Category: Balkans

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU anti-fraud office coordinates seizure of around 40,000 litres of illicit alcohol

    Source: European Union 2

    The European Anti-Fraud Office coordinated an action that led the EU Member States’ and Norwegian customs authorities to seize around 40,000 litres of illicit alcoholic beverages. The targeted action is part of operation OPSON XIII, the global initiative coordinated alongside Europol to tackle food fraud and ensure the safety of food and beverages across Europe. 

    The operation, which ran from December 2023 to May 2024, focused on identifying and removing counterfeit and substandard food and drinks from markets while disturbing the criminal network behind these illicit products. 

    As in previous years, OLAF led a targeted action focused specifically on illicit alcoholic beverages. The operation revealed sophisticated schemes aimed at infiltrating the EU market with products of inferior quality – mostly beer, homemade alcohol and wine. Fraudsters used deceptive packaging, falsified documents and false labels to sell these products to consumers. 

    The OLAF coordinated action involved customs authorities from 15 Member States and one non-EU country: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Slovakia. 

    More information on Operation OPSON XIII is available in Europol’s press release.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: European Commission President Ursula von der LEYEN Western Balkans tour (Serbia)

    Source: European Commission (video statements)

    Press conference with HE Aleksandar Vučić, President of the Republic of Serbia

    Watch on the Audiovisual Portal of the European Commission:
    Follow us on:
    -X: https://twitter.com/EU_Commission
    -Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/europeancommission/
    -Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/EuropeanCommission
    -LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/european-commission/
    -Medium: https://medium.com/@EuropeanCommission

    Check our website: http://ec.europa.eu/

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tjj3a8mPfko

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE Presence in Albania hosts workshop to empower women in cybersecurity

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: OSCE Presence in Albania hosts workshop to empower women in cybersecurity

    Young women engage in the OSCE Presence-organized workshop on empowering women in cybersecurity, Tirana, 24 October 2024. (OSCE) Photo details

    With the aim to empower aspiring women in cybersecurity, the OSCE Presence in Albania, in partnership with the National Cybersecurity Authority, organized a workshop featuring testimonies and panel discussions from successful female leaders in the field, on 24 October 2024.
    The event provided a platform for these motivational women to share their personal journeys, discussing the challenges they faced and the opportunities available in the cybersecurity landscape.
    “We believe that cybersecurity represents not only a challenge for which we should all be prepared, but also a big opportunity to empower youth to become active part of this important sector”, said Brunilda Halili, National Community Safety Officer of the Presence.
    The workshop culminated in a hands-on cyber drill designed specifically for women students, aimed at enhancing their technical skills and confidence. Thirty-eight participants engaged in practical exercises that equipped them with essential capabilities for a future in cybersecurity.
    In the end of the interactive cyber drill, a 3rd year student of Information Technology at the Polytechnic University of Tirana, Xhorxhia Prenga, said: “Until today, I’ve been undecided about my future in the IT field. Today I decided that I want to continue my Master studies in cybersecurity, because now I understand the impact of this field in the society, and the many possibilities I will have to further advance my professional career in this dynamic field”.
    The event was part of the Presence’s project “Supporting national authorities and communities to effectively prevent and address safety and security issues – Phase II”.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Transcript of Fiscal Monitor October 2024 Press Briefing

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    October 23, 2024

    SPEAKERS:
    Vitor Gaspar, Director, Fiscal Affairs Department
    Era Dabla‑Norris, Deputy Director, Fiscal Affairs Department
    Davide Furceri, Division Chief, Fiscal Affairs Department
    Tatiana Mossot, Moderator, Senior Communications Officer

    The Moderator (Ms. Mossot): Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening to our viewers around the world. I am Tatiana Mossot, the IMF Communications Department, and I will be your host for today’s press briefing on the Annual Meetings 2024 Fiscal Monitor, “Putting a Lead on Public Debt.” I am pleased to introduce this morning the Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department, Vitor Gaspar. He is joined by Era Dabla‑Norris, Deputy Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department, and Davide Furceri, who is the Division Chief of the Fiscal Affairs Department. Good morning, Vitor, Era, Davide.

    Before taking your questions, let me kick‑start our briefing by turning to you, Vitor, for your opening remarks. Vitor, the floor is yours.

    Mr. Gaspar: Thank you so much, Tatiana. Good morning, everybody. Thank you all for your interest in the Fiscal Monitor, covering fiscal policies all around the world. Deficits are high and global public debt is very high, rising, and risky. Global public debt is projected to go above $100 trillion this year. At the current pace, the global debt‑to‑GDP ratio will approach 100 percent by the end of the decade, rising above the pandemic peak. But the message of high and rising debt masks considerable diversity across countries. I will distinguish three groups.

    Public debt is higher and projected to grow faster than pre‑pandemic in about one third of the countries. This includes not only the largest economies, China and the United States, but also other large countries such as Brazil, France, Italy, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, representing in total about 70 percent of global GDP.

    In another one third of the countries, public debt is higher but projected to grow slower or decline compared with pre‑pandemic.

    In the rest of the world, debt is lower than pre‑pandemic. The Fiscal Monitor makes the case that public debt risks are elevated, and prospects are worse than they look. The Fiscal Monitor presents a novel framework, debt at risk, that illustrates risks around the most likely debt projection at various time horizons. Here we concentrate on the next 3 years.

    Our analysis shows that risks to public debt projections are tilted to the upside. In a severe adverse scenario, public debt would be 20 percentage points of GDP above the baseline projection. In most countries, fiscal plans that governments have put in place are insufficient to deliver stable or declining public debt ratios with a high degree of confidence. Additional efforts are necessary. Delaying adjustment is costly and risky. Kicking the can down the road will not do. The time to act is now. The likelihood of a soft landing has increased. Monetary policy has already started to ease in major economies. Unemployment is low in many countries. And, therefore, given these circumstances, most economies are well‑positioned to deal with fiscal adjustment.

    But it does matter how it is done. While the specific circumstances depend on—while specifics depend on country circumstances, the Fiscal Monitor and earlier IMF work provide useful pointers. For example, countries should avoid cuts in public investment. This can have severe effects on growth. Good governance and transparency improve the prospects of public understanding and social acceptance of fiscal reforms.

    Countries that are sufficiently away from debt distress should adjust in a sustained and gradual way to contain debt vulnerabilities without unnecessary adverse effect on growth and employment. However, in countries in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress, timely and frontloaded decisive action to control public debt or even debt restructuring may be necessary. Everywhere, fiscal policy, as structural policy, can make a substantial contribution to growth and jobs.

    What is the bottom line? Public debt is very high, rising, and risky. The time is now to pivot towards a gradual, sustained, and people‑focused fiscal adjustment.

    My colleagues and I are ready to answer your questions. Thank you for your attention and interest.

    The Moderator (Ms. Mossot): Thank you, Vitor. So, we will open the floor for questions. Thank you.

    Question: Good morning, given your findings on the increasing trend of spending across the political spectrum, how do governments then plan to balance the urgent need, as you stated, for investment in critical areas like healthcare and climate adaptation with the risks of what you also stated, overly optimistic debt projections?

    Ms. Dabla‑Norris: Thank you, global debt is very high, 100 trillion this year and rising. And debt risks, all the ones you mentioned, are also very elevated. So, policymakers are now facing a fundamental policy trilemma, to maintain debt sustainability, amid very high levels of debt in some countries, to accommodate the spending pressures for climate adaptation, for development goals, for population aging, and at the same time to garner support that is needed for reforms. This is why we are calling for a strategic pivot in public finances for countries to put their public finances in order. And why is this important? Because this can help create room that is needed for the priority spending. It can create fiscal space to combat future shocks that will surely come. And it can also help sustain long‑term growth.

    What this means is that for some countries, a very decisive implementation of reforms is needed now, under current plans. For many others, an additional adjustment is required that needs to be gradual but sustained. And yet for others with very high debt levels that are rising, a more frontloaded adjustment will be needed.

    These efforts, these fiscal efforts need to be people‑focused, because you want to balance the trade‑off between these measures adversely impacting growth and inequality. So, here it is important to seek to preserve public spending. It is important to seek to preserve social spending. And improving the quality, the composition, the efficiency of government spending can ensure that every dollar that is spent has maximum impact. It creates room for other types of spending without adding to debt pressures.

    Mobilizing revenues, setting up broad‑based and fair tax systems can allow countries to collect revenues to meet their spending needs. And this is particularly important in the case of emerging market and developing economies, which have considerable untapped tax potential.

    But I think it is also important to note that policymakers need to build the trust that taxpayer’s resources that are being collected will be well‑spent. This is why we are emphasizing strengthening governance, improving fiscal frameworks to build that trust that is needed for reforms.

    Ms. Mossot: We will go to this side of the room. The gentleman in the fourth row.

    Question: Thank you for doing this. I was wondering if you could please drive us a bit further to the debt‑at‑risk framework. Thank you.

    Mr. Furceri: Thank you. The debt risk is a framework that links current macroeconomic, financial, and political conditions to the entire spectrum of the future debt outcomes. So, in some sense it goes beyond the point focus that we typically provide, and it enables economic policymakers to first quantify what are the risks surrounding the debt projections and, second, what are the sources of this risk.

    The current framework estimates that in a severely adverse scenario but plausible, debt to GDP could be 20 percentage points higher in the next 3 years than currently projected. Why is this the case? This is because there are risks related to weaker growth, tighter financial conditions, as well as economic and political uncertainty.

    Another point that the Fiscal Monitor makes is that beyond this global level, the debt to risk associated to the global level, there is significant heterogeneities across countries. For example, in the case of advanced economies, our estimates of data risk are about 135 percent to GDP by 2026. This is a high level. It is lower than what we observed during the peak of the pandemic, but it is high, and it indeed is even higher than what we observed during the Global Financial Crisis.

    In the case of emerging market economies, what we see is that debt risk is increasing even compared to the pandemic and our estimate is about 88 percentage points of GDP.

    Summarizing, we think that this is a framework that could be useful to quantify a risk, identify the sources, and then make a response to this risk.

    Ms. Mossot: We will take another question in the room before going online.

    Question: Thank very much. I would like to know, Vitor, how can fiscal governance be strengthened to ensure long‑term fiscal adjustments, and while at it, what are the risks if fiscal adjustments are delayed, and how would that affect global financial markets? My second question, what lessons can be learned from countries that have successfully managed high debt levels in the past and how can transparency and accountability in public finance be improved to build trust and ensure effective debt management?

    Mr. Gaspar: Thank you so much. I will start with the timing. So I have already emphasized that delaying adjustment is costly and risky. You come from Ghana. If you allow me to place your question in the context of the sub‑Saharan Africa more broadly. I would argue that building fiscal space is not only crucial to limit public debt risks, but in many countries in sub‑Saharan Africa, it is key to enable this state to play its full role in development, which is, of course, a very important priority in the region.

    You asked about lessons from experience. I would say that fiscal adjustment should be timely. It should be decisive. It should be well‑designed. And it should be effectively communicated. And you have pointers on all of this in the Fiscal Monitor.

    You asked a very important question on governance. I would put it together with transparency and accountability. Era has already commented on why it is so important from a political viewpoint, but we have been working in this area for many years. For example, the IMF has a code on fiscal transparency that is extremely interesting. Something that also came up in a seminar that I participated in yesterday is the opportunities afforded by technology to make progress on governance. One of the speakers from India introduced this idea of three Ts that I found very inspiring. The three Ts are technology that is used to promote transparency. And if you have technology and transparency, you should expect to gain trust. And if you have trust, you have the citizens behind the government and, therefore, even willing to pay taxes, not necessarily happily, but in a quasi-voluntary way.

    Ms. Mossot: Thank you, Vitor. We have a question from Forbes, Mexico.” I have a question in countries like Mexico where fiscal consolidation is necessary. What are the biggest risks of this consolidation and how could it boost economic growth?” This is a question for Era.

    Ms. Dabla‑Norris: So, as we have said more generally, the design of fiscal adjustment is what really matters. And there is a right way to do it, and there are many wrong ways to do it.

    In the Fiscal Monitor, we illustrate how countries can undertake fiscal adjustment in a way that is what we call people focused. By that I mean, we want to trade off the negative impacts of the adjustment on growth and on inequality. And we do this by looking at different types of fiscal instruments. And different instruments have very different impacts. So, for example, progressive taxes have a very different impact on consumption and incentives to work and save as compared to other types of taxation.

    Similarly, cutting public investment has both negative short‑run effects on growth and wages, as well as more medium‑term impacts on growth. Cutting regressive energy subsidies similarly have much less of a deleterious impact on income and the consumption of the poor.

    So depending upon the country context, depending upon whether there is scope to raise revenues in non‑distortionary ways, depending upon the nature and the composition of public spending, there are ways for countries to do fiscal adjustment in a manner that is growth‑friendly and people‑friendly.

    Ms. Mossot: So, the last one we have from online is for you, Davide. “The report suggests that low‑income development countries should build tax capacity and improve spending efficiency. Given the high levels of debt and limited resources in these countries, how realistic are these recommendations without substantial international financial support?”

    Mr. Furceri: Indeed, many developing countries face significant pressing spending needs. For sustained development goals, to achieve climate goals, our estimate in the previous Fiscal Monitor suggests that the envelope of these spending needs could be as much as high as 16 percent of GDP.

    So, in this context, one important policy action is to increase revenue through revenue mobilization. Now, it is important that this revenue mobilization strategy is guided by the principle that make the tax system more efficient, more equitable, and more progressive. So policies could be, for example, to reduce informalities, broaden the tax base, increase efficiency in revenue collections, as well as progressivity.

    In the report, we also make the point that improving fiscal institutions, as also Era mentioned, is key to garner public support and to make sure that the debt system is indeed efficient.

    There is also policy on the spending side, improving the quality, the composition, and the efficiency spending to make sure that each dollar spent is well spent, is spent on the key priority areas, and maximizing it.

    Now, there are countries that will need help. The IMF as in the past years and as always has provided significant advice to countries from policy support, policy advice but also financing support. Just to give a number, over the past 4 years, about $60 billion of funding has been provided to African economies to help their challenge. And important, the IMF is also providing a variety of capacity development to support, including exactly in this area, for example, increase Public Finance Management, improve taxation, revenue mobilization, as well as a new area that are developing that are becoming more and more important, such as climate change.

    The Moderator (Ms. Mossot): Thank you. The gentleman with his book in the hand.

    Question: Thank you. You mentioned in the report that developed economies, including the United Kingdom, face risks if they do not bring debt down. We have a budget next week. Perhaps you could tell us what are those risks if the U.K. does not address its debt position quickly?

    Mr. Gaspar: So, when we think about the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom is one of the countries that I listed where debt is substantially higher than it was projected pre‑pandemic. It is also one of the countries where debt is projected to increase over time, albeit at a declining pace.

    If I were to give you my concern about the U.K., I would use what Kristalina Georgieva, the Managing Director of the Fund, emphasizes a theme through these Annual Meetings, the combination of high debt and low growth. For the case of the United Kingdom, I would put it as follows. The United Kingdom is living with interest rates that are close to U.S. interest rates, but it is also living with growth rates that are not close to U.S. growth rates. And that leads to a theme that has been amply debated in the United Kingdom, which is the importance of public investment.

    In the United Kingdom, as in many other advanced economies, public investment as a percentage of GDP has been trending down. And given challenges associated with the energy transition, new technologies, technological innovation, and much else, public investment is badly needed. The Fiscal Monitor emphasizes that public investment should be protected in the framework of a set of rules and budgetary procedures that foster sound macroeconomic performance. The fact that that debate is very much at the center of the debate in the United Kingdom right now is very much welcome.

    Ms. Mossot: We will take another question on this side. The lady in green.

    Question: Thank you. After 3 years of consolidation, fiscal deficits are widening in the western Balkans. The public expenditures are increasing but more on social debt—more on social spendings than on capital spendings. How do you evaluate the economic situation in this region?

    Ms. Dabla‑Norris: So, in western Balkans as a whole, growth has picked up since 2023, although there are differences across countries. For example, in North Macedonia, growth is projected to be 2.2 percent in 2024, down from 2.7 percent in 2023. But for the region, the growth momentum is expected to continue in 2025.

    Now, when it comes to inflation, we see that headline inflation continues to ease throughout the region, but core inflation remains stubbornly high in some countries.

    In terms of fiscal and debt, the differential—the interest and growth differential for the region is projected to remain negative over the medium term. And this is a good thing because it is favorable to debt dynamics, but this gap is closing. It is narrowing over time.

    So, what is important at this juncture for these countries is to sustainably lift their growth prospects. And the IMF has spoken at length about the importance of structural and fiscal structural reforms that are needed to improve the composition of spending, to lift public investment sustainably and to undertake the labor and product market reforms that are required to sustainably boost productivity.

    Ms. Mossot: Thank you. Back to the center of the room.

    Question: Thanks for taking my question. I wanted to ask about France. Do you believe that the French government’s plans to return to a budget deficit of less than 3 percent by 2029 is realistic, given the size of the deficit you project for France this year?

    Mr. Gaspar: So, when it comes to France, we have a country that is also in the group of countries where debt is considerably higher than pre‑pandemic. At this point in time, in our projections, the debt‑to‑GDP ratio in France is projected to increase by about 2 percentage points every year. So, given this path, we recommend in the case of France not only fiscal adjustment but fiscal adjustment that is appropriately frontloaded to enable France to credibly put public debt under control and inside the European framework.

    That is completely in line with our general recommendation because the European framework allows for a country‑specific path. It allows for risks to be considered. It allows for the impact of the investment and structural reform to be internalized through an adjustment period that varies, according to cases, from 5 to 7 years.

    We do believe that the government in France has presented ideas, proposals that move in the right direction, but we are waiting for more clarity coming from actual enacted measures in France.

    Ms. Mossot: Another one here, the lady in blue there.

    Question: Thank you. May I have an insight about public debt in Tunisia and reasons beyond not mentioning it in your report? Thank you.

    Mr. Furceri: For the specific numbers for Tunisia, I would defer to the regional press briefs that is coming in the coming days. What I would like to point out, that one of the challenges that we see in many countries in North Africa, it also relates with the untargeted subsidies. And one point that we make in the report is that, also as Era mentioned, that when you think about how to recalibrate spending, it is important to preserve public investment. It is important to present targeted transfers for those that are most vulnerable, and to recalibrate the spending, for example, from away from high wage compensation when this is not the case, and untargeted subsidies.

    Ms. Mossot: Thank you. This side, second row, the gentleman.

    Question: I just had a question about the U.S. election. As you know, both candidates are offering many tax breaks, no taxes on tips, no tax on social security on the Trump side. These would add to the deficit of the U.S. on the Trump side as much as $7 and a half trillion over 10 years. Some estimates more than 10 trillion. Kamala Harris’ plans would call for less debt because she would raise taxes in some cases. But I am just wondering, the worse‑case scenario, how concerned are you about the amount of debt that the U.S. could be adding here? It seems to be the opposite of what the IMF has been recommending for a long time. Do you have concerns about financial markets taking matters into their own hands and imposing some discipline?

    Mr. Gaspar: Thanks, I am clearly not commenting on specific elections or political platforms, but I point to you that the Fiscal Monitor in the spring was dedicated to the great election year, and there we do make a number of comments about the relevance of politics for fiscal policy. And Era, has very interesting research where she documents that political platforms on the left and on the right all around the world have turned in favor of fiscal support and fiscal expansion. And that makes the job of the Ministers of Finance around the world and the Secretary of Treasury here in the United States a particularly demanding job, but Era may want to comment on that.

    When it comes to the United States, the United States is one of the largest economies where it is a fact that debt is considerably above what it was pre‑pandemic. It is growing at about 2 percentage points of GDP every year. And so from that viewpoint, this path of debt cannot continue forever. We do believe that the situation in the United States is sustainable because the policymakers in the United States have access to many combinations of policy instruments that enable them to put the path of public debt under control. And they will do that at a time and with the composition of their choosing. The decision lies with the U.S. political system.

    Now, it is very important to understand that the United States is now in a very favorable economic and financial situation. Financing conditions are easing in the United States. The Fed has already started its policy pivot. The growth in the United States has been outperforming that of other advanced economies. The labor market in the United States shows indicators that are the envy of many other countries. And so the prescription that the time to adjust is now applies to the United States. It turns out that the Fiscal Monitor also documents that the United States is very important for the determination of global financial conditions and, therefore, adjustment in the United States is not only good for the United States, it is good also for the rest of the world.

    Ms. Mossot: Back to the center of the room. The lady with the red shirt, please.

    Question: My question is, whether you can comment on China’s recent stimulus package and as you mentioned in the opening, it seems that the largest economies, including China and the United States, is projected to keep raising its public debt, so I wonder how you are going to comment on the fiscal implication of the stimulus package, and do you have any other specific fiscal policy for China? Thank you.

    Mr. Gaspar: Thank you for your question. China is very important. China is one of the largest economies that I listed. The other is the United States. For China and for the United States, we say the same. Debt is growing. Debt is growing rapidly. That process cannot continue forever, but China, as the United States, has ample policy space. And so it has the means to put public debt in China under control with the policy composition and the timing that will be the choice of the Chinese political system.

    If I were to say what is most important for me for China, I would say four things. The first one is that fiscal policy, as structural policy, should contribute to the rebalancing of the Chinese economy in the sense of changing the composition of demand from exports to domestic demand. It is very important that the very high savings ratio in China diminishes so that Chinese households will be able to consume more and feel safe doing that. Making the social safety net in China wider would be a structural way of doing exactly that.

    The second aspect is to act decisively to end financial misallocations associated with the property sector crisis, the real estate crisis. That is very important to stabilize the situation in China but also to build confidence, which would help with the first dimension that I pointed out as well.

    Now, third, very much in the province of public finances, this is very important to address public finance imbalances and vulnerabilities at the sub‑national level. And now, there are sub‑national governments in China that are struggling with financial conditions—financial constraints, and it is very important to remove those constraints, and, again, is linked to my second point.

    Fourth and last, it is very important that fiscal policy, as structural policy, promotes the transition to a new growth model in China, a model based on technological innovation, a model that supports the structural transformation towards a green economy. And my understanding is that this fourth element has been emphasized by the political authorities in China at the highest level.

    Ms. Mossot: Thank you. Back to this side of the room.

    Question: As already mentioned, a novel assessment framework debt that is at risk varies from country to country. Please, could you provide me details, which risks are more important and more dangerous for Ukrainian debt? And one more related question. It is that you give advice for emerging markets to increase indirect taxes for revenue mobilization. And in the case of Ukraine, when we recently already increased our taxes, for example, war tax and tax for banks’ profits, which recommendations you can give us in our situation and the worse circumstances, and maybe there are other instruments despite tax increasing.

    Ms. Dabla‑Norris: Thank you. The debt‑at‑risk framework that has been presented in the Fiscal Monitor includes 70 countries, but we do not identify or quantify the debt at risk for all individual countries. Now, that said, the framework, as Davide mentions, shows that factors such as weak growth, tighter financial conditions, geopolitical uncertainty, or policy uncertainty can all add to future debt risks. This applies to Ukraine as it does to many other countries. And in the case of Ukraine particularly, the outlook, as you know, remains exceptionally uncertain.

    So, in terms of priorities, we believe that the authorities need to continue to restore debt sustainability. And in this regard, there is two important aspects. The first is to complete the restructuring of external commercial debt in line with program commitments. And the second is to really redouble efforts on domestic revenue mobilization and to accelerate the implementation of their national revenue strategy. Now, what is important here is the strategy is not only about aiming to raise revenues, mobilize revenues, but to fundamentally change the tax system. The strategy aims to reduce tax evasion, tax avoidance, to improve tax compliance, and more broadly enhance the fairness and equity of the tax system. And the IMF has long advocated for countries that it is not about raising rates. It is about broadening the base and making tax systems as fair and equitable as possible.

    Ms. Mossot: Back to this side. The gentleman on the second row.

    Question: I just want to ask a couple of questions, blended into one. In July, the IMF released calculations showing that the U.K. budget balance, excluding interest payments, would need to improve by between .8 and 1.4 percentage points of GDP per year to get debt under control, an adjustment of 22 to 39 billion pounds. Since then, we know that the Treasury has carried out an audit and discovered over‑spends it was not aware of, and the government has made decisions on things like public sector pay. So my question to you is, how has that changed the calculations you made in July? You talked about the importance of people‑focused adjustments. Would an increase in employer national insurance contributions be people‑friendly and growth‑friendly in your view?

    Mr. Gaspar: Thank you so much. So, your questions are very detailed and very specific, and so I am not in a position to comment on them at this point in time. Concerning the U.K., we believe it is very important to bring public debt under control. It is very important to control for public debt risks. In the Fiscal Monitor, we actually make the point that the risks that one should take into account when conducting a prudent fiscal policy go beyond the reference to the baseline that you made. So we believe that it is possible to make a stronger case for fiscal prudence than what was implicit in your question.

    Still, it is important how the adjustment is made, and Era has emphasized very much the importance of being people‑friendly. And we, all of us, have emphasized the important contribution of public investment. And there you do have specific estimates for the U.K., impacts of public investment on economic activity and growth from the Office of Budget’s responsibility. I do not know if you want to add something.

    Ms. Dabla‑Norris: No. Just to say that there are important tradeoffs, not just for the U.K., but for many countries, and there may be certain short‑term measures that see or appear to be less people‑friendly but that they improve the sustainability of the system for future generations. So there is an intertemporal aspect of this, referring to fiscal policy, that we often forget. So, pension systems, health systems, the sustainability, the fiscal sustainability of the system also matters for people because it is going to impact different generations in a different way.

    Ms. Mossot: The very last question.

    Question: Thank you. I would like to ask, what are the prescriptions on how developing countries can put their public debt in order, especially sub‑Saharan Africa? And, for example, Nigeria now and many other countries in Africa, their public debt has ballooned because of exchange rates devaluation. So what are your prescriptions? You also mentioned the tax systems should be friendly. In Africa, we are not seeing tax systems as being friendly now because a lot of people, they say, okay, why did not the tax base broaden? How much can you broaden since you have a lot of poor people? So, what kinds of tradeoffs do you do when incomes and people are also squeezed?

    The last one is from the report. $100 trillion of global debt. How much of that is from developing economies? Thank you.

    Mr. Furceri: Thank you very much. The challenges that Nigeria faces, as well as many other countries in the region, there are two. One is very low revenue‑to‑GDP ratio. For example, I believe that in the case of Nigeria it is about 10 percentage points. The second, one trend that we have seen, that we are a bit concerned, is that the ratio—the debt service obligation to revenue has been increasing. So for the average low‑income country, it is about 15 percent. What does it mean? It means that basically a large part of revenue in these countries goes to just finance the debt. And this is something that we would recommend to improve, or we can improve as we mentioned revenue mobilization. We think that it is important. It is important to broaden the tax base. But at the same time, and especially in countries like Nigeria that have been severely affected by the drought, we have seen also higher food price, it is important to put in place ex ante system and mechanisms that are transfer resources from the government to those that are most affected and those that are poor.

    Ms. Mossot: Thank you very much. We have to close this session. Thank you again Era, Davide, and Vitor. You can find the full report of the Fiscal Monitor on the IMF website and also a reminder that there is tomorrow at 8:00 a.m. the Managing Director’s press conference. Thank you, all.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER:

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese NGOs aim to make bigger intl impact

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    China has cultivated thousands of technology-focused nongovernmental organizations in recent years to stimulate innovation and bolster its influence in global research and development governance, a Ministry of Civil Affairs official said on Wednesday.

    Zhang Lin, a deputy head of the ministry’s bureau of NGO administration, said that by the end of last year, China had over 24,000 such organizations at the forefront of technological innovation, playing a crucial role in advancing the nation’s expertise in competitive technologies.

    “At the same time, the ministry is fostering national and international social organizations to facilitate engagement in global scientific and technological governance initiatives,” she told a news conference in Beijing.

    Technology-based organizations have increasingly emerged as a pivotal force propelling China toward technological advancement.

    Authorities have recognized their crucial role in uniting and mobilizing technology professionals to serve the national interest, fostering collaboration among industries, academia and researchers, promoting exchanges and showcasing industry expertise.

    In a significant move to enhance the global influence of these groups, the ministry introduced rules in 2021 enabling Chinese NGOs to recruit renowned foreign scientists and appoint them to management positions.

    While the full text of the rules has not been publicly disclosed, a media release on the ministry’s website stated that the regulations mandated these NGOs to improve communication and engagement with foreign technology experts.

    The release emphasized that these organizations should establish a robust service system tailored to the needs of foreign technology professionals, fostering a stronger sense of belonging and integration within the community.

    The Chinese Institute of Electronics, one of over 200 national-level technology-focused organizations, plays a crucial role in advancing technological development in China.

    According to its website, the institute is responsible for a variety of tasks, including organizing international seminars, publishing influential papers and recommending talent to governmental bodies.

    With a membership exceeding 170,000 professionals with strong knowledge on subjects such as semiconductors, computer science, communication technologies and radar, the institute also manages the editing and publication of 10 esteemed academic journals covering topics in its members’ respective fields. Since 2003, it has honored outstanding scientists with its annual Science and Technology Award.

    The institute describes itself as a national academic nonprofit social organization that was voluntarily established by technology workers in the electronic information sector, related enterprises and institutions, and social groups.

    “We are an important social force in the development of China’s electronic information technology industry,” the institute said in its charter.

    International NGOs focusing on technology have significantly influenced global science governance by organizing academic conferences, publishing influential works and presenting awards.

    Last year, the Chinese government announced the establishment of 17 such NGOs.

    One notable organization among them is the Alliance of National and International Science Organizations for the Belt and Road Regions, launched in 2018 with the objective of enhancing cooperation in science, technology and innovation among countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative.

    Its membership includes prestigious institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkiye, and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK supports rugby development in Solomon Islands through SOS Kit Aid

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Rugby Solomon Islands received donation of training kits from UK charity SOS Kit Aid through partnership with the British High Commission in Solomon Islands.

    A group photo with the SOS Aid kit donated to SIRUF.

    SOS Kit Aid is a charity organisation that distributes both new and second-hand rugby kits to children all over the world, with the support of World Rugby. It was founded back in 2001, by rugby dad, John Broadfoot, who, whilst during a trip to Romania witnessed a smiling 8-year-old boy running with the ball under one arm, whilst he used the other arm to hold up his shorts. John wanted to do something about this.

    John knew that his sons had several pairs of boots and other kit lying around at home, and so, to test out the potential, he collected kit from ten schools, to see how much was available on a wider scale. The test was an outstanding success and so SOS Kit Aid was born.

    Handing over the kits to the Solomon Islands Rugby Union Federation (SIRUF), High Commissioner His Excellency Thomas Coward said:

    Rugby teaches children values and teamwork. The Solomon Islanders Rugby Union Federation Get into Rugby programme frames this through its approach to Respect, Integrity, Solidarity, Discipline and Fun. Rugby is a great bridge between our two countries and brings us all together.

    Receiving the kits on SIRUF’s behalf was Secretary of the Executive Board, Angikinui Francis Tekatoha who said rugby has a long history and they have been developing the sport in Solomon Islands. He added:

    Our partnership with the British High Commission supports our Get into Rugby programme, Get into Rugby Plus and Rise Rugby. Our most recent rugby development programme is focusing on women, young people and schools so the gifts you are giving us today will be used in those programmes for training. The donation of kit deepens the partnership between the Rugby Federation and the British High Commission.

    Updates to this page

    Published 24 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Christmas air mail – latest dates of posting 2024

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

          Hongkong Post today (October 24) announced the latest air mail posting dates for Christmas this year. While the dates are provisional, they have been calculated based on the requirements of respective postal administrations, and are for reference only. These dates and services are subject to availability of flights, and may be altered at short notice. Members of the public are advised to post earlier than the dates shown. They may visit the Hongkong Post web page at (www.hongkongpost.hk/en/about_us/whats_new/index.html) on the service availability for various destinations before posting.
     

    Destinations
    Letters and packets
    Parcels

    Asia and the Middle East

    Bangladesh
    December 5
    November 29

    Brunei Darussalam
    December 3
    *

    India
    December 2
    November 29

    Indonesia
    December 6
    December 5

    Iran
    December 3
    December 2

    Israel
    December 3
    *

    Japan
    December 4
    December 4

    Jordan
    December 3
    December 2

    Korea
    December 3
    December 3

    Lao People’s Democratic Republic
    December 9
    December 6

    Lebanon
    November 29
    November 28

    Malaysia
    December 3
    December 2

    Myanmar
    December 3
    *

    Nepal
    December 3
    *

    Pakistan
    December 9
    December 2

    Saudi Arabia
    December 3
    December 2

    Singapore
    December 2
    November 29

    Sri Lanka
    December 9
    *

    Taiwan
    December 4
    December 2

    Thailand
    December 4
    December 2

    The Mainland
    December 9
    December 5

    The Philippines
    December 3
    December 2

    United Arab Emirates
    December 5
    December 4

    Vietnam
    December 6
    December 5

    Other destinations in Asia
    and the Middle East
    December 5
    December 4

    Central, South and North America

    Argentina
    November 19
    November 18

    Brazil
    December 2
    November 20

    Canada
    December 4
    November 28

    Chile
    November 28
    November 18

    Costa Rica
    November 19
    *

    Mexico
    November 29
    November 29

    Panama
    December 3
    December 2

    Peru
    December 3
    December 2

    United States
    December 5
    December 5

    Other destinations in Central, South and North America   
    November 28
    November 26

    Europe

    Austria
    December 3
    December 2

    Belgium
    December 5
    December 4

    Cyprus
    November 19
    November 18

    Czech Republic
    November 18
    November 18

    Denmark
    December 2
    November 29

    Estonia
    December 4
    December 3

    Finland
    December 5
    December 2

    France
    December 3
    December 3

    Germany
    December 6
    December 5

    Greece
    November 28
    November 27

    Hungary
    December 3
    December 2

    Iceland
    December 2
    *

    Ireland
    December 9
    December 2

    Italy
    December 3
    *

    Latvia
    December 2
    November 29

    Lithuania
    December 3
    December 2

    Malta
    December 3
    December 2

    Netherlands
    December 3
    December 2

    Norway
    December 3
    December 2

    Poland
    December 4
    December 2

    Portugal
    December 3
    November 28

    Romania
    December 6
    December 2

    Russia
    November 25
    November 15

    Serbia
    December 3
    December 2

    Slovakia
    December 4
    November 29

    Spain
    November 28
    November 28

    Sweden
    December 3
    December 2

    Switzerland
    December 9
    December 5

    Türkiye
    December 3
    December 2

    United Kingdom
    December 3
    December 3

    Other destinations in Europe
    November 26
    November 25

    Oceania

    Australia
    December 4
    December 4

    Fiji
    November 29
    November 28

    French Polynesia
    December 3
    December 2

    Nauru
    November 29
    *

    New Caledonia
    December 3
    December 2

    New Zealand
    November 29
    November 29

    Papua New Guinea
    November 26
    *

    Solomon Islands
    December 3
    *

    Tonga
    December 3
    December 2

    Other destinations in Oceania
    December 3
    November 25

    Africa

    Egypt
    December 6
    December 6

    Kenya
    December 3
    *

    Malawi
    December 4
    *

    Mauritius
    December 3
    November 27

    Morocco
    December 3
    December 2

    South Africa
    November 21
    November 20

    Other destinations in Africa
    December 3
    December 2

    * Service is currently under suspension

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI China: 2024 Silk Road Rediscovery Tour of Beijing launched

    Source: China State Council Information Office 2

    The 2024 Silk Road Rediscovery Tour of Beijing kicked off in the capital city of China on the evening of October 21. The event, themed “Explore a Modernized City of Opportunities”, welcomed prominent international influencers from Albania, Brazil, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, the United States, and Uzbekistan, to embark on a journey of discovery in Beijing.

    Foreign influencers and other attendees launching the event together
    Since 2016, ten consecutive sessions of the Silk Road Rediscovery Tour of Beijing have been held, participated by a total of 125 international influencers from 51 Belt and Road partner countries so far.

    Mukhammad Obidov, Chief Editor of Uzbekistan National News Agency and Chairman of the Fergana Journalists’ Association, delivered a speech as the representative of all the participating influencers.
    Mukhammad Obidov, Chief Editor of Uzbekistan National News Agency and Chairman of the Fergana Journalists’ Association, spoke of the increasing interest of Uzbek people towards their neighboring countries, especially China, and suggested creating an alliance of Central Asian and Chinese journalists as well as a unified information platform to help deepen understanding among the members of this proposed alliance.

    Kanat Sakhariyanov, Director of Kazakhstan’s Atameken TV, delivered a speech.
    Kanat Sakhariyanov, Director of Kazakhstan’s Atameken TV, said in his speech that Beijing is a city marked by the convergence of ancient history and cutting-edge technologies, and that the residents of Beijing are good at living with each other in harmony through tolerance and mutual respect. Since 2019, Atameken TV has aired more than 20 documentaries about China along with regular news programs such as “On the Silk Road” and “China News”, as part of efforts to strengthen understanding between the two countries.

    Lucas Eleuterio Fernandes, a Brazilian influencer, delivered a speech.
    Lucas Eleuterio Fernandes, a journalist and presenter of TV Globo and a social media influencer from Brazil, is also a popular social media influencer with 2.1 million followers on Instagram. He began his world tour from China in 2010 and returned here 14 years later to find “astounding Chinese development and transformation”. According to Fernandes, “Many people still have misconceptions about this country, but I want to say that China is a place everyone should visit at least once in their lifetime.”
    This year’s Silk Road Rediscovery Tour of Beijing will run from October 21 to 25, and the participating influencers will experience Beijing’s unique urban charm blending ancient heritage and modern achievements from multiple angles and through a number of landmarks, including the three major cultural venues in Beijing Municipal Administrative Center, ZGC E-Town International Robot Industrial Park, GTVerse Center, the Palace Museum, the Olympic Tower, the No. 3 Blast Furnace and the Big Air Shougang in Shougang Park, etc.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Security: 16 arrests as police target migrant smuggling across the Sava River

    Source: Europol

    Using overcrowded boats, the suspects willingly put the lives and safety of the migrants at risk. After crossing the river, the migrants were clandestinely transported in various types of vehicles. Hiding them in passenger cars or the cargo areas of transport vehicles, the criminals would move the migrants towards Slovenia, Italy, Germany, and other EU countries. It is estimated that…

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Video: European Commission President Ursula von der LEYEN Western Balkans tour (North Macedonia)

    Source: European Commission (video statements)

    Press conference with HE Hristijan Mickoski, Prime Minister of the Republic of North Macedonia

    Watch on the Audiovisual Portal of the European Commission:
    Follow us on:
    -X: https://twitter.com/EU_Commission
    -Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/europeancommission/
    -Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/EuropeanCommission
    -LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/european-commission/
    -Medium: https://medium.com/@EuropeanCommission

    Check our website: http://ec.europa.eu/

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GSpeCM3gvME

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: Navy’s Third Operational F-35C Lightning II Squadron Achieves Safe For Flight Certification

    Source: United States Navy

    The F-35C enhances the carrier strike group’s ability to project power, supporting U.S. national security and integrating seamlessly with other carrier air wing assets.

    “I couldn’t be more proud of the Winder Team for this achievement,” said Cmdr. Nathan Staples, VFA-86 Commanding Officer. “Our team has excelled since the transition began in February 2023, and I look forward to our future achievements and the standards we set for the Lightning II community.”

    The squadron’s transition from the F/A-18E Super Hornet, flown for 36 years, began in September 2023. Nearly 200 personnel completed training at Eglin AFB, Fla., and NAS Lemoore, while nine pilots finished their flight syllabus with VFA-125, the Navy’s F-35C Fleet Replacement Squadron, while simultaneously executing tactical training events with Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center and TOPGUN.

    After achieving several key milestones, including a perfect score on the Conventional Weapons Technical Proficiency Inspection and the highest Maintenance Program Assist inspection score, VFA-86 earned Interim Safe for Flight certification in June 2024. In July, they conducted their first embarked operations aboard USS Nimitz (CVN 68), culminating in Full Safe for Flight certification.

    “Our success is due to proactive management, engaged leadership, and a can-do attitude,” said AFCM Rich Brickey, VFA-86 Maintenance Master Chief. “Our Sailors have excelled in every metric and will continue to do so whenever called upon.”

    Established in 1951, VFA-86 has flown nine different aircraft and supported combat operations in Vietnam, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. As the Navy’s newest F-35C squadron, the Sidewinders remain committed to their motto: “When diplomacy fails… 86 ’em!”

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Protecting public spaces and critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks focus of OSCE workshop in North Macedonia

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: Protecting public spaces and critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks focus of OSCE workshop in North Macedonia

    Protecting public spaces and critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks focus of OSCE workshop in North Macedonia | OSCE
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    Home Newsroom News and press releases Protecting public spaces and critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks focus of OSCE workshop in North Macedonia

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE Presence in Albania organizes 10th annual Media Development Forum

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: OSCE Presence in Albania organizes 10th annual Media Development Forum

    Representatives from media, public institutions, academics, and civil society gather at the OSCE Presence in Albania’s 10th annual Media Development Forum, Tirana, 23 October 2024. (OSCE) Photo details

    Representatives from local media, public institutions, academics, and civil society gathered at the OSCE Presence in Albania’s 10th annual Media Development Forum, a key event focused on the future of media freedom and integrity in the country.
    Ambassador Michel Tarran, Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania, opened the forum with a commitment to fostering a structured dialogue between Albania’s institutions and its media sector. He said: “Building on last year’s discussions, the OSCE Presence is willing and remains committed to supporting the structured dialogue between Albania’s institutions and its media sector. For this purpose, we avail not only the resources we have at disposal at the OSCE Presence in Albania but also from the broader set of OSCE institutions that are specialized in democratization and media affairs. We believe that this dialogue will foster a more collaborative environment where public officials and media professionals can work together to strengthen press freedom and find solutions that work in the Albanian context.”
    Opening remarks were also delivered by Ambassador Silvio Gonzato, Head of the Delegation of the European Union in Albania, and Philippe Tremblay, Director of the Office of the OSCE’s Representative on Freedom of the Media, through a video address.
    The forum facilitated discussions on the intersection of media policy and journalist safety, highlighting the importance of aligning with European standards while exploring how to enhance protections for journalists. Participants emphasized the need for continued reforms to strengthen the media landscape and ongoing efforts to further communication between the media and government institutions.
    Another key focus was the current state of media ownership in Albania and its impact on journalistic independence. The increasing concentration of media ownership raised concerns about the impartiality of information that the public receives, with discussions centred on strategies to promote transparency and media pluralism.
    The relationship between the media and the judiciary was another relevant and intertwining topic. Participants explored ways to improve communication and collaboration between journalists and judicial authorities, aiming to foster a more supportive environment for accurate reporting.
    By bringing together diverse stakeholders, the Media Development Forum aimed to enhance cooperation among public institutions, media organizations, and civil society, ultimately working towards a more vibrant and secure media environment in Albania.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Attorney Announces Murder-for-Hire Charges Against IRGC Brigadier General and Former Intelligence Officer and Members of an Iranian Intelligence Network

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

    Ruhollah Bazghandi and Members of His Iran-Based Network, Contracted Members of an Eastern European Organized Crime Group to Murder a U.S. Citizen of Iranian Origin in New York City Who Has Publicly Opposed the Iranian Government

    Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York; Merrick B. Garland, the Attorney General of the United States; Matthew G. Olsen, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Christopher A. Wray, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”); and James E. Dennehy, Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Field Office of the FBI, announced the unsealing of murder-for-hire, money-laundering, and sanctions charges against RUHOLLAH BAZGHANDI, a/k/a “Roohollah Azimi,” FNU LNU, a/k/a “Haj Taher,” (“HAJ TAHER”), HOSSEIN SEDIGHI, and SEYED MOHAMMAD FOROUZAN.  The charges are contained in a Superseding Indictment unsealed today in Manhattan federal court.  As detailed in the Superseding Indictment, BAZGHANDI, HAJ TAHER, SEDIGHI, and FOROUZAN contracted members of an Eastern European criminal organization, including RAFAT AMIROV, a/k/a “Farkhaddin Mirzoev,” a/k/a “Pᴎᴍ,”  a/k/a “Rome,” POLAD OMAROV, a/k/a “Araz Aliyev,” a/k/a “Polad Qaqa,” a/k/a “Haci Qaqa,” and ZIALAT MAMEDOV, a/k/a “Ziko,” to murder a U.S. citizen of Iranian origin in New York City who has publicly opposed the Iranian Government and who has previously been the target of similar plots by the Iranian Government.  AMIROV, OMAROV, and MAMEDOV previously were arrested on charges contained in underlying indictments.  AMIROV and OMAROV are in custody in the U.S., pending trial; Mamedov was extradited from the Czech Republic to the Republic of Georgia (“Georgia”) to face charges there.  BAZGHANDI, HAJ TAHER, SEDIGHI, and FOROUZAN, all of whom are based in Iran, remain at large.  The case is pending before U.S. District Judge Colleen McMahon.

    U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “As alleged, for years, the Government of Iran has attempted to assassinate, on U.S. soil, a U.S. citizen of Iranian origin who is a prominent critic of the Iranian regime.  In January 2023, we unsealed charges alleging that members of an Eastern European crime group engaged in a plot to murder this victim.  As we allege, that group was not acting alone.  Today, we hold their Iranian masters to account, and allege that these Iran-based co-conspirators, including a Brigadier General in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, directed the murder plot.  By charging these Iran-based defendants, we seek to strike another public blow at the heart of the Government of Iran’s efforts to execute the victim—as well as its lethal targeting, intimidation, and repression of other Iranian dissidents critical of the regime in the U.S. and abroad.”  

    Attorney General Merrick B. Garland said: “The Justice Department has now charged eight individuals, including an Iranian military official, for their efforts to silence and kill a U.S. citizen because of her criticism of the Iranian regime.  We will not tolerate efforts by an authoritarian regime like Iran to undermine the fundamental rights guaranteed to every American.  Three of the defendants charged in this horrific plot are now in U.S. custody, and we will never stop working to identify, find, and bring to justice all those who endanger the safety of the American people.”

    Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen said: “Today’s indictment makes plain that the Iranian regime for years has been behind a violent campaign to stalk, intimidate, and arrange the killing of an American dissident on U.S. soil for bravely speaking up for the rights of the Iranian people.  The Department is committed to exposing and holding accountable those in Tehran who believe they can hide their hand in carrying out such reprehensible activities.”

    FBI Director Christopher A. Wray said: “Today’s indictment exposes the full extent of Iran’s plot to silence an American journalist for criticizing the Iranian regime.  According to the charges, a brigadier general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and a former Iranian intelligence officer, working with a network of conspirators, planned to kill a dissident living in New York City.  The FBI’s investigation led to the disruption of this plot as one of the conspirators was allegedly on their way to murder the victim in New York.  As these charges show, the FBI will work with our partners here and abroad to hold accountable those who target Americans.”

    FBI Assistant Director in Charge James E. Dennehy said: “Today we charge four members of the Bazghandi Network – each connected to the Iranian government – as being responsible for hiring members of an Eastern European Organized Crime Group to murder an American citizen in New York City.   This crime was intended to stop an American from exercising their Constitutionally protected right to free speech; to end their life for speaking out publicly against the Iranian regime and its human rights violations.  The FBI will aggressively pursue, disrupt, and hold accountable any foreign government which attempts to murder our citizens on our soil.”

    According to the allegations contained in the Superseding Indictment, other court filings, and statements made during court proceedings:[1] 

    BAZGHANDI, who resides in Iran, is an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”) Brigadier General and has previously served as chief of an IRGC Intelligence Organization (“IRGC-IO”) counterintelligence office.  In April 2023, the U.S. Secretary of State designated IRGC-IO as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 14078, relating to hostage-taking and the wrongful detention of U.S. nationals abroad. On the same date, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned BAZGHANDI in connection with his involvement with the detention of foreign prisoners held in Iran.  BAZGHANDI was designated by the Treasury Department a second time in June 2023, this time under Executive Order 13224, for his participation in IRGC-IO’s lethal targeting operations.  HAJ TAHER, SEDIGHI, and FOROUZAN (collectively with BAZGHANDI, the “Bazghandi Network”), each of whom resides in Iran, also have connections to the Government of Iran.    

    The Bazghandi Network contracted AMIROV, OMAROV, MAMEDOV, and Khalid Mehdiyev to murder, on U.S. soil, a victim (the “Victim”) residing in New York City.  The Victim is a journalist, author, and human rights activist who has publicized the Government of Iran’s human rights abuses and suppression of political expression, including in connection with continuing protests against the regime across Iran.  As recently as 2020 and 2021, Iranian intelligence officials and assets plotted to kidnap the Victim from within the U.S. for rendition to Iran in an effort to silence the Victim’s criticism of the regime.  That plot was disrupted and exposed by the FBI and led to the filing of federal kidnapping conspiracy and other charges in the Southern District of New York against several participants in the plot in U.S. v. Farahani, et al., 21 Cr. 430 (RA) (S.D.N.Y.).

    Since at least July 2022, the Bazghandi Network tasked members of the Organization with assassinating the Victim.  The Organization’s participation in the murder-for-hire plot was directed by AMIROV, who resided in Iran and who was tasked with targeting the Victim by individuals in Iran.  On approximately July 13, 2022, AMIROV forwarded targeting information—which Amirov had received from individuals in Iran—about the Victim and the Victim’s residence to OMAROV.  OMAROV, in turn, together with MAMEDOV, directed and collaborated with Mehdiyev, who was residing in Yonkers, New York, to carry out the plot against the Victim. Mehdiyev’s participation in the plot was disrupted when he was arrested near the Victim’s home on or about July 28, 2022, while in possession of the assault rifle, along with 66 rounds of ammunition, approximately $1,100 in cash, and a black ski mask.

    In January 2023, AMIROV, OMAROV, and MAMEDOV were arrested overseas.  On January 27, 2023, they were charged publicly for their roles in the plot to assassinate the Victim.  Nevertheless, in the months that followed, members of the Bazghandi Network continued to target the Victim.  For example, in or about March 2023, HAJ TAHER searched for information about the Victim’s family members and SEDIGHI saved an image of the Victim’s residence. As recently as on or about May 1, 2023, BAZGHANDI conducted an Internet search, in Farsi, for, “a person in the house of [the Victim] movie,” and, on the same date, watched a video with the title, “A video of the arrested gunman in front of [the Victim]’s home in New York received by [the Victim’s employer].”

    *               *                *

    BAZGHANDI, HAJ TAHER, SEDIGHI, and FOROUZAN, all of Iran, have been charged with murder-for-hire, which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison (Count One); conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison (Count Two); conspiracy to commit money laundering, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison (Count Three); and conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and sanctions against the Government of Iran, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison (Count Six).

    AMIROV, 45, of IRAN; OMAROV, 39, of the Czech Republic and Slovenia; Mamedov, 32, of Georgia; also have been charged in Counts One, Two, and Three, as well as with attempted murder in aid of racketeering, which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison (Count Four); and possession and use of a firearm in connection with the attempted murder, which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years in prison (Count Five).

    The potential maximum sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by Judge McMahon.

    Mr. Williams praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI and its New York Field Office Counterintelligence-Cyber Division and the New York FBI Iran Threat Task Force.  Mr. Williams also thanked the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) and the NYPD Intelligence Bureau, as well as the Department of Justice’s National Security Division and the Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs, for their assistance.

    This case is being handled by the Office’s National Security and International Narcotics Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael D. Lockard, Jacob H. Gutwillig, and Matthew J.C. Hellman are in charge of the prosecution, with assistance from Trial Attorneys Christopher Rigali and Leslie Esbrook of the Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, and Dmitriy Slavin of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section.

    The charges in the Superseding Indictment are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.


    [1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the Superseding Indictment, and the description of the Superseding Indictment set forth herein, constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Defence Secretary John Healey opening remarks from Trinity House agreement press conference 23 October 2024

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Defence Secretary John Healey delivered opening remarks alongside German defence minister, Boris Pistorius, after signing the Trinity House Agreement

    This is a significant day for UK relations and for both our countries. Less than 100 days since I first visited Berlin in July to kick off these negotiations together, we have today signed a landmark defence agreement here at Trinity House in London. First, I want to thank our negotiating teams, they worked at pace, and they have helped us secure a deal which forges closer cooperation between our militaries and our industries, which contains immediate actions and longer term ambitions. Today’s agreement strengthens our security, it will grow our economies.

    And you know, when I was Shadow Defence Secretary before the general election, I had conversations with allies and partners and academics that said Britain needed to play a bigger part in NATO. They said European allies needed to take on more responsibility for European security and this, this is the driving force behind our NATO, first UK Defence strategy, behind our reset of UK relations with Europe. We share the same threats, war in Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East, growing Russian aggression. We share the same values, democracy, individual freedom, rule of law.

    And in a more dangerous world, allies are our strategic strength, and we must do more together. But I believe then, as I know Boris, you did too, that the UK-Germany defence relationship was underdeveloped. The UK and Germany are currently Europe’s top two defence spenders. We’re currently Europe’s top two supporters of Ukraine in military and economic aid. Yes, there’s 40 years of great cooperation on fast jets between UK and Germany. Yes, both countries have deployed and operated together in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, and to counter IS. But the collaboration has been ad hoc. It has not been systematic, and there is no fully-fledged defence cooperation agreement. And as I started work on this area, with some of you in this room, and I thank you for your contributions. As I started work sometime last year, there were only 28 German military personnel training in the UK. There were only six Brits doing the same in Germany, we only had one bilateral German-UK defence industrial programme. So there was huge potential, which we both wanted to seize. The potential and imperative to respond to increasing threats to strengthen our collective security through NATO, which is the cornerstone for the defence of both our nations.

    So today, we have signed this landmark Trinity House Agreement. It secures defence cooperation across all domains, land, sea, air, cyber, space. It will be put on a legal footing in the wider treaty between the UK and Germany. The agreement confirms new lighthouse defence projects between our militaries, and where better to announce these than Trinity house, which is home of England’s official Lighthouse Authority and has been so since 1794. In fact, actually, it goes back longer than that, to Henry the Eighth, when he took the first steps to maritime regulation from this building in 1514. And Admiral Ian Lower, thank you for your hospitality, thank you for hosting us, and thank you to your teams for helping us organise this event.

    But in this new agreement, our new cooperation is focused on the now, with our army’s training, exercising, innovating more together on NATO’s eastern flank, on German P8 planes operating out of Lossiemouth to help protect the North Atlantic and on new support for Ukraine through the capability coalitions, and also enabling German seeking helicopters to be equipped with modern missile systems. So cooperation focused on the now, and also cooperation focused on the weapons of the future: developing a new deep strike system together; pursuing new drones that could operate alongside our tanks; our planes and our warships; kick starting work together to protect vital undersea cables in the North Sea; advancing innovation between our armies to shape the future of NATO warfare; driven by AI and emerging technologies. And as well as this, this agreement paves the way for closer industrial cooperation.

    So today, Rheinmetall have announced plans to build a new gun barrel factory in Britain, supporting 400 jobs, bringing nearly half a billion pounds of benefit to the UK economy, and reestablishing a critical defence industry for the first time in 10 years, gun barrels built in Britain with British steel for our British armed forces and for our allies. And from artillery to AI, from the weapons of now to the weapons of the future, Helsing have also confirmed today a new investment of 350 million pounds into the UK for the development of AI systems. So this shows today’s agreement gives renewed confidence to investors in the UK defence industrial base. Finally, just to give this a bigger context, our new government was elected in July to deliver change. Before with the election, we promised a new defence agreement with Germany in six months, we’ve signed this landmark agreement in less than four months. This is what turning talk into action looks like. This is what resetting relations with Europe looks like. This is what growing our economy looks like, and this is what a NATO first defence strategy looks like. And today’s agreement also sends a signal to our adversaries. We will deter and we will defend against any aggression together.

    Boris, I look forward to working closely with you in putting this agreement into action. Today really is only the start of new, deeper relations between our two nations. And yes, politicians may come and go, but the Trinity house agreement will live on, and it will keep our countries and Europe safely in the years to come. Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Statement by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with Albanian Prime Minister Rama

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Statement Tirana, 23 Oct 2024 Thank you so much Prime Minister, dear Edi,
    I am very happy to be back here in Tirana. And I am very glad to see how much Albania has already achieved on its wa…

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Croatia’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of play – 23-10-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Croatia’s national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) is an ambitious outline of reforms and investment designed to mitigate the pandemic’s socioeconomic fallout. Following the December 2023 amendment of the Croatian NRRP, to which a REPowerEU chapter was added, the plan’s worth reached €10 040.7 million (or 18.5 % of national gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019), an increase of over 59 % compared with the original (2021) version of the plan, which was worth €6 297 million in grants only. The amended plan comes with a grant allocation of €5 779.4 million and a freshly requested loan allocation of €4 254.2 million (of which more than 62 % is for the REPowerEU chapter). The grant part includes the June 2022 downward revision of Croatia’s grant allocation of €785.1 million and the country’s REPowerEU grant allocation of €269 million. In addition, Croatia has requested a €7.2 million transfer from its share of the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to its NRRP. So far, Croatia has received €4 487.3 million of Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) resources (44.7 % of the amended NRRP) in the form of pre financing, five grant and one loan instalment. The disbursements are above the current EU average of 41 %. The measures in the amended plan are designed to help Croatia overcome the socioeconomic ramifications of both the pandemic and the energy crisis, as well as to address the consequences of the two devastating earthquakes of 2020. The plan focuses on the green transition by devoting over 39 % of the resources to it. It also fosters the digital transformation by committing 20.1 % of the funds (excluding the REPowerEU chapter) to digital projects. In the context of the European Semester, in 2024 the Commission assessed the implementation of the Croatian plan as ‘under way’. The European Parliament continues to ensure transparency and accountability through interinstitutional dialogues on RRF implementation, and scrutiny of the Commission’s work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fourth edition. The ‘NGEU delivery’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – EU budget for 2025 to focus on research, health, education, and climate action

    Source: European Parliament

    Parliament demands an EU budget for 2025 that focuses on improving people’s lives, boosting competitiveness, and addressing current challenges.

    MEPs set the overall level of commitment appropriations for the 2025 draft budget at almost €201 billion, €1.24 billion more than the Commission’s proposal from last June. Parliament wants to boost programmes vital in addressing health challenges, supporting young people, agriculture and rural areas, helping people suffering from natural disasters, boosting climate action, managing migration and security needs, and strengthening EU support for neighbouring regions experiencing geopolitical and humanitarian crises. MEPs restored €1.52  billion in funding cuts proposed by the Council, and set payment appropriations at €153.5 billion.

    Repayment costs for the European Recovery Instrument (EURI)

    The EURI repayment costs, which are twice the amount initially forecast for 2025, should not result in reduced funding for essential programmes, like Erasmus+ or R&D, according to Parliament. MEPs want to reverse cuts made by member states to appropriations dedicated to these areas and to use the new “EURI cascade mechanism” introduced by the revision of the EU’s long-term budget . This mechanism is designed to manage escalating Next Generation EU borrowing costs without affecting key initiatives, maintaining the budget’s flexibility and response capacity.

    Quotes

    Victor Negrescu (S&D, Romania), general rapporteur for the EU budget 2025 (for section III – Commission), said: “Today’s vote is a strong signal of support for a citizen-centred EU budget focused on investments in economic development and improving people’s lives. That is why we are asking for an increase of €110 million for actions in the area of health, an additional €70 million for Erasmus, €42 million to protect our citizens against the effects of natural disasters, an additional €96 million for agriculture, €120 million for humanitarian aid, and €110 million for the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood.”

    Niclas Herbst (EPP, Germany), rapporteur for the other sections, said: “Cybersecurity is vital for EU institutions and has remained a pressing concern since 2023. Another key priority is ensuring that the institutions have enough staff to fulfil new tasks, like for the implementation of the Artificial Intelligence Act. Additionally, improving the security of European External Action Service buildings, particularly in delegations situated in remote and high-risk areas, is essential. To address this, an increase of €37 million is required.”

    Next steps

    The vote initiates three weeks of “conciliation” talks with the Council, with the aim of reaching a deal for next year’s budget, which then has to be voted on by Parliament and signed by its President.

    Background

    Over 90% of the EU budget funds activities in EU countries and beyond, benefiting citizens, regions, farmers, researchers, students, NGOs, and businesses. Unlike national budgets, the EU budget is primarily aimed at investment, to generate growth and opportunities across the European Union.

    The EU serves 27 countries with a total population of 450 million. With these figures in mind, the annual EU budget is actually relatively small – on average €160-180 billion annually in 2021-27. This is comparable to the national budget of Denmark, which serves 5.6 million people, and is about 30% smaller than the budget of Poland, which serves 38 million people. (Source: Commission)

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Serious concerns regarding animal cruelty during animal transport in Austria – E-002112/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    16.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002112/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anja Hazekamp (The Left)

    Two shocking incidents of animal cruelty have recently been observed during the transport of animals in Austria.

    During the export of pregnant animals from Austria, footage on the Bulgarian-Turkish border shows a calf being cut out of a pregnant, dead cow, following which the calf is thrown on to the blood-drenched ground, while shaking violently[1]. Other footage shows animals unable to stand upright due to illness or exhaustion being brutally dragged from a vehicle by their front legs.[2]

    An overloaded truck carrying 142 calves was also stopped in Austria. A veterinarian on site confirmed that this transport from the Netherlands should never have taken place because the transport documents were not in order, the duration of the transport and the planned rest breaks were not respected and the water system for the animals was inadequate[3].

    • 1.Can the Commission outline its views on the mistreatment of calves during these transports?
    • 2.What action and sanctions has the Commission already taken against the relevant authorities in the Member States concerned for a flagrant infringement of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005?
    • 3.Does the Commission consider serious cruelty to animals to be reason enough to suspend the transport of live animals from Austria?

    Submitted: 16.10.2024

    • [1] https://vgt.at/presse/news/2024/news20240905mn.php.
    • [2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JcI0XeoepN4.
    • [3] https://www.krone.at/3518368.
    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Alarming spread of peste des petits ruminants (PPR) – E-002100/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    16.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002100/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Daniel Buda (PPE), Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (PPE)

    The first signs of sheep and goat plague or peste des petits ruminants (PPR) were detected in Tulcea County in Romania on 11 July 2024, on a commercial farm with a herd of 49 091 sheep, and a month later outbreaks were confirmed at 60 other sites across the country. The outbreaks were identified in the south-east and west of Romania, indicating the rapid spread of the disease despite the immediate implementation of measures to combat it.

    Losses from the 60 sites amount to 232 927 animals, which has hit the livestock sector hard. The slaughter of hundreds of thousands of goats and sheep due to this epidemic has impacted significantly not just on farmers, but also right the way along the economic chain.

    • 1.What aid mechanisms does the Commission intend to implement for the livestock sector?
    • 2.Will the Commission authorise, as a matter of urgency, the rollout across the EU of the current vaccine against PPR?
    • 3.In countries not as yet seriously affected by PPR, the protocol is to slaughter contaminated flocks but, in countries where the disease occurs frequently, an alternative to slaughter is to isolate sick animals and treat them with antibiotics to prevent secondary infections. Will the Commission endorse such an approach in order to limit the number of animals slaughtered and reduce farmers’ losses?

    Submitted: 16.10.2024

    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine – P10_TA(2025)0006 – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on historical remembrance,

    –  having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

    –  having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

    –  having regard to the Geneva Conventions,

    –  having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas on 24 February 2022, the Russian regime declared the start of a ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine based on false claims that it needed to protect civilians;

    B.  whereas, in fact, since 24 February 2022 the Russian Federation has been waging an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in continuation of previous aggressions since 2014, and continues to persistently violate the principles of the UN Charter through its aggressive actions against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine and to blatantly and grossly violate international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in particular through the massive use of targeted attacks against the civilian population, residential areas and civilian infrastructure;

    C.  whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, immediately qualified Russia’s war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution of 14 November 2022, it recognised the need to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its war of aggression, as well as legally and financially responsible for its internationally wrongful acts, and that Russia should pay reparations for the injuries and damage caused;

    D.  whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated act but a continuation of its imperialistic policy, which has included a war against Chechnya and military aggression against Georgia in 2008, and the occupation of Crimea and the start of a war in the Donbas in 2014;

    E.  whereas the start of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against neighbouring Ukraine was preceded by several public declarations by the president of the Russian Federation seeking to justify its use of force by means of historical revisionism, false claims and illegitimate demands for the recognition of its exclusive interests in Ukraine and other neighbouring countries;

    F.  whereas the Russian regime has been making widespread use of disinformation, including based on distorted historical arguments, and foreign information manipulation and interference in an attempt to justify its crime of aggression, to incite the Russian population to support its illegal regime and illegal war of aggression against neighbouring Ukraine, to interfere in the democratic processes of other countries and to reduce support among their populations for continued international assistance and support for Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression; whereas the Russian regime denies Ukraine’s distinct national identity, falsely claiming it as part of the Russian world (‘Russkiy mir’), a narrative rooted in imperialistic ideology; whereas Russia is demolishing Holodomor memorials and restoring demolished monuments to Lenin in the occupied territories of Ukraine;

    G.  whereas Russia has not only failed to acknowledge the unforgivable initial role of the Soviet Union in the early stages of World War II, for example through the 1939 Treaty of Non-Aggression between Nazi Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) and its secrets protocols, commonly referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, in which both totalitarian regimes conspired to divide Europe into exclusive spheres of influence, and failed to assume its responsibility for the many atrocities and mass crimes committed in territories occupied by the Soviet Union, but the current Russian regime has also instrumentalised history and created a cult of ‘victory’ around World War II to ideologically mobilise citizens and manipulate them into supporting an illegal war of aggression;

    H.  whereas Russia has developed a growing disinformation campaign of historical revisionism for the purpose of denying Ukraine its national identity, statehood and very existence, and with the aim of justifying its claims to exclusive spheres of influence, which is reminiscent of how the Soviet Union agreed with Nazi Germany to invade and occupy parts of Poland and Romania as well as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; whereas today, Russia poses a particular threat to Poland and the Baltic States and their sovereignty through this type of historical revisionism;

    I.  whereas Victory Day, celebrated annually on 9 May, has been turned by the current Russian regime into a tool of war propaganda in Russia, by exploiting the narrative of the ‘liberation of Europe from Nazism’ and thus ignoring the subsequent Soviet occupation of the Baltic States and the subjugation of central Europe; whereas this narrative of liberation from Nazism is being used today in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    J.  whereas in some Member States, communist symbols, as well as the symbols of the ongoing Russian aggression, are prohibited by law; whereas since 2009, 23 August has been commemorated across the EU as the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of all Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes; whereas since 2003, Parliament has held an annual commemoration for the victims of mass Soviet deportations;

    1.  Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on Russia to immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine and to completely and unconditionally withdraw all forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, to end its forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians and to release all detained and deported Ukrainians, particularly children;

    2.  Rejects the various claims made by the Russian regime as futile attempts to justify an illegal war of aggression that constitutes a blatant violation of the UN Charter and of the responsibility of the Russian Federation as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to maintain peace and stability and that was immediately recognised as such by the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, along with an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly; recalls that no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military, historic or otherwise, may serve as a justification for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine;

    3.  Condemns the Russian regime’s systematic falsification and use of distorted historical arguments, such as those related to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in its attempt to manipulate Russian public opinion into supporting criminal actions such as the illegal war of aggression against neighbouring Ukraine, to undermine international support and assistance for Ukraine and to erase Ukraine’s distinct cultural and historical identity; denounces Russia’s claim that it is entitled to zones of exclusive interest at the expense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states as incompatible with international law;

    4.  Condemns the Russian Federation’s failure to establish accountability for Soviet crimes and its deliberate obstruction of historical research by denying access to and closing Soviet archives, as well as the fact that it has enacted legislation criminalising the truthful portrayal of Soviet and Russian crimes and persecuted civil society organisations investigating Soviet crimes, and has glorified Stalinist totalitarianism and re-created its methods; maintains that impunity and the lack of factually accurate historical and public debate and education has contributed to the current Russian regime’s ability to revive imperialist policies and instrumentalise history for its criminal purposes; condemns the persecution of civil society organisations investigating Soviet crimes or the crimes of the current regime, including the liquidation of International Memorial, the Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre, and the Moscow Helsinki Group, as well as the forced closure of the Sakharov Centre;

    5.  Recalls that the deliberate attacks of the Russian Federation on the civilian population of Ukraine, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the use of torture, sexual violence and rape as weapons of war, the deportation of thousands of Ukrainian citizens to the territory of the Russian Federation, the forced transfer and adoption of Ukrainian children, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights constitute war crimes for which all perpetrators must be held accountable;

    6.  Reiterates, therefore, its full support for the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC into the situation in Ukraine based on alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; welcomes Ukraine’s formal accession to the ICC as of 1 January 2025 as an important contribution to international efforts to establish accountability for serious international crimes; calls for the EU to make further diplomatic efforts to encourage the ratification of the Rome Statute and all its amendments globally;

    7.  Furthermore also reiterates its call for the establishment of a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed by the leadership of the Russian Federation against Ukraine; reiterates its call on the Commission, the Council and the European External Action Service to provide all political, financial and practical support necessary for the establishment of a special tribunal; expresses its full support for the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine, based in The Hague and supporting the ongoing efforts of the Joint Investigation Team, as a first concrete step towards the establishment of the special tribunal;

    8.  Calls strongly for the EU and its Member States to further increase and coordinate their efforts, including with like-minded partners, to promptly and rigorously counter Russian disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference in order to protect the integrity of their democratic processes and strengthen the resilience of European societies, inter alia by actively promoting media literacy and by supporting quality media and professional journalism, in particular investigative journalism that uncovers Russian propaganda, its methods and networks, and by supporting research into new hybrid influence technologies;

    9.  Calls for the EU to expand its sanctions against Russian media outlets conducting disinformation and information manipulation campaigns supporting and justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and calls on the Member States to swiftly and thoroughly implement these sanctions and to dedicate sufficient resources to effectively addressing this hybrid warfare; calls for the EU and the Member States to step up their support for the independent Russian media in exile in order to enable diverse voices in the Russian-language media;

    10.  Expresses deep concern about the recent announcements from social media companies’ leadership concerning relaxing their rules on fact-checking and moderation and how this will further enable Russia’s disinformation campaign around the world; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strictly enforce the Digital Services Act in response to these announcements by Meta and earlier by X, including as an important part of the fight against Russian disinformation;

    11.  Calls on EU citizens to critically evaluate information by questioning its origins and intentions, particularly when it pertains to narratives linked to Russia, and to crosscheck facts using diverse and reliable sources to resist attempts at manipulation by foreign malign actors;

    12.  Condemns Moscow’s exploitation of Orthodox religion for geopolitical purposes, notably through the instrumentalisation of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) as a tool to influence and exert control over Orthodox populations in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and other countries;

    13.  Responds to the statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 2 May 2023 on the ideology of ‘Ruscism’ by condemning the nationalist imperialist ideology, policy and practices of the current Russian regime; stresses the incompatibility of this ideology and policy and these practices with international law and European values;

    14.  Believes that Russia’s attempts to misrepresent, revise and distort the history of Ukraine undermine the collective memory and identity of Europe as a whole and represent a threat to historical truth, democratic values and peace in Europe; calls on the Member States, therefore, to invest more in education on and research into the common history of Europe and European remembrance, and to support projects that promote a better understanding of the impact of the division of Europe during the Cold War; expresses its support for the building of a pan-European memorial in Brussels for the victims of the 20th century totalitarian regimes; regrets the continued use of symbols of totalitarian regimes in public spaces and calls for an EU-wide ban on the use of both Nazi and Soviet communist symbols as well as symbols of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine;

    15.  Expresses its wish for the EU and its Member States to promote better knowledge and understanding of the human suffering of Europeans inflicted by the Soviet regime during the 20th century; in this respect, calls for remembrance and respect for the victims of Soviet crimes, such as the mass deportations, including of the Crimean Tatar people and from the Baltic countries, the Gulag system, the Holodomor, massacres such as the Katyn massacre, and the Upper Silesian tragedy;

    16.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, and the Russian institutions.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Unreasonably high electricity prices – E-002091/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The issue of energy prices is of crucial importance both for the competitiveness of European companies and for the wellbeing of citizens.

    The Commission has been assessing the root causes for the high electricity prices in Southeastern Europe and has engaged bilaterally with the respective Member States.

    The Commission is in continuous discussions with Member States to support the implementation of adequate tools to respond to price spikes, without interfering with the proper functioning of the wholesale markets and the necessary investment needed for the energy transition.

    These tools include mobilising non-fossil flexibility, reducing demand during critical hours, increasing cross-border capacities, and protecting consumers .

    The existing internal market rules allow Member States to introduce all such measures, and the Commission is committed to support the Member States in their design.

    The Commission also underlines the importance of using existing interconnections between Southeastern Europe and the rest of Europe efficiently, and is engaging with some Member States to support the maximisation of the use of existing interconnections.

    European Union funding, in particular from the Connecting Europe Facility for Energy, is available for cross-border projects of common interest.

    The facility has notably provided funding for the electrical interconnection between Greece and Bulgaria that was commissioned in 2023.

    The Commission will actively work on affordability of energy. In this regard, already in the first 100 days of its mandate, the incoming Commission plans to adopt the Clean Industrial Deal, including an Action Plan for Affordable Energy.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Brutality of Croatian border police – E-002123/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The competence to carry out investigations into individual allegations against the national authorities, and to ensure remedial actions where allegations of wrongdoing are corroborated, is the responsibility of Member States.

    The Commission has been supporting the Croatian authorities in the establishment of the independent monitoring mechanism (IMM). The Coordination Board of the IMM issues reports on their activities, available on the IMM website[1].

    Following its Schengen accession on 1 January 2023, the first periodic Schengen evaluation of Croatia took place in December 2023 — March 2024 under the current Schengen evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism[2].

    Particular attention was paid to the respect of fundamental rights in the treatment of migrants and access to asylum procedure at Croatia’s borders.

    Observers from the Fundamental Right Agency (FRA) participated in the evaluation team. The evaluation report, adopted on 31 October 2024, concluded that, overall, the Croatian authorities duly consider fundamental rights when implementing the Schengen acquis.

    Looking ahead, Article 10 of the Screening Regulation[3] provides an obligation on Member States to set up independent mechanisms to monitor compliance with EU and international law during the screening.

    All Member States, including Croatia, should ensure that they fulfil this obligation, put in place adequate safeguards for these bodies’ independence, and equip them with appropriate financial means, taking also into account the FRA Guidance of 19 September 2024[4].

    • [1] https:// http://www.nmn.hr
    • [2] Council Regulation (EU) 2022/922 of 9 June 2022 on the establishment and operation of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013.
    • [3] Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 introducing the screening of third-country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817.
    • [4] Monitoring fundamental rights during screening and the asylum border procedure — A guide on national independent mechanisms (europa.eu) https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-independent-border-monitoring-mechanisms_en.pdf

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Greece gets EIB policy support for regions affected by lignite phase-out

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • EIB Advisory supports five Greek regions in social and green transformation projects following the gradual phase-out of lignite in Greece’s energy production
    • The goal is to improve living standards through investments in renewable energy, reskilling and urban development
    • The EIB Advisory service is supported by the InvestEU Advisory Hub

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) will advise five regions in Greece for investment programmes aimed at mitigating the social and economic impacts of lignite phase-out and facilitating the country’s transition to climate neutrality.

    Through the InvestEU Advisory Hub, the EIB will assist Western Macedonia, Megalopolis in the Peloponnese, Crete, and the North and South Aegean Islands, address economic and social aspects of the green transition.

    The EIB’s technical assistance, which is valued initially at €2.75 million, will be offered to the five regions. Greece plans to end, by 2026, the use of lignite which generates about a third of the country’s electricity, as it has been proven to be more harmful than other fossil fuels, causing climate change. The EIB have already previously provided similar support to help Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic cope with the permanent closure of lignite mines.

    “The European Investment Bank remains focused in its commitment to support Greece in addressing the complex challenges of the green transition, ensuring no region is left behind,” said EIB Vice-President Yannis Tsakiris. “Through the Advisory Hub, we are equipping the five regions with the technical expertise necessary to design and implement long-term investment plans, that will drive social and economic cohesion, foster renewable energy projects, and create sustainable job opportunities. This collaboration is a vital step toward mitigating the socio-economic impacts of the lignite phase-out while laying the groundwork for a climate-neutral future.”

    The EIB’s advisory services aim to:

    • Support and develop investment programmes that aim to revitalize and strengthen local economies.
    • Enhance institutional frameworks by providing training and sharing best practices from other EU Member States.
    • Ensure effective project management and compliance with EU standards.
    • Assist the regions in preparing grant applications, with a submission deadline of 11 September 2025, to secure the necessary funding.

    The accord, which comes under the InvestEU programme, builds on the Greek government’s commitment to social and economic cohesion efforts across the country and to align with European Union goals. It is also part of the European Green Deal and the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM), which aim to transform the European Union into the world’s first climate-neutral region by 2050 through mobilizing €100 billion in investments to assist areas most affected by the transition to low-carbon and climate-resilient economies.

    The regions receiving this support are covered by Greece’s “Just Transition Plan”. Following, are more details about the five areas:

    • Western Macedonia: Historically Greece’s energy powerhouse, it is heavily impacted by coal plant decommissioning. The main goal for the next day is to transform it into an “alternative clean energy hub” and to attract investment in new and dynamic sectors of national importance.
    • Megalopolis, Peloponnese: Renowned for lignite mining and power generation, requiring a transition to sustainable energy sources. The main goal is to promote the area as an “entrepreneurship hub” with an emphasis on new and innovative productive activities around the bioeconomy value chain (agriculture, circular and digital economy)
    • Crete: Focuses on integrating renewable energy sources and phasing out autonomous power plants. Additionally, the goal is to achieve “greener” development for the island and transform its business activities into more sustainable models.
    • North Aegean Islands: Relies on agriculture and tourism, with necessary investments in sustainable practices, including the blue economy, as well as the phasing out of autonomous power plants.
    • South Aegean Islands: The transformation of the tourism-driven economy is anticipated, while promoting green development initiatives and supporting the growth of business activities related to the clean energy value chain

    EIB’s role in supporting a climate-neutral Europe

    As the EU’s climate bank, the EIB plays a critical role in financing and advising projects under the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan (SEIP). The SEIP’s objective is to mobilise €1trillion in sustainable investments by 2030, with the JTM serving as a cornerstone for ensuring a just and inclusive transition across Europe.

    About InvestEU

    The InvestEU programme provides the European Union with crucial long-term funding by leveraging substantial private and public funds in support of a sustainable recovery. It brings together under one roof the multitude of EU financial instruments currently available to support investment in the European Union, making funding for investment projects in Europe simpler, more efficient and more flexible. The programme consists of three components: the InvestEU Fund, the InvestEU Advisory Hub and the InvestEU Portal. Through advisory support offered to project developers, the InvestEU Advisory Hub mproves the quality of investment projects and their alignment with the EU long term policy goals.

    Background information

    About the EIB

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances sound investments that further EU policy objectives. EIB projects bolster competitiveness, drive innovation, promote sustainable development, enhance social and territorial cohesion, and support a just and swift transition to climate neutrality.

    Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the EU is directed towards cohesion regions, where the per capita income is lower. This underscores the Bank’s commitment to foster inclusive growth and  converge the living standards.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – The EU’s new bilateral security and defence partnerships – 24-01-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    The Strategic Compass, adopted by the 27 EU Member States in March 2022 – only weeks after the onset of Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked aggression on Ukraine –emphasised the need for robust partnerships, for the EU to be able to achieve its objectives in the area of security and defence. Alongside ‘acting’ (operations), ‘securing’ (resilience) and ‘investing’, ‘partnering’ is one of the four main pillars of the Compass. The document itself outlines specific targets and deadlines to measure progress in this area. While the EU has partnered with other security and defence actors (essentially states and international organisations) in the past, a new model of tailored security and defence partnership was launched shortly after the adoption of the Compass, as a reinforced framework for enhanced partnership. To date, the EU has signed six such partnerships – with (by date of signature) Norway, Moldova, South Korea, Japan, Albania and North Macedonia, and more are envisaged. While the partnerships vary in content, depending on the assessed mutual interests of the EU and each individual partner, some ten areas of cooperation are common to all six. The European Parliament has highlighted the significance of the Strategic Compass’s partnership dimension and, in particular, the value of security and defence dialogues with partners from the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership, as well as with key partners in strategic maritime areas such as the Southern Neighbourhood and the Indo-Pacific. Parliament has underlined that cooperation with countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, the Western Balkans, Japan, Australia and certain African countries serves as a key element of the common security and defence policy. In 2023, it called for deeper military and defence cooperation with Japan and South Korea, and for closer cooperation with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB Global strengthens partnership with Albania

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • The EU bank has provided advisory support to facilitate the introduction of a green taxonomy in the country.
    • EIB Vice-President Robert de Groot and Albanian Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Hasani have signed a host country agreement to enhance mutual collaboration.
    • Since 2010, EIB Global has provided €420 million for key transportation, water supply, energy and private sector projects in Albania under the Team Europe initiative.

    European Investment Bank (EIB) Vice-President Robert de Groot has visited Albania, meeting with Prime Minister Edi Rama and high-level government and EU representatives to discuss and strengthen cooperation on priority areas such as energy, transport, regional connectivity and private sector development.

    To this end, he signed a cooperation agreement with the Governor of the National Bank of Albania Gent Sejko for the implementation of the EIB’s Greening Financial Systems programme, in the presence of EU Delegation’s Head of Cooperation Hubert Perr. The technical assistance provided through this programme will enable the Bank of Albania to incorporate climate risks into the regulatory framework, while developing the green taxonomy for the financial sector in the country in line with the Paris Agreement. It will help Albanian banks embrace climate finance best practices, catalyse new funding for green projects, and better assess, monitor and report on climate-related risks.

    These efforts will encourage green investments among Albanian companies, while helping them adopt the necessary transition strategies to mitigate climate risks. In turn, this will enable sustainable and climate-resilient growth in the Albanian economy. Funded by the International Climate Initiative Fund, the programme is being implemented in partnership with the Nationally Determined Contributions Partnership, a global coalition of countries and institutions committed to advancing climate action through sustainable development.

    On the same occasion, EIB Vice-President de Groot signed a host country agreement with the Republic of Albania, represented by the country’s Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Igli Hasani, in the presence of EU Ambassador to Albania Silvio Gonzato. This agreement will enable the EIB to strengthen cooperation with local partners under Team Europe initiative to maximise financial and technical support for key projects such as the modernisation of the railway line from Vorë to the border with Montenegro, the improvement of water distribution system in the Municipality of Tirana, and the deployment of favourable financing for small businesses.

    EIB Vice-President Robert de Groot, who is responsible for operations in the Western Balkans, said: “The signing of these agreements mark yet another milestone for the European Investment Bank in Albania. Going forward on Albania’s path to EU accession, we are committed to delivering new high-impact projects that promote improved connectivity and green transition in Albania”.

    Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania Igli Hasani said: “The Host Country Agreement with the EIB, signed today, strengthens its role in boosting Albania’s rapid economic development and EU integration. EIB has supported Albania’s transition from the start. Increased funding and expertise will aid in implementing the EU’s Economic and Investment Plan & Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. Tirana is set to grow as a regional economic hub.”

    Governor of the Bank of Albania Gent Sejko said: “The Bank of Albania has taken substantial steps to enhance the financial sector’s capacity to address climate risks. Through collaboration with the European Investment Bank, an institution with extensive expertise in sustainable finance, we are empowered to advance green finance, align our policies with European best practices, and build a financial system equipped to meet the challenges of sustainable development. This agreement underscores our shared commitment to fostering green finance and supporting a financial system that drives the transition towards a sustainable and resilient economy. The green taxonomy, to be developed through this partnership, will play a crucial role in channelling funds toward environmentally impactful investments, fostering greater transparency and financial sustainability.”

    Head of the EU Delegation to Albania Ambassador Silvio Gonzato remarked: ““The EU in Albania is glad to support the strengthening of the partnership between the European Investment Bank and Albania, at a time when Albania has announced its ambitious schedule for the accession negotiations. The EIB is a key partner of the EU when it comes to supporting Albania’s EU integration process. Our joint focus now is on actively supporting Albania’s implementation of the EU Growth Plan and the related Reform and Growth Agenda, fostering modernisation, reforms, and sustainable economic growth. We call upon Albania to maximise the benefits of its partnership with the EU and the EIB to build the foundations for a stronger, more connected and more prosperous Albania within the EU.”

    Since 2010, EIB Global has provided €420 million for key transportation, water supply, energy and private sector projects in Albania.

    Background information:

    About the EIB and EIB Global:

    The EIB is the long-term financing institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It makes long-term finance available for sound investment in order to contribute towards EU policy goals. The EIB supports projects in four priority areas: infrastructure, innovation, climate and environment, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm devoted to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance, and a key partner of the Global Gateway. We aim to support €100 billion of investment by the end of 2027 – around one-third of the overall target of this EU initiative. Within Team Europe, EIB Global fosters strong, focused partnerships alongside fellow development finance institutions and civil society. EIB Global brings the EIB Group closer to local people, companies and institutions through our offices around the world.

    About EIB Global in the Western Balkans:

    The EIB is a leading international financier in the Western Balkans. Since 2009, the Bank has financed projects worth close to €11 billion in the region. On top of its continued support for the reconstruction and upgrade of public infrastructure, since 2010 the EIB has expanded into many new areas, such as healthcare, research and development, education and small and medium enterprises. 

    About the EIB in Albania:

    The EIB has been active in Albania since 1995. To date, 27 projects have been financed and over €700 million invested, mostly in key transport, energy, water and wastewater infrastructure.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Debates – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg – Revised edition

    Source: European Parliament

    Verbatim report of proceedings
     344k  764k
    Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg
    1. Opening of the sitting
      2. Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (debate)
      3. Resumption of the sitting
      4. Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (debate)
      5. Resumption of the sitting
      6. Composition of new committees
      7. Composition of committees and delegations
      8. Voting time
        8.1. Case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RC-B10-0069/2025, B10-0065/2025, B10-0069/2025, B10-0070/2025, B10-0072/2025, B10-0078/2025, B10-0081/2025, B10-0084/2025) (vote)
        8.2. Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (RC-B10-0066/2025, B10-0063/2025, B10-0066/2025, B10-0067/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025, B10-0086/2025) (vote)
        8.3. Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (RC-B10-0087/2025, B10-0087/2025, B10-0088/2025, B10-0089/2025, B10-0090/2025, B10-0091/2025, B10-0092/2025, B10-0093/2025) (vote)
        8.4. Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (RC-B10-0074/2025, B10-0074/2025, B10-0075/2025, B10-0076/2025, B10-0077/2025, B10-0079/2025) (vote)
        8.5. Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (RC-B10-0064/2025, B10-0064/2025, B10-0068/2025, B10-0071/2025, B10-0080/2025, B10-0083/2025) (vote)
      9. Resumption of the sitting
      10. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting
      11. Major interpellations (debate)
      12. Explanations of votes
      13. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted
      14. Dates of forthcoming sittings
      15. Closure of the sitting
      16. Adjournment of the session

       

    PRÉSIDENCE: YOUNOUS OMARJEE
    Vice-Président

     
    1. Opening of the sitting

       

    (La séance est ouverte à 09h01)

     

    2. Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (debate)


     

      Jessika Roswall, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, healthy soils are fundamental for our collective future. Without rich and fertile soils, we have no food and many farmers have their livelihoods affected. We must pay more attention to combating land degradation and enhancing drought resilience for our economy and for our security.

    Europe is not immune to these issues. One of our key political priorities for the coming mandate, the new water resilience strategy, comes from the realisation that our European and global waters are under unsustainable pressure. At the same time, our Joint Research Centre Soil Observatory notes that at least 62 % of EU soils are affected by degradation.

    Droughts have substantial impacts on nearly all regions of the EU. This is why I travelled to Riyadh for the opening of the desertification COP16 on my first day as European Commissioner. I wanted to send a strong signal of the EU’s clear commitment to multilateralism and to cooperation with international partners on our key environmental challenges.

    The desertification COP followed the two meetings of the climate and biodiversity COPs. The day before it started, countries failed to agree on a global treaty on plastic pollution. On desertification, despite the EU’s strong engagement, we reached a mixed result in Riyadh. Parties were not able to reach a compromise on the main topic on the agenda – an instrument to address droughts. It is disappointing that we cannot bridge our differences and reach consensus on such critical issues.

    We were also disappointed in the outcome on gender and civil society organisations. The participation of these organisations increases transparency and democratic accountability. Their contribution is essential. However, some countries increasingly challenge the role and contributions of civil society organisations.

    Finally, we were disappointed that the parties were reluctant to embrace synergies across the three Rio Conventions on desertification, climate and biodiversity.

    However, we did also make progress on several fronts, and every bit of multilateral success is worth celebrating. We reached an agreement on establishing the Science-Policy Interface as a permanent body. We also adopted decisions on land tenure, on migration related to desertification, land degradation and droughts, and on avoiding, reducing and reversing degradation on agricultural land. It was the first time in the history of the Convention that agricultural land degradation was addressed. We must look at sustainable agricultural practices and healthy land together.

    Finally, after a 10‑year freeze, the parties agreed to increase the core budget of the Convention. This is an important step to ensure that global challenges like desertification, drought and water scarcity are properly addressed in the multilateral agenda.

    The EU is contributing to the concrete implementation of the Convention, particularly through our continued support for the Great Green Wall, an inspiring UNCCD flagship initiative that the EU is proud to champion. Building on this commitment, the EU has launched the second phase of the UN World Restoration Flagship, Regreening Africa, which is a key contribution to the Green Wall Initiative.

    Honourable Members, the EU and its Member States will need to step up efforts to protect our values and implement international commitments in the UNCCD and within the EU. In this regard, I am happy to report that the Commission is responding to the commitments of the European Court of Auditors by developing a methodology to assess land degradation and certification for the EU. This will require careful preparation and strategic alliances. We need to address land use, climate change, biodiversity loss, water scarcity and pollution in a coherent manner.

    Honourable Members, these are reflections from my first ever COP, and I am convinced that this COP on desertification needs to be more central. We also cannot look at the outcome of Riyadh without acknowledging that international negotiations have become more difficult, more complex and interconnected when the world is facing several ecological crises. Biodiversity, climate, food, water and energy challenges are all interconnected with land use.

    I’m now looking forward to hearing your views.

     
       

     

      Carmen Crespo Díaz, en nombre del Grupo PPE. – Señor presidente, señora comisaria, gracias por el empuje al tema del agua desde la nueva Comisión. Creemos que es fundamental. Yo soy de una tierra desértica, al lado del desierto de Europa de Tabernas, y allí se demuestra con la huerta de Europa —porque el 80 % del producto de frutas y hortalizas se exporta desde allí —que es posible abordar esta cuestión. ¿Por qué? Porque hay veinte veces menor huella hídrica en todos los productos agroalimentarios.

    Ese es el gran milagro: que para las infraestructuras hidráulicas se utilicen los fondos Next Generation, el Banco Europeo de Inversiones y se creen infraestructuras donde la ciencia, con todo lo que se está investigando, permita. Creo en estos momentos que es fundamental prestar atención a todas las fuentes hídricas: todas son necesarias, algunas en prevención y otras adecuadas a las cuestiones agrarias. Creo que es importantísima la economía circular, y las aguas residuales nos dan una oportunidad en Europa de tener agua regenerada, que incluso podemos inyectar a nuestra hucha del futuro, que son, en este caso, todas las aguas subterráneas.

    Por ello, creo que se puede hacer, que tenemos la obligación de hacerlo y que, además, en este momento, los países como España, como el mío, deberían trabajar en estas infraestructuras hidráulicas de prevención —también adaptadas a lo que es el tema agrario— y, por supuesto, bajar los impuestos, el IVA de los alimentos, que la rebaja no se ha prorrogado en este momento en ese decreto trampa que ayer llevaron al Congreso de los Diputados. Creo que es fundamental la seguridad alimentaria y, para conseguirla, tenemos que trabajar en las infraestructuras hidráulicas, como la nueva Comisión y la nueva comisaria están haciendo en este momento en Europa.

     
       

     

      Marta Temido, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, Senhora Comissária, Caros Colegas, a desertificação e a degradação dos solos, tal como as alterações climáticas, são uma realidade que põe em causa os direitos humanos mais básicos, como o direito à alimentação ou o direito ao acesso à água limpa e segura. Atingem, em especial, as comunidades mais vulneráveis, as mulheres, as crianças, os povos indígenas, mas, potencialmente, vão atingir-nos a todos.

    E a COP 16, que decorreu em Riade no passado mês de dezembro, reforçou a urgência do combate a estes fenómenos, através da intensificação da colaboração internacional e de uma abordagem integrada. A União Europeia reafirmou o seu compromisso com a meta global de neutralidade da degradação da terra e o empenho em atingir este objetivo até 2030, através de incentivos aos Estados-Membros para que adotem políticas que favoreçam a restauração das terras e a implementação de práticas agrícolas sustentáveis.

    Por isso, a União Europeia tem de continuar a incentivar a adoção destas práticas agrícolas regenerativas, que respeitem os ecossistemas naturais e contribuam para a restauração de solos degradados, e deve bater-se pela implementação da Lei do Restauro da Natureza. Mas a inclusão da sociedade civil e do setor privado neste combate são essenciais, e isso exige iniciativas de apoio.

    Quero referir, aqui, uma iniciativa da sociedade civil do meu país, Portugal, que exemplifica bem esta luta que precisamos de levar a cabo com ela. E é a iniciativa Pró-Montado Alentejo, um projeto que visa promover a construção de uma barreira florestal ativa na região sul de Portugal, baseada no montado de sobreiro e azinheira, com o objetivo de mitigar os efeitos das alterações climáticas, combater a desertificação, proteger a diversidade e, enfim, combater o despovoamento.

     
       

     

      Julien Leonardelli, au nom du groupe PfE. – Monsieur le Président, la COP16 a été, sans aucun doute, la plus grande réunion d’États à ce jour sur le sujet de la désertification. Elle se tenait à Riyad, ce qui a permis aux participants de constater à quel point ce problème bouleverse des puissances régionales qui reposaient autrefois sur l’agriculture, comme l’Éthiopie ou l’Égypte. Ce véritable fléau est aujourd’hui à nos portes. On l’observe déjà en Grèce, en Italie, mais aussi dans ma région au sud de la France, en Occitanie, où l’eau courante des habitants est désormais rationnée en été, lors des canicules, où les agriculteurs ne peuvent pas toujours arroser leurs cultures et où les feux de forêt se font de plus en plus fréquents.

    Aujourd’hui, le temps n’est plus aux belles intentions et aux fausses promesses, mais au changement. Les Européens touchés par l’artificialisation des sols et la sécheresse méritent mieux que les ânonnements suffisants de ceux qui se tiennent dans des tours de verre et de béton. Pour répondre à ce défi, il faut privilégier les circuits courts, réduire le libre-échange débridé qui pollue notre air et nos océans et se tourner vers l’innovation et la recherche, à l’image des pays du Golfe. Ne restons pas spectateurs, soyons les acteurs de notre salut avant qu’il ne soit trop tard.

     
       

     

      Francesco Ventola, a nome del gruppo ECR. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, dal rapporto COP16 la desertificazione e la siccità rappresentano non solo emergenze ambientali, ma anche minacce sociali ed economiche per intere regioni.

    I dati forniti sottolineano che oltre il 40 % delle terre globali è degradato e che la siccità provoca perdite economiche annuali che superano i 300 miliardi. In Italia, questo si traduce in una crisi che colpisce soprattutto il comparto agricolo.

    Si rende sempre più necessaria e indispensabile la realizzazione di infrastrutture che ottimizzino il sistema di raccolta, conservazione e distribuzione della risorsa acqua. È necessario investire in impianti di riuso delle acque reflue. Nessuna goccia deve essere dispersa: non ce lo possiamo permettere.

    Non possiamo più accettare false politiche ambientali ideologizzate, che bloccano sui territori la realizzazione di progetti innovativi e realmente sostenibili. Bisogna intraprendere tutte le strade che la scienza e la tecnologia ci offrono per fronteggiare il rischio desertificazione.

    Cari colleghi, non limitiamoci solo a parlare dei problemi: agiamo per risolverli e facciamolo con determinazione, per il bene dei nostri territori, dell’Europa e delle generazioni future.

     
       

     

      Martin Hojsík, za skupinu Renew. – Vážený pán predsedajúci, vážená pani komisárka, vážené kolegyne, vážení kolegovia, aj keď sa takpovediac symbolicky konferencia dohody OSN o dezertifikácii konala v Saudskej Arábii uprostred púšte, nie je to téma, ktorá sa týka len Arabského polostrova a Afriky. Je to téma, ktorá sa veľmi bytostne týka aj nás v Európe. Dezertifikácia je každodenným problémom na Cypre, v Španielsku, v Taliansku, ale aj uprostred Európy. U nás doma na Slovensku každým rokom vidíme väčší a väčší podiel pôdy, ktorú už farmári nedokážu obhospodarovať, ktorá sa nám stráca takpovediac priamo pred očami, pretože sa vysušuje. O tom je dezertifikácia. Sucho a nedostatok vody sa stali fenoménom našej doby a keď prídu, tak prídu ako záplavy. Klimatická kríza sa mení na klimatickú katastrofu. Ničíme biodiverzitu a meníme krajinu v púšť. V niektorých častiach Slovenska farmári prišli až o 40 % svojich výnosov kvôli dezertifikácii. Taký obrovský to je problém. Preto ako spravodajca Európskeho parlamentu pre zákon o pôde, naozaj vás chcem vyzvať, aby ste ho podporili. Dúfam, že sa nám spolu s Komisiou a Radou podarí dosiahnuť čoskoro v trialógu dohodu. Základom je mať kvalitné informácie. V Rijáde sa dohodla medzinárodná platforma. V Európe takú nemáme, zákon o pôde ju vie poskytnúť.

     
       

     

      Pär Holmgren, för Verts/ALE gruppen. – Herr talman! Kommissionär Roswall! Klimatförändringarna handlar verkligen inte bara om att det blir varmare på planeten, utan ett mycket större hot i stora delar av världen är förändringarna i nederbördsklimatet. Det blir mer nederbörd, kraftigare nederbörd på de platser där vi redan har mycket vatten. Men framför allt, i det här sammanhang som vi diskuterar nu, på många platser, inte minst där vi har en stor del av mänskligheten, där vi har en stor del av jordbruk och matproduktion, blir det nu sakta men säkert torrare.

    Det är ett enormt stort akut hot mot oss och vår matproduktion. Det här gäller inte bara andra delar av världen, det gäller här hemma i Europa också. Vi ser delar av framför allt Sydeuropa, hur skördar av till exempel majs och vete redan har sjunkit med storleksordningen 60 %.

    Vi vet också att det torrare klimatet, det torrare, lokala och regionala klimatet, medför en massa riskkonsekvenser. Till exempel de förskräckliga översvämningar som vi såg i Valencia senast förvärrades så mycket av att marken där först hade blivit så torr och hård att den inte kunde ta emot vatten.

    Som kommissionär Roswall konstaterade: På COP16, visst i vissa steg, i vissa sammanhang tog vi steg framåt, men som ofta i sådana här sammanhang var det lite blandade resultat. Det största problemet är att vi återigen misslyckades med att få ett bindande globalt ramverk när det gäller att bekämpa torka.

    Hade ansvariga politiker redan i slutet på 1900‑talet tagit hänsyn till den forskning som fanns då hade vi förhoppningsvis inte varit där vi är nu. Men nu är vi där vi är, och det innebär att vi, inte minst här i EU, måste höja ambitionerna, både när det gäller att minska utsläppen och arbeta ännu mer aktivt med klimatanpassning.

     
       

     

      Catarina Martins, em nome do Grupo The Left. – Senhor Presidente, nos próximos 25 anos, três em cada quatro pessoas será afetada pela seca a nível mundial. É uma catástrofe e está aqui. A Europa está a aquecer mais rápido do que o resto do mundo e a seca prolongada chegou décadas antes do que estava previsto.

    Por isso mesmo, e apesar do veto dos Estados Unidos e do Japão a um acordo para um regime global de resiliência à seca, a União Europeia não pode desistir desse objetivo e deve agir a todos os níveis.

    Venho de um país, Portugal, onde a agricultura superintensiva condena boa parte da população alentejana e algarvia, incluindo os pequenos agricultores, a uma vida sem água. O que produzem não alimenta essas populações nem deixa riqueza no país. Tudo é exportado, incluindo os lucros. Por lá, ficam só os solos degradados.

    Por isso, bem sei que esta não é a luta da ecologia contra a agricultura, é a das nossas vidas, incluindo a produção alimentar, contra a voragem das multinacionais do agronegócio. E por isso, Senhora Comissária, vai ser mesmo preciso coragem para enfrentar alguns dos mais poderosos interesses económicos.

     
       

     

      Zsuzsanna Borvendég, a ESN képviselőcsoport nevében. – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! Magyarország termőföldjei az emberi tevékenység miatt száradnak ki. A Kárpát-medence természetes vízháztartása elegendő vizet biztosítana, ha a tájnak megfelelő módon gazdálkodnánk.

    De ma mindent a profitéhség határoz meg, amely kizsákmányolja a környezetet. Ártereink helyén zöldhasút termő szántóföldek vannak. Hagyjuk, hogy a folyók átvágtassanak az országon, ahelyett, hogy átitatnák a talajt az éltető vízzel.

    Az uniós döntéshozatal a klímaválság kapcsán a levegő összetételére fókuszál, és erre hivatkozva betarthatatlan emissziós szabályokat alkot, de az ennek érdekében használt új technológiák a talaj és a talajvizek elszennyeződését fokozzák.

    Magyarországon az aszállyal párhuzamosan az akkumulátorgyárak vízszennyező hatásával is számolni kell, vagyis nálunk is a gazdasági lobbik írják felül a környezetvédelmet.

    A Föld egy komplex rendszer, amely komplex válaszokat igényel, nem lehet kiragadni egyes problémákat. Ha valós megoldásokat akarunk, akkor a lokalitás felé kell mozdulnunk, és uniós forrásokból is a helyi sajátosságoknak megfelelő természetközeli megoldásokat kell támogatnunk.

     
       

     

      Christine Schneider (PPE). – Herr Präsident, Frau Kommissarin, meine sehr geehrten Damen und Herren! Wüstenbildung ist eine globale Herausforderung, und Europa ist immer stärker betroffen. Unsere Ernährungssicherheit, die wir lange für selbstverständlich hielten, ist bedroht. Eine Lösung kann nur mit und nicht gegen unsere Landwirtinnen und Landwirte gefunden werden. Was passiert, wenn wir über ihre Köpfe hinweg entscheiden, das haben die letzten Jahre gezeigt. Bauernproteste sind zwischenzeitlich vor diesem Haus zum Alltag geworden. Daher mein dringender Appell: Beziehen Sie von Anfang an den Berufsstand mit ein, insbesondere bei der angekündigten Water Resilience Strategy.

    Drei Aspekte möchte ich hervorheben: Wir brauchen erstens ein intelligentes Wassermanagement. Nutzen wir die künstliche Intelligenz, um Wasserressourcen effizient zu verteilen. Setzen wir auf Wiederverwendung von Grauwasser und Abwasser, und bauen wir wassersparende Infrastruktur aus. So können wir Wasser nachhaltig zwischen den Regionen und Sektoren nutzen. Zweitens: dürreresistentes Saatgut. Es ist unverzichtbar, um Erträge selbst unter extremen Klimabedingungen zu sichern. Dazu brauchen wir neue Züchtungstechnologien, und die Blockade im Rat muss beendet werden. Drittens: Innovative Bewässerungslösungen, Tröpfchen- und Präzisionsbewässerung nutzen Sensorendaten, setzen Wasser ganz gezielt ein und vermeiden dadurch Verluste. Diese Technologien müssen wir stärker fördern, um unsere Landwirtschaft noch effizienter und nachhaltiger zu machen.

    Kurz zusammengefasst: Wenn wir Ernährungssicherheit wollen, brauchen wir neue Technologien und innovative Lösungen in enger Zusammenarbeit mit unseren internationalen Partnern, mit unseren Landwirten, aber auch mit uns Verbraucherinnen und Verbrauchern.

     
       

     

      Σάκης Αρναούτογλου (S&D). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η Γη μας, πηγή ζωής για αιώνες, αντιμετωπίζει τον κίνδυνο να μετατραπεί σε πηγή αφανισμού. Οφείλουμε να αποτρέψουμε τη μετατροπή εύφορων περιοχών σε ερημωμένα τοπία. Όταν το έδαφος καταστρέφεται, διακυβεύεται το μέλλον της ανθρωπότητας. Η ζωή δεν μπορεί να ευδοκιμήσει σε καμένη γη. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση καλείται να αναλάβει ηγετικό ρόλο, διακηρύσσοντας την ανάγκη για ορθολογική διαχείριση των φυσικών πόρων και τερματισμό επιτέλους της αδράνειας. Η συνέχιση της παρούσας πορείας θα οδηγήσει στη συγκομιδή των συνεπειών της αδιαφορίας μας και όχι των καρπών της γης. Προτείνω τη σύναψη ενός Συμφώνου για Ζωντανή Γη, μια συμφωνία που θα προβλέπει την αντιστάθμιση κάθε χαμένης έκτασης με την αναγέννηση διπλάσιας έκτασης μέσω βιώσιμων επενδύσεων. Μια τέτοια πρωτοβουλία θα μπορούσε να αποτελέσει ένα νέο παγκόσμιο πρότυπο για τη βιώσιμη διαχείριση των εδαφών. Δεν πρόκειται για μια ουτοπική ιδέα, αλλά για μια επιτακτική ανάγκη. Παρά τις προσπάθειες για την προστασία του πλανήτη, παρατηρούμε την εστίαση ορισμένων στην εξερεύνηση διαστημικών προορισμών, παραβλέποντας την ανάγκη για άμεση δράση στη Γη. Φαίνεται να προκρίνεται η κατάκτηση ενός απομακρυσμένου κόκκινου πλανήτη εις βάρος της διαφύλαξης του πράσινου πλανήτη μας. Επιπλέον, διαπιστώνεται η ενίσχυση ρητορικών που αμφισβητούν την κρισιμότητα της κατάστασης, υποβαθμίζοντας τις περιβαλλοντικές προκλήσεις σε πολιτικά παιχνίδια. Η φύση μάς απευθύνει επείγουσα έκκληση. Ας την αφουγκραστούμε, πριν η σιωπή της γίνει πιο εκκωφαντική από οποιαδήποτε φωνή. Ο χρόνος για δράση είναι τώρα. Και σε όσους αναζητούν καταφύγιο σε άλλους πλανήτες, ας τους υπενθυμίσουμε ότι εκεί οι συνθήκες είναι ήδη ερημικές και θα έρθει η ερημοποίηση και στον πλανήτη μας, αν αυτό επιζητούν.

     
       

     

      Mireia Borrás Pabón (PfE). – Señor presidente, señora comisaria, señorías, voy a ser muy clara: la CP16 ha sido otro espectáculo bochornoso de hipocresía, con líderes mundiales que vuelan en sus jets privados a Arabia Saudí; un país, por cierto, que incumple el 75 % de las restricciones medioambientales que ustedes desde aquí, desde Bruselas, imponen sin piedad a nuestros agricultores. Sí, aquellos mismos que evitan la desertificación del territorio. ¿Y qué resultados hemos obtenido? Ninguno, ningún compromiso vinculante.

    Nos enfrentamos a un gran problema, señora comisaria: casi el 70 % de las tierras agrícolas mediterráneas están en riesgo de desertificación y solo en España —en mi país— dos millones de hectáreas ya están clasificadas como desérticas. ¿Y qué hace la Comisión al respecto? Lo de siempre: culpabilizar al cambio climático. Pero ¿se han planteado, por un momento, que el principal problema fuera, por ejemplo, la falta de inversión en infraestructuras hídricas? En Europa se pierden millones de toneladas de agua de riego debido a infraestructuras hídricas que están tremendamente anticuadas.

    Miremos a Israel —un país que tiene recursos hídricos muy escasos y condiciones casi desérticas—, que ha revolucionado su agricultura con tecnología muy avanzada; mientras ellos aumentan su productividad un 30 %, aquí en Europa nuestros agricultores se ven obligados a abandonar sus tierras. Desde Vox ya seguimos en esta línea y propusimos un plan: un gran Plan Hidrológico Nacional para garantizar el agua y cohesionar el territorio. ¿Y qué es lo que votó toda la izquierda en bloque? Un no rotundo. ¿Y qué es lo que votó el Partido Popular? Pues se abstuvo, como siempre, cuando le gustan nuestras iniciativas, pero tienen complejo en admitirlo.

    Miremos ahora a Jaén: Marmolejo, Arjona, Lopera. ¿Les suenan, señores del PP? Son lugares de España donde el Partido Popular está expropiando tierras cultivadas con olivos para construir masivamente plantas fotovoltaicas. ¿Les preocupa de verdad la desertificación, señores del PP? 100 000 olivos a la basura, en nombre de la sostenibilidad. Empezamos a pensar que ustedes prefieren el aceite de Marruecos al aceite de Jaén, pero lo cierto es que no me extrañaría ver dentro de muy poco tanto al Partido Popular como a la izquierda manifestándose juntos en contra de sus propias políticas, esta vez no en apoyo de las nucleares, sino en su falsa solidaridad con los agricultores de Jaén, tan falsa como la sostenibilidad que defienden.

     
       

     

      Laurence Trochu (ECR). – Monsieur le Président, Madame la Commissaire, mes chers collègues, face aux enjeux climatiques, il est triste de voir que les solutions idéologiques prennent trop souvent le pas sur le bon sens. La question de la désertification n’y fait pas exception et les réponses apportées à ce problème, que personne ne nie d’ailleurs, sont souvent illusoires. À ce titre, l’opposition féroce et même, parfois, violente des écologistes français à des solutions de bon sens telles que les mégabassines, qui stockent le surplus d’eau de l’hiver pour le réutiliser l’été, est un exemple éloquent.

    Alors, plutôt que de voir en l’homme uniquement un prédateur-pollueur, l’homme doit être la solution, par l’innovation, le progrès technique et la recherche. La désertification ne peut être combattue par une écologie punitive et normative à outrance, ruineuse pour notre compétitivité, comme l’a d’ailleurs souligné le rapport Draghi.

    Nos agriculteurs, qui ont façonné nos paysages, sont las d’être désignés comme les principaux responsables et d’être écrasés de normes. Dernier artefact idéologique, le changement climatique est aussi utilisé comme prétexte pour justifier une immigration de masse venue du Sud dont plus personne ne veut. Alors, chers collègues, pour relever le défi du climat, sortons enfin de l’idéologie.

     
       

     

      Billy Kelleher (Renew). – Mr President, as I stand here, my home country of Ireland is preparing to be battered by one of the strongest storms in decades. And if you look at the weather forecasts across Europe, there’s rain in many areas. So it’s a concept that is very hard to understand when we sometimes speak about desertification.

    But, in reality, the scale of this problem – the desertification – should be everyone’s concern. It affects the land of homes to 1.5 billion people. The UN estimates that 135 million people have already been displaced due to desertification, and this could rise to 700 million by 2050. This land is also important agricultural land, and the UN estimates that 40 % of agricultural land has already been degraded.

    The consequences are far-reaching: humanitarian, migration, environmental problems, food and water security, political stability or political instability, for global security, for trade and supply chains there are significant challenges. And each of these consequences will have an impact also on Europe and the daily lives of our citizens.

    We cannot reverse the problems in the very short term, but we have to plan and we must make real collective efforts to halt its spread and to address its long-term implications. So while I welcome the commitments at the COP16 of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, especially regarding the financial commitments from both the public and private sector, we do need to ensure that we make a common effort to bring forward the challenges regarding drought and the protocols with regard to tackling the same.

    If we are going to halt this runaway train, we need to have a common, coherent plan for tackling drought and that involves governments, businesses, local people, scientists and engineers.

     
       

     

      Kai Tegethoff (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, the summer of 2024 is the hottest on record in the EU and globally. Thirteen Member States, meaning almost 50 % of the Member States of the EU, are affected by desertification and almost 25 % of the territory is sensitive to desertification. Still, while the EU promotes the leadership role globally, we are not prepared ourselves.

    The desertification COP16 failed to agree on a global drought framework, and the Commission promised to present a water resilience strategy already a year ago. I hope this will come very soon.

    And Commissioner Roswall, in your introduction, in your first sentence you said that we need to focus on helping farmers, and in the second sentence it was ‘focus on economy’. I think what we really need in that water resilience strategy is water saving targets. We need to improve efficiency and reuse of water. We need to protect and restore our water supplies and the whole catchment area.

    And then at the same time, considering the wildfires and the flooding that we deal with here every single plenary session, we have to make sure that this water resilience strategy is accompanied and embedded into a real European climate adaptation law.

     
       

     

      João Oliveira (The Left). – Senhor Presidente, o problema da desertificação é um problema ambiental ou climático, mas é essencialmente um problema da relação do ser humano com a natureza, é um problema humano, social e económico.

    As conclusões da COP16 contêm muitos dos elementos relevantes para o debate sobre o combate à desertificação, mas revelam também as muitas dificuldades que é preciso ainda superar.

    Há muito por fazer para que haja verdadeiramente soluções, relativamente ao uso e à gestão eficientes da água e dos recursos hídricos, relativamente à ocupação e ordenamento equilibrado do território, relativamente à promoção de práticas produtivas sustentáveis, equilibradas, seja na agricultura, na pecuária, na silvicultura. Há muito por fazer no investimento público que é preciso nos territórios rurais, para travar o abandono da população e a consequente desertificação do território.

    Permitam-me trazer, aqui, um aspeto que é relevante em Portugal, que é o montado de sobreiros e azinheiras, que é característico do meu país. O montado não é apenas um conjunto de árvores que retêm carbono e resistem melhor aos incêndios. O montado é um sistema agrosilvopastoril que tem de ser encarado como tal em todas as suas dimensões, não apenas pelo valor ambiental, mas pelo enorme valor social que tem, porque cria emprego, fixa as populações, permite práticas produtivas sustentáveis e equilibradas, garante um adequado ordenamento do território na compatibilização da sua utilização para fins produtivos, mas também tem preocupações ambientais.

    Este é um exemplo do investimento que precisamos de fazer em áreas e em recursos que, sendo naturais de cada país, naturalmente permitem uma resposta mais eficaz ao combate à desertificação.

     
       

     

      Daniel Buda (PPE). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, doamnelor și domnilor colegi, deșertificarea este o realitate care nu poate fi contestată, iar la COP 16 s-a subliniat acest lucru. Potrivit datelor oficiale, deșertificarea generează costuri globale de peste 300 de miliarde de euro și afectează mai mult de 1,5 miliarde de oameni, crescând presiunile migraționiste și alimentând războaiele pentru resurse.

    Uniunea pierde anual 74 de miliarde de euro din cauza degradării terenurilor, iar lipsa acțiunii va reduce randamentele culturilor cu cel puțin 10 % până în 2050, generând o penurie, atât pentru apă, cât și pentru alimente. România, țara mea, se confruntă din plin cu aceste fenomene. Avem nevoie urgent de acțiuni curajoase, care nu doar să prevină acest fenomen, ci chiar să-l inverseze pe termen lung.

    Pentru a ne proteja securitatea alimentară, trebuie să investim în tehnologii și soluții inovatoare, precum noile tehnici genomice în gestionarea durabilă a apei și dezvoltarea unor sisteme inteligente de irigații la prețuri accesibile pentru toți fermierii, și subliniez acest lucru: la prețuri accesibile pentru toți fermierii.

    În același timp, se impune utilizarea eficientă a apelor uzate, mai ales în jurul marilor centre urbane, și investiții serioase în ceea ce înseamnă desalinizarea apei marine, toate acestea trebuind să devină o prioritate strategică și o obligație față de cetățenii noștri.

    Investițiile din sectorul privat trebuie încurajate, iar Comisia trebuie să se asigure că statele membre utilizează eficient și rapid banii pentru împăduriri și perdele forestiere. Europa are la dispoziție soluții, însă fără investiții direcționate și finanțare adecvată, nu va putea face față acestor provocări.

    Stimați colegi, alegerea este a noastră: să acționăm acum sau generațiile viitoare vor suporta consecințele imobilismului nostru destructibil.

     
       

     

      Maria Grapini (S&D). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, stimați colegi, sigur, dezbatem o problemă foarte importantă, păcat că sunt așa de puțini membri ai Parlamentului European în sală. Așa cum s-a declarat și aici, cum a fost și în declarația Convenției, se degradează anual terenul. S-a ajuns la 70 % din terenuri care au fost transformate din starea lor naturală.

    Secetele cauzează pagube și costuri și daune, peste 300 de miliarde pe an. Unde merg aceste daune și pagube? Evident, la fermieri și, până la urmă, la cetățeni. Doar în perioada 2015-2019, circa 100 de milioane de hectare de terenuri sănătoase și productive au fost degradate anual, amenințând evident, securitatea alimentară a globului, precum și disponibilitatea apei.

    Ce trebuie făcut, doamnă comisară? Ne-ați relatat ce a fost la Convenție și că nu s-a ajuns la compromisuri importante. Eu cred că Uniunea Europeană trebuie să fie preocupată mai ales de ce se întâmplă în Uniunea Europeană, sigur, și global. Eu cred că trebuie să îmbunătățim instrumentele politice naționale și europene pentru abordarea productivă de gestionare a secetei. Aici avem foarte mult de făcut. Este nevoie de alocarea de bugete pentru finanțarea restaurării terenurilor, creșterea rezistenței la secetă, prin cercetare și inovare.

    Comisia Europeană trebuie să aibă un plan de acțiuni la nivelul Uniunii Europene care să combată degradarea terenurilor în colaborare cu statele membre. Și mai trebuie făcut ceva, doamnă comisară: politicile Uniunii Europene, ale Comisiei, nu trebuie să se anuleze ca la algebră – plus și minus – sunt mii de hectare acum, cu parcuri fotovoltaice, terenuri care nu mai sunt recuperate zeci de ani.

    Trebuie să vedem cum corelăm politica energetică cu această politică de protejare a terenurilor și cred foarte mult că este nevoie să vă gândiți, în principal, la cum să nu creăm presiune asupra fermierilor din Uniunea Europeană, asupra cetățenilor din Uniunea Europeană, atât timp cât în restul globului, Statele Unite, Japonia și celelalte state, nu au votat la această Convenție.

     
       

     

      Mathilde Androuët (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, à l’issue de la COP16 consacrée à la désertification qui a eu lieu à Riyad, 12 milliards ont été sécurisés d’ici 2030 pour améliorer les terres, dont dix proviennent de la Banque islamique de développement. Dans un rassemblement international, les pétromonarchies sont donc venues au secours des déserts de sable, déserts où parfois on construit, en dépit de tout souci environnemental et économique, des pistes de ski.

    Voilà, une fois de plus, la démonstration qu’aux problèmes environnementaux, qui sont des problèmes localisés, on ne peut avoir de réponse globalisée. Les COP sont des rassemblements de déblocage ou de création de fonds financiers, aucunement des lieux de réflexion et d’apport de solutions environnementales. Aussi, sur le problème majeur de la désertification et de l’assèchement des sols, ayons une vision et des solutions locales. La gestion de l’eau est une question sensible et différente d’un pays à l’autre et, parfois, d’une région à l’autre dans un seul et même pays. L’an passé, dans le nord de la France, les cultures ont souffert de trop de pluies, soit l’inverse exact des Pyrénées orientales, en manque d’eau permanent.

    Si vous vous refusez au traitement local pour n’opérer qu’à l’échelle européenne, prenons des problèmes communs. En Bulgarie comme en Guadeloupe, 60 % de l’eau est perdue tant les infrastructures sont vétustes et fuyardes. De même, encouragez le reboisement, le replantage des haies pour favoriser la captation de l’eau par les sols. Bref, appuyez-vous sur ceux qui connaissent le mieux leur environnement, à savoir les paysans, plutôt que sur les financiers des pétromonarchies pour régler nos problèmes d’eau et de désertification en Europe. À problème local, solution nationale.

     
       

     

      Marie Toussaint (Verts/ALE). – Monsieur le Président, la désertification, c’est l’autre nom de l’injustice climatique et de la vulnérabilité. C’est d’ailleurs peut-être parce qu’elle a d’abord touché les pays les plus pauvres que les pays les plus riches n’y ont, pendant si longtemps, prêté que si peu d’attention. La désertification est aujourd’hui sur nous. La Corse et les parties les plus pauvres de la Méditerranée, Perpignan et ses quartiers parmi les plus précaires de France, ou encore la dévastée Mayotte, n’ont plus d’eau. En Guadeloupe, l’érosion côtière frappe, puisant dans l’assèchement des terres. Quand dans le Massif central, ce sont évidemment les petits paysans qui souffrent le plus et qui n’ont pas les moyens d’acheter du foin pour leurs élevages lorsque celui-ci vient à manquer.

    Au fond, la désertification continue dans l’indifférence, parce qu’elle frappe d’abord et de manière évidente les plus vulnérables. Mais ne soyons pas naïfs: nous réaliserons bientôt que la désertification est notre affaire à tous. Espérons qu’alors il ne sera pas trop tard. En Afrique, c’est déjà 16 % du PIB qui s’est évaporé du fait de la désertification.

    Madame la Commissaire, nous ne sommes pas impuissants, ici, sur le territoire européen, pour un enjeu qui est bien un enjeu planétaire. La désertification est liée au dérèglement climatique et aux énergies fossiles. Alors sortons-en, et plus vite qu’aujourd’hui. Elle est aussi liée à l’agriculture intensive et à la déforestation que nous pouvons, que nous devons combattre. Alors agissons! Il n’y a plus de temps à perdre.

     
       

     

      Valentina Palmisano (The Left). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, non è necessario guardare al Sahara per comprendere la desertificazione: i deserti si trovano ormai dietro casa. Sempre più spesso, immagini surreali, e allo stesso tempo drammatiche, mostrano paesaggi trasformati, fiumi ridotti a sentieri e laghi completamente prosciugati.

    Il 40 % del suolo del Sud Italia è già a rischio, come tanti paesi del Mediterraneo. In questo modo, stiamo trasformando paesaggi millenari.

    E questo non è soltanto il risultato del cambiamento climatico, ma anche di pratiche agricole non sostenibili, che hanno impoverito il nostro suolo. Ecco, il nostro approccio deve cambiare, privilegiando la qualità delle produzioni e la rigenerazione del suolo.

    Il degrado non è inevitabile, per fortuna: possiamo invertire la rotta. Servono però incentivi per modelli agricoli basati sulla qualità e sulla rigenerazione del suolo. La politica deve smettere di finanziare pratiche obsolete e supportare invece l’innovazione.

    Colleghi, la desertificazione, infatti, non è soltanto una sfida tecnica, ma è anche una questione di giustizia verso i nostri territori e soprattutto verso le generazioni future.

    Il mio monito è che non sia la COP17 a salvare il suolo europeo, ma il nostro impegno concreto, oggi.

     
       

     

      Salvatore De Meo (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signora Commissaria, onorevoli colleghi, la desertificazione è una delle sfide più urgenti del nostro tempo, aggravata dal cambiamento climatico e dalle attività dell’uomo.

    Non è solo una crisi ambientale, ma un problema sociale ed economico che minaccia la biodiversità, la sicurezza alimentare e la stabilità delle nostre comunità, alimentando tensioni e migrazioni forzate.

    Pensate che, ogni anno, 12 milioni di ettari vengono degradati, mettendo a rischio la sopravvivenza di oltre un miliardo di persone. Questo dato ci allarma e ci ricorda che la desertificazione, insieme alla crescente scarsità dell’acqua, richiede risposte immediate, coordinate e ambiziose.

    La COP16 è stata un’occasione per riflettere sulle nostre responsabilità, perché l’Unione europea manca di un’azione comune adeguata e le risorse dedicate sono ancora troppo limitate rispetto alla portata degli interventi.

    Dobbiamo impegnarci e sostenere lo sviluppo di politiche sostenibili, promuovendo pratiche agricole rigenerative e resilienti, un uso responsabile delle risorse idriche e l’innovazione tecnologica per ripristinare gli ambienti degradati.

    La cooperazione internazionale, inoltre, è importante perché nessun paese può affrontare da solo questa battaglia. La desertificazione non conosce confini e le sue conseguenze si ripercuotono su scala globale. Solo lavorando insieme possiamo affrontare la complessità di questa sfida. Ciò significa condividere conoscenze, tecnologie e risorse, oltre a costruire – come si sta facendo – partenariati solidi tra governi, organizzazioni internazionali, società civile e settore privato.

    Combattere la desertificazione significa investire nel futuro, nella nostra diversità, nella sicurezza alimentare e nella stabilità delle generazioni future.

     
       

     

      Thomas Bajada (S&D). – Mr President, desertification is not a story from far, far away. Its serious implications have long been affecting the Mediterranean region due to its unique ecosystems, economic dependencies and limited natural resources.

    In southern Spain, over-irrigation has led to soil erosion. In Crete, aquifers have been overexploited, leading to salinisation. In the neighbouring Sahel region, desertification has displaced millions of people, increasing migratory pressures towards Europe. And in Malta, increased pressure on desalinisation plants raised energy consumption and costs, which are passed on to households and businesses.

    Today this is not a story only for southern Europeans. It is also a story shared with other Europeans from temperate and humid climates like Bulgaria. In fact, last year 45 % of the EU’s territory faced drought, threatening food production and water security.

    Desertification is about humanity, our dependence on water for survival, and our need for water security and food security. Therefore, our response must be people-centred. The fight against desertification demands global cooperation, but it also starts at home in this very House. We need to dramatically increase our political commitment to water – we need to preserve our lands, help our nature to recover and conserve our water. And, dear Commissioner, we need to act now, with an ambitious European water resilience strategy before it is too late.

    As rapporteur of the Parliament’s initiative, I call for decisive action to protect our people and resources and build a sustainable future of a liveable world for future generations to come.

     
       

     

      France Jamet (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, la désertification est une menace importante, mais il en est une dont on ne parle pas assez, c’est la désertification de nos fonds marins. Déplorer l’acidification de nos océans, le réchauffement des eaux ou la hausse du niveau de la mer ne suffit pas. Il faut aussi dénoncer les causes de ce désastre. En France, par exemple, dans le Morbihan, on les trouve dans la construction stérilisante de parcs éoliens offshores ou dans les ravages de bateaux-usines sans-frontiéristes. Deux activités nocives, deux activités pourtant encouragées par l’Union européenne, qui témoignent de l’hypocrisie générale, voire de l’imposture pseudo-écologiste sur la préservation et la pérennité de nos écosystèmes.

    Depuis quinze ans, on constate la dégradation alarmante de nos océans, qui menace nos richesses maritimes, les métiers qui en dépendent, au premier rang desquels nos pêcheurs, et nos ressources alimentaires. Cet équilibre si fragile, aggravé par la pollution terrestre qui se déverse dans nos mers, a aussi un impact sur nos climats et sur la désertification terrestre. La pluie salvatrice qu’attendent nos agriculteurs et les populations touchées par la sécheresse, cette pluie salvatrice ne tombe pas du ciel, elle vient de nos océans.

    Alors tous ces vœux pieux et autres déclarations d’intention ne résoudront rien si nous ne remettons pas en cause l’écosystème mondialiste que vous avez mis en place, basé sur un libre-échangisme dérégulé au détriment d’un localisme raisonné et national.

     
       

     

      Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Verts/ALE). – Señor presidente, en los últimos diez años, la superficie desertificada en la península ibérica se ha multiplicado por veintitrés. Es especialmente preocupante en el sur de Alicante, en la Vega Baja, un territorio de transición, precisamente donde la presión urbanística es salvaje, donde la presión del sobreturismo es salvaje, y donde ahora ya no ocurre de forma aislada que se corte el agua, sino que ya es de forma recurrente. Y no solo se corta en verano, también en otros periodos del año. Ni pasa solo con el agua destinada a la gente y, por lo tanto, con el agua de boca, sino también con la que usan los agricultores.

    En el mismo territorio también ya hay una lucha que se va viviendo en toda Europa, que es por la privatización del agua. Tenemos cada vez menos agua y cada vez está gestionada por menos manos y mirando siempre hacia el negocio. Por eso, hacen falta de una vez por todas políticas valientes que custodien el territorio, que nos adapten al cambio climático y que protejan a la ciudadanía, por ejemplo, ante situaciones como la dana que hemos vivido en Valencia. Y hace falta que el agua sea gestionada de forma pública para que sea un derecho garantizado para el conjunto de la ciudadanía.

    (El orador acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul»)

     
       

     

      João Oliveira (The Left), Pergunta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Senhor Deputado, o Governo de Portugal avançou recentemente com uma lei chamada Lei dos Solos, que tem como objetivo permitir a construção em solos onde até hoje essa construção não era permitida. Esta decisão, naturalmente, favorece a especulação imobiliária, mas cria também problemas de desordenamento do território.

    O senhor deputado vem da região de Valência — onde ainda recentemente houve uma tragédia, na sequência de umas cheias —, por isso, queria colocar-lhe uma questão precisamente a partir da sua experiência.

    Considerando a experiência na região de Valência, decisões como esta do Governo português, de desordenamento do território e de favorecimento da especulação imobiliária, permitem a solução de algum problema, por exemplo, o problema da habitação — que é o pretexto que o Governo português utiliza —, ou o combate à desertificação dos territórios? Ou, pelo contrário, opções destas de desordenamento do território agravam ainda mais as consequências de catástrofes naturais, como aquelas que atingiram a região de Valência?

     
       

     

      Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Verts/ALE), respuesta de «tarjeta azul». – Sí, señor diputado Oliveira, la presión urbanística y la urbanización salvaje de hoy son las víctimas del mañana. Lo hemos visto en nuestra tierra con la dana: se ha construido donde no se podía construir, porque se ha visto que el territorio solo era un espacio de especulación y no para que la gente tuviera garantizado su espacio vital y se protegieran sus vidas.

    La gente ha muerto por estar, entre otras cosas, urbanizando territorios que no se pueden urbanizar. Ha habido una dana que ha llegado con esa cantidad de agua brutal porque estaba absolutamente todo cimentado, porque la tierra no ha podido acoger toda el agua también. Por eso es tan importante que se combatan esas iniciativas como la del Gobierno portugués que usted dice, porque urbanizar, insisto, de forma salvaje es crear víctimas en el futuro.

     
       

     

      Sebastian Everding (The Left). – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! „Wälder gehen den Völkern voran, die Wüsten folgen ihnen“. Das sagte schon im 17. Jahrhundert der französische Schriftsteller Chateaubriand. Der Klimawandel und der massive Einsatz von Düngemitteln verstärken die Bodenerosion und auch das Artensterben. Grundwasserentnahmen für Bergbautätigkeiten, die industrielle Massentierhaltung und die Bewässerung in der Landwirtschaft entziehen Wäldern das Grundwasser, das dringend für die Regeneration in Dürrezeiten benötigt wird. Sie tragen zur Bodenversandung bei, schädigen das Ökosystem und trocknen CO2-Senken wie Moore aus. Hier muss dringend durch mehr Schutzzonen und mehr Entnahmeeinschränkungen gehandelt werden.

    Ein weiteres Mittel gegen Wüstenbildung könnte ein stärkerer Fokus auf die Agroforstwirtschaft sein. Dürren bedrohen bereits jetzt die Lebensgrundlage von rund 1,8 Milliarden Menschen weltweit und bringen gefährdete Gemeinschaften immer weiter an den Rand des Abgrundes. Darüber hinaus kosten sie 300 Milliarden US‑Dollar pro Jahr und bedrohen wichtige Wirtschaftssektoren wie die Landwirtschaft, Energie und Wasser. Liebe Frau Kommissarin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, wie bei allen anderen Aspekten des Klimawandels gilt auch hier: Es ist weitaus günstiger, jetzt zu handeln, als später zu versuchen, die Folgen zu kompensieren.

    (Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

     
       



     

      Gabriella Gerzsenyi (PPE). – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! A teve helyes állat, de nem szeretnénk közlekedési eszközként használni. Az éghajlatváltozás miatt az elsivatagosodás Magyarországon is egyre nagyobb probléma. Duna-Tisza közi homokhátság hazánk területének mintegy 10%-a, most már az ENSZ szerint hivatalosan is félsivatag.

    Ez a kormányzati tétlenségnek a szimbóluma. Csökkennek a terméshozamok, megnehezül a megélhetés, homokviharok előfordulnak, tavak száradnak ki és élőhelyek szűnnek meg. S nem csak környezeti, hanem társadalmi és gazdasági válság is, hiszen veszélyben az élelmiszer-ellátás és elnéptelenedik a vidék.

    Már két évtizede tudományos tanulmány és program készült a problémára. Az akkori kormány elfogadta, a Fidesz-kormány azonban tudatosan figyelmen kívül hagyja a szakértők figyelmeztetéseit, elhanyagolja a vízgazdálkodást, a talajvédelmet, ellenben százmilliárdokat költ presztízsberuházásokra, például stadionokra.

    A megoldás kulcsa az uniós, nemzeti és a helyi összefogás. Úgy véljük, hogy európai szinten átfogó stratégiára van szükség a fenntartható földhasználat és a vízvisszatartó technológiák támogatására.

    A Tisza Magyarország legnépszerűbb pártja. Kormányra kerülésünk után vissza fogjuk állítani az önálló környezetvédelmi minisztériumot. Kiemelten foglalkozni fogunk a talajvédelemmel, vízgazdálkodással, európai forrásokat irányítunk az érintett közösségekhez, és támogatni fogjuk a gazdákat ebben a küzdelemben is.

     
       

     

      César Luena (S&D). – Señor presidente, señorías, es un debate en un contexto bastante difícil, porque tenemos al nuevo inquilino de la Casa Blanca y su negacionismo, y un Grupo PPE retardista, ya lo siento. El discurso de ayer del señor Tusk nos lleva por esos senderos peligrosos.

    Presento dos ideas que son como dos evidencias. El suelo es un recurso no renovable, es importante no olvidarlo. ¿Saben cuánto han aumentado las sequías en los últimos 25 años? Un 30 %. Y, en este contexto, señora comisaria, ¿qué puede hacer la Unión? Le digo que defender las políticas verdes —al paso que vamos— va a ser algo casi contracultural. Pues mire, en primer lugar, una evaluación de riesgo de desertificación y degradación de las tierras, como sugirió el Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo en el año 2018. No sabemos nada de ese informe. La Ley de vigilancia del suelo, por favor, se lo pido a sus colegas del Grupo PPE, porque la están rebajando y rebajando, como todas las normativas medioambientales. Podemos declararnos como región en riesgo de desertificación en el marco de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas. Para eso no tenemos que esperar a ninguna cumbre internacional, eso podemos hacerlo ya nosotros. Y, sobre todo, presente una estrategia específica de desertificación, como le ha dicho este Parlamento.

    Fíjese: hasta cuatro grandes medidas podemos hacer nosotros solos —la Unión Europea— y dar ejemplo en el mundo. Pero claro, hay demasiado retardismo en la derecha. No caiga en eso, señora comisaria, hay muchos Grupos que la vamos a apoyar.

    (El orador acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul»)

     
       


     

      César Luena (S&D), respuesta de «tarjeta azul». – Estaba mirando, señor presidente, por si era alguien de la extrema derecha, porque no hubiera aceptado nunca nada, ni tarjeta azul ni verde.

    Mire, todo lo relacionado con los fondos europeos, a pesar de su Grupo y de su política en España, lo estamos sacando adelante bien. Y no quiero recordar aquí lo que han intentado ustedes hacer con la vicepresidenta primera, Teresa Ribera. Es decir, que a pesar de que ustedes aquí estén en contra de todo y siempre estén poniendo obstáculos y problemas, nosotros estamos aplicando muy bien los fondos NextGenerationEU en España y lo seguiremos haciendo. Solo le pido una cosa: está bien que me haga esa pregunta, pero después, en España, ayuden, que siempre están en contra de todo.

     
       

     

      Jutta Paulus (Verts/ALE). – Herr Präsident, Frau Kommissarin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Als ich ein Kind war, war Wüste die Sahara oder die Gobi. Ferne, beeindruckende Orte, beschrieben in den Romanen von Karl May oder den Schilderungen von Sven Hedin. Und heute, nur wenige Jahrzehnte später, sehen wir Wüstenbildung in Spanien, in Portugal, in Italien, in Griechenland, in Ungarn, in Bulgarien. Wer sich da wundert, hat die Wissenschaft ignoriert oder den Einflüsterern der fossilen Industrie geglaubt. Die haben Milliarden investiert, um Zweifel zu säen – Zweifel an den Erkenntnissen, die Exxon selbst schon in den 70ern ermittelt hatte, um sie dann in den Giftschrank zu legen und öffentlich die Wissenschaft zu diskreditieren.

    Die Leugner sitzen auch in diesem Haus bei den Rechten, den noch Rechteren und den noch noch Rechteren, und bei der Welt‑Wüsten‑Konferenz haben wir leider auch keine großen Fortschritte gemacht, denn auch hier sitzen ja die Petrostaaten mit am Tisch. Deshalb: Europa muss handeln. Wir brauchen ein Klimaanpassungsgesetz, das naturbasierte Lösungen in den Mittelpunkt stellt, und eine glaubwürdige Unterstützung für die Länder, die am stärksten betroffen sind.

    (Die Rednerin ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

     
       


     

      Jutta Paulus (Verts/ALE), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Vielen Dank, Frau Kollegin, für die Frage. Es ist mir ein Rätsel, wo Sie Ihre Anschuldigungen und Informationen hernehmen, denn wir sind ja durchaus die Partei, die für eine bäuerliche, kleinbäuerliche, familienzentrierte Landwirtschaft eintritt, die für eine nachhaltige Landwirtschaft eintritt, die im Einklang mit dem steht, was uns die Wissenschaft empfiehlt.

    Da brauchen Sie bloß mal in die Berichte unserer eigenen Agentur zu schauen – die Europäische Umweltagentur ist eine Agentur dieser Europäischen Union. Da sitzen hochmögende Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler, die sich seit Jahren und Jahrzehnten mit diesen Fragen beschäftigen. Und das, was wir in unseren Programmen, in unseren Vorschlägen aufgreifen, entspricht dem, was diese Wissenschaft uns vorschlägt, denn wir stehen auf dem Boden der Wissenschaft und nicht auf dem Boden der Lobbyinteressen, die hier leider ihre Papiere verbreiten.

     
       


     

      Borja Giménez Larraz (PPE). – Señor presidente, el agua es vida y el agua es desarrollo. Hoy vemos como la desertificación avanza. La falta de agua se ha convertido en una amenaza, especialmente para los países y las regiones del sur de Europa. Aunque algunos somos más vulnerables, este desafío nos afecta a todos. Hablamos del acceso a un bien básico. Hablamos de un recurso fundamental para la agricultura y para la ganadería, para la industria, para crear empleo y fijar la población.

    La Unión Europea debe implicarse de lleno en el impulso de un pacto europeo del agua que establezca medidas integrales para garantizar una gestión sostenible y eficiente de los recursos hídricos. Y ese pacto hay que dotarlo de fondos: necesitamos fondos para construir y modernizar infraestructuras hidráulicas, como embalses y presas que permitan regular cauces y gestionar periodos de sequía de forma más eficaz. Necesitamos fondos para mejorar y modernizar los sistemas de regadío. Todo ello acompañado de políticas de gestión eficiente del agua. Y hay que actuar con urgencia.

    En España, en mi región, Aragón, que tiene zonas profundamente áridas y desérticas, el Parlamento autonómico aprobó por unanimidad en 1992 el llamado Pacto del Agua, un acuerdo que reivindica las obras hidráulicas necesarias para garantizar las necesidades presentes y futuras de la comunidad. Pues bien, en estos treinta años hemos avanzado muy poco: tenemos más de treinta obras pendientes. Sabemos desde hace décadas qué es lo que queremos, lo que necesitamos, pero la falta de voluntad y fondos lo ha dejado en el olvido. Ante la inacción del Gobierno de España, la Unión Europea debe adoptar un papel activo. Debe contribuir a financiar estas obras. Hoy ya no es una opción: es una obligación.

     
       

     

      Camilla Laureti (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la desertificazione va affrontata a livello globale, perché mette a rischio biodiversità, risorse idriche e sicurezza alimentare e fa tremare la giustizia sociale.

    Spaventa pensare che, anche a causa degli effetti della desertificazione e della siccità, entro il 2050 oltre 200 milioni di persone potrebbero essere costrette a migrare.

    Lo vediamo anche in Europa: il Sud soffre sempre di più per siccità e carenza di acqua. In Italia abbiamo intere regioni che restano per lunghi periodi senz’acqua, anche a causa di una scorretta gestione della risorsa idrica. L’acqua – il nostro bene più prezioso – non è una merce, ma è un diritto, e dobbiamo incentivarne conservazione e riuso e lavorare sulle reti idriche.

    Dobbiamo proteggere e ripristinare i nostri suoli, favorire con finanziamenti ad hoc e risorse il passaggio da metodi di coltivazione intensivi a pratiche agricole sostenibili. Se perdiamo i nostri suoli, perdiamo il pianeta.

    La desertificazione l’abbiamo vista arrivare e porta anche, e soprattutto, la nostra impronta: per questo, dobbiamo smettere di far finta che non esista e dobbiamo agire sin da ora.

     
       

     

      Marco Falcone (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signora Commissaria, onorevoli colleghi, in un momento in cui larga parte del continente fronteggia l’inverno, potrebbe apparire fuori contesto parlare di desertificazione e carenza idrica. Eppure, questo dovrebbe essere l’atteggiamento che qui in Europa dovremmo tutti avere: occuparci per tempo di questa enorme sfida, di questa enorme emergenza, prima che sia troppo tardi.

    E ve lo dice chi arriva qua a Strasburgo da una delle due più importanti isole del Mediterraneo, la Sicilia, e rappresenta due delle più importanti isole – assieme alla Sicilia, anche la Sardegna – entrambe fortemente a rischio. Si immagina che più del 50 % del territorio delle due regioni, addirittura entro i prossimi trent’anni, potrebbe essere a rischio desertificazione.

    Certo, il cambiamento climatico è un fattore decisivo. Purtroppo, però, la lotta alla desertificazione non può essere affidata solo alle misure collegate in qualche modo al Green Deal. Anzi, questo grande contenitore potrebbe diventare un luogo in cui tutto si perde, e già la Corte dei conti europea, nel 2018, aveva invitato l’Unione europea ad avere una visione completa e a porre in essere dei programmi di pianificazione.

    Ecco perché noi del Partito Popolare Europeo siamo per la difesa del territorio, certamente, e riteniamo che le isole debbano essere guardate con grande attenzione. Come? Tramite un serio programma di investimenti e, se vogliamo, di infrastrutture, non solo di transizione energetica.

    L’Europa deve avere il coraggio di varare un grande piano di stanziamenti strutturali per la lotta all’avanzare del deserto.

    (L’oratore accetta di rispondere a una domanda “cartellino blu”)

     
       


     

      Marco Falcone (PPE), risposta a una domanda “cartellino blu”. – Noi del Partito Popolare Europeo guardiamo a un approccio molto pragmatico. Certamente, la transizione ecologica diventa per noi il faro, ma al contempo riteniamo che un serio programma di investimenti debba essere calibrato alle esigenze del territorio. Non dobbiamo eccedere in un senso, ma nemmeno in un altro.

    Certamente, gli interventi in agricoltura, gli interventi tecnologici e, se vogliamo, anche un serio piano di investimenti, soprattutto in condutture idriche di adduzione e, se vogliamo, di approvvigionamento, possono rappresentare certamente una soluzione.

    Lo dico per la Sicilia – io provengo dalla Sicilia – dove l’acqua non manca, ma mancano le infrastrutture. Per cui, grazie per il suo input.

     
       

     

      Leire Pajín (S&D). – Señor presidente, señorías, se ha dicho aquí reiteradamente, nos enfrentamos a una crisis aparentemente silenciosa, pero profundamente devastadora: la desertificación, la pérdida de suelos fértiles y de recursos hídricos. De nuevo, es una crisis global que nos afecta a todos, también en Europa, especialmente en el Mediterráneo, en países como España, en regiones como Alicante.

    Hasta el 40 % de las tierras del mundo —casi la mitad— están degradadas. Esto supone una amenaza a la biodiversidad, pero también a la seguridad alimentaria. Las cifras lo dejan bien claro: el 90 % de la población mundial pasa hambre; es decir, más de 700 millones de personas, por no hablar de los cientos de miles de desplazados y de refugiados por la desertificación y por el cambio climático.

    El derecho a la alimentación es fundamental. Señorías, no podemos estar hablando aquí de las sequías y de la desertificación, pero luego intentar retrasar y retardar las normas que protegen contra la degradación de los suelos o que protegen la biodiversidad. No podemos hablar aquí de las cifras, pero después querer ser más laxos con las leyes que luchan contra eso.

    Por eso, señorías, como dijo el Tribunal de Cuentas, como dijo Naciones Unidas y como ha dicho el Consejo, necesitamos un plan ambicioso, transversal, que se coordine con otras Convenciones de las Naciones Unidas, con presupuesto y con objetivos, sin más demora.

     
       

     

      Manuela Ripa (PPE). – Herr Präsident! Die Wüstenbildung ist eines der drängendsten Probleme unserer Zeit – nicht nur etwa in Afrika oder in Asien, auch in Europa. 13 EU‑Länder in Süd‑, Mittel‑ und Osteuropa sind nach eigenen Angaben bereits betroffen. Auch in anderen Teilen Europas schreitet die Austrocknung von Böden voran. Zukünftig könnten auch hier Wüsten entstehen. Dass es dringenden Handlungsbedarf gibt, dieses Bewusstsein war nicht ausreichend vorhanden bei der COP16 in Riad. Auch in der EU wird definitiv nicht genügend getan. Probleme sind voranschreitende Bodenversiegelung, Entwaldung, zu intensive Landnutzung, falsche Bewirtschaftung. Der Klimawandel mit Dürren und Starkregenereignissen beschleunigt zudem noch den Verlust fruchtbarer Böden.

    Daher ist es von entscheidender Bedeutung, dass wir in Europa neben einer effektiven Wasserstrategie das EU‑Bodengesetz verabschieden – als erster wichtiger Schritt hin zu mehr Bodenschutz und gegen Wüstenbildung. Bei der Wüstenbildung ist es wie beim Klimawandel. Es ist viel kostengünstiger und einfacher, jetzt Gegenmaßnahmen zu ergreifen, als die Dinge umzukehren, wenn der Schaden schon eingetreten ist. Denn dann ist es zu spät.

     
       

     

      Jean-Marc Germain (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, mes chers collègues, Bakou, Cali, Riyad, les différentes COP se suivent et se ressemblent. Elles sont toujours utiles par leur existence même, mais jamais à la hauteur: 40 % des sols seraient dégradés dans le monde et 75 % de la population mondiale en sera affectée d’ici à 2050, 75 %. On le sait, les plus vulnérables en sont les premières victimes.

    Appelons un chat un chat: cette COP fut une déception. Et si l’Europe a fait preuve de volontarisme sur la promotion de la résilience à la sécheresse, son rôle a été plus ambigu: en s’opposant à un protocole juridiquement contraignant sur la sécheresse, en portant insuffisamment les pratiques agricoles durables et par une contribution financière insuffisante. Le Partenariat mondial de résilience à la sécheresse et ses 12 milliards de promesses a le mérite d’exister. Mais c’est une goutte d’eau, si je puis dire, par rapport aux 2 500 milliards nécessaires pour restaurer le milliard d’hectares de terres dégradées.

    Alors que Donald Trump vient de sortir de l’accord sur le climat, faisons preuve de leadership. Allons en Mongolie pour la COP17 avec des propositions et des aides concrètes, faute de quoi la planète et les générations futures ne nous le pardonneront pas.

     
       

     

      Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (PPE). – Doamnă comisară, domnule președinte, stimați colegi, deșertificarea afectează deja 13 state membre, iar seceta cauzează pierderi de 9 miliarde de euro anual. Doar în România, 400 de mii de hectare sunt afectate de deșertificare. Adoptarea Regulamentului privind restaurarea naturii impune statelor membre să refacă 20 % din terenurile degradate până în 2030.

    Din păcate, regulamentul nu a fost însoțit de alocări bugetare suplimentare. Drept urmare, solicit Comisiei Europene ca în următorul exercițiu financiar să abordeze această insuficiență și să pună fonduri concrete la dispoziția țărilor din Uniune.

    Totodată, pentru menținerea securității alimentare, este esențial să sporim investițiile în dezvoltarea sistemelor de irigații inteligente, utilizarea apelor urbane reziduale tratate, captarea apei pluviale și construirea de rezervoare.

    În plus, rezultatele cercetării privind desalinizarea apei marine din programul Orizont Europa trebuie să fie accesibile statelor membre pentru implementarea acestor tehnologii moderne la costuri reduse.

     
       

     

      Stefano Bonaccini (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, siccità, incendi e pratiche produttive che minano la fertilità dei suoli stanno innalzando il rischio di desertificazione anche qui in Europa, dove 13 paesi, tra cui il mio e altri sei nel bacino del Mediterraneo in particolare, sono colpiti da questo fenomeno.

    A rimetterci sono produzione e sicurezza alimentare, tessuto sociale ed economico delle aree colpite, e i nostri agricoltori, prime vittime dei cambiamenti climatici che qualcuno, addirittura ancora oggi, nega.

    L’Unione europea deve essere protagonista in questa sfida a livello globale, diffondendo nei paesi più a rischio buone pratiche – ad esempio, irrigazione di precisione o depurazione e riuso agricolo delle acque reflue – e con un piano europeo per le acque, e per l’acqua, che con più risorse per le politiche di sviluppo regionale e rurale – confido per delega nel Commissario Fitto – sostenga e semplifichi investimenti per una maggiore capacità di accumulo – dighe invasi, bacini e reti di distribuzione più efficienti – e autorizzi nuove colture che necessitano di meno acqua.

    Il prossimo bilancio pluriennale, allora, deve diventare l’occasione per migliorare alcune politiche dell’Unione e sostenere con i fatti, e non le parole, cittadini e imprese nel contrasto al cambiamento climatico.

     
       

     

      Ştefan Muşoiu (S&D). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, dragi colegi, la nivelul Uniunii, deșertificarea afectează 8 % din teritoriu, așa cum au precizat și colegii mei antevorbitori. Zonele cele mai prejudiciate însă sunt cele din Europa Centrală, de Sud și de Est. Și țara mea, România, suferă din cauza acestui proces nesănătos al naturii. 40 % din suprafața sa agricolă este în pericol să se transforme în dune de nisip.

    De aceea, nu trebuie să permitem ca acest neajuns major să devină o amenințare la adresa siguranței alimentare a generațiilor viitoare de europeni. Acest fenomen grav trebuie decelerat prin strategii comunitare concrete și ferme.

    Trebuie să avem în vedere că micii fermieri din toate aceste zone de pe continent, afectate de deșertificare, sunt și ei în pericol. Nu au cum să se lupte singuri împotriva naturii și trebuie să le venim în ajutor. Au nevoie de susținere financiară europeană care să dubleze eforturile mai mari sau mai mici ale guvernelor naționale. Mizez pe înțelepciunea noastră comună și pe o reacție mai bine conturată a Comisiei pentru frânarea acestui fenomen natural periculos.

     
       

       

    Interventions à la demande

     
       


     

      Hélder Sousa Silva (PPE). – Senhor Presidente, Senhora Comissária, a desertificação é um desafio crescente que se coloca à União Europeia, especialmente nos Estados-Membros do Sul e, particularmente, próximos do Mediterrâneo.

    A falta de água, a exaustão dos solos e as alterações climáticas são, hoje, uma dura realidade nalgumas zonas da União e, além disso, assistimos também ao despovoamento de algumas regiões do interior por falta de atratividade e de competitividade.

    Portugal enfrenta cumulativamente estes dois problemas. As regiões do Alentejo e do Algarve evidenciam uma brutal falta de água, quer para agricultura, quer para consumo humano. E as regiões próximas da fronteira com Espanha sofrem de despovoamento.

    Em resultado destas duas situações, assistimos a fluxos migratórios do interior para o litoral, das zonas rurais para as zonas urbanas, que são verdadeiros problemas. Por isso, considero que o próximo quadro financeiro plurianual deve responder à desertificação e ao despovoamento e, assim, resolver o problema de coesão territorial que enfrentamos na nossa União.

     
       

     

      Seán Kelly (PPE).(Níor phioc an micreafón suas tús na hóráide) … labhairt ar an ábhar tábhachtach seo, gaineamhlú an domhain.

    And depending on who you’re listening to, between 20 % and 40 % of land is threatened with desertification, particularly in places like the Sahel, Gobi Desert, South America. I think it’s good that the European Union are now emphasising that deforestation, in particular, has to end in any free trade deals we’ll be doing.

    Within Europe, we will be shortly discussing the next CAP and, obviously, protection of the soil, nature restoration are going to be key in that. And I would make one suggestion: give every farmer in Europe a minimum of 50 trees native to their own area to set on their farm. This would help to restore nature, protect the soils and be a small step to end desertification.

    Bímis ag dul ar aghaidh de réir a chéile, mar de réir a chéile a dhéantar na caisleáin.

     
       

       

    (Fin des interventions à la demande)

     
       

     

      Jessika Roswall, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, your interventions show how important it is for the EU to continue tackling the interconnected challenges of droughts, land use, climate change, biodiversity loss and water scarcity together for our economy, our security and our livelihoods. They show that we are not ignoring the difficulties we face in the current geopolitical climate. And as many of you have also mentioned, we are all affected.

    I just also want to say – and this is to César Luena – that the Commission is not ignoring this. And I just want to repeat one thing that I said in my first remark: the Commission is responding to the recommendation of the European Court of Auditors by developing a methodology to assess land degradation and desertification for the EU.

    Although we didn’t leave Riyadh with all our desired outcomes, we should still acknowledge and build on the important progress that was made. So now we need to keep up the momentum. We need to accelerate implementation at national and international levels, and continue our work to agree on the outstanding COP16 decisions, especially on droughts.

    Many of you have underlined the importance of water and the need to make progress on strengthening our water resilience, so I also want to say – as I said earlier, and I know you know – that the Commission has made it a priority to present a new strategy on this.

    I know Parliament is already making progress on its reports on this. I thank you today for your input, and I look forward to close dialogue with you, with your rapporteur, Thomas Bajada, and all of you on this important topic, and of course, on continuing fighting desertification.

     
       


       

    (La séance est suspendue quelques instants)

     
       

       

    IN THE CHAIR: CHRISTEL SCHALDEMOSE
    Vice-President

     

    3. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (The sitting resumed at 10:29)

     

    4. Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (debate)


     

      Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, honourable Members, first of all, sorry I’m a couple of minutes late – I was in the office, actually, but I didn’t make it here on time, I’m sorry about that. Also, thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this debate on the need to agree on global policy standards for crypto. As you may well know, these standards, of course, do exist and have been agreed in international fora. Let me give you a brief overview of how they came about and where the EU stands in their implementation.

    International regulatory and policy organisations have been working on international crypto standards for a number of years now. Early on, there was an international understanding that crypto markets are global markets and are largely unregulated and pose, of course, also risks that need to be addressed. And then in 2023 the G20 unveiled the crypto-asset policy implementation roadmap, which reflected the policy and regulatory responses developed primarily by the International Monetary Fund, the Financial Stability Board and standard-setting bodies covering specific areas of finance such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions on investor protection, or also the Financial Action Task Force on anti-money laundering.

    The core of these international standards on crypto are the FSB recommendations on crypto-asset markets and activities, and recommendations for global stablecoin arrangements. The European Union is the first major jurisdiction to have reflected those standards in law. We have done this by adopting the regulation on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA), which has now started to apply, and we have also amended other legislation such as the Anti-Money Laundering Directive and also the Transfer of Funds Regulation.

    We are strongly committed to ensuring the global implementation of international standards. We regularly advocate this in the relevant international fora in which we as a European Union participate.

    Implementation of international standards of course is necessary, not only to ensure a minimum level of policy and regulatory convergence internationally, but also to ensure that jurisdictions follow a sensible common denominator in addressing the risks also posed by the crypto markets. This is particularly important in crypto markets, which are global in nature, of course – yes, everyone knows that, with crypto exchanges and platforms operating across borders and assets also moving on open networks that are widely accessible.

    The adoption of international crypto standards has so far been incremental. Indeed, jurisdictions have made progress also in implementing the policy and also the regulatory responses developed by, as I said, the IMF, the FSB and the standard‑setting bodies. Almost all FSB jurisdictions have plans to develop new – or at least revise existing – regulatory frameworks for crypto.

    Information gathered at the international level suggests that the majority of FSB member jurisdictions expect to achieve alignment with the FSB framework by this year, by 2025. And this is of course very good news. We will continue to support relevant international organisations to ensure that the momentum we have now in implementing international standards on crypto is maintained. And we stand, of course, ready to work with jurisdictions that wish to benefit from our experience with MiCA. This includes the US. The US has been heavily involved in defining, together with other partners, the international standards on crypto, and I’m convinced that the new administration is fully aware of the fact that a robust policy response to crypto requires also an international effort.

    We therefore look forward, of course, to continuing working with the US authorities as they consider their policy approach to crypto assets and related service providers, and we would view it as a positive development if the US were to make progress on crypto‑specific legislation that would provide greater legal clarity on the treatment of crypto assets and related service providers, while at the same time also addressing the risks we are facing. And we believe existing international standards should form the basis of any crypto framework, including, of course, the one in the US, not least because they ensure international convergence in this area and contribute to a level playing field.

    Our experience in the European Union has shown that ensuring legal clarity is the right way to support innovation in these markets, while mitigating, on the other hand, of course, also the risks we are facing. Developments in the crypto market since the adoption of MiCA have only strengthened the case for legal clarity. Whatever approach the US ultimately takes, we do hope it will ensure that innovation flourishes while allowing, of course, on the other hand, also bad actors to be weeded out.

     
       

     

      Markus Ferber, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Kommissar, liebe Kolleginnen, liebe Kollegen! Diverse Kryptowährungen, allen voran Bitcoin, haben in den vergangenen Tagen Rekordkurse erklommen. Der Grund ist klar: Die neue Administration in den Vereinigten Staaten ist diese Woche ins Amt gekommen, und sie wird sehr viel kryptofreundlicher sein als die Vorgängerverwaltung. Der neue US-Präsident spricht gar davon, eine strategische Bitcoin-Reserve aufzubauen und die USA zum Krypto-Mekka der Welt machen zu wollen. Dass Donald Trump es wohl ernst meint, sieht man auch daran, dass er selbst einen eigenen Meme Coin aufgelegt hat, der wohl nur ein Ziel hat: seinen Reichtum noch etwas zu vergrößern. Ich glaube, die Anleger werden nichts davon haben.

    Unabhängig davon, wie man zu Kryptowährungen steht, unterstreicht diese Entwicklung ein grundsätzliches Problem: Obwohl Kryptowährungen ein globales Phänomen sind, haben wir keinen internationalen Ordnungsrahmen. Ein Regierungswechsel in den USA führt deshalb sehr schnell dazu, dass sich die Marktlage rapide verändert und da auch der Verbraucherschutz, auch für europäische Anleger, massiv unter die Räder kommt. In anderen Teilen des Finanzmarkts, vom Bankensektor bis zum Clearing, haben wir uns aus guten Gründen auf internationale Standards verständigt. Die haben wir im Kryptosektor bisher nicht, und das rächt sich jetzt auch.

    In der Europäischen Union sind wir mit der Verordnung über Märkte für Krypto-Assets, der MiCAR, weltweit Vorreiter. Wir haben in der EU ein glaubwürdiges Regelwerk geschaffen, das den Wildwest-Auswüchsen wie in den USA einen Riegel vorschiebt und gleichzeitig Vorhersehbarkeit und Planbarkeit für alle Marktteilnehmer schafft. Es gäbe also bereits eine Blaupause für internationale Mindeststandards. Deswegen, lieber Herr Kommissar, sollten wir von dieser Blaupause Gebrauch machen und auf internationale Lösungen hinwirken. Dass das nicht einfach ist, ist klar. Aber wenn wir nicht anfangen, werden wir es nie schaffen.

     
       

     

      Jonás Fernández, en nombre del Grupo S&D. – Señora presidenta, señor comisario, sin duda, yo creo que todos podríamos convenir en la necesidad de esas normas internacionales para el mercado de las cripto. Así he entendido las palabras de la Comisión apelando a la necesidad de fijar esos estándares mínimos.

    Pero, ciertamente, viendo lo que estamos viendo al otro lado del Atlántico, yo creo que deberíamos empezar a reconsiderar los buenos propósitos y empezar a trabajar más para proteger Europa, en un tiempo en que Donald Trump e incluso su mujer emiten su propia moneda —como decía mi colega Markus Ferber— en los días previos a tomar posesión, mostrando poco respeto, en mi opinión, por la propia institucionalidad. Deberíamos recibir el mensaje en Europa, y yo creo que el mensaje que tenemos que recibir es que no podemos contar con la Administración estadounidense en los próximos años para llegar a ningún tipo de acuerdo mínimo sobre criptomonedas.

    Por lo tanto, en vez de apelar a los buenos propósitos en los que llevamos empeñados años, deberíamos tener una posición mucho más asertiva y ser conscientes de que ese escenario va a ser casi imposible y que, por lo tanto, tenemos que aplicar el Reglamento MiCA —claro que hay que aplicar el Reglamento MiCA—, pero tenemos que también proteger a nuestro sector financiero, a nuestros bancos y a nuestros seguros de posibles impactos de inestabilidad financiera derivada de las cripto más allá de Europa. Y debemos también acelerar la negociación para tener un euro digital en Europa que permita ofrecer una respuesta propia a las necesidades, al parecer, de algunos inversores.

     
       


     

      Marlena Maląg, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Szanowni Państwo. Unia Europejska dzięki wprowadzeniu przepisów MICA stała się globalnym pionierem w regulacji rynku kryptoaktywów, wyzwalając je tak naprawdę z szarej strefy. Należy docenić fakt, że regulacja MICA wprowadza obowiązek raportowania, zapewnia mechanizmy kontroli wewnętrznej oraz wymaga separacji aktywów klienta od aktywów dostawców usług kryptowalutowych. To podstawy, które zapewniają większą przejrzystość, bezpieczeństwo inwestorów. Co ważne, zabezpieczone są także interesy państw członkowskich spoza strefy euro.

    Kryptowaluty, jak wiemy, nie mają granic. Musimy sobie jednak jasno powiedzieć, że różnice między krajami znacząco obniżają atrakcyjność tego rynku i spowalniają jego rozwój. Dlatego konieczne jest wypracowanie globalnych standardów regulacyjnych. Unia Europejska, choć jest liderem w tej dziedzinie, musi uważać, by nie przyjąć jak zwykle zbyt restrykcyjnego podejścia, które mogłoby wepchnąć innowacje, inwestycje w bardziej elastyczne rynki spoza Unii Europejskiej.

    Jeszcze niedawno kryptowaluty ożywiały marzenia części inwestorów o infrastrukturze finansowej niezależnej od banków centralnych. Dziś te marzenia nieco osłabły. Ale kryptowaluty są i będą trwałym elementem globalnej gospodarki. Naszym zadaniem jest traktowanie kryptowalut jako narzędzi finansowych, które wymagają odpowiedniej regulacji, ale bliskich rynkom tradycyjnym, takich regulacji, które zapewnią bezpieczeństwo inwestorom, nie tłumiąc jednocześnie innowacji. Nie możemy przespać tej rewolucji. Przyszłość rynku kryptowalut wymaga równowagi między ochroną interesów klienta a umożliwieniem przede wszystkim dalszego rozwoju.

     
       

     

      Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, au nom du groupe Renew. – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, aux États-Unis, Donald Trump se rêve en président de la crypto. Résultat, la cryptosphère s’enflamme, une cryptomonnaie créée à son effigie et une autre dédiée à Melania, le bitcoin qui s’envole et la démission du président de l’Autorité des marchés financiers américains. Pendant ce chaos, en Europe, nous avons fait un choix différent: réguler pour protéger.

    Avec le règlement MiCA, nous avons posé les bases d’un marché des cryptomonnaies sécurisé, imposant des mesures solides contre le blanchiment d’argent et contre le financement du terrorisme, comme par exemple la vérification des identités et le signalement des activités suspectes. Car oui, les cryptomonnaies ont des avantages. Elles offrent de nouvelles opportunités d’investissement, encouragent les plus jeunes à venir investir, et permettent un soutien vital face à des systèmes corrompus ou en zone de guerre, comme pour la diaspora ukrainienne.

    Mais elles ne doivent pas devenir une jungle mondiale au service des fraudeurs et des criminels. À ceux qui, en Europe, flirtent avec les leaders américains du bitcoin: savez-vous que leur véritable objectif est de contourner nos devises officielles, à commencer par l’euro, et de saboter notre système monétaire en Europe? Drôles de souverainistes. Comme pour l’intelligence artificielle ou la taxation minimale, l’Europe doit pousser pour un cadre mondial. Les cryptomonnaies ne doivent pas devenir un eldorado pour les tricheurs, mais un outil au service de tous les investisseurs 2.0.

    Monsieur le Commissaire, agissez maintenant pour adopter au plus vite des normes mondiales minimales. Il y va de la souveraineté de l’Europe, de celle de l’euro et de la protection de nos concitoyens européens.

     
       

     

      Rasmus Andresen, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Seit knapp einer Woche gibt es den Trump Meme Coin – ökonomisch wertlos und für Trump‑Fans vor allem eine emotionale Bindung zu ihrem großen Idol. Der TrumpCoin ist eine Betrugsmaschine, das zum Teil auch ausländische Geld geht in die Kassen der Trump‑Familie. Während Ex‑US‑Präsident Jimmy Carter Ende der 70er-Jahre noch seine Erdnussfarm verkaufen musste, als er gewählt wurde, betrügt Trump auf der ganzen Linie. Aber der TrumpCoin ist vor allem auch eine Symbolik für eine andere US‑Politik im Bereich der Kryptowährungsregulierung, und das sollte uns Sorgen machen. Wir sollten hier ganz klar feststellen, dass Anlagen in Kryptos mit hohen Risiken verbunden sind und dass wir auch wissen, dass das Geldwäscherisiko bei Kryptowährungen deutlich höher ist als in anderen Bereichen.

    Der Mehrwert, der durch Kryptowährungen geschaffen wird, ist fraglich. US‑Präsident Trump öffnet mit blinder Deregulierung und auch, indem er Krypto‑Ultras in wichtige Finanzämter in seiner Administration befördert, der Privatisierung des Währungssystems Tür und Tor. Lassen Sie mich ganz klar sagen: Das darf nicht der europäische Weg sein. Ich bin froh, dass eigentlich aus den großen Fraktionen fast alle Redner auch Skepsis zum Ausdruck gebracht haben und deutlich gemacht haben, dass wir auf der einen Seite internationale Standards brauchen – ja –, aber dass wir nicht den Kurs einschlagen sollten, den die Trump‑Administration hier auf den Weg bringt.

     
       


     

      Pasquale Tridico, a nome del gruppo The Left. – Signora Presidente, signor Commissario, onorevoli colleghi, mentre negli Stati Uniti, con l’insediamento di Trump, il Bitcoin raggiunge valori storici e persino una moneta meme di Trump guadagna miliardi di capitalizzazione, in Europa il dibattito sulle valute digitali resta fermo, specialmente per quanto riguarda l’euro digitale.

    L’euro digitale emesso dalla Banca centrale europea rappresenterebbe una risposta pubblica, sicura e indipendente, a sostegno della nostra autonomia strategica ed economica rispetto alle criptovalute, che, a causa della loro volatilità e della mancanza di regolamentazione, non possono offrire un metodo di pagamento stabile.

    Questo progetto, però, rimane bloccato per alcuni paesi che mettono il veto e gruppi politici. Noi, invece, sosteniamo con forza l’introduzione di questo strumento, perché garantirebbe l’indipendenza strategica dell’Europa dai colossi stranieri, principalmente americani, che monopolizzano i pagamenti elettronici, permetterebbe la costruzione di un’infrastruttura europea per i pagamenti digitali, ridurrebbe i costi di transazione per consumatori e venditori e, inoltre, aumenterebbe la stabilità finanziaria.

    L’euro digitale rappresenterebbe anche una risposta cruciale nella lotta all’evasione, che ogni anno priva il welfare europeo di 824 miliardi di euro di gettito fiscale.

    Commissario, Le chiediamo un passo in avanti rispetto all’euro digitale.

     
       

     

      René Aust, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! In den vergangenen Jahren sind weltweit die staatlichen Möglichkeiten gewachsen, uns Bürger zu überwachen. Der Wunsch, sich gegen diese Überwachung zu schützen, wächst jedoch ebenso. Darum erleben Kryptowährungen wie Bitcoin einen solchen Aufschwung. Während der Coronazeit haben wir beispielsweise in Kanada erleben müssen, wie unliebsamen Regierungskritikern die Konten gesperrt wurden. Manche Betroffene hatten nach diesen Kontoschließungen nicht einmal mehr die Möglichkeit, ihre Mieten zu bezahlen. Kryptowährungen schützen durch Verschlüsselungstechnologien unsere Bürger vor übergriffigen Staaten. Gut so!

    Darüber hinaus wollen wir, dass unser Geld sicher ist vor staatlicher Manipulation. Immer mehr Gelddruckerei durch Zentralbanken entwertet das Geld weltweit. Der Euro hat seit dem Jahr 2001 um mehr als ein Drittel seiner Kaufkraft verloren. Darum wollen viele Bürger eine manipulationssichere Währung. Auch das versprechen Kryptowährungen. Im Übrigen: Wenn hier gerade davon gesprochen wird, dass Terrorfinanzierung und Drogenfinanzierung durch Bitcoin begangen wird: 90 Prozent aller Terrorfinanzierungen finden nach wie vor durch Dollar oder Euro statt. Wir setzen uns für die Souveränität unserer Nationen ein, aber genauso setzen wir uns ein für die Souveränität unserer Bürger. Wir trauen ihnen zu, für sich selber zu entscheiden. Darum wollen wir Neuerungen wie Bitcoin und Co. auch weiterhin zulassen, und zwar so, dass nicht Politiker, die keine Ahnung von diesen Dingen haben, darin rummanipulieren. Die neue Trump‑Regierung macht es vor: keine Angst vor Innovation, sondern die Chancen ergreifen. Technologieoffenheit also auch im Finanzbereich.

     
       

     

      Regina Doherty (PPE). – Madam President, colleagues, we have spent the last few months since I’ve been here intensively talking about the importance of innovation, and it is clear that, despite all of the risks it entails, crypto stems from a desire to innovate and operate outside traditional norms and structures.

    In general, legislators and regulators should focus on creating the conditions for innovation and sectors to thrive. But in this case, there’s vital issues of trust, consumer protection and there is obviously the serious potential for financial crime that still exists.

    And yet, on the other side of the Atlantic, we hear the promises of the new administration of the sector, even as the President’s own meme coins were launched and then crashed and lost half their value in the space of one weekend.

    I think there are serious questions that have to be asked about a situation where the most powerful politician and one of the richest men in the world can self‑enrich himself through a scheme while purporting to be in charge of the regulators of that particular innovation? And while these questions go unaddressed, the cryptocurrency industry will continue to face serious pushback by some of us in this Chamber and outside.

    The EU’s legal framework for the sector seeks to promote innovation while tackling market abuse and the very large elements of criminality, and its full implementation has literally only just begun, it’s in its infancy. So, I hope that when we eventually come to review and have an international standard, that our efforts will be used for that global standard.

     
       

     

      Eero Heinäluoma (S&D). – Madam President, despite the hurray mood in parts of the crypto world since the election of Trump, it’s important to look at the facts. I see at least three reasons to remain concerned about this bubble.

    Firstly, despite all the measures adopted, crypto seems to remain the favourite tool for sanctions evaders and gangsters, including cocaine cartels, North Korean hackers, Iranian and Russian spies and fentanyl smugglers. If we want to tackle these problems seriously, let’s hit them where it hurts. Secondly, as well outlined by the ECB, the recent rise in Bitcoin value benefits mainly a happy few at the expense of the many. From an investor protection perspective, this is far from optimal. Finally, in times of high energy prices and energy scarcity, investing in infrastructure to mine bitcoins is wasting energy.

    Therefore, it is good to have this debate. We indeed need global standards for crypto to tackle these challenges, and the EU should take the lead as MiCA and the AML package can give some inspiration. But we should go further and we need a MiCA 2 to close remaining regulatory loopholes, for example, around NFTs and decentralised finance applications. We count, therefore, on this new commission to pick up this role and push this agenda forward.

     
       

     

      Aleksandar Nikolic (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, comme avec Internet, le cloud et l’IA, nous sommes une fois encore à la charrette des grandes puissances sur la cryptomonnaie. 10 % des Européens détiendraient des cryptomonnaies. En France, ils seraient déjà 12 %, soit plus de 8 millions de Français. Et cela continue d’augmenter.

    Et vous? Votre premier réflexe, c’est d’avoir peur. Ce n’est pas de savoir comment investir dans cette nouvelle technologie, la fameuse chaîne de blocs, mais comment la réguler, comment taxer les profits de monsieur Tout-le-Monde et comment la contrôler. Car au fond, c’est ça qui vous terrifie dans le monde de la crypto: il échappe aux technocrates. Quand il y a une nouvelle technologie, immédiatement vous en avez peur et vous voulez la réguler.

    Nous, on se demande comment s’y adapter et comment en tirer profit. Nos préoccupations sont: pourquoi l’Europe n’innove plus et comment utiliser ces technologies pour booster notre compétitivité. Plutôt que de taxer, favorisons l’investissement dans l’industrie européenne et l’économie réelle, incitons les détenteurs de crypto à transformer les plus-values en actions dans des entreprises innovantes, faisant en sorte que les futurs Nakamoto ou Musk soient européens et créent des technologies de rupture sur notre sol. Soyons enfin un continent d’avenir. Oui, il faut rendre la crypto utile et pour cela, il faut se débarrasser des technos inutiles.

     
       

     

      Guillaume Peltier (ECR). – Madame la Présidente, partout, le socialisme mène à la ruine. Il y eut, certes, l’URSS, Cuba, l’Angola ou le Brésil qui se réveillèrent pauvres comme jamais. Mais aujourd’hui, c’est l’Europe que les gauches tentent d’asservir. Pas un jour qui ne passe sans que les politiciens de gauche n’inventent, en France ou ailleurs, une nouvelle norme, une nouvelle taxe, une nouvelle contrainte. Pas un jour qui ne passe sans que les vieilles gauches sur ces bancs ne hurlent contre le mérite, l’effort, le succès, le travail. Alors, je le dis à tous ces politiciens: laissez-nous tranquilles. Quand laisserez-vous respirer les entrepreneurs et les originaux de tout poil dont vous sabordez le talent?

    Le pénible babil technocratique de ce débat sur les cryptomonnaies est le symptôme d’une Europe en dormition, épuisée par la fièvre socialiste. Dépassée et déclassée, voilà l’Europe que vous proposez au monde, transformant la terre de Jacques Cœur en mouroir de l’esprit d’entreprise. Pire: à l’heure où le monde entier fait le choix de la liberté avec Donald Trump, Elon Musk ou Javier Milei, vous voulez nous contraindre à la relégation. Pourtant, l’histoire est têtue. En connaissez-vous beaucoup des gens de gauche qui, à la chute du mur de Berlin, se sont enfuis à l’Est? Le monde entier s’éveille et vous, la gauche, vous voulez continuer à dormir de vos vieilles lunes ou, pire, vous ronflez de vos impôts fatigués. Alors écoutez bien: nous ne voulons plus de vous, nous ne voulons plus être ni taxés ni spoliés, nous voulons être libres!

     
       

     

      Gilles Boyer (Renew). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, les cryptomonnaies gagnent d’évidence en popularité. Elles fonctionnent en dehors de toute législation financière et dans l’anonymat le plus total. Comme tout instrument de spéculation, elles feront la fortune des uns et l’infortune des autres, sans jamais contribuer à l’économie réelle. Mais n’oublions pas, et c’est notre rôle, que c’est avant tout à la puissance publique d’organiser la circulation des monnaies en s’adaptant aux nouveaux usages et de garantir la stabilité et l’utilisation de l’euro.

    C’est le sens du projet d’euro numérique, un équivalent à l’argent liquide dans un portefeuille numérique, émis et garanti par la Banque centrale européenne, à l’inverse des cryptomonnaies. Ce sera un moyen de paiement gratuit, sécurisé, accepté partout en Europe, même dans les zones sans connexion Internet et avec, dans certains cas, un niveau d’anonymat similaire à l’argent liquide. L’euro numérique permettra à l’Union européenne de préserver et de renforcer sa souveraineté monétaire dans un secteur des paiements de plus en plus numérisé. Les colégislateurs doivent s’y atteler sans tarder, au premier rang desquels notre Parlement.

     
       


     

      Catarina Martins (The Left). – Senhora Presidente, todas as épocas tiveram as suas bolhas e fraudes financeiras. Hoje, são as criptomoedas, uma burla disfarçada de investimento, que gera uma montanha de poluição sem produzir um alfinete.

    Sem surpresa e sem escrúpulos, Trump acaba de anunciar a criação da sua própria criptomoeda, que será regida pelas regras que o próprio criará como presidente dos Estados Unidos. Como em qualquer esquema de pirâmide, só os criadores, como Trump, sairão sempre cheios de dinheiro, mas, neste caso, dinheiro real, euros, dólares. Os incautos e deslumbrados vão perder tudo.

    Senhor Comissário, ao permitir as criptomoedas a pretexto da regulação, as instituições europeias estão a normalizar a burla, contribuindo para enganar cidadãos e, ao permitir aos bancos a constituição de carteiras de criptoativos, estão a criar um mecanismo crescente de contágio aos mercados, ignorando até os avisos do FMI. Na crise do Silicon Valley Bank, já tivemos um cheiro deste mecanismo.

    Sejamos claros: regular as criptomoedas tem de ser proibir as criptomoedas, impedir os bancos de as comprar, proteger as pessoas da burla, evitar a próxima crise financeira.

     
       


     

      Kateřina Konečná (NI). – Paní předsedající, vážený pane komisaři, vážené kolegyně, vážení kolegové, kryptoměny s sebou nesou příslib inovací, ale také celou řadu rizik. Miliony lidí v nich vidí příležitost, ale bohužel je zde i mnoho těch, kteří kvůli podvodům a nejasným pravidlům již přišli o své celoživotní úspory. A to vyžaduje od států a jejich institucí velkou opatrnost. Kryptoměny nelze apriori odmítat. Přináší nové možnosti v oblasti financí, nezávislosti i v investicích. Nicméně je nezbytné, aby jejich rozvoj byl ukotven v jasných principech. Jedním z těch klíčových je i právo občanů platit hotově, což považuji za základní svobodu, kterou musíme chránit. Nové metody oběhu finančních prostředků nemohou vést k zániku těch stávajících, které slouží právě jako pojistka celého systému. Kryptoměny a blockchain mohou ohrozit například prudký vývoj kvantových počítačů. Na toto všechno musíme být připraveni. Proto vyzývám k vytvoření globálních standardů, které zajistí ochranu uživatelů, jejich případné odškodnění v případě podvodů, transparentnost trhu, pravidla zdanění a zároveň respekt k finančním právům občanů.

     
       

     

      Kinga Kollár (PPE). – Tisztelt Elnök Asszony! Világszinten növekedik a kriptoeszközökbe való befektetések volumene. Ugyanakkor az nem kérdés, hogy ez a befektetési forma különösen kockázatos. Ezért az ilyen termékekkel való kereskedéshez nagyfokú pénzügyi jártasság és tudatosság szükséges.

    Legyünk reálisak! Egy OECD-jelentés szerint a befektetők kevesebb, mint fele érti a kamatos kamat számítását, így azt gondolom, jól tettük, hogy Európa megfelelő időben a szabályozás mellett tette le voksát, és globális standardokért harcol.

    Hiszen jól tudjuk a kétezres évekből, hogy a pénzügyi válságok nem állnak meg a határokon. Az áttekintő szabályozást az is indokolja, hogy a kriptoeszközök a feketegazdaság valutájaként is funkcionálnak.

    Ugyanakkor a túlszabályozást is el kell kerülnünk, mert az sem elfogadható, hogy a szabályozás akadályozza az európai innovációt, és ezáltal az európai vállalkozások lemaradnak a globális piacokon.

    Versenyképesség, prudencia, fogyasztóvédelem és a magas standardok globális kiterjesztése. Ez az irány, amit követnünk kell, de még inkább a pénzügyi ismeretek és tudatosság növelésére van szükség, mert ez a kulcs ahhoz, hogy az európai állampolgárok jó befektetési döntéseket hozzanak, és ezáltal növeljék vagyonukat, Európa vagyonát.

     
       

     

      Aurore Lalucq (S&D). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, parce que sans régulation, le marché des crypto-actifs, ce ne sont pas des monnaies, ce ne sont pas des technologies, ce sont des actifs financiers. Ce serait fait d’arnaques, de financements, de pratiques illicites en tout genre, dont celle du financement de groupes terroristes tels que Daesh. Nous avons choisi de les réglementer dans un climat hostile, violent, toxique, fait de menaces et de cyber-harcèlement.

    Il est donc cocasse de voir aujourd’hui que ceux-là mêmes qui nous harcelaient à l’époque et hurlaient qu’ils allaient partir aux États-Unis à cause de nous, se plaignent des pratiques actuelles de l’administration de Donald Trump, lequel a déstabilisé le marché avec le lancement de son «coin». Ils sont en train d’expérimenter ce qu’est la loi du plus fort quand elle ne leur est pas favorable. Donc oui, évidemment, comme nous l’avons toujours dit, il nous faut des réglementations au niveau international. Il faut aussi protéger la nôtre, se renforcer sur la question de la stabilité financière, mais surtout, par pitié, ne perdons pas trop de temps avec ce débat. On sait ce qu’il faut faire dans le domaine des cryptomonnaies. En revanche, on doit avancer en ce qui concerne l’euro numérique et la création de nos propres «big tech».

     
       

     

      Mathilde Androuët (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, l’essor des cryptomonnaies est un défi majeur pour nos États et pour l’Union européenne. Ces systèmes alternatifs, échappant souvent au contrôle des banques centrales, ne doivent pas compromettre un principe fondamental: la souveraineté monétaire des nations. La monnaie est un attribut régalien indispensable pour garantir la stabilité économique et protéger nos concitoyens.

    Pourtant, pendant que l’Europe s’interroge, d’autres pays avancent à grands pas. Les États-Unis, par exemple, ne se contentent pas d’encadrer ces nouvelles technologies; ils les soutiennent, les développent et les utilisent comme un levier d’influence stratégique à l’échelle mondiale. De leur côté, la Chine et d’autres puissances investissent massivement pour asseoir leur domination numérique.

    Face à cela, l’Europe ne peut rester figée dans une culture de la surréglementation. Certes, il est essentiel de garantir un cadre sûr, transparent et respectueux de nos valeurs. Mais réglementer sans agir, c’est accepter de subir. Nous devons changer de paradigme. Investissons dans les technologies numériques comme la chaîne de blocs, soutenons les entreprises innovantes et encourageons l’émergence de solutions européennes compétitives. Il en va de notre souveraineté économique et monétaire.

    Nous ne pouvons pas laisser des acteurs extérieurs imposer leurs règles, dicter leurs normes et nous asservir à des technologies qu’ils contrôlent seuls. Soyons ambitieux, bâtissons une Europe qui ose, qui innove et qui s’affirme comme un leader mondial. Oui, l’avenir de notre souveraineté ne s’écrira pas dans l’attentisme; l’Europe doit être forte, visionnaire et audacieuse.

     
       

     

      Adrian-George Axinia (ECR). – Doamnă președintă, un aforism care a devenit celebru în ultimii ani este că regulile fizicii se aplică indiferent dacă noi credem sau nu în ele. Parafrazând și luând în considerare propunerea de reglementare Markets in Crypto Assets (MiCA) putem spune că aceste monede virtuale vor exista, indiferent dacă Uniunea Europeană sau orice alt stat membru crede că sunt bune sau încearcă să le controleze total. Ceea ce nu înțelege Comisia Europeană, ține de rațiunea de a exista a acestor criptomonede.

    Li se aplică logica unei monede bazate pe încredere, a cetățenilor sau a piețelor. Or, apariția acestor monede virtuale este mai degrabă rezultatul neîncrederii în modul de funcționare a economiei și al sistemelor politico-administrative complexe. Mulți se refugiază în cripto pentru a-și proteja valoarea proprietății în fața inflației, a turbulențelor financiare și economice, dar și ca tentativă de ocolire a unui sistem Big Brother care vrea să știe la secundă ce face fiecare cetățean cu banii.

    În forma actuală, Markets in Crypto Assets va eșua tocmai din dorința prea mare de a intra în intimitatea oamenilor și de a verifica și controla fluxurile financiare. Exact cum s-a întâmplat și cu tentativa de interzicere sau limitare a plăților cash.

    Abordarea propusă de Comisie este deci mai aproape de China, unde tranzacțiile cripto sunt interzise, decât de un sistem financiar deschis spre inovație. Inclusiv în această privință, Bruxelles-ul ar avea de învățat de la noua administrație de la Washington.

     
       

     

      Cynthia Ní Mhurchú (Renew). – A Uachtaráin, criptea-airgeadraí. Forbairt mhór teicneolaíochta, gan dabht, le deiseanna dearfacha ar nós córas airgeadais níos ionchuimsithí, idirbhearta trasteorann níos tapúla agus féidearthachtaí réabhlóideacha trí theicneolaíocht bhlocshlabhra. Níor chóir dúinn san Eoraip neamhaird a dhéanamh de chriptea. Ach, ná ligimis orainn go mbeidh sé seo brea éasca.

    Tá fíordhúshlán ag baint leis na deiseanna seo. Guagacht praghsanna, gníomhaíochtaí mídhleathacha agus easpa cosaintí láidre do thomhaltóirí. Ábhair imní dhlisteanacha iad seo a éilíonn freagairt láidir shoiléir, ach, ag an am céanna, níor cheart dúinn rialú iomarcach a dhéanamh ar bhonn eagla na heagla. Má dhéanaimid nuálaíocht a thachtadh, tá an baol ann go gcaillfimid an borradh díreach céanna a d’fhéadfadh ceannaire domhanda a dhéanamh den Eoraip sa gheilleagar digiteach.

    Seachas sin, caithfidh ár gcur chuige a bheith cliste, ag féachaint chun tosaigh agus réidh le lúbadh mar a oireann. Tá rialacha ag teastáil a chuireann trédhearcacht chun cinn, mar shampla cosaintí láidre i gcoinne sciúradh airgid agus cosaintí do thomhaltóirí. Ar an gcaoi chéanna, ní mór dúinn an nuálaíocht a chothú trí oibriú le nuálaithe príobháideacha, trí chreataí solúbtha a chruthú. I ndeireadh na dála, tá deis ar leith ag an Eoraip anseo le criptea. Ba chóir dúinn an deis a thapú.

     
       

     

      Giuseppe Antoci (The Left). – Signora Presidente, signor Commissario Brunner, onorevoli colleghi, Europol ci segnala un incremento nell’uso criminale delle criptovalute nel riciclaggio di denaro e per la richiesta dei riscatti dopo gli attacchi informatici. La blockchain facilita trasferimenti rapidi di capitali a livello globale, offrendo ai criminali un vantaggio significativo.

    Nel campo della cibercriminalità emergono tecniche avanzatissime, che richiedono competenze elevate degli investigatori. Tali competenze necessitano di personale adeguatamente formato.

    Inoltre, cresce l’uso di criptovalute ancorate al valore delle materie prime, apprezzate dai capi criminali per la loro stabilità e facile comprensione.

    La mancanza di strumenti adeguati per il tracciamento delle criptovalute in alcuni Stati membri sta facendo aumentare le richieste di supporto investigativo a Europol.

    Di fronte a queste sfide – e conoscendo la Sua grande sensibilità – è essenziale un impegno coordinato per sviluppare standard globali e condivisi, al fine di combattere efficacemente l’uso illegale di questa tecnologia.

     
       

     

      Marcin Sypniewski (ESN). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Noblista Fryderyk von Hayek powiedział, że nie ma odpowiedzi, dlaczego monopol na emisję pieniądza jest taki niezbędny w dzisiejszym świecie. I gdy po kryzysie w 2008 roku chroniliście banki przed upadkiem, do którego pośrednio doprowadziliście, to programista czy grupa programistów, znani jako Satoshi Nakamoto, powiedzieli „dość”. Powiedzieli dość pokusie nadużycia, z której korzystają rządy i banki, dość psucia pieniądza przez jego emisję, dość fałszywemu pieniądzowi. I w ten sposób powstał bitcoin. Jest to najlepszy kandydat do stania się pieniądzem. Jest rzadki, podzielny, trudny do podrobienia, a przede wszystkim nie uznaje nad sobą dyktatów rządów i banków. Jest też antykruchy. I wszystkie te zakusy, żeby go ograniczyć, tylko go wzmacniają. I patrząc na te wszystkie proponowane ograniczenia, wiem chyba, jaka jest odpowiedź na pytanie Hayeka. Powiedział on, że najgorszym monopolem w rękach rządów jest monopol na pieniądz. I te dążenia do ograniczenia kryptowalut wynikają z tego, że są to niepaństwowe środki wymiany, które wygrywają z inwigilowanym, przeregulowanym pieniądzem dekretowym. Pamiętajmy o tym, że pieniądz powinien służyć ludziom, a nie – elitom.

     
       

     

      Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus (NI). – Doamnă președintă, stimați colegi, România a fost teatrul unor operațiuni financiare absolut tragice pentru poporul român în anii 90. Scheme Ponzi implementate de tipi care erau manipulați de servicii secrete și politicieni au reușit să devalizeze buzunarele poporului român.

    Ulterior, sigur, societatea a evoluat. În 2001 au apărut avioanele care au dărâmat blocurile gemene și, sigur, a început războiul împotriva terorismului. În 2008 a apărut Bitcoin pe fondul crizei din America, criză ce s-a transferat și în Europa, desigur, și ulterior criptomonedele au luat avânt.

    V-ați gândit, poate, că acest imbold al statelor împotriva cetățeanului de a bloca deținerea cash-ului a favorizat acest avânt al criptomonedelor? Și acum, noi vrem să reglementăm. A apărut acest regulament MiCA ce reglementează anumite lucruri, dar nu reușește să facă o diferență între oamenii care au rea-voință de la început și oamenii care într-adevăr vor să facă proiecte serioase în criptomonede.

     
       


     

      Lídia Pereira (PPE). – Senhora Presidente, mais do que exportar legislação, a Europa tem de exportar inovação. Mas vamos ser claros: não fomos pioneiros na tecnologia que suporta os criptoativos e devíamos ter sido, mas para criar o regulamento, obrigações e burocracias, aí não perdemos tempo.

    É evidente que os criptoativos precisam de um quadro legal. São um ativo financeiro, por isso, há mínimos de transparência e, muito importante, de proteção do investidor. Mas é também evidente que essas leis têm de garantir segurança e previsibilidade para quem quer inovar e investir.

    Se aqui na Europa não estamos a garantir nem uma coisa nem outra, como vamos defender uma regulação global? Primeiro, temos de garantir que o regulamento de mercado de criptoativos é bem implementado. Segundo, temos de apoiar a inovação em blockchain com a consciência de que é uma tecnologia que não se esgota em criptomoedas, mas que pode e deve ser aplicada noutras áreas. Terceiro, temos de perceber que criptomoedas são hoje ativos financeiros como qualquer outro.

    Tentar uma regulação global tem impacto na concorrência livre, na dinâmica do mercado e na liberdade financeira das pessoas. Não podemos viver num faroeste financeiro, quando falamos de criptomoedas, mas também não podemos aprisionar novos projetos, novas ideias e novos investimentos que criam emprego e oportunidades.

    Este já não é o tempo de desconfiar de tudo quanto é novo, é o tempo de confiar naqueles que inovam, que investem, que fazem futuro no presente.

     
       


     

      Nikos Papandreou (S&D). – Madam President, Commissioner, from this discussion I think the answer is staring us in the face.

    We have two distinct philosophies, one on one side of the Atlantic and one on the other side. The US is a free market, let it bloom, let’s have the $TRUMP coin and then we regulate. Ours is let’s regulate and see what happens.

    What’s happening now is, besides the criminal activities with crypto, it’s also used by poor people in countries with inflation. So they put it into crypto, a very unsafe coin, and then turn it back into their currency.

    What we need to do is to create the Spinelli coin, which is the digital euro, and to have our own digital crypto competing so that we can impose international standards with safe asset from Europe.

    We will not be able to regulate the huge space from the rest of the world, unless we have our own digital coin that people will trust in, not only in Europe but internationally. MiCA helps on that. The way we will impose international standards and MiCA is by having our own innovation and our own Europe.

    (The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question)

     
       

     

      Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI), întrebare adresată conform procedurii „cartonașului albastru”. – Ați vorbit de regulamentul MiCA. Aici avem o regulă în care se menționează că ofertanții sau persoanele care solicită admiterea la tranzacționare cu criptoactive, altele decât jetoanele de referință la active și jetoanele de bani electronici, trebuie să fie persoane juridice, să publice o carte albă, iar următoarea regulă este: să acționați cinstit, corect și profesional. Puteți să-mi spuneți, vă rog frumos – și în calitate de avocat, vă întreb – cum veți ajunge la concluzia că persoana respectivă acționează cinstit, corect și profesional, înainte de a fi în calitatea lor de ofertanți sau persoanele care solicită admiterea la tranzacționare?

     
       


     

      Angéline Furet (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, la chaîne de blocs et les cryptomonnaies sont nées d’une idée simple: redonner le contrôle aux individus, renforcer la transparence et garantir un accès équitable à des systèmes ouverts. Décentralisation, transparence et sécurité sont donc les valeurs fondamentales de cette révolution. Mais aujourd’hui, la chaîne de blocs va bien au-delà des transactions financières. Elle révolutionne la gestion des données, la traçabilité et la confiance numérique en transcendant les frontières et en appelant à une coopération mondiale. Cependant, avec cet immense potentiel viennent aussi des défis: fraudes, inégalités d’accès et manque de réglementations claires.

    C’est donc ici que réside notre responsabilité collective. Il faut bâtir des normes mondiales, non pas pour étouffer l’innovation, mais pour l’encadrer et l’amplifier. Ces normes doivent donc 1) sécuriser les utilisateurs; 2) préserver la décentralisation; 3) favoriser un cadre propice à l’innovation.

    L’Europe, avec des initiatives comme le règlement MiCA, a démontré qu’une réglementation, bien que partielle, est envisageable. Elle doit donc maintenant agir comme un pont pour initier un dialogue mondial. La chaîne de blocs est une chance unique de construire des systèmes plus justes et équitables. Ensemble, nous pouvons orienter cette révolution vers un avenir plus ouvert et prospère.

     
       

     

      Ondřej Krutílek (ECR). – Vážená paní předsedající, vážený pane komisaři, ke kryptoměnám musíme přistupovat konstruktivně. Od loňského roku platí nařízení MiCA a já věřím, že jeho zavádění do praxe probíhá bez větších problémů.

    V Česku se díky našemu poslanci Jiřímu Havránkové podařilo prosadit jak automatické právo na zřízení bankovního účtu pro kryptopodnikatele, tak osvobození od daně při prodeji kryptoměn po třech letech. Myslím si, že tímto přístupem by se mohly inspirovat i další evropské státy. Naopak nápady typu zdanění nerealizovaných zisků z kryptoměn, které slyšíme z některých zemí, bych opravdu nedoporučoval.

    Američané mají k regulaci kryptoměn odlišný přístup, a tak se domnívám, že dosažení globálních standardů minimálně v tuhle chvíli nepřichází v úvahu. I proto bychom měli být opatrní s jakoukoli další možnou regulací od nás z Evropské unie. Důležité je, aby přehnaná regulace a nepředvídatelné právní prostředí nemotivovaly startupy a další firmy k úprku z Evropy.

    Pokud se bavíme o blockchainu, je to technologie budoucnosti, která nabízí řadu praktických aplikací. Příští týden v úterý pořádám v Bruselu akci, na kterou bych vás chtěl všechny pozvat. Bude na ní mimo jiné představen i projekt Českého vysokého učení technického a půjde o inovativní blockchainovou platformu pro decentralizované vydávání dluhopisů pro malé a střední podniky. Tak se stavte.

     
       


     

      Adnan Dibrani (S&D). – Fru talman! Kommissionär! Kryptovaluta, som en gång varit väldigt nischat, har snabbt fått genomslag i hela världen. Det är också en digital revolution som öppnat upp nya möjligheter inom andra sektorer.

    Det finns en stor potential i blockchain‑tekniken som kan innebära vinster för till exempel offentlig sektor, för mer robusta och effektiva system. Just nu undersöks därhemma till exempel hur vi ska använda den här tekniken inom vården, för att kunna säkrare hantera och dela personlig hälsodata.

    Det är viktigt att vi främjar ny teknik när den kommer, men samtidigt är det viktigt att den nya tekniken har en viss kontroll. Teknik får inte användas för att skada konsumenter, för terrorismfinansiering, för penningtvätt och så vidare. Här har EU gått före och reglerat krypto. Men krypto existerar på global nivå och därav behöver vi standarder på global nivå, så att vi kan dra nytta av potentialen, inte hämma den, och se till så att tekniken används på rätt sätt och inte används av suspekta nationer för att skada konsumenter och våra system som vi håller så kärt.

     
       

     

      Diego Solier (NI). – Señora presidente, señor comisario, el Reglamento MiCA, aunque presentado como un avance hacia la regulación de los criptoactivos, representa una amenaza directa a los derechos de los ciudadanos.

    Bajo el pretexto de proteger al consumidor y garantizar la estabilidad financiera, este marco podría socavar la privacidad, la libertad financiera y la innovación. Imponer estándares globales en un sistema creado para ser descentralizado es, literalmente, ponerle puertas al campo.

    Medidas como la recopilación masiva de datos personales, requisitos de capital inalcanzables para start-ups y la prohibición de ciertos criptoactivos no solo ahogan la innovación, sino que limitan la libertad de elección de los ciudadanos. Además, la vigilancia y la supervisión excesiva abren la puerta a un control digital sin precedentes.

    Mi pregunta es clara: ¿estamos regulando para proteger al ciudadano o para reforzar el control de los grandes poderes económicos y políticos sobre sus vidas? No podemos permitir que este Reglamento traicione la esencia de las criptomonedas: descentralización, autonomía y libertad.

     
       

     

      Andrey Kovatchev (PPE). – Madam President, Commissioner, dear colleagues, the European tech sector faces challenges that create a perception of stagnation compared to dynamic regions like South‑East Asia and the US. The EU is a global pioneer in the introduction of regulations such as the MiCA, with the aim to protect customers, but without hamper the growth. Yes, we need global standards, and the EU must be in the lead of this introduction. But also, we need to wake up.

    Talent migration is a big concern, with 90 % of the EU tech workers willing to relocate to the US for better salaries and funding opportunities. To reclaim the position of Europe, we need innovation‑friendly policies, including clear regulatory frameworks and sandbox environments for start-ups that will promote prosperity and growth.

    The rapid development of cryptocurrency markets highlights the urgent need to educate people on how to navigate the evolving landscape responsibly. Without proper knowledge, individuals and businesses risk falling victim to scams, fraud, financial crimes or malign global players. Europe needs to act now and act fast, if we are serious about our fostering competitiveness, and to act together with the responsible crypto community and not in a war with them.

    Are we ready to take bold decisions to ensure our success or will we risk again being left behind as others seize opportunities which we hesitate to explore? Commission and Council and colleagues, we need to act now.

     
       

     

      Waldemar Buda (ECR). – Doregulować, przeregulować i zabić. Taka jest regulacja i takie są działania Unii Europejskiej w wielu sprawach. Tak było z przedsiębiorcami, tak było z rolnikami. I teraz dokładnie tak samo podchodzimy do blockchain i kryptowalut. Za chwilę się okaże, że cały świat na tym zarabia, cały świat się rozwija, a my nie traktujemy tego jako szansy, tylko traktujemy to jako zagrożenie. Dzisiaj największe aktywa w kryptowalutach mają Chiny i Stany Zjednoczone, a Europa zastanawia się, jak to ograniczyć? Jak to zwalczyć? Za chwilę miliard osób na świecie będzie miało kryptowaluty.

    W Polsce 12% osób w wieku produkcyjnym ma już kryptowaluty. Ja się więc bardziej boję tego, że wy będziecie doregulowywać niż że nie będziecie robić nic, bo to pewnie zabije ten rynek i inni będą na tym zarabiać. Oczywiście nieprawidłowości trzeba ścigać, ale rozsądnie. Dzisiaj jak w Polsce się próbuje to uregulować, to lobbyści obsiedli urzędy i instytucje i ciężko cokolwiek zrobić. I ci, co mają na tym zarobić, i tak zarobią. A zwykli ludzie niestety nie mogą inwestować i się w tej sprawie rozwijać.

     
       

     

      Caterina Chinnici (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signor Commissario Brunner, onorevoli colleghi, “follow the money”: è questo il metodo per contrastare davvero la criminalità organizzata, come l’esperienza investigativa e giudiziaria italiana ci insegna da oltre quarant’anni. E “focus on the money” è oggi il motto della Procura europea nel solco di quell’insegnamento.

    Quando il denaro si fa virtuale, le sfide per le autorità di regolamentazione e di contrasto si complicano, mentre invece si moltiplicano le opportunità per le organizzazioni criminali: decentralizzazione, anonimato, bassa tracciabilità, scarsità di controlli, possibilità di effettuare rapidi trasferimenti di denaro transfrontalieri e di creare catene complesse di transazioni sono solo alcune delle ragioni che rendono criptovalute e blockchain strumenti sempre più utili per la criminalità organizzata transnazionale e per le organizzazioni terroristiche globali.

    In criptovalute si pagano i traffici di droga, armi ed esseri umani e, attraverso le operazioni che le criptovalute consentono, i capitali illeciti vengono riciclati e reinvestiti agevolmente nell’economia legale.

    Per questo, è necessario regolamentare il fenomeno. Certo, con il regolamento sui mercati delle cripto‑attività, le norme sui trasferimenti di cripto‑attività e le nuove norme su antiriciclaggio e confisca abbiamo iniziato a farlo, però l’Unione deve continuare a sostenere l’adozione di regole uniformi e standard globali, per impedire alle organizzazioni criminali di sfruttare a proprio vantaggio lacune e differenze normative, arginare il jurisdiction shopping e, così, contrastare davvero il crimine economico e finanziario.

     
       

     

      Seán Kelly (PPE). – Madam President, digital and cryptocurrencies present an important opportunity for Europe, provided we establish the necessary safeguards. We must strike the right balance between regulating to enhance consumer protection and promote financial stability, while ensuring we do not hinder innovation or impede the financial inclusion that cryptocurrencies can offer.

    The MiCA Regulation demonstrates Europe’s willingness to lead in establishing best-in-class regulatory frameworks. Recent events, such as the collapse of the FTX in November 2022, have shown why proper standards are essential to protect our citizens from irresponsible, and even fraudulent, market behaviour.

    However, the new Trump administration’s pro-crypto stance provides an opportunity for us to reflect. We hear from the crypto industry that the US is now becoming a more attractive jurisdiction than the EU, with its regulatory approach expected to be looser than ours. On this I make two points.

    One: here in Europe we must approach this industry with the same competitiveness lens we apply to all sectors. It is vital to monitor the impact of our regulations and remain adaptable enough to amend them if needed, ensuring we maintain the right balance.

    Two: those in the crypto industry eyeing Trump’s America with enthusiasm might reflect on the Trump coin debacle before this week’s inauguration. Be careful what you wish for!

    Ultimately, the cross-border and decentralised nature of cryptocurrencies demands international cooperation to address clear regulatory gaps, as was stated by the Commissioner and my colleague Markus Ferber. So let us collaborate closely with our global partners to establish clear and enforceable global standards.

     
       

       

    Catch-the-eye procedure

     
       

     

      Niels Geuking (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Kommissar! Die ursprüngliche Idee von Kryptowährungen, ein globales und dezentrales Finanzsystem aufzubauen, hatte schon ihren Reiz und war leicht faszinierend, aber selbst der Bitcoin ist heute eine Riesenmogelpackung: 60 Prozent aller Bitcoins werden gerade mal von weniger als 18 000 Adressen verwahrt. Wo ist da der dezentrale Gedanke geblieben?

    Auf dem Kryptomarkt insgesamt herrscht dann auch eine Wildwest-Mentalität. Die Meme Coins sind Betrug mit Ansage. Vom Hawk Tuah Girl bis zum TrumpCoin – es mangelt schlicht und ergreifend überall an Substanz. Am Ende versucht dann jeder, jemand Dümmeren zu finden, der bereit ist, mehr zu bezahlen, als man selbst investiert hat. Es ist ein Spiel mit Verlierern und ein modernes Beispiel der Tulpenmanie, getrieben von Profitgier und Dummheit. 2021 sagte Trump selbst noch, Kryptowährungen seien eine potenzielle Katastrophe, gar Betrug – zumindest, bis er selbst einen Deal machen konnte. Weltweit durchsetzbare Regeln ohne die USA? Schwierig. Dabei braucht es sie, und zwar vor allem für die Technologie und den Fortschritt brauchen wir die globalen Standards. Zur Not …

    (Die Präsidentin entzieht dem Redner das Wort.)

     
       

     

      Maria Grapini (S&D). – Doamnă președintă, domnule comisar, de teama evaziunii nu trebuie să ne opunem inovației. Sigur, criptomonedele sunt rezultatul unei inovații. Ați spus foarte bine, avem regulament, avem directivă, ne gândim la standarde internaționale, pentru că da, nu suntem singuri pe lume, avem o piață globală.

    Problema este că, din punctul meu de vedere, nu trebuie să obstrucționăm cetățenii în a-și folosi veniturile, nu trebuie să obstrucționăm întreprinderile să investească așa cum doresc, ci trebuie să avem reguli pe care să le respecte.

    Ați spus, domnule comisar, între altele, că doriți să scoateți actorii dăunători. Trebuie să vedeți și cum, trebuie să spuneți ce măsuri, trebuie foarte multă transparență. Nu știu dacă aveți o statistică în Uniunea Europeană, în statele membre: Câte cazuri avem de evaziune, de înșelătorii prin criptomonede?

    Dar trebuie făcute aceste lucruri și cred că trebuie să rămânem cu această inovație – criptomonede – și în Uniunea Europeană, însă cu o reglementare și o supraveghere corectă.

    (Președinta a retras cuvântul vorbitoarei)

     
       

     

      Alexander Jungbluth (ESN). – Frau Präsidentin! Ich glaube, diese heutige Debatte hat wieder gezeigt, dass es unterschiedliche Menschenbilder gibt, die in diesem Parlament hier vertreten werden. Und eigentlich werden hier in diesem Haus immer Debatten darüber geführt, dass man Dinge regulieren muss, Dinge steuern muss. Freie Meinungen werden über den DSA eingeschränkt, und bei den Kryptowährungen ist es auch das Ziel, das möglichst an die kurze Leine zu legen.

    Ich glaube, wir sollten hier an dieser Stelle mal feststellen, dass unser Menschenbild ist, dass wir freie, mündige Bürger haben. Und freie, mündige Bürger sind auch in der Lage, sich eine freie Währung zu suchen. Und aus dem Grund, glaube ich, sind Kryptowährungen genau das Mittel, sich gegen staatliche Repressionen zu wehren, sich abzukoppeln von Staaten und einer Europäischen Union, die immer übergriffiger werden.

     
       


     

      Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis (S&D). – Gerbiama pirmininke, komisare G. Braunai, labai malonu pasveikinti ir labai tikrai geras sumanymas ir teisinga linkme. Čia vienas kolega kalbėjo apie Dievo laiminimą, tai jam priminsiu, kad Dievas ne tik laimino, bet davė Dekalogą ir davė virš trijų šimtų įsakų ir įsakymų. Taigi, reguliavimas prasidėjo nuo Dievo. Tai visiems linkiu to nepamiršti. Toliau, antras dalykas, noriu atkreipti dėmesį – taip, godumas, spekuliacijos, pinigų plovimas, visos šitos bėdos yra didžiulės. Prisiminkite, kas atsitiko su finansų krize, kai griuvo didieji bankai. Tuomet su privačiais lėktuvais važiavo gelbėtis pas ką? Pas vyriausybes. Kai įvyko didžiulės krizės jau su kripto bankais vėl gi buvo tas pats. Todėl išties tie, kurie per daug kalbate apie laisvę, atminkit vieną, kai būna skaudžios pasekmės, tuomet ir tenka ieškoti pagalbos ne kitur, o valstybėse ir reguliuojamuose bankuose.

    (posėdžio pirmininkė iš kalbėtojo atima žodį)

     
       

     

      Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI). – Am văzut că vă deranjează foarte mult că Donald Trump și-a făcut propriul Bitcoin. Bravo lui! De ce nu faceți și dumneavoastră? Dumneavoastră sunteți cu băncile, băncile opresive! Ca avocat, am văzut cum băncile și-au bătut joc de clienții lor, i-au lăsat fără case, fără pământuri, fără nimic, oameni care s-au sinucis din cauza băncilor – cămătari legali.

    În acest context, bitcoinul – vreți și pe acesta să îl monopolizați, să îi faceți regulamente, oricum, extrem de proaste, pentru că niciodată nu o să puteți să garantați că o persoană sau o companie acționează cinstit, corect și profesional. În fapt, nicio companie nu poate acționa cinstit, corect și profesional din cauza impozitelor voastre.

    Mi-aduc aminte, statul român, ca să mă oprească, în „plandemie”, să mai lupt împotriva măștii și a vaccinării, mi-au blocat toate conturile și mi-au luat toți banii din bănci și mi-au dat 30 000 de euro amendă. Așa, ca să fiu controlată, să nu mai am cu ce să-mi cresc copiii. Bitcoinul este libertate și …

    (Președinta a retras cuvântul vorbitoarei)

     
       

       

    (End of catch-the-eye procedure)

     
       

     

      Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, what an interesting discussion and God bless Europe, I would say. I would like to conclude maybe this discussion by saying that we, of course, remain strong supporters of international standards for crypto. These represent a common set of principles around which jurisdictions around the world can converge.

    These standards ensure, at the end, an appropriate policy framework for crypto markets allowing innovation – yes, that is very important – to take place while ensuring that risks are appropriately mitigated. And with this EU MiCA Regulation all of you and most of you were talking about, Europe is the first major jurisdiction to achieve compliance also with international crypto standards.

    However, the Commission is well aware that our efforts alone, or even a partial international effort, cannot ensure that the risks posed by these global crypto markets are adequately addressed, and it is therefore crucial that the adoption of international crypto standards continues to grow.

    The US, that was mentioned as well as a key partner, of course, in promoting the adoption of international standards. We therefore do hope that the new administration will act as a catalyst for further progress in bringing regulatory clarity to crypto asset markets in the United States. And we would expect that any new policy and regulatory developments in the US fully, of course, reflect international standards.

    Thanks again for the discussion and for giving the Commission also the opportunity to participate in this very important exchange.

     
       


       

    (The sitting was suspended at 11:48)

     
       

       

    IN THE CHAIR: SABINE VERHEYEN
    Vice-President

     

    5. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (The sitting resumed at 11:59)

     

    6. Composition of new committees

     

      President. – Following the creation of the standing committees on security and defence and public health, and the special committees on the European Democracy Shield and on the housing crisis in the European Union, the political groups and the non-attached Members have notified the President of appointments to these new standing and special committees as of 23 January 2025.

    The list of the committees’ members will be published online and in the minutes.

     

    7. Composition of committees and delegations
























     

      President. – Sorry. We have clear rules on what are points of order. Some colleagues are very generous when there are actual accidents or things that are happening. But sorry, we have to stick to the points of order, because on Monday we have the one-minute speeches so you can make your position on special issues you want to raise.

    But we are here exactly for points of order. And that is what I exercise, clearly to the Rules. And there is no discussion about what has happened yesterday or the week after, or 20 weeks before or later. Sorry, we have clear order to rule it like it is.

    (Applause)

     

    8. Voting time

     

      President. – The next item is the vote.

     

    8.1. Case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RC-B10-0069/2025, B10-0065/2025, B10-0069/2025, B10-0070/2025, B10-0072/2025, B10-0078/2025, B10-0081/2025, B10-0084/2025) (vote)

     

      President. – The first vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on the case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see minutes, item 8.1).

     

    8.2. Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (RC-B10-0066/2025, B10-0063/2025, B10-0066/2025, B10-0067/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025, B10-0086/2025) (vote)

     

      President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on the systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (see minutes, item 8.2).

     

    8.3. Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (RC-B10-0087/2025, B10-0087/2025, B10-0088/2025, B10-0089/2025, B10-0090/2025, B10-0091/2025, B10-0092/2025, B10-0093/2025) (vote)

     

      President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on the case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (see minutes, item 8.3).

     

    8.4. Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (RC-B10-0074/2025, B10-0074/2025, B10-0075/2025, B10-0076/2025, B10-0077/2025, B10-0079/2025) (vote)

     

      President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (see minutes, item 8.4).

     

    9. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (Sēde tika atsākta plkst. 15:00.)

     

    10. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

     

      Priekšsēdētājs. – Ir pieejams vakardienas sēdes protokols un pieņemtie teksti. Vai ir kādas piezīmes? Protokols ir apstiprināts.

     

    11. Major interpellations (debate)

     

      Priekšsēdētājs. – Nākamais darba kārtības punkts ir debates par plašu interpelāciju, uz kuru jāatbild rakstiski un kurai seko debates, un kuru ECR vārdā iesniedza Charlie Weimers, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Kristoffer Storm, Jaak Madison, Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Alexandr Vondra, Patryk Jaki, Johan Van Overtveldt, Roberts Zīle, Emmanouil Fragkos, Georgiana Teodorescu, Geadis Geadi, Marion Maréchal, Ivaylo Valchev, Kosma Złotowski, Mariusz Kamiński, Maciej Wąsik, Dick Erixon, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Beatrice Timgren, Nicolas Bay, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Ondřej Krutílek, Guillaume Peltier, Michał Dworczyk, Laurence Trochu, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Tobiasz Bocheński un Gheorghe Piperea Komisijai par ES finansējumu fiziskiem robežu aizsardzības elementiem, piemēram, sienām, žogiem vai citām barjerām, pie ES ārējām robežām (G-001002/2024).

     
       

     

      Jaak Madison, author. – Mr President, first of all, we are pretty many Members here on the last day of the week.

    First of all, in September, on September 20, 30 Members of the Parliament, so pretty many, have addressed written questions to the Commission. Unfortunately, we haven’t got any answer in six weeks. So, c’est la vie, and the result is that we have to discuss the question here.

    And I’m even more happy that on this very important topic, we can ask directly from the new Commissioner from Austria, who understands probably very well about the consequences of the illegal migration, about security, about the defence questions.

    The question was about the EU funds and is there any kind of consideration in the European Commission to finance also the projects to protect our external borders physically? For example, in February 2023, the European Council implored the Commission to immediately mobilise substantial EU funds and means in order to help countries bolster their border protection capabilities and infrastructure.

    Commission President von der Leyen has said that the EU will act to strengthen our external borders, specifically by providing an integrated package of mobile and stationary infrastructure from cars to cameras, from watchtowers to electronic surveillance.

    Unfortunately, we understand very well that it’s not enough to fight against, for example, the hybrid attacks by Russia, where they are using thousands of people as a weapon against Finland, against Poland, Lithuania, maybe next day to Estonia. And if those people are used by Russia’s hybrid attack, how can we stop to move them to Germany, to Austria, to the inside of the European Union, thanks to the Schengen free movement that we have?.

    That is why we had only two concrete questions: why has the Commission not yet recognised the reality on the ground at the EU’s external borders and moved to lift its anachronistic moratorium on EU funding for physical border barriers?

    And secondly, considering the ongoing hostile activities at the eastern border and the Member States have taken to constructing border barriers to counter the instrumentation of migrants, will the Commission change its approach and support Member States’ external border barrier projects financially via the EU budget?

     
       

     

      Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, thank you, first of all, for bringing this very important topic to the agenda this afternoon. Let me start by saying that I fully agree with the imperative of reinforced management of our external borders. It must be, of course, us and not the smugglers who decide who comes to our European Union and under what circumstances. This is all the more imperative given precisely the hybrid threats you mentioned. Our response must be as united as it is resolute.

    Coming from a ministry of finance for the last three years, allow me to start my intervention with some figures. In 2024, we saw a 38 % drop in irregular arrivals compared with the previous year. So it’s 239 000 compared with 386 000. And this includes a sharp 78 % drop on the Western Balkan route and 59 % fall on the central Mediterranean route. And that’s stated, as you mentioned, by President von der Leyen in her latest letter also to the European Council. This is the result of the EU’s active engagement with our partner countries, and it is working. We see that and we must continue to pursue these efforts.

    But, as you rightly mentioned, in parallel, we are very much aware that some regions are still under pressure, of course. In particular, there was a threefold increase in irregular crossings at the eastern border, in part as a result, as you mentioned, of the instrumentalisation of migrants by Russia and Belarus in their attempt to destabilise the European Union and undermine also our security. As a response, last month, the Commission issued a communication on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration and also strengthening security at the EU’s external borders. The Commission recognised that Member States can take proportionate, on the one hand, and also temporary measures to address the threat posed by both Russia and Belarus.

    Member States have the responsibility, of course, also to maintain law and order and safeguard national security. That’s pretty obvious. But they do so with the support of the European Union and also its budget on a European Union level. Those Member States bordering Russia and Belarus have recently received additional funding of EUR 170 million to enhance border surveillance altogether.

    This is just part of the broader picture of EU budgetary support to border management. All EU funding for border management has more than tripled over the past three multiannual financial frameworks (the famous MFF), with up to 7.7 billion allocated for border management and also visa instrument in the current 2021 to 2027 period. With these funds, the European Union is building one of the most advanced border management systems in the world and the largest share of this amount – that’s EUR 4.3 billion – is allocated directly to Member States under their national programmes.

    Also the EU’s decentralised agencies – Frontex, eu-LISA, the EUAA, of course, the asylum agency – they also play a key role when it comes to border management, and their budget for the current period amounts to EUR 9.8 billion. In the future, the strengthening of Frontex with increased operational capabilities, including a tripling of its standing corps, will also further contribute to supporting the Member States – because that’s what Frontex is here for – in addressing the challenges at the external borders.

    I would therefore argue that not only has the Commission recognised the reality on the ground, but it is actively also supporting enhanced border management with substantial means, actually. I would also underline that this remains a key priority for me and for the Commission in general. And we are committed to continuing to strengthen the EU’s external borders and supporting the Member States, of course, both operationally and financially, to boost border surveillance.

    I am also very keenly aware, however, that budgets are limited, and the EU budget, of course, is no exception here. It is essential to make the most of every single euro, channelling it to where it is most effective at the end of the day and has the biggest impact, of course. Given these considerations, the Commission has so far focused funding, where the needs are the most urgent and where European money can have a real added value. This has included financing for mobile and stationary units, for border surveillance systems and equipment, for refurbishment of border crossing points, new installations for IT systems, plus also, of course, the maintenance of the equipment. All this increases situational awareness on border control capabilities, which are, of course, crucial for effective border protection, combined, as I said before, with continued support and also continued deployment by Frontex.

    That is the picture of today: EU funding is available to Member States to provide well‑equipped and also modern infrastructure for a very high level of security at the European external borders and to help also combat irregular migration. These things must go hand in hand. On top of this, Member States can decide, of course, themselves to finance structures such as fences, for instance, themselves, while always ensuring, of course, respect for fundamental rights.

    Now, the next step – and this is very important what I’m going to say now – going forward, Mr Madison, and following the trend also observed in the last years, it is clear that the overall needs for border management must be reassessed as part of the preparation of the next multiannual financial framework. This process is currently underway and should of course not be pre-empted. We will, of course, take into account the border management needs we have for the next months and years to come, which must be considered in a holistic manner for the different needs, priorities and resources available, whilst always ensuring that measures are, of course, proportionate and also respect fundamental rights.

    The views of the European Parliament in preparation of that process are, of course, incredibly important. At the same time, constant engagement is necessary to achieve results on external border management, and the European Union will continue to deepen these comprehensive and strategic relations that it is building with key countries of origin, but also key countries of transit, including migration in the spectrum of key interests covered by these agreements.

     
       

     

      Lena Düpont, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Mr President, Commissioner, I’d like to address the topic of today on two levels: on a procedural one and on a content one.

    On the procedure, as a representative of this House, of course, I also need to underline the request towards the Commission to respect the timelines and, of course, to adhere to the timelines. There’s a reason why we set timelines for the answering of the questions, and I think that we can do more actually also to work together to come closer again in that sense.

    On content, as it is mainly about instrumentalism – where, by the way, the ECR had the rapporteurship in the previous term – I think the question here at stake does not necessarily reflect the dynamic in the policy field. The Commission, the Commission President, they are in close debate with the Member States concerned. There are proposals on the table, both with financial support and additional money, but also in the adaptation of the policy response.

    As a general remark, Europe is the strongest when we act together and we, as the EPP, will make sure to do so further down the road. And while I say that some here in the House need to accept that there is a thing such instrumentalism – that it is part of hybrid attacks, and it needs to be seen in the geopolitical context – other parts here in the House also need to accept that as well, because the very same reason why we are speaking about this cynical, state-sponsored and state-accepted smuggling business is Moscow and Minsk attacking – trying to pressure – the European Union.

    So at least actors, some here in the House, want to align closer with. I would call that cognitive dissonance, but solve that out on your own. Rest assured that we, as the EPP, will go forward working on a common solution as a European Union that is strong and proud of its roots and values.

     
       

     

      Ana Catarina Mendes, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, Caros Colegas, fiquei muito preocupada com o final da sua intervenção, Senhor Comissário, permita-me partilhar isto consigo.

    Em 2021, quando se aumentou a verba para o Fundo de Gestão Integrada das Fronteiras, a Senhora Presidente da Comissão afirmou — e cito — «a União Europeia não financiará nem muros, nem arame, nem cercas». O Senhor Comissário terminou a sua intervenção a dizer: «vamos aumentar o financiamento para as cercas».

    E queria dizer-lhe, em nome dos Socialistas e Democratas, que estamos totalmente de acordo que é preciso gerir as nossas fronteiras, mas gerir as nossas fronteiras não significa violação dos direitos humanos, como temos assistido frequentemente.

    Por isso, as verbas que foram atribuídas — mais verbas —, para as fronteiras, para este fundo, não podem ser para as câmaras de vigilância, para as cercas, para os muros, porque isso é ao arrepio daquilo que tem sido a política de migrações da União Europeia ao longo dos anos.

    E, por isso, Senhor Comissário, aquilo que lhe queria dizer é que tenha em conta os dados que aqui referiu, que eu, ontem, referi na minha outra intervenção, e que são verdade: em 2024, houve um decréscimo da imigração irregular em 38 %.

    Isso significa, Senhor Comissário, que nós temos de continuar a estar atentos à implementação do Pacto das Migrações e ter uma visão humanista daquilo que é a imigração. Nós não vamos parar a imigração com a mão, como não paramos o vento com as mãos, é impossível. Os fluxos migratórios existem desde sempre.

    A Frontex tem sido, muitas vezes, acusada de violar direitos fundamentais e, recentemente, a plataforma para a cooperação sobre cidadãos não documentados alertou para a violação sistemática, nas fronteiras, dos direitos humanos destes cidadãos, por isso, aquilo que lhe peço é que continue a ser o guardião dos tratados e a tratar as pessoas com dignidade.

     
       

     

      András László, on behalf of the PfE Group. – Mr President, EU countries want border walls and other barriers against illegal immigration, and the EU should pay for it. The majority of European leaders demanded that the European Commission immediately mobilise substantial funding for this. This was two years ago and Ursula von der Leyen did nothing.

    What did the Commission do instead? They sued Hungary for defending the EU’s external borders. For not allowing illegal entry into the EU, Hungary received a EUR 200 million fine. In addition, they demand that we pay a fine of EUR 1 million for each and every day that we refuse to give up our efforts to keep illegal migrants out of the EU.

    European citizens don’t want a Christmas like in Magdeburg. They don’t want a New Year’s Eve like in Brussels or Cologne. Europeans want tough border protection on the outer borders of the European Union. The radical ideology of Brussels elites about open borders is a failure. It goes against the will of EU governments, it goes against the will of European citizens and it goes against common sense.

    Ultimately, European citizens pay the highest price for it. In 10 years, Hungary has already spent EUR 2 billion to defend the EU’s borders on the south. In the east, several countries are now spending vast resources to keep illegal immigrants out.

    Pay for the fence in Hungary; pay for the fence in Finland; pay for the fence in Poland and all other countries that defend our external borders. This was the demand of the European governments so that European citizens won’t have to pay with their blood.

     
       

     

      Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Panie Przewodniczący! Szanowni Państwo, od czerwca 2021 roku Polska, Łotwa i Litwa doświadczają kryzysu na swojej granicy z Białorusią, gdzie dziesiątki tysięcy migrantów i osób ubiegających się o azyl, głównie z Afryki i Bliskiego Wschodu, próbowały przedostać się i próbują przedostać się do Unii Europejskiej przy wsparciu władz białoruskich. Od 2023 roku dołączyła tutaj również Finlandia. Już bezpośrednio Rosja, bez pomocy swojego pomocnika, jakim jest Łukaszenka, tak samo próbuje wepchnąć na terytorium Unii Europejskiej nielegalnych imigrantów.

    Tymczasem nowe rozporządzenie kryzysowe, które jest częścią Paktu o Azylu i Migracji, odnosi się do problemu instrumentalizacji migracji jedynie z perspektywy prawa azylowego i jedynie poprzez zapewnienie bardzo ograniczonego katalogu odstępstw od obowiązujących przepisów, które mają być stosowane przez państwa członkowskie zaatakowane w ten hybrydowy sposób. Oczekujemy jednak, jako Europejczycy od Unii Europejskiej bardziej asertywnych rozwiązań, skupiających się przede wszystkim na bezpieczeństwie obywateli Unii Europejskiej. Rozwiązania takie powinny obejmować wzmocnienie infrastruktury granicznej, budowę barier fizycznych i modernizację systemu granic, współpracę organów ścigania i odpowiednie wsparcie Europolu i Frontexu z wykorzystaniem również narzędzi współpracy międzynarodowej, w tym skutecznej współpracy z państwami trzecimi w zakresie powrotów i umów o readmisji.

    Szanowni Państwo, chciałbym przypomnieć też o sytuacji, która miała miejsce, kiedy ta hybrydowa wojna Putina się rozpoczęła. Byliśmy świadkami w tej Izbie festiwalu hipokryzji i wystąpień zgoła kabaretowych. Przedstawiciele nie tylko lewicy, ale również PPE atakowali w sposób grubiański i skrajnie niemądry ówczesny rząd polski, rząd Prawa i Sprawiedliwości za budowę muru na granicy polsko- białoruskiej i za ochronę granicy zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej. Ba, nawet został zdymisjonowany ówczesny szef Frontexu, za to tylko, że wsparł ówczesne działania rządu polskiego. Nie kto inny, jak ówczesny lider PPE, sam Donald Tusk, grzmiał, że migranci zwiezieni przez Łukaszenkę to biedni ludzie, których należy wpuścić, bo przybywają oni tutaj w poszukiwaniu lepszego życia.

    Europosłowie Platformy Obywatelskiej, którzy dzisiaj zasiadają w tej Izbie, pajacowali na granicy, atakując werbalnie funkcjonariuszy polskiej Straży Granicznej, policji czy wojska. A dzisiaj jesteśmy świadkami cudu. Nie kto inny, a ten sam Donald Tusk wczoraj z tego miejsca mówi, że najważniejsze jest bezpieczeństwo i wzywa do ochrony granic zewnętrznych.

    Szanowni Państwo, jego kolega, pan Max Weber z tego miejsca gratuluje Tuskowi odsunięcie Prawa i Sprawiedliwości od władzy i wysyła premiera Jarosława Kaczyńskiego na emeryturę. Panie Weber, gdyby nie premier Jarosław Kaczyński, którego siła i wola polityczna powstrzymała ten nielegalny proceder, to te setki tysięcy migrantów miałby Pan dzisiaj w Berlinie, w Monachium i w innych miastach niemieckich. Jeżeli ktoś ma iść na emeryturę to Pan, Ursula von der Leyen i zabierzcie Tuska, dzięki Wam ma już wysoką emeryturę europejską.

     
       

     

      Fabienne Keller, au nom du groupe Renew. – Monsieur le Président, cher Roberts Zīle, Monsieur le Commissaire Magnus Brunner, nous avons eu ce débat de très nombreuses fois et, en dépit d’arguments logiques, factuels, et de statistiques démontrant que construire des murs aux frontières non seulement ne marche pas, mais que ce n’est pas non plus dans notre ADN européen, nous y voilà encore.

    Contrairement à ce qu’aime prétendre l’extrême droite, il ne suffit pas de construire des murs à nos frontières pour régler la question de l’immigration illégale. Bien sûr que nous devons protéger nos frontières, nous organiser pour les faire respecter, comme vous l’avez expliqué, Monsieur le Commissaire; nous nous y employons. Mais la meilleure gestion de la migration et la meilleure protection de nos frontières, elle passe aussi par l’application de ce pacte, qui n’est pas encore en œuvre. En effet, un volet majeur de la mise en œuvre du pacte est consacré à cette protection des frontières.

    Cela passe par la création de procédures accélérées aux frontières, d’un filtrage rigoureux, d’une base de données sur l’asile et la migration et de moyens budgétaires supplémentaires. Le pacte comprend également un volet de coopération avec les États tiers afin de prévenir les départs irréguliers, de lutter contre le trafic des migrants, de coopérer en matière de réadmission et de promouvoir des voies d’accès légales. Ce sont ces mesures novatrices que nous devons financer avec le budget européen.

    Ce budget doit être utilisé pour rassembler. Il doit être mis au service des citoyens et de la solidarité. Le budget européen, chers collègues, doit construire des ponts, pas des murs.

     
       

     

      Mélissa Camara, au nom du groupe Verts/ALE. – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, barrières, barbelés, divisions. Là est l’obsession d’une partie de la classe politique européenne. Partout où des États ont dressé des murs, ils n’ont semé que souffrance et désespoir. Aujourd’hui, une soixantaine de murs parsèment le globe de cicatrices de béton. Depuis une vingtaine d’années, les barrières physiques se multiplient aux frontières de l’Union européenne, en Hongrie, en Espagne, en Grèce, en Bulgarie. Ce sont désormais 13 % des frontières terrestres de l’Union européenne qui sont clôturées.

    Les murs, donc, comme seule perspective politique, partout. Regardez ce mur entre les États-Unis et le Mexique érigé sous Bush, toujours plus haut sous Trump, plus de 1 000 kilomètres d’acier et de méfiance. Ce mur que, chaque année, des centaines de milliers de personnes cherchent à franchir, poussées par l’espoir d’une vie meilleure. Et ici, en Europe, c’est la même histoire. Ceuta et Melilla, par exemple. Une porte close, des regards détournés. Ces barrières ne résolvent rien. Elles brisent des vies, elles éteignent les rêves et tuent. Souvenons-nous du 24 juin 2022 à Melilla: le gaz lacrymogène, les balles en caoutchouc, des migrants piégés entre les clôtures, blessés, abandonnés, sans soins… 23 vies fauchées. Et combien d’autres en Europe?

    Les murs n’arrêtent pas les pas. Ils allongent les routes. Ils poussent les exilés vers des chemins plus périlleux où l’ombre de la traite les guette. Les murs ne stoppent pas non plus les catastrophes humanitaires et climatiques, les guerres, les persécutions qui ont lieu partout dans le monde. Je l’ai dit hier dans une autre intervention et je souhaite le rappeler aujourd’hui: personne ne quitte son pays, ses repères, sa famille et ses proches par choix. Les murs ne protègent pas, ils séparent, ils creusent des fossés entre les peuples. Ils nourrissent la peur et la haine.

    Puisque les murs ne suffisent pas, désormais, des caméras, des drones de surveillance et tout un arsenal numérique sont déployés aux frontières de l’Europe. Mais les gens continueront d’essayer. Leur permettre de franchir les frontières n’est ici qu’une question d’humanité et de solidarité.

    Cette Europe forteresse n’est pas la mienne. Mon Europe est celle d’un accueil digne et inconditionnel, celle des droits humains et de l’égalité. Jamais nous n’accepterons la surenchère des moyens sécuritaires contre les personnes exilées, comme la droite et l’extrême droite de ce Parlement le réclament. Des milliards qui partent en fumée chaque année, pour quelle protection? Pour quel résultat, sinon la mort et le désespoir? Cessons enfin l’apathie morale. L’Europe doit choisir l’humanité, la solidarité, les ponts et refuser les murs.

     
       

     

      Christine Anderson, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Europa wird angegriffen – nicht durch Panzer oder Raketen, sondern durch den Migrantenansturm auf unsere Grenzen, der als Waffe gegen uns eingesetzt wird. Und das funktioniert, weil wir uns von linken Spinnern haben einreden lassen, Pushbacks seien illegal. Pushbacks – also das konsequente Zurückweisen von Migranten an den Grenzen – sind aber das effektivste Mittel, um illegale Grenzübertritte zu verhindern und diesen Angriff auf unsere Heimatländer abzuwehren.

    Dass wir sie nicht nutzen dürfen, verdanken wir einer massiven Lobbyarbeit von Pro-Migrations-NGOs, finanziert von exzentrischen Milliardären, die sich als moralische Instanz aufspielen. Tatsächlich aber gefährdet deren Agenda nicht nur die Sicherheit Europas, sondern Europa an sich. Jedes souveräne Land hat das Recht, ja, die Pflicht, seine Grenzen zu schützen. Die Behauptung, dass dies rechtswidrig sei, ist eine dreiste Lüge, die Europa jeder Möglichkeit der Selbstverteidigung beraubt.

    Und natürlich brauchen wir physische Barrieren an den Außengrenzen – sie wirken, sie schützen, sind legal und legitim. Diese Zäune und Mauern sind nichts anderes als ein in Stacheldraht und Beton gegossener Pushback. Also bauen wir sie endlich, diese physischen Barrieren, und schützen wir endlich unsere Heimatländer und unsere Bürger.

    Auch Sie, Herr Kommissar Brunner, sollten doch inzwischen zur Kenntnis genommen haben, dass die politische Landschaft im Wandel ist. Ihre christdemokratische Partei wird bald Juniorpartner der FPÖ sein. Sie werden Ihren Kurs ohnehin ändern müssen. Warum nicht jetzt? Und wenn nicht jetzt, wann dann?

    Aber die nächsten Wahlen werden ohnehin zeigen, dass die Bürger keine Parteien mehr wählen werden, die sich weigern, die Grenzen zu schützen. Sie werden keine Parteien mehr wählen, die die Sicherheit der eigenen Bürger auf dem Altar imaginärer Rechte und Ansprüche von Millionen von rückständigen Masseninvasoren opfern und – mehr noch – sie ihnen erbarmungslos zum Fraß vorwerfen.

    Kommen Sie endlich zur Besinnung. Handeln Sie – und zwar entschieden und jetzt!

     
       


     

      Murielle Laurent (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, «structures physiques de protection des frontières», il s’agit là du titre de ce débat. Ce n’est en réalité que du verbiage politiquement correct pour parler de murs, de barrières, de barbelés. Cette sémantique nous renvoie à une période bien sombre de notre histoire.

    La Communauté européenne a été bâtie sur un idéal de paix, d’union et d’ouverture. Notre but n’est pas d’ériger des murs, mais de les faire tomber, comme ce fut le cas le 9 novembre 1989 avec la chute du mur de Berlin. Financer de telles infrastructures serait une insulte à la construction européenne. Plutôt que de construire des murs, nous devrions consacrer notre budget à défendre la démocratie, menacée par les populistes et non par les migrants. Comme je l’ai dit hier, ici même, lors du débat sur les liens entre la criminalité et la migration: il n’y a qu’en assumant une migration positive, en mettant en place des voies légales de migration et en engageant des partenariats sérieux avec les autres pays que nous pourrons y parvenir. Non, ce ne sont pas des idioties, c’est du bon sens. Le respect des droits fondamentaux, c’est du bon sens.

     
       

     

      France Jamet (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, 30 000 personnes. 30 000 personnes sont mortes en tentant de traverser la Méditerranée, à la poursuite d’un eldorado fictif, à la poursuite d’un eldorado que vous leur avez vendu. Ces morts tragiques, elles ne sont pas à mettre sur le compte de la lutte contre l’immigration illégale, mais sur celui de votre idéologie sans-frontiériste, des pompes aspirantes que vous avez mises en place et de votre mansuétude vis-à-vis des réseaux mafieux de passeurs. On voit d’ailleurs à Mayotte, sur notre sol, aujourd’hui, le résultat de cette politique du laissez-faire.

    Alors c’est vrai, construire des infrastructures pour stopper cette pression migratoire, qui pèse sur nos comptes publics, notre économie et la sécurité de nos compatriotes, ne sera pas suffisant sans un arsenal juridique et la volonté politique. Pour cela, il faut d’abord avoir le courage de dire: «Sachez que si vous entrez illégalement sur notre territoire, ce sera l’expulsion et le retour.»

     
       


       

    Brīvais mikrofons

     
       


     

      Bogdan Rzońca (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Chciałem zabrać głos, żeby oddać hołd 21 letniemu Mateuszowi Sitkowi. Polski żołnierz, 21 letni żołnierz, został zabity przez bandytów na granicy polsko-białoruskiej. Zabity, zamordowany. I chcę o tym tu powiedzieć, bo wtedy, kiedy my, Polacy, broniliśmy granicy Unii Europejskiej, kiedy Putin i Łukaszenka wpychał uchodźców do Polski, prowadząc wojnę hybrydową, wy świetnie tu bawiliście się w Parlamencie Europejskim na fałszywym filmie polskiej reżyserki, która ośmieszała polską policję, polskich żołnierzy, tych wszystkich, którzy bronili granicy Unii Europejskiej.

    Musicie się za to wstydzić. Będę wam o tym zawsze przypominał, dlatego że dzisiaj oczywiście ta debata jest ważna, cieszę się, że komisarz przyjął takie, a nie inne stanowisko, ale wołaliśmy o te pieniądze na granicy, o to bezpieczeństwo w poprzednich latach i się nie udawało. A wczoraj oklaskiwaliście Donalda Tuska, który tutaj, w Brukseli, powiedział tak: To, co robi polski rząd Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, to szpetna propaganda. A myśmy po prostu zwyczajnie bronili granicy Unii Europejskiej. (przewodniczący odebrał mówcy głos)

    (Przewodniczący przerwał mówcy)

     
       

     

      Siegbert Frank Droese (ESN). – Herr Präsident! Ich hatte selber die Gelegenheit, als Bundestagsabgeordneter die litauische Außengrenze, die bulgarische Außengrenze zu besuchen, und es gab immer Kritik an den Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten durch die EU, dass eben zu viel humanitäre Maßnahmen gefördert wurden, aber kein robuster Grenzschutz. Insofern sind die Ausführungen von Politkommissar Brunner ein kleiner Fortschritt.

    Alleine mir fehlt der Glaube an den Willen. Wir brauchen den Willen zur Festung Europa. Wir brauchen einen, wenn Sie so wollen, neuen Eisernen Vorhang an den Außengrenzen Europas. Aber wir brauchen auch im Inneren Europas Ordnung. Wir werden daher nicht umhin kommen, Millionen von Straftätern und illegalen Migranten auszuweisen. Also wir brauchen millionenfache Remigration innerhalb Europas.

    Und das ist leider in Ihren Worten, Herr Politkommissar Brunner, überhaupt nicht vorgekommen. Solange dieses Thema nicht zentral als Aufgabe von Ihnen angesehen wird, kann ich leider Ihren schönen Worten keinen Glauben schenken.

     
       

       

    (Brīvā mikrofona uzstāšanos beigas.)

     
       

     

      Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, honourable Members, thank you very much, first of all, for your interventions.

    Border protection, I think we all agree, is a shared responsibility. We know the dimension of the challenge, definitely. And we will continue to dedicate also massive resources to meet it in cooperation, of course, with national authorities, with the EU agencies dealing with the topic, and with partner countries of origin and also of transit, as I said in my former statement.

    EU funds will have a strong role to play in this, and the preparation of the next MFF will be the moment to reassess the needs for border management and how these can be better addressed, whilst always ensuring – and this is also very important – that measures are proportionate and of course respect fundamental rights.

    I stand ready to engage with you on this in the weeks to come. I think that is very important. And I stand, of course, also ready to listen to you all.

     
       

     

      President. – Thank you very much, Commissioner.

    The debate is closed.

     

    12. Explanations of votes

     

      Priekšsēdētājs. – Nākamais darba kārtības punkts bija paredzēts balsojumu skaidrojumi, bet tā kā neviens balsojuma skaidrojums nav saņemts, tad pāreju pie šīs sēdes nobeiguma.

     

    13. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted

     

      Priekšsēdētājs. – Šīs sēdes protokols tiks iesniegts Parlamentam apstiprināšanai nākamās sēdes sākumā.

    Ja nav iebildumu, šodienas sēdē pieņemtās rezolūcijas nosūtīšu tajās norādītajām personām un struktūrām.

     

    14. Dates of forthcoming sittings

     

      Priekšsēdētājs. – Nākamā sesija notiks 2025. gada 29. janvārī Briselē.

     

    15. Closure of the sitting

       

    (Sēde tika slēgta plkst. 15:41.)

     

    16. Adjournment of the session

     

      Priekšsēdētājs. – Eiropas Parlamenta sesiju pasludinu par pārtrauktu.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Polis Joins Local Leaders in Welcoming Slovenian Delegation to Pueblo, Celebrates Bojon Community and Decades-Long Military Partnership

    Source: US State of Colorado

    PUEBLO – Today, Governor Polis joined Mayor Heather Graham, former Mayor Nick Gradisar and Pueblo Community College President Dr. Chato Hazelbaker in welcoming a delegation from Slovenia to Pueblo that included Slovenian Ambassador H.E. Mr. Iztok Mirošič, and Consul Tamara Gorenc. 

    “Pueblo and Colorado’s deep ties with Slovenia have been built on over a century of trust and partnership since the first Slovene families arrived in Pueblo in the 1880s. This visit is an also exciting opportunity to celebrate 30 years of strong military cooperation between the Colorado National Giard and Slovenia , and further strengthen ties that benefit Coloradans and Slovenians alike,” said Governor Jared Polis.

     Colorado and Slovenia share a long-standing partnership through the National Guard State Partnership Program, which has fostered collaboration in security, education, and cultural initiatives since its inception. 

    Earlier this week, the delegation unveiled the Republic of Slovenia’s new Consulate in Brighton. This new consulate signifies the importance of the 30-year relationship between the Colorado National Guard and Slovenian Armed Forces and its potential to enhance collaboration in trade, education, and cultural exchange for years to come. 

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minutes – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg – Final edition

    Source: European Parliament

    PV-10-2025-01-23

    EN

    EN

    iPlPv_Sit

    Minutes
    Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg

     Abbreviations and symbols

    + adopted
    rejected
    lapsed
    W withdrawn
    RCV roll-call votes
    EV electronic vote
    SEC secret ballot
    split split vote
    sep separate vote
    am amendment
    CA compromise amendment
    CP corresponding part
    D deleting amendment
    = identical amendments
    § paragraph

    IN THE CHAIR: Younous OMARJEE
    Vice-President

    1. Opening of the sitting

    The sitting opened at 09:01.


    2. Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (debate)

    Commission statement: Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (2025/3018(RSP))

    Jessika Roswall (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Carmen Crespo Díaz, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marta Temido, on behalf of the S&D Group, Julien Leonardelli, on behalf of the PfE Group, Francesco Ventola, on behalf of the ECR Group, Martin Hojsík, on behalf of the Renew Group, Pär Holmgren, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Catarina Martins, on behalf of The Left Group, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, on behalf of the ESN Group, Christine Schneider, Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Laurence Trochu, Billy Kelleher, Kai Tegethoff, João Oliveira, Daniel Buda, Maria Grapini, Mathilde Androuët, Marie Toussaint, Valentina Palmisano, Salvatore De Meo, Thomas Bajada, France Jamet, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Sebastian Everding, who also answered a blue-card question from Sander Smit, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, César Luena, who also answered a blue-card question from Carmen Crespo Díaz, Jutta Paulus, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, Nikolas Farantouris, Borja Giménez Larraz, Camilla Laureti, Marco Falcone, who also answered a blue-card question from Kai Tegethoff, Leire Pajín, Manuela Ripa, Jean-Marc Germain, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Stefano Bonaccini and Ştefan Muşoiu.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Grzegorz Braun, Hélder Sousa Silva and Seán Kelly.

    The following spoke: Jessika Roswall.

    The debate closed.

    (The sitting was suspended for a few moments.)


    IN THE CHAIR: Christel SCHALDEMOSE
    Vice-President

    3. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 10:29.


    4. Cryptocurrencies need for global standards (debate)

    Commission statement: Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (2025/2514(RSP))

    Magnus Brunner (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Markus Ferber, on behalf of the PPE Group, Jonás Fernández, on behalf of the S&D Group, Pierre Pimpie, on behalf of the PfE Group, Marlena Maląg, on behalf of the ECR Group, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, on behalf of the Renew Group, Rasmus Andresen, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group (the President reminded the speaker of the rules on conduct), Pasquale Tridico, on behalf of The Left Group, René Aust, on behalf of the ESN Group, Regina Doherty, Eero Heinäluoma, Aleksandar Nikolic, Guillaume Peltier, Gilles Boyer, Damian Boeselager, Catarina Martins, Stanislav Stoyanov, Kateřina Konečná, Kinga Kollár, Aurore Lalucq, Mathilde Androuët, Adrian-George Axinia, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Giuseppe Antoci, Marcin Sypniewski, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Lídia Pereira (the President provided some clarifications on the blue-card procedure), Nikos Papandreou, who also answered a blue-card question from Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Angéline Furet, Ondřej Krutílek, Michalis Hadjipantela, Adnan Dibrani, Diego Solier, Andrey Kovatchev, Waldemar Buda, Caterina Chinnici and Seán Kelly.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Niels Geuking, Maria Grapini, Alexander Jungbluth, Grzegorz Braun, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis and Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă.

    The following spoke: Magnus Brunner.

    The debate closed.

    (The sitting was suspended at 11:48.)


    IN THE CHAIR: Sabine VERHEYEN
    Vice-President

    5. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 11:59.


    6. Composition of new committees

    Following the creation of the standing committees on security and defence and on public health, and the creation of the special committees on the European Democracy Shield and on the housing crisis in the European Union, the President had received nominations for membership of these new standing and special committees from the political groups and the non-attached Members, in accordance with Rules 212 and 213.

    The decisions took effect as of that day.

    The lists of Members nominated to form these committees are annexed to these minutes (minutes of 23.1.2025 Annex 1).


    7. Composition of committees and delegations

    The Renew Group and non-attached Members had notified the President of the following decisions changing the composition of committees:

    – ITRE Committee: Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez to replace Barry Andrews, Elena Yoncheva

    – REGI Committee: Elsi Katainen

    – LIBE Committee: Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle

    – PETI Committee: Cynthia Ní Mhurchú and Eugen Tomac were no longer members, Taner Kabilov

    The decisions took effect as of that day.

    The following spoke: Jordan Bardella, Carlo Fidanza and Patryk Jaki on points of order (the President cut off the speakers as their remarks did not constitute points of order).


    8. Voting time

    For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.




    8.2. Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (vote)

    Motions for resolutions RC-B10-0066/2025 (minutes of 23.1.2025, item I), B10-0063/2025, B10-0066/2025, B10-0067/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025 and B10-0086/2025 (minutes of 22.1.2025, item 1) (2025/2511(RSP))

    The debate had taken place on 22 January 2025 (minutes of 22.1.2025, item 16.2).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0004)

    (Motions for resolutions B10-0063/2025 and B10-0067/2025 fell.)

    Detailed voting results








    9. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 15:00.


    10. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

    The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.


    11. Major interpellations (debate)

    Major interpellation for written answer with debate (G-001002/2024) submitted by Charlie Weimers, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Kristoffer Storm, Jaak Madison, Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Alexandr Vondra, Patryk Jaki, Johan Van Overtveldt, Roberts Zīle, Emmanouil Fragkos, Georgiana Teodorescu, Geadis Geadi, Marion Maréchal, Ivaylo Valchev, Kosma Złotowski, Mariusz Kamiński, Maciej Wąsik, Dick Erixon, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Beatrice Timgren, Nicolas Bay, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Ondřej Krutílek, Guillaume Peltier, Michał Dworczyk, Laurence Trochu, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Tobiasz Bocheński, Gheorghe Piperea, on behalf of the ECR Group, to the Commission: EU funding of physical border protection structures such as walls, fences or other barriers at the external border (B10-0001/2025)

    Jaak Madison moved the major interpellation.

    Magnus Brunner (Member of the Commission) answered the major interpellation.

    The following spoke: Lena Düpont, on behalf of the PPE Group, Ana Catarina Mendes, on behalf of the S&D Group, András László, on behalf of the PfE Group, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, on behalf of the ECR Group, Fabienne Keller, on behalf of the Renew Group, Mélissa Camara, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Christine Anderson, on behalf of the ESN Group, Fredis Beleris, Murielle Laurent, France Jamet and Riho Terras.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Kinga Kollár, Bogdan Rzońca and Siegbert Frank Droese.

    The following spoke: Magnus Brunner.

    The debate closed.


    12. Explanations of vote

    Written explanations of vote

    Explanations of vote submitted in writing under Rule 201 appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website.


    13. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted

    In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the beginning of the afternoon of the sitting on Monday, 10 February 2025.

    With Parliament’s agreement, the texts adopted during the part-session would be forwarded to their respective addressees without delay.


    14. Dates of forthcoming sittings

    The next sitting would be held on 29 January 2025.


    15. Closure of the sitting

    The sitting closed at 15:41.


    16. Adjournment of the session

    The session of the European Parliament was adjourned.

    Alessandro Chiocchetti

    Roberta Metsola

    Secretary-General

    President


    LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT


    I. Motions for resolutions tabled

    Case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

    on the case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2025/2510(RSP)) (RC-B10-0069/2025)
    (replacing motions for resolutions B10-0069/2025, B10-0072/2025, B10-0078/2025, B10-0081/2025 and B10-0084/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Wouter Beke, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Michael Gahler, Luděk Niedermayer, Christophe Gomart, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Jessica Polfjärd, Tomáš Zdechovský, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Elio Di Rupo
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Waldemar Tomaszewski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Sebastian Tynkkynen
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Catarina Vieira
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages

    Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

    on the systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (2025/2511(RSP)) (RC-B10-0066/2025)
    (replacing motions for resolutions B10-0066/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025 and B10-0086/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Tomáš Zdechovský, Loucas Fourlas, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, David McAllister, Michael Gahler, Željana Zovko, Christophe Gomart, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Javier Zarzalejos, Luděk Niedermayer, Wouter Beke, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Jessica Polfjärd, Danuše Nerudová, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Chloé Ridel, Daniel Attard, Alessandra Moretti
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Carlo Fidanza, Reinis Pozņaks, Aurelijus Veryga, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alberico Gambino, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Dick Erixon, Beatrice Timgren, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Alexandr Vondra, Marion Maréchal, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Carlo Ciccioli, Charlie Weimers
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Petras Auštrevičius, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Bart Groothuis, Bernard Guetta, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Hannah Neumann
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Per Clausen, Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt

    Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria

    Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

    on the case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (2025/2512(RSP)) (RC-B10-0087/2025)
    (replacing motions for resolutions B10-0087/2025, B10-0089/2025, B10-0091/2025, B10-0092/2025 and B10-0093/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Christophe Gomart, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Michael Gahler, Luděk Niedermayer, Wouter Beke, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Jessica Polfjärd, Tomáš Zdechovský, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Marta Temido
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Alexandr Vondra, Marion Maréchal, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Małgorzata Gosiewska
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Helmut Brandstätter, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Bernard Guetta, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Leoluca Orlando
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

    Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate:

    on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0074/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Thijs Reuten, Raphaël Glucksmann
    on behalf of the S&D Group

    on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0075/2025)
    Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Siegfried Mureşan, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Mika Aaltola, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Sandra Kalniete, Seán Kelly, Ondřej Kolář, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Ana Miguel Pedro, Paulius Saudargas, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Pekka Toveri, Inese Vaidere, Milan Zver
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0076/2025)
    Sergey Lagodinsky, Hannah Neumann, Markéta Gregorová, Mārtiņš Staķis, Maria Ohisalo, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Villy Søvndal, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Reinier Van Lanschot
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0077/2025)
    Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Olivier Chastel, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Michał Kobosko, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0079/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Rihards Kols, Ondřej Krutílek, Jaak Madison, Ivaylo Valchev, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Veronika Vrecionová, Roberts Zīle, Aurelijus Veryga, Maciej Wąsik, Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Alexandr Vondra
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 136(2) and (4):

    on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (RC-B10-0074/2025)
    (replacing motions for resolutions B10-0074/2025, B10-0075/2025, B10-0076/2025, B10-0077/2025 and B10-0079/2025)
    Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Siegfried Mureşan, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Mika Aaltola, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Sandra Kalniete, Seán Kelly, Ondřej Kolář, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Ana Miguel Pedro, Paulius Saudargas, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Pekka Toveri, Inese Vaidere, Milan Zver
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Thijs Reuten, Raphaël Glucksmann
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Rihards Kols, Reinis Pozņaks, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Roberts Zīle, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Jaak Madison, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Cristian Terheş, Maciej Wąsik, Ivaylo Valchev, Aurelijus Veryga, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Karin Karlsbro, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Michał Kobosko, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Sergey Lagodinsky
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025

    Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate:

    on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0064/2025)
    Gabriel Mato, Sebastião Bugalho, Davor Ivo Stier
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0068/2025)
    Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Hermann Tertsch, Jorge Martín Frías, Silvia Sardone, Nikola Bartůšek, Susanna Ceccardi, Roberto Vannacci, António Tânger Corrêa, Enikő Győri
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0071/2025)
    Leire Pajín
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Catarina Vieira, Ville Niinistö, Nicolae Ştefănuță
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0080/2025)
    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Valérie Devaux, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Ana Vasconcelos, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0083/2025)
    Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Alberico Gambino, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Diego Solier, Rihards Kols, Ondřej Krutílek, Jaak Madison, Nora Junco García, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Veronika Vrecionová, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Alexandr Vondra
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

    on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (RC-B10-0064/2025)
    (replacing motions for resolutions B10-0064/2025, B10-0080/2025 and B10-0083/2025)
    Gabriel Mato, Sebastião Bugalho, Davor Ivo Stier, Francisco José Millán Mon
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Ivaylo Valchev, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Rihards Kols, Alexandr Vondra, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Alberico Gambino, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Ana Vasconcelos, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group


    II. Decisions to draw up own-initiative reports

    Decisions to draw up own-initiative reports (Rule 55)

    (Following the Conference of Presidents’ decision of 15 January 2025)

    AFCO Committee

    – Reform of the European Electoral Act – hurdles to ratification and implementation in the Member States (2025/2028(INI))

    – Institutional aspects of the Report on the future of European Competitiveness (Draghi Report) (2025/2013(INI))

    – Stock-taking of the European elections 2024 (2025/2012(INI))

    AFET Committee

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Ukraine (2025/2026(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova (2025/2025(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia (2025/2024(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye (2025/2023(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia (2025/2022(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on North Macedonia (2025/2021(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro (2025/2020(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Kosovo (2025/2019(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina (2025/2018(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania (2025/2017(INI))

    DEVE Committee

    – Financing for development – ahead of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville (2025/2004(INI))

    – Implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals in view of the 2025 High-Level Political Forum (2025/2014(INI))
    (opinion: FEMM)

    IMCO Committee

    – Implementation and streamlining of EU internal market rules to strengthen the single market (2025/2009(INI))

    ITRE Committee

    – Future of the EU biotechnology and biomanufacturing sector: leveraging research, boosting innovation and enhancing competitiveness (2025/2008(INI))

    – European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure (2025/2007(INI))

    – Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system (2025/2006(INI))

    JURI Committee

    – Monitoring the application of European Union law in 2023 and 2024 (2025/2016(INI))
    (opinion: PETI)

    – European Union regulatory fitness and subsidiarity and proportionality – report on Better Law-Making covering 2023 and 2024 (2025/2015(INI))

    PECH Committee

    – Fisheries management approaches for safeguarding sensitive species, tackling invasive species and benefiting local economies (2025/2011(INI))

    – The role of social, economic and environmental standards in safeguarding fair competition for all aquatic food products and improving food security (2025/2010(INI))

    PETI Committee

    – Deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2023 (2025/2027(INI))

    (Following the Conference of Presidents’ decision of 19 December 2024)

    – The multiannual plan for the Baltic Sea and ways forward (2024/2127(INI))

    – The impact of the implementation of the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive 2014/89/EU on fisheries in selected fishing areas and sea basins (2024/2126(INI))

    – Decarbonisation and modernisation of EU fisheries, and the development and deployment of fishing gear (2024/2123(INI))

    AGRI Committee

    – The position of farmers in the agri-food value chain (2024/2122(INI))

    ECON Committee

    – The role of simple tax rules and tax fragmentation in European competitiveness (2024/2118(INI))

    – A coherent tax framework for the EU’s financial sector (2024/2117(INI))

    – Facilitating the financing of investments and reforms to boost European competitiveness and creating a Capital Markets Union (Draghi Report) (2024/2116(INI))
    (opinion: BUDG)

    FEMM Committee

    – Gender Equality Strategy 2025 (2024/2125(INI))
    (opinion: LIBE)

    – Women’s entrepreneurship in rural and island areas and outermost regions (2024/2124(INI))
    (opinion: AGRI)

    IMCO Committee

    – A new legislative framework for products that is fit for the digital and sustainable transition (2024/2119(INI))

    REGI Committee

    – The role of cohesion policy in supporting the just transition (2024/2121(INI))
    (opinion: EMPL)

    – The role of cohesion policy investment in resolving the current housing crisis (2024/2120(INI))
    (opinion: EMPL)


    III. Consent procedure

    Reports with a motion for a non-legislative resolution (consent procedure) (Rule 107(5))

    (Following notification by the Conference of Committee Chairs on 15 January 2025)

    AFET Committee

    – Interim report in view of the consent procedure on the Agreement establishing an association between the EU and the Principality of Andorra and the Republic of San Marino (2024/0101R(NLE)2024/0101(NLE))
    (opinion: ECON, IMCO)


    IV. Petitions

    Petitions Nos 1427-24 to 1518-24 had been entered in the register on 17 January 2025 and had been forwarded to the committee responsible, in accordance with Rule 232(9) and (10).

    The President had, on 17 January 2025, forwarded to the committee responsible, in accordance with Rule 232(15), petitions addressed to the European Parliament by natural or legal persons who were not citizens of the European Union and who did not reside, or have their registered office, in a Member State.


    V. Documents received

    The following documents had been received from Members:

    – Mathilde Androuët, Gerolf Annemans, Jordan Bardella, Nikola Bartůšek, Rachel Blom, Barbara Bonte, Paolo Borchia, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Irmhild Boßdorf, Jaroslav Bžoch, Klara Dostalova, Marieke Ehlers, Dick Erixon, Tomasz Froelich, Petras Gražulis, Branko Grims, Catherine Griset, Enikő Győri, Roman Haider, Fernand Kartheiser, Ondřej Knotek, Vilis Krištopans, Julien Leonardelli, Jorge Martín Frías, Milan Mazurek, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Jana Nagyová, Hans Neuhoff, Julie Rechagneux, Dominik Tarczyński, Hermann Tertsch, Isabella Tovaglieri, António Tânger Corrêa, Milan Uhrík, Tom Vandendriessche, Harald Vilimsky, Ewa Zajączkowska-Hernik and Auke Zijlstra. Motion for a resolution on Dismantling Overregulation and Government Encroachment: reclaiming competitiveness and innovation in the European Union (B10-0214/2024)
    referred to committee responsible: JURI
    opinion: ITRE

    – Pekka Toveri and Sebastian Tynkkynen. Motion for a resolution on restricting the ability of passenger and cargo traffic to enter European Union airspace from Russia (B10-0220/2024)
    referred to committee responsible: TRAN
    opinion: AFET

    – Matthieu Valet. Motion for a resolution on EU policy on Syrian refugees following the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime (B10-0237/2024)
    referred to committee responsible: LIBE

    – Christine Anderson, Anja Arndt, René Aust, Arno Bausemer, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, Markus Buchheit, Petr Bystron, Elisabeth Dieringer, Siegbert Frank Droese, Marc Jongen, Mary Khan, Sarah Knafo, Maximilian Krah and Jaroslava Pokorná Jermanová. Motion for a resolution on financial and organisational support for Member States to repatriate Syrian nationals (B10-0238/2024)
    referred to committee responsible: LIBE


    ATTENDANCE REGISTER

    Present:

    Aaltola Mika, Abadía Jover Maravillas, Adamowicz Magdalena, Aftias Georgios, Agirregoitia Martínez Oihane, Agius Peter, Agius Saliba Alex, Allione Grégory, Al-Sahlani Abir, Anadiotis Nikolaos, Anderson Christine, Andersson Li, Andresen Rasmus, Andrews Barry, Andriukaitis Vytenis Povilas, Androuët Mathilde, Angel Marc, Annemans Gerolf, Antoci Giuseppe, Arias Echeverría Pablo, Arimont Pascal, Arłukowicz Bartosz, Arnaoutoglou Sakis, Arndt Anja, Arvanitis Konstantinos, Asens Llodrà Jaume, Assis Francisco, Attard Daniel, Aubry Manon, Auštrevičius Petras, Axinia Adrian-George, Azmani Malik, Bajada Thomas, Baljeu Jeannette, Ballarín Cereza Laura, Bardella Jordan, Barley Katarina, Barna Dan, Barrena Arza Pernando, Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Bartůšek Nikola, Bausemer Arno, Bay Nicolas, Bay Christophe, Beke Wouter, Beleris Fredis, Bellamy François-Xavier, Benea Adrian-Dragoş, Benifei Brando, Benjumea Benjumea Isabel, Beňová Monika, Berendsen Tom, Berger Stefan, Berg Sibylle, Berlato Sergio, Bernhuber Alexander, Biedroń Robert, Bielan Adam, Bischoff Gabriele, Blaha Ľuboš, Blinkevičiūtė Vilija, Blom Rachel, Bloss Michael, Bocheński Tobiasz, Boeselager Damian, Bogdan Ioan-Rareş, Bonaccini Stefano, Bonte Barbara, Borchia Paolo, Borrás Pabón Mireia, Borvendég Zsuzsanna, Borzan Biljana, Bosanac Gordan, Bosse Stine, Botenga Marc, Boyer Gilles, Boylan Lynn, Brandstätter Helmut, Brasier-Clain Marie-Luce, Braun Grzegorz, Brejza Krzysztof, Bricmont Saskia, Brnjac Nikolina, Brudziński Joachim Stanisław, Bryłka Anna, Buczek Tomasz, Buda Daniel, Buda Waldemar, Budka Borys, Bugalho Sebastião, Buła Andrzej, Burkhardt Delara, Buxadé Villalba Jorge, Bžoch Jaroslav, Camara Mélissa, Canfin Pascal, Carberry Nina, Casa David, Caspary Daniel, Cassart Benoit, Castillo Laurent, del Castillo Vera Pilar, Cavazzini Anna, Cavedagna Stefano, Ceccardi Susanna, Cepeda José, Ceulemans Estelle, Chahim Mohammed, Chaibi Leila, Chastel Olivier, Chinnici Caterina, Christensen Asger, Ciccioli Carlo, Cifrová Ostrihoňová Veronika, Ciriani Alessandro, Cisint Anna Maria, Clausen Per, Clergeau Christophe, Cormand David, Corrado Annalisa, Costanzo Vivien, Cotrim De Figueiredo João, Cowen Barry, Cremer Tobias, Crespo Díaz Carmen, Cristea Andi, Cunha Paulo, Danielsson Johan, Dauchy Marie, Dávid Dóra, David Ivan, Decaro Antonio, de la Hoz Quintano Raúl, Della Valle Danilo, Deloge Valérie, De Masi Fabio, De Meo Salvatore, Demirel Özlem, Deutsch Tamás, Devaux Valérie, Dibrani Adnan, Diepeveen Ton, Dieringer Elisabeth, Dîncu Vasile, Di Rupo Elio, Doherty Regina, Doleschal Christian, Dömötör Csaba, Do Nascimento Cabral Paulo, Donazzan Elena, Dorfmann Herbert, Dostál Ondřej, Droese Siegbert Frank, Düpont Lena, Ecke Matthias, Ehler Christian, Ehlers Marieke, Eriksson Sofie, Erixon Dick, Eroglu Engin, Everding Sebastian, Ezcurra Almansa Alma, Falcone Marco, Farantouris Nikolas, Farreng Laurence, Farský Jan, Ferber Markus, Fernández Jonás, Fidanza Carlo, Fiocchi Pietro, Firmenich Ruth, Fita Claire, Fourlas Loucas, Fourreau Emma, Fragkos Emmanouil, Freund Daniel, Frigout Anne-Sophie, Fritzon Heléne, Froelich Tomasz, Fuglsang Niels, Furet Angéline, Furore Mario, Gahler Michael, Galán Estrella, Gálvez Lina, Gambino Alberico, García Hermida-Van Der Walle Raquel, Garraud Jean-Paul, Gasiuk-Pihowicz Kamila, Geadi Geadis, Gedin Hanna, Geese Alexandra, Geier Jens, Geisel Thomas, Gemma Chiara, Georgiou Giorgos, Gerbrandy Gerben-Jan, Germain Jean-Marc, Gerzsenyi Gabriella, Geuking Niels, Gieseke Jens, Giménez Larraz Borja, Girauta Vidal Juan Carlos, Glavak Sunčana, Glück Andreas, Glucksmann Raphaël, Goerens Charles, Gomart Christophe, Gomes Isilda, Gómez López Sandra, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Pons Esteban, Gori Giorgio, Gosiewska Małgorzata, Gotink Dirk, Gozi Sandro, Grapini Maria, Gražulis Petras, Grims Branko, Griset Catherine, Gronkiewicz-Waltz Hanna, Groothuis Bart, Grossmann Elisabeth, Grudler Christophe, Gualmini Elisabetta, Guarda Cristina, Guetta Bernard, Guzenina Maria, Hadjipantela Michalis, Hahn Svenja, Haider Roman, Halicki Andrzej, Hassan Rima, Häusling Martin, Hava Mircea-Gheorghe, Hazekamp Anja, Heide Hannes, Heinäluoma Eero, Henriksson Anna-Maja, Herbst Niclas, Herranz García Esther, Hetman Krzysztof, Hohlmeier Monika, Hojsík Martin, Holmgren Pär, Hölvényi György, Homs Ginel Alicia, Humberto Sérgio, Ijabs Ivars, Imart Céline, Incir Evin, Inselvini Paolo, Iovanovici Şoşoacă Diana, Jalloul Muro Hana, Jamet France, Jerković Romana, Jongen Marc, Joński Dariusz, Joron Virginie, Jouvet Pierre, Joveva Irena, Juknevičienė Rasa, Junco García Nora, Jungbluth Alexander, Kabilov Taner, Kalfon François, Kaljurand Marina, Kalniete Sandra, Kamiński Mariusz, Kanev Radan, Karlsbro Karin, Kartheiser Fernand, Karvašová Ľubica, Katainen Elsi, Kefalogiannis Emmanouil, Kelleher Billy, Keller Fabienne, Kelly Seán, Kemp Martine, Kennes Rudi, Khan Mary, Kobosko Michał, Köhler Stefan, Kohut Łukasz, Kokalari Arba, Kolář Ondřej, Kollár Kinga, Kols Rihards, Konečná Kateřina, Kopacz Ewa, Körner Moritz, Kountoura Elena, Kovatchev Andrey, Krah Maximilian, Krištopans Vilis, Kruis Sebastian, Krutílek Ondřej, Kubín Tomáš, Kuhnke Alice, Kulja András Tivadar, Kulmuni Katri, Kyllönen Merja, Kyuchyuk Ilhan, Lagodinsky Sergey, Lakos Eszter, Lalucq Aurore, Lange Bernd, Langensiepen Katrin, Laššáková Judita, László András, Laurent Murielle, Laureti Camilla, Laykova Rada, Lazarov Ilia, Lazarus Luis-Vicențiu, Le Callennec Isabelle, Leggeri Fabrice, Lenaers Jeroen, Leonardelli Julien, Lewandowski Janusz, Lexmann Miriam, Liese Peter, Lins Norbert, Loiseau Nathalie, Løkkegaard Morten, Lopatka Reinhold, López Javi, López Aguilar Juan Fernando, López-Istúriz White Antonio, Lövin Isabella, Luena César, Łukacijewska Elżbieta Katarzyna, Lupo Giuseppe, McAllister David, Madison Jaak, Magoni Lara, Maij Marit, Maląg Marlena, Manda Claudiu, Mandl Lukas, Maniatis Yannis, Mantovani Mario, Maran Pierfrancesco, Marczułajtis-Walczak Jagna, Mariani Thierry, Marino Ignazio Roberto, Martín Frías Jorge, Martins Catarina, Martusciello Fulvio, Marzà Ibáñez Vicent, Matthieu Sara, Mavrides Costas, Mayer Georg, Mazurek Milan, Mažylis Liudas, McNamara Michael, Mebarek Nora, Mehnert Alexandra, Meleti Eleonora, Mendes Ana Catarina, Mendia Idoia, Mertens Verena, Mesure Marina, Metsola Roberta, Metz Tilly, Mikser Sven, Millán Mon Francisco José, Miranda Paz Ana, Molnár Csaba, Montero Irene, Montserrat Dolors, Morace Carolina, Moreira de Sá Tiago, Moreno Sánchez Javier, Moretti Alessandra, Motreanu Dan-Ştefan, Mularczyk Arkadiusz, Müller Piotr, Mullooly Ciaran, Mureşan Siegfried, Muşoiu Ştefan, Nagyová Jana, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Negrescu Victor, Nemec Matjaž, Nerudová Danuše, Nesci Denis, Neuhoff Hans, Neumann Hannah, Nevado del Campo Elena, Niebler Angelika, Niedermayer Luděk, Niinistö Ville, Nikolic Aleksandar, Ní Mhurchú Cynthia, Noichl Maria, Nordqvist Rasmus, Novakov Andrey, Nykiel Mirosława, Obajtek Daniel, Ódor Ľudovít, Oetjen Jan-Christoph, Ohisalo Maria, Oliveira João, Olivier Philippe, Omarjee Younous, Ondruš Branislav, Ó Ríordáin Aodhán, Ozdoba Jacek, Paet Urmas, Pajín Leire, Palmisano Valentina, Papadakis Kostas, Papandreou Nikos, Pappas Nikos, Pascual de la Parte Nicolás, Pedro Ana Miguel, Pedulla’ Gaetano, Pellerin-Carlin Thomas, Peltier Guillaume, Penkova Tsvetelina, Pennelle Gilles, Pereira Lídia, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie, Petrov Hristo, Picaro Michele, Picula Tonino, Piera Pascale, Pimpie Pierre, Piperea Gheorghe, de la Pisa Carrión Margarita, Pokorná Jermanová Jaroslava, Polato Daniele, Polfjärd Jessica, Popescu Virgil-Daniel, Pozņaks Reinis, Princi Giusi, Protas Jacek, Pürner Friedrich, Rackete Carola, Radev Emil, Radtke Dennis, Rafowicz Emma, Ratas Jüri, Rechagneux Julie, Regner Evelyn, Repasi René, Repp Sabrina, Ressler Karlo, Reuten Thijs, Riba i Giner Diana, Ricci Matteo, Riehl Nela, Ripa Manuela, Rodrigues André, Ros Sempere Marcos, Roth Neveďalová Katarína, Rougé André, Ruissen Bert-Jan, Ruotolo Sandro, Rzońca Bogdan, Saeidi Arash, Salini Massimiliano, Salis Ilaria, Salla Aura, Sánchez Amor Nacho, Sanchez Julien, Sancho Murillo Elena, Saramo Jussi, Sardone Silvia, Šarec Marjan, Sargiacomo Eric, Satouri Mounir, Saudargas Paulius, Sbai Majdouline, Sberna Antonella, Schaldemose Christel, Schaller-Baross Ernő, Schenk Oliver, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna, Schieder Andreas, Schilling Lena, Schneider Christine, Schwab Andreas, Scuderi Benedetta, Seekatz Ralf, Sell Alexander, Serrano Sierra Rosa, Serra Sánchez Isabel, Sienkiewicz Bartłomiej, Simon Sven, Singer Christine, Sinkevičius Virginijus, Sippel Birgit, Sjöstedt Jonas, Śmiszek Krzysztof, Smith Anthony, Smit Sander, Sokol Tomislav, Solier Diego, Sommen Liesbet, Sonneborn Martin, Sorel Malika, Sousa Silva Hélder, Søvndal Villy, Squarta Marco, Staķis Mārtiņš, Stancanelli Raffaele, Stier Davor Ivo, Stöteler Sebastiaan, Stoyanov Stanislav, Strack-Zimmermann Marie-Agnes, Strada Cecilia, Streit Joachim, Strik Tineke, Strolenberg Anna, Stürgkh Anna, Sypniewski Marcin, Szczerba Michał, Szekeres Pál, Szydło Beata, Tamburrano Dario, Tânger Corrêa António, Tarquinio Marco, Târziu Claudiu-Richard, Tavares Carla, Tegethoff Kai, Temido Marta, Teodorescu Georgiana, Teodorescu Måwe Alice, Ter Laak Ingeborg, Terras Riho, Thionnet Pierre-Romain, Timgren Beatrice, Tinagli Irene, Tobback Bruno, Tobé Tomas, Tolassy Rody, Tomašič Zala, Tomc Romana, Tonin Matej, Toom Jana, Topo Raffaele, Torselli Francesco, Tosi Flavio, Toussaint Marie, Toveri Pekka, Tridico Pasquale, Trochu Laurence, Tsiodras Dimitris, Tudose Mihai, Tynkkynen Sebastian, Uhrík Milan, Ušakovs Nils, Vaidere Inese, Valchev Ivaylo, Vălean Adina, Valet Matthieu, Van Brempt Kathleen, Van Brug Anouk, van den Berg Brigitte, Vandendriessche Tom, Van Dijck Kris, Van Lanschot Reinier, Van Leeuwen Jessika, Vannacci Roberto, Van Overtveldt Johan, Van Sparrentak Kim, Varaut Alexandre, Vasconcelos Ana, Vasile-Voiculescu Vlad, Vautmans Hilde, Vedrenne Marie-Pierre, Ventola Francesco, Verheyen Sabine, Verougstraete Yvan, Veryga Aurelijus, Vieira Catarina, Vigenin Kristian, Vilimsky Harald, Vincze Loránt, Vind Marianne, Vistisen Anders, Vivaldini Mariateresa, Volgin Petar, von der Schulenburg Michael, Vondra Alexandr, Voss Axel, Vozemberg-Vrionidi Elissavet, Vrecionová Veronika, Vázquez Lázara Adrián, Waitz Thomas, Walsmann Marion, Warborn Jörgen, Warnke Jan-Peter, Wąsik Maciej, Wawrykiewicz Michał, Wcisło Marta, Wechsler Andrea, Werbrouck Séverine, Wiesner Emma, Wiezik Michal, Wilmès Sophie, Winkler Iuliu, Winzig Angelika, Wiseler-Lima Isabel, Wiśniewska Jadwiga, Wölken Tiemo, Wolters Lara, Yar Lucia, Yon-Courtin Stéphanie, Zacharia Maria, Zajączkowska-Hernik Ewa, Zalewska Anna, Žalimas Dainius, Zan Alessandro, Zarzalejos Javier, Zdechovský Tomáš, Zdrojewski Bogdan Andrzej, Zijlstra Auke, Zīle Roberts, Zingaretti Nicola, Złotowski Kosma, Zoido Álvarez Juan Ignacio, Zovko Željana, Zver Milan

    Excused:

    Sidl Günther


    ANNEX 1 – Composition of new committees

    C01A SEDE

    [ 20/01/2025 – ]

    Комисия по сигурност и отбрана

    Comisión de Seguridad y Defensa

    Výbor pro bezpečnost a obranu

    Udvalget om Sikkerhed og Forsvar

    Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung

    Julgeoleku- ja kaitsekomisjon

    Επιτροπή Ασφάλειας και Άμυνας

    Committee on Security and Defence

    Commission de la sécurité et de la défense

    An Coiste um Shlándáil agus Cosaint

    Odbor za sigurnost i obranu

    Commissione per la sicurezza e la difesa

    Drošības un aizsardzības komiteja

    Saugumo ir gynybos komitetas

    ssBiztonság- és Védelempolitikai Bizottság

    Kumitat għas-Sigurtà u d-Difiża

    Commissie veiligheid en defensie

    Komisja Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony

    Comissão da Segurança e da Defesa

    Comisia pentru securitate și apărare

    Výbor pre bezpečnosť a obranu

    Odbor za varnost in obrambo

    Turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikan valiokunta

    Utskottet för säkerhet och försvar

    (43 members)

    PPE (11)

    BEKE Wouter

    DE MEO Salvatore

    GOMART Christophe

    HERBST Niclas

    MEIMARAKIS Vangelis

    NOVAKOV Andrey

    PASCUAL DE LA PARTE Nicolás

    SZCZERBA Michał

    TEODORESCU MÅWE Alice

    TERRAS Riho

    TOVERI Pekka

    S&D (8)

    CREMER Tobias

    DI RUPO Elio

    GLUCKSMANN Raphaël

    LÓPEZ Javi

    MAVRIDES Costas

    MENDES Ana Catarina

    MIKSER Sven

    TUDOSE Mihai

    PfE (5)

    HÖLVÉNYI György

    POKORNÁ JERMANOVÁ Jaroslava

    STÖTELER Sebastiaan

    THIONNET Pierre-Romain

    VANNACCI Roberto

    ECR (5)

    DONAZZAN Elena

    DWORCZYK Michał

    GAMBINO Alberico

    POZŅAKS Reinis

    VONDRA Alexandr

    Renew (5)

    AUŠTREVIČIUS Petras

    LOISEAU Nathalie

    ŠAREC Marjan

    STRACK-ZIMMERMANN Marie-Agnes

    YAR Lucia

    Verts/ALE (3)

    NEUMANN Hannah

    STAĶIS Mārtiņš

    VAN LANSCHOT Reinier

    The Left (3)

    BOTENGA Marc

    DEMIREL Özlem

    KYLLÖNEN Merja

    ESN (1)

    NEUHOFF Hans

    NI (2)

    PAPADAKIS Kostas

    VON DER SCHULENBURG Michael

    C08A SANT

    [ 20/01/2025 – ]

    Комисия по обществено здраве

    Comisión de Salud Pública

    Výbor pro veřejné zdraví

    Udvalget om Folkesundhed

    Ausschuss für öffentliche Gesundheit

    Rahvatervishoiu komisjon

    Επιτροπή Δημόσιας Υγείας

    Committee on Public Health

    Commission de la santé publique

    An Coiste um Shláinte Phoiblí

    Odbor za javno zdravlje

    Commissione per la sanità pubblica

    Sabiedrības veselības komiteja

    Visuomenės sveikatos komitetas

    Közegészségügyi Bizottság

    Kumitat għas-Saħħa Pubblika

    Commissie volksgezondheid

    Komisja Zdrowia Publicznego

    Comissão da Saúde Pública

    Comisia pentru sănătate publică

    Výbor pre verejné zdravie

    Odbor za javno zdravje

    Kansanterveyden valiokunta

    Utskottet för folkhälsa

    (43 members)

    PPE (11)

    ARŁUKOWICZ Bartosz

    CASTILLO Laurent

    HADJIPANTELA Michalis

    JARUBAS Adam

    KULJA András Tivadar

    LIESE Peter

    MORATTI Letizia

    NEVADO DEL CAMPO Elena

    POLFJÄRD Jessica

    SCHENK Oliver

    SOKOL Tomislav

    S&D (8)

    ANDRIUKAITIS Vytenis Povilas

    CLERGEAU Christophe

    GONZÁLEZ CASARES Nicolás

    JERKOVIĆ Romana

    MORETTI Alessandra

    NEGRESCU Victor

    PAPANDREOU Nikos

    WÖLKEN Tiemo

    PfE (5)

    BRASIER-CLAIN Marie-Luce

    DE LA PISA CARRIÓN Margarita

    FERENC Viktória

    HAUSER Gerald

    KNOTEK Ondřej

    ECR (5)

    BUDA Waldemar

    FRAGKOS Emmanouil

    PICARO Michele

    RAZZA Ruggero

    TROCHU Laurence

    Renew (5)

    BOSSE Stine

    CANFIN Pascal

    CHASTEL Olivier

    CIFROVÁ OSTRIHOŇOVÁ Veronika

    VASILE-VOICULESCU Vlad

    Verts/ALE (3)

    HÄUSLING Martin

    MARINO Ignazio Roberto

    METZ Tilly

    The Left (3)

    MARTINS Catarina

    PALMISANO Valentina

    TAMBURRANO Dario

    ESN (1)

    ANDERSON Christine

    NI (2)

    BEŇOVÁ Monika

    DOSTÁL Ondřej

    CS01 EUDS

    [ 20/01/2025 – ]

    Специална комисия относно европейския щит за демокрацията

    Comisión Especial sobre el Escudo Europeo de la Democracia

    Zvláštní výbor pro Evropský štít pro demokracii

    Det Særlige Udvalg om Det Europæiske Demokratiskjold

    Sonderausschuss für den Europäischen Schutzschild für die Demokratie

    Euroopa demokraatia kaitse erikomisjon

    Ειδική Επιτροπή για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ασπίδα Δημοκρατίας

    Special committee on the European Democracy Shield

    Commission spéciale sur le bouclier européen de la démocratie

    An Coiste Speisialta um an Sciath Eorpach don Daonlathas

    Posebni odbor za europski štit za zaštitu demokracije

    Commissione speciale sullo scudo europeo per la democrazia

    Īpašā komiteja attiecībā uz Eiropas demokrātijas vairogu

    Specialusis komitetas Europos demokratijos skydo klausimais

    Az európai demokráciapajzzsal foglalkozó különbizottság

    Kumitat Speċjali dwar it-Tarka Ewropea għad-Demokrazija

    Bijzondere Commissie inzake een schild voor de Europese democratie

    Komisja Specjalna ds. Europejskiej Tarczy Demokracji

    Comissão Especial sobre o Escudo Europeu da Democracia

    Comisia specială pentru Scutul democrației europene

    Osobitný výbor pre európsky štít na obranu demokracie

    Posebni odbor za evropski ščit za demokracijo

    Eurooppalaista demokratian kilpeä käsittelevä erityisvaliokunta

    Särskilda utskottet för det europeiska demokratiförsvaret

    (33 members)

    PPE (9)

    AALTOLA Mika

    BOGDAN Ioan-Rareş

    DÜPONT Lena

    KALNIETE Sandra

    MARTUSCIELLO Fulvio

    SIENKIEWICZ Bartłomiej

    TOBÉ Tomas

    ZDECHOVSKÝ Tomáš

    ZOIDO ÁLVAREZ Juan Ignacio

    S&D (6)

    DÎNCU Vasile

    MENDES Ana Catarina

    MOLNÁR Csaba

    PICIERNO Pina

    SCHALDEMOSE Christel

    VAN BREMPT Kathleen

    PfE (4)

    BŽOCH Jaroslav

    LEGGERI Fabrice

    SCHALLER-BAROSS Ernő

    TÂNGER CORRÊA António

    ECR (4)

    CAVEDAGNA Stefano

    KANKO Assita

    SZYDŁO Beata

    TERHEŞ Cristian

    Renew (4)

    BRANDSTÄTTER Helmut

    GROOTHUIS Bart

    LOISEAU Nathalie

    WILMÈS Sophie

    Verts/ALE (2)

    GEESE Alexandra

    VAN SPARRENTAK Kim

    The Left (2)

    ARVANITIS Konstantinos

    DELLA VALLE Danilo

    ESN (1)

    ANDERSON Christine

    NI (1)

    PANAYIOTOU Fidias

    CS02 HOUS

    [ 20/01/2025 – ]

    Специална комисия относно жилищната криза в Европейския съюз

    Comisión Especial sobre la Crisis de la Vivienda en la Unión Europea

    Zvláštní výbor pro krizi v oblasti bydlení v Evropské unii

    Det Særlige Udvalg om Boligkrisen i Den Europæiske Union

    Sonderausschuss zur Wohnraumkrise in der Europäischen Union

    Euroopa Liidu eluasemekriisi erikomisjon

    Ειδική Επιτροπή για τη στεγαστική κρίση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση

    Special committee on the Housing Crisis in the European Union

    Commission spéciale sur la crise du logement dans l’Union européenne

    An Coiste Speisialta um an nGéarchéim Tithíochta san Aontas Eorpach

    Posebni odbor za stambenu krizu u Europskoj uniji

    Commissione speciale sulla crisi degli alloggi nell’Unione europea

    Īpašā komiteja mājokļu krīzes risināšanai Eiropas Savienībā

    Specialusis komitetas būsto krizės Europos Sąjungoje klausimais

    Az Európai Unióban tapasztalható lakhatási válsággal foglalkozó különbizottság

    Kumitat Speċjali dwar il-Kriżi tal-Akkomodazzjoni fl-Unjoni Ewropea

    Bijzondere Commissie inzake de huisvestingscrisis in de Europese Unie

    Komisja Specjalna ds. Kryzysu Mieszkaniowego w Unii Europejskiej

    Comissão Especial sobre a Crise de Habitação na União Europeia

    Comisia specială pentru criza locuințelor în Uniunea Europeană

    Osobitný výbor pre krízu bývania v Európskej únii

    Posebni odbor za stanovanjsko krizo v Evropski uniji

    Asuntokriisiä Euroopan unionissa käsittelevä erityisvaliokunta

    Särskilda utskottet för bostadskrisen i Europeiska unionen

    (33 members)

    PPE (9)

    BUGALHO Sebastião

    CASA David

    DOHERTY Regina

    EZCURRA ALMANSA Alma

    FALCONE Marco

    FERBER Markus

    GOTINK Dirk

    LE CALLENNEC Isabelle

    MARCZUŁAJTIS-WALCZAK Jagna

    S&D (6)

    BISCHOFF Gabriele

    GOMES Isilda

    HOMS GINEL Alicia

    MEBAREK Nora

    SCHIEDER Andreas

    TINAGLI Irene

    PfE (4)

    BLOM Rachel

    DOSTALOVA Klara

    HÖLVÉNYI György

    RECHAGNEUX Julie

    ECR (4)

    JUNCO GARCÍA Nora

    MAGONI Lara

    SBERNA Antonella

    TEODORESCU Georgiana

    Renew (4)

    HOJSÍK Martin

    MULLOOLY Ciaran

    TOOM Jana

    VAN DEN BERG Brigitte

    Verts/ALE (2)

    MARZÀ IBÁÑEZ Vicent

    OHISALO Maria

    The Left (2)

    CHAIBI Leila

    MONTERO Irene

    ESN (1)

    BOSSDORF Irmhild

    NI (1)

    ZACHARIA Maria

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Romania Native Charged With Illegal Reentry

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    WILLIAMSPORT – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Pennsylvania announced that Nicolae Strava, age 30, a citizen of Romania, was indicted on January 23, 2025, by a federal grand jury for illegal reentry.

    According to Acting United States Attorney John C. Gurganus, the indictment alleges that Strava was previously removed from the United States on April 23, 2019, through Houston, Texas.  It is alleged that he was subsequently found in the United States on September 20, 2024, in Centre County, Pennsylvania, without having first obtained legal permission to reenter the country.

    This case was investigated by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO).  Assistant U.S. Attorney Robin Zenzinger is prosecuting the case.

    The maximum penalty under federal law for the most significant offense is two years, a fine, and supervised release following imprisonment.  A sentence following a finding of guilt is imposed by the Judge after consideration of the applicable federal sentencing statutes and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.

    Indictments are only allegations. All persons charged by indictment are presumed to be innocent unless and until found guilty in court.

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    MIL Security OSI