Category: Business

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Competition policy – annual report 2024 – P10_TA(2025)0104 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to Articles 101 to 109 thereof,

    –  having regard to the publication of 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen entitled ‘Europe’s choice – political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024–2029’,

    –  having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    –  having regard to the report of 18 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors Special Report21/2024 of 23 October 2024 entitled ‘State aid in times of crisis – Swift reaction but shortcomings in the Commission’s monitoring and inconsistencies in the framework to support the EU’s industrial policy objectives’,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation)(1),

    –   having regard to Article 11 TFEU, which mandates the integration of environmental protection requirements into the definition and implementation of all EU policies and activities, with a view to promoting sustainable development,

    –  having regard to Article 3 of Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030(2), which provides that environmentally harmful subsidies, in particular fossil fuel subsidies, should be phased out without delay,

    –  having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 3 September 2024 in Case C‑611/22 P, Illumina v Commission(3), of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑465/20 P, European Commission v Ireland and Others(4), and of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑48/22 P (Google and Alphabet v Commission)(5),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s report of June 2024 entitled ‘Protecting competition in a changing world – Evidence on the evolution of competition in the EU during the past 25 years’,

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘The role of commodity traders in shaping agricultural markets’, published by its Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in November 2024,

    –  having regard to the report of 20 December 2023 by the European Securities and Markets Authority entitled ‘CRA Market Share Report: 2023 edition’,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0071/2025),

    A.  whereas the current challenging economic, climate and geopolitical contexts, marked by uncertainty and unpredictability, require a renewed approach to European competitiveness and concrete strategies to boost economic growth;

    B.  whereas the proper enforcement of the EU competition policy framework leads to lower prices, higher quality, greater choice for consumers, faster innovation and a fairer and more resilient economy, and protects entry conditions for operators in the internal market, tackling abuses of dominant position, monopolies and practices distortive to the internal market;

    C.  whereas the Draghi report underlines that the EU has a broad and diversified industrial innovation base, with a strong comparative advantage in green technologies, but that sustained efforts are needed in order to retain that advantage; whereas the integration of climate and environmental considerations into competition policy is essential, in that regard; whereas the Letta report maintains that the lack of EU integration in the financial, energy and electronic communications sectors is a primary reason for Europe’s declining competitiveness;

    D.  whereas the EU’s competition policy could contribute to bolstering the resilience of the internal market, as well as achieving the goals of the European Green Deal, the 2030 Digital Compass and the Competitiveness Compass, for which international exchange and cooperation are essential;

    E.  whereas the Commission and the national competition authorities need to act in an impartial and objective way in order to preserve the credibility of the EU’s competition policy; whereas the political independence of national competition authorities is of utmost importance to ensure the impartiality and credibility of competition policy;

    General considerations

    1.  Considers that EU competition law seeks to shield against excessive levels of concentration and accumulation of market power, and reaffirms the role of competition policy in encouraging efficiency, innovation and growth, creating a level playing field and protecting consumers, by assuring that markets remain competitive, efficient, dynamic and innovative, delivering high-quality products and services at fair prices and with a wider range of choice;

    2.  Reiterates that competition policy should contribute to all of the EU’s policies, notably in the fields of sustainability, energy, defence and digitalisation; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to a new State aid framework to accompany the Clean Industrial Deal, so as to ensure competitiveness through mobilising the necessary public support for the energy transition to decarbonise EU industry, while ensuring that this does not hinder innovation, increase prices or reduce competition in the internal market; reiterates that State aid should not distort fair and effective competition;

    3.  Emphasises that the global strength and importance of the EU single market derives not only from its internal and external competitiveness but also from its ability to set common standards and guarantee territorial cohesion; notes that at the same time, policymakers should take due account of international regulatory and market developments and calls on the Commission to strive for continued dialogue and cooperation at international level, including via second-generation cooperation agreements that allow for more effective information exchange between competition authorities, and the development of influence on competition policy, globally; highlights the importance of the European Competition Network (ECN) and calls on the Commission to prioritise sustained constructive dialogue and cooperation, in this regard, at international level; calls for the coordination between national competition authorities to ensure the uniform application of competition rules and underlines the necessity of increasing collaboration between antitrust and other sectoral regulators;

    A competitive Union

    4.  Supports the Commission’s commitment to investing in sustainable competitiveness; welcomes the Draghi report’s emphasis on innovation, investments, market integration, decarbonisation and resilience, and the Letta report’s focus on integration, autonomy and solidarity; encourages policies that promote innovation, competitiveness and sustainable and inclusive growth;

    5.  Underlines the need for coordinated, targeted and truly European industrial policy to boost competitiveness; notes that this must not result in market dominance or abuse thereof, price distortion or economic inefficiencies, and points to the need for effective merger control procedures;

    6.  Considers that any State aid granted should be consistent with EU policy objectives; notes the Commission’s intention to provide guidance on the compatibility of State aid with innovation, climate and economic security considerations, as well as its actions to scale down and phase out fossil fuel subsidies under the Clean Industrial Deal, and encourages the Member States to consider the introduction of further conditions for the receipt of State aid; calls for companies structured through non-EU tax havens to be barred from receiving State aid; invites the Commission to investigate the lack of harmonisation of clawback mechanisms;

    7.  Takes note of the Commission’s report asserting that market concentration, markups and profits have increased over the past 25 years, while industry dynamism has decreased, despite the active enforcement of competition law; also takes note that this increase in markups was found to be driven by market share reallocation towards the largest firms; further notes that weak levels of competition have had significant negative impacts on consumers, purchasing power, and on the competitiveness of EU firms and overall economic growth; recalls that the application of competition law should focus on ensuring open, competitive markets free from anti-competitive practices;

    8.  Points out that State aid is increasingly used to support industrial policy objectives; recalls that such aid, as permitted under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, must not adversely affect trading conditions or the common interest; notes the divergent fiscal capabilities of the Member States and warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field; calls on the Commission to monitor these effects and to ensure the integrity of the single market, which can be done through a common financing instrument for a European industrial policy, such as a European Competitiveness Fund, as proposed by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines; calls on the Commission and the Member States not to engage in subsidy competition, which only exacerbates market distortions, notably when financing undertakings that are not efficient; concludes that temporary State aid frameworks have failed to prevent further market fragmentation and notes that only two of the Member States accounted for 77 % of State aid notified; calls for stricter State aid notification monitoring and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency, in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors;

    9.   Underlines the importance of the important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs) for financing projects within the EU with a cross-border dimension; stresses that IPCEIs should have genuine EU added value, which means that they should have a positive impact on more than one Member State; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any such State aid notification is completed within six months at the latest;

    10.  Takes note of the Draghi report’s estimate that, in order to protect our EU competitiveness, an additional EUR 800 billion per year is needed; acknowledges the importance of public and private investment in this context; underlines that the EU budget needs to be properly equipped to that end; regards the completion of the Savings and Investments Union as important for mobilising private investment, addressing the fragmentation of the internal market and supporting the EU’s industrial strategy; acknowledges the urgent need for reforms alongside the effective implementation of the three action areas outlined in the Draghi report: (i) closing the innovation gap with the US and China; (ii) a common plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness to accelerate the energy transition and reduce energy costs; and (iii) enhancing security and reducing dependencies;

    11.  Welcomes the protection of the level playing field of European markets and European companies and their workers granted by anti-dumping measures that correct for distortive foreign State aid; calls on the Commission to make swift use of available trade instruments on procurement and foreign subsidies to prevent unfair competition in the internal market;

    Enforcement priorities

    12.  Observes changes in business practices, highlighting a decline in cartel cases; cautions, however, against new forms of harmful conduct like tacit collusion and algorithmic collusion, and emphasises the need to align enforcement priorities with this evolving landscape;

    13.  Notes the Draghi report’s proposal for a ‘new competition tool’ as a flexible market investigation tool designed to address structural competition problems that do not result from anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominance, and to impose market-wide, forward-looking structural or behavioural remedies, including by lowering entry barriers for competitors, with the aim of increasing competitiveness, incentivising innovation and protecting vulnerable consumers; invites the Commission to analyse how this tool would complement the existing framework for sector investigations;

    14.  Recalls that under the Treaty, the Commission is empowered to address exploitative abuses;

    15.  Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; is aware that EU competition rules stipulate that structural remedies should only be used as a last resort if behavioural remedies have proven ineffective, but nonetheless regrets the reluctance of the Commission to address market dominance through structural remedies; reiterates its invitation to make better use of structural remedies and end the primacy given to behavioural remedies, and encourages further efforts to strengthen their application when necessary; calls on the Commission to make better use of the interim measures instrument to stop any practice that would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

    16.  Welcomes the priority given to housing by the 2024-2029 Commission; calls on the Commission to assess how EU competition principles affect the supply of services of general economic interest (SGEI); calls on the Commission to assess the position of social services of general interest and an SGEI exemption for affordable housing;

    17.  Stresses the importance of State aid as a tool for closing the economic gap between more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, outermost regions and economically depressed areas; recalls that allowing State aid in the context of SGEIs remains essential for the survival of these areas, especially in the context of State support dedicated to connectivity and other basic provisions of services for communities residing in isolated, remote or peripheral regions of the EU; calls on the Commission to investigate possibilities of further flexibility in providing funding to these regions;

    18.  Takes note of the recent Court of Justice of the European Union ruling which found that one of the Member States has failed to transpose the ECN+ Directive into national legislation; underlines the importance of transposing the ECN+ Directive fully; calls on all of the Member States to ensure a proper implementation of this Directive;

    Merger and antitrust

    19.  Notes with concern the Court of Justice of the European Union’s interpretation of Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation in Case C-611/22 P (Illumina v Commission), rescinding the Commission’s approach of accepting referrals of non-notifiable deals; acknowledges that the EC Merger Regulation does not provide the Commission with sufficient tools for dealing with killer acquisitions; strongly believes that the impact of merger decisions on the internal market justifies the inclusion of an internal market legal base in the EC Merger Regulation, so as to fully involve co-legislators, in a manner similar to that of the Digital Markets Act (DMA); calls on the Commission to require Member States that have or can claim the relevant competence to examine potential killer acquisitions in the light of their national merger control laws, and to continue to refer those deals in accordance with Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of reviewing the EC Merger Regulation to be able to examine mergers that fall below EU or national thresholds, regardless of the sectors involved;

    20.  Notes that since the 2004 entry into force of the EC Merger Regulation, 0,7 % of notified mergers have been either blocked by the Commission or withdrawn following an investigation;

    21.  Notes that the turnover thresholds in the EC Merger Regulation alone might not be suitable for detecting all cases that should be reviewed by the competition authorities; highlights practices used by dominant firms to avoid formal investigations, such as the growing use of ‘partnerships’ in the AI sector, which further suggests that a review of the EU Merger Regulation is necessary;

    22.  Welcomes the Draghi report’s proposal for an ‘innovation defence’ in cases where a merger increases the ability and incentive to innovate, and invites the Commission to analyse and further develop this concept; furthermore calls for matters of public interest, such as the impact on workers, to be taken into account;

    23.  Asks the Commission to identify the national barriers that may prevent it from considering the EU market as the relevant one in its analyses of mergers; calls on the Commission to present a legislative proposal to remove these impediments; notes that the international environment needs to be carefully analysed when deciding on the definition of the relevant market in competition and merger control cases; calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking approach to consolidation in the EU where appropriate, as also proposed by the Draghi and Letta reports, taking into account the strategic importance and pro-competitive impact of scale and favourable investment conditions in certain sectors for driving innovation and long-term competition;

    24.  Calls for merger assessment frameworks to be updated to reflect the realities of the digital economy, where market power can be manifested in ways beyond traditional market share in clearly delineated markets; supports the development of advanced methodologies for analysing data-driven dominance and network effects, emphasising the critical role of consumer choice in selecting digital services and devices; encourages the Commission to enhance mechanisms enabling interoperability across services and devices, fostering innovation and competition in the digital ecosystem; urges the Commission to progress swiftly on the implementation of the existing interoperability obligations for messaging services under the DMA, the existing interoperability obligations for cloud providers under the Data Act and to start work on the review of the DMA for May 2026; urges the Commission to implement existing interoperability obligations under the DMA and look into extending interoperability obligations to online social networking services; supports the Commission in taking more account of the potential harm to competition when assessing mergers where expansion into adjacent markets would have the effect of further strengthening market dominance in the acquiring company’s core market;

    25.  Calls on the Commission to address excessively long antitrust investigations during which companies continue to benefit from their anticompetitive practices; calls on the Commission to set appropriate time limits for antitrust cases and ensure an effective follow-through of decisions taken; calls on the Commission to adopt further interim measures to stop any practice which would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

    Sectoral policies

    26.  Welcomes the two September 2024 landmark judgments by the Court of Justice confirming the Commission’s assertion that the Irish tax deal with Apple constitutes illegal State aid and that Google abused its dominant position in contravention of the Treaties; acknowledges that the legal framework in Ireland has since changed; encourages the Commission to continue the clamp down on State aid abuses involving the selective granting of tax breaks to companies;

    27.  Notes the detrimental effect of international tax competition; recalls its support for the implementation of Pillar Two of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); deeply regrets the US presidential Executive Order of 20 January 2025 which asserts that the OECD global tax agreement has ‘no force or effect within the United States’; stresses the importance of multilateralism in ensuring that multinationals pay their fair share of taxation where value is created; takes the view that the EU should fully stand by the OECD’s Pillar Two Directive;

    28.  Emphasises the worrying market concentrations in various digital markets, such as social media, search engines, AI, cloud services, e-commerce, microchips and online advertising; underlines the actual and potential negative impact on EU competitiveness, the resilience of supply chains, media freedom, privacy and data protection, society and democracy; urges the Commission to address issues that are specific to the tech market, including infrastructural power in hardware and cloud computing layers, vertical concentration, algorithmic manipulation of the digital public sphere and market leveraging in digital markets, as demonstrated by the progress made under the DMA; additionally calls for the opening of new investigations into the cloud services sector to further ensure fair competition and innovation, taking into account the degree of market concentration in this sector and anticompetitive practices related to complex and non-transparent licensing terms or forced bundling; furthermore, urges the Commission to address the increasing vertical concentration of dominant players across the advertising value chain, which puts the EU online advertising sector at risk;

    29.  Notes the rapid development of AI services, which has the potential to result in market concentration; calls on the Commission to take an ecosystemic approach towards this sector, including by developing and applying new theories of harm to address the further entrenchment of the dominant players in this sector; highlights that the DMA contains several provisions that must be used to prevent gatekeepers from restricting emerging AI developers, and asks the Commission to act swiftly to address the risk of consumers being forced into using pre-determined AI services on their mobile devices, ensuring that AI systems remain user-selectable and transparent, thereby safeguarding competition and consumer choice; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of adding generative AI as a new core platform service under the DMA;

    30.  Notes that large digital players use their market power, power over consumers, financial resources and data concentration in one market to leverage their position in another; stresses that small players cannot compete with the aforementioned factors, which makes EU citizens even more dependent on the same small number of non-EU companies and endangers strategic autonomy; calls for increased scrutiny of the leveraging of position by dominant digital sector players into other sectors and the EU’s strategic autonomy, through a revision of the merger guidelines to ensure that market leveraging can be scrutinised more effectively;

    31.  Notes the importance of data and data analytics tools as one of the deterring factors for digital market concentrations and acquisitions in the digital sector; calls for an opinion of the European Data Protection Board in cases of concentrations involving one or more operators in digital sectors on the relevance of datasets for the intended concentration, the personal data the target acquisition processes and the potential impact on the rights to privacy and data protection the intended concentration has;

    32.  Expresses concern regarding the growing use of dynamic pricing mechanisms across the EU; calls on the Commission to explore regulatory measures against highly adaptive and opaque pricing methods;

    33.  Calls on the Commission to vigorously enforce all competition rules, including the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and the DMA, in order to address gatekeeper practices and foster contestable markets and fair competition; stresses that the Commission must have sufficient staff for enforcement, while noting that new tools, as well as scientists and economists stemming from divergent disciplines, can work to improve competition law enforcement; underlines in particular that the DMA should be applied rigorously and independently, without any undermining by external pressures; stresses that the DMA and potential fines must not be used as a bargaining chip in relation to discussions on tariffs, but as a cornerstone of the EU’s efforts to ensure fair and competitive digital markets; notes the six non-compliance procedures launched against some designated gatekeepers; is deeply concerned about potential delays in critical investigations and the capacity of the Commission to respect their ‘best effort’ obligations and to make a decision on non-compliance procedures without undue delay;

    34.  Notes with concern the fragmentation in numerous consumer markets, including financial services, telecoms and household energy, and calls for faster and greater market integration where there are benefits for consumers, and for recognition that this market integration can drive investment and innovation;

    35.  Expresses alarm at the high concentration in the retail, agricultural and automotive sectors in overseas territories whereby excessive prices set by dominant undertakings on essential products and services amplify inequalities, precariousness and territorial disparities; calls on the Commission to launch an investigation into potential abuses of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU;

    36.  Notes with concern the high degree of market concentration in the European financial sector, as well as its sustained over-reliance on a limited number of non-EU service providers; notes that the three largest credit rating agencies still hold a market share of over 90 %; expresses concern about the continued high concentration in the public interest entities (PIE) audit market, with four firms mainly holding the vast majority of EU revenues for PIE audits, limiting choice and risking supervisory capture; invites the Commission to present an impact assessment on options to address these concerns; urges the Commission to carefully assess public tenders for expertise from audit market participants so that potential conflicts of interest are avoided;

    37.  Expresses concern about the food price crisis and notes, in this regard, the high levels of market concentration in food supply chains; reiterates its call for the Commission to urgently conduct a thorough analysis of the extent and effect of buying alliances, thereby devoting special attention to guaranteeing fair competition and greater transparency in supermarket and hypermarket chains’ commercial practices, particularly where such practices affect brand value and product choice or limit innovation or price comparability; recalls, in this light, the market concentration in agri-commodity trading wherein four companies account for the vast majority of the global crop trade; regrets that the Commission nonetheless conditionally approved the 2024 Bunge-Viterra merger (M.11204) despite competition concerns; asks the Commission to address excessive power accumulation in the hands of a few large players in this market, in order to strengthen the bargaining position of farmers and consumers alike; highlights the implementation of the New Competition Tool in this context;

    38.  Notes the high-net profits of EU banks during this inflationary period, mostly driven by the delayed pass-through of the rapid monetary policy tightening to deposit rates;

    39.  Notes with particular concern the dominant position of two international card schemes in the EU payments market, and their engagement in practices that reinforce and extend their dominance of this market, potentially further increasing barriers to entry and hampering long-term innovation(6), as well as leading to higher costs for EU businesses and ultimately consumers; calls on the Commission to take decisive actions, emphasising the need for a review of the Interchange Fee Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/751) to tackle the significant increase in card scheme fees charged by international card schemes and to ensure a fair, competitive and transparent market environment;

    Parliamentary involvement

    40.  Stresses that Parliament should be sufficiently involved in shaping competition policy; cautions against the over-reliance on soft-law instruments, such as guidance and temporary frameworks, in which Parliament’s involvement is limited; calls on the Commission to enter into negotiation for an interinstitutional agreement on competition policy to formalise its enforcement priorities to Parliament; calls on the European Council to adopt a decision under Article 48(7) TEU allowing for the adoption of legislative acts in the area of competition policy in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure; stresses that Parliament should be more involved in the activity of working parties and expert groups in the International Competition Network and the OECD as an observer, and also in the High-Level Group on the DMA;

    41.  Calls on the responsible Executive Vice-President, also Commissioner in charge of competition policy to maintain close contact with Parliament’s competent committee and its working group on competition issues;

    o
    o   o

    42.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 024, 29.1.2004, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/139/oj.
    (2) OJ L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/591/oj.
    (3) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 September 2024, Illumina v Commission, C-611/22 P, ECLI:EU:C:2024:677.
    (4) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 September 2024, European Commission v Ireland and Others, C-465/20 P, ECLI:EU:C:2024:724.
    (5) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 September 2024, Google and Alphabet v Commission, C-48/22 P, CLI:EU:C:2024:726.
    (6) European Court of Auditors, Special Report: ‘Digital payments in the EU – Progress towards making them safer, faster, and less expensive, despite remaining gaps’, 9 January 2025, https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2025-01/SR-2025-01_EN.pdf.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Kosovo – P10_TA(2025)0094 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and Kosovo, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 April 2016,

    –  having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2022,

    –  having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe of 12 May 2022,

    –  having regard to the framework agreement between the European Union and Kosovo on the general principles for the participation of Kosovo in Union programmes(2), in force since 1 August 2017,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(3),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(4),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans Summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia, of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb, of 6 October 2021 in Brdo pri Kranju, of 6 December 2022 in Tirana, of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0692),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0692),

    –  having regard to the general summary and the country assessments by the Commission, dated 31 May 2023 and 13 June 2024, on Kosovo’s economic reform programme,

    –  having regard to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye, adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, and to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 of 9 September 2010, which acknowledged the content of the ICJ opinion and welcomed the EU’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

    –  having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and to the implementation annex thereto,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1095 of 5 June 2023 amending Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)(5), which extended the mission’s mandate until 14 June 2025,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Kosovo)(6),

    –  having regard to the final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2021 municipal elections in Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the preliminary report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2025 parliamentary elections in Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the fourth meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council between the European Union and Kosovo held in Brussels on 7 December 2021,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the joint recommendations adopted at the 12th meeting of the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 9 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International,

    –  having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the Democracy Report 2024 of March 2024 by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0075/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement policy is one of the most effective EU foreign policy instruments and one of the most successful policies to incentivise and encourage fundamental reforms, and is a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B.  whereas democracy, human rights and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    C.  whereas the EU enlargement process is a strategic tool for strengthening stability, democracy and economic development in Europe, and each enlargement country is judged on its own merits and whereas it is the implementation of the necessary reforms and compliance with the set of criteria and common European values that determines the timetable and progress of accession; whereas Kosovo’s path towards EU membership also depends on the normalisation of relations with Serbia;

    D.  whereas the EU is the largest provider of financial support to Kosovo;

    E.  whereas Kosovo has been subjected to foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, particularly from Russia, especially through Serbian nationalist outlets, and China, through soft power, aiming to destabilise its democratic institutions, jeopardise societal cohesion, and incite ethnic violence; whereas the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023 was followed by a massive spread of disinformation that further exacerbated tensions; whereas Kosovo authorities adopted the Law on the Independent Media Commission (IMC) in July 2024; whereas, in May 2024, the Council of Europe published a legal opinion on the draft law on the IMC expressing concerns related to certain aspects of the at-that-time draft law, and providing recommendations on how to address these concerns; whereas the final text of the Law on the IMC did not reflect most of the recommendations made;

    F.  whereas the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, also known as EULEX, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the common security and defence policy of the European Union;

    G.  whereas in 2018 and 2023, petitions were signed by over 500 people who historically self-identify as Bulgarian;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Commends Kosovo’s commitment to EU accession, which reflects a clear strategic geopolitical choice, and the continued strong support of its citizens for Kosovo’s European path; reiterates that Kosovo has been consistent in its efforts to integrate into the European Union;

    2.  Reiterates its firm belief that Kosovo’s future lies in the EU and that all efforts to bring Kosovo out of the ‘grey zone’ are in the interest of the people of both Kosovo and the EU, especially in the context of the current geopolitical dynamics in the region, rapid major shifts in world politics and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    3.  Supports Kosovo’s application for EU membership, which reflects the overwhelming cross-party consensus on EU integration and a clear geopolitical strategic choice; reiterates its call on the Member States in the Council to mandate the Commission to present its questionnaire and to submit its opinion on the merits of the country’s application; calls on the five non-recognising Member States that have not yet recognised Kosovo’s independence to do so without delay and thus allow Kosovo to progress on its EU path on an equal footing with the other candidate countries; recalls the advisory opinion of the ICJ dated 22 July 2010, which states that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence does not violate general international law;

    4.  Recalls that membership of the European Union is based on a merit-based process, conditional on the rigorous implementation of reforms aligned with the highest European standards, in particular compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the rule of law, and ensures the effective application of laws in practice; encourages Kosovo to continue its efforts in this regard, by further strengthening its commitment to the values and standards of the Union; stresses that enlargement also implies thorough preparation of potential new members, while respecting the economic stability of the internal market, social and environmental standards and the proper functioning of the European institutions;

    5.  Welcomes the visa liberalisation, adopted in April 2023 and in place since 1 January 2024, as a tangible result of Kosovo’s ever-closer relations with the EU and as evidence of Kosovo’s efforts on the path of European integration; welcomes Kosovo’s decision to unilaterally abolish visa requirements for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina; welcomes the decision of Spain to recognise ordinary passports issued by Kosovo as valid travel documents as of January 2024;

    6.  Notes the tangible progress in the areas of justice, freedom and security, the fight against organised crime and a functioning market economy; regrets the limited progress and calls for an acceleration of reforms in the area of rule of law; welcomes Kosovo’s ambition to advance the implementation of reforms, which remains the country’s priority; regrets the lack of a decision-making quorum in the Kosovo National Assembly, caused by the boycott of the Assembly work by political parties ahead of parliamentary elections;

    7.  Regrets the politicisation of institutions such as the Central Election Commission and the IMC;

    8.  Commends Kosovo’s ongoing alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, in particular its firm condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its implementation of the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus, aligning with the Union’s foreign policy, and its support through humanitarian aid and military assistance packages to Ukraine, which confirm that Kosovo is a reliable and valuable partner committed to EU integration and confirms its clear geopolitical orientation, firmly anchored in the European and transatlantic alliance;

    9.  Calls for the immediate lifting of the EU measures against Kosovo, which are no longer justified as Kosovo has fulfilled the EU requirements and as the measures also stand in gross contradiction to Kosovo’s demonstrated commitment to European values and alignment with EU policies, limiting the impact of the EU’s partnership with Kosovo and hindering the resumption of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in good faith;

    10.  Reiterates its full support for Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe and for the country’s strategic orientation plan to join the NATO Partnership for Peace programme and its bids to join other international organisations; calls on the relevant organisations and the Member States to proactively support Kosovo’s respective bids; calls on the Commission and the EU Office in Kosovo to step up their efforts in enhancing visibility and promoting the role, efforts and benefits of the closer partnership between the EU and Kosovo;

    11.   Welcomes the fact that Kosovo reduced administrative burden by simplifying procedures through the implementation of the related program for 2022-2027; notes that the strategic framework for public administration is in place, but not efficiently implemented; regrets the fact that delays in public administration reform have left EU funding management weak and that accountability in the public sector is insufficient; calls on Kosovo to improve public administration and the merit-based civil service system by amending and adopting the Law on public officials and the Law on the independent oversight board of civil service;

    12.  Regrets that the Kosovo Constitutional Court ruling on the Law on salaries, which unifies the current system of remuneration for public officials, is not yet functional; calls on the Kosovo Government to revise its legislation on public financial management to meet international standards and to incorporate the public investment methodology into the revised legislation;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13.  Welcomes the important and positive progress on addressing many of the EU Election Observation Mission’s (EU EOM) long-standing recommendations and on presenting a consensual law on general elections; notes that this provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections, in line with international and regional standards; notes that in response to an invitation by the president of Kosovo, the European Union deployed an EU EOM, including an observer delegation of Members of the European Parliament, to observe the parliamentary elections in Kosovo on 9 February 2025; welcomes the conclusions of the EU EOM confirming the conduct of peaceful, free and fair elections on 9 February 2025 with the participation of all communities in Kosovo; regrets the harsh rhetoric of the political parties during the campaign; takes note of the technical problems encountered during the counting process and encourages the Kosovo authorities to increase their efforts to improve the organisation of the next elections; notes the lack of genuine political pluralism within the Kosovo Serb community at the parliamentary elections, despite multiple Kosovo Serb electoral lists; is concerned by reports of continuous pressure on voters from the Serbian community exercised by Belgrade; condemns the repeated interference in the electoral campaign by US Special Envoy Richard Grenell;

    14.  Notes with concern the political deadlock caused by the fragmented political landscape and failure so far to elect a speaker of the Parliament, hindering the formation of a government following the legislative elections of 9 February 2025 and delaying the parliamentary reading of several budgetary texts; encourages the political parties to work together to overcome this stalemate as soon as possible;

    15.  Notes with concern that the Law on Local Elections and the Law on General Elections are still not implemented and harmonised with the Law on Gender Equality, which mandates 50 % equal representation of women and men; regrets that women continue to be underrepresented;

    16.  Welcomes the adoption of the law on the Special Prosecution Office and the progress in adjudicating corruption cases; commends the active work of the Special Prosecution Office for solving seven war crime cases; calls for further clarification of the division of jurisdiction between the Special Prosecution Office and the Basic Prosecution in handling investigations and prosecutions; calls on Kosovo to continue strengthening the Special Prosecution Office by enhancing its capacity to investigate and prosecute high-profile organised crime cases; calls on the police and Special Prosecution Office to work closely together to develop strategies for conducting investigations more effectively, with a clear division of responsibility;

    17.  Takes note of the progress in Kosovo’s ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index, as it has moved upward 10 places since last year, considering it to be a positive development while acknowledging that this is attributable both to decreases in other countries’ scores and, more significantly, to the adoption of qualitative legislation, but that it still remains largely unsatisfactory; emphasises that gaining people’s trust requires not only legislative reforms but also visible results in investigating, prosecuting and convicting cases of corruption at all levels; regrets that Kosovo has lacked an anti-corruption strategy since 2019 and urges for more efforts to finalise it as a matter of priority; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption;

    18.  Expresses serious concern about systemic vulnerabilities in Kosovo’s judiciary, particularly regarding the independence of the justice system and respect for separation of powers; reiterates its concern about delays to trials and continued criticism by government officials of judicial decisions in individual cases; welcomes the fact that in December 2024, the government submitted its draft legislation on judicial reforms to the Venice Commission and that the first opinion was issued by the latter on 18 March 2025; calls on Kosovo to ensure that legislation governing the integrity and accountability of the judiciary is consistent with European standards and Venice Commission recommendations; calls on the Government of Kosovo to allocate adequate budget for the judicial system; welcomes the establishment of the Commercial Court, progress in the recruitment of new judges and prosecutors in a merit-based and transparent process, and an overall increase of transparency;

    19.  Welcomes the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the parliamentary elections and encourages their elected representatives to play an active role within the Kosovo legislative framework, in support of Kosovo’s European future; regrets, however, the boycott of parties representing Kosovo Serbs during the local elections in April 2023 and the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions; expresses concern over Serbia’s interference in the parliamentary elections through Srpska Lista (SL);

    20.  Welcomes the implementation of the 2016 judgement of the Constitutional Court on the Visoki Dečani/Deçani Monastery land ownership by registering the monastery as the owner, in March 2024;

    21.  Welcomes the steady increase in organised crime sentences and the fact that the legal framework on the fight against organised crime is aligned with the EU acquis; emphasises the need for prosecution services and police to strengthen their joint action against criminal groups and networks; expresses concern about the security challenges in the north of Kosovo, particularly following the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023, which demanded significant police resources; emphasises the need to deepen cooperation in the field of combating drug trafficking; calls for further alignment regarding the fight against terrorism;

    22.  Welcomes the adoption of the strategy and action plan on control of small arms light weapons and explosives, as well as the high level of compliance with the rules of the UN Firearms Protocol;

    23.  Remains concerned over the slow implementation of the rule of law strategy and action plan;

    24.  Reaffirms its commitment to maintaining and strengthening its cooperation with the Kosovo Assembly and its members in support of democratic processes related to Kosovo’s European path by using Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives; believes that this partnership can be revitalised and further reinforced following the democratic elections held on 9 February 2025; encourages the active involvement and collaboration of all elected members of the newly formed Kosovo Assembly;

    25.  Condemns the serious security incidents in the north of Kosovo in late November 2024, the gravest act occurring near the village of Vragë in Zubin Potok, where explosive devices damaged critical infrastructure by targeting the main channel of the Ibër Lepenc system; expresses its support for Kosovo’s institutions in conducting a full investigation of these criminal actions so that the perpetrators will be brought to justice;

    26.  Commends the work of EULEX, which has been assisting Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule of law institutions;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Notes that Kosovo has the necessary institutional set-up for the promotion and protection of human rights; welcomes the adoption of the strategy for the protection and promotion of the rights of communities; emphasises, however, that human rights protection remains weak owing to the lack of legislative implementation, political will and limited human and financial resources and calls for strengthened enforcement and accountability mechanisms;

    28.  Acknowledges that Kosovo’s constitution is very progressive in terms of protection of minority rights; notes with regret that the petition signed by nearly 500 people who have historically self-identified as Bulgarian, which was registered at the Assembly of Kosovo in January 2023, has still not been considered and recommends that those rights be enshrined in law and ensured in practice; calls on Kosovo to ensure that all minorities recognised under the Law on protection of minority rights and members of their communities, are fully incorporated into the country’s constitution; calls on the Kosovo authorities to step up efforts to protect the rights of all minorities, including national communities, in particular vulnerable national communities, and to provide them equal opportunities and adequate representation in political and cultural life, public media, the administration and the judiciary, as well as prevent their assimilation and promote their integration into Kosovo’s society and strengthen activities to eliminate social and economic challenges of these national minorities;

    29.  Welcomes the increase in funding to shelters for victims of domestic violence and trafficking; notes that domestic violence remains the most common form of gender-based violence; expresses concerns that the system continues to fail in ensuring the effective prevention of domestic violence;

    30.  Regrets that the adoption of the draft Civil Code of Kosovo remains pending; highlights that the draft Civil Code addresses several important issues related to gender equality as a fundamental EU value, including enabling an equal share of joint marital property among women and men spouses; stresses the importance of ensuring rights for all people in Kosovo in the Civil Code to safeguard respect for constitutional rights and opportunities for the LGBTIQ community; expresses concern that women remain under-represented in senior political positions, specifically related to security and the dialogue, and emphasises the urgent need for their involvement in peacemaking and reconciliation processes, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; calls for more efforts to be made to improve the place of women in society;

    31.  Notes that the prison system broadly follows UN Standard Minimum Rules and calls for the better protection of the rights of prisoners, particularly female, minority and mentally ill prisoners; remains concerned that discriminatory language against women and LGBTIQ people persists, and calls on the authorities to create and implement a national gender strategy for research fields, such as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics; commends the participation of women in high-quality business and management training programmes, as well as in ICT related domains, facilitated by the instrument for pre-accession assistance funds; regrets that women from minority groups, particularly the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, face numerous forms of discrimination, particularly in education, employment and access to healthcare; expresses concerns that the central administration does not adequately represent minority communities, and the number of women in senior positions is low;

    32.  Regrets that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has not yet been adopted; expresses concerns that there is insufficient alignment between Kosovo’s legislation and the EU acquis on the rights of people with disabilities, who face discrimination and barriers to accessing social services;

    33.  Welcomes Kosovo’s consistent improvement in its position in the 2024 Liberal Democracy Index and Electoral Democracy Index, as prepared by the Varieties of Democracy Institute, which measures the rule of law, checks and balances, civil liberties, and free and fair elections;

    34.  Takes note of Kosovo’s pluralistic media environment while awaiting the decision of the Constitutional Court on the main media law and underlines the role of the IMC, whose independence in decision-making needs to be strictly ensured and full functioning restored; regrets, however, the decline in Kosovo’s media freedom, as evidenced by its drop from the 56th to the 75th place in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; reaffirms that media pluralism and transparency are prerequisites for EU accession; calls for greater transparency on media ownership and financing with a view to enhancing media independence and pluralism; emphasises the need for robust measures to protect journalists from harassment and intimidation, and to ensure the independence of media regulatory bodies; notes the concerns raised by civil society about the allegedly politically motivated election of the Chair of the IMC; urges the Kosovo authorities to further revise the Law on the IMC in order to include the recommendations made by the Council of Europe, thus aligning the national law with EU standards and practices; recommends increased support for independent media outlets and fact-checking organisations in Kosovo, recognising their crucial role in countering disinformation and providing accurate information to the public; encourages the EU to provide technical and financial assistance to these entities; encourages the Kosovo authorities to request tailor-made Technical Assistance and Information Exchange expert missions bodies; calls for the adoption of the law on Radio Television of Kosovo and the law on the protection of journalists’ sources;

    35.  Expresses concern over the recent cyberattack targeting Kosovo’s digital infrastructure; urges the Kosovo Government to reinforce its capacities to combat foreign interference and disinformation, particularly those originating from Serbian nationalist outlets and Russia, aimed at destabilising the region and undermining the European integration of the Western Balkans, by developing comprehensive strategies that include public awareness campaigns also combating disinformation undermining women’s participation in public life, strengthening cybersecurity and related infrastructure, fostering collaboration with international partners, most notably the European Union, to protect its digital economy, public services and national security, and addressing disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats that aim to destabilise the country and undermine its European perspective; encourages the integration of media literacy programs into Kosovo’s educational curriculum to equip citizens with the skills necessary to identify and counteract disinformation;

    36.  Commends the fact that Kosovo provided shelter and asylum to journalists from Ukraine and Afghanistan;

    37.  Expresses serious concern about the significant increase in attacks against journalists and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP cases), including by government officials; calls on the authorities to advance their work on anti-SLAPP legislation in line with the new EU Directive 2024/1069(7); calls on Kosovo to work actively to secure the ability of journalists to carry out their work and to ensure full freedom for the media to operate independently; underlines the need to stop all forms of violence;

    38.  Welcomes Kosovo’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a very crucial and positive role in the reform process; encourages the Kosovo Government to enhance its cooperation with civil society, in particular with women’s rights organisations, on decision-making and to make more use of the Government Council for Cooperation with Civil Society for building collaborative relationships and genuinely implicating civil society in a transparent legislative process from an early stage onwards; stresses the importance of increasing accountability and transparency in relation to public funding for civil society organisations; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress;

    39.  Regrets the lack of a clear plan for engaging Kosovo Serbs in the north and that initiatives to involve the Serb community in Kosovo’s political, social and economic structures remain very limited; reiterates its call to improve the internal dialogue and genuinely and directly engage with the independent civil society organisations of Kosovo Serbs, in particular in the north, with the aim of building trust, facilitating the daily life of Kosovo Serbs and successfully integrating them;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    40.  Commends Kosovo’s engagement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives and encourages it to enhance its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes; commends Kosovo on its constructive approach and active engagement in regional cooperation and trade facilitation that led to the unblocking of the Central European Free Trade Agreement;

    41.  Calls on Serbia to open all wartime archives and grant access to the former Yugoslav Secret Service (UDBA) and Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service (KOS) files, ensuring their return to respective governments upon request; emphasises the need to open these archives region-wide to investigate communist-era crimes and strengthen democracy, accountability and institutions in the Western Balkans;

    42.  Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    43.  Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Kosovo and Serbia in order to achieve a comprehensive legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    44.  Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    45.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    46.  Condemns all actions that endanger stability and jeopardise the reconciliation process, including the tensions in the north of Kosovo and provocations by Serbian state-sponsored groups and illegal armed formations, and urges the European Union to take a stronger stance against external interference in Kosovo’s internal affairs; emphasises that both sides must fully implement all agreements reached and avoid unilateral actions that could escalate tensions; calls on the Kosovo police to ensure that they fully abide by all rule of law and human rights requirements, and to guarantee that a multi-ethnic and inclusive police force, fully in line with legal requirements, is deployed in the north of Kosovo; recalls the shared responsibility of all political representatives and all communities in Kosovo for upholding peace, security and the rule of law;

    47.  Welcomes the establishment of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons in December 2024 and calls for swift progress in implementing the May 2023 Political Declaration on Missing Persons; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to refrain from politicising this humanitarian issue and to step up their efforts in implementing the declaration as part of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and to establish cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia;

    48.  Welcomes the recent agreements in the framework of the Berlin Process;

    49.  Welcomes Kosovo’s decision to remove restrictions on the entry of Serbian finished products at the Merdare border crossing;

    50.  Welcomes the presence of the Kosovo Force and its role in building and maintaining a safe and secure environment and in developing a stable and peaceful Kosovo on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration; recalls the importance of the mission for the ongoing development of the Kosovo Security Force through the provision of advice, training and capacity building;

    Socio-economic reforms

    51.  Welcomes Kosovo’s active engagement in the implementation of the new growth plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to deepen EU-related reforms and reduce the socio-economic gap between EU Member States and the Western Balkan countries; welcomes the adoption of Kosovo’s Reform Agenda and recalls that Kosovo (as well as Serbia) needs to show improved commitment to the EU-facilitated Dialogue in order to access the resources;

    52.  Welcomes the progress achieved by Kosovo in developing a functioning market economy and encourages Kosovo to implement the necessary structural reforms to address fiscal challenges, while ensuring adequate labour protection, fair wages, and improved working conditions in line with EU legislation;

    53.  Reiterates its calls on the Commission to develop a regional strategy to address the persistent youth unemployment and brain drain by tackling the skills mismatch between the education system and the labour market, improving the quality of teaching, and ensuring adequate funding for active labour market measures and vocational training schemes, along with adequate childcare and pre-school education facilities;

    54.  Welcomes the fact that Kosovo’s cybercrime legislation is broadly aligned with the EU acquis; notes Kosovo’s limited progress in the digital transformation of public services; emphasises the need for it to align with EU digital legislation as well as with the needs of its people, specifically with the European Electronic Communications Code, the EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2)(8), the EU toolbox for 5G security, and the Digital Services Act(9) and the Digital Markets Act(10); notes that Kosovo’s economy remains highly dependent on imports and stresses the need for economic diversification to enhance competitiveness and sustainability, particularly in the context of deeper integration into EU markets;

    55.  Regrets that the draft law on textbooks, presented in 2022, is still pending final adoption in the Kosovo Assembly; calls on Kosovo to finalise the implementation of the new curricular framework for basic education, complete the revision of current textbooks, provide sustainable training to teachers, and systematically apply quality assurance mechanisms at all education levels;

    56.  Urges Kosovo to ensure better access to quality healthcare services; notes that healthcare expenditure remains the second lowest in the region, and calls for a comprehensive healthcare reform to address the needs of all citizens, especially in rural and underserved areas;

    57.  Notes with concern that access to social services, particularly for vulnerable groups, worsened with the government’s closure of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which was done without transparent consultation with civil society and other stakeholders and contributed to significant confusion; calls for better, evidence-based budgeting to improve social services, particularly for survivors of gender-based violence in accordance with the new legal framework;

    58.  Calls on Kosovo to provide equal and non-discriminatory state education in minority languages;

    59.  Reiterates the need to reach out to young people from the Serb majority municipalities and to integrate them in the socio-economic structures of the country;

    Energy, environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    60.  Notes that Kosovo has made some progress on the security of energy supply but remains heavily reliant on outdated, highly polluting power plants, posing serious health and environmental risks; notes that Kosovo needs to ensure the time-efficient implementation of its energy programme for 2022-2025 to meet its ambitious targets and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels; calls for the EU to step up and prioritise its efforts to help Kosovo overcome its air pollution problems; notes that Kosovo’s new energy strategy does not promote the construction of hydropower plants due to their harmful environmental impact, in particular because of the water scarcity in the country;

    61.  Highlights the need for comprehensive infrastructure development in Kosovo to facilitate the reduction of emissions from public transport and the expansion of electrified transport; stresses that improving accessibility and ensuring compatibility with the EU transport network must remain a priority;

    62.  Welcomes the agreement at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of data roaming charges and further reductions leading to prices close to domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entrance into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Urges Kosovo to enhance compliance with emission ceilings, improve the integration of environmental considerations into sectoral policies and adopt necessary measures for pollution, soil and water contamination control and waste management, in line with EU and international standards and commitments; urges Kosovo to improve comprehensive environmental impact assessments and to integrate sustainability measures into infrastructure planning; calls on Kosovo to increase the protected areas in the country and to improve instruments and measures for their protection with a view to safeguarding biodiversity, including key habitats of the critically endangered Balkan lynx; encourages Kosovo to intensify and speed up collaborative efforts with its neighbouring countries to designate transboundary protected areas and establish coherent transboundary management plans;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Kosovo.

    (1) OJ L 71, 16.3.2016, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2016/342/oj.
    (2) OJ L 195, 27.7.2017, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2017/1388/oj.
    (3) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (5) OJ L 146, 6.6.2023, p.22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1095/oj.
    (6) OJ L 110, 25.4.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/850/oj.
    (7) Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
    (8) Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).
    (9) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (10) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Spain: EIB finances with €20 million Heura Foods to develop innovative and sustainable plant-based food products

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • Heura Foods is a Spain based startup that produces 100% plant-based, sustainable and healthy food products with a focus on plant-based meat.
    • The agreement will finance investments to boost Heura’s R&D&I capabilities to produce new products in several categories.
    • The agreement contributes to the EIB strategic priorities of supporting European innovation and the bioeconomy sector while fostering healthy and environmentally friendly food systems in Europe.
    • The operation is backed by InvestEU, an EU programme that aims to unlock over €372 billion in investment by 2027.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) has signed a €20 million loan with Spanish start-up Heura Foods to support development and commercialization of innovative, sustainable and healthy food products 100% plant-based. Heura is a bioeconomy pioneer and innovator in the plant-based foods sector with headquarters in Barcelona. Heura focuses on improving food composition by replacing saturated fats and cholesterol with ingredients rich in fiber and antioxidants, while ensuring a high protein content.

    The loan will support Heura’s R&D&I programme for the development of plant-based alternatives to meat, cheese, and other animal products, as well as products that incorporate a higher share of protein than conventionally found on the supermarket shelves.  Heura’s objective is to provide nutritious alternatives to traditional meat products and popular ultra-processed food categories, using legume-based proteins and healthy fats. The loan will also permit Heura to scale up its production capacity by financing investments in equipment needed to this end, both in Heura’s laboratories and in the co-manufacturers premises in Spain.  Ultimately, the agreement will contribute to fostering healthy and environmentally friendly food systems in Europe.

    “The EIB’s support for innovation and biotechnology is key to Europe’s technological leadership. With this agreement we are boosting the dynamism of the startup ecosystem in Spain and Europe and responding to new consumer needs by developing new sustainable food products,’” said Nadia Calviño, President of the EIB Group.

    “This financing agreement with Heura is a clear example of how the EIB is stepping up its support for companies that are at the forefront of the bioeconomy sector, driving innovation and sustainability across the entire value chain. By investing in the development of new plant-based foods products, the EIB is also contributing to a more sustainable and healthy food system in Europe and the overall food security of the European Union”, said EIB Director of Equity, Growth Capital and Project Finance Alessandro Izzo.

    “Innovation is our tool to live longer and better. We are committed to simple processes, legumes, healthy fats, and science in the service of collective well-being. Our goal is to democratize food that is tasty, nutritious, and aligned with today’s challenges”, said co-founder and CEO of Heura Foods, Marc Coloma.

    “For the European Commission, fostering innovation is crucial for enhancing the competitiveness of its agri-food industry. We welcome the European Investment Bank support to research and development in innovative agri-food companies. This can help the EU to unlock new economic opportunities, create high-value jobs, and solidify its position as a leader in the evolving global food landscape. This operation is a good example of what InvestEU can do to empower businesses to grow, innovate, and build a sustainable future” stated Lucas González Ojeda, Acting Director of the European Commission Representation in Spain.

    The EIB loan is guaranteed by InvestEU, the flagship EU programme to mobilize over €372 billion of additional public and private sector investment to support EU policy goals from 2021 to 2027.

    Background information

    EIB
    The ElB is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by the Member States. Built around eight core priorities, it finances investments that pursue EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union, and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund, signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Agreement, as pledged in the group’s Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects that contribute directly to climate change mitigation and adaptation, and a healthier environment.

    In Spain, the EIB Group signed €12.3 billion of new financing for more than 100 high-impact projects in 2024, helping power the country’s green and digital transition and promote economic growth, competitiveness and better services for inhabitants.

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here.

    InvestEU

    The InvestEU programme provides the European Union with crucial long-term funding by leveraging substantial private and public funds in support of a sustainable recovery. It also helps mobilise private investment for EU policy priorities, such as the European Green Deal and the digital transition. InvestEU brings together under one roof the multitude of EU financial instruments available to support investment in the European Union, making funding for investment projects in Europe simpler, more efficient and more flexible. The programme consists of three components: the InvestEU Fund, the InvestEU Advisory Hub and the InvestEU Portal. The InvestEU Fund is implemented through financial partners that invest in projects, leveraging on the EU budget guarantee of €26.2 billion. The entire budget guarantee will back the investment projects of the implementing partners, increasing their risk-bearing capacity and mobilising at least €372 billion in additional investment.

    Heura Foods

    Heura Foods is a 100% plant-based food technology startup founded by activists and born in Barcelona. It creates solutions that make the problems of the current food system obsolete and accelerate change towards a world where our daily eating habits have a positive impact on humans, the planet and other animals. While based on scientific discoveries and cutting-edge technologies, Heura’s innovations maintain the culinary traditions of the Mediterranean, including high nutritional density, positive climate impact and exceptional taste. Already a market leader in Spain, Heura is expanding the plant-based category across Europe.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Nominees of the 2025 One World Media Women’s Solutions Reporting Award are out

    Source: European Investment Bank

    One World Media unveiled the nominees for this year’s Awards in each category, including the Women’s Solutions Reporting Award, supported by the European Investment Bank.

    After weeks of careful consideration, One World Media’s expert panel has selected three outstanding nominees in each of the 13 categories. Fifty judges from 29 countries reviewed 559 powerful entries to identify the very best journalism from across the global south.

    The judges have looked for overall merit of a story alongside criteria like relevance, substance and impact, among others. The decisions weren’t easy. But the results are now in!

    We are thrilled to present the nominees of the Women’s Solutions Reporting Award. Huge congratulations to them!

    Discover the 2025 nominees for all categories: Shortlist 2025 – One World Media

    Winners will be announced at the Awards Ceremony on 25th of June.

    Check out our latest news: One World Media Awards

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Serbia – P10_TA(2025)0093 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

    –  having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

    –  having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    –   having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

    –   having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

    –  having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

    –  having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Human Rights order to Serbia of 29 April 2025 to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,

    –  having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

    –  having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo(5), and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B.  whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

    C.  whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    D.  whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

    E.  whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

    F.  whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

    G.  whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

    H.  whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

    I.  whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

    J.  whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

    K.  whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

    L.  whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

    M.  whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

    N.  whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59,7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

    O.  whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

    P.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

    2.  Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

    3.  Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

    4.  Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

    5.  Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

    6.  Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

    7.  Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

    8.  Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

    9.  Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

    10.  Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

    11.  Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

    12.  Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13.  Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

    14.  Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

    15.  Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

    16.  Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

    17.  Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025, and of the subsequent election of the new government led by Đuro Macut, appointed on 16 April 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

    18.  Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

    19.  Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

    20.  Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

    21.  Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

    22.  Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    23.  Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 16 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

    24.  Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

    25.  Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

    26.  Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

    27.  Deplores the continuing violence against students, including the recent incident at the Faculty of Sports and Physical Education building in Novi Sad, in which at least five people were injured as a result of the police storming the building accompanied by the Dean, Patrik Drid;

    28.  Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

    29.  Is deeply concerned about the increasing political and financial pressure on primary and secondary school teachers, as well as university professors, who were deprived of their salaries for taking part in the collective action to support students’ demands; deplores in this context the unacceptable legal proceedings and media smear campaign against the Rector of the University of Belgrade;

    30.  Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

    31.  Deplores the alleged illegal wiretapping and detention of five activists from the opposition Movement of Free Citizens (PSG) and a student from the STAV organisation in March 2025, and the arrest warrants issued for other STAV activists; condemns the use of the case by the propaganda media and the unfounded extension of the detention; calls on the Serbian authorities to release Marija Vasić, Lazar Dinić, Mladen Cvijetić, Lado Jovović, Srđan Đurić and Davor Stefanović from detention;

    32.  Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

    33.  Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

    34.  Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act(7) and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(8); encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

    35.  Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

    36.  Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

    37.  Condemns the political pressure exerted on universities and other research institutions through a hasty government decree that interferes with the academic freedom of researchers and cuts their salaries; condemns the vilification of professors, researchers and other academic staff in pro-government media; deplores the increasing use of temporary contracts for teachers and other civil servants as a political tool to exert pressure and control;

    38.  Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

    39.  Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

    40.  Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

    41.  Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

    42.  Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

    43.  Deeply deplores the demographic decline in Serbia, which is being exacerbated by negative net migration due to economic hardship and political persecution; stresses that it is mainly young, educated and productive people who are being forced to leave the country, as well as those pressured and threatened on account of their political views, including Dijana Hrka, the mother of one of the victims of the Novi Sad railway station tragedy, who fears for her safety after being put under pressure by SNS supporters;

    44.  Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

    45.  Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

    46.  Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

    47.  Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

    48.  Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

    49.  Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    50.  Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

    51.  Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

    52.  Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

    53.  Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

    54.  Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

    55.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish a regional commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    56.  Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

    57.  Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    58.  Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    59.  Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    60.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    Socio-economic reforms

    61.  Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

    62.  Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

    63.  Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

    64.  Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

    65.  Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

    66.  Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

    67.  Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

    68.  Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

    Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    69.  Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

    70.  Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

    71.  Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

    72.  Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

    73.  Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

    74.  Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    75.  Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    76.  Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU(9), since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

    o
    o   o

    77.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

    (1) OJ L 278, 18.10.2013, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2013/490/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/2654, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2654/oj.
    (6) OJ C, C/2024/6339, 7.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6339/oj.
    (7) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (9) Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/52/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Steadyhand Announces Unitholder Approval to Change Manager to Purpose Investments

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VANCOUVER, British Columbia, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Steadyhand Investment Management Ltd. (“Steadyhand”) announced today that it has received unitholder approval to change the manager of the Steadyhand Investment Funds (the “Funds”) to Purpose Investments Inc. (“Purpose Investments”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Purpose Unlimited Inc. (“Purpose”). Specifically, the unitholders approved the change in manager from Steadyhand to Purpose Investments, and the change to the investment objectives of each of the Funds, all as more particularly described in the Notice of Special Meetings of Unitholders and Joint Management Information Circular dated April 7, 2025 (the “Circular”).

    “We’re pleased to report that our clients voted overwhelmingly in favour of the changes,” said Tom Bradley, Steadyhand Chair and co-founder. “This strong endorsement is a testament to the confidence our clients have in the future of Steadyhand and Purpose.”

    These changes were previously announced by Purpose and Steadyhand on March 24, 2025, in connection with the announcement that Purpose had entered into an agreement to acquire all the issued and outstanding shares of Steadyhand and Steadyhand Investment Funds, Inc. (the “Transaction”). Voting results for each of the Funds will be available under their respective profiles at www.sedarplus.ca.

    The Transaction and changes approved by unitholders are expected to be completed in and around Q2 2025, pending regulatory approvals and customary closing conditions. Additional details regarding the Transaction and the changes affecting the Funds are set out in the Circular and the simplified prospectus and fund facts for the Funds, and amendments thereto, which are available under each Fund’s profile at www.sedarplus.ca.

    About Purpose

    Purpose is a growing independent financial services firm on a mission to redefine the industry by putting customers first and delivering innovative solutions that shape the future of finance. Purpose offers cutting-edge technology and a diverse suite of financial products and services to empower Canadians with the tools and advice they need to succeed. Founded and led by entrepreneur Som Seif, the firm’s businesses span asset and wealth management and small business financing and include Purpose Investments, Driven by Purpose, Advisor Solutions by Purpose and Longevity. For more information, please visit www.purpose-unlimited.com.

    About Steadyhand

    Steadyhand is a low-fee investment firm with a mission of providing Canadians with a better investing outcome and a simpler, more personalized experience. It offers clear-cut advice, customized plans, and most importantly, a steady hand, to help investors achieve their financial goals. The firm has approximately $1.3 billion of assets under management with offices in Vancouver and Toronto.

    For further information, please contact:

    David Toyne
    Chief Development Officer
    Steadyhand Investment Funds Inc.
    1-888-888-3147

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Pace-O-Matic presents inaugural Integrity Award to Larry Hilimire

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DULUTH, Ga., May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Pace-O-Matic and its founder, Michael Pace, have presented the first-ever Integrity Award to Larry Hilimire, amusement industry legend and owner of Staunton Automatics in New York. The award was presented to Hilimire at the Amusement and Music Operators Association New York (AMOA-NY) annual gala in Manhattan on April 28.

    The Integrity Award recognizes individuals in the amusement industry or related fields who exemplify the highest standards of integrity. Recipients are those who consistently demonstrate honesty, fairness, and ethical conduct in all aspects of their professional endeavors.

    For over five decades, Larry Hilimire has led Stanton Automatics with a rare blend of vision, integrity, and grit, growing a family business into one of the most respected music and amusement operations in the country. His leadership has transformed the amusement industry, not just through innovation, but by setting the standard for how business should be done.

    “Larry’s a straight shooter — honest, dependable, and always guided by principle,” said Michael Pace, founder of Pace-O-Matic and creator of the Integrity Award. “He’s someone who will tell you what you need to hear, even if it’s not what you want to hear. That’s someone you can trust; that’s integrity. Thank you, Larry, for your decades of leadership, your unwavering ethics, and your lasting impact on the industry.”

    Mark Twain once famously said, “Do the right thing. It will gratify some people and astonish the rest.” The Integrity Award is intended to celebrate those who live by this example. It will honor game developers, executives, partners, or any other professionals who go above and beyond to ensure their actions reflect a deep commitment to doing what is right, even when faced with challenges or when it might not be the easiest path. This award is not just about what one achieves but how one achieves it, highlighting the importance of integrity in the industry.

    “Humbled, grateful, and shocked are just a few things I am feeling as I receive this award,” said Hilimire. “I want to thank Michael and Karmin, as well as the Pace-O-Matic family, for this great recognition. It is truly the highlight of my lifelong career.”

    Hilimire added, “I am sure all of you know who Tim Coughlin is, NY Giants head coach and two-time Super Bowl Champion. I often think of the picture of Tom sitting in his office after one of his Super Bowl wins, the trophy on his desk, with his feet up and a sign on his lap that read ‘Mission Accomplished’. I am going to have my son take a picture of me, feet up on my desk, with this beautiful award in hand, and a sign that says, ‘Mission Accomplished’.”

    The award is embodied in a stunning piece of hand-blown glass art. The award features a clear, luminous glass structure with intricate layers and varying colors. Every award is a unique art piece, and no two are the same. This is the first of several Integrity Award recognitions, which will be announced and presented in the coming months.

    Media Contact:
    Rachel Albritton
    502-905-5170
    rachel.albritton@paceomatic.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/e5cb269e-b1db-4399-8a85-20cb663818ff

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Revolutionising Cloud Access for Nigerian Business with Local Innovation

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    About Angola Cables:Angola Cables is an internationally established ICT and digital solutions and network services provider. The company specializes in connectivity solutions for the wholesale market and offers tailored digital services and solutions across multiple industries, including Cloud resources for the corporate enterprise sector.TelCables West Africa is powered by the Angola Cables network, a multinational telecommunications company operating in the wholesale market. The company operates connectivity, IT solutions and services as well as international data circuit capacity and IP Transit via submarine cables.

    As the most connected network operator in Africa, we provide secure, low-latency direct routes from West Africa to the USA and South America and from West Africa to London. With our presence across a few Nigerian IP hubs from Lekki, WACS CLS, Medallion DC, Rack Centre and others, and connections across Africa via the Djoliba network, we can connect your business to the world.

    For more information, visit the website: https://TelCables.ng/

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI USA: Welch on Trump’s Drug Pricing Order: “Pass our bipartisan bill so we can lower prescription drug prices for good.”

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Peter Welch (D-Vermont)
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senator Peter Welch (D-Vt.) released the following statement on President Trump’s drug pricing Executive Order: 
    “President Trump and I agree—prescription drugs are too expensive in America, and we’re getting ripped off. There is no reason pharmaceutical companies should charge American patients more than what they charge in other countries. I spoke with President Trump about this concern in his first term and he tried a similar order to lower drug costs, but ultimately it wasn’t durable.  Senator Hawley and I have a bill to lower drug prices through international reference pricing—the Fair Prescription Drug Prices for Americans Act. I encourage the President to get on board with our bipartisan bill so we can lower prescription drug prices for good.” 
    Senators Welch and Hawley recently introduced the Fair Prescription Drug Prices for Americans Act, bipartisan legislation to lower drug prices for Americans. This bill prohibits pharmaceutical companies from selling drugs in the United States at higher prices than an international average, ending the practice of forcing Americans to pay the world’s highest prices for medications. Welch and Hawley’s legislation would correct decades of policies that benefited pharmaceutical companies but left American patients holding the bag. Americans pay substantially more than patients in other developed nations for the same prescription drugs. The bill would also impose stiff civil monetary penalties on pharmaceutical companies that violate this rule.  
    Senator Welch has been a longtime champion of lowering prescription drug prices.  

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: ProvisionAi Launches Make-n-Ship—A Breakthrough AutoO2 Capability for Optimizing Factory Shipments in Tight Dock Environments

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    FRANKLIN, Tenn., May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — ProvisionAi, with patented AI-powered transportation optimization, today announced the launch of Make-n-Ship, a powerful new capability in its AutoO2 platform. Designed specifically for factories with minimal or no buffer space between production lines and shipping docks, Make-n-Ship enables intelligent shipment building that reduces transportation costs and deploys the right product to the right place.

    Traditional load planning systems assume flexibility regarding when and where goods can be staged prior to shipment. However, many manufacturing plants operate in environments where finished goods must go directly from the line to the trailer. Make-n-Ship addresses this challenge by leveraging real-time production schedules, utilizing every inch of available staging space, and optimizing load configurations to align with supply plan priorities.

    “Factories with little or no storage space have been forced to make trade-offs between operational feasibility and transportation efficiency,” said Tom Moore, CEO of ProvisionAi. “Make-n-Ship eliminates that compromise. It dynamically adapts to the production reality, respects the uncertainty in attainment, and still finds a way to maximize trailer fill and minimize freight spend.

    The Make-n-Ship capability ensures that the product is deployed to the site that needs it most by closely aligning shipments with the supply plan’s prioritization logic. If a production run is cut short, Make-n-Ship automatically creates the shipment plan to send available product to the highest-need destinations first—those at greatest risk of stockout or those most critical to downstream operations. Conversely, if production exceeds requirements, the system applies customizable business rules to smartly offload the excess, for example, replenishing nearby hubs or “fair sharing” the excess, ensuring the dock stays clear without disrupting the broader supply chain plan.

    Key features of Make-n-Ship include:

    • Intelligent staging space utilization, making optimal use of constrained buffer zones without requiring manual intervention.
    • Alignment with supply plan priorities, ensuring that the most critical products ship first—even when production variability occurs.
    • Optimization of shipment size and mode, reducing transportation costs while improving service levels.

    This enhancement is now available to all AutoO2 customers and can be implemented with minimal disruption. Companies in food, beverage, consumer products, and other high-volume industries will particularly benefit from this capability where dock congestion and inventory precision are mission-critical.

    To learn more about Make-n-Ship and how AutoO2 can transform your factory shipments, contact sales@provisionai.com.

    About ProvisionAi
    ProvisionAi is the creator of LevelLoad and AutoO2, the only patented solution that seamlessly links supply planning with transportation execution to optimize truckload efficiency and reduce costs. Trusted by Fortune 500 manufacturers and logistics teams, ProvisionAi helps unlock hidden savings and deliver supply chain sustainability at scale.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/0c563383-a8bd-4d3c-80af-14f6fa83bd71

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Funded Ventures Launches Terrace Wealth in Partnership with Industry Veteran Ryan Bowman to Offer Tailored Wealth Management Solutions

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Clayton, Missouri, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Funded Ventures, in partnership with industry veteran Ryan Bowman, is proud to announce the launch of Terrace Wealth, a new wealth management firm focused on delivering personalized, fee-only financial solutions. Led by Ryan, Terrace Wealth will provide individuals, families, and institutions with customized strategies for investment management and wealth building.

    Ryan is a seasoned CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER™ with over a decade of experience as a wealth advisor. Ryan was previously a partner at a Denver-based wealth management firm, where he spearheaded the successful transition from Raymond James to an independent, fee-only Registered Investment Advisor (RIA). Ryan has an MBA from Washington University in St. Louis and previously served four years in the United States Army as a combat Infantryman, earning the rank of Sergeant and was awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge. Ryan joined Funded Ventures in 2024 as an Operating Partner to launch Terrace Wealth, bringing his passion for transparent, client-focused financial strategies to the Midwest.

    Brian Wolfe founded Funded Ventures in 2017 to buy and build small businesses. Funded Ventures previously co-led the acquisition of three businesses in the SEO SaaS vertical with sale to private equity. Brian is a retired partner at Kirkland & Ellis, where he practiced for 17 years, and teaches courses on entrepreneurship through acquisition and private equity at Washington University in St. Louis, UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School and Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Brian also serves on the board of many civic organizations including the Skandalaris Center at Washington University in St. Louis and is a member of the Young Presidents’ Organization.

    “We are excited to launch Terrace Wealth,” said Ryan. “Our goal is to provide a client-focused, holistic approach to wealth management free of conflicts of interest, combining years of experience with a deep understanding of each client’s financial needs.”

    Brian added, “Trust and transparency are essential in building long-term financial relationships. We’re committed to working closely with our clients to create tailored strategies that align with their personal and institutional goals. We’re excited to bring cutting-edge wealth management solutions to the Midwest.”

    Terrace Wealth will offer a range of services, including retirement and goal planning, cash and money management, tax optimization, estate planning, and risk management. The firm is dedicated to serving individuals, families, and institutional clients across the Midwest, providing personalized, forward-thinking financial strategies that align with their long-term objectives.

    The firm plans to grow organically and via strategic acquisition partnerships, positioning itself for long-term success in the wealth management industry. The ideal acquisition partners are fee-only planning-focused firms offering investment management. Terrace also welcomes partnerships with single-owner practices where the advisor wants (or needs) to pull back from the practice to some degree or to realize a gradual exit that retains value, income, and a more ideal day-to-day.

    For more information about Terrace Wealth and services offered, please visit www.terracewealth.com or contact Ryan Bowman at ryan@terracewealth.com or (314) 810-4012.

    About Terrace Wealth

    Terrace Wealth is a fee-only wealth management firm based in Clayton, Missouri, that provides personalized financial strategies, offering services such as retirement and goal planning, cash and money management and estate planning. Terrace Wealth aims to help clients build and manage wealth by tailoring solutions to meet their unique financial goals. 

    About Funded Ventures

    Funded Ventures was founded in 2017 to acquire and grow small businesses. The firm previously co-led the acquisition of three companies in the SEO SaaS sector, culminating in a successful sale to private equity. Funded Ventures is currently building in the home services, legal services, and home health industries. Visit www.fundedventures.com to learn more.


    Press inquiries

    Terrace Wealth
    https://www.terracewealth.com
    Brian Wolfe
    wolfebd@gmail.com

    The MIL Network

  • Infrastructure key force of national economy to build better future: Nepal PM

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Prime Minister of Nepal K P Sharma Oli addresses Nepal Infrastructure Summit 2024 in Kathmandu emphasizing infrastructure as the key force of the national economy and the foundation to build a better future. The Nepal Infrastructure Summit is jointly organised by the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure and Transport, the Confederation of Nepalese Industries, and the Investment Board.

     

    PM said that Infrastructure development is the most prioritized area of Nepal, which is vital for fostering economic growth and enhancing social development. He expressed his concern that roads, bridges, and public transit systems were neglected for long, which has resulted in increased traffic congestion, delayed goods and services, and a growing divide between those who have access to reliable infrastructure and those who do not. Moreover, the PM underlined the need to augment clean energy, IT and urban infrastructure to spur the growth process. He shared that the government had set high priority toward infrastructure development.

     

    He reminded the gathering at the summit that infrastructure development is a catalyst for growth. Improved transportation systems enable the efficient movement of goods and services, thus lowering costs and boosting trade. Industrial infrastructure is critical for reversing the trend of deindustrialization and promoting exports.

     

    Moreover, the PM said reliable energy attracts investments and fosters industrialization, while better communication networks connect people, facilitate education, and open doors to new opportunities.

     

    The PM also stressed the guarantee of environmentally sustainable infrastructure building. The private sector’s role is essential to this end. All sides’ initiatives are required to realize the shared vision of Happy Nepali and Prosperous Nepal. DPM and FM Bishnu Paudel said that public finance would be mobilized by maintaining economic and fiscal discipline and financial accountability. The Finance Minister argued that as a landlocked country with a difficult geography, infrastructure building is a challenging job for Nepal.

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Multiple agreements reached in Qatar

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    Continuing his visit to Qatar, Chief Executive John Lee today met local government and business leaders there, and witnessed the reaching of 35 agreements or memoranda of understanding among government departments, enterprises and institutions from Hong Kong, the Mainland and Qatar.

     

    In the morning, Mr Lee met Qatar’s Minister of Labour Ali bin Saeed bin Samikh Al Marri to discuss plans for enhancing talent exchanges. Highlighting that Hong Kong is home to five of the world’s top 100 universities and is on a path to become an international hub for post-secondary education, Mr Lee emphasised that the city offers a Belt & Road Scholarship to encourage students from countries or regions in the Belt & Road Initiative to pursue studies in the city. He invited more young people from Qatar to study in Hong Kong and develop careers in the city.

     

    Afterwards, the Chief Executive and members of his delegation attended a roundtable meeting with representatives of the Qatari Businessmen Association and the Qatar Chamber of Commerce & Industry.

     

    Extolling Hong Kong’s robust legal system, resilient financial system and simple and low tax regime, Mr Lee said he welcomed Qatari enterprises to capitalise on the city’s advantages in connecting with both Mainland China and other parts of the world under the “one country, two systems” principle. He added that Qatari enterprises can leverage Hong Kong’s financial, logistics and professional services, and its bridging roles, to tap into the Mainland market.

     

    In the afternoon, Mr Lee attended a business lunch where he spoke of Hong Kong’s development opportunities and business advantages to over 300 local political and business representatives.

     

    He also took the opportunity to announce that Hong Kong and Qatar have substantially concluded negotiations on an Investment Promotion & Protection Agreement, and will begin discussions on mutual recognition arrangements for their respective Authorized Economic Operator Programmes, in order to create a more favourable environment for the flow of capital and goods.

     

    In addition, the Chief Executive revealed that Hong Kong Special Administrative Region passport holders can visit Qatar visa-free for up to 30 days. He said he looks forward to deepening co-operation with Qatar, adding that Hong Kong and Qatar can jointly seize development opportunities brought by the Greater Bay Area and the Belt & Road Initiative.

     

    Government departments, enterprises and institutions from Hong Kong, the Mainland and Qatar also announced 35 memoranda of understanding or agreements covering economic co-operation, investment, technology, legal collaboration, finance, banking, and capital market development.

     

    Besides co-operation between Hong Kong and Qatar, two agreements were signed directly between Mainland and Qatari enterprises to foster co-operation in financial services and high-end manufacturing. A tripartite agreement was also signed among Hong Kong, the Mainland and Qatar to strengthen co-operation in fintech, covering Web3 and artificial intelligence.

     

    After the lunch event, Mr Lee visited Hamad International Airport in Doha to learn about an autonomous vehicle pilot project there.

     

    The project involves participation by UISEE, a Mainland Chinese enterprise which has established its international headquarters in Hong Kong. Having also collaborated with Hong Kong International Airport on autonomous vehicle projects, UISEE has drawn on those experiences to promote its technology to overseas clients.

     

    Mr Lee and the delegation will depart for Kuwait tonight.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Keynote Address at the Crypto Task Force Roundtable on Tokenization

    Source: Securities and Exchange Commission

    Thank you and good afternoon. I am delighted to speak to this distinguished group at today’s roundtable on tokenization.[1] Thank you to the panelists for participating today.

    The topic of this afternoon’s discussion is timely as securities are increasingly migrating from traditional (or “off-chain”) databases to blockchain-based (or “on-chain”) ledger systems.

    This movement of securities from off-chain to on-chain systems is akin to the transition of audio recordings from analog vinyl records to cassette tapes to digital software decades ago. The ability to easily encode audio in a digital file format, which could readily be transferred, modified, and stored, unlocked tremendous innovation within the music industry.[2] Audio was freed from its boundaries as a static, fixed-format creation. It suddenly was compatible and interoperable across a wide range of devices and applications. It could be combined, broken apart, and programmed to form entirely new products. This also led to the development of novel hardware devices and streaming content business models, greatly benefiting consumers and the American economy.[3]

    Just as the shift to digital audio revolutionized the music industry, the migration to on-chain securities has the potential to remodel aspects of the securities market by enabling entirely new methods of issuing, trading, owning, and using securities. For example, on-chain securities can utilize smart contracts to transparently distribute dividends to shareholders on a regular cadence. Tokenization can also enhance capital formation by transforming relatively illiquid assets into liquid investment opportunities. Blockchain technology holds the promise to allow for a broad swath of novel use cases for securities, fostering new kinds of market activities that many of the Commission’s legacy rules and regulations do not contemplate today.

    In order for the United States to be the “crypto capital of the planet” as envisioned by President Trump,[4] the Commission must keep pace with innovation and consider whether regulatory changes are needed to accommodate on-chain securities and other crypto assets. Rules and regulations designed for off-chain securities may be incompatible with or unnecessary for on-chain assets and stifle the growth of blockchain technology.

    A key priority of my Chairmanship will be to develop a rational regulatory framework for crypto asset markets that establishes clear rules of the road for the issuance, custody, and trading of crypto assets while continuing to discourage bad actors from violating the law. Clear rules of the road are necessary for investor protection against fraud – not the least to help them identify scams that do not comport with the law.

    It is a new day at the SEC. Policymaking will no longer result from ad hoc enforcement actions. Instead, the Commission will utilize its existing rulemaking, interpretive, and exemptive authorities to set fit-for-purpose standards for market participants. The Commission’s enforcement approach will return to Congress’ original intent, which is to police violations of these established obligations, particularly as they relate to fraud and manipulation.

    This undertaking requires coordination across multiple offices and divisions within the Commission, which is why I am pleased that Commissioner Uyeda and Commissioner Peirce have worked together to establish the Crypto Task Force. For too long, the Commission has been plagued by policymaking siloes. The Crypto Task Force exemplifies how our policy divisions can come together to expeditiously provide long-needed clarity and certainty to the American public.

    Now, I mentioned three areas of focus for crypto asset policy – issuance, custody, and trading.

    Issuance

    First, I intend for the Commission to establish clear and sensible guidelines for distributions of crypto assets that are securities or subject to an investment contract. Only four crypto asset issuers have conducted registered offerings and offerings pursuant to Regulation A.[5] Issuers have largely avoided these types of offerings, in part, due to challenges in satisfying the associated disclosure requirements. In cases where the issuer does not intend to distribute ordinary securities, such as stock, bonds, or notes, issuers also struggle to determine whether a crypto asset constitutes a “security” or is subject to an investment contract.[6]

    In the past few years, the SEC first pursued what I call the “head-in-the-sand” approach – perhaps hoping that crypto would go away. Then, it pivoted and pursued a shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later approach of regulation through enforcement. It claimed that it was willing to talk to prospective registrants, “Just come in to visit,” but this proved ephemeral at best and more often misleading because the SEC made no necessary adaptations to registration forms for this new technology. For example, Form S-1 continues to require detailed information regarding executive compensation and use of proceeds, which may not be relevant or material for investment decisions in crypto assets. While the SEC has previously adapted its forms for offerings of asset-backed securities and by real estate investment trusts, it has not done so for crypto assets despite increased investor interest in this space over the past few years. We cannot encourage innovation by trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.

    I am committed to the Commission charting a new course. The Commission staff recently issued a staff statement on disclosure obligations for certain registrations and offerings.[7] The staff also clarified the view that certain distributions and crypto assets do not implicate the federal securities laws, and I expect the staff to continue to provide clarifications at my direction with regard to other types of distributions and assets.[8] However, existing registration exemptions and safe harbors may not be entirely fit-for-purpose for certain types of crypto asset offerings. I view this construct of staff pronouncements as extremely temporary – Commission action is both vital and necessary.  In the meantime, I have asked the Commission staff to consider whether additional guidance, registration exemptions, and safe harbors are needed to create pathways for crypto asset issuances within the United States. I believe that the Commission has broad discretion under the securities acts to accommodate the crypto industry, and I intend to get it done.

    Custody

    Second, I support providing registrants with greater optionality in determining how to custody crypto assets. Commission staff recently removed a significant impediment for companies seeking to provide crypto asset custodial services by rescinding Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 121.[9] That pronouncement was a grave error. The staff had no place to act so broadly in place of Commission action and without notice-and-comment rulemaking. The action created needless confusion and went far beyond the jurisdiction of the SEC in its effects. However, the SEC can do much more to enhance competition in the market for legally compliant custodial services than merely getting rid of SAB 121.

    It is important to provide clarity on the types of custodians that qualify as a “qualified custodian” under the Advisers Act and Investment Company Act, as well as reasonable exceptions from the qualified custody requirements to accommodate certain common practices within crypto asset markets. Many advisers and funds have access to self-custodial solutions that incorporate more advanced technology to safeguard crypto assets as compared to some of the custodians in the market. Consequently, the custody rules may need to be updated to allow advisers and funds to engage in self-custody under certain circumstances.

    Additionally, it may be necessary to repeal and replace the “special purpose broker-dealer” framework[10] with a more rational regime. Only two special purpose broker-dealer are in operation today due clearly to the significant limitations imposed on these entities. Broker-dealers are not and never were restricted from acting as a custodian for non-security crypto assets or crypto asset securities, but Commission action may be needed to clarify the application of the customer protection and net capital rules to this activity.

    Trading

    Third, I am in favor of allowing registrants to trade a broader variety of products on their platforms and in response to market demand, activities which previous Commissions had prevented. For example, some broker-dealers seek to go to market with a “super app” that offers trading in securities and non-securities and other financial services all under a single roof. Nothing in the federal securities laws prohibits registered broker-dealers with an alternative trading system from facilitating trading in non-securities, including via “pairs trading” between securities and non-securities. I have asked the staff to help us devise ways to modernize the ATS regulatory regime to better accommodate crypto assets. Additionally, I have asked the staff to explore whether further guidance or rulemaking may be helpful for enabling the listing and trading of crypto assets on national securities exchanges.

    While the Commission and its staff work to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for crypto assets, securities market participants should not be compelled to go offshore to innovate with blockchain technology. I would like to explore whether conditional exemptive relief would be appropriate for registrants and non-registrants that seek to bring new products and services to market that may otherwise not be compatible with current Commission rules and regulations.

    I am eager to coordinate with colleagues in President Trump’s Administration and Congress to make the United States the best place in the world to participate in crypto asset markets.

    Thank you for your attention. I look forward to the discussions to follow.

     


    [1] These remarks reflect my individual views as Chairman of the Commission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the full Commission or my fellow Commissioners.

    [5] For example, INX Limited offered crypto assets pursuant to a Form F-1; Blockstack PBC and YouNow, Inc. conducted Regulation A offerings of crypto assets.

    [8] See Division of Corporation Finance, Staff Statement on Meme Coins, Feb. 27, 2025, https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/staff-statement-meme-coins; Division of Corporation Finance, Statement on Certain Proof-of-Work Mining Activities, Mar. 20, 2025, https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/statement-certain-proof-work-mining-activities-032025; Division of Corporation Finance, Statement on Stablecoins, April 4, 2025, https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/statement-stablecoins-040425.

    [10] Custody of Digital Asset Securities by Special Purpose Broker-Dealers, 86 Fed. Reg. 11627 (Feb. 26, 2021).

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: NBC Securities Appoints Kim Davis as Chief Growth Officer to Accelerate Strategic Expansion and Innovation

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    BIRMINGHAM, Ala., May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — NBC Securities, a leading independent full-service broker-dealer and registered investment advisor headquartered in Alabama, is pleased to announce the appointment of Kim Davis as its new Chief Growth Officer (CGO). In this strategic leadership role, Davis will be responsible for driving growth initiatives, expanding market reach, and spearheading innovation across business lines.

    With a proven track record in leading the recruitment of financial advisors, boosting productivity and strengthening practice management offerings, Davis brings over 30 years of experience in the financial services industry. She will report directly to John Doody, CEO, working closely with executive leadership to align business development, marketing, and product strategy with the firm’s long-term vision.

    “Throughout her distinguished career, Kim has earned a reputation as a trusted advisor and strategic partner to countless financial professionals. She has extensive experience attracting and developing top talent, as well as designing training and support programs that empower financial advisors to expand their businesses,” said CEO John Doody. “I am excited to collaborate with her as she applies her proven expertise to elevate our practice management platform and drive the ambitious growth objectives we have set for ourselves.”

    Prior to joining NBC, Davis held senior leadership positions at Concourse Financial, Synovus Securities, Morgan Stanley and Stifel Financial, where she led initiatives that drove significant business growth, including positive year-over-year revenue growth, national expansion and digital transformation.

    “I am truly honored to join NBC Securities at such a pivotal time. NBC has long been recognized as a highly respected firm, known for its unwavering commitment to exceptional service, personalized solutions and direct access to the leadership team,” said Davis. “I look forward to building upon on our distinct legacy and continuing to deliver meaningful value to clients, partners, and employees alike.”

    This appointment reflects NBC’s commitment to investing in forward-looking strategies that fuel growth, enhance client experience, and position the firm as a market leader.

    About NBC

    NBC Securities is a privately held, full-service broker-dealer and registered investment advisor, the firm caters to individuals and companies across the United States. They provide private wealth services and asset management strategies from financial professionals who average over 25 years of industry experience, in addition to technology-driven custodial solutions that streamline and optimize operations for advisors nationwide.

    They are independent and employee-owned, committed to building lasting relationships and legacies. The firm achieves this through the combined power of our network of advisors, sophisticated suite of business services, and in-house portfolio products and research that spans equities, fixed income, mutual funds, SMA’s, annuities, and life insurance.

    NBC Securities manages or advises approximately $5 billion in assets with an operating footprint that spans the US with corporate headquarters located in Birmingham, Alabama and 28 branch offices, including Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, and Ohio.

    For more information, visit www.nbcsecurities.com.

    Contact: press@mbcstrategic.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Kvika banki hf.: Transaction in relation to a share buy-back programme – buy-back is completed

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    In weeks 19 and 20 Kvika banki hf. („Kvika“ or „the bank“) purchased 14,902,447 of its own shares at the purchase price ISK 202,578,769. See further details below:

    Date Time No. of shares purchased Share price (rate) Purchase price
    5.5.2025 09:49:56  1,000,000     13.70  13,700,000    
    5.5.2025 11:39:44  1,000,000     13.70  13,700,000    
    5.5.2025 14:14:34  500,000     13.65  6,825,000    
    6.5.2025 09:36:56  1,000,000     13.60  13,600,000    
    6.5.2025 14:53:14  2,000,000     13.58  27,150,000    
    7.5.2025 10:10:53  1,000,000     13.58  13,575,000    
    7.5.2025 12:41:29  2,000,000     13.58  27,150,000    
    7.5.2025 15:16:15  3,000,000     13.55  40,650,000    
    8.5.2025 09:44:08  1,000,000     13.68  13,675,000    
    8.5.2025 14:15:37  2,000,000     13.50  27,000,000    
    12.5.2025 13:18:36  402,447     13.80  5,553,769    
    Total   14.902.447   202,578,769

    The trade is in accordance with Kvika‘s buyback programme, announced on 27 February 2025 and based on the authorisation of a shareholders‘ meeting of Kvika held on 21 March 2024.

    Kvika has now purchased a total of 163,590,409 shares under the buyback programme, which corresponds to 3.533% of issued shares in the company. The total purchase price is ISK 2,500,000,000. Post these transactions Kvika holds 134,410,410 of own shares which corresponds to 2.902% of issued shares.

    Buyback under the programme amounted to a maximum purchase price of 2,500,000,000 ISK and is therefore completed.

    The execution of the buy-back programme must comply with Act on Public Limited Companies. No. 2/1995. In addition. the buy-back programme must be implemented as provided for in the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council no. 596/2014. on market abuse. as well as the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 on regulatory technical standards for the conditions applicable to buy-back programmes and stabilisation measures. which supplements that Regulation.

    Further information please contact Kvika‘s investor relations, ir@kvika.is.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Governors and Heads of Supervision reaffirm expectation to implement Basel III and discuss work on financial impact of extreme weather events

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    • Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS) unanimously reaffirm their expectation to implement Basel III in full and consistently and as soon as possible.
    • The Basel Committee will publish a voluntary disclosure framework on climate-related financial risks for jurisdictions to consider.
    • GHOS agreed to prioritise further analysis on the financial risk implications of extreme weather events.

    The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS), the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, met on 12 May 2025.

    Basel III implementation

    The GHOS took stock of the implementation status of the outstanding Basel III reforms, which were finalised in 2017. Members have continued to make good progress with implementation. About 70% of member jurisdictions have now implemented, or will shortly implement, the standards.

    GHOS members unanimously reaffirmed their expectation of implementing all aspects of the Basel III framework in full, consistently and as soon as possible. The series of shocks to financial markets over the past few years have highlighted the importance of having a prudent global regulatory framework in place. The GHOS tasked the Committee with continuing to monitor and assess the full and consistent implementation of Basel III.

    The GHOS also took note of the Committee’s ongoing analytical and supervisory work to assess whether specific features of the Basel Framework performed as intended during the 2023 banking turmoil, such as liquidity risk and interest rate risk in the banking book.

    Climate-related financial risks

    GHOS members discussed the Committee’s proposed Pillar 3 disclosure framework for climate-related financial risks. The Basel Committee will publish a voluntary disclosure framework for jurisdictions to consider.

    The GHOS also discussed the Committee’s broader work on climate-related financial risks. The GHOS tasked the Committee with prioritising its work to analyse the impact of extreme weather events on financial risks.


    Note to editors: 

    The Basel Committee is the primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. The Committee reports to the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision and seeks its endorsement for major decisions. The Committee has no formal supranational authority, and its decisions have no legal force. Rather, the Committee relies on its members’ commitments to achieve its mandate. The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision is chaired by Tiff Macklem, Governor of the Bank of Canada. The Basel Committee is chaired by Erik Thedéen, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank. 

    More information about the Basel Committee is available here.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Malliotakis Rallies in Brooklyn for Support for Senior Tax Relief Ahead of Budget Deal

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Nicole Malliotakis (NY-11)

    (BROOKLYN, NY) – Congresswoman Nicole Malliotakis was joined by local senior citizens at the Bay Ridge Center to rally support for her effort to reduce taxes on Social Security income for seniors. As a member of the House Ways & Means Committee, Malliotakis has played a key role in negotiations and is working to build momentum in Washington to pass this big, beautiful bill as part of the upcoming budget reconciliation tax package.

     

    The Ways & Means Committee is scheduled to meet this week for a markup of the bill text—a critical step toward advancing these tax relief provisions through Congress. The legislation is expected to include a provision that mirrors Malliotakis’ existing legislation and provide a bonus deduction for seniors, offering $4,000 for individuals earning $75,000 or less and $8,000 for married couples earning $150,000 or less.

     

    Congresswoman Malliotakis has been a leading advocate for raising the SALT cap, which is currently set at $10,000 and has disproportionately impacted seniors and middle-class families in high-tax states like New York. Tripling the cap to $30,000 would provide much needed relief for middle-class families—covering 98% of households in her district. She is also pushing to increase the standard deduction to deliver meaningful relief to hardworking taxpayers and prevent the return of the Alternative Minimum Tax.

     

    “As Ways & Means meets this week to debate and vote on the tax portion of the reconciliation package, I am excited that key provisions of legislation I’ve introduced will be included to reduce the tax burden on working Americans, senior citizens and middle-class families in our community,” said Rep. Nicole Malliotakis. “Today I joined Brooklyn seniors to rally support for needed tax relief because too many seniors are being forced to stretch their retirement savings further than ever before. After a lifetime of hard work and paying taxes, they deserve to keep more of their Social Security and retirement income without Uncle Sam reaching into their pockets again.”

    Malliotakis is also sponsoring other measures to ease the burden on seniors, including:

     

    • H.R. 1129, The Tax Relief Unleashed for Seniors by Trump (TRUST) Act, would increase the amount of income that is tax exempt and index the threshold to inflation, allowing seniors to keep more of their benefits. Malliotakis’ legislation would double current exempt income from $25,000 to $50,000 for single filers and from $32,000 to $64,000 for married couples age 65 and older.

    • H.R. 2266, The Reducing Excessive Taxation and Inefficiencies by Reforming Elder Exemptions to Support Fairness, Inflation Relief, and Simpler Taxes Act (RETIREES FIRST Act) aimed at modernizing outdated Social Security tax thresholds to deliver tax relief to middle-class retirees.

     

    Today, nearly 56% of retirees pay taxes on their Social Security benefits, compared to less than 10% in 1984 when the Social Security exemptions were first established. As this figure is projected to rise further, Malliotakis is taking action having introduced legislation to raise the provisional income thresholds to $34,000 for single filers and $68,000 for married filers—up from the current levels of $25,000 and $32,000, respectively. The legislation would exempt most middle-class retirees from paying taxes on their Social Security benefits by reducing their tax burden.

    The income thresholds for taxation of benefits have remained unchanged since first established by Congress in 1984. At the time, less than 10 percent of beneficiaries paid federal income tax on their benefits, but because wages have increased, the proportion of beneficiaries who must pay federal income tax on benefits has risen over time.

    LINKS TO LEGISLATIVE TEXTS

    H.R. 1130 HERE

    H.R. 1129 HERE

    H.R. 2266 HERE

     

    In addition to reducing the tax burden on America’s seniors, Malliotakis as a member of the House Committee on Ways & Means and is acutely focused on increasing the State and Local Tax Deduction (SALT), and increasing domestic production by incentivizing companies to bring their manufacturing facilities and supply chains home.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: SCHUMER – WITH CAPITAL REGION RELIGIOUS LEADERS, FOOD BANKS & FARMERS – SOUNDS ALARM THAT UNDER GOP PLAN TO CUT SNAP – AMERICA’S LARGEST ANTI-HUNGER PROGRAM – THOUSANDS OF KIDS, SENIORS, & FAMILIES…

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New York Charles E Schumer

    Already 27 Tractor Trailers, Nearly 1 Million Pounds Of Food, For The Regional Food Bank Of Northeastern NY Has Been Canceled Due To Trump’s Cruel USDA Cuts – Now GOP Wants To Steal Up To $230 Billion From SNAP To Fund Trump’s Tax Breaks For Corporations & Billionaires

    Schumer, With Church Leaders & Advocates, Say This Double Whammy Could Hurtle Families To A Hunger Crisis, Impacting 112,000+ In Capital Region, Millions Nationwide; Demands GOP Block Cruel Cut To SNAP And Protect Anti-Hunger Programs

    Schumer: No Child Should Go To Bed Hungry. This Is Not A Partisan Issue; This Is A Moral Issue

    As Congressional Republicans look to advance the largest potential cut to the anti-hunger program SNAP in American history this week, U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer stood with Capital Region religious leaders, food banks, & farmers to issue a stark warning and demand action against the devastating proposed $230 billion SNAP cut to fund Trump’s tax cuts for corporations & billionaires, that would leave thousands of seniors, families and children hungry. The senator joined with church leaders and hunger advocates to say how this is a moral issue that we should all unite to stop, and Schumer called on the administration to reverse its hunger program cuts and for the NY House Republicans to stand against stealing from SNAP, which over 112,000 in the Capital Region rely on for food.

    “No child should ever go to bed hungry. But Trump’s slashing of anti-hunger programs at the USDA has already cancelled 27 tractor trailers, nearly 1 million pounds of food, for the Regional Food Bank of Northeastern NY. Now, House Republicans are trying to rush through the budget process and make the largest cut to SNAP in history. With food insecurity on the rise, this is a double whammy that could hurtle families to a hunger crisis,” said Senator Schumer. “Stealing from SNAP to pay for Trump’s tax breaks for corporations & billionaires is as backwards as it gets, and will result in thousands of kids, seniors, and families going hungry. It is not a partisan issue, it is a moral issue. That is why I am here to show what these cuts mean for the nuns, priests, and food banks on the frontlines of fighting against hunger. Together we are demanding a stop to this all-out assault on our federal anti-hunger programs and to protect SNAP for our children, veterans, seniors, and families.”

    Sister Betsy Van Deusen, CEO of Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany said, “SNAP is a lifeline for so many people in our communities and across the country. Working people who are trying to feed their families depend on this critical resource. The vast and draconian cuts that have been discussed will send children to bed hungry, our elders without basic nutrition and our veterans without dignity. the lives of wealthiest people in our country will not be substantially changed by another tax cut, but the millions on whose backs those cuts come, will be devastated.”

    Schumer added, “It only takes a few NY House Republicans to join us to stop this cruel cut to SNAP. We need NY Republicans to show us which side they are on with their actions. For feeding corporate & billionaires’ greed or for feeding hungry families here in the Capital Region. We need them to join us in demanding the USDA reverse all of Trump’s cuts to our farmers, food banks, and anti-hunger programs and keep their hands off SNAP to fund Trump’s tax breaks.”

    Schumer explained how Trump’s USDA has already cruelly canceled $1 billion in food assistance, hurting the Capital Region’s Food Bank of Northeastern NY, and if these SNAP cuts move forward it would be a double whammy, hurtling us to a hunger crisis. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is a lifeline for nearly 3 million NY seniors, veterans and families who rely on the critical funding to purchase groceries. Schumer said that we should be investing more not less in anti-hunger programs, but under the Republican proposal, the average family would be reduced to just $5.00 per day per person. A breakdown of SNAP recipients in the Capital Region from the Center for American Progress can be found below:

    County

    SNAP Recipients

    % of County on SNAP

    SNAP Retailers

    Albany

    34,556

    10.9%

    281

    Columbia

    5,546

    9.1%

    82

    Greene

    4,504

    9.5%

    54

    Rensselaer

    15,022

    9.4%

    148

    Saratoga

    13,847

    5.8%

    163

    Schenectady

    22,196

    13.9%

    166

    Schoharie

    3,671

    12.2%

    34

    Warren

    6,726

    10.3%

    75

    Washington

    6,556

    10.8%

    61

    TOTAL

    112,624

     

    1,064

    Schumer explained the Republican proposal to cut up to $230 billion from SNAP would inevitably mean costs of feeding families shift to states, who simply do not have the capacity to absorb this massive increase in expenses, risking families going hungry. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, mandating New York State to cover even a modest share of SNAP benefits would shift astronomical costs to the state with even just 5% increasing New York State’s costs by nearly $3.5 billion from FY2026 to FY2034. The senator said it is impossible to cut this much from federal SNAP funding without ripping food away from hungry children, seniors, veterans, people with disabilities, and more.

    These agonizing decisions would be amplified even further at the local level, with non-profits, many of whom have already had their funding cut, unable to fill in the gap. Counties could even be forced to shoulder the burden of increased costs in SNAP, using more local dollars to provide coverage because less federal funding will be coming in.

    According to New York’s Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, in New York’s 20th Congressional District – which represents all of Albany, Saratoga, and Schenectady counties, and portions of Montgomery and Rensselaer counties – nearly 45,000 households receive an estimated $185 million in annual benefits. 34% of SNAP recipients are children, 15% are elderly, and 12% are people with disabilities. In New York’s 21st Congressional District – which represents all of Clinton, Franklin, St. Lawrence, Lewis, Hamilton, Essex, Warren, Washington, Fulton, Herkimer, Montgomery, and Schoharie counties, and portions of Jefferson, Oneida, and Saratoga counties – more than 52,000 households receive as estimated$194 million in annual benefits. 30% of SNAP recipients are children, 18% are elderly, and 14% are people with disabilities.

    Schumer said, “SNAP is a lifeline that helps uplift everyone, from the NY farms who get direct assistance from the program to the Capital Region families’ kitchen tables. NY Republicans are tying themselves in knots to try to justify these SNAP cuts, but the math shows you cannot make the massive cuts the House’s tax bill proposes without risking the food security for thousands of families. I’m all for reducing any waste or fraud to make the program more efficient, but rushing to pass these massive damaging cuts with no plan while they slash our food banks is a recipe for disaster.”

    The proposed SNAP cuts would be a blow to Capital Region food banks which have already been hit hard by Trump’s funding freezes and canceled payments. Earlier this year, the USDA canceled $1 billion in food assistance for organizations to purchase locally grown food. USDA programs provide food banks, schools, and other organizations with federal support to purchase local food products from NY farms.

    The Regional Food Bank of Northeastern New York has already had 27 tractor-trailers of food canceled, which is nearly 1 million pounds meant to feed Capital Region families. That’s nearly 800,000 meals, and the food bank expects to lose over 200 tractor-trailers over the next year. 80% of this food goes to pantries and soup kitchens like CONSERNS-U in Rensselaer. The food bank also works with religious leaders like Catholic Charities to distribute food to those who need it most.

    Schumer said these proposed cuts will limit food banks’ ability to keep shelves stocked as more people have been forced to rely on food banks to feed their families. Food bank workers and religious leaders across Upstate New York are concerned about the impact of potential cuts to SNAP on the people they serve, and farmers are worried there will be nowhere to sell their food if SNAP funding levels drop.

    “No matter which way you slice it, this Congressional Republican plan will screw Capital Region families, food banks and farmers from farm to table. We need everyone to stand up to these cuts that would take away food from our neighbors in need,” added Schumer.

    “When federal nutrition programs are cut, it’s not just a single plate that goes empty — it’s millions,” said Tom Nardacci, CEO of the Regional Food Bank. “Without federal support, community organizations simply can’t fill the growing gap. Slashing SNAP or canceling USDA food deliveries doesn’t just reduce access — it clears the table entirely for seniors, children, veterans, and families in every community in this country. We appreciate Senator Schumer fighting to save these important programs.”

    “Cutting or reducing budgets for food safety net programs is the exact opposite of what is needed to ensure New Yorkers don’t go hungry,” said Natasha Pernicka, Executive Director for The Food Pantries for the Capital District. “Any reductions to current SNAP will continue to exacerbate the growing strain on our food pantry system. We should be doing much more to help our food-insecure communities, not less.”

    Proposed rollbacks to the country’s most widely utilized nutrition assistance program would strain budgets for Capital Region families. Schumer said decimating funding for SNAP right as costs at grocery stores across the country are skyrocketing will hit the Capital Region hard. According to the New York State Community Action Association, more than 12% of people in Rensselaer County live in poverty, including nearly 20% of children. According to No Kid Hungry, over half of New Yorkers reported going into debt in the past year due to rising food costs, with over 60% of families with children.

    SNAP not only supplements families’ food budgets, it has also generated great economic benefits for New York State and NY-20 specifically. According to the National Grocers Association, grocery stores across New York State sold over $2.1 billion in groceries to people using SNAP benefits, including $99.3 million in NY-20. This created more than 18,500 New York jobs in the grocery industry, including 876 in NY-20, and generated more than $820.8 million in grocery industry wages, including $38.7 million in NY-20.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: DeGette Statement on Energy & Commerce Republicans’ Harmful Reconciliation Package

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Diana DeGette (First District of Colorado)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. — Today, Energy & Commerce Health Subcommittee Ranking Member Diana DeGette (CO-01) released the following statement after Republicans on the Energy & Commerce Committee announced the text of their portion of the ‘One Big, Beautiful Bill.’

    “House Republicans are terrified the American people will learn the details of their plan to gut Medicaid, so they want to pass this monstrosity of a bill less than 48 hours after making the bill public to distract and mislead their constituents. They want to kick at least 8.6 million Americans off their health care to pay for tax cuts for billionaires, and that is exactly what this bill will do. House Republicans are so laser-focused on pleasing Trump, they are willing to make their constituents’ lives harder and health care more expensive.

    “Throughout the markup for this legislation, I will call out Republicans for their disgraceful policies, force votes on amendments to protect Medicaid, and stand up to their brazen disregard for their constituents’ well-being while they pad the pockets of billionaires like Elon Musk.”

    The Energy & Commerce Committee will be marking up their portion of the “One Big, Beautiful Bill” on Tuesday, May 13. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office found that the health provisions in the bill would cause at least 8.6 million Americans to lose health care. 

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warren, Booker, Nadler Press Pepsi on Potentially Illegal Price Discrimination Against Small, Independently-Owned Grocery Stores

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren
    May 12, 2025
    “Charging discriminatory, high prices to smaller, independent retailers harms those retailers’ ability to compete, and often forces consumers to endure unfair price increases.”
    “American families across the country continue to struggle to afford groceries, and enforcement of the [Robinson-Patman Act] is part of the solution to help promote competition throughout the food supply chain and ease their financial burden.”
    Text of Letter (PDF)
    Washington, D.C. — U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Cory Booker (D-N.J.), along with Representative Jerry Nadler (D-N.Y.) wrote to Ramon Laguarta, CEO of PepsiCo, Inc. (Pepsi) demanding an explanation for the company’s potentially illegal price discrimination against small and independent grocery stores. The lawmakers are the top Democrats on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, and House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Administrate State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust, respectively. 
    Representatives Becca Balint (D-Vt.), Andre Carson (D-Ind.), Maggie Goodlander (D-N.H.), Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), Summer Lee (D-Pa.), Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.), and Nikema Williams (D-Ga.) joined in signing the letter. 
    In recent months, Pepsi has faced legal action from convenience stores and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a regulator charged with enforcing federal consumer protection laws and antitrust laws. In January 2025, the FTC sued Pepsi, accusing it of violating the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), which prohibits sellers from engaging in anticompetitive price discrimination. The FTC claimed that for years, Pepsi has disadvantaged retailers – including local convenience stores – by consistently giving benefits and advantages, such as promotional payments, to a big-box store, while denying those same benefits to the store’s competitors.
    In February 2025, two small, family-owned convenience stores accused Pepsi and its subsidiary Frito-Lay of violating the RPA, claiming the corporation charged independent retailers more “for identical bags of snack chips” compared to what it charged chain stores. The plaintiffs claimed they were charged as much as 50 percent more for those goods, and that the “discriminatory pricing” forced them to pass on the higher costs to consumers. 
    “The Robinson-Patman Act is an important tool for the FTC to combat illegal price discrimination and concentration, and to provide a level playing field to all businesses…Charging discriminatory, high prices to smaller, independent retailers harms those retailers’ ability to compete, and often forces consumers to endure unfair price increases,” wrote the lawmakers. 
    The RPA forbids sellers from charging competing buyers different prices for the same goods when the price discrimination may lessen or harm competition. The law also prohibits special promotional payments, discounts, rebates, allowances, or services to one buyer unless they are made available to all competing buyers.
    “As food prices remain sky-high, the FTC should continue to enforce the RPA to promote fair competition in the food industry,” urged the lawmakers. 
    The bicameral coalition asked Pepsi to explain, by May 25, 2025, its pricing strategies, any discrepancies between what it charges chain retailers and small, independent retailers, how these price discrepancies affect shopping options for consumers, and the company’s lobbying efforts to refute price discrimination allegations.  
    As a champion for American consumers and a secure and healthy economy, Senator Warren has engaged in oversight of corporations for unfairly increasing prices for consumers. She has also been calling for more competition and stronger enforcement of antitrust laws to bring down prices for families: 
    In May 2025, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Jim Banks (R-Ind.) applauded the Department of Justice’s ongoing investigation into potential anticompetitive practices by major egg producers and urged the agency to continue its thorough investigation as egg prices continue to rise.
    In January 2025, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) led 19 of their colleagues, writing to President Donald Trump, pushing him to take meaningful steps to lower the prices of eggs and other groceries—a problem he largely ignored during his entire first week in office.
    In November 2024, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Congressman Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) led their colleagues in writing to Chair of the Federal Trade Commission, Lina Khan, and Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Thomas Vilsack, urging them to investigate Albertsons and other major grocery chains for predatory practices that could have violated federal laws.
    In October 2024, Senators Elizabeth Warren led a letter to President and Chief Executive Officer of McDonald’s, Chris Kempczinski, pushing for more information on McDonald’s pricing decisions as fast food prices continue to increase, outpacing inflation and squeezing customers.
    In October 2024, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Ed Markey, along with Representatives Jim McGovern and Ayanna Pressley, sent a letter to Frans Muller, CEO of Ahold Delhaize—parent company of Stop & Shop—demanding an explanation for its potential use of pricing algorithms is leading to price gouging, resulting in higher prices in minority and working class communities in Massachusetts.
    On May 3, 2024, during a hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, Senator Warren called out food industry price gouging and urged action to combat unfair pricing practices.
    On March 28, 2024, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Representative Mary Gay Scanlon (D-Penn.) led a group of 14 lawmakers in a letter to FTC Chair Lina Khan urging the agency to revive enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), a critical tool to promote fair competition in the food industry. 
    On February 28, 2024, Senator Warren joined Senator Bob Casey (D-Pa.) in introducing the Shrinkflation Prevention Act to crack down on corporations that deceive consumers by selling smaller sizes of their products without lowering prices.
    On February 15, 2024, Senators Warren, Baldwin, Casey, and U.S. Representative Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.) reintroduced the Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024, which would protect consumers and prohibit corporate price gouging by authorizing the FTC and state attorneys general to enforce a federal ban against grossly excessive price increases.
    In December 2023, Senator Warren urged the FTC to block the Kroger-Albertsons merger, which would give the five largest food retail companies control of 55 percent of all grocery sales, allowing them to further control and ultimately raise consumer prices, while also reducing job competition, decreasing wages, and decreasing the bargaining power of organized labor.
    In November 2023, Senator Warren called out TransDigm for its refusal to provide cost and pricing information needed to prevent price gouging of taxpayers and the Department of Defense.
    Senator Warren repeatedly urged the Biden administration to closely scrutinize other potentially anticompetitive mergers that could lead to higher prices for consumers and accelerate industry consolidation. She has led letters about the proposed mergers of Frontier and Spirit airlines, JetBlue and Spirit Airlines, Sanderson-Wayne, WarnerMedia-Discovery, and Amazon-MGM.
    In March 2022, Senator Warren introduced the Prohibiting Anticompetitive Mergers Act to help stomp out rampant industry consolidation that allows companies to raise consumer prices and mistreat workers. The bill would ban the biggest, most anticompetitive mergers and give the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission the teeth to reject deals in the first instance without court orders and to break up harmful mergers.
    In February 2022, at a hearing, Senator Warren called out corporations for abusing their market power to raise consumer prices and boost profits.
    That same month, Senator Warren requested the Department of Justice to take aggressive action against corporations violating antitrust laws to hike prices for consumers.
    In January 2022, Senator Warren questioned Federal Reserve nominee Lael Brainard about market concentration and price gouging driving inflation.
    At a January 2022 hearing, Senator Warren pressed Fed Chair Jerome Powell on the role of corporate concentration in driving up prices for consumers during his renomination hearing to be Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
    In a New York Times op-ed published in April 2020, Senator Warren urged Congress to focus on cracking down on price gouging in its ongoing effort to address the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.
    In March 2020, Senator Warren joined her colleagues in urging the FTC to use its full authority to prevent abusive price gouging on consumer health products during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: CPS Announces $419.95 Million Senior Subordinate Asset-Backed Securitization

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LAS VEGAS, Nevada, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. (Nasdaq: CPSS) (“CPS” or the “Company”) announced the closing of its second term securitization in 2025 on Monday May 12, 2025. The transaction is CPS’s 55th senior subordinate securitization since the beginning of 2011 and the 38th consecutive securitization to receive a triple “A” rating from at least two rating agencies on the senior class of notes.

    In the transaction, qualified institutional buyers purchased $419.95 million of asset-backed notes secured by $439.29 million in automobile receivables originated by CPS. The sold notes, issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2025-B, consist of five classes. Ratings of the notes were provided by Standard & Poor’s and DBRS Morningstar, and were based on the structure of the transaction, the historical performance of similar receivables and CPS’s experience as a servicer.

    Note Class Amount
    (in millions)
    Interest Rate Average
    Life (years)
    Price S&P’s
    Rating
    DBRS
    Rating
    A $ 191.520 4.74% 0.65 99.99620% AAA AAA
    B $ 58.430 4.79% 1.75 99.99344% AA AA
    C $ 70.280 5.12% 2.43 99.97744% A A
    D $ 40.640 5.56% 3.23 99.97917% BBB BBB
    E $ 59.080 7.95% 3.98 99.99266% NR BB
                 

    The weighted average coupon on the notes is approximately 5.96%.

    The 2025-B transaction has initial credit enhancement consisting of a cash deposit equal to 1.00% of the original receivable pool balance and overcollateralization of 4.40%. The transaction agreements require accelerated payment of principal on the notes to reach overcollateralization of the lesser of 8.65% of the original receivable pool balance, or 22.00% of the then outstanding pool balance.

    The transaction was a private offering of securities, not registered under the Securities Act of 1933, or any state securities law. All such securities having been sold, this announcement of their sale appears as a matter of record only.

    About Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc.

    Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. is an independent specialty finance company that provides indirect automobile financing to individuals with past credit problems or limited credit histories. We purchase retail installment sales contracts primarily from franchised automobile dealerships secured by late model used vehicles and, to a lesser extent, new vehicles. We fund these contract purchases on a long-term basis primarily through the securitization markets and service the contracts over their lives.

    Investor Relations Contact

    Danny Bharwani, Chief Financial Officer
    949-753-6811

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Oportun Named a Bay Area Top Workplace for 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SAN CARLOS, Calif., May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Oportun (Nasdaq: OPRT), a mission-driven financial services company, today announced that it has been named a Top Workplace for 2025 by San Francisco Bay Area Top Workplaces. Oportun has been named a top place by the San Francisco Chronicle for seven years and by regional or national publications in each of the last ten years.

    “Being recognized as a top workplace for ten years running is a testament to the people, culture and mission here at Oportun,” said Raul Vazquez, CEO of Oportun. “We remain deeply committed to fostering an environment that challenges, supports and rewards team members so they can excel and thrive in their pursuit of making financial health effortless for anyone.”

    The Bay Area Top Workplaces list is based solely on employee feedback gathered through a third-party survey administered by employee engagement technology partner Energage LLC. The confidential survey uniquely measures the employee experience and its component themes, including employees feeling respected & supported, enabled to grow, and empowered to execute, to name a few.

    For more information about Oportun, visit https://oportun.com.

    About Oportun
    Oportun (Nasdaq: OPRT) is a mission-driven financial services company that puts its members’ financial goals within reach. With intelligent borrowing, savings, and budgeting capabilities, Oportun empowers members with the confidence to build a better financial future. Since inception, Oportun has provided more than $20.3 billion in responsible and affordable credit, saved its members more than $2.4 billion in interest and fees, and helped its members set aside an average of more than $1,800 annually. For more information, visit Oportun.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: DRML Miner introduces an inventive investment approach, aiming to go beyond typical cloud mining platforms.

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New York, NY, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — AI-Driven Digital Currency Generation Hub. Distinguishing Between Cryptocurrency Allocation and Remote Mining. Unlike virtual mining, which carries considerable entry barriers, restricted access, and management charges that lessen earnings, DRML Miner‘s digital currency deployment tactic permits participants to engage at any point without concealed costs, delivering a more user-friendly and lucrative substitute.

    In today’s rapidly transforming fiscal sphere, distributed ledger technology offers an entirely novel perspective on capital oversight. With profound industry understanding, DRML Mining has crafted these tactics to supply high-yield asset growth resolutions and assist clientele in achieving sustainable progress across varied market conditions.

    DRML Miner Distributed Ledger Prosperity Strategy: Low-Exposure Arbitrage

    Approach: Concentrating on leading digital currencies like BTC, ETH, and USDT, this methodology employs grid-based trading and market-neutral tactics to assure consistent earnings, rendering it an excellent choice for new allocators or those seeking steady asset appreciation.

    Market-Neutral Approach: This tactic harnesses intelligent computational systems to safeguard against market oscillations, pinpoint long-term patterns in cryptocurrency valuations, and secure persistent gains regardless of market instability. This approach incorporates moderate leverage and varied asset distribution to bolster resilience.

    Cross-chain arbitrage: This tactic leverages price differentials between disparate distributed ledgers to execute minimal-risk spread transactions via swift market assessment, rapid implementation, and cross-network technology.

    Stable-Pegged Coin Income Tactic: Aims to generate revenue through stable-value coin interest rates and market fluidity. This avenue harnesses DeFi platforms and yield aggregators to maximize returns.

    High-Velocity Trading (HVT) Tactic: Employs sophisticated algorithms to perform a substantial volume of transactions, capture minute market movements in real-time, and realize rapid and efficient profits.

    Future Outlook of Distributed Ledger Investment

    DRML Mining CEO stated: “DRML Mining believes that distributed ledger technology will reshape the global financial sector and furnish unprecedented investment opportunities. We are dedicated to equipping customers with the most efficacious wealth management resolutions so they can maintain a leading position in this constantly evolving marketplace.”

    Join DRML Miner and unlock the autonomy of future wealth management.

    The tactics detailed above represent just a segment of DRML Mining’s pioneering products. Currently, a range of wealth-building approaches are obtainable for investment. Interested allocators are invited to explore DRML’s web portal to investigate the potential for distributed ledger asset expansion. Exclusive onboarding advantages include:

    • Register to instantly obtain a $10 welcome bonus.
    • Daily sign-in agreement reward of $0.6.
    • Once the DRML Miner account balance reaches $100 (digital wallet connection required), funds can be readily withdrawn.
    • No hidden charges or transaction levies.
    • Round-the-clock online assistance to furnish clients with enhanced support services.

    About DRML Miner: Founded in 2018 and headquartered in London, DRML Miner focuses on premium capital management and distributed ledger investment. We are committed to delivering state-of-the-art investment resolutions and collaborating with prominent global financial institutions and technology innovators to propel continuous advancement in the investment domain. If you want to learn more about DRML Miner, please visit its official website: https://drmlminer.com or acquire our mobile application from Google Play or the Apple Store.

    Disclaimer: The information provided in this press release does not constitute an investment solicitation, nor does it constitute investment advice, financial advice, or trading recommendations. Cryptocurrency mining and staking involve risks and the possibility of losing funds. It is strongly recommended that you perform due diligence before investing or trading in cryptocurrencies and securities, including consulting a professional financial advisor.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: Syria faces renewed sectarian violence as government fails to deliver inclusivity

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Katya Alkhateeb, Senior Researcher in International Human Rights Law & Humanitarian Law at Essex Law School and Human Rights Centre, University of Essex

    A recent surge in violence against Syria’s Druze religious community has reportedly seen over 100 people killed since the start of May. This is a grim extension of sectarian targeting that began with the massacre of Alawite civilians in March.

    Both crises are grounded in the same religious justifications, revealing problems in Syria’s transition following the end of the Assad family’s 53-year rule.

    Specifically these atrocities are linked by the misuse of nafir aam – a general call to arms or mass mobilisation. It is an Arabic term rooted in classical Islamic jurisprudence, especially in discussions about jihad and collective defence.

    It is declared only when the Muslim community faces an existential threat, such as an invasion or overwhelming danger from an enemy.


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    Recently though, it has been used by extremist groups such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda to summon Muslims to fight supposed enemies of the faith. These enemies have, in most cases, been innocent civilians.

    In March, when gunmen loyal to Syria’s former leader Bashar al-Assad (who is an Alawite) clashed with security forces, the transitional government issued a nafir aam. Loudspeakers in mosques across northern Syria broadcast mobilisation calls, tribal groups pledged support, and recruitment links flooded social media.

    The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that close to 1,400 Alawite civilians were subsequently murdered, with the final death toll likely to be much higher.

    A post on the Telegram channel of Syria’s ruling Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organisation reading: ‘General mobilisation now being announced via loudspeakers in Idlib and Aleppo toward the coast. Listen to the important and urgent announcement directly.’
    Telegram

    The same sectarian machinery has now been turned against the Druze. This latest wave of violence was triggered by the unproven allegation that a Druze cleric was responsible for an audio recording containing anti-Islamic remarks. Despite the cleric’s immediate denial, armed groups launched assaults on Druze areas near Syria’s capital, Damascus.

    Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, vowed to protect the Druze and the Israeli military subsequently carried out a series of airstrikes across Syria. These included strikes near the presidential palace. While Netanyahu has positioned these actions as protecting a vulnerable minority, they risk further destabilising Syria’s fragile transition.

    Deeply entrenched sectarianism

    Syria’s transitional government is led by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Following its campaign against Assad, HTS has been implementing a new policy of tolerance towards minority groups. The Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has vowed to protect minorities and pursue more inclusive policies.

    But HTS is arguably failing to deliver the inclusive governance it promised when seizing control of the country in December 2024. The seven-member committee for the national dialogue conference, which began in February to discuss a new path for the nation, lacked Alawite, Kurdish and Druze representation.

    The resulting constitutional declaration offered no explicit protections for Syria’s religious diversity. It also centralises power in ways that undermine pluralism.

    Article 3 of the constitutional declaration states that the “religion of the president of the republic is Islam” and “Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation”. Officials have clarified that any future parliament would remain subordinate to Islamic law.

    The ideological basis and policy for sectarian violence in Syria remains deeply entrenched. A 14th-century fatwa (a religious edict) by Sunni Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyyah branded Alawites as “infidels”. This fatwa continues to circulate in areas under government control.

    At the Brussels donors’ conference on Syria in March, Syrian foreign minister Asaad al-Shibani blamed “54 years of minority rule” for mass displacement and deaths – raising concerns about sectarian narratives. And the integrity of the investigation into the recent massacres have been questioned, notably by the Syrians for Truth and Justice human rights group.

    Criticisms have also been made over the inclusion of controversial figures to the newly formed Civil Peace Committee, which is tasked with healing the sectarian wounds left by Assad family rule. One of these figures, Sheikh Anas Ayrout, was reported 12 years ago to have made inciting comments against Alawites.

    Civil society organisations, including the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, have called on the government to issue protective religious rulings for minority communities. But their appeals have gone unanswered. And violence, particularly against Alawites in Homs and Aleppo, has surged dramatically.

    Five months after Assad’s fall, it seems that Syria is not witnessing the long hoped for fruition of its 2011 revolution, where pro-democracy protests swept through the country, but rather its continuing unravelling.

    The groups now in power had little to do with the revolution’s early democratic hopes. They have emerged from transnational jihadist networks with a radically different vision for Syria’s future.

    In the view of prominent Syrian intellectual Yassin al-Haj Saleh, Syria urgently needs a period of de-escalation and genuine political concessions. He argues for “taking two or three steps back … to move more firmly forward”. Political solutions must precede the creation of public institutions, not the other way around.

    If the cycle of sectarian violence is not broken, Syria risks sliding deeper into communal bloodshed that could permanently fracture the nation’s social fabric.

    The international community must act decisively. It has to apply concrete political pressure that makes the protection of all Syrians – regardless of sect – a non-negotiable foundation for Syria’s path forward.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Syria faces renewed sectarian violence as government fails to deliver inclusivity – https://theconversation.com/syria-faces-renewed-sectarian-violence-as-government-fails-to-deliver-inclusivity-255974

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: How the weather got ‘stuck’ over the UK – and produced an unusually dry and warm spring

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Simon H. Lee, Lecturer in Atmospheric Science, University of St Andrews

    Wildfires have ignited in forests and on moorland across the UK in recent months. LSP EM/Shutterstock

    A “blocking” weather system lingering high above the UK has produced one of the driest, warmest and brightest starts to spring on record.

    April 2025 was the sunniest since records began in 1910. This followed the third-sunniest March, and both months saw temperatures well above average nationwide. On May 1, the temperature reached 29.3°C in Kew Gardens in London – a new record for the date.

    Meteorologists are warning of the potential for a summer drought, as the UK has seen roughly half its usual amount of rainfall for March and April. While farmers fret about this year’s harvest, some water companies are urging customers to help reservoir levels recover by limiting water use.

    Meanwhile, wildfires have engulfed forest and moorland in areas of Scotland, Wales and England.

    Most of the UK has experienced a record-dry spring so far.
    Met Office

    For several weeks, a stubborn area of high pressure over the UK has diverted the usual flow of mild, moist air from the North Atlantic like a boulder in a river. This is known as a blocking weather system.

    Within it, air descends, warms and dries, which is why this weather pattern tends to be linked to heatwaves and drought. Blocking is usually persistent, making it seem like the weather is stuck.

    Here’s how climate change may have played a role in setting up this unusual spring.


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    The human fingerprint

    The warming climate means that unusually warm weather is occurring more often and becoming more intense. At the same time, we can expect more periods of both severe drought and extreme rainfall. Sudden changes from drought to deluge, termed “weather whiplash”, are due to the intensification of the water cycle in a warmer atmosphere that can hold more water vapour.

    However, certain weather patterns are necessary to produce extreme weather. More blocking events in future could increase the chance of heatwaves or drought. But are blocking weather patterns becoming more common?

    It’s difficult to determine how weather patterns will change as a result of the rising concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which is predominantly caused by the burning of fossil fuels.

    Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that weather patterns vary year to year. Several years in a row with more blocking events than usual could make it seem like blocking is increasing due to climate change, but it could simply be down to chance.

    As a result, it is difficult to detect the fingerprint of human activity from weather observations alone. For example, blocking weather patterns over Greenland during summer have happened more often in recent decades, which can enhance the melting of the ice sheet. But it isn’t clear that this trend is the result of human-induced climate change.

    Climate models do suggest future changes in the occurrence of blocking, however. These computer simulations, consisting of equations that describe the fundamental physics of the atmosphere, are the main tool scientists use to perform experiments that parse how the climate will behave in future.

    The blocking system is visible in the area of high pressure over Britain and Ireland.
    National Centers for Environmental Prediction/National Center for Atmospheric Research/NOAA Physical Sciences Laboratory, CC BY

    When scientists run climate model simulations with increased greenhouse gas concentrations the results consistently show a decrease in blocking events. But blocking generally happens more often in real life than model simulations, which reduces the confidence scientists have in future projections.

    Keeping track of the jet stream

    The movement of weather systems in Earth’s mid-latitudes – including over the UK – is linked to the jet stream, which is a fast-flowing river of air driven by the contrast in temperature between the poles and mid-latitudes.

    Some researchers have suggested that, because the Arctic is warming faster than the tropics, the jet stream may weaken and become more “wavy”, increasing the occurrence of blocking events, contrary to what most climate models show.

    Outside of the scientific community, this idea has become popular. However, the hypothesis remains controversial among scientists, and observational evidence has weakened in recent years.

    In fact, tens of kilometres above the Earth’s surface, near commercial aircraft cruising altitudes, the opposite trends are occurring: the temperature difference between the Arctic and mid-latitudes is increasing, acting to increase the strength of the jet stream.

    There are considerable challenges with understanding how climate change is affecting the large-scale atmospheric patterns which drive the weather we experience. These include large natural variability and imperfect climate models. Models mostly suggest a decline in blocking events with climate change, though this remains relatively uncertain compared with other aspects of the science.

    Overall, we can be confident that climate change is bringing warmer conditions in all seasons. Scientists also have strong evidence to suggest that drought conditions will become more common. These changes are already affecting food production, energy generation and water availability and these impacts will continue to worsen with climate change.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

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    Simon H. Lee has received funding from the Natural Environment Research Council and the National Science Foundation.

    Matthew Patterson receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council in the UK via the the National Centre for Atmospheric Science.

    ref. How the weather got ‘stuck’ over the UK – and produced an unusually dry and warm spring – https://theconversation.com/how-the-weather-got-stuck-over-the-uk-and-produced-an-unusually-dry-and-warm-spring-255987

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Is matcha a healthier alternative to coffee? Here’s what you need to know

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Anthony Booker, Reader in Ethnopharmacology, University of Westminster

    Ekateryna Zubal/Shutterstock

    Matcha, with its vibrant green hue and centuries-old tradition, is often celebrated as a health boosting superfood. But what exactly sets it apart from regular green tea, or even your morning coffee?

    Like green and black tea, matcha comes from
    the camellia sinensis plant. The difference lies in how it’s grown and processed. While black tea is fermented and regular green tea is simply dried, matcha is shade-grown for several weeks before harvest.

    This unique method alters the plant’s chemistry, boosting certain compounds like chlorophyll and amino acids and giving matcha its distinct flavour and rich green colour. The leaves are then dried and finely ground into a powder – hence its name, which literally translates to “powdered tea” in Japanese.


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    Although widely associated with Japanese culture and Zen tea ceremonies, matcha actually originated in China. It was brought to Japan in the 12th century by Buddhist monks, who used it to support meditation. Over time, it became a staple in Japanese tea culture, especially in formal tea ceremonies.

    From a health perspective, matcha offers many of the same benefits as green tea – thanks to its high content of polyphenols, including flavonoids, which are known antioxidants. However, because the leaves are consumed whole in powdered form, matcha may provide a more concentrated dose of these beneficial compounds.

    Lots of potential, relatively little research

    Matcha is touted for its wide range of potential health benefits: antioxidant, antimicrobial, anti-inflammatory, anti-obesity and even anti-cancer effects, as well as potential improvements in brain function, stress relief, heart health and blood sugar regulation.

    But there’s a catch: most of the evidence supporting these claims comes from lab studies (on cells or animals), not robust clinical trials in humans. So while the early research is promising, it’s far from conclusive.

    One thing we do know: matcha contains caffeine – more than regular green tea, though typically less than coffee. Caffeine itself has well documented health benefits when consumed in moderation, including improved focus, mood, metabolism and even reduced risk of certain diseases like Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s.

    But high doses can cause side effects like insomnia, anxiety and elevated blood pressure. The “more is better” approach doesn’t apply here, and the optimal dose of caffeine remains unclear.

    When comparing matcha to coffee, both offer similar antioxidant properties and cardiovascular benefits. However, coffee has been studied more extensively, with clearer guidelines: three to four cups a day appears to be a safe upper limit for most people.

    For matcha, the guidance is slightly more conservative, with sources suggesting one to three cups a day, probably due to the higher levels of polyphenols.




    Read more:
    All the reasons a cup of coffee really can be good for you


    Tannins and polyphenols in both tea and coffee can interfere with iron absorption, especially from plant-based foods. Drinking large amounts regularly, particularly around mealtimes, may increase the risk of iron-deficiency anaemia.

    That’s why it’s recommended to enjoy these beverages at least two hours before or after meals, especially for people who follow a predominantly plant-based diet or are already prone to low iron levels.

    Jitter-free

    Another consideration: both coffee and matcha are mildly acidic and can cause digestive discomfort or reflux in people with sensitive stomachs. That said, matcha may be a better choice for some. Unlike coffee, it contains L-theanine, an amino acid that promotes relaxation and may counteract the jittery effects of caffeine, making it a gentler alternative for people prone to anxiety.

    Both matcha and coffee have potential health benefits and the right choice depends on your personal needs and preferences. Coffee is better studied and may be ideal for those who tolerate caffeine well and enjoy several cups a day. Matcha, on the other hand, is a great option for those looking to consume less caffeine while still benefiting from antioxidants – and without the crash or jitters.

    Just remember to enjoy either in moderation, especially if you’re managing iron levels or digestive issues.

    Anthony Booker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Is matcha a healthier alternative to coffee? Here’s what you need to know – https://theconversation.com/is-matcha-a-healthier-alternative-to-coffee-heres-what-you-need-to-know-255729

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: The Climate Fiction Prize 2025: the five shortlisted books reviewed by our experts

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Louisa Egbunike, Associate Professor in African Literature, Durham University

    Five novels have been shortlisted for the 2025 Climate Fiction Prize. Our academics review the finalists ahead of the announcement of the winner on May 14.

    And So I Roar by Abi Daré

    Abi Daré’s poignant second novel, And So I Roar, charts the parallel stories of Tia, an environmental advocate, and Adunni, a Nigerian teenager first introduced in The Girl with the Louding Voice (2020).

    Now under Tia’s care in Lagos, Adunni has escaped child marriage and domestic abuse.

    When she returns to her village, Ikati, where she and other girls are blamed for the drought and face the threat of violence, the novel unravels long-held secrets. Daré masterfully explores how environmental crises intersect with gendered violence, showing how impoverished women disproportionately bear the burden of climate change.

    And So I Roar highlights intergenerational, inter-ethnic and cross-class solidarity, celebrating the courage of women and girls who defy society’s expectations. It is a powerful testament to resilience, as women and girls confront injustice and find the strength to lift their voices and, finally, roar.

    By Louisa Uchum Egbunike, associate professor in African literature

    The Morningside by Téa Obreht

    Obreht’s The Morningside is a quietly dazzling piece of climate fiction – more adjacent to our world than removed from it, and all the more unsettling for it.

    Set in Island City, a place marked by an unnamed tragedy, the novel centres on Sil, an 11-year-old girl who moves into the Morningside apartment complex with her mother.

    Both are climate refugees, though the novel wears this reality lightly – what matters more are the small acts of home-making, the search for belonging and the ghosts that travel with them. Magical realism is deftly handled here, interlaced with hints of folklore that feel entirely plausible within the book’s fragile ecology.

    The Morningside is deeply readable – generous, tender and brimming with quiet unease. It never tips into bleakness, but its warnings are clear enough. “The things you had, the things you saw,” Sil’s mother tells us, “will probably be gone by the time [your children are] born.”

    By Sam Illingworth, professor of creative pedagogies

    Briefly Very Beautiful by Roz Dineen

    Roz Dineen’s Briefly Very Beautiful immerses readers in a world that both is and is not a familiar fiction. Crisply written, in direct, unfussy prose, it is, at one level, a story of a woman, Cass, trying to protect her children as her relationship unravels.

    At the same time, a parallel social collapse triggered by climate change puts the ordinary in an extraordinary frame.

    Much of the effect of this novel comes from Cass’s utterly believable responses to what is taking place around her, her almost peripheral awareness of other people fleeing the city, her own craving for fresh air “like she’d craved things in pregnancy, with a scary gorging hunger”.

    Briefly Very Beautiful is a novel brave enough to recognise that there is no simple, heroic response to some situations. That sometimes, the determination to live an ordinary life is the truly heroic course of action.

    By Christopher Morash, professor of Irish writing

    Orbital by Samantha Harvey

    Samantha Harvey’s Orbital skilfully exposes the human cost of space flight, set against the urgency of the climate crisis. While a typhoon of life-threatening proportions gathers across south-east Asia, six cosmonauts hurtle around Earth on the International Space Station.

    Their everyday routine of tasteless food and laboratory work is in stark contrast to the awesome spectacle of the blue planet, oscillating between night and day, dark and light, where international borders are meaningless.

    While they teach laboratory mice to orient themselves in micro-gravity, they rigorously document their own bodily functions to satisfy some “grand abstract dream of interplanetary life” away from “the planet held hostage by humans, a gun to its vitals”. These are humans, Harvey tells us, “with a godly view that’s the blessing and also the curse”. Harvey has written a novel for the end of the world as we know it. The hope it offers is that we might learn to know it differently.

    By Debra Benita Shaw, reader in cultural theory

    The Ministry of Time by Kaliane Bradley

    The best novels defy easy categorisation, and The Ministry of Time covers many genres: climate fiction, sci-fi, speculative fiction, romance, action.

    It tells the story of a female civil servant who is a handler for one of five people plucked from history before their death. It was fun to imagine how today’s world would be perceived from various perspectives, including a zesty young lesbian woman from the 17th century, a shy young lieutenant from the first world war and a 19th-century naval officer.

    The story adopts the usual dystopian tropes of a world that has destroyed itself through greed, power-seeking and over-indulgence. In the final plea to the reader not to let this terrible future unfold, the assumption is that if we’re scared enough, we’ll all give up red meat, stop flying and campaign for climate policies.

    My research, and psychological studies of fear caution us that the response is just as likely to be voting for far-right leaders, marginalisation of innocent victims, and buying up all the toilet rolls. I loved this book, but to inspire greener behaviour, showing visions of what a sustainable society might look like if we did things right would be a welcome change.

    By Denise Baden, professor of sustainable business


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    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. The Climate Fiction Prize 2025: the five shortlisted books reviewed by our experts – https://theconversation.com/the-climate-fiction-prize-2025-the-five-shortlisted-books-reviewed-by-our-experts-253056

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Medetomidine: what you need to know about the animal sedative turning up in opioid deaths

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Paul Chazot, Professor of Pharmacology, Durham University

    Michael O’Keene/Shutterstock.com

    The opioid crisis, increasingly driven by synthetic opioids, continues to claim tens of thousands of lives annually in the US alone. Similar crises have arisen all over the western world.

    The crisis has become more complex as powerful synthetic opioids like fentanyl, nitazenes and oxycodone are now being “cut” (mixed) with other drugs that slow brain activity, including animal tranquillisers.

    The emergence of medetomidine as a new contaminant in the US illicit drug market signals a worrying development in this escalating crisis. When public health officials in Philadelphia first began testing for the drug in May last year, medetomidine was found in 29% of fentanyl samples analysed. Six months later, the drug was found in 87% of fentanyl samples.

    Medetomidine, a drug approved only for veterinary use as a sedative and painkiller, has increasingly been implicated in illicit fentanyl-related overdoses.


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    Like xylazine – another veterinary tranquilliser recently detected in street drugs – it is believed that medetomidine is added to fentanyl to boost its euphoric effects and hence make it more appealing to users. However, medetomidine is even more potent and longer-lasting than xylazine.

    An overdose of medetomidine can cause extreme sleepiness, very low blood pressure, slow heart rate, trouble breathing (respiratory failure), and even coma or death. This is because medetomidine rapidly depresses the central nervous system and slows the heart rate significantly.

    When medetomidine is used with opioids, the risk is even greater because both drugs can slow breathing, and together they can make it much worse.

    Overdose-reversing drugs

    Police and paramedics use naloxone to reverse fentanyl overdoses. But if the drug is mixed with medetomidine, naloxone won’t work because medetomidine affects the body in a different way.

    Naloxone won’t reverse the effects of animal tranquillisers.
    oasisamuel / Shutterstock.com

    Atipamezole can reverse the effects of medetomidine – such as sedation, slowed breathing and slowed heart rate – but it’s only been tested in dogs. The US Food and Drug Administration has not approved the drug for human use.

    Overdoses from fentanyl and high-potency nitazenes are also common in the UK and across Europe. The spread of medetomidine in street drugs in other parts of the world needs urgent attention.

    The first death in the UK involving xylazine was reported by the National Programme on Substance Abuse Deaths in December 2022. Between April 2023 and January 2024, 17 cases were reported in the UK, in a range of opioid tablets and powders, including codeine, tramadol and heroin.

    So far, no confirmed cases involving medetomidine have been reported in the UK. If trends in the US are reliable indicators, the UK may face similar challenges soon.

    Paul Chazot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Medetomidine: what you need to know about the animal sedative turning up in opioid deaths – https://theconversation.com/medetomidine-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-animal-sedative-turning-up-in-opioid-deaths-256015

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Media Alert: Low-level flights to image geology over parts of New England

    Source: US Geological Survey

    The survey is part of USGS Earth Mapping Resources Initiative, a partnership with the geological surveys of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont as well as other states.

    “Increasing knowledge of New England’s geologic framework will help with national priorities, like sourcing critical minerals, and regional concerns – like mapping pyrrhotite to minimize its use in local infrastructure,” said Jamey Jones, science coordinator for the USGS Earth Mapping Resources Initiative. 

    Pyrrhotite, a mineral found in bedrock under certain parts of Connecticut and Massachusetts, can cause long-term structural weakness in construction when used in cement.

    The survey is being coordinated by the U.S. Geological Survey as part of a larger, nationwide effort to provide data and images that expand the fundamental knowledge of geology across the nation. The data collected will be made freely available to the public once complete. 

    During the survey, which will be conducted in spring to fall 2025, instruments on the airplane will measure variations in the Earth’s magnetic field and natural, low-level radiation created by different rock types beneath vegetation and up to several miles below the surface. This information will help researchers develop geologic maps of resources and hazards in three dimensions. 

    The aircraft will be equipped with an elongated “boom” that extends either in front of or behind the main cabin that houses sensors. These scientific instruments are completely passive with no emissions that pose a risk to humans, animals, or plant life. No photography or video data will be collected. 

    The aircraft will be flown by experienced pilots who are specially trained and approved for low-level flying. These pilots work with the FAA to ensure flights are safe and in accordance with U.S. law. The surveys will be conducted during daylight hours only. 

    The aircraft will fly along pre-planned fight paths relatively low to the ground at about 300 feet (100 meters) above the surface in some areas. The ground clearance will be increased to 1,000 feet (300+ meters) over populated areas and will comply with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. 

    Funding by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act has facilitated coverage of such a large area. 

    Flights will cover areas within the following counties: 

    Connecticut: Fairfield, Hartford, Litchfield, Middlesex, New Haven, New London, Tolland, Windham. Massachusetts: Berkshire, Franklin, Hampden, Hampshire, Middlesex, Worcester. New Hampshire: Cheshire, Hillsborough. Rhode Island: Kent, Providence, Washington. Vermont: Bennington, Windham, as well as Fisher’s Island, New York

    MIL OSI USA News