Source: European Parliament
B10‑0329/2025
European Parliament resolution on tackling China’s critical raw materials export restrictions
(2025/2800(RSP))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on EU-China relations,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020[1] (Critical Raw Materials Act),
– having regard to the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the principles of free, fair, and rules-based trade,
– having regard to WTO dispute settlement rulings DS431, DS432 and DS433 on China’s rare earth export restrictions,
– having regard to the G7 critical minerals action plan,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas on 4 April 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce imposed export restrictions on magnets and seven rare earth elements (REEs): samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium;
B. whereas China’s new export licensing process for rare earth elements results in significant delays, has negative impacts on supply chains and threatens imminent stoppages for production in certain sectors; whereas it is also forcing industry to disclose sensitive information reaching beyond standard licensing processes;
C. whereas China’s new export restrictions further undermine its reliability as a supplier for EU industry; whereas delays and difficulties in obtaining customs clearance arise even when licences are granted;
D. whereas China’s decision to start issuing export licences for rare earth elements and magnets to some European companies represents only temporary relief and falls significantly short of a systemic solution;
E. whereas these new export restrictions represent just the latest development in China’s increased use of unilateral controls on exports that are broader in scope than the multilateral export controls and do not have a clear security rationale;
F. whereas China introduced export restrictions on gallium and germanium in August 2023, and further export restrictions on graphite in December 2023;
G. whereas China has, in the past, already been found in breach of its WTO Accession Protocol commitments and Article XI(1) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for introducing unjustified export restrictions on REEs; whereas this demonstrates a clear pattern of action;
H. whereas China’s use of export restrictions is a clear example of its exploitation of its dominance of the global critical raw materials market and economic blackmail, resulting in supply chain disruptions;
I. whereas 100 % of the EU’s supply of heavy REEs comes from China; whereas the EU’s general dependency on critical raw materials from China remains a major threat to the EU’s economy and resilience and a cause for concern;
J. whereas the EU faces the complex challenge of securing a sustainable supply of critical raw materials while adhering to its environmental and societal commitments;
K. whereas the EU’s demand for critical raw materials is surging and is projected to rise further, due among other things to developments in the defence sector, as well as the digital and energy transitions;
L. whereas the shift in energy policy has increased demand for previously underutilised resources, including REEs, as well as ‘conventional’ commodities such as copper, nickel, cobalt and lithium; whereas, additionally, the shift has heightened the need for metals and metalloids, including gallium, germanium, selenium, indium and tellurium, which are often only obtained as by-products during the extraction of primary commodities and have low recycling rates, further complicating their supply chain and availability;
M. whereas apart from raw material extraction, China is also increasing its dominance of critical raw materials markets through refining and processing; whereas 94 % of the Australian production of lithium minerals and 99 % of the Congolese production of cobalt goes to China for refining; whereas China imports 67 % of the world’s supply of manganese ore, and exports 70 % of the world’s refined manganese;
N. whereas China’s political objective is to secure access to raw materials in other countries and strengthen its dominance in global markets; whereas China has been accused of demanding exclusive access to resources as a condition for investment through its Belt and Road Initiative, which invests heavily in resource-rich countries; whereas such conditions reinforce monopsony power and accentuate concentration, thus making critical raw materials markets less resilient;
1. Expresses serious concern about the People’s Republic of China’s unjustified use of unilateral export controls on critical raw materials, including its latest measures targeting seven rare earth materials and magnets; deplores China’s weaponisation of critical raw materials and its use of market dominance for geopolitical leverage;
2. Calls on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to immediately remove these rare earths and related products from its control list, thereby restoring a stable, predictable and sufficient supply;
3. Condemns the PRC’s coercive economic and trade practices and calls for swift, coordinated and proportionate responses to its systematic use of trade dependencies as a tool of influence; emphasises that such practices extend beyond critical raw materials, affecting a wide range of strategic sectors;
4. Notes with concern that for a large number of raw materials, the supply risk for Europe has gone up significantly[2]; believes that an increasing supply risk over time is symptomatic of Europe’s growing reliance on raw materials from a limited number of suppliers located in countries with governance and/or trade risks, its lack of progress in research and development targeting substitute materials, and the inability of current recycling practices to meet growing demand;
5. Recognises the need to diversify supply chains for raw materials as a critical measure to enhance economic resilience, reduce strategic dependencies and ensure stable access to essential inputs in the face of geopolitical and market disruptions; calls strongly for the EU and its Member States to closely cooperate with global allies and like-minded partners in order to counteract abusive and distortive practices in the critical minerals sector; welcomes, in that respect, the G7 critical minerals action plan, announced following the 50th G7 summit that took place in June 2025;
6. Recalls that the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act will establish a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials, for example by identifying critical and strategic raw materials, setting benchmarks for domestic production and promoting improved circularity; Calls, in this respect, for the provisions of the Act to be implemented in full;
7. Emphasises the need to step up domestic extraction of raw materials in the EU; notes that mineral extraction within the EU operates under stricter regulation than in most other countries globally; stresses that this, coupled with shorter and more secure supply lines to EU customers, offers distinct advantages, including enhanced economic resilience and a reduced carbon footprint associated with raw material sourcing;
8. Expresses concern about the negative public perception of extraction projects in Europe; stresses that this demonstrates a clear disconnect between EU policymakers and local populations, as well as other stakeholders, regarding the implementation of energy and climate policies, as the green transition and the move away from fossil fuels require increased production of many raw materials and the establishment of secure supply chains; regrets that a number of mining projects in Europe, for example for lithium, have been significantly delayed or entirely cancelled due to public opposition; notes that while all human activities, mining included, have some degree of impact on the environment, the European mining sector has made substantial progress in developing methods and implementing strategies to mitigate its environmental footprint, balancing the need for resource extraction with responsible stewardship of the natural environment;
9. Notes that the complexity of the EU’s mineral raw materials legislation is additionally exacerbated by the requirements of EU nature protection regulations, such as the Nature Restoration Regulation[3], which also limit the availability of land for mining activities, as extractive projects will likely face stricter environmental assessments, and areas designated for restoration may be off-limits to mining projects;
10. Draws attention to the fact that China not only produces the vast majority of critical raw materials, but also controls a significant portion of global processing capacity; notes, in this regard, that in order to resolve its supply problem, the EU, apart from gaining access to resources from a wider variety of countries and developing its own EU domestic resources, needs to (re-)establish processing capacity within Europe;
11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council and the Commission.
