Category: Australia

  • MIL-OSI: Trupanion to Participate in the 46th Annual Raymond James Institutional Investor Conference

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SEATTLE, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Trupanion, Inc. (Nasdaq: TRUP), a leader in medical insurance for cats and dogs, announced today that Fawwad Qureshi, Chief Financial Officer, will present at the 46th Annual Raymond James Institutional Investor Conference on Monday, March 3, 2025, at 8:05 a.m. ET and will participate in meetings with investors throughout the day.

    The presentation will be webcast live and can be accessed on Trupanion’s Investor Relations website at http://investors.trupanion.com.

    About Trupanion:

    Trupanion is a leader in medical insurance for cats and dogs throughout the United States, Canada, certain countries in Continental Europe, and Australia with over 1,000,000 pets currently enrolled. For over two decades, Trupanion has given pet owners peace of mind so they can focus on their pet’s recovery, not financial stress. Trupanion is committed to providing pet parents with the highest value in pet medical insurance with unlimited payouts for the life of their pets. With its patented process, Trupanion is the only North American provider with the technology to pay veterinarians directly in seconds at the time of checkout. Trupanion is listed on NASDAQ under the symbol “TRUP”. The company was founded in 2000 and is headquartered in Seattle, WA. Trupanion policies are issued, in the United States, by its wholly-owned insurance entity American Pet Insurance Company and, in Canada, by Accelerant Insurance Company of Canada. Trupanion Australia is a partnership between Trupanion and Hollard Insurance Company. Policies are sold and administered in Canada by Canada Pet Health Insurance Services, Inc. dba Trupanion 309-1277 Lynn Valley Road, North Vancouver, BC V7J 0A2 and in the United States by Trupanion Managers USA, Inc. (CA license No. 0G22803, NPN 9588590). Canada Pet Health Insurance Services, Inc. is a registered damage insurance agency and claims adjuster in Quebec #603927. Trupanion Australia is a partnership between Trupanion and Hollard Insurance Company. For more information, please visit trupanion.com.

    Contact: 

    Laura Bainbridge, Senior Vice President, Corporate Communications
    Gil Melchior, Director, Investor Relations
    Investor.Relations@trupanion.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Negotiations for social security agreement with Sweden to begin

    Source: Ministers for Social Services

    The Albanese Labor Government will soon commence negotiations with the Swedish Government on a bilateral social security agreement.

    An agreement would boost access to certain Australian and Swedish social security benefits for eligible people who have lived or worked in both countries.

    Minister for Social Services Amanda Rishworth said Australia has much to gain from an agreement and she looks forward to strengthening the ties between our two countries.

    “It’s great to see negotiations will soon get underway for a social security agreement with Sweden, giving people greater freedom and choice in how and where they spend their retirement, secure in the knowledge they will be supported,” Minister Rishworth said.

    “Businesses operating across both countries may also benefit, with this arrangement ensuring they don’t have to pay compulsory superannuation and insurance contributions in both countries for seconded employees.”

    Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong said the agreement will be an important step in deepening the Australia-Sweden relationship.

    “With growing family and community links between Sweden and Australia, more Australians are dividing their lives between the countries,” Minister Wong said.

    “This agreement will provide greater choice for retiring Australians with Swedish connections, and will help to remove burdens for Australian and Swedish businesses seeking to invest in each other’s economy.”

    Swedish Ambassador Pontus Melander said an agreement would be a significant milestone in growing Australia’s relationship with Sweden.

    “Agreements like this are very important to facilitate for our citizens and bring Australia and Sweden even closer together,” Mr Melander said.

    “We are already close friends and partners, and it is excellent that negotiations on a bilateral social security agreement have started.”

    Australia has social security agreements with 32 countries.

    More information is available on the Department of Social Services website.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Four-year term: a chance for a more mature democracy

    Source: ACT Party

    ACT Leader David Seymour is welcoming the announcement that legislation enabling a four-year Parliamentary term will advance to select committee.

    The legislation is modelled on a draft Bill produced by ACT, and a commitment to advance it to select committee was secured in ACT’s coalition agreement.

    “Improving our approach to law making is how we secure more economic growth, better social services, better regulation, and ultimately give the next generation more reason to stay here,” says Seymour.

    “A four-year term will lead to more accountability and better law making, giving Kiwis more time to see whether political promises translate into results, so they can vote accordingly.

    “Polling shows more Kiwis support the four-year term than oppose it.

    “It’s important to point out that ACT’s proposal ensures the term can only be extended if the Government turns control of Select Committees over to the Opposition. This introduces balance by giving the Opposition more power to scrutinise and question Ministers, officials, and legislation.

    “ACT’s proposal means such a significant constitutional change will only come into effect with the consent of New Zealanders. If the legislation is supported by Parliament, it will then be subject to a public referendum.

    “I’m proud that ACT has started another tough conversation. We look forward to Kiwis having their say at select committee. Ultimately, we’re trying to achieve better law making a more mature democracy. That’s worth a constructive debate.”

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: In Joint Senate-House Veterans Hearing, King Stresses Supporting Servicemembers Shifting to Civilian Life

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Maine Angus King
    WASHINGTON, D.C. — In a joint hearing before the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee (SVAC) and the House Veterans Affairs Committee (HVAC), Senator Angus King (I-Maine), spoke about the importance of ensuring a smooth transition from active duty status to civilian life for veterans with James LaCoursiere, Jr., the National Commander of The American Legion. In the exchange, Senator King referenced the bipartisan TAP Promotion Act, legislation he championed that would proactively help veterans in the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) as they begin applying for their well-deserved benefits, and Commander LaCoursiere voiced his support for the bill — calling it “very critical.” According to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), approximately 200,000 servicemembers make the transition to civilian life each year. Additionally, the first few months after leaving active duty are often the most fragile for veterans, putting them at an increased risk for self-harm and suicide. According to a National Veteran Suicide Prevention Annual Report, suicide is the second leading cause of death in veterans under the age of 45.
    “Now, I do want to talk about transition for a minute. Be The One is one of the most important initiatives going on in the country right now. Thank you for staffing that, for setting it up and for making it actually happen. I have a simple formula for transition. I think the Defense Department should spend as much money on transition as they do on recruitment. One of the things we are working on here is something called the TAP Promotion Act which would bring Veteran Service Organizations (VSO) into the process of transition. We have to have a warm hand off. I think you quoted a number, a very large percentage of the suicides are at the first year or two after transition. That is a place where we really need to give some effort. Commander, tell me about how important you think transition is,” said Senator King.
    “Thank you very much for that question. The TAP program is very critical. It is a very important element and critical that [veterans] get 365 days to transition and educate themselves on it. As we all know, the more knowledge you have, it gives us a much better sense of direction on where to go and what you need but it serves you in the right direction for gainful future employment. As we all know, employment starts you in the right direction for stability with your family and it also drives the economy forward. Too often we sit back and they don’t know where to go for assistance when they get out of the military. I am not saying the second you get out of the military that you need assistance, but down the road you may need that assistance. They need to be afforded all the tools and resources and even get a start in their next career as they take off the uniform, replied Commander LaCoursiere.
    “My vision is someone meet you at the airport when you come home and says, ‘welcome home, here’s what the VA can do for you — here are the programs. Give me a call if you need any help.’ That is where things like the Be The One Program can be a difference. Thank you for what you’re doing. Be our eyes and ears and let us know what is happening out there so we can protect and defend the most sacred obligation this government has which is to its veterans,” said Senator King.
    Representing one of the states with the highest rates of military families and veterans per capita, Senator King has been a staunch advocate for America’s servicemembers and veterans. A member of the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee (SVAC), he works to ensure American veterans receive their earned benefits and that the VA is properly implementing various programs such as the PACT Act, the State Veterans Homes Domiciliary Care Flexibility Act, and the John Scott Hannon Act. Earlier this month, in a letter to VA Secretary Doug Collins, Senator King joined his colleagues in urging for immediate action to secure veterans’ personal information provided by VA or other agencies to Elon Musk and his “Department of Government Efficiency” (DOGE), a measure that would protect millions of veterans’ medical records stored in VA’s computer systems. Previously, Senator King introduced the Lethal Means Safe Storage for Veteran Suicide Prevention Act to provide firearm storage to veterans in an effort to reduce suicides among the veteran population. In addition, he helped pass the Veterans COLA Act, which increased benefits for 30,000 Maine veterans and their families. Recently, Senator King introduced bipartisan legislation alongside SVAC Chairman Senator Jerry Moran (R-KS) to improve care coordination for veterans who rely on both VA health care and Medicare. This week, Senator King was honored by the Disabled American Veterans as its 2025 Legislator of the Year. Last year, he was recognized by the Wounded Warrior Project as the 2024 Legislator of the Year for his “outstanding legislative effort and achievement to improve the lives of the wounded, ill, and injured veterans.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Minister Rishworth doorstop interview in Cairns, Queensland

    Source: Ministers for Social Services

    E&OE TRANSCRIPT

    Topic: Expanding crisis accommodation services for First Nations communities.

    MATT SMITH, LABOR CANDIDATE FOR LEICHHARDT: Morning. My name is Matt Smith, the ALP’s candidate for the Federal seat of Leichhardt, standing here at Warringu today. I’ve just been out the back speaking to some of the workforce here, Davina and Karen, and they are doing some absolutely fantastic work keeping women and children safe right across the region. Every woman and child deserves safety. Organisations such as Warringu are able to provide that support for those fleeing domestic violence situations and preparing the women and the children, helping them get back onto their feet and back into the community.

    We’re here today specifically as well for an announcement for additional targeted funding for the Torres Strait, a bit over $1.2 million to improve the services of women’s shelters up there to make sure they too can provide culturally appropriate services for their women and children. Shelters is an interesting term. There are a lot of implications behind it. The guys here at Warringu prefer the new term healing places, which is what they are. It gives the women and children space to heal, become themselves and get back out and live their best lives. I’ll hand over now to Minister Rishworth who has more detail.

    AMANDA RISHWORTH, MINISTER FOR SOCIAL SERVICES: It’s absolutely wonderful to be here with Matt Smith and we’ve just been speaking to those working at Warringu, an Aboriginal-controlled organisation providing important safety safety to women and children escaping family and domestic violence. What we heard today is the activities they are undertaking as a result of a grant that we provided them of over a million dollars. And part of that work is about building the capacity of the women’s shelters across the whole of Far North Queensland. Hearing how they’re supporting women’s shelters across Far North Queensland, to feel like they’re not alone, to support them with extra clinical expertise and governance support. This is really important work and what it does is it enables the whole network of 13 different women’s shelters to be able to build capacity and improve their service offering. But today what we’re also announcing is an immediate boost of $1.25 million to be directed into the Torres Strait.

    We know that many Torres Strait Islander women and children don’t want to come all the way to Cairns if they are wanting to get out of a family and domestic violence situation. The message we heard very clear as we developed our Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Action Plan, but also through the rapid review, was that women and children don’t want to leave the Torres Strait to find safety. And that’s why the immediate funding boost that we’re announcing today for the Torres Strait will enable that organisation up there, the women’s shelter up there, to expand their capacity and to do more work with women and children escaping family and domestic violence. This is one of just one of the initiatives that we have taken as a government for funding family and domestic violence. It builds on our National Plan to end violence against women and children in one generation, and of course, our Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Action Plan that was actually developed alongside Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. This is really important investment and funding, and I look forward to seeing the results that it will be able to deliver.

    JOURNALIST: What exactly will this money go towards? I mean, will it be more employees? Will it be more buildings?

    AMANDA RISHWORTH: This funding is about expanding the capacity of the shelter. It really is flexible funding to respond to local need. What we heard here at Warringu was the funding went particularly to workers that can work with sexual violence in particular, because that is something that has not been focused on as much as they would like to. The funding also went to connecting up and supporting shelters across the region so that they can have better systems in place to support women and children. So, we will work with the local shelter on Thursday Island to work out what investment they need to improve the capacity of their shelter. So, it is deliberately designed to be flexible to meet local needs. And hearing from Warringu today, they said the flexibility is critically important so they can meet the needs of local community.

    JOURNALIST: Why have you decided to start this funding in the Torres Strait? Are the domestic violence rates particularly bad there?

    AMANDA RISHWORTH: It is not because there is more violence in the Torres Strait. Why we are investing in the Torres Strait is because we heard the deep desire to make sure people do not have to leave the Torres Strait. So, women and children clearly said through our rapid review, through our consultations on our Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander plan, that they don’t want to travel too far from community. So, the Torres Strait was particularly identified because we want to ensure that there is increased capacity so that women and children can stay in the Torres Strait and don’t have to, for example, come all the way to Cairns.

    JOURNALIST: How many people – women and children – are seen at this facility roughly?

    AMANDA RISHWORTH: I will leave it to local organisations to talk about that. What we hear though, is that many, many women and children do seek support and do seek crisis accommodation. But as we heard from the workers here today, it is also about healing and recovery. And that’s a really important part of the National Plan and the work they do, but each location is different. But, of course, women and children escaping family and domestic violence – there is high demand, and we want to make sure there’s a safe place for them to go. Thank you.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI: Expand Energy Corporation Reports Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2024 Results, Issues 2025 Outlook

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    OKLAHOMA CITY, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Expand Energy Corporation (NASDAQ:EXE) (“Expand Energy” or the “Company”) today reported fourth quarter and full-year 2024 financial and operating results and issued its 2025 outlook.

    Fourth Quarter Highlights

    • Net cash provided by operating activities of $382 million
    • Net loss of $399 million, or $1.72 per fully diluted share; adjusted net income(1)of $131 million, or $0.55 per share
    • Adjusted EBITDAX(1)of $964 million
    • Produced approximately 6.41 Bcfe/d net (91% natural gas)
    • Debut $750 million Investment Grade issuance, setting record spread for energy rising star (+132 bps to 10-year Treasury)

    2025 Outlook

    • Increasing expected synergy capture to ~$400 million in 2025, with the total target of $500 million in annual synergies expected to be achieved by year end 2026
    • Quarterly base dividend of $0.575 per common share to be paid in March 2025, 16th straight quarter paying a dividend
    • Expected to produce ~7.1 Bcfe/d for ~$2.7 billion of capital and deploy $300 million of incremental capital to create an additional ~300 MMcfe/d of productive capacity in 2026

    (1) Definitions of non-GAAP financial measures and reconciliations of each non-GAAP financial measure to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure are included at the end of this news release.

    “The global need for reliable, affordable, lower carbon energy has never been greater. Our strong fourth quarter results and 2025 outlook clearly demonstrate, as the nation’s largest gas producer, we are ready to answer the call and expand opportunity for consumers and investors alike,” said Nick Dell’Osso, Expand Energy’s President and Chief Executive Officer. “The powerful combination of our attractive, market-connected portfolio, peer-leading returns program, and resilient financial foundation is distinctly unique among domestic natural gas producers. Our focus on integration and operational execution continues to deliver, allowing us to capture 80% of our $500 million synergy target in 2025 as we drive to lower our breakeven costs and more efficiently reach markets in need. Importantly, our capital plan positions us to continue our strategy to build productive capacity, positioning the company to efficiently and rapidly respond with production in 2026 should market conditions warrant.”

    Operations Update

    In the fourth quarter, Expand Energy operated an average of twelve rigs to drill 44 wells and turned 41 wells in line, resulting in net production of approximately 6.41 Bcfe per day (91% natural gas). A detailed breakdown of fourth quarter production, capital expenditures and activity can be found in supplemental slides which have been posted at https://investors.expandenergy.com/events-presentations.

    2025 Annual Synergy, Capital and Operating Outlook

    In 2025, Expand Energy expects to run ~12 rigs and invest approximately $2.7 billion yielding an estimated daily production of approximately 7.1 Bcfe/d. The company intends to build incremental productive capacity for an additional $300 million by running ~15 rigs in the second half of the year. This positions the company to efficiently grow production from a year-end 2025 exit rate of approximately 7.2 Bcfe/d to average approximately 7.5 Bcfe/d in 2026 should market conditions warrant.

    Expand Energy is increasing its 2025 expected annual synergy target by $175 million to approximately $400 million. The company expects to achieve the full $500 million in annual synergies by year end 2026.

    A detailed breakdown of 2025 annual synergy, capital, and operating outlook can be found in supplemental slides which have been posted at https://investors.expandenergy.com/events-presentations.

    Shareholder Returns Update

    Expand Energy enhanced its capital return framework in 2024 to more efficiently return cash to shareholders and reduce net debt. The company plans to pay its quarterly base dividend of $0.575 per share on March 27, 2025 to shareholders of record at the close of business on March 11, 2025. The company expects to allocate $500 million to net debt reduction in 2025, and at current market conditions, to have additional free cash flow available to allocate to the combination of variable dividends, share repurchases, and the balance sheet.

    Conference Call Information

    A conference call to discuss Expand Energy’s fourth quarter and full-year 2024 financial and operating results and 2025 outlook has been scheduled for 9 a.m. EDT on February 27, 2025. Participants can access the live webcast at https://edge.media-server.com/mmc/p/jwd532c5/. Participants who would like to ask a question, can register at https://register.vevent.com/register/BIada59e18f58249708a9b9b311a92efae, and will receive the dial-in info and a unique PIN to join the call. Links to the conference call will be provided at https://investors.expandenergy.com/. A replay will be available on the website following the call.

    Financial Statements, Non-GAAP Financial Measures and 2025 Guidance and Outlook Projections

    This news release contains the non-GAAP financial measures described below in the section titled “Non-GAAP Financial Measures.” Reconciliations of each non-GAAP financial measure used in this news release to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure are provided below. Additional detail on the company’s 2024 fourth quarter and full-year financial and operational results, along with non-GAAP measures that adjust for items typically excluded by securities analysts, are available on the company’s website. Non-GAAP measures should not be considered as an alternative to, or more meaningful than, GAAP measures. Management’s guidance for 2025 can be found on the company’s website at www.expandenergy.com.

    Expand Energy Corporation (NASDAQ: EXE) is the largest independent natural gas producer in the United States, powered by dedicated and innovative employees focused on disrupting the industry’s traditional cost and market delivery model to responsibly develop assets in the nation’s most prolific natural gas basins. Expand Energy’s returns-driven strategy strives to create sustainable value for its stakeholders by leveraging its scale, financial strength and operational execution. Expand Energy is committed to expanding America’s energy reach to fuel a more affordable, reliable, lower carbon future.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Forward-looking statements include our current expectations or forecasts of future events, including matters relating to armed conflict and instability in Europe and the Middle East, along with the effects of the current global economic environment, and the impact of each on our business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows, actions by, or disputes among or between, members of OPEC+ and other foreign oil-exporting countries, market factors, market prices, our ability to meet debt service requirements, our ability to continue to pay cash dividends, our ability to capture synergies, the amount and timing of any cash dividends and our ESG initiatives. Forward-looking and other statements in this news release regarding our environmental, social and other sustainability plans and goals are not an indication that these statements are necessarily material to investors or required to be disclosed in our filings with the Securities and Exchange commission (“SEC”). In addition, historical, current, and forward-looking environmental, social and sustainability-related statements may be based on standards for measuring progress that are still developing, internal controls and processes that continue to evolve, and assumptions that are subject to change in the future. Forward-looking statements often address our expected future business, financial performance and financial condition, and often contain words such as “aim”, “predict”, “should”, “expect,” “could,” “may,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “plan,” “ability,” “believe,” “seek,” “see,” “will,” “would,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “target,” “guidance,” “outlook,” “opportunity” or “strategy.” The absence of such words or expressions does not necessarily mean the statements are not forward-looking.

    Although we believe the expectations and forecasts reflected in our forward-looking statements are reasonable, they are inherently subject to numerous risks and uncertainties, most of which are difficult to predict and many of which are beyond our control. No assurance can be given that such forward-looking statements will be correct or achieved or that the assumptions are accurate or will not change over time. Particular uncertainties that could cause our actual results to be materially different than those expressed in our forward-looking statements include:

    • Reduce demand for natural gas, oil, and natural gas liquids;
    • negative public perceptions of our industry;
    • competition in the natural gas and oil exploration and production industry;
    • the volatility of natural gas, oil and NGL prices, which are affected by general economic and business conditions, as well as increased demand for (and availability of) alternative fuels and electric vehicles;
    • risks from regional epidemics or pandemics and related economic turmoil, including supply chain constraints;
    • write-downs of our natural gas and oil asset carrying values due to low commodity prices;
    • significant capital expenditures are required to replace our reserves and conduct our business;
    • our ability to replace reserves and sustain production;
    • uncertainties inherent in estimating quantities of natural gas, oil and NGL reserves and projecting future rates of production and the amount and timing of development expenditures;
    • drilling and operating risks and resulting liabilities;
    • our ability to generate profits or achieve targeted results in drilling and well operations;
    • leasehold terms expiring before production can be established;
    • risks from our commodity price risk management activities;
    • uncertainties, risks and costs associated with natural gas and oil operations;
    • our need to secure adequate supplies of water for our drilling operations and to dispose of or recycle the water used;
    • pipeline and gathering system capacity constraints and transportation interruptions;
    • risks related to our plans to participate in the global LNG value chain;
    • terrorist activities and/or cyber-attacks adversely impacting our operations;
    • risks from failure to protect personal information and data and compliance with data privacy and security laws and regulations;
    • disruption of our business by natural or human causes beyond our control;
    • a deterioration in general economic, business or industry conditions;
    • the impact of inflation and commodity price volatility, including as a result of decisions made by OPEC+ and armed conflict and instability in Europe and the Middle East, along with the effects of the current global economic environment, on our business, financial condition, employees, contractors, vendors and the global demand for natural gas and oil and on U.S. and global financial markets;
    • our inability to access the capital markets on favorable terms;
    • the limitations on our financial flexibility due to our level of indebtedness and restrictive covenants from our indebtedness;
    • challenges with employee retention and increasingly competitive labor market
    • risks related to acquisitions or dispositions, or potential acquisitions or dispositions; risks related to loss of management personnel, other key employees, customers, suppliers, vendors, landlords, joint venture partners and other business partners as a result of the merger with Southwestern Energy Company (“Southwestern”); the risk that problems may arise in successfully integrating the businesses of the companies, which may result in the combined company not operating as effectively and efficiently as expected; and the risk that the combined company may be unable to achieve synergies or other anticipated benefits of the Southwestern merger or it may take longer than expected to achieve those synergies or benefits;
    • security threats, including cybersecurity threats and disruptions to our business and operations from breaches of our information technology systems, or from breaches of information technology systems of third parties with whom we transact business;
    • our ability to achieve and maintain ESG certifications, goals and commitments;
    • environmental and ESG legislation and regulatory initiatives, including those addressing the impact of climate change or further regulating hydraulic fracturing, methane emissions, flaring or water disposal;
    • federal and state tax proposals affecting our industry;
    • risks related to an annual limitation on the utilization of our tax attributes, which was triggered upon the completion of the Southwestern merger, as well as trading in our common stock, additional issuance of common stock, and certain other stock transactions, which could lead to an additional, potentially more restrictive, annual limitation; and
    • other factors that are described under Risk Factors in Item 1A of Part I of our Annual Report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC.

    We caution you not to place undue reliance on the forward-looking statements contained in this news release, which speak only as of the filing date, and we undertake no obligation and have no intention to update any forward-looking statement, except as required by law. We urge you to carefully review and consider the disclosures in this news release and our filings with the SEC that attempt to advise interested parties of the risks and factors that may affect our business.

    All forward-looking statements attributable to us are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.

             
    CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS (unaudited)        
             
    ($ in millions, except per share data)   December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
    Assets        
    Current assets:        
    Cash and cash equivalents   $ 317     $ 1,079  
    Restricted cash     78       74  
    Accounts receivable, net     1,226       593  
    Derivative assets     84       637  
    Other current assets     292       226  
    Total current assets     1,997       2,609  
    Property and equipment:        
    Natural gas and oil properties, successful efforts method        
    Proved natural gas and oil properties     23,093       11,468  
    Unproved properties     5,897       1,806  
    Other property and equipment     654       497  
    Total property and equipment     29,644       13,771  
    Less: accumulated depreciation, depletion and amortization     (5,362 )     (3,674 )
    Total property and equipment, net     24,282       10,097  
    Long-term derivative assets     1       74  
    Deferred income tax assets     589       933  
    Other long-term assets     1,025       663  
    Total assets   $ 27,894     $ 14,376  
             
    Liabilities and stockholders’ equity        
    Current liabilities:        
    Accounts payable   $ 777     $ 425  
    Current maturities of long-term debt, net     389        
    Accrued interest     100       39  
    Derivative liabilities     71       3  
    Other current liabilities     1,786       847  
    Total current liabilities     3,123       1,314  
    Long-term debt, net     5,291       2,028  
    Long-term derivative liabilities     68       9  
    Asset retirement obligations, net of current portion     499       265  
    Long-term contract liabilities     1,227        
    Other long-term liabilities     121       31  
    Total liabilities     10,329       3,647  
    Contingencies and commitments        
    Stockholders’ equity:        
    Common stock, $0.01 par value, 450,000,000 shares authorized: 231,769,886 and 130,789,936 shares issued     2       1  
    Additional paid-in capital     13,687       5,754  
    Retained earnings     3,876       4,974  
    Total stockholders’ equity     17,565       10,729  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity   $ 27,894     $ 14,376  
                     
         
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS (unaudited)    
             
        Three Months Ended December 31,   Year Ended December 31,
        2024   2023   2024   2023
    ($ in millions, except per share data)                
    Revenues and other:                
    Natural gas, oil and NGL   $ 1,595     $ 763     $ 2,969     $ 3,547  
    Marketing     649       513       1,290       2,500  
    Natural gas, oil and NGL derivatives     (245 )     533       (38 )     1,728  
    Gains on sales of assets     2       139       14       946  
    Total revenues and other     2,001       1,948       4,235       8,721  
    Operating expenses:                
    Production     158       63       316       356  
    Gathering, processing and transportation     556       190       1,035       853  
    Severance and ad valorem taxes     39       31       97       167  
    Exploration     3       8       10       27  
    Marketing     654       514       1,310       2,499  
    General and administrative     53       32       186       127  
    Separation and other termination costs           2       23       5  
    Depreciation, depletion and amortization     647       379       1,729       1,527  
    Other operating expense, net     277       3       332       18  
    Total operating expenses     2,387       1,222       5,038       5,579  
    Income (loss) from operations     (386 )     726       (803 )     3,142  
    Other income (expense):                
    Interest expense     (64 )     (22 )     (123 )     (104 )
    Gains (losses) on purchases, exchanges or extinguishments of debt     1             (1 )      
    Other income, net     28       31       86       79  
    Total other income (expense)     (35 )     9       (38 )     (25 )
    Income (loss) before income taxes     (421 )     735       (841 )     3,117  
    Income tax expense (benefit)     (22 )     166       (127 )     698  
    Net income (loss)   $ (399 )   $ 569     $ (714 )   $ 2,419  
    Earnings (loss) per common share:                
    Basic   $ (1.72 )   $ 4.34     $ (4.55 )   $ 18.21  
    Diluted   $ (1.72 )   $ 4.02     $ (4.55 )   $ 16.92  
    Weighted average common shares outstanding (in thousands):                
    Basic     231,539       130,999       156,989       132,840  
    Diluted     231,539       141,491       156,989       142,976  
                                     
         
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS (unaudited)    
             
        Three Months Ended December 31,   Year Ended December 31,
    ($ in millions)   2024   2023   2024   2023
    Cash flows from operating activities:                
    Net income (loss)   $ (399 )   $ 569     $ (714 )   $ 2,419  
    Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash provided by operating activities:                
    Depreciation, depletion and amortization     647       379       1,729       1,527  
    Deferred income tax expense (benefit)     (18 )     109       (123 )     428  
    Derivative (gains) losses, net     245       (533 )     38       (1,728 )
    Cash receipts on derivative settlements, net     252       187       947       354  
    Share-based compensation     9       8       38       33  
    Gains on sales of assets     (2 )     (139 )     (14 )     (946 )
    Contract amortization     (57 )           (57 )      
    (Gains) losses on purchases, exchanges or extinguishments of debt     (1 )           1        
    Other     51       (17 )     35       18  
    Changes in assets and liabilities     (345 )     (93 )     (315 )     275  
    Net cash provided by operating activities     382       470       1,565       2,380  
    Cash flows from investing activities:                
    Capital expenditures     (536 )     (379 )     (1,557 )     (1,829 )
    Receipts of deferred consideration     50             166        
    Business combination, net     (459 )           (459 )      
    Contributions to investments     (4 )     (82 )     (75 )     (231 )
    Proceeds from divestitures of property and equipment     4       566       21       2,533  
    Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities     (945 )     105       (1,904 )     473  
    Cash flows from financing activities:                
    Proceeds from Credit Facility     20             20       1,125  
    Payments on Credit Facility     (20 )           (20 )     (2,175 )
    Proceeds from issuance of senior notes, net     747             747        
    Funds held for transition services           (91 )            
    Proceeds from warrant exercise     2             3        
    Debt issuance and other financing costs     (7 )           (11 )      
    Cash paid to repurchase and retire common stock           (42 )           (355 )
    Cash paid to purchase debt     (767 )           (767 )      
    Cash paid for common stock dividends     (134 )     (75 )     (388 )     (487 )
    Other     (3 )           (3 )      
    Net cash used in financing activities     (162 )     (208 )     (419 )     (1,892 )
    Net increase (decrease) in cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash     (725 )     367       (758 )     961  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash, beginning of period     1,120       786       1,153       192  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash, end of period   $ 395     $ 1,153     $ 395     $ 1,153  
                     
    Cash and cash equivalents   $ 317     $ 1,079     $ 317     $ 1,079  
    Restricted cash     78       74       78       74  
    Total cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash   $ 395     $ 1,153     $ 395     $ 1,153  
                                     
             
    NATURAL GAS, OIL AND NGL PRODUCTION AND AVERAGE SALES PRICES (unaudited)        
                                     
        Three Months Ended December 31, 2024
        Natural Gas   Oil   NGL   Total
        MMcf per day   $/Mcf   MBbl per day   $/Bbl   MBbl per day   $/Bbl   MMcfe per day   $/Mcfe
    Haynesville   2,338   2.57           2,338   2.57
    Northeast Appalachia   2,425   2.34           2,425   2.34
    Southwest Appalachia   1,067   2.42   12   60.41   85   27.44   1,649   3.42
    Total   5,830   2.45   12   60.41   85   27.44   6,412   2.70
                                     
    Average NYMEX Price       2.79       70.27                
    Average Realized Price (including realized derivatives)       2.91       61.28       26.90       3.11
        Three Months Ended December 31, 2023
        Natural Gas   Oil   NGL   Total
        MMcf per day   $/Mcf   MBbl per day   $/Bbl   MBbl per day   $/Bbl   MMcfe per day   $/Mcfe
    Haynesville   1,497   2.41           1,497   2.41
    Northeast Appalachia   1,801   2.15           1,801   2.15
    Eagle Ford   52   2.42   6   82.49   7   25.67   129   6.30
    Total   3,350   2.27   6   82.49   7   25.67   3,427   2.42
                                     
    Average NYMEX Price       2.88       78.35                
    Average Realized Price (including realized derivatives)       2.87       82.49       25.67       3.01
        Year Ended December 31, 2024
        Natural Gas   Oil   NGL   Total
        MMcf per day   $/Mcf   MBbl per day   $/Bbl   MBbl per day   $/Bbl   MMcfe per day   $/Mcfe
    Haynesville   1,532   2.14           1,532   2.14
    Northeast Appalachia   1,809   1.88           1,809   1.88
    Southwest Appalachia   270   2.42   3   60.41   21   27.44   417   3.42
    Total   3,611   2.03   3   60.41   21   27.44   3,758   2.16
                                     
    Average NYMEX Price       2.27       75.72                
    Average Realized Price (including realized derivatives)       2.75       61.04       26.91       2.84
        Year Ended December 31, 2023
        Natural Gas   Oil   NGL   Total
        MMcf per day   $/Mcf   MBbl per day   $/Bbl   MBbl per day   $/Bbl   MMcfe per day   $/Mcfe
    Haynesville   1,551   2.30           1,551   2.30
    Northeast Appalachia   1,834   2.22           1,834   2.22
    Eagle Ford   85   2.25   21   77.80   10   25.62   274   7.64
    Total   3,470   2.25   21   77.80   10   25.62   3,659   2.66
                                     
    Average NYMEX Price       2.74       77.63                
    Average Realized Price (including realized derivatives)       2.64       72.89       25.62       2.99
                                     
         
    CAPITAL EXPENDITURES ACCRUED (unaudited)    
             
        Three Months Ended December 31,   Year Ended December 31,
        2024
      2023
      2024
      2023
    ($ in millions)                
    Drilling and completion capital expenditures:                
    Haynesville   $ 300     $ 187     $ 777     $ 891  
    Northeast Appalachia     97       119       377       443  
    Southwest Appalachia     103             103        
    Eagle Ford                       222  
    Total drilling and completion capital expenditures     500       306       1,257       1,556  
    Non-drilling and completion – field     51       50       157       150  
    Non-drilling and completion – corporate     42       20       115       76  
    Total capital expenditures   $ 593     $ 376     $ 1,529     $ 1,782  
                                     
       
    NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES  
       

    As a supplement to the financial results prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP, Expand Energy’s quarterly earnings releases contain certain financial measures that are not prepared or presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP. These non-GAAP financial measures include Adjusted Net Income, Adjusted Diluted Earnings Per Common Share, Adjusted EBITDAX, Free Cash Flow, Adjusted Free Cash Flow and Net Debt. A reconciliation of each financial measure to its most directly comparable GAAP financial measure is included in the tables below. Management believes these adjusted financial measures are a meaningful adjunct to earnings and cash flows calculated in accordance with GAAP because (a) management uses these financial measures to evaluate the company’s trends and performance, (b) these financial measures are comparable to estimates provided by securities analysts, and (c) items excluded generally are one-time items or items whose timing or amount cannot be reasonably estimated. Accordingly, any guidance provided by the company generally excludes information regarding these types of items.

    Expand Energy’s definitions of each non-GAAP measure presented herein are provided below. Because not all companies or securities analysts use identical calculations, Expand Energy’s non-GAAP measures may not be comparable to similarly titled measures of other companies or securities analysts.

    Adjusted Net Income: Adjusted Net Income is defined as net income (loss) adjusted to exclude unrealized (gains) losses on natural gas and oil derivatives, (gains) losses on sales of assets, and certain items management believes affect the comparability of operating results, less a tax effect using applicable rates. Expand Energy believes that Adjusted Net Income facilitates comparisons of the company’s period-over-period performance, by excluding the impact of items that, in the opinion of management, do not reflect Expand Energy’s core operating performance. Adjusted Net Income should not be considered an alternative to, or more meaningful than, net income (loss) as presented in accordance with GAAP.

    Adjusted Diluted Earnings Per Common Share: Adjusted Diluted Earnings Per Common Share is defined as diluted earnings (loss) per common share adjusted to exclude the per diluted share amounts attributed to unrealized (gains) losses on natural gas and oil derivatives, (gains) losses on sales of assets, and certain items management believes affect the comparability of operating results, less a tax effect using applicable rates. Expand Energy believes that Adjusted Diluted Earnings Per Common Share facilitates comparisons of the company’s period-over-period performance, by excluding the impact of items that, in the opinion of management, do not reflect Expand Energy’s core operating performance. Adjusted Diluted Earnings Per Common Share should not be considered an alternative to, or more meaningful than, earnings (loss) per common share as presented in accordance with GAAP.

    Adjusted EBITDAX: Adjusted EBITDAX is defined as net income (loss) before interest expense, income tax expense (benefit), depreciation, depletion and amortization expense, exploration expense, unrealized (gains) losses on natural gas and oil derivatives, separation and other termination costs, (gains) losses on sales of assets, and certain items management believes affect the comparability of operating results. Adjusted EBITDAX is presented as it provides investors an indication of the company’s ability to internally fund exploration and development activities and service or incur debt. Adjusted EBITDAX should not be considered an alternative to, or more meaningful than, net income (loss) as presented in accordance with GAAP.

    Free Cash Flow: Free Cash Flow is defined as net cash provided by operating activities less cash capital expenditures. Free Cash Flow is a liquidity measure that provides investors additional information regarding the company’s ability to service or incur debt and return cash to shareholders. Free Cash Flow should not be considered an alternative to, or more meaningful than, net cash provided by (used in) operating activities, or any other measure of liquidity presented in accordance with GAAP.

    Adjusted Free Cash Flow: Adjusted Free Cash Flow is defined as net cash provided by operating activities less cash capital expenditures and cash contributions to investments, adjusted to exclude certain items management believes affect the comparability of operating results. Adjusted Free Cash Flow is a liquidity measure that provides investors additional information regarding the company’s ability to service or incur debt and return cash to shareholders and is used to determine Expand Energy’s payout of enhanced returns framework. Adjusted Free Cash Flow should not be considered an alternative to, or more meaningful than, net cash provided by (used in) operating activities, or any other measure of liquidity presented in accordance with GAAP.

    Net Debt: Net Debt is defined as GAAP total debt excluding premiums, discounts, and deferred issuance costs less cash and cash equivalents. Net Debt is useful to investors as a widely understood measure of liquidity and leverage, but this measure should not be considered as an alternative to, or more meaningful than, total debt presented in accordance with GAAP.

    Present Value of Estimated Future Net Revenues or PV-10: Present Value of Estimated Future Net Revenues or PV-10 is defined as the estimated future gross revenue to be generated from the production of proved reserves, net of estimated production and future development costs, using prices calculated as the average natural gas and oil price during the preceding 12-month period prior to the end of the current reporting period, (determined as the unweighted arithmetic average of prices on the first day of each month within the 12-month period) and costs in effect at the determination date (unless such costs are subject to change pursuant to contractual provisions), without giving effect to non-property related expenses such as general and administrative expenses, debt service and future income tax expense or to depreciation, depletion and amortization, discounted using an annual discount rate of 10%. PV-10 is derived from the standardized measure, which is the most directly comparable financial measure computed using GAAP and differs in that PV-10 does not include the effects of income taxes on future net revenues. Management uses PV-10, which is calculated without deducting estimated future income tax expenses, as a measure of the value of the Company’s current proved reserves and to compare relative values among peer companies. Present Value of Estimated Future Net Revenues or PV-10 should not be considered an alternative to, or more meaningful than, the standardized measure presented in accordance with GAAP. Neither PV-10 nor the standardized measure represents an estimate of the fair market value of the Company’s natural gas and oil properties.

         
    RECONCILIATION OF NET INCOME (LOSS) TO ADJUSTED NET INCOME (unaudited)    
             
        Three Months Ended December 31,   Year Ended December 31,
    ($ in millions)   2024   2023   2024   2023
    Net income (loss) (GAAP)   $ (399 )   $ 569     $ (714 )   $ 2,419  
                     
    Adjustments:                
    Unrealized (gains) losses on natural gas and oil derivatives     490       (347 )     979       (1,278 )
    Separation and other termination costs           2       23       5  
    Gains on sales of assets     (2 )     (139 )     (14 )     (946 )
    Other operating expense, net(a)     267       4       325       22  
    (Gains) losses on purchases, exchanges or extinguishments of debt     (1 )           1        
    Contract amortization     (57 )           (57 )      
    Other     (21 )     (18 )     (38 )     (37 )
    Tax effect of adjustments(b)     (146 )     114       (271 )     517  
    Adjusted net income (Non-GAAP)   $ 131     $ 185     $ 234     $ 702  
    (a)   The three- and twelve-month periods ended December 31, 2024 include an adjustment for costs incurred related to the Southwestern Merger.
    (b)   The three- and twelve-month periods ended December 31, 2024 include a tax effect attributed to the reconciling adjustments using a statutory rate of 22% and the three- and twelve-month periods December 31, 2023 include a tax effect attributed to the reconciling adjustments using a statutory rate of 23%.
         
         
    RECONCILIATION OF EARNINGS (LOSS) PER COMMON SHARE TO ADJUSTED DILUTED EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE (unaudited)    
             
        Three Months Ended December 31,   Year Ended December 31,
    ($/share)   2024   2023   2024   2023
    Earnings (loss) per common share (GAAP)   $ (1.72 )   $ 4.34     $ (4.55 )   $ 18.21  
    Effect of dilutive securities           (0.32 )           (1.29 )
    Diluted earnings (loss) per common share (GAAP)   $ (1.72 )   $ 4.02     $ (4.55 )   $ 16.92  
                     
    Adjustments:                
    Unrealized (gains) losses on natural gas and oil derivatives     2.12       (2.44 )     6.24       (8.94 )
    Separation and other termination costs           0.01       0.14       0.04  
    Gains on sales of assets     (0.01 )     (0.99 )     (0.09 )     (6.62 )
    Other operating expense, net(a)     1.16       0.03       2.07       0.15  
    (Gains) losses on purchases, exchanges or extinguishments of debt                 0.01        
    Contract amortization     (0.24 )           (0.36 )      
    Other     (0.09 )     (0.13 )     (0.24 )     (0.26 )
    Tax effect of adjustments(b)     (0.64 )     0.81       (1.73 )     3.62  
    Effect of dilutive securities     (0.03 )           (0.08 )      
    Adjusted diluted earnings per common share (Non-GAAP)   $ 0.55     $ 1.31     $ 1.41     $ 4.91  
    (a)   The three- and twelve-month periods ended December 31, 2024 include an adjustment for costs incurred related to the Southwestern Merger.
    (b)   The three- and twelve-month periods ended December 31, 2024 include a tax effect attributed to the reconciling adjustments using a statutory rate of 22% and the three- and twelve-month periods December 31, 2023 include a tax effect attributed to the reconciling adjustments using a statutory rate of 23%.
         
         
    RECONCILIATION OF NET INCOME (LOSS) TO ADJUSTED EBITDAX (unaudited)    
             
        Three Months Ended December 31,   Year Ended December 31,
        2024   2023   2024   2023
    ($ in millions)                
    Net income (loss) (GAAP)   $ (399 )   $ 569     $ (714 )   $ 2,419  
                     
    Adjustments:                
    Interest expense     64       22       123       104  
    Income tax expense (benefit)     (22 )     166       (127 )     698  
    Depreciation, depletion and amortization     647       379       1,729       1,527  
    Exploration     3       8       10       27  
    Unrealized (gains) losses on natural gas and oil derivatives     490       (347 )     979       (1,278 )
    Separation and other termination costs           2       23       5  
    Gains on sales of assets     (2 )     (139 )     (14 )     (946 )
    Other operating expense, net(a)     267       4       325       22  
    (Gains) losses on purchases, exchanges or extinguishments of debt     (1 )           1        
    Contract amortization     (57 )           (57 )      
    Other     (26 )     (29 )     (83 )     (65 )
    Adjusted EBITDAX (Non-GAAP)   $ 964     $ 635     $ 2,195     $ 2,513  
    (a)   The three- and twelve-month periods ended December 31, 2024 include an adjustment for costs incurred related to the Southwestern Merger.
         
         
    RECONCILIATION OF NET CASH PROVIDED BY OPERATING ACTIVITIES TO ADJUSTED FREE CASH FLOW (unaudited)    
             
        Three Months Ended December 31,   Year Ended December 31,
        2024   2023   2024   2023
    ($ in millions)                
    Net cash provided by operating activities (GAAP)   $ 382     $ 470     $ 1,565     $ 2,380  
    Cash capital expenditures     (536 )     (379 )     (1,557 )     (1,829 )
    Free cash flow (Non-GAAP)     (154 )     91       8       551  
    Cash paid for merger expenses     231             269        
    Cash contributions to investments     (4 )     (82 )     (75 )     (231 )
    Free cash flow associated with divested assets(a)           (48 )           (243 )
    Adjusted free cash flow (Non-GAAP)   $ 73     $ (39 )   $ 202     $ 77  
    (a)   In March and April of 2023, we closed two divestitures of certain Eagle Ford assets. Due to the structure of these transactions, both of which had an effective date of October 1, 2022, the cash generated by these assets was delivered to the respective buyers through a reduction in the proceeds we received at the closing of each transaction. Additionally, in November 2023, we closed the divestiture of the final portion of our Eagle Ford assets, with an effective date of February 1, 2023 and the cash generated by these assets was delivered to the buyer through a reduction in the proceeds we received at the closing of the transaction.
         
         
    RECONCILIATION OF TOTAL DEBT TO NET DEBT (unaudited)    
         
    ($ in millions)   December 31, 2024
    Total debt (GAAP)   $ 5,680  
    Premiums, discounts and issuance costs on debt     6  
    Principal amount of debt     5,686  
    Cash and cash equivalents     (317 )
    Net debt (Non-GAAP)   $ 5,369  
             
             
    PROVED RESERVES (unaudited)        
             
        SEC pricing(a)   Five-year strip pricing(b)
    ($ in millions)        
    Proved reserves (Bcfe)     20,800       26,816  
    Standardized measure   $ 7,531     $ 22,120  
    PV-10(c)   $ 7,567     $ 25,975  
    (a)   SEC proved reserves as of December 31, 2024 were based on a natural gas price of $2.13 per Mcf and an oil price of $75.48 per barrel of oil and NGL. Pricing was determined in accordance with the SEC requirement using the unweighted arithmetic average of the prices on the first day of each month within the 12-month period ended December 31, 2024. The average adjusted product prices weighted by production over the remaining lives of the properties are $0.65 per Mcf of gas, $65.16 per barrel of oil and $15.20 per barrel of NGL.
    (b)   Pricing used in the five-year strip pricing sensitivity reflects five-year strip pricing as of February 19, 2025 and held constant thereafter using (i) the NYMEX five-year strip adjusted for regional differentials using Henry Hub for gas and (ii) the NYMEX West Texas Intermediate five-year strip for oil, adjusted for regional differentials consistent with those used in the SEC pricing, and holding all other assumptions constant. The average adjusted product prices weighted by production over the remaining lives of the properties would be $2.35 per Mcf of gas, $54.16 per barrel of oil, and $12.86 per barrel of NGL.

    The NYMEX strip price for proved reserves and related metrics are intended to illustrate reserve sensitivities to market expectations of commodity prices and should not be confused with SEC pricing for proved reserves and do not comply with SEC pricing assumptions. Management believes that the presentation of reserve volume and related metrics using NYMEX forward strip prices provides investors with additional useful information about the Company’s reserves because the forward prices are based on the market’s forward-looking expectations of oil and gas prices as of a certain date. The price at which the Company can sell its production in the future is the major determinant of the likely economic producibility of the Company’s reserves. The Company hedges certain amounts of future production based on futures prices. In addition, the Company uses such forward-looking market-based data in developing its drilling plans, assessing its capital expenditure needs and projecting future cash flows. While NYMEX strip prices represent a consensus estimate of future pricing, such prices are only an estimate and are not necessarily an accurate projection of future oil and gas prices. Actual future prices may vary significantly from NYMEX prices; therefore, actual revenue and value generated may be more or less than the amounts disclosed. Investors should be careful to consider forward prices in addition to, and not as a substitute for, SEC pricing, when considering the Company’s reserves.

    (c)   PV-10 differs from the standardized measure because the former does not include the effects of estimated future income tax expense. PV-10 using SEC pricing excludes $36 million of estimated future income tax expense, and PV-10 using February 19, 2025 strip pricing excludes $3,855 million of estimated future income tax expense.
         
         
    INVESTOR CONTACT: MEDIA CONTACT: EXPAND ENERGY CORPORATION
    Chris Ayres Brooke Coe 6100 North Western Avenue
    (405) 935-8870 (405) 935-8878 P.O. Box 18496
    ir@expandenergy.com media@expandenergy.com Oklahoma City, OK 73154
         

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Magnite Reports Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Total Revenue up 4% & Contribution ex-TAC(1)up 9% in Fourth Quarter

    Contribution ex-TAC(1)from CTV Grows 23% in Fourth Quarter

    Adjusted EBITDA Margin(2)of 42% in Fourth Quarter

    NEW YORK, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) —  Magnite (NASDAQ: MGNI), the world’s largest independent sell-side advertising company, today reported its results of operations for the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024.

    Recent Highlights:

    • Revenue of $194.0 million for Q4 2024, up 4% from Q4 2023
    • Contribution ex-TAC(1) of $180.2 million for Q4 2024, an increase of 9% from Q4 2023
    • Contribution ex-TAC(1) attributable to CTV for Q4 2024 of $77.9 million, which exceeded guidance of $75 to $77 million, and was up 23% year-over-year
    • Contribution ex-TAC(1) attributable to DV+ for Q4 2024 of $102.3 million, an increase of 1% year-over-year
    • Net income for Q4 2024 of $36.4 million, or $0.24 per diluted share, compared to net income of $30.9 million, or $0.16 per diluted share for Q4 2023
    • Adjusted EBITDA(1) of $76.5 million in Q4 2024 representing a 42% Adjusted EBITDA margin(2), compared to Adjusted EBITDA(1) of $70.4 million for Q4 2023
    • Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share(1) of $0.34 for Q4 2024, compared to non-GAAP diluted earnings per share(1) of $0.29 for Q4 2023
    • Operating cash flow(3) in Q4 2024 of $64.4 million
    • Contribution ex-TAC(1) attributable to CTV for the full-year 2024 of $260.2 million, an increase of 19% year-over-year, representing 43% of total Contribution ex-TAC(1)
    • Adjusted EBITDA(1) for the full-year 2024 of $196.9 million, an increase of 15% from the full-year 2023
    • Ended 2024 with $483.2 million in cash and cash equivalents

    Expectations:

    • Total Contribution ex-TAC(1) for Q1 2025 to be between $140 and $144 million
    • Contribution ex-TAC(1) attributable to CTV for Q1 2025 to be between $61 and $63 million
    • Contribution ex-TAC(1) attributable to DV+ for Q1 2025 to be between $79 and $81 million
    • Adjusted EBITDA operating expenses(4) for Q1 2025 to be between $111 and $113 million
    • Total Contribution ex-TAC(1) growth above 10% for the full-year 2025
    • Excluding political, total 2025 Contribution ex-TAC(1) growth in the mid-teens
    • Adjusted EBITDA margin(2) expansion of at least 100 basis points for 2025
    • Mid-teens percentage growth of Adjusted EBITDA(1) for 2025
    • High-teens to 20% growth in free cash flow(5) for 2025

    “CTV performed well above expectations based on strength from our partnerships with many of the largest industry players. Our DV+ business grew modestly in Q4 due to marketers pausing campaigns after the election, but has rebounded since the start of 2025 and resumed growth in the mid-to-high single digits. We are very encouraged with partner and agency traction to start 2025, and have also made strides to improve efficiency across our business.” said Michael G. Barrett, CEO of Magnite. “We look forward to a solid growth year in 2025, despite a mixed ad spend environment and political comps. We continue to balance top-line growth and profitability to drive free cash flow, which is reflected in our outlook for 2025. Key areas of investment will be live sports, ClearLine, agency marketplaces, curation, AI and overall platform efficiency.”

                         
    Magnite Fourth Quarter 2024 Results Summary
    (in millions, except per share amounts and percentages)
      Three Months Ended   Year Ended
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
      Change
    Favorable/
    (Unfavorable)
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
      Change
    Favorable/
    (Unfavorable)
    Revenue $194.0    $186.9   4%   $668.2     $619.7   8%
    Gross profit $126.2    $116.9   8%   $409.3     $209.8   95%
    Contribution ex-TAC(1) $180.2    $165.3   9%   $606.9     $549.1   11%
    Net income (loss) $36.4    $30.9   18%   $22.8     ($159.2)   NM
    Adjusted EBITDA(1) $76.5    $70.4   9%   $196.9     $171.4   15%
    Adjusted EBITDA margin(2)  42%    43%   (1) ppt    32%      31%   1 ppt
    Basic earnings (loss) per share $0.26   $0.22   18%   $0.16     ($1.17)   NM
    Diluted earnings (loss) per share $0.24   $0.16   50%   $0.16     ($1.17)   NM
    Non-GAAP earnings per share(1) $0.34   $0.29   17%   $0.71     $0.54   31%
                             

    NM = Not meaningful

    Notes:
    (1)   Contribution ex-TAC, Adjusted EBITDA, and non-GAAP earnings per share are non-GAAP financial measures. Please see the discussion in the section called “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” and the reconciliations included at the end of this press release.
    (2)   Adjusted EBITDA margin is calculated as Adjusted EBITDA divided by Contribution ex-TAC.
    (3)   Operating cash flow is calculated as Adjusted EBITDA less capital expenditures.
    (4)   Adjusted EBITDA operating expenses is calculated as Contribution ex-TAC less Adjusted EBITDA.
    (5)   Free cash flow is defined as operating cash flow (Adjusted EBITDA less capital expenditures) less net interest expense.
         

    Fourth Quarter 2024 Results Conference Call and Webcast:

    The Company will host a conference call on February 26, 2025 at 1:30 PM (PT) / 4:30 PM (ET) to discuss the results for its fourth quarter of 2024.

       
    Live conference call  
    Toll free number: (844) 875-6911 (for domestic callers)
    Direct dial number: (412) 902-6511 (for international callers)
    Passcode: Ask to join the Magnite conference call
    Simultaneous audio webcast: http://investor.magnite.com, under “Events and Presentations”
       
    Conference call replay  
    Toll free number: (877) 344-7529 (for domestic callers)
    Direct dial number: (412) 317-0088 (for international callers)
    Passcode: 1991482
    Webcast link: http://investor.magnite.com, under “Events and Presentations”

    About Magnite
    We’re Magnite (NASDAQ: MGNI), the world’s largest independent sell-side advertising platform. Publishers use our technology to monetize their content across all screens and formats, including CTV, online video, display, and audio. The world’s leading agencies and brands trust our platform to access brand-safe, high-quality ad inventory and execute billions of advertising transactions each month. Anchored in bustling New York City, sunny Los Angeles, mile-high Denver, historic London, colorful Singapore, and down under in Sydney, Magnite has offices across North America, EMEA, LATAM, and APAC.

    Forward-Looking Statements:
    This press release and management’s prepared remarks during the conference call referred to above include, and management’s answers to questions during the conference call may include, forward-looking statements, including statements based upon or relating to our expectations, assumptions, estimates, and projections. In some cases, you can identify forward-looking statements by terms such as “may,” “might,” “will,” “objective,” “intend,” “should,” “could,” “can,” “would,” “expect,” “believe,” “design,” “anticipate,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,” “plan” or the negative of these terms, and similar expressions. Forward-looking statements may include, but are not limited to, statements concerning the Company’s guidance or expectations with respect to future financial performance; acquisitions by the Company, or the anticipated benefits thereof; macroeconomic conditions or concerns related thereto; the growth of ad-supported programmatic connected television; our ability to use and collect data to provide our offerings; the scope and duration of client relationships; the fees we may charge in the future; key strategic objectives; anticipated benefits of new offerings; business mix; sales growth; benefits from supply path optimization; our ability to adapt to advancements in artificial intelligence; the development of identity solutions; client utilization of our offerings; the impact of requests for discounts, rebates or other fee concessions; our competitive differentiation; our market share and leadership position in the industry; market conditions, trends, and opportunities; certain statements regarding future operational performance measures; and other statements that are not historical facts. These statements are not guarantees of future performance; they reflect our current views with respect to future events and are based on assumptions and estimates and subject to known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause our actual results, performance or achievements to be materially different from expectations or results projected or implied by forward-looking statements.

    We discuss many of these risks and additional factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated by our forward-looking statements under the headings “Risk Factors” and “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations,” and elsewhere in this press release and in other filings we have made and will make from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC, including our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024 and subsequent filings. These forward-looking statements represent our estimates and assumptions only as of the date of the report in which they are included. Unless required by federal securities laws, we assume no obligation to update any of these forward-looking statements, or to update the reasons actual results could differ materially from those anticipated, to reflect circumstances or events that occur after the statements are made. Without limiting the foregoing, any guidance we may provide will generally be given only in connection with quarterly and annual earnings announcements, without interim updates, and we may appear at industry conferences or make other public statements without disclosing material nonpublic information in our possession. Given these uncertainties, investors should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements. Investors should read this press release and the documents that we reference in this press release and have filed or will file with the SEC completely and with the understanding that our actual future results may be materially different from what we expect. We qualify all of our forward-looking statements by these cautionary statements.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Operational Measures:

    In addition to our GAAP results, we review certain non-GAAP financial measures to help us evaluate our business on a consistent basis, measure our performance, identify trends affecting our business, establish budgets, measure the effectiveness of investments in our technology and development and sales and marketing, and assess our operational efficiencies. These non-GAAP financial measures include Contribution ex-TAC, Adjusted EBITDA, Non-GAAP Income (Loss), and Non-GAAP Earnings (Loss) per share, each of which is discussed below.

    These non-GAAP financial measures are not intended to be considered in isolation from, as substitutes for, or as superior to, the corresponding financial measures prepared in accordance with GAAP. You are encouraged to evaluate these adjustments, and review the reconciliation of these non-GAAP financial measures to their most comparable GAAP measures, and the reasons we consider them appropriate. It is important to note that the particular items we exclude from, or include in, our non-GAAP financial measures may differ from the items excluded from, or included in, similar non-GAAP financial measures used by other companies. See “Reconciliation of Revenue to Gross Profit to Contribution ex-TAC,” “Reconciliation of net income (loss) to Adjusted EBITDA,” “Reconciliation of net income (loss) to non-GAAP income (loss),” and “Reconciliation of GAAP earnings (loss) per share to non-GAAP earnings (loss) per share” included as part of this press release.

    We do not provide a reconciliation of our non-GAAP financial expectations for Contribution ex-TAC and Adjusted EBITDA, or a forecast of the most comparable GAAP measures, because the amount and timing of many future charges that impact these measures (such as amortization of future acquired intangible assets, acquisition-related charges, foreign exchange (gain) loss, net, stock-based compensation, impairment charges, provision or benefit for income taxes, and our future revenue mix), which could be material, are variable, uncertain, or out of our control and therefore cannot be reasonably predicted without unreasonable effort, if at all. In addition, we believe such reconciliations or forecasts could imply a degree of precision that might be confusing or misleading to investors.

    Contribution ex-TAC:

    Contribution ex-TAC is calculated as gross profit plus cost of revenue, excluding traffic acquisition cost (“TAC”). Traffic acquisition cost, a component of cost of revenue, represents what we must pay sellers for the sale of advertising inventory through our platform for revenue reported on a gross basis. Contribution ex-TAC is a non-GAAP financial measure that is most comparable to gross profit. We believe Contribution ex-TAC is a useful measure in facilitating a consistent comparison against our core business without considering the impact of traffic acquisition costs related to revenue reported on a gross basis.

    Adjusted EBITDA:

    We define Adjusted EBITDA as net income (loss) adjusted to exclude stock-based compensation expense, depreciation and amortization, amortization of acquired intangible assets, impairment charges, interest income or expense, and other cash and non-cash based income or expenses that we do not consider indicative of our core operating performance, including, but not limited to foreign exchange gains and losses, acquisition and related items, gains or losses on extinguishment of debt, other debt refinancing expenses, non-operational real estate and other expenses (income), net, and provision (benefit) for income taxes. We also track future expenses on an Adjusted EBITDA basis, and describe them as Adjusted EBITDA operating expenses, which includes total operating expenses. Total operating expenses include cost of revenue. Adjusted EBITDA operating expenses is calculated as Contribution ex-TAC less Adjusted EBITDA. We adjust Adjusted EBITDA operating expenses for the same expense items excluded in Adjusted EBITDA. We believe Adjusted EBITDA is useful to investors in evaluating our performance for the following reasons:

    • Adjusted EBITDA is widely used by investors and securities analysts to measure a company’s performance without regard to items such as those we exclude in calculating this measure, which can vary substantially from company to company depending upon their financing, capital structures, and the method by which assets were acquired.
    • Our management uses Adjusted EBITDA in conjunction with GAAP financial measures for planning purposes, including the preparation of our annual operating budget, as a measure of performance and the effectiveness of our business strategies, and in communications with our board of directors concerning our performance. Adjusted EBITDA is also used as a metric for determining payment of cash incentive compensation.
    • Adjusted EBITDA provides a measure of consistency and comparability with our past performance that many investors find useful, facilitates period-to-period comparisons of operations, and also facilitates comparisons with other peer companies, many of which use similar non-GAAP financial measures to supplement their GAAP results.

    Although Adjusted EBITDA is frequently used by investors and securities analysts in their evaluations of companies, Adjusted EBITDA has limitations as an analytical tool, and should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for analysis of our results of operations as reported under GAAP. These limitations include:

    • Stock-based compensation is a non-cash charge and will remain an element of our long-term incentive compensation package, although we exclude it as an expense when evaluating our ongoing operating performance for a particular period.
    • Depreciation and amortization are non-cash charges, and the assets being depreciated or amortized will often have to be replaced in the future, but Adjusted EBITDA does not reflect any cash requirements for these replacements.
    • Impairment charges are non-cash charges related to goodwill, intangible assets and/or long-lived assets.
    • Adjusted EBITDA does not reflect certain cash and non-cash charges related to acquisition and related items, such as amortization of acquired intangible assets, merger, acquisition, or restructuring related severance costs, and changes in the fair value of contingent consideration.
    • Adjusted EBITDA does not reflect cash and non-cash charges and changes in, or cash requirements for, acquisition and related items, such as certain transaction expenses.
    • Adjusted EBITDA does not reflect cash and non-cash charges related to certain financing transactions such as gains or losses on extinguishment of debt or other debt refinancing expenses.
    • Adjusted EBITDA does not reflect certain non-operational real estate and other (income) and expense, net, which consists of transactions or expenses that are typically by nature non-operating, one-time items, or unrelated to our core operations.
    • Adjusted EBITDA does not reflect changes in our working capital needs, capital expenditures, or contractual commitments.
    • Adjusted EBITDA does not reflect cash requirements for income taxes and the cash impact of other income or expense.
    • Other companies may calculate Adjusted EBITDA differently than we do, limiting its usefulness as a comparative measure.

    Our Adjusted EBITDA is influenced by fluctuations in our revenue, cost of revenue, and the timing and amounts of the cost of our operations. Adjusted EBITDA should not be considered as an alternative to net income (loss), income (loss) from operations, or any other measure of financial performance calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP.

    Non-GAAP Income (Loss) and Non-GAAP Earnings (Loss) per Share:
    We define non-GAAP earnings (loss) per share as non-GAAP income (loss) divided by non-GAAP weighted-average shares outstanding. Non-GAAP income (loss) is equal to net income (loss) excluding stock-based compensation, cash and non-cash based merger, acquisition, and restructuring costs, which consist primarily of professional service fees associated with merger and acquisition activities, cash-based employee termination costs, and other restructuring activities, including facility closures, relocation costs, contract termination costs, and impairment costs of abandoned technology associated with restructuring activities, amortization of acquired intangible assets, gains or losses on extinguishment of debt, non-operational real estate and other expenses or income, foreign currency gains and losses, interest expense associated with Convertible Senior Notes, other debt refinance expenses, and the tax impact of these items. In periods in which we have non-GAAP income, non-GAAP weighted-average shares outstanding used to calculate non-GAAP earnings per share includes the impact of potentially dilutive shares. Potentially dilutive shares consist of stock options, restricted stock units, performance stock units, and potential shares issued under the Employee Stock Purchase Plan, each computed using the treasury stock method, and the impact of shares that would be issuable assuming conversion of all of the Convertible Senior Notes, calculated under the if-converted method. We believe non-GAAP earnings (loss) per share is useful to investors in evaluating our ongoing operational performance and our trends on a per share basis, and also facilitates comparison of our financial results on a per share basis with other companies, many of which present a similar non-GAAP measure. However, a potential limitation of our use of non-GAAP earnings (loss) per share is that other companies may define non-GAAP earnings (loss) per share differently, which may make comparison difficult. This measure may also exclude expenses that may have a material impact on our reported financial results. Non-GAAP earnings (loss) per share is a performance measure and should not be used as a measure of liquidity. Because of these limitations, we also consider the comparable GAAP measure of net income (loss).

     
    MAGNITE, INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (In thousands)
    (unaudited)
     
      December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
    ASSETS      
    Current assets:      
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 483,220     $ 326,219  
    Accounts receivable, net   1,200,046       1,176,276  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets   19,914       20,508  
    TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS   1,703,180       1,523,003  
    Property and equipment, net   68,730       47,371  
    Right-of-use lease asset   50,329       60,549  
    Internal use software development costs, net   26,625       21,926  
    Intangible assets, net   21,309       51,011  
    Goodwill   978,217       978,217  
    Other assets, non-current   6,378       6,729  
    TOTAL ASSETS $ 2,854,768     $ 2,688,806  
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY      
    Current liabilities:      
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses $ 1,466,377     $ 1,372,176  
    Lease liabilities, current   16,086       20,402  
    Debt, current   3,641       3,600  
    Other current liabilities   9,880       5,957  
    TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES   1,495,984       1,402,135  
    Debt, non-current, net of debt issuance costs   550,104       532,986  
    Lease liabilities, non-current   38,983       49,665  
    Other liabilities, non-current   1,479       2,337  
    TOTAL LIABILITIES   2,086,550       1,987,123  
    STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY      
    Common stock   2       2  
    Additional paid-in capital           1,433,809       1,387,715  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss   (4,421 )     (2,076 )
    Accumulated deficit   (661,172 )     (683,958 )
    TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY   768,218       701,683  
    TOTAL LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY $ 2,854,768     $ 2,688,806  
     
     
    MAGNITE, INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (In thousands, except per share amounts)
    (unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended   Year Ended
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
    Revenue $ 193,968     $ 186,932     $ 668,170     $ 619,710  
    Expenses (1)(2):              
    Cost of revenue   67,786       70,025       258,838       409,906  
    Sales and marketing   40,628       37,575       166,142       173,982  
    Technology and development   22,262       23,183       95,243       94,318  
    General and administrative   23,074       21,025       96,860       89,048  
    Merger, acquisition, and restructuring costs                     7,465  
    Total expenses   153,750       151,808       617,083       774,719  
    Income (loss) from operations   40,218       35,124       51,087       (155,009 )
    Other expense:              
    Interest expense, net   5,433       8,100       27,032       32,369  
    Foreign exchange (gain) loss, net   (6,303 )     3,495       (5,083 )     1,953  
    (Gain) loss on extinguishment of debt         (8,348 )     7,706       (26,480 )
    Other income   (1,170 )     (1,287 )     (5,052 )     (5,304 )
    Total other (income) expense, net   (2,040 )     1,960       24,603       2,538  
    Income (loss) before income taxes   42,258       33,164       26,484       (157,547 )
    Provision for income taxes   5,851       2,250       3,698       1,637  
    Net income (loss) $ 36,407     $ 30,914     $ 22,786     $ (159,184 )
    Net earnings (loss) per share:              
    Basic $ 0.26     $ 0.22     $ 0.16     $ (1.17 )
    Diluted $ 0.24     $ 0.16     $ 0.16     $ (1.17 )
    Weighted average shares used to compute net earnings (loss) per share:              
    Basic   141,106       138,212       140,557       136,620  
    Diluted   152,434       143,793       146,810       136,620  
     
    (1) Stock-based compensation expense included in our expenses was as follows:
      Three Months Ended   Year Ended
    December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
    Cost of revenue $ 423   $ 436   $ 1,924   $ 1,809
    Sales and marketing   7,473     6,394     31,436     27,263
    Technology and development   3,617     4,624     18,210     20,542
    General and administrative   5,845     5,701     24,949     22,860
    Merger, acquisition, and restructuring costs               143
    Total stock-based compensation expense $ 17,358   $ 17,155   $ 76,519   $ 72,617
     
    (2) Depreciation and amortization expense included in our expenses was as follows:
      Three Months Ended   Year Ended
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
    Cost of revenue $ 13,538   $ 13,901   $ 47,570   $ 211,956
    Sales and marketing   2,473     2,628     10,157     27,584
    Technology and development   88     188     460     779
    General and administrative   71     103     323     501
    Total depreciation and amortization expense $ 16,170   $ 16,820   $ 58,510   $ 240,820
     
       
    MAGNITE, INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    (In thousands)
    (unaudited)
       
      Year Ended
      December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
    OPERATING ACTIVITIES:      
    Net income (loss) $ 22,786     $ (159,184 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash provided by operating activities:      
    Depreciation and amortization   58,510       240,820  
    Stock-based compensation   76,519       72,617  
    (Gain) loss on extinguishment of debt   7,706       (26,480 )
    Provision for doubtful accounts   587       4,666  
    Amortization of debt discount and issuance costs   4,119       6,279  
    Non-cash lease expense   (4,772 )     (1,712 )
    Deferred income taxes   95       (2,379 )
    Unrealized foreign currency (gain) loss, net   (7,001 )     1,266  
    Other items, net   23       3,007  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:      
    Accounts receivable   (26,024 )     (220,102 )
    Prepaid expenses and other assets   1,980       1,004  
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses   97,380       294,677  
    Other liabilities   3,293       (112 )
    Net cash provided by operating activities   235,201       214,367  
    INVESTING ACTIVITIES:      
    Purchases of property and equipment   (32,810 )     (26,764 )
    Capitalized internal use software development costs   (14,260 )     (10,619 )
    Other investing activities   (432 )      
    Net cash used in investing activities   (47,502 )     (37,383 )
    FINANCING ACTIVITIES:      
    Proceeds from the Term Loan B Facility refinancing and repricing activities, net of debt discount   413,463        
    Repayment of the Term Loan B Facility from refinancing and repricing activities   (403,113 )      
    Payment for debt issuance costs   (4,547 )      
    Repayment of debt   (1,823 )     (3,600 )
    Repurchase of Convertible Senior Notes         (165,518 )
    Proceeds from exercise of stock options   572       2,166  
    Proceeds from issuance of common stock under employee stock purchase plan   3,589       3,513  
    Taxes paid related to net share settlement   (22,472 )     (11,814 )
    Purchase of treasury stock   (14,573 )      
    Repayment of finance leases         (276 )
    Payment of indemnification claims holdback         (2,313 )
    Net cash used in financing activities   (28,904 )     (177,842 )
    EFFECT OF EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES ON CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND RESTRICTED CASH   (1,794 )     575  
    CHANGE IN CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND RESTRICTED CASH   157,001       (283 )
    CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND RESTRICTED CASH — Beginning of period   326,219       326,502  
    CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND RESTRICTED CASH — End of period $ 483,220     $ 326,219  
     
       
    MAGNITE, INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS-(Continued)
    (In thousands)
    (unaudited)
       
      Year Ended
      December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
    SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURES OF OTHER CASH FLOW INFORMATION:      
    Cash paid for income taxes $ 3,870   $ 5,357
    Cash paid for interest $ 36,863   $ 37,028
    Capitalized assets financed by accounts payable and accrued expenses and other liabilities $ 6,742   $ 1,690
    Capitalized stock-based compensation $ 2,459   $ 2,012
    Operating lease right-of-use assets obtained in exchange for operating lease liabilities $ 13,628   $ 4,017
    Operating lease right-of-use assets reduction and corresponding adjustment to operating lease liabilities from lease terminations $ 4,622   $
    Non-cash financing activity related to Amendment No. 1 to the 2024 Credit Agreement $ 311,974   $
               
     
    MAGNITE, INC.
    CALCULATION OF BASIC AND DILUTED EARNINGS (LOSS) PER SHARE
    (In thousands, except per share data)
    (unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended   Year Ended
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
       
    Basic and Diluted Earnings (Loss) Per Share:              
    Net income (loss) $ 36,407   $ 30,914     $ 22,786   $ (159,184 )
    Weighted-average common shares outstanding used to compute basic earnings (loss) per share   141,106     138,212       140,557     136,620  
    Basic earnings (loss) per share $ 0.26   $ 0.22     $ 0.16   $ (1.17 )
                   
    Diluted Earnings (Loss) Per Share:              
    Net income (loss) $ 36,407   $ 30,914     $ 22,786   $ (159,184 )
    Adjustments:              
    Interest expense, Convertible Senior Notes, net of tax   517     508            
    Gain on extinguishment of debt, net of tax       (8,151 )          
    Net income (loss) for calculation of diluted income (loss) $ 36,924   $ 23,271     $ 22,786   $ (159,184 )
                   
    Weighted-average common shares used in basic earnings (loss) per share   141,106     138,212       140,557     136,620  
    Dilutive effect of weighted-average restricted stock units   5,044     545       3,731      
    Dilutive effect of weighted-average common stock options   2,012     1,156       1,811      
    Dilutive effect of weighted-average performance stock units   1,037           669      
    Dilutive effect of weighted-average ESPP shares   25     15       42      
    Dilutive effect of weighted-average convertible notes   3,210     3,865            
    Weighted-average shares used to compute diluted net earnings (loss) per share   152,434     143,793       146,810     136,620  
    Diluted net earnings (loss) per share $ 0.24   $ 0.16     $ 0.16   $ (1.17 )
     
     
    MAGNITE, INC.
    RECONCILIATION OF REVENUE TO GROSS PROFIT TO CONTRIBUTION EX-TAC
    (In thousands)
    (unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended   Year Ended
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
    Revenue $ 193,968   $ 186,932   $ 668,170   $ 619,710
    Less: Cost of revenue   67,786     70,025     258,838     409,906
    Gross Profit   126,182     116,907     409,332     209,804
    Add back: Cost of revenue, excluding TAC   54,016     48,373     197,610     339,343
    Contribution ex-TAC $ 180,198   $ 165,280   $ 606,942   $ 549,147
                   
     
    MAGNITE, INC.
    RECONCILIATION OF NET INCOME (LOSS) TO ADJUSTED EBITDA
    (In thousands)
    (unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended   Year Ended
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
    Net income (loss) $ 36,407     $ 30,914     $ 22,786     $ (159,184 )
    Add back (deduct):              
    Depreciation and amortization expense, excluding amortization of acquired intangible assets   8,698       9,198       28,376       38,330  
    Amortization of acquired intangibles   7,472       7,622       30,134       202,490  
    Stock-based compensation expense   17,358       17,155       76,519       72,617  
    Merger, acquisition, and restructuring costs, excluding stock-based compensation expense                     7,322  
    Non-operational real estate and other expense, net   1,597       20       1,579       310  
    Interest expense, net   5,433       8,100       27,032       32,369  
    Foreign exchange (gain) loss, net   (6,303 )     3,495       (5,083 )     1,953  
    (Gain) loss on extinguishment of debt         (8,348 )     7,706       (26,480 )
    Other debt refinancing expense               4,103        
    Provision for income taxes   5,851       2,250       3,698       1,637  
    Adjusted EBITDA $ 76,513     $ 70,406     $ 196,850     $ 171,364  
     
     
    MAGNITE, INC.
    RECONCILIATION OF NET INCOME (LOSS) TO NON-GAAP INCOME (LOSS)
    (In thousands)
    (unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended   Year Ended
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
    Net income (loss) $ 36,407     $ 30,914     $ 22,786     $ (159,184 )
    Add back (deduct):              
    Merger, acquisition, and restructuring costs, including amortization of acquired intangibles and excluding stock-based compensation expense   7,472       7,622       30,134       209,812  
    Stock-based compensation expense   17,358       17,155       76,519       72,617  
    Non-operational real estate and other expense, net   1,597       20       1,579       310  
    Foreign exchange (gain) loss, net   (6,303 )     3,495       (5,083 )     1,953  
    Interest expense, Convertible Senior Notes   421       508       1,686       2,620  
    (Gain) loss on extinguishment of debt         (8,348 )     7,706       (26,480 )
    Other debt refinancing expense               4,103        
    Tax effect of Non-GAAP adjustments(1)   (5,339 )     (10,218 )     (32,806 )     (23,740 )
    Non-GAAP income $ 51,613     $ 41,148     $ 106,624     $ 77,908  
     
    (1) Non-GAAP income (loss) includes the estimated tax impact from the reconciling items reconciling between net income (loss) and non-GAAP income (loss).
       
     
    MAGNITE, INC.
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP EARNINGS (LOSS) PER SHARE TO NON-GAAP EARNINGS PER SHARE
    (In thousands, except per share amounts)
    (unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended   Year Ended
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
    GAAP net earnings (loss) per share (1):              
    Basic $ 0.26   $ 0.22   $ 0.16   $ (1.17 )
    Diluted $ 0.24   $ 0.16   $ 0.16   $ (1.17 )
                   
    Non-GAAP income (2) $ 51,613   $ 41,148   $ 106,624   $ 77,908  
    Non-GAAP earnings per share $ 0.34   $ 0.29   $ 0.71   $ 0.54  
                   
    Weighted-average shares used to compute basic net earnings (loss) per share   141,106     138,212     140,557     136,620  
    Dilutive effect of weighted-average common stock options, RSAs, RSUs, and PSUs   8,093     1,701     6,211     3,258  
    Dilutive effect of weighted-average ESPP shares   25     15     42     31  
    Dilutive effect of weighted-average Convertible Senior Notes   3,210     3,865     3,210     4,981  
    Non-GAAP weighted-average shares outstanding (3)   152,434     143,793     150,020     144,890  
     
    (1) Calculated as net income (loss) divided by basic and diluted weighted-average shares used to compute net income (loss) per share as included in the consolidated statement of operations.
    (2) Refer to reconciliation of net income (loss) to non-GAAP income (loss).
    (3) Non-GAAP earnings per share is computed using the same weighted-average number of shares that are used to compute GAAP net income (loss) per share in periods where there is both a non-GAAP loss and a GAAP net loss.
     
     
    MAGNITE, INC.
    CONTRIBUTION EX-TAC BY CHANNEL
    (In thousands, except percentages)
    (unaudited)
     
      Contribution ex-TAC
      Three Months Ended
      December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
       
    Channel:              
    CTV $ 77,923   43 %   $ 63,530   38 %
    Mobile   71,660   40       71,566   44  
    Desktop   30,615   17       30,184   18  
    Total $ 180,198   100 %   $ 165,280   100 %
     
      Contribution ex-TAC
      Year Ended
      December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
       
    Channel:              
    CTV $ 260,159   43 %   $ 218,494   40 %
    Mobile   242,018   40       226,826   41  
    Desktop   104,765   17       103,827   19  
    Total $ 606,942   100 %   $ 549,147   100 %

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Why Productivity Matters

    Source: Reserve Bank of Australia

    Introduction

    Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today at the Australian Business Economists’ Annual Forecasting Conference. There has been lots of discussion about productivity in recent years. In some economies this discussion has been about subdued growth in overall productivity, including in Australia since just before the pandemic. There has also been discussion about the outlook for productivity. For example, the extent to which artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other technologies will support future productivity growth. These are important issues that I expect will come up in discussions today.

    In my remarks I’m going to focus on a different question: why does productivity matter? At the central bank we’re not experts in how to improve productivity. But trends in productivity are very important for the macroeconomy. In the context of the Australian economy, I will discuss how stronger productivity growth can support growth in aggregate supply, incomes and aggregate demand. I will then spend some time discussing recent productivity outcomes in Australia and how we’ve been thinking about those in our assessment of economic conditions.

    But first, what is productivity? When we talk about productivity, we’re talking about how much output we get relative to what we put in. At an individual level, I increase my own productivity by making a shopping list before I buy groceries, so I don’t forget anything and avoid multiple trips to the supermarket. At the firm level, productivity might be improved by implementing customer relationship management software to streamline communication with clients and automate routine tasks. At the economy-wide level – which is what matters for the central bank and our dual mandate of full employment and low and stable inflation – productivity reflects a multitude of decisions like these. Ultimately it’s about how efficiently capital and labour are employed across the economy to produce goods and services.

    How do we measure productivity? Economists typically focus on two measures: labour productivity, which measures how much output is produced for every hour worked; and multifactor productivity (MFP), which reflects how efficiently all inputs to production – such as labour, capital, energy and raw materials – are combined to produce output.

    In a simple production function framework where a firm produces output using two inputs – labour and capital – labour productivity depends on two things. The first is how much capital each person has to work with. Providing workers with more or better capital – like machines or faster computers – can increase the amount of output each worker produces. This is referred to as ‘capital deepening’. The second is MFP. Improving MFP involves finding new ways to combine labour and capital to produce more output. For example, by reorganising a production line or using GPS technology to precisely guide machinery for planting, fertilising and harvesting. In this respect, labour productivity is not just about labour efficiency; it depends on firms’ decisions about how much capital to employ and how efficiently labour and capital work together to produce output.

    In thinking about the relationship between productivity and aggregate supply, incomes and demand, I will focus mainly on labour productivity. This is because labour productivity most closely aligns with measures of economic living standards. It’s also easier to measure than MFP.

    As you might sense, productivity is not about working harder, but working smarter. Many of the biggest productivity improvements have come from things that have made our lives easier, like computers, robots, the internet and smartphones – though personally I’m still questioning whether smartphones are productivity enhancing or a productivity sapping distraction.

    Economists talk about productivity a lot. So I’ll now turn to the question of why productivity matters.

    Productivity and supply

    If productivity increases, the economy can produce more goods and services from all the available economic inputs. As such, productivity is a key driver of growth in the supply capacity of the economy, or potential output.

    Productivity in Australia has been volatile in recent years but, looking through the volatility, is around the same level as in the few years before the pandemic. Productivity growth has also been consistently below the RBA’s projections for some time now (Graph 1). This has generated internal discussions about what trend labour productivity growth might look like in the period ahead, and what that means for estimates of potential output growth over the forecast period. The current assumption is that annual labour productivity growth will pick up to around one per cent in the medium term, which is close to its longer run average. This could be consistent with, for example, the rapid adoption of technology across many industries leading to higher productivity outcomes. However, the projected pick-up in productivity growth has not materialised in recent years and staff are currently assessing whether weak productivity outcomes are likely to persist.

    Weak productivity growth in recent years has contributed to slower growth in the supply capacity, or potential output, of the economy than otherwise. Graph 2 shows one of our estimates of potential output, which is based on actual productivity outcomes observed in the data. The graph also shows a counterfactual path where productivity growth in recent years was higher, at its average rate in the two decades prior to the pandemic. This suggests that the size of the economy is a lot smaller than it would have been, had productivity growth been more like in the past (all else equal).

    It’s important to keep in mind that, in this counterfactual world where supply capacity was much higher, incomes and demand would also have been higher too. Let me turn to that now.

    Productivity, incomes and wages

    While productivity growth contributes to growth in the supply capacity of the economy, it also contributes to growth in incomes and demand.

    At times, labour productivity (output per hour worked) and real income per hour track one another closely (Graph 3). Looking through the volatility, both are currently around similar levels as in the period prior to the pandemic.

    Other factors besides productivity can affect growth in incomes per hour. For example, higher prices for Australian exports can generate higher incomes domestically. So the terms of trade – the prices we receive for our exports relative to the prices we pay for our imports – can also be an important driver of incomes in the domestic economy. We can see this in the decade from the early 2000s: despite the slowing in productivity growth, real incomes per hour continued to increase, partly owing to substantial increases in the prices received for Australian exports like iron ore and coal. The surge in demand for our exports, particularly from China, supported profits in the mining industry and related parts of the Australian economy, as well as demand for labour and wages growth.

    Over the longer run, labour productivity and real wages – as measured by average earnings from the national accounts – also tend to move together (Graph 4). Over the inflation targeting period, labour productivity has grown at an average annual rate of 1.1 per cent and real labour earnings have grown at 0.9 per cent. So, higher productivity not only benefits firms, it also benefits workers by increasing their purchasing power. The Productivity Commission has previously pointed to the productivity of bakers as a reason we can consume more bread or spend that extra money elsewhere – in 1901 it took 18 minutes of the average worker’s time to afford a loaf of bread, while today it’s just 4 minutes. There must be a joke in there somewhere about how we spend our dough.

    In the short run, however, growth in real wages and labour productivity can and do diverge as the economy adjusts to economic shocks. For example, and as noted previously, increases in the prices received for Australian exports can have an impact on domestic profits and wages (and without an increase in labour productivity). Ultimately, however, it is very hard for an economy to support real wages growth in the longer run without productivity growth.

    Productivity and consumption

    Productivity growth also tends to support consumption growth. When productivity and incomes are growing more strongly, people are able to spend more and consumption grows more quickly. Weak growth in consumption per capita over recent years has coincided with weak growth in productivity, real incomes and real wages (Graph 5).

    Similar patterns have been evident in other economies, where subdued productivity growth has been associated with slower growth in household incomes and consumption (Graph 6). The exception is the United States, where growth in both productivity and consumption has been relatively strong.

    Recent trends in productivity

    So far I’ve focused on the importance of productivity growth for aggregate supply, incomes and demand over the longer run. I’ll now turn to recent trends in productivity growth in Australia and some potential implications for the near-term economic outlook.

    Discerning recent trends in productivity is difficult because of volatility in the data associated with the pandemic and other supply disruptions. Looking through the volatility, labour productivity growth has been low, averaging 0.2 per cent per year between 2017/18 and 2023/24 (Graph 7).

    Reverting to the simple production function framework that I noted earlier, the slow growth in labour productivity over recent years has reflected slow growth in both MFP and the amount of capital available to each worker.

    MFP growth averaged 0.2 per cent per year between 2017/18 and 2023/24, which was well below its historical average. Some have argued that slower MFP growth could reflect temporary factors. For example, tight labour market conditions over recent years have been associated with large numbers of individuals entering the workforce or changing jobs; this may have weighed on productivity as some individuals were trained or retrained and some firms adapted production processes to accommodate strong employment growth. If this was the case, MFP growth could pick up as the economy adjusts. However, work by some RBA staff finds that temporary factors like these have not been the primary cause of slow MFP growth, suggesting that structural factors could be weighing on productivity growth.

    Slow growth in the amount of capital available for each worker in the Australian economy – or a lack of ‘capital deepening’ – has also contributed to slow growth in labour productivity (Graph 8). Capital per worker was broadly unchanged for around five years leading up to the pandemic and – looking through the volatility in the data during the pandemic – is currently a bit below those levels. In other words, overall investment has not kept pace with the strong growth in employment recently.

    To help understand the recent slow growth in productivity, I’ll look at productivity outcomes in various parts of the economy.

    I’ll start with the non-market sector – which includes the health care, education and public administration industries – where employment growth has been very strong over recent years. The level of measured productivity in some parts of the non-market sector is low relative to the aggregate economy. So, as the non-market sector has become a larger share of the economy in recent years, this has weighed on overall productivity growth in the economy. Our estimates suggest that the rising share of non-market employment lowered the economy-wide measure of labour productivity growth by around 0.3 percentage points per year on average from 2017/18 to 2023/24, as shown by the yellow bars in Graph 9. This compares with around 0.15 percentage points per year over the previous decade, and so the recent effects have been a bit larger than in the past.

    But there is more to the story about productivity and the non-market sector. I have emphasised measured productivity because it is very difficult to measure output – and therefore productivity – in parts of the non-market sector. The central measurement problem is a lack of meaningful prices for some non-market output, such as public hospital services provided to public patients. This makes it very difficult to accurately identify quantities of output, which are needed to measure productivity. For example, research by the Productivity Commission suggests that productivity in the health care industry is higher than official estimates. As such, the drag on productivity from the non-market sector may be overstated.

    Noting the challenges of measuring productivity in the non-market sector, what’s been going on in the rest of the economy? Labour productivity growth in the market sector averaged around 0.6 per cent per year from 2017/18 to 2023/24 – below its average of 1.6 per cent over the previous two decades – though it picked up in 2023/24.

    Table 1: Growth in Labour Productivity

    Average annual growth rates (per cent)(a)

    Sector 1998/99 to 2017/18 2017/18 to 2023/24
    All industries 1.3 0.2
    Non-farm 1.1 0.1
    Market sector 1.6 0.6
    Market sector ex mining 1.4 1.0

    (a) Average growth rates calculated between financial years.

    Sources: ABS; RBA.

    While the level of productivity in the mining industry in Australia is higher than in other industries, productivity growth in that industry has declined over recent years. Excluding mining, productivity growth in the market sector since 2017/18 has averaged 1 per cent per year, though this is still lower than its average over the preceding two decades and well below the rates recorded during the high productivity growth period in the 1990s.

    More generally, a range of explanations have been provided for the slowing in productivity growth globally since the 1990s. A well-documented one for Australia is declining ‘economic dynamism’ – it now takes longer for inputs to production to move to higher productivity firms, and it also takes longer for firms to catch up to the global frontier of performance and technology. Evidence suggests that at least part of the decline in economic dynamism relates to declining competition in the economy. Regulatory barriers also appear to have played a role in Australia, notably in the construction industry. Other explanations include slowing human capital accumulation, declining trade integration, and mismeasurement.

    What does the recent subdued growth in productivity mean for our assessment of economic conditions? While productivity growth is associated with growth in incomes and wages over the longer run, in the short run there can be material divergences between these variables. Over the past year or so, real average hourly earnings in the economy have grown faster than labour productivity. This exerts upward pressure on firms’ unit labour costs and is consistent with our assessment that labour market conditions are still tight, notwithstanding some easing in those conditions over the past couple of years.

    What will happen from here? Our latest forecasts in the Statement on Monetary Policy incorporate a pick-up in productivity growth over the next couple of years, which would add to the economy’s supply capacity and help alleviate cost pressures. But there is considerable uncertainty around this projection. If productivity growth remains weak, the near-term outlook will depend critically on how the economy adjusts. If growth in demand is also weaker and wages adjust quickly to this slower growth in the supply capacity of the economy, there might not be a material impact on cost pressures. But if demand picks up as expected or wages adjust slowly to continued weak productivity outcomes, cost pressures could be higher than we expect. We will continue to monitor these developments carefully, alongside the full range of indicators we use to assess current economic conditions.

    Concluding remarks

    To conclude, productivity matters because it is a key driver of economic living standards. Over the longer run, higher productivity growth expands the supply capacity of the economy and supports growth in incomes, wages and aggregate demand. In the short run, however, there can be meaningful divergences in the growth rates of these important macroeconomic variables. Recent weak growth in productivity has constrained growth in aggregate supply. Whether productivity growth improves from here and how the economy adjusts are important questions for the economic outlook.

    Thank you for your time today. I look forward to your questions.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI Security: 8 Charged in North Charleston Public Corruption Schemes, including 3 City Councilmen

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    CHARLESTON, S.C. — Eight people have been charged in federal court for a series of bribery, kickback, extortion, and money laundering schemes following a public corruption investigation in North Charleston. Three of the individuals charged are elected members of the North Charleston City Council.

    Four individuals have been charged by Information and have agreed to plead guilty:

    Jerome Sydney Heyward, 61, North Charleston City Councilmember;

    Sandino Savalas Moses, 50, North Charleston City Councilmember;

    Donavan Laval Moten, 46, founder of Core4Success Foundation; and

    Aaron Charles-Lee Hicks, 37, resident of North Charleston.

    A federal grand jury returned indictments against four others:

    Mike A. Brown, 46, North Charleston City Council Member;

    Hason Tatorian (“Tory”) Fields, 51, a Goose Creek resident;

    Rose Emily Lorenzo, 65, a North Carolina resident; and

    Michelle Stent-Hilton, 56, a North Charleston resident.

    Heyward is charged in three separate schemes with corruptly using his position as a North Charleston City Councilman to personally enrich himself through bribes, kickbacks, and extortion and to deprive the citizens and the government of North Charleston of their intangible right to the honest and faithful services of the North Charleston City Council. In the first scheme, Heyward extorted a businessman by soliciting payments in exchange for his official action as a City Councilman. In the second scheme, Heyward conspired with Mike A. Brown and Aaron Hicks to solicit and accept bribes from Aaron Hicks—working on behalf of a company with business before North Charleston City Council—in exchange for his support of the rezoning of the Baker Hospital site. In the third scheme, Heyward conspired with Donavan Moten, Rose Lorenzo, and Michelle Stent-Hilton to embezzle funds belonging to North Charleston by soliciting and accepting kickbacks from non-profit organizations run by Moten and Stent-Hilton that received violence reduction grant funds from the City.

    Heyward has agreed to plead guilty to: extortion under color of official right and using fear of economic harm; multiple counts of conspiracy to commit bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud; multiple counts of bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud; theft with respect to programs receiving federal funds; and multiple counts of money laundering. Heyward faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $500,000, and a term of supervised release of three years. Heyward has agreed to cooperate with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

    Mike A. Brown is charged with conspiring with Heyward and Hicks to commit bribery and honest services wire fraud. The indictment alleges that Mike A. Brown, while serving as a North Charleston City Councilmember, solicited and accepted bribes from Hicks—working on behalf of a company requesting the rezoning of the Baker Hospital site—in exchange for his support of the rezoning application. Mike A. Brown faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $250,000, and a term of supervised release of three years. He will be arraigned on these charges in March.

    Aaron Hicks is charged with a conspiracy to pay bribes to Mike A. Brown and Jerome Heyward and a separate conspiracy with Hason Tatorian Fields to bribe Sandino Moses in exchange for their influence on North Charleston City Council and their support of the rezoning of the Baker Hospital site. Hicks has agreed to plead guilty to two counts of conspiracy to commit bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud; bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds, and honest services wire fraud. Hicks has agreed to cooperate fully with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Hicks faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $250,000, and a term of supervised release of three years.

    Hason Tatorian (“Tory”) Fields is charged with conspiracy to commit bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud, bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds, and honest services wire fraud. The indictment alleges that Fields conspired with Hicks to pay bribes to Sandino Moses. Thereafter, Fields paid Moses two bribes in an attempt to influence him in connection with his official action regarding the rezoning of the Baker Hospital site. Fields faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $250,000 and a term of supervised release of three years.

    Sandino Moses is charged with misprision of a felony. The Information alleges that Moses knew that Fields and others attempted to bribe him and paid him bribes but he failed to disclose that criminal conduct and instead took steps to conceal the bribes by returning the money to Fields. Moses has agreed to plead guilty and to cooperate fully with federal state and local law enforcement agencies. He faces a maximum term of imprisonment of three years, a fine of $250,000, and a maximum term of supervised release of one year.

    Donavan Laval Moten has agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud, theft with respect to programs receiving federal funds, bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds, honest services wire fraud, and money laundering. The information alleges that Moten conspired with Jerome Heyward and Rose Lorenzo to kick back a portion of funds that Moten’s nonprofit received from North Charleston to Heyward, who at the time was on North Charleston’s City Council. The indictment further alleges that after receiving the money from North Charleston, Moten laundered Heyward’s portion through Lorenzo. Moten has agreed to cooperate fully with federal, state, and local enforcement officials. Moten faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $500,000 and a term of supervised release of three years.

    Michelle Stent-Hilton is charged with conspiracy to commit bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud, theft with respect to programs receiving federal funds, bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds, honest services wire fraud, and money laundering. The indictment alleges that Stent-Hilton, who is affiliated with a non-profit and served as Jerome Heyward’s personal assistant, promised to pay Heyward a portion of money the non-profit received from the city of North Charleston. At the time, Heyward was serving on North Charleston City Council and voted on the grant proposal to distribute funds to non-profits, including Stent-Hilton’s. The indictment further alleges that after receiving money from North Charleston, Stent-Hilton laundered Heyward’s kick back through Rose Lorenzo. Stent-Hilton faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $500,000 and a term of supervised release of three years.

    Rose Emily Lorenzo is charged with conspiracy to commit bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud, theft with respect to programs receiving federal funds, bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds, honest services wire fraud, and money laundering. The indictment alleges that Lorenzo conspired with Jerome Heyward and others to kick back a portion of City of North Charleston grant funds that were awarded to non-profits affiliated with Donavan Moten and Michelle Stent-Hilton to Heyward. The indictment further alleges that Lorenzo agreed to launder the funds by acting as an intermediary who received the funds from Moten and Stent-Hilton, and then wired them to Heyward for the purpose of concealing the true purpose of the transaction. Lorenzo faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $500,000 and a term of supervised release of three years.

    Heyward, Moten, Hicks, and Moses are scheduled to plead guilty before the Honorable Richard M. Gergel on Friday, Feb. 28.

    “When elected officials take their oath of office, they make a sacred promise to the people they serve.  They pledge to uphold the law, to act with integrity, and to place the public interest above their own,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Brook B. Andrews for the District of South Carolina. “Public service should never merely be a job – it is a public trust. The allegations in this case describe a profound betrayal of that trust.”

    “Public corruption at any level of government cannot be tolerated,” said Steve Jensen Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Columbia Field Office. “Citizens have a right to expect honesty, fairness, and integrity from their leaders. The FBI, in collaboration with our law enforcement partners, is dedicated to aggressively investigating corruption and ensuring those responsible are held accountable.”

    “SLED Agents worked hand-in-hand with our federal partners to ensure that justice will be served,” said SLED Chief Mark Keel. “No matter who you are, or what position you hold, you will be held accountable for breaking the law. Elected officials and citizens should be working together to better their community, not exploiting others.”

    The case was investigated by the FBI Columbia Field Office and the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Emily Limehouse and Whit Sowards are prosecuting the case.

    All charges in the indictment are merely accusations and defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australia could make it easier for consumers to fight back against anti-competitive behaviour. Here’s how

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mel Marquis, Deputy Associate Dean and Senior Lecturer in Law, Monash University

    From the supermarket to the petrol pump, many Australians are concerned about the power of large corporations. Are consumers getting a fair deal? Do they have enough choice?

    This week, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is due to hand the government the final report from its inquiry into Australia’s supermarket sector. They have already said the sector is highly concentrated, with just a few sellers controlling prices and exploiting small suppliers.

    This advocacy highlights a key source of pressure on wallets. The ACCC is also pursuing consumer law claims against the big supermarkets for creating the “illusion” of discounted prices.

    But across the economy, it is unlikely consumer interests are being protected as much as they could be. Further reforms in competition law would help.

    In some countries, consumers can band together to sue private companies and demand compensation if they’ve been harmed by anti-competitive behaviour.

    Australian consumers can sue companies too – but it can be burdensome, expensive and complicated. In fact, consumer suits seeking damages for such conduct are rare. Australia could make it easier to fight back.

    The problem

    Treasury will wrap up a major review of competition law in August.

    Two areas of reform have rightly been given particular attention: a merger law for the whole economy, and special rules for large digital platforms.

    The ACCC is Australia’s competition regulator and consumer law advocate.
    Jarretera/Shutterstock

    The merger reform has led to amendments to help the ACCC protect markets and a consultation on regulating platforms which has recently concluded.

    Treasury is considering other reforms as well. However, putting consumers in a better position to claim damages for anti-competitive conduct is not on the agenda.

    That is unfortunate. Consumers should feel more secure using competition law to demand compensation for anti-competitive harm. As the ACCC has said, the annual damage caused by cartels could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, a staggering figure.

    Even when the ACCC and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions succeed in bringing cartellists to court to obtain penalties or even criminal sentences, it is a way to punish and deter. It does not make victims whole.

    Overseas solutions

    Australia lags behind its global counterparts.

    In 2005, the European Union launched a debate on this subject. Laws were passed to ensure victims of anti-competitive conduct have a right to full compensation.

    The European Union has seen a growth in private competition law actions.
    MDart10/Shutterstock

    Since then, it appears to have become easier for consumers there to seek damages. From 2014 to 2019, one study showed a fivefold increase in the number of cases lodged in the EU, from 50 up to 239 private claims seeking compensation.

    In the United States, private antitrust enforcement thrives due to large class actions, where consumers with a similar grievance come together to take action against corporate defendants.

    US antitrust law allows treble damages, which means consumers can in theory receive three times the value of any harm suffered plus the costs of the lawsuit. In reality they recover less than that, but with large classes of claimants, the incentives to pursue claims through litigation and settlements are strong.

    The Australian situation

    On paper, private enforcement of competition law already exists in Australia. However, incentives appear weaker here.

    In the EU and US, class actions are designed to encourage claimants to seek compensation for anti-competitive harm, but the rarity of such claims in Australia suggests the settings aren’t quite right.

    Google is currently subject to antitrust action in Australia.
    JHVEPhoto/Shutterstock

    A class action against major banks for allegedly rigging exchange rates, and a recently lodged class action against Google relating to its AdTech operations, are the exceptions, not the rule.

    A 2012 article in the UNSW Law Journal said it was “time for an Australian debate”, but little has happened since.

    What now? Here are some possible reforms

    Various reforms and initiatives could bolster private enforcement in Australia, including:

    1. Reviewing evidence rules to allow judges to order the disclosure of documents collected during investigations, provided the public interest is not compromised. If evidence is too hard to access, victims of cartels have no chance of proving their case.

    2. Making it easier for a willing defendant to settle out of court. Sometimes, one defendant in a cartel case may be open to settling out of court but the other defendants are not. In such a case, to make it easier for the willing defendant to settle, it could be clarified that the non-settling defendants – if eventually ordered to pay the claimants – cannot then reclaim part of those damages as a “contribution” from the defendant that did settle.

    Without this assurance, individual defendants that would otherwise be ready to settle may hesitate for fear of paying more than their share.

    3. The ACCC could also more aggressively seek redress for consumers, which would reduce the need for damages actions. So far, the ACCC and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions have not made enough use of their ability to seek orders granting such compensation in cartel cases.

    Competition law is not just about promoting dynamism and productivity growth, and fairer prices and potential wage growth, though these are clearly desirable.

    Competition law should also be about securing relief for victims to make them whole, and to boost their trust in markets. Facilitating private rights of action for consumers can help to elevate justice in this area of the law.

    Mel Marquis has in the past received research grants funded by the Commonwealth of Australia and administered by the ACCC. He is a member of the Competition and Consumer Committee of the Law Institute of Victoria. The views expressed are personal to the author.

    ref. Australia could make it easier for consumers to fight back against anti-competitive behaviour. Here’s how – https://theconversation.com/australia-could-make-it-easier-for-consumers-to-fight-back-against-anti-competitive-behaviour-heres-how-250505

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  • MIL-Evening Report: There’s a new ‘rapid review’ into school bullying. Research shows we need to involve the whole school to stop it

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Fiona MacDonald, Principal Research Fellow, Institute for Sustainable Industries and Liveable Cities, Victoria University

    shutterstock LBeddoe/Shutterstock

    About one in four students report being regularly bullied in Australian schools.

    Children who are bullied can feel anxious and excluded, stop sleeping and eating well, and lose interest in school. There are serious potential long-term effects, which include anxiety and depression. Being bullied is also a risk factor for suicidal thoughts and behaviours.

    Following the 2024 death of Sydney Year 7 student Charlotte O’Brien, the federal government wants to develop a national standard to address bullying in schools.

    It has just announced a “rapid review” of bullying in schools, to be done in six months (though not before the federal election). This will look at what schools currently do to address bullying and what they should be doing.

    What does the research tell us works when it comes to addressing bullying in schools?

    What is bullying?

    Bullying is behaviour that is aggressive, intentional, repetitive and unprovoked.

    It also involves a power imbalance in favour of the perpetrator.

    As well as physical abuse, these behaviours can involve verbal teasing, harassment, damaging property, and antisocial behaviours such as spreading gossip or excluding someone. It can happen in person or online.

    Bullying can mean a child stops wanting to go to school.
    Doria Nippot/Shutterstock



    Read more:
    5 questions your child’s school should be able to answer about bullying


    Initial responses to bullying

    Much of the early research response to incidents on school bullying focused on the perpetrator and victim, and what the school should do in response to the bullying incident.

    This involved senior teachers such as the principal and school counsellor meeting with the perpetrator and victim and their parents/guardians. Here they would work out strategies to try and make amends and prevent future incidents.

    For example, a perpetrator may have had to apologise to the victim and take on additional responsibilities in the school. They may also be warned about suspension or exclusion.

    But these responses do not address the complexity of bullying. This includes the reasons why a child might bully another as well as its broader impact. Often other students are also inadvertently involved in or affected by bullying. Seeing someone else being bullied can be upsetting, students may feel angry, sad or concerned they may also be bullied.

    The shift to prevention

    So more recent research has emphasised the importance of prevention to reduce rates of school bullying. This could include anti-bullying policies, classroom rules and discussions about bullying as well as information for parents.

    This relies on what researchers call a “whole school approach”. Instead of bullying being seen as the responsibility of the principal or other senior teachers to deal with a few “at risk” kids, it is the responsibility of all staff, students and parents – and even the broader community.

    This means students are educated to understand what is and is not bullying and what to do if they witness it. It also means teachers have clear policies to follow and a clear understanding of “gateway behaviours,” which can escalate into bullying. Parents likewise know what to do if their child is being bullied or the kinds of behaviours that can lead up to it – such as namecalling or eyerolling.

    Other measures could include a dedicated staff member to champion anti-bullying measures in the school and partnerships with community members and organisations. This could be junior sporting clubs or even the school crossing guard (who can provide information about antisocial behaviours they observe).

    The aim is to create a school culture which is safe and supportive for students, where harmful behaviour is clearly understood and dealt with early if it happens.

    A whole school approach sees students invovled in prevention bullying at their school.
    Monkey Business Images/ Shutterstock



    Read more:
    Why do kids bully? And what can parents do about it?


    The importance of data

    Current research also emphasises the importance of schools regularly collecting, analysing and acting on data about bullying and the school environment. This enables schools to identify changes within the school environment before they escalate to bullying.

    Schools already collect data about their students and behaviours, including attendance, playground incidents and their attitudes to school. But many don’t have the time or expertise to analyse it.

    Listening to students

    Research also shows anti-bullying efforts are more effective when students are involved.

    This helps build trust between students, families and school staff, gives students a sense of ownership about solutions. Importantly it also enables young people to share their perspectives about what will work in their lives and classrooms.

    This could include schools regularly asking students about bullying and other issues they are having at schools and genuinely considering their suggestions about how to improve both prevention and responses.

    Fiona MacDonald received funding from Alannah & Madeline Foundation for this research.

    Nina Van Dyke received funding from the Alannah & Madeline Foundation for this research.

    ref. There’s a new ‘rapid review’ into school bullying. Research shows we need to involve the whole school to stop it – https://theconversation.com/theres-a-new-rapid-review-into-school-bullying-research-shows-we-need-to-involve-the-whole-school-to-stop-it-250519

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  • MIL-Evening Report: Intense heat changes our biology and can make us age significantly faster: study

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Rongbin Xu, Research Fellow in Health and Epigenetics, Monash University

    PorporLing/Shutterstock

    Heat takes it out of you. After a long, hot day, we feel tired and grumpy.

    But sustained periods of heat do more than that – they age us faster. Cumulative heat stress changes our epigenetics – how our cells turn on or off gene switches in response to environmental pressure.

    Now, new research from the United States explores the pressing question of how extreme heat affects humans. The findings are concerning. The more days of intense heat a participant endured, the faster they aged. Longer periods of extreme heat accelerated ageing in older people by more than two years.

    As the climate heats up, humans will be exposed to more and more heat – and our bodies will respond to these stresses by ageing faster. These findings are especially pertinent to Australia, where heatwaves are expected to become more frequent and intense in a warmer world.

    How, exactly, does heat age us?

    Ageing is natural. But the rate of ageing varies from human to human. As we go through life, our bodies are affected by stresses and shocks. For instance, if we don’t get enough sleep over a long period, we will age faster.

    While heat can directly sicken or kill us, it also has a long tail. Sustained heat stresses our bodies and make them less efficient at doing the many jobs needed to stay alive. This is what we mean when we say it accelerates biological ageing. This deterioration is likely to precede the later development of diseases and disabilities.

    What does that look like on a genetic level? You might think your genes don’t change over your life, and this is mostly true (apart from random mutations).

    But what does change is how your genes are expressed. That is, while your DNA stays the same, your cells can switch some of its thousands of genes off or on in response to stresses. At any one time, only a fraction of the genes in any cell are turned on – meaning they are busy making proteins.

    This is known as epigenetics. The most common and best understood pathway here is called DNA methylation (DNAm). Methylation here refers to a chemical our cells can use to block a DNA sequence from activating and producing proteins with various functions. Cellular changes in DNAm can lead to proteins being produced more or less, which in turn can flow on to affect physiological functions and our health status. This can be both bad or good.

    Heat stress can alter the pattern of which genes are turned off or on, which in turn can affect our rate of ageing.

    Severe heat stress can be remembered in cells, leading them to change their DNAm patterns over time. In laboratory testing, the effect is pronounced in fish, chickens, guinea pigs and mice.

    To date, much research on how heat affects epigenetics has focused on animals and plants. Here, the evidence is clear – even a single episode of extreme heat has been shown to have a long-lasting effect on mice.

    But only a couple of studies have been done involving humans, and they have been limited. This is the gap this new research is intended to help fill.

    Sustained heat changes how our cells express genes – accelerating ageing.
    aleks333/Shutterstock

    What did the study find?

    The study by researchers at the University of Southern California involved almost 3,700 people, with an average age of 68 years.

    Heat affects older people more than younger people. Our ability to control our body temperature drops as we age, and we are less resilient to outside stresses and shocks. We also know periods of extreme heat trigger a wave of illness and death, especially among older people.

    The study set out to better understand what happens to human bodies at a biological level when they’re exposed to intense heat over the short, medium and longer term.

    To do this, the researchers took blood samples and measured epigenetic changes at thousands of sites across the genome, which were used to calculate three clocks measuring biological age, named PcPhenoAge, PCGrimAge and DunedinPACE.

    Ageing is natural – but the speed at which we age can change.
    Bricolage/Shutterstock

    Then, they looked at the levels of heat each participant would have been exposed in their geographic areas over the preceding six years, which was 2010–16. They used the US heat index to assess heat, from caution (days up to 32°C), extreme caution (32–39°C) and danger (39–51°C). They used regression modelling to see how much faster people were ageing over the normal rate of ageing.

    The effect of heat was clear in the three biological clocks. Longer term exposure to intense heat increased biological age by 2.48 years over the six year period of the study according to PCPhenoAge, 1.09 years according to PCGrimAge and 0.05 years according to DunedinPACE.

    Over the period of the study, the effect was up to 2.48 years faster than normal ageing, where one calendar year equals one biological year of ageing. That is, rather than their bodies ageing the equivalent of six years over a six year period, heat could have aged their bodies up to 8.48 years.

    Importantly, the biological clocks differ quite substantially and we don’t yet know why. The authors suggest the PCPhenoAge clock may capture a broader spectrum of biological ageing, covering both short term and longer term heat stress, while the other two may be more sensitive to long term heat exposure.

    The way these researchers have conducted their study gives us confidence in their findings – the study sample was large and representative, and the use of the heat index rather than air temperature is an improvement over previous studies. However, the findings don’t account for whether the participants had airconditioning in their homes or spent much time outside.

    We need to know more

    Perhaps surprisingly, there has been little research done to date on what heat does to human epigenetics.

    In 2020, we conducted a systemic review of the science of how environment affects human epigenetics. We found only seven studies, with most focused on the effect of cold rather than heat.

    Now we have this new research which sheds light on the extent to which heat ages us.

    As we face a warmer future, our epigenetics will change in response. There is still a lot of work to do to see how we can adapt to these changes – or if we even can, in some parts of the world.

    Rongbin Xu received funding from VicHealth.

    Shuai Li receives funding from NHMRC, Cancer Australia, Victorian Cancer Agency, Cancer Council Victoria and NIH.

    ref. Intense heat changes our biology and can make us age significantly faster: study – https://theconversation.com/intense-heat-changes-our-biology-and-can-make-us-age-significantly-faster-study-250784

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  • MIL-Evening Report: Australians can wait at least 258 days for their first psychiatry appointment, our new study shows

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Yuting Zhang, Professor of Health Economics, The University of Melbourne

    chainarong06/Shutterstock

    Anyone who needs to make their first appointment with a psychiatrist may expect a bit of a wait. Our new research shows Australians are waiting an average 77 days for this initial appointment. But some were waiting for at least eight months.

    We also showed people are waiting longer and longer for these appointments over the past decade or so, particularly in regional and remote areas. And telehealth has not reduced this city-country disparity.

    Our study is the first of its kind to look at the national picture of wait times for a first appointment with a psychiatrist. Here’s why our findings are so concerning.

    What we did

    We analysed data from the Medicare Benefits Schedule from 2011 to 2022. This allowed us to analyse trends in wait times without accessing individual patients’ medical records.

    The particular dataset we used allowed us to look at the time from a GP referral to the first appointment with a private psychiatrist.

    A first appointment with a psychiatrist is crucial as it may lead to an official diagnosis if there is not one already, or it may map out future treatment options, including whether medicine or hospital admission is needed. Depending on the situation, treatment may start immediately, then be reviewed at subsequent appointments. However, with a delayed initial appointment, there’s the risk of delayed diagnosis and treatment, and symptoms worsening.

    We focused on wait times for initial outpatient appointments with private psychiatrists, and looked at wait times for face-to-face and telehealth attendances separately.

    We did not include wait times to see psychiatrists at public hospitals. And we couldn’t see what psychiatry appointments were for, and how urgent it was for a patient to see a psychiatrist at short notice.

    What we found

    We found wait times for the first psychiatry appointment after a GP referral had increased steadily in the past decade or so, especially since 2020. In 2011, the mean waiting time was 51 days, rising to 77 days by 2022.

    Waiting times varied substantially between patients. For example, in 2022, 25% of the wait times for a face-to-face appointment were under ten days. But 95% of wait times were under 258 days. This means the longest wait times were more than 258 days.

    For telehealth services in 2022, the equivalent wait times ranged from 11 to 235 days.

    Wait times also varied by location. People in regional and remote areas consistently had longer wait times than those living in major cities, for both in-person and telehealth services.

    The disparity remained over time, except for in-person services during the early years of the COVID pandemic. This is when rural areas in Australia had fewer lockdowns and less stringent movement restrictions compared to major cities.



    Why didn’t telehealth help?

    Our study did not look at reasons for increasing wait times. However, longer waits do not appear to be due to increased demand, considering the total number of visits has not gone up. For example, we showed the total number of visits for combined in-person and telehealth first appointments was 108,630 in 2020, 111,718 in 2021, and 104,214 in 2022.

    But what about telehealth? This has widely been touted as a boon for regional and remote Australians, as it allows them to access psychiatry services without the time and expense of having to travel long distances.

    Telehealth took off in 2020 due to COVID. There were 2,066 total first psychiatry visits between 2011 and 2019, increasing to 12,860 in 2020. But in 2022, there were 27,527.

    However, we found the number of telehealth visits offset the number of face-to-face visits, and the total visits remained stable in recent years. As telehealth still takes up psychiatrists’ time, it did not help to reduce wait times.

    What are the implications?

    The national rise in wait times over the past decade or so is concerning, especially for high-risk patients with severe mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, severe depression and bipolar disorder. Any delays in treatment for these patients could cause substantial harms to them and others in their communities.

    Our results also come at a time of increased pressure on mental health services more broadly including:

    Now, more than ever, we need to pay continued attention to access and distribution of psychiatric services across Australia.

    Yuting Zhang has received funding from the Australian Research Council (future fellowship project ID FT200100630), Department of Veterans’ Affairs, the Victorian Department of Health, and National Health and Medical Research Council. In the past, Professor Zhang has received funding from several US institutes including the US National Institutes of Health, Commonwealth fund, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. She has not received funding from for-profit industry including the private health insurance industry.

    Ou Yang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Australians can wait at least 258 days for their first psychiatry appointment, our new study shows – https://theconversation.com/australians-can-wait-at-least-258-days-for-their-first-psychiatry-appointment-our-new-study-shows-248012

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  • MIL-Evening Report: We analysed almost 1,000 social media posts about 5 popular medical tests. Most were utterly misleading

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Brooke Nickel, NHMRC Emerging Leader Research Fellow, University of Sydney

    C-R-V/Shutterstock

    When Kim Kardashian posted on Instagram about having had a full-body MRI, she enthused that the test can be “life saving”, detecting diseases in the earliest stages before symptoms arise.

    What Kardashian neglected to say was there’s no evidence this expensive scan can bring benefits for healthy people. She also didn’t mention it can carry harms including unnecessary diagnoses and inappropriate treatments.

    With this post in mind, we wanted to explore what influencers are telling us about medical tests.

    In a new study published today in JAMA Network Open, we analysed nearly 1,000 Instagram and TikTok posts about five popular medical tests which can all do more harm than good to healthy people, including the full-body MRI scan.

    We found the overwhelming majority of these posts were utterly misleading.

    5 controversial tests

    Before we get into the details of what we found, a bit about the five tests included in our study.

    While these tests can be valuable to some, all five carry the risk of overdiagnosis for generally healthy people. Overdiagnosis is the diagnosis of a condition which would have never caused symptoms or problems. Overdiagnosis leads to overtreatment, which can cause unnecessary side effects and stress for the person, and wasted resources for the health system.

    As an example, estimates suggest 29,000 cancers a year are overdiagnosed in Australia alone.

    Overdiagnosis is a global problem, and it’s driven in part by healthy people having tests like these. Often, they’re promoted under the guise of early screening, as a way to “take control” of your health. But most healthy people simply don’t need them.

    These are the five tests we looked at:

    The full-body MRI scan claims to test for up to 500 conditions, including cancer. Yet there is no proven benefit of the scan for healthy people, and a real risk of unnecessary treatment from “false alarm” diagnoses.

    The “egg timer” test (technically known as the AMH, or anti-mullarian hormone test) is often falsely promoted as a fertility test for healthy women. While it may be beneficial for women within a fertility clinic setting, it cannot reliably predict the chance of a woman conceiving, or menopause starting. However, low results can increase fear and anxiety, and lead to unnecessary and expensive fertility treatments.

    Multi-cancer early detection blood tests are being heavily marketed as the “holy grail of cancer detection”, with claims they can screen for more than 50 cancers. In reality, clinical trials are still a long way from finished. There’s no good evidence yet that the benefits will outweigh the harms of unnecessary cancer diagnoses.

    The gut microbiome test of your stool promises “wellness” via early detection of many conditions, from flatulence to depression, again without good evidence of benefit. There’s also concern that test results can lead to wasted resources.

    Testosterone testing in healthy men is not supported by any high-quality evidence, with concerns direct-to-consumer advertising leads men to get tested and take testosterone replacement therapy unnecessarily. Use of testosterone replacement therapy carries its own risk of potential harms with the long-term safety in relation to heart disease and mortality still largely unknown.

    Multi-cancer early detection blood tests are heavily marketed.
    Yuri A/Shutterstock

    What we found

    Together with an international group of health researchers, we analysed 982 posts pertaining to the above tests from across Instagram and TikTok. The posts we looked at came from influencers and account holders with at least 1,000 followers, some with a few million followers. In total, the creators of the posts we included had close to 200 million followers.

    Even discounting the bots, that’s a massive amount of influence (and likely doesn’t reflect their actual reach to non-followers too).

    The vast majority of posts were misleading, failing to even mention the possibility of harm arising from taking one of these tests. We found:

    • 87% of posts mentioned test benefits, while only 15% mentioned potential harms

    • only 6% of posts mentioned the risk of overdiagnosis

    • only 6% of posts discussed any scientific evidence, while 34% of posts used personal stories to promote the test

    • 68% of influencers and account holders had financial interests in promoting the test (for example, a partnership, collaboration, sponsorship or selling for their own profit in some way).

    Further analysis revealed medical doctors were slightly more balanced in their posts. They were more likely to mention the harms of the test, and less likely to have a strongly promotional tone.

    The vast majority of posts we looked at were misleading.
    DimaBerlin/Shutterstock

    As all studies do, ours had some limitations. For example, we didn’t analyse comments connected to posts. These may give further insights into the information being provided about these tests, and how social media users perceive them.

    Nonetheless, our findings add to the growing body of evidence showing misleading medical information is widespread on social media.

    What can we do about it?

    Experts have proposed a range of solutions including pre-bunking strategies, which means proactively educating the public about common misinformation techniques.

    However, solutions like these often place responsibility on the individual. And with all the information on social media to navigate, that’s a big ask, even for people with adequate health literacy.

    What’s urgently needed is stronger regulation to prevent misleading information being created and shared in the first place. This is especially important given social media platforms including Instagram are moving away from fact-checking.

    In the meantime, remember that if information about medical tests promoted by influencers sounds too good to be true, it probably is.

    Brooke Nickel receives fellowship funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC). She is on the Scientific Committee of the Preventing Overdiagnosis Conference.

    Joshua Zadro receives fellowship funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC).

    Ray Moynihan has received research funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council.

    ref. We analysed almost 1,000 social media posts about 5 popular medical tests. Most were utterly misleading – https://theconversation.com/we-analysed-almost-1-000-social-media-posts-about-5-popular-medical-tests-most-were-utterly-misleading-247362

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  • MIL-Evening Report: DeepSeek is now a global force. But it’s just one player in China’s booming AI industry

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mimi Zou, Professor, School of Private & Commercial Law, UNSW Sydney

    Dorason/Shutterstock

    When small Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) company DeepSeek released a family of extremely efficient and highly competitive AI models last month, it rocked the global tech community. The release revealed China’s growing technological prowess. It also showcased a distinctly Chinese approach to AI advancement.

    This approach is characterised by strategic investment, efficient innovation and careful regulatory oversight. And it’s evident throughout China’s broader AI landscape, of which DeepSeek is just one player.

    In fact, the country has a vast ecosystem of AI companies.

    They may not be globally recognisable names like other AI companies such as DeepSeek, OpenAI and Anthropic. But each has carved out their own speciality and is contributing to the development of this rapidly evolving technology.

    Tech giants and startups

    The giants of China’s technology industry include Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent. All these companies are investing heavily in AI development.

    Alibaba CEO Eddie Wu earlier this month said the multibillion dollar company plans to “aggressively invest” in its pursuit of developing AI that is equal to, or more advanced than, human intelligence.

    The company is already working with Apple to incorporate its existing AI models into Chinese iPhones. (Outside China, iPhones offer similar integration with OpenAI’s ChatGPT.)

    But a new generation of smaller, specialised AI companies has also emerged.

    For example, Shanghai-listed Cambricon Technologies focuses on AI chip development. Yitu Technology specialises in healthcare and smart city applications.

    Megvii Technology and CloudWalk Technology have carved out niches in image recognition and computer vision, while iFLYTEK creates voice recognition technology.

    Multibillion dollar Chinese tech company Alibaba plans to aggressively invest in AI.
    testing/Shutterstock

    Innovative paths to success

    Despite United States’ chip sanctions and China’s restricted information environment, these Chinese AI companies have found paths to success.

    US companies such as OpenAI have trained their large language models on the open internet. But Chinese companies have used vast datasets from domestic platforms such as WeChat, Weibo and Zhihu. They also use government-authorised data sources.

    Many Chinese AI companies also embrace open-source development. This means they publish detailed technical papers and release their models for others to build upon. This approach focuses on efficiency and practical application rather than raw computing power.

    The result is a distinctly Chinese approach to AI.

    Importantly, China’s state support for AI development has also been substantial. Besides the central government, local and provincial governments have provided massive funding through venture funds, subsidies and tax incentives.

    China has also established at least 48 data exchanges across different cities in recent years. These are authorised marketplaces where AI companies can purchase massive datasets in a regulated environment.

    By 2028, China also plans to establish more than 100 “trusted data spaces”.

    These are secure, regulated environments designed to standardise data exchanges across sectors and regions. They will form the foundation of a comprehensive national data market, allowing access to and use of diverse datasets within a controlled framework.

    A strong education push

    The growth of the AI industry in China is also tied to a strong AI education push.

    In 2018, China’s Ministry of Education launched an action plan for accelerating AI innovation in universities.

    Publicly available data shows 535 universities have established AI undergraduate majors and some 43 specialised AI schools and research institutes have also been created since 2017. (In comparison, there are at least 14 colleges and universities in the United States offering formal AI undergraduate degrees.)

    Together, these institutions are building an AI talent pipeline in China. This is crucial to Beijing’s ambition of becoming a global AI innovation leader by 2030.

    China’s AI strategy combines extensive state support with targeted regulation. Rather than imposing blanket controls, regulators have developed a targeted approach to managing AI risks.

    The 2023 regulations on generative AI are particularly revealing of Beijing’s approach.

    They impose content-related obligations specifically on public-facing generative AI services, such as ensuring all content created and services provided are lawful, uphold core socialist values and respect intellectual property rights. These obligations, however, exclude generative AI used for enterprise, research and development. This allows for some unrestricted innovation.

    There are 43 specialised AI schools and research institutes in China, including at Renmen University in Beijing.
    humphery/Shutterstock

    International players

    China and the US dominate the global AI landscape. But several significant players are emerging elsewhere.

    For example, France’s Mistral AI has raised over €1 billion (A$1.6 billion) to date to build large language models. In comparison, OpenAI raised US$6.6 billion (A$9.4 billion) in a recent funding round, and is in talks to raise a further US$40 billion.

    Other European companies are focused on specialised applications, specific industries or regional markets. For example, Germany’s Aleph Alpha offers an AI tool that allows companies to customise third-party models for their own purposes

    In the United Kingdom, Graphcore is manufacturing AI chips and Wayve is making autonomous driving AI systems.

    Challenging conventional wisdom

    DeepSeek’s breakthrough last month demonstrated massive computing infrastructure and multibillion dollar budgets aren’t always necessary for the successful development of AI.

    For those invested in the technology’s future, companies that achieve DeepSeek-level efficiencies could significantly influence the trajectory of AI development.

    We may see a global landscape where innovative AI companies elsewhere can achieve breakthroughs, while still operating within ecosystems dominated by American and Chinese advantages in talent, data and investment.

    The future of AI may not be determined solely by who leads the race. Instead, it may be determined by how different approaches shape the technology’s development.

    China’s model offers important lessons for other countries seeking to build their AI capabilities while managing certain risks.

    Mimi Zou has previously received funding from the British Academy. She is affiliated with the Asia Society Australia.

    ref. DeepSeek is now a global force. But it’s just one player in China’s booming AI industry – https://theconversation.com/deepseek-is-now-a-global-force-but-its-just-one-player-in-chinas-booming-ai-industry-250494

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Murray, Former FTA Worker, Park Ranger, BPA Analyst Lay Out How Mass Layoffs Across Federal Workforce Decimate Services, Leave Everyone Worse Off

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray
    Murray: “Elon Musk and Donald Trump are proving every single day they don’t know what they are doing, they don’t know what our federal workers do, and they don’t care if their firing spree ends up burning down something important.”
    ***VIDEO HERE***
    ***WA FACT SHEET: Impact in Washington State of Trump and Musk’s Reckless Mass Layoffs***
    Washington, D.C. — Today, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, held a virtual press conference with federal workers in Washington state—including from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), National Park Service (NPS), and Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)—who were recently laid off through no fault of their own and with zero justification, as part of Trump and Musk’s unprecedented assault on the federal workforce. The speakers underscored how Trump and Musk’s mass firings will severely jeopardize essential services that help families each and every day, and will leave us all worse off.
    Murray was joined for the press call by: Emily Conner, former Federal Transit Administration Region 10 FTA grants management specialist from Shoreline; Sam Peterson, former Park Ranger with the National Park Service at the Lake Roosevelt National Recreation Area in Eastern Washington; and Katie Emerson, former Management and Program Analyst at the Bonneville Power Administration, who resides in Southwest Washington.
    “Elon Musk and Donald Trump are proving every single day they don’t know what they are doing, they don’t know what our federal workers do, and they don’t care if their firing spree ends up burning down something important,” Senator Murray said. “Just this week, they fired another 1,400 staff at the VA—people who are helping serve our veterans, gone for no reason. And here’s the thing—they are still trying to fire even more people with even less forethought. The Trump-Musk firing spree continues to be about as surgical as a wrecking ball… These mass layoffs have nothing to do with government efficiency. In fact, they will do the exact opposite. Trump and Musk’s reckless firing spree means veterans waiting longer to get their disability claims approved, slower review of new drugs and medical devices, slower response to natural disasters, fewer people who help keep our skies safe for the flying public, and the list goes on.”
    “These are real-life impacts on everyday people, regardless of political beliefs, affiliations, or how people voted. And the ultimate price for these sudden and chaotic staffing cuts is that the American people will pay for it literally with their time and their money–they just don’t realize it yet,” said Emily Conner, former Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Region 10 FTA grants management specialist from Shoreline who was abruptly laid off as part of Trump and Musk’s cuts through no fault of her own. “Federal workers are civil servants; they work to serve the American people, and they take that job very seriously. Now that there aren’t enough people left to do the work, there’ll be ripple effects across the entire country in small and large ways that people just don’t understand yet, and it’s only going to get worse with more force reductions.”
    “The Park Service exists to do the incredibly challenging job of preserving America’s treasures while also sharing them with the public, but thousands of us do it with a smile on our face, and for less compensation that we could receive in the private sector. The Park Service really exists to help make and keep Americans happy and preserve everything that is great about our amazing nation. Without me on the job, and people like me, the existing staff will be stretched thin, safety issues will arise, and the services that the American taxpayer has already paid for won’t be present in our national park sites,” said Sam Peterson, a Park Ranger at the Lake Roosevelt National Recreation Area in Eastern Washington who was recently laid off by Trump and Musk through no fault of his own and with zero justification.
    “In addition to the excess workload, staffing shortages will lead to increased overtime and travel costs to get severely limited crews out for critical maintenance work and to respond to system outages. BPA response times to power outages in some locations may be delayed, as our crews are shorthanded and overworked,” said Katie Emerson, a Program Analyst at the Bonneville Power Administration who had worked at BPA for more than 10 years as a contractor and direct employee before being laid off without cause as part of the probationary firings. “Staff shortages will also force already-planned power grid enhancement and expansion projects to be delayed, projects intended to strengthen power grid stability. Staff shortages will be felt not just in the present term, but also in the long term. Electrical apprenticeship recruitment and hiring for 2025 was cancelled. It takes four years to train these employees to be at full capacity, so this single year delay will be felt for many years to come.”
    Senator Murray has been raising the alarm about how mass firings at all manner of federal agencies will hurt families, veterans, small businesses, farmers, and so many others in Washington state and across the country. Senator Murray has spoken out on the Senate floor against this administration’s attacks on federal workers and held multiple press conferences to call attention to how Trump and Musk’s mass layoffs are hurting federal workers in Washington state and undermining services for everyone. Earlier this month, she released both a national fact sheet and a Washington state fact sheet detailing what we know about the mass layoffs so far. Senator Murray also sent an open letter to federal workers and a newsletter to her constituents in Washington state outlining her concerns with the administration’s so-called “Fork in the Road” offer.
    Senator Murray has also sent a flurry of recent oversight letters demanding answers about indiscriminate staffing reductions across federal agencies—including letters to HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. on mass firings across HHS as well as a letter focused specifically on firings at FDA, Energy Secretary Chris Wright on indiscriminate firings at BPA, HUD Secretary Scott Turner on reports of massive staff cuts at HUD, Interior Secretary Doug Burham on National Parks Service staffing cuts, and Acting USDA Secretary Gary Washington on the universal hiring pause for USDA firefighters, among others.
    Senator Murray’s full remarks, as delivered on today’s press call, are below and video is HERE:
    “Thank you all so much for joining me in this this conversation. Here’s where we are: the fact of the matter is Elon Musk and Donald Trump are proving every single day they do not know what theyare doing, they don’t know what our federal workers actually do, and they don’t care if their firing spree ends up burning down something really important.
    “And it’s not just because they’re just out of touch billionaires—though they clearly are out of touch billionaires—because maybe that would explain why they don’t care if firing staff who help child care and Head Start centers keep their doors open makes it harder for parents to get child care, or firing Social Security workers, which cuts off our seniors from help with their benefits, or firing our BPA workers which will raise energy costs for our families.
    “But still, even people like Trump and Elon who take private jets everywhere should understand you do not fire FAA workers weeks after the deadliest crash in decades—that, to me, is just common sense!
    “But Trump and Musk have shown they couldn’t care less—even if lives are at stake. Unbelievably, they have fired public health experts working on bird flu—and even nuclear weapons experts!
    “If Trump and Musk stopped and used a single brain cell for a single second, the danger of firing nuclear experts willy-nilly would have been obvious.
    “But no, it was only after a public outcry—when everyone pointed out what should have been obvious—that they tried to reverse course and hire some of them back.
    “Just this week, they fired another 1,400 staff at the VA—people who are helping serve our veterans, gone for no reason. And here’s the thing—they are still trying to fire even more people with even less forethought.
    “The Trump-Musk firing spree continues to be about as surgical as a wrecking ball.
    “First, it was that scammy ‘Fork in the Road’ email—which they’ve been awfully quiet about since their latest email.
    “Then it was firing everyone who was new, or who was newly promoted. They didn’t target low performers—they targeted some of our highest performers.
    “And now they want to lay off anyone who didn’t respond quickly enough to an email that they sent out over the weekend. Of course, we all know they’re not going to read millions of responses.
    “Which is unfortunate, actually, because Elon and Trump clearly do need to learn a thing or two about what our workers actually do, and how important it is. They obviously do not have the slightest idea.
    “And now, it is being reporting that they just want to chuck all of these responses into some AI they’ve cooked up for firing people. Honestly, with as thoughtless as Trump and Musk are sometimes—I can almost see why they’re so desperate for artificial intelligence to do the thinking that they don’t seem to be capable of.
    “But that is no way to treat people who have dedicated themselves to our country—often for years, and many of them, by the way, are veterans!
    “That’s right: nearly one-third of our federal workforce are veterans, people who have literally put their lives on the line for our country—and now, we’re all seeing what Trump and Musk think about that.
    “And let’s be clear: these mass layoffs have nothing to do with government efficiency. In fact, they will do the exact opposite.
    “Trump and Musk’s reckless firing spree means veterans waiting longer to get their disability claims approved, slower review of new drugs and medical devices, slower response to natural disasters, fewer people who help keep our skies safe for the flying public, and the list goes on.
    “President Trump and Elon Musk may not actually care who they fire, what these workers do, and what pain and danger it will mean for our families.
    “But I understand it, and unlike them—I actually want to focus this conversation on what our federal workers actually do and how firing them, en masse, without rhyme or reason, hurts the American people in a big way.
    “So today, I want to give the floor to some dedicated federal workers who can talk about the work they were doing—before Trump and Musk sent them packing for no reason—and why it is important for all of us.
    “Because these are not just the people who keep America going—they are some of the people who make America great. So, with that, I want to turn it over to three people who have been fired to share with you their stories—and I’m going to start with Emily.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 – A10-0012/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024

    (2024/2081(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

     having regard to Articles 2, 3, 8, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

     having regard to Articles 17 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations human rights treaties and instruments,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

     having regard to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,

     having regard to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 43/29 of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  of 10 December 1984 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 18 December 2002,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  of 12 December 2006 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 13 December 2006,

     having regard to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1976,

     having regard to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 18 December 1992,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144 on 9 December 1998,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 13 September 2007,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas of 28 September 2018,

     having regard to the Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference of Population and Development in 1994 and its review conferences,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto, adopted on 25 May 2000,

     having regard to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 5 June 1998,

     having regard to the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of September 1995 and its review conferences,

     having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 25 September 2015, in particular goals 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 thereof,

     having regard to the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted on 19 December 2018 and the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees adopted on 17 December 2018,

     having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002,

     having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the International Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance of 10 April 2006[1],

     having regard to the Council of Europe Conventions of 4 April 1997 for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, and the Additional Protocols thereto, of 16 May 2005 on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and of 25 October 2007 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,

     having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which not all Member States have ratified but which entered into force for the EU on 1 October 2023,

     having regard to Protocols Nos 6 and 13 to the Council of Europe Convention of 28 April 1983 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty,

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe[3],

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2024 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2024,

     having regard to the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, adopted by the Council on 17 November 2020 and its Mid-term Review adopted on 9 June 2023,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on the alignment of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 with the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027,

     having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – an ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action (JOIN(2020)0017),

     having regard to the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0152),

     having regard to the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0698),

     having regard to the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),

     having regard to the EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021)0101),

     having regard to the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0565),

     having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation (COM(2020)0620),

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders, adopted by the Council on 14 June 2004 and revised in 2008, and the second guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation, endorsed in 2020,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, adopted by the Council on 8 December 2008,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of 2005, as updated in 2009,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, as updated by the Council on 12 April 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons, adopted on 24 June 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, adopted by the Council on 18 March 2019,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, adopted by the Council on 17 June 2019,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on EU policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with partner/third countries, approved by the Council on 22 February 2021,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict, approved by the Council on 24 June 2024,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492),

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 March 2023 on the role of the civic space in protecting and promoting fundamental rights in the EU,

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859[4],

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453),

     having regard to the joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 for a Council regulation on restrictive measures against serious acts of corruption (JOIN(2023)0013),

     having regard to the 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,

     having regard to its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, which in 2024 was awarded to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy,

     having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act)[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023[9], and to its previous resolutions on earlier annual reports,

     having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure, in particular those adopted in 2023 and 2024,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0012/2025),

    A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Articles 2 and 21 TEU; whereas the EU’s action worldwide must be guided by the universality and indivisibility of human rights and by the fact that the effective protection and defence of human rights and democracy is at the core of the EU’s external action;

    B. whereas consistency and coherence across the EU’s internal and external policies are key for achieving an effective and credible EU human rights policy, and in defending and supporting freedom and democracy;

    C. whereas democratic systems are the most suitable to guarantee that every person has the ability to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas effective rules-based multilateralism is the best organisational system to defend democracies;

    D. whereas the EU strongly believes in and fully supports multilateralism, a rules-based global order and the set of universal values, principles and norms that guide the UN member states and that the UN member states have pledged to uphold, in accordance with the UN Charter; whereas a world of democracies, understood as a world of political systems that defend and protect human rights worldwide, is a safer world, as democracies have significant checks and balances in place to prevent the unpredictability of autocracies;

    E. whereas the rise in authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism threatens the global rules-based order, the protection and promotion of freedom and human rights in the world, as well as the values and principles on which the EU is founded;

    F. whereas in December 2023, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrated its 75th anniversary; whereas today, more than ever since the UN’s foundation, totalitarian regimes challenge the UN Charter’s basic principles, seek to rewrite international norms, undermine multilateral institutions and threaten peace and security globally;

    G. whereas in November 2024, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child celebrated its 35th anniversary;

    H. whereas the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is regarded as a turning point for the global agenda on gender equality and will celebrate its 30th anniversary in 2025;

    I. whereas the legitimacy and functioning of the international rules-based order are dependent on compliance with the orders of, and respect for, international bodies, such as United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and orders and decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC); whereas multilateralism is being challenged by increasing global threats, such as terrorism and extremism, which threaten compliance with such orders and decisions, as well as, generally, with provisions of international law, human rights law and international humanitarian law in emerging and ongoing conflict situations; whereas international institutions, their officials, and those cooperating with them, are the subject of attacks and threats; whereas the international community, including the EU, has a responsibility to uphold the international rules-based order by enforcing universal compliance, including by its partners;

    J. whereas the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes a framework of accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; whereas the independence of the ICC is vital to ensure that justice is delivered impartially and without political interference;

    K. whereas the 2023 Mid-term Review of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, now extended to 2027, has shown that, despite the progress achieved so far, more needs to be done, in cooperation with like-minded democratic partners, especially in the context of the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption;

    L. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) are crucial partners in the EU’s efforts to safeguard and advance human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as to prevent conflicts globally; whereas state and non-state actors around the world are increasingly censoring, silencing and harassing, among others, HRDs, CSOs, journalists, religious communities, opposition leaders and other vulnerable groups in their work, shrinking the civil space ever further; whereas this behaviour includes measures encompassing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), restrictive government policies, transnational repression, defamation campaigns, discrimination, intimidation and violence, including extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, abductions, and arbitrary arrests and detention; whereas attacks on HRDs are increasingly extending to their families and communities, including those living in exile;

    M. whereas gender equality is a core EU value, and the human rights of women and girls, including their sexual and reproductive rights, continue to be violated across the world; whereas women experience unique and disproportionate impacts from conflicts, climate change and migration, including increased risks of gender-based violence, economic marginalisation and barriers to accessing resources; whereas women HRDs and CSOs continue to experience shrinking space for their critical work, as well as threats of violence, harassment and intimidation;

    N. whereas the past year has been marked by a further proliferation of laws on ‘foreign agents’ or foreign influence, including in countries with EU candidate status, targeting CSOs and media outlets and attempting to prevent them from receiving financial support from abroad, including from the EU and its Member States, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship;

    O. whereas in 2024, more than half the world’s population went to the polls, and many of these elections were marked by manipulation, disinformation and attempts at interference from inside or outside the country;

    P. whereas the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) warns of a decline in the intent of states and other political forces to protect press freedom; whereas, according to RSF, 47 journalists and media workers have been killed, most of them in conflict zones, and 573 have been imprisoned since 1 January 2024;

    Q. whereas 251 million children and young people are deprived of their fundamental right to education and remain out of school, according to the UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report 2024; whereas girls and women are affected not only by poverty but also by cultural norms, gender bias, child marriage and violence through official, discriminatory policies that prevent them from accessing education and the labour market and attempt to erase them from public life;

    R. whereas at least one million people are unjustly imprisoned for political reasons, among them several laureates and finalists of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;

    S. whereas environmental harm and the impacts of climate change are intensifying precariousness, marginalisation and inequality, and increasingly displacing people from their homes or trapping them in unsafe conditions, thereby heightening their vulnerability and jeopardising their human rights;

    Global challenges to democracy and human rights

    1. Reasserts the universality, interdependence, interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights and the inherent dignity of every human being; reaffirms the duty of the EU and its Member States to promote and protect democracy and the universality of human rights around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead by example, in line with its values, to promote and strictly uphold human rights and international justice;

    2. Insists that respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be the cornerstone of the EU’s external policy, in line with its founding principles; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States, to that end, to strive for a continued ambitious commitment to make freedom, democracy and human rights and their protection a central part of all EU policies in a streamlined manner and to enhance the consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies in this field, including through all of its international agreements;

    3. Stresses that the EU must be fully prepared to counter the rise of authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism, as well as the increasing violations of the principles of universality of human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law;

    4. Condemns the increasing trend of violations and abuses of human rights and democratic principles and values across the world, such as, among others, threats of backsliding on human rights, notably women’s rights, as well as executions, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill treatment, gender-based violence, clampdowns on civil society, political opponents, marginalised and vulnerable groups including children and elderly people, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and  ethnic and religious minorities; condemns, equally, slavery and forced labour, excessive use of violence by public authorities, including violent crackdowns on peaceful protests and other assemblies, systematic and structural discrimination, instrumentalisation of the judiciary, censorship and threats to independent media, including threats in the digital sphere such as online surveillance and internet shutdowns, political attacks against international institutions and the rules-based international order, and increasing use of unlawful methods of war in grave breach of international humanitarian law and human rights law; deplores the weakening of the protection of democratic institutions and processes, and the shrinking space for civil societies around the world; denounces the transnational repression, by illiberal regimes, of citizens and activists who have sought refuge abroad, including on EU soil;

    5. Notes with deep concern the ongoing international crisis of accountability and the challenge to the pursuit of ending impunity for violations of core norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in conflicts around the world; reaffirms the neutrality and importance of humanitarian aid in all conflicts and crises; underlines the serious consequences of discrediting and attacking the organisations of multilateral forums, such as the UN, which can foster a culture of impunity and undermine the trust in and functioning of the UN system; calls for the EU to uphold the international legal system and take effective measures to enforce compliance;

    6. Notes with satisfaction that there are also ‘human rights bright spots’ within this context of major challenges to human rights worldwide; highlights, in particular, the work of CSOs and HRDs; underlines the need for a more strategic communication on human rights and democracy by spreading news about positive results, policies and best practices; supports the Good Human Rights Stories initiative[10] as a way of promoting positive stories about human rights and recommends that it be updated; underlines the role of the EU’s public and cultural diplomacy, as well as international cultural relations, in the promotion of human rights, and calls for the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to increase its efforts in this regard;

    Strengthening the EU’s toolbox for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy around the world

    7. Notes with concern the increasing divide worldwide; stresses the shared responsibility of the EU to continue defending democratic values and principles and human rights, international justice, peace and dignity around the world, which are even more important to defend in the current volatile state of global politics; calls upon the EU to keep communication channels open with different stakeholders and to continue to develop a comprehensive toolbox to strengthen human rights and democracy globally;

    EU action plan on human rights and democracy

    8. Observes that the EU and its Member States have made substantial progress in implementing the EU action plan on human rights and democracy, although they have not reached all of its goals, in part also due to the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption; welcomes, in this sense, the extension of the action plan until 2027, with a view to maximising the synergies and complementarity between human rights and democracy at local, national and global levels;

    EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Human Rights

    9. Fully supports the work of the EUSR for Human Rights in contributing to the visibility and coherence of the EU’s human rights actions in its external relations; upholds the EUSR’s central role in the EU’s promotion and protection of human rights by engaging with non-EU countries and like-minded partners; underlines the need for close cooperation between the EUSR for Human Rights and other EUSRs and Special Envoys in order to further improve this coherence, and calls for greater visibility for the role of the EUSR for Human Rights; calls for the EUSR to be supported in his work with increased resources and better coordination with EU delegations around the world; regrets, despite continuous calls, Parliament’s exclusion from the process of selecting the EUSR; insists on the need for the EUSR to report back to Parliament regularly;

    Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe and the human rights and democracy thematic programme

    10. Recalls the fundamental role of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, including its thematic programme on human rights and democracy, as a flagship EU instrument in promoting and protecting human rights and democracy around the world; highlights the need to engage with civil society in all the EU’s relevant external activities, including the Global Gateway Strategy which is financed through the NDICI-Global Europe; reiterates the importance of streamlining a human-rights based approach in the EU’s external action instruments; underlines Parliament’s role in the instrument’s programming process and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to share all relevant information in a timely manner in order to enable Parliament to play its role accordingly, in particular during high-level geopolitical dialogues with the Commission and in the mid-term review process as well as in its resolutions; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that a response is provided to the recommendation letters following each geopolitical dialogue and each resolution; urges the Commission to develop and launch a comprehensive, centralised website dedicated to the NDICI-Global Europe, including information on all the multiannual indicative programmes, detailing their respective budgets, associated actions and the financial allocations they are backing, organised both by country and by theme; notes that the NDICI-Global Europe and all future instruments must focus on the fundamental drivers of ongoing challenges, including the need to strengthen the resilience of local communities and democracy support activities by supporting economic development;

    11. Calls for independent, ex ante assessments to determine the possible implications and risks of projects with regard to human rights, in line with Article 25(5) of  Regulation (EU) 2021/947; calls for independent human rights monitoring throughout the implementation of projects in third countries, especially in relation to projects entailing a high risk of violations; calls for a suspension of projects that (in)directly contribute to human rights violations in non-EU countries; reiterates the prohibition on allocating EU funds to activities that are contrary to EU fundamental values, such as terrorism or extremism; calls on the Commission to share all human rights-related assessments with Parliament in a proactive manner;

    EU trade and international agreements

    12. Reiterates its call to integrate human rights assessments and include robust clauses on human rights in agreements between the EU and non-EU countries, supported by a clear set of benchmarks and procedures to be followed in the event of violations; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the human rights clauses in current international agreements are actively monitored and effectively enforced and to improve their communication with Parliament concerning considerations and decisions regarding this enforcement; reiterates that in the face of persistent breaches of human rights clauses by its partner countries, including those related to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus programme, the EU should react swiftly and decisively, including by suspending the agreements in question if other options prove ineffective; calls for the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal to be implemented, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, or for the Commission’s Single Entry Point to be adapted to allow complaints regarding failure to comply with human rights clauses to be submitted; calls on the EU institutions to engage regularly with the business community and civil society in order to strengthen the links between international trade, human rights and economic security; calls for the EU to ensure human rights promotion and protection through its Global Gateway investments and projects, by ensuring that they do no harm;

    EU human rights dialogues

    13. Stresses the important role of human rights dialogues within the EU’s human rights toolbox and as a key vehicle for the implementation of the EU action plan on human rights and democracy; highlights that these dialogues must address the overall situation of human rights and democracy with the relevant countries; notes that human rights dialogues should be seen as a key element of sustained EU engagement and not as a free-standing instrument, and that the persistent failure of non-EU countries to genuinely engage in dialogues and to implement key deliverables should lead to the use of other appropriate foreign policy tools; recalls that these dialogues need to be used in conjunction and synergy with other instruments, using a more-for-more and a less-for-less approach; reiterates the need to raise individual cases, in particular those of Sakharov Prize laureates and those highlighted by Parliament in its resolutions, and ensure adequate follow-up; calls on the EEAS and EU delegations to increase the visibility of these dialogues and their outcomes, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that can be included in a published joint press statement, and to conduct suitable follow-up action on it; calls for the enhanced and meaningful involvement of civil society in the dialogues; stresses that genuine CSOs must not be impeded from participating in human rights dialogues and that any dialogue must include all genuine CSOs without any limitations;

    EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act)

    14. Welcomes the increasing use of the EU GHRSR as a key political tool in the EU’s defence of human rights and democracy across the world; regrets, however, that its use has continued to be limited, especially in the current geopolitical landscape; notes, however, the challenges that the requirement of unanimity poses in the adoption of sanctions and reiterates its call on the Council to introduce qualified majority voting for decisions on the GHRSR; recalls, in this regard, the formal request submitted by Parliament to the Council in 2023, on calling an EU reform convention, with the aim, among others, of increasing the number of decisions taken by qualified majority; calls for a stronger use of the GHRSR and other ad hoc sanctions regimes on those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including high-level officials; fully supports the possibility of imposing targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework in this regard, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the GHRSR or under a different regime; highlights the need for the complete enforcement of sanctions and calls for circumventions to be tackled;

    Democracy support activities

    15. Reiterates its concern regarding the increasing attacks by authoritarian and illiberal regimes on democratic principles, values and pluralism; stresses that the defence and support of democracy around the world is increasingly becoming of geopolitical and strategic interest; emphasises the importance of Parliament’s efforts in capacity-building for partner parliaments, promoting mediation and encouraging a culture of dialogue and compromise, especially among young political leaders, and empowering women parliamentarians, HRDs and representatives from civil society and independent media; reiterates its call on the Commission to continue and expand its activities in these areas by increasing funding and support for EU bodies, agencies and other grant-based organisations; stresses the critical importance of directly supporting civil society and persons expressing dissenting views, particularly in the current climate of growing global tensions and repression in increasing numbers of countries; reiterates the importance of EU election observation missions and Parliament’s contribution to developing and enhancing their methodology; calls for the development of an EU toolbox to be used in cases of disputed or non-transparent election results in order to prevent political and military crises in the post-election environment; calls for enhanced EU action to counter manipulative and false messages against the EU in election campaigns, in particular in countries that receive significant EU humanitarian and development assistance and in countries that are candidates for EU membership; calls for enhanced collaboration between Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group, the relevant Commission directorates-general and the EEAS;

    EU support for human rights defenders

    16. Is extremely concerned by the continuing restriction of civil society space and rising threats to the work of HRDs and members of CSOs, as well as their families, communities and lawyers, and finds particularly concerning the increasingly sophisticated means used to persecute them; strongly condemns their arbitrary detentions and killings; deplores the harassment of CSOs through legislative provisions such as foreign agents laws and similar, and other restrictions they face; deplores the fact that women HRDs continue to face relentless and ever more sophisticated violations against them, including targeted killings, physical attacks, disappearances, smear campaigns, arrests, judicial harassment and intimidation; notes with concern that these attacks seem designed to systematically silence women HRDs and erase their voices from the public sphere; supports wholeheartedly the work of HRDs and EU action to ensure their protection worldwide; underscores the pressing need for a comprehensive and timely revision of the EU Guidelines on HRDs, with a view to addressing the emerging challenges and threats, and to ensuring their applicability and effectiveness in the protection of HRDs globally, while integrating gender-sensitive and intersectional approaches in the updated Guidelines, reflecting the diverse backgrounds and experiences of HRDs, and taking into account the specific vulnerabilities they may face; calls for the complete and consistent application of the EU Guidelines on HRDs by the EU and its Member States; calls for efforts to enhance communication strategies to increase the visibility of EU actions and channels for the protection of and the support mechanisms for HRDs;

    17. Raises serious concerns over the increasing phenomenon of transnational repression against HRDs, journalists and civil society; calls for the formulation of an EU strategy harmonising national responses to transnational repression;

    18. Expresses deep concern regarding the increasingly precarious financial landscape faced by HRDs and communities advocating for rights, particularly within a global context characterised by intensifying repression; notes that, as a result of the current geopolitical context, HRDs’ need for support has increased; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to make full use of their financial support for HRDs, ensuring the establishment of flexible, accessible and sustained funding mechanisms that enable these defenders to continue their vital work in the face of mounting challenges;

    19. Insists that the EEAS, the Commission and the EU delegations pay particular attention to the situation of the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk and take resolute action, in coordination with the Member States and Parliament, to ensure their well-being, safety or liberation;

    20. Welcomes the update of the EU Visa Code Handbook in relation to HRDs and calls for its full and consistent application by the Member States; reiterates its call for the Commission to take a proactive role in the establishment of a coordinated approach among the Member States for HRDs at risk, for instance streamlining visa procedures and promoting harmonisation in the EU’s visa application process;

    Combating impunity and corruption

    21. Underlines that both impunity and corruption enable and aggravate human rights violations and abuses and the erosion of democratic principles; welcomes the anti-corruption actions in EU external policies in the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012); supports the anti-corruption provisions included in the EU trade agreements with non-EU countries; stresses the important role of civil society and journalists in non-EU countries in the oversight of the fight against impunity and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their efforts in justice reforms, the fight against impunity, and the improvement of transparency and of anti-corruption institutions in non-EU countries; encourages the EU and its Member States to coordinate more closely with allies and partners wherever possible in order to counter systemic corruption that enables autocrats to maintain power, deprives societies of key resources and undermines democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    22. Insists on the need for the EU to take clear steps to recognise the close link between corruption and human rights violations in order to target economic and financial enablers of human rights abusers;

    EU actions at multilateral level

    23. Reaffirms that promoting the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights around the world requires strong international cooperation at a multilateral level; underlines the particularly important role of the UN and its bodies as the main forum which must be able to effectively advance efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and respect for human rights and international law; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting the work of the UN, its agencies and special procedures, both politically and financially, to ensure that it is fit for purpose, and to push back against the influence of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; stresses that the current multilateral order needs to fully incorporate into its architecture the new global actors, especially those focusing on democracy and human rights; reiterates the need for the EU and its Member States to speak with one voice at the UN and in other multilateral forums in order to effectively tackle global challenges to human rights and democracy in multilateral forums and to support the strongest possible language in line with international human rights standards; calls, to this end, for progress in ensuring that the EU has a seat in international organisations, including the UN Security Council, in addition to the existing Member States’ seats; calls for EU delegations to play a stronger role in multilateral forums, for which they should have appropriate resources available;

    24. Is deeply concerned by growing attacks against the rules-based global order by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, including through unprovoked and unjustified aggression against peaceful neighbours and through the undermining of the functioning of UN bodies, namely the abuse of veto power at the UN Security Council; underlines that the diminished effectiveness of these bodies brings with it real costs in terms of conflicts, lives lost and human suffering, and seriously weakens the general ability of countries to deal with global challenges; calls on the Member States and like minded partners to develop a robust strategy and to intensify their efforts to reverse this trend and to send a united and strong message of support to those organisations when they are attacked or threatened; believes that the UN, its bodies, and other multilateral organisations are in need of reform, in order to address these growing challenges and threats;

    25. Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the International Court of Justice and the ICC as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions amid a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls that a well-funded ICC is essential for the effective prosecution of serious international crimes; welcomes the political and financial support the EU has given to the ICC, including the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, and the launch of the ‘Global initiative to fight against impunity for international crimes’ offering financial support to CSOs dedicated to fostering justice and accountability for international crimes and serious human rights violations, including by facilitating survivors’ participation in legal proceedings; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and intensify their support to the ICC – including to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims – with the necessary means, including resources and political backing, and to use all instruments at their disposal to combat impunity worldwide and enable the ICC to fulfil its mandate effectively; calls on all the Member States to respect and implement the actions and decisions of the International Court of Justice and all organs of the ICC, including the OTP and the Chambers, to urge other countries to join and cooperate with the court, including to enforce ICC arrest warrants, and to support their work as an independent and impartial international justice institution everywhere in the world; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the court’s work; calls for the EU to urge non-EU countries, including its major partners, to recognise the ICC and become a state party to the Rome Statute;

    26. Stresses the importance of not politicising the ICC, as trust in the court is eroded if its mandate is misused; condemns, in particular and in the most critical terms, the political attacks, sanctions and other coercive measures introduced or envisaged against the ICC itself and against its staff; calls on the Member States and the EU institutions to cooperate to work on solutions in order to protect the institution of the ICC and its staff from any future sanctions that would threaten the functioning of the court;

    27. Recognises universal jurisdiction as an important tool of the international criminal justice system to prevent and combat impunity and promote international accountability; calls on the Member States to apply universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity;

    28. Calls for the EU and its Member States to lead the global fight against all forms of extremism and welcomes the adoption of an EU strategy to this end; demands that the fight against terrorism be at the top of the EU’s domestic and foreign affairs agenda;

    Upholding international humanitarian law

    29. Notes with concern the increasing disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly in the form of ongoing conflicts around the world; strongly condemns the increase in deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in multiple conflict settings; underlines that it is of the utmost importance that all UN and humanitarian aid agencies are able to provide full, timely and unhindered assistance to all people in vulnerable situations and calls on all parties to armed conflicts to fully respect the work of these agencies and ensure they can meet the basic needs of civilians without interference; denounces attempts to undermine UN agencies delivering humanitarian aid; urges all parties to armed conflicts to protect civilian populations, humanitarian and medical workers, and journalists and media workers; calls on all parties to armed conflicts to respect the legitimacy and inviolability of UN peacekeeping missions; calls on all states to unconditionally and fully conform with international humanitarian law; calls on the international community, and the Member States in particular, to promote accountability and the fight against impunity for grave breaches of international humanitarian law; calls for the systematic creation of humanitarian corridors in regions at war and in combat situations, whenever necessary, in order to allow civilians at risk to escape conflicts, and strongly condemns any attacks on them; demands unhindered access for humanitarian organisations monitoring and assisting prisoners of war, as provided for in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War; expects international organisations to abide by international law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war; calls for international cooperation and assistance in the return of forcibly deported persons, in particular children and hostages;

    30. Reiterates its call on the Member States to help contain armed conflicts and serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law by strictly abiding by the provisions of Article 7 of the UN Arms Trade Treaty of 2 April 2013 on Export and Export Assessment and Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment;

    31. Given the gendered impacts of armed conflicts, deplores the insufficient priority and focus given to sexual and gender-based violence and to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) across the EU’s humanitarian and refugee response; reiterates that humanitarian crises intensify SRHR- and gender-related challenges and recalls that in crisis zones, particularly among vulnerable groups such as refugees and migrants, women and girls are particularly exposed to sexual violence, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual exploitation, rape as a weapon of war and unwanted pregnancies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to give high priority to gender equality and SRHR in their humanitarian aid and refugee response, as well as accountability and access to justice and redress for sexual and reproductive rights violations and gender-based violence, including in terms of training for humanitarian actors, and existing and future funding;

    Team Europe approach

    32. Recognises the potential for stronger alignment in approaches to human rights protection and promotion between EU institutions, Member States’ embassies and EU delegations in non-EU countries, particularly in encouraging those countries to comply with their international obligations and to refrain from harassment and persecution of critical voices; emphasises the opportunity for Member States’ embassies to take an increasingly active role in advancing and safeguarding human rights, while also supporting civil society in these countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all possible means to urge countries to release political prisoners; highlights the importance of shared responsibility between Member States and EU delegations in these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify their collective efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and to support democracy worldwide; encourages careful monitoring and assessment of the capacity of EU delegations to ensure that each one has a designated point of contact for cases of human rights violations, and that this mandate is allocated sufficient resources to respond in an effective and timely manner; reiterates, in this context, the importance, for the EU delegations, of existing EU guidelines related to specific areas of human rights;

    Responding to universal human rights and democracy challenges

    Right to freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

    33. Condemns any action or attempt to legalise, instigate, authorise, consent or acquiesce to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment methods under any circumstances; condemns the increasing reports of the use of torture by state actors in many different contexts, including in custodial and extra-custodial settings – of political prisoners, among others – and in conflict situations around the world, notably in violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as well as the killing of prisoners of war, which amounts to a war crime, and reiterates the non-derogable nature of the right to be free from torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment; reiterates the EU’s zero-tolerance policy to torture and other ill-treatment and calls on the relevant institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights, to take a thorough stance on any such case;

    34. Reiterates its calls for universal ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol thereto, and for the need for states to bring their national provisions in this respect in line with international standards; reiterates, in accordance with the revised Guidelines on the EU’s policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019, the importance of engaging with relevant stakeholders in the fight to eradicate torture, and to monitor places of detention;

    Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association

    35. Reiterates the need to protect the EU democratic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms therein, particularly freedoms of assembly and association; highlights the growing violent repression of protest and peaceful assemblies within the EU civic space, with cases of torture and ill-treatment resulting in deaths and other serious violations; underscores the need to strengthen this fundamental right in conjunction with the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment;

    Right to food, water and sanitation

    36. Recalls that the right to food, including having physical and economic access to adequate food or the means to its procurement, is a human right; is extremely concerned about the challenges to the right to food worldwide, especially in situations of war and conflicts; condemns the increasing reports of the weaponisation of food in situations of armed conflict; calls for the EU and its Member States to promote mandatory guidelines on the right to food without discrimination within the UN system; urges the EU and the Member States to fully support, politically and financially, organisations and agencies working to secure the right to food in conflict zones; recalls the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas in view of attaining food security; commends the work of the UN World Food Programme, in this regard;

    37. Reaffirms the rights to safe drinking water and to sanitation as human rights, both rights being complementary; underlines that access to clean drinking water is indispensable to a healthy and dignified life and is essential for the maintenance of human dignity; highlights the fact that the right to water is a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest, and in common public and global goods; underscores the importance of the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, and urges the EU institutions and the Member States to implement and promote their application in non-EU countries and in multilateral forums;

    Climate change and the environment

    38. Highlights that climate change and its impact on the environment has direct effects on the effective enjoyment of all human rights; recognises the important work of CSOs, indigenous peoples and local communities, land and environmental HRDs and indigenous activists for the protection of a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, including access to land and water sources; deplores the risks that environmental HRDs and indigenous activists face and calls for their effective protection to be guaranteed; notes that communities contributing the least to climate change are the ones more likely to be affected by climate risks and natural disasters and calls, in this regard, for increasing support to the most vulnerable groups; recalls that indigenous peoples and local communities play an important role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; recalls that the transition to clean energy must be fair and respect everyone’s fundamental rights; reiterates the importance of the achievement of the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the protection of the human rights of present and future generations;

    39. Notes with deep concern the increasing threats to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment posed by the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of warfare that adversely and disproportionately affect the environment; stresses the need to effectively address the displacement of people caused by environmental destruction and climate change, which increases the risk of human rights violations and heightens vulnerabilities to different forms of exploitation; recognises that children face more acute risks from climate-related disasters and are also one of the largest groups to be affected; calls for the EU to focus on addressing the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of the rights of the child;

    Rights of the child

    40. Calls for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights, including for those most marginalised and those in the most vulnerable situations, through all of the EU’s external policies; calls for more concerted efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of children’s rights in crisis or emergency situations; condemns the decline in respect for the rights of the child and the increasing violations and abuses of these rights, including through violence, early and forced marriage, sexual abuse including genital mutilation, trafficking, child labour, honour killings, recruitment of child soldiers, lack of access to education and healthcare, malnutrition and extreme poverty; further condemns the increase in deaths of children in situations of armed conflict and stresses the need for effective protection of children’s rights in active warfare; calls for new EU initiatives to promote and protect children’s rights, with a view to rehabilitating and reintegrating conflict-affected children, ensuring that they have a protected, family- and community-based environment as a natural context for their lives, in which assistance and education are fundamental elements; reiterates its call for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights through all EU external policies; calls on all countries to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as a matter of urgency, in order to allow for the universal ratification of this foundational instrument;

    41. Stresses the importance of closing the financing gap that would enable countries to meet their SDG 4 targets on quality education and ensure access to education for all children and young people; reiterates its calls to address cultural norms and gender biases that prevent girls and women from receiving an education and urges the creation of gender-responsive education systems worldwide;

    42. Stresses that education represents the starting point for cultivating principles and values that contribute to the personal development of children, as well as to social cohesion and democracy, and the rule of law around the world; to that end calls for the EU to promote its values through supporting access to education and learning for women and girls;

    Rights of women and gender equality

    43. Stresses that women’s rights and gender equality are indispensable and indivisible human rights, as well as a basis for the rule of law and inclusive resilient democracies; deplores the fact that millions of women and girls continue to experience discrimination and violence, especially in the context of conflicts, post-conflict situations and displacements, and are denied their dignity, autonomy and even life; condemns the impunity with which perpetrators commit violations against women HRDs; is appalled by the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war and stresses the need to shed light on these instances, and for better international cooperation on fighting impunity for these crimes; calls for the EU, its Member States and like-minded partners to step up their efforts to ensure the full enjoyment and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights, and to incorporate a gender mainstreaming approach across all policies, taking into account the differentiated impacts of global challenges such as climate change or conflicts; condemns in the strongest terms the increasing attacks on SRHR around the world, as well as gender-based violence; strongly deplores cases of female genital mutilation, honour killings, child marriages and forced marriages; welcomes the accession of the EU to the Istanbul Convention and strongly encourages the remaining EU Member States to ratify the Istanbul Convention without further delay; calls for the EU and its international partners to strengthen their efforts to ensure that women fully enjoy human rights and are treated equally to men; emphasises the importance of safeguarding the rights of women, ensuring that their health, safety and dignity are protected, particularly in the context of healthcare access and workplace protections; underlines the need to keep opposing and condemning, in the strongest terms, anti-abortion laws that punish women and girls with decades-long jail sentences, even in cases of rape, incest or when the life of the pregnant woman is at risk; stresses the need to pursue efforts to fully eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation; fully supports the role of the EU Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;

    44. Recognises that gender apartheid constitutes a systematic and institutionalised form of oppression, depriving women and girls of fundamental rights solely on the basis of their gender; notes with deep concern the entrenchment of gender apartheid in certain regions, where women face extensive restrictions on education, employment, healthcare and freedom of movement, often underpinned by legal and cultural frameworks that reinforce gender-based discrimination; urges the EU and the Member States to proactively address gender apartheid through strengthened diplomatic efforts, targeted economic measures and accountability mechanisms that support civil society organisations advocating for gender equality; calls for the formal recognition of gender apartheid as a distinct human rights violation and for support for international initiatives for its classification as a crime against humanity, thus contributing to the establishment of a global accountability standard;

    Rights of refugees and asylum seekers

    45. Denounces the erosion of the human rights and the safety of refugees, asylum seekers and forcibly displaced persons; reaffirms their inalienable human rights and fundamental right to seek asylum; recalls the obligation of states to protect them in accordance with international law; underlines the importance of identification and registration of individuals, including children, as a key tool for protecting refugees and ensuring the integrity of refugee protection systems, preventing human trafficking and the recruitment of children into armed militias; calls for the EU and its Member States to effectively uphold their rights in the EU’s asylum and migration policy and in the EU’s cooperation with partner countries in this regard; deplores the increasing xenophobia, racism and discrimination towards migrants, as well as the different forms of violence they face, including during their displacement, and the many barriers they face, including in access to healthcare; condemns the instrumentalisation of migration at EU borders by foreign actors, which constitutes hybrid attacks against the Member States as well as a dehumanisation of migrants; stresses that the EU should step up its efforts to acknowledge and develop ways to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, building the resilience of migrants’ communities of origin and helping them offer their members the possibility to enjoy a decent life in their home country; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and, where possible, step up their support for countries hosting the most refugees, as well as for transit countries; reiterates that close cooperation and engagement with non-EU countries, with full respect for fundamental rights, remain key to preventing migrant smuggling; stresses, in this regard, that the dissemination of information and awareness-raising campaigns on the risks of smuggling are crucial, as well as of the migration laws of the destination countries, in order to prevent the undertaking of unnecessarily risky journeys by those who do not have grounds for asylum; calls for EU-funded humanitarian operations to take into consideration the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children and to ensure their protection while they are displaced; underlines the importance of developing an effective framework of safe and legal pathways to the EU and welcomes, in this regard, the Commission communication on attracting skills and talent to the EU[11], including the development of talent partnerships with partner countries; calls for respect for the principle of non-refoulement to countries where the life and liberty of people would be threatened; calls for the EU and its Member States to discuss the phenomenon of instrumentalised migration orchestrated by authoritarian regimes and organised crime groups, and emphasises the need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, develop effective countermeasures, and consider its implications for the human rights framework;

    46. Reaffirms that no agreement with a non-EU country designated as a transit country should be concluded without Parliament’s scrutiny, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to include robust human rights clauses, monitoring mechanisms and impact assessments therein; reiterates its call on the Commission to integrate ex ante human rights impact assessments into such agreements;

    Rights of LGBTIQ+ persons

    47. Deplores the human rights violations, including discrimination, persecution, violence and killings, against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons around the world; is extremely concerned by the spreading of hatred and anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives and legislation that target LGBTIQ+ persons and HRDs; calls for the adoption of policies that protect LGBTIQ+ people and give them the tools to safely report a violation of their rights, in line with the EU Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by LGBTI Persons; expresses special concern over LGBTIQ+ people living under non-democratic regimes or in conflict situations, and calls for rapid response mechanisms to protect them as well as their defenders; reiterates its calls for the full implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as the EU’s tool for improving the situation of LGBTIQ+ people around the world; calls for  the use of the death penalty to be rejected under all circumstances, including any legislation that would impose the death penalty for homosexuality; calls for the EU and its Member States to further engage the countries with such legislation in reconsidering their position on the death penalty; notes further that the imposition of the death penalty on the basis of such legislation is arbitrary killing per se, and a breach of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

    Rights of persons with disabilities

    48. Is concerned by the challenges to the full enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities; reiterates its calls for the EU to assist partner countries in the development of policies in support of carers of persons with disabilities; calls for the raising of social awareness and the combating of discriminatory behaviours against persons with disabilities; points to the additional complications faced by persons with disabilities in conflict situations and natural disasters, as they are more vulnerable to violence and often do not receive adequate support; urges all parties to conflict situations worldwide to take adequate measures to mitigate the risks to them as much as possible; emphasises the need to safeguard children with disabilities from any form of exploitation; calls for the EU, in its external policy, to make use of the strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 as a tool to improve the situation of persons with disabilities, particularly concerning poverty and discrimination, but also problems with access to education, healthcare and employment, and participation in political life; encourages the EU to support partner countries in developing inclusive economic policies that promote accessible vocational training and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, fostering their full and active economic participation;

    Rights of elderly people

    49. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to develop new avenues to strengthen the rights of elderly people, taking into account the multiple challenges they face, such as age-based discrimination, poverty, violence and a lack of social protection, healthcare and other essential services, as well as barriers to employment; calls for the implementation of specific measures to combat the risk of poverty for older women through increased social support; underlines the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on Ageing on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the protection of the human rights of older people and calls for the EU and its Member States to consider actively supporting that work; stresses the need for a cross-cutting intergenerational approach in EU policies, in order to build and encourage solidarity between young people and elderly people;

    Right to equality and non-discrimination

    50. Reiterates its condemnation of all forms of racism, intolerance, antisemitism, Islamophobia, persecution of Christians, xenophobia and discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, social class, disability, caste, religion, belief, age, sexual orientation or gender identity; condemns the growing international threat of hate speech and speech that incites violence, including online; reiterates the crucial role of education and dialogue in promoting tolerance, understanding and diversity; calls for the adoption or the strengthening of mechanisms for reporting discriminatory behaviours as well as access to effective legal remedies, to help end the impunity of those who engage in this behaviour;

    Right to life: towards the universal abolition of the death penalty

    51. Reiterates its principled opposition to the death penalty, which is irreversible and incompatible with the right to life and with the prohibition of torture, and a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment; stresses that the EU must be relentless in its pursuit of the universal abolition of the death penalty as a major objective of its human rights foreign policy; notes that despite the trend in some non-EU countries to take steps towards abolishing the death penalty, significant challenges in this regard still exist; deplores the fact that in other non-EU countries the number of death sentences that have been carried out has reached its highest level in the last five years; reiterates its call for all countries to completely abolish the death penalty or establish an immediate moratorium on the use of the death penalty (sentences and executions) as a first step towards its abolition; urges, in this regard, the EU to intensify diplomatic engagement with countries that continue to practise the death penalty, encouraging dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues and providing support for the development of judicial reforms that could lead towards its abolition;

    Right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief

    52. Reiterates its concern regarding violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; is concerned about the worldwide increase in intolerance towards different religious communities; deplores the instrumentalisation of religious or belief identities for political purposes and the exclusion of persons belonging to religious and belief minorities and religious communities, including from political participation, as well as the destruction and vandalism of sites and works of art of cultural and historical value, in certain non-EU countries; stresses that the freedom to choose one’s religion, to believe or not to believe is a human right that cannot be punished; condemns, therefore, the existence and implementation of so-called apostasy laws and blasphemy laws that lead to harsh penalties, degrading treatment and, in some cases, even to death sentences; calls for the abolition of apostasy laws and blasphemy laws; stresses that the Special Envoy for the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU should be granted more resources so that he can efficiently carry out his mandate; highlights the need for the Special Envoy to continue to work closely and in a complementary manner with the EUSR for Human Rights and the Council Working Party on Human Rights; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, to raise these issues at UN human rights forums and to continue working with the relevant UN mechanisms and committees; calls for the EU to request and consolidate reports by EU delegations on the state of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief;

    53. Recalls that most of the drivers of violent conflicts worldwide involve minority grievances of exclusion, discrimination and inequalities linked to violations of the human rights of minorities, as observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues; stresses the need to mainstream the protection of the rights of minorities and for the development of protection mechanisms at the level of the UN; recalls the obligations of states to protect the rights of their national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic minorities within their respective territories; calls on the Commission to support the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities worldwide, including this as a priority under the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the EU’s NDICI-Global Europe;

    Right to freedom of expression, academic freedom, media freedom and the right to information

    54. Emphasises the critical significance of freedom of expression and access to trustworthy and diverse sources of information for sustaining democracy and a thriving civic space; recalls that democracies can only function when citizens have access to independent and reliable information, making journalists key players in the safeguarding of democracy; is therefore seriously concerned about the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression in numerous countries worldwide, particularly for journalists, through censorship, enforced self-censorship, so-called foreign agents laws and the misuse of counter-terrorism or anti-corruption laws to suppress journalists and civil society groups; is concerned by the use of hate speech against journalists, both online and offline, leading to a deterrent effect; raises concerns, additionally, about the physical security of journalists and media workers and their being targeted in conflict zones; notes the number of journalists killed in conflict situations in 2023, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, has increased alarmingly – by 85 % – since 2022;

    55. Calls urgently for the EU to back trustworthy media and information outlets that promote the accountability of authorities and support democratic transitions, while stressing the need to preserve the principles of pluralism, transparency and independence; highlights the role played by fact checkers in the media landscape, ensuring that the public can trust the information they receive; is concerned that they are therefore major targets for attacks by illiberal regimes that originate and disseminate disinformation, propaganda and fake news; condemns the extensive use of SLAPPs to silence journalists, activists, trade unionists and HRDs globally; welcomes, in this context, the directive designed to shield journalists and HRDs from abusive legal actions and SLAPPs; encourages lawmakers in non-EU countries to develop legislation with the same goal, as part of broader efforts to promote and protect media freedom and pluralism; requests that attacks on media freedom, as well as the persistent and systematic erosion of the right to information, be taken into account in the EU’s monitoring of the compliance of international agreements;

    56. Welcomes the Commission’s plan to finance initiatives that support journalists on legal and practical matters, including beyond the EU, through the European Democracy Action Plan; calls for the EU to strengthen its efforts to aid targeted journalists globally, recalling that independent journalists are on the frontline of the fight against disinformation, which undermines democracies; acknowledges the contribution to achieving this goal of programmes such as the now-defunct Media4Democracy and other EU-funded activities, including those of the European Endowment for Democracy; urges the EU to help make reliable news sources available to more people living in countries that restrict press freedom;

    57. Remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating state of press freedom around the world; condemns the censorship of journalists, HRDs and CSOs through the application of so-called foreign agents laws, as well as other legislative and non-legislative measures adopted by authoritarian and illiberal regimes;

    58. Reaffirms its commitment to protecting and promoting academic freedom as a key component of open and democratic societies; underlines the attacks to academic freedom not only by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but also by extreme and populist forces worldwide; calls for the development of benchmarks for academic freedom into institutional quality assurance within academic rankings, procedures and criteria;

    59. Notes with concern that more than half of the world’s population lives within environments of completely or severely restricted levels of academic freedom, which has severe consequences for the right to education, the enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress and the freedom of opinion and expression; urges the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to halt censorship, threats or attacks on academic freedom, and especially the imprisonment of scholars worldwide; welcomes the inclusion of academics at risk in the EU Human Rights Defenders Mechanism; calls on the Commission to ensure continued high-level support for the Global Campus of Human Rights, which has provided a safe space for students and scholars who had to flee their countries for defending democracy and human rights;

    Rights of indigenous peoples

    60. Notes with regret that indigenous peoples continue to face widespread and systematic discrimination and persecution worldwide, including forced displacements; condemns arbitrary arrests and the killing of human rights and land defenders who stand up for the rights of indigenous peoples; stresses that the promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples and their traditional practices are key to achieving sustainable development, combating climate change and conserving biodiversity; urges governments to pursue development and environmental policies that respect economic, social and cultural rights, and that are inclusive of indigenous peoples and local populations, in line with the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for the EU, its Member States and their partners in the international community to adopt all necessary measures for the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous people, including as regards their languages, lands, territories and resources, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the principle of free, prior and informed consent; calls on all states to ensure that indigenous peoples and local communities are included in the deliberations and decision-making processes of international climate diplomacy; encourages the Commission to continue to promote dialogue and collaboration between indigenous peoples and the EU;

    Right to public participation

    61. Deplores that the right to participate in free and fair elections is not respected in authoritarian, illiberal, and totalitarian regimes; highlights that these regimes conduct fake elections with the aim of entrenching their power, as they lack real political contestation and pluralism; is alarmed by current trends in electoral processes, such as the increasing decline in electoral participation and democratic performance or the growing disputes concerning the credibility of elections; highlights with deep concern the growing interference by some states in other countries’ elections through hybrid tactics; reaffirms the necessity of increasing political representation of women, young people and vulnerable groups and to guarantee the public participation of minorities; underlines that distrust in the electoral process can be exacerbated not only by irregularities but also by public statements, including from participants; emphasises that public perception of electoral process is as crucial as the process itself, as its manipulation can lead to polarisation or targeted attacks; calls on non-EU countries to reinforce their efforts to clearly communicate all the steps of their respective electoral processes and systems, as well as the existing accountability mechanisms in case of irregularities; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to analyse and report to Parliament their initiatives to tackle the challenges posed by articifical intelligence (AI) in electoral processes;

    Human rights, business and trade

    62. Stresses the role of trade as a major instrument to promote and improve the human rights situation in the EU’s partner countries; urges the Commission to improve coordination between the EU’s trade, investment and development policies and prioritise and promote the development of human rights through EU trade policies, including the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus; notes, however, that there has been little to no improvement in some of the countries concerned; stresses the responsibilities of states and other actors, such as corporations, to mitigate the effects of climate change, prevent their negative impact on human rights and promote appropriate policies in compliance with human rights obligations; deplores the detrimental effects of some excessive and exploitative business activities on human rights and democracy; welcomes the harmonisation resulting from the adoption of the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence with binding EU rules on responsible corporate behaviour with regard to human, labour and environmental rights; further welcomes the Regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market[12] and calls for its swift implementation at Member State level; calls for the implementation of the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, and for the adaptation of the Commission’s Single Entry Point to allow for the submission of complaints regarding failures to comply with human rights clauses, which should be accessible, citizen-friendly and transparent; calls for the EU to continue its efforts to eliminate child labour, and forced and bonded labour; stresses the importance of remediation and access to justice measures that are in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, including financial and non-financial measures in consultation with the victims; calls on the Council to adopt an ambitious mandate for the EU to engage in the ongoing negotiations on the UN legally binding instrument on business and human rights as soon as possible;

    63. Highlights that in many regions of the world, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are often the driving force of local economies with an increasing number of women running them; underlines that MSMEs account for 90 % of businesses, 60 to 70 % of employment and 50 % of gross domestic product worldwide; highlights the importance of MSMEs in their contribution to the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of the SDGs, namely those on the eradication of poverty and decent working conditions for all;

    Human rights and digital technologies

    64. Is concerned by the threat that AI can pose to democracy and human rights, especially if it is not duly regulated; highlights the need for oversight, robust transparency and appropriate safeguards for new and emergent technologies, as well as a human-rights based approach; welcomes the Council conclusions on Digital Diplomacy of 26 June 2023 to strengthen the EU’s role and leadership in global digital governance, in particular its position as a shaper of the global digital rulebook based on democratic principles; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act which aims to harmonise the rules on AI for protecting human rights, and the advantages that AI can bring to human wellbeing; is deeply concerned about the harmful consequences of the misuse of AI and deepfakes, particularly for women and children; notes with concern the adverse effects of the ‘fake content industry’ on the right to information and press freedom, including the rapid development of AI and the subsequent empowerment of the disinformation industry[13]; condemns the use of new and emerging technologies, such as facial recognition technology and digital surveillance, as coercive instruments and their use in the increasing harassment, intimidation and persecution of HRDs, activists, journalists and lawyers; calls on the Council for the listing under the EUGHRSR of state and non-state actors that are engaging in these practices; notes with concern the rapid development of AI in military applications, as well as the potential development and deployment of autonomous systems that could make life-or-death decisions without human input;

    65. Recalls that the international trade in spyware to non-EU countries where such tools are used against human rights activists, journalists and government critics, is a violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter;

    66. Welcomes the adoption in May 2024 of the first Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, aimed at ensuring that activities within the entire life cycle of AI systems are fully consistent with human rights, democracy and the rule of law; reiterates the need for greater legislative attention to be paid to the profound changes arising from activities within the life cycle of AI systems, which have the potential to promote human prosperity, individual and social well-being, sustainable development, gender equality, and the empowerment of all women and girls, but also pose the risk of creating or exacerbating inequalities and incentivising cyber and physical violence, including violence experienced by women and individuals in vulnerable situations;

    67. Stresses that the internet should be a place where freedom of expression prevails; considers, nevertheless, that the rights of individuals need to be respected; is of the opinion that, where applicable, what is considered to be illegal offline, should be considered illegal online; expresses concern for the growing number of internet shutdowns; highlights that internet shutdowns are often used by authoritarian regimes, among others, to silence political dissidence and curb political freedom; calls urgently for the EU to combat this alarming phenomenon, including considering allowing EU-based providers to offer safe communication tools to people who have been thereby deprived of online access; urges the EU to take a firm stance against any attempts by tech giants to circumvent or undermine national legal systems and independent court decisions, and to protect democratic principles and implement measures to maintain the integrity of elections, as well as to protect the right to information, especially during electoral periods;

    °

    ° °

    68. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Union Heads of Delegation.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Each year, the European Parliament adopts three annual reports on the EU’s foreign, security and defence, and human rights policies.

     

    The three reports are on:

     

     the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the AFET Committee,

     Human Rights and Democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 (based on the EU Annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World) – competence of the DROI Subcommittee, and

     the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the SEDE Subcommittee.

     

    These reports monitor and assess the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the EU policy on Human Rights and the Common Security and Defence Policy. They are a key component of the European Parliament’s contribution to EU foreign policy making, most notably in regard to the strengthened right of scrutiny conferred to the European Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon. It is essential that the European Parliament responds to the annual reports issued by other institutions as soon as they are published.

    ANNEX I: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, until the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Partnership for Democracy/International Dalit Solidarity Network

    Clean Clothes Campaign

    Protection International

    Race & Equality

    FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights

    International Partnership for Human Rights

    Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

    Front Line Defenders

    Save the Children

    Avocats Sans Frontières

    Center for Reproductive Rights

    Reporters without Borders

    End FGM European Network

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do ), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    ANNEX II: INDIVIDUAL CASES RAISED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FROM DECEMBER 2023 TO JANUARY 2025

     

    COUNTRY

     

    Individual

    BACKGROUND

    ACTION TAKEN BY THE PARLIAMENT

    AFGHANISTAN

     

    Manizha Seddiqi Ahmad Fahim Azimi

    Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee  Ezatullah Zwab

    Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab are human rights defenders who have been detained in Afghanistan.

    In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the arbitrary detention of human rights defenders, including Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab;

     

    – Calls for victims of violence against women and girls to be released from prison, where they are being held in inhumane conditions to the detriment of their mental and physical health.

     

    ALGERIA

     

    Boualem Sansal

    French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal was detained on 16 November 2024 by the Algerian authorities, his whereabouts remained unknown for over a week, during which time he was denied access to his family and legal counsel; he was subsequently charged with national security-related offences under Article 87bis of the Algerian Penal Code, and he is awaiting trial.

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the arrest and detention of Boualem Sansal and calls for his immediate and unconditional release;

     

    – Equally condemns the arrests of all other activists, political prisoners, journalists, human rights defenders and others detained or sentenced for exercising their right to freedom of opinion and expression, including journalist Abdelwakil Blamm and writer Tadjadit Mohamed, and calls for their release;

     

    – Reiterates, as enshrined in the EU-Algeria Partnership Priorities, the importance of the rule of law in order to consolidate freedom of expression; stresses that renewing this agreement must be based upon continued and substantial progress in the aforementioned domains and underscores that all future disbursements of EU funds should consider the progress made in this regard.

     

    AZERBAIJAN

     

    Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu

    Ilhamiz Guliyev

    Ulvi Hasanli Sevinj Vagifgizi

    Nargiz Absalamova

    Hafiz Babali,

    Elnara Gasimova Aziz Orujov

    Rufat Muradli

    Avaz Zeynalli

    Elnur Shukurov

    Alasgar Mammadli

    Farid Ismayilov

     

    Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist and opposition figure, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life.

     

    Ilhamiz Guliyev, a human rights defender, was arbitrarily arrested on 4 December 2023 on dubious accusations of drug trafficking after he testified as whistleblower about the police tampering with evidence against government critics; he is facing up to 12 years in prison.

     

    Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev are political prisoners, and Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov are human rights defenders and journalists.

    In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release Ilhamiz Guliyev; notes that Gubad Ibadoghlu has been released and placed under house arrest and calls on the authorities to lift the travel ban and drop all charges against him; calls on Azerbaijan to urgently ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad;

     

    – Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release all other political prisoners, including Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, human rights defenders and journalists Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov, as well as EU and other nationals.

     

    AZERBAIJAN

     

    Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

    Political prisoner and 2024 Sakharov Prize finalist Gubad Ibadoghlu remains under house arrest; the European Court of Human Rights ruled that his health condition is critical, requiring hospitalisation and urgent heart surgery.

     

    Civil society leader Anar Mammadli has been in pre-trial detention since April 2024 on bogus charges, with his health deteriorating due to denied healthcare.

     

    In early December 2024, the Azerbaijani authorities arrested MeydanTV journalists Aynur Ganbarova, Aytaj Ahmadova, Khayala Agayeva, Natig Javadli and Aysel Umudova, and journalists Ramin Jabrayilzade and Ahmad Mukhtar; they also arrested Baku Journalism School deputy director Ulvi Tahirov, political leader Azer Gasimli and human rights defender Rufat Safarov; all face unfounded, politically motivated charges.

     

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately end the crackdown on all dissident groups and unconditionally release and drop all charges against human rights defenders, journalists and political and other activists prosecuted under fabricated, politically motivated charges;

     

    – Demands that the authorities immediately lift the travel ban on Ibadoghlu, unconditionally drop all charges against him and allow him to receive urgent treatment abroad; deplores the fact that Ibadoghlu was not allowed to attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony or connect remotely;

     

    – Calls on Azerbaijan to lift undue restrictions on independent media by aligning its laws on the registration and funding of non-governmental groups and media with Venice Commission recommendations; demands that the authorities end the repression of MeydanTV, ToplumTV, Abaz Media and Kanal13;

     

    – Calls for EU sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime to be imposed on Azerbaijani officials responsible for serious human rights violations, including Fuad Alasgarov, Vilayat Eyvazov and Ali Naghiyev.

     

    BELARUS

     

    Marina Adamovich, Mikalai Statkevich  Tatsiana Seviarynets, Pavel Seviarynets Daria Losik

    Ihar Losik

    Mikalai Kazlou

    Ryhor Kastusiou Mikalai Statkevich Pavel Seviarynets

    Marina Adamovich, wife of Mikalai Statkevich (political prisoner), Tatsiana Seviarynets, mother of Pavel Seviarynets (political prisoner), and earlier-arrested Daria Losik, wife of Ihar Losik (political prisoner), have suffered interrogations and detentions by the KGB. 

     

    Mikalai Kazlou, Ryhor Kastusiou, Mikalai Statkevich and Pavel Seviarynets, all political prisoners, face isolation, torture, denial of medical care and forced labour.

    In its resolution of 14 December 2023, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the recent wave of mass arrests in Belarus and urges the illegitimate Lukashenka regime to cease repression, especially any gender-based persecution, and reminds the regime of its international obligations;

     

    – Calls for the immediate unconditional release and compensation of all more than 1 400 political prisoners, as well as their families and arbitrarily detained persons, while restoring their full rights.

     

    BELARUS

     

    Mikola Statkevich

    Ales Bialiatski

    Maria Kalesnikava Siarhei Tsikhanouski Viktar Babaryka Maksim Znak

    Pavel Sevyarynets Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk

    Andrzej Poczobut  Ihar Losik

    Former presidential candidate and 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate Mikola Statkevich has been imprisoned on politically motivated charges for 14 years; he is kept in solitary confinement under maximum security; his health is deteriorating and his lawyers and family have been denied information and contact for over 300 days.

     

    Prominent Belarusian political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, Maksim Znak, Pavel Sevyarynets, Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk, Andrzej Poczobut and Ihar Losik, have been subjected to similar isolation.

    In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Demands the immediate, unconditional release of Mikola Statkevich and all 1 500 political prisoners; calls for the withdrawal of all charges against them, their full rehabilitation and financial compensation for the damage suffered as a result of being deprived of liberty;

     

    – Insists that the prisoners must receive proper medical assistance and access to lawyers, family, diplomats and international organisations, which can assess their condition and provide aid; regrets the inaction of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Belarus;

     

    – Strongly condemns the unjustified, politically motivated sentences and continued repression of Belarusian democratic forces, civil society, human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, clergy, political activists and their family members.

     

    CHINA

     

    Ding Yuande

    Ma Ruimei

     

    On 12 May 2023 Falun Gong practitioners Mr Ding Yuande and his wife Ms Ma Ruimei were arrested without a warrant; Ms Ma was released on bail, but was then intimidated by police because of a rescue campaign launched by their son abroad.

     

    Mr Ding was detained with no family visits for eight months; on 15 December 2023 he was sentenced to three years in prison with a CNY 15 000 fine.

    In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly urges the PRC to immediately end the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and other minorities, including Uyghurs and Tibetans; demands the immediate and unconditional release of Mr Ding and all Falun Gong practitioners in China;

     

    – Calls for the PRC to end domestic and transnational surveillance and control and the suppression of religious freedom; urges the PRC to abide by its obligations under international law and its own constitution to respect and protect human rights.

     

    CHINA

     

    Ilham Tohti

    Gulshan Abbas

    In 2014 Ilham Tohti was convicted of politically motivated charges of ‘separatism’ and sentenced to life imprisonment; he worked to foster dialogue between Uyghurs and Han Chinese; he was awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize. Gulshan Abbas has been serving a 20-year sentence on fallacious terrorism-related charges relating to activities of her sister, a defender of the human rights of persecuted Uyghurs in the PRC.

     

     

    Gulshan Abbas, is a Uyghur retired doctor, who was forcibly disappeared in retaliation of her sisters public criticism of the treatment of Uyghurs. She has received a 20-year sentence in 2020, for participating in a terrorist organisation.

     

    In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the PRC’s violations of the human rights of Uyghurs and people in Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China;

     

    – Urges the PRC to immediately and unconditionally release Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas, as well as those arbitrarily detained in China and those mentioned by the EU during the 57th session of the UN Human Rights Council, guarantee their access to medical care and lawyers, provide information on their whereabouts and ensure family visiting rights; calls for the EU and the Member States to apply pressure in this respect at every high-level contact;

     

    – Demands that the PRC authorities halt their repression and targeting of Uyghurs with abusive policies, including intense surveillance, forced labour, sterilisation, birth prevention measures and the destruction of Uyghur identity, which amount to crimes against humanity and a serious risk of genocide; calls for the closure of all internment camps;

     

    – Strongly condemns the PRC for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to XUAR and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable;

     

    – Welcomes the EU’s forced labour regulation and insists on its full implementation; calls on businesses operating in the PRC, particularly in XUAR, to comply with their HR due diligence obligations.

     

    CUBA

     

    José Daniel Ferrer Garcia

     

    Human rights defender and opposition leader José Daniel Ferrer García was detained on 11 July 2021 in the context of widespread protests in Cuba, and has been held in isolation since 14 August 2021; the Cuban regime has imprisoned, harassed and intimidated him for over a decade for his peaceful political activism; since March 2023, he has been held incommunicado and his family have received no information about his health and have been denied the right to visit him.

    In its resolution of 19 September 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – The Cuban regime holds political prisoners in the most appalling conditions; whereas reports indicate that José Daniel Ferrer is in a critical condition and has been held without access to medical treatment, with inadequate food and in unsanitary conditions, which constitute forms of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment;

     

    – The human rights situation in Cuba is alarming, particularly for dissidents, who are subjected to worrying levels of surveillance and arbitrary detention; whereas the number of political prisoners is unknown but reliable sources state that the regime holds over a thousand prisoners, including minors; whereas among the many political prisoners are Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara and Lizandra Gongora, whose health condition is critical;

     

    – Urges the Cuban regime to immediately and unconditionally release José Daniel Ferrer and all persons politically and arbitrarily detained for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;

     

    – Condemns the torture and inhuman, degrading and ill-treatment perpetrated by the Cuban authorities against José Daniel Ferrer and the other political prisoners; calls for the families of victims of the regime’s persecution to be granted immediate access to them, pending their release, and for the victims to be given medical care.

     

    CRIMEA

    Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

    Crimean journalist and human rights defender Iryna Danylovych was abducted in 2022, accused of possessing explosives and sentenced to 6 years and 11 months of imprisonment; NGO activist Tofik Abdulhaziiev was arrested in 2019 and sentenced to 12 years in a maximum security prison on trumped-up charges, and since 2023 is being held in a prison some 2 700 km away from Crimea; citizen journalist Amet Suleymanov was sentenced to 12 years of prison in 2021.

     

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns Russia’s continuous targeting of ethnic Ukrainians and systematic persecution of indigenous Crimean Tatars, which aims to erase their identity, heritage and culture, echoing, for the Crimean Tatars, the genocidal deportations of 1944; considers that Crimea’s future is tied to its recognition as the Crimean Tatars’ historic homeland;

     

    – Condemns the persecution of journalists, civil society activists and human rights defenders and the deportation of civilians including political prisoners from Crimea to penitentiary institutions across Russia, contrary to international law;

     

    – Demands the immediate and unconditional release of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov and other political prisoners; calls for immediate medical care to be provided; denounces the upholding of verdicts against seriously ill individuals, which constitutes a blatant violation of international human rights standards; calls on the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN to establish the whereabouts of civilian detainees from Crimea.

     

    DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

     

    Jean-Jacques Wondo

    Jean-Jacques Wondo, a Belgian-Congolese security, military and political expert, was arrested following a failed coup on 19 May 2024, for which he was accused of being the ‘intellectual perpetrator’, on 13 September 2024, Wondo and 36 others were sentenced to death by a military court.

     

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the sentencing to death of Wondo and others and the grave violations of their right to a fair trial;

     

    – Urges the DRC Government to immediately overturn the death sentences, reinstate a moratorium on executions and take steps towards the full abolition of the death penalty;

     

    –  Expresses deep concern about Wondo’s deteriorating health, calls for him to be given immediate access to medical treatment and insists on his immediate release;

     

    – Calls for systemic reforms to be implemented in the DRC to rebuild the judiciary into an independent, fair and efficient institution that guarantees due process and the protection of fundamental rights.

     

    GREECE

     

    George Karaivaz

    George Karaivaz was a journalist who have been murdered on 9 April 2021.

    In its resolution of 7 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Is deeply concerned by the failure of law enforcement and the judicial authorities in Greece to make progress in the investigation into the murder of the Greek journalist George Karaivaz on 9 April 2021; notes that two suspects were arrested in April 2023, but otherwise there has not been any discernible activity in the police investigation; strongly urges the authorities to take all the necessary steps towards conducting a thorough and effective investigation, and to bring those involved in the murder, at any level, to justice; urges the authorities to request assistance from Europol.

     

    HONG KONG

     

    Andy Li

    Joseph John

    Andy Li, a pro-democracy activist and key witness in Jimmy Lai’s trial, allegedly confessed, under torture, to conspiracy and collusion with foreign entities.

     

    Joseph John, a HK-Portuguese dual national, is the first extraterritorial application of the NSL to an EU citizen; John was arrested for allegedly posting anti-China social media content and committing, from Europe, incitement to ‘secession’, and was sentenced on 11 April 2024 to five years’ imprisonment.

    In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release Li, John, Lai, Kok Tsz-lun and all other pro-democracy representatives and activists detained for exercising their freedoms and democratic rights, and to drop all charges against them;

     

    – Highlights the SNSO’s undermining of press freedoms; calls on the authorities to stop harassing and prosecuting journalists.

     

    HONG KONG/ CHINA

     

    Jimmy Lai

    Jimmy Lai has been detained since 2020 on trumped-up charges; his trial started in 2023 after various delays; he denied these charges and faces life imprisonment; his British lawyer has been refused permission to represent him. Jimmy Lai a British national since 1996, is a Hong Kong media tycoon, and a known pro- democracy supporter.  Political prisoners in HK endure difficult conditions, often affecting their health, throughout lengthy pre-trial detentions, as with 76-year-old Lai, who has diabetes and has been denied Communion in prison.

     

    45 pro-democracy politicians, activists and journalists were sentenced for subversion, in the ‘Hong Kong 47’ case, for organising unofficial election primaries; their trials were the largest national security trials to date;

     

    In its resolution of 28 November 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the sentencing of pro-democracy activists on national security charges, in violation of international law; calls for the repeal of the NSL and the SNSO; denounces the degradation of basic freedoms in HK;

     

    – Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release all pro-democracy activists, including Lai and Chung, and to drop all charges against them;

     

    – Calls on the EEAS and the Member States to warn China that its actions in HK will have consequences for EU-China relations; calls on the Council to review its 2020 conclusions on HK and to impose targeted sanctions on John Lee and other HK and Chinese officials responsible for human rights violations, to revoke HK’s favourable customs treatment and review the status of the HK Economic Trade Office in Brussels; urges the Member States to file an ICJ case against China’s decision to impose the NSL on HK and Macau.

     

    IRAN

     

    Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi

    Kurdish activists, social worker Pakhshan Azizi and advocate for women’s rights Verisheh (Wrisha) Moradi were sentenced to death for ‘armed rebellion against the state’.

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Denounces the Iranian regime’s unrestrained repression of human rights, in particular the targeting of women activists; strongly condemns the death sentence against Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi; demands that Iran immediately and unconditionally release all unjustly imprisoned human rights defenders and political prisoners, including Pakhshan Azizi, Wrisha Moradi and at least 56 other political prisoners on death row;

     

    – Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase support for Iranian human rights defenders and expresses its full support and solidarity with Iranians united in the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement;

     

    – Urges the Iranian authorities to immediately release, safely repatriate and drop all charges against EU nationals, including Olivier Grondeau, Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and Ahmadreza Djalali; strongly condemns Iran’s use of hostage diplomacy; calls for the EU and its Member States to undertake joint diplomatic efforts and work collectively towards their release;

     

    – Strongly condemns the murder of Jamshid Sharmahd; urges the Islamic regime in Iran to provide details of the circumstances of his death and for his remains to be immediately returned to his family;

     

    – Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and to extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for human rights violations, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, Prosecutor-General Mohammad Movahedi-Azad and Judge Iman Afshari;

     

    – Urges the Iranian authorities to provide the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran and the UN fact-finding mission with full, unimpeded access to enact their mandates.

     

    KYRGYZSTAN

     

    Temirlan Sultanbekov

    Temirlan Sultanbekov is the leader of the Kyrgyzstan Social Democrats party (SDK), he and other party officials have been arrested for vote-buying allegations, with an audiotape of unknown origin serving as the primary evidence, for which the judicial authorisation is unclear and its connection with the detainees unknown.

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to immediately release Mr Sultanbekov and other party officials and adopt alternative measures to detention, while respecting their right to due process in line with the civil and political rights guaranteed under the Kyrgyz constitution and international obligations; calls on the authorities to ensure his safety and well-being;

     

    – Urges the Kyrgyz government to halt its campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, independent media outlets and journalists; is concerned by the adoption of the Russian-style ‘foreign agents’ law; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to drop all charges against human rights defenders, including Makhabat Tazhibek Kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aktilek Kaparov and Ayke Beishekeeva, journalists from the Temirov Live and Ait Ait Dese channels.

     

    RUSSIA

     

    Alexei Navalny

    Vladimir Kara-Murza

    Yuri Dmitriev

    Ilya Yashin

    Alexei Gorinov

    Lilia Chanysheva Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin

    Daniel Kholodny Vadim Kobzev

    Igor Sergunin

    Alexei Liptser Viktoria Petrova Maria Ponomarenko Alexandra Skochilenko

    Svetlana Petriychuk Evgenia Berkovich Dmitry Ivanov

    Ioann Kurmoyarov Igor Baryshnikov Dmitry Talantov Alexei Moskalev

    Oleg Orlov

    Boris Kagarlitsky

    Ivan Safronov

     

    Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian political figure and the 2021 laureate of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, perished in a Siberian penal colony north of the Arctic Circle while serving a unfounded, politically motivated prison sentence. He had been in detention since 17 January 2021, the date on which he returned to Russia following medical rehabilitation after an attempted state-sponsored assassination using the internationally banned nerve agent Novichok; he had previously been detained and arrested many times and had been sentenced, on fabricated and politically motivated grounds, to long prison terms in evident attempts to stop his political activities and anti-corruption campaigns.

     

    Vladimir Kara-Murza, Yuri Dmitriev, Ilya Yashin, Alexei Gorinov, Lilia Chanysheva, Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin, Daniel Kholodny, Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, Alexei Liptser, Viktoria Petrova, Maria Ponomarenko, Alexandra Skochilenko, Svetlana Petriychuk, Evgenia Berkovich, Dmitry Ivanov, Ioann Kurmoyarov, Igor Baryshnikov, Dmitry Talantov, Alexei Moskalev, Oleg Orlov, Boris Kagarlitsky and Ivan Safronov are political prisoners.

     

    In its resolution of 29 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the murder of Alexei Navalny; expresses its wholehearted condolences to his family, associates and colleagues, and to his countless supporters across Russia; expresses its full support to Yulia Navalnaya in her determination to continue the work started by Alexei Navalny with her support, and to the Anti-Corruption Foundation founded by Navalny, which is continuing its work under the new circumstances;

     

    – Calls on the Russian authorities to drop all arbitrary charges and to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons.

    TAJIKISTAN

     

    Abdullo Ghurbati Daler Imomali Zavqibek Saidamini Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva Khushruz Jumayev Khurshed Fozilov

    Manuchehr Kholiknazarov Buzurgmehr Yorov

     

    Abdullo Ghurbati, Daler Imomali, Zavqibek Saidamini, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda, Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Khushruz Jumayev and Khurshed Fozilov are journalists who have been sentenced to between seven and over 20 years in prison in retaliation for their coverage of social issues and human rights abuses, including in GBAO.

     

    Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov  are human rights lawyers who have been detained.

    In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the ongoing crackdown, including anti-extremism legislation, against independent media, government critics, human rights activists and independent lawyers; condemns the closure of independent media and websites, including the online media outlets Pamir Daily News, New Tajikistan 2 and Akhbor.com;

     

    – Condemns all politically motivated trials and the lack of fair and public hearings by independent courts; urges the authorities to stop persecuting journalists, immediately and unconditionally release those who have been arbitrarily detained and drop all charges against them, stop the persecution of lawyers defending government critics and release human rights lawyers Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov;

     

    – Urges the government to ensure that detainees have access to adequate healthcare; calls for a thorough investigation into allegations of mistreatment in custody and forced confessions, and those responsible to be brought to justice.

     

    TÜRKIYE

     

    Bülent Mumay

    Bülent Mumay is a Turkish journalist and coordinator of the Istanbul bureau of Deutsche Welle’s Turkish editorial office, was sentenced to 20 months in prison for social media posts about a pro-government company’s seizure of Istanbul Municipality’s subway funds during the AKP administration; his appeal was rejected, and his tweets removed.

    In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the sentence against Bülent Mumay, which follows a broader pattern of silencing critical journalism; calls on the Turkish authorities to drop the charges against Bülent Mumay, and all arbitrarily detained media workers and journalists, as well as political opponents, human rights defenders, civil servants and academics;

     

      Is deeply concerned about the ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Türkiye, relentless crackdown on any critical voices and targeting of independent journalists, activists and opposition members amid frequent reports of legal intimidation, censorship and financial coercion as ways to suppress criticism and investigative journalism.

     

    VENEZUELA

     

    Rocío San Miguel

    General Hernández Da Costa 

    Ronald Ojeda

    María Corina Machado

    Juan Freites

    Luis Camacaro Guillermo Lopez Emil Brandt

     

    Rocío San Miguel is a lawyer and human rights activist with Spanish nationality, who got kidnapped by the Venezuelan regime on 9 February 2024, and sentenced on politically motivated grounds of suspected conspiracy against Nicolás Maduro and his regime; she is currently being detained in El Helicoide prison, which is known for human rights abuses, including torture.

     

    Hernández Da Costa has been a political prisoner since August 2018; on 19 February 2024, he was forcibly transferred to El Rodeo 1 prison, designed to detain political prisoners; an unknown number of prisoners, including some EU citizens, were also transferred; the general suffers from medical ailments that require constant treatment, which he is being denied.

     

    Ronald Ojeda was a former political prisoner who escaped the Maduro regime, and got murdered in Chile.

     

    Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro, Guillermo Lopez and Emil Brandt are four campaign coordinators working for the opposition to the regime’s presidential candidate, and have been detained on political grounds.

     

    In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Demands the immediate unconditional release of all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons, and the full restoration of their rights; exhorts the regime to cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition;

     

    – Strongly condemns the Maduro regime for imprisoning hundreds of political prisoners;

     

    – Calls on the international community to support a return to democracy in Venezuela, particularly in the light of the upcoming elections, in which the leader of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, must be allowed to fully participate.

    VENEZUELA

     

    Maria Corina Machado

    Juan Freites

    Luis Camacaro Guillermo López

    Maria Corina Machado was selected as the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, winning with 92,35 % of the votes in the primary elections. She got a disqualification of 15 years.

     

    For several months, members of María Corina Machado’s campaign team – including Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo López, who were unlawfully detained and have since been reported missing.

    In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all the arbitrarily arrested political and social leaders, including three campaign staffers of the presidential candidate of the opposition to the regime María Corina Machado, namely Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo Lopez;

     

    – Strongly condemns the attempts to disqualify the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and others, such as Henrique Capriles, from holding public office;

     

    – Urges the Venezuelan regime to immediately stop the persecution of the primary winner and thus fully legitimate candidate of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and other opposition politicians.

     

     

     

     

    ANNEX III: LIST OF SAKHAROV PRIZE LAUREATES AND FINALISTS IMPRISONED AND DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY

     

    Year of Sakharov Prize award

    Name and surname

    Laureate / Finalist

    Country

    Situation (Detention / house arrest / temporarily released)

    Length of prison sentence

    Start date of detention

    2024

    Gubad Ibadoghlu

    Finalist

    Azerbaijan

    Under travel ban

     

    A court rejected Ibadoglu’s appeal against the travel ban on 3/12/2024

    2021

    Alexei Navalny

    Laureate

     

    Russia

    Deceased in prison on 16/2/2024

     

    3,5 + 9 + 19 years

    Last detained 17/2/21, last sentenced 4/8/23

    2020

    Siarhei Tsikhanouski

     

    Maryia Kalesnikava

     

    Mikola Statkevich

     

     

    Ales Bialiatski

    Laureate

     

    Laureate

     

    Laureate

     

     

    Laureate

    Belarus

     

    Detention

     

    Detention

     

    Detention

     

     

    Detention

    18 years

     

    11 years

     

    14 years

     

     

    10 years

     

    Detained 29/5/20, sentenced 14/12/21

    Detained 07/9/20, sentenced 06/9/21

    Last detained 31/5/20, last sentenced 14/12/21

    Last detained 15/7/21, last sentenced 03/03/23

    2020

    Porfirio Sorto Cedillo, José Avelino Cedillo, Orbin Naún Hernández, Kevin Alejandro Romero, Arnold Javier Aleman, Ever Alexander Cedillo, Daniel Marquez and Jeremías Martínez Díaz

    Finalists

    Honduras

    Detention

    Unknown

    1/9/2019, released on 24/2/2022, after a ruling by the Supreme Court of Honduras

    2019

    Ilham Tohti

    Laureate

    China

    Detention

    Unknown

    23/9/2014

    2018

    Nasser Zefzafi

     

    Finalist

    Morocco

    Detention

    20 years

    5/4/2019

    2017

    Dawit Isaak

    Finalist

    Eritrea

    Incommunicado detention

    Unknown

    23/9/2001

    2015

    Raif Badawi

    Laureate

    Saudi Arabia

    Released on 11/3/2022, since then under a 10-year travel ban

     

    10 years

    First sentenced on 17/12/2012, but announced on 30/3/2013

    2012

    Nasrin Sotoudeh

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Jafar Panahi

    Laureate

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Laureate

    Iran

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Iran

    Detention, on temporary medical furlough since July 2021, arrested again 29/10/2023 and released 15/11/2023

     

    Detained in 2022,

    released on 3/2/2023 after hunger strike

    38 years

     

     

     

     

     

     

    6 years

    6/3/2019 (most recent)

     

     

     

     

     

    compelled in July 2022 to serve a 10-years old prison sentence

    2011

    Razan Zaitouneh

    Laureate

    Syria

    Kidnapped in 2013. Presumptions of detention and death.

     

    9/12/2013

    2009

    Memorial – Oleg Orlov

    Laureate

     

     

    Russia

    Released on 1/8/2024 as part of a prisoner exchange with the US and Germany

    2.5 years

    Latest sentence in February 2024. Memorial as legal entity liquidated in January 2022.

     

     

    ANNEX IV: LIST OF RESOLUTIONS

    List of resolutions adopted by the European Parliament from December 2023 to January 2025 and related directly or indirectly to human rights violations in the world

     

     

    Country/Region

    Date of adoption in plenary

     

    Title

    Africa

     

     

    Algeria

    23.01.2025

    The case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria

    Democratic Republic of the Congo

    23.01.2025

    The case of Jean-Jacques Wondo

     

    Gambia

     

    25.04.2024

    On the proposed repeal of the law banning female genital mutilation in The Gambia

    Nigeria

    08.02.2024

    On the recent attacks on Christmas Eve in Plateau State in Nigeria

    Sudan

    18.01.2024

    On the threat of famine following the spread of the conflict in Sudan

    Tanzania

    14.12.2023

    On the Maasai Communities in Tanzania

    Americas

     

     

    Cuba

    29.02.2024

    On the critical situation in Cuba

    Cuba

    19.09.2024

    The case of José Daniel Ferrer García in Cuba

    Guatemala

    14.12.2023

    On the attempt at a coup d’état in Guatemala

    Venezuela

    08.02.2024

    On further repression against the democratic forces in Venezuela: attacks on presidential candidate María Corina Machado

     

    Venezuela

     

    14.03.2024

    On the case of Rocío San Miguel and General Hernández Da Costa, among other political prisoners in Venezuela

    Venezuela

    19.09.2024

    Situation on Venezuela

    Venezuela

    23.01.2025

    Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025

    Asia

     

     

     

    Afghanistan

     

     

    14.03.2024

    On the repressive environment in Afghanistan, including public executions and violence against women

    Afghanistan

    19.09.2024

    The deteriorating situation of women in Afghanistan due to the recent adoption of the law on the “Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice”

     

    Azerbaijan

     

    25.04.2024

    On Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev

    Azerbaijan

    19.12.2024

    Continued repression of civil society and independent media in Azerbaijan and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

    Cambodia

    28.11.2024

    The shrinking space for civil society in Cambodia, in particular the case of the labour rights organisation CENTRAL

     

    China

     

    18.01.2024

    On the ongoing persecution of Falun Gong in China, notably the case of Mr Ding Yuande

    China

     

    10.10.2024

    The cases of unjustly imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas

    China/ Taiwan

    24.10.2024

    Misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

     

    Hong Kong

     

    25.04.2024

    On the new security law in Hong Kong and the cases of Andy Li and Joseph John

    Hong Kong/ China

     

    28.11.2024

    Hong Kong, notably the cases of Jimmy Lai and the 45 activists recently convicted under the national security law

    Kyrgyzstan

    19.12.2024

    Human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov

    Tajikistan

    18.01.2024

    On Tajikistan: state repression against the independent media

     

    Tibet

     

    14.12.2023

    On the abduction of Tibetan children and forced assimilation practices through Chinese boarding schools in Tibet

    Middle East

     

     

     

    Iran/Israel

     

    25.04.2024

    On Iran’s unprecedented attack against Israel, the need for de-escalation and an EU response

     

    Iran

     

    08.02.2024

    On the increased number of executions in Iran, in particular the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou

    Iran

    28.11.2024

    The increasing and systematic repression of women in Iran

    Iran

    23.01.2025

    Systematic repression of human rights in Iran

    Iraq

    10.10.2024

    Iraq, notably the situation of women’s rights and the recent proposal to amend the Personal Status Law

     

    Palestine

     

    18.01.2024

    On the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the need to reach a ceasefire and the risks of regional escalation

     

    Palestine

     

    14.03.2024

    On the immediate risk of mass starvation in Gaza and the attacks on humanitarian aid deliveries

    Europe and Eastern Partnership countries

     

     

     

    Azerbaijan/Armenia

     

    13.03.2024

    On closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia

    Azerbaijan/ Armenia

    24.10.2024

    Situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

     

    Belarus

     

    14.12.2023

    On the unknown status of Mikola Statkevich and the recent attacks on Belarusian politicians’ and activists’ family members

     

    Belarus

     

    08.02.2024

    on the new wave of mass arrests in Belarus of opposition activists and their family members

    Belarus

    19.09.2024

    The severe situation of political prisoners in Belarus

    Belarus

    22.01.2025

    Actions to address the continued oppression and fake elections in Belarus

    Crimea

    19.12.2024

    11th year of the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and the deteriorating human rights situation in occupied Crimea, notably the cases of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

     

    Georgia

     

    25.04.2024

    On attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society

    Georgia

    09.10.2024

    The democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

    Georgia

    28.11.2024

    Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud

    Greece

    07.02.2024

    On the rule of law and media freedom in Greece

     

    Hungary

     

    24.04.2024

    On ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications

    Hungary

    18.01.2024

    On the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds

    Moldova

    09.10.2024

    Strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration

     

    Russia

     

    29.02.2024

    On the murder of Alexei Navalny and the need for EU action in support of political prisoners and oppressed civil society in Russia

     

    Russia

     

    08.02.2024

    On Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

     

     

    Russia

     

     

    25.04.2024

    On new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the European Union

     

    Russia

     

    25.04.2024

    On Russia’s undemocratic presidential elections and their illegitimate extension to the occupied territories

    Russia

     

    14.11.2024

    EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia

    Russia

     

    23.01.2025

    Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

    Russia/ North Korea

    28.11.2024

    Reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia

    Serbia

    08.02.2024

    On the situation in Serbia following the elections

     

    Slovakia

     

    17.01.2024

    On the planned dissolution of key anti-corruption structures in Slovakia and its implications for the rule of law

    Türkiye

    10.10.2024

    European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye

    Cross-cutting issues

     

     

    Children liberty

    13.12.2023

    On the situation of children deprived of liberty in the world

     

    LGBTIQ rights

     

    08.02.2024

    On the implementation of the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025

     

     

    Protection of journalists

     

     

    27.02.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings

     

    Human rights and democracy

     

    28.02.2024

    Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023

    Foreign and security policy

    28.02.2024

    Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2023

     

     

    Media freedom

     

     

    13.03.2024

    On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market

     

     

    Forced labour

     

     

    23.04.2024

    On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market

    Right of abortion

    11.04.2024

    On including the right to abortion in the EU Fundamental Rights Charter

     

     

    Due diligence

     

     

    24.04.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive

     

    Fundamental rights

     

    18.01.2024

    On the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023

    Hate speech

    18.01.2024

    On extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime

     

     

    Business and human rights

     

     

    18.01.2024

    On shaping the EU’s position on the UN binding instrument on business and human rights, in particular on access to remedy and the protection of victims

    Freedom of scientific research

    17.01.2024

    On promotion of the freedom of scientific research in the EU

    Citizens, equality, rights and values

    16.01.2024

    On the implementation of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme 2021-2027

     

     

    Violence against women

     

     

    24.04.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating violence against women and domestic violence

     

    Human beings traffic

     

    23.04.2024

    On preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Sydney ETO holds Chinese New Year reception in Auckland to celebrate Year of Snake (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Sydney ETO holds Chinese New Year reception in Auckland to celebrate Year of Snake (with photos)
    Sydney ETO holds Chinese New Year reception in Auckland to celebrate Year of Snake (with photos)
    ******************************************************************************************

         The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, Sydney (Sydney ETO) hosted a Chinese New Year reception in Auckland, New Zealand, yesterday (February 25) to celebrate the Year of the Snake.           Over 150 guests from various sectors, including political and business circles, media, academia, community groups and government representatives, attended the reception. Among them were the Consul General of the People’s Republic of China in Auckland, Mr Chen Shijie; the Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Forestry, Minister for Trade and Investment and Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs of New Zealand, Mr Todd McClay; and the Mayor of Auckland, Mr Wayne Brown.           The Director of the Sydney ETO, Mr Ricky Chong, said in his welcoming remarks that Hong Kong and New Zealand share a long-standing and dynamic trade partnership built on a mutual commitment to open markets and free trade. Notably, New Zealand was the first foreign country to secure a free trade agreement with Hong Kong, reinforcing the depth of economic ties. The Hong Kong, China – New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, signed in 2010 and in force since 2011, offers New Zealand exporters a competitive advantage and expands opportunities in the region.     “In Hong Kong, we are investing heavily to enhance our world-class infrastructure. A prime example is our new state-of-the-art Kai Tak Sports Park, set to open next month. With its 50 000-seat main stadium, the sports park will firmly put Hong Kong on the map as a global hub for major international sports and entertainment events. The world’s famous Hong Kong Sevens will also be held at the new Kai Tak Stadium from March 28 to 30,” Mr Chong added.     To promote Hong Kong’s pop culture, a music performance featuring Hong Kong teenagers in New Zealand was staged at the reception.       In addition to the reception in Auckland, the Sydney ETO also hosted Chinese New Year receptions in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide in Australia to celebrate the Year of the Snake with the communities. 

     
    Ends/Wednesday, February 26, 2025Issued at HKT 20:45

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘One of the best films I’ve seen’: new Australian prison film Inside is an astonishing debut

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ari Mattes, Lecturer in Communications and Media, University of Notre Dame Australia

    Bonsai Films

    Every so often a film comes along that’s so good that, as we sit in the dark in the cinema, our whole being seems to become charged with electricity and we find ourselves forgetting to breathe. All of our thoughts become anchored to the screen, and the suspension of disbelief comes as close to complete as it ever could be.

    Inside, written and directed by first time feature filmmaker Charles Williams (he won the Palme d’Or at Cannes for his 2018 short film, All These Creatures, so he’s not exactly a beginner), is such a film.

    To say it’s one of the best Australian films I’ve seen is to qualify it with an unnecessary adjective – it’s one of the best films I’ve seen, period.

    A rich tradition of prision dramas

    Australian cinema has a rich tradition focusing on gangsters and criminals, from Bruce Beresford’s masterful hardboiled larrikin thriller Money Movers (1978) to more recent examples like Justin Kurzel’s hypnotic Snowtown (2011).

    Within this subset there have been some stellar prison films. Everynight, Everynight (1994) still packs a punch, and the opening and closing sections of Chopper (2000), set in prison, are the most compelling parts of the movie.

    Inside follows juvenile murderer Mel Blight (Vincent Miller) as he turns 18 and is moved to adult prison while awaiting (but perhaps not really wanting) parole.

    Once there, he befriends charismatic career criminal Warren Murfett (Guy Pearce) who takes him under his wing and tries to coerce him into murdering fellow inmate Mark Shepard (Cosmo Jarvis), a child murderer with a contract recently taken out on him by the family of his victim.

    Mel can get close enough to Shepard to do the hit – he befriends Shepard while sharing a cell with him, and starts playing keyboard in accompaniment of Shepard’s bizarre born-again sermons – but whether or not he will do so generates much of the tension of the film.

    Measured intensity

    Williams spent six years working on the film, and it shows.

    Every element is meticulously realised, from the litany of striking, monstrous faces of the extras in the prison (who seem so authentic, one assumes Williams used real convicts) to the perverse but wholly believable actions of Murfett’s estranged son Adrian (Toby Wallace), when Murfett visits him for a day trip.

    (Let’s just say it’s no sentimental reunion: there’s nothing Shawshank Redemption about Inside.)

    The performances match the measured intensity of the rest of the film.
    Bonsai Films

    The film is so good as a whole that it’s perhaps unfair to single out any element, but the score by Chiara Costanza is particularly mesmerising. It captures – in a low-key fashion – the mix of controlled fear and narcissistic bravado that constitutes life inside for these characters.

    The performances match the measured intensity of the rest of the film.

    Jarvis is astonishingly good as Mark Shepherd. He emanates a kind of calm, restrained power at all times, as though his body is primed for shocking violence at any moment, yet devoid of frenetic energy. He’s so good, it’s hard to believe this British actor isn’t an Australian.

    Cosmo Jarvis is astonishingly good as Mark Shepherd.
    Bonsai Films

    Fellow countryman Wallace is similarly brilliant, endowing his small role as Murfett’s son with a memorable combination of arrogance and nastiness.

    Miller as Mel, in his first feature film, possesses a quality of stillness difficult for a young actor to achieve. All that nervous energy has to go somewhere, and it usually goes into bigger and louder.

    Pearce is also fine, though as a seasoned screen veteran of this kind of role, one senses he could do it in his sleep.

    Stunningly simple

    Inside’s stunningly simple narrative sustains profound analyses of and reflections on the human character and condition.

    This is one example of the classical Hollywood narrative structure being done with precision and purpose, with form and content seamlessly operating together in the unfolding of the drama.

    There are no self-conscious winks at the viewer, no homages to genre, and no attempts to be clever. Watching the film is a decidedly intense experience – it contains one of the most viscerally shocking scenes I’ve seen – but at the same time this is underscored in places by an extremely subtle, wry sense of humour, like when Murfett and Mel bond over (the now defunct) Fantales lollies.

    The film refuses to give the viewer an easy moral position. There are no pat explanations of characters’ motivations and actions, no attempts at psychologically or morally explaining away the ambiguities and tensions of this world to appease the stomach of the viewer.

    The film refuses to give the viewer an easy moral position.
    Bonsai Films

    This sets it apart from the vast majority of commercial films made these days. Though it represents the actions of the characters within a context (which is both personal and sociological), there’s no nifty three-minute speech at the end about how crime begets crime, or how we should treat prisoners more humanely.

    Simply put, Inside is a brilliant film. Williams poetically charges a fairly conventional Aussie prison narrative with profound existential questions in a way that never feels overbearing or heavy-handed. He proves himself, here, a formidable writer-director.

    I can’t wait to see the next film he makes. If the critical acclaim certain to follow Inside is indicative, it should be in fewer than six years.

    Ari Mattes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. ‘One of the best films I’ve seen’: new Australian prison film Inside is an astonishing debut – https://theconversation.com/one-of-the-best-films-ive-seen-new-australian-prison-film-inside-is-an-astonishing-debut-247206

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Politicians are podcasting their way onto phone screens, but the impact may be fleeting

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Susan Grantham, Lecturer in Communication, Griffith University

    TikTok

    Australian podcast listeners have been treated to two appearances by the same guest in the past week: Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.

    Yesterday, sports comedy team The Grade Cricketer announced a new podcast, The Circus, in which Albanese was the first guest. While Albanese isn’t necessarily known for his love of cricket, he appeared relaxed, laughing and authentic.

    It came hot on the heels of his previous podcast appearance, with influencer Abbie Chatfield. Chatfield’s content is often about feminism and social justice: a very different demographic of consumers.

    While few voters may listen to a full episode (and many may have never heard of the podcasts or the attached personalities), that doesn’t really matter. The real impact is in the short-form video clips that get repackaged for TikTok and Instagram.

    These viral snippets offer politicians a chance to appear authentic, relatable and human: traits that can make or break a modern political campaign, especially one that will likely be decided by Australians under 40.

    The politics of podcasting

    Podcasting has become a vital component of modern political strategy, offering long-form, intimate conversations that contrast with the often combative nature of traditional media interviews.

    As podcast interviews are usually conducted by hosts highly sympathetic to the politician’s cause, they’re rarely as hard-hitting as traditional media. It’s unsurprising politicians would seek them out for that reason alone.

    In last year’s US presidential race, both candidates went on popular podcasts to boost their messaging.

    In Australia, consider the case of Chatfield’s podcast. Her strong social media presence (more than 580,000 followers on both Instagram and TikTok) ensures any political commentary reaches a vast and engaged audience.

    Combine this with further amplification by other influencers such as Holly MacAlpine (who has 100,000 TikTok followers), and the virality of the message becomes significant.

    MacAlpine has been trending for a while after her contribution to accusations about Opposition Leader Peter Dutton’s private life, further amplifying her political commentary.

    Earlier this month, Albanese also appeared on Betoota Talks, the podcast run by the creators of satirical news site The Betoota Advocate. It’s clear Labor is relying on podcasts with strong social media followings to reach younger, digitally engaged audiences.

    It’s not just Labor using podcasts and influencers.

    Dutton appeared on Diving Deep with Sam Fricker, an Olympian turned influencer. His TikTok boasts two million followers. Airing back in December, it was an early nod from the Liberal Party leader that his election campaigning had commenced.

    Hiding the real power

    While podcasts offer politicians a platform for extended storytelling, the real political currency comes from the carefully clipped, high-impact moments that make their way to TikTok and Instagram reels.

    These videos are bite-sized, making them easier to consume and share. They are emotionally engaging – laughter, passion and frustration all translate well.

    It creates a platform for individual leaders to further solidify their political authenticity through sharing the clips.

    Crucially, it provides further opportunities for influencers and other social media users to amplify, engage with, and reshape the content, extending its reach and impact across digital networks.

    This is important to reach the younger voters who largely make up the user base of TikTok. This election will be the first that Baby Boomer voters are outnumbered by Gen Z and Millenials, so political parties can’t afford to ignore them.

    Slow off the blocks?

    In 2022, Labor’s digital campaign was widely praised for its effectiveness. From meme-driven content to a strong presence on TikTok, Labor successfully tapped into online culture to engage younger voters and shape the political narrative.

    Now, it’s unclear whether that strategy is still being deployed effectively. Yes, individual influencers are propping up Albanese’s image, but is the party itself doing enough to drive a coordinated digital campaign?

    Consider Dutton’s decision to join TikTok. It was a move that, while seemingly contradictory to the Coalition’s prior stance on banning the platform, signals an understanding that TikTok is an unavoidable political battleground.

    The Liberal Party has upped its TikTok game. Its videos often outperform Labor’s.

    The videos that are posted on Albanese’s TikTok, which he first posted to in December, are often poorly received.

    Labor seems to be relying on influencer support and positive branding by association rather than running its own robust, digital-first strategy.

    Where to from here?

    What’s clear is that political campaigning is no longer just about ads, speeches, and debates. It’s about engagement on the platforms where voters actually spend their time. If parties don’t take control of their narratives in these spaces, others will do it for them.

    The crossover of podcasting and short-form video is redefining political engagement. Politicians who appear on the right platforms are tapping into a new form of authenticity that resonates online.

    But unless those appearances are part of a structured, strategic approach, they remain fleeting moments rather than sustained influence.

    Susan Grantham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Politicians are podcasting their way onto phone screens, but the impact may be fleeting – https://theconversation.com/politicians-are-podcasting-their-way-onto-phone-screens-but-the-impact-may-be-fleeting-250793

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Results of the Rapid Flood Guidance service 2024 trial

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Results of the Rapid Flood Guidance service 2024 trial

    Positive feedback informs plans for a 2025 service.

    The Rapid Flood Guidance trial service

    The Flood Forecasting Centre (FFC) Rapid Flood Guidance (RFG) service trial ran from 14 May to 30 September 2024.

    It gave short notice updates for England and Wales to supplement the Flood Guidance Statement (FGS). It provided:

    • an advisory badge on the front page of the FGS for days when there was a heightened risk of rapid flooding
    • RFG updates on heightened risk days

    The service made use of new convective weather forecasting (nowcasting) capability from the Met Office’s Expert Weather Hub combined with information from the FFC’s hydrometeorologists.

    During the trial:

    • there were over 1,700 signups to the service
    • the RFG badge appeared on the FGS on 52 days
    • RFG updates were issued on 19 days
    • a total of 55 RFG updates were issued – and downloaded over 16,000 times

    Rapid Flood Guidance trial research

    We undertook a programme of research during the trial to understand:

    • how engaged and satisfied responders were with the RFG service
    • to what extent the RFG service improved the response to rapid flooding

    To do this we used:

    • an in-trial feedback form
    • post-event short surveys – sent out after an event to RFG users in the relevant geographical areas
    • a post-trial online survey – sent out to all registered RFG users at the end of the trial
    • post-event and post-trial interviews with RFG users

    Our research included 655 individual engagements with RFG users.

    User satisfaction

    The research showed that users were very satisfied with the RFG service.  

    84% rated their experience as positive. 

    Users said that the RFG:

    • provided an extra level of information and detail – allowing them to focus their efforts on high-risk areas
    • was easy to use and understand
    • used language which was clear and concise
    • was easy to access through email and SMS

    Improved response to rapid flooding

    The trial results show that the RFG service has improved the response to rapid flooding.

    When we asked users if the RFG updates helped them over and above any other information they had at the time:

    • 88% agreed that it improved their situational awareness of the emerging situation (43% strongly agreed)
    • 74% agreed that it helped them communicate the flood situation to others (33% strongly agreed)
    • 60% agreed that it helped them make operational decisions ahead of flood events (24% strongly agreed)
    • 30% agreed that is helped them in other ways (12% strongly agreed)

    Typically, the RFG was being used:

    • to alert relevant departments like highways and welfare services
    • to inform others, either directly or as part of a summary of multiple sources of information
    • in combination with other sources of information, particularly the National Severe Weather Warning Service (NSWWS)
    • in combination with responders’ local knowledge to understand the potential impacts

    Value of the service

    The research showed that benefits that can be attributed to the RFG include:

    • financial
    • improved public, staff and patient safety
    • better human resource and task allocation

    We were able to identify case studies to illustrate the value of the RFG, including:

    • an emergency planning officer deciding not to stand up tanker operations – saving the council money and reducing unnecessary fatigue for staff
    • a response officer packing extra personal protective equipment (PPE) – and communicating the RFG to his team so they were prepared for the day ahead
    • fire and rescue using the RFG information to plan an evacuation of a mobile home site at risk of flooding in good time
    • mountain rescue coordinating volunteers so that their time was used effectively – and ensuring they could travel safely to where they were needed
    • a hospital coordinator being able to schedule investigative and maintenance work better – and allocate tasks more efficiently

    Looking to the future

    The research showed that there is an appetite for a continuation of the service.

    94% would sign up to receive the RFG in future, if it was made available.

    Users see potential for it to be incorporated into their operational procedures and processes. However, they would be reluctant to do this until:

    • there is confidence that the RFG will become a permanent service
    • there is more clarity on how the RFG fits in with existing severe weather and flood warning services

    FFC Head of Centre, Russell Turner said:

    I’m really excited to see how the RFG has helped the responder community make improved decisions – and that they have continued to engage with the trial so positively.  It shows the responder community is keen to tackle this difficult issue. We are already using the results from the trial to develop the RFG further, as part of the FFC’s commitment to improving our services – and we hope to be running an updated service during summer 2025.  

    An RFG service for summer 2025

    We are developing plans for a summer 2025 RFG service, incorporating what our users have told us in the trial. These are likely to include improvements to:

    • user customisation, including local authority (rather than regional) level sign up
    • clarity and readability of content
    • mapping

    In addition to the RFG service, further investments are planned in the science and forecasting of rapid flooding and its impacts.

    Further details of the 2025 service will be communicated when they are available.

    Part of a wider investment in improved forecasting

    The RFG trial service is part of the Surface Water Flood Forecasting Improvement Project (SWFFIP) which is:

    Updates to this page

    Published 26 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: News 02/26/2025 Blackburn, Schatz Introduce Bill to Strengthen U.S.-Taiwan Partnership, Safeguard U.S. from Communist China’s Security Threats

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn)
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) and Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii) introduced the Taiwan Travel and Tourism Coordination Act to keep Americans safer by establishing robust security screenings for those traveling to the U.S. from Asia, open new markets for American industry, and strengthen the economic partnership between the U.S. and Taiwan:  
    “Not only does the Chinese Communist Party present a threat to Taiwan, but Communist China’s campaign for global dominance also presents a clear threat to U.S. interests,” said Senator Blackburn. “We need to secure our homeland by requiring Customs and Border Protection officers to inspect those who are traveling to the U.S. from airports in Asia, and the Taiwan Travel and Tourism Coordination Act would move us one step closer to achieving enhanced security at foreign airports. This legislation would also help identify opportunities to strengthen our economic partnership with Taiwan and increase collaboration between our two countries.”
    “Taiwan is a key partner in the Indo-Pacific, and boosting our ties strengthens both Taiwan and the United States. This bill would help unlock more economic opportunities for the people of Taiwan, Hawai‘i, and our entire country,” said Senator Schatz, a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
    BACKGROUND
    Taiwan is the United States’ vital trading partner and ally in the Indo-Pacific region and is increasingly under threat from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To combat this threat to our interests, we must assist our allies in stabilizing their economies and growing their national industries.
    Travel and tourism play a crucial role in a nation’s economic security, yet this sector in Taiwan faces pressure and coercion from the CCP. With strategic efforts proposed in this bill, the United States and Taiwan can turn these challenges into opportunities to strengthen our relations and our tourism industries.
    The CCP’s campaign for global dominance presents a clear threat to both Taiwan and U.S. interests as well. To secure our homeland, we must establish “pre-clearance” facilities in Asia. Pre-clearance is the strategic stationing of Customs and Border Protection personnel at designated foreign airports to inspect travelers prior to boarding U.S.-bound flights, and it is incredibly important to enhance security, increase collaboration, and streamline travel. Notably, there is no pre-clearance facility in Asia, despite there being an annual average of over 4 million travelers from the continent.
    TAIWAN TRAVEL AND TOURISM COORDINATION ACT
    Specifically, the Taiwan Travel and Tourism Coordination Act would require the federal government to:
    Identify opportunities for enhanced travel between the U.S. and Taiwan;
    Facilitate events and coordination between the travel and tourism industry partners in the United States and Taiwan;
    Coordinate with Taiwan and other agencies on the safety and security of international visitors both at home and abroad; and
    Conduct a feasibility study on establishing a pre-clearance facility in Taiwan. 
    Click here for bill text.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Theatre’s thriving horror revival reflects a cultural moment of collective anxiety

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Richard Hand, Professor of Media Practice, University of East Anglia

    The stage has long presented horror as entertainment, from 19th-century ghost and revenge melodramas to the blood-soaked spectacles of the grand-guignol, the Parisian “theatre of horror’.

    In recent decades, horror theatre has often been perceived as a relic of the past, overshadowed by its more commercially dominant and popular cinematic and digital counterparts. This may have seemed evident in 2023 when The Woman in Black finally closed after 33 years of haunting London’s West End.

    Yet, a recent wave of new and revived horror plays suggests that the genre is once again thriving on stage. With audiences flocking to 2:22 A Ghost Story, Paranormal Activity, Saint Maud, Inside No. 9 Stage/Fright and two concurrent but unrelated adaptations of the infamous Enfield poltergeist case, it begs the question: what is driving this resurgence? And could it be a reflection of our cultural moment – one that echoes the anxieties and uncertainties of previous gothic ages?


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    The original 19th-century gothic period in theatre was characterised by its fascination with the supernatural, the macabre and psychological extremes. Drawing inspiration from gothic literature, these plays often featured doomed heroines, villainous aristocrats and vengeful spectres, creating a haunting atmosphere of terror, suspense and unease.

    Melodrama played a key role, with heightened emotions, moral polarities, and elaborate stage effects – such as trapdoors, phantasmagorical projections and eerie soundscapes – enhancing the spectacle. Gothic theatre reflected contemporary anxieties about the unknown, scientific progress, and the boundaries between reason and madness, captivating audiences with its thrilling blend of horror and theatrical illusion.

    The demise of the neo-Victorian gothic The Woman in Black aside, horror theatre is anything but exorcised from the stage. The Leeds Playhouse stage adaptation of Paranormal Activity, directed by Felix Barrett, used technology, scene staging and ingeniously deployed magic tricks for a spine-chilling experience as compellingly immersive as many of the director’s more famous Punchdrunk shows.

    Danny Robins, whose podcast and TV show Uncanny has captivated audiences with real-life supernatural tales, enjoyed success when his 2:22 A Ghost Story materialised in the nervous context of a post-lockdown London in 2021. The play has continued in revivals and on tour while, in parallel, Robins’ podcast became a live stage tour, Uncanny: I Know What I Saw, filling theatres across the UK.

    Similarly, Inside No. 9 Stage/Fright has recently opened in London giving the beloved but concluded television programme an afterlife, and proving its signature brand of macabre storytelling is highly suited to a live environment.

    These productions, and others like them, are drawing significant audiences, not just for their jump scares and eerie atmospheres but because they tap into something deeper: a desire to engage with horror in a way that feels immediate and unfiltered by the distraction of screens.

    Live performance offers something that no digital medium can fully replicate: physical presence, unpredictability, and the heightened emotional responses that come from sharing an experience in real time with real people, most of whom will be complete strangers.

    Horror theatre’s resurgence taps into a collective psychological need to process fear in a safe space. Stage horror offers audiences a cathartic release – a chance to confront, experience, and ultimately purge fear in a controlled environment.

    The communal nature of theatre makes this experience all the more potent: the gasps, shrieks, and laughter of fellow audience members reinforce the sense of shared vulnerability and nervousness, exhilaration and hilarity.

    At a time when people are overwhelmed by an endless stream of manipulated digital content, horror theatre provides a real and visceral alternative. The genre’s success also speaks to theatre’s ability to evolve with changing audience expectations, incorporating elements of interactivity, immersion and technological innovation that mirror trends in gaming, VR, and participatory storytelling.

    Horror theatre’s return is about more than just entertainment and escapism: it reflects a cultural shift reminiscent of past gothic revivals. Historically, horror has flourished during times of social and political upheaval.

    The 19th-century fascination with ghosts, revenge narratives and heightened melodramas coincided with anxieties about revolution, industrialisation, urbanisation, shifting morality, and scientific progress that threatened religious beliefs. The French grand-guignol mirrored a period of deep social unrest, shifting political landscapes and the simultaneous awe and angst about technological and medical advances.

    Theatre, as a medium, has always been uniquely responsive to “the moment”. Today, as we grapple with global crises, from pandemics and climate change to political volatility and technological overreach, it is no surprise that horror has found renewed cultural relevance.

    The horror stories that dominate recent productions are not just exercises in fright – they are reflections of contemporary anxieties. The current touring revival of Jeremy Dyson and Andy Nyman’s Ghost Stories, the stage adaptations of Peter James’ macabre thrillers, and other unnerving productions signals a fascination with the blurred boundary between everyday reality and our phobias, mirroring wider societal debates around truth, belief, and uncertainty.

    What we are witnessing, then, is not just a nostalgic resurgence of the old-fashioned genre of horror theatre but the reflection of a new gothic age, one shaped by our era’s profound fears and instabilities. The success of these productions suggests that horror is not only commercially viable in the theatre but culturally necessary.

    Whether through traditional ghost stories, psychological thrillers, or experimental immersive experiences, horror theatre is asserting its place as a genre that speaks to the present moment. As long as there are cultural fears to be explored and exorcised, horror theatre will continue to haunt our stages – and our imaginations.

    Richard Hand does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Theatre’s thriving horror revival reflects a cultural moment of collective anxiety – https://theconversation.com/theatres-thriving-horror-revival-reflects-a-cultural-moment-of-collective-anxiety-249651

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: Dundee Corporation Continues To Advance Its Strategic Plan and Announces Proposed Sale of Its Interest in Android Industries

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TORONTO, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Dundee Corporation (TSX: DC.A) (the “Corporation” or “Dundee”) is pleased to announce that the ownership group of Android Industries, L.L.C. (“Android”) have agreed to sell their interest in Android. The Corporation holds a 20% interest in Android, a private company and leading high technology-enabled assembler and sequencer of complex assemblies for the automotive industry.

    As a result of this transaction, Dundee anticipates receiving cash proceeds of approximately C$24.5 million at closing, with an incremental C$6.9 million payable contingent upon the release of all escrows. “The sale of our 20% interest in Android Industries represents a significant milestone for Dundee as we rationalize what remains of our non-core legacy asset portfolio which is a key strategic initiative as we recycle our capital into our core mining business,” said Jonathan Goodman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Dundee Corporation. “I would like to extend my congratulations to the team for their exceptional effort in getting this deal moved toward the finish line.  This divesture underscores the Corporation’s commitment to optimizing its asset portfolio and delivering value to shareholders.  We remain focused on executing on our strategic objectives and pursuing growth within the mining sector.”

    The transaction is subject to satisfying customary closing conditions and obtaining necessary regulatory approvals and is expected to close on or around the end of the first quarter of 2025.

    ABOUT DUNDEE CORPORATION:

    Dundee Corporation is a public Canadian independent holding company, listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol “DC.A”. Through its operating subsidiaries, Dundee Corporation is an active investor focused on delivering long-term, sustainable value as a trusted partner in the mining sector with more than 30 years of experience making accretive mining investments.

    FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS:

    This press release may contain forward-looking information within the meaning of applicable securities legislation, which reflects Dundee Corporation’s current expectations regarding future events. Forward-looking information is based on a number of assumptions and is subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, many of which are beyond Dundee Corporation’s control, which could cause actual results and events to differ materially from those that are disclosed in or implied by such forward-looking information. Such risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to, the factors discussed under “Risk Factors” in the Annual Information Form of Dundee Corporation and subsequent filings made with securities commissions in Canada. Dundee Corporation does not undertake any obligation to update such forward-looking information, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as expressly required by applicable law.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT:

    Investor and Media Relations
    T: (416) 864-3584
    E: ir@dundeecorporation.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Ambitious budget set to empower communities and support the most vulnerable

    Source: Scotland – City of Perth

    Despite the costs of providing essential services continuing to rise, flexibility from a three-year Council Tax strategy and additional funding from the Scottish Government meant that Councillors were able to agree a budget for each of the next three years which prioritises services for the most vulnerable, avoids further public sector job cuts, and invests in community empowerment and business growth. All with a lower Council Tax increase than originally proposed.

    The agreed Council Tax increase for 2025/26 is 9.5%. This follows a freeze in the current year. For people living in a Band D property, this represents a £2.56 weekly increase, or £11.11 more a month. Provisional increases have also been agreed of 9.5% for 2026/27 and 6% for 2027/28.

    Key investments agreed:

    • Protecting vital services for residents in the greatest need – the budget prioritises vulnerable residents, with almost £7 million to maintain health and social care services, plus £1 million over two years to support innovation and provide new models of delivering care in our communities. 
    • Protecting frontline jobs – no further job cuts are required as part of the budget decisions made today, with over £2 million being put back into Education and Learning to reverse proposed reductions in teacher numbers and £400,000 to prevent further cuts to teams supporting vulnerable children and families. Council officers are continuing to deliver on phase 2 of the leadership savings agreed last year.
    • Empowering communities – the budget includes £1 million to support community resilience, £1 million for Culture Perth and Kinross services, and almost £150,000 in community sports.

    Council Leader, Councillor Grant Laing, said: “Community groups are an essential part of delivering on local ambitions, and I’m proud that this budget creates more opportunities than ever before to put them at the heart of local decision-making. From additional funding for Bloom groups and Community Councils, to investing in community resilience and community sports, there’s lots we have been able to do.

    “We’ve also listened to the community members who have campaigned in support of their rural libraries, and allocated money over two years to allow Culture Perth and Kinross to maintain current premises and opening hours. But, this funding is contingent upon the energy and commitment shown by those supporters now being directed towards working with CPK to plan and implement sustainable futures for those libraries.”

    Additional key investments include:

    • Economic growth – £9 million over four years in the Commercial Property Investment Programme to make more units available for new and growing businesses, particularly in rural Perth and Kinross.
    • Environmental initiatives – £200,000 to provide practical support to Bloom and biodiversity groups to accelerate the delivery of the biodiversity aims of our Grow Wild approach to greenspaces. And, another £200,000 to deliver a new round of the Green Living Fund for community projects.
    • Public transport – almost £170,000 to extend the offer for free bus travel on the first Saturday of every month for another year, adding extra free travel for Clean Air Day in June and for an additional free Saturday in December in the peak Christmas shopping season. Plus, almost £70,000 for rural bus services and community transport initiatives.
    • Tackling poverty – adding £2 million to target anti-poverty initiatives, including continuing school holiday food and fun activities, and investing in efforts to tackle poverty in rural areas.

    Councillor Laing added: “One of our key priorities is to tackle poverty head-on. We are investing in job creation and growth schemes, such as apprenticeships and rural employability programs, to provide more opportunities for our residents. Additionally, we are adding £2 million to our anti-poverty funding and allocating £600,000 to the Financial Insecurity Fund and Scottish Welfare Fund. This will ensure that we can support those facing financial challenges and help them access the discounts and benefits they are entitled to.

    “Our Welfare Rights Team does a fantastic job in helping maximise income for households in financial need. By investing further in this team, we can support even more households and ensure that everyone in our community has the resources they need to thrive.
    “With this ambitious budget, we are not only addressing immediate needs but also laying the foundations for a resilient and thriving community. Together, we are building a brighter future for Perth and Kinross.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: JMIC’s Role Expands to Entire CMF Operating Area

    Source: United States Navy

    To support the newly expanded JMIC mission, Royal Australian Navy Capt. Jorge McKee, Combined Task Force (CTF) 153 commander, transferred three Naval Cooperation and Guidance of Shipping (NCAGS) specialist officers to JMIC.

    McKee with JMIC Director, U.S. Navy Capt. Lee Stuart, and JMIC Deputy Director, Republic of Singapore Navy Cmdr. Andrew Sim, to transfer the officers, who are from the Royal Netherlands and Royal Norwegian navies.

    Since forming on Feb. 20, 2024, as part of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG), the international response to attacks on merchant mariners by Yemen-based Houthis terrorists, JMIC has enhanced understanding, information sharing and cooperation between naval and commercial shipping in the region.

    Once responsibility for OPG transferred from CTF 153 to the U.S. Navy’s Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 50 on Feb. 1, JMIC expanded their operating area so they can provide the same level of service to the entire operating area.

    JMIC’s regular information products now include incident monitoring, reporting and security assessments for the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Northwestern Indian Ocean in addition to the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab.

    “These officers have been an integral part of this task force, bringing valuable specialist commercial shipping industry expertise to inform daily operational decisions that I, and the rest of the team, have greatly appreciated,” McKee said. “We look forward to seeing their expertise benefit all CMF task forces and shipping operators across the region.”

    Stuart likened the officers to the first crew of a newly commissioned ship.

    “These officers are JMIC ‘plank owners.’” Stuart said. “They comprise the first crew of a combined unit supporting the free flow of commerce and commercial mariner safety for years to come.”

    JMIC welcomes engagement from shipping industry stakeholders via its new LinkedIn page at: https://www.linkedin.com/company/jmic

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: World Trade Organisation 2nd Trade Policy Review of Ukraine – Joint Statement

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    News story

    World Trade Organisation 2nd Trade Policy Review of Ukraine – Joint Statement

    At the second Trade Policy Review of Ukraine, the UK and Members from across the WTO reiterated their unwavering solidarity and support for Ukraine in a joint statement at the World Trade Organization.

    We, the delegations of the undersigned WTO Members, on the occasion of the Second Trade Policy Review of Ukraine in the WTO, held on 26 and 28 February 2025, reiterate our full support for and solidarity with the people of Ukraine. We express our deep sadness at the devastating human losses and profound suffering caused by Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, which continues for the fourth year in gross violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

    We reaffirm our commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and call for the Russian Federation to immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.

    Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to have devastating global and regional impacts, including on Ukraine’s economy and ability to trade. The destruction of significant parts of Ukraine’s transport routes, port infrastructure, and grain storage facilities as well as the mining of millions of hectares of agricultural land is impeding Ukraine’s ability to produce, export, and import. We are gravely concerned about the consequences of this destruction for Ukraine and for global trade, in particular with regard to the supply to international markets of a number of key commodities produced by Ukraine, including agricultural and food products, fertilisers, and critical minerals. We are also deeply concerned by reports of attacks on civilian vessels transporting agricultural goods from Ukrainian Black Sea ports and millions of tonnes of grain being plundered by Russia from illegally occupied regions of Ukraine using falsified phytosanitary certificates and hiding vessels’ data. These actions violate the principles and values of the WTO.

    Ukraine is one of the world’s top exporters of key agricultural commodities such as wheat, maize, barley, soybeans and sunflower oil. We recognise Ukraine’s determination, despite Russia’s war of aggression, to ensure global food security and supply to some of the most vulnerable parts of the world, particularly developing countries and LDCs. In this regard, the “Grain from Ukraine” initiative, which has already helped to feed 20 million people in 13 countries, continues to be an important tool to help to respond to world hunger. We praise Ukraine’s achievement of maintaining under difficult conditions food exports by its Black Sea corridor to global markets and commend the ongoing functioning of the EU Solidarity Lanes and their contribution to global food security and Ukraine’s economy. This benefits all countries, notably the most in need. In this context, it is necessary to ensure free, full, and safe navigation in the Black and Azov Seas and that sea routes and ports are not threatened or blocked by threat of or use of force.

    We underscore the need to reach, as soon as possible, a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine, in full respect of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We welcome Ukraine’s efforts aimed at achieving peace, including through the principles laid out in the Peace Formula and Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework adopted at the Summit on Peace in Ukraine on Bürgenstock. We reiterate that the Russian Federation must bear the legal consequences of all of its internationally wrongful acts, including making reparation for injury and loss, including for any humanitarian, economic, and environmental damage caused by such acts.

    We will continue work to support Ukraine and to facilitate its exports and supply chains for the benefit of global food security. We encourage all WTO Members to do likewise in a manner commensurate with their capacity, including by facilitating the use of infrastructure, as well as facilitating and simplifying customs procedures. Within the capacity of each WTO Member, we will continue to provide assistance to Ukraine to alleviate the suffering of the Ukrainian people. We will also continue to look for practical ways to help and assist Ukraine in its reconstruction efforts, economic recovery, activities, and projects to overcome the negative consequences of Russia’s war of aggression.

    Albania, Australia, Canada, Chile, European Union, Georgia, Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, New Zealand, Republic of Moldova, Norway, Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Ukraine

    Updates to this page

    Published 26 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI: TopLine Financial Credit Union Members and Employees Provide Warmth to Those in Need This Winter

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MAPLE GROVE, Minn., Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — TopLine Financial Credit Union, a Twin Cities-based member-owned financial services cooperative, held their fourth annual Winter Gear Drive during the month of January benefitting local non-profits, Avenues for Youth, Karen Organization of Minnesota, MORE Community Services and YMCA of the North Youth and Family Services. TopLine members and employees generously donated winter gear items of youth and adult size jackets, boots, gloves, hats, scarves, socks and more to help bring warmth to those in need in our local communities.

    Employees were able to participate by donating winter gear items and money in exchange for a “Foundation Friday/Saturday” sticker, allowing them to wear jeans to work. TopLine and community members could also purchase items from an Amazon Wishlist or Target Registry and have them delivered directly to TopLine, and in return delivered to the charitable partners. When the program ended TopLine employees and members had donated over 493 winter gear items and $1,191 in cash to assist local individuals and families.

    “We are dedicated to meeting the needs identified by our nonprofit partners through various donation drives,” said Mick Olson, President and CEO of TopLine. “We are grateful for the generosity of our donors who have supported youth, adults, and families in our communities by donating coats, hats, mittens, scarves, and other warm winter items. We deeply appreciate our nonprofit partners who handle the distribution of all collected items.”

    Avenues for Youth provides emergency shelter, short-term housing and supportive services for homeless youth in a safe and nurturing environment. There are over 6,000 homeless youth in Minnesota each night. Avenues shelters in Brooklyn Park and Minneapolis help over 300 youth. Visit www.avenuesforyouth.org.

    Karen Organization of Minnesota provides refugees with resources and programs to remove barriers and achieve economic, social and cultural well-being. Visit https://mnkaren.org.

    MORE Community Services provides refugees and immigrants with education and support, helping them achieve economic and social independence today and for generations to come. Visit more-empowerment.org.

    The YMCA of the North Youth and Family Services is a leading nonprofit dedicated to strengthening communities through youth development, healthy living and social responsibility.
    To learn more about the Y’s mission and work, visit https://www.ymcanorth.org/impact.

    TopLine Financial Credit Union, a Twin Cities-based credit union, is Minnesota’s 9th largest credit union, with assets of over $1.1 billion and serves over 70,000 members. Established in 1935, the not-for-profit financial cooperative offers a complete line of financial services from its ten branch locations — in Bloomington, Brooklyn Park, Champlin, Circle Pines, Coon Rapids, Forest Lake, Maple Grove, Plymouth, St. Francis and in St. Paul’s Como Park — as well as by phone and online at www.TopLinecu.com or www.ahcu.coop. Membership is available to anyone who lives, works, worships, attends school or volunteers in Anoka, Benton, Carver, Chisago, Dakota, Hennepin, Isanti, Kanabec, Mille Lacs, Pine, Ramsey, Scott, Sherburne, Washington and Wright counties in Minnesota and their immediate family members, as well as employees and retirees of Anoka Hennepin School District #11, Anoka Technical College, Federal Premium Ammunition, Hoffman Enclosures, Inc., GRACO, Inc., and their subsidiaries. Visit us on our Facebook or Instagram. To learn more about the credit union’s foundation, visit www.TopLinecu.com/Foundation.

    CONTACT:
    Vicki Roscoe Erickson
    Senior Vice President and Chief Marketing Officer
    TopLine Financial Credit Union
    verickson@toplinecu.com | 763.391.0872

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/569e6412-d235-42f2-b3a7-82b07a9a58f4

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Bridgetown Research raises $19M from Lightspeed and Accel to deploy AI business research agents

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Seattle, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Strategic business decisions have traditionally been expensive and slow for a fundamental reason: they don’t happen enough. This means companies lack both historical data to learn from and experts who have seen enough similar cases. Bridgetown Research is changing that. Today, the AI decision science startup announced $19 million in Series A funding led by Lightspeed and Accel, with participation from a leading research university.

    Bridgetown Research has developed AI agents that autonomously execute research. Most notable amongst these agents are voice bots trained to recruit and interview industry experts, gathering primary data that can be analyzed alongside alternative data sourced from their partners. 

    Bridgetown Research founder Harsh Sahai.

    Founded by Harsh Sahai, who previously led machine learning teams at Amazon before leading strategy engagements at McKinsey & Co., Bridgetown Research was born from a simple observation: the majority of business analyses are a permutation of a small number of automatable tasks. The founding team, comprising former professionals from McKinsey, Bain, Amazon, and leading tech startups, brings together extensive experience across strategy consulting and technology.

    “We are excited to be a catalyst for change. We are working with multiple private equity firms, management consulting firms, and corporate teams to help make strategic decisions better and faster. This in turn is driving up demand for advisory and information services downstream. We enable $10+ of advisory and information services revenue for every $1 we make. Together with leading institutions, we’re building something bigger than ourselves—an ecosystem where everyone thrives,” commented Harsh Sahai, CEO & founder of Bridgetown Research.

    While many AI solutions focus on searching and summarizing information using LLMs, real world business decisions require much more than synthesising the open web. They need proprietary data such as primary data from experts and customer surveys, along with frameworks to understand markets, what Harsh Sahai calls “ontologies”. Moreover, outputs need to be repeatable and auditable for a business to use them to make decisions with tens of millions of dollars at stake. Bridgetown Research is the only player using agents to gather primary data and systematically find patterns in it to generate original insights. 

    Bridgetown Research: (L to R) Founder Harsh Sahai with Director of Engineering Mohak Singh. 

    “AI is causing widespread disruptions across many enterprise functions, and Bridgetown Research is riding that wave by assisting executives in making important strategic decisions. We are pleased to see Bridgetown serving several marquee customers, with users likening its platform to having a team of top-tier consultants at their fingertips. We are excited to partner with Harsh, who, with his background as an ace AI research scientist turned management consultant, blends a unique combination of skills and insight needed to imagine this whole new category of applied AI,” said Anagh Prasad, Investor at Accel.

    Bridgetown Research started with a focus on private equity deal screening diligence. Multiple top-tier PE & VC firms already use Bridgetown Research for deal screening and deeper commercial diligence. They’re able to screen their pipeline much faster with initial analysis taking 24 hours instead of weeks without Bridgetown enabling teams to focus on actual decision making instead of research and analysis. For other customers Bridgetown has enabled voice of customer conversations that cover hundreds of respondents in parallel, and within days. 

    Ishaan Preet Singh, Investor at Lightspeed added “Companies are built on the quality of strategic decisions, and the research and analysis behind it. Bridgetown Research enables the smartest executives and investors to make these decisions with an order of magnitude more information, and at a pace that was earlier impossible. Harsh and Bridgetown are already creating immense value for their customers, but are still just scratching the surface of the leverage that AI can create.”

    As global markets become increasingly complex, the demand for efficient and effective decision-making tools continues to rise. With this funding round, Bridgetown Research plans to invest further in training its AI agents to perform a broader set of analyses across a broader range of domains, and deepening industry partnerships to enhance access to domain-specific intelligence.

    Ends

    Media images can be found here

    About Bridgetown Research
    Bridgetown Research builds AI agents for decision research. Its voice agents and web crawlers find and clean data, while its analyses agents produce repeatable, auditable, and reliable analyses. The team consists of computer scientists, econometricians, software engineers, investors and business consultants, working across geographies. For more information please visit https://www.bridgetownresearch.com/ 

    About Accel 
    Accel is a global venture capital firm that aims to be the first partner to exceptional teams everywhere (Facebook, Flipkart, etc.), from inception through all phases of private company growth. Accel has been operating in India since 2008, and its investments include companies like BookMyShow, Browserstack, Flipkart, Freshworks, FalconX, Infra.Market, Chargebee, Clevertap, Cure Fit, Musigma, Moneyview, Mensa Brands, Myntra, Moglix, Ninjacart, Swiggy, Stanza Living, Urban Company, Zetwerk, and Zenoti, among many others. We help ambitious entrepreneurs build iconic global businesses. For more, visit: www.accel.com

    About Lightspeed
    Lightspeed is a global multi-stage venture capital firm focused on accelerating disruptive innovations and trends in the Enterprise, Consumer, Health, and Fintech sectors. Over the past two decades, the Lightspeed team has backed hundreds of entrepreneurs and helped build more than 500 companies globally including Affirm, Acceldata, Carta, Cato Networks, Darwinbox, Epic Games, Faire, Innovaccer, Guardant Health, Mulesoft, Navan, Netskope, Nutanix, Physics Wallah, Razorpay, Rubrik, Sharechat, Snap, OYO Rooms, Ultima Genomics, Zepto and more. Lightspeed and its global team currently manage $25B in AUM across the Lightspeed platform, with investment professionals and advisors in the U.S., Europe, India, Israel, and Southeast Asia. www.lsip.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Mental Health Australia calls for free mental health care for all children and young people in Australia

    Source: Mental Health Australia

    Peak mental health body Mental Health Australia (MHA) is urging all political parties to commit to free mental health care for everyone under the age of 25 as part of their federal election platforms. MHA Director of Policy and Advocacy, Emma Greeney, said that with two-thirds of mental health to guarantee all children and young people the chance to thrive.

    See full media release at the PDF attached below. 

    For further information and references see: Mental Health Australia’s website and Federal Election Platform: Case for Change – Free mental health support for children and young people  

    MIL OSI News