Category: Balkans

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UK calls on Israel to lift its block on aid: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    The UK calls on Israel to lift its block on aid: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Statement by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

    The UK called this meeting alongside Denmark, France, Greece and Slovenia in response to the alarming warnings that the humanitarian situation in Gaza is worse than it has ever been.

    So we are calling for three urgent things.

    First, the UK calls on Israel to lift its block on aid.

    The World Food Programme warned us over a week ago that they have no food left. 

    And IPC data released yesterday shows that the whole of Gaza is at the risk of famine. 

    Meanwhile, tonnes of food are currently sitting rotting at the border, blocked from reaching people who are starving. 

    This is cruel and it is inexcusable. 

    And it risks further deaths that should be avoidable. 

    Second, the UK will not support any aid mechanism that seeks to deliver political or military objectives or puts vulnerable civilians at risk. 

    We call on Israel to urgently engage with the UN to ensure a return to delivery of aid in line with humanitarian principles. 

    International law requires Israel to allow the rapid and unimpeded provision of humanitarian aid to all civilians.

    Third, the UK reiterates our outrage at the killing of Palestinian Red Crescent workers and the strikes on a UNOPS compound in March. 

    We are disappointed that Israel has not yet released the final findings of its investigation into the UNOPS incident or taken concrete action to ensure these incidents can never happen again.

    President, the release of Edan Alexander yesterday after 17 months of cruel Hamas captivity offers a rare moment of hope. 

    We must never forget the suffering of those hostages that remain in Gaza and those families awaiting the return of their loved ones’ remains.

    It is ceasefire deals that have delivered the release of over 180 hostages and allowed a massive scale-up of aid for desperate Palestinians. 

    This shows what is possible with political will. 

    This is why we strongly oppose an expansion of this conflict, as do many hostages’ families.

    And it is a ceasefire deal that now offers the best hope of ending the agony of the hostages and their families, alleviating the suffering of civilians in Gaza, ending Hamas’ control of Gaza and achieving a pathway to a two-state solution.

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas and Commissioner Kos on the parliamentary elections in Albania

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Statement Brussels, 13 May 2025 On Sunday, the people of Albania exercised their democratic right to vote, electing their representatives to the Parliament. We congratulate all the competent authorities that ensured smooth operations across the country. These elections also marked the introduction of out-of-country voting for the first time.  

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Draft agenda – Tuesday, 17 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    34 Combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child sexual abuse material and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (recast)
    Jeroen Lenaers     – (possibly) Amendments; rejection Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 31 Amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure implementing the Agreement establishing the Ethics Body
    Sven Simon     – Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 30 Amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure concerning the declaration of input (Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure)
    Sven Simon     – Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 36 Electoral rights of mobile Union citizens in European Parliament elections
    Sven Simon     – (possibly) Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 35 The termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the EU and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and timber products to the European Union (FLEGT)
    Karin Karlsbro     – (possibly) Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 41 Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system
    Anna Stürgkh     – Amendments by the rapporteur, 71 MEPs at least, Alternative motions for resolutions Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00     – Joint alternative motions for resolutions Thursday, 12 June 2025, 12:00 28 Financing for development – ahead of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville
    Charles Goerens     – (possibly) Amendments by the rapporteur, 71 MEPs at least; Alternative motions for resolutions Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00     – (possibly) Joint alternative motions for resolutions Thursday, 12 June 2025, 12:00 26 Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility
    Victor Negrescu, Siegfried Mureşan     – Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 25 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro
    Marjan Šarec     – (possibly) Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 17 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova
    Sven Mikser     – (possibly) Amendments Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 13 June 2025, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 16 June 2025, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 17 June 2025, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 18 June 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Failure to meet General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requirements: qualifications and skills of nominated members of the Bulgarian data protection authority (DPA) – P-001797/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001797/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Radan Kanev (PPE)

    Exchanges in 2020 between the Bulgarian data protection authority (DPA) and the Commission regarding the drafting of the first report on the evaluation and review of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) highlighted a failure to provide sufficient legislative guarantees as to the competence of initially nominated members of the DPA.

    The same report specifies that the Commission will ‘continue to closely monitor the effective and full independence of national DPAs’[1].

    However, numerous recent publications regarding the ongoing nomination and election procedure of members of the Bulgarian DPA report their failure to comply with the necessary qualification, experience and skills requirements.

    In light of the above, can the Commission please answer the following:

    • 1.What steps will it take in order to ensure the application of the GDPR as regards compliance on the part of members of the Bulgarian DPA with independence and quality requirements in the context of already established deficits of national procedural rules?
    • 2.Will those steps include an urgent approach to the ongoing election procedure, since it is approaching the final stages, namely a vote of the National Assembly?
    • 3.Is the violation of Article 53(2) of the GDPR subject to the EU Pilot mechanism?

    Submitted: 2.5.2025

    • [1] EUR-Lex – 52020DC0264 – EN – EUR-Lex.
    Last updated: 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Commission, executive agencies and European Development Funds – P10_TA(2025)0077 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section III – Commission,

    –  having regard to its decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budgets of the executive agencies for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0074/2025),

    A.  whereas the eleventh EDF has reached its final stage as its sunset clause came into effect on 31 December 2020; whereas, however, specific contracts for existing financing agreements were signed until 31 December 2023, and the implementation of the ongoing projects funded by the EDF will continue until their final completion;

    B.  whereas the ninth, tenth and eleventh(1) EDFs were not incorporated into the Union general budget and continue to be implemented and reported on separately until their closure;

    C.  whereas, for the 2021-2027 MFF, development cooperation aid to ACP countries is integrated in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI-Global Europe’) as part of the EU general budget, and development cooperation aid to OCTs, including Greenland, has been incorporated into the Decision on the Overseas Association;

    D.  whereas the EDFs are managed almost entirely by the Commission’s DG INTPA with a small proportion (7 %) of the 2023 EDF expenditure being managed by DG NEAR;

    Political priorities

    1.  Underlines its strong commitment to the Union’s fundamental values and principles which are enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); in the framework of the discharge process, stresses especially the principles of sound financial management as set out in Article 317 TFEU and the combatting of fraud and protection of the financial interests of the Union as set out in Article 325 TFEU;

    2.  Underlines the importance of the principle of separation of powers in the Union and recalls that according to the Treaty, the institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation; believes that under no circumstances the actions of one Union institution should affect the independence of another institution; urges all other institutions to respect the role of the Parliament as the sole Union institution directly elected by the citizens and to refrain from any undue, direct or indirect interference in its legislative processes, thereby ensuring that Parliament’s decision making-process remains free and independent from other Union institutions or any other entities;

    3.  Highlights the importance of the Union budget for achieving the Union’s political priorities, as well as its role in assisting Member States in unforeseen situations such as international conflicts or crises and their consequences; points out in this regard the continuing relevance of investments and support from the Union budget for reducing disparities between Member States and regions, for promoting economic growth and employment, for combating poverty and social exclusion, and thus for improving the daily life of European citizens;

    4.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the Court) for the financial year 2023 has issued a clean opinion concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, regrets that the Court has had to issue for the 5th consecutive year an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of Union budget expenditure and a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

    5.  Expresses its deep concerns that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been on a rising trend since the financial year 2020 and has reached 5,6 % for the financial year 2023; notes that there are significant differences in the error rates between headings which range from spending areas with error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 % up to an error rate of 9,3 % in the case of cohesion policy; further notes that discharge is a political process where all issues related to a specific financial year may be taken into consideration and that the decision on whether to grant or refuse discharge should remain factual and anchored in the Union acquis, and that it is taken for the budget as a whole; urges the Commission, finally, to take into account the Court’s recommendations and to reduce the overall error rate over the coming years; further asks the Commission to present an Action Plan within the four months on reducing the error rate;

    6.  Is concerned that the Commission and the Court have different interpretations of what the “error rate” represents, thus generating confusion; expresses its support for a common audit approach and methodology and strongly calls on both institutions to find a solution to the divergent approaches before the 2024 discharge; is concerned that the Commission is systematically underestimating the existing error level and that this could lead to an ineffective protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    7.  Expresses again its deep its concern that the accumulated outstanding commitments (RAL – reste à liquider) have reached a record level of EUR 543 billion, equivalent to 3,2 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023 and representing more than double the Union annual budget for 2023; underlines that such a record high level of outstanding commitments risks creating challenges for the future smooth implementation of extraordinary high levels of payments and/or leading to significant decommitments to the detriment of the implementation of Union policy objectives;

    8.  Further expresses its concern that the outstanding debt from borrowing has reached EUR 458,5 billion, equivalent to 2,7 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023; notes that the increase in outstanding debt during 2023, equivalent to EUR 110,5 billion, has made the Union one of the largest debt issuers in Europe; further notes that the amount of outstanding debt is projected to increase further during the coming years, especially due to increased borrowing linked to the RRF and financial assistance to a number of countries including Ukraine which is the victim of a war of aggression by Russia; reiterates its deep concerns that the increase in debt makes the Union budget more vulnerable to increases in interest rates since a part of the debt will have to be serviced and repaid by the Union budget;

    9.  Recalls the importance of a strict application of the financial rules of the Union in all programmes and on all beneficiaries, in order to avoid all forms of fraud, conflicts of interest, corruption, double funding and money laundering;

    10.  Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect the principles of the rule of law; reiterates its deep concerns about the deteriorating rule of law situation in certain Member States including attacks or restrictions to the activities of civil society organisations, which not only poses a significant threat to democratic values but also leads to an increased risk of financial losses for the Union budget; calls for the provision of adequate support to civil society organisations active in the field; acknowledges the emergence of new forms of rule of law violations by national governments and calls on the Commission to address these evolving challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach the principles of the rule of law where such breaches affect, or risk affecting, the financial interests of the Union; at the same time, underlines the need for complete and timely information on decisions related to the implementation of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism; encourages the Commission to explicitly assess when shortcomings in the rule of law are of a systemic nature; calls for a stronger emphasis on the implementation of country-specific recommendations, coupled with effective follow-up mechanisms and measurable benchmarks; proposes the establishment of a comprehensive rule of law monitoring framework involving all Union institutions, Member States, and candidate countries, aimed at ensuring coherence and uniformity across the Union, while at the same time ensuring a fair and impartial application; calls on the Commission to propose measures to ensure the protection of final beneficiaries in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without undermining the application and effectiveness of the regulation;

    11.  Takes note of the innovative nature of the RRF and its contribution to supporting Member States in recovering from the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and creating a more resilient European economy; is of the opinion that any shift to a performance-based approach based on the RRF as a model requires addressing the many issues identified in its implementation, as well as assessing data on its full impact, before using such a model; recalls the many problems identified in the implementation of the RRF which would need to be addressed, including, but not limited to: the lack of adequate consultation of the regional and local authorities and other relevant stakeholders, such as social partners and civil society organisations and the lack of their involvement in the implementation; the weak cross border dimension, which may hint to a reduced EU added value in that respect; the lack of a clear definition of the milestones and targets and their satisfactorily fulfilment; the insufficient flexibility; the common debt with long-term debt payment as a consequence; the serious transparency, audit and control problems of the program which make it impossible for the citizens to be informed about the final beneficiaries of actions funded by the Union and pushes Member States to use RRF funds to cover projects very similar to those financed by Cohesion funds but with a much more limited capacity of control; reiterates the concern about the interpretation of the Commission and Member States on what a “final recipient” of RRF funding represents, which is not in line with the agreement of the REPowerEU negotiations and maintains that ministries, public authorities or other contracting authorities cannot be listed as final recipients of RRF funding; further expresses concern about the findings of the Court in relation to the risk of double funding and financing of recurring budgetary expenditure which are not in line with the RRF legal basis;

    12.  Notes that the set-up of the NGEU mechanism implies that the repayment of NGEU loans must start before the end of 2027 and be completed by 2058 at the latest; is concerned that the increase in interest rates over the last years has increased the borrowing costs under the NGEU significantly compared with original estimates; reiterates the need to fully respect the timeline of the legally binding roadmap for the introduction of new own resources and underlines that swift progress on new own resources is essential to repay NGEU and safeguard the current and future MFFs;

    13.  Stresses the urgent need for significant de-bureaucratisation, streamlining and simplification of all Union policies and their funding in line with the recommendations in the Draghi report(2) in order to ease the burdens for European businesses and increase European competitiveness, while ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union; underlines that simplification will also have a positive effect on error rates in the implementation of policies because many errors happen because of overcomplicated rules which are difficult to navigate, especially for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), new applicants, spin-offs and start-ups;

    14.  Reiterates the need to balance the further simplification of rules and procedures with much more systematic use of digitalised reporting, better and more robust controls and adequate ex post checks on the most repeated areas of irregular spending that do not add excessive bureaucratic complexity for beneficiaries, develop training sessions and practical information for applicants, in particular new applicants, and improve the assistance and guidelines for SMEs, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies and all other relevant stakeholders; reminds that a robust control system under the responsibility of the Commission is particularly needed for the RRF;

    15.  Stresses the need and highlights the importance of the NDICI programme for the support to global challenges, the promotion of human rights, freedoms and democracy; underlines the importance of reinforcing the Eastern Neighbourhood line in order to support political, economic and social reforms in this challenged region;

    16.  Underlines that it is imperative for the credibility of the Union that the Commission ensures that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to any kind of terrorist movements or any other movement expressing extremist views, inciting violence and/or hatred, that are directly in opposition to the European Union’s fundamental values, including Islamist anti-Semitic, anti-Christian and anti-Islamic movements; in this context, recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October; recalls that in 9 cases their employment was formally terminated in the interests of UNRWA; takes note of the results of the investigation launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS); underlines that the Commission should also establish better controls ensuring that no such funding happens indirectly through third parties and organise better traceability of Union funds to final beneficiaries;

    17.  Reiterates deep concerns about the increase in the exploitation of Union funds against Union principles and values, especially when the use of funds and transfers to other organisations are not entirely traceable; warns of the danger of Union funds ultimately being used within corrupt circles and being subject to fraud and irregularities, foreign interference or entrism; emphasises the importance of ‘final beneficiary transparency’ for Union funds;

    18.  Emphasises the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and preventing potential foreign interference; condemns any improper attempt to influence the legislative activities of the European Parliament; insists on the responsibility of OLAF to conduct all necessary in-depth investigations; stresses the importance of the work carried out by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in protecting the European Union’s financial interests; insists to provide to the EPPO adequate financial and human resources; recalls the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union, and insist on its swift implementation in all EU institutions;

    19.  Recalls the crucial role of civil society organisations (CSOs), including NGOs, in upholding democratic values to support a vibrant and lively democratic society, ensuring a sound basis for broad coverage of all relevant views in different debates and highlights that CSOs may receive support from Union funds to exercise these functions, as provided in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union;

    20.  Notes that there have been allegations from some Members of the Budgetary Control committee that grant agreements, concluded by the Commission included detailed lobbying activities which could be interpreted as potentially interfering with internal decision making in the Union Institutions; notes that the Commission took a series of measures to address the allegations by adopting guidance on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy, stating that while such grant agreements did not breach the EU legal framework, they could potentially entail a reputational risk for the Union; notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’; notes that such a disclaimer was further added in the 2024 call for proposals for operation grants;

    21.  Notes that a screening of grant agreements in all portfolios to verify their alignment with the new guidance is ongoing and that, so far, the Commission has not communicated to the Parliament the full results of the screening nor other measures that the Commission might take, if necessary; calls the Commission to keep the discharge authority informed at all times; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with Union institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability;

    22.  Recalls that EU funding requires stringent accountability and transparency standards; in line with the ECA recommendations in the Special Report 05/2024(3) and the recent special Report 11/2025(4), urges the Commission to ensure that the information disclosed in the Financial Transparency System is frequently updated, reliable, comparable and useful; stresses the need to allocate additional resources to the EUTR Secretariat to enable a systematic and thorough monitoring of the Transparency Register; this should include allocating resources towards AI implementation to develop an AI based search mechanism; recalls the need to proactively check that all entities beneficiaries of EU funds respect EU values;

    23.  Welcomes the reply of Commissioner Serafin to the written question(5), once again confirming EU funding was granted and used by NGOs in full respect of EU Treaties and LIFE Regulation(6); takes further note of the recent ECA Special Report on transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs(7), which, while stating that the use of EU funding for NGO advocacy is legal, also confirms it is in line with EU’s legal transparency requirements as laid down in the EU Financial Regulation; at the same time ECA SR 11/2025 points to the fact that more should be done to improve transparency of EU funding received by all beneficiaries; calls in this regard on the Commission to implement ECA recommendations regarding screening of self-declarations in the EU’s Financial Transparency System, as well as proactive monitoring of the respect to EU fundamental values and principles by the beneficiaries;

    24.  Welcomes the entry into force of the recast of the Financial Regulation; welcomes, in particular, the enhancements related to tracking Union funds through digital tools and interoperability that will bolster the protection of the Union Financial Interests, the targeted extension of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management following MFF 2027, the reference to the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism and the introduction of a conditionality based on Union values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as well as the opportunity to streamline SMEs and individual applicants with the introduction of very low-value grants;

    CHAPTER 1 – Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

    The European Court of Auditors’ statement of assurance and budgetary and financial management

    Reliability of the accounts

    25.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023(8), that the consolidated accounts of the European Union for that year are reliable; notes that the Court has issued a clean opinion on the reliability of the accounts every year since 2007;

    26.  Notes that on 31 December 2023, total liabilities amounted to EUR 679,9 billion, and total assets amounted to EUR 467,7 billion; notes that the difference of EUR 212,2 billion represents the negative net assets, comprising debt and the portion of expenses already incurred by the Union up to 31 December 2023 that must be funded by future budgets;

    27.  Notes that at the end of 2023, the estimated value of incurred but not yet claimed eligible expenses due to beneficiaries, recorded as accrued expenses, was EUR 155,2 billion (2021: EUR 148,7 billion), of which EUR 7,4 billion is related to accrued RRF expenditure;

    28.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion that the assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses, including those related to NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the estimate related to the UK’s withdrawal process, and the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are presented fairly in the consolidated annual accounts;

    Legality and regularity of Union revenue

    29.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the Union’s revenue is free from material error and that the managing systems examined by the Court were generally effective;

    Legality and regularity of Union expenditure

    30.  Strongly regrets the adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of the Union budget expenditure issued by the Court for the fifth year in a row; considers this increasingly problematic, as the Commission seems unable, or unwilling, to identify the cause and address the underlying issues; regrets the Commission is not accepting some recommendations of the Court of Auditors; notes in particular the importance of reinforcement of financial management of the Commission and Member States, that is considered as not reliable by the Court and therefore compromises the reliability of the Annual Management and Performance Report; calls on the Commission to present a clear action plan on reducing the error rate within the following four months; stresses that Parliament shall duly scrutinise such an action plan;

    31.  Is seriously concerned by the Court’s estimation of the error level of 5,6 % in 2023 expenditure; notes that this is an accelerated deterioration compared to the previous two years (4,2 % in 2022 and 3.0 % in 2021); notes with concern that the Court continues to detect substantial issues in reimbursement-based expenditure where the estimated level of error is 7,9 %; notes that the effect of the errors found by the Court is estimated to be both material and pervasive; calls for the Commission’s financial management to be tightened up, in accordance with the recommendations made by the Court in its Annual Reports and Special Reports, in order to resolutely tackle the high error rate over the next few years; underlines the Court’s warning that the increasing European debt is placing growing pressure on the Union budget;

    32.  Notes that the Commission in its Annual Management and Performance Report categorises the expenditure into higher, medium and lower risk categories, in order to focus action on high-risk areas; while the Court uses only two risk categories in order to produce an opinion on the legality and regularity of the expenditures; is worried that the Court’s work revealed limitations in the Commission’s ex-post work, which, taken together, affect the robustness of the Commission’s risk assessment; notes with concern that one of the areas most impacted was ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, where the Court assessed the majority of the spending to be high risk, while the Commission classified only a minority in this way;

    33.  Reiterates the concerns about the Court observation that the Commission’s risk assessment is likely to underestimate the level of risk in several areas; is also worried by recurrent weaknesses identified by the Court in Member States’ management and control systems, which are still not still preventing or detecting irregularities in heading 2, thus limiting the reliance that can be placed on their work, while the Commission’s error rates do still rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively;

    34.  Notes that the increase is primarily caused by the estimated level of error under MFF heading 2 – cohesion, resilience and values, where the Court found 9,3 % of expenditure to be in breach of Union rules and regulations; recalls the underlying issues that are reported by the Court and that have been known for several years;

    35.  Underlines that the estimated level of error in the Union’s expenditure, as presented in the Court’s statement of assurance, is an estimate of the money that should not have been paid out because it was not used in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations; considers that, though not an indicator of fraud or corruption, the estimated level of error represents expenditure where corrective actions are necessary, and thus shows a wasteful use of resources; regrets that, while being a problem in itself, this will also give a negative impression to citizens, and may even call into question the Commission’s ability to effectively protect the Union’s financial interests;

    36.  Notes with concern that the Commission´s own estimate of the risk at payment is only 1,9 % for 2023 and has been at that level since 2020; notes that the Commission estimates its capacity to correct and recover irregular expenditure during implementation of the associated programmes at 1,0 %, resulting in a risk at closure of 0,9 %; is concerned that again for this year the Commission’s risk at payment is not only below the Court estimated level of error of 5,6 % but also below the Court range, which is between 4,4 % and 6,8 %; highlights that the divergence between the Court’s overall error rate and the Commission’s risk at payment is also evident in some of the specific spending areas, in particular in heading 2, even more than in the past; welcomes the Court’s estimate of the level of error as an important indicator for the existing risks;

    37.  Notes the multi-annual perspective of the Commission’s risk at closure, as corrections and recoveries after year-end are not reflected in the Court’s estimate of the level of error; regrets, however, the confusion caused by the Commission’s presentation of the risk at payment;

    38.  Recalls the positions expressed in the 2022 discharge resolution and the exchanges of views in the discharge hearings for the financial year 2023 on the diverging methodologies and estimates between the Court and the Commission of errors made in Union expenditure; notes in particular that the Court’s error rate is based on a statistical sample, whereas the Commission’s risk at payment is to a large extent compiled from the error rates reported by national auditing authorities in Member States and calculated only after corrections and repayments; reminds that the Court’s error rate includes the errors that remained undetected by the Member States and the Commission, which demonstrates that the Commission’s error rates are an underestimation; notes with concern an even wider gap between the Court’s and Commission’s estimates; further notes that the Commission and the Court are organising joint workshops on this issue; notes that the Court recently aligned its methodology on procurement in the decentralised agencies with the methodology of the Commission; reiterates its support for the independent audit approach and methodology of the Court and invites the Commission to cooperate with the Court with a view to increasing harmonisation and providing for more comparable estimates of the level of error;

    39.  Recalls that the discharge authority needs a statement of assurance, provided by the Court, on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions at year-end for its decision on discharge for that year; notes that Union spending programmes are multiannual and that their management and control systems cover multiple years, allowing for corrections and recoveries after year-end;

    40.  Recalls that the Commission is responsible for preventing and detecting fraud; notes that the Court, in the exercise of its mandate, is obliged to report any cases of irregularity; notes that the Court forwards to the EPPO suspicions of criminal offences falling under its competences and to OLAF suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activity affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that, in 2023, the Court reported 20 cases of suspected fraud to OLAF, and in parallel reported 12 of these cases to the EPPO, resulting so far in four OLAF investigations and nine EPPO investigations; commends the Court for its reporting of cases of irregularity to OLAF and the EPPO, as information resulting from audit engagements usually has a high degree of reliability; reminds in this framework of the key role played by the whole Union’s anti-fraud architecture and expresses some concerns about the refusal of some Member States to cooperate with one of its elements, the EPPO;

    Budgetary and financial management

    41.  Notes that in 2023, 98,9 % of the available commitment appropriations were used (EUR 184,4 billion out of EUR 186,5 billion); notes that the available appropriations were higher than the MFF ceiling of EUR 182,7 billion due to the use of special instruments for new or unforeseen events; notes that 90,0 % of payment appropriations were used (EUR 162,0 billion of EUR 165,2 billion available);

    42.  Notes with concern that the total outstanding commitments, which represent future debts if not decommitted, reached an all-time high of EUR 543 billion (2022: EUR 450 billion); notes that the Commission foresees a decrease from 2025 to 2029 when committed amounts for both NGEU and the 2021-2027 programming period should be paid out; notes however that the actual amounts for 2023 (EUR 543 billion) are much higher than the forecasted amount (EUR 490 billion), calling the Commission’s estimates into question;

    43.  Recalls that the time available for implementing shared management funds under the 2021-2027 MFF is shorter than under previous MFFs because of the n+2 for the last year, which, coupled with the high RAL, will raise the risk of decommitments; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission has increased its forecasted amount of decommitments from EUR 7,6 billion for 2023-2027, to EUR 8,1 billion for 2024-2027 to EUR 8,8 billion for 2025-2027, a 15 % increase in 2 years; underlines with concern that the Commission has underestimated its projections for the RAL in the last two years, and that the Commission therefore likely underestimates the amount of decommitments that will be made until 2027; notes the introduction of the “cascade mechanism” following the mid-term review of the MFF 2021-2027 and the incentive to use decommitted amounts to cover increased interest costs for amounts borrowed by the Commission for NGEU;

    44.   Notes that the latest long-term payment forecast produced by the Commission foresees substantial decommitments as of 2027 unless Member States undertake additional efforts and implement at a much faster pace than in the period 2014-2020; notes that for the CF, ERDF, and ESF+ cohesion policy funds, the Commission forecast total decommitments for 2024-2027 at EUR 2,2 billion, more than five times its 2022 forecast of EUR 0,4 billion; warns that for the Just Transition Fund (JTF), the low implementation in 2023 puts important amounts at risk from 2025 onwards; calls on the Commission and on the Member States to use all of the available possibilities to avoid decommitments;

    45.  Notes with concern that Union debt increased from EUR 344,3 billion in 2022 to EUR 458,5 billion in 2023, 60 % of which is related to NGEU; notes that only for the debt issued for NGEU, associated interest costs need to be paid directly from the Union Budget and that, due to increased interest rates, these costs for the current MFF (until the end of 2027) are estimated to be between EUR 17 billion and EUR 27 billion higher than the initially forecasted EUR 14,9 billion;

    46.  Notes with concern that the total exposure of the Union budget because of guarantees and contingent liabilities for loans rose to EUR 298,0 billion; notes that assumptions on capital-market interest should be made conservatively, both for existing debt and new debt and that for both categories a viable plan for its repayment is necessary; notes that the Court received information from the Commission that indicates that the exposure will steadily increase in the coming years, putting additional pressure on the headroom of the budget and further reducing the flexibility of the Union budget; supports the Court recommendations to the Commission to act more proactively to ensure that its mitigating tools (such as the Common Provisioning Fund) have sufficient capacity as well as to provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure, making its estimate public;

    47.  Notes with concern that the Court in its Special Report 07/2024(9) observed that a significant share of recovery orders issued between 2014 and 2022 were still outstanding at the time of their audit; further notes that the Commission, in its replies to the Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control’s (CONT Committee) written questions for the 2023 discharge, mentioned that there are 1 357 overdue recovery orders for a total outstanding amount of approximately EUR 335 million for the period 2014-2023; calls on the Commission to prioritise collecting monies under overdue recovery orders and to keep the Committee on Budgetary Control informed about progress made;

    48.  Highlights that equality is a founding value of the Union and is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; recalls the commitment of the Union to gender mainstreaming in its policy-making and implementation of Union funds, including gender budgeting; encourages the Commission to continue the efforts made in gender budgeting and in tracking the impact of the Union budget to foster gender equality; recalls the obligation of the Commission to accompany all legislative proposals with an impact assessment when they are projected to have a significant economic, social, and environmental impact in order to guarantee, among other things, fair distribution of funds;

    49.  Notes that the review of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Transparency Register is due by July 2025; calls on the Commission to ensure that the process is as open as possible, to align financial reporting requirements across all categories of registrants (including funding sources and lobbying budgets), addressing also the risk identified in the Court’s Special Report on the EU Transparency Register (SR 05/2024) regarding self-declarations on the category of interest representation; believes that, in order to address the recommendations of the Court, the resources of the secretariat of the Transparency Register should be increased;

    50.  Recalls the following findings of the Court of Auditors’ Special Report 11/2025: (i) that the identification and registration of entities as NGOs are not always consistent and reliable; (ii) that despite a more streamlined granting process, issues with the completeness and accuracy of data remain; (iii) that the lack of a reliable overview of Union spending on NGOs hampers useful analysis; (iv) that the calls for proposals in the Court’s sample were transparent; (v) that respect for Union values is not pro-actively verified; and (vi) that transparency practices vary widely in the Court’s sample, with larger NGOs performing better. calls on the Commission to fully implement the recommendations in the Court’s Special Report;

    Recommendations

    51.  Strongly supports the recommendations of the Court in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (annual report for the 2023 financial year)(10) as well as in related special reports; calls on the Commission to implement them without delay and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    52.  Calls on the Court to look for ways, together with the Commission, to align their methodologies for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;

    53.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) continue to engage with the Court in order to increase understanding, convergence and comparability of the two approaches to the diverging estimates of errors in Union expenditure;
       (ii) qualify the impact of corrective measures on the overall level of error;
       (iii) look for ways, together with the Court, to align their methodologies as regards the evaluation of procurement errors, and the estimation of the level of error for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;
       (iv) present the discharge authority with a strategy to strengthen the use of funds for their intended purpose, increase absorption and prevent decommitments in order to maximise the EU-added value of the Union Budget;
       (v) increase the reliability of the forecast of the outstanding commitments with a more realistic estimate of the absorption of Union funds to give the discharge authority a better forecast of the development of the RAL over the years and better protect the Union budget;
       (vi) report on, and provide sufficient measures to, protecting the Union budget from the different risks identified beyond the RAL, such as decommitments in cohesion policy, the increasing debt, increased budget exposure and the impact of increasing inflation;
       (vii) provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure by presenting, in the Annual Management and Performance Report, a multi-annual outlook on the exposure of the Union Budget to budgetary guarantees;
       (viii) substantially simplify rules and procedures and improve the assistance to, and ensure consistent and user-friendly guidelines for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies, CSOs and all other relevant stakeholders, without compromising the quality of the controls;
       (ix) make sure that the mitigation tools in place have sufficient capacity to effectively face the exposure risks of the Union budget;
       (x) boost efforts to improve transparency in the use of funds, including as regards information on final beneficiaries, including on the funds that are allocated for the preparation of policy and legislative proposals;
       (xi) put in place all necessary means for ensuring that all interest representatives that approach Union institutions are registered in the Transparency Register; further asks the Commission to set up an effective mechanism to ensure that entities funded by the Union in the Transparency Register are aligned with Union values and demand full transparency on their financing, providing a deeper insight into the financing of all entities registered and which should be the condition to approach all Union institutions, bodies and agencies;
       (xii) together with Parliament and Council, guarantee adequate resources for the secretariat of the Transparency Register in order to ensure that the entries on the lobbying activities of all interest representatives can be checked for accuracy and that lobbying become more transparent as requested in the Court in Special Report 05/2024 on the EU Transparency Register; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to identify irregularities to guarantee a wide range of search capabilities;
       (xiii) require interest representatives in the Transparency Register to list their financial supporters by self-declaring that they are only representing their interests or the collective interests of their members and to propose an amendment to Annex II to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 to require them to list their financial supporters in the EU Transparency Register, even if they state in that register that they are only representing the interests of their own members; urges entities already registered that have not listed their financial resources by self-declaration to declare them voluntarily before the interinstitutional agreement is amended;
       (xiv) continue to support Member States in improving both the quality and the quantity of checks and to share best practices in the fight against fraud and corruption;
       (xv) address the situation regarding late recovery orders and to take all necessary measures to recover the majority of the amount outstanding for the period 2014-2023, including implementation of corporate escalation mechanisms, and keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in recovering the sums;
       (xvi) reinforce the capacity of the Anti-fraud Architecture of the Union, including the provision of sufficient financial and human resources, and facilitate the cooperation between them;

    Revenue

    54.  Welcomes that for 2023, the Court is also able to issue a clean opinion on the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, stresses that the problems with customs duties not being declared or being incorrectly declared (a customs gap) leading to a shortfall in collected import duties has been a persistent problem for many years and could potentially entail a loss of traditional own resources for the Union and for the Member States;

    55.  Notes with serious concern that the Court has examined the implementation of the Commission’s Customs Action Plan, which has the potential to lead to a significant reduction of the customs gap, and has again identified insufficient progress in the implementation of some actions from this plan; notes that the Commission, as part of this plan, proposed a customs reform in May 2023(11), including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub;

    56.  Recalls that the Court has highlighted the risks to the EU’s financial interests from inadequate or ineffective customs controls of imported goods; commends the efforts made by OLAF on the fight against Fraud linked to customs duties and VAT; underlines the rise of the ecommerce and the online platforms risks due to potential security and safety threats and risk of non-compliance with EU taxation and customs rules, product standards, intellectual property rights, prohibitions and restrictions;

    57.  Notes with concern that the Court revealed that the Commission did not charge late interest payments for six cases related to late corrections to GNI data by Member States where the Commission has expressed reservations; agrees with the Court that the Commission, as a matter of principle, ought to charge late interest payments in such cases in order to create an incentive for Member States to address the reservations within the deadlines;

    58.  Notes with satisfaction that the new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste generated by Member States in 2023 amounted to EUR 7,2 billion, equivalent to 4,0 % of the EU’s total revenue; further notes that the Court identified(12) some problems related to the reliability and comparability of data; stresses that it provides an excellent example of a new own resource, as it creates positive incentives for Member States to reduce the volume of non-recycled plastic packaging while at the same time generating a new revenue stream for the Union;

    59.  Stresses that the Commission’s proposals concerning new own resources from 2021 comprising three elements, the first based on revenues from emissions trading (ETS), the second drawing on the resources generated by the Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, and the third based on the share of residual profits from multinationals that will be re-allocated to Member States under the OECD/G20 agreement on a re-allocation of taxing rights (“Pillar One”) are obvious candidates for such new resources; at the same time, points out that other sources might also be considered if they should prove to be easier for Member States to approve; welcomes other initiatives that may lead to new own resources for the Union budget;

    60.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) increase focus and pressure on the implementation of the Customs Action Plan and not least the proposal for a significant customs reform from May 2023, including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub; ensure that Member States implement effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations; initiate infringement proceedings in those cases where there is sufficient evidence that Member States are implementing a manifestly inadequate penalty system for breaches of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 6(13) (DAC 6);
       (ii) insist on the importance of intensifying and diversifying the International customs cooperation with trade partners and stresses the need to strengthen the fight against cross-border tax and customs fraud in the context of the expansion of e-commerce;
       (iii) create incentives for Member States to address reservations related to corrections of GNI data by Member States within the deadlines by charging late interest payments;
       (iv) continue work towards the introduction of additional new own resources;

    Single market, Innovation and Digital

    61.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 1 ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ was EUR 25,3 billion (13,2 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: EUR 15,3 billion (60,5 %) for Research, EUR 4,1 billion (16,1 %) for Transport, Energy and Digital, EUR 2,3 billion (9,1 %) for the InvestEU Programme, EUR 2,2 billion (8,7 %) for Space, and EUR 1,4 billion (5,6 %) for other areas;

    62.  Notes that the Court has examined 127 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading, notably the Horizon 2020 programme (90 transactions), Horizon Europe (7 transactions), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), space programmes and financial instruments, and also that it has reviewed the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA) ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors and the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) and the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA);

    63.  Notes that the Court estimates that the level of error in spending on ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ in 2023 was material at 3,3 %; notes the Court’s observation that research and innovation expenditure is most affected by error, particularly in the area of personnel costs; further notes that the Commission estimates the risk at payment as 1,4 % for this heading, which is in the lower half of the range of the Court’s estimate; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that the Commission’s risk at payment for this heading remains an underestimate, because of weaknesses identified by the Court in the Commission’s ex post audits in this area since the financial year 2019(14);

    64.  Notes with concern that 39 (31 %) of the 127 transactions that the Court examined contained errors; is deeply concerned that for seven cases of quantifiable errors made by beneficiaries, the Commission (or the auditors contracted by the beneficiaries) had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure, and thus, had the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1,4 percentage points lower; highlights that this points to weaknesses in the Commission’s controls;

    Research and innovation

    65.  Highlights the importance of Union research and innovation (R&I) funding programmes for the scientific, societal, economic and technological development of the Union, reducing inequalities, achieving the green and digital transitions and decreasing the Union’s energy dependency on Russia; recalls that Horizon Europe is the most significant research and innovation programme in Europe, with a total budget of EUR 95,5 billion for 2021-2027, including EUR 5,4 billion from the NGEU instrument; notes that the RRF has allocated around EUR 48 billion in investments to R&I; underlines that in order to enhance the Union’s competitiveness and close the innovation gap, additional funding for R&I is needed, taking into account the Draghi report’s pertinent recommendations; highlights, in particular, the need to increase defence-related R&I spending due to the current geopolitical conditions, which could serve as an important component of the innovation policy strategy;

    66.  Notes that its predecessor, Horizon 2020, with a budget of EUR 75,6 billion funded more than 35 000 projects between 2014 and 2020 and its calls attracted over a million individual applications from 177 countries; further notes that in her hearing for the 2023 discharge, Commissioner Ivanova underlined the EU added value of EU R&I funding programmes, explaining that the final evaluation of Horizon 2020 estimated that, for each euro of costs linked to the programme five euros worth of benefits would be generated for society by 2040; deeply regrets that 74 % of proposals assessed as high quality by independent experts could not be funded due to budget constraints; notes that an additional EUR 159 billion would have been needed to fund all high-quality proposals; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for Union research and innovation, not the least to increase the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity, in line with the Union’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029;

    67.  Notes the late adoption of the Horizon Europe legal bases in 2021 and welcomes that the Commission managed to reach close to 100 % budget implementation in 2023; notes that the number of grant agreements signed by the end of 2023 was 10 674 and a further two framework agreements were signed;

    68.  Notes with concern that the Court found errors relating to ineligible costs in 30 of the 97 research and innovation transactions in its sample, and that these errors represent 71 % of the Court’s estimated level of error for this heading in 2023; reiterates its concern that after 9 years of implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme, the calculation of personnel costs remains a major source of errors, as 22 of the 30 research transactions with quantifiable errors in the Court’s sample (around 73 %) are affected by the incorrect application of the methodology for calculating personnel costs; acknowledges both the Commission’s and the Court’s continued efforts to remedy this situation; welcomes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendations to enhance beneficiaries’ compliance with the daily-rate rules and to ensure clarity concerning daily-rate rules in Horizon Europe documents;

    69.  Underlines the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures governing Union R&I funding; notes that in 2023 the Commission has continued the roll out of simplified cost options such as lump sums and unit costs in Horizon Europe; further notes the remarks made by the Director-General for Research and Innovation in the exchange of views with the CONT Committee that the Commission intends to increase the disbursement of Horizon Europe funds through lump sums to 50 % by 2027; welcomes that the Commission, taking the Court’s recommendations issued in its annual reports for 2022 into account, will further specify the requirements defining the proper implementation of lump sum grants, including the elements of each work package triggering payment, and will also provide detailed guidance to those involved in assessing the implementation of projects; further notes that, as described in the Commission’s assessment of Lump Sum Funding in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe 2018-2024, beneficiaries would welcome more clarity on how lump sum grants would be audited; is concerned that the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe is not yet developed;

    70.  Stresses the crucial role of the private sector in addressing the innovation gap in the Union and improving the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity; believes, in particular, that it is imperative to continue to promote and facilitate as much as possible the participation of SMEs in Union R&I funding programmes; notes the Court’s conclusion that SMEs and newcomers are more prone to making errors than other beneficiaries since they lack the experience and resources to administer the funds; welcomes the efforts made by the Commission to support SMEs specifically, for example through information campaigns, contacts with the system of National Contact Points and the dedicated helpdesk of the Research Enquiry Service; considers that the simplification of rules and procedures is the major driver for increased participation of SMEs;

    Energy, Transport and Digital

    71.  Highlights the importance of Union investments in the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services and notes that the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), with EUR 4,1 billion of expenditure in 2023, is a key Union instrument in delivering these objectives;

    72.  Draws attention to the need to simplify the application procedures under the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) in order to enable greater participation of smaller entities and local initiatives in the development of European transport infrastructure; regrets that the CEF-T budget does not cover all the needs for sustainable transport investments and that most of the CEF-T budget has already been allocated, leaving a funding gap until 2027;

    73.  Recalls that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting sanctions imposed on Russia continued to adversely impact the Union’s transport sector in 2023, leading to traffic shortages, supply chain bottlenecks, and the necessity to bypass traditional routes, thereby extending journey times and increasing costs; points out that the Eastern border regions, especially in the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Romania, have been particularly affected by economic losses and a halt of cross-border mobility as a consequence of the Russian aggression; calls on the Commission to introduce targeted measures, including in the next MFF, to facilitate recovery of the affected regions;

    74.  Calls on the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the funding allocated to the cross-border and multi-country infrastructure projects, facing significant implementation challenges, financial difficulties, or delays, such as Rail Baltica; points out that this review should address inefficiencies in planning and management as well as escalating construction costs that threaten project timelines and objectives; reiterates that greater transparency in the management of public funds increases citizens’ trust in the Union institutions;

    75.  Notes with concern that the Court found two errors in CEF projects in its 2023 sample, and that one of these relates to a serious breach of the Union’s public procurement rules, and has led to the contract being awarded to a consortium that did not fulfil the selection criteria and that this error contributed 28 % to the estimated error rate for heading 1;

    76.  Is deeply concerned by the Court’s findings in relation to the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA)ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors, in particular the Court’s conclusion that while the strategies for both CEF1 (2014-2020) and CEF2 (2021-2027) are based on a sound analysis of risks and past irregularities, the guidelines for ex-ante checks on procurement were not detailed enough; fully supports the Court’s recommendation that the Commission should further develop these guidelines;

    Recommendations

    77.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) secure the provision of adequate resources to support high-quality research and innovation project proposals with an EU added value in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework;
       (ii) continue to simplify rules and procedures in line with the new financial regulation, to support training sessions and user-friendly, consistent and practical information for applicants in Member States, in particular for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, CSOs or local action groups and to encourage applications from beneficiaries in Member States with more limited participation, as well as from smaller entities;
       (iii) continue to apply simplified rules and procedures, digitalisation measures and simplified cost options (SCOs) while addressing, in particular, the risk of irregularities and fraud and the costs of controls, and finalising the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe as soon as possible;
       (iv) further specify the requirements for defining proper implementation of lump sum grants, taking into account the Court’s pertinent recommendations from its 2022 Annual Report, and verify the actual implementation of projects using lump sums;
       (v) undertake a thorough analysis of procurement errors found and further develop the guidelines describing the extent of the checks to be performed for ex ante controls on procurement for CEF projects, as recommended by the Court;

    Cohesion, Resilience and Values

    78.  Stresses the importance of Union cohesion policy for economic and territorial convergence and development in the regions of the Union, as well as for supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 2 ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ was EUR 73,3 billion (38,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 47,8 % for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and other regional operations, 18,9 % for the European Social Fund (ESF), 9,8 % for the Cohesion Fund (CF), 3,8 % for Erasmus+, 2,1 % for CEF Transport, and 3,8 % for other areas;

    79.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 238 transactions covering the full range of spending under MFF Heading 2; notes with concern that the Court’s estimated overall level of error in expenditure under this heading in 2023 increased to 9,3 %, which is significantly above the materiality threshold; draws attention to the marked increase in the overall level of error estimated by the Court in 2023 compared to previous years (6,4 % in 2022, 3,6 % in 2021);

    80.  Is concerned about the Court’s observation that the significant additional resources made available under the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU), the approaching end of the eligibility period for 2014-2020 programmes (31 December 2023), and parallel implementation of the NGEU programme have put additional pressure on Member State’s administrations, increasing the risk of errors; is in particular concerned by the practice of reducing Member States’ co-funding, as is the case under REACT-EU, the Coronavirus Investment Initiative (CRII) and CRII+, which reduces the ownership and associated incentives for properly overseeing expenditure; notes from the Commission replies the acknowledgement that some authorities may have carried out less effective controls and verifications due to the heavy overload and increasing pressure of parallel implementation of 2014-2020 programmes and of additional funding under NGEU;

    81.  Notes the Court’s analysis of transactions with additional funding through REACT-EU and flexibility through CRII+ and Cohesion’s Action for Refugees (CARE) and their contribution to the estimated levels of error; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities, without either decreasing requirements or increasing preventive checks and controls at the same time, contributed to the high error rate;

    82.  Notes the Court’s Review 03/2024 “An overview of the assurance framework and the key factors contributing to errors in 2014-2020 cohesion spending” that provides a multi-annual overview covering six years of audit results, including an assessment of management and control issues, aiming to strengthen the assurance model; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that, although the assurance framework for cohesion policy has helped to reduce the level of error, it has not been effective in bringing the overall level of error below the materiality threshold of 2 %; is worried that the Commission can rely only to a limited degree on the work of the national audit authorities, because of the systematic weaknesses; supports the Court’s recommendation to the Commission to strengthen the implementation of the assurance framework for the 2021-2027 cohesion spending; reminds the Commission of the discharge authority’s call to work closely with the Member States to improve the management and control system for Union expenditure to reduce the high error rate to below the 2 % materiality threshold;

    83.  Notes the Court’s observation in its review on the reliability of the work of key actors in the control system for cohesion policy; is concerned by the Court’s finding that during a 6-year period managing authorities, the first line of defence for detection and prevention of errors, are not sufficiently effective in mitigating the inherent high risk of error in cohesion policy; considers it even more worrying that the Court found that the second line of defence, the Member States’ audit authorities, are not able to determine the correct error rate for the packages of expenditure they audit and provide assurance on, since the Court detected additional errors in at least 39 % of these packages; notes that these errors have been detected and reported by the Court annually for more than 6 years and that there is therefore a systemic issue;

    84.  Notes the Court’s categorisation of errors found in cohesion expenditure, with ineligible projects accounting for 29 %, ineligible costs for 26 % and serious non-compliance in public procurement procedures accounting for 21 % of errors and ERDF and CF related expenditure accounting for the largest share of errors (80 %); notes that expenditure under the ESF+, YEI and FEAD are proportionally less affected by error, as they together account for 16 % of errors, while they together account for around 20 % of the budget under this heading;

    85.  Notes the study commissioned by the Committee on Budgetary Control on ‘Lessons learned from the implementation of crisis response tools’ that shows that absorption of uncommitted cohesion resources was supported by the flexibilities introduced under CRII and CRII+; is concerned by the finding of the researchers that quality of fast-tracked projects might not have reached the same level as investments before the pandemic; is further concerned by the researchers’ observation that the risk of low-quality projects is entirely borne by the Union Budget, because of 100 % EU-funding in CRII, CRII+ and REACT-EU; considers that 100 % EU-funding might help absorption, but that absorption is not a goal in itself;

    86.  Stresses that, in its most recent discharge opinions, the Committee on Regional Development called for additional advisory support from the Commission to national, local and regional authorities to avoid a situation of administrative overload; recognises the Commission’s efforts but, observes that, regrettably, these have not been sufficient to mitigate the risk of error; warns that a similar administrative overload might occur at the end of the RRF eligibility period and the final years of the MFF; underlines the need to address the insufficient administrative capacity of national, local and regional authorities as a matter of urgency; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to provide them with clear guidance, and to increase its support for administrative capacity building, including through staff training, best practice sharing, peer-to-peer reviews and technical assistance to ensure effective fund management;

    87.  Notes the public discussions on the post-2027 multiannual financial framework that may indicate a shift towards a performance-based model, coupling investments and reforms, and a desire to simplify rules and procedures; calls on the Commission to prioritise the financial responses to the current threats resulting from the geopolitical situation; warns that any decision on the future design of spending programmes must not be to the detriment of oversight and control of Union expenditure in terms of transparency and information at Union level about non-compliance with rules and regulations; considers that the errors identified by the Court and the way the Commission handles those errors are also an indication of a properly functioning management and control system and notes that both institutions stated their commitment to improve the system and bring down the error rate;

    88.  Notes, as in previous years, the Court’s observation that the Commission’s desk reviews, to review and assess the work of audit authorities, are aimed at checking only consistency of regularity information, and that they are therefore too limited to confirm the residual error rate reported by the national authorities in their assurance packages; notes the Commission’s reply that it complements its desk review with on-the-spot audit work covering the programmes and assurance packages, which enables it to establish a reasonable and fair estimate of the error rates for each programme; considers that the Court’s observation is about the scope of the desk reviews and the fact that they are only aimed at consistency and therefore too limited to provide the Commission with information that is sufficiently reliable;

    89.  Is concerned about the persistent shortcomings observed by the Court in the work of national audit authorities as visible in the weaknesses identified in the assurance packages, with a residual error rate above the materiality threshold for more than 60 % of the value of assurance packages audited in 2023; stresses with concern that managing authorities consistently do not effectively succeed in preventing or detecting irregularities in expenditure declared by beneficiaries and that this reduces the extent to which the Commission can rely on their work;

    90.  Reminds that in shared management, it is the Commission’s responsibility to make sure that Member States set up management and control systems that function effectively during the implementation of programmes; is worried that both the Commission and the Court have identified that not all Member States’ management and control systems function effectively, thus negatively effecting the reliability of the Commission error rates, as they rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively; calls into question the possibility for the Commission to continue to rely on national systems;

    91.  Considers that for the single audit approach to work well, and in order to achieve reduced administrative burden for beneficiaries and managing authorities, adherence to audit standards at all levels of control and audit is of essential importance; is therefore worried by the Court’s finding in its annual report that essential supporting documents about compliance with eligibility conditions were not presented by programme authorities and beneficiaries, and also by the finding by the Court presented in its review that insufficient documentation of audit work from audit authorities limits the reliance that can be placed on audit work of national audit authorities;

    92.  Recalls that following Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council(15) (CPR) for the programming period 2021-2027, Member States need to comply with horizontal and thematic enabling conditions, which need to remain fulfilled and respected throughout the implementation period of the funds; recalls that when enabling conditions are not fulfilled at the time of submission of a payment application to the Commission for the specific objective concerned, the related expenditure will not be reimbursed from the Union budget until the Commission is satisfied that the enabling condition has been fulfilled; recalls the strong regrets of the discharge authority in relation to the Commission decision of 13 December 2023(16) considering that Hungary fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition related to judicial independence that enabled the Hungarian authorities to submit reimbursement claims of up to EUR 10,2 billion; notes with concern that since the release of these funds, the Hungarian government has not taken steps to reinstate the independence of the judiciary but on the contrary; reiterates its worries about the lack of adequate control mechanisms or unreliable public procurement procedures to guarantee sound financial management and the protection of the Union budget; believes that this decision politically contradicts the prolongation of the measures adopted under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(17) (the ‘Conditionality Regulation’);

    93.  Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2023 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm the increasing pressure on judicial independence, including concerns over the selection and promotion of judges, and recent reports of intimidation and interference in judicial decisions, as exemplified by the resignations of judges in protest against political influence; notes with concern in the same vein that the head of the Hungarian Integrity Authority, a key institution established as a condition set by the Commission for the release of Union funds under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, is facing increasing pressure from the Hungarian government; calls on the Commission to ensure a coordinated and holistic approach across all relevant Union funds and legislative tools, emphasizing that Union funds must not be allocated to activities undermining democracy or reinforcing authoritarianism;

    94.  Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation establishes a mechanism and measures to protect the Union Budget from breaches of the rule of law when other procedures set out in Union legislation would not protect the budget more efficiently; recalls that this mechanism was activated on 15 December 2022 in the case of Hungary over concerns related to its system of public procurement, resulting in a temporary suspension of 55 % of budgetary commitments for three cohesion policy programmes; recalls that the same regulation, in line with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093(18) (the ‘MFF Regulation’), stipulates that suspended commitments of 2022 (year n), may not be re-entered into the budget beyond 2024 (year n+2) and that therefore 55 % of commitments from 2022, around EUR 1 billion, were decommitted in December 2024; notes that no other procedures under the Conditionality Regulation are ongoing;

    95.  Notes that the Commission allocated an equivalent of five full-time staff members to the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation and reiterates the European Court of Auditor’s concerns raised in its Special Report 03/2024 that current staff numbers appear to be insufficient to ensure a strict and coherent application of the Regulation;

    96.  Reiterates the need to treat as a single, integral package all the measures required for the release of Union funding under the Conditionality Regulation, the CPR and Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council(19) (the ‘RRF Regulation’); stresses the importance of the protection of the Union financial interests also for disbursement of pre-financing;

    97.  Notes that some investments which would have been eligible for financing under cohesion are included in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans; recalls that the general objective of the RRF enshrined in Article 4 of the RRF Regulation is to promote the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion, and that one of its six pillars is specifically dedicated to this purpose; acknowledges that the wide scope of the RRF results in limited overlap with other Union funding programmes, as intended by the co-legislators when establishing the Article 9 of the RRF Regulation, which establishes additionality and complementarity funding as key principles; draws attention, however, to the risks of double funding emerging from such situations;

    98.  Expresses its preoccupation about the visible delays in implementation of cohesion policy in Member States and the lack of capacity of national administrations to deal in parallel with different spending programmes (e.g. cohesion programmes and RRF programmes) covering complementary or even similar objectives; calls on the Commission to ensure that sufficient technical assistance is provided to Member States facing difficulties in order to address existing delays in the implementation of cohesion programmes;

    99.  Recognises the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly direct public funding into security, defence and preparedness, while facing dramatically reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes, particularly Interreg programmes; notes the measures taken by the European Commission to support these regions, notably through flexibilities provided under cohesion policy; welcomes that providing support to eastern border regions most affected by Russia’s aggression is included in the mission letter of the Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms; calls on the Commission to ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression, both in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;

    100.  Stresses the importance of ESF+ which aims to achieve high employment, fair social protection, a skilled and resilient workforce, and inclusive/cohesive societies as key in eradicating poverty; expresses the need to provide it with the continued financial and political support of the Union, national and regional institutions in the delivery of its objectives and targets in the years to come; underlines the importance of closely involving regional actors, in particular civil society organisations and social partners working on the ground in the implementation of ESF+ funded activities;

    101.  Welcomes the frontloading of EUR 100 million from the 2027 budget of Erasmus+ to the 2023 budget of Erasmus+, which enabled continued support to pupils, students, teachers and qualified staff fleeing from Ukraine, and the extra EUR 20 million awarded to Erasmus+ in 2023 as a result of Parliament’s insistence; stresses that frontloading must remain an exception to rapid response to unforeseen acute crisis situations; underlines that any frontloading of Erasmus+ cannot result in cuts for the programme at the end of current MFF; emphasises that every effort must be made to respond to such situations preferentially with additional funding;

    102.  Emphasises the need for strict oversight of the allocation of funds to prevent misuse within the Erasmus programme; asks the Commission to gather evidence to investigate any case of fraudulent or suspicious recipients, in accordance with its duties outlined in the Financial Regulation and Erasmus+ grant agreements; calls for adequate safeguarding of the programme from abuse by organizations whose activities are not aligned with the fundamental values of the Union (human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights); recalls that the Commission is legally bound to ensure that programme beneficiaries commit to and ensure the respect of these values and do not commit professional misconduct;

    103.  Notes that in 2023, the budget of the EU4Health programme, the main financial instrument to support Union health initiatives, was EUR 735 million, mainly managed by Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and implemented through the European Health and Digital Executive Agency; acknowledges the progress of initiatives funded under this programme, notably in the areas of health emergency preparedness, the Beating Cancer Plan, the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe and in the implementation of Union health legislation;

    Recommendations

    104.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) re-consider the practice of 100 % Union funding in Union crisis response instruments, where increasing pre-financing might provide faster availability of funds, while maintaining a shared financial budgetary control responsibility in implementation of the funds by maintaining financial involvement from both national and Union level;
       (ii) ensure selection of qualitatively good projects with cohesion policy funds by favouring long-term investments, and duly justifying 100 % Union funding while limiting its application;
       (iii) address the systemic issue of non-detection of errors at Member State level in cohesion policy spending with an action plan, aimed at reporting an accurate error rate in assurance packages, and detection of errors at the first lines of defence by making available more, and/or better targeting existing resources and increase detection capacity at Member State and Commission level;
       (iv) calculate and report to the discharge authority the cost of control for all expenditure handled by national authorities concerning cohesion policy funds, and NGEU, and compare these figures with the cost of control when only Cohesion policy funds were handled by the same authorities;
       (v) address the recurrent issue of insufficient documentation at beneficiary, programme authority and audit authority level, not only through checks, awareness raising and information on requirements, but also through increased digitalisation and where possible, through financial incentives to penalise non-respect of the requirements for sound financial management;
       (vi) expand the scope of its desk review of assurance packages to review more quality criteria in addition to consistency to make a reliable estimate of the residual error rate for the assurance package under review, as well as of the risk at payment as a whole;
       (vii) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats for the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;
       (viii) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;
       (ix) continuously monitor the implementation by the Hungarian Government of measures foreseen in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022; assess to what extent the situation has improved or worsened, including in relation to the challenges faced by the Hungarian Integrity Authority, and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation;
       (x) provide Member States with increased technical assistance in order to address delays in the implementation of national programmes in order to increase the absorption rate;
       (xi) closely monitor and mitigate the increasing risk of double funding between Cohesion programmes and RRF funding and address any such occurrences without delay;
       (xii) further enhance simplification in the implementation of cohesion programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xiii) take all necessary measures to bring down the error rate in close cooperation with the Court of Auditors;
       (xiv) ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, both in the short-term and in the medium-term;

    Natural resources

    105.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 3 ‘Natural resources’ was EUR 59,5 billion (31,1 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 65,0 % for direct payments under the European Agricultural Guarantee fund (EAGF), 27,6 % for the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 4,2 % for market-related expenditure under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), 1,9 % for Maritime and Fisheries, 0,9 % for Environment and Climate (LIFE), and 0,4 % for other areas;

    106.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 218 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading; notes that the Court also examined the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) and the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), as well as selected systems in 20 Member States and the United Kingdom; notes that the Court estimates the level of error for ‘Natural Resources’ to be 2,2 % (2,2 % in 2022) and that the majority of the errors found affected rural development transactions;

    107.  Points out, however, that this is partly due to the complexity of environmental schemes in rural development programmes and the recognized negative issue of “gold plating” at national level;

    108.  Notes, in this context, the lower-than-expected implementation rate of EAFRD funding for the period 2023-2027, with an absorption rate of only 1 % at the end of 2023, with payments amounting to EUR 0,7 billion, and expects the absorption rate to increase significantly in the course of the next reporting period;

    109.  Notes that the Court found 16 quantifiable errors in rural development, 15 in direct payments, three in expenditure related to market measures, and three in non-CAP expenditure; is reassured by the Commission’s assessment that most errors concern clerical mistakes and by the actions taken by the Commission to prevent errors in the future;

    110.  Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with ineligible claims accounting for 35 % of the errors, and administrative errors and inaccurate information on areas or animals for 21 % and 20 % respectively; notes with concern, that as in previous years, that the Court found in several cases that the Member State authorities and the Commission had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities and the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1.0 percentage point lower;

    111.  Notes that 2023 was the first year of the CAP 2023-2027 new delivery model, which integrates performance elements, agreed with the Member States in Strategic Plans, as basis for payments; notes that 2023 was a modest start of the new delivery model, EUR 63,65 million declared on the basis of generated outputs and therefore subject to a ‘performance clearance’ by DG AGRI out of EUR 215,52 million declared under the CAP Strategic plans under sectoral interventions and rural development; notes that in 2024 payments under the new delivery model will have increased substantially; notes the Court’s observations as regards processing performance data for the Annual Performance Reports where Member States are in the process of setting-up systems and procedures and at times manually aggregate data, with associated risks for the reliability of data;

    112.  Recalls the farmers’ protests across Europe towards the end of 2023 and early 2024 and the Commission’s response aimed at simplification, in particular for small farmers, and increasing discretionary powers for Member States; stresses that simplification should go hand in hand with sound financial management and take into account the Union’s climate commitments; welcomes the Commission’s targeted approach, especially concerning the distinction between farm size in terms of agricultural land and number of farms; cautions that discretion given to Member States should also be accompanied by thorough oversight by the Commission;

    113.  Recalls that both the Commission and Member States are responsible for addressing fraud in CAP spending; welcomes in that regard the work done in terms of anti-fraud risk assessments and the update of its anti-fraud strategy by DG AGRI;

    114.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 07/2024 on the Commission’s systems for recovering irregular expenditure, and the Commission’s reply; notes the Court’s observation that recoveries concerning agricultural expenditure have been relatively successful, attributed in part to the so-called 50-50 rule that incentivised Member States to recover funds; notes that this rule has not been retained in the 2023-2027 CAP and the Court’s warning that this might lead to a deterioration of the rate of recovery for agricultural expenditure;

    115.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply; stresses the importance of ensuring that all key elements for assessing performance are provided; considers that plans need to account for specific situations in specific Member States and that therefore a certain level of divergence is even desirable, is however worried that divergence in ambitions may mean that there is no level playing field for farmers across Member States; is further disappointed by the Court’s finding that although the new monitoring framework has been simplified, the CAP objectives lack clarity and indicators focus on outputs rather than results, and that important result indicators are missing; notes that the Court recommends the Commission to promote exchange of best practices in the plans and strengthening the future CAP monitoring framework;

    116.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 19/2024 on Organic farming in the EU, and the Commission’s reply; is once more worried by the Court’s finding that a weak strategic framework and data constraints prevent the measurement of the impact of the policy; considers that the increased focus on performance and definition of targets and indicators, and the related monitoring of results across Union policies needs to be supported by an equal increase of the Commission’s capacity to define performance frameworks and monitor performance;

    117.  Welcomes the increased competitiveness achieved through market measures in the wine sector and encourages the Commission and Member States to persevere in their efforts to replicate this success in other sectors;

    118.  Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue; underlines that separation of powers between the institutions as laid down in Article 13 TEU must always be respected and that Union institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation;

    119.  Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme; recalls the provisions of the LIFE+ Regulation, including those related to operating grants, the eligibility conditions, the award criteria, the overall allocation for 2021-2027 and the distribution of funds within the programme;

    120.  Notes that some members of the Budgetary Control committee requested access to a series of grant agreements under the LIFE programme, as well as other Union funding programmes, and after scrutinising them expressed concerns on the content of several of the programmes in February 2024; notes that the Commission, including the Internal Audit Service (IAS), was initially not aware of any issue, but adopted a series of measures with the aim of addressing the concerns; recalls the discharge written questions and hearings with the Secretary-General of the Commission on 5 November 2024, the responsible Commissioners for MFF Heading 3 on 12 November, and the Commissioner responsible for Budget and administration on 9 December 2024 where the concerns and the Commission’s response were discussed;

    121.  Notes the concerns expressed by some members of the Budgetary Control Committee that certain grant agreements between the European Union Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) and beneficiaries, such as CSOs and private companies, under the LIFE Programme include ‘work plans’ containing detailed advocacy actions towards Union institutions or their representatives, as well as other actions directed towards certain trade agreements which the Union was negotiating, or litigation measures to be pursued by the respective entities; acknowledges that this could be potentially interpreted as interfering with internal decision making in Union institutions; notes that the Commission has performed a legal analysis of the grant agreements that raised concerns of some Members of the CONT Committee, which concluded that there was no evidence that the entities concerned had breached their contractual or code of conduct obligations, yet the Commission asked some beneficiaries to make amendments to the grant agreements that contained the specific provisions that potentially entailed a reputational risk; further notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’;

    122.  Underlines that Union financing should not contribute to undermining the rule of law, nor the values on which the Union is founded; recalls the provisions of Article 163 of the Financial Regulation; considers it crucial that there should be no funding without traceability of funds;

    123.  Notes the actions taken by the Commission to address the allegations which included the issuance of guidance for Commission services on funding activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy and screening of their contract portfolios to determine which agreements were not in line with the guidance; takes note of the measures adopted so far by the Commission while awaiting the results of the screening of the grant agreements with all the beneficiaries, which was requested by the Commission’s Corporate Management Board;

    124.  Notes the decision-making structure, including the evaluation board within CINEA, for deciding on contracts between the Commission and beneficiaries; urges the Commission to ensure that the decision-making structure of CINEA for deciding on contracts to be awarded features clear accountability, clear responsibilities and a practical structure;

    125.  Notes that the executive agency conducts annual bottom-up risk management exercises and that these bottom-up risk management exercises did not identify any critical risks; notes that irrespective of the financing programme, evaluation procedures should be constantly reviewed and adapted if needed;

    126.  Notes reports in the media that the President of the Commission hired a paid special adviser to deliver a report on the “Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture” who received a salary equal to a Director-General in the Commission; is concerned by the remuneration of all the special advisers and the discretion the Commission has in deciding their remuneration, which creates arbitrary inequalities;

    Recommendations

    127.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) closely monitor the Member States’ progress as regards the processing of performance data and the aggregation of data for the annual performance report and keep the discharge authority informed about issues with reliability of performance data, in particular where it concerns manually aggregated data;
       (ii) inform the discharge authority why the Court concludes that for several years several errors could have been prevented, had the Commission and Member States used all information at their disposal and why the Commission and Member States do not manage to address this issue appropriately;
       (iii) apply the lessons learned as regards the reduction of the administrative burden from its response to the farmers’ protests in future policy initiatives, while taking due account of the risk of abuse of funds where control measures are reduced, or risk of too much divergence between Member States when discretionary powers are used without proper oversight;
       (iv) keep the discharge authority informed about the recovery rates of agricultural expenditure, in particular if the rate deteriorates in comparison to the recovery rate under the previous CAP and swiftly mitigate the causes for the deterioration, including considering the introduction of new incentives for Member State authorities to recover funds;
       (v) assess the differences in ambition of strategic plans and inform the discharge authority whether there is divergence between Member States, threatening the level-playing field for farmers, and assess how the Commission addresses those differences;
       (vi) make better use of its capacity for setting-up performance frameworks, for defining objectives and indicators and holding those contributing to the achievements, be they Member States or beneficiaries, accountable for their contributions;
       (vii) update the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy to devote attention to advocating for and upholding a clear separation of executive and legislative power in the Union;
       (viii) have a clear and comprehensive strategy at Commission level as to how to better protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure that Union funds are spent for their intended purposes and diligently apply the Financial Regulation provisions, including by ensuring that grant agreements can be suspended or terminated when beneficiaries violate the Union’s legislation;
       (ix) ensure a fair distribution of Union funds to CSOs to contribute to a pluralistic and vibrant society;
       (x) ensure that the Commission’s guidance adopted in 2024 is applied by all authorising officers and, if necessary, further develop guidance to fully align grant agreements with Treaty provisions and existing legislation;
       (xi) make the results of the screening of grant agreements available to the discharge authority in order to allow an assessment of the extent to which the Commission may be exposed to a reputational risk;
       (xii) adequately address issues such as revolving doors, transparency in financing and donations, the fight against money laundering, limiting foreign interference, independence from political and economic influence, whistleblowing and transparent governance structures, in respect of all entities receiving Union funds;
       (xiii) review the template for MoUs between the Commission and executive agencies to ensure clearer division of responsibilities;
       (xiv) instruct the audit structure to review contracts with beneficiaries and to flag in case they identify contracts that are not in line with applicable financial rules;
       (xv) have the IAS review contracts between the Commission and grantees, specifically to search for content that is not in line with applicable financial rules within work packages;
       (xvi) evaluate the decision-making structure in the areas of the awarding of contracts and instruct Commission services and executive agencies to perform better checks on the content of contracts at all stages, including by ensuring that work packages and key performance indicators as listed by applicants align with the objectives of respective funding programmes;
       (xvii) adopt more precise categorisation of entities listed in the Financial Transparency System;
       (xviii) review its rules for special advisers to remove the arbitrary selection and remuneration;
       (xix) further enhance simplification in the implementation of programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xx) improve the quality of dialogue with farmers from all Member States;
       (xxi) react more quickly when serious concerns of the discharge authority are flagged to the Commission;
       (xxii) perform adequate checks of entities listed in the Transparency Register, in order to ensure that they comprehensively list their activities in the Register;
       (xxiii) draw clearer lines of responsibility when implementing collaborative platforms;
       (xxiv) instruct the Corporate Management Board to submit consolidated information on the list of critical risks to the internal audit service and ensure executive agencies address potential risks and ensure a transparent selection of independent evaluators to prevent conflict of interest and guarantee their independence;
       (xxv) instruct all DGs and executive agencies to review the distribution of funds dedicated to auditing in order to ensure sufficient resources;
       (xxvi) ensure that proposals for Multiannual Work Programmes of any Union funding instrument have clear guidelines on the activities eligible for funding, clearer rules on screening of applications and on admissible content as well as clearer requirements for transparency and traceability of the use of Union funds, including in relation to the disclosure requirements under the EU Transparency Register;
       (xxvii) ensure that all grant agreements respect the necessary requirements related to transparency, traceability and visibility of funds;

    Migration and Border management

    128.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 4 ‘Migration and Border Management’ was EUR 2,7 billion (1,4 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 1,2 billion (46,5 %) for three decentralised agencies, the European Boarder Coast Agency (FRONTEX), the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU- LISA); 1 billion (38,6 %) for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), and 0,4 billion (14,9 %) for the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF);

    129.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 4 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 18 % of AMIF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    130.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 23 transactions, which is not large enough to be representative of the spending under MFF headings 4 and 5 and, thus, it cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for these headings; further notes that the Court’s audit results show that the expenditure under MFF headings 4 and 5 is affected by eligibility and procurement issues and that it is a high-risk area (7 out of 23 transactions audited, i.e. 30,4 %, were affected by errors); is concerned that the Court detected four quantifiable errors which had a financial impact on the amounts charged to the Union budget and that it also found further ten cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions (which had no direct financial impact on the Union budget); therefore, invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for heading 4; notes that the Commission concludes that the risk at payment in 2023 is 1,1 % for the expenditure on migration and border management;

    131.  Notes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendation made in its annual report for 2023 to provide further guidance on applicable rules to the Member State authorities responsible for implementing DG HOME funding via shared management; regrets that the Commission has not yet fully implemented the Court’s previous recommendations that were due to be addressed by the end of 2023; notes that DG HOME is undertaking a reassessment of its ex-ante methodology to ensure the respect of the rules applicable to post-2021 generation of grants, and that this reassessment will also address the Court’s relevant recommendations and those of the IAS audit on the preparedness for closing actions and programmes funded under the Internal Security Fund (ISF) and the AMIF 2014-2020 through direct and shared management;

    132.  Notes with concern that two reservations on the declaration of assurance were issued in DG HOME’s Annual Activity Report for 2023 and that one reservation concerns the implementation of AMIF and ISF 2014-2020 in several Member States and the other reservation concerns the implementation of Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 2021-2027 in one Member State; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to take remedial measures for the underlying issues that necessitated the reservations;

    133.  Welcomes the progress identified by the Court in its review of the preparatory work done by five member state audit authorities in managing the transition of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF funds to the CPR of the 2021-2027 MFF; observes that these audit authorities reported to the Court that the support and guidance DG HOME provided to them was satisfactory; notes with concern that at the time of the Court’s audit four out of five Member State audit authorities had not finalised their audit strategies;

    134.  Takes note of the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; welcomes that the mid-term revision of the MFF 2021-2027 allocated an additional EUR 2 billion to migration and border management for 2024-2027 to address the growing challenges in migration and border management resulting from the current geopolitical context; notes, however, that additional funds might be needed with a view to ensuring the full implementation of the Pact; calls for the quick implementation of the Pact in the Member States;

    135.  Stresses that securing the Union’s external borders is a pillar of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; notes with concern that the Commission reported that the number of irregular border crossings in the Union increased in 2023 to 380 000, compared to 330 000 in 2022; observes that the BMVI can support frontline Member States to ensure they have the resources for infrastructure, facilities and installations necessary to secure the external borders of the Union, including electronic border security enhancements and other tools for border surveillance as provided for in annex III of the BMVI regulation; notes the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 that the Union will step up its action to prevent irregular departures and loss of life, to reduce pressure on the borders of the Union and on reception capacities, to fight against smugglers and to increase returns; underlines the need to better protect vulnerable people from smuggling and trafficking networks and address the negative effects of the instrumentalisation of migrants as part of hybrid attacks, notably by pro-Russian forces, as well as by the Belarusian regime;

    136.  Recalls that, according to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States and the Commission must ensure respect for fundamental rights and compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the implementation of Union funds;

    137.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the AMIF 2014-2020 was performing below expectations in terms of facilitating returns of migrants: also takes note of the fact that the Court and the Commission agree that progress in this area was particularly affected by COVID-19-related travel restrictions; further notes that in 2023 return measures were supported with EUR 29,8 million from the AMIF; considers that the Commission must provide stronger efforts to assist Member States in addressing irregular border crossing and in successfully implementing returns of third-country nationals, as well as the integration of legal migrants; looks forward to receiving consolidated information in 2025 on progress in this regard through the ex-post evaluation AMIF 2014-2020; highlights that the Commission should continue to take action on migration and asylum within the framework of external action, including the ‘Team Europe’ approach while also increasing the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries and safeguarding the role of the Parliament;

    Recommendations

    138.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) address the Court’s recommendations in a thorough and timely manner and share DG HOME’s revised ex-ante methodology, once completed, with the discharge authority;
       (ii) continue to support the Member State managing and audit authorities in the timely finalisation of their audit strategies for MFF 2021-2027 funds, paying particular attention to eligibility and procurement issues, as well as all other recurrent findings of the Court;
       (iii) take action to improve the performance of actions funded by the Union in terms of effective returns and combatting irregular migration, while ensuring the full respect of Union legislation and the fundamental values of the Union;
       (iv) take action to increase the efficiency of Union spending on the protection and management of the European Union’s external borders;
       (v) monitor, assist in and scrutinise the timely progress of the administrative, operational and legal steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full implementation of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum by 2026;
       (vi) increase the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries, while safeguarding the role of Parliament in ensuring the democratic scrutiny of Union spending;
       (vii) continuously assess, in the implementation of the Union Budget, compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulation;

    Security and Defence

    139.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ was EUR 1,4 billion (0,7 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 500 million (38,4 %) for the European Defence Fund (EDF), 300 million (19 %) for military mobility, 200 million (17,1 %) for decentralised agencies, namely the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Europol and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), 200 million (13,1 %) for the ISF, and 200 million (12,4 %) for nuclear safety, decommissioning and other areas;

    140.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 5 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 25 % of ISF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    141.  Notes with concern that, for the reasons explained in the section on migration and border management, the Court cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ and that, based on its audit results, the Court considers expenditure from this heading to be high-risk; therefore, invites the Court to provide an estimate of the error rate for this heading as well; notes that the Commission concludes that in 2023 the risk at payment was 0,5 % for the expenditure on security and defence;

    142.  Observes that the Commission has not accepted the Court’s recommendation to carefully check and document the technical aspects of military mobility grant applications to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) during the grant award procedure and that the Commission considers that its current processes already ensure a check on whether dual-use infrastructure projects meet the eligibility conditions;

    143.  Recalls the highly unstable geopolitical situation in the Union’s neighbourhood giving rise to greater security and defence challenges, including hybrid threats, and thereby to greater investment needs in security, defence and preparedness, since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; draws attention to the fact that MFF heading 5, dedicated to security and defence, is the smallest of all MFF headings and regrets that the Union’s current budget for ensuring the security and defence of its citizens is not equal to the challenges to be met either in the short or the long term; notes that in 2023 Union funding in support of the defence industry came exclusively from the EDF; recalls the role played by the EDF in supporting European technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies; welcomes that submissions to the 2023 EDF calls increased by 72 % compared to the previous year, demonstrating the strong and constantly growing interest of European defence industry actors and research organisations in the EDF and the high demand for funding in this sector; notes that under the 2023 calls, the Union committed EUR 1,15 billion for 61 defence R&D projects, benefiting 581 legal entities from 26 Member States and Norway; notes that on average 17 entities from eight different Member States and Norway participate in each project; underlines the importance of a level playing field in supporting cross-border defence R&D cooperation;

    144.  Welcomes the Commission’s actions to enhance support for SMEs in the defence sector, in particular appreciates that the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which provides a diverse range of instruments tailored to support SMEs within the defence ecosystem, became fully operational in 2023, with EUR 224 million allocated to it from the EDF budget; appreciates, further, the role of the SME bonus under the EDF in facilitating the access of smaller actors and innovators in defence supply chains; notes that in the 2023 EDF calls, 42 % of the entities selected for funding were SMEs, an increased share compared to 2022 (38,2 %), and that 18 % of the total funding available through the EDF calls is allocated to SMEs;

    145.  Recalls that the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) was a precursor programme of the EDF with a budget of EUR 90 million that funded 18 research projects selected following calls for proposals in the years 2017 to 2019; further recalls that the Court, in its Special Report 10/2023 ‘The Preparatory action on defence research’, has observed that the Union still lacked a long-term strategy for the projects under the EDF, particularly in terms of impact, additional research, development, manufacturing and procurement; welcomes that the Commission has accepted all of the Court’s recommendations and has confirmed that their implementation is ongoing; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s adoption of a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and legislative proposal establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as well as its commitment to build up the EDF; nevertheless, in view of the geopolitical realities the Union faces, is concerned that the full implementation of the Court’s recommendations is expected only in 2026;

    146.  Recalls the Court’s observations in its Special Report 10/2023 regarding the limited availability of human resources at the Commission and the subsequent risk for the EDF; notes that the growing number of proposals to evaluate and projects to manage puts considerable pressure on human resources; further notes the large share of seconded national experts (17 %) among DG DEFIS staff in 2023 and DG DEFIS’s intention to reinforce staff by the selection of officials through specialised EPSO competitions in the field of space and defence, for which the reserve lists were finalised in November 2023;

    147.  Notes that the implementation of ‘Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0’ is ongoing, with EUR 1,74 billion allocated for dual-use transport infrastructure projects under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) between 2021-2027; notes that so far the Union has co-funded 95 military mobility projects in 21 Member States and that 94 of these projects are still ongoing and most of them are expected to be finalised between 2026 and 2027; notes with concern that following three calls for proposals organised in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the entirety of the military mobility envelope under the CEF for the current programming period has thereby already been exhausted; considers that although making the budget quickly available by frontloading amounts into the 2022 and 2023 calls responded to the need to take into account the evolution of the security situation in Europe following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it simultaneously led to Union funding being unstable and unpredictable by leaving a gap of more than four years with no more Union funds available for military mobility calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects until the post-2027 MFF; recalls the Court’s conclusions in its Special Report 04/2025 that the Action Plan was not built on sufficiently solid foundations and that progress towards its objective, namely ensuring swift and seamless movement of personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale, has been variable due to design weaknesses and remaining obstacles to implementation; notes that the Commission considers that more action is needed to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure corridors, including on regulatory issues such as cross-border movement permission procedures; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission had not carried out a robust assessment of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable; regrets that only EUR 300 million was spent on military mobility in 2023 and is concerned that calls for proposals under the military mobility envelope faced a four-time oversubscription rate, demonstrating the increased interest among Member States and project beneficiaries;

    148.  Expresses deep concern over the Commission’s decision to proceed with the adoption of the “Rearm EU” initiative without prior consultation of the European Parliament; regrets that such a decision bypasses the principle of institutional balance and undermines Parliament’s role as co-legislator in shaping strategic and budgetary priorities; urges the Commission to refrain from initiating substantial policy instruments that impact the Union’s financial and strategic architecture without ensuring full respect for the prerogatives of the Parliament;

    149.  Notes that the European Parliament has called on the Union and its Member States to put in place a legal framework enabling Russia to be classified as a State sponsor of terrorism;

    Recommendations

    150.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) develop a longer-term strategy for the EDF, building on the experience with Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the Court’s recommendations, as soon as possible;
       (ii) secure the provision of adequate resources to enhance Union defence cooperation, in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and the timely recruitment of expert staff, and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;
       (iii) further strengthen military mobility in the Union by substantially increasing the funding available to improve dual-use transport infrastructure corridors and by taking action to eliminate administrative, procedural and regulatory barriers to cross-border military movements, while prioritising Union funding to projects that best respond to the current European threat landscape; taking into account the Court’s findings and recommendations in special report 04/2025;
       (iv) take action to ensure due diligence in relation to project criteria for dual-use military mobility infrastructure projects, in line with the Court’s recommendation;

    Neighbourhood and the world

    151.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ was EUR 15,2 billion (7,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 63,4 % for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe), 16,4 % for Humanitarian Aid (HUMA), 16 % for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) and 4.2 % for other actions and programmes; notes that in total, payments for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ reached 15,2 billion in 2023, representing approximatively 8 % of the overall Union expenditure excluding RRF;

    152.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 72 transactions, which is not adequately representative of the spending under this MFF heading and, therefore, cannot provide an estimate of the error rate; considering that the Court’s audit results show that this is a high-risk area (of 37 out of 72 transactions audited, i.e. 51.4 %, were affected by errors), invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for this chapter; notes that the Court found 31 errors that had a financial impact on the Union budget, relating to ineligible beneficiaries, ineligible costs, expenditure not incurred, and breaches of public procurement rules, areas that could point to risks of unreliable functioning of control mechanisms;

    153.  Notes, additionally, that the Court detected 19 cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions, none of which had direct financial impact on the Union budget, and which included issues such as ambiguous cost allocations, non-compliance with visibility rules, and inadequate documentation;

    154.  Is concerned that the Court found a significant non-compliance with visibility rules in an EU-funded project under indirect management by DG NEAR, which concerned a contribution agreement worth EUR 21,2 million signed with an international organisation in a project where the aim was to support Eastern partnership countries in tackling COVID-19; notes that the Court found that most donation certificates it checked did not contain any acknowledgment that the medical equipment donated was funded by the Union; recalls that beneficiaries of Union funds are required to clearly publicise the fact that the Union has financed or co-financed the action they are implementing; notes the Commission’s replies that it is discussing new communication and visibility guidelines with the United Nations to reduce the risks of errors on compliance with visibility rules;

    155.  Expresses concern that the Court, in its IT audit on the information system OPSYS’ component for managing user access and rights, found three shortcomings including (i) that the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) had not formalised a procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users; (ii) four cases in which standard users had more access rights than they needed for their jobs, which is not in line with the Commission’s IT standards; and that (iii) DG INTPA did not manage all administrator accounts belonging to staff of other directorates-general; is concerned that these weaknesses increase the risks of both inappropriate access to the system and non-compliance with the rules and procedures for implementing external action projects, and also undermine the integrity of system processes and data;

    156.  Notes that the Commission intensified communication with international organisations in order to raise awareness of the need to ensure that the Court’s auditors obtain full access to documents when auditing projects funded by the Union, and that the Commission has supported initiatives to find permanent solutions to the issues of access to and retention of documents; notes, however, the Commission’s acknowledgment that despite efforts, some constraints regarding access to documents persist due to the existing legal frameworks of the implementing partners, which are not expected to change in the near future;

    157.  Urges the Commission to enhance the rule of law conditionality-based approach of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) III funding in order for the instrument to serve its purpose of effectively preparing accession countries to fulfil the conditions of becoming Member States of the Union; reiterates its calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the Court’s Special Report 01/2022 in order to ensure an effective impact of Union financial assistance in support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans, in particular by developing guidelines on the application of the provisions on modulation and conditionality under IPA III;

    158.  Stresses that Union aid should under no circumstances – directly or indirectly – be financing terrorism, hence it should not support any entity connected to Hamas or any other terrorist or extremist organisation; notes to this end, it is legitimate and necessary to be able to clearly know and identify all the final beneficiaries of European aid in third countries; emphasises the need for strict control over the distribution and use of aid to ensure no misuse of funds;

    159.  Notes with regret that the European Commission financed the Gaziantep Islamic Science and Technology University, which has proven ties to terrorist organisation of Hamas; calls on the Commission to cancel all ties to this university and other universities with ties to terrorist organisations;

    160.  Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering enhanced support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, to also make full use of trusted partners, such as the WHO, WFP UNICEF or different Red Crescent organisations; recalls the importance for the Commission to guarantee independent controls of UNRWA by external experts, the Court and experienced international partners;

    161.  Notes that the Commission has been working in the last months with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS on the allegations of involvement of 19 of its staff in the 7th October 2023 attack, and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA on the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Group led by former French Minister of Foreign Affairs Colonna to strengthen control and oversight; notes that the Commission has reassessed the Union’s 2024 funding decision for UNRWA and that, through an exchange of letters between Commissioner Várhelyi and UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, the Union reached an agreement about the Union’s conditional assistance for UNRWA, linked to a number of milestones in relation to three work streams, including the screening of UNRWA staff, an audit by the Union, as well as the reinforcement of the Department of Internal Investigations and Ethics office; notes that Union assistance was resumed;

    162.  Recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards by the next school year, in particular those that contain antisemitism as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance classification endorsed by the Union, incitement to violence, hate speech, and glorification of terrorism; recalls the provisions of previous discharge resolutions; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards, that all anti-Semitic references are deleted, and that examples which incite to hatred and violence are removed, as repeatedly requested in the resolutions accompanying the discharge decisions; recalls the findings of the Georg Eckert Institute’s report funded by the Union, which revealed a complex picture on the textbooks; notes that the Union does not fund the Palestinian textbooks, and that neither are they the responsibility of UNRWA, which nevertheless reviews all issued textbooks to address any problematic content;); notes that the Commission will carry out close scrutiny to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly, to the drafting, teaching, or exposure of such educational materials to Palestinian children, including those provided by UN organisations;

    163.  Notes DG NEAR’s acknowledgement in its AAR 2023 that projects in Kyiv received regular visits but security constraints limited on-site monitoring and project visits in other Ukrainian regions; further notes that the constraints on adequately monitoring projects in Ukraine led to a renewed reservation in the 2023 AAR of DG NEAR and that corrective actions are being implemented, such as monitoring progress on project implementation through desk reviews, remote solutions and using a service provider;

    164.  Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO; welcomes, in addition, that, pursuant to article 36 of the Ukraine Facility Regulation, the Commission established in June 2024 an Audit Board, with the mission of assisting the Commission in assessing the effectiveness of Ukraine’s management and control systems regarding the funds provided under the Facility and in fighting mismanagement of Union funding under the Ukraine Facility; calls on the Commission to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

    165.  Notes with concern the recent reports on the findings of a draft audit report paid for by the Commission on the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) Secretariat which allege to suspected fraud, unpaid salaries and further liabilities; notes that as reported the Commission has contributed EUR 3,7 million to the Secretariat in 2023 and is trying to recover EUR 3,6 million as of March 2024; asks the Commission to ensure full transparency and accountability, grant access to the audit report and inform the members of Parliament on the concrete steps taken;

    166.  Calls on the Commission in line with the Court’s recommendations in its opinion 03/2024 to integrate into the new MFF legislative proposal the recommendations of the External Action Guarantee complementing the Commission’s evaluation, including increased use of blending (grants) in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society;

    167.  Is concerned about the allocation of EFSD+ under the new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope in favour of benefiting countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs, and fragile and conflict-affected countries; calls for reporting on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in these countries and for transparency on how the quota of allocations to LDCs within country MIPs is respected within allocations of the regional MIPs;

    168.  While recognising the Global Gateway strategy as a concerted Union response to global challenges, reiterates that actions bringing together public and private investment must always be guided by the legal framework as provided by the NDICI Regulation, the Agenda 2030, and the needs of partner countries, as communicated by way of an honest dialogue at eye level; is concerned about inconsistencies surrounding Global Gateway programmes; calls, therefore, for improved transparency, democratic accountability, robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in Global Gateway and Team Europe initiatives; calls for a centralised, publicly accessible platform, regularly updated, to detail Global Gateway projects, including their objectives, funding sources, implementing partners, and expected outcomes;

    European Development Fund (EDF)

    169.  Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 140 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 31 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 87 transactions authorised by 14 EU delegations(20) and 19 payments approved by Commission headquarters;

    170.  Notes with concern that, out of the 140 transactions examined, 62 (44,3 %) contained errors, compared to 57 (40,7 %) in 2022 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 52 errors (48 in 2022), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2023 to be 8,9 % (7,1 % in 2022);

    171.  Highlights with concern that the three most common types of errors in the financial year 2023 related to expenditure not incurred at 45 % (51 % in 2022), to absence of essential supporting documents at 31 % (7 % in 2022) and to ineligible expenditure at 23 % (24 % in 2022);

    172.  Notes the Commission’s replies to written questions to Commissioners Jutta Urpilainen and Oliver Varhelyi that in 2023 approximately 45 % of the total errors are due to excess clearing, a practice where expenditure not incurred is included in the accounts as expenditure incurred, and that therefore such errors are temporary, since they will no longer exist after the final clearings; notes furthermore that, to reduce these temporary errors, the Commission has requested its partners to review their reporting templates to allow for easier identification of incurred expenditure, and that DG INTPA launched a special working group to screen the compliance of relevant organisations through a risk management framework; also notes that DG INTPA is currently reviewing its control strategy, which aims also to identify how ex-ante controls can be strengthened and to improve the reporting of the pillar-assessed organisations to the Commission; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the effects of these actions;

    173.  Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and also on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of this review;

    174.  Is concerned that, as in previous years, some international organisations provided only limited access to documents (e.g., in read-only format), which hindered the planning, execution and quality control of the Court’s audit and led to delays; notes that audit and control issues were discussed with UN entities on several occasions, including in the context of joint technical reference group meetings and the relevant EU-UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) working group; notes furthermore that the Commission is working with the International Organisations concerned and has intensified communication with them on the Court’s access to documents; encourages, as in previous years, the Commission to increase these efforts;

    175.  Stresses that, according to Court’s assessment, the Residual Error Rate (RER) study does not constitute an assurance engagement or an audit and is based on the RER methodology and manual provided by DG INTPA; notes that DG INTPA clarifies that the RER study is meant to be a key indicator for the estimated financial impact of residual errors, i.e., it measures the proper functioning of the internal control system and thus, demonstrates the Commission’s corrective capacity; stresses that, as in previous years, the Court has found limitations in the study; notes, furthermore, the Court’s opinion, as in previous years, that the RER methodology allows the contractor to rely entirely on the results of DG INTPA´s controls, and that relying on the work of other auditors is contrary to the purpose of an RER study; highlights the Court’s finding that in cases where these previous checks were carried out under the FAFA between the European Commission and the United Nations, the contractor is not always able to carry out additional substantive testing as the FAFA limits the Commission’s verification rights; highlights the Commission’s reply which recognised the limitations in terms of controls set in the FAFA; urges the Commission to look for workable solutions to resolve this issue;

    176.  Recalls that two EUTFs were created under the EDFs; recalls that EUTF for Africa has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, with 88 % of contributions (EUR 4,4 billion) coming from the EDF and the Union budget; deplores that, despite several requests from Parliament, the process of managing and allocating these funds still lacks transparency; is concerned by the Court’s findings in its Special report 17/2024 “The EU trust fund for Africa Despite new approaches, support remained unfocused; notes that, despite an innovative approach to identifying human rights risks in a difficult environment, these risks were not comprehensively addressed and that the Court found that the assessment of potential risks to human rights was not comprehensive; recalls that the Commission is unable to identify and report on the most efficient and effective approaches to reducing irregular migration and forced displacements in Africa according to the Court; regrets that the new monitoring system aggregates information from all EUTF projects, but suffers from issues of data accuracy; notes that the Union’s Africa trust fund is set to be phased out in 2025;

    Recommendations

    177.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations:

       (i) as regards the OPSYS application system, formalise and enhance the procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users, enhance the quality of the new software, and allocate resources needed to enhance its maturity and robustness;
       (ii) strengthen guidance and controls to ensure that organisations implementing contracts under indirect management, including international organisations, international financial institutions and state agencies, comply with visibility rules;
       (iii) continue to intensify its communication with international organisations in order to provide the Court with complete, unlimited and timely access to documents necessary to carry out its task in accordance with the TFEU, and not just in read-only format;
       (iv) put in place adequate ex ante and ex post control measures in unstable or conflict zones to ensure the proper control of spending of Union funds and ways to recover the Union funds;
       (v) take measures to improve controls systems for the clearing of pre-financing paid to international organisations;
       (vi) strengthen ex ante controls before accepting expenditure;

    178.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) strictly monitor through all available mechanisms and work with UNRWA to ensure the implementation of all agreed actions to guarantee that UNRWA works in full compliance with humanitarian principles and neutrality, including in the forthcoming EU-UNRWA joint declaration and the upcoming financing decisions for conditional Union assistance;
       (ii) ensure that all contracts involving Union funds fully respect applicable Union legislation, including accountability, transparency, and sound financial management, and that this includes verifying that there are no subcontractors, natural persons, participants in workshops and/or trainings or recipients of financial support made to third parties subject to Union restrictive measures or involved in the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as well as other acts of hatred and incitement to hatred;
       (iii) increase evidence-based targeting of geographical areas and beneficiaries, and improve the accuracy of reported achievements of future development action, including through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe;

    European public Administration

    179.  Notes that the Commission is directly responsible for the implementation of 59,1 % of the overall administrative budget of the Union, equivalent to EUR 7,2 billion; further notes that 70 % of the administrative expenditure relates to human resources including pensions while the remaining primarily covers expenditure related to buildings, equipment, energy, communications and IT; notes with satisfaction that also for 2023 the Court concludes that the spending area is low risk;

    180.  Notes that during 2023, 2152 civil servants left the Commission primarily due to retirement, resignation or the end of their contracts; notes that this represents a relatively high turnover, which should give the Commission ample possibilities to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

    181.  Encourages the Commission together with EPSO to ensure that necessary technical systems are put in place as quickly as possible and that processes are accelerated in order for the Commission and other Union institutions to be able to rely on EPSO for the selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions;

    182.  Appreciates that female representation in management positions increased from 46,1 % in December 2022 to 47,8 % in December 2023; encourages the Commission to continue to focus on ensuring and maintaining gender balance on all levels of management;

    183.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission has implemented policies to enhance work-life balance and staff well-being, including the right to disconnect; at the same time commends that a new decision on the prevention and fight against harassment was adopted which establishes the position of a Chief Confidential Counsellor as key figure in the fight against harassment; stresses the need to provide this position with the appropriate resources to effectively carry out multiple challenging tasks;

    184.  Acknowledges the progress of the Commission with regard to the internalisation of crèche staff;

    185.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission issued updated versions of the guidelines on ethical standards for participation of the Members of the European Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament and guidelines for the participation of Members of the Commission in election campaigns at Member State level; further commends that in March 2023, the Commission adopted much needed strengthened rules on missions and costs paid by third parties;

    186.  Stresses the need to ensure that all the Union Institutions in Luxembourg can attract staff to all types of jobs and careers; notes that especially for servants in lower pay grades Luxembourg can be a less attractive option due to the costs of living; notes that with the agreement on the budget for 2025 the first step has been taken by establishing a special housing allowance for staff in lower grades working in Union institutions in Luxembourg;

    187.  Notes that the Commission has an ambitious goal of reducing the overall office space of the Commission by 25 % and the number of buildings by 50 % by 2030 compared to 2020; notes that the total reduction in overall space reached a little over 83 000 m2 in 2023, equal to a reduction of 11 %; welcomes that this goal is an important element in the Commission achieving carbon neutrality and reducing administrative costs; stresses that it is important that the reduction in the number of building and office space and the resulting roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;

    188.  Is concerned about the severe delays, including delays of up to 6 months, faced by civil servants across the institutions when receiving the reimbursements of healthcare costs under the institutions’ sickness insurance scheme; is also concerned about the inadequate treatment of civil servants and MEPs with autoimmune diseases, neurological disorders, COPD (obstructive pulmonary disease), long COVID, undiagnosed and rare diseases by the sickness insurance scheme of the institutions; notes that patients with these symptoms are often not reimbursed for their diagnostic tests;

    189.  Notes that, in 2023, the Ombudsman launched 398 inquiries concerning the Commission; further notes that during 2023 the Commission received 187 closing decisions without remarks and 17 decisions of maladministration; notes with concern that the Ombudsman receives many citizens’ complaints about extreme delays in gaining access to requested documents from the Commission and encourages the Commission to strive to speed up the processing of such requests and further reduce the number of decisions of maladministration and establish clear rules concerning access to all types of written texts whether on paper, email, text messages or any other form of communication, which is part of an administrative process related to Commission policies or decisions; notes that out of the nine investigations related to the Commission concluded by OLAF in 2023, seven were closed with recommendations; calls on the Commission to ensure transparency and accountability in the follow-up to these cases;

    190.  Expresses deep concern that there has been allegations of corruption linked to the Commission; at the same time deplores that there has been allegations about officials from the Commission that allegedly accepted gifts from a country that the Union was negotiating an agreement with; stresses the need for a clear and systematic approach to ensure that all OLAF cases involving relevant potential criminal offences are promptly referred to the EPPO and the competent national authorities; calls on the Commission to reinforce relevant rules and procedures in order to ensure that all cases are handled in a strict, correct and efficient way;

    191.  Notes that only very few cases of psychological and sexual harassment have been recognised as such in the past years and expresses concern that this may point to institutional blind spots in the Commission, given the significant number of employees of the institution;

    192.  Expresses deep concern regarding reports of an ongoing investigation involving the former Commissioner for Justice, who is alleged to have been engaged, during his time in office, in money laundering activities involving funds of unknown origin; calls on the Commission to fully cooperate with the Belgian authorities and to urgently clarify whether these activities were in any way connected to his official duties within the Commission;

    193.  Calls on the Commission to prioritise permanent staff over external consultants and contractual staff, in order to guarantee high quality working conditions and to prevent knowledge and experience from being lost; calls for flexibility for DGs with a high proportion of seconded national experts (SNE) in the establishment plan to convert SNE posts into temporary agent posts with the aim of ensuring better expertise retention, operational functionality and business continuity; further insists on avoiding the externalisation of tasks to consultancies when available know-how can be found in-house;

    194.  Notes that, in recent years, the Commission has increasingly outsourced impact assessments to external companies, raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to strengthen provisions to prevent possible conflicts of interest and to provide better guidance to staff handling public procurement procedures for policy-related service contracts;

    195.  Regrets the alleged espionage organised by the Hungarian Government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent any violations;

    196.  Welcomes the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2023/2841(21); takes note of cybersecurity investments, including EUR 30 million allocated to enhancing digital security in the Commission; calls on the Commission to spare no effort in further developing a cybersecurity culture, promoting training and awareness within the Union institution; stresses the importance of continued adequate investments in cybersecurity towards the longer term indicative target in the order of at least 10 % of total IT spending;

    197.  Reiterates its concern that the significant risks to the security and protection of the registry and operating mechanism of the Union system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading against cyberattacks have still not been adequately addressed; points out that this issue has been highlighted in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) since 2010, with reservations raised in each report; notes that this concern is once again emphasised in the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s 2023 AAR, further underscoring the persistent failure to prioritise the security of the system;

    European Schools

    198.  Notes that the European Schools’ overall budget for 2023 was EUR 417,5 million primarily funded by the Commission, other Union institutions, Member States and fees from parents; further notes that almost 80 % of the budget was spent on staff costs;

    199.  Notes with satisfaction that the Court is able to conclude that nothing has come to their attention that causes them to believe that the consolidated accounts for 2023 are not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards;

    200.  Observes that the Court found some systematic or recurrent weaknesses in payments and related human resources (HR) and procurement procedures including insufficient verification of supporting evidence affecting the regularity of some HR procedures and payments;

    201.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) ensure that Union Institutions can rely on EPSO to efficiently organise and complete selection procedures and other staff related procedures in order to provide Union Institutions with sufficient highly qualified and motivated candidates for open positions;
       (ii) explore all possibilities to correct significant geographical and gender imbalances in different categories of the staff;
       (iii) continue work on measures that will ensure that Union Institutions based in Luxembourg can continue to attract highly qualified staff for all types of job profiles;
       (iv) ensure that the roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;
       (v) make more staff available for processing of reimbursement requests for the sickness insurance scheme, to improve staff training and to have better IT software available to process requests more quickly;
       (vi) act as a role model, particularly for diseases that do not fall into classical fields and rare diseases; urges the Commission to expand their technical knowledge and handling of these cases; urges the Commission to expand the catalogue of tests eligible for reimbursement to include a wider bandwidth for laboratory tests and other diagnostic procedures and exams as well as treatments; urges the Commission to do this promptly;
       (vii) ensure the rapid introduction of strong protective mechanisms for Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and third countries, safeguarding their rights;
       (viii) support the European Schools in their implementation, as soon as possible, of recommendations by the Court from previous years and the recommendation from the report concerning the financial year 2023 which asks the schools to perform systematic checks of supporting evidence on allowances paid to seconded staff;
       (ix) prepare a report analysing the reasons why the vast majority of harassment complaints (requests for assistance) in the Commission are dismissed, most of them without even opening an administrative inquiry, and recommending how such dysfunctionality of the formal procedure can be addressed;
       (x) ensure that as of 2025, requests for assistance in harassment cases are followed up with a proper administrative inquiry by the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) or OLAF so as to ensure that harassers are held accountable and sanctioned proportionately to their wrongdoing;

    CHAPTER II – Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    General remarks

    202.  Notes that in 2023, 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) were revised, and that these revisions had an impact on the pace of implementation of the existing plans, causing delays; notes at the same time that the political priorities in Member States can change; notes that increased energy prices, high inflation and supply chain disruptions caused by Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, and, in some cases, natural disasters, contributed to the revision of the RRPs; underlines that the delays caused by the revisions of the RRPs came in addition to existing ones, as shown by the significant differences between the foreseen calendar of payments requests and the actual transmission of these requests by the Member States to the Commission; remains concerned by the risk of under-implementation and of failure to reach the milestones and targets (M&Ts) as agreed in the RRPs; emphasises the need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms to ensure that delays do not disproportionately impact key projects;

    203.  Notes that there should be a clear thematic link between reforms and investments and that there may be, in certain cases, a long delay between the creation of the national recovery plans and the completion of milestones and targets; regrets that the RRF design does not allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to emerging crises in a prompt manner;

    204.  Draws attention with utmost concern to the statement of the President of the Court, arguing that approximately half of the RRF disbursements had not reached the real economy, and questions if the other half may have been used either to substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or generate profit to Member States from the increased interest rates;

    205.  Recalls that the RRF is a temporary recovery instrument based on performance, i.e. that payments are linked to the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts related to reforms and investments included in the national RRPs; stresses that the effectiveness of the RRF must be assessed, not only in terms of disbursement, but also in terms of its ability to generate tangible, long-term improvements of the consequences of the pandemic; recalls that there is no definition in the RRF Regulation of the “satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts”; recalls that each national plan should effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the European Semester, particularly the country- specific recommendations (CSRs) adopted by the Council; notes the fact that, thanks to the RRF, the percentage of CSRs with progress has increased by 17 % between 2021 and 2023;

    206.  Notes that in 2023, the Commission disbursed a total of EUR 75 billion, and additional pre-financing payments of EUR 7,1 billion, which brought the total disbursements by the end of 2023 to EUR 220,8 billion, divided into EUR 141,6 billion in grants (40 % of the total EUR 357 billion for grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) envelope) and EUR 79,2 billion in loans (27 % of the total EUR 291 billion for loans under the RRF envelope); mandates detailed reporting requirements on how Member States allocate funds, preventing substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures, and ensuring funds reach intended beneficiaries;

    Court’s observations

    207.  Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; is concerned that the Court concluded that seven out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were affected by quantitative findings and that six of these payments were affected by material error; notes that in the Court’s opinion, except for those matters, the RRF expenditure accepted in the accounts for the year 2023 is legal and regular in all material respects; notes that the nature of the RRF spending model relies on the assessments of milestones and targets (M&Ts) to be made by the Commission; notes that in 2023, the Court checked 452 M&Ts included in 23 grant payments and that it does not provide an error rate due to the nature of the RRF’s spending model but estimates the minimum financial impact of its findings to be above the materiality threshold; is convinced that Member States should also bear responsibility for errors detected in post-disbursement;

    208.  Expresses deep concern that the Court was unable to verify the actual financial impact of erroneous or ineligible RRF payments due to the inherent limitations of the milestone and target-based assessment model; calls on the Commission to develop a more transparent error-tracking methodology to prevent misallocation and inefficiency;

    209.  Notes that the Court audited 325 out of 542 milestones and 127 out of 135 targets included in 2023 payment requests for grants; regrets that the Court considers that 16 of them were affected by regularity issues (2.4 % of the total); is concerned by the fact that the Court considers that the requirements had not been satisfactorily fulfilled for seven M&Ts in six payments and that the Commission had still made the corresponding payments; notes that the Court’s conclusions are based on extensive audit work and regrets that the Commission contests some of the Court’s conclusions; notes that all of the RRF payments must be assessed against the framework communicated and applied by the Commission, which must take into consideration for each payment the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee and the scrutiny by Member State experts under the comitology procedure; requests the Commission to ensure that all disputed payments related to unsatisfactorily fulfilled M&Ts undergo independent external review to strengthen public trust in the process; recommends an introduction of real-time tracking systems for disbursements and expenditures to prevent misallocations under the RRF and the MFF;

    210.  Notes with particular concern that the Court has identified nine potential cases of ineligible M&Ts linked to the continuation of a pre-existing project that either started before the eligibility period, or that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure; regrets the lack of clarity in the RRF Regulation, and does not share the Commission’s interpretation that the eligibility period concerns only the date of start of works on a specific project rather than the beginning of the preparatory or projection phase; regrets that such a view led to measures which were planned before the RRF eligibility period being included in the RRPs, and acknowledges that any measure must respect the scope, objectives and eligibility conditions set by the RRF Regulation; calls on the Commission to implement stricter verification mechanisms to prevent the inclusion of pre-existing projects that do not provide added value under the RRF framework;

    211.  Recalls that RRF funds shall not be used to replace recurring budgetary expenditure, unless in duly justified case; and is preoccupied by the Court’s findings that some M&Ts that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure were not adequately justified in the RRPs;

    212.  Notes with concern the Court’s finding that NGEU borrowing may more than double by 2026 while the bulk of repayment is deferred to future MFFs; recalls that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must start before the end of 2027, if unused appropriations remain available in the budget line to cover NGEU financing costs, and be completed by 2058 at the latest; notes that the Union budget exposure at the end of 2023 is expected to rise in 2024 and 2025, mainly due to RRF loans; is concerned that potential changes in market conditions might result in higher borrowing costs which, for the NGEU debt relating to grants, will have to be borne by the Union budget; is concerned that there is to date still no repayment plan for the NGEU common debt, and that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument, NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences for the Union’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas;

    213.  Notes the Court’s finding that payments from RRF were lower than expected in 2023; emphasises that the Court has criticised the slow disbursement and absorption of RRF funds; is concerned by the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that absorption of RRF funds has progressed with some delays, that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period for which a significant proportion of funds have already been paid out, and that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period is more challenging with an increase in number of M&Ts, a shift from reforms to investments and more advanced stage of implementation, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year;

    214.  Notes, conversely, that according to the Commission the achievement of M&Ts is broadly on track, as by 31 August 2024, over 40 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed to Member States, with the disbursement of grants reaching 48 % and loans slightly exceeding 30 %; notes that the pace of payment requests has also accelerated since the second half of 2023 with the revision of the RRPs linked to the introduction of the REPowerEU chapters was finalised in 2023;

    215.  Notes the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that additional reasons for slow absorption included measures not being suited to the RRF’s timeframe and underestimation of the time needed to implement them (due to public procurement and state aid rules); as well as uncertainties on implementing rules and how they should be applied including lacking guidance on the ‘do no significant harm’ principle (DNSH) and how to ascribe to it;

    216.  Expresses strong concerns about the Court’s observation that point to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member States control systems as this poses a risk to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the Union’s financial interests; recalls that, according to the RRF Regulation, Member State control systems have a key role to play in ensuring that the financial interests of the Union are protected effectively; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary, including imposing financial corrections, and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    217.  Expresses concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report N°22/2024 on ‘Double funding from the EU budget: Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to cost’; highlights that Member States can propose so-called ‘zero cost measures’, i.e. measures estimated to have no costs to be financed by the RRF, and for which there is no check at all for double-funding, as the Commission considers that measures which receive no RRF funds are free of risk from that perspective; also notes with concern the Court’s findings that from Member States’ perspective, the many layers of governance involved including national, regional or municipality level, make coordination and oversight very challenging; is concerned that when checks are performed, (i) they suffer from a very complicated environment with different IT tools used often not interoperable and data recorded in an often non-standardised way, leaving manual cross-checks across databases as the only possible tool to check for double funding, and (ii) Member States’ control systems rely to a large extent on self-declarations by recipients of Union funds; notes, however, that the Court did not find any case of double funding;

    218.  Notes the Commission’s observation that, according to the RRF Regulation, double funding is explicitly linked to budgetary costs and thus, there can be no double funding if the Member State has not submitted any cost estimate linked to a specific measure as part of its national plan; notes that the Commission underlines that no-cost reforms do not increase the financial envelope but are nevertheless essential criteria for the Commission’s positive assessment of RRPs, as well as their full implementation for the relevant payments; points out that the Commission, shortly after the Court audit field work, acknowledged it had identified the first two potential cases of double funding;

    219.  Recalls that Article 9 of the RRF Regulation establishes additionality and complementarity between Union programmes and instruments funding as key principles; believes that, to respect these principles but avoid the risk of double financing, the same measures already included in other national plans benefiting from Union funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should either not be included in RRPs or more thoroughly described, even if they do not incur any costs, in order to avoid double funding; underlines that due to the different model of implementation, double funding between RRF and other Union financing instruments might be more difficult to identify, and urges the Commission to remain vigilant and pro-active in identifying any potential situation of double funding;

    220.  Regrets the lack of adequate safeguards to prevent double funding of projects under both the RRF and other Union financial instruments; calls for an automated cross-checking system between RRF and cohesion Funds, the Common Agricultural Policy, and other Union funding programmes to detect and eliminate duplicate claims;

    221.  Expresses concern about the Court’s finding in its Review 01/2023: ‘EU financing through cohesion policy and the RRF: A comparative analysis’ that reporting of fraud involving RRF expenditure still lacks a standardised approach with strong coordination and cooperation between Member States, which are obliged to report on cases of suspected fraud not in an integrated IT system, but in the management declaration accompanying every payment request, although Member States have also reported cases outside of the management declarations; regrets that there are no clear guidelines about exactly when a case of suspected fraud should be reported, whether there is a reporting threshold, and what standard information should be reported for each case and about the remedial measures taken; furthermore supports the request made by the Court to the Commission in the same review 01/2023 to obtain sufficient assurance from the Member States on the effectiveness of national systems to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest;

    222.  Expresses concerns that in 2023 the Commission had to introduce 10 additional control milestones for seven Members States to address the weaknesses identified in their control systems; reminds and supports the Court’s evaluation that the fact control milestones were introduced, which means that Member states systems were not fully functional when the plans started to be implemented, posing a serious risk to the regularity of the of the RRF expenditure and to the protection of financial interests;

    223.  Regrets the findings of the Court’s Special Report No 26/2023 that several policy areas in the RRF’s pillar containing health policies lack a corresponding common indicator to measure progress; is concerned that this impedes the proper monitoring and understanding of progress made towards achieving milestones and targets linked to health policies;

    224.  Welcomes that, in 2023, the Commission made progress in eliminating any possibility of misinterpretation of figures of the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and that the Scoreboard further addressed the related recommendation of the Court to improve the presentation of data displayed on the Scoreboard and to improve explanations with regard to its limitations, in particular by better explaining the underlying methodologies and explicitly stating, where applicable, that the data is estimated;

    Audit and control

    225.  Welcomes that, based on the Court’s recommendations and the experience gained, the Commission, in 2023, published three methodological notes to clarify the application of the RRF Regulation, including its framework for (i) assessing the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts, upon conducting an assessment, and (ii) the application of the provisions related to the reversal of M&Ts, as well as a methodology to determine the amount to be suspended if a milestone or target is not satisfactorily fulfilled; takes note of the updated Guidance on RRPs, adopted on 19 July 2024, which provides additional guidance to ensure the continued adequacy of controls to identify and avoid any risk of double funding as well as the methodology for reductions and recoveries under the RRF in accordance with Article 24(8) of the RRF Regulation;

    226.  Calls on the Commission to increase the number of ex-post audits and on-the-ground inspections for RRF-funded projects, particularly in high-risk sectors such as digital infrastructure, energy where previous Union funding programmes have identified significant irregularities;

    227.  Warns that the inclusion of pre-existing projects and the substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures within the RRF framework undermines the additionality principle, effectively converting the instrument into a backdoor financing mechanism for Member States’ regular budgets, rather than fostering genuine post-crisis recovery and resilience; calls for an urgent review to prevent further dilution of the RRF’s purpose;

    228.  Advocates more decisiveness on the part of both the Commission and Member States in order to detect irregularities in the spending of RRF funds and to recover undue payments;

    229.  Is concerned with the Court’s counter-reply to the Commission’s replies on the existence of an assurance gap at Union level regarding compliance with Union and national rules on public procurement and State aid; notes that the Commission argues that the assurance provided by DG ECFIN covers the effectiveness of Member States’ controls on compliance with public procurement and state aid rules. however, stresses that while DG ECFIN’s AAR refers to Commission assessments of the existence and effectiveness of Member States’ controls, there is no conclusion regarding their effectiveness; expresses concern that, according to the Court, this represents an important limitation of the scope of the Commission’s declaration of assurance, meaning that the Commission still does not provide full assurance as to whether RRF expenditure – which the Commission manages directly – complies with the rules;

    230.  Stresses that delays in disbursement and absorption of RRF funds not only slow down economic recovery but also create substantial risks of last-minute, low-quality spending towards the end of the RRF period; calls on the Commission to introduce stricter interim evaluations to prevent a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rush that could lead to waste and misallocation;

    231.  Notes with serious concern that Member States may strategically forego their final payment requests to avoid fulfilling politically sensitive milestones and targets, thereby evading necessary but unpopular reforms; calls on the Commission to introduce financial penalties for incomplete RRF implementation to prevent manipulation of the payment structure;

    232.  Notes that the Commission’s replies that it extended the scope of its audit work beyond that required by the RRF Regulation to verify that the control procedures put in place in the Member States give the necessary assurance that Member States regularly and effectively verify compliance with public procurement and State aid rules and eligibility for RRF measures, but disagrees with the Commission’s opinion that the conclusions of DG ECFIN’s Annual activity report cover this;

    233.  Notes with concern that, as stated by the Commission in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, a majority of Member States consider that the payment suspension methodology remains unclear when it comes to reforms because of the discretion given to the Commission in applying the methodology; urges the Commission to revise this methodology in order to avoid any double standards in its application;

    234.  Notes that the Commission’s IAS, in its audit on ex-ante controls of the RRF payment requests carried out in 2023, identified a very important issue according to which DG ECFIN, in cooperation with the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, should further develop and formalise the existing guidance for the cases where DG ECFIN requests that Member States make additional commitments concerning action stemming from audit and control milestones, in particular that the guidance should define (i) how DG ECFIN should follow up the fulfilment of the formal confirmation on the Member State’s commitment, (ii) the criteria for determining the deadlines for the Member States to fulfil the commitments, and (iii) the relations between the ‘commitment framework’, the ‘framework for assessing M&Ts under the RRF Regulation’ and the ‘Reversal of M&Ts under the Facility’;

    235.  Notes that the Commission checks during its “Protection of the Financial Interest of the Union” audits that Member States have a clear and codified process for transmitting cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and double funding to all competent authorities, including the EPPO where relevant;

    236.  Is concerned by the Court reporting in its annual reports that by the end of 2023, the EPPO had 206 active investigations related to funds used to implement RRF measures and estimated potential damages of over EUR 1,8 billion (concerning both national and Union funding); notes that the 206 open investigations concern ten Member States, with around 75 % of these cases coming from one country; is worried that at the end of 2023 the Member States’ management declarations had not reported a single case of detected suspected fraud, meaning that none of the EPPO open cases were reported by Member States themselves, casting doubts on Member States’ ability to detect and fight frauds; stresses that, while no investigation has yet been completed, the figures presented by the EPPO confirm that the risk of fraud is present in the RRF, and that they call into question the reliability of Member State management declarations in terms of reporting detected fraud and the remedial measures taken; calls for urgent reinforcement of fraud detection mechanisms, including a mandatory fraud risk assessment for all large-scale RRF projects; calls on the Commission to ensure that the EPPO has adequate resources to investigate cases of fraud related to RRF expenditure, given the increasing number of investigations and high estimated damages;

    237.  Warns that Member States’ self-reported fraud cases under RRF remain significantly underreported, creating a misleading picture of financial integrity;

    238.  Strongly regrets the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations and use the Irregularity Management System (IMS);

    239.  Recalls that the Financial Regulation recast in force since 30 September 2024 (‘FR recast’) provides for the extension of its scope of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management and direct management in cases where the budget is implemented with Member States, for programmes adopted or financed as from 1 January 2028; calls on the Commission to act on the most serious grounds for exclusion in order to better protect the financial interests of the Union;

    240.  Notes that, with a view to reducing the margin between the Commission and the Court, for different interpretations of M&Ts, the Commission has published its approach to the concepts of the start date of a measure and the concept of ‘substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure’ as Annex II and Annex III of its 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the RRF; re-iterate its calls on the Commission to keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;

    Implementation and impact

    241.  Urges the Commission to minimise risks that Member States might chose not to receive parts or the entire amounts of the last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last M&Ts and jeopardising the overall implementation of the RRPs; is extremely concerned about the additional risks of measures being reversed after the RRF lifetime, and urges the Commission, when making the final payments, to ensure that such situations will not occur;

    242.  Emphasises that, according to the Commission’s mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, Member States highlighted the need to mobilise more resources than initially planned to revise the RRPs, and that the efficiency of the performance-based approach is reduced by the ‘excessively complex procedures’ for the plan modifications, which do not distinguish between major or minor amendments and require Council approval for any modification;

    243.  Stresses that for control and audits in the RRF, Member States should put in place arrangements to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests, and that the Commission performs ex-post and system audits on M&Ts; stresses that some confusion persists with respect to the role of the Court, which has developed a strategy (2021-2025 Strategy) for carrying out its responsibilities for the NGEU programme and the RRF, which some Member States perceive as an unnecessary overlap and administrative burden; is concerned that the Commission, both in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024 and its RRF Annual Report of 10 October 2024, acknowledged that Member States’ authorities at all levels found the audit and control procedures to be too complex, and that Member States complained about overlapping audits by national authorities, the Commission and the Court; fully supports the Court work on the RRF; welcomes that the Commission has admitted and accepted that the Court has a full audit mandate on RRF, which is one of the foundation for the Parliament discharge on the RRF funds; recommends to the Member States to cooperate with the European Court of Auditors;

    244.  Is concerned that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation highlighted the entry costs for Member States’ administrations, with room for further simplification; notes, according to this Commission’s Annual Report, that concerning the design of the instrument, in the mid-term evaluation Member States referred to the combined obligations linked to (i) the evidence needed to prove fulfilment of M&Ts, (ii) demanding reporting requirements, for example the common indicators and the bi-annual data; and (iii) the audit and control framework; recalls that Member States see room for simplifying control and audit procedures, ensuring better coordination among the actors involved and avoiding multiple checks; also notes, again according to the Commission RRF Annual Report 2024, that some national authorities also pointed to inflexibility in the Commission’s assessment of milestones and targets and the rigid and resource-intensive procedures to revise RRPs;

    245.  Notes that one of the objectives of the RRF is to help Member States to implement ambitious reforms and investments that make their economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and prepared for the green and digital transitions; highlights with concerns the finding of the Court in its Special Report 15/2024 underlining the lack of relevance, quality and comparability of data submitted by the Member States, with data insufficient to evaluate progress on climate adaptation in the Member States, and thus paving the way for possible greenwashing; expresses concern that the RRF could become a financial vehicle for superficial rebranding of conventional expenditures as ‘green’; encourages the Commission to introduce a mechanism within the RRF framework to track the environmental impact of investments and ensure alignment with the Union’s climate objectives;

    246.  Highlights the RRF impact on the Union business and SMEs; notes that RRF has provided EUR 78 billion in direct support to SMEs, representing 12 % of total RRF expenditure, and that broader measures benefiting businesses amount to EUR 152 billion (23 % of total RRF spending); notes that EUR 2,75 million SMEs, approximately 11 % of all active SMEs in the Union, have received support through the RRF; underlines that nearly 600 000 businesses have benefited from digitalisation initiatives, while EUR 5,2 billion have been allocated to green transition projects, including renewable energy and hydrogen;

    247.  Highlights with concern that the facilitation of cross-border projects has not worked out; deplores that, despite the inclusion in the RRPs of several measures linked to Important Projects of Common Interest (‘IPCEIs’) and cross-border measures in the REPowerEU chapters, the national governance of the Facility has not sufficiently promoted cross-border cooperation; strongly insists that Union financing should be better linked with the achievement of common Union objectives and should generate EU added value;

    248.  Emphasises that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation acknowledged the insufficient involvement of Member States of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations, social partners, and other relevant stakeholders in the preparation and the implementation of the national RRPs; calls for their close involvement in the implementation of the national RRPs on the ground;

    249.  Urges the Commission not to approve any revision of RRPs, which may lead to a re-packaging of planned reforms or investments into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation; notes that any revision should always aim to create added value and increase synergies;

    Transparency

    250.  Recalls that, while Member States are not required to publish all data on final recipients, Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council(22) amending the RRF Regulation requires Member States to publish information on the 100 final recipients receiving the highest amount of funding under the RRF; welcomes that on 10 October 2024, the Commission published, as part of the RRF Annual Report 2024, a dedicated Annex to provide further clarity on the concept of final recipients under the RRF Regulation and the scope of the publication of data on the largest 100 final recipients; expresses deep concern over the interpretation of the Commission of the concept of “final recipient” under the RRF, as often they are listed only at the ministry level, and that the descriptions are vague, with many examples available in almost all lists provided by Member States; reiterates its demand that the list of 100 largest final recipients provides the factual natural person or entity that is the last in a chain of money transfers to be made available in a publicly accessible database to enhance accountability and enable independent oversight, while respecting the legal framework of Union data protection; is concerned that otherwise it will be problematic to measure the impact and guarantee visibility of the RRF funds to the citizens, although also takes into account the RRF Scoreboard and the project map; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance, to prevent a similar interpretation from being applied to the transparency provisions in other financial regulations;

    251.  Reminds the Commission that the letter and spirit of the RRF Regulation must be strictly followed, and that the adoption of guidelines or other internal documents must be fully in line with the results of the negotiations between the co-legislators; is convinced that this has not been the case when the Commission adopted the provisions related to the interpretation of what a “final recipient” is in its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU;

    252.  Notes that not being able to ascertain final recipients of RRF funding poses a severe risk to the transparency and traceability of Union funds and thus to the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    253.  Recalls that a robust IT infrastructure is essential for data collection, programme monitoring and evaluation, and that managing authorities and beneficiaries are critical of the level of information required and duplication with other domestic systems; notes that, in contrast to the Cohesion Policy, the Court under the RRF pointed to the different structures and approaches used by national monitoring authorities, which could be perceived as less reliable by providing non-homogeneous information and leaving room for a potentially high number of errors; stresses that, in this respect, centralised interoperable systems facilitate efficient data collection and reporting, while fragmented systems underscore the need for streamlined approaches;

    254.  Welcomes that the ‘FR recast’ establishes horizontal measures for a centralised website (Financial Transparency System) at Union level, covering all recipients of Union funding, and notes that this website is due to overcome the current fragmentation, enhance transparency, and facilitate public scrutiny of recipients; notes that the Commission, as from the next MFF (i.e. post 2027) will be required to use the relevant data stored in the data mining and risk-scoring tool, Arachne, to feed the centralised website for transparency purposes, and that, in line with data protection rules, the website will include only public data, e.g. relevant data on recipients, contractors, subcontractors, and beneficiaries; further stresses that all Member States will have an obligation to provide the Commission with access to this data, to be fed into Arachne by automated means; regrets that the use of Arachne by Member States is not compulsory;

    255.  Notes that the final M&T of the national RRPs must be completed by 31 August 2026 according to Articles 18(4) and 20(5) of the Regulation; recalls the need for the Commission to work closely with every Member State to speed up implementation on the ground including through providing regular guidance and, upon request, technical assistance to help the implementation of the plans; re-iterates its concerns about the possibility of the reversal of M&Ts after the lifetime of the RRF, and urges the Commission to prevent such situations;

    256.  Calls on the Commission to reject any request of revision of RRPs which would lower the overall ambition of the plan or would eliminate important structural reforms from the RRPs, and to prioritise the completion of measures related to CSRs in RRPs; further calls on the Commission to step up its technical assistance to Member States lagging behind in the RRF implementation;

    Recommendations

    257.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its Annual Report as well as those of its related special reports, and welcomes that the Commission accepts the vast majority of them; calls on the Commission to implement them and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    258.  Calls on the Commission to grant full access to the Court to the new reporting tool on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), FENIX as soon as possible;

    259.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) carefully balance auditing and control requirements with the administrative burden imposed on Member States and beneficiaries of future performance-based instruments, while maintaining a sufficient level of control and audit that would grant a solid protection of the Union financial interests;
       (ii) closely monitor the continued fulfilment of M&Ts, in particular those related to audit, monitoring and control and ensure an adequate monitoring of any potential reversal of previously completed M&Ts;
       (iii) use the results of its checks on Member States control systems to express a clear conclusion on their effectiveness and take all appropriate measures;
       (iv) establish one single contact point for Member States on the Statement of Assurance at the Commission to which the Court can have access without further burdening Member States with requests for additional proofs;
       (v) record and monitor systematically all irregularities and all frauds affecting RRF funds;
       (vi) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the “final recipients”, of the RRF Regulation, by revising its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU, and to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of “final recipients”; calls on the Commission to come forward with proposals requiring Member States to publish details of all final recipients;
       (vii) streamline its control on the M&Ts through the implementation of a Single Audit approach, which would allow reduction of the administrative burden, the consolidation of audit responsibilities between the Commission and the Court, the coordination of audit timelines and requirements to avoid duplication and overlapping controls and audits, but at the same time ensuring the full protection of the Union financial interests;
       (viii) support Member States in making IT systems truly interoperable, so as to facilitate efficient data collection, reporting and exchange between various government departments and agencies to allow the minimisation of the risks of double funding, actively cross-check between relevant databases, and communicate with Member States about their administrative capacities to ensure double funding does not occur; notes in this regard, the positive examples provided at the Court Conference on Transparency and Traceability of EU Recovery and Resilience Funding in October 2024;
       (ix) work closely with Member States to ensure that M&Ts, in particular those of a structural nature or linked with CSRs, are fully and diligently implemented, and that no revision of RRPs will be approved in cases where ambition has been lowered or important measures have been weakened; avoid, to the extent possible, the revision of plans that would represent a “re-packaging” of planned measures into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation;
       (x) strictly apply the provisions of the RRF Regulation, including those regarding suspension of payments or recoveries of amounts, in particular if the protection of the financial interests of the Union is not ensured;
       (xi) apply very strictly the methodology on partial payments, including as regards structural measures and measures linked to the implementation of CSRs;
       (xii) develop a methodology based on quality and comparability of data to evaluate progress on green and digital transitions, as well as the tangible benefits, in the Member States;
       (xiii) ensure that Member States diligently apply the visibility provisions of the RRF, making sure that measures implemented through the Facility are adequately flagged as funded by the Union;
       (xiv) provide technical assistance, administrative support and advice to Member States to strengthen their administrative capacity, including through the organisation of regular meetings of the Informal Expert Group on the implementation of the RRF to discuss technical aspects and encourage the exchange of good practices amongst national authorities;
       (xv) perform, whenever a revision of the RRPs is proposed, a comprehensive analysis of new and existing measures and whether they would substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or would be in breach of other eligibility conditions of the RRPs;
       (xvi) provide training and support to Member States to increase administrative capacities including training on specialised skills, knowledge and providing examples of best practices;
       (xvii) keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;
       (xviii) use the recommendations of the Court from its work on the RRF and the experience gained in the implementation for the design of the next multiannual financial framework architecture including the implementation of future Union performance-based instruments;
       (xix) strengthen the design of future performance-based instruments by ensuring a closer link between disbursements and progress in implementation;
       (xx) ensure that any future revision, as well as the overall implementation, of RRPs is done in close cooperation with and consultation of local and regional authorities, and other relevant stakeholders in order to maximise the RRP’s impact;
       (xxi) analyse the weaknesses present in performance-based instruments, and address these weaknesses when designing new programmes in the future;
       (xxii) build, in the next MFF, on a high-level of interoperability and data exchange between various government departments and agencies to facilitate efficient data sharing and real-time updates across multiple platforms in order to allow to track overlapping projects, minimising the risks of double counting and double funding.
    (1) The 11th EDF covers the 2021-2027 MFF.
    (2) ‘The future of European competitiveness’, 9 September 2024.
    (3) Special report 05/2024: EU Transparency Register – provides useful but limited information on lobbying activities.
    (4) Special Report 11/2025 Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs – despite progress, the overview is still not reliable.
    (5) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (6) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783.
    (7) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (8) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (9) ECA Special Report 07/2024: The Commission’s systems for recovering irregular EU expenditure – Potential to recover more and faster.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (11) COM(2023) 258.
    (12) ECA Special Report 16/2024: EU revenue based on non‑recycled plastic packaging waste – A challenging start hindered by data that is not sufficiently comparable or reliable.
    (13) Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements (OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/822/oj).
    (14) ECA 2023 Annual Report para 1.35.
    (15) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).
    (16) Commission Decision of 13.12.2023 on the reassessment, on the Commission’s initiative, of the fulfilment of the conditions under Article 4 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 following Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 regarding Hungary, C(2023)8999.
    (17) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).
    (18) Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj).
    (19) Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).
    (20) Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, The Gambia, Togo and Uganda.
    (21) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj).
    (22) Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool or military tactic: Joint statement on the humanitarian situation in Gaza

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Speech

    Humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool or military tactic: Joint statement on the humanitarian situation in Gaza

    Joint statement delivered by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, on behalf of Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.

    We, the UK, Denmark, France, Greece and Slovenia, called for today’s urgent meeting of the Security Council on the situation in Gaza.

    First, we first want to welcome the release of Edan Alexander yesterday and reiterate our call for all of the remaining hostages who have been cruelly held by Hamas for over 18 months to be released immediately.

    Their suffering must end. The Security Council has been consistent and clear on this since the brutal terror attack on 7 October.  

    Hamas must have no future role in Gaza or be in a position to threaten Israel.

    Israel has now fully blocked aid entering Gaza for over two months. 

    Blocking aid as a “pressure lever” is unacceptable. 

    And last week, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved plans to expand its military operations in Gaza.

    We strongly oppose both these actions, which will add to Palestinian suffering, while doing nothing to serve the long-term interests of peace and security in the region, nor to secure the safe return of the hostages.

    Any attempt by Israel to annex land in Gaza would be unacceptable and violate international law.

    Palestinian territory must not be reduced nor subjected to any demographic change.

    On the humanitarian situation, the World Food Programme have told us they already have no food left. Palestinian civilians, including children, face starvation as a result. 

    Just yesterday, the IPC released a report warning that Gaza’s entire population is already at critical risk of famine. 

    Without an urgent lifting of the aid block, more Palestinians are at risk of dying. Deaths that could easily be avoided.

    Humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool or a military tactic.

    We are also deeply concerned at proposals to establish a new mechanism for the delivery of aid, which the UN has said would not meet humanitarian principles.

    International law requires Israel to allow and facilitate the safe, rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian aid and ensure that basic services are provided for all Gazan civilians.

    This applies to all armed conflicts around the world.

    Gaza is not an exception.

    We have two clear messages for the Government of Israel: lift the block on aid entering Gaza now and enable the UN and all humanitarians to save lives.

    Any model for distributing humanitarian aid must be independent, impartial and neutral, and in line with international humanitarian law and principles. 

    We cannot support any model that places political or military objectives above the needs of civilians. Or that undermines the UN and other partners’ ability to operate independently.

    We are also outraged by the killing of Palestinian Red Crescent workers and the hit on a UN compound on 19 March. Humanitarian aid workers and UN premises must be protected.

    We call on Israel to complete and release the findings of its investigation into the UN compound incident and take concrete action to ensure this can never happen again.

    At least 418 aid workers have been killed in Gaza since the conflict began.

    That is at least 418 too many.

    We urge Israel to investigate all incidents transparently, to be clear on the steps taken to hold those responsible to account and reinstate an effective deconfliction system.

    The only way to end the suffering of both Palestinians and Israelis is for an immediate return to a ceasefire, the release of all the hostages, and to urgently advance efforts to achieve a two-state solution. 

    This is the only way to achieve long-term peace and security for both Palestinians and Israelis, and we welcome France and Saudi Arabia’s leadership in chairing an international conference on the two-state solution here in New York in June.

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: What to look out for from the music of the 2025 Eurovision Song Contest

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Samuel Murray, Lecturer in Music Management, University of Leeds

    I’m in Basel, Switzerland – host city of this year’s Eurovision Song Contest – to present research about treatment of songwriters in the contest. While I’m here, I’ll be conducting field research and attending one of the shows. Here’s what I’ll be looking out for during this year’s competition.

    One of the joys of Eurovision is hearing songs in different languages and different musical styles. Of the 37 entries in this year’s contest, 23 songs include languages other than English (13% more than in 2024), and 17 of those are entirely sung in languages other than English (14% more than in 2024).

    With more than half of the entries now featuring languages other than English, the chances of a non-English song winning have increased. Among these entries, there are some particularly interesting language choices.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    One of the biggest controversies regarding language this year has been the Maltese entry Serving, performed by Miriana Conte. The song was originally titled Serving Kant. Kant is the Maltese word for singing but is pronounced in the same way as the English swear word “cunt”.

    It is a knowing reference to the phrase “serving cunt”. Drawn from black queer ballroom culture, popularised through shows like Rupaul’s Drag Race, it means to do something in a powerfully feminine manner.




    Read more:
    They’re serving what?! How the c-word went from camp to internet mainstream


    Despite therefore provocatively sounding as though it includes a word many viewers will find offensive, the Maltese broadcaster PBS has robustly defended Conte’s right to sing in her native Maltese.

    This was deemed within the rules, but then the BBC complained that it couldn’t broadcast the song. Subsequently the European Broadcasting Union have made Malta change the lyrics – although don’t be surprised if you hear fans in audience fill in the missing word.

    The controversy around the song has provided it with priceless PR and firmly placed it in contention for the win. I rather suspect this may have been the plan all along.

    Another interesting linguistic choice has been this year’s entry from The Netherlands. C’est La Vie, sung by Claude Kiambe, is in the French language, not Dutch, as a tribute to his Congolese roots.

    C’est La Vie by Claude.

    In an interview for the official Eurovision website Kiambe explained: “C’est La Vie is a tribute to a parent and for me that’s my mother. As a little boy and throughout my youth, she taught me to see the positive in the things you experience in life, even when you experience setbacks.”

    French allows Kiambe to authentically express his identity and personal story. This song is significant as it becomes the first from The Netherlands to be sung in French.

    Unusual song topics

    It wouldn’t be Eurovision without songs that cover unusual subject matters. The current favourite to win the contest is the Swedish entry Bara Bada Bastu, or Let’s Just Sauna, by the group KAJ. KAJ are from Finland where sauna is a core fundamental of culture.

    Bara Bada Bastu by KAJ.

    Ireland’s entry Laika Party, meanwhile, takes the unusual approach of creative lyrical speculative fiction. The song ponders what would happen if Laika, the first dog in space, was still alive and partying above Earth.

    Another unusual offering is Tommy Cash’s Espresso Macchiato, representing Estonia. Some viewers have interpreted the song as mocking Italian culture. It has attracted criticism from Italian politicians including senator Gian Marco Sentinaio who produced a flyer in response with the message: “Whoever insults Italy must stay out of Eurovision.”

    The songwriters

    Quite often in Eurovision, songwriters are overlooked for their role in the contest. As you read this article, many writers are already locked away at songwriting camps working away on entries for next year. In fact the Norwegian songwriting camp has already taken place for next year’s Eurovision.

    This year 134 songwriters are behind the 37 songs performed across the contest.

    In popular music songwriting it is now quite commonplace for writers to work in large groups, with each team member making contributions to creating the melody, harmony or the production of the track. This year the Armenian song Survivor, performed by Parg, has the most writers. Ten people were involved in its creation, including Parg himself. The UK comes a close second with seven writers contributing to the entry What the Hell Just Happened?, performed by Remember Monday.

    Survivor by Parg has ten songwriters.

    Another notable statistic this year is that in 30 out of 37 songs, the singer has a songwriting credit. This makes it very likely that we will see a songwriter lift the Eurovision trophy. This year many artists share personal stories in their songs, including France’s Louane who pays tribute to her mother with Maman and Italy’s Luca Corsi, who reflects on his childhood in Volevo Essere un Duro.

    Many of this year’s songwriters have competed in the contest before. Swedish songwriters Peter Boström and Thomas G:Son, who are no strangers to Eurovision having won the contest twice writing Loreen’s entries Euphoria (2012) and Tattoo (2023), are back once again, this time co-writing Survivor for Armenia.

    Another winning Swedish songwriter returning is Linnea Deb. She wrote Sweden’s winning song Heroes in 2015. This time she has co-written Hallucination for Denmark. Alongside the returning Swedes are fellow serial contest writers Dimitris Kontopoulos and Darko Dimitrov, who between them have over 20 contest entries under their belt but are yet to have a victory.

    There will also be a return to the contest for Teodora Špirić, better known a Teya, who alongside Salena, performed Who the Hell is Edgar? for Austria in 2023. This year she is the songwriter for Austrian entry Wasted Love performed by JJ. It’s currently the bookies favourite.

    There are also many new British writers in the contest to keep an eye on, including Emma Gale who has co-written the Croatian entry Poison Cake.

    This year’s contest brings a diversity of languages, subject matter and songwriters together to present 37 unique offerings from which the juries and voters of Europe will choose a winner. While the bookies and fans may have favourites, at this stage a clear winner is not a given – all can change when the songs are performed live.

    Samuel Murray is affiliated with the Musicians’ Union and a writer member of PRS for Music.

    ref. What to look out for from the music of the 2025 Eurovision Song Contest – https://theconversation.com/what-to-look-out-for-from-the-music-of-the-2025-eurovision-song-contest-256388

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Remarks by President António Costa at the joint press conference with Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    Source: Council of the European Union

    In the context of a visit to the Western Balkans, European Council President António Costa met with the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo. During the joint press conference, he reaffirmed the EU’s full commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession process, while addressing concerns about the persisting challenges in the country, namely the need to accelerate progress on the necessary reforms and the recent developments in República Srpska.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Remarks by President António Costa at the joint press conference with President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić

    Source: Council of the European Union

    In the context of a visit to the Western Balkan region, European Council President António Costa met in Belgrade with the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić. During the joint press conference, he reaffirmed the EU’s strong commitment to Serbia’s accession, emphasising that now there is a momentum that must be seized through swift reforms. He stressed that accession is a merit-based process, highlighting the need for full alignment with EU foreign policy, including support for Ukraine and strong condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Last Month in the Field – April 2025

    Source: Frontex

    In April 2025, Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, demonstrated its broad commitment to keeping Europe’s borders secure through a range of impactful operations and collaborations. From cracking down on smugglers in Eastern Europe to saving lives at sea in the Mediterranean, and from embracing new border technologies to strengthening partnerships across the continent, the month showcased Frontex’s dedication to a safer and more cooperative Europe. The following highlights recap how Frontex and national authorities worked hand-in-hand over the past month, underscoring a professional and proactive approach to European border management. 

    Bulgarian authorities and Frontex scored a victory against cross-border crime this month by stopping a haul of counterfeit goods at the Lesovo border crossing with Turkey. In a joint operation, the Bulgarian Border Police and Customs officers, supported by Frontex Standing Corps officers, intercepted two vehicles loaded with fake designer clothing and footwear. More than 1,400 garments and 900 pairs of shoes bearing logos of famous brands were seized – items that would have been worth an estimated €70,000 on the black market had they slipped through. Some illicit products even carried price tags up to €600 for a single T-shirt, a sign of how convincing the fakes appeared. 

    This success at the EU’s external border was a direct result of vigilant cooperation. As one Frontex officer put it, “It is not easy to tell a fake from an original when it comes to counterfeit goods. But working together with professionals every day, we have become a serious obstacle for smugglers.” The operation highlighted the excellent partnership between Frontex and the Bulgarian authorities in protecting EU consumers and legitimate businesses. The Frontex officer’s praise for his Bulgarian colleagues underscores the fruitful cooperation on the ground. The confiscated counterfeit items will now be used as evidence, preventing them from entering EU markets, while the perpetrators face legal consequences. This case sends a clear message: through close collaboration, border agencies are effectively shutting down smuggling routes for fake goods. 

    Another major enforcement success in April took place on the Romania–Ukraine border, where a joint team from the Romanian Border Police, Romanian Customs, and Frontex thwarted a large-scale cigarette smuggling attempt. In under an hour, officers apprehended two individuals attempting to illegally bring over 2.6 million cigarettes into the EU. The smugglers had gone to great lengths to hide their contraband, using some truly creative compartments to try to evade detection. The team’s discovery was all the more impressive given the inventive hiding places employed, including: 

    Thanks to the sharp eyes and expertise of the border guards, these concealments were uncovered before the illicit cargo could move further into Europe. The Frontex officer supporting the operation – known among colleagues as a veteran in fighting smuggling – played a key role in detecting the contraband. Romanian officials and Frontex supervisors alike praised the operation’s success. One colleague lauded the involved officer as “a true professional with a special and inexhaustible flair for detecting cross-border crime.” This compliment underscores the high level of skill present in such joint teams. The “hats off” accolades went to all Romanian and Frontex personnel involved, highlighting how teamwork and shared intelligence can foil even the most elaborate smuggling schemes. The seizure of 2.6 million cigarettes not only represents a financial blow to organised crime but also protects EU markets and taxpayers from the illegal tobacco trade. It stands as yet another example of effective Frontex support at EU borders, keeping illicit goods out of circulation. 

    As warmer spring weather set in, April saw a surge in irregular migration across the Central Mediterranean, testing the readiness and solidarity of EU border forces. Within just a few days, over 1,100 migrants had arrived on Italian shores, many taking to the sea in flimsy boats launched from North Africa. This sudden influx – more than one thousand people in a 72-hour span – put considerable strain on Italy’s reception facilities and underscored the ongoing challenges in this maritime corridor. In response, Frontex and several EU Member States mobilised swiftly to ensure lives were protected and borders monitored. 

    European solidarity was on full display during these rescues. Danish and Lithuanian patrol boats deployed under Frontex’s coordination helped the Italian authorities save nearly 400 people from five small, unseaworthy vessels in the central Mediterranean. Operating under Italy’s lead, the crews from Denmark and Lithuania worked tirelessly to transfer men, women, and children from overcrowded, unsafe boats to the relative safety of EU vessels. At the same time, Frontex aerial surveillance teams intensified patrol flights over the sea. Frontex aircraft spotted multiple migrant boats in distress from the air, relaying precise coordinates to rescue units. This early detection enabled timely life-saving interventions by the Italian Coast Guard and other assets, preventing potential tragedies at sea. 

    Over the course of three days, dozens of rescue operations were carried out by a combination of national and Frontex-deployed resources. Such joint efforts demonstrate the value of a truly integrated European approach: Member States lending support to one another via Frontex when migratory pressure spikes in a particular region. The Executive Director of Frontex noted that every person saved is a testament to the collective commitment of the EU to protect lives. While the Central Mediterranean route remains difficult and dangerous, April’s experience showed how coordinated action can meet these challenges. By pooling vessels, aircraft, and expertise from across Europe, Frontex and its partners helped ensure that a surge in crossings did not turn into a humanitarian disaster. The Agency continues to work closely with Italy and other front-line states, not only to manage irregular migration flows but also to go after the criminal networks exploiting vulnerable migrants. Saving lives at sea remains at the core of Frontex’s mission, alongside securing the EU’s external borders. 

    In April, Frontex achieved a significant milestone in enhancing border security technology and cooperation. Thanks to a new agreement with Cyprus, Frontex officers now have direct access to Cyprus’s national border database at crossing points. This development means that Frontex personnel deployed in support of Cypriot authorities can instantly check traveler information and other border data just as national officers do. The immediate benefits of this integration are clear, leading to: 

    • Faster, more secure screening at airports and other entry points, reducing wait times for travelers while enhancing security through better information sharing. 

    By plugging into Cyprus’s databases, Frontex can help close information gaps and streamline operations on the ground. This is one of the first practical outcomes of a broader initiative to improve data-driven border management. Importantly, preparations are underway for the full rollout of Frontex’s access to the Schengen Information System (SIS) – Europe’s largest security database – which will take cooperation to the next level in the near future. Gaining SIS access will enable Frontex officers to spot persons or objects of interest (such as stolen documents or wanted individuals) across all of Europe’s borders in real time, greatly amplifying their effectiveness. 

    This deepening tech integration with Member States exemplifies Frontex’s push for “smart borders.” It shows how investing in modern IT solutions can make border control both faster and more secure, without compromising on thoroughness. Cypriot authorities have welcomed Frontex’s connectivity to their systems, noting that it serves as a force multiplier for national border guards. Together, Frontex and Cyprus are building a border management approach that is fast, fair, and future-ready – one that leverages the best of technology and teamwork to protect the EU’s external frontiers. 

    This month marked two years since the launch of the joint operation between Frontex and North Macedonia, a partnership that has significantly bolstered border security in the Western Balkans. In April 2023, North Macedonia became the first Western Balkan country to host Frontex border teams under a special status agreement, and two years on, the results of this cooperation are evident and worth celebrating. Frontex Standing Corps officers have been working side by side with North Macedonian Border Police along the country’s borders, sharing expertise and helping to manage migratory movements and security threats in the region. Together, over the past 24 months, they have achieved several important milestones in border management, including: 

    • Joint patrols conducted along North Macedonia’s borders with neighbouring countries, enhancing surveillance and the ability to intercept irregular crossings or illicit activities. These mixed teams have increased the visibility and reach of border control, acting as a deterrent to smugglers and traffickers. 

    • Delivery of modern equipment and technical assets to North Macedonia’s authorities. Frontex has provided patrol vehicles, document inspection devices, and other specialist tools to strengthen the country’s border infrastructure. This upgraded equipment means local border guards are better equipped to spot fake documents, hidden contraband, or unauthorised entries. 

    • Stronger overall border protection for North Macedonia and Europe. By reinforcing a key section of the Balkan migration route, the cooperation has contributed to greater security for the entire EU external border. It has helped manage migration flows more effectively and cracked down on cross-border crime, from migrant smuggling to contraband trafficking, benefitting all Europeans. 

    Frontex and North Macedonia’s officials commemorated the two-year anniversary by reflecting on these successes and looking ahead to continued collaboration. The presence of European border guards in North Macedonia underscores the EU’s commitment to working with its neighbours to tackle shared challenges. It also provides invaluable experience to all the officers involved, creating a spirit of camaraderie and mutual understanding. According to Frontex’s leadership, this partnership is a model of EU–Western Balkans cooperation, showing how aligning procedures and sharing resources can lead to concrete improvements in security and border management. As the operation enters its third year, Frontex plans to maintain its support, including further training for North Macedonia’s officers and ongoing joint patrols, thereby maintaining the positive momentum. The past two years have laid a solid foundation for even closer ties and a more secure region in the future. 

    Frontex’s activities in April were not limited to field operations – they also extended to strategic dialogue at the highest levels. A noteworthy event took place at the Frontex Operational Headquarters in Piraeus, Greece, where Commander Georgios Pyliaros (the Frontex Field Commander in Greece) hosted a high-level meeting with Admiral José António Vizinha Mirones, the Commander of the Portuguese Maritime Police. Admiral Mirones visited the Piraeus headquarters as part of a Joint Coordination Board discussion, focusing on the current operational situation and challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly regarding migration flows affecting Greece and Cyprus. 

    During this visit, both leaders exchanged insights on maritime border security and reinforced their commitment to close cooperation. Commander Pyliaros expressed, on behalf of Frontex’s chain of command, sincere appreciation for Portugal’s continued contribution to Frontex-led operations. He highlighted the professionalism and dedication displayed by the Portuguese crews operating coastal patrol vessels in Greek waters. These Portuguese Maritime Police teams, deployed under Frontex, have been instrumental in joint patrols and search-and-rescue missions in the Aegean Sea, and their exemplary performance and seamless integration with Frontex units have not gone unnoticed. Admiral Mirones, for his part, conveyed gratitude for the opportunity to visit and engage with Frontex’s Greece office. He commended the collective effort being made to safeguard Europe’s maritime borders and stressed the importance of ongoing collaboration. Both officials agreed that maintaining strong partnerships – such as the one between Frontex and Portugal – is crucial in addressing migration and security challenges at sea. 

    The meeting concluded on a highly positive note, symbolising the unity of purpose among European border and coast guard services. In a ceremonial gesture, commemorative coins were exchanged between Frontex and the Portuguese Maritime Police, underscoring mutual respect and teamwork. This high-level maritime dialogue not only strengthened bilateral ties but also provided strategic guidance for field operations. With Portugal’s vessels and crews continuing to serve in Frontex missions, such coordination ensures that everyone is rowing in the same direction. The result is a more effective response to irregular migration by sea and a safer maritime environment for all. These talks in April set the stage for even more synchronised efforts in the months to come, reaffirming that European partners stand stronger together in protecting the EU’s external borders. 

    Frontex also invested in long-term security capacity this month by focusing on the fight against illicit firearms. Firearms trafficking is a growing threat to EU internal security, especially in times of war and instability when weapons can more easily find their way onto the black market. In April, within the framework of the EU’s EMPACT initiative (European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats), Frontex led a specialised training programme in Poland aimed at sharpening the skills of border guards in intercepting illegal arms. The training was hosted at the Polish Border Guard Academy in Kętrzyn – a centre known for advanced law enforcement training – and brought together officers from 10 EU Member States. These participants, all of them frontline border or customs officers, underwent intensive instruction on how to better detect and stop the smuggling of firearms at EU borders. 

    Over the course of the training, the multinational group of officers learned about concealment methods and detection techniques for firearms. Experts shared real-case examples of smugglers attempting to hide weapons and ammunition in vehicles, cargo, or personal luggage, highlighting red flags to watch for. The trainees practiced using x-ray scanners, metal detectors, and other tools to identify weapons hidden in creative ways. They also exchanged intelligence on smuggling routes and the latest trends in gun trafficking, recognising that traffickers are constantly adapting their methods. By simulating realistic scenarios, the course enabled officers to hone their decision-making under pressure – for instance, when discovering a hidden handgun during a routine vehicle inspection at a border crossing. The overarching goal was to equip frontline officers with the knowledge, tools, and confidence to intercept firearms before those weapons can reach our streets and communities. 

    This EMPACT-supported training in Poland is part of a broader EU effort to cut off the supply of illegal firearms that can fuel organised crime or even terrorism. By investing in people and skills, Frontex and its partners are strengthening a critical line of defence against gun trafficking. The officers who completed the course in Kętrzyn will take their enhanced expertise back to their home countries – from Scandinavia to Southern Europe – multiplying the impact. They form a network of trained specialists who can also share best practices with colleagues, thus raising overall capacity across the EU. Frontex officials highlighted that such cooperative training not only improves technical know-how but also builds trust and communication channels among European border agencies. Ultimately, this means better coordinated operations and information-sharing when it comes to stopping dangerous weapons from crossing into the EU. The training concluded with participants and instructors affirming their commitment to stay one step ahead of firearms traffickers. As new security challenges emerge, continuous professional development like this ensures that Europe’s border guards remain vigilant and prepared. 

    April 2025 showcased the full spectrum of Frontex’s mission – from frontline enforcement and lifesaving rescues to technological advancement and international partnership. As Europe’s external border challenges continue to evolve with the changing seasons and geopolitical context, Frontex is moving ahead with resolve. The Agency is leveraging the momentum from April’s successes to further strengthen cooperation, whether by expanding joint operations in partner countries or by welcoming more contributions from Member States. It is accelerating the adoption of modern technology and information systems to give border guards an edge in both speed and accuracy. Equally, Frontex remains committed to investing in its people – through training, leadership development, and a culture of shared expertise – recognising that a well-prepared human element is key to any high-tech solution. In the coming months, Frontex will continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with EU countries at their borders, upholding European values of security and solidarity. By building on the foundations laid in April, the European Border and Coast Guard will be even better equipped to tackle whatever challenges the future holds – protecting the EU’s borders and the people who depend on them, with professionalism, compassion, and unity. 

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Court of Justice of the European Union – P10_TA(2025)0080 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IV – Court of Justice of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0050/2025),

    A.  whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and by implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B.  whereas the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the judicial institution of the Union, having the task of ensuring compliance with Union law by overseeing the uniform interpretation and application of the Treaties and ensuring the lawfulness of measures adopted by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies;

    C.  whereas the CJEU helps preserving the values of the Union and, through its case-law, works towards the building of Europe;

    D.  whereas the CJEU comprises two courts: the Court of Justice and the General Court;

    E.  whereas Parliament and Council amended Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the CJEU (the ‘Statute’)(1) in 2024 with respect to the transfer of preliminary rulings in specific areas to the jurisdiction of the General Court;

    1.  Notes that the budget of the CJEU falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 12,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,4 % of the total Union budget); notes that the CJEU’s budget of approximately EUR 0,5 billion represents approximately 3,9 % of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

    2.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’) examined a sample of 70 transactions under the heading ‘Administration’, 10 more than were examined in 2022; the Court further states that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2023 accounted for approximately 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology (IT), and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

    3.  Notes that 21 (30 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the five errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold;

    4.  Notes that the Court’s report did not identify any specific issues concerning the CJEU;

    Budgetary and financial management

    5.  Notes that the budget allocated for the CJEU in 2023 amounted to EUR 486 025 796, which represented an increase of 3,9 % compared to 2022; notes that this increase was mainly related to salary adjustments forecasted for 2023; stresses that the budget of the CJEU is essentially administrative, with around 75 % of the appropriations related to expenditure for its members and staff, and almost all of the rest related to expenditure for buildings and IT;

    6.  Notes that the overall implementation rate of the budget at the end of 2023 was 97,72 %; notes that five transfers were submitted to the budgetary authority in accordance with Article 29 of the Financial Regulation to reinforce the budget lines for ‘Energy consumption’, ‘Purchases, work, servicing and maintenance of equipment and software’ and ‘buildings’ from other budget lines, mainly the budget line for staff ‘Remuneration and allowances’; notes that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continued to create budgetary pressure for the CJEU, including through rising inflation and salary adjustments, strongly increasing energy costs and costs for a number of goods and services;

    7.  Notes with satisfaction that the authorising officer by delegation declared that the resources allocated had been used for the purpose intended and in accordance with the principle of sound financial management and that the control procedures put in place provided the necessary guarantees as to the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions;

    8.  Notes that the average payment time stood at 23,1 days in 2023 compared to 24,32 days in 2022; calls on the CJEU to continue its efforts to reduce the time for payment, particularly considering that 81 % of invoices were received electronically in 2023;

    9.  Notes that the CJEU’s mission budget, which stood at EUR 638 000 for both staff and Members in 2023, continued to decrease by 3,3 % in 2023 compared to 2022; notes that 85,1 % of the appropriations for missions in 2023 were used compared to 46,6 % in 2022 due to the persistent travel restrictions in application at that time;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    10.  Notes the significant steps taken by the CJEU in 2023 towards its judicial reform which has led to the partial transfer of jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice to the General Court; notes that a political agreement with Parliament and Council was reached at the end of 2023 in view of the amendment to the Statute of the CJEU and with a view to improving the functioning of the CJEU against the background of a steady increase in the caseload and in the complexity and sensitive nature of questions raised; notes that, further to the adoption of the reform in 2024, detailed rules and procedures were adopted in order to complete the reform and allow the implementation of the new regulatory framework as of 1 October 2024;

    11.  Notes that, in 2023, the Court of Justice ruled on five cases concerning the principle of primacy in the context of four preliminary rulings brought by the courts in Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Romania, as well as one infringement case concerning Poland; stresses the fundamental importance of the principle of primacy of Union law, which ensures the uniform interpretation and application of Union law across all Member States and safeguards the rule of law as a core value of the Union; strongly reaffirms that the primacy of Union law is the cornerstone of the Union’s legal order and highlights the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the Union. Furthermore, notes that the General Court ruled on six cases related to measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law by the Hungarian government, which systematically undermines core Union values; urges the Commission to take decisive enforcement actions against any Member State that challenges or disregards the binding nature of CJEU rulings; highlights that, in cases relating to the investigation of the Union budget, the principles of due process and fundamental rights must be fully respected by all competent authorities;

    12.  Notes that Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union states that “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions […]”;

    13.  Condemns any national measures or legislative actions that seek to undermine the codification and enforcement of CJEU judgments; calls for the establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism to track Member State compliance with CJEU rulings and recommends linking compliance with EU funding disbursement under the rule of law conditionality framework;

    14.  Notes that 821 new cases were submitted to the Court of Justice in 2023, compared to 806 in 2022, out of which 63 % were references for preliminary ruling and 28,6 % were appeals against decisions of the General Court; notes that the General Court saw a major increase of cases with 1 271 new cases in 2023 compared to 904 in 2022, including an exceptional series of 404 joint cases submitted in October 2023; notes that in 2023 for the General Court, 37 % of the new cases, including the series of 404 joint cases, concerned actions relating to institutional law, 24,3 % concerned actions relating to intellectual property and 6 % concerned disputes between institutions of the Union and their staff; notes that the total number of pending cases remains stable when compared to previous years: considering the previously mentioned 404 cases as a single case, 2 587 cases were pending at the end of 2023, compared to 2 585 at the end of 2022 and 2 541 at the end of 2021;

    15.  Notes that the Court of Justice closed 783 cases in 2023, compared to 808 in 2022, and that the General Court closed 904 cases in 2023, compared to 858 in 2022;

    16.  Welcomes the decrease in the average length of proceedings for the cases closed by the Court of Justice, whereas in 2023 that average was 16,1 months, compared to 16,4 months in 2022; notes that the average duration for the cases closed by the General Court was 18,2 months, compared to 16,2 months in 2022, which the General Court explained was due to the nature and related complexity of the proceedings managed in 2023;

    17.  Notes the decrease in the average time taken to deal with direct actions before the Court of Justice (from 23,5 months in 2022 to 20,8 months in 2023) and with references for preliminary rulings (from 17,3 months to 16,8 months); notes that, as regards the litigation before the Court of Justice, there was a significant increase in the number of direct actions, in particular in the field of the environment, and that the questions referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in 2023 related principally to the area of freedom, security and justice, followed by taxation, consumer protection and transport; notes that, as regards the litigation before the General Court, there was an increase of cases in the fields of intellectual property and economic and monetary policy, including banking;

    18.  Notes with satisfaction the high use rate of e-Curia in 2023, with 10 502 e-Curia accounts being registered: 94 % of lodgements before the General Court were made via e-Curia, which is the same as in 2022, while the use rate of e-Curia at the Court of Justice went up to approximately 89 %, compared to 87 % in 2022;

    19.  Appreciates the progress made in digitising the judicial archives with a view to preserving documents for future consultation and facilitating access for researchers and the public by means of a digital portal;

    20.  Welcomes the performance-based approach developed by the CJEU, allowing the CJEU to take decisions based on performance outcomes and the level of achievement of its objectives, measured through a set of workload and operational indicators; notes that the key performance indicators used by the CJEU cover a wide range of specific areas in support of the five management objectives relating to the proper functioning of the CJEU, digitalisation and emerging technologies, openness and transparency, multilingualism and human resources management;

    21.  Notes that the internal control framework of the CJEU was subject to an in-depth evaluation in 2022-2023, which confirmed its soundness; notes that, as part of that evaluation, the financial control circuits were adapted in order to make the controls more efficient;

    22.  Notes that the main internal audits carried out in 2023 concerned the CJEU’s expenditure on the cleaning of buildings, the effectiveness of the internal control system to safeguard the CJEU’s IT assets and the staff selection procedures; notes that an internal audit also carried out a study on the use of artificial intelligence in the area of justice in relation to the implementation of a “strategy for integrating tools based on artificial intelligence into the operation of the CJEU”; notes that, in many cases, the services of the CJEU took actions to implement the internal audit recommendations before the formal finalisation of the internal audits and that those actions were considered satisfactory by the internal auditor;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    23.  Notes that, at the end of 2023, the CJEU employed 1340 officials (58 %), 765 temporary agents (33 %) under Articles 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Staff of the EU, and 198 contract agents (9 %); notes that, at the end of 2023, the occupation rate of the establishment plan stood at 97,11 %; notes further that the annual turnover of staff was 7,8 % in 2023, which was particularly due to the 20 % of those staff who left the CJEU by taking retirement;

    24.  Notes that the Court of Justice is composed of 27 Judges and 11 Advocates General and that no new Judge or Advocate General took office in 2023; notes further that the General Court is composed of 54 Judges and that two new Judges, one woman and one man, took office during 2023; notes further that a new Registrar for the General Court was elected in 2023;

    25.  Welcomes the CJEU’s detailed responses to the questionnaire from Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control, provided as part of the current discharge procedure, particularly regarding staff distribution at the end of 2023; notes that the gender composition of the Court of Justice and the General Court continues to be very unbalanced; expresses its appreciation of the letter from the President of the General Court to the President of the Conference of the Representatives of the Member States in 2024, calling on Member States to take the need for gender balance into account when nominating candidates for the replacement of Judges and Advocates General; calls on Member States to take the need for gender balance into account when nominating candidates for the replacement of judges;

    26.  Takes note that, of the 2 303 officials and agents serving at the end of 2023, 61 % are women; welcomes the fact that the proportion of women in administrative positions is 55 %, and especially the fact that, in managerial posts, the proportion has increased to 43 %, compared to 40 % in 2022 and 2021, confirming the upward trend recorded since 2018 (41 % in 2020, 39 % in 2019 and 37,5 % in 2018); notes however that representation of women was the highest in assistant grades, whereas it was the lowest in senior management positions; calls on the CJEU to ensure a greater representation of women in senior management positions and take further measures to promote gender balance at all levels; welcomes the efforts deployed by the CJEU in favour of equality, inclusion and diversity, especially at recruitment stage;

    27.  Calls on the CJEU to publish an annual Gender and Diversity Report to provide transparency on gender representation at all levels of the institution, including Judges, Advocates General, and administrative staff, as well as to provide for concrete measures of improving gender parity in senior positions;

    28.  Welcomes that all Union nationalities are represented in the staff of the CJEU, but notes that certain nationalities are more represented than others; welcomes the continued efforts of the CJEU to promote a better geographical balance among its staff, in particular by fostering the visibility and attractiveness of its job vacancies, creating and offering more favourable job conditions to attract temporary agents from certain less-represented Member States and communicating widely to varied audiences on the job opportunities at the CJEU in 2023; notes that a significant effort was made to attract many talented young people from different Member States though the CJEU’s internship programme; invites the CJEU to examine whether trainees are proportionally represented from all member states;

    29.  Urges the CJEU to promote a multilingual working environment, recognizing its potential to enhance the fair distribution of nationalities among its staff; calls on all EU institutions to uphold and ensure the principle of multilingualism;

    30.  Welcomes the work done by the High Level Interinstitutional Group on enhancing the attractiveness of Luxembourg as a place of work for staff; calls on the CJEU to maintain and enhance cooperation with other Luxembourg-based institutions across different initiatives; notes with appreciation that the budgetary authority approved for the financial year 2025 the necessary appropriations in order to allow the granting of a housing allowance to staff at lower grades, as recommended by the High Level Interinstitutional Group; asks that Parliament be updated on the progress of such initiatives intended to improve the attractiveness of Luxembourg as a place of work;

    31.  Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU implemented several initiatives to promote physical and mental wellbeing of staff through specialised workshops and awareness-raising activities; notes that the teleworking scheme, which entered into force on 1 May 2022, was assessed positively by the managers, among whom 92 % replied that the productivity of staff teleworking was either equivalent or better than prior to the existence of the teleworking scheme; notes that, with a view to achieving a better work and personal-life balance, in 2023, the CJEU renewed the possibility for its staff to telework from outside the place of employment up to 10 days per year, especially during the judicial vacations;

    32.  Welcomes the ongoing awareness-raising, information and training campaigns aiming at promoting inclusion, mutual respect, cooperation and support for people with disabilities and their helpers;

    33.  Notes that the number of working days of sick leave was 20 198 in 2023, corresponding to a reduction of 14,78 % compared to 2022; notes with concern that the medical service reported 11 cases of burnout in 2023; welcomes a thorough analysis of diagnostic reports undertaken by the CJEU to identify instances of professional burnout and the CJEU’s focus on preventive measures, especially the reinforcement of its medical and social workers’ team, the prevention of psychosocial risks in the workplace and the introduction of awareness-raising activities for management on the right to disconnect and the risks of over-performance; encourages the CJEU to maintain focus on this problem in order to prevent any further cases associated with burnout and inform the Parliament of the measures taken in this regard;

    34.  Notes that an administrative enquiry was launched in 2023 on an alleged case of sexual harassment concerning a member of staff and that this case was closed in 2024 with a sanction; expresses concern that a procedure of assistance for alleged harassment concerning a judge was also filed in 2023 but no harassment was established in that case; notes that an interdepartmental working group, established in March 2023, therefore ahead of the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, examined the rules and procedures in place in the CJEU to prevent harassment and made some recommendations with a view to improving these rules and procedures; encourages the CJEU to follow up and continue to show no tolerance for harassment in the workplace by introducing mandatory training on unconscious bias and ethical standards for all judges and senior officials to prevent abuse of power;

    Ethical framework

    35.  Notes with satisfaction that, as requested in previous discharge recommendations, the new code of conduct on the rights and obligations of officials and other servants of the CJEU reflecting the CJEU’s values and commitment to ethics was drawn up in 2023 and adopted in March 2024; notes that the code of conduct includes provisions on conflict of interests, duty of loyalty, duty of confidentiality and discretion, outside activities, occupational activities after leaving the service and publications and also applies to seconded national experts and trainee judges hosted under the European Judicial Training Network; notes that, in 2023, awareness-raising activities and revamped training on the code of conduct were organised for staff and managers, with a particular focus on newcomers; calls for a mandatory training for all staff on a regular basis and asks that Parliament be kept informed about the implementation of the code of conduct;

    36.  Notes that, before the code of conduct entered into force, two potential cases of conflict of interest were declared and handled in accordance with the procedures in place, with the aim of ensuring that the new members of staff concerned were not involved in the management of files that they knew from a previous job;

    37.  Notes that, further to the adoption of the code of conduct for Members and former Members of the CJEU, the declaration of interests of the Members have been published online to avoid any potential conflict of interest in the handling of cases; notes that the CJEU is constantly reassessing its internal rules on this matter with a view to updating those rules and to ensuring the highest possible standards of ethical behaviour; calls on the CJEU to establish an independent ethics committee to oversee compliance with the code of conduct and investigate potential breaches; calls for mandatory annual ethics training for all CJEU personnel, including Judges and Advocates General to preserve the integrity of the CJEU; asks the CJEU to inform Parliament about the results of any further assessment of the effectiveness of that measure aimed at the prevention of conflicts of interest;

    38.  Welcomes the publication of the declarations of interests of the Members of the CJEU but calls for the introduction of a standard pre-appointment screening process to identify and mitigate potential conflicts of interest at an early stage; urges the Council to establish transparent guidelines for Member States when nominating candidates for judicial positions at the CJEU;

    39.  Urges the CJEU to introduce a mandatory recusal policy for judges in cases where they have past professional affiliations with litigants appearing before the CJEU; calls for stricter conflict-of-interest screening for judges and high-ranking staff, including regular updates to financial disclosure requirements; asks for the publication of real-time recusal decisions in cases where judges declare a conflict of interest, ensuring greater transparency in the judicial process and reinforcing public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the CJEU;

    40.  Notes that in 2023, all Members of the CJEU were resident of Luxembourg in accordance with Article 14 of the Statute;

    41.  Notes that the list of external activities carried out by the Members of both the Court of Justice and the General Court has been published on the CJEU website since 2018; further notes that the list is difficult to read for the general public and recommends its revision to ensure greater clarity and informativeness; notes that the prior authorisation by the general meeting of the Court of Justice or by the plenary conference of the General Court is only granted when the external activity is compatible with the requirements of the code of conduct and with the Members’ obligations to be available for judicial activities; asks the CJEU to inform the discharge authority about any initiatives to improve the readability of the information related to external activities, in line with previous discharge recommendations;

    42.  Notes that the rules governing Members’ travels, missions and use of drivers and cars, as updated in 2021, provide that only the running costs resulting from the car use for purposes related to the execution of a mission order or to the exercise of his or her mandate within a limit of 10 000 km are borne by the CJEU; reiterates its opinion that the use of the car fleet outside of the strict performance of the duties of the Members of the CJEU should not take place under any circumstances, notes that the CJEU reported to be in discussion with other institutions in order to obtain a harmonised set of rules for the use of official vehicles, while respecting the autonomy of each institution; invites all Union institutions to agree on a single system to be applied horizontally, which would reduce the confusion and increase transparency and efficiency in the use of public money; asks the CJEU to keep Parliament informed of any progress in this matter;

    43.  Notes that an OLAF case, referred to in previous discharge resolutions, which dealt with the conduct of a member of staff that might have constituted a serious failure to comply with their obligations, was closed in 2023; notes that the CJEU is not aware of any new OLAF investigation or recommendation in 2023;

    44.  Notes that the CJEU did not report any cases of fraud, corruption or misuse of Union funds in 2023; notes that the CJEU’s anti-fraud strategy is an integral part of its integrated internal control and risk management framework, with a particular focus on the risks of improper disclosure of information;

    Transparency and access to justice for citizens

    45.  Welcomes the CJEU’s engagement to enhance transparency, access to justice and public openness, thus contributing to foster public trust in the Union institutions;

    46.  Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU consolidated the streaming service for hearings of the Court of Justice and of the General Court on the Curia website, thus facilitating the access of citizens to the judicial activities of the CJEU; welcomes the improvement of the CVRIA website, in terms of its structure, functionalities and content; welcomes that the delivery of judgments of the Court of Justice, the reading of opinions of the Advocates General, the hearings of the Grand Chamber and certain hearings of chambers sitting with five Judges have been broadcast live on the Curia website since 2023; calls on the CJEU to further improve transparency by broadcasting all hearings of both the Court of Justice and the General Court on its website and permanently storing them online;

    47.  Welcomes that, further to the reform of its Statute, the CJEU will publish statements of case or written observations lodged in preliminary ruling proceedings after the closure of such proceedings, except in cases of objection to the publication of a person’s statement of case or observation; underlines that such publication will improve transparency and access to justice for citizens and calls on the CJEU to publish all documents related to a file on its website; calls on the CJEU to implement a procedure that could be used by any person to access in house all the documents related to a case;

    48.  Notes that rules on the use of videoconferencing were adopted by the General Court in April 2023 and by the Court of Justice in September 2024, according to which a party may request the use of videoconferencing where security or other serious reasons prevent that party’s representative from participating in a hearing in person;

    49.  Notes that the rules laid down by the CJEU decision of 26 November 2019 concerning public access to documents held by the CJEU in the exercise of its administrative function do not apply to judicial documents for which access is governed by the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice or the Rules of Procedure of the General Court; notes that the CJEU registered 21 requests of public access to administrative documents in 2023 and granted access to administrative documents in 12 cases; notes that the European Ombudsman found no instances of maladministration on the part of the CJEU in 2023;

    50.  Invites the CJEU to simplify the process of finding specific rulings on e-curia; welcomes efforts to make the interface more client-friendly and intuitive;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    51.  Notes that compared to 2022 the budget expenditure increased by 10,9 % for IT projects, by 13 % for IT equipment, by 59 % for cybersecurity projects and by 72 % for cybersecurity services, licences and equipment in 2023;

    52.  Notes that the implementation of major digitalisation projects under the digital transformation strategy remained a priority for the CJEU in 2023, such as the development of the integrated case management system (SIGA), the promotion of the use of the e-Curia application for the lodging and notification of procedural documents by electronic means, the adoption of eSignature and the adoption of HAN/Ares electronic document record and management system; notes that the CJEU tracks the return on investment in digitalisation projects in terms of costs and resources efficiency and asks the CJEU to keep the discharge authority informed of its findings in that area;

    53.  Notes that, as part of its comprehensive initiative to increase accessibility and inclusion for persons with vulnerability, the CJEU has continued to implement the “accessibility by design” approach for any change and evolution of its IT systems; notes that, following an audit of the Curia website, the CJEU started to improve the site’s accessibility to a wide range of users, such as people with visual impairments, hearing impairments or learning disabilities;

    54.  Notes that the CJEU implemented several projects based on artificial intelligence (AI), such as the automation of document analysis for references to applicable legislation and assistance with invoice verification through robotic processes and hearing transcription, in line with its new AI integration strategy adopted in June 2023; underlines that it is of vital importance that AI is used in a manner which fully preserves the independence, the quality and the serenity of the legal processes, is in full consideration of ethical matters and is used under human oversight and allowing human intervention in order to avoid negative consequences or risks, or stop the system if it does not perform as intended; notes that, as part of that strategy, the CJEU set up an AI management board composed of members of the Court of Justice and of the General Court to oversee the ethical aspects of AI use within the CJEU and to set clear boundaries for its application; welcomes the staff guidelines on the use of AI issued by the board; welcomes the initiatives in place to upskill employees in digital competencies through the training path developed in cooperation with the Interinstitutional Committee for Digital Transformation (ETA); emphasises that the digitalisation of justice and the adoption of emerging technologies such as AI will offer significant advantages for the efficient functioning of the CJEU; recommends however that the CJEU anticipate the associated cybersecurity risks and strengthen even more its collaboration with the EU Agency for Cybersecurity and CERT-EU;

    55.  Notes that no EDPS enquiries were communicated to the CJEU in 2023; notes that, in 2023, EDPS had not addressed any specific recommendation to the CJEU following its investigation regarding the use of cloud services by Amazon web services; notes that EDPS published a decision in 2023 confirming compliance of the CJEU’s use of cloud videoconferencing services with data protection law; reiterates however its concerns regarding the use of external cloud services, given the growing threats about cybersecurity and digital sovereignty;

    56.  Welcomes the CJEU adoption of a cyber roadmap in 2023 and strengthening of its cybersecurity operational capabilities to better protect its systems against the increasing number of cyberattacks; underlines furthermore that a robust cybersecurity strategy is an essential tool to fight against foreign interferences aiming to undermine the integrity of the European Institutions; notes that the CJEU has taken various measures to reinforce its cybersecurity preparedness and ability to recover from security incidents, including through its participation in the governance of the Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board and through a combination of cybersecurity controls and tools in line with the recommendations of CERT-EU; notes that the budgetary authority approved for the financial year 2025 the necessary appropriations for two additional posts in order to reinforce the CJEU’s staff capacities in the field of cybersecurity;

    57.  Welcomes the measures taken, such as cybersecurity audits, staff training and rapid incident response protocols, to protect the CJEU’s technological infrastructure from cyber threats; stresses that the digitisation of justice and the use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence will bring many benefits in terms of the smooth functioning of the CJEU, but also entail risks that the CJEU needs to pre-empt and protect itself against; suggests in this regard that the CJEU develop a cybersecurity strategy and step up collaboration with other Union institutions, in particular ENISA (the EU Agency for Cybersecurity), on the prevention of cyber-attacks, the number and sophistication of which are growing exponentially in Europe;

    58.  Welcomes the initiative to assign fictitious names to anonymised cases, by using a computerised automatic name generator, in order to strengthen the protection of personal data and facilitate the identification of individual cases;

    59.  Notes with satisfaction the amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, which will clarify and simplify judicial procedures, including the possibility of using videoconferencing for hearings, electronic signature of decisions and the designation of pilot cases;

    Buildings

    60.  Notes that, following-up on the cross services reflection about the most efficient use of the CJEU’s premises, that was concluded in 2023, pilot projects were launched; notes that the results of those projects, together with other factors, such as environmental and budgetary aspects, quality of justice, well-being at work, inclusion, accessibility and the attractiveness of the CJEU, will be taken into account in the final decision on the use of the CJEU’s buildings; asks that Parliament be kept informed about the implementation of those conclusions and the consequences for the organisation of the workspace;

    61.  Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU further pursued its comprehensive initiative to increase accessibility and inclusion for persons with disabilities, with the aim of guaranteeing access to the CJEU, physically or virtually, to all individuals, participants in proceedings and visitors; notes further that, in 2023, the CJEU started to make an inventory of its infrastructure with a view to complying with the new national accessibility legislation as of 1 January 2032; asks that Parliament be kept informed about further initiatives in this area;

    Environment and sustainability

    62.  Notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the CJEU continued to significantly reduce its energy consumption and carbon footprint compared to 2015, which is the baseline for the implementation of the CJEU’s eco-management and audit scheme strategy, thanks to energy-saving measures and optimisation of its heating, cooling and lighting infrastructures; notes that heating consumption was reduced by 33,5 %, electricity by 28,7 %, water by 20,1 %, office paper by 63 %, office and canteen waste by 43 % and greenhouse gas emissions by 30,2 % in 2023 compared to 2015; welcomes that the CJEU applied green procurement criteria in 10 calls for tender above EUR 60 000; welcomes the CJEU’s commitment to the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS); encourages the CJEU to continue its efforts in reducing its environmental impact, with a strategy to reach carbon neutrality by 2035;

    63.  Welcomes that the CJEU has taken several initiatives to support and increase sustainable mobility for its staff and Members, including subsidies for public transportation, subsidies for self-service bicycles, improved bike parking facilities and improved facilities for hybrid and electrical cars;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    64.  Welcomes the budgetary savings achieved through cooperation with other institutions and in particular the shared applications and hosting services based on service-level agreements with the Commission as well as the participation in interinstitutional procurement procedures, which have allowed the CJEU to optimise costs and resources;

    65.  Welcomes the efforts of the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) in training national judges on EU law; notes with appreciation that, in line with the CJEU’s declaration entitled “Supporting the EJTN to shape a sustainable European judicial culture”, the CJEU and the EJTN sought to increase the diversity of long-term trainees in 2023, with the aim of ultimately increasing their number to one per Member State; notes that the measures taken have already been successful since the CJEU has trainees from some Member States which previously did not actively participate in the programme; notes that 15 remunerated traineeships were offered for the year 2023-24; calls on the CJEU to further develop its knowledge-sharing initiatives, including joint case-law databases and virtual collaboration platforms to support national courts in complex legal interpretations;

    66.  Emphasises that traineeships should be remunerated in compliance with the European Parliament’s resolution of 14 June 2023 on Quality Traineeships in the Union (2020/2005(INL)), which calls for all internships in Europe to be paid; welcomes that currently all trainees at the CJEU receive a grant during their stay, mainly from the CJEU and, in some specific cases, from other sources; take notes that the CJEU only accepts a few trainees (less than 10 per year) paid by other sources, and for short periods (on average 2 months); welcomes that in such cases, the CJEU administration carefully checks that these trainees receive a grant, allowance or remuneration for this traineeship, paid directly by their employer or academic institution;

    67.  Appreciates that the CJEU fully cooperates with OLAF, the Court, the EDPS and the European Ombudsman; notes that, in 2023, the CJEU has continued to work towards maintaining the established dialogue with national courts, and in particular with the constitutional and supreme courts, and that the CJEU hosted a number of meetings, including the annual meeting of national judges; encourages deeper cooperation between the CJEU and national courts to strengthen uniform application of Union law; recommends establishing a permanent judicial exchange programme for judges from Member States to work alongside their CJEU counterparts, fostering best practices in the interpretation of Union law;

    Communication

    68.  Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU strengthened its efforts to engage with Union citizens by enhancing its outreach on social media; notes that, at the end of 2023, the number of subscribers to the CJEU’s LinkedIn account increased by 32 % and the number of followers on the CJEU’s two accounts on X (formerly Twitter) by 9 %,while the views on its YouTube channel increased by 84,96 % compared to the previous year;

    69.  Welcomes the CJEU’s efforts to enhance strategic communication and transparency towards Union citizens on the judicial activities of the CJEU, especially through the organisation of an open day, the offer for visitors, in particular the special virtual visits, in which 800 students participated in 2023, and the review of the drafting of its press releases and online publications in an accessible style, about matters of media interest or which have an impact on the lives of citizens.

    (1) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, OJ L, 2024/2019, 12.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2019/oj.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Committee on the Rights of the Child Opens Ninety-Ninth Session, Adopts New Bureau with Sopio Kiladze as Chairperson

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Rights of the Child this morning opened its ninety-ninth session, which is being held in Geneva from 12 to 30 May, during which the Committee will review reports on the efforts to adhere to the Convention on the Rights of the Child of Brazil, Indonesia, Iraq, Norway, Qatar and Romania, as well as on Brazil’s efforts to implement the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.

    In an opening statement, Andrea Ori, Chief, Groups in Focus Section, Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Representative of the Secretary-General, said the Committee’s work was more crucial than ever.  Significant progress in children’s rights, which seemed secure until recently, was now severely disrupted.  Children worldwide were increasingly affected by a convergence of crises, including economic downturns, climate change, public health emergencies, and armed conflicts.

    Mr. Ori warned that the recent global funding crisis exacerbated the situation of children, with a daunting forecast ahead.  The United Nations Children’s Fund had projected that in 2025, at least 14 million children would experience interruptions in vital nutrition support and services due to current and anticipated funding cuts, putting them at increased risk of severe malnutrition and death.  The capacity to vaccinate over 15 million vulnerable children against measles in fragile and conflict-affected countries would also be drastically reduced.

    Considering the troubling outlook for children, Mr. Ori said, there was an urgent need for coordinated global efforts to safeguard children’s rights and ensure their well-being.  Now, more than ever, it was crucial for governments to fulfil their commitments under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

    Mr. Ori concluded by wishing the Committee all the best for a productive session.

    During the meeting, the Committee elected a new Chair and Bureau.  Sopio Kiladze (Georgia) was elected as Chair, and Cephas Lumina (Zambia), Thuwayba Al Barwani (Oman), Philip D. Jaffe (Switzerland), and Mary Beloff (Argentina) were elected as Vice-Chairs. 

    The Committee also welcomed four new members – Timothy. P.T. Ekesa (Kenya), Mariana Ianachevici (Republic of Moldova), Juliana Scerri Ferrante (Malta), and Zeinebou Taleb Moussa (Mauritania) – and welcomed back Mr. Lumina, who previously served as a member from 2017 to 2021.   They made their solemn declaration. 

    Ms. Kiladze said it was a pleasure and honour to be elected as Chair of the Committee.  She said her election came at a difficult time in which many children around the world were affected by violations of their rights. She said it was vital that the Committee continued to work for the protection of the rights of children everywhere.

    Before adopting the session’s agenda, the Committee also heard statements from representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Children’s Fund, Child Rights Connect, and the Secretary of the Committee.

    Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.  The programme of work of the Committee’s ninety-ninth session and other documents related to the session can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. this afternoon to consider the seventh periodic report of Norway (CRC/C/NOR/7).

    Statements

    ANDREA ORI, Chief, Groups in Focus Section, Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Representative of the Secretary-General, welcomed the four new members of the Committee: Timothy Ekesa (Kenya), Mariana Ianachevici (Republic of Moldova), Juliana Scerri Ferrante (Malta), and Zeinebou Taleb Moussa (Mauritania), and the returning member Cephas Lumina (Zambia).  Each member brought valuable and diverse experiences that would greatly enhance the Committee’s work.  Additionally, he congratulated the members who had been re-elected for another term: Rinchen Chophel (Bhutan); Sopio Kiladze (Georgia); Benyam Dawit Mezmur (Ethiopia); and Benoit Van Keirsbilck (Belgium).

    The Committee’s work was more crucial than ever.  Significant progress in children’s rights, particularly in health and education, which seemed secure until recently, was now severely disrupted.  Children worldwide were increasingly affected by a convergence of crises, including economic downturns, climate change, public health emergencies, and armed conflicts.  The recent global funding crisis exacerbated their situation, with a daunting forecast ahead. 

    The United Nations Children’s Fund had projected that in 2025, at least 14 million children would experience interruptions in vital nutrition support and services due to current and anticipated funding cuts, putting them at increased risk of severe malnutrition and death.  The capacity to vaccinate over 15 million vulnerable children against measles in fragile and conflict-affected countries would be drastically reduced.  Immunisation services, disease surveillance, and outbreak responses in nearly 50 countries were already facing disruptions.

    Mr. Ori said, quoting the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “human rights are like air: we need them to live— but we only notice them when we are suffocating.”  Today, countless children worldwide were suffocating as their rights were denied and overlooked.  Considering the troubling outlook for children, there was an urgent need for coordinated global efforts to safeguard their rights and ensure their well-being. Now, more than ever, it was crucial for governments to fulfil their commitments under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

    The global funding crisis was also affecting the Committee’s work directly.  Its pre-sessional working group, scheduled to be held after this session, was cancelled as funding was not available.  Altogether, 15 sessions across 10 treaty bodies were at stake, and it was highly likely that, for those treaty bodies with three sessions, the Office of the High Commissioner would not be able to secure the funding to hold the third session.  The lack of predictability and the piecemeal approach with last-minute confirmation created huge uncertainty, led to wasted time and effort, and higher costs.

    The Office of the High Commissioner had received only 73 per cent of its approved regular budget in 2025, and 87 per cent of its approved regular budget in 2024.  As a result, the United Nations Secretariat was implementing a hiring freeze until August 2025.  This would impact on regular budget posts approved to support the treaty body system, which currently could not be filled.  The Secretariat was in a similar situation last year, and this had led to increased backlogs in reviewing State party reports and backlogs in registering and analysing individual communications.

    The United Nations Office at Geneva’s conference services had also adopted cash conservation measures, which would impact on the conference support provided to the United Nations human rights treaty bodies, particularly in terms of documentation, meeting time, and interpretation, with an overall reduction of 10 per cent.  This meant treaty bodies’ mandated activities would be even more affected in 2025 than in 2024, impacting their ability to have dialogues with States parties and to make decisions on individual communications, resulting in further delays and backlogs.  The Office was also forced to significantly reduce treaty body capacity building activities, which provided support for States to report to, and interact with, treaty bodies.

    All this caused real damage to predictability, which was so important for States, civil society organizations and rights-holders to engage with treaty bodies.  Given the overall reduction in funds and availability of support services, “business as usual” would no longer be possible and the treaty bodies needed to plan on doing less with less.

    On a more positive note, the annual meeting of Chairpersons of human rights treaty bodies would be held in Geneva from 2 to 6 June.  The Chairs would dedicate the meeting to the liquidity crisis, which was affecting the very existence of treaty bodies if they could no longer fulfil their mandates, and to discuss what could be done to increase predictability within the current financial and human constraints, including reviewing the decisions and recommendations from their last meeting and their working methods.

    The 2025 full-day meeting on the rights of the child at the Human Rights Council on 13 March, which focused on early childhood development, featured speeches by children and an informal dialogue on the topic between a group of young people, Member States and the High Commissioner.

    The first session of the Open Ended Inter-Governmental Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the Convention on education would be held from 1 to 5 September in Geneva.  The Office was working closely with the sponsors of the resolution to establish the modalities for the process leading up to the first session of the Inter-Governmental Working Group and its programme of work. A call for submissions was issued in March for the attention of States, civil society, United Nations agencies and children, for whom a toolkit for consultations had been prepared.

    In conclusion, Mr. Ori wished the Committee all the best for a productive session, saying that he looked forward to working with the new Chair and Bureau of the Committee for the next two years.

    SOPIO KILADZE, newly elected Committee Chair, said it was a pleasure and honour to be elected as Chair of the Committee.  She said her election came at a difficult time in which many children around the world were affected by violations of their rights.  It was vital that the Committee continued to work for the protection of the rights of children everywhere.

    Regarding the session’s agenda, Ms. Kiladze said that the Committee would hold dialogues to consider the reports of six States parties: Brazil, Indonesia, Iraq, Norway, Qatar and Romania.  The scheduled review of Pakistan was postponed to a later session at the request of the State party.

    During the session, the Committee would continue its discussions on how its cooperation with various relevant bodies could be further strengthened to enhance the promotion and protection of the rights of the child.  It would also discuss the organisation of its future work and consideration of States parties’ reports, focusing on issues related to its methods of work and follow-up to the treaty body strengthening process.

    In addition, the Committee would consider any communication and information it had received through its communication procedure and would continue to consider how to integrate days of general discussion into the process of developing general comments.  The Committee would also continue its work on its new general comment on children’s right to access to justice and to an effective remedy.

    ALLEGRA FRANCHETTI, Secretary of the Committee, said that no reports had been received under the Convention since the last session, with the total number of reports pending consideration remaining at 62.  The total number of ratifications of the Convention remained at 196, while 64 periodic reports were overdue, of which 10 for more than five years and five for more than 10 years.

    There had been one new accession to an Optional Protocol to the Convention since the last session, with Estonia acceding to the Optional Protocol on a communications procedure.  The total number of ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict remained at 173, while ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography remained at 178, and ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on a communications procedure was now at 53. 

    No new reports had been received under any of the Optional Protocols.  There were 37 initial reports overdue under the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict; and 47 overdue under the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.

    Statements by United Nations Bodies and Civil Society Representatives

    Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said the current global political and financial environment was difficult and complex.

    The Office introduced reports to be presented at the upcoming June session of the Human Rights Council related to children’s rights, including the second report of the High Commissioner on child rights mainstreaming, a report on the use of digital technologies to achieve universal birth registration, and a report on ensuring quality education for children.

    The Office was also preparing a report on the rights of the child and violations of the human rights of children in armed conflicts, which would be presented at the September session of the Human Rights Council, and a report on the safety of the child in the digital environment, which would be presented at the Council in 2026. 

    In addition, the Office had held a capacity-building roundtable with Member States on 5 June on strengthening child participation at the Human Rights Council, and it continued to contribute to the civil society and academia-led process to develop global guidelines on child participation in global events, helping to convene two participatory surveys that had reached over 200 children worldwide.

    The Office encouraged Committee members and other parties to participate in the Fifth World Conference on Justice for Children, to be held in Spain for 2 to 4 June.  The Office would work with the Committee to protect children’s rights in this difficult time.

    United Nations Children’s Fund commended the work of the Committee’s outgoing bureau and expressed its desire to work with the new Bureau and all Committee Experts.  Perhaps more than ever, the Committee was meeting at a time of great constraint for the international human rights system.  It was regrettable that the pre-sessional working group was cancelled. The Fund was discussing with the Committee regarding alternative means of engaging with children and civil society from the countries concerned in preparation for the next session.

    Armed conflicts, climate change, poverty, violence and inequalities, among other trends, continued to deprive millions of children of their rights, and the mere recognition that children had rights continued to be challenged in all parts of the world.  There was a normative pushback against children’s rights at the last Human Rights Council.  Most statements focused exclusively on children’s vulnerability and their right to protection, and did not highlight children’s agency, empowerment and participation.  In negotiations on a resolution on child rights defenders, there was much resistance to attempts to recognise their contributions.

    The Fund had held consultations with more than 7,000 children related to the Committee’s general comment 27 on children’s right to access to justice and to an effective remedy and had worked to develop a child-friendly version of the draft general comment. 

    The Fund had also worked on a child rights training course for its staff and had updated its handbook on the jurisprudence of the Committee.  Later in the year, the Fund would start to develop guidance on general measures of implementation, following the online guidance on children’s rights legislative reform launched last year.

    Child Rights Connect expressed its renewed commitment to supporting the Committee.  It welcomed the holding of the session, despite uncertainty due to the United Nations’ liquidity crisis, and requested the Committee to discuss the organisation of its future work, including how and when it would engage with children and civil society.

    Child Rights Connect raised deep concern about the impact on children of the funding crisis affecting the child rights sector.  Despite these circumstances, it continued to collaborate with stakeholders and carry out its mandate.  It welcomed the development of general comment 27, and had mobilised children and civil society around it, producing a methodology for consulting with children along with supporting child-friendly materials.  It had also recently launched a global survey on the digital protection of child human rights defenders, which collected the opinions and experiences of children who had stood up to protect human rights in the digital space.

    At a time when manifold crises affected children of the world, all persons holding mandates for children needed to strengthen joint efforts and find new ways of working with creativity to better serve children.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CRC25.009E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Slovak and Serbian leaders’ Moscow visit, EU statement

    Source: European Commission (video statements)

    Regarding the Slovak and Serbian leaders’ visit to Moscow for this year’s May-end World War II celebrations, the EU states that Russia has used this event for propaganda and justification for their full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The EU does not legitimise Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine and remains united in its support for Ukraine.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uiSZKNs-EJs

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: European Public Prosecutor’s Office (the ‘EPPO’) – P10_TA(2025)0087 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0051/2025),

    A.  whereas the EPPO is the independent public prosecution office of the Union, responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes against the financial interests of the Union, for significantly enhancing the Union’s capacity to safeguard taxpayer funds, and for bringing to judgment the perpetrators of, and accomplices to, criminal offences provided for in Directive (EU) 2017/1371(1) and indicated by Regulation (EU) 2017/1939(2);

    B.  whereas the competence of the EPPO encompasses several types of fraud, and includes cross-border VAT fraud with a total damage of at least EUR 10 million, money laundering, corruption, organised crime and other offences for which the EPPO performs prosecutorial functions before the competent courts of the participating Member States;

    C.  whereas the EPPO is one of the component of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture and, as such, its actions are coordinated with and complementary to those of the other components of the architecture, to achieve streamlined, efficient coordination that enhances the overall effectiveness of the architecture;

    D.  whereas the EPPO intervenes when national authorities could investigate and prosecute crimes but where the prerogatives of national authorities stop at the borders of their country, and other organisations like Eurojust, OLAF and Europol do not have the necessary powers to carry out the relevant criminal investigations and prosecutions;

    E.  whereas the procedural acts of the EPPO are subject to judicial review by the national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) has, by way of preliminary rulings or judicial reviews of those acts, residual power to ensure a consistent application of Union law;

    F.  whereas the EPPO is composed of a central level, with its headquarters in Luxembourg, consisting of the European Chief Prosecutor, 22 European Prosecutors (one per participating Member State), the Administrative Director, and a decentralised, national- level consisting of the European delegated prosecutors (EDPs) in the 22 participating Member States;

    G.  whereas at the central level the European Chief Prosecutor and the 22 European Prosecutors compose the College of the EPPO (the ‘College’) and supervise the investigations and prosecutions carried out by the EDPs at the national level, who operate with complete independence from their national authorities;

    H.  whereas, under Article 93 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the EPPO Administrative Director, acting as the authorising officer of the EPPO, is to implement its budget under its own responsibility and within the limits authorised in the budget and shall send each year to the budgetary authority all information relevant to the findings of any evaluation procedures;

    I.  whereas, in accordance with Article 50(2) of the EPPO’s Financial Rules, the Accounting Officer of the Commission is also to act as Accounting Officer of the EPPO and is responsible for the preparation of the annual accounts, which are consolidated with those of the Union;

    J.  whereas, under the current framework, the final annual accounts are scrutinised by the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’) and it is with the Council to recommend and to the European Parliament to decide whether to grant discharge to EPPO’s Administrative Director in respect of the implementation of the budget for a given financial year;

    K.  whereas the scrutiny over the management of the EPPO resources and related expenditure cannot ignore the examination of operational activities, their consequences and impact and the methods of their execution;

    L.  whereas the EPPO has been operating autonomously in the implementation of its budget only since 24 June 2021 and it has started its operational activities, necessitating continuous evaluation to ensure resources align with operational effectiveness, on 1 June 2021, which is also the dies a quo for the five-year term indicated in Article 119 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 upon reaching which the Commission will have to submit to the European Parliament and to the Council and to national parliaments an evaluation report on the implementation and impact of such Regulation, and on the effectiveness and efficiency of the EPPO and its working practices, together with its conclusions;

    M.  whereas, in accordance with Article 119(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the Commission is to submit legislative proposals to the European Parliament and to the Council if it concludes that it is necessary to have additional or more detailed rules on the setting up of the EPPO, its functions or the procedure applicable to its activities, including its cross-border investigations;

    1.  Welcomes the positive opinion of the Court on the reliability of the EPPO’s accounts for the year ended 31 December 2023 and on the legality and regularity of the underlying revenue and payments;

    2.  Recalls the Parliament’s strong support for the establishment of the EPPO; acknowledges the EPPO as an independent Union body; stresses the EPPO’s important role in the protection of the Union’s financial interests and as an essential component of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture and of a wider Union system based on integrity, accountability, transparency and the sound financial management of resources; commends the EPPO for its work in investigating, prosecuting, and ensuring justice for crimes affecting the Union budget, such as fraud, corruption, and cross-border VAT fraud;

    3.  Highlights the critical necessity of promptly dedicating necessary resources to ensure the timely conclusion of the ongoing investigation into the acquisition of the COVID-19 vaccine in the Union, especially considering the substantial public interest in this matter, coupled with the fact that the investigation already commenced in 2022 and to this date no decision has been publicly announced;

    4.  Notes that it is possible to compare only the two most recent budgetary and operational performances of the EPPO, for the period 2022 to 2023, following the EPPO’s financial autonomy in June 2021; observes that, in that context, the budgetary increases related to the EPPO’s activities remain very difficult to estimate because of the EPPO’s recent establishment, the unique characteristics of the EPPO and its main activities, the unpredictable level of fraud detection, the wide variety of its cases, its lack of discretion with regard to pursuing prosecutions coupled with its reliance on the resources and procedural constraints of national judicial systems, the lack of a fixed correlation between the number and the costs of investigations, and the magnitude of the Union’s financial interests that are to be protected; also observes that it is difficult to estimate the expenditure for the caseload related to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) because of its unprecedented manner of implementation and high volume of resources;

    Budgetary and financial management

    5.  Notes that the overall final budget allocated to the EPPO for 2023 was EUR 65,9 million, substantially increased (by 14,7 %) from the EUR 51,2 million that was allocated in 2022, while the 2021 budget (EUR 26,2 million) related to a period prior to the EPPO’s financial autonomy; observes that the EPPO’s budget includes the reinforcement, granted by the budgetary authority at the request of the EPPO in June 2023, by EUR 500 000 (the request also included human resources related to the essential enhancement of the EPPO’s security capacity, leading to the grant of eight additional establishment plan posts); appreciates that no budget was returned in 2023, compared to 10 % (EUR 5,9 million) of the initial budget in 2022 and 21 % (EUR 9,5 million) in 2021; re-iterates the need for the EPPO to be provided with sufficient resources to adequately fulfil its mandate;

    6.  Welcomes the increasing level of budget implementation, which was 99,6 % in 2023 (compared to 98,1 % in 2022 and 97,4 % in 2021); appreciates that the overall execution rate for payments progressed in 2023 reaching 85,3 % (compared to 76,6 % and 71 % in 2022 and 2021) and the average payment time decreased to 17 days compared to 23,8 in 2022 and 21,0 in 2021); observes that the electronic invoicing module (e-invoicing) was rolled out in June 2023 and it will contribute to further reducing administrative burdens, time-to-payment and the overall processing costs; encourages a further refinement of operational processes to maximise efficiency;

    7.  Understands that, because the budget endowment requests were only partially met, the EPPO focused its financial resources on the intake of additional EDPs, which has an impact on the EPPO’s capacity to lead the increasing number of investigations and prosecutions, on the need to improve the security standing of the organisation and on the maintenance of its case-management System (CMS), which could have negatively affected the management of cross-border investigations; underlines the importance of additional funding and strengthening its staffing to enable the EPPO to effectively combat organised crime, protect the Union’s financial interests, and uphold the rule of law, which are key Union priorities; calls for a dedicated increase in funding within the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to ensure it can continue to meet its objectives and obligations;

    8.  Is aware that, following the achievement of its financial autonomy, in June 2021, the EPPO prioritised the operational expenditure related to investigation, prosecution and security measures, and that this has resulted in limiting the non-operational expenditure to essential level support services; remarks that, in this context, a total of EUR 28 312 075 was allocated on operational expenditure lines (Title 3), representing 43 % of the EPPO’s final budget 2023 (compared to EUR 21 047 346, which was 41 % in 2022); observes that the main cost drivers for these activities were the EDPs’ remuneration (51 % of the operational activities compared to 42 % in 2022), followed by operational ICT activities like maintenance and development of the EPPO’s CMS (19 % compared to 28 % in 2022), and the linguistic services (translation and interpretation related activities) (14 %, the same as in 2022);

    9.  Notes that the remuneration of the EDPs reached EUR 14,5 million (compared to EUR 8,7 million in 2022), which represents the main operational expenditure because of the increased number of EDPs in place over 2023; welcomes the accession of Poland and Sweden to the EPPO, which was announced in 2024; notes that it did not affect the 2023 expenditure and concerns the 2024 budget only marginally, due to the late and gradual intake of two European Prosecutors and a number of EDPs; understands that a more solid cost estimation will not be possible until 2025; welcomes the inclusion in the programme of the objective of the new Irish Government to join the EPPO; calls on the Hungarian government, as the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO, despite the absence of any legal or constitutional impediment, to join the EPPO without further delay;

    10.  Observes that costs for missions and operational meetings increased further in 2023 (mission costs were EUR 1 175 000 in 2023 and EUR 980 000 in 2022; operational meeting in 2023 were EUR 659 752 compared to EUR 170 000 in 2022), in line with the increasing level of intensity of investigations;

    11.  Is aware that the costs for translation services are expected to further increase, in line with the EPPO’s increasing caseload, and recognises the need for additional resources for translation; welcomes both the internal guidance developed on the use of translation services, with a view to reinforcing control over costs and including the recommendation to use machine translation services whenever possible, and the use of national service providers of the limit allowed by the current Regulation to address the problem; observes, in that regard, that while Article 107 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 provides for translation services required for the administrative functioning of the EPPO at the central level to be provided by the Union’s Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union, it also provides for different handling of operational and urgent matters and empowers EDPs to decide on the arrangements for translations for the purpose of investigations in accordance with applicable national law;

    12.  Notes that in 2023 the EPPO signed 234 specific contracts under existing framework contracts, for a total of more than EUR 11 million, with a significant increase in the use of EPPO framework contracts (82 specific contracts for a value of more than EUR 6,5 million) due, to a great extent, to the use of the EPPO’s framework contract for the Provision of Services in the Field of Information Systems; observes that only one contract, concerning the EPPO’s CMS, was awarded via a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice for reasons of extreme urgency;

    13.  Observes that carry-over of appropriations from the previous exercise in 2022 amounted to EUR 10 969 680 (24,4 % of the EPPO’s 2022 final budget), of which 84,8 % was consumed (EUR 9 307 392) and 15,2 % was cancelled (compared to 21,4 % in 2022) and notes that forecasts indicate another carry-over in 2024, pending completion of the deliverables, for payment appropriations (the carry-over from 2023 to 2024 amounted to EUR 9 392 989); understands that partial cancellation is a consequence of the progressive establishment of the EPPO’s administrative practices following the financial autonomy it achieved in 2021; notes that carry-over appropriations cancelled for approved budgets of 2022 and 2023 could be neither used with existing or new contracts nor synchronised with the principle of annuality, while the planning of the corresponding expenses, mainly related to translation, meetings, missions and external contractors, could not be accurate due to a lack of any historical data and figures and the rapid evolving of the organisation; appreciates that the continuous strengthening of the EPPO’s administrative capacity is progressively addressing those issues and that, while a fully estimation cannot be made in advance because of the nature of the EPPO’s operational activity, the expected level of cancelled appropriations will diminish in 2024;

    14.  Notes that in 2023 two budget transfers were adopted by the European Chief Prosecutor, on a proposal drawn up by the Administrative Director, and that they were notified to the College for information, for a total transferred between titles of EUR 1,2 million;

    15.  Acknowledges the need for adequate budget flexibility, to address unexpected operational needs such as, in 2023, the war in Ukraine, inflationary pressures, or other global challenges and understands that the EPPO made use of its Financial Rules by timely reallocation of appropriations via budget amendments (one in June and one in November) and via budget transfers (one in September and one in December);

    16.  Reiterates its observation on the obsolete 2017 Legislative Financial Statement which is deemed to be no longer fit-for-purpose due to a significantly underestimated workload; recalls its previous resolution, underlining that the absence of a mid-term budgetary review obliges the EPPO to wait until the very end of the budgetary adoption process to have clarity on what resource level it can implement in the subsequent year, and it limits the EPPO’s capacity to anticipate budget implementation preparatory activities as well as the options that should be made available to achieve maximum flexibility in the development of an organisational infrastructure for a project as innovative as the EPPO; notes that this, in particular, affects the early launch of recruitment, delaying the progress towards full occupancy among others and the overall absorption capacity of the EPPO;

    17.  Maintains that the budgetary and human resources allocated to the EPPO are expected to be adequate to allow the efficient and successful carrying out of its mandate and the normal handling of the related administrative procedures; reiterates its call on the Commission to review the EPPO budgetary framework in close cooperation with the EPPO to find adequate ways to support it in its work; calls on the Commission to allocate additional resources, justified by the growing number of complex cases, and emphasises that these should not be dependent on the revision of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 or of the EPPO mandate, but rather on the importance of the fight against organised crime and the protection of the Union’s financial interests in the next MFF;

    18.  Emphasises that the activities of the EPPO contribute to the protection of the Union’s financial interests and are also expected to recover amounts from the Union’s budget that were not used for its intended purpose due to criminal activities; believes that the amounts resulting from seizing and confiscating measures adopted by the EDPs in the Member States could, after the deduction of costs incurred by the Member States’ authorities to implement those measures, flow back into the Union Budget in accordance with Article 38 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939; considers that the potential revenue resulting from seizing and confiscating measures should be accounted for in the Union Budget as non-assigned revenue; calls on the Commission to make the necessary arrangements with the relevant national authorities to allow those amounts to enter into the Union Budget;

    19.  Acknowledges that the EPPO clearly contributes to European added value in terms of coordination and cooperation with the Member States in investigating and prosecuting crimes against the financial interests of the Union and that the EPPO has been achieving the goals set out in Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 in that regard; expects Member States to comply with legal obligations and to report all relevant cases to the EPPO; notes with concern that in several instances Member States have been declaring criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union as national cases, which are within the competence of the EPPO; notes that questions of competence between the national authorities and the EDPs have come up in several cases across several countries; is aware that, according to Article 25(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, cases of disagreement about the EPPO’s competences are to be decided by the same national judicial authority who is responsible for determining the competent body for prosecution at national level; regrets that in many participating Member States the procedures in force and the national authorities entrusted with the decisions on such cases regarding conflicts of competence are not set in compliance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, stresses that in cases of conflicts of competence between the EPPO and a national prosecution authority, the national authority competent to decide on the attribution of competence could come to a conclusion without requesting a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice and could, instead adopt a decision that is binding on the EPPO and points out that this is against the spirit of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, which provides that, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provision on conflicts of competence between the EPPO and national authorities; believes that the current situation lacks legal clarity; encourages all Member States to work more closely with the EPPO; emphasises that the competence of the EPPO is clearly outlined in Article 22(1) and (2), and in Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, and that all Member States are to comply with that Regulation; notes that when Member States have doubts about the competence of the EPPO in a particular case, there is the possibility of submitting a preliminary question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU and Article 42(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 ; urges the Commission, where there is a breach of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, to submit the case to the Court of Justice; notes with concern that the question of competence can cause a halt to the investigation; is concerned about potential loss of evidence when cases are paused; calls on the Commission to collect information regarding cases regarding conflicts of competence for the evaluation report that will be submitted in 2026;

    20.  Reiterates that Article 91(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 is to be implemented properly and underlines that the peculiar characteristics of prosecution and investigation expenditure, including the exceptional cases of the EPPO’s operational expenditure governed by that provision, have to be taken into account; understands that, in 2023, a first financing agreement was signed in the framework of a pilot for the reimbursement of claims made under Article 91(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, to cover exceptionally costly investigation measures carried out at national level on behalf of the EPPO; appreciates that the corresponding payment was audited by the Court during the 2023 audit and was deemed legal and regular;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    21.  Welcomes that, during 2023, the College met 22 times and adopted 73 decisions, among which are the anti-fraud strategy 2023-2025, the anti-harassment policy for staff and for members of the College or the EDPs;

    22.  Acknowledges that the EPPO continued its efforts to set in place a system to monitor efficiency gains and cost savings, and notes that in 2023 it launched a review of the budget and activities’ strategic and operational planning and monitoring processes and of the recruitment processes, to make gains in speed and acquired competences; points out that, overall, the internal control systems in force are effective;

    23.  Notes that, to further develop the EPPO’s assurance framework, the internal auditor of the EPPO for non-operational matters (IAS) initiated, in 2023, a limited review of the EPPO’s building blocks of assurance; believes that this engagement, scheduled to be finalised during the course of 2024, will provide recommendations to build a stronger capacity for the Authorising Officer to issue a credible declaration of assurance;

    24.  Welcomes the benchmarking exercise carried out by the Internal Audit Capability (IAC) by comparing the deployed human resources of the EPPO with a set of other Union entities and national prosecution offices, against a standardised set of pillars which includes administrative support and operational activities; observes that, in 2023, the IAC tested the internal oversight environment and ran the first internal audit as an analysis of the working environment and internal controls of the EPPO’s decentralised office in Sofia, Bulgaria;

    25.  Reiterates its view that the IAS and the IAC should coordinate their actions with a view to advising and assisting the EPPO in the establishment of its main core processes and the achievement of its objectives;

    26.  Notes that the EPPO has developed its own purchase capacity, resulting from its own specifically run procurement processes launched in 2023, and manages its own specific contracts and order forms with regard to the implementation of existing framework contracts that were signed in 2023; observes that the EPPO continues, in parallel, to operate its purchase capacity through service level agreements with other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by joining inter-institutional contracts with various market operators;

    27.  Is aware that in 2023 the Administrative Director established the minimum standards (assessment criteria) for each of the 17 internal control principles based on the COSO 2013 Control-Integrated Framework and established by the EPPO Internal Control Framework (ICF) as building blocks of the EPPO internal control system; observes that out of 72 compliance criteria, 51 are observed as fulfilled, 20 have some elements in place but further development is desirable and only in the case of one criterion has no significant implementation has been noted; appreciates that, since its adoption by the College on March 2021, 71 % of the adopted ICF assessment have been successfully implemented whereas additional effort needs to be made for the full implementation of the remaining 29 %;

    28.  Welcomes that, on 1 March 2023, an updated version of the EPPO Anti-Fraud Strategy 2023-2025 was adopted setting the objectives to counter fraud at all levels of the organisation in connection with a dedicated action plan which is part of the EPPO internal control environment and is monitored on a regular basis; appreciates the annual review of the Anti-Fraud Strategy action plan by the EPPO Internal Control Officer, reporting the results of that review to the Administrative Director;

    29.  Is aware that, in line with the EPPO’s financial rules, the EPPO ensures an adequate level of financial transactions and procurement procedures via ex post controls on financial transactions (payments, commitments and recovery orders) and on procurement procedures for the period 1 January to 31 December 2023;

    30.  Observes the increase in crime reports submitted to the EPPO (4 187 in 2023 compared to 3 318 in 2022 and 2 832 in 2021) and, as a result, the increase in open investigations (1 371 in 2023 compared to 865 in 2022 and 567 in 2021) and in the estimation of damage (EUR 19,27 billion in 2023 compared to 14,1 billion in 2022 and 5,4 billion in 2021); remarks that reports from private parties (2 494, which is 29 % more than in 2022) and from national authorities (1 562, which is 24 % more than in 2022) represent the biggest share of operational input received, while regrets that reports from other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies remained very low (108), suggesting that no significant improvement in terms of detection and reporting was achieved from their side; notes that the number of indictments (139 in 2023 compared to 87 in 2022 and 5 in 2021) together with the freezing orders obtained by the EPPO (EUR 1,5 billion compared to EUR 359,1 million in 2022 and EUR 147 million in 2021) are indicative of the growing performance level of the EPPO;

    31.  Notes that, compared with 2022, the caseload of the EPPO almost doubled in 2023, reaching up to 1 927 active investigations; commends the fruitful activities of the EPPO in 2023, which included 139 indictments, 339 VAT-related cases and over 200 investigations on the implementation of NextGenerationEU; further notes that the EPPO started to bring more perpetrators of Union fraud to justice in front of national courts;

    32.  Notes that, in 2023, 48 cases concluded with a court conviction (compared to 20 cases in 2022) and that EUR 60 million was the amount confiscated (compared to EUR 2 million in 2021); underlines the importance of a systematic reporting on the follow-up to these cases in terms of the financial measures adopted (confiscation and recovery) to get a clearer understanding of the impact of the EPPO’s actions; welcomes the actions undertaken by the EPPO and the Commission to streamline their communications and make them adequate in relation to the needs of possible administrative procedures for the adoption of measures to restore the Union’s budget affected by financial crimes; reiterates its call on the Commission to assist the EPPO in monitoring and follow-up activities, in such a way that the EPPO’s limited resources are not diverted from their investigative and prosecutorial tasks; encourages the EPPO, where possible and appropriate, to engage in better cooperation with other components of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, such as Eurojust and Europol, or using – via OLAF- the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services established in the Member States to monitor the results of its investigations;

    33.  Underlines the essential role of asset recovery in the creation of a credible deterrent to organised crime; welcomes the EPPO’s participation in international networks to advance its asset recovery operations further; stresses the need for the Commission to invite the EPPO to participate in the newly created cooperation network on asset recovery and confiscation; notes that the timely and effective investigation and prosecution of fraud-related crimes can generate significant savings for the budget of the Union and the budgets of the Member States;

    34.  Is concerned about the increasing number of EPPO investigations regarding the implementation of Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) (there were 233 investigations at the end of 2023, compared to 15 investigations at the end of 2022) and their relevant estimated financial damage (EUR 1,86 billion); is particularly concerned that, despite the high number of investigations, there is currently no obligation on Member States to report RRF cases to the Commission through the Irregularity Management System (IMS); recalls the obligation to report all the cases of fraud affecting RRF to the EPPO and stresses that such cases are also relevant for EDES-related measures; stresses that the EPPO’s workload, initially underestimated, has significantly increased and is expected to continue growing particularly due to the rising number of RRF-related cases and that relevant analyses suggest a possible exponential grow in the number of cases of fraud, corruption, double funding and conflicts of interest in the coming years; calls on the EPPO to systematically analyse and identify fraud patterns in Member States where multiple RRF cases have been detected, and to communicate these patterns to Member States, the Commission and the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, with the objective of enhancing preventative measures to mitigate the risk of fraud; calls on the EPPO, the Commission and OLAF to cooperate closely with the aim of minimising, as much as possible, the impact of such fraudulent misbehaviours on the Union’s budget and safeguarding the achievements of the RRF’s goals; recalls the call on the Commission to provide adequate guidance to the EPPO on how to support and foster the adoption of the remedial measures which follow the EPPO’s independent investigation and prosecution of fraud affecting the RRF and to keep the budgetary authority informed regarding the available options;

    35.  Understands that the EPPO reacted to Parliament’s call for a better monitoring system and enhanced follow-up of investigations and prosecutions by launching a project on digital statistical tools which would allow better use of the data that it processes, and the development of a strategic analysis capacity to identify the patterns of fraud; shares the EPPO’s view that the success of those efforts are directly linked to the available resources and calls on the Commission to take these activities and the related costs into consideration for the future proposals on Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and on budgetary endowments;

    36.  Appreciates the EPPO’s efforts in the setting up key performance indicators (KPIs) for both operational and administrative activities with specific targets due to its peculiar business model; maintains its remark on the need for operational activities to include reference to the amounts seized, confiscated and eventually recovered to the Union’s budget, the safeguard of which is ultimately the raison d’être of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture of which the EPPO is an important component; understands that monitoring and follow-up action, including reporting on the recovery results, are not in the EPPO’s remit and require resources and specific prerogatives that are not part of the EPPO’s mission; asks the Commission to support the EPPO in identifying indicators linked to the achievement of that essential task, stressing that a better monitoring system, and more data of good granularity and aggregated in cluster per typology of misconduct, sector of interest or geographical area, could allow making more tangible the impact of the EPPO’s investigations and allow the identification of patterns of fraud;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    37.  Observes the upward trend in the number of staff, increasing from 58 in 2020, to 122 in 2021, 217 by the end of 2022 and 238 by the end of 2023; is aware that, for 2023, the EPPO requested from the budgetary authority the suppression of 20 contract agent posts and the creation of 20 temporary agent posts, which was granted and implemented by the EPPO in the same year, resulting in the total number of staff remaining unchanged (248, out of with 171 TAs, 48 CAs and 29 SNEs), with a different allocation of posts (191 TAs, 28 CAs and 29 SNEs); points out, however, that following certain security weaknesses identified, the EPPO requested in May 2023 an amending budget and additional posts to enhance the physical, information and cyber security at central and decentralised levels and that out of 21 security posts identified, only eight posts (1 AD 9, 4 AD 6 and 3 AST 3) were granted in November 2023 for further security implementations which was finalised in 2024;

    38.  Points out that, in 2023, the occupancy rate at the central office was 92,97 %, of which 238 were members of staff compared to 256 budgeted posts; notes that out of 140 posts for the EDPs, 130 were on the post at the end of 2023 and another 10 started at the beginning of 2024, reaching 100 % of occupancy rate; observes that the EPPO reinforced its capacity to run timely and transparent recruitment procedures by concluding 24 selection procedures in 2023, on-boarding 45 statutory staff members and 8 new European Prosecutors while 35 new EDPs were appointed;

    39.  Notes that, by December 2023, staff turnover (TAs and CAs) was at 4,62 %(3), recording a total of 11 resignations throughout the year, mainly justified by leaving to another institution (four cases) and for more senior positions offered in other Union institutions (seven cases); observes that the main underlying cause for this turnover is the specificity of the Luxembourg labour market, which has a very limited talent pool and small offer of specialised skills;

    40.  Acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to satisfy the EPPO’s requests for additional posts; believes that the workload perspectives indicates that further resources are needed, especially considering the backlog and additional RRF-related cases and far-reaching VAT fraud and also considering that the administrative and central support functions are expected to grow, in line with the larger operational population; points out the risk of underestimating needs and capacities; remarks that the cost of interim staff and external service providers working intra-muros in 2023 reached EUR 4 235 242; encourages the Commission and the EPPO to find a sustainable long-term solution which allows for continuity, preserves confidentiality and retains built-in competences; appreciates that the EPPO’s additional operational needs are exhaustively integrated in the EPPO Single Programming Document 2024-2026 and in EPPO budget requests;

    41.  Notes with concern that the Luxembourg labour market is very competitive, that the financial conditions offered by the Union administration are not attractive compared to the local market (subject to diverse salary indexations throughout the year), and do not take due account of the high cost of living in Luxembourg, which has become even more difficult because of the inflation rate and the increased cost of housing; notes that the EPPO cannot offer a career path for its members of staff to become Union Officials and that its posts are therefore even less attractive than those in the four other Union institutions operating from Luxembourg; emphasises that this results either in a very limited number of applications for vacant posts or in the rejection by the selected candidates of the employment offer once received, due to the high cost of living; calls on the EPPO and the Commission to implement measures that enhance the EPPO’s attractiveness for highly skilled professionals with international experience, such as the housing allowance for lower-grade staff approved by the budgetary authority for 2025, as recommended by the High-Level Interinstitutional Group; notes the overrepresentation of certain nationalities among staff;

    42.  Notes that, at the end of 2023, geographical and gender balance was adequately pursued overall across the 238 members of staff (with 137 men and 101 women); maintains that the nationality breakdown of the EPPO population is constantly monitored by those hiring new members of staff, in seeking to ensure balance, especially, in light of the uneven distribution of applicants, and with Italy (34), Romania (33), Greece (26) and Belgium (24) being more represented across the 26 different nationalities; encourages the EPPO to adopt proactive measures to ensure a balanced representation of nationalities among its staff, reflecting the diversity of the participating Member States; expresses concerns over the gender distribution among senior management positions (four men to one woman) and calls for this issue to be addressed in the framework of the overall diversity strategy; calls for the publication of an annual report, disaggregated by gender, nationality, and employment category, including concrete measures to close gaps in recruitment and career advancement and to monitor and address imbalances;

    43.  Is aware that the decision to implement a strategy on Diversity and Inclusion was made in 2023, with the development of the strategy to be executed in the course of 2024; encourages the EPPO to progress with its adoption and to periodically launch surveys among its staff, by promoting peer-review with other components of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, such as Eurojust, OLAF and Europol; understands that the EPPO’s policy on Diversity & Inclusion will be based on the EU Agencies Network Charter on Diversity & Inclusion, adopted in March 2023, and believes that it will in general encourage diversity to make the workplace more attractive to candidates with specific needs; reiterates its request to the EPPO to adopt its Charter on Diversity and Inclusion without delay, in light of the increase in staff during 2023;

    44.  Remarks that, including TAs, CAs, SNEs and EDPs, 341 out of 396 staff (compared to 275 out of 332 in 2022) were deployed in investigative activities by the end of 2023 (that is 86,10 % compared to 82,83 % in 2022 and 86 % in 2021) while 55 members of staff (compared to 57 in 2022) were engaged in administrative support and control functions;

    45.  Welcomes the appointment of 8 new European Prosecutors and 35 new EDP’s to the EPPO in 2023; reiterates that the EPPO can fulfil its role only if it enjoys full judicial independence, which flows from a merit-based and objective appointment procedure; encourages Member States to contribute to the full independence of the EPPO in that regard;

    46.  Maintains that the appointment of EDPs is a shared responsibility of the EPPO and the Member States; stresses that the appointment procedure must always comply with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and the principle of national procedural autonomy;

    47.  Underlines the need for greater career development opportunities for EDPs to attract and retain experienced professionals; calls for improved employment conditions, including a clear career progression path and the standardisation of social security and pension arrangements across participating Member States, ensuring that national salary discrepancies do not deter qualified candidates from applying;

    48.  Appreciates that, in the course of 2023 and beginning 2024, the number of EDPs reached the initially foreseen number of 140; welcomes the decision to align the remuneration of EDPs with that of EU Officials of equivalent level of responsibility, rather than 80 % of the salary of EU Officials, as originally provided for; takes the view that this decision increases the attractiveness of the EDP’s function, paving the way to the recruitment of more experienced national prosecutors whose national salary was higher than the remuneration offered by the EPPO, and in the meantime reduces the administrative burden on the EPPO for the implementation of Article 16(1) of the Conditions of Employment of the EDPs, which provides that, in the case of total net remuneration lower than the national salary, a top-up amount is provided to ensure that the remuneration matches the previous level;

    49.  Underlines that the selection process for European Prosecutors and EDPs is not managed autonomously by the EPPO, because European Prosecutors are nominated by the Member States and then appointed by the European Council, whereas EDPs are nominated by the Member States and appointed by the College; maintains that the application of qualified candidates to the EDP positions could increase and the process could become more selective by adopting a clear career perspective and more favourable administrative discipline on social security and health insurance coverage; reiterates that the creation of a specific status for EDPs would be consistent with the nature of their judicial function and contribute on making those posts more appealing; calls on the Commission to propose adequate solutions in the event of amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1939;

    50.  Understands that each Member State is obliged (under Article 96(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939) to put in place arrangements of legislative or administrative nature to maintain the affiliation and coverage of the EDPs, including any contributions to the relevant national social security, pension and insurance schemes, but a number of Member States have not yet fully complied with this obligation; therefore calls on the Commission to propose an effective solution to the social security and health insurance coverage gap of the EDPs at the revision of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939;

    51.  Notes that five complaints about the appointment of EDPs were introduced before the Court of Justice until 2023, of which three were closed (either dismissed or withdrawn) and one was dismissed, but an appeal is currently pending before the Court of Justice, and the last action for annulment of the decision of the College rejecting the nomination as EDP of a person nominated by a Member State was admitted in July 2024 on the grounds of a lack of sufficient reasoning in the College’s decision and an analysis is on-going on the manner in which the annulment is to be implemented; observes that there are no new complaints before the General Court concerning appointments to the EPPO;

    52.  Notes that the EPPO’s learning and development strategy was launched in 2023, aiming to promote a culture of continuous learning and facilitate the continuous assessment and adaptation of the staff’s evolving learning needs, together with the pilot learning needs analysis;

    53.  Notes, as regards measures and policies in place to safeguard the physical and mental well-being of staff, that in 2023 all measures were subject to revision and consultation by all involved stakeholders (the staff committee, members of staff in general, and management), seeking to find a balance between expectations and reality of the EPPO as a growing and rapidly changing organisation; observes that there the EPPO operates a flexitime scheme and a work-from-home standard scheme, which provides for one day of telework per week as a basis and a maximum of three days per week, plus extensions accepted in light of serious health or family constraints; remarks that current framework also includes 10 days’ work from outside the place of employment in a given year, to be used without link to other days of leave; believes that the EPPO’s current working conditions allow staff to take advantage of digital solutions by integrating a good level of autonomy in the management of working patterns, facilitating the conciliation of private and work life and promoting team morale and spirit; welcomes the on-going development of a policy on well-being which shall contain a section on well-being for staff benefiting from telework;

    54.  Highlights that, as suggested by Parliament, in the second semester of 2023 an open consultation on flexible working arrangements took place, and the decisions adopted in 2021 and 2022 underwent an ex post revision; notes that in consideration of the input of all stakeholders, on December 2023 the Administrative Director incorporated updates to the provisions; notes that changes included the enlargement of the notion of ‘place of telework’ (from 2 to 2,5 hours’ time/distance radius around the EPPO’s central office), and the introduction of hybrid working arrangements for interim agency staff; observes that no further change was adopted by College decisions, taking into account that the Administrative Director decisions had already enacted the conclusions of the staff consultations;

    55.  Notes that, following Parliament’s calls, a staff satisfaction (engagement) survey is planned in the first quarter of 2025; understands that the EPPO’s staff committee has also run a staff priorities survey, and encourages a more intensive dialogue to enhance the work-life conditions;

    56.  Welcomes that no case of burnout or harassment have been reported and that the number of long-term sick leave is very limited; welcomes the EPPO’s awareness of its duty to ensure promotion and preservation of health and wellbeing across staff, as well as the monitoring practices to earn such understanding which take into account untaken annual leave, the carry-over of annual leave and absences, the number of staff on long-term sick leave and the length of the absences; recalls the importance of establishing a clear and structured procedure for reporting cases of harassment by the European Chief Prosecutor and by the European Prosecutors, as well as its divulgation to all the staff;

    57.  Observes that, in early 2023, the EPPO’s central office carried out a traineeship pilot and the EPPO legal service sector hosted two trainees followed by two more in March and September 2023 for remunerated, in-person, five-month traineeships; notes that, based on the positive conclusions of the pilot, a traineeship policy was drafted and has been approved in 2024, followed by a first cycle of effective trainees the same year; welcomes the initiative to launch an experimental relationship-building with the local university and if successful, calls for its expansion to additional universities across the EU, which could offer interesting perspectives to further develop the early talent programmes for diversity; stresses that the high cost of living in Luxembourg poses a considerable obstacle for potential trainees; emphasizes that traineeships should be remunerated in compliance with the European Parliament’s resolution of 14 June 2023 with recommendations to the Commission on quality traineeships in the Union (2020/2005(INL)), which calls for all internships in the Union to be paid;

    58.  Welcomes the intense activity of the staff committee, the final adoption of its internal rules of procedure, the launch of the first staff committee open day, the launch of the first EPPO-wide staff survey, the participation of its representatives in the selection procedures, the retroactive revision of all general implementing provisions adopted by the EPPO before the establishment of the staff committee, the submission of input on internal reorganisation, working time and hybrid working, implementing rules and the improvement of working conditions;

    59.  Understands that the EPPO is progressing towards the finalisation of a business continuity plan, which is included in the Union’s administration management standards, and urges the EPPO to adopt it without further delay;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    60.  Understands that the EPPO’s ethical framework is being gradually built up; observes that the core values of that ethical framework are clearly set out in codes of conduct, which outline the standards of behaviour expected of employees at all levels; also observes that the ethical framework depends on the EPPO’s code of good administrative behaviour, its anti-fraud strategy and a training programme on ethics, which encompasses harassment, whistleblowing, the prevention of conflicts of interest and other ethical issues; regrets that members of staff of the EPPO are not required to attend that training programme, which would ensure a consistent understanding and application of the EPPO’s codes of conduct; calls on the EPPO to remedy the situation;

    61.  Notes the EPPO’s engagement in awareness-raising actions among staff about ethical framework and related matters; encourages the EPPO to make mandatory the attendance of such sessions by European Prosecutors and EDPs at their taking over of duties; believes that internal dialogue needs to be intensified;

    62.  Notes that no effective cases of conflict of interest were detected in 2023; is aware that dedicated conflict of interest declaration forms have been established and conflict of interest rules are in force for the members of College, the EDPs, the members of staff of the operational units, and other sensitive posts; welcomes the ongoing development of a structured conflict of interest policy and calls on the EPPO to finalise its adoption; calls for the implementation of a mandatory annual refreshment of an ethics and integrity training course for all EPPO personnel;

    63.  Urges the EPPO to enhance its internal integrity framework by mandating public disclosure of all financial interests and external activities of senior officials, including members of the College; calls for a periodic audit of these disclosures to identify and mitigate potential risks of undue influence;

    64.  Understands that the EPPO seeks to prevent revolving doors in particular by endorsing the strict application of the provisions of the Staff Regulations, which are set out in all contracts of the EPPO, including ad hoc exit forms that indicate the obligations that apply after termination of engagement; welcomes in this regard the adoption, in 2023, of the Guidelines for the EPPO Staff on Outside Activities and Assignments, which apply to activities that are not considered to relate to hobbies of leisure activities outside the remit of the EPPO;

    65.  Calls for the introduction of a more robust revolving door policy, including an extended cooling-off period of at least two years for senior EPPO officials before they can engage in private-sector employment related to EPPO investigations; requests that the EPPO conducts an annual review of compliance with these post-employment restrictions;

    66.  Calls the EPPO to adopt a dedicated whistleblowing and anti-retaliation procedure to integrate the implementing rules to the Staff Regulations adopted by the College (College Decision 2021/077 laying down guidelines on whistleblowing applicable within the EPPO) and to accompany Article 45.12 of the EPPO Financial Rules (establishing the actions to be undertaken in the circumstances) in order to ensure a safe and protected workplace; welcomes the initiative of intensifying internal communication on the first network of confidential counsellors and on the anti-harassment provisions and to all National European Delegated Prosecutors’ Assistants (NEDPAs) on whistleblowing mechanism for breaches against the EPPO mandate;

    Digitalisation, Cybersecurity and data protection

    67.  Deplores the situation of the EPPO in the area of its IT autonomy, which is adversely affected by the decision of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Digital Services (‘DG Digital Services’, formerly DIGIT) to discontinue the provision of digital workplace services; points out that EPPO IT autonomy requires additional human and financial resources which so far have not been granted because of the limitation imposed by the overall available budgetary resources in the concerned lines; regrets that, on grounds of the risks to its operational activities, the EPPO had to establish its own digital service capacity to accommodate the additional human resources that it was granted in light of the participation of Poland and Sweden;

    68.  Notes that the EPPO’s initial approach was to prioritise resources on the setting and working of essential digital services linked to its operational activities, such as its case-management system, while acknowledging that the EPPO’s digital services, which, at least in part, diverge from those of the Commission, would have needed, in the mid-term, a tailored approach; observes that the interruption of service by the Commission occurs in the crucial phase of the consolidation of the EPPO’s establishment;

    69.  Understands that, in 2023, the EPPO’s IT, Security and Corporate Services unit continued the implementation of two major programmes: the IT Autonomy Programme, to offer a complete catalogue of administrative IT services fully managed internally, and the EPPO’s CMS programme, to further develop the digitalisation of the organisation in its core business area; acknowledges that in 2023 the EPPO continued to prepare to gradually transition from a digital workplace provided by DG Digital Services to an EPPO-owned and operated solution; is aware that the resources needed to implement this change, although were included in the EPPO’s budget request for 2023, were not granted by the budgetary authority; notes that following DG Digital Service’s announcement, the EPPO started negotiation to seek a solution which has not yet been achieved;

    70.  Appreciates that Commission has temporarily extended the provision of IT services until June 2025 but maintains that the outsourcing of those services is a suboptimal solution in the current situation; understands that not only security and confidentiality-related arguments, but also purely financial aspects, suggest to reconsider the decision, because the outsourcing would appear much more costly than the in-house solution, and the adoption of the latter, after DG Digital Services cease providing their services, would be managed by the EPPO; stresses that, to implement the preferable in-house solution, the complex administrative aspects, the EPPO lack of experience and the de-centralised configuration of the EPPO with EDPs and NEDPAs in several locations across the Union, will require a more relevant budget and a lengthy transition period;

    71.  Reiterates its call on DG Digital Services to not interrupt its support to the EPPO until such a time as the EPPO has its own reliable IT system; deems it to be essential to avoid loss of data and to keep the EPPO fully operational in the transition between IT services providers; maintains that clear communication and operational coordination on the transition is to be ensured involving the highest decision-making levels of the Commission and the EPPO; asks the Commission and the EPPO to agree upon a gradual passage of competences for a smooth and continuous transition in the period after the extension, which could be extended beyond June 2025;

    72.  Observes that EPPO’s requests for permanent additional posts to fill the gap stemming from the discontinuation of DG Digital Services were refused, in January 2023, when EPPO requested 45 establishment plan, and at the end of February 2024, when a request for an amending budget 2024 for EUR 2,98 million and 37 established plan posts was also rejected; notes that the solution of recruiting intra-muros contractors could be a part of an interim solution to address DG Digital Service’s discontinuation, but while that approach would offer immediate operational continuity, it should not be conceived as a definitive solution for the EPPO, taking into account the extremely sensitive nature of its activities and the need to ensure continuity and reliability of its digital services, as well as the highest level of security of its IT infrastructure, systems and equipment; shares the view that the rejection of the EPPO’s budgetary requests is indicative of differences in the assessment of the problem, which has an adverse impact on the EPPO’s operational activities and represents a potential reputational risk for the Union in the case it results in weakening the EPPO’s operational capacity;

    73.  Understands that each EDP has to use any national and the EPPO’s CMS, which are different data bases governed by different access rights; believes that this situation increases the daily complexity in the data management; is also aware that to make it possible the processing and exchange of information between the central services of the EDPs and the EPPO, all the casefiles need to be digitalised by the EDPs using national digital tools and in compliance with national law; appreciates, in this regard, the formal creation of the NEDPA status in the official organisation chart which allows granting access to NEDPAs (staff of the national office) directly to the EPPO’s CMS, like that unburdening the EDPs of administrative tasks and creating the basis for more accuracy and consistency of case data between the two case-management systems; takes the view that the way towards integration between the EPPO’s CMS and national case-management systems would be facilitated by appropriate revision of regulation and that these steps would increase the effectiveness of EPPO investigations; notes, however, that such integration could be primarily a matter of compatible technological solutions used in the different Member States and linked to the actual level of digitalisation of judiciary proceedings in those Member States; observes that the burden of the inherent costs is currently shared, with the national budget covering the costs of the equipment needed for interaction with the national case-management systems, and the EPPO budget covering hardware and the setting of a digital working environment that is secured to the same standard as EPPO central office staff and which is considered part of the operational communication costs provided for by Regulation (EU) 2017/1939;

    74.  Understands that interoperability is material to achieving efficient data exchange and cooperation and that in order to adopt minimum common data exchange agreements and the implementation of judicial interoperability tools, an e-CODEX EPPO Use Case Project, initiated in 2023, involved several workshops with the e-CODEX Consortium to align on technical and functional requirements; regrets that, after several workshops with e-CODEX Consortium, the project was paused to allow the transition to the new e-CODEX programme manager, eu-LISA, and due to lack of EPPO resources with expertise in this area; calls on the Commission to act as a facilitator for further progressing in the project and to factor also those actions in the EPPO’s budgetary needs estimate;

    75.  Is aware of the increased threat to the EPPO’s IT structural integrity stemming from the aggressiveness of organised crime, combatted by the EPPO, and resulting in the need to step up physical and digital security; notes that in 2023 the EPPO focused on enhancing its security governance; appreciates the EPPO decision to create a dedicated unit to address cyber and physical security; observes that the EPPO prepared a framework including new processes, roles and responsibilities and policies to increase the security of the digital systems used for the handling of operational and administrative data; understands that several risk assessments were carried out to assess the security framework of the digital systems which suggested the implementation of additional technical and governance measures to enhance the EPPO’s security environment; remarks that the policy framework was improved in the circumstance, with a security strategy and global information security policy proposed in 2023 and formally approved and adopted in 2024;

    76.  Observes that the EPPO completed, in 2023, the set-up of security contact points in all participating Member States to enhance cooperation on security matters for staff and EPPO offices located in those Member States; welcomes the service level agreement is in place with CERT-EU that provides support and monitoring for specific services for incident response-related matters; underlines that the deployed system to assess risk and to report incidents is well structured and training is provided effectively; appreciates the external assessment performed for physical security whose findings translated in a roadmap for improvement by the host country;

    77.  Praises the significant progress made in 2023 towards the implementation of a backup data centre and the deployment of an associated disaster recovery scenario; appreciates, in that regard, the EPPO’s development of its own case-management ecosystem the components of which are all hosted in the EPPO data centre and managed by the EPPO’s staff, guaranteeing the EPPO control, retention and ownership of systems and data processed;

    78.  Acknowledges the EPPO’s need for up-to-date equipment and IT systems to deal with increasingly complicated crimes frequently involving digital elements and digital methodologies; stresses as well the urgency of developing a strong cybersecurity framework, given the growing risks posed by highly tech-savvy criminal networks and potential foreign interferences, through cyberattacks; supports the EPPO in its request for resources to be allocated to protecting its cybersecurity and calls for the swift implementation of a robust cybersecurity strategy to safeguard EPPO’s operations and data integrity;

    79.  Stresses that the nature of the EPPO’s activities entails the need for specific oversight and dedicated attention to the protection of personal data; takes the view that the EPPO and the EDPS should engage in continuous dialogue to ensure the usability of the data for the investigation and prosecution and, at the same time, ensure respect for the protection of personal data; understands that the requirements relating to data protection handling stems from Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and from Regulation (EU) 2018/1725(4) and that those requirements are complemented and implemented by College decisions, adopted after consulting the EDPS; appreciates the decision to provide mandatory training for all members of staff, including dedicated data protection training essential to the access to the EPPO’s CMS;

    Buildings and security

    80.  Observes that, thanks to the lease agreement by which Luxembourg authorities provide the building currently hosting the EPPO’s headquarters (the TOB building) on a rent-free basis, the costs are limited to a service charge fee of EUR 716 724 per year; notes that, in 2023, EUR 248 103 was paid to the same Luxembourg authorities for security installations in the two additional floors (9 and 10) delivered to the EPPO in Q1 2023;

    81.  Welcomes, having regard to physical security, the allocation – with amending budget 2023 and the budget 2024 – of the resources needed to have a proportionate capacity to deliver enhanced security services (21 additional posts to enhance its security capability) and the EPPO’s efforts towards the continuous improvement and efficiency alignment of the physical security processes; maintains the proper functioning of the EPPO implies that prosecutors and staff have to be protected to be able to pursue their mission to its full extent, without threats, influence or pressure;

    Environment and sustainability

    82.  Believes that the Luxembourg authorities providing the EPPO’s headquarters should consider their sustainability and energetic performance; calls on the EPPO to engage in discussions with the Luxembourg authorities to explore specific actions for improving the environmental footprint of its premises, including the installation of renewable energy sources such as solar panels, the introduction of CO2 offsetting measures and implementation of the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme to evaluate, report, enhance organisations’ environmental performance and to save energy; calls on the Commission to facilitate dialogue between the EPPO and the local host authorities to ensure the optimal use of resources and the alignment of EPPO’s operations with the Union’s sustainability;

    83.  Notes that the EPPO’s central office is integrated in the Luxembourg network of free public transport making it easily reachable through low environmental impact means, at no cost for staff and visitors and that the central office underground car park provides a dedicated zone for bike parking; understands that exchanges are ongoing concerning the installation of charging stations for e-vehicles in the same underground car park;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    84.  Maintains that the EPPO’s role as a major operational component of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture can be effectively pursued only with intense cooperation with and support from its partners and stakeholders; reiterates that the EPPO can fulfil its role only if it enjoys full judicial independence; encourages Member States to contribute to the full independence of the EPPO in that regard and encourages the EPPO to continue its communication and coordination efforts with the several partners whose action has been designed to be reciprocal and complementary;

    85.  Welcomes the initiatives launched by OLAF and the EPPO to intensify and streamline their operational cooperation and share knowledge amongst the involved actors; appreciates the first international conference allowing exchange of views between EPPO prosecutors and OLAF investigators, hosted by Parliament in 2024; emphasises that the revision of the regulatory frameworks of OLAF and EPPO provides the opportunity to reconsider many aspects of their working together in the light of the experiences earned in those first years of EPPO operational activity, having specific regard to the opening of complementary OLAF investigations and administrative investigations in support of the EPPO, as well as OLAF’s increased role in detecting and reporting fraud to the EPPO in support of the recovery of the damage to the Union budget; believes that the dialogue and cooperation within the antifraud architecture could be made more effective by the setting of a regular inter-institutional forum with a view to optimising the efficiency and efficacy of the available resources in action;

    86.  Welcomes the initiatives launched by OLAF and the EPPO to intensify operational dialogue and improve coordination; underlines the importance of full and effective data-sharing between the EPPO, OLAF, Eurojust, and Europol to ensure seamless cooperation in the fight against cross-border fraud; calls for the establishment of a joint working group to oversee data integration and case management efficiency among these bodies;

    87.  Encourages continued and enhanced cooperation between the EPPO and OLAF, in line with their respective regulations, and the obligation on OLAF to report, without undue delay, suspicions of criminal contact to the EPPO, in order to enable it to tackle fraud, corruption and financial crime affecting the Union’s financial interests; supports the further development of joint initiatives, information sharing and coordinated actions between the EPPO and OLAF, as such cooperation is vital in strengthening the protection of the Union’s financial interests and the Union’s fight against financial crime and to ensuring the effective and efficient use of Union resources;

    88.  Commends the close cooperation in 2023 between the EPPO and the Court of Auditors, resulting in the timely transmission of information on suspicions of criminal offences falling within the EPPO’s competences;

    89.  Expects that the working group established with the Commission, and the meetings on the implementation of the Commission-EPPO Working Arrangement, will ensure that EPPO notifications for the purpose of administrative recovery, as provided for by Article 103(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 will duly and effectively enable the Commission to maximise recovery to the Union budget, while complying with the confidentiality and proper conduct of the investigative actions; stresses that, in this specific regard, no feedback has been yet provided by either party, preventing the legislators from earning a comprehensive understanding of the underlying issues, including the specific amounts recovered annually by the Commission from Member States in cases of damage to the Union budget; highlights that the recovery of funds by national authorities remains under the Commission’s responsibility, as mentioned in the Mission Letter to the Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration, while the EPPO does not hold a mandate to follow up on the recovery process; calls on the Member States to strengthen cooperation and inform both the Commission and the EPPO of final confiscations; urges a revision of the relevant Regulations to clarify the EPPO’s role in the recovery process; and urges the EPPO and the Commission to adopt an agreed upon form of reporting to Parliament; understands that this could require appropriate development of the EPPO’s CMS, and asks the Commission to prioritise the allocation of resources to the EPPO to meet that need;

    90.  Welcomes the strengthened cooperation with Europol; observes that the ODIN (Operational Digital Infrastructure Network) programme would enable the full exploitation of the amount of data collected by the EPPO in its investigations (more than 1000 terabytes and growing); notes that, in that framework, the EPPO has identified possible crimes outside its competences, including organised crime, drug trafficking, illicit cigarette production, investment fraud, illegal gambling and prostitution (non-PIF offences), and others which have resulted in the transmission of several files as key evidence to ongoing national investigations and that 28 new cases have been initiated by national prosecution offices to further investigate those non-PIF offences, which are outside the EPPO’s remit; understands that for this and other analyses, however, cooperation with Europol suffers from limitations stemming from national procedural criminal law and accessibility of the EPPO data owned; underlines that the EPPO’s existing competence to investigate organised crime and money laundering linked to fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests should be supported through adequate resources and efficient cooperation with Europol; considers that while cooperation with Europol needs to be even further enhanced, it cannot fully substitute the development of the EPPO’s internal analytical platform, which remains vital to a fast interpretation of the data collected during its investigations and the setting of operational strategies in cross-border cases requiring access to the EPPO’s entire CMS; recalls that, in its upcoming evaluation report, the Commission should carefully analyse to which categories of crimes the EPPO’s mandate needs to be extended, in order to take full advantage of its potential; welcomes the EPPO’s call for enhanced cooperation with Union institutions;

    91.  Is concerned about the increasing number of cases concerning the RRF; appreciates the timely information provided to the Commission and to the relevant Parliament Committees on this matter; believes that the large number of active cases involving RRF funds justifies an intensification of the exchanges held with, in particular, the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, with the aim of identifying possible oversight or control gaps or fraud patterns and to allow the Commission to keep up to date its performance monitoring mechanisms and to enforce the reduction and recovery measures recently designed; reiterates that RRF funds are Union and not national funds and are under the jurisdiction of the EPPO and encourages the Commission and other Union’s bodies and authorities to increase the detection efforts and report to the EPPO every relevant situation;

    92.  Welcomes that the EPPO signed Working Arrangement with Parliament in November 2024, establishing clear modalities of cooperation for the purpose of protecting the Union’s financial interests;

    93.  Notes that, in 2023, the EPPO continued to rely on inter-institutional contracts and bilateral agreements (SLAs) to purchase goods and services at a lower cost; observes that, at the end of 2023, the EPPO had 80 active membership in inter-institutional framework contracts and 22 service-level agreement or other bilateral agreements with other Union’s entities with the aim of maximising budgetary savings from the contractual instruments in place, in line with the principles of sound financial management;

    94.  Strongly welcomes the participation of Poland and Sweden in the EPPO; is aware that this will have an impact on the EPPO’s budgetary needs, and supports the EPPO’s request which aims to equip the EPPO with the necessary resources to take advantage of the participation of Poland and Sweden to its operational activities; notes that while Ireland and Denmark continue to exercise their opt-out from the EPPO under Protocols No 21 and 22 TFEU, Hungary is the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO; calls on the Hungarian government to join the EPPO without further delay; recalls the collection of 680 000 signatures in favour of joining the EPPO, underscoring a strong societal demand for enhanced legal safeguards against fraud and corruption affecting the Union’s financial interests;

    95.  Observes that, in 2023, no major improvement towards participation into the EPPO has occurred with the Irish authorities; reminds that their refusal to cooperate with the EPPO in executing several requests for mutual legal assistance sent by the EDPs had resulted in the EPPO reporting the situation to the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(5); appreciated the following decision of the Irish authorities to amend their domestic legislation providing the legal framework for mutual legal assistance to the EPPO and underlines that from 1 November 2023 it provides mutual legal assistance to the EPPO based on this unilateral recognition; notes that no exchanges occurred with the Irish inter-agency working group established to examine Ireland’s potential future participation in the EPPO; urges the Commission, the EPPO and the Irish authorities to engage in a constructive dialogue to find an effective way of cooperation;

    96.  Maintains that any lack of cooperation with the EPPO by any of the Member States, whether they are participating in the enhanced cooperation that established the EPPO, creates niches of immunity and privilege that make the defence of the financial interests of the Union uneven and inefficient at best; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States concerned to make any possible effort to integrate the current scenario with the few but still very important missing components, promoting the extension of the participation in the EPPO by the other still non-participating Member States in such a way that strengthens the effectiveness of the protection of the Union and national budgets; calls on the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO and urges the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings against any Member State that systematically obstructs EPPO-led investigations; takes the view that membership of the EPPO should be a precondition for receiving Union funds;

    97.  Condemns the recently reported systematic espionage organized by the Hungarian government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission into the potential misuse of Union funds by ELIOS, a company linked to the Hungarian Prime Minister’s son-in-law; emphasizes that OLAF and the EPPO, as cornerstone institutions of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, are regrettably exposed to such threats not only from third countries but also within EU Member States; stresses that such actions gravely undermine the rule of law and the integrity of Union institutions; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union’s institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent such unacceptable violations in the future;

    Communication

    98.  Observes that the EPPO engages in continuous efforts to enhance internal and external communication; appreciates the actions carried out via social network platforms and encourages the EPPO to maintain its proactive and transparent approach;

    99.  Believes that explanations about the EPPO’s interventions and operations and about their background, when reported in the media and posted on social networks, would contribute to reinforcing the reputation of the institutions amongst citizens and raise awareness in taxpayers about the complexity of the protection of the Union’s financial interests;

    100.  Maintains that proper and accurate communication from the EPPO would also increase the involvement of civil society and increase submission of potential investigative input; understands that the EPPO asks to have the reporting option included in every standard presentation for external audiences or at conferences and seminars, when possible and appropriate; notes that, in 2023, the EPPO’s corporate website underwent a complete redesign, with the primary focus on enhancing accessibility and user-friendliness, and that the option to report a crime is now prominently displayed at the top of every webpage together with a banner highlighting this feature in the homepage;

    101.  Observes that the level of the EPPO’s resources that are devoted to communication are limited, and that, in view of the need to establish the EPPO’s digital autonomy, management of the EPPO website will have to be brought in-house, requiring additional resources, after DG Digital Services cease providing that service; underlines that the increasing volume and the sensitivity of EPPO investigations calls for attention in exchanges with the media, journalists, citizens and academia; reiterates its call on the EPPO to clearly strike the best possible balance between transparency and public interest on the one hand and confidentiality and proper conduct of the investigation on the other, and to ensure the neutrality of its communications about its activities;

    102.  Recalls the importance of transparency in the EPPO’s interactions with external actors; calls for the establishment of a mandatory public register of all meetings between EPPO officials and representatives of third parties, including lobbyists and national government representatives, in order to prevent undue influence and reinforce public trust in the EPPO’s independence;

    Effect of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

    103.  Recalls that EPPO competences extend to Union funds even when used in third countries; believes that the working arrangements with the Ukrainian competent authorities could effectively enhance the level of protection of the Union’s financial interests following the relevant commitments undertaken to support Ukraine and its population; welcomes the efforts undertaken by the Ukrainian authorities on anti-corruption measures, but recalls that the country is still subject to high rate of corruption and fraud, demanding extra precaution to be taken and further anti-corruption measure in order to successfully reach transparency goals; is aware that transmission of evidence has occurred in execution of mutual legal assistance requests and welcomes the perspective of activating a joint task force with the Ukrainian authorities to coordinate investigations; reminds the Commission and other Union institutions bodies, offices and agencies of the importance of detection and timely submission of investigative input to the EPPO.

    (1) Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj).
    (2) Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017, implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).
    (3) According to the Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2023, the turnover rate was 5,9 % for temporary and contract agents.
    (4) Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj).
    (5) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Dogs being used in experiments and the phasing out of animal testing – E-001721/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001721/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Niels Fuglsang (S&D)

    14 368 dogs were used in testing in 2022, a reduction of 9 % since 2021. 48 tests were conducted to satisfy industrial chemicals legislation and 26 to satisfy non-EU requirements. In the EU, the highest users are France (3 934), Germany (2 873) and Spain (1 511).

    Out of the EU Member States and Norway that previously used dogs in testing, 41 % (7 out of 17) reported increases in dog use between 2021 and 2022: Germany (8 %, 2 657 to 2 873), Ireland (36 %, 194 to 264), Italy (1 %, 751 to 759), the Netherlands (11 %, 912 to 1 008), Poland (1 113 %, 8 to 97) and Spain (33 %, 1 138 to 1 511), as well as Norway (363 %, 41 to 190). Portugal and Romania reported 22 and 40 uses respectively, after reporting 0 in 2021[1].

    • 1.Why were dogs being used in testing conducted under chemicals legislation in the EU, and what recommendations is the Commission making about the use of dogs in testing under chemicals legislation?
    • 2.What action is the Commission taking regarding the use of dogs in testing for non-EU purposes, where their use is not, or would not be, required in the EU?
    • 3.What is the Commission doing to encourage the Member States to phase out the use of dogs in testing across the EU?

    Submitted: 30.4.2025

    • [1] https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/envdataportal/content/alures/section2_number-of-uses.html.
    Last updated: 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The European Water Resilience Strategy – P10_TA(2025)0091 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Article 191 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with particular emphasis on the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation,

    –  having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted in December 2022,

    –  having regard to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants of 22 May 2001,

    –  having regard to the precautionary principle and the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay, as enshrined in Article 191(2) TFEU,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law)(1),

    –  having regard to Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy(2) (Water Framework Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration(3) (Groundwater Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2008/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directives 82/176/EEC, 83/513/EEC, 84/156/EEC, 84/491/EEC, 86/280/EEC and amending Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) (Environmental Quality Standards Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks(5),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption(6) (Drinking Water Directive),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/741 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020 on minimum requirements for water reuse(7) (Water Reuse Regulation),

    –  having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive)(8),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment(9) (revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste(10),

    –  having regard to Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources(11),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869(12),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC(13) (Critical Entities Resilience Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)(14),

    –  having regard to Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides(15),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013(16),

    –  having regard to Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190 of 19 December 2024 on the use of bisphenol A (BPA) and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives with harmonised classification for specific hazardous properties in certain materials and articles intended to come into contact with food, amending Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/213(17),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2021 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 May 2021 entitled ‘Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All – EU Action Plan: ‘Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil’’ (COM(2021)0400),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 18 July 2007 on addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts in the European Union (COM(2007)0414),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan: For a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 14 November 2012 entitled ‘A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water Resources’ (COM(2012)0673),

    –  having regard to the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030,

    –  having regard to the COP29 Declaration on Water for Climate Action, endorsed by the European Union,

    –  having regard to the European Oceans Pact announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

    –  having regard to the European climate adaptation plan and the European water resilience strategy announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU’s 8th environment action programme,

    –  having regards to its resolution of 5 October 2022 entitled ‘Access to water as a human right – the external dimension’(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on the devastating floods in central and eastern Europe, the loss of lives and the EU’s preparedness to act on such disasters exacerbated by climate change(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean: strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN climate change conference in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)(22),

    –  having regard to the Commission report of 4 February 2025 on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) entitled ‘Third river basin management plans – Second flood risk management plans’ (COM(2025)0002),

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 15/2024 of 16 October 2024 entitled ‘Climate adaptation in the EU – action not keeping up with ambition’,

    –  having regard to former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness’,

    –  having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the implementation of the EU water legislation(23),

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 33/2018 of 18 December 2018 entitled ‘Combating desertification in the EU: a growing threat in need of more action,

    –  having regard to the European citizens’ initiative (ECI) on the right to water,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on the follow-up to the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water(24),

    –  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010, which recognises the human right to water and sanitation,

    –  having regard to the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 20/2024 of 30 September 2024 entitled ‘Common Agricultural Policy Plans – Greener, but not matching the EU’s ambitions for the climate and the environment’,

    –  having regard to European Environment Agency report 07/2024 of 15 October 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s state of water 2024: the need for improved water resilience’ (EEA Report 07/2024),

    –  having regard to the Environment Council conclusions of 17 June 2024 on the 8th environment action programme,

    –  having regard to European Court of Auditors special report 20/2021 of 28 September 2021 entitled ‘Sustainable water use in agriculture: CAP funds more likely to promote greater rather than more efficient water use’,

    –  having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee declaration of 26 October 2023 for an EU Blue Deal,

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 5 July 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Soil Monitoring and Resilience (Soil Monitoring Law) (COM(2023)0416),

    –  having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration and Directive 2008/105/EC on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy(25),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (A10-0073/2025),

    A.  whereas water is essential for life and humanity; whereas the EU has to manage current and future water resources efficiently and respond effectively to the current water challenges, as they directly affect human health, the environment and its ecosystems, strategic socio-economic activities such as energy production, agriculture and food security, and the EU’s competitiveness;

    B.  whereas water is a scarce and limited resource and, while 70 % of the earth’s surface is water-covered, available and usable fresh water accounts for only 0,5 % of water on earth(26); whereas mountains are real water towers and important freshwater reservoirs in Europe, the Alps alone providing 40 % of Europe’s fresh water(27);

    C.  whereas groundwater supplies two thirds of the EU’s drinking water and supports many ecosystems(28); whereas the services provided by freshwater ecosystems are worth over EUR 11 trillion in Europe, and provide considerable health and recreational benefits, such as from angling(29);

    D.  whereas water stress is already occurring in Europe, affecting approximately 20 % of Europe’s territory and 30 % of the population on average every year, figures that are likely to increase in the future on account of climate change(30), despite the fact that total water abstraction at the EU-27 level appeared to decrease by 15 % between 2000 and 2019; whereas the increase in the number and recurrence of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods, and the fact that they are expected to become yet more frequent in the near future, poses a risk to human life and the EU’s food sovereignty and could lead to regions in Europe becoming uninhabitable;

    E.  whereas 78 % of Europeans consider that the EU should propose additional measures to address water-related issues in Europe and 21 % of Europeans consider pollution to be the main threat linked to water in their country(31);

    F.  whereas the human right to water and sanitation was recognised as a human right in a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 28 July 2010;

    G.  whereas the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water was the first ever to gather the required number of signatories, calling for the EU to ensure the right to water for all;

    H.  whereas the provisions of Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 thereto on Services of General Interest are key elements to be prominently taken into account in all aspects of the design and implementation of the European water resilience strategy (EWRS), thus safeguarding the status of Europe’s water services as essential public services, and ensuring accessibility, equity, affordability and the maintenance of high quality standards;

    I.  whereas the Member States should follow up on the recommendations of the Commission report of November 2023(32) in order to improve water balances as the knowledge basis for making decisions about water allocation;

    J.  whereas substantive corporate value may be at risk owing to worsening water insecurity, with a decrease in the capacity of production or its complete halt as a consequence; whereas assets in water-stressed regions could become stranded, temporarily or permanently, if assumptions made about water availability and access prove inaccurate, if regulatory responses are unanticipated or if risk mitigation and stewardship plans are not put in place(33);

    K.  whereas the deadline set by the Water Framework Directive (WFD) for European rivers, lakes, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwaters to achieve ‘good’ status was 2015, with a possible postponement to 2027 under certain conditions; whereas the objective of achieving good chemical status for all EU water bodies by 2027 remains far from being achieved, primarily due to substances such as mercury, brominated flame retardants and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons(34);

    L.  whereas the 2025 report on the implementation of the WFD shows that delays in meeting the WFD’s targets are not due to a deficiency in the legislation but to a lack of funding, slow implementation and insufficient integration of environmental objectives into sectoral policies; whereas analysis has shown that the Member States are not meeting the annual investment needs, which are estimated to be EUR 77 billion, with a financing gap currently estimated at around EUR 25 billion a year; whereas the report also shows the clear need for the Member States to increase their level of ambition and accelerate action to reduce the compliance gap as much as possible before 2027, to increase investment and ensure adequate financing, including via EU funds, to achieve the objectives of their programmes of measures, as well as to put in place additional measures to reduce current persistent environmental challenges to and improve transboundary cooperation;

    M.  whereas the water legislation has been evaluated as fit for purpose; whereas it establishes a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater; whereas, at the same time, it allows for less stringent environmental objectives to be achieved if socio-economic needs served by such human activity cannot be achieved by other means and it allows for a failure to achieve the objectives for water bodies if the reason for the failure is overriding public interest; whereas the legislation is proportionate and mandates the authorities of the Member States, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, to decide on the overriding public interest; whereas in some cases this may be the protection of the environment and in others a socio-economic activity;

    N.  whereas industry accounts for approximately 40 % of total water abstraction in Europe; whereas the largest categories of the annual water abstraction in the EU-27, according to the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE), are abstraction for cooling in electricity generation (34 %), followed by abstraction for agriculture (29 %), public water supply (21 %) and manufacturing (15 %)(35); whereas data on water abstraction and use in the EU is historical and poor(36);

    O.  whereas electricity production is the largest water-abstracting sector, but most of the water is returned to the environment after cooling or turbine propulsion; whereas overall, agriculture is the highest net water-consuming sector at the EU level, as most of the water is consumed by the crop or evaporates; whereas other uses, such as industry and water utilities, abstract and consume comparatively less water, but they can represent significant pressures at a local level, especially on groundwater(37);

    P.  whereas all industrial activity requires water to produce its end products or to support production activities; whereas businesses depend on water for their daily operations, and as water scarcity increases, it can disrupt operations, raise costs and create regulatory and reputational risks;

    Q.  whereas the energy sector relies heavily on water resources; whereas this dependency poses a serious risk as water scarcity can impact energy production processes and supply security, especially where water is used as feedstock or for cooling; whereas the transition to renewable energy, particularly wind and solar energy, offers sustainable and water-efficient decarbonisation pathways and the opportunity to halt or reverse the trend of increasing water consumption;

    R.  whereas water is an essential resource for agriculture in the production of high-quality food, feed and renewable raw materials; whereas agriculture depends on water availability and irrigation helps to shield farmers from irregular rainfall and to increase the viability, yield and quality of the crops, but is a significant drain on water resources; whereas in view of climate change, changing weather patterns and increased frequency of floods and droughts, the importance of water as a resource for the production of high-quality agricultural products and of the need for water to be used efficiently will therefore be fundamental to the security of food supply and to the solutions to address water scarcity; whereas reducing pressure on surface water and groundwater from agriculture must go hand in hand with investment aimed at the use of reclaimed water and innovative desalination technologies, thereby achieving a better water balance as well as promoting clean alternative energies such as green hydrogen;

    S.  whereas global population growth requires increased food production, and the EU must guarantee food sovereignty, as laid down in Article 39 TFEU;

    T.  whereas reliable data on water accounting, that is, the systematic study of the current status and trends in water supply, demand, accessibility and use in domains that have been specified(38), is crucial for an assessment of the current situation in the EU and for European competitiveness;

    U.  whereas the potential of wastewater as an alternative water supply is underestimated, given that 60-70 % of the potential value of wastewater across the EU is currently unexploited(39) and less than 3 % of treated wastewater is reused in the EU(40); whereas there is significant potential for circular approaches to water in households, as only a small amount of the water in households is used for drinking and eating and therefore requires the highest quality standards;

    V.  whereas a very large quantity of water is lost due to obsolete or ageing water networks and the lack of necessary maintenance; whereas investment in the maintenance, improvement and development of resilient innovative irrigation infrastructures is essential for reducing and improving the efficiency of water consumption in agriculture; whereas such improvements in efficiency enable the water saved to be used for other purposes or enable the natural flow rates of watercourses to be maintained;

    W.  whereas clean and sufficient water is an essential element in implementing and achieving a real sustainable circular economy in the EU;

    X.  whereas water leakage is an underestimated global issue, which significantly exacerbates water scarcity, with an average of 23 % of treated water lost during distribution in the EU due to leaky pipes, outdated treatment facilities and insufficient reservoirs(41); whereas the revised Drinking Water Directive included measures to reduce water leakages, as well as risk assessment and management of the catchment areas for drinking water abstraction;

    Y.  whereas in 2021, 91 % of Europe’s groundwater bodies were reported as having achieved ‘good quantitative status’, while 77 % were reported as having ‘good chemical status’(42);

    Z.  whereas in 2021, only 37 % of Europe’s surface water bodies were reported as being in ‘good’ or ‘high’ ecological status, while 29 % achieved ‘good chemical status’(43);

    AA.  whereas the European Environment Agency emphasises that the proportion of surface waters failing to achieve good ecological status is uneven across Europe, and that these are more prevalent in parts of central and western Europe, and stresses that differences in water status between the Member States may be caused by different pressures, but that those differences may also result from varying approaches to monitoring and assessment(44);

    AB.  whereas the quality of surface waters across the continent reflects continuing and combined pressures, in particular diffuse pollution and the degradation of their natural flow and physical features; whereas pollution by nutrients and persistent priority substances, as well as by substances newly emerging as pollutants, continues; whereas groundwaters are affected by diffuse pollution and also suffer from intensive abstraction(45);

    AC.  whereas groundwater supplies 65 % of water for drinking and 25 % of water for agricultural irrigation in the EU(46); whereas it is a finite resource that needs to be protected from pollution and over-exploitation(47);

    AD.  whereas monitoring data from the European Environment Agency indicates widespread pollution by per- and polyfluoralkyl substances (PFAS), commonly referred to as ‘forever chemicals’, in European waters, posing significant risks to aquatic ecosystems and human health; whereas short-chain PFAS trifluoroacetic acid (TFA) has been detected in drinking water all over Europe; whereas PFAS persist in the environment, bioaccumulate in living organisms and cause adverse (eco)toxicological effects; whereas from a group of 6 000 to 10 000 individual substances, only a few have been extensively studied and their impact on human health and environment is known; whereas 99 % of PFAS remain undetected in the environment as a result of limits in monitoring;

    AE.  whereas the lack of EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and insufficient monitoring of less-studied PFAS compounds exacerbate the challenge of achieving good chemical status for EU waters in line with the WFD and pose a substantial technical and financial burden on health systems and on water service providers while jeopardising applications of water and sewage sludge reuse;

    AF.  whereas hazardous chemicals, including heavy metals and other pollutants, released into water bodies by industrial activities, significantly impact water quality and aquatic ecosystems(48);

    AG.  whereas pharmaceutical substances are increasingly identified in surface water and groundwater; whereas pollution caused by pharmaceutical residues necessitates advanced water treatment technologies, including membrane filtration, activated carbon treatment, advanced oxidation processes and other innovative purification techniques;

    AH.  whereas Directive 2010/75/EU(49) mandates that the potential aggravation of the impact of industrial discharges on the state of water bodies due to variations of water flow dynamics should be explicitly taken into account in the granting and reviewing of permits; whereas the best available techniques will newly incorporate notions of environmental performance levels related to water and permits, which translate the use of these techniques into environmental performance limit values; whereas this is a welcome change with a potential improvement to the industry’s resilience, as EU installations may already face a lower production capacity seasonally due to water scarcity;

    AI.  whereas urban wastewater is one of the main sources of water pollution, if not properly collected and treated; whereas the objectives of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive should not be lowered, and its scope should be extended to other sectors and substances that contribute to water pollution;

    AJ.  whereas nutrient pollution in EU water bodies leads to eutrophication, loss of biodiversity, and degradation of aquatic ecosystems(50); whereas pesticide run-off contaminates surface water and groundwater, threatening water quality and human health;

    AK.  whereas research indicates that exposure in Europe to the synthetic chemical bisphenol A (BPA), which is used in products ranging from plastic and metal food containers to reusable water bottles, is well above acceptable health safety levels(51);

    AL.  whereas soil and nutrient management lies at the basis of improving water quality and availability; whereas the EWRS should focus on improving nutrient management, with the aim of closing nutrient loops to reduce nutrient emissions to waterways; whereas the safe use of sewage sludge in agriculture will also reduce the EU’s very high dependency on the import of phosphorus mineral fertiliser, for example, from Russia; whereas the safe use of sludge should therefore also be considered as contributing to European resilience and strategic autonomy;

    AM.  whereas climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; whereas many impacts of climate change are felt through water, such as more intense and frequent droughts, more extreme flooding and more erratic seasonal rainfall; whereas floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security, and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion, economic prosperity and stability, as well as jeopardising the long-term availability of this valuable resource;

    AN.  whereas the European climate risk assessment recognised that Europe’s policies and adaptation actions are not keeping pace with the rapidly growing risks that threaten ecosystems, infrastructure, food and water supply and people’s health, as well as the economy and finance(52);

    AO.  whereas assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show that the sea level rise due to climate change is leading to an increase in the salinity of soils and freshwaters, compromising ecosystem health and water quality, as well as affecting 80 million Europeans living in low elevation coastal zones and flood plains; whereas freshwater and marine ecosystems are interconnected as riverine pollution, disruption to sediment flows and water shortages all have a very strong impact on the health of marine ecosystems, particularly the coastal ones, as well as on the viability of social and economic activities that depend on them, such as transport, fisheries, agriculture, aquaculture and tourism;

    AP.  whereas prolonged drought, extreme heat and large-scale flooding events, caused by changing weather patterns, will intensify and become more frequent throughout the continent, damaging ecosystems and human health and leading to major disruption to economic activities and decreasing the overall quantity and quality of available water; whereas preserving water resources and the natural functions of rivers, while supplying sufficient water of good quality, is becoming a major challenge that will require increased climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, effective management and innovative measures to increase water availability; whereas managing water scarcity and flood risks affordably and sustainably will increasingly become important across the EU;

    AQ.  whereas in 2022, Europe experienced its hottest summer and the second warmest year on record, leading to drought impacting over 15 % of EU territory; whereas the average annual economic loss caused by droughts in the EU between1981 and 2010 was estimated at around EUR 9 billion per year; whereas with no adaptation measures, it is estimated that annual drought losses in Europe and the UK could increase to EUR 45 billion per year up to 2100 with warming of 3°C(53); whereas in the period of 1998-2020, floods comprised 43 % of all disaster events in Europe; whereas climate change impacts and socio-economic developments are leading to more frequent flooding, affecting an increasing number of people and causing increasing damage; whereas 12 % of Europe’s population lives in floodplains(54);

    AR.  whereas the cost of inaction in addressing water-related challenges is extremely high, given that 90 % of disasters are related to water(55); whereas without policy action, the cost of economic losses from coastal floods alone could exceed EUR 1 trillion per year by the end of the century in the EU(56) and the economic cost of droughts in Europe could exceed EUR 65 billion a year by 2100(57);

    AS.  whereas significant differences exist between the Member States in water availability, management strategies and usage patterns, and vulnerability to climate change impacts can vary considerably; whereas a tailored approach is required to enhance water resilience and ensure sustainable water management;

    AT.  whereas droughts constitute one of the chief catastrophic consequences of climate change; whereas around 23 % of the EU’s territory is moderately susceptible to desertification and 8 % is highly susceptible to it; whereas Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain and Italy are among the countries most affected, and 74 % of Spain’s surface area is at risk of desertification; whereas the EWRS should look beyond prolonged droughts, but rather address the reality that the semi-arid line is moving north, resulting in increasing areas in the EU that will face chronic long-term unavailability of sufficient freshwater resources;

    AU.  whereas policies related to desertification, water consumption and climate change are closely interconnected; whereas as part of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the EU reaffirmed in 2015 and later re-confirmed in 2024(58) its commitment to achieving land degradation neutrality by 2030, which, according to the European Court of Auditors special report on desertification, is unlikely to be achieved;

    AV.  whereas water infrastructure can help maintain a constant and predictable flow and supply of water; whereas in 2022, the annual average river discharge across Europe was the second lowest since records began in 1991(59);

    AW.  whereas downstream areas are particularly dependent on upstream water management and abstraction; whereas the Member States should refrain from implementing measures that significantly increase flood risks upstream or downstream of other countries in the same river basin, in accordance with the WFD;

    AX.  whereas nature-based solutions are pertinent interventions that, when tailored to specific ecosystems and needs, can increase resilience in the water cycle and provide multiple benefits in terms of biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration, improved water quality, nutrient retention, supply of drinking water, wildfire prevention and flood risk mitigation; whereas nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and the operable life of water infrastructure, therefore ensuring, in many cases, complementarity of both solutions;

    AY.  whereas natural water retention measures are nature-based solutions that aim to store water in natural, agricultural, forested and urban landscapes;

    AZ.  whereas water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such; whereas, under Directive (EU) 2024/1203 on the protection of the environment through criminal law(60), abstraction of surface water or groundwater within the meaning of the WFD constitutes a criminal offence where such conduct is unlawful and intentional, and causes, or is likely to cause, substantial damage to the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or to the quantitative status of groundwater bodies;

    BA.  whereas soil biodiversity and soil organic carbon affect water retention capacity; whereas soil erosion, compaction and certain soil management practices that cause soil degradation lead to a steady decrease in the water retention capacity of soil, which as a consequence exacerbates drought and flood events with a direct negative impact on farming; whereas healthy soil is therefore one of the drivers of water resilience, which itself should be approached and managed at river basin level; whereas better land management is key to preventing disasters;

    BB.  whereas the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) includes an ambitious but non-binding target of dedicating at least 7,5 % of annual EU spending to the biodiversity objectives in 2024 and 10 % in both 2026 and 2027; whereas the new financial framework should incorporate a water perspective with a view to allocating sufficient resources to the future EWRS in order to ensure resilient water ecosystems and infrastructure, and security of water supply, and to facilitate investments in innovative solutions;

    BC.  whereas cohesion funding has played a crucial role in improving water and sanitation services across the Member States; whereas continued support is required to ensure their long-term resilience and compliance with increasingly stringent quality standards;

    BD.  whereas pricing policies can improve the efficiency of water use; whereas such policies are a national competence and account for the regional differences in water availability and the source of water supply; whereas pricing can play a significant role in prompting households and other economic sectors to optimise consumption, as well as in ensuring that water users effectively participate in recovering the costs of water services; whereas pricing policies should also consider affordability for households and small businesses;

    BE.  whereas digitalisation and innovation can effectively assist the Member States, regional bodies and the Commission in collecting data on and monitoring water management; whereas the EU is at the forefront of new technological developments in the water sector, accounting for 40 % of all international patent families in this sector between 1992 and 2021(61), a position that needs to be fostered and nurtured, and the potential of the internal market fully exploited; whereas hurdles for the introduction and scaling-up of new water technologies need to be examined and a just European level playing field guaranteed; whereas continued support for research in water technology innovation is needed to secure and to create jobs and boost European competitiveness;

    BF.  whereas innovation is a crucial tool to help the water sector meet the challenges of the United Nation’s SDGs, adapt to climate change and become more water-efficient;

    BG.  whereas deployment of monitoring and modelling technologies is still lagging behind in many Member States, and the digitalisation of the sector is too slow; whereas provisions on the river basin management plans in the WFD do not explicitly include concrete measures to digitise the water sector; whereas common shortcomings for the current policies harnessing the potential digital solutions are related to the lack of technology guidance, monitoring standards, policy integration, standardisation and public involvement;

    BH.  whereas the water sector is vulnerable to various threats, including physical attacks, cyberattacks and contamination with harmful agents; whereas such incidents could result in widespread illness, casualties and service disruptions, significantly impacting public health, the environment and economic stability; whereas the digitalisation of water management might introduce further security risks in a context of increasing hostile attacks on critical infrastructure; whereas the implementation of the NIS2 Directive and Critical Entities Resilience Directive can contribute to mitigating security risks to vital (drinking) water systems and (drinking) water infrastructure, arising from geopolitical tensions;

    BI.  whereas advances in sensor technology, computing, artificial intelligence (AI) and big data management can help monitor water quantity and quality and inform the operational decisions of the policymakers and water management companies; whereas innovations in nature-based systems to manage water are available and can contribute to resilient water management;

    BJ.  whereas water is a vital component in the life cycle of AI, both in the operation of data centres and the manufacture of hardware; whereas the rapid expansion of AI could result in an exponential increase in water demand; whereas that dependency on an increasingly scarce resource poses significant challenges in terms of sustainability; whereas strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, hydrogen, electric vehicle batteries and data centres, play a key role in achieving a competitive and autonomous EU;

    BK.  whereas chiller and cooling tower systems, based on innovative cooling technologies such as evaporative and closed-loop cooling, are already available and can contribute to reducing water consumption in industrial, heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems applications;

    BL.  whereas research must be promoted with a view to producing alternative active ingredients to combat pests, to ensure greater plant health and reduce the use of inputs and phytosanitary products;

    BM.  whereas water resilience is crucial in education and teaching, and in raising awareness and giving information about the functioning of the water cycle;

    BN.  whereas limited access to water and related infrastructure has a negative impact, especially on women, as it undermines the realisation of other human rights, such as self-determination, economic independence and education;

    BO.  whereas 60 % of European river basin districts are transnational, which makes effective transboundary cooperation crucial; whereas 20 European countries depend on other countries for more than 10 % of their water resources, with five countries relying on more than 75 % of their resources coming from abroad via rivers(62); whereas this cooperation should be strengthened to account for current and future climate challenges such as droughts and floods;

    BP.  whereas United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres appointed a Special Envoy on Water, aiming to enhance international cooperation and synergies among international water processes;

    BQ.  whereas clean water access and sustainable and resilient sanitation infrastructure are key components of the One Health approach, recognising the interconnection between the health of humans and water pollution;

    BR.  whereas water cooperation across borders and sectors generates many benefits, including enhancing food security, sustaining healthy livelihoods and ecosystems, helping address resilience to climate change, contributing to disaster risk reduction, providing renewable energy, supporting cities and industry, and fostering regional integration and peace;

    BS.  whereas geopolitical developments demonstrate that the EU should be ready to withstand the challenges that go beyond the environmental sphere; whereas non-environmental threats, such as recent accidents related to the damaged cable in the Baltic Sea, send the EU a strong message that strengthening transboundary cooperation is key in addressing both the environmental and security-related objectives;

    BT.  whereas about 41 000 kilometres of inland waterways flow through 25 of the Member States; whereas inland waterways, which rely on the availability of water resources, perform a crucial role in optimising water supply and mitigating the impact of droughts and floods, as well as supporting the economic activities and the development of regions;

    BU.  whereas the increasing water scarcity, inequalities in access to water, and external shocks to the water sector have heightened interdependencies, increasing competition for water and leading to complex economic repercussions;

    General remarks

    1.  Welcomes and supports President von der Leyen’s announcement in the political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on putting forward a European Water Resilience Strategy (EWRS) addressing water efficiency, scarcity, pollution and water-related risks, as well as the recognition that water is an indispensable resource that is increasingly under stress from climate change and increasing demands;

    2.  Believes that while implementing legislation, economic competitiveness should be taken into account in line with the Competitiveness Compass; calls for the implementation of EU environmental legislation in order to build a resilient and competitive Europe, mitigate and adapt to climate change, halt biodiversity loss, prevent pollution, ensure food security, limit resource use and waste, and strive towards efficient use of resources, including water, while taking into account the precautionary principle, the control-at-source principle and the polluter-pays principle; highlights the fact that water availability impacts the quantity, quality, variety and seasonal availability of foods that can be produced;

    3.  Calls for the EU to integrate its commitments to the COP29 Baku Dialogue on Water for Climate Action and the UN 2023 Water Conference into the international dimension of the strategy;

    4.  Stresses the urgent need to enhance water resilience and management to ensure sustainable freshwater supplies for people, the economy and the environment; emphasises that the EWRS should be developed in coordination with the European Oceans Pact, ensuring a cohesive and integrated approach to managing freshwater and ocean resources, addressing interconnected challenges, enhancing competitiveness and promoting sustainable water management across inland and marine environments, while ensuring a holistic ‘source-to-sea’ approach;

    5.  Insists on the need for a comprehensive and holistic EWRS that integrates water quality, quantity, security, infrastructure, technology and management aspects and includes the restoration of the water cycle as a key element, as it underpins economic activities, ensures resource availability and contributes to climate regulation;

    6.  Stresses the importance of water supply, in particular drinking water, as well as water security of supply; points out that all environmental restoration projects should take into account the water security aspects, prioritising solutions that not only provide environmental benefits, but also guarantee the supply and efficient management of water; emphasises, furthermore, that ecological restoration measures should be carried out in synergy with the development of the EU’s renewable energy potential and not impact the overall energy resilience;

    7.  Recommends that lakes and other freshwater-dependent habitats be included in the strategy, alongside rivers, transitional waters and groundwater, as essential components of the EU’s water resilience efforts;

    8.  Stresses the urgent need to improve crisis-warning systems with regard to heavy water incidents, as well as to improve preventive measures;

    9.  Calls on the Commission to present a European climate adaptation plan, including concrete legislative proposals and actions, particularly regarding infrastructure resilience, water management and nature-based solutions, while prioritising the protection of vulnerable communities, to make the EU more resilient and to lead by example;

    10.  Reiterates that access to clean and safe drinking water and sanitation is a human right; emphasises that this right must be unequivocally ensured, with everyone having access to affordable and good quality water services, including the inhabitants of islands and outermost regions;

    11.  Stresses that no one, whether in public places or private establishments, should be denied access to water supplied from a distribution network intended for human consumption, where available;

    12.  Notes that industrial activities and agricultural production require water to produce their end products or to support production activities, with the amount of water used varying depending on the type of activity; highlights the fact that ensuring Europe’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy requires a water-smart society where technology and data enhance a circular economy, fostering sustainable and water-efficient practices; calls on all relevant actors to accelerate the transition towards water-efficient, circular industry and agriculture by promoting and investing in innovative solutions, including digital tools and technologies, resource recovery, water reuse, renewable energy production, infrastructure, nature-based solutions and inclusive governance mechanisms;

    13.  Urges the Commission to integrate and mainstream the water dimension into internal and external EU policies through a cross-sectoral approach in order to ensure that water resilience, sustainability and security is woven into the fabric of European policies; calls on the Commission, in particular, to carry out a water-related assessment of any regulatory measure, including related to energy, as part of the socio-economic and environmental impact assessment; emphasises that assessing how each EU policy, and EU-funded projects and infrastructure, can impact water resources in terms of quantity, quality and accessibility would ensure that water resilience is a cornerstone of policy formulation and implementation, thus shifting the paradigm from treating water as an infinite resource to recognising its intrinsic value for humanity and for the EU’s ecological and socio-economic landscape and its competitiveness;

    Water efficiency

    14.  Stresses that efficient water use is essential for preserving the EU’s water resources and that water efficiency should be a key objective of the EU; calls, in this regard, for a consequential reduction in water demand, including by addressing excessive leakage levels, investing in research and innovative solutions, modernising industrial and production processes, upgrading water infrastructure, managing water resources and peak demands sustainably, prioritising uses and ensuring that higher water efficiency results in a reduction in overall freshwater consumption as well as in an increase in water availability in water-stressed areas at the local and regional levels; believes that areas affected by prolonged drought and desertification should be given priority;

    15.  Calls for a legislative framework setting sectoral water efficiency and water abstraction targets at basin level, based on up-to-date assessments of water availability and climate risks, including a water valuation approach that accounts for ecosystem services and long-term sustainability, and covering all water uses, including industry, energy, agriculture, public institutions and households; underlines the fact that these targets should be ambitious yet adaptable, taking into account the specific circumstances and progress already achieved by each Member State to ensure continued efforts towards efficiency gains across all regions; stresses the importance of efficient and uniform data collection practices across the Member States and all sectors, including through the use of innovative technologies, as well as real-time data collection points for more transparency on water consumption; emphasises the need to carry out an appropriate assessment of the environmental and socio-economic impacts of water use; stresses that the strategic importance of food production must not be compromised; emphasises that science, research and technology are important for water efficiency and water use as well as for the circular economy in this regard; calls for the creation and promotion of new smart and high-performance irrigation systems, rainwater retention and water from reuse, as well as water-efficient irrigation systems;

    16.  Reiterates the need to develop a common EU methodology for setting water efficiency and water abstraction targets to ensure the sustainable use of available renewable water resources within an integrated water resources management framework which gives due consideration to linkages beyond the water sector through the water-energy-food-ecosystems nexus, thus enabling decision-makers and economic actors to plan the necessary investment to ensure water supply security in an increasingly sustainable manner, while giving due consideration to the characteristics of the water bodies concerned;

    17.  Calls for close collaboration on integrated energy and water resource planning and related technologies across all sectors at national, regional and local levels, including between all stakeholders, in order to establish mechanisms for ensuring coherence across water and energy policies;

    18.  Calls on the Commission to put forward a comprehensive policy on sustainable water management for industry based on reducing, recovering, reusing and recycling, including a focus on the use of water-efficient and circular technologies, water recycling, pollutant reduction strategies and the promotion of closed-loop systems;

    19.  Recalls that the growing threat of water scarcity is jeopardising industries and projects that are key to Europe’s competitiveness drive, including semiconductors, data centres, renewable hydrogen and electric vehicle battery production; notes that these industries will increasingly face pressure to reduce their environmental impact and improve water resource efficiency, including both direct and indirect water usage; calls on the Member States to support water-intensive industries in setting up water-efficiency plans aimed at saving, reusing and recycling water, preventing water pollution and implementing water-efficient technologies; calls on the Commission to incorporate comprehensive water management strategies into relevant EU industrial policies and sector-specific transition pathways, with a particular focus on strategic water-intensive sectors;

    20.  Stresses that knowledge, data, research and technology are key for efficient water use; calls for adequate financial and technical support to be given to the Member States to implement efficient water management measures, including by means of innovative and modern technologies;

    21.  Welcomes the recommendations of the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture underlining that sustainable farming practices and new business models need to be scaled up to promote more efficient use of natural resources, especially water;

    22.  Calls for the transition to a more sustainable and competitive farming model, assisted by the implementation of sustainable practices and innovative solutions that promote biodiversity, reduce chemical inputs and enable water resources to be managed efficiently, including nature-based solutions, regenerative management, smart precision irrigation technologies, digital monitoring systems, advanced treatment methods and smart water distribution networks, optimising consumption and preventing water resource depletion, and that help ensure continued productivity while enabling agriculture to reduce pollution, use pesticides and fertilisers efficiently, improve the hydrological cycle, enhance groundwater recharge and adapt to lower water use; considers that technological solutions can also include measures that can increase water absorption, infiltration and retention in agricultural systems, which are important amid increasing occurrences of both drought and heavy rains;

    23.  Points out that innovative irrigation solutions and practices can enhance water efficiency in agriculture, gaining an economic advantage while also reducing environmental burdens; notes that farmers generally lack sufficient means and incentives to know about water use by crops, actual irrigation applications, the yield responses of crops to different water management practices, and thus current on-farm water-efficiency levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to incentivise the uptake and support the maintenance of innovative irrigation solutions such as drip irrigation to allow for an active management of water levels and efficient use of water resources, as well as to promote continuous knowledge exchange, so that all relevant stakeholders can share greater responsibility across the entire water supply chain;

    24.  Recalls that the use of nutrients such as nitrate and phosphate is essential for food production, as this activity would not be possible without their use; recommends better consideration of the nutrient cycle in agricultural production and the exploitation of the value in urban wastewater; calls for more research into the effective use of nutrients and the development of nutrient recovery technologies, in order to decrease the Union’s dependence on imported raw materials; recognises the high potential for nutrient recovery from water and calls on the Member States to support the agricultural sector to optimise their nutrient consumption including by using resources (nitrate and phosphorus) recovered from wastewater treatment plants; calls on the Commission to propose an integrated nutrient management action plan to effectively address loss of valuable agricultural inputs, recycling of nutrients, nutrient pollution and inefficiencies in the nutrient cycle; calls for the proper and safe recovery of phosphorus from organic sources and for incentivising investments in its recovery and circular nutrient management in accordance with the Commission’s JRC publication(63);

    25.  Stresses that the current Nitrates Directive is due for revision, as outdated provisions promote the use of artificial fertilisers rather than organic manure; calls for an urgent review of the Nitrates Directive before the end of this year, and its revision to promote circular nutrient management;

    26.  Emphasises, in line with the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture, the need to support the transition to regionally adapted crop and seed varieties and the switch to different crops, with reduced water requirements and greater drought resistance, as well as the need to support the adoption of appropriate soil management practices; considers the need for stronger support for scientific research and technological development related to the breeding of new species, to enable the production and supply of foodstuffs to be diversified and their quality enhanced, while raising the level of protection for human health and the environment; notes the potential of plant varieties that are more resistant to water stress and pests and could play a role in reducing water use and could reduce the environmental footprint of crops;

    27.  Calls for financial and technical support for farmers and rural communities, particularly in water-stressed areas, to help them adopt sustainable land management practices that improve soil and water quality, contribute to biodiversity and mitigate climate change; emphasises the need for special attention to be given to regions that are particularly vulnerable to soil degradation and water scarcity;

    28.  Acknowledges the significant efforts made by farmers to enhance water quality and emphasises the need for an appropriate timeframe to allow the effects of these measures to be accurately assessed;

    29.  Points to the success of the agricultural European Innovation Partnership EIP‑AGRI and calls for the continuation of knowledge exchange, expertise and peer-to-peer learning via the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Network;

    30.  Notes the links between carbon sinking and water availability, and calls for coherence between the water resilience strategy and carbon farming schemes;

    31.  Reiterates that the Water Reuse Regulation aims at reducing the pressure on water bodies by setting out provisions on reusing water after appropriate treatment extends its life cycle, thereby preserving water resources; emphasises, however, that regulatory, financial and technological barriers, including the economic competitiveness of reclaimed wastewater, risk management planning and the sharing of responsibilities, contribute to the slow uptake of reuse of reclaimed water for agriculture; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to adopt supportive policies, at both the EU and the local level, that incentivise water reuse practices, taking into account the importance of adapting wastewater treatment and quality requirements to the intended water use; notes that treated wastewater also finds valuable applications in various industrial processes and urban contexts, contributing to reducing the pressure on freshwater resources and the conservation of drinking water; calls therefore on the Commission to assess a possible extension of the scope of the Water Reuse Regulation in order to establish, at EU level, minimum water quality standards for safe water reuse for industrial and urban purposes;

    32.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to specify systems of regulatory and financial incentives for the reuse of treated wastewater in water-intensive sectors and to provide specific funding for the construction of infrastructure connecting wastewater treatment plants and refined water distribution networks; urges a streamlined approach in EU legislation to remove administrative barriers and promote safe and efficient water recycling across the Member States; calls on the Member States to set up national water reuse and saving plans to incentivise cross-sectoral cooperation in water management;

    33.  Reiterates that reused water could alleviate abstraction from rivers, lakes and groundwater for irrigated agriculture; underlines the fact that reused water can contribute to maintaining base flows and minimum water levels during dry periods;

    34.  Highlights the potential of the building sector to save water, for example, with the help of smart sub-metering systems, efficient greywater systems, reuse of domestic wastewater or rainwater harvesting; stresses that the energy performance of buildings can be enhanced by water efficiency, reducing greenhouse gas emissions; calls on the Member States and local authorities to incentivise water-saving features in new buildings; stresses, in this regard, that water-efficient practices should be factored into urban planning; highlights the fact that harvesting rain water as well as using and reusing water efficiently can improve climate adaptation in cities;

    35.  Calls for the transition, in industry and in the energy and digital sectors, to optimised cooling efficiency and alternative cooling methods that are less water-dependent, in order to ensure significant water savings in these sectors;

    36.  Points out that, while households represent 10 % of the overall water consumption in the EU, action on improving domestic water efficiency is also necessary; notes that water-saving technological solutions are readily available and can reduce water consumption in households without compromising comfort or requiring high investment; calls on the Member States to support consumers in transitioning towards such technologies and to strengthen consumer awareness of water consumption and potential efficiency gains by anchoring domestic water efficiency in water, building and consumer policies across the EU;

    37.  Notes that the leakage rates from pipes are high in some Member States, which increases the total share of domestic water consumption; welcomes the provisions of the new Drinking Water Directive on leakage rates and the ongoing work of the Commission to evaluate those rates and set threshold values that will trigger action in the Member States concerned; calls on the Member States to urgently tackle leakage in water supply networks and to fully implement the monitoring and reporting requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, so that the Commission can set a threshold value for leakage by January 2028; emphasises the need for sustainable urban irrigation networks to be modernised, to curb leakages and reduce their water footprint; calls on the Member States to regularly inform the public about the efficiency and effectiveness of their water supplies;

    38.  Points out that public sector organisations provide significant untapped potential for saving water by virtue of their size or their nature as public organisations; believes that the public sector should act as a role model for other sectors;

    39.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote easily accessible and free information, training, advisory programmes and information campaigns aimed at raising public awareness of sustainable water resource management;

    40.  Recommends that water-efficiency aspects, such as reductions in water loss and reuse of water, be integrated in the upcoming revision of the public procurement framework;

    Water pollution

    41.  Underlines the fact that the existing EU water policy framework is designed to address the effective management of water resources and the protection and restoration of freshwater and marine ecosystems, but that its poor implementation and enforcement, insufficient funding and lack of proper cost-benefit analyses of the implementation measures undermine its effectiveness;

    42.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement and enforce the current legislation, in particular the WFD and its ‘daughter’ directives (the Groundwater Directive and the Environmental Quality Standards Directive), with a particular focus on strengthening the monitoring and reporting mechanisms to ensure that all Member States consistently implement the required water protection measures; recalls the need for sufficient funding to implement these acts;

    43.  Stresses that the chemical pollution of surface water and groundwater poses a threat to the aquatic environment, with effects such as acute and chronic toxicity in aquatic organisms, accumulation of pollutants in the ecosystem and loss of habitats and biodiversity, as well as to human health;

    44.  Calls for the establishment of comprehensive EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and surface water; stresses that respective updates of the relevant directives are essential for safeguarding water quality and achieving good chemical status for water bodies as mandated under the WFD;

    45.  Insists that essential uses of PFAS in critical sectors, such as medical devices, pharmaceuticals and products necessary for the twin transition to a climate neutral and digital economy, are not endangered in the context of upcoming legislative and non-legislative proposals; calls on the Commission to propose to phase out forever chemicals (PFAS) – starting with consumer goods – linked to harmful effects on human health and the environment, based on scientific evidence, allowing their use where there are no safe alternatives; underlines the need to scale up investments and accelerate the research and development of equivalent and safe alternatives;

    46.  Calls on the Commission to propose updated limits on PFAS in drinking water, taking into account the latest scientific knowledge;

    47.  Emphasises the urgency of addressing, primarily at the source, and effectively monitoring pollution from pharmaceuticals, bisphenols, antimicrobial resistance genes, persistent organic pollutants and other existing and emerging pollutants, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition and the goal of achieving good chemical status for all water bodies;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to close the gaps with enhanced funding and the enforcement of current laws, and the integration of circular economy principles to mitigate pollution at its source and safeguard water ecosystems for future generations; underscores the fact that antibiotic-resistant bacteria and certain emerging pollutants remain insufficiently addressed, necessitating further innovation and investment; emphasises the need for all sectors to apply sustainable production processes and circular practices, proactively preventing pollutants from entering water systems;

    49.  Recalls that microplastics may enter drinking water sources in a number of ways: from surface run-off (for example, after a rain event) to wastewater effluent (both treated and untreated), combined sewer overflows, industrial effluent, degraded plastic waste and atmospheric deposition; calls on the Commission to put forward, in line with the requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, a full risk assessment of microplastics in drinking water, while continuously working on reliable and robust sampling and analytical methods in order to appropriately address the potential threat of this emerging pollutant to sources of water intended for human consumption;

    50.  Emphasises the need to improve the monitoring and regulation of plastic pollution in freshwater and marine environments, with particular attention to microplastics and single-use plastics; encourages the Commission to assess current enforcement mechanisms and consider further measures to protect water quality;

    51.  Calls on the stakeholders to develop safe water contact materials, to substitute BPA and other bisphenols and ensure compliance with Regulation (EU) 1935/2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food(64) and the recently adopted provisions as regards the use of BPA and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives (Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190);

    52.  Recalls that the revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, in effect since 1 January 2025, imposes new obligations regarding water purification, requiring pharmaceutical and cosmetic producers to cover at least 80 % of the costs of removing micropollutants from wastewater, with the aim of reducing harmful substances in the environment; notes the existence of differing figures and assessments regarding the impact this would have on the pharmaceutical sector and, consequently, on the availability and affordability of medicines, and therefore calls on the Commission to conduct a new and comprehensive assessment of the impact on this sector;

    53.  Calls for increased EU support for local authorities for the modernisation of wastewater treatment plants and the promotion of water reuse, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, ensuring that municipal wastewater management contributes effectively to good chemical and ecological water status;

    54.  Calls for increased monitoring of pesticide residues in water bodies and enforcement of pesticide application regulations to mitigate their impact on water quality; stresses the need for increased funding to support farmers in the adoption of low-input and organic farming practices that reduce reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilisers, as well as to provide appropriate training and independent advisory services to farmers and other operators on the use, effectiveness and toxicity of pesticides, as well as best practice;

    55.  Insists on the integration of circular economy principles to reduce hazardous chemical use in industrial processes; stresses the need for additional funding to support industries in transitioning to clean technologies that minimise water pollution(65);

    56.  Recognises the role of treated sludge as a local and circular source of fertiliser, contributing to soil health, nutrient recycling and reduced dependency on synthetic fertilisers; emphasises the importance of preventing PFAS, heavy metals, microplastics and other harmful substances from entering sewer networks in order to enable the safe and sustainable use of high-quality sewage sludge in agriculture;

    57.  Calls on the Commission to include an overview of measures in an annex to the EWRS, with a timeline for achieving the objectives in question;

    Adaptation to climate change: floods, droughts, stress areas, disaster preparedness

    58.  Calls for the climate adaptation proofing of all new EU legislative and non-legislative acts in order to ensure the integration of climate adaptation into sectoral plans and policy measures affecting water and land use; highlights, in this regard, the need for increased climate ambition as part of the fight against climate change, while urging the Member States to ensure that all climate adaptation measures affecting water use contribute to long-term, improved water resilience; calls on the Commission to take fully into account the geographical and environmental conditions in the Member States, as well as the specific situation of islands, outermost regions and other areas of high vulnerability, such as areas affected by desertification, when adopting new legislative and non-legislative proposals; asks the Commission to present a roadmap for current and ongoing legislative and non-legislative policy measures, including targets and monitoring requirements affecting water and land use;

    59.  Emphasises the need for tailored climate adaptation measures for the Mediterranean region, which faces unique challenges such as prolonged droughts and saline intrusion into freshwater resources;

    60.  Stresses the specific challenges faced by island areas due to the scarcity of drinking water and calls for targeted measures to protect island water resources, including improving rainwater collection and storage infrastructure, and implementing alternative water sources, while enhancing water resource monitoring and management systems; calls, further, on the Member States to take better account of mountainous regions in national adaptation plans in order to meet the specific challenges of water management in mountainous areas;

    61.  Reiterates that climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should not come at the cost of ecosystem degradation, and should avoid increasing the demand for water- and energy-intensive activities, and should instead prioritise energy- and water-efficient innovation and technologies as part of moving towards a more resource-efficient economy, without undermining its productivity, while ensuring equitable access to water for all; points out that, in order to be effective, climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should be tailored to national circumstances, while enhancing competitiveness and productivity in the short and long term; points out the possibilities of synergies, in this regard, with innovative energy production such as photovoltaics and biogas, as it can also contribute to an increase in agricultural income;

    62.  Recognises the importance of reserving water for nature and the need to maintain healthy freshwater ecosystems, for the good functioning of the water cycle, for human activities and for mitigating the impacts of droughts and water scarcity; underlines, in the context of restoring freshwater ecosystems and the natural functions of rivers, the importance of removing ‘obsolete barriers’, namely artificial barriers that no longer fulfil their original purpose or are no longer needed, wherever such opportunities exist, on the basis of current knowledge and experience; calls for the establishment of specific programmes for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring minimum flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    63.  Insists that, with climate change impact becoming more persistent, flood and drought management must fully integrate the arising risks, including changing weather patterns, such as increased rain patterns leading to excess of water; is convinced that a combination of monitoring and data collection, preparedness, emergency and recovery responses taking into account the principle of ‘building back better’(66)on the one hand, and adapting societal and economic activities on the other, is essential to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience, especially in the light of the quantitative aspect of water becoming more prominent; stresses, in this regard, the need for climate-resilient nature-based solutions and infrastructure that take into account the impact of extreme climate events in their development to ensure their viability in the face of extreme climate events;

    64.  Recalls that in 2007, the WFD was supplemented by Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks, which aims to establish a framework to reduce the adverse consequences of flooding on human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity; notes that making the two directives mutually compatible is achieved through risk management plans and river basin flood management plans as the components of an integrated water management system in which coordination is crucial; recalls that flood prevention is closely connected to urban green spaces, soil protection strategies and investment in drainage networks;

    65.  Stresses that preparedness for water scarcity and drought can be significantly improved in the EU, considering that no drought management plans are in place in several Member States(67); calls on the Member States and, where applicable, competent regional and local authorities, to develop drought management plans, particularly with a view to ensuring the provision of drinking water, ensuring food production and integrating digitalised monitoring, control and early warning systems in order to support effective and data-based decisions on protection, response and communication measures with clearly defined areas of responsibility; points out the need to introduce EU-level provisions as regards drought management plans, similar to the ones on flood management plans;

    66.  Insists, in view of the numerous climatic events, such as floods, droughts and cyclones, which have affected Europe, on the importance of the EU having a robust mechanism for responding to such crises, including systems for warning and providing assistance to the civilian population; points out that digital monitoring, adequate public display of relevant data and early warning systems are key to developing effective drought and flood management plans at the level of the Member States; emphasises, further, the importance of fully using the available EU tools, such as the flood forecasts of the European Flood Awareness System and the Global Flood Awareness System, and the Global Flood Monitoring tool, as part of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service;

    67.  Stresses the importance of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) in helping countries hit by water-related disasters such as flood and droughts; calls for increased funding to provide the UCPM with sufficient and upgraded resources in order to increase preparedness and improve capacity building;

    68.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance citizen preparedness in the event of water-related disasters or crisis; stresses the importance of information campaigns and demonstration exercises in education facilities, public administration and businesses in order to build a ‘preparedness culture’ for citizens;

    69.  Calls on the Member States to systematically renew and upgrade their water infrastructure, including drinking water and sanitation infrastructure, as well as infrastructure regulating river flows, and to invest in innovative solutions based on good practice, making water systems more resilient to climate change, ensuring stable drinking water supply, enabling the early detection of losses and reducing water leakages and waste, while optimising water transport and storage systems; highlights the fact that funding for innovative water infrastructure is insufficient compared to the investment needs across the EU; calls, in this regard, for dedicated funding, on national, regional or EU level, to ensure adequate financing for the development, maintenance and modernisation of water-resilient infrastructure, to foster innovative solutions and technologies and ensure long-term sustainability of that water infrastructure;

    70.  Regrets that, despite the threat that desertification poses to water quality and availability, soil fertility and food production, and despite the fact that 13 Member States have declared themselves to be affected by desertification in the context of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Commission is not addressing desertification effectively and efficiently; urges the Commission, therefore, in line with the Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on desertification, land degradation and drought, to present an integrated EU-wide action plan to combat desertification, land degradation and drought, aiming at building resilience to drought and achieving land degradation neutrality in the EU by 2030, based on a full impact assessment;

    71.  Insists that the agricultural sector be further supported in implementing new technologies to reduce the demand for water, while at the same time increasing access to water, including by supporting water retention and groundwater recharge; calls for research results, for example on seawater desalination, to be made accessible and to facilitate the deployment of innovative desalination solutions; calls on the Member States to create natural water reserves based on up-to-date assessments of climate risks to protect critical water supplies and their catchments, and taking into consideration the environmental and socio-economic impact of developing such reserves; points out that such natural water reserves would complement the WFD’s requirement for Member States to identify water bodies used for drinking water abstraction, making sure they meet the objectives set out in Article 4 WFD and in the Drinking Water Directive, and would ensure their necessary protection; notes that such natural water reserves already exist under different forms in various Member States; stresses that assistance should be given to Member States or local and regional governments to help them develop natural water reserves;

    72.  Notes the potential of retention infrastructure as an example of water generation systems created using the best available, cost-effective techniques that have the lowest environmental impact, including by means of wastewater reuse or rainwater collection, in order to reduce the risks of droughts and floods, increase water security and foster circularity, water reclamation and reuse; believes that water retention facilities may be useful tools provided that they are authorised by local or national authorities under clear conditions, including the capacity of local groundwater to sustain such activities and the need for farmers accessing the water resource to adapt their practices to more sustainable practices, in particular in terms of water needs and water quality; calls on the Commission to use its available tools, including financial support, to streamline this approach among the Member States;

    73.  Deplores the unlawful or intentional abstraction of water, which is likely to cause substantial damage to water bodies; calls for strong dissuasive measures to be applied, including through the criminal law, to protect the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or of the quantitative status of groundwater bodies; notes that additional support for training and knowledge transfer for national enforcement capacities is needed;

    74.  Notes the important cross-cutting role of nature-based solutions in addressing the challenges of the triple planetary crisis and restoring the natural water cycle; calls on the Commission and the Member States to prioritise, taking into account the environmental and socio-economic impacts, the deployment of nature-based solutions for water resilience in their policy actions and recommendations, such as the re-wetting of wetlands and peatlands to increase ground water availability and surrounding soil moisture, the restoration and protection of floodplains, natural water retention measures, revegetation as a barrier against floods, and rainwater conservation, in order to strengthen water availability, mitigate climate change risks and support long-term resilience for communities, businesses and food production; underlines that, in addition to nature-based solutions, complementary investment in engineering solutions remains necessary to ensure successful climate adaptation and water resilience in the long term;

    Funding and pricing

    75.  Notes that nature-based solutions and natural water retention measures have the potential to restore groundwater levels and support ecological flows while reducing water-related risks from water scarcity, floods and droughts; notes that in flood management, nature-based solutions cannot usually replace existing solutions and may not be effective for the most extreme events; points out, however, that nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and operable life of grey infrastructure by increasing water absorption capacity, reducing water velocity and regulating peak flows; reiterates, in this regard, that the effectiveness of nature-based solutions is context-specific and must be adapted to the local situation; emphasises in this regard that a ‘one solution that fits all’ does not exist;

    76.  Stresses the need to provide financial support for sustainable innovative methods and solutions, while having due regard to public-private partnerships;

    77.  Stresses, in the context of climate adaptation, the importance of healthy soils in ensuring water security and circularity; emphasises that the natural water retention of soils must be improved through measures to enhance soil health, minimising carbon losses, as well as actions at the level of the water body, such as the stabilisation of riverbanks, including through re-naturalisation, and the restoration of the retention capacities of aquifers;

    78.  Notes that thoroughly designed forest management measures can improve watershed health, regulate water flow and reduce drought and flood stress, given the essential role of trees and forests in water cycle regulation, through their ability to purify water, increase the availability of water resources and improve soil moisture retention; proposes that this be duly considered when the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, develops Union disaster resilience goals and that it be considered in the development and refinement of disaster risk management and contingency planning; highlights the need, in this regard, for more research, data collection, innovation and funding to support land managers in preventing the impact of environmental stressors such as drought floods and diminishing watershed function;

    79.  Recognises that urban areas are increasingly vulnerable to water-related climate risks such as flooding, water shortages and heat stress; calls for the integration of urban water resilience planning into climate adaptation strategies, including investment in green roofs, permeable infrastructure, rainwater harvesting and storm water retention systems, as well as measures aimed at increasing green and blue spaces in urban areas, in order to mitigate extreme weather impacts and to reduce the risks to human life and property; calls further for the maintenance of, and regained access to, urban waterways in cities;

    80.  Emphasises that the EWRS should ensure adequate funding from public and private sources in order to support the modernisation, upgrading, adaptation and maintenance of resilient water infrastructure, sustainable water management, data collection, research, effective monitoring, digitalisation, upskilling, nature-based solutions, the development and the uptake of innovative water-efficient technologies, as well as to ensure environmental and socio-economic sustainability in line with the goals set by the new European Competitiveness Compass;

    81.  Calls on the Commission to create a separate and dedicated fund for water resilience within the upcoming MFF; believes that specific financial mechanisms should also be established within the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund to support water-smart technologies and water investment; strongly believes that, in the interim, water should be prioritised in existing funding frameworks, including the Cohesion Fund; stresses that EU funding mechanisms must incorporate considerations of social equity and affordability, in particular in the context of providing water services to the population, ensuring support for Member States and citizens with greater financial constraints and specific realities, while meeting water management obligations; highlights the importance of adjusting existing funding, subsidies and financing streams related to water management and other related land uses, moving away from outdated engineering solutions to innovative ones, as well as nature-based solutions or a combination thereof;

    82.  Calls for targeted funding, via Horizon Europe and the EIP-AGRI, for field trials on the water relations of different cropping systems; calls for the recognition of the role of women in water policies and for specific funding to be identified to promote their access to agriculture;

    83.  Recalls that the lack of dedicated funding for water or binding funding targets within the current MFF limits the EU’s capacity to direct targeted investment towards essential water resilience measures, including infrastructure modernisation, innovation, climate adaptation measures and the implementation of nature-based solutions, and thus its competitive capacity, as the absence of a water balance creates an additional burden for the economy of the regions; notes that outermost and mountainous regions and islands in the EU are particularly struggling to access funding or public-private partnerships to support local and regional investment in water management and infrastructure;

    84.  Stresses the important role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in water financing; highlights the fact that the EIB is actively investing in and supporting the water sector; stresses that the EU should collaborate with the EIB to share best practice and calls, further, on the EIB and other financial institutions to strengthen their role in the funding of innovative and resilient water infrastructure, improved sanitation and drinking water infrastructure, digitalisation, as well as to support projects aimed at flood risk reduction, erosion prevention and the revitalization of watercourses, by facilitating favourable conditions for water investment;

    85.  Urges the Commission to explore and promote innovative financing mechanisms, including payments for ecosystem services and green bonds, while ensuring regulatory clarity and safeguards to prevent market distortions; calls on the EIB and other financial institutions to prioritise low-interest loans and credits for Member States and regional and local authorities undertaking large-scale restoration projects, with specific provisions to support economically disadvantaged regions;

    86.  Highlights the importance of public-private partnerships as a source of funding for water investment; calls on the Commission to incentivise private investment in the water sector by creating a supportive regulatory framework that may include co-financing opportunities and public-private partnerships in order to drive innovation, improve infrastructure and ensure sustainable water management solutions across the Member States; underlines, nevertheless, that the involvement of private investment in the EU water sector must not undermine the status of water as a public good and a public service, and that the long-term resilience of the sector, as well as the principles of accessibility, affordability and sustainability must be ensured;

    87.  Calls on the Member States to adopt governance frameworks that clearly define the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in planning, financing and implementing nature-based solutions; believes that these frameworks should integrate funding from diverse sources, including philanthropic contributions and private-sector partnerships, while ensuring equitable access to resources for small-scale projects, particularly managed at local or regional levels;

    88.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to address water aspects in their budgets and to improve governance within the regions in the use of EU funds;

    89.  Underlines the need to provide targeted financial and technical assistance to municipalities to facilitate compliance with water-related legislation;

    90.  Encourages the Member States to accelerate the granting of authorisations for sustainable and innovative resilient water infrastructure projects to enable their rapid implementation in the face of the urgent challenges;

    91.  Notes that the application of the cost recovery principle on water services, which provides that all water users effectively and proportionately participate financially in the recovery of the costs of water services, remains low to non-existent in several Member States; calls on the Member States and their regional authorities to implement adequate water pricing policies and apply the cost recovery principle for both environmental and resource costs in line with the WFD; calls on the Member States to take into account the long investment cycles when implementing the cost recovery principle and to ensure sufficient funding is available for needed (re)investment;

    92.  Stresses the importance of ensuring that water pricing supports long-term water security by reflecting the economic, environmental and resource costs of water use; encourages the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to ensure that water pricing is economically sustainable, socially fair and promotes efficient water use, and that it reflects the availability of water across different Member States and regions, particularly in water-stressed regions, while safeguarding affordability for households and small businesses; calls on the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to insure transparent water prices and to raise awareness of the value of water services;

    93.  Points out that competent national water authorities will play a central role in implementing new water management and conservation plans at the level of the Member States; calls, therefore, on the Members States to financially and technically increase the capacity of those competent authorities to play a more significant enabling and advisory role in sustainable and future-proof water management and storage infrastructure; believes that EU funds, such as the Just Transition Fund, should be used to further assist Member States and water agencies in implementation;

    Digitalisation, security and technological innovation

    94.  Stresses the potential and the necessity for digitalisation and AI in improving the management and monitoring of bodies of water and water infrastructure, as well as in reporting and ensuring the comparability of data reflecting different geographical flow conditions;

    95.  Calls on the Commission, the Member States and water providers to mainstream transparency and digitalisation as fundamental principles in water management and to enhance the use of management and metering data, with the aim of strengthening monitoring, assessment, accountability and decision-making, while optimising and simplifying reporting obligations; calls for digitally enabled water technologies to facilitate real-time, sample-based and distance monitoring and reporting on water quality, leakages, usage and resources; calls for improved efficiency in the use of public funds and public spending in this area; recognises that widespread deployment of innovative digital technologies needs to be accompanied by digital skills training;

    96.  Emphasises the need to promote digitalisation and data-centric solutions in building a water-smart society; stresses the need to develop digital solutions for monitoring water consumption and optimising the use of water resources across all sectors; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to provide financial support for the implementation of smart water management systems, focusing on the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

    97.  Points out that water systems, including water treatment and distribution systems, are considered one of the nation’s critical infrastructures and security pillars, and hence key for the EU’s strategic autonomy, and require increased protection and the ability of utilities to detect, respond to, and recover from physical and cyberthreats and cyberattacks; notes that a higher level of digitalisation comes with new vulnerabilities; points out that, in the event of a threat or an attack, water system operators can lose their ability to control the flow and quality of the water or lose the ability to track the true status of the water system; insists that vulnerability assessments and an emergency response plan should be an integral part of the water management system in every Member State; encourages the promotion of information sharing about threats to cybersecurity and procedures to exchange best practice among operators, as well as to establish a cybersecurity culture through technical security measures, competence building and awareness creation and communication; draws attention to the measures and provisions in the NIS2 Directive and the Critical Entities Resilience Directive which could help mitigate the arising security risks; calls on the Commission to take the lead in reinforcing the EU-level coordination formats and to propose effective tools in the upcoming Preparedness Union Strategy with the aim of ensuring timely preparedness to tackle environmental and non-environmental risks to the water bodies that are threatening the EU’s overall security;

    98.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase the involvement of women in decisions regarding water resilience; calls for the adoption of a methodological approach that effectively considers gender-related needs in the implementation of water supply projects, by implementing monitoring, reporting and tracking that use tools and indicators disaggregated by gender;

    99.  Notes that better data and data analysis are key to evidence-based decision-making and the swift identification of small changes in water quality that could present a threat to bodies of water, together with the evaluation of best practice and identification of the most cost-effective and impactful measures;

    100.  Stresses that improved, reliable and interoperable data on water supply, demand, distribution, accessibility and use are needed and that data points need to be established; urges the Commission and the Member States to enhance data collection and improve data interoperability across all levels to support the implementation of current water legislation, as well as to facilitate circular economy and water-smart industrial symbiosis strategies; highlights the fact that data and AI could be used in modelling water and energy consumption as well as reuse and recycling capacities;

    101.  Calls on the Commission to better recognise the fundamental role of the water sector in bolstering EU competiveness by fostering research and innovation and promoting entrepreneurship and talent; emphasises, in this regard, the importance of ramping up innovation in the water sector; points out that the European Innovation Centre for Industrial Transformation and Emissions, created as part of Directive 2010/75/EU, could play a role in this regard, as it evaluates the environmental performance of industrial technologies and gathers information on innovative industrial environmental techniques; points, further, to existing partnerships like the Water4All Partnership, a funding programme for scientific research;

    102.  Believes that there is a need to build and nurture multi-stakeholder platforms to promote innovation uptake at all levels, local and national; recommends that these platforms involve a wide range of participants – the public and private sectors, and civil society associations – to build a coalition of partners to bring about change; supports the promotion of knowledge sharing on how digital water technologies can support the implementation of existing EU water legislation, as well as capacity building at local, regional and national levels; calls on the Commission and the Members States to expand digital skills, and research and development (R&D) programmes targeting water, including through collaboration with universities, research centres and SMEs;

    103.  Acknowledges the critical role of data centres in the digital economy; notes with concern that the rapid expansion of the technology could lead to a substantial increase in AI’s demand for water resources associated with their operations, which could undermine the environmental benefits that AI promises to deliver, such as resource optimisation and carbon emission reductions, and stresses the need to integrate water efficiency measures in their design and operation; urges the Commission to address the use of water resources by information and communications technologies (ICT) and, in particular, by AI and data centres in its EWRS, in particular by encouraging data centres to reuse treated water and to promote the design of more efficient chips and components to reduce the need for cooling; recommends that the Member States prioritise water resilience strategies that address the specific challenges posed by data centres to ensure the sustainability of both the digital and the environmental agendas;

    104.  Recalls that seawater desalination is the process of removing salt from sea or brackish water to make it useable for a range of ‘fit for use’ purposes, including drinking, and that it is thus an important technological solution for people’s livelihoods; notes that, at the same time, desalination is an energy-intensive process and should ideally be done using renewable energy, whenever possible, in order to minimise environmental impacts; reiterates that desalination produces a by-product, brine (a concentrated salt solution), that must be properly disposed of to avoid adverse impacts on the marine environment; considers, therefore, that desalination based on reverse osmosis or thermal technologies should be applied, if other more environmentally sustainable options are not available or cannot be implemented, particularly in remote areas and islands; highlights, in this regard, the ongoing work on new technological solutions, such as microbial desalination cells, offering an environmentally sustainable and innovative alternative to traditional desalination methods, particularly to provide clean water and wastewater treatment to small, isolated locations without electricity;

    105.  Stresses the need for increased funding and R&D into technologies such as innovative desalination techniques in order to increase the efficiency, sustainability and the scaling up of such technologies; calls for research into the possibilities of using such technologies in agriculture to diversify the water supply points and therefore decrease the vulnerability of the sector to water stress;

    106.  Notes that in the last decade, there have been many scientific breakthroughs for making water treatment smarter and more circular, with these solutions offering opportunities for using digital solutions, AI and remote sensing to use water more efficiently and by reusing treated wastewater for irrigation and recovering energy and nutrients from wastewater;

    107.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the regulatory obstacles within the single market to facilitate the development, scaling-up, and placing on the market of innovative biotechnology and biomanufacturing solutions and the promotion of cleaner manufacturing and circularity;

    108.  Calls for the funding, development and authorisation of innovative solutions for crop protection and fertilisation, including biological control agents and active substances with lower impact on the environment, which are needed for a just transition to more sustainable agricultural systems;

    109.  Calls for specific programmes to be established for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring adequate flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    Cross-border and international cooperation

    110.  Stresses the need for a comprehensive EWRS that fosters cross-border cooperation, more uniform data collection and reporting, sharing best practice between local, regional and national actors, ensuring sustainable water management and equitable resource distribution among the Member States, preventing water challenges such as scarcity and flood risk from being passed on to other Member States;

    111.  Emphasises that climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; notes that floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion and stability; recognises that water resilience is crucial for preventing and addressing current and future health, food, energy and security crises; emphasises that water resilience promotes transboundary water cooperation, serving as a catalyst for peace and security, as countries are interconnected through shared rivers and groundwater resources;

    112.  Calls for increased cross-border cooperation between the Member States in the management of shared river basins and groundwater aquifers and in the effective collection and sharing of data on water quality, pollution levels and water levels; recommends the establishment of regional cooperation centres to coordinate the implementation of joint water resilience strategies, taking into account the climate, social and economic challenges of each territory;

    113.  Calls for enhanced international cooperation, including at the level of river basins, to address the growing water crisis, ensure clean and high-quality water, promote sustainable water management and implement various innovative water technologies, including nature-based solutions; calls for the anchoring of cooperation across borders at operational, tactical and strategic levels;

    114.  Calls for the establishment of cross-border projects under Interreg and other EU funds to improve regional cooperation in the management of water resources, with a particular focus on ensuring the fair distribution of water between sectors and Member States;

    115.  Stresses the need to strengthen EU monitoring capacities through digitalisation and modern technologies, including satellite surveillance and real-time pollution tracking, which are essential for preventing and combating cross-border pollution;

    116.  Urges the Commission to implement a specific diplomatic role dedicated to resolving water-related conflicts, promoting water cooperation and protecting water sources and systems, particularly during armed conflicts and in transboundary contexts;

    117.  Urges the EU to lead international efforts to protect and restore water ecosystems in line with the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation;

    o
    o   o

    118.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj.
    (2) OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/60/oj.
    (3) OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, p. 19, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/118/oj.
    (4) OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 84, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/105/oj.
    (5) OJ L 288, 6.11.2007, p. 27, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2007/60/oj.
    (6) OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2020/2184/oj.
    (7) OJ L 177, 5.6.2020, p. 32, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/741/oj.
    (8) OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/56/oj.
    (9) OJ L, 2024/3019, 12.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/3019/oj.
    (10) OJ L, 2024/1785, 15.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1785/oj.
    (11) OJ L 375, 31.12.1991, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1991/676/oj.
    (12) OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1991/oj.
    (13) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj.
    (14) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj.
    (15) OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 71, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/128/oj.
    (16) OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.
    (17) OJ L, 2024/3190, 31.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3190/oj.
    (18) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 54.
    (19) OJ C, C/2024/7216, 10.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7216/oj.
    (20) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 106.
    (21) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 28.
    (22) OJ C, C/2025/808, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/808/oj.
    (23) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 126.
    (24) OJ C 316, 22.9.2017, p. 99.
    (25) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0358.
    (26) World Meteorological Organization, 2021 State of Climate Services – Water, WMO-No 1278, WMO, Geneva, 2021.
    (27) European Environment Agency, Water resources across Europe – confronting water scarcity and drought, EEA Report 2/2009.
    (28) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (29) WWF, High Cost of Cheap Water, WWF, Gland, 2021.
    (30) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (31) European Commission, Attitudes of Europeans towards the environment, Special Eurobarometer 550, May 2024.
    (32) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, et al., Implementation of water balances in the EU – Final report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (33) Disclosure Insight Action (CDP) and Planet Tracker, High and Dry. How Water Issues Are Stranding Assets, 2022.
    (34) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (35) European Environment Agency, ‘Water abstraction by economic sector in the 27 EU Member States, 2000-2022’, European Environment Agency website, 5 December 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/water-abstraction-by-source-and/water-abstraction-by-economic?activeTab=8a280073-bf94-4717-b3e2-1374b57ca99d.
    (36) Eurostat, ‘Archive: Water use in industry’, Eurostat website, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Water_use_in_industry&oldid=196132#Further_Eurostat_information.
    (37) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (38) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Water accounting and auditing, A sourcebook, FAO Water Reports 43, FAO, Rome, 2016.
    (39) European Investment Bank, Wastewater as a resource, EIB, 2022.
    (40) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, ‘Water reuse: New EU rules to improve access to safe irrigation’, European Commission website, 26 June 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/water-reuse-new-eu-rules-improve-access-safe-irrigation-2023-06-26_en.
    (41) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, ‘Zero pollution: Improved quality and access to drinking water’, European Commission website, 12 January 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/improved-quality-and-access-drinking-water-all-europeans-2023-01-12_en.
    (42) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (43) Ibid.
    (44) Ibid.
    (45) Ibid.
    (46) Ibid.
    (47) Ibid.
    (48) European Environment Agency, ‘Industrial pollutant releases to water in Europe’, European Environment Agency website, 30 May 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/industrial-pollutant-releases-to-water.
    (49) Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (OJ L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/75/oj).
    (50) European Commission ‘Nitrates’, European Commission website, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/water/nitrates_en#implementation.
    (51) European Environment Agency, ‘Public exposure to widely used Bisphenol A exceeds acceptable health safety levels’, European Environment Agency website, 14 September 2023, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/newsroom/news/public-exposure-to-bisphenol-a.
    (52) European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment, EEA Report 01/2024.
    (53) Cammalleri, C. et al., Global warming and drought impacts in the EU, JRC Technical Report , Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
    (54) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (55) Feyen, L. et al., Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe, JRC PESETA IV final report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
    (56) European Environment AgencyEuropean Climate Risk Assessment, EEA Report 01/2024.
    (57) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, GAR Special Report on Drought 2021, Geneva, UNDRR, 2021.
    (58) Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought.
    (59) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (60) Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and 2009/123/EC (OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1203/oj).
    (61) European Patent Office, Innovation in water-related technologies, EPO, Munich 2024.
    (62) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (63) European Commission JRC Science for Policy Report, ‘Technical proposals for the safe use of processed manure above the threshold established for Nitrate Vulnerable Zones by the Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC)’, 2020.
    (64) Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food and repealing Directives 80/590/EEC and 89/109/EEC (OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/1935/oj).
    (65) European Environment Agency,‘Industrial pollutant releases to water in Europe, European Environment Agency website, 30 May 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/industrial-pollutant-releases-to-water.
    (66) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Build Back Better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, UNISDR, Geneva, 2019.
    (67) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment et al. Stock-taking analysis and outlook of drought policies, planning and management in EU Member States – Final Report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Kosovo – P10_TA(2025)0094 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and Kosovo, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 April 2016,

    –  having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2022,

    –  having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe of 12 May 2022,

    –  having regard to the framework agreement between the European Union and Kosovo on the general principles for the participation of Kosovo in Union programmes(2), in force since 1 August 2017,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(3),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(4),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans Summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia, of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb, of 6 October 2021 in Brdo pri Kranju, of 6 December 2022 in Tirana, of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0692),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0692),

    –  having regard to the general summary and the country assessments by the Commission, dated 31 May 2023 and 13 June 2024, on Kosovo’s economic reform programme,

    –  having regard to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye, adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, and to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 of 9 September 2010, which acknowledged the content of the ICJ opinion and welcomed the EU’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

    –  having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and to the implementation annex thereto,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1095 of 5 June 2023 amending Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)(5), which extended the mission’s mandate until 14 June 2025,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Kosovo)(6),

    –  having regard to the final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2021 municipal elections in Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the preliminary report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2025 parliamentary elections in Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the fourth meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council between the European Union and Kosovo held in Brussels on 7 December 2021,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the joint recommendations adopted at the 12th meeting of the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 9 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International,

    –  having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the Democracy Report 2024 of March 2024 by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0075/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement policy is one of the most effective EU foreign policy instruments and one of the most successful policies to incentivise and encourage fundamental reforms, and is a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B.  whereas democracy, human rights and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    C.  whereas the EU enlargement process is a strategic tool for strengthening stability, democracy and economic development in Europe, and each enlargement country is judged on its own merits and whereas it is the implementation of the necessary reforms and compliance with the set of criteria and common European values that determines the timetable and progress of accession; whereas Kosovo’s path towards EU membership also depends on the normalisation of relations with Serbia;

    D.  whereas the EU is the largest provider of financial support to Kosovo;

    E.  whereas Kosovo has been subjected to foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, particularly from Russia, especially through Serbian nationalist outlets, and China, through soft power, aiming to destabilise its democratic institutions, jeopardise societal cohesion, and incite ethnic violence; whereas the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023 was followed by a massive spread of disinformation that further exacerbated tensions; whereas Kosovo authorities adopted the Law on the Independent Media Commission (IMC) in July 2024; whereas, in May 2024, the Council of Europe published a legal opinion on the draft law on the IMC expressing concerns related to certain aspects of the at-that-time draft law, and providing recommendations on how to address these concerns; whereas the final text of the Law on the IMC did not reflect most of the recommendations made;

    F.  whereas the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, also known as EULEX, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the common security and defence policy of the European Union;

    G.  whereas in 2018 and 2023, petitions were signed by over 500 people who historically self-identify as Bulgarian;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Commends Kosovo’s commitment to EU accession, which reflects a clear strategic geopolitical choice, and the continued strong support of its citizens for Kosovo’s European path; reiterates that Kosovo has been consistent in its efforts to integrate into the European Union;

    2.  Reiterates its firm belief that Kosovo’s future lies in the EU and that all efforts to bring Kosovo out of the ‘grey zone’ are in the interest of the people of both Kosovo and the EU, especially in the context of the current geopolitical dynamics in the region, rapid major shifts in world politics and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    3.  Supports Kosovo’s application for EU membership, which reflects the overwhelming cross-party consensus on EU integration and a clear geopolitical strategic choice; reiterates its call on the Member States in the Council to mandate the Commission to present its questionnaire and to submit its opinion on the merits of the country’s application; calls on the five non-recognising Member States that have not yet recognised Kosovo’s independence to do so without delay and thus allow Kosovo to progress on its EU path on an equal footing with the other candidate countries; recalls the advisory opinion of the ICJ dated 22 July 2010, which states that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence does not violate general international law;

    4.  Recalls that membership of the European Union is based on a merit-based process, conditional on the rigorous implementation of reforms aligned with the highest European standards, in particular compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the rule of law, and ensures the effective application of laws in practice; encourages Kosovo to continue its efforts in this regard, by further strengthening its commitment to the values and standards of the Union; stresses that enlargement also implies thorough preparation of potential new members, while respecting the economic stability of the internal market, social and environmental standards and the proper functioning of the European institutions;

    5.  Welcomes the visa liberalisation, adopted in April 2023 and in place since 1 January 2024, as a tangible result of Kosovo’s ever-closer relations with the EU and as evidence of Kosovo’s efforts on the path of European integration; welcomes Kosovo’s decision to unilaterally abolish visa requirements for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina; welcomes the decision of Spain to recognise ordinary passports issued by Kosovo as valid travel documents as of January 2024;

    6.  Notes the tangible progress in the areas of justice, freedom and security, the fight against organised crime and a functioning market economy; regrets the limited progress and calls for an acceleration of reforms in the area of rule of law; welcomes Kosovo’s ambition to advance the implementation of reforms, which remains the country’s priority; regrets the lack of a decision-making quorum in the Kosovo National Assembly, caused by the boycott of the Assembly work by political parties ahead of parliamentary elections;

    7.  Regrets the politicisation of institutions such as the Central Election Commission and the IMC;

    8.  Commends Kosovo’s ongoing alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, in particular its firm condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its implementation of the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus, aligning with the Union’s foreign policy, and its support through humanitarian aid and military assistance packages to Ukraine, which confirm that Kosovo is a reliable and valuable partner committed to EU integration and confirms its clear geopolitical orientation, firmly anchored in the European and transatlantic alliance;

    9.  Calls for the immediate lifting of the EU measures against Kosovo, which are no longer justified as Kosovo has fulfilled the EU requirements and as the measures also stand in gross contradiction to Kosovo’s demonstrated commitment to European values and alignment with EU policies, limiting the impact of the EU’s partnership with Kosovo and hindering the resumption of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in good faith;

    10.  Reiterates its full support for Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe and for the country’s strategic orientation plan to join the NATO Partnership for Peace programme and its bids to join other international organisations; calls on the relevant organisations and the Member States to proactively support Kosovo’s respective bids; calls on the Commission and the EU Office in Kosovo to step up their efforts in enhancing visibility and promoting the role, efforts and benefits of the closer partnership between the EU and Kosovo;

    11.   Welcomes the fact that Kosovo reduced administrative burden by simplifying procedures through the implementation of the related program for 2022-2027; notes that the strategic framework for public administration is in place, but not efficiently implemented; regrets the fact that delays in public administration reform have left EU funding management weak and that accountability in the public sector is insufficient; calls on Kosovo to improve public administration and the merit-based civil service system by amending and adopting the Law on public officials and the Law on the independent oversight board of civil service;

    12.  Regrets that the Kosovo Constitutional Court ruling on the Law on salaries, which unifies the current system of remuneration for public officials, is not yet functional; calls on the Kosovo Government to revise its legislation on public financial management to meet international standards and to incorporate the public investment methodology into the revised legislation;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13.  Welcomes the important and positive progress on addressing many of the EU Election Observation Mission’s (EU EOM) long-standing recommendations and on presenting a consensual law on general elections; notes that this provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections, in line with international and regional standards; notes that in response to an invitation by the president of Kosovo, the European Union deployed an EU EOM, including an observer delegation of Members of the European Parliament, to observe the parliamentary elections in Kosovo on 9 February 2025; welcomes the conclusions of the EU EOM confirming the conduct of peaceful, free and fair elections on 9 February 2025 with the participation of all communities in Kosovo; regrets the harsh rhetoric of the political parties during the campaign; takes note of the technical problems encountered during the counting process and encourages the Kosovo authorities to increase their efforts to improve the organisation of the next elections; notes the lack of genuine political pluralism within the Kosovo Serb community at the parliamentary elections, despite multiple Kosovo Serb electoral lists; is concerned by reports of continuous pressure on voters from the Serbian community exercised by Belgrade; condemns the repeated interference in the electoral campaign by US Special Envoy Richard Grenell;

    14.  Notes with concern the political deadlock caused by the fragmented political landscape and failure so far to elect a speaker of the Parliament, hindering the formation of a government following the legislative elections of 9 February 2025 and delaying the parliamentary reading of several budgetary texts; encourages the political parties to work together to overcome this stalemate as soon as possible;

    15.  Notes with concern that the Law on Local Elections and the Law on General Elections are still not implemented and harmonised with the Law on Gender Equality, which mandates 50 % equal representation of women and men; regrets that women continue to be underrepresented;

    16.  Welcomes the adoption of the law on the Special Prosecution Office and the progress in adjudicating corruption cases; commends the active work of the Special Prosecution Office for solving seven war crime cases; calls for further clarification of the division of jurisdiction between the Special Prosecution Office and the Basic Prosecution in handling investigations and prosecutions; calls on Kosovo to continue strengthening the Special Prosecution Office by enhancing its capacity to investigate and prosecute high-profile organised crime cases; calls on the police and Special Prosecution Office to work closely together to develop strategies for conducting investigations more effectively, with a clear division of responsibility;

    17.  Takes note of the progress in Kosovo’s ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index, as it has moved upward 10 places since last year, considering it to be a positive development while acknowledging that this is attributable both to decreases in other countries’ scores and, more significantly, to the adoption of qualitative legislation, but that it still remains largely unsatisfactory; emphasises that gaining people’s trust requires not only legislative reforms but also visible results in investigating, prosecuting and convicting cases of corruption at all levels; regrets that Kosovo has lacked an anti-corruption strategy since 2019 and urges for more efforts to finalise it as a matter of priority; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption;

    18.  Expresses serious concern about systemic vulnerabilities in Kosovo’s judiciary, particularly regarding the independence of the justice system and respect for separation of powers; reiterates its concern about delays to trials and continued criticism by government officials of judicial decisions in individual cases; welcomes the fact that in December 2024, the government submitted its draft legislation on judicial reforms to the Venice Commission and that the first opinion was issued by the latter on 18 March 2025; calls on Kosovo to ensure that legislation governing the integrity and accountability of the judiciary is consistent with European standards and Venice Commission recommendations; calls on the Government of Kosovo to allocate adequate budget for the judicial system; welcomes the establishment of the Commercial Court, progress in the recruitment of new judges and prosecutors in a merit-based and transparent process, and an overall increase of transparency;

    19.  Welcomes the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the parliamentary elections and encourages their elected representatives to play an active role within the Kosovo legislative framework, in support of Kosovo’s European future; regrets, however, the boycott of parties representing Kosovo Serbs during the local elections in April 2023 and the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions; expresses concern over Serbia’s interference in the parliamentary elections through Srpska Lista (SL);

    20.  Welcomes the implementation of the 2016 judgement of the Constitutional Court on the Visoki Dečani/Deçani Monastery land ownership by registering the monastery as the owner, in March 2024;

    21.  Welcomes the steady increase in organised crime sentences and the fact that the legal framework on the fight against organised crime is aligned with the EU acquis; emphasises the need for prosecution services and police to strengthen their joint action against criminal groups and networks; expresses concern about the security challenges in the north of Kosovo, particularly following the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023, which demanded significant police resources; emphasises the need to deepen cooperation in the field of combating drug trafficking; calls for further alignment regarding the fight against terrorism;

    22.  Welcomes the adoption of the strategy and action plan on control of small arms light weapons and explosives, as well as the high level of compliance with the rules of the UN Firearms Protocol;

    23.  Remains concerned over the slow implementation of the rule of law strategy and action plan;

    24.  Reaffirms its commitment to maintaining and strengthening its cooperation with the Kosovo Assembly and its members in support of democratic processes related to Kosovo’s European path by using Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives; believes that this partnership can be revitalised and further reinforced following the democratic elections held on 9 February 2025; encourages the active involvement and collaboration of all elected members of the newly formed Kosovo Assembly;

    25.  Condemns the serious security incidents in the north of Kosovo in late November 2024, the gravest act occurring near the village of Vragë in Zubin Potok, where explosive devices damaged critical infrastructure by targeting the main channel of the Ibër Lepenc system; expresses its support for Kosovo’s institutions in conducting a full investigation of these criminal actions so that the perpetrators will be brought to justice;

    26.  Commends the work of EULEX, which has been assisting Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule of law institutions;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Notes that Kosovo has the necessary institutional set-up for the promotion and protection of human rights; welcomes the adoption of the strategy for the protection and promotion of the rights of communities; emphasises, however, that human rights protection remains weak owing to the lack of legislative implementation, political will and limited human and financial resources and calls for strengthened enforcement and accountability mechanisms;

    28.  Acknowledges that Kosovo’s constitution is very progressive in terms of protection of minority rights; notes with regret that the petition signed by nearly 500 people who have historically self-identified as Bulgarian, which was registered at the Assembly of Kosovo in January 2023, has still not been considered and recommends that those rights be enshrined in law and ensured in practice; calls on Kosovo to ensure that all minorities recognised under the Law on protection of minority rights and members of their communities, are fully incorporated into the country’s constitution; calls on the Kosovo authorities to step up efforts to protect the rights of all minorities, including national communities, in particular vulnerable national communities, and to provide them equal opportunities and adequate representation in political and cultural life, public media, the administration and the judiciary, as well as prevent their assimilation and promote their integration into Kosovo’s society and strengthen activities to eliminate social and economic challenges of these national minorities;

    29.  Welcomes the increase in funding to shelters for victims of domestic violence and trafficking; notes that domestic violence remains the most common form of gender-based violence; expresses concerns that the system continues to fail in ensuring the effective prevention of domestic violence;

    30.  Regrets that the adoption of the draft Civil Code of Kosovo remains pending; highlights that the draft Civil Code addresses several important issues related to gender equality as a fundamental EU value, including enabling an equal share of joint marital property among women and men spouses; stresses the importance of ensuring rights for all people in Kosovo in the Civil Code to safeguard respect for constitutional rights and opportunities for the LGBTIQ community; expresses concern that women remain under-represented in senior political positions, specifically related to security and the dialogue, and emphasises the urgent need for their involvement in peacemaking and reconciliation processes, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; calls for more efforts to be made to improve the place of women in society;

    31.  Notes that the prison system broadly follows UN Standard Minimum Rules and calls for the better protection of the rights of prisoners, particularly female, minority and mentally ill prisoners; remains concerned that discriminatory language against women and LGBTIQ people persists, and calls on the authorities to create and implement a national gender strategy for research fields, such as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics; commends the participation of women in high-quality business and management training programmes, as well as in ICT related domains, facilitated by the instrument for pre-accession assistance funds; regrets that women from minority groups, particularly the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, face numerous forms of discrimination, particularly in education, employment and access to healthcare; expresses concerns that the central administration does not adequately represent minority communities, and the number of women in senior positions is low;

    32.  Regrets that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has not yet been adopted; expresses concerns that there is insufficient alignment between Kosovo’s legislation and the EU acquis on the rights of people with disabilities, who face discrimination and barriers to accessing social services;

    33.  Welcomes Kosovo’s consistent improvement in its position in the 2024 Liberal Democracy Index and Electoral Democracy Index, as prepared by the Varieties of Democracy Institute, which measures the rule of law, checks and balances, civil liberties, and free and fair elections;

    34.  Takes note of Kosovo’s pluralistic media environment while awaiting the decision of the Constitutional Court on the main media law and underlines the role of the IMC, whose independence in decision-making needs to be strictly ensured and full functioning restored; regrets, however, the decline in Kosovo’s media freedom, as evidenced by its drop from the 56th to the 75th place in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; reaffirms that media pluralism and transparency are prerequisites for EU accession; calls for greater transparency on media ownership and financing with a view to enhancing media independence and pluralism; emphasises the need for robust measures to protect journalists from harassment and intimidation, and to ensure the independence of media regulatory bodies; notes the concerns raised by civil society about the allegedly politically motivated election of the Chair of the IMC; urges the Kosovo authorities to further revise the Law on the IMC in order to include the recommendations made by the Council of Europe, thus aligning the national law with EU standards and practices; recommends increased support for independent media outlets and fact-checking organisations in Kosovo, recognising their crucial role in countering disinformation and providing accurate information to the public; encourages the EU to provide technical and financial assistance to these entities; encourages the Kosovo authorities to request tailor-made Technical Assistance and Information Exchange expert missions bodies; calls for the adoption of the law on Radio Television of Kosovo and the law on the protection of journalists’ sources;

    35.  Expresses concern over the recent cyberattack targeting Kosovo’s digital infrastructure; urges the Kosovo Government to reinforce its capacities to combat foreign interference and disinformation, particularly those originating from Serbian nationalist outlets and Russia, aimed at destabilising the region and undermining the European integration of the Western Balkans, by developing comprehensive strategies that include public awareness campaigns also combating disinformation undermining women’s participation in public life, strengthening cybersecurity and related infrastructure, fostering collaboration with international partners, most notably the European Union, to protect its digital economy, public services and national security, and addressing disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats that aim to destabilise the country and undermine its European perspective; encourages the integration of media literacy programs into Kosovo’s educational curriculum to equip citizens with the skills necessary to identify and counteract disinformation;

    36.  Commends the fact that Kosovo provided shelter and asylum to journalists from Ukraine and Afghanistan;

    37.  Expresses serious concern about the significant increase in attacks against journalists and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP cases), including by government officials; calls on the authorities to advance their work on anti-SLAPP legislation in line with the new EU Directive 2024/1069(7); calls on Kosovo to work actively to secure the ability of journalists to carry out their work and to ensure full freedom for the media to operate independently; underlines the need to stop all forms of violence;

    38.  Welcomes Kosovo’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a very crucial and positive role in the reform process; encourages the Kosovo Government to enhance its cooperation with civil society, in particular with women’s rights organisations, on decision-making and to make more use of the Government Council for Cooperation with Civil Society for building collaborative relationships and genuinely implicating civil society in a transparent legislative process from an early stage onwards; stresses the importance of increasing accountability and transparency in relation to public funding for civil society organisations; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress;

    39.  Regrets the lack of a clear plan for engaging Kosovo Serbs in the north and that initiatives to involve the Serb community in Kosovo’s political, social and economic structures remain very limited; reiterates its call to improve the internal dialogue and genuinely and directly engage with the independent civil society organisations of Kosovo Serbs, in particular in the north, with the aim of building trust, facilitating the daily life of Kosovo Serbs and successfully integrating them;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    40.  Commends Kosovo’s engagement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives and encourages it to enhance its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes; commends Kosovo on its constructive approach and active engagement in regional cooperation and trade facilitation that led to the unblocking of the Central European Free Trade Agreement;

    41.  Calls on Serbia to open all wartime archives and grant access to the former Yugoslav Secret Service (UDBA) and Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service (KOS) files, ensuring their return to respective governments upon request; emphasises the need to open these archives region-wide to investigate communist-era crimes and strengthen democracy, accountability and institutions in the Western Balkans;

    42.  Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    43.  Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Kosovo and Serbia in order to achieve a comprehensive legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    44.  Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    45.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    46.  Condemns all actions that endanger stability and jeopardise the reconciliation process, including the tensions in the north of Kosovo and provocations by Serbian state-sponsored groups and illegal armed formations, and urges the European Union to take a stronger stance against external interference in Kosovo’s internal affairs; emphasises that both sides must fully implement all agreements reached and avoid unilateral actions that could escalate tensions; calls on the Kosovo police to ensure that they fully abide by all rule of law and human rights requirements, and to guarantee that a multi-ethnic and inclusive police force, fully in line with legal requirements, is deployed in the north of Kosovo; recalls the shared responsibility of all political representatives and all communities in Kosovo for upholding peace, security and the rule of law;

    47.  Welcomes the establishment of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons in December 2024 and calls for swift progress in implementing the May 2023 Political Declaration on Missing Persons; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to refrain from politicising this humanitarian issue and to step up their efforts in implementing the declaration as part of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and to establish cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia;

    48.  Welcomes the recent agreements in the framework of the Berlin Process;

    49.  Welcomes Kosovo’s decision to remove restrictions on the entry of Serbian finished products at the Merdare border crossing;

    50.  Welcomes the presence of the Kosovo Force and its role in building and maintaining a safe and secure environment and in developing a stable and peaceful Kosovo on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration; recalls the importance of the mission for the ongoing development of the Kosovo Security Force through the provision of advice, training and capacity building;

    Socio-economic reforms

    51.  Welcomes Kosovo’s active engagement in the implementation of the new growth plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to deepen EU-related reforms and reduce the socio-economic gap between EU Member States and the Western Balkan countries; welcomes the adoption of Kosovo’s Reform Agenda and recalls that Kosovo (as well as Serbia) needs to show improved commitment to the EU-facilitated Dialogue in order to access the resources;

    52.  Welcomes the progress achieved by Kosovo in developing a functioning market economy and encourages Kosovo to implement the necessary structural reforms to address fiscal challenges, while ensuring adequate labour protection, fair wages, and improved working conditions in line with EU legislation;

    53.  Reiterates its calls on the Commission to develop a regional strategy to address the persistent youth unemployment and brain drain by tackling the skills mismatch between the education system and the labour market, improving the quality of teaching, and ensuring adequate funding for active labour market measures and vocational training schemes, along with adequate childcare and pre-school education facilities;

    54.  Welcomes the fact that Kosovo’s cybercrime legislation is broadly aligned with the EU acquis; notes Kosovo’s limited progress in the digital transformation of public services; emphasises the need for it to align with EU digital legislation as well as with the needs of its people, specifically with the European Electronic Communications Code, the EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2)(8), the EU toolbox for 5G security, and the Digital Services Act(9) and the Digital Markets Act(10); notes that Kosovo’s economy remains highly dependent on imports and stresses the need for economic diversification to enhance competitiveness and sustainability, particularly in the context of deeper integration into EU markets;

    55.  Regrets that the draft law on textbooks, presented in 2022, is still pending final adoption in the Kosovo Assembly; calls on Kosovo to finalise the implementation of the new curricular framework for basic education, complete the revision of current textbooks, provide sustainable training to teachers, and systematically apply quality assurance mechanisms at all education levels;

    56.  Urges Kosovo to ensure better access to quality healthcare services; notes that healthcare expenditure remains the second lowest in the region, and calls for a comprehensive healthcare reform to address the needs of all citizens, especially in rural and underserved areas;

    57.  Notes with concern that access to social services, particularly for vulnerable groups, worsened with the government’s closure of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which was done without transparent consultation with civil society and other stakeholders and contributed to significant confusion; calls for better, evidence-based budgeting to improve social services, particularly for survivors of gender-based violence in accordance with the new legal framework;

    58.  Calls on Kosovo to provide equal and non-discriminatory state education in minority languages;

    59.  Reiterates the need to reach out to young people from the Serb majority municipalities and to integrate them in the socio-economic structures of the country;

    Energy, environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    60.  Notes that Kosovo has made some progress on the security of energy supply but remains heavily reliant on outdated, highly polluting power plants, posing serious health and environmental risks; notes that Kosovo needs to ensure the time-efficient implementation of its energy programme for 2022-2025 to meet its ambitious targets and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels; calls for the EU to step up and prioritise its efforts to help Kosovo overcome its air pollution problems; notes that Kosovo’s new energy strategy does not promote the construction of hydropower plants due to their harmful environmental impact, in particular because of the water scarcity in the country;

    61.  Highlights the need for comprehensive infrastructure development in Kosovo to facilitate the reduction of emissions from public transport and the expansion of electrified transport; stresses that improving accessibility and ensuring compatibility with the EU transport network must remain a priority;

    62.  Welcomes the agreement at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of data roaming charges and further reductions leading to prices close to domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entrance into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Urges Kosovo to enhance compliance with emission ceilings, improve the integration of environmental considerations into sectoral policies and adopt necessary measures for pollution, soil and water contamination control and waste management, in line with EU and international standards and commitments; urges Kosovo to improve comprehensive environmental impact assessments and to integrate sustainability measures into infrastructure planning; calls on Kosovo to increase the protected areas in the country and to improve instruments and measures for their protection with a view to safeguarding biodiversity, including key habitats of the critically endangered Balkan lynx; encourages Kosovo to intensify and speed up collaborative efforts with its neighbouring countries to designate transboundary protected areas and establish coherent transboundary management plans;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Kosovo.

    (1) OJ L 71, 16.3.2016, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2016/342/oj.
    (2) OJ L 195, 27.7.2017, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2017/1388/oj.
    (3) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (5) OJ L 146, 6.6.2023, p.22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1095/oj.
    (6) OJ L 110, 25.4.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/850/oj.
    (7) Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
    (8) Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).
    (9) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (10) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Serbia – P10_TA(2025)0093 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

    –  having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

    –  having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    –   having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

    –   having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

    –  having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

    –  having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Human Rights order to Serbia of 29 April 2025 to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,

    –  having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

    –  having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo(5), and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B.  whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

    C.  whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    D.  whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

    E.  whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

    F.  whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

    G.  whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

    H.  whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

    I.  whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

    J.  whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

    K.  whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

    L.  whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

    M.  whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

    N.  whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59,7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

    O.  whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

    P.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

    2.  Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

    3.  Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

    4.  Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

    5.  Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

    6.  Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

    7.  Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

    8.  Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

    9.  Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

    10.  Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

    11.  Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

    12.  Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13.  Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

    14.  Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

    15.  Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

    16.  Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

    17.  Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025, and of the subsequent election of the new government led by Đuro Macut, appointed on 16 April 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

    18.  Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

    19.  Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

    20.  Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

    21.  Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

    22.  Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    23.  Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 16 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

    24.  Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

    25.  Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

    26.  Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

    27.  Deplores the continuing violence against students, including the recent incident at the Faculty of Sports and Physical Education building in Novi Sad, in which at least five people were injured as a result of the police storming the building accompanied by the Dean, Patrik Drid;

    28.  Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

    29.  Is deeply concerned about the increasing political and financial pressure on primary and secondary school teachers, as well as university professors, who were deprived of their salaries for taking part in the collective action to support students’ demands; deplores in this context the unacceptable legal proceedings and media smear campaign against the Rector of the University of Belgrade;

    30.  Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

    31.  Deplores the alleged illegal wiretapping and detention of five activists from the opposition Movement of Free Citizens (PSG) and a student from the STAV organisation in March 2025, and the arrest warrants issued for other STAV activists; condemns the use of the case by the propaganda media and the unfounded extension of the detention; calls on the Serbian authorities to release Marija Vasić, Lazar Dinić, Mladen Cvijetić, Lado Jovović, Srđan Đurić and Davor Stefanović from detention;

    32.  Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

    33.  Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

    34.  Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act(7) and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(8); encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

    35.  Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

    36.  Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

    37.  Condemns the political pressure exerted on universities and other research institutions through a hasty government decree that interferes with the academic freedom of researchers and cuts their salaries; condemns the vilification of professors, researchers and other academic staff in pro-government media; deplores the increasing use of temporary contracts for teachers and other civil servants as a political tool to exert pressure and control;

    38.  Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

    39.  Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

    40.  Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

    41.  Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

    42.  Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

    43.  Deeply deplores the demographic decline in Serbia, which is being exacerbated by negative net migration due to economic hardship and political persecution; stresses that it is mainly young, educated and productive people who are being forced to leave the country, as well as those pressured and threatened on account of their political views, including Dijana Hrka, the mother of one of the victims of the Novi Sad railway station tragedy, who fears for her safety after being put under pressure by SNS supporters;

    44.  Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

    45.  Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

    46.  Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

    47.  Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

    48.  Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

    49.  Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    50.  Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

    51.  Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

    52.  Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

    53.  Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

    54.  Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

    55.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish a regional commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    56.  Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

    57.  Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    58.  Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    59.  Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    60.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    Socio-economic reforms

    61.  Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

    62.  Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

    63.  Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

    64.  Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

    65.  Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

    66.  Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

    67.  Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

    68.  Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

    Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    69.  Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

    70.  Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

    71.  Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

    72.  Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

    73.  Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

    74.  Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    75.  Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    76.  Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU(9), since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

    o
    o   o

    77.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

    (1) OJ L 278, 18.10.2013, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2013/490/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/2654, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2654/oj.
    (6) OJ C, C/2024/6339, 7.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6339/oj.
    (7) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (9) Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/52/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Group of six convicted of spying for Russia jailed for total of 50 years

    Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police

    A group of six Bulgarians living in the UK have been jailed for a combined total of more than 50 years for being part of a spying operation across Europe on behalf of Russia.

    Following a three-month trial at the Old Bailey, two women and a man were found guilty of conspiring to obtain information intended to be directly or indirectly useful to Russia.

    Three other men pleaded guilty to Official Secrets Act charges before the trial started.

    Commander Dominic Murphy, head of the Met’s Counter Terrorism Command, said: “The strength of the investigation into the group’s surveillance operations left the ringleaders – Orlin Roussev and Bizer Dzhambazov – with no option but to plead guilty to the charges they faced.

    “As shown in footage from his initial interviews, Roussev firmly denied carrying out any espionage activity for Russia. However, before he was due to stand trial, he admitted that he had been part of the conspiracy to spy.

    “This was in large part due to the detailed analysis of more than 200,000 digital messages and hundreds of items seized from Roussev’s home address.

    “The investigation team worked incredibly hard to piece together a complex and wide-ranging conspiracy that I would describe as espionage on an industrial scale.

    “The significant jail sentences handed to the group reflect the serious threat they posed to the safety and interests of the UK, as well as targets across Europe.

    “This case is a clear example of the increasing amount of state threat casework we are dealing with in the UK. It also highlights a relatively new phenomenon whereby espionage is being ‘outsourced’ by certain states.

    “Regardless of the form the threat takes, this investigation shows that we will take action to identify and disrupt any such activity that puts UK national security and the safety of the public at risk.”

    The court heard that detectives from the Met’s Counter terrorism Command seized hundreds of items after a co-ordinated series of raids and arrests were carried out on 8 February 2023.

    In particular, a 33-room former hotel belonging to Roussev was found to contain items including sophisticated spying equipment such as listening devices, concealed cameras and a fake ID card printer.

    Through their investigation, detectives identified that Roussev, who was leading the group, was in direct contact with Jan Marsalek – an Austrian national who, in turn, was identified as working with the Russian intelligence services.

    The investigation team identified six core spying ‘plots’ the group were involved in. This included activity that targeted two investigative journalists who were seen as reporting stories contrary to the interests of the Russian state.

    A former senior Kazakh politician who lived in the UK was also targeted, and the group planned to stage protests at the Kazakhstan embassy in London. Both operations were part of an elaborate plan to help the Russia state gain favour with Kazakhstan.

    The group also carried out surveillance at a US military site in Germany, where they believed Ukrainian soldiers were being trained.

    Another man who was designated as a ‘foreign agent’ by Russia was also targeted by the group during surveillance operations in Montenegro.

    Sifting through thousands of messages, and then matching these up with physical travel, financial statements and surveillance reports and footage, meant detectives were able to build up a compelling picture of the group’s activity, as well as identify those involved and their roles within the group.

    The six members of the group, who were all sentenced at the Old Bailey on Monday, 12 May, were:

    – Orlin Roussev, 46 (06.02.1978) of Great Yarmouth, Norfolk, sentenced to 10 years’ and eight months imprisonment.
    – Bizer Maksimov Dzhambazov, 43 (21.04.1981), of Harrow, north London, sentenced to 10 years and two months’ imprisonment.
    – Katrin Nikolayeva Ivanova, 33 (01.07.1991) of Harrow, north London, sentenced to nine years and eight months’ imprisonment.
    – Ivan Iliev Stoyanov, 33 (22.12.1991) of Greenford, west London, sentenced to five years and three weeks’ imprisonment
    – Vanya Nikolaveva Gaberova, 30 (10.08.1994) of Euston, north London, sentenced to six years, eight months and three weeks’ imprisonment.
    – Tihomir Ivanov Ivanchev, 39 (31.07.85) of Acton, west London, sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.

    Officers found that Roussev was directing the group’s activity, and was receiving tasks through his contact with Marsalak. Dzhambazov was effectively the second in command.

    The other four were involved in the execution of various espionage and surveillance activities across the UK and Europe in relation to the six plots identified by detectives.

    Ivanova, Gaberova and Ivanchev were all found guilty on 7 March of conspiracy to spy, contrary to Section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977.

    Roussev and Dzhambazov pleaded guilty before the trial started to the same offence.

    Stoyanov pleaded guilty before the trial to spying, contrary to section 1(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act 1911.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: OilXCoin Begins Capital Raise on Republic.com 

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ZURICH, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — OilXCoin, the evolutionary digital asset grounded in real-world value, is proud to announce it will launch a Reg D capital raise through Republic, one of the industry’s leading platforms for compliant investment offerings. This milestone reaffirms the company’s commitment to transparency, investor protection, and broad market accessibility.

    Having secured regulatory approval for OilXCoin’s prospectus from the Financial Market Authority (FMA) in Liechtenstein, along with passporting rights across the European Economic Area (EEA), OilXCoin continues to raise the bar in real-world asset (RWA) tokenization

    By partnering with Republic, OilXCoin expands its reach across both traditional and crypto-native capital markets through a platform widely recognized for its credibility with global investor communities.

    “Partnering with Republic aligns well with our goal of delivering an asset-backed token to qualified investors as we position OilXCoin for its market entry.” said Dave Rademacher, Co-Founder of OilXCoin. “The platform is trusted by investors and has a track record of facilitating compliant, high-quality investment opportunities.” 

    OilXCoin offers investors exposure to natural gas and oil reserves and their upstream value chains. With a capped token supply and a dual revenue model that includes both natural gas & oil revenues and transaction activity within the blockchain ecosystem, OilXCoin is designed to be a resilient and scalable investment opportunity.

    This public raise builds on early momentum, with more than USD $1.7 million already secured through private placements and restricted securities sales, now providing an opportunity for accredited investors in the United States under Reg D to participate.

    “We believe OilXCoin offers something fundamentally different,” said Glenn McColpin, Head of Oil & Gas at OilXCoin. “By combining real asset backing with blockchain infrastructure – and now launching on platforms like Republic – we’re creating a new way for oil and gas reserves to be financed by investors.”

    With the tokenized asset market projected to grow exponentially, OilXCoin is well-positioned to lead in a space where demand for compliant, real-world asset exposure continues to rise.

    Follow along at x.com/oilxcoin and linkedin.com/oilxcoin to stay updated and be part of this new wave in digital, asset-backed investment.

    -ENDS-

    About OilXCoin:

    OilXCoin is a digital asset that combines the resilience of tangible real-world assets, specifically oil & gas (O&G) and their upstream value chains, with the innovation of blockchain technology, providing investors with a unique opportunity to access both the traditional O&G sector and the dynamic cryptocurrency markets.

    The token is a perpetual debt instrument that gives investors exposure to O&G assets of DeXentra GmbH. Upon a termination of the OilXCoin, holders will have a claim to a share of the (actual or estimated) net proceeds from the disposal of DeXentra GmbH’s O&G assets. The OilXCoin provides no fixed yield. The OilXCoin is issued in the form of ledger-based securities under Swiss law.

    Disclosure: Here

    Investor Notice:

    OilXCoin tokens are available solely to residents of select EEA jurisdictions* and Switzerland. U.S. persons may acquire tokens under Regulation D 506(c). Visit oilxcoin.io for further details and to view or request a copy of the prospectus for the OilXCoin.

    The information contained herein is provided for informational and discussion purposes only and is not intended to be a recommendation for any investment or other advice of any kind, and shall not constitute or imply any offer to purchase, sell, or hold any security or to enter into or engage in any type of transaction. Any such offers will only be made pursuant to formal offering materials containing full details regarding risks, minimum investment, fees, and expenses of such transaction. 

    The tokens offered hereby may be deemed to be securities under U.S. securities laws, and will be sold in the United States only to persons that qualify as “accredited investors” under an exemption provided by Rule 506(c) of Regulation D. The tokens will be subject to transfer restrictions and any U.S. investor should not assume that the tokens can be resold immediately. Neither the Securities and Exchange Commission nor any other regulatory agency has passed upon the merits of or has given its approval to the tokens, the terms of the offering, or the accuracy or completeness of any offering materials.

    *Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden.

    Contact:

    Aroma Kumar
    Account Manager
    aroma@lunapr.io
    www.lunapr.io

    Media Notice:

    The information contained in this press release is intended solely for dissemination by media outlets to their affiliates located in the following jurisdictions: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States of America.

    Distribution or sharing of the contents herein outside of these specified jurisdictions is strictly prohibited. Media outlets receiving this communication are responsible for ensuring compliance with this restriction and must exercise due diligence in disseminating information accordingly.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 11 May 2025 Departmental update WHO adds Serbia to its series of country case studies on local production ecosystems for pharmaceuticals, vaccines, and biologicals

    Source: World Health Organisation

    The World Health Organization (WHO) announces the publication of a new country case study examining the ecosystem for local production of pharmaceuticals, vaccines, and biologicals in the Republic of Serbia. This publication marks the seventh case study in WHO’s series led by the Local Production and Assistance (LPA) Unit within the Access to Medicines and Health Products Division (MHP).

    This series is developed in support of WHO’s mandate under the landmark resolution WHA74.6 on strengthening local production of medicines and other health technologies to improve access. The country-focused assessments contribute to support low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in creating enabling environments for sustainable local production and technology transfer.

    The new Serbia case study provides a comprehensive analysis of the country’s local production ecosystem, including mRNA vaccine technology. It highlights both established infrastructure and areas in need of improvement, such as political commitment and technology readiness, while recognizing the country’s strong legal and regulatory frameworks, R&D investment, and innovation incentives.

    The study explores legislative and financing mechanisms, intellectual property frameworks, market preparedness, and regulatory oversight. This case study was developed through a rigorous assessment process that included interviews, policy reviews, and stakeholder consultations. It reflects collaboration between WHO headquarters, the WHO Country Office for Serbia, and national institutions, and was made possible through funding from the Governments of China and France.

    The WHO case study series now includes Bangladesh, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Serbia and Tunisia. Each country profile provides recommendations for improving sustainable, quality local manufacturing capabilities aligned with public health priorities.

    The full case study is available on the LPA websites under the “Country Case Studies” section.
    For further information, please contact Dr Jicui Dong, Head of the LPA Unit, at dongj@who.int, copying localproduction@who.int.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI: Beamr Issues Q1-2025 CEO Letter to Shareholders: Experiencing Rising Demand for Our Technology Across Key Verticals

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    In Q1 2025, Beamr expanded sales pipelines amid growing traction from large-scale prospects, engaged in major industry events, and continued innovation in cloud and product offerings

    Herzliya, Israel, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Beamr Imaging Ltd. (NASDAQ: BMR), a leader in video optimization technology and solutions, today issued a Letter to Shareholders from Sharon Carmel, Chief Executive Officer.

    Dear Shareholders:

    I am pleased to share with you our Q1-2025 activities, progress, and other recent updates, including the expansion of our sales initiatives, supported by growing traction from large-scale prospective customers, participation in leading industry events where we engaged with hundreds of attendees, and continued advancement of our strategic partnerships.

    Q1 2025 Highlights  – Capitalizing on Market Validation:

    Scaling Our Sales Pipelines

    Beamr’s value proposition continues to gain traction across verticals where video is central to business activity and its usage is growing rapidly. Our technology addresses critical challenges associated with large-scale video workflows, including storage, networking, and operational efficiency. These challenges are particularly acute in markets such as media and entertainment, user-generated content, and machine learning sectors, including internet-of-things and autonomous vehicles.

    During Q1 2025 and into early Q2 2025, Beamr expanded its sales team by adding two U.S.-based sales managers to strengthen outreach and responsiveness in our key geographic market. The company’s executives and sales directors conducted more than 130 face-to-face meetings with existing and prospective customers, as well as strategic partners. A significant portion of these meetings took place at three premier industry events: ACM Mile-High-Video 2025, NVIDIA GTC 2025, and the NAB Show 2025. During these engagements, Beamr showcased its high-quality, high-performance, GPU-accelerated video solutions, enabling efficient AI-powered video enhancements. 

    In the coming months, we aim to build on the expanding sales pipeline and growing industry recognition. We anticipate significant revenue growth in 2025, driven by the momentum established in customer and prospect engagements and continued implementation of our go-to-market strategy.

    Amazon Web Services – ISV Accelerate

    In Q1 2025, Beamr joined the AWS ISV Accelerate program, a global co-sell initiative for Amazon Web Services (AWS) partners, offering key benefits to drive visibility and co-selling opportunities. As an Independent Software Vendor (ISV) in the program, Beamr demonstrates strong alignment with AWS’s go-to-market strategies and initiatives. Beamr had progressed from listing on AWS Marketplace to becoming an ISV Accelerate Member in just three months.

    AI Video Webinar

    In January 2025, Beamr hosted a webinar titled: “The Future of AI Video – From Infrastructure to Experience”. The webinar featured Richard Kerris, VP of Media and Entertainment at NVIDIA, Jeffrey Schick, VP Strategic Client Engagement Media and Entertainment at Oracle and myself. 

    Participating in Premier Industry Events

    ACM Mile-High-Video 2025

    In February 2025, I delivered a keynote speech at the ACM Mile-High-Video 2025 conference, held in Denver, Colorado, titled “Is the future of video processing destined for GPU.” The conference is a flagship video formats and streaming event that is geared towards practicing engineers in areas related to media compression and streaming. 

    NVIDIA GTC 2025

    In March 2025, I presented a session showcasing how AI algorithms reshape video quality and usability and improve the efficiency of video workflows, at NVIDIA GTC in San Jose, California. The session attracted more than 430 attendees.

    Beamr CEO Sharon Carmel presenting at NVIDIA GTC 

    NAB Show 2025

    In April, 2025, Beamr participated in the NAB Show 2025 in Las Vegas, Nevada where we presented our solution for scalable, high-quality video content upgrade to the advanced AV1 codec. Our offering, paired with a simple, competitive pricing plan, addresses key adoption barriers to AV1, and received the NAB Show Product of the Year award. As part of the event, I delivered a presentation at the AWS theater and participated in a panel at the Oracle streaming summit. 

    Beamr’s AV1 solution wins the NAB Show Product of the Year award

    In February 2025, Beamr presented at the A.G.P.’s Virtual Technology Conference, and in March 2025 participated in the Loop Capital Markets 2025 Investor Conference. This month, we will participate in the Ladenburg Thalmann Technology Innovation Expo in New York and participate virtually in the Needham Technology, Media & Consumer 1×1 Conference.

    In January 2025, I was interviewed for the Wall Street Resource Podcast (Listen to the full interview here), after an interview at Nasdaq as part of their Amplify Spotlight interview series in December 2024 (Watch the full interview here).

                                  
    Developing the Beamr Cloud and Product Offering

    In recent months, we enhanced our SaaS, Beamr Cloud, with new capabilities addressing evolving needs of customers and prospects, including:

    • Increasing subjective and objective video quality.
    • A competitive, flexible pricing model with tiered, minutes-based plans that support video business growth, offered alongside storage-based pricing tailored to companies with heavy video usage.
    • A “Playground” designed to provide new users with an engaging and intuitive experience for evaluating Beamr’s services.

    Beamr GPU-accelerated, high-quality, and scalable video solutions extend beyond Beamr Cloud to include offerings on our partner cloud platforms, AWS and Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI), private cloud and enterprise-tailored deployments with improved security and privacy, and on-premises deployments.

    Strengthening the Beamr Team

    To support our expanding research and development, sales and marketing initiatives, we hired six new team members across our offices in Herzliya, Serbia and the US, during Q1 2025 and early Q2 2025. New hires include engineers, a product growth lead, and directors of sales.
        
    Financial highlights*

    During the three month period ended March 31, 2025, we generated approximately $0.63M in revenue, compared with $0.41M in the three months ended March 31, 2024, representing a 55% year over year increase, which was primarily attributable to the earlier recognition of a significant legacy license renewal in Q1-2025 that was previously renewed in Q2-2024. Our balance sheet remains strong with $15.2M of cash and cash equivalents, as of March 31, 2025.
        
    The first quarter of 2025 marked a strong start to the year, with multiple opportunities to present our vision and showcase our technology and solutions to hundreds of professionals and executives in the video industry across multiple verticals. We continue to see growing interest in our offerings, highlighting both rising demand and expanding market validation. Notably, we believe that increased engagement from larger industry players signals a promising outlook for the company’s business development in the months ahead. We remain focused on implementing our vision and believe that Beamr will continue to capitalize on the significant validation that we have been creating as we convert prospects in the sales funnel into significant revenue growth in the coming quarters.

    Respectfully,

    Sharon Carmel
    Chief Executive Officer, Beamr Imaging Ltd.

    About Beamr

    Beamr (Nasdaq: BMR) is a world leader in content-adaptive video optimization, trusted by top media companies, including Netflix and Paramount. Beamr’s perceptual optimization technology (CABR) is backed by 53 patents and an Emmy® Award for Technology and Engineering winner. The innovative technology reduces video file size by up to 50% while guaranteeing quality.

    Beamr Cloud is a high-performance, GPU-accelerated video optimization and modernization service designed for businesses and video professionals across diverse industries. It is conveniently available to Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI) customers. Beamr Cloud enables high-performance, cost-effective video modernization to advanced formats, such as AV1, and efficient AI-powered enhancements.

    For more details, please visit www.beamr.com or the investors’ website www.investors.beamr.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” that are subject to substantial risks and uncertainties. Forward-looking statements in this communication may include, among other things, statements about Beamr’s strategic and business plans, technology, relationships, objectives and expectations for its business, the impact of trends on and interest in its business, intellectual property or product and its future results, operations and financial performance and condition, including its expectations for significant revenue growth in 2025. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, contained in this press release are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements contained in this press release may be identified by the use of words such as “anticipate,” “believe,” “contemplate,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “intend,” “seek,” “may,” “might,” “plan,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “target,” “aim,” “should,” “will” “would,” or the negative of these words or other similar expressions, although not all forward-looking statements contain these words. Forward-looking statements are based on the Company’s current expectations and are subject to inherent uncertainties, risks and assumptions that are difficult to predict. Further, certain forward-looking statements are based on assumptions as to future events that may not prove to be accurate. For a more detailed description of the risks and uncertainties affecting the Company, reference is made to the Company’s reports filed from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), including, but not limited to, the risks detailed in the Company’s annual report filed with the SEC on March 4, 2025 and in subsequent filings with the SEC. Forward-looking statements contained in this announcement are made as of the date hereof and the Company undertakes no duty to update such information except as required under applicable law.

    Investor Contact:
    investorrelations@beamr.com

    * This unaudited preliminary financial information regarding our revenues for the three months and quarter ended March 31, 2025, is based upon our estimates and subject to completion of our quarter-end financial results. Moreover, this financial information has been prepared solely on the basis of currently available information by, and is the responsibility of, management. Our independent registered public accounting firm has not audited, reviewed or performed any procedures with respect to such preliminary estimates or the accounting treatment thereof and does not express an opinion or any other form of assurance with respect thereto. This preliminary financial information is not a comprehensive statement of our financial results for this period.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Parliamentary elections begin in Albania

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    TIRANA, May 11 (Xinhua) — Voting for parliamentary elections began across Albania on Sunday.

    A total of 3.7 million eligible voters, including those living abroad, will cast their ballots to elect 140 members of parliament from 11 political parties and coalitions.

    There are more than 5,225 polling stations across the country, which opened at 07:00 local time /05:00 GMT/ and are due to close at 19:00 local time /17:00 GMT/.

    These are Albania’s first parliamentary elections since the country formally began negotiations to join the European Union in July 2022. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi reaffirms China’s commitment to friendly cooperation, international equity

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Soldiers march during a grand parade marking the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War in Moscow, Russia, May 9, 2025. (Xinhua/Xie Huanchi)

    Chinese President Xi Jinping left here Saturday after paying a state visit to Russia and attending the celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War.

    During bilateral meetings with leaders of several countries here Friday on the sidelines of the Victory Day celebrations, Xi reaffirmed China’s commitment to enhancing cooperation and strengthening ties with these countries, and emphasized the importance of upholding multilateralism and working together to address global challenges.

    REMEMBERING HISTORY

    On Friday, the Chinese president joined his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and leaders from more than 20 countries and international organizations to lay red flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

    The solemn ceremony marked a moment of remembering and paying tribute to those who perished in the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War.

    The Soviet Union was the principal theater of World War II in Europe, losing 27 million lives, while China was the main theater in Asia, suffering 35 million casualties in its resistance against the bulk of Japanese militarist forces.

    Together, the two countries were the mainstay of resistance against Japanese militarism and German Nazism, making pivotal contributions to the victory in the World Anti-Fascist War.

    This was the second time for Xi to attend Russia’s Victory Day celebrations. Ten years ago, he traveled to Moscow for the 70th anniversary. In the same year, Putin also attended China’s Victory Day parade on Sept. 3 in Beijing to commemorate the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.

    The past decade has been one of profound turbulence and transformation in the international landscape, Xi noted when meeting the press with Putin on Thursday.

    In the face of the changes of the world, of the times and of historical significance, China and Russia should keep a firm grasp on the development direction of bilateral ties and the general trend of the development of human society, Xi said, calling for greater joint efforts in safeguarding international fairness and justice.

    Ahead of Xi’s visit, Russian media published the Chinese leader’s signed article titled “Learning from History to Build Together a Brighter Future.”

    “Indeed, historical memory and truth will not fade with the passage of time. They serve as inspirations that mirror the present and illuminate the future. We must learn from history, especially the hard lessons of the Second World War,” he wrote.

    IRONCLAD FRIENDSHIPS

    During bilateral meetings with Venezuelan, Cuban and Serbian leaders attending Russia’s Victory Day celebrations, Xi reaffirmed ironclad friendships between China and the three countries, emphasizing the importance of deepening cooperation in various sectors.

    In his meeting with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, Xi noted that China and Venezuela have forged an ironclad friendship amid the changing international situation.

    Since the two countries elevated bilateral relations to an all-weather strategic partnership in 2023, exchanges across various sectors and at all levels have been vigorous, bilateral trade has grown continuously, new progress has been made in investment cooperation and people-to-people exchanges, and friendship between the two sides has become increasingly popular among the two peoples, Xi said.

    He said China has always viewed and developed relations with Venezuela from a strategic and long-term perspective and is willing to enhance the exchange of governance experience with Venezuela, continue to deepen practical cooperation in various areas and take bilateral ties to new heights, so as to better benefit the two peoples.

    While meeting with Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel, Xi noted that this year marks the 65th anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and Cuba, adding that China is willing to further consolidate the ironclad friendship with Cuba, build a closer China-Cuba community with a shared future, and set an example of solidarity and cooperation among socialist countries and sincere mutual assistance among developing countries.

    Xi called on both sides to promote steady progress in exchanges at all levels and cooperation in various fields, and ensure that high-level political mutual trust always remains a distinct feature of relations between the two ruling parties and the two countries.

    In his meeting with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, Xi urged the two sides to carry forward the ironclad friendship, boost mutually beneficial cooperation and advance the high-quality building of a China-Serbia community with a shared future.

    China is ready to deepen strategic communication with Serbia, enhance mutual support, strengthen cooperation in trade and investment, continue supporting the construction and operation of relevant projects, give full play to their demonstrative effect, and achieve more outcomes that deliver mutual benefit and win-win results, Xi said.

    UPHOLDING MULTILATERALISM

    In these bilateral meetings on Friday, Xi also reaffirmed China’s commitment to multilateralism and international cooperation, and emphasized the importance of working together to address global challenges.

    During his meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, Xi said that China stands ready to work with Slovakia and other countries to jointly address challenges through solidarity and cooperation and safeguard international fairness and justice.

    Fico said that the Slovak side stands ready to join efforts with China to uphold multilateralism, safeguard free trade rules, and maintain the stability of global industrial and supply chains.

    During the meeting with Maduro, Xi said that China is ready to work with Venezuela and other Latin American countries to firmly uphold the UN-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law.

    For his part, Maduro said that Venezuela is willing to strengthen coordination and cooperation with China to uphold multilateralism, defend international fairness and justice, and safeguard the common interests of the international community.

    In the meeting with Myanmar leader Min Aung Hlaing, Xi urged the two sides to jointly uphold the UN-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law, and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.

    In the meeting with Diaz-Canel, Xi urged the two sides to enhance coordination and cooperation within such frameworks as the BRICS and the China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum, oppose power politics and unilateral bullying, and safeguard international fairness and justice.

    Diaz-Canel said Cuba supports the three major global initiatives proposed by China, and is willing to work with China to jointly oppose unilateralism and protectionism, and to safeguard the common interests of the international community.

    In his meeting with Serbia’s Vucic, Xi said China is ready to work with all countries in the world, including Serbia, to unite and cooperate to meet challenges, jointly safeguard world peace and international fairness and justice, safeguard the achievements of economic globalization, and promote the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.

    Vucic commends China’s steadfast support for multilateralism, noting that China’s visions and actions have bolstered the international community’s courage and confidence in safeguarding common interests.

    Serbia stands ready to unite with China in addressing the challenges posed by unilateralism and protectionism, Vucic added. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi’s Russia trip advances friendships, defends int’l equity: Chinese FM

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, May 10 — Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia has further consolidated the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era, led the world in jointly maintaining the postwar international order, and promoted the multi-polarization of the world and the reconstruction of the international political landscape, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Saturday.

    At the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Xi paid a state visit to Russia and attended the celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War from Wednesday to Saturday.

    Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said during a press briefing that Xi’s visit has great historical significance.

    During his visit, Xi and Putin had in-depth communication on issues of common concern for nearly 10 hours, Wang said, adding that the most important political outcome of the visit was the signing of a joint statement on deepening the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era by the two heads of state.

    The two sides agreed to continue expanding cooperation and to consolidate the foundation of economic, trade and energy cooperation, Wang said, adding that the two sides signed a new version of the investments protection agreement, effectively countering the countercurrent of protectionism.

    Regarding the Ukraine crisis, Xi noted that China welcomes all efforts conducive to peace, and believes it is important to accommodate the legitimate security concerns of all countries and eliminate the root causes of the crisis.

    Xi’s attendance at the May 9 Victory Day celebrations once again demonstrated China’s commitment to working with other countries to uphold a correct historical perspective on World War II (WWII) and jointly safeguard the postwar international order, Wang said.

    Amid a complex and turbulent international landscape, Xi said, China and Russia must firmly uphold the UN-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law.

    Wang said that Taiwan’s restoration to China is a victorious outcome of WWII and an integral part of the postwar international order.

    No matter how the situation on the Taiwan island evolves or what troubles external forces may make, the historical trend toward China’s ultimate and inevitable reunification is unstoppable, Xi said.

    During his visit, Xi also had extensive contacts with political leaders from various countries attending the celebrations and held bilateral meetings with several national leaders from three continents, reaching broad consensus on firmly supporting each other, defending multilateralism and opposing power politics and bullying.

    During his meeting with Myanmar leader Min Aung Hlaing, Xi emphasized that the Chinese side supports Myanmar in safeguarding its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national stability, and steadily advancing its domestic political agenda.

    While meeting with Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, respectively, Xi pointed out that Latin American and Caribbean States are sovereign and independent nations, not anyone’s backyard.

    Diaz-Canel and Maduro spoke highly of Xi’s vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind as well as the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative. They expressed readiness to work with China in opposing unilateralism and protectionism.

    In his meeting with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, respectively, Xi emphasized that China and the EU should firmly pursue multilateralism, jointly oppose unilateral bullying, safeguard the achievements of economic globalization, and maintain the global free trade system and international economic and trade order.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Global Covenant of Mayor for Climate and Energy and UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction engage Armenian municipalities in climate finance access

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    A dedicated webinar on “The Gap Fund: Supporting Armenian Municipalities Towards Climate Finance” was held on 8 May 2025, marking a significant milestone in the engagement of Armenian cities in climate resilience and disaster risk reduction. Organized by the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy (GCoM) partnership with the City Climate Finance Gap Fund — a committed member of the MCR2030 Regional Coordinating Committee — the event brought together municipal representatives, urban planners, and DRR practitioners from across Armenia.

    In collaboration with UNDRR, COM EAST, and the National Platform for DRR in Armenia (ARNAP Foundation), the webinar introduced the Gap Fund’s objectives and application process, providing Armenian municipalities with practical guidance on accessing early-stage technical assistance for low-carbon, climate-resilient projects. The cities were equipped with a better understanding of how to apply for Gap Fund support, what types of assistance and expert guidance are available, and how these resources can help them move from climate ambition to actionable and fundable project pipelines.

    As part of the session, Branka Knežević, Deputy Secretary for Urban Planning and Sustainable Development from the City of Podgorica, Montenegro, shared the city’s experience with the Gap Fund, offering valuable lessons learned and insights into developing successful climate finance proposals. Her contribution helped demonstrate how peer learning can support practical progress at the local level.

    Andrew Bower, Programme Mangement Officer at UNDRR Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia, emphasized the importance of risk-sensitive urban development, reinforcing the MCR2030 vision to build resilient cities through targeted support and partnership. Following the webinar, GCoM and UNDRR will work closely in supporting Armenian cities with their applications to the Gap Fund. 

    With growing momentum for climate action at the local level, this session represents a vital step in preparing Armenian cities to pursue climate and resilience projects more effectively.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia contributed to the development of friendship and upholding justice – Chinese Foreign Minister

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, May 10 (Xinhua) — Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia has further strengthened the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination in the new era, set a benchmark for the world’s joint efforts to safeguard the post-war international order, and promoted the transition to a multipolar world and the reconstruction of the international political architecture, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said on Saturday.

    At the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Russia from May 7 to 10 and took part in celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory in the Great Patriotic War.

    As Wang Yi, who is also a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, noted during a briefing for journalists, Xi Jinping’s visit is of great historical significance.

    The head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry pointed out that during the visit, Xi Jinping and V. Putin spent almost 10 hours in-depth communication on issues of mutual interest. The most important political outcome of the visit was the signing by the heads of the two states of a joint statement on further deepening Chinese-Russian relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction in the new era, Wang Yi stated.

    The parties agreed to continue to expand cooperation and strengthen the foundation of trade, economic and energy cooperation, Wang Yi continued, adding that the parties signed an updated version of the investment protection agreement, thereby giving a powerful response to the regressive trend of protectionism.

    Speaking about the crisis in Ukraine, Xi Jinping noted that China welcomes all efforts to promote peace and considers it necessary to take into account the legitimate security interests of all countries and eliminate the root causes of the crisis.

    Xi Jinping’s presence at the Victory Day celebration on May 9 once again demonstrated China’s desire to work with other countries to promote a correct view of the history of World War II and jointly uphold the post-war international order, the head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry noted.

    Xi Jinping said that in the face of a volatile and turbulent international situation, China and Russia should firmly uphold the international system with the UN at its core and the international order based on international law.

    Wang Yi noted that the return of Taiwan to China is the result of the victory in World War II and an important integral part of the post-war international order.

    No matter how the situation on Taiwan develops and no matter what problems external forces create, the historical trend of China’s inevitable and inevitable reunification is unstoppable, Xi Jinping pointed out.

    During his visit, the Chinese leader also held extensive contacts with politicians from various countries who attended the celebrations, as well as bilateral meetings with a number of national leaders from three continents, reaching broad consensus on firm mutual support, upholding multilateralism and opposing power politics and bullying.

    During his meeting with Myanmar leader Min Aung Hlaing, Xi Jinping stressed that China supports Myanmar in following a development path suited to its national conditions, safeguarding its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national stability, and confidently advancing its domestic political agenda.

    During separate meetings with Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Xi Jinping noted that Latin American and Caribbean states are sovereign and independent nations, not someone’s “backyard.”

    M. Diaz-Canel and N. Maduro praised Xi Jinping’s vision of building a community with a shared future for humanity, as well as the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative. They expressed their readiness to work with China to counter unilateralism and protectionism.

    During meetings with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico, Xi Jinping stressed that China and the EU should firmly adhere to multilateralism, jointly oppose unilateral bullying, safeguard the achievements of economic globalization, and uphold the global free trade system and the international economic and trade order. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Special Report: Standing on the Right Side of History and Justice – Op-Ed by Chinese President Xi Jinping Sparks Great Response from International Community

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, May 10 (Xinhua) — Chinese President Xi Jinping recently published an article entitled “Lessons from the Past for the Future” in the Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper, stressing the need to learn from history, draw wisdom and strength from the profound experience of World War II and the great victory in the World Anti-Fascist War, resolutely oppose all forms of hegemonism and power politics, and jointly create a better future for humanity.

    Representatives of many countries told Xinhua that in this article, the Chinese leader, based on the common interests of all mankind, looks at both the past and the present and puts forward a series of important proposals. Today, when unilateralism, hegemonism, tyranny and bullying have become serious threats, all countries in the world should stand on the right side of history, the side of justice, resolutely safeguard the post-war world order, firmly uphold international justice and work together for a bright future for mankind.

    “TO PROTECT HISTORICAL TRUTH, WE MUST WORK HARD”

    On the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the Victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized that holding a correct view of the history of World War II is of great practical importance. In his opinion piece, the Chinese leader quoted a line from the well-known Soviet song “Katyusha”: “Apple and pear trees were in bloom.” This not only reminded us of the shared historical memory of the two peoples who fought shoulder to shoulder in World War II, but also that Russian-Chinese friendship has only grown stronger,” said Alexei Rodionov, a sinologist and professor at St. Petersburg State University.

    “The air raid sirens for the victims of the Nanjing Massacre still sound, and the railway tracks in front of the Auschwitz concentration camp still gleam coldly,” said Virun Phichaiwonphakdee, director of the Thailand-China Belt and Road Studies Center. “Historical memory and truth that are not erased by time provide us with inspiration and lessons, always reminding us of reality and pointing the way to the future,” he quoted Xi Jinping as saying. “Victory in World War II was achieved at the cost of blood and sacrifice. Protecting history is not only respecting history, but also protecting justice in the modern world,” the expert noted.

    “Any attempt to distort the historical truth about World War II and deny the victory in World War II will not succeed. The people of the world will not tolerate attempts to turn back history,” said Japanese biological weapons expert, Professor Emeritus of Shiga Medical University Kazuo Nishiyama. He fully agrees that humanity should draw wisdom and strength from the profound lessons of World War II and the great victory in the anti-fascist war. “In order to protect the historical truth, it is still necessary to work tirelessly to prevent the repetition of tragedies in the future,” the scientist believes.

    “World War II is a tragedy for all of humanity. We must tell history in a comprehensive and truthful manner, deeply understand the atrocities of war, and strengthen education for peace,” said Pawel Machcewicz, founding director of the Museum of World War II in Gdansk, Poland.

    “For Serbia, Xi Jinping’s article carries an important message: defending the truth requires great efforts. The state visit of President Xi Jinping to Russia is such an effort,” said Aleksandar Mitic, a research fellow at the Serbian Institute of International Politics and Economics. “Unfortunately, we still see how certain Western forces are trying to downplay the enormous sacrifices and contributions of China, Russia, Serbia and other countries to the historic victory over fascism and militarism, but these attempts are doomed to failure,” he said.

    According to French entrepreneur and commentator Arnaud Bertrand, Xi Jinping’s article contains many profound thoughts, especially when he compares the past and the present, points out that humanity is once again at a crossroads of “solidarity or division, dialogue or confrontation, win-win or zero-sum game,” and declares the need to resolutely defend the post-war international order and the authority of the UN. “President Xi Jinping’s opinion piece is a window into China’s contemporary strategic thinking. As a defender of the post-war world order, China is committed to countering hegemonic forces and is an important power that upholds the multilateral system and international law,” A. Bertrand noted.

    “CHINA, AS THE MAIN THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, MADE AN OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION TO THE VICTORY IN WORLD WAR II”

    In his opinion article, Xi Jinping emphasized that, as the main theaters of military operations in Asia and Europe, China and the Soviet Union bore the brunt of the attacks of militaristic Japan and Nazi Germany, and made a decisive contribution to the victory in the World Anti-Fascist War. The international community generally believes that the victory on the main eastern front completely destroyed the ambitions of militarism and fascism and was of great global significance.

    “The victory was achieved thanks to the joint efforts of the anti-Hitler coalition, and the USSR and China were its most important part,” emphasized the scientific secretary of the Victory Museum in Moscow Boris Cheltsov. According to him, the peoples of the USSR and China fought shoulder to shoulder against fascism and militarism, supporting each other. As the main theater of military operations in the East, China made an invaluable contribution to the final defeat of Japanese militarism and the victory over fascism due to the enormous sacrifice of the entire people.

    Guzel Maitdinova, Director of the Center for Geopolitical Studies at the Russian-Tajik /Slavonic/ University, noted that China has always been the main force in the fight against Japanese militarism, and most of the Japanese army was held back on the Chinese front. The Chinese people, having made enormous sacrifices, held the main eastern front and made an outstanding contribution to the victory in World War II, she added.

    “Without China, World War II might not have ended in 1945,” said Faruk Borić, chairman of the Bosnian-Chinese Friendship Association. According to him, the front in China effectively held back the Japanese invaders and provided valuable time for victory in Europe, playing an important role in the global fight against fascism. He also noted that as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has always actively supported the multilateral order, firmly upholding the international system with the UN as the core and the world order based on international law. “China’s respect for history makes it an indispensable force in maintaining world peace,” the expert said.

    President Xi Jinping has emphasized that Taiwan’s return to China is an important part of the outcome of World War II and the post-war world order. Gu Xuewu, Director of the Center for Global Studies at the University of Bonn in Germany, noted that Taiwan’s return was one of the outcomes of the victory in World War II and was widely recognized by the international community. Undermining these outcomes would seriously disrupt the existing world order.

    Muhab Nassar, an associate professor of international law at Cairo University, said China’s sovereignty over Taiwan is a legally justified and recognized fact. Xi Jinping’s opinion piece once again expressed a firm position: the Taiwan issue concerns China’s fundamental interests, which China will not compromise under any circumstances.

    “TO ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPERITY, THE WORLD NEEDS JUSTICE, NOT HEGEMONY”

    In his opinion article, President Xi Jinping stated that today’s world still faces a growing deficit in peace, development, security and governance. The vision of a community with a shared future for humanity, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative are designed to address this deficit, actively participate and join forces with other countries in advancing the reform of the global governance system through the prism of justice and fairness.

    Akkan Suver, chairman of Turkey’s Marmara Group Foundation for Strategic and Social Research, said the three global initiatives proposed by Xi Jinping “represent a fair concept of global governance that truly protects multilateralism.” “Amid the rise of unilateralism, China firmly opposes any form of hegemony and power politics, and is committed to upholding the international order and norms that serve the interests of developing countries. In the face of multiple conflicts, the world needs dialogue and cooperation rather than division, and global development needs reason and conscience rather than dictate,” he said.

    General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kurdistan operating in Iraq Kawa Mahmud fully agrees with Xi Jinping’s statement that “the world needs justice, not hegemony.” He noted that today’s world still suffers from manifestations of hegemonism and power politics, which only increases uncertainty in the international situation. “To achieve universal development and prosperity, the world needs justice, not hegemony. Only a fair and rational system of global governance can meet the interests of all countries. The formation of a multipolar world based on mutual respect and mutual benefit has become the consensus of most states,” the politician emphasized.

    “The Middle East has long been an arena of instability, from the war in Iraq to the Syrian crisis, the conflict in Yemen and the Palestinian-Israeli issue. The peace deficit is only getting worse,” said Abdullah al-Dosari, editor-in-chief of the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Arab, after reading Xi Jinping’s article. “The concept of a community with a common destiny for humanity that he proposed, the emphasis on dialogue rather than confrontation, on partnership rather than the creation of blocs, on mutually beneficial cooperation rather than a zero-sum game – all of this is important for ensuring peace and stability in the region,” the editor-in-chief is confident.

    Qaiser Nawab, Chairman of Pakistan’s Belt and Road Organization for Sustainable Development, said President Xi Jinping had deeply revealed China’s understanding of the world order, emphasizing dialogue, common development and respect for diversity, and calling for a more inclusive and fair international governance system. He said China’s three global initiatives are helping to shape a fairer and more inclusive world.

    “In his article, President Xi Jinping noted that light will dispel darkness, and justice will ultimately triumph over evil. This is not only a profound summary of the historical lessons of World War II, but also a reflection of the realities of the modern world: peace and justice do not come naturally, they must be firmly defended,” said Chuan Keng Koon, director of the Sun Yat-sen Centre of the Penang Science Society (Malaysia). “Today, when we recall that history, we do not do so for the sake of inciting hatred, but to gain wisdom and strength. By learning from the past, we resolutely oppose hegemonism and power politics, and always uphold the path of peace, development and mutually beneficial cooperation,” the expert emphasized. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI China: China’s Zheng clinches first clay-court win of season in Italian Open

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Chinese tennis star Zheng Qinwen advanced to the third round of the WTA Italian Open on Friday, defeating Serbia’s Olga Danilovic 6-1, 6-4 in 90 minutes.

    Zheng Qinwen returns a shot during the women’s singles 2nd round match between Zheng Qinwen of China and Olga Danilovic of Serbia at the WTA Italian Open in Rome, Italy, May 9, 2025. (Xinhua/Li Jing)

    Seeded eighth, Zheng received a first-round bye. Her opponent, world No. 33 Danilovic, had lost to Zheng in straight sets at the 2023 United Cup. Friday’s match marked their first clay-court meeting.

    Zheng dominated the opening set, racing to a 5-0 lead. Despite facing four break points in the seventh game, she held serve and sealed the set 6-1 with an ace.

    The second set saw both players exchange breaks early, with Zheng edging ahead 3-2. She later won four consecutive points to claim the eighth game and closed out the set 6-4, securing her first clay-court win of the season.

    “Before going on court, I told myself I needed to be more consistent,” Zheng said. “In my last match in Madrid, I had too many unforced errors, so today my goal was to stay steady first, then look for chances to attack. I feel like I stuck to my game plan well.”

    Looking ahead to the Rome tournament and the French Open, Zheng emphasized mental composure: “When my emotions get too restless, it affects my performance on court. Now, my goal is to quiet my mind and take it one match at a time.”

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Closes One Hundred and Fifteenth Session, Issues Concluding Observations on Reports of Gabon, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Republic of Korea and Ukraine

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination this afternoon closed its one hundred and fifteenth session, during which it reviewed the reports of Gabon, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Republic of Korea and Ukraine.

    Chinsung Chung, Committee Rapporteur, said that the Committee’s concluding observations for the five country reviews conducted during the session were available on the session’s webpage.  The Committee thanked the State party delegations that participated in dialogues; the national human rights institutions of Ukraine and the Republic of Korea for submitting written reports and providing updates during the session; and the various civil society representatives who contributed essential information to the reviews.

    Ms. Chung said that this year was the sixtieth anniversary of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  During the yearlong campaign, the Committee would highlight the achievements made in the last 60 years and identify effective and concrete ways to overcome structural and emerging challenges in making the Convention’s goal – a world free of racial discrimination – a reality.  Information on the anniversary was available on the webpage for the campaign.

    At the opening meeting of the session, Ms. Chung reported, Antti Korkeakivi, Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of the Human Rights Treaties Branch of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, gave a speech highlighting the Committee’s important work and its contributions to promoting and protecting the human rights of all people without discrimination.  He underlined that the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention was an opportunity to explore avenues to generate greater political will and concrete action to fight against racial discrimination.

    Mr. Korkeakivi recognised the negative impact of the United Nations’ liquidity crisis on the planning and implementation of the work of all Committees, as the holding of the next sessions for this year was still uncertain.  He confirmed that the Office of the High Commissioner was doing its utmost to ensure that the treaty bodies could implement their mandates.  Nevertheless, all indications pointed to a continuation of the difficult liquidity situation for the foreseeable future. 

    During the one hundred and fifteenth session, Ms. Chung said, the Committee reviewed follow-up reports for Croatia, Germany, Morocco, Uruguay and Tajikistan.  The Committee thanked these States parties for their reports and invited them to duly consider its recommendations and include the steps taken to implement them in their next periodic reports.

    The Committee pursued its work toward the elaboration of its joint general recommendations 38 and 39 with the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families on eradicating xenophobia towards migrants and others perceived as such.

    Ms. Chung said the Committee also discussed the development of a general recommendation on reparations for the injustices of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the ongoing harms to people of African descent, holding a half-day of general discussion on 25 April 2025 as part of this process.  Two expert panels examined legal frameworks for reparations and the lasting effects of slavery, including systemic racism and institutional responsibility. Drawing on these discussions and over 60 written submissions, the Committee would now begin drafting the general recommendation, which would be shared for public input before adoption. Further information was available on the Committee’s webpage.

    Further, Ms. Chung reported, the Committee considered 16 submissions under its early warning and urgent action procedure and endorsed 13 letters to States parties assessed in this procedure.  It also considered four cases under the individual complaints procedure. It declared admissible one case against Germany and discontinued three other cases.

    Ms. Chung also provided an update on the follow-up procedure to the Ad-Hoc Conciliation Commission report published in August 2024 on the inter-State communication submitted by the State of Palestine against Israel under article 11 of the Convention.  Today, 9 May, the Committee issued a statement on the catastrophic humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory, acting under its follow-up and early warning and urgent action procedure.

    On 24 April, Ms. Chung said, the Committee held a meeting with States parties.  The Committee thanked all States parties’ representatives who contributed to this event and appreciated that it was well attended.  Earlier today, the Committee also held a meeting with civil society organizations.  In addition, during the session, the Committee heard a report on follow-up to article 13 of the Convention and adopted an updated version of its Rules of Procedure, which would be made available shortly.

    In closing remarks, Michal Balcerzak, Committee Chairperson, said this had been a very productive session.  He thanked the Committee Experts, who had all contributed significantly to the Committee’s work throughout the session, and to working towards the Committee’s mandate of the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination wherever it occurred.  He also thanked all other persons who had contributed to the smooth execution of the Committee’s work.

    Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.  Other documents related to the session can be found here.

    Due to the current financial situation, the dates of the second sessions of some treaty bodies are not yet confirmed. The next session of the Committee is scheduled take place between 11 and 29 August 2025, with the reports of Burundi, Guatemala, Maldives, New Zealand, Sweden and Tunisia scheduled for review. All information, including the proposed programme of work, will be available on the session webpage.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CERD25.009E

    MIL OSI United Nations News