Category: Balkans

  • MIL-OSI: Ageas Re partners with Slovenian insurer Triglav Group in connection with the Motor insurance business distributed by Italian Insurtech Prima

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Ageas Re partners with Slovenian insurer Triglav Group in connection with the Motor insurance business distributed by Italian Insurtech Prima

    Today, Ageas Re, the reinsurance arm of Ageas Group, concluded a reinsurance agreement with Slovenian insurer Triglav Group in connection with the partnership entered into by Triglav Group with leading Italian direct Motor insurance distributor, Prima Assicurazioni S.p.A. (Prima), with the objective to expand its business portfolio and to contribute to the Ageas’s Elevate27 profitable growth ambitions.

    Under to the agreement, Ageas Re takes an 80% Quota Share on the Prima business underwritten by Triglav Group in 2025, commencing in the coming weeks.

    Prima is a rapidly growing, profitable insurance distributor that began distributing personal lines policies, mainly Motor, in 2015. Since then, it has become the number 1 in the Italian Direct Motor business. In 2024, the company generated EUR 1.3 billion gross written premiums, servicing over 4 million customers, and EUR 104 million Group EBITDA.

    This agreement is in perfect alignment with Ageas’s Elevate27 strategy to achieve profitable growth in an attractive European Non-Life market. The Italian Motor insurance market generates premiums in excess of EUR 15 billion, with consistent profitability. Through this partnership, Ageas Re teams up with a tech-driven, local champion, with proven track record, providing immediate market entry with considerable scale.

    Ageas Re anticipates inflows from this transaction in excess of EUR 500 million in 2025 and a Net Operating Result of around EUR 15 million, spread over 2025 and 2026. The impact on Group Solvency is estimated to be no more than -4 points in 2025.

    Hans De Cuyper, CEO of Ageas stated: The agreement with Triglav Group aligns well with many aspects of our newly launched strategy, Elevate27. This collaboration enables us to enter a promising European growth market in Non-Life insurance and achieve profitable growth through a partner with a strong market position.”

    Joachim Racz, CEO of Ageas Re continued: “I am pleased to announce this partnership. Along with the entire Ageas Re team, I look forward to establishing a successful collaboration, offering high-quality insurance products to the Italian customer distributed by Prima. We would also like to thank Howden Re for the excellent management of the process and transaction.”

    George Ottathycal, CEO of Prima said: “Prima Assicurazioni has experienced remarkable growth in the Italian motor insurance market, surpassing 4 million active customers in just ten years. This success is the result of our sophisticated and rigorous pricing and underwriting, outstanding user experience, and, most importantly, our carefully selected strategic partners who fully align with our cutting-edge, technology- and data-driven business model. Not only will the solidity and trust of the new partners Triglav Group and Ageas Re further expand our growth, but will also deliver significant value to our entire network of agents and brokers—and, above all, to our customers.”

    Andrej Slapar, President of the Management Board of Zavarovalnica Triglav, commented: “Our strategic ambition is to grow beyond existing markets and enhance Triglav Group’s international recognition. The Italian motor insurance market presents a strong opportunity to support this goal, and we are pleased to be working with well-established partners Prima and Ageas Re. The Triglav Group will continue to explore opportunities for further growth and for delivering on the other objectives set out in our strategy.”

    Ageas is a Belgian rooted listed international insurance Group with a heritage spanning of 200 years. It offers Retail and Business customers Life and Non-Life insurance products designed to suit their specific needs, today and tomorrow, and is also engaged in reinsurance activities. As one of Europe’s larger insurance companies, Ageas concentrates its activities in Europe and Asia, which together make up the major part of the global insurance market. It operates successful insurance businesses in Belgium, the UK, Portugal, Türkiye, China, Malaysia, India, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Singapore, and the Philippines through a combination of wholly owned subsidiaries and long-term partnerships with strong financial institutions and key distributors. Ageas ranks among the market leaders in the countries in which it operates. It represents a staff force of about 50,000 people and reported annual inflows of EUR 18.5 billion in 2024.

    Prima Assicurazioni is an insurtech company operating as a specialized insurance agency in the automotive, home, and family sectors, serving over 4 million clients. It has revolutionized the Italian insurance market through innovation, technology, and a data-driven strategy. Thanks to unprecedented growth over its 10-year history, Prima’s evolving business model has enhanced the user experience, offering competitive pricing and fostering greater market competition. A leader in Italy’s online motor insurance sector, Prima also operates a nationwide network of agents. Since 2022, the company has expanded into the United Kingdom and Spain.

    For 125 years, the Triglav Group has earned the trust of clients and other stakeholders through its expertise, experience, and financial strength. It is the largest insurance-financial group in the Adria region and one of the leading groups in Southeast Europe. The Group operates in six countries, with broader international presence through insurance and reinsurance activities. Insurance and asset management are the two main pillars of its operations. The Group employs more than 5,000 people. Its mission is to create a safer future. The core values of the Group are responsiveness, simplicity, and reliability. Its vision is focused on strengthening its identity and recognition as an international insurance-financial group. Through sustainable operations, it provides a development-oriented environment for employees, maintains strong partnerships, and represents a stable, secure, and profitable investment for shareholders. The parent company of the Triglav Group is Zavarovalnica Triglav, a Prime Market issuer on the Ljubljana Stock Exchange.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: 18 countries elected to ECOSOC for three-year term

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    UNITED NATIONS, June 5 (Xinhua) — Eighteen countries, including China, were elected on Wednesday to three-year terms on the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the coordinating body for economic and social work of U.N. agencies and funds.

    UN General Assembly President Philemon Young announced the results after a secret ballot.

    The council included Burundi, Chad, Mozambique and Sierra Leone from Africa, China, India, Lebanon and Turkmenistan from Asia and the Pacific, Croatia, Russia and Ukraine from Eastern Europe, Ecuador, Peru and Saint Kitts and Nevis from Latin America and the Caribbean, and Australia, Finland, Norway and Turkey from Western Europe and other regions.

    These ECOSOC members are elected for a three-year term beginning on 1 January 2026.

    ECOSOC has 54 members. Its membership is renewed annually by a vote in the UN General Assembly. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • US vetoes UN Security Council demand for Gaza ceasefire

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The United States on Wednesday vetoed a draft U.N. Security Council resolution that demanded an “immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire” between Israel and Hamas militants in Gaza and unhindered aid access across the war-torn enclave.

    The other 14 countries on the council voted in favor of the draft as a humanitarian crisis grips the enclave of more than 2 million people, where famine looms and aid has only trickled in since Israel lifted an 11-week blockade last month.

    “The United States has been clear: We would not support any measure that fails to condemn Hamas and does not call for Hamas to disarm and leave Gaza,” Acting U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Dorothy Shea told the council before the vote, arguing that it would also undermine U.S.-led efforts to broker a ceasefire.

    Washington is Israel’s biggest ally and arms supplier.

    The Security Council vote came as Israel pushes ahead with an offensive in Gaza after ending a two-month truce in March. Gaza health authorities said Israeli strikes killed 45 people on Wednesday, while Israel said a soldier died in fighting.

    Britain’s U.N. Ambassador Barbara Woodward criticized the Israeli government’s decisions to expand its military operations in Gaza and severely restrict humanitarian aid as “unjustifiable, disproportionate and counterproductive.”

    Israel has rejected calls for an unconditional or permanent ceasefire, saying Hamas cannot stay in Gaza. Israel’s U.N. Ambassador Danny Danon told the council members who voted in favor of the draft: “You chose appeasement and submission. You chose a road that does not lead to peace. Only to more terror.”

    Hamas condemned the U.S. veto, describing it as showing “the U.S. administration’s blind bias” towards Israel. The draft Security Council resolution had also demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages held by Hamas and others.

    RIVAL AID OPERATIONS

    The war in Gaza has raged since 2023 after Hamas militants killed 1,200 people in Israel in an October 7 attack and took some 250 hostages back to the enclave, according to Israeli tallies. Many of those killed or captured were civilians.

    Israel responded with a military campaign that has killed over 54,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities. They say civilians have borne the brunt of the attacks and that thousands more bodies have been lost under rubble.

    Under global pressure, Israel allowed limited U.N.-led deliveries to resume on May 19. A week later a controversial new aid distribution system was launched by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, backed by the U.S. and Israel.

    Israel has long accused Hamas of stealing aid, which the group denies. Israel and the U.S. are urging the U.N. to work through the GHF, which is using private U.S. security and logistics companies to transport aid into Gaza for distribution at so-called secure distribution sites.

    “No one wants to see Palestinian civilians in Gaza go hungry or thirsty,” Shea told the Security Council, adding that the draft resolution did not “acknowledge the disastrous shortcomings of the prior method of aid delivery.”

    The U.N. and international aid groups have refused to work with the GHF because they say it is not neutral, militarizes aid and forces the displacement of Palestinians.

    No aid was distributed by the U.S.-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation on Wednesday as it pressed the Israeli military to boost civilian safety beyond the perimeter of its so-called secure distribution sites after a deadly incident on Tuesday.

    The GHF said it has asked the Israeli military to “guide foot traffic in a way that minimizes confusion or escalation risks” near military positions, provide clearer civilian guidance and enhance training of soldiers on civilian safety.

    ‘DELAYS AND DENIALS’

    The GHF posted on Facebook that “ongoing maintenance work” would delay the opening of its distribution sites on Thursday. It said on Tuesday that it has so far distributed more than seven million meals since it started operations.

    Despite U.S. and Israeli criticism of the U.N.-led Gaza aid operation, a U.S. ceasefire plan proposes the delivery of aid by the United Nations, the Red Crescent and other agreed channels. Israel has agreed to the ceasefire plan but Hamas is seeking changes that the U.S. has rejected as “totally unacceptable.”

    Ahead of the U.N. Security Council vote, U.N. aid chief Tom Fletcher again appealed for the U.N. and aid groups to be allowed to assist people in Gaza, stressing that they have a plan, supplies and experience.

    “Open the crossings – all of them. Let in lifesaving aid at scale, from all directions. Lift the restrictions on what and how much aid we can bring in. Ensure our convoys aren’t held up by delays and denials,” Fletcher said in a statement.

    The U.N. has long-blamed Israel and lawlessness in the enclave for hindering the delivery of aid into Gaza and its distribution throughout the war zone.

    “Enough of suffering of civilians. Enough of food being used as a weapon. Enough is enough is enough,” Slovenia’s U.N. Ambassador Samuel Zbogar told the Security Council.

    A similar humanitarian-focused draft resolution is now expected to be put to a vote in the 193-member U.N. General Assembly, where no countries have a veto power and it would likely pass, diplomats said.

    Danon warned: “Don’t waste more of your time, because no resolution, no vote, no moral failure, will stand in our way.”

    (Reuters)

  • Boisson lights up French Open, Sinner and Djokovic book semi-final showdown

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Wild card Lois Boisson lit up the French Open on Wednesday when the home hope downed sixth-seeded Russian Mirra Andreeva to make the semi-finals before Novak Djokovic set up a blockbuster meeting with world number one Jannik Sinner.

    While Sinner stretched his Grand Slam winning streak to 19 matches after back-to-back titles at the U.S. Open last year and the Australian Open in January, Boisson, ranked 361st, thrilled the home crowd with a dazzling performance.

    Three-time French Open winner Novak Djokovic stole the show in the evening by outlasting German third seed Alexander Zverev 4-6 6-3 6-2 6-4 to remain in the hunt for a record 25th Grand Slam title at the venue of his Olympic gold medal last year.

    Victory after three hours and 17 minutes was the 38-year-old Serbian’s 101st win at Roland Garros but he had to draw from his seemingly endless reserves of energy and experience to prevail.

    “There was a lot of tension, pressure but it’s normal when you play Zverev, one of the best in the world, in the last five-six years,” Djokovic said.

    “My game is based on a lot of running. I’m 38, it’s not easy to keep running like that but, OK, it works.”

    Sinner was barely troubled as he defeated Alexander Bublik 6-1 7-5 6-0 and became the first Italian man to reach six Grand Slam semi-finals.

    The 23-year-old, who served a three-month doping ban before returning to action in Rome last month, raced through the first set after twice breaking the Kazakh, who had stunned fifth seed Jack Draper in the previous round.

    Looking to become the first man representing Kazakhstan to defeat a world number one, Bublik, who hit 37 drop shots against Draper, pulled out this weapon again in the second set.

    Sinner broke and held to take it before the 27-year-old Bublik, ever the entertainer, delighted fans with an underarm serve but ultimately could do nothing to stop the Italian’s march into the last four.

    BOISSON SPARKLES

    Earlier Boisson became the toast of France after staging the tournament’s biggest upset with a 7-6(6) 6-3 win over Andreeva, who had been tipped as a title contender, in an electrifying match that had the home crowd on the edge of their seats.

    The 22-year-old had stunned third seed Jessica Pegula in round four, but on Wednesday pulled off another major shock, beating Andreeva, who had not lost a set in the tournament.

    “Every player dreams of winning a Slam – and for a French player, Roland Garros even more so. I’ll go for it because my dream is to win the final, not the semi-final,” Boisson said.

    Andreeva, the 18-year-old sixth seed who was bidding to become the youngest female player to reach back-to-back French Open semi-finals in nearly three decades, quickly found herself chasing Boisson’s fierce forehand.

    The underdog, who has been a breath of fresh air in the tournament with her no-nonsense power game and down-to-earth approach, looked to have run out of steam as Andreeva went 3-0 up but she proceeded to win the next six consecutive games.

    Andreeva repeatedly lost her temper and was handed a warning when she fired a ball into the stands in frustration.

    With the home crowd the loudest it had been since the start, chants of ‘Lois, Lois’ echoed across the Philippe Chatrier court, with the decibel level lifted even further because the roof was closed due to rain.

    Boisson, who will jump almost 300 places in the rankings next week, will face 2023 U.S. Open champion Coco Gauff, who came out on top in an error-ridden quarter-final against Australian Open champion Madison Keys with the pair littering the court with 101 unforced errors.

    UNFORCED ERRORS

    With a total of 49 unforced errors in the first set alone they both struggled to hold serve and Gauff, a semi-finalist in Paris last year, wasted a set point before Keys, who reached the French Open last four in 2018, edged ahead with a tiebreak win.

    Gauff, who reached the final in 2022 and is the youngest woman to claim 25 main-draw wins at Roland Garros since Martina Hingis (1995-2000), bounced back to win the next two sets.

    “So many unforced errors,” Gauff, who also had 10 double faults, said to herself after sinking another easy baseline shot into the net.

    “I was just trying to be aggressive,” the 21-year-old Gauff said. “Usually if you’re playing too passive, in the end the more aggressive player is going to win. I knew in the second and the third that I had to try my best.”

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI China: 18 states elected into UN Economic and Social Council for three-year term

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Philemon Yang (L), president of the UN General Assembly, presides over a meeting to elect members of the UN Economic and Social Council at the UN headquarters in New York, on June 4, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Eighteen states, including China, were elected on Wednesday into the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the coordinating body for the economic and social work of UN agencies and funds, for a three-year term.

    Philemon Yang, president of the General Assembly, announced the results after voting by secret ballot in the assembly.

    Elected were Burundi, Chad, Mozambique, Sierra Leone from African states; China, India, Lebanon, Turkmenistan from Asia-Pacific states; Croatia, Russia, Ukraine from Eastern European states; Ecuador, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis from Latin America and Caribbean states; Australia, Finland, Norway, Türkiye from Western European and other states.

    They were elected for a three-year term beginning on Jan. 1, 2026.

    Russia failed to obtain the two-thirds majority needed for election in the first round of the voting. It won in a restrictive round against Belarus.

    In a by-election for rotation within the Western European and other states group, Germany was elected for a one-year term beginning on Jan. 1, 2026. It will replace Liechtenstein. The United States was elected for a two-year term beginning on Jan. 1, 2026. It will replace Italy.

    ECOSOC has 54 members, which are elected each year by the General Assembly for overlapping three-year terms. Seats on the council are allocated on the basis of geographical representation with 14 seats to African states, 11 to Asia-Pacific states, six to Eastern European states, 10 to Latin American and Caribbean states, and 13 to Western Europe and other states. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Getting away with it … sort of. How a dictator and a fugitive Nazi advanced international human rights law

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Olivera Simic, Associate Professor in Law, Griffith University

    Pinochet and Rauff? They were alike. Each had two faces. One gentle, the other hard. They were joined.

    And they both got away with it … Sort of.

    Philippe Sands loves to tell stories. A master of historical non-fiction, he has become known for his unique blend of deeply personal, legal and historical narratives, which weave together incredible coincidences with moving stories of human courage in the face of mass atrocities and horror.

    Sands is a leading practitioner of international law, a professor at University College London, an author, a playwright, and the recipient of numerous literary awards. He is also someone whose family was murdered in the vortex of the Holocaust in Ukraine.

    With his previous two books, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (2016) and The Ratline: Love, Lies and Justice on the Trail of a Nazi Fugitive (2020), he demonstrated his unique skill in presenting complex legal cases to avid readers.

    His latest book, 38 Londres Street: On Impunity, Pinochet in England and a Nazi in Patagonia, rounds out the trilogy.

    If it weren’t based on facts, one might think it was a brilliantly crafted thriller.


    Review: 38 Londres Street: On Impunity, Pinochet in England and a Nazi in Patagonia – Philippe Sands (Weidenfeld & Nicolson)


    38 Londres Street weaves together several narratives, but at its heart is the story of the legal attempts to end impunity for two accused criminals. One is Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. The other is Walther Rauff, a former SS officer who fled to South America and allegedly worked with Pinochet’s Secret Intelligence Service.

    Sands brings these two men into a single narrative to highlight the legal struggle against impunity for mass atrocities, though he never loses sight of the victims and their human stories of suffering, courage and persistence.

    These were people whose lives were abruptly and violently taken. Sands includes many of their names and tragic fates in his book. He informs his readers that the Cementerio Sara Braun in Punta Arenas, Chile, has a memorial bearing the names of Pinochet’s many victims. He clearly wants these individuals never to be forgotten.

    Universal jurisdiction and the Pinochet precedent

    The building at 38 Londres Street in Santiago was once a site of pain. At this secret interrogation centre, one of many across Santiago and the rest of Chile, Pinochet’s agents imprisoned, tortured, executed and disappeared tens of thousands of people deemed leftists, socialists, communists or “other undesirables”.

    Pinochet came to power on September 11, 1973, overthrowing the democratically elected socialist government of President Salvador Allende in a military coup. He would rule Chile with an iron fist until 1990.

    Chile’s youth became the targets of his murderous regime. Sands notes that most victims were between 21 and 30 years old. The majority of them were workers; the rest mainly comprised academics, professionals and students. The atrocities were committed with impunity.

    Like all dictators, Pinochet believed himself untouchable. But in October 1998, while visiting the UK, he was arrested in London. Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón was seeking Pinochet’s extradition to Spain in order to try him for human rights abuses.

    Garzón was acting under the then-controversial legal principle of universal jurisdiction, which allows courts in one country to prosecute grave human rights violations committed outside its borders, regardless of the nationality of the accused.

    Never before had a former head of state of one country been arrested by, and in another, for committing international crimes.

    Sands would become involved in one of the most famous cases in international law since the Nuremberg trials more than 50 years earlier. Pinochet’s lawyers offered him an opportunity to participate in the case, arguing for the former dictator’s immunity as a former head of state. His wife threatened to divorce him if he accepted.

    He declined the offer. Instead, Sands represented Human Rights Watch when the Pinochet case was considered by the Law Lords.

    Pinochet had been indicted for crimes against humanity and genocide. At issue was the question of whether Pinochet, as a former head of state, had immunity before the English courts for acts committed in another country while he was in office. Should there be a legal protection for former dictators?

    The proceedings in London were novel and remarkable, writes Sands, because this was an open legal question when Pinochet was arrested. His arrest raised an unprecedented issue: was there an exception to the rule of immunity for a former head of state when a crime in international law was involved? And did the exception apply before a national court, rather than an international one?


    Many believed Pinochet’s immunity should be lifted and extradition proceedings should go ahead, so that he could answer for the deaths of Spanish nationals and others. If that did not happen, it was argued, the travesty of justice would signal that any dictator could get away with genocide. As Sands writes, immunity and impunity often go hand in hand.

    In this landmark case, Pinochet was stripped of the immunity from prosecution he had enjoyed as a former president. He was ordered to stand trial on charges of human rights abuses.

    For the next 16 months, he remained in the UK, awaiting extradition to Spain. But it never happened. The initial judgement on immunity was quashed, due to concerns about possible bias of one of the judges. The case returned to square one. New hearings took place.

    In January 2000, the UK eventually decided not to proceed with extradition, claiming that Pinochet was too ill to stand trial and that “it would not be fair”. He was allowed to return to Chile as a free man, thanks to medical doctors rather than lawyers.

    Political leaders in Europe generally welcomed the ruling. Margaret Thatcher, former British prime minister and Pinochet’s longstanding ally, was adamant that the lengthy legal wrangle had been a waste of public money. Seemingly agitated, she said in front of the cameras:

    Senator Pinochet was a staunch friend of Britain throughout the Falklands War. His reward from this government was to be held prisoner for 16 months. In the meantime, his health has been broken, his reputation tarnished, and vast funds of public money have been squandered on a political vendetta.

    Subsequent attempts to prosecute Pinochet in Chile were unsuccessful. He died in 2006 at the age of 91, without ever being tried for the human rights abuses that occurred while he was in power. Retributive justice, in the end, was not served. But Pinochet’s case opened the gates for efforts to bring other former and serving heads of state to justice.

    Today, the 38 Londres Street serves as a place of national memory where visitors can walk through its halls and learn about its dark past.

    The Nazi who invented the gas chambers

    Running parallel with Pinochet’s story is that of Nazi fugitive Walther Rauff.

    Rauff invented the mobile gas chambers that were precursors to the gas chambers in Nazi concentration camps. At the end of the second world war, he escaped to South America, settling in Chile. Germany made numerous attempts to have Rauff extradited to face charges, but the Chilean government refused these demands. He spent his days in the backwaters of Patagonia, running a king-crab cannery business.

    Sands travels to Patagonia and meets people who remember Rauff, whose identity seems to have been common knowledge among his neighbours and co-workers: “everyone knew rumours and stories of his past”; they knew about “the gas vans” and that he “once killed many people”. But no one seemed to be bothered. They describe Rauff as “cultivated and kind”. To many of Sands’ interlocutors, the stories about Rauff “were long ago and far away”.

    While dealing with the failed attempts for his extradition, Rauff put his energies into “harvesting crabs, making sure the tins were packed tight, [and] managing the workers”. He continued to do so, enjoying the company of his dog Bobby, when Pinochet became Chile’s new leader.

    Pinochet was an old friend. Sands records that the two men met in the 1950s in Quito, Ecuador, where Rauff was staying, having fled an Italian prison camp at the end of the war. The men shared a contempt for communism and an affinity for German culture. Pinochet encouraged Rauff to move to Chile.

    Rauff delighted in Pinochet’s murderous regime. Sands tell us that Pinochet used Rauff’s “expertise” to help with the murder and disappearance of thousands of people. But the controversy over whether Rauff worked for the Chilean military, becoming “chief advisor” to its intelligence services, or perhaps even its “head”, remains unresolved. Definitive and provable evidence about the assistance Rauff may have given to Pinochet was never obtained.

    Holding dictators to account

    One of the many coincidences Sands stumbles upon is that Rauff lived in Punta Arenas in southern Chile on a street called “Jugoslavija”, named after the country where I was born, which disintegrated in the 1990s in a brutal civil war marked by mass atrocities and genocide.

    Former Yugoslavian and Serbian president Slobodan Milošević would become the first-ever serving head of state to be charged with international crimes and extradited to an international court.

    Milošević was extradited to The Hague in 2001 after he was indicted for war crimes committed in Kosovo and Croatia, and for genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina following an order from the Serbian government. His trial is widely hailed as a landmark moment in the development of international criminal law, though he died in his cell before his trial ended, dying “innocent” like his counterparts Pinochet and Rauff.

    Slobodan Milošević in The Hague, July 2001.
    Robert Goddyn, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

    In 38 Londres Street, Sands brings to light the behind-the-scenes struggles to hold Pinochet and Rauff accountable. The book explores the intricacies and politics of international law. Despite its bitter ending, Pinochet’s case remains one of the most far reaching and important in the field of human rights. It caused other countries to reflect on their own legal immunities.

    As a researcher and academic, I found the book significant because it also offers insight into what it takes to conduct such expansive archival and qualitative research. Over several years, “in between work and life”, Sands travels to different corners of the globe and speaks to informants from all walks of life, including descendants of the perpetrators. He visits the sites of the events he recounts, most of them places marked by pain. He seeks to see and feel a past that still lingers.

    His method requires stamina, passion and unwavering diligence. His strong commitment to neutrality, decency and impartiality makes him stand out not only as a highly skilled writer, but a survivor who continues to unpack and share the legacy of the Holocaust. There is much to respect and learn from in Sands’ account, not least about the intricacies of writing a compelling story.

    Holding dictators to account is hard. Pinochet and Rauff deprived victims of the retributive justice they needed and deserved. Yet justice and reparations have many different meanings. They can be symbolic too, and still profoundly meaningful to victims. As one of the survivors of Pinochet’s regime replied to Sands when asked whether he believed his case was one of total impunity: “Not quite total […] Dawson [an island detention camp] has been recognised as a site of national memory, a protected monument, and that means something.”

    Pinochet and Rauff were never convicted, but they were not free. Pinochet spent years under house arrest, bitter and devastated, unable to walk the streets. Rauff lived in constant fear of being arrested and extradited. They were both haunted. This, after all, may have brought some satisfaction to the victims.

    Sands was once asked: “Do you believe in justice?” He replied: “Sort of.” Sands comes to understand that justice is “uneven in its delivery”. He has learned “to tamper expectations”. Maybe we all need to learn that skill from him too. Ultimately, justice remains a work-in-progress, just like the process of learning from a dark past.

    Olivera Simic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Getting away with it … sort of. How a dictator and a fugitive Nazi advanced international human rights law – https://theconversation.com/getting-away-with-it-sort-of-how-a-dictator-and-a-fugitive-nazi-advanced-international-human-rights-law-257241

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Kosovo Draws SDR 80.122 million Under the Stand-By Arrangement

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 4, 2025

    Washington, DC: Following the successful conclusion of Stand-by (SBA) and Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements on May 24, 2025, the Kosovo authorities have made use of SDR 80.122 million (€96.22 million) available under the SBA, approved on May 25, 2023.

    The authorities will use the drawing to build buffers against potential shortfalls in external financing in a context of heightened uncertainty, as foreshadowed in their Letter of Intent of April 30, 2025 (see IMF Country Report No. 2025/112).

    Kosovo’s SBA and RSF arrangements provided access to SDR 80.122 million (€96.22 million, 97 percent of quota) and to SDR 61.95 million (€74.39 million, 75 percent of quota) respectively, to support Kosovo’s economic policies. Together with the SBA drawdown and already disbursed RSF resources, Kosovo will have outstanding IMF credit of SDR 142.07 million (€170.61 million).

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/04/pr25181-kosovo-draws-sdr-80-million-under-the-stand-by-arrangement

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Europe Subcommittee Chairman Self Delivers Opening Remarks at Hearing on NATO

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-321-9747

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Europe Subcommittee Chairman Keith Self delivered opening remarks at a subcommittee hearing titled, “Assessing the Challenges Facing NATO.”

    Watch Here

    -Remarks-

    The purpose of this hearing is to provide members with an informed perspective of the U.S. policy toward NATO and an opportunity to discuss NATO’s trajectory in advance of the June summit in The Hague. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

    The Hague will be focused on funding for NATO, This first chart […] shows the NATO nations. They, they are listed top to bottom by GDP. They are listed on the right side by the percentage that they provide.

    Of course, the U.S. is at the top with Almost $29 trillion in GDP then you go down to Germany, UK, France, Italy, Canada, and Spain. Down here you’ve got the frontline countries you’ve got Lithuania, you’ve got Latvia, you’ve got Estonia. Uh, some of the Balkan countries are down below. The ones that I want to point out. The summit tells us that they are going to be going above 3% somewhere.

    I want to point out right here we have got some the major economies in NATO — specifically France, Italy, Canada [and Spain] — that are well below […] their current 2% commitment. These are major economies. This is a major change that needs to happen at the summit.

     Now just a couple of comparisons. This compares Poland to everyone else on the Eastern Flank, the eastern flank being defined as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Poland has a GDP of about 840 billion dollars, eastern flank is 890, so they’re not dissimilar. The defense budgets are quite a bit disimilar.

    Their percentage though Poland is at over 4% currently and going higher. The Eastern Flank is a 2.36 and going higher and has already committed to go higher.

    And one more just to give you an idea of where the funding in NATO. stands, this is Germany versus the Eastern Flank, so we’ve added Poland to the East of Germany. So Germany has the 4.6, the Eastern Flank has 1.7. Here are the defense budgets. The Eastern Flank is providing a higher percentage than Germany is.

    So, my point in all of these three slides is [that] there is work to do in the summit later this month. Now I know that people have made commitments, but what you just saw were 2024, the last year we had a full year’s funding toward NATO. That is, that is a major problem that I wanted to highlight. We’ve got other issues in this, in this briefing, but that’s the one that I wanted to start with. The first thing we have to start with is everyone pulling their weight in NATO.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Bulgaria meets criteria to join the euro area on 1 January 2026

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Brussels, 04 Jun 2025 Today, the European Commission concluded that Bulgaria is ready to adopt the euro as of 1 January 2026 – a key milestone that would make it the twenty-first Member State to join the euro area.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report – A10-0100/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report

    (2024/2078(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

     having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

     having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

     having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[1] (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[2] (the Common Provisions Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[3] (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014[4],

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

     having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

     having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

     having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

     having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

     having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

     having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States[6];

     having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded[9],

     having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU[10],

     having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[11],

     having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[13],

     having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’[14],

     having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092[15],

     having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report[16],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[17],

     having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU[18],

     having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society[19],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas[20],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe[21],

     having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling[22],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report[23],

     having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)[24],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021[25],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded[26],

     having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia[27],

     having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia[28],

     having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU[29],

     having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP[30],

     having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union[31],

     having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe[32],

     having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’[33],

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[34],

     having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds[35],

     having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware[36] ,

     having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland[37],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists[38],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (COM(2023)0051),

     having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023[39],

     having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime[40],

     having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications[41],

     having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

     having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

     having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

     having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

     having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

     having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

     having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)[42],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

    A. whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

    B. whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected[43],[44]; whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

    C. whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

    D. whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

    E. whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

    F. whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

    Independence of the judiciary

    1. Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

    2. Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

    3. Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges   essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

    4. Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

    5. Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice;

    6. Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

    7. Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

    8. Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States[45] and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

    9. Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

    10. Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

    11. Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

    12. Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

    13. Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

    14. Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

    15. Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

    16. Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive[46] to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

    17. Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

    18. Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

    19. Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

    Anti-corruption framework

    20. Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

    21. Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

    22. Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

    23. Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

    24. Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

    25. Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation[47] and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law[48] in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

    26. Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

    27. Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

    28. Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

    29. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

    30. Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking; acknowledges the agreement on establishing the Interinstitutional Body for Ethical Standards;

    31. Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

    Media pluralism and freedom

    32. Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)[49] and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

    33. Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive[50], as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

    34. Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings[51], and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

    35. Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

    36. Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

    37. Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes; 

    38. Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act[52] (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

    39. Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

    40. Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

    41. Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343[53] on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

    42. Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

    Civil society organisations (CSOs)

    43. Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

    44. Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)[54] and civil society networks[55]; reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

    45. Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups[56];

    46. Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

    47. Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

    48. Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

    49. Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

    50. Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States[57] and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

    Equality and non-discrimination before the law

    51. Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

    52. Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC[58] on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive[59] and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

    53. Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

    54. Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    55. Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

    56. Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC[60] in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings[61] of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

    57. Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

    58. Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

    59. Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

    60. Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500[62] and Directive 2024/1499[63], which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

    61. Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

    62. Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

    63. Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)[64]; urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

    64. Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

    65. Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

    Single market and the rule of law

    66. Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

    67. Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

    68. Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

    69. Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

    70. Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

    71. Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

    72. Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

    Rule of law toolbox

    73. Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

    74. Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

    75. Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

    76. Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law[65], not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

    77. Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

    78. Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

    79. Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

    Checks and balances

    80. Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

    81. Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

    82. Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

    83. Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act[66], the AI Act[67], Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising[68] and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

    84. Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

    85. Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

    86. Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

    87. Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms[69]; recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

    88. Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

    89. Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

    90. Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

    Horizontal recommendations

    91. Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

    92. Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

    93. Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    94. Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

    95. Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

    96. Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

    97. Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

    98. Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

    99. Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; reiterates the proposal to create a permanent group of eminent personalities (‘wise persons group’) composed of independent legal, academic and human rights experts, tasked with systematically monitoring rule of law developments in Member States and providing regular assessments, recommendations and early warnings to the Commission; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

    100. Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

    101. Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

    102. Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

    103. Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

    104. Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

    105. Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

    °

    ° °

    106. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Investments in defence and Romania’s budget deficit – P-002191/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-002191/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza (ECR)

    The European Union has approved the creation of the SAFE instrument, the EUR 150 billion European arms fund that will support those Member States that wish to invest in defence industrial production through common procurement. This initiative is welcome in the current geopolitical context.

    However, since Romania has been in the excessive debt procedure (over 3 % of GDP) for four years and Romania had an ESA (standard used in the European Union) budget deficit of 9.2 % of GDP in 2024:

    • 1.How does the European Commission intend to harmonise the implementation of the SAFE programme with the situation of Member States with a major budget deficit, such as Romania, so that access to financing to strengthen defence capacities does not deepen national fiscal imbalances?
    • 2.In view of the high level of the budget deficit estimated for Romania (8.6 % of GDP in 2025), what concrete instruments is the European Commission making available to support Romania in its efforts to strengthen national defence, without compromising macroeconomic stability?
    • 3.What opportunities for financing or participation in European defence programmes are available to Romania in the context of other security initiatives, which do not entail new sovereign loans and can contribute to the development of defence industrial capacities?

    Submitted: 2.6.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Concerns regarding integrity mechanisms for EPPO national representatives – E-001356/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is independent from the Commission. The Commission is not involved in the administrative inquiry concerning the European Prosecutor from Bulgaria, nor in the vetting or the assessment of the asset disclosure requirements of the members of the EPPO, for which the EPPO is responsible in accordance with the relevant rules and procedures.

    The Commission is evaluating the implementation and impact of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 (‘EPPO Regulation’)[1], as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of the EPPO and its working practices. The evaluation report is due in 2026.

    In this context, the Commission will also assess whether the existing measures to strengthen integrity checks, transparency and asset verification for EPPO staff are sufficient.

    The cooperation between the EPPO and national authorities will be covered by the same evaluation. In addition, the Commission has been receiving from the EPPO, since 2023 and on an annual basis, a contribution on the cooperation between the national authorities and the EPPO in the context of the annual Rule of Law Cycle.

    This information will feed into the evaluation of the EPPO Regulation and the EPPO’s effectiveness, efficiency and working practices.

    • [1] Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1-71.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Supporting East Macedonia and Thrace in the face of the demographic crisis – E-001062/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission recognises the challenge of population decline and encourages Member States to develop integrated policies to manage demographic change.

    The Commission’s Demographic Toolbox provides a set of tools that can support Member States and regions in these efforts. As part of the Demographic Toolbox, the Talent Booster Mechanism is targeted towards EU regions that are experiencing a decline in their working-age population and that are affected by the departure of young people. The EU Long-term Vision for Rural Areas also includes strategies to address demographic decline.

    Cohesion Policy is committed to reducing disparities between regions in different Member States, including Greece, ensuring inter alia that people can effectively stay in the place they call home.

    Some EUR 639 million has been allocated to the regional programme for Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, aimed among others at fostering entrepreneurship, strengthening education and social care infrastructure, and promoting the region’s natural and cultural heritage to boost the region’s attractiveness. These investments will create jobs and upgrade public infrastructure, improving quality of life of residents.

    Additionally, the region benefits from a programme under the European Social Fund Plus aimed at boosting employment. It improves job access and activation measures for all jobseekers, focusing on youth, the long-term unemployed, disadvantaged groups in the labour market, and inactive people.

    The program also promotes self-employment and the social economy with a budget of EUR 12.75 million. Current actions include supporting enterprises in hiring highly qualified unemployed individuals and helping unemployed people start businesses.

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Public Schedule – May 29, 2025

    Source: United States Department of State (4)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    ***THE DAILY PUBLIC SCHEDULE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE***

    SECRETARY MARCO RUBIO

    9:30 a.m. Secretary Rubio meets with North Macedonia Foreign Minister Timčo Mucunski at the Department of State.
    (CAMERA SPRAY AT THE TOP)
    Call time for video cameras, still cameras and writers is 9:00 a.m. from the 23rd Street entrance.

    DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER LANDAU

    Deputy Secretary Landau attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

    DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES MICHAEL J. RIGAS

    Deputy Secretary Rigas attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

    SENIOR OFFICIAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS LISA KENNA

    Senior Official Kenna attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

    BRIEFING SCHEDULE

    1:45 p.m. Department Press Briefing with Spokesperson Tammy Bruce. 
    (OPEN PRESS COVERAGE)
    The Department Press Briefing will be streamed live on the Department homepage and YouTube Channel.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Travelling Gallery’s 2025 tour continues with SEEDLINGS: Diasporic Imaginaries

    Source: Scotland – City of Edinburgh

    Continuing Travelling Gallery’s 2025 programme is a group exhibition exploring ways to connect with our worlds through other-than-human perspectives. Challenging the boundaries between culture and nature, the exhibition looks to destabilise colonial systems, categories, and hierarchies, that tend to favour scientific theory and marginalise ancestral knowledges and indigenous cosmologies.

    Curated with Jelena Sofronijevic, and featuring work by artists Emii Alrai, Iman Datoo, Remi Jabłecki, Radovan Kraguly, Zeljko Kujundzic, Leo Robinson, and Amba Sayal-Bennett, the exhibition brings together a variety of contemporary artistic practices, including drawing, printmaking, sculpture and film, that reimagine our collective understandings and visions of places and times.

    Common across the works in the exhibition is the use of the seed as a means to think about and connect themes concerning ecologies, environments, and migration. For some, the seed represents a world of its own, a self-contained body or cell, capable of crossing borders. For others, it serves as a starting point for alternative possibilities and ways of being. Many of the artists have researched specific seeds, in their ‘native’ soils, and displaced in banks and libraries. The potato is offered as an incidental ‘root’ to many of their works. In the film, Kinnomic Botany (2022), Iman Datoo draws upon research in the Commonwealth Potato Collection at the James Hutton Institute near Dundee, the UK’s largest collection of potato seeds, to challenge dominant taxonomies or ways of classifying lives.

    More speculative connections can be made between Remi Jabłecki and Radovan Kraguly’s practices. The former’s futuristic sculptures remind us of the otherworldly, even alien qualities of these most earthly and everyday British crops, with the artist using them as a means to think about transformation and personal growth. Kraguly’s prints,though as detailed as scientific and botanical illustrations, are similarly cosmic, avoiding categorisation in their ambiguous representations and titles. Reflecting on relations of control between humans and nature, his works also illustrate the role of different pastoral and agricultural environments in the formation of the artist’s own identity and early adoption of ‘climate politics’, connecting his formative experiences growing up on a farm in the former Yugoslavia, to his later practice in rural Wales.

    Amba Sayal-Bennett’s architectural sculptures Kern (2024) and Phlo (2024) are part of the artist’s investigations into rubber, a commodity once so highly demanded its value surpassed that of silver. In a mission facilitated by the British government, Henry Wickham stole and trafficked 70,000 rubber seeds from the Amazon rainforest in Brazil in 1876. Transported to Kew Gardens in London, they were then dispersed to British colonies for cultivation. Its plural uses and potential for profit led to its proliferation across the globe – yet the soil in India refused to take the seeds, which the artist puts forward as a form of environmental resistance to the colonial project. Artist Emii Alrai, by contrast, focusses on excavation, exploring archaeology, Western museological structures, and the complex process of ruination.

    Scotland has proved fertile land for many of the artists’ practices, yet, for some, SEEDLINGS presents the first opportunity to experience their works in these contexts. Born in Subotica, Yugoslavia (now Serbia), Zeljko Kujundzic lived and worked in Edinburgh between 1948 and 1958, before moving with his partner and frequent collaborator, Ann, and their children, to British Columbia (BC). His developed, complex work in ceramic sculpture, often featuring the thunderbird, a mythological bird-like spirit widespread in North American indigenous and First Nation cultures and storytelling, is deeply rooted in these early experiences. Yet his part in Edinburgh’s growing artistic community, and work with artists and writers like Ian Hamilton Finlay, Nannie Katharin Wells, Bernard Leach, and Joan Faithfull, has, thus far, been walked over, in more conventional art histories. A selection of archive materials concerning his invention of the solar kiln, unearthed from public and private collections across the UK and Canada, are presented here for the first time – the exhibition itself seeking to germinate future research.

    The exhibition will also include a newly commissioned essay, How does a tree fit inside a seed?, exploring the artists’ works, both individually, and as constellated in the exhibition, by the curator Jelena Sofronijevic. The text journeys through the construction and overlapping uses of terms like ‘native’ and, ‘invasive’, ‘indigenous’, ‘naturalisation’, and ‘dispersal’, to challenge binaries between beings, and consider ideas of home, identity, and belonging in the context of diasporas.
    Launching in Edinburgh on Calton Hill (outside the Collective Gallery) on Friday 6 June from 11am to 5pm, the exhibition will tour to arts venues, community centres, high streets and schools across Scotland including in the Western Isles, Glasgow, Falkirk,Clackmannanshire, North Lanarkshire, Scottish Borders before culminating at Edinburgh Art Festival in August.

    It is accompanied by a series of interventions on social media, highlighting the artists’ connections to the places of our tour, and a number of talks, tours, and workshops, including with artist Leo Robinson.

    Details of confirmed tour dates and venues can be found on the Travelling Gallery website. 

    Louise Briggs, Curator, Travelling Gallery said:

    It has been a real pleasure to work with Jelena Sofronijevic on this exhibition and to be introduced to the work of a number of artists, many of whom have interesting connections to Edinburgh and Scotland through their work & research as well as their personal & professional lives. This exhibition continues to explore our annual theme looking at The Environment and Climate Emergency. We hope SEEDLINGS will offer visitors a new way of thinking about our relationship with, and connection to nature and may encourage them to perhaps think about our worlds and our interconnectedness in different ways.

    Culture and Communities Convener Margaret Graham, said: 

    The Travelling Gallery is a unique and fantastic example of how art can and should be accessible for all. I’m delighted that, with our support, the Gallery has been able to remove barriers to art by taking powerful and thought-provoking exhibitions into communities across Scotland.

    This year’s exhibition not only invites us to engage with outstanding contemporary works but also encourages us to reflect on the world through different lenses. With such a talented group of artists involved, I encourage everyone to visit when the gallery sets off this week.

    Additional thanks go to: All of the exhibiting artists; Nena Kraguly; Family and Friends of Kujundzic; The City of Edinburgh Council; Creative Scotland; City Art Centre, Edinburgh; Government Art Collection; Ingleby Gallery; Carbon 12 Gallery; Palmer Gallery; and the University of British Columbia Library Rare Books and Special Collections, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
     
     
     

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: European Commission approves Bulgaria’s transition to euro in 2026

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Brussels/Sofia, June 4 (Xinhua) — Bulgaria has met the criteria to adopt the euro as of January 1, 2026, making it the 21st member of the eurozone, the European Commission (EC) announced on Wednesday.

    The conclusion of the Commission’s 2025 Convergence Report, prepared at Bulgaria’s request, confirms that the country meets the four nominal convergence criteria required for adoption of the euro. The assessment also took into account broader economic indicators such as market integration and the balance of payments. The findings were also supported by a parallel report from the European Central Bank (ECB).

    Based on the conclusion, the European Commission proposed that the EU Council adopt a decision and a regulation on the introduction of the euro in Bulgaria. The final decision should be taken by the EU Council in the first half of July after consultations with the Eurogroup, the European Council, the European Parliament and the ECB.

    “This brings Bulgaria one step closer to adopting the euro,” said EC President Ursula von der Leyen, adding that eurozone membership would strengthen the country’s economy through increased trade, investment and access to finance.

    Bulgarian Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov welcomed the positive assessment, calling it the result of years of reforms and coordination with other European partners. He is expected to make a formal statement later on Wednesday.

    Meanwhile, public opinion in Bulgaria remains divided on the issue. A recent poll by the Trend Research Center found that only 21 percent of respondents support switching to the euro in 2026, while 33 percent want to delay the introduction of the single currency and 38 percent reject the idea entirely. In recent weeks, protests have been held across the country demanding a referendum on keeping the national currency, the lev. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Exclusive: US tariffs add uncertainty for EU and Balkans – analyst

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    SARAJEVO, June 4 (Xinhua) — The U.S. proposal to impose tariffs on EU goods signals a broader shift in its policies and could cause significant damage to transatlantic economic ties, Adnan Huskic, an analyst and associate professor at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, told Xinhua in a recent interview.

    “This move reflects a simplistic approach to global trade and deep-rooted mistrust of Europe,” he said. “Such measures go beyond economics and demonstrate the continued abdication of the United States’ role in ensuring security on the European continent.”

    Although Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a member of the European Union, Huskic noted, it remains closely linked to EU countries, especially Germany, its main export market. “Any economic downturn in Germany or the EU will have serious side effects for Bosnia and the entire Western Balkans,” he said.

    A. Huskic also expressed concern about the fragmented response of the region to global changes. “The countries of the Western Balkans often act independently of each other and do not maintain strategic cooperation. Such fragmentation makes them vulnerable to global shocks, and ultimately they have to adapt to the dynamics created by the main players in this arena.”

    The change in the US approach to global interaction has created uncertainty among its partners, said A. Huskic, adding that the new reality is the United States, characterized by an inconsistent and unpredictable policy.

    “The rest of the world must stand firm in defense of free trade,” he added.

    The expert also pointed to Europe’s lag in emerging technologies and the need for reform. According to him, the EU is currently lagging behind in artificial intelligence and other innovative areas, and its economic model is in dire need of change.

    The EU must quickly reform and seek global partners with similar goals to become more autonomous and innovative, added A. Huskic. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: ECB reports on Bulgaria’s progress towards euro adoption

    Source: European Central Bank

    4 June 2025

    • ECB report assesses Bulgaria’s progress towards Economic and Monetary Union
    • Positive assessment with respect to possible euro adoption on 1 January 2026

    Bulgaria has made good progress towards economic convergence with the euro area since 2024, according to the Convergence Report of the European Central Bank (ECB) published today.

    “This positive assessment of convergence paves the way for Bulgaria to introduce the euro as of 1 January 2026 and become the 21st EU Member State to join the euro area,” said Philip R. Lane, Member of the ECB Executive Board. “I wish to congratulate Bulgaria on its tremendous dedication to making the adjustments needed.”

    According to the ECB’s assessment, Bulgaria is within the reference values of the convergence criteria and complies with the legal requirements. Having participated in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) and the banking union since 10 July 2020, Bulgaria has made another step towards European integration under challenging economic conditions. Achieving an environment that is conducive to sustainable convergence in Bulgaria requires stability-oriented economic policies and wide-ranging structural reforms. These policies are discussed in more detail in the report.

    As regards the price stability criterion, in April 2025, the 12-month average rate of HICP inflation in Bulgaria stood at 2.7%, i.e. just below the reference value of 2.8% (Chart 1). The reference value is based on the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability, i.e. Ireland (1.2%), Finland (1.3%) and Italy (1.4%), taking their average inflation over the past 12 months and adding 1.5 percentage points.

    Chart 1

    HICP inflation and reference value

    (annual percentage changes)

    Sources: European Commission (Eurostat) and ECB calculations.
    Notes: 12-month moving average rounded to one decimal.

    Regarding the fiscal criterion, Bulgaria has not been subject to an excessive deficit procedure since 2012. The country’s general government budget deficit stood at 3.0% of GDP in 2024, i.e. at the level of the 3% reference value (Chart 2). Its general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 24.1%, i.e. well below the 60% reference value, and it has been well below 60% of GDP for the past 20 years.

    Chart 2

    General government balance and debt

    (as a percentage of GDP)

    Sources: European System of Central Banks and European Commission (Eurostat).

    As regards the exchange rate criterion, the Bulgarian lev participated in ERM II in the two-year reference period from 20 May 2023 to 19 May 2025. Over the reference period, the lev did not exhibit any deviation from the central rate of 1.95583 levs per euro. Bulgaria has completed almost all of its ERM II post-entry commitments, but further progress is needed to address the outstanding shortcomings in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.

    Long-term interest rates in Bulgaria stood at 3.9%, on average, over the reference period from May 2024 to April 2025 and were therefore below the 5.1% reference value for the interest rate convergence criterion.

    As for the compatibility of national legislation, Bulgarian law is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, as required under Article 131 of the Treaty.

    Today’s report was published following Bulgaria’s request, the next regular Convergence Report of the ECB will be published in 2026.

    For media queries, please contact Benoit Deeg, tel.: +49 172 1683704.

    Notes

    • European Commission Convergence Report 2025
    • Close cooperation established between ECB and Bulgaria
    • The Convergence Report of the ECB reviews the economic and legal convergence of non-euro area EU Member States with a derogation every second year or at the request of a specific country. It assesses the degree of sustainable economic convergence with the euro area, whether the national legislation is compatible with the EU legal framework, and whether the statutory requirements are fulfilled for the respective national central banks. Given its “opt-out” clause, Denmark is not covered by this assessment unless this is specifically requested by the country.
    • The cut-off date for the statistics included in this Convergence Report was 19 May 2025. The reference period for the price stability criterion and the long-term interest rate criterion is from May 2024 to April 2025. Forecasts are based on the European Commission’s Spring 2025 Economic Forecast and other information relevant to a forward-looking assessment of the sustainability of convergence.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: GPDRR 2025 highlights: Tuesday 3 June 2025

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    The human cost of disasters includes lost livelihoods, homes, and cultural ties to landscapes. Where livelihoods are already fragile and being eroded, a disaster-induced displacement of even a few days can damage economic opportunities for years to come. So, the human dimension of recovery remains central to discussions as delegates convened for a second day in several preparatory events for the 8th Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (GPDRR), namely: the World Resilient Recovery Conference, the Third Stakeholder Forum on DRR, and the Global Early Warning for All Multistakeholder Forum (EW4All).

    The GPDRR official programme was launched with a high-level roundtable event at lunchtime and a formal opening ceremony in the afternoon, followed by an official reception.

    Official programme

    Opening

    Kamal Kishore, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction, and head of UNDRR, opened the event highlighting the exceptional urgency and importance of delivering on the Sendai Framework. He underscored how communities were coming together and the need to learn from their initiatives, imagination, and resourcefulness, and called for commitment from all actors.

    Recalling the recent loss of a Swiss village to a glacier landslide, Amina J. Mohammed, United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, commented that “early warning saves lives but cannot save glaciers from disappearing.” She stressed that disasters and their cascading effects annually cost up to USD 3.2 trillion and noted that record-breaking disasters make entire regions uninsurable. She called for risk-informed development across all sectors; scaled-up public and private investments in resilience; and national financial frameworks that align with adaptation needs.

    Ignazio Cassis, Minister, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, observed that, “Risk today is everywhere. Fires are where wetlands were centuries ago.” Noting that the GPDRR2025 is the last Global Platform before the 2030 deadline, he urged that countries deliver on the Sendai Framework, apply science and artificial intelligence, and adopt risk mitigation metrics to mobilize and foster resources.

    Amina J. Mohammed, UN Deputy Secretary-General.

    After a musical performance on the Hang Drum and a choreographed presentation by Sendai4Youth, Patricia Danzi, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, opened the Eighth Session of the GPDRR.

    Enhancing national DRR governance by 2030—A dialogue among national platforms for DRR

    In opening remarks to this high-level event, Kishore observed that the risk landscape platform is becoming increasingly complex. He recommended strengthening national DRR platforms and embedding risk reduction into national policies and frameworks; ensuring sustainable and predictable finance with policies matching sustainable long-term plans; and having a common risk assessment framework to support national entities with proper data and analytics.

    Speaking on behalf of the host country, Franziska Schmid, Swiss National Platform for Natural Hazards (PLANAT), described the work of PLANAT and highlighted challenges, including overlapping reporting mechanisms and strategies among national government entities focused on resilience. She stressed the importance of addressing duplication, developing appropriate tools, such as hazard maps and building permits, and ensuring crisis management provisions are actually functional.

    Discussions then followed in a roundtable format, moderated by Paola Albrito, UNDRR. Albrito invited delegates to: describe the demonstrated impact of their National Platforms for DRR, share lessons learned, identify remaining gaps in DRR governance, and highlight ways and opportunities to boost Sendai Framework implementation by 2030.

    View of the room during the Dialogue Among National Platforms for DRR.

    In their interventions, many called for collaboration among regional and country partners. Speakers included the Deputy Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tajikistan, as well as many ministers and high-level government representatives. They highlighted lessons and challenges, including: enhancing preparedness through strengthening and modernizing approaches; improving planning and promoting concrete analyses from real-life situations at the grassroots; and mobilizing adequate financing and developing technical expertise to adequately prepare communities.

    All interventions are recorded here.

    Third Stakeholder Forum on DRR

    The Stakeholder Forum continued its deliberations throughout the day, concluding in the afternoon with reflections by supporters and participants of the Stakeholder Engagement Mechanism.

    Spotlight session—Early warning for all

    Moderator Rebecca Murphy, Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR), invited the UNDRR Stakeholder Forum and the Multi-Stakeholder EW4All communities to combine efforts in crafting action points for the 2025 Global Platform on DRR.

    In the keynote, Gavin White, Risk-informed Early Action Partnership (REAP), summarized common themes in Early Warning, noting that: preparing for disasters is about inclusiveness, honest communication and trusting the person who is providing the guidance; and early warning systems (EWS) can act as a bridge overcoming the silo approaches among different DRR stakeholders. Panelists suggested that: while no system can predict with 100% certainty what shape hazards will take, it is crucial to build trust and understand local contexts; response planners should establish appropriate actions to follow early warnings; emergency systems must be tailored to communities’ experiences so that people can distinguish between different disasters and respond uniquely to each threat; both elderly and youth can inform EWS and response planning; and conflict zones require unique solutions that consider the fragility and power dynamics within communities.

    Bridging the gap: Critical media’s role in strengthening alerts and enhancing disaster preparedness

    Giacomo Mazzone, Media Saving Lives, moderated the session. Matthieu Rawolle, EBU Media Intelligence Service, shared examples of how terrestrial radio networks remained uninterrupted and accessible during disasters, and are used to inform the public and facilitate emergency response, especially when mobile phone and internet services are interrupted. He concluded that radio is an essential communication medium in times of crisis and requires investment.

    Raditya Jati, Deputy Minister of System and Strategy, National Disaster Management Authority, Indonesia, emphasized the need for media to go beyond reporting on casualties and housing collapse, and to incorporate education for people to prepare for disasters.

    Event rooms remained full throughout the day.

    Noting that UNDRR is the first UN agency that recognized media’s role in crises, Natalia Ilieva, Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union, described the Media Saving Lives collaboration between the World Broadcasting Unions and UNDRR that focuses on shifting media perspectives from reactive to proactive reporting, showing the real causes for disasters and instructing people on how to avoid harm. Grégoire Ndjaka, African Broadcasting Union, highlighted the reach of radio in Africa extending to places without electricity supply. Orengiye Fyneface, African Broadcasting Union, discussed trust challenges with journalism as a disaster information source in Africa, pointing to bureaucratic hurdles that prevent journalists from reaching scientists.

    Shaping a sustainable tomorrow: Aligning the Sendai Midterm Review with the Pact for the Future

    Abraham Bugre, University of Regina, moderated this session. In her opening remarks, Toni-Shae Freckleton, UNDRR, called for transitioning from short-term responses to long-term prevention. She stated that the Pact for the Future embeds DRR and resilience building.

    Juan Carlos Uribe Vega, United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) highlighted gaps in understanding localization and the importance of local-level governance. Jekulin Lipi Saikia, GNDR, called for a focus on listening to and working with communities, improving financial access, and increasing citizen science. Amber Fletcher, University of Regina, emphasized the role of community-driven actions, citizen science, and community engagement in reaching the diverse range of local voices. In the ensuing discussion, attendees identified communication disconnection, lack of funding, and localization among the persistent gaps between global networks and local realities.

    Closing session

    Tanjir Hossain, UNDRR Stakeholder Engagement Mechanism (SEM), moderated the closing session. Jamie Cummings, SEM, recalled her own experience of disaster when Hurricane Helene struck her hometown of Asheville, North Carolina. Describing how volunteers had operated a traditional Appalachian mule brigade to transport life-saving medications to mountain communities after roads were destroyed, she reflected that, “communities who know the land most, hold the solutions.” Martin Schuldes, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), stressed that “the substance and spirit” of the conference must translate into concrete action.

    Jilhane El Gaouzi, African Union Commission, urged all concerned to “be realistic and speed up implementation,” given that only five years remain until the Sendai Framework deadline.

    View of the panel during the Closing Session of the Stakeholder Forum.

    World Resilient Recovery Conference

    At the opening of this one-day event, Mutale Nalumongo, Vice-President, Zambia, highlighted Zambia’s promotion of climate-resilient agriculture through promotion of drought-tolerant crop varieties, access to weather-based insurance and investment in EWS, including advisories to farmers. Following further opening remarks by speakers, two plenaries and several thematic sessions took place during the day.

    Plenary 1—Taking stock of current recovery practices

    Carolina Fuentes Castellanos, Director, Santiago Network Secretariat, moderated the session.

    Sujit Mohanty, UNDRR, noted the high costs of reconstruction and the difficulties of countries that are perpetually in a state of recovery from one disaster after another, pointing to the need to address institutional fragmentation.

    Renato Umali Solidum, Jr., Department of Science and Technology, Philippines, advocated for greater cohesion between DRR and climate action as being “two sides of the same coin.” He called for transparent grant-based governance to reach at-risk commuities and address both slow-onset and sudden disasters.

    Leon Lundy, Minister of State Office, The Bahamas, highlighted the launch of The Bahamas’ National Disaster Risk Management Authority. He drew attention to the 2022 Act mandating public body disaster plans, including continuity plans, restoration timelines, and staff redeployment protocols to ensure essential services can be maintained or rapidly restored after a disaster.

    Krishna Swaroop Vatsa, National Disaster Management Authority, India, highlighted allocation of 30% of the Authority’s funds for recovery and reconstruction, which are released through an assessment-based process.

    Fuentes Castellanos offered countries the Secretariat’s support for structuring technical assistance requests.

    Plenary 2—From commitment to action: Leadership for resilient recovery

    Shivangi Chavda, GNDR, moderated the session.

    Guangzhe Chen, World Bank, described the World Bank’s recent transition to supporting infrastructure resilience efforts. He invited countries to access the Bank’s preparedness and response toolkit to strengthen their disaster reduction policies, citing recent examples from Malawi, Albania, and Madagascar.

    On financial instruments, panelists explored ways to distribute more rapid financial support, including through multi-dimensional approaches.

    On displacement following disasters, Rania Sharshr, International Organization for Migration (IOM), emphasized that one of the greatest needs of governments is access to reliable and accurate data on how displaced people have been impacted, and guidance on how to integrate these people into existing communities.

    The session concluded with the presentation of the Resilient Recovery Framework by Abhilash Panda, UNDRR.

    Thematic sessions

    Further sessions took place through the day. Besides the three sessions reported here, delegates took part in other Stakeholder Forum sessions on governance mechanisms, unlocking financial potential, housing reconstruction, and multi-hazard EWS.

    Restoring livelihood: Solutions for disaster-induced displacement and resilient recovery

    Mona Folkesson, UN Development Coordination Office (DCO), moderated the session.

    Emad Adly, Arab Network for Environment and Development, highlighted water scarcity as a key issue for the region and local-level coordination as a key challenge. Alexandra Bilak, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), cited experience from the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake in Nepal to show how livelihood erosion influences the severity of displacement.

    Ibrahim Osman Farah, Vice President, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia, described livelihood restoration during return and resettlement of internally displaced persons, through ensuring cultural access to land, water, schools, and income-generating opportunities as long-term resilience-based approaches.

    Tasneem Siddiqui, University of Dhaka, recounted how students were a driving force for the university’s Refugee and Migration Research Unit, which now has formed Adaptation Committees in many local areas and supports implementation of national policies on livelihood diversification and skills training. She urged treating displacement not as a humanitarian issue, but as a human rights one.

    Aslam Perwaiz, Executive Director, Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, emphasized skill development with local communities and SMEs to create livelihood options for displaced communities.

    Driving resilience: The critical role of private sector’s operational readiness for resilient recovery

    Moderator, Cedrick Moriggi, Corporate Chief Resilience Officer Network, emphasized connecting the corporate world with the UNDRR world. Ommid Saberi, International Finance Corporation, recommended investing in the “economics of families,” or small businesses, saying even small government incentives can mobilize large funds from the private sector. Dorothee Baumann-Pauly, University of Geneva, said human rights are the enablers for resilience. Jonathan Rake, Swiss Re Solutions, highlighted the need for the private sector to engage locally and to develop and combine social programmes with parametric solutions. Chris Ulatt, Octopus, said upfront investment to boost resilience is the right move, but observed that few investors will remain for the duration of an investment. Kerry Hinds, Department of Emergency Management, Barbados, described an audit tool to ascertain risks and priorities for public-private partnerships, noting the tool helps standardize and trigger business continuity protocols for disaster risk management.

    Turning experience into action: learning from large-scale disasters

    Dilanthi Amaratunga, Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System, moderated the session.

    Banak Joshua Dei Wal, South Sudan’s DRR Focal Point, highlighted the need to work together and identify risks for Sendai Framework implementation to be effective.

    Saini Yang, Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR), emphasized that China’s National Flood Prevention System has proven effective, with more than an 80% decrease in flood mortality rates over the last 20 years.

    Trevor Bhupsingh, Public Safety Canada, highlighted Canada’s Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements.

    Guy Gryspeert, Honeywell, defined resilience as the capability of preventing a crisis by having awareness and planning in place.

    Ali Hamza Pehlivan, Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), Türkiye, highlighted the usefulness of their National Disaster Response Plan during the 2023 earthquake. Makiko Ohashi, Cabinet Office of Japan, noted the utility of planning on the assumption that a mega-disaster may occur at any time and of reviewing DDR plans in the aftermath of disasters.

    Participants engage in discussions between sessions throughout the day.

    Global Early Warning for All (EW4All) Multistakeholder Forum

    After thematic sessions during the day, EW4All concluded its discussions. Gavin White, Risk-Informed Early Action Partnership, moderated the closing session. Panelists highlighted the importance of focusing on preparedness and developing trust, the need to shift perspectives toward a systemic approach to EWS, and the need to increase private funding.

    In closing remarks, Andrea Hermenejildo, Deputy Secretary General for Risk Management, Ecuador, stressed EWS is not only a technical issue, but also involves social justice. Paola Albrito, Director, UNDRR, emphasized that EW4All is both needed and achievable. Noting the central role of local communities, she underlined that resilience is built with communities.

    Doreen Bogdan-Martin, Secretary-General, International Telecommunication Union, underlined that scaling-up EWS requires partnerships and breaking silos across economic sectors, UN agencies and industries.

    Jagan Chapagain, Secretary-General, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), stressed that inclusive action and investment in EW4All is essential.

    Celeste Saulo, Secretary-General, World Meteorological Organization (WMO), stated that having EWS in just 108 countries is neither sufficient nor acceptable, and called for closing this “justice gap” by providing EWS worldwide and accelerating the transformation needed to protect every person on Earth.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: ECB reports on Bulgaria’s progress towards euro adoption

    Source: European Central Bank

    4 June 2025

    • ECB report assesses Bulgaria’s progress towards Economic and Monetary Union
    • Positive assessment with respect to possible euro adoption on 1 January 2026

    Bulgaria has made good progress towards economic convergence with the euro area since 2024, according to the Convergence Report of the European Central Bank (ECB) published today.

    “This positive assessment of convergence paves the way for Bulgaria to introduce the euro as of 1 January 2026 and become the 21st EU Member State to join the euro area,” said Philip R. Lane, Member of the ECB Executive Board. “I wish to congratulate Bulgaria on its tremendous dedication to making the adjustments needed.”

    According to the ECB’s assessment, Bulgaria is within the reference values of the convergence criteria and complies with the legal requirements. Having participated in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) and the banking union since 10 July 2020, Bulgaria has made another step towards European integration under challenging economic conditions. Achieving an environment that is conducive to sustainable convergence in Bulgaria requires stability-oriented economic policies and wide-ranging structural reforms. These policies are discussed in more detail in the report.

    As regards the price stability criterion, in April 2025, the 12-month average rate of HICP inflation in Bulgaria stood at 2.7%, i.e. just below the reference value of 2.8% (Chart 1). The reference value is based on the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability, i.e. Ireland (1.2%), Finland (1.3%) and Italy (1.4%), taking their average inflation over the past 12 months and adding 1.5 percentage points.

    Chart 1

    HICP inflation and reference value

    (annual percentage changes)

    Sources: European Commission (Eurostat) and ECB calculations.
    Notes: 12-month moving average rounded to one decimal.

    Regarding the fiscal criterion, Bulgaria has not been subject to an excessive deficit procedure since 2012. The country’s general government budget deficit stood at 3.0% of GDP in 2024, i.e. at the level of the 3% reference value (Chart 2). Its general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 24.1%, i.e. well below the 60% reference value, and it has been well below 60% of GDP for the past 20 years.

    Chart 2

    General government balance and debt

    (as a percentage of GDP)

    Sources: European System of Central Banks and European Commission (Eurostat).

    As regards the exchange rate criterion, the Bulgarian lev participated in ERM II in the two-year reference period from 20 May 2023 to 19 May 2025. Over the reference period, the lev did not exhibit any deviation from the central rate of 1.95583 levs per euro. Bulgaria has completed almost all of its ERM II post-entry commitments, but further progress is needed to address the outstanding shortcomings in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.

    Long-term interest rates in Bulgaria stood at 3.9%, on average, over the reference period from May 2024 to April 2025 and were therefore below the 5.1% reference value for the interest rate convergence criterion.

    As for the compatibility of national legislation, Bulgarian law is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, as required under Article 131 of the Treaty.

    Today’s report was published following Bulgaria’s request, the next regular Convergence Report of the ECB will be published in 2026.

    For media queries, please contact Benoit Deeg, tel.: +49 172 1683704.

    Notes

    • European Commission Convergence Report 2025
    • Close cooperation established between ECB and Bulgaria
    • The Convergence Report of the ECB reviews the economic and legal convergence of non-euro area EU Member States with a derogation every second year or at the request of a specific country. It assesses the degree of sustainable economic convergence with the euro area, whether the national legislation is compatible with the EU legal framework, and whether the statutory requirements are fulfilled for the respective national central banks. Given its “opt-out” clause, Denmark is not covered by this assessment unless this is specifically requested by the country.
    • The cut-off date for the statistics included in this Convergence Report was 19 May 2025. The reference period for the price stability criterion and the long-term interest rate criterion is from May 2024 to April 2025. Forecasts are based on the European Commission’s Spring 2025 Economic Forecast and other information relevant to a forward-looking assessment of the sustainability of convergence.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro – A10-0093/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro

    (2025/2020(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

     having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

     having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

     having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

     having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

     having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

     having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

     having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

     having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

     having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

     having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

     having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

     having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

     having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement[4],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[5],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B. whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D. whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G. whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2. Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3. Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4. Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5. Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6. Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7. Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8. Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9. Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10. Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11. Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12. Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13. Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14. Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights[6]; urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15. Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16. Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17. Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18. Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19. Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20. Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary,  and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21. Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22. Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23. Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24. Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25. Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26. Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27. Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28. Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29. Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30. Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31. Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32. Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33. Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34. Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35. Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36. Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37. Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38. Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39. Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40. Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41. Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42. Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44. Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45. Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46. Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47. Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48. Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49. Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51. Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53. Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54. Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55. Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56. Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58. Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59. Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60. Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61. Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62. Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63. Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

     

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    64. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: UNECE study identifies pathways for digital and green energy transition in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

    Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

    The transition to clean energy in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia necessitates a comprehensive overhaul of power systems, with investment needs estimated at $150 billion by 2030. However, by embracing digitalization across all sectors – from generation and transmission to distribution and end-use – and integration with renewable energy, these countries could reduce their carbon emissions by up to 70% and energy costs by as much as 80%, subject to system-wide optimization, outlines the UNECE study “Integrating twin transition with legacy energy systems”   

    The study analyses opportunities and challenges for a digital transformation of energy systems in Albania, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine, where about 60% of the total energy mix today comes from natural gas and coal.   

    The study underscores that digital solutions and innovations such as Artificial Intelligence, Internet of Things, Digital Twins, and Virtual Power Plants, offer significant opportunities in managing and integrating distributed, often variable renewable energy-based resources. It also highlights potential to optimize legacy systems and enhance both cybersecurity and grid resilience. 

    This will require robust policy measures and initiatives to boost investments in advanced, resilient grids. It will also necessitate increased support for innovation and research, strategic planning and massive professional training.   

    Overcoming challenges 

    The study identifies key challenges to be addressed in the region’s largely outdated energy systems: 

    • Ageing energy infrastructure, much of which was built during the Soviet era. For example, in Belarus, over 60% of the thermal power plants are over 30 years old, resulting in high maintenance costs; in Georgia, the average age of electricity transmission lines exceeds 30 years, resulting in transmission losses estimated at 12%.  

    • Energy security risks due to dependence on fossil fuel imports. For example, the Republic of Moldova imports approximately 70% of its electricity, primarily from Romania and Ukraine; in Belarus, about 50% of energy needs are met through natural gas imports from the Russian Federation. 

    • Limited financial resources to invest in modernizing energy systems. For instance, Albania has struggled to secure funding for proposed solar and wind projects totalling approximately $300 million; in Belarus only about 5% of the necessary investments have been secured for planned RE installations; financial constraints limit modernization of ageing hydropower infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan. 

    • Lack of skilled workforce. For example, in Georgia, around 30% of energy sector professionals lack formal training in RE technologies.  

    • Climate and health impacts. For instance, Belarus emits approximately 8 million tonnes of CO2 annually from its energy sector alone, with coal-fired plants being significant contributors. North Macedonia’s reliance on coal contributes to air pollution levels among the highest in Europe.  

    Key strategies identified in the study include: 

    • Cross-border infrastructure projects, such as Trans-Caspian high-voltage direct current lines, are vital for enhancing regional energy trade and digital connectivity; 

    The report identifies three priority action areas: (1) scaling energy efficiency through retrofitting that embraces digital technologies; (2) promoting hybrid energy models that combine gas with hydrogen; and (3) advancing smart grids, standardization, and regional integration. 

    Importantly, the study promotes a human-centered approach to digitalization that  balances innovation with ethical considerations and prioritizes equity, social considerations, and long-term sustainability for a just transition. 

    From research to action 

    The study was showcased during a workshop “Assessing the readiness of the energy sector to implement smart digital energy-efficient technologies in Belarus in view of climate change mitigation” held in Minsk, Belarus, and online on 22 May 2025. The hybrid workshop, organized by UNECE in cooperation with UNDP Belarus and the Department of Energy Efficiency of the State Committee for Standardization of the Republic of Belarus, brought together over 100 participants including government officials, energy sector representatives, and international experts, to explore how smart digital tools can support energy efficiency, clean mobility, and climate action in Belarus.  

    For more information about UNECE work on Energy Efficiency, please visit: https://unece.org/sustainable-energy/energy-efficiency 

     Photo credit: Adobe Stock Images by Sergii.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • US-backed Gaza aid group halts distribution, UN to vote on ceasefire demand

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The U.S.-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation will not give out any aid on Wednesday as it presses Israel to boost civilian safety beyond the perimeter of its distribution sites, a day after dozens of Palestinians seeking aid were killed.

    The GHF said it has asked the Israeli military to “guide foot traffic in a way that minimizes confusion or escalation risks” near military perimeters; develop clearer guidance for civilians; and enhance training to support civilian safety.

    “Our top priority remains ensuring the safety and dignity of civilians receiving aid,” said a GHF spokesperson. An Israeli military spokesperson warned civilians against moving in areas leading to GHF sites on Wednesday, deeming them “combat zones”.

    The Israeli military said on Tuesday that it opened fire on a group of people it viewed as a threat near a GHF food aid distribution site. The International Committee of the Red Cross said at least 27 people were killed and dozens injured. The GHF said the incident was “well beyond” its site.

    Palestinians who collected food GHF boxes on Tuesday described scenes of pandemonium, with no-one overseeing the handover of supplies or checking IDs, as crowds jostled for aid.

    The U.N. Security Council is also set to vote on Wednesday on a demand for a ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian militants Hamas and humanitarian access across Gaza, where aid has trickled amid chaos and bloodshed after Israel lifted an 11-week blockade on the enclave where famine looms.

    “It is unacceptable. Civilians are risking – and in several instances losing – their lives just trying to get food,” U.N. spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said on Tuesday, adding that the aid distribution model backed by the U.S. and Israel was “all a recipe for disaster, which is exactly what is going on.”

    That model is run by the newly created GHF, which started operations in the enclave a week ago and said on Tuesday that it has given out more than seven million meals from three so-called secure distribution sites. GHF Interim Executive Director John Acree urged humanitarians in Gaza: “Work with us and we will get your aid delivered to those who are depending on it.”

    U.S. VETO?

    The U.N. and other aid groups have refused to work with the GHF because they say it is not neutral and the distribution model militarizes aid. GHF uses private U.S. security and logistics companies to get aid to the distribution sites.

    It is the latest in a string of efforts to get more aid into the enclave, where experts say the entire population of some 2.1 million people is at risk of famine. Jordan last year spearheaded humanitarian air drops, while the U.S. briefly installed a floating aid pier, but it was beset by challenges.

    The U.N. has long-blamed Israel and lawlessness in the enclave for hindering the delivery of aid into Gaza and its distribution throughout the war zone. Israel accuses Hamas of stealing aid, which the group denies.

    Israel said on Tuesday that three of its soldiers had been killed in fighting in northern Gaza. Gaza health officials said at least 18 more Palestinians were killed in other military strikes in the territory on Tuesday. Reuters could not independently verify the reports in northern and southern Gaza.

    The 10 elected members of the U.N. Security Council have asked for the 15-member body to vote on Wednesday on a draft resolution that demands “an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire in Gaza respected by all parties.”

    The draft text, seen by Reuters, also demands the release of all hostages held by Hamas and others, and the immediate lifting of all restrictions on the entry of aid and its safe and unhindered distribution, including by the U.N., throughout Gaza.

    “The time to act has already passed,” Slovenia’s U.N. Ambassador Samuel Zbogar told Reuters. “It is our historical responsibility not to remain silent.”

    As U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration tries to broker a ceasefire in Gaza, it was not immediately clear if Washington would veto the draft text. A spokesperson for the U.S. mission to the U.N. said: “We cannot preview our actions currently under consideration.”

    A resolution needs nine votes in favor and no vetoes by the permanent members – the United States, Russia, China, Britain or France – to pass.

    The war in Gaza has raged since 2023 after Hamas militants killed 1,200 people in Israel in an October 7 attack and took some 250 hostages back to the enclave, according to Israeli tallies.

    Israel responded with a military campaign that has killed over 54,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities, which do not distinguish between fighters and non-combatants.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Security: UPDATED: Fourth man arrested in connection with arsons in north London

    Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police

    A fourth man has been arrested as part of an investigation into a series of fires in north London.

    A 48-year-old man [D] was arrested on Monday, 2 June at London Stansted Airport. He was initially stopped by officers under schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act, 2000, before being arrested on suspicion of conspiracy to commit arson with intent to endanger life.

    The arrest is connected to an investigation into a vehicle fire in NW5 on Thursday, 8 May, a fire at the entrance of a property in N7 on Sunday, 11 May and a fire at a residential address in NW5 in the early hours of Monday, 12 May.

    The man [D] has been taken to a London police station, before being released on bail to a date in July.

    The Crown Prosecution Service previously authorised charged against three other men:

    • Roman Lavrynovych 21 (06.02.04), of Sydenham, a Ukrainian national [A] was charged with three counts of arson with intent to endanger life.
    • Stanislav Carpiuc, 26 (15.07.98) of Romford, a Romanian national, [B] was charged with conspiracy to commit arson with intent to endanger life.
    • Petro Pochynok 34 (25.07.90) of north London, a Ukrainian national [C] was charged with conspiracy to commit arson with intent to endanger life.

    The three men [A-C] have been remanded in custody to next appear at the Old Bailey on Friday, 6 June.

    The investigation is being led by officers from the Met’s Counter Terrorism Command due to the fires all having connections to a high-profile public figure. Anyone with information that could assist the investigation should call police on 101 quoting CAD 441/12 May. Enquiries remain ongoing.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission meddling in the Romanian presidential election – E-001112/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Democracy is a founding value of the EU. Elections are at the core of democracy and should be fair and free from any interference.

    The conduct and the organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional and legislative rules, while respecting their international obligations and EU law.

    National competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility of ensuring compliance with these rules. The Commission has no comment on the decision by the Romanian Constitutional Court of 6 December 2024 to annul the first round of the Romanian presidential elections, nor on the decisions taken by the Romanian Electoral Bureau as regards the validation of candidates in national elections. These matters fall entirely under the responsibility of the Member States.

    Last updated: 3 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Romanian National Sentenced for Defrauding Banks and Leaving Hundreds of Banking Customers as Victims in His Wake

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    PROVIDENCE – A Romanian national illegally present in the United States who is described in court documents as being an “undeterred serial scammer” who left hundreds of victims in his wake after stealing and using their personal banking information has been sentenced to nearly three years in federal prison and will face deportation proceedings, announced Acting United States Attorney Sara Miron Bloom.

    Mario Demarco, a/k/a Marius Lupu a/k/a David Adamec, 30, pleaded guilty in January to a charge of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. He was sentenced today by U.S. District Court Judge Mary S. McElroy to 33 months in federal prison to be followed by two years of supervised release. Additionally, Demarco was ordered to pay restitution totaling $16,567.06.

    An immigration detainer has been lodged by Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

    Court documents reflect that for more than two years, beginning in October 2022, Demarco traveled up and down the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic installing skimming devices on ATMs. These devices intercepted hundreds of customers’ debit card and banking information, which Demarco used to create fraudulent debit cards. The bogus cards were then used to make unauthorized cash withdrawals, attempted withdrawals, and purchases.

    Throughout the course of the conspiracy, Demarco installed skimming devices on at least ten ATMs and compromised at least 952 cards. Demarco owes restitution to fifteen different banks.

    The case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Taylor A. Dean and Ly T. Chin.

    The matter was investigated by Homeland Security Investigations, with assistance from the Warwick, RI, Police Department, Cranston, RI, Police Department, East Greenwich, RI, Police Department, North Kingstown, RI,  Police Department, East Providence, RI, Police Department, Boston, MA, Police Department, New York City Police Department, and the Stratford, CT, Police Department.

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    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Bahrain, Colombia, DRC, Latvia and Liberia elected as non-permanent members of UN Security Council

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    UNITED NATIONS, June 3 (Xinhua) — Bahrain, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Latvia and Liberia were on Tuesday elected as non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (SC) for a two-year term from January 1, 2026 to December 31, 2027.

    Latvia will become a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the first time.

    The above-mentioned countries will replace the current non-permanent members of this body, which include Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia.

    The UN Security Council is considered the most influential body of the world organization. Its task is to maintain international peace and security, it can make legally binding decisions, and also has the right to impose sanctions and authorize the use of force. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: South Texas stash house discovered by ICE Rio Grande Valley leads to the arrest of 16 illegal aliens

    Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

    HARLINGEN, Texas — A suspected stash house in Mercedes, Texas, was uncovered June 2 by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement resulting in the apprehension of 16 illegal aliens.

    On June 1, ICE received a tip from an anonymous caller reporting that multiple illegal aliens were being harbored at a residence in Mercedes. ICE contacted the Mercedes Police Department, which conducted a welfare check of the property. Authorities spoke to the owner of the property who admitted to harboring approximately 16 individuals inside the home.

    “This operation underscores the critical role that the public and local law enforcement partners play in identifying and disrupting human smuggling operations,” said ICE Homeland Security Investigations Rio Grande Valley Deputy Special Agent in Charge Mark Lippa. “Transnational criminal networks continue to endanger lives for profit. ICE will relentlessly pursue those who exploit vulnerable individuals for financial gain.”

    The 16 individuals encountered were identified as nationals of Nepal, Albania, Mexico, Honduras and Guatemala. Sixteen were taken into custody for immigration violations and another individual, a Mexican national, is being questioned for his role in human smuggling.

    The investigation remains ongoing. The enforcement action was supported by ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. Border Patrol and U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Field Operations.

    Members of the public are encouraged to report suspicious activity or tips related to human smuggling by calling 866-347-2423 or by submitting an anonymous tip via the ICE online tip form.

    Follow HSI San Antonio on X at @HSI_SanAntonio to learn more about its enforcement efforts and investigations.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Xbox Games Showcase 2025 kicks off June 8

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Xbox Games Showcase 2025 kicks off June 8

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: “Through Her Lens”: New UN Photo Exhibit Celebrates Women Leading Peace

    Source: United Nations – Peacekeeping

    New York, 7 June 2025 – This June, the United Nations will unveil a compelling new photo exhibit at New York’s Photoville Festival, bringing global attention to the leadership, courage and impact of women and their allies driving peace in some of the world’s most volatile places. Featuring original photos by local women photographers, the exhibition spotlights women peacebuilders, human rights defenders, UN peacekeepers and grassroots activists whose stories are too often overlooked. Their portraits and environments reflect both the challenges of conflict and the possibilities that emerge when women lead.

    Launched in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), the exhibition highlights the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda which recognises not only the disproportionate impact of conflict on women but also their indispensable role in shaping peace, building trust, and leading transformative change.

    “The fight for gender equality is not just about fairness,” said United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres in his remarks at the 2025 International Women’s Day commemoration in New York. “It is about power – who gets a seat at the table, and who is locked out. Simply put, when women and girls rise, everyone thrives.”

    Captured across eleven settings – Abyei, Cyprus, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, Lebanon, Mozambique, Occupied Palestinian Territory, South Sudan and Sudan – the images tell a collective story of resilience, resistance, and transformation.

    “Too often, the role of women in peace processes and trust building is overlooked or underrepresented,” said Laura Hasani, a photojournalist from Kosovo with over 25 years’ experience. “These photos aim to change that, so the world sees and hears from the women who are rebuilding communities and leading change.”

    In Haiti, Clyfane Saintil, a feminist activist and nonprofit leader featured in the exhibit, helps Haitian girls and women build confidence to claim their rights and shape their futures. “Change begins in our communities, where women and girls rise, and when men choose to be allies rather than obstacles,” she said.

    Through the lens of those living the realities of conflict, the exhibition reframes how we see women: not only as victims, but as architects of peace and justice. It also calls on governments, international organisations, and communities to recommit to the promise of the WPS agenda, which remains as urgent today as it was 25 years ago.

    Through Her Lens: Women Rising for Peace is a collaboration between the United Nations Department of Peace Operations and Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, UN Women, and the Elsie Initiative Fund. Premiering in Brooklyn Bridge Park on 7 June 2025, it will remain open to the public until 22 June, then travel to some of the countries featured before reaching the European Parliament in Brussels and, in October, UN Headquarters in New York, among others.

    The exhibition is supported by the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom, whose generous contributions made it possible to share these powerful stories worldwide.

    The exhibition is free to view from June 7-22, 2025, at the Photoville Festival, Brooklyn Bridge Park, Pier 1, New York City.

    Find out more: Through Her Lens: Women Rising for Peace – Photoville Festival

    Download the digital assets: Trello board

    Note to the editors: The ‘Through Their Lens: Women Rising for Peace’ photo exhibition is underpinned by the principles outlined in United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent nine resolutions on Women, Peace and Security. The resolutions recognise the importance of women’s full, equal and meaningful participation in conflict resolution and call for greater inclusion of women in peacemaking and decision-making at all levels in peace and political processes.

    * * * *

    Media contacts:

    UN Department of Peace Operations

    Sophie Boudre

    Email: boudre@un.org

    Tel.: +1 917 691 5359

    Milly Copping James

    Email: milly.coppingjames@un.org

    Tel.: +1 646 897 6383

    UN Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs

    Kyung Ae (Susie) Lim

    Email: lim7@un.org

    Tel.: +1 646 595 7068

    UN Women

    Media Team Email: media.team@unwomen.org

    MIL OSI United Nations News