that was formed by the volcanic eruption or was transported there through grass from a bird’s nest.

    Why is this useful to know?

    This discovery sheds light on the biodiversity and biogeography of thrips and many other groups of insects during a time when we know flowering plants that heavily relied on insect pollination were rapidly diversifying. This plant-insect reciprocal interaction goes back to the Devonian period, a time when there was a large super-continent called Gondwana. That’s when the first land plants evolved and dominated the Earth, and inadvertently led to many groups of insects, including thrips, diversifying to keep up with drastic changes in their preferred plant diets and habitats due to the dramatic environmental and climatic changes.



    Read more:
    Fossil insects help to reconstruct the past: how I ended up studying them (and you can too)

    The fossil find also contributes to a more accurate documentation of life on Earth during the Cretaceous and helps scientists in reconstructing the past environment and climate in Botswana.

    Hopefully there are more fossil insects waiting to be discovered in Botswana and elsewhere in Africa, to keep improving our picture of this long-ago world, and preserve the heritage of our continent.

    Sandiso Mnguni receives funding from the GENUS: DSTI-NRF Centre of Excellence in Palaeosciences (Grant 86073). He is affiliated with the Agricultural Research Council Plant Health and Protection (ARC-PHP) and the Sophumelela Youth Development Programme (SYDP).

    – ref. The first fossil thrips in Africa: this tiny insect pest met its end in a volcanic lake 90 million years ago – https://theconversation.com/the-first-fossil-thrips-in-africa-this-tiny-insect-pest-met-its-end-in-a-volcanic-lake-90-million-years-ago-249077

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Sun Dong bound for Beijing

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    Secretary for Innovation, Technology & Industry Prof Sun Dong is due to depart today for Beijing, where together with Secretary General of the World Internet Conference (WIC) Ren Xianliang he will tomorrow attend a press conference to announce details of this year’s WIC Asia-Pacific Summit, which will be held in Hong Kong.

    Prof Sun will return to Hong Kong tomorrow. During his absence, Under Secretary for Innovation, Technology & Industry Lillian Cheong will be Acting Secretary.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Secretary-General of ASEAN to participate in the 22nd Meeting of the High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Community’s Post-2025 in Penang, Malaysia

    Source: ASEAN

    In his capacity as a member of the High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Community’s Post-2025 Vision, Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, will lead the ASEAN Secretariat delegation to participate in the 22th Meeting of the High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Community’s Post-2025 Vision, to be held in Penang, Malaysia, on 18 to 19 March 2025. Taking advantage of his stay in Malaysia, SG Dr. Kao will visit Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where he will meet with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, THE HONOURABLE DATO’ SERI UTAMA HAJI MOHAMAD BIN HAJI HASAN, on 20 March 2025.
    The post Secretary-General of ASEAN to participate in the 22nd Meeting of the High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Community’s Post-2025 in Penang, Malaysia appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI China: 30.8 kg of heroin seized in central Myanmar

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    Myanmar authorities have seized 30.8 kg of heroin and 154,000 stimulant tablets in central Myanmar’s Mandalay region, the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) said on Saturday.

    Acting on a tip-off, anti-narcotics police searched a vehicle in Pyigyitagon township of Mandalay region on March 9 and confiscated the narcotics, and arrested three suspects.

    Three other suspects in connection with the case were later arrested.

    The seized narcotics are approximately worth over 1 billion kyats (about 476,190 U.S. dollars).

    The suspects have been charged under the country’s Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law, and further investigations were ongoing. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Former Filipino Duterte’s arrest by the ICC – 20 journalists killed during his presidency

    Pacific Media Watch

    Paris-based global media freedom watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has recalled that 20 journalists were killed during the six-year Philippines presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, a regime marked by fierce repression of the press.

    Former president Duterte was arrested earlier this week as part of an International Criminal Court investigation into crimes against humanity linked to his merciless war on drugs. He is now in The Hague awaiting trial.

    The watchdog has called on the administration of current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr to take strong measures to fully restore the country’s press freedom and combat impunity for the crimes against media committed by Duterte’s regime.

    “Just because you’re a journalist you are not exempted from assassination, if you’re a son of a bitch,” Rodrigo Duterte said in his inauguration speech on 30 June 2016, which set the tone for the rest of his mandate — unrestrained violence against journalists and total disregard for press freedom, said RSF in a statement.

    During the Duterte regime’s rule, RSF recorded 20 cases of journalists killed while working.

    Among them was Jesus Yutrago Malabanan, shot dead after covering Rodrigo Duterte’s drug war for Reuters.

    Online harassment surged, particularly targeting women journalists.

    Maria Ressa troll target
    The most prominent victim was Maria Ressa, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and founder of the news site Rappler, who faced an orchestrated hate campaign led by troll armies allied with the government in response to her commitment to exposing the then-president’s bloody war.

    Media outlets critical of President Duterte’s authoritarian excesses were systematically muzzled: the country’s leading television network, ABS-CBN, was forced to shut down; Rappler and Maria Ressa faced repeated lawsuits; and a businessman close to the president took over the country’s leading newspaper, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, raising concerns over its editorial independence.

    “The arrest of Rodrigo Duterte is good news for the Filipino journalism community, who were the direct targets of his campaign of terror,” said RSF’s Asia-Pacific bureau director Cédric Alviani.

    RSF’s Asia-Pacific bureau director Cédric Alviani . . . “the Filipino journalism community were the direct targets of [former president Rodrigo Duterte]’s campaign of terror.” Image: RSF

    “President Marcos and his administration must immediately investigate Duterte’s past crimes and take strong measures to fully restore the country’s press freedom.”

    The repression carried out during Duterte’s tenure continues to impact on Filipino journalism: investigative journalist Frenchie Mae Cumpio has been languishing in prison since her arrest in 2020, still awaiting a verdict in her trial for “financing terrorism” and “illegal possession of firearms” — trumped-up charges that could see her sentenced to 40 years in prison.

    With 147 journalists murdered since the restoration of democracy in 1986, the Philippines remains one of the deadliest countries for media workers.

    The republic ranked 134th out of 180 in the 2024 RSF World Press Freedom Index.

    Source report from Reporters Without Borders. Pacific Media Watch collaborates with RSF.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Television interview – Sunday Agenda, Sky News

    Source: Minister for Trade

    Andrew Clennell: The Trade Minister, Don Farrell, joins me now from Adelaide. Don Farrell, thanks for your time. You’re due to talk to the US Trade Ambassador tomorrow.

    Minister for Trade: Pleased to be with you.

    Andrew Clennell: And you spoke at two o’clock Friday morning to Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. How did your chat with Mr Lutnick go and what are you hoping to achieve with Mr Greer?

    Minister for Trade: Look, Andrew, I did speak with Commerce Secretary Lutnick. That’s the second contact we’ve had with one another since he just recently was appointed to that position. I obviously expressed my disappointment that we had not been able to reach an agreement over the suspension of tariffs on steel and aluminium. But I did say that there’s obviously a further review, and you’ve talked about some of the issues that potentially arise, that the U.S. Government is undertaking by the early part of April. I indicated to him that we want to continue to talk with them. I find that discussion is the best way to resolve these issues. Not retaliatory tariffs, but discussion. What we need to do, Andrew, is find out what it is that the Americans want in terms of this relationship between Australia and the United States and then make President Trump an offer he can’t refuse.

    Andrew Clennell: And did Howard Lutnick give you any indication of what they might be after? Because obviously you offered them some form of critical minerals deal. Did he give any, any ray of light you had a chance? I mean, I think you’ve said that President Trump allowed Australia or the Prime Minister to believe there was a chance when there wasn’t. Has he given you any suggestion there’s a chance, or was he holding the line and saying, look, this is our America First policy, that’s it.

    Minister for Trade: Look, it wasn’t a pessimistic conversation, I’m pleased to say, Andrew. but look, he gave, you know, no assurances about what might happen in the next round of negotiations. Our job is to sit down and continue to talk. I think the important thing here to understand, Andrew, is that when President Trump, in his first iteration, gave Australia an exemption to Prime Minister Turnbull, it was one of over 30 exemptions that the United States gave to a range of countries around the world. So, more than 30 countries, including most of our competitors in the American market, were able to get an exemption. On this occasion, not one country, not one country got an exemption on either steel or aluminium. Now, that’s obviously, we think that’s bad news. We think it’s bad news, obviously, for the companies that trade in Australia with the United States. It’s also bad news for the Americans because what that has done is simply pushed up the price of steel and aluminium in the US market and that has to have an impact both on, on inflation and on jobs. So, part of my job is to continue to put the arguments to the Americans that in fact, this is the wrong policy to adopt. We should actually be doing the opposite. We should be making more free trade, more fair trade, rather than less trade.

    And of course, one of the things that we’ve done in government is diversify our trading relationship. So, we have new agreements with the United Kingdom, we’ve got new agreements with India. I think we’re just about to get another offer from the Indians to even expand our trading relationship with India. We’ve signed a new agreement with the United Arab Emirates. This is like dealing with the Woolies warehouse of the Middle East. If you can get your products into the United Arab Emirates, then you can get it all around the Middle East. On Tuesday night, I spoke with my Korean counterpart, Mr. Ahn, and we’ve got identical problems with the United States. Of course, they sell a lot more steel into the United States than we do. But we are talking about how we can expand our relationship with Korea so that we can sell more product into Korea.

    So, it’s a two-pronged approach. Andrew, we are continuing the discussions with the United States. We’ll continue to discuss. We’re not going down the track of some countries in applying retaliatory tariffs. I don’t think that will work, it hasn’t worked for any other country, why would it work for us? We want to explain our position and we want to get those exemptions for Australian companies because it’s good for prosperity in the United States, but it’s also good for prosperity in Australia.

    Andrew Clennell: Well, I think you’ve got Buckley’s chance of arguing free and fair trade to the Trump administration, to be frank Minister, but what’s the worst-case scenario here? What’s the worst-case scenario? $30 billion, our exports to the U.S. Could we lose it all?

    Minister for Trade: Look, I don’t believe so, Andrew. And just on that first point you made, Buckley’s chance. When I came to this job three years ago, we had $20 billion worth of trade bans in China. People told me, look, you will never, never, ever get that trade back. At the end of last year, the last of the products that had been subject to those trade impediments, namely crayfish, we got back into China. And since then, in the first month of that new trade, we got $188 million of crayfish sold into China. You can reverse these decisions, Andrew, so, don’t give up on us just yet. You can get countries to realise. You can get countries if you keep talking to them and you keep making your arguments, which is exactly what I intend to do. If you keep making your arguments, you can in fact convince countries that the policies that they are adopting are in fact counterproductive, just as they were with China.

    Andrew Clennell: Okay, but what’s the worst-case scenario? What’s the worst-case scenario here?

    Minister for Trade: Look, I wish I could tell you exactly what the American Government is finally going to do. To be honest with you, I suspect they don’t even know themselves right now. They’re conducting this review. They’re conducting the review in respect of every single trade agreement they have. It’s not just Australia, it’s every country. And my job in the discussions that go on in this coming week and in the weeks ahead is to get the best result for Australian producers, and that’s what I intend to do. And it’ll only be by reaching out, by having discussions, by putting our point of view that we’re going to get an acceptable outcome here.

    Andrew Clennell: In any of these discussions, do you talk about the prospect of a phone call between Prime Minister Albanese and President Trump?

    Minister for Trade: Oh, that’s way above my pay grade, I’m afraid, Andrew.

    Andrew Clennell: Is it though? Kevin Rudd asks.

    Minister for Trade: Well, he’s the ambassador, of course he asks, and that’s the job of the ambassador to do that representation on behalf of the Australian Prime Minister.

    Andrew Clennell: How many times has he asked, do you know?

    Minister for Trade: No, I don’t know the answer to that question, Andrew. But you know, we were amongst the first countries to ring President Trump when he was elected and congratulated him. The Prime Minister did that. And we of course got a second phone call with him to express our concerns about the direction that he was taking in respect of tariffs.

    To the best of my knowledge, we were the only country in the world where he said, I’m going to give some consideration to not applying these tariffs to you. Now, I know we didn’t get the exemption in the end, but we were the only country that at least got him to say, look, we’re going to give some consideration to this. Ultimately, the consideration was that they would not do it.

    As I’ve said on Sky previously, the people around President Trump, particularly Mr. Navarro, I think, were determined that they weren’t going to go down the track that they went down last time. So, I mentioned before over 30 countries got exemptions for steel and aluminium. They were determined, the people around President Trump were determined not to go down that track again. They were going to apply the tariffs, the 25 per cent tariffs, and no country was going to get an exemption. But look, we will continue to talk. As I said, I’ve spoken to Commerce Secretary Lutnick on Friday morning, tomorrow US time, so, Tuesday morning, I think 7:30, I’m going to have my conversation with Jamieson Greer. We’re going to work out firstly what it is that the Americans want out of this arrangement, because it’s still not clear to me what it is that they are seeking. But once we find that out, we’ll work through this issue and we’ll work through it in Australia’s national interest.

    Andrew Clennell: Why haven’t you been to the US, yourself?

    Minister for Trade: Look, can I say this, Andrew, modern communications these days, a telephone call, a video conference, which is what I’ll be doing with Jamieson Greer, Ambassador Greer, on Tuesday, we’re getting our message across. After that first conversation between President Trump and Prime Minister Albanese, we embarked on a course of action which was determined in consultation with the officials in the United States about how best to progress our concerns about the introduction or the reintroduction of tariffs. We followed that. We followed that course of action and we followed it until last Wednesday when it became clear that the Americans were not going to give us an exemption. So, we had a plan. We had a plan for how we deal with this issue. We were hopeful, certainly based on early discussions, that we would get a successful result here. In the event that that didn’t happen. But we’re not giving up. We’re continuing the talks. And in fact, in lots of ways, the talks will be beefed up in the weeks and the months ahead as we try and resolve all of these issues, but these are not easy issues, Andrew.

    Andrew Clennell: No, they’re not. But Peter Dutton says you haven’t got the relationships. He’s pointed the finger at Kevin Rudd. The suggestion is Albanese, the Prime Minister, was seen as too close to Joe Biden. Penny Wong found out from the media that this had occurred. What do you say to all that? I mean, his contention as we go into an election campaign is their government would have better luck with the US Administration. What do you say to that?

    Minister for Trade: Look, Peter Dutton couldn’t go two rounds with a revolving door Andrew. What happened? When we came to government, there were $20 billion worth of tariffs and trade impediments with the Chinese. If Peter Dutton’s so good at building relationships and solving problems, they didn’t get a cent, they didn’t get a cent or a single tariff removed in that previous three years in government. We got the best result or the best response of any country in the world. We got a consideration by the President to review these tariffs. Now ok, it didn’t ultimately result in us getting the tariffs removed and we accept that. We accept that situation. I’d ask your listeners, who do you think is going to be better to negotiate with the United States? Somebody with a proven record of getting results or somebody, when they had the opportunity to get some results, did nothing. Did nothing. They did nothing.

    Andrew Clennell: What would a tariff do to the beef industry?

    Minister for Trade: It would certainly have a clearly a negative impact. The United States I think is, if it’s not the largest export market for our beef industry, it would have a significant impact. We are expanding our beef exports, our beef exports right now thanks to the Albanese Labor Government, are the best that they’ve ever been. We’re exporting more beef than we ever have. The significance, of course to the United States about our beef exports is that most of it goes into McDonald’s hamburgers. And if you push up the price of those beef exports by 25 per cent or 10 per cent or whatever the figure is, then you simply push up the price of hamburgers in the United States. It doesn’t make any sense, Andrew. It doesn’t make any sense at all.

    Andrew Clennell: Sure.

    Minister for Trade: You want to be pushing prices down. You don’t want to be pushing them up.

    Andrew Clennell: Indeed. There’s also speculation the trade war could harm the PBS somehow and cause pharmaceutical prices to go up. How would that occur and what do you make of that speculation?

    Minister for Trade: Well, it simply is speculation. That’s all it is, Andrew. I’ve not heard one comment from any person in the United States that refers to the PBS. We’ve got a terrific health system. We’re continuing to improve all the time. Minister Butler is always coming up with new ideas to improve our health system. The PBS is an essential part of our health system and there will be absolutely nothing that the Americans can do to impact on our health system or the PBS system. And we certainly, we certainly would not contemplate doing anything at any stage that makes our health system more expensive. We want to put downward pressure on the cost of health and we’re going to continue to do that, especially if we get re-elected in a few weeks’ time.

    Andrew Clennell: It’s been reported the deal that Australia put on the table was access to our critical minerals like lithium, manganese, what’s the nature of that deal? Presumably America would still have to pay for the minerals. Would they get the minerals at a cheaper rate? Would they have the first right of refusal on the minerals? What are the minerals to be used for? Making mobile phones, electric cars and the like?

    Minister for Trade: Yeah, look, Australia is very fortunate in the sense that we have either the largest or the second largest reserves of all critical minerals and rare earths in the world. Now, critical minerals are different from other minerals. If you go up to the Pilbara, you can see iron ore as far as the eye can see, Andrew. Critical minerals tend to be in much smaller deposits and they’re much deeper down. Two things about that. They are more expensive to extract and they take longer to dig out of the ground and they don’t last as long so you’ve got to keep finding new resources. What this means for what we were proposing to the Americans was continued and improved investment in getting access to those critical minerals. We’ve got some of the most sophisticated miners in Australia, Andrew. We’ve got a very sophisticated mining operation here, much more sophisticated than the Americans. But the thing we often don’t have is access to capital. So, the offer to the Americans was, look, we’ll work with you. You want these critical minerals, you want them for electric batteries in cars, you’ve mentioned some of the other things, mobile phones, all of these sorts of things. But the process of extraction is expensive, we need capital. We want to work with other countries. We want to particularly work, for instance, with the Europeans. We’ve made them some offers in this regard. It’s not about cheaper prices, it’s not about preferred access. It’s about ensuring that they’ve got a reliable supply chain to ensure that when they need these critical minerals, you’ve got a reliable country like Australia who can provide them.

    Andrew Clennell: So, would that be Australian money or American money? When you talk about increased investment –

    Minister for Trade: Both. Both.

    Andrew Clennell: Okay. So, an Australian financial offer was put on the table?

    Minister for Trade: No, it wasn’t a financial offer in that sense. It was a way forward to try and get support both in Australia and in the United States for extracting these critical minerals. So, if we’re going to go down the track of decarbonising our economies, this is the way we need to go. But it’s going to require investment, significant investment. The Australian Government is already making significant investments in this area. But to get to where we want to get to in terms of that net zero project, then we need more investment and – 

    Andrew Clennell: Do you see the hand of Elon Musk? Do you see the hand of Elon Musk in any of this? The keenness of the Americans for these critical minerals.

    Minister for Trade: Well, look, they didn’t accept our offer. So, if Mr Musk was involved in this, then he doesn’t appear to have influenced the result, if that was what he was after. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Musk was not involved in any of these discussions that I –

    Andrew Clennell: All right, no worries. We’re nearly out of time. Overnight, the PM reiterated in a meeting with European leaders he would consider sending peacekeepers to Ukraine if there was peace. That’ll be controversial with a lot of Australians because it’s not our region. We know Peter Dutton doesn’t support this. Is the PM trying to muscle up here after Peter Dutton has continually called him weak? What’s the motivation to get involved in this conflict?

    Minister for Trade: Andrew, for the last 80 years, in other words, since the end of World War II, Australia has been involved in peacekeeping missions all the way around the world. We’ve come out right from day one, Prime Minister Albanese has been very clear and very strong on this, we support Ukraine. Ukraine’s fight for democracy. Ukraine’s fight for its sovereignty is Australia’s fight. It’s Australia’s fight. We’ve made significant financial contributions to Ukraine to ensure that they can defend themselves from this illegal and immoral monster, Putin, and we’ll continue to do that. And if Prime Minister Starmer says, look, will you contribute to peacekeeping? I think that’s the right thing to do. Look, it’s not all about popularity and so forth, but it’s the right thing to do. We want to see peace around the world. The best thing that Australia can do in terms of any international relationship is to support peace. And if we can make a contribution to that peacekeeping effort, then I think we should. And I think Mr. Dutton is completely on the wrong track here. Australians support the Ukrainian fight. I was on the steps of Parliament House just a couple of weeks ago with Premier Malinauskas. His background is Lithuanian. He knows exactly what happens if you don’t stand up to bullies like Putin. It’s in our interest to defend democracy in Ukraine. It’s in our interest to be part of a peacekeeping force when there’s peace.

    Andrew Clennell: Finally, and briefly, there was something of a blow to the government late last week with the default market offer out, that Australians face price rises of up to 10 per cent on their power bills. Will the government’s electricity subsidy be extended and increased in the budget?

    Minister for Trade: Well, you know the answer to that question, Andrew. You’ll have to ask the Treasurer, and you’ve only got a few more sleeps to find out what’s going to be in the next budget.

    Andrew Clennell: Well, I might ask him on the show next week. Thanks very much, Don Farrell.

    Minister for Trade: Nice talking with you Andrew. 

    MIL OSI News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Trump freezes VOA, other US-funded media outlets

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Hundreds of staffers at Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe and other outlets received a weekend email that they will be barred from their offices and should surrender press passes and equipment, local media reported Saturday.

    The cuts followed an executive order by U.S. President Donald Trump on Friday, which listed U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), as part of “unnecessary” federal bureaucracy.

    USAGM, VOA’s parent agency, employs about 3,500 staff and has an 886 million-U.S. dollar budget for 2024, according to its latest report to Congress.

    The agency has severed all contracts for the privately incorporated international broadcasters it funds, including Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Asia, local media reported.

    VOA director Michael Abramowitz said on social media that nearly his entire staff of 1,300 journalists, producers and assistants had been put on administrative leave.

    The White House said the cuts would ensure “taxpayers are no longer on the hook for radical propaganda.”

    Reports indicated that the decision is expected to face challenges, as Congress, not the president, has the constitutional power of the purse. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese animated blockbuster ‘Ne Zha 2’ premieres in Indonesia

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    Audience enter the cinema for the Indonesian premiere of Chinese animated film Ne Zha 2 at CGV Grand Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 15, 2025. (Xinhua/Xu Qin)

    Chinese animated blockbuster “Ne Zha 2,” the highest-grossing animated film of all time, premiered in Jakarta, Indonesia, on Saturday, with a packed theater of eager moviegoers.

    Throughout the screening, Indonesian moviegoers were fully immersed in the movie, responding with laughter, gasp, and applause. Notably, the audience was moved and hailed spontaneously, showing their excitement and appreciation.

    After the screening, many young viewers gathered near the “Ne Zha 2” posters to film videos, eagerly recommending the movie to others.

    Oscar Prajnaphalla, head of marketing at Warner Bros. Indonesia, the movie’s local distributor, expressed his admiration. “This is the first Chinese movie we have distributed, and I must say, ‘Ne Zha 2’ left a strong impression. The animation is top-notch, the production quality is outstanding, and the story is deeply engaging. It’s a film that truly captivates the audience.”

    “Seeing today’s response, it’s clear that viewers were highly impressed by the animation and storytelling. I do not doubt that through word-of-mouth, ‘Ne Zha 2’ will attract even more moviegoers. We look forward to bringing more exceptional Chinese films to the Indonesian market in the future,” he added.

    For many Indonesians, “Ne Zha 2” marks their first experience with Chinese animated movies. Local moviegoer Syarah Prasetyo described it as a visually stunning film that kept her engaged throughout.

    “The plot twists kept me engaged, and the depiction of parental love resonated deeply with our culture, making it easy to connect with. The humor and emotional moments were well-balanced, making the entire viewing experience incredibly enjoyable. I genuinely look forward to seeing more outstanding Chinese movies at Indonesian cinemas,” she said.

    “Ne Zha 2” will officially hit screens in Indonesia on March 21. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Two disciplines in arts at AADTHU achieve record highs in QS World University Rankings

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    Participants pose for a group photo after a forum during the 2024 Tsinghua International Conference on Art & Design Education (ICADE 2024) in Milan, Nov. 16, 2024. [Photo courtesy of AADTHU]

    Tsinghua University ranked No. 1 in Asia and No. 14 globally for arts and design, and No. 2 in Asia and No. 3 worldwide for art history in the 15th edition of the QS World University Rankings by Subject, released on March 12 by global higher education analytics firm Quacquarelli Symonds.  

    Both disciplines are part of the Academy of Arts & Design, Tsinghua University (AADTHU). Notably, the art and design discipline rose 10 places in the global rankings, while the art history climbed 2 places.

    In its largest-ever subject rankings, Quacquarelli Symonds compared over 21,000 academic programs, taken by students at more than 1,700 universities across 100 countries and regions, spanning 55 subjects and five faculty areas. The Chinese mainland ranked third globally with 1,230 subjects listed, trailing only the United States and the United Kingdom.

    According to AADTHU’s official website, the academy’s achievements are deeply rooted in its strong commitment to constructing an integrated interdisciplinary system and to pioneering internationalized education.  

    By leading the reform of global art education, AADTHU is crafting a new professional development blueprint with an open approach. It is deepening its strategy of integrating art and science, advancing the development of interdisciplinary talent, and fostering innovation in technology and design, cultivating professionals with expertise in both the sciences and humanities.  

    In 2024, the academy invited 44 professors from prestigious global institutions, alongside artists, designers and industry leaders, for short-term programs. These initiatives featured 30 lectures, eight courses and two workshops, drawing over 1,000 faculty and student participants. Beyond this, the academy hosted 42 distinguished international experts as keynote speakers at conferences it either organized or co-hosted.

    Notable events from 2024 include an opening forum on the integration of art design and industry innovation in the era of artificial intelligence (AI) at Milan Academic Week in Milan, Italy, in January, as well as the 6th Art and Science International Symposium held in Beijing in March. Meanwhile, the 2024 Tsinghua International Conference on Art & Design Education (ICADE 2024), themed “New Dimensions: Imagination Beyond the Horizon,” and the exhibition “From the Seine to Guanghua Road: Modernization of Art Deco” were successfully held in Milan and Beijing, respectively, in November.  

    Further highlights from last year include the “Arts and Crafts Artworks Exhibition of AADTHU” held in Wakayama prefecture, Japan, and a special exhibition and international symposium on Dunhuang art research, which opened at the China-France Fashion Week in Paris, France. “Brilliance of Cooperation: The Olympic Art Exhibition of Tsinghua University” was also held in Lausanne, Switzerland, in October.  

    Additionally, Tsinghua University’s doctoral degree authorization points for the first-level disciplines of both art studies and design studies successfully passed an on-site evaluation in October by experts from peer higher education institutions. Earlier this year in January, the China Scientometrics and Bibliometrics Research Center of CNKI also named 11 faculty members from AADTHU as “2024 CNKI Highly Cited Scholars.” CNKI stands for China National Knowledge Infrastructure, a leading online academic database.

    AADTHU offers a diverse range of disciplines across 10 departments, including textile and fashion design, ceramic design, visual communication design, environmental art design, industrial design, information art & design, painting, sculpture, arts and crafts, and art history. The academy also features specialized offices for research, international exchanges, and art galleries. 

    The academy’s website also showed in recent years, AADTHU has continued to enhance its international standards, strengthen global academic exchanges, and expand its influence in international art education. Its art and design discipline, among the earliest in China to grant master’s and doctoral degrees, consistently ranks first nationally, emphasizing interdisciplinary, innovative, and globally competent talent development. AADTHU’s Department of Art History has also ranked among the top in national evaluations, with over half of its graduates securing positions at universities, museums, and research institutions.

    AADTHU pledges to use its expertise to support a global community with a shared future. Guided by the principle of “art for life, design for livelihood,” it is contributing to addressing rural revitalization, livelihood development and global issues, making art a force for progress and contributing Tsinghua’s wisdom to world civilization.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: ‘Ne Zha 2’ storms into global box office top 5, cementing it as a cultural phenomenon

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    Cultural creative products of Chinese animated film Ne Zha 2 are pictured in a toy store in Chengdu, southwest China’s Sichuan Province, March 4, 2025. (Xinhua/Lu Youyi)

    Chinese animated blockbuster “Ne Zha 2” has soared past Disney’s “Star Wars: The Force Awakens” to claim the fifth spot on the all-time global box office charts, further solidifying its status as both a cultural and commercial phenomenon.

    According to data from ticketing platform Maoyan as of Saturday, the film’s global earnings — including presales — have surpassed 15.019 billion yuan (about 2.09 billion U.S. dollars), a milestone reached just 45 days after its release during the Chinese New Year on Jan. 29.

    This latest feat adds to an impressive list of records for the film, which became the first film to gross 1 billion U.S. dollars in a single market, the first non-Hollywood title to enter the billion-dollar club, and the highest-grossing animated movie of all time worldwide.

    MILESTONE FOR CHINESE CINEMA

    Directed by Yang Yu, known as Jiaozi, the sequel to 2019’s “Ne Zha” — which grossed 5 billion yuan and topped the Chinese box office that year — has redefined the ceiling for single-film earnings in Chinese cinema. Over 98 percent of its revenue has come from the Chinese mainland, according to Maoyan data.

    “This success has not only boosted the confidence of creators but also showcased the resilience and immense growth potential of the Chinese market,” said Lai Li, a Maoyan analyst.

    The film’s roots run deep in Chinese mythology, continuing the story of the boy god Nezha as he and his ally Aobing struggle to rebuild their physical forms. With the help of the immortal Taiyi Zhenren, they navigate a journey of self-discovery, fate and defiance.

    The story’s rich mythology, dazzling animation and universal themes have struck a chord with audiences. “‘Ne Zha 2’ is a miracle and a peak in Chinese cinema, a record that may remain unbroken for a long time,” said Chen Xuguang, director of the Institute of Film, Television and Theatre at Peking University.

    EXPANDING GLOBAL REACH WITH ACCLAIM

    The film’s technical achievements are just as remarkable. With nearly 2,000 visual effects shots and contributions from 138 animation studios, “Ne Zha 2” exemplifies the growing strength of China’s creative industry.

    Since its international rollout began on Feb. 13 in Australia and New Zealand, “Ne Zha 2” has steadily expanded its global footprint. It opened in North America the following day, shattering the region’s 20-year-old opening weekend record for a Chinese-language film.

    Sheila Sofian, a professor at the University of Southern California and a member of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, praised the film’s production design, sound design, and music, calling it “mind-blowing” in a video interview shared by China Media Group.

    After debuting in Singapore on March 6, “Ne Zha 2” launched this week in the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, with further Southeast Asian rollouts planned in the coming weeks.

    Its European expansion is also underway. On Friday, the film held preview screenings in Britain and Ireland ahead of its official March 21 release in both countries, with further European rollouts to follow.

    Cedric Behrel, managing director of Trinity CineAsia, which holds theatrical distribution rights for “Ne Zha 2” across 37 territories, including the UK, Ireland, Germany, France and Spain, described the film’s European launch as “unprecedented in scope.”

    INDUSTRY-WIDE, CULTURAL IMPACT

    “Ne Zha 2” has struck a deep emotional chord with audiences. One Maoyan user reflected on the film’s themes of prejudice and resilience, writing, “The line ‘prejudice in people’s hearts is like an unmovable mountain’ rings true… Even I, from a humble background, used to judge others based on their family background.”

    Another viewer, a high school student preparing for China’s tough college entrance exams, found personal inspiration: “With 100 days left until the exam, ‘Ne Zha 2’ reminded me that my potential is limitless. If there’s no path ahead, I’ll carve one out myself!”

    Largely driven by “Ne Zha 2,” China’s box office revenue during the 2025 Spring Festival holiday hit a record high, injecting much-needed optimism into the country’s film industry, which saw earnings fall by 23 percent in 2024 compared to 2023, and by 34 percent from the pre-pandemic peak in 2019.

    Dong Wenxin, a film critic and manager of a cinema in Jinan, Shandong Province, emphasized the film’s industry-wide impact. “‘Ne Zha 2’ hasn’t drained the market but expanded it. More people are paying attention to theatrical releases and are willing to support quality content,” she told Xinhua. “We owe a lot to ‘Ne Zha 2’ — it’s proof that great commercial blockbusters can sustain a healthy market cycle.”

    Beyond its domestic success, “Ne Zha 2” is poised to serve as a cultural bridge, offering global audiences a window into China’s rich mythology and traditions.

    Yin Hong, vice chairman of the China Film Association and a professor at Tsinghua University, told Xinhua that the success of “Ne Zha 2” reflects the dynamism of China’s creative industries, the enduring appeal of its traditional culture, and the potential for Chinese stories to captivate audiences all over the world.

    In a video interview, Jiaozi reflected on the personal journey the “Ne Zha” films have taken him on, revealing how the series has evolved from his own passion into a broad cultural phenomenon. “The first step was creating something I loved, and domestic audiences loved it too,” he said. “Over time, I’ve worked to improve it, to refine my craft. I believe that one day, new ideas, deeper meanings, and a new soul will emerge from it, and the whole world will be able to appreciate it.”

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Guam at decolonisation ‘crossroads’ with resolution on US statehood

    By Mar-Vic Cagurangan in Hagatna, Guam

    Debate on Guam’s future as a US territory has intensified with its legislature due to vote on a non-binding resolution to become a US state amid mounting Pacific geostrategic tensions and expansionist declarations by the Trump administration.

    Located closer to Beijing than Hawai’i, Guam serves as a key US strategic asset, known as the “tip of the spear,” with 10,000 military personnel, an air base for F-35 fighters and B-2 bombers and home port for Virginia-class nuclear submarines.

    The small US territory of 166,000 people is also listed by the UN for decolonisation and last year became an associate member at the Pacific Islands Forum.

    Local Senator William A. Parkinson introduced the resolution to the legislature last Wednesday and called for Guam to be fully integrated into the American union, possibly as the 51st state.

    “We are standing in a moment of history where two great empires are standing face-to-face with each other, about to go to war,” Parkinson said at a press conference on Thursday.

    “We have to be real about what’s going on in this part of the world. We are a tiny island but we are too strategically important to be left alone. Stay with America or do we let ourselves be absorbed by China?”

    His resolution states the decision “must be built upon the informed consent of the people of Guam through a referendum”.

    Trump’s expansionist policies
    Parkinson’s resolution comes as US President Donald Trump advocates territorially expansionist policies, particularly towards the strategically located Danish-ruled autonomous territory of Greenland and America’s northern neighbour, Canada.

    “This one moment in time, this one moment in history, the stars are aligning so that the geopolitics of the United States favour statehood for Guam,” Parkinson said. “This is an opportunity we cannot pass up.”

    Guam Legislature Senator William A. Parkinson holds a press conference after introducing his resolution. BenarNews screenshot APR

    As a territory, Guam residents are American citizens but they cannot vote for the US president and their lone delegate to the Congress has no voting power on the floor.

    The US acquired Guam, along with Puerto Rico, in 1898 after winning the Spanish-American War, and both remain unincorporated territories to this day.

    Independence advocates and representatives from the Guam Commission on Decolonisation regularly testify at the UN’s Decolonisation Committee, where the island has been listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory since 1946.

    Commission on Decolonisation executive director Melvin Won Pat-Borja said he was not opposed to statehood but is concerned if any decision on Guam’s status was left to the US.

    “Decolonisation is the right of the colonised,” he said while attending Parkinson’s press conference, the Pacific Daily News reported.

    ‘Hands of our coloniser’
    “It’s counterintuitive to say that, ‘we’re seeking a path forward, a path out of this inequity,’ and then turn around and put it right back in the hands of our coloniser.

    “No matter what status any of us prefer, ultimately that is not for any one of us to decide, but it is up to a collective decision that we have to come to, and the only way to do it is via referendum,” he said, reports Kuam News.

    With the geostrategic competition between the US and China in the Pacific, Guam has become increasingly significant in supporting American naval and air operations, especially in the event of a conflict over Taiwan or in the South China Sea.

    The two US bases have seen Guam’s economy become heavily reliant on military investments and tourism.

    The Defence Department holds about 25 percent of Guam’s land and is preparing to spend billions to upgrade the island’s military infrastructure as another 5000 American marines relocate there from Japan’s Okinawa islands.

    Guam is also within range of Chinese and North Korean ballistic missiles and the US has trialed a defence system, with the first tests held in December.

    Governor Lou Leon Guerrero delivers her “State of the Island” address in Guam on Tuesday . . . “Guam cannot be the linchpin of American security in the Asian-Pacific if nearly 14,000 of our residents are without shelter . . .” Image: Office of the Governor of Guam/Benar News

    The “moment in history” for statehood may also be defined by the Trump administration spending cuts, Guam Governor Lou Leon Guerrero warned in her “state of the island” address on Wednesday.

    Military presence leveraged
    The island has in recent years leveraged the increased military presence to demand federal assistance and the territory’s treasury relies on at least US$0.5 billion in annual funding.

    “Let us be clear about this: Guam cannot be the linchpin of American security in the Asian-Pacific if nearly 14,000 of our residents are without shelter, because housing aid to Guam is cut, or if 36,000 of our people lose access to Medicaid and Medicare coverage keeping them healthy, alive and out of poverty,” Guerrero said.

    Parkinson’s proposed legislative resolution calls for an end to 125-plus years of US colonial uncertainty.

    “The people of Guam, as the rightful stewards of their homeland, must assert their inalienable right to self-determination,” states the resolution, including that there be a “full examination of statehood or enhanced autonomous status for Guam.”

    “Granting Guam equal political status would signal unequivocally that Guam is an integral part of the United States, deterring adversaries who might otherwise perceive Guam as a mere expendable outpost.”

    If adopted by the Guam legislature, the non-binding resolution would be transmitted to the White House.

    A local statute enacted in 2000 for a political status plebiscite on statehood, independence or free association has become bogged down in US courts.

    ‘Reject colonial status quo’
    Neil Weare, a former Guam resident and co-director of Right to Democracy, said the self-determination process must be centred on what the people of Guam want, “not just what’s best for US national security”.

    “Right to Democracy does not take a position on political status, other than to reject the undemocratic and colonial status quo,” Weare said on behalf of the nonprofit organisation that advocates for rights and self-determination in US territories.

    “People can have different views on what is the best solution to this problem, but we should all be in agreement that the continued undemocratic rule of millions of people in US territories is wrong and needs to end.”

    He said the 250th anniversary of the US Declaration of Independence next year can open a new venue for a conversation about key concepts — such as the “consent of the governed” — involving Guam and other US territories.

    Republished from BenarNews with permission.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI China: US launches new crewed mission to bring home stranded astronauts

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    NASA and SpaceX launched a new crewed mission to the International Space Station (ISS) on Friday to bring home two NASA astronauts who have been stranded in space since last June.

    The spacecraft lifted off aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket from NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in the state of Florida at 7:03 p.m. Friday Eastern Time (2303 GMT), according to a NASA live broadcast.

    About two and a half minutes after the launch, SpaceX confirmed the successful separation of the rocket’s first stage. The first stage booster landed at Landing Zone 1 located near the launch pad.

    The spacecraft is currently en route to the ISS. It will take about 28.5 hours for the spacecraft to autonomously dock to the space station, scheduled at 11:30 p.m. Saturday Eastern Time (0330 GMT Sunday), NASA said.

    The new mission, codenamed Crew-10, carries NASA astronauts Anne McClain and Nichole Ayers, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency astronaut Takuya Onishi, and cosmonaut Kirill Peskov with Russian state space corporation Roscosmos to the ISS.

    During their mission, Crew-10 is scheduled to conduct material flammability tests to contribute to future spacecraft and facility designs, NASA said, adding that the crew will engage with students worldwide via the ISS ham radio program and use the program’s existing hardware to test a backup lunar navigation solution.

    Also, one crew member will conduct an integrated study to monitor and analyze physiological and psychological changes in the human body, providing valuable insights for future deep space missions.

    Following the arrival of Crew-10 to the orbital laboratory, NASA’s SpaceX Crew-9 mission — which includes NASA astronauts Nick Hague, Suni Williams, Butch Wilmore, and Roscosmos cosmonaut Aleksandr Gorbunov — will return to Earth.

    Williams and Wilmore have been stuck in space since last June due to technical problems of Boeing’s Starliner which took them to the ISS.

    The two astronauts were initially scheduled for an eight-day mission in space, but numerous issues were detected during their trip to the ISS, including helium leaks and propulsion issues. As a result, NASA deemed the Starliner spacecraft unsafe to return with astronauts on board.

    While the Starliner spacecraft returned to Earth last September, Williams and Wilmore remained aboard the ISS for several additional months. 

    MIL OSI China News –