Category: Child Poverty

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: England athletics announces new partnership with launch event at Coventry school

    Source: City of Coventry

    England Athletics, the development body for running and athletics in the England, as well as its official charity partner, the Personal Best Foundation has announced a new partnership with Citroën.

    The partnership comes on the back of research by Citroën to parents that found on average, British children spend 4.75 hours a week exercising, while the Chief Medical Officers recommend at least 60 minutes every day.

    The partnership was announced at Sowe Valley Primary school, Coventry with Team GB Paralympian and Personal Best Foundation Ambassador, Hannah Cockroft CBE, where pupils took part in a morning of sports and activities with the organisations.

    Cllr Dr Kindy Sandhu, Cabinet Member for Education and Skills, said: “This event was a wonderful example of what happens when education and sport come together to inspire young people. Giving every child, regardless of background or ability, the opportunity to be active, confident and included is at the heart of what we aim for in Coventry’s schools. It’s especially meaningful to see inclusive sport embedded in learning and I’m proud that our city is leading the way with programmes like this.”

    Cllr Kamran Caan, Cabinet Member for Public Health and Sport, said: “It was fantastic to see the energy and excitement at Sowe Valley Primary School as children took part in inclusive athletics led by Hannah Cockroft. Initiatives like this are exactly what we need to tackle inactivity and the health inequalities that affect so many of our communities. Encouraging active lifestyles from an early age is key to improving long-term physical and mental health across Coventry and this partnership is a powerful step in the right direction.”

    England Athletics’ purpose is to inspire individuals of all ages, abilities and backgrounds to take up running and athletics, fulfil their potential and develop a lifelong love of the sport.

    According to Sport England’s annual Active Lives survey 2023/24, only 47% of children are meeting the UK’s Chief Medical Officer’s recommended daily activity levels**, with children from low-income families and underserved communities the least likely to be active.

    According to Citroen’s own research, it found that a lack of time and interest were cited by over a third of parents as the main barriers to getting their children to exercise. Around one in eight toddlers and primary school-aged children in England are categorised as obese.

    In year 6, the prevalence of obesity alone in children is 22.7% and for those living in the most deprived areas this increases to 30.2%.

    The UK has some of the poorest child mental health outcomes globally, with the cost of living crisis further limiting opportunities for physical activity. Inequality and poverty put the opportunity for organised exercise and activity beyond the reach of around 4 million children and young people across the UK.

    The partnership between Citroën, England Athletics and Personal Best Foundation will help to change this, as initially 15 primary schools – prioritising those with the greatest need and children most at risk of inactivity – in Coventry, Warwickshire and Ellesmere Port, close to Citroen Headquarters, will benefit from free weekly after-school athletics programmes. In addition, free training for the teachers in the schools will allow the programme to be continued and ensure that running, jumping and throwing have a place in the curriculum.

    The partnership will also support young, up and coming athletes in England through England Athletics’ National and Age group championships and its Talent Pathway Programme, which aims to help gifted young athletes progress to be the international athletics stars of the future.

    England Athletics, Chief Executive Officer, Chris Jones, said: “We are proud to welcome Citroën into the England Athletics family. This partnership supports our shared commitment to sustainability and making athletics more accessible for young people. Through our Personal Best Foundation, Citroën’s support will help young people in schools across England experience athletics and will open the doors of opportunity for some of the most disadvantaged children and young people in England.

    “Citroën’s backing of our national events and talent programmes – supported by Citroën’s electric vehicles – aligns with our drive for a more sustainable future and our approach to encourage our network of athletes and clubs to adopt more sustainable practices.”

    Chris Theobold, Sales and Operations Director, Citroën UK, added: “We’re proud that our partnership with England Athletics will give young people access to sport and exercise, help improve young people’s lives and offer support to the next generation of talent.

    “The statistics on childhood inactivity and health is very concerning and we are very happy to be able to make running, jumping and throwing more accessible, just as we are making electric vehicles accessible to all. In partnering with England Athletics and its official charity, we believe we can help make a difference and give school children in some of the country’s less fortunate areas the chance to enjoy the benefits of athletics, be active and have fun. Whilst also supporting elite talent on the pathway to success.”

    Hannah Cockroft CBE, Personal Best Foundation Ambassador and England Athletics Sustainability Ambassador, said: “It’s fantastic to be part of this exciting new partnership between England Athletics, the Personal Best Foundation, and Citroën. It’s a privilege to meet the school children today and see first-hand how powerful sport can be in changing lives and helping young people discover what they are truly capable of.

    “I passionately believe that every young person should have the access and the opportunities to experience the physical and mental benefits of sport irrespective of their background or personal circumstances. It’s also great to see a partnership with a real commitment to sustainability, promoting a healthier, more active, and more responsible future.”

    You can find out more about the partnership and England Athletics at englandalthetics.org.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • Jose Mujica, Uruguay’s former leader, rebel icon, and cannabis reformer, dead at 89

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Jose Mujica, a one-time guerrilla and later president of Uruguay who drove a beat-up VW Beetle and enacted progressive reforms that carried his reputation well beyond South America, has died aged 89.

    The straight-talking Mujica, known to many Uruguayans by his nickname “Pepe,” led the small farming country’s leftist government from 2010 to 2015 after convincing voters his radical past was a closed chapter.

    “It is with deep sorrow that we announce the death of our comrade Pepe Mujica,” President Yamandu Orsi said in a post on X. “Thank you for everything you gave us and for your deep love for your people.”

    As president, Mujica adopted what was then a pioneering liberal stance on issues related to civil liberties. He signed a law allowing gay marriage and abortions in early pregnancy, and backed a proposal to legalize marijuana sales. The gay marriage and abortion measures were a big shift for Catholic Latin America, and the move on marijuana was at the time almost unprecedented worldwide.

    Regional leaders, including leftist presidents in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, mourned Mujica’s passing and praised his example.

    “He defended democracy like few others. And he never stopped advocating for social justice and the end of all inequalities,” said Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Mujica’s “greatness transcended the borders of Uruguay and his presidential term,” he added.

    During his term in office, Mujica refused to move to the presidential residence, choosing to stay in his modest home where he kept a small flower farm in a suburb of Montevideo, the capital.

    Shunning a formal suit and tie, it was common to see him driving around in his Beetle or eating at downtown restaurants where office workers had lunch.

    In a May 2024 interview with Reuters in the tin-roofed house that Mujica shared with his wife, former Senator Lucia Topolansky, he said he had kept the old Beetle and that it was still in “phenomenal” condition.

    But, he added, he preferred a turn on the tractor, saying it was “more entertaining” than a car and was a place where “you have time to think.”

    Critics questioned Mujica’s tendency to break with protocol, while his blunt and occasionally uncouth statements sometimes forced him to explain himself, under pressure from opponents and political allies alike.

    But it was his down-to-earth style and progressive musings that endeared him to many Uruguayans.

    “The problem is that the world is run by old people, who forget what they were like when they were young,” Mujica said during the 2024 interview.

    Mujica himself was 74 when he became president. He was elected with 52% of the vote, despite some voters’ concerns about his age and his past as one of the leaders of the Tupamaros rebel group in the 1960s and 1970s.

    Lucia Topolansky was Mujica’s long-term partner, dating back to their days in the Tupamaros. The couple married in 2005, and she served as vice president from 2017-2020.

    After leaving office, they remained politically active, regularly attending inaugurations of Latin American presidents and giving crucial backing to candidates in Uruguay, including Orsi, who took office in March 2025. They stopped growing flowers on their small holding but continued to cultivate vegetables, including tomatoes that Topolansky pickled each season.

    BEHIND BARS

    Jose Mujica’s birth certificate recorded him as born in 1935, although he claimed there was an error and that he was actually born a year earlier. He once described his upbringing as “dignified poverty.”

    Mujica’s father died when he was 9 or 10 years old, and as a boy he helped his mother maintain the farm where they grew flowers and kept chickens and a few cows.

    At the time Mujica became interested in politics, Uruguay’s left was weak and fractured, and he began his political career in a progressive wing of the center-right National Party.

    In the late 1960s, he joined the Marxist Tupamaros guerrilla movement, which sought to weaken Uruguay’s conservative government through robberies, political kidnappings, and bombings.

    Mujica later said that he had never killed anyone but was involved in several violent clashes with police and soldiers and was once shot six times.

    Uruguay’s security forces gained the upper hand over the Tupamaros by the time the military swept to power in a 1973 coup, marking the start of a 12-year dictatorship in which about 200 people were kidnapped and killed. Thousands more were jailed and tortured.

    Mujica spent almost 15 years behind bars, many in solitary confinement, lying at the bottom of an old horse trough with only ants for company. He managed to escape twice, once by tunneling into a nearby house. His biggest “vice” as he approached 90, he later said, was talking to himself, alluding to his time in isolation.

    When democracy was restored to the farming country of roughly 3 million people in 1985, Mujica was released and returned to politics, gradually becoming a prominent figure on the left.

    He served as agriculture minister in the center-left coalition of his predecessor, President Tabaré Vázquez, who would go on to succeed him from 2015 to 2020.

    Mujica’s support base was on the left, but he maintained a fluid dialogue with opponents within the center-right, inviting them to traditional barbecues at his home.

    “We can’t pretend to agree on everything. We have to agree with what there is, not with what we like,” he said.

    He believed drugs should be decriminalized “under strict state control” and addiction addressed.

    “I do not defend drug use. But I can’t defend (a ban) because now we have two problems: drug addiction, which is a disease, and narcotrafficking, which is worse,” he said.

    In retirement, he remained resolutely optimistic.

    “I want to convey to all the young people that life is beautiful, but it wears out and you fall,” he said following a cancer diagnosis.

    “The point is to start over every time you fall, and if there is anger, transform it into hope.”

    –Reuters

  • MIL-OSI USA: Sánchez, Davis, DelBene champion bill to reduce child care costs for working families

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Linda Sanchez (38th District of CA)

    In contrast to GOP effort to slash child care funding, this bill increases maximum child care credit by nearly 400 percent

    WASHINGTON – Representatives Linda Sánchez (D-Calif.), Danny K. Davis (D-Ill.) and Suzan DelBene (D-Wash.) introduced the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit Enhancement Act to permanently expand the child care tax credit. The bill would raise the maximum credit from $1,050 to $4,000 for one child and from $2,100 to $8,000 for two or more children. 

    Senators Tina Smith (D-Minn.), Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Patty Murray (D-Wash.) introduced companion legislation in the Senate.

    “Working parents shouldn’t have to choose between earning a paycheck and caring for their kids,” said Sánchez. “Expanding the child care tax credit will make child care more affordable and accessible, so parents can focus on their work knowing their kids are being cared for.”

    “High-quality, affordable child care is essential to the economic well-being of families, businesses, and our country,” said Rep. Davis. “I am proud to lead the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit Enhancement Act that would restore the 2021 credit so that families can receive up to $4,000 for child care for one child or up to $8,000 for two or more children, much better than the almost $600 that the typical family receives currently. This bill would strengthen the financial well-being of families and grow our economy. It is critical that Congress acts now to help working families.”

    “Access to affordable child care is one of the biggest barriers families face. Enhancing the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit will give parents the relief they need by supporting both families and care providers,” said DelBene. “This bill is a commonsense step toward making child care more accessible and affordable for every family.” 

    The Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) is the only tax credit that helps working parents offset the rising cost of child care. In 2021, Democrats successfully enhanced both the CDCTC and the Child Tax Credit because both credits are essential to support parents’ ability to provide for their families. While 100 percent of the CDCTC reimburses parents for actual child care costs paid to work, parents mostly use the Child Tax Credit to defray other significant costs of caring for a child, such as food, rent, and clothing. 

    As currently structured, the CDCTC unfortunately fails to meet the needs of tens of millions of working families. Very few families receive meaningful benefit from the credit due to the extremely low phase-out level of $15,000, the low expense limits, the non-refundable nature, and the loss of benefit due to inflation. For example, the Tax Policy Center estimates that only 13 percent of families with children claimed the CDCTC in 2022. The Child Care and Dependent Credit Enhancement Act will increase the maximum credit amount to $4,000 per child up to $8,000 for two or more children, expand eligibility to low-income families, make the credit available to married couples who file separately due to high student loan debt, and retain the credit’s value over time by indexing it to inflation. Compared to 2019, low-income working parents quadrupled their credit received in 2021. 

    High-quality, affordable child care is essential to the economic well-being of families, businesses, and our country. Yet, child care places a major financial burden on American families. The price of child care can range from $5,357 to $17,171 per year depending on location and type of care. Astoundingly, the cost of center-based care for two children is more than the average mortgage in 41 states and more than the average annual rent in all 50 states plus DC. Households under the poverty line spend nearly one third of their income on child care, and increases in median child care prices are connected to lower maternal employment rates. Further, the child care crisis hits families of color disproportionately hard. For a single parent who has never been married who is Black, Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or American Indian/Alaska Native, child care can cost 36 percent, 41 percent, or 49 percent of the median income, respectively, compared to only 31 percent for single white parents. Further, Latino and American Indian and Alaska Native parents disproportionately live in child care deserts.

    Statements from Supporting Organizations

    The bill is endorsed by state and national child and worker advocates, including: Center for Law and Social Policy, Child Care Aware of America, Early Care and Education Consortium, First Five Years Fund, First Focus Campaign for Children, MomsRising, National Association for the Education of Young Children, National Women’s Law Center Action Fund, Save the Children, Start Early, Society for Human Resource Management, and ZERO TO THREE.

    “Often conflated with the child tax credit, the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit is one of the only tax incentives that helps working families with their child care expenses. As the cost of care increases, many families must contend with whether their current job pays enough to justify their child care expenses,” said Radha Mohan, executive director, Early Care and Education Consortium. “For families where one parent must leave the workforce because they cannot afford the cost of care, this often hurts the family from an economic standpoint in the long run. The CDCTC Enhancement Act helps ensure that families do not have to make this choice by providing a credit to offset the cost of care. When paired with programs such as the Child Care and Development Block Grant, this bill will ensure that many families will have reduced their child care costs by over 50 percent.”

    “As almost any working family with young children will tell you, the cost of child care is a major source of financial stress, putting immense pressure on already tight budgets,” said Sarah Rittling,executive director, First Five Years Fund. “The Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit Enhancement Act would make essential updates to the CDCTC to ensure more parents are able to keep more of what they earn to offset the high cost of care. We are grateful to Reps. Danny Davis, Suzan DelBene, and Linda Sanchez for their leadership and commitment to supporting families with young children.” 

    “For families with young children, the cost of childcare is often unaffordable and impacts their economic opportunity – the cornerstone of child and family well-being. The Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit Enhancement Act of 2025 is an important effort to update the CDCTC to ensure that more families can offset their child care costs. We are grateful to Rep. Danny Davis and his longstanding efforts to support children and families in his district and across the country, and also extend that appreciation to Reps. Suzan DelBene and Linda Sanchez., said Diana Rauner, president, Start Early.

    “Affordable child care isn’t a luxury – it’s the backbone of our economy,” said Yelena Tsilker, senior government relations and advocacy director, ZERO TO THREE. “Parents of infants now face child care bills that top $16,000 a year – higher than in-state college tuition in many states. The Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit Enhancement Act tackles that crisis head-on by making the CDCTC fully refundable and increasing the maximum credit, so families of every income can choose the high-quality care their babies need. This relief will keep parents in the workforce and help millions of children thrive. We applaud Representatives Davis, DelBene, and Sánchez for championing legislation that hard-working families have long awaited.” 

    The text of the bill is available HERE; a summary of the bill is available HERE

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: New global data: New Zealand ranks alarmingly low for child wellbeing, mental health

    Source: UNICEF

    Wednesday 14th May 2025 – New Zealand has ranked fourth lowest out of 36 OECD and EU countries for child well being in a new report just released by UNICEF.

    For mental wellbeing, New Zealand was the lowest ranking country, in 36th place out of 36 countries with available data.

    New Zealand showed the single highest youth suicide rate in the analysed countries during the reporting period – almost three times higher than the average for high-income countries.The report cites suicide as the fourth most common cause of death globally among adolescents aged 15-19 years.

    The latest in a UNICEF Innocenti research series spanning 25 years, Report Card 19: Fragile Gains – Child Wellbeing at Risk in an Unpredictable World uses globally comparable datasets to provide critical insight into child wellbeing in the world’s wealthier countries between 2018-2022. While it is encouraging that recent domestic statistics on suspected suicide indicate that rates may be slightly decreasing, New Zealand is still a notable outliercompared to other countries and our rates are much too high.  

    The report also shows where Aotearoa is falling behind on other key issues facing children – including physical wellbeing, where New Zealand has the third highest percentage of overweight children, and bullying, where the percentage of bullied children is the second highest.

    UNICEF Aotearoa CEO Michelle Sharp says the data should be a wake-up call and the upcoming Budget is an opportunity for the government to create positive change.

    “Too many children in Aotearoa are missing out on their childhood. We’re calling on the government to direct funding towards addressing these problems and to shift the dial, so New Zealand is not ranked so alarmingly close to the bottom of the table when it comes to child wellbeing. The government can act now, and act quickly to make positive impacts if it chooses to,” she says.

    UNICEF Aotearoa is deeply concerned about what the report tells us on children and young people’s wellbeing in our country, and the trajectory this continues to take since 2022.Recent data captured in the Government’s own Annual Report on the Child and Youth Strategy, as well as the most recent child poverty data from Statistics NZ, indicates that on major themes relating to poverty and mental wellbeing, the data has not improved in the last two years.

    Food security, affordable housing, hospital admissions and material hardship all continue to show negative trends.  

    Faced with this stark data, UNICEF Aotearoa is calling on the government to address economic inequality and to prioritise funding for suicide prevention in the upcoming Budget, particularly for Māori and Pacific youth, who are disproportionately represented in negative statistics.    

    UNICEF Aotearoa Director of Advocacy and Programmes Teresa Tepania-Ashton saysthere are several measures that could be implemented quickly.

    “Immediately expanding eligibility for the Best Start payment to all children up to the age of five and laying out a roadmap for expanding eligibility up to the age of 18 would help tackle economic inequality and make a positive difference to many whānau in Aotearoa who are doing it really tough at the moment,” she says.

    “We also support calls for the government to address food insecurity by fully funding an expanded Ka Ora Ka Ako healthy school lunches programme, ensuring that all children across every school and early childhood centre have access to nutritious meals, thereby tackling food insecurity quickly”.

    Sharp says child wellbeing in New Zealand is a political choice.

    “The quality of life being experienced by the tamariki and rangatahi in this country is down to political choice, and we urge our decision-makers to make the right choices and directly invest in children in the imminent Budget and beyond”.  

    Sharp says child wellbeing in New Zealand is a political choice.

    “The quality of life being experienced by the tamariki and rangatahi in this country is down to political choice, and we urge our decision-makers to make the right choices and directly invest in children in the imminent Budget and beyond”.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Secretary-General’s video message to the 25th edition of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Conferences (JEEC/25) at Instituto Superior Técnico Lisboa, 5-9 May 2025 [scroll down for English version]

    Source: United Nations secretary general

    Download the vídeo:
    https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/downloads2.unmultimedia.org/public/video/evergreen/MSG+SG+/SG+25th+Coordination+of+the+Electrical+and+Computer+Engineering+Career+Week+5-9+MAY+25/MSG+SG+ENGINEERING+CAREER+WEEK+IST+LISBON+21+FEB+25.mp4

    https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/downloads2.unmultimedia.org/public/video/evergreen/MSG+SG+/SG+25th+Coordination+of+the+Electrical+and+Computer+Engineering+Career+Week+5-9+MAY+25/MSG+SG+ENGINEERING+CAREER+WEEK+IST+LISBON+21+FEB+25+EN.mp4

    Caras alunas e caros alunos,

    Saúdo-vos calorosamente por ocasião destas importantes e entusiasmantes jornadas no Instituto Superior Técnico.

    Como antigo aluno, posso afirmar que o Técnico teve um papel decisivo na minha formação e na minha capacidade de aprender a aprender e de começar a procurar soluções para os desafios do nosso mundo em rápida mudança.

    Esta procura de soluções é o objetivo das disciplinas de ciências, tecnologia, engenharia e matemática.

    Da luta contra a pobreza, a fome, a desigualdade e a discriminação, passando pela resolução de conflitos e pela crise climática, até ao aproveitamento do grande potencial de tecnologias em rápida evolução como a Inteligência Artificial, precisamos das vossas ideias, conhecimentos e inovações. 

    Ao empreenderem por uma carreira em engenharia eletrotécnica e de computadores, têm a oportunidade de desempenhar um papel fundamental para enfrentar estes desafios e melhorar a vida das pessoas. 

    Através do Pacto para o Futuro, recentemente adotado pelas Nações Unidas, os países concordaram em acelerar os investimentos nos sistemas educativos, para garantir que os alunos de todas as idades possam ter um melhor acesso à formação e à tecnologia de que precisam ao longo das suas vidas.

    O Pacto apela também à criação de um Painel Científico Internacional Independente sobre Inteligência Artificial que promova um entendimento comum dos riscos, benefícios e capacidades – e um diálogo global que garanta que todos os países tenham uma voz ativa na definição do futuro da Inteligência Artificial.

    Caras alunas e caros alunos,

    Os vossos estudos no Técnico estão a proporcionar-vos a base de que precisam.

    Mas os próximos passos dependem de cada um de vós.

    Por isso, mantenham-se curiosos e empenhados.

    Continuem a alargar os limites da inovação e do conhecimento humano.

    Continuem a aprender a aprender.

    E obrigado por dedicarem as vossas mãos, mentes e corações à tarefa mais importante de todas – a de moldar um futuro melhor, mais justo e mais saudável para todas as pessoas.

    Bem hajam!

    ***

    Dear students,

    I send warm greetings for this important and exciting week at Instituto Superior Técnico.

    As a former student, I can say that Técnico played a decisive role in my own education and in my ability to learn how to learn, and to begin seeking solutions to the challenges of our rapidly changing world.

    This search for solutions is what the science, technology, engineering and math subjects are all about.

    From fighting poverty, hunger, inequality and discrimination, to addressing conflicts and the climate crisis, to harnessing the great potential of rapidly evolving technology like Artificial Intelligence, we need the ideas, expertise and innovations of all of you. 

    By pursuing a career in electrical and computer engineering, you can play a critical role in tackling these challenges and improving people’s lives. 

    Through the recently adopted Pact for the Future, countries agreed to accelerate investments in education systems, to ensure that learners of all ages can better access the training and technology they need throughout their lives.

    The Pact also calls for the creation of an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI that promotes a common understanding of risks, benefits and capabilities — and a global dialogue that ensure that all countries have a voice in shaping the future of Artificial Intelligence.

    Dear students,

    Your studies at Técnico are giving you the foundation you need.

    But the next steps are up to you.

    So stay curious and engaged.

    Keep pushing the boundaries of innovation and human knowledge.

    Continue learning how to learn.

    And thank you for lending your hands, minds and hearts to the most important task of all — shaping a better, fairer, healthier future for all people.

    Thank you.

    ***
     

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Green Budget for a country worth fighting for

    Source: Green Party

    The Green Budget shows how much better our lives could be under a Green Government, instead of one dominated by corporate greed.

    “This is a Budget for a country that belongs to and works for New Zealanders,” says Green Party co-leader Chlöe Swarbrick. 

    “We believe in fairness and common sense. A Green Government will rapidly reduce emissions, reduce the cost of living and improve our quality of life.

    “That means free GP visits, free Early Childhood Education, free dental care, an Income Guarantee to ensure no one falls below the poverty line, housing for all, a stable climate, clean air, clean water and clean soil.

    “We can do this by taxing the wealthiest fairly.

    “Or, we can continue to let our infrastructure crumble, kids go hungry and the healthcare system teeter on the edge of collapse, as the Government promises for their Budget next week.

    “These are political choices. The Greens choose a country worth fighting for, instead of the Luxon Government’s choices seeing New Zealanders leaving in record numbers.

    “The Aotearoa we all deserve is entirely within our grasp. Our Green Budget is the detailed map, and in the coming weeks, we will be working with communities across Aotearoa to start our journey to making it a reality,” says Chlöe Swarbrick. 

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI China: Full Text: President Xi’s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Full Text: President Xi’s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum

    BEIJING, May 13 — Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum.

    The following is the full text of the speech:

    Writing a New Chapter in Building

    A China-LAC Community with a Shared Future

    Keynote Address by H.E. Xi Jinping

    President of the People’s Republic of China

    At the Opening Ceremony

    Of the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum

    Beijing, May 13, 2025

    Your Excellency President Gustavo Petro,

    Your Excellency President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,

    Your Excellency President Gabriel Boric,

    Your Excellency President Dilma Rousseff,

    Delegates of CELAC Member States,

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    Friends,

    It gives me great pleasure to meet so many old and new friends from Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries in Beijing. On behalf of the Chinese government and people, I extend a warm welcome to you all.

    In 2015, LAC delegates and I attended the opening ceremony of the First Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing, which marked the launch of the China-CELAC Forum. Ten years on, with dedicated nurturing of both sides, the Forum has grown from a tender sapling into a towering tree. This fills me with deep pride and satisfaction.

    Although China and the LAC region are geographically distant, the bonds of our friendship stretch back through centuries. As early as in the 16th century, Nao de China, or “Ships of China,” laden with friendship, shuttled across the Pacific, marking the dawn of interactions and exchanges between China and the LAC region. From the 1960s onward, as New China established diplomatic ties with some LAC countries, exchanges and cooperation between the two sides became closer and closer. Since the turn of the century and in particular in recent years, China and LAC countries have ushered in a historic era of building a shared future.

    We stand shoulder to shoulder and support each other. China appreciates the long-standing commitment of LAC countries that have diplomatic ties with China to the one-China principle. China firmly supports LAC countries in pursuing development paths suited to their national conditions, safeguarding sovereignty and independence, and opposing external interference. In the 1960s, mass rallies and demonstrations took place across China in support of the Panamanian people’s rightful claim to sovereignty over the Panama Canal. In the 1970s, during the Latin American campaign for 200-nautical-mile maritime rights, China voiced its resolute and unequivocal support for the legitimate demands of developing countries. For 32 consecutive times since 1992, China has consistently voted for the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the U.S. embargo against Cuba.

    We ride the tide of progress together to pursue win-win cooperation. Embracing the trend of economic globalization, China and LAC countries have deepened cooperation in trade, investment, finance, science and technology, infrastructure, and many other fields. Under the framework of high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, the two sides have implemented more than 200 infrastructure projects, creating over a million jobs. The China-LAC satellite cooperation program has set a model for high-tech South-South cooperation. The inauguration of Chancay Port in Peru has established a new land-and-sea connectivity link between Asia and Latin America. China has signed free trade agreements with Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Last year, trade between China and LAC countries exceeded US$500 billion for the first time, an increase of over 40 times from the beginning of this century.

    We unite in tough times to conquer challenges through mutual support. China and LAC countries have collaborated on disaster prevention, mitigation and relief and on joint response to hurricanes, earthquakes and other natural disasters. Since 1993, China has dispatched 38 medical teams to the Caribbean. When the pandemic of the century struck, China was among the first to offer assistance to LAC countries, providing over 300 million doses of vaccines and nearly 40 million units of medical supplies and equipment, and sending multiple teams of medical experts. All this helped protect the lives of hundreds of millions across the region.

    We uphold solidarity and coordination and rise to global challenges with resolve. Together, China and LAC countries champion true multilateralism, uphold international fairness and justice, advance global governance reform, and promote multipolarization of the world and greater democracy in international relations. We have worked together to address global challenges like climate change, and advance progress in global biodiversity governance. China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, which has been endorsed by more than 110 countries, contributing our wisdom and strength to resolving international hotspot issues.

    Facts have shown that China and LAC countries are advancing hand in hand as a community with a shared future. This community of ours is founded upon equality, powered by mutual benefit and win-win, invigorated by openness and inclusiveness, and dedicated to the people’s well-being. It exhibits enduring vitality and holds immense promise.

    Distinguished Delegates,

    Friends,

    The century-defining transformation is accelerating across the globe, with multiple risks compounding one another. Such developments make unity and cooperation among nations indispensable for safeguarding global peace and stability and for promoting global development and prosperity. There are no winners in tariff wars or trade wars. Bullying or hegemonism only leads to self-isolation. China and LAC countries are important members of the Global South. Independence and autonomy are our glorious tradition. Development and revitalization are our inherent right. And fairness and justice are our common pursuit. In the face of seething undercurrents of geopolitical and bloc confrontation and the surging tide of unilateralism and protectionism, China stands ready to join hands with our LAC partners to launch five programs that advance our shared development and revitalization, and contribute to a China-LAC community with a shared future.

    The first is Solidarity Program. China will work with LAC countries to support each other on issues bearing on our respective core interests and major concerns. We must enhance exchanges in all fields, and strengthen communication and coordination on major international and regional issues. In the next three years, to facilitate our exchanges on national governance best practices, China will invite 300 members from political parties of CELAC member states every year to visit China. China supports the efforts by LAC countries in increasing their influence on the multilateral stage. We will work with LAC countries to firmly safeguard the international system with the U.N. at its core and the international order underpinned by international law, and to speak with one voice in international and regional affairs.

    The second is Development Program. China will work with LAC countries to implement the Global Development Initiative. We will resolutely uphold the multilateral trading system, ensure stable, unimpeded global industrial and supply chains, and promote an international environment of openness and cooperation. We should foster greater synergy between our development strategies, expand high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, and bolster cooperation in traditional areas such as infrastructure, agriculture and food, and energy and minerals. We should expand cooperation in emerging areas such as clean energy, 5G telecommunications, the digital economy and artificial intelligence, and carry out the China-LAC Science and Technology Partnership. China will increase imports of quality products from LAC countries, and encourage its enterprises to expand investment in the LAC region. We will provide a RMB66 billion yuan credit line to support LAC countries’ development.

    The third is Civilization Program. China will work with LAC countries to implement the Global Civilization Initiative. We should uphold the vision of equality, mutual learning, dialogue, and inclusiveness between civilizations, and champion humanity’s common values of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom. We should enhance China-LAC civilizational exchanges and mutual learning, including through a conference on China-LAC inter-civilizational dialogue. We should deepen cultural and artistic exchanges and cooperation, and hold the Latin American and Caribbean Arts Season. We should strengthen exchanges and cooperation in cultural heritage fields such as joint archaeological projects, conservation and restoration of ancient and historic sites, and museum exhibitions. We should also carry out collaborative studies of ancient civilizations and enhance cooperation to combat illicit trafficking of cultural property.

    The fourth is Peace Program. China will work with LAC countries to implement the Global Security Initiative. China supports the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace and the Declaration of Member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The two sides should cooperate more closely in disaster governance, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, anti-corruption, narcotics control and combating transnational organized crime so as to safeguard security and stability in the region. China will organize law enforcement training programs tailored to the needs of CELAC member states, and do our best to provide equipment assistance.

    The fifth is People-to-People Connectivity Program. In the next three years, China will provide CELAC member states with 3,500 government scholarships, 10,000 training opportunities in China, 500 International Chinese Language Teachers Scholarships, 300 training opportunities for poverty reduction professionals, and 1,000 funded placements through the Chinese Bridge program. We will initiate 300 “small and beautiful” livelihood projects, actively promote vocational education cooperation programs such as Luban Workshop, and support CELAC member states in developing Chinese language education. We will also launch an exhibition of Chinese films and TV programs under The Bond, and work with LAC countries to translate and introduce 10 premium TV dramas and audiovisual programs annually to each other. China will host the China-LAC tourism dialogue with LAC countries. To facilitate friendly exchanges, China has decided to implement a visa exemption for five LAC countries as the first step, and will expand this policy coverage at proper times.

    Distinguished Delegates,

    Friends,

    As an 11th-century Chinese poet wrote, “Life’s greatest joy comes from finding kindred spirits.” Latin America has a similar proverb which goes, “The one who has a friend has a treasure.” No matter how the world changes, China will always stand by LAC countries as a good friend and a good partner. Let us march forward together on our paths toward modernization, working together to write a new chapter in building a China-LAC community with a shared future.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi unveils roadmap for deepening cooperation with LAC countries

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum and delivers a keynote speech at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    BEIJING, May 13 — Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday announced the launch of five programs to advance shared development and revitalization with Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries.

    The five programs, ranging from solidarity, development and civilization to peace and people-to-people connectivity, were announced by Xi when delivering a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing.

    In 2015, Xi and LAC delegates attended the opening ceremony of the first ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing, which marked the launch of the forum.

    On Solidarity Program, Xi said China is willing to strengthen solidarity with LAC countries and continue to support each other on issues concerning their core interests and major concerns, to firmly safeguard the international system with the U.N. at its core and the international order underpinned by international law, and to speak with one voice in international and regional affairs.

    In the next three years, China will invite 300 members from political parties of CELAC member states every year to visit China to facilitate exchanges on national governance best practices, Xi said.

    On Development Program, China is willing to work with LAC countries to implement the Global Development Initiative, resolutely uphold the multilateral trading system, ensure stable, unimpeded global industrial and supply chains, and promote an international environment of openness and cooperation, Xi said.

    Noting that the two sides should foster greater synergy between their development strategies and expand high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, Xi said China will import more quality products from LAC countries and encourage Chinese enterprises to expand their investment in the region.

    On Civilization Program, Xi called for joint implementation of the Global Civilization Initiative. He said both sides should uphold the vision of equality, mutual learning, dialogue, and inclusiveness between civilizations, champion humanity’s common values of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy and freedom, and enhance China-LAC civilizational exchanges and mutual learning, including through a conference on China-LAC inter-civilizational dialogue.

    On Peace Program, Xi called for joint implementation of the Global Security Initiative. He said both sides should cooperate more closely in disaster governance, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, anti-corruption, narcotics control and combating transnational organized crime so as to safeguard security and stability in the region.

    On People-to-People Connectivity Program, Xi said in the next three years, China will provide CELAC member states with 3,500 government scholarships, 10,000 training opportunities in China, 500 International Chinese Language Teachers Scholarships, 300 training opportunities for poverty reduction professionals, and 1,000 funded placements through the Chinese Bridge program, initiate 300 “small and beautiful” livelihood projects, and support CELAC member states in developing Chinese language education.

    China has decided to offer a visa-free policy to five LAC countries, and will expand the policy to cover more regional countries in due course, Xi said.

    Gustavo Petro, president of Colombia, the CELAC rotating chair, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Chilean President Gabriel Boric, and Dilma Rousseff, president of the New Development Bank and former Brazilian president, addressed the event respectively.

    Special representative of Yamandu Orsi, president of Uruguay, the incoming CELAC rotating chair, read out the president’s congratulatory letter.

    Faced with a world full of uncertainties, LAC countries and China should work together to promote continuous new progress in building a community with a shared future, they said.

    Both sides should respect each other and firmly support each other in safeguarding sovereignty and choosing their own development path, they said, calling for strengthening the synergy between the development strategies of LAC countries and the Belt and Road Initiative, and promoting cooperation in trade, investment, infrastructure, agriculture, science and technology, new energy and education.

    The two sides should also promote exchanges and dialogues among civilizations, safeguard the authority of the U.N., support multilateralism and free trade, and oppose unilateralism, protectionism, power politics and bullying to safeguard the common interests of the Global South, they added.

    Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum and delivers a keynote speech at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Chinese President Xi Jinping poses for a group photo with guests attending the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. Xi attended the opening ceremony of the meeting and delivered a keynote speech. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum and delivers a keynote speech at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Chinese President Xi Jinping and guests attend the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. Xi delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the meeting. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Chinese President Xi Jinping and guests attend the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. Xi delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the meeting. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Colombian President Gustavo Petro, also rotating president of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Chilean President Gabriel Boric delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Dilma Rousseff, president of the New Development Bank and former Brazilian president, delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Africa – Speak Up Africa galvanizes private sector engagement to accelerate malaria-elimination efforts in Africa

    SOURCE: Speak Up Africa

    The agreement builds on a five-year collaboration between Speak Up Africa and Canal+ Group, which has contributed more than $1.5 million in airtime and in-kind support

    ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast, May 13, 2025/ — On the sidelines of the Africa CEO Forum, Speak Up Africa (www.SpeakUpAfrica.org), in collaboration with the RBM Partnership to End Malaria, the African Leaders Malaria Alliance (ALMA), and Malaria No More UK, launched the Francophone chapter of the Change the Story campaign and unveiled a new report, Change the Story, Save Lives: The Private Sector’s Role in Ending Malaria.  

    The campaign aims to amplify the voices of women and girls and mobilize the African private sector to accelerate malaria elimination. With the upcoming Global Fund 8th Replenishment and rising funding gaps, 2025 represents a critical moment to unlock new resources and scale up impact.

    “This is your moment to co-invest for impact, because when Africa’s private sector leads, the world pays attention,” said Dr. Michael Adekunle Charles, CEO of the RBM Partnership to End Malaria. “The Global Fund has saved millions of lives and strengthened health systems. Your investments now can safeguard both economic resilience and public health.”

    The accompanying report calls on businesses to:

    Provide direct or in-kind support to national malaria control efforts

    Channel resources into the Global Fund’s 8th Replenishment

    Join End Malaria Councils to drive multisectoral advocacy and resource mobilization

    Invest in the new Voix EssentiELLEs Fund for Malaria Elimination, focused on women-led, community-driven efforts.

    Africa’s fight against malaria needs to be bold and the private sector is a vital partner in that mission.” said Joy Phumaphi, Executive Secretary of ALMA and Board Chair of the RBM Partnership to End Malaria “By joining End Malaria Councils and Funds and investing in community-led solutions, companies can unlock the innovations and resources needed to deliver impact, protect lives, power economies, and achieve a malaria-free future.”

    Launched during the event, the Voix EssentiELLEs Fund for Malaria Elimination aims to mobilize $4 million by 2030 to support flexible malaria funding for women and girls, and regional advocacy aligned with national priorities.

    “To avoid losing years of progress in the fight against malaria, securing new and diversified sources of funding is urgent,” said Pierre N’gou Dimba, Minister of Health, Public Hygiene and Universal Health Coverage of Côte d’Ivoire. “The private sector has a direct stake in malaria elimination. Healthy communities lead to thriving economies.”

    Women and girls continue to carry the greatest burden of malaria, yet remain underrepresented in decision-making and funding. “Investing in women and girls accelerates development. Women leaders strengthen communities, drive innovation, and help lift families out of poverty. And we know that for every $1 invested in malaria control, we gain up to $60 in economic returns. Malaria-free communities are not just healthier, they are more resilient, productive, and profitable” said Yacine Djibo, Executive Director of Speak Up Africa.  

    A 2024 study found that reducing malaria incidence by 90% by 2030 could boost the continent’s GDP by $126.9 billion. Malaria is not just a health issue, it is an economic barrier that weakens productivity, drives household spending, and constrains growth.

    As part of Speak Up Africa’s ongoing work with the private sector, the organization signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Canal+ Côte d’Ivoire and the National Malaria Control Program. The agreement builds on a five-year collaboration between Speak Up Africa and Canal+ Group, which has contributed more than $1.5 million in airtime and in-kind support.

    “Through our platform, we are proud to drive awareness and contribute to the fight against malaria,” said Adama Koné, Director General of Canal+ Côte d’Ivoire. “Together with Speak Up Africa and their partners, we are committed to changing the story to end malaria in Africa.”

    Download (apo-opa.co/44Dl9bq) the ‘Change the Story, Save Lives: The private sector’s role in ending malaria’ Report (https://apo-opa.co/3EZagGp).

    Media Contact:
    Maelle Ba
    maelle.ba@speakupafrica.org

    Speak Up Africa:
    Speak Up Africa is an African-led, Senegal-based organization dedicated to building an Africa where growth and sustainable development are driven by Africa’s own citizens. Speak Up Africa convenes, enables and advocates. Focusing on strategic communications and advocacy, the organization is dedicated to supporting African leaders and citizens to take an active role in identifying and developing solutions to tackle the challenges facing the African continent — including malaria, NTDs, immunization, sanitation, gender equality and global health research and development. From its strategic base in Dakar, Senegal, the Speak Up Africa team partners with African leaders and change-makers to put in place the right policies and secure sufficient resources to achieve our sustainable development goals and the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

    MIL OSI – Submitted News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Türkiye – P10_TA(2025)0092 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

    –  having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

    –  having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation(1) (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

    –  having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

    –  having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

    –  having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

    –  having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

    –  having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

    –  having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

    –  having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Türkiye’ (COM(2024)0593),

    –  having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

    –  having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

    –  having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

    –  having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

    –  having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

    –  having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

    –  having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye(2), of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey(3), and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks(4),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide(6),

    –  having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey(7), of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye(8) and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye(9),

    –  having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

    A.  whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

    B.  whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

    C.  whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

    D.  whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

    E.  whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36,7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

    F.  whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

    G.  whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

    H.  whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

    I.  whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

    J.  whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

    K.  whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

    L.  whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

    M.  whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

    N.  whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

    O.  whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

    P.  whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

    Q.  whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

    R.  whereas in March 2025 the Turkish Government spent at least USD 10 billion of its currency reserves to counteract the collapse of its financial markets and the devaluation of the lira caused by its decision to arrest and detain Mayor of Istanbul and prominent opposition politician Ekrem İmamoğlu; whereas the Turkish Government’s undermining of Turkish democracy and the rule of law creates an unfavourable environment for foreign direct investment and hence weakens the Turkish economy, with grave consequences for the socio-economic situation of Turkish citizens;

    S.  whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3,1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10 billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

    T.  whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78,2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

    U.  whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians, journalists and human rights defenders, among others;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation but encourages it to review its expectations for engagement in the foreseeable future, in light of the deterioration of democratic standards that has been pushing the country towards an authoritarian model over the past decade, accelerating recently with the politically motivated arrest of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s main political opponent, Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Ekrem İmamoğlu;

    2.  Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

    3.  Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

    4.  Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

    5.  Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

    6.  Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

    The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

    7.  Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

    8.  Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

    9.  Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

    10.  Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

    11.  Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

    12.  Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

    13.  Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

    14.  Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

    15.  Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, and Joakim Medin, Swedish journalist for ETC, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

    16.  Strongly condemns the recent arrest and detention of the Swedish journalist Joakim Medin; reiterates that freedom of the press is a fundamental right and core EU value; strongly condemns the accusations made against Joakim Medin, which are solely based on his journalistic work and therefore demands his immediate and unconditional release and that of other journalists imprisoned for exercising their freedom of speech;

    17.  Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

    18.  Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

    19.  Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; is appalled by the recent filing and acceptance of a new indictment against Selahattin Demirtaş in which the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office asks for up to 15 years of imprisonment and a ban on his political activities on the basis of several speeches he made in 2016; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

    20.  Calls on Türkiye to respect the European Court of Human Rights decision of 24 January 2008, which found Türkiye guilty of breaching Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, due to its failure to locate and prosecute those responsible in the case of the murders of Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou, which were committed in Cyprus in 1996; calls on the Turkish authorities to enforce the international arrest warrants against the murder suspects, and hand them over to the Republic of Cyprus;

    21.  Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners, such as the case of Soydan Akay, who is being unjustly kept imprisoned; calls for his immediate release on humanitarian and health grounds; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

    22.  Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

    23.  Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; condemns in the strongest terms the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that these last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, and the slowdown on social media; condemns the Turkish authorities’ harsh crackdown on the peaceful mass protests, including the detention of nearly 2000 people, many of them students, and the prosecution of hundreds of them through hasty mass trials with a lack of any evidence of criminal wrongdoing; expresses its deep concern over the unlawful arrest of Esila Ayık, a Ghent-based photography student detained on 8 April 2025 during protests in Istanbul, particularly owing to her untreated heart and kidney conditions; calls for the immediate release of all those still in detention and the acquittal of all those prosecuted for exercising their fundamental rights; deplores the arrests, detentions and deportations of local and international journalists covering the protests, in violation of the freedom of the press; urges the Turkish authorities to promptly and effectively investigate all allegations of harassment and excessive use of force against protesters and to uphold the freedom of assembly and protest; considers that the attacks against İmamoğlu constitute a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model; regrets the EU’s lack of a strong, unified response to these alarming developments;

    24.  Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

    25.  Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so-called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes; warns against further encroachments on women’s rights, as exemplified by Türkiye’s recent ban on elective caesarean sections at private medical centres without medical justification, which constitutes an unacceptable infringement on women’s bodily autonomy;

    26.  Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

    27.  Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

    28.  Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

    Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    29.  Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3,1 million refugees, including 2,9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3,2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

    30.  Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli), should the latter exercise its lawful right to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles into the Aegean Sea, in accordance with Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

    31.  Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

    32.  Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; strongly condemns Türkiye’s attempts to upgrade the secessionist entity’s status in occupied Cyprus, including via the Organisation of Turkic States, and calls on all states to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty according to UNSC resolutions; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

    33.  Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

    34.  Reiterates its deep concern regarding all unilateral actions which aim at entrenching on the ground the permanent division of Cyprus as opposed to its reunification; condemns, in this context, the recent illegal visit of President Erdoğan to the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as his provocative statements, which jeopardise the efforts of the UN, the EU, the international community at large and other parties involved for the resumption of substantial negotiations in the agreed framework; regrets that such unilateral actions are tantamount to a direct illegitimate intervention against the interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities;

    35.  Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

    36.  Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to occupied military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

    37.  Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

    38.  Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

    39.  Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

    40.  Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

    41.  Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

    42.  Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

    43.  Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

    44.  Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

    45.  Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

    46.  Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

    Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

    47.  Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

    48.  Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

    49.  Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

    50.  Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

    51.  Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

    Wider EU-Türkiye relations

    52.  Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points towards a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; recalls, however, that democratic backsliding and non-alignment with the CFSP are not conducive to significant progress being made in that regard; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

    53.  Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, notes that various high-level dialogues (HLDs) were held recently, including the HLD on trade and the HLD on economy, as steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities, on the condition that such cooperation must go hand-in-hand with clear and consistent conditionality grounded in respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental rights, as previously underlined in this resolution;

    54.  Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

    55.  Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member States to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities; regrets, however, the poor oversight on the part of the Commission, exemplified by the Erasmus partnership with Gaziantep Islam Science and Technology University, whose leadership publicly expressed support for terrorist acts; calls on the Commission to ensure that partner universities respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by conducting ex ante verifications and regular controls;

    The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

    56.  Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

    57.  Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement; underlines that such a positive process must be based on and matched by tangible progress in Türkiye as regards CFSP alignment, democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental values;

    58.  Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

    59.  Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

    60.  Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

    61.  Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

    o
    o   o

    62.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

    (1) OJ L 134, 7.5.2014, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/252/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/1760, 22.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1760/oj.
    (3) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 2.
    (4) OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 143.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) OJ C 328, 6.9.2016, p. 2.
    (7) OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 112.
    (8) OJ C, C/2025/206, 14.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/206/oj.
    (9) Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0016.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Socio-economic consequences of the new ‘EU ETS 2’ emissions-trading system – E-000578/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission and the Member States are working towards the timely implementation of the new Emissions Trading System for buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2), which was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2023. This includes regular technical level discussions and exchanges at the political level with all Member States, including Poland.

    The Commission’s impact assessment[1] for the review of the ETS Directive provided a detailed analysis of the socioeconomic impact of ETS2. The impact assessment shows that the ETS2 effects on fuel prices are limited. Furthermore, ETS2 contains strong safeguard mechanisms to avoid prices rising very fast, including a safeguard to delay the start of the system to 2028 in case gas or oil prices are exceptionally high in 2026.

    Europe’s reliance on imported fossil fuels causes energy price volatility and higher supply costs, significantly impacting consumers’ energy bills. To reduce energy costs for consumers in the EU, we need to reduce energy consumption and accelerate the roll-out of renewable energy, which is an effective way to achieve decarbonisation. The Social Climate Fund (SCF), financed by ETS2, aims to ensure that vulnerable households and micro-enterprises will be supported in this transition. The purpose of the SCF is to turn ETS2 into a clearly progressive measure, and to spur green investments that will address the root causes of energy and transport poverty.

    • [1] SWD(2021)0601 final.
    Last updated: 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Rights of the Child Commend Norway on Child Welfare Act, Raise Questions on Proposed Increased Use of Force in Schools and Data on Children with Disabilities

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Rights of the Child today concluded its review of the seventh periodic report of Norway, with Committee Experts commending the State on the new child welfare act, while raising questions about the proposed increased use of force in schools and the lack of data on children with disabilities. 

    Bragi Gudbrandsson, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, commended Norway for the child welfare act which was a wonderful piece of legislation. 

     

    Mr. Gudbrandsson said the Committee was concerned that Norway planned to use stronger force and constraints.  How had the country reached this situation?

    Faith Marshall Harris, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, also emphasised her concern, stating that instead of teachers being trained to de-escalate violence, they were given the power to use more force than police officers.  It seemed that the Government had responded in a knee-jerk reaction to media pressure; however, the situation was more about training teachers to deal with these situations in a non-violent way.  Norway was encouraged to rethink this approach. 

    Thuwayba Al Barwani, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said Norway had excellent data but when it came to disability, there was no disaggregated data to better understand the situation of children with disabilities in the country.  How many of these children lived with their families? How many lived in residential care? How many were receiving support services?  What awareness raising campaigns were in place to remove stigma and educate about disability? 

    What measures were in place to provide quality psychological care for children with mental health disabilities in all municipalities?   

    The delegation said the new education act introduced a broader scope for exercising force and restraint.  Employees could now intervene against pupils when necessary.  Norway shared the Committee’s concerns and had tried to state explicitly in the provision that this was a last resort, with strict measures for physical restriction to take place.  The Government and municipalities focused on the competence of the staff to put pre-emptive measures in place so that physical interventions were a last resort and only used when necessary. 

    The delegation said the Norwegian strategy for equality for all ran until 2030, with an important competence to increase the visibility of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in all municipalities.  In 2025, the Government allocated 280 million kroner for grants for people with disabilities.  Norway could not definitively say how many people with disabilities were living in the country.  A recent report by Statistic Norway, focused on the different definitions of disability, which would hopefully assist the State in future.

    Introducing the report, Lene Vågslid, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, said since the last dialogue with the Committee in 2018, Norway had taken significant steps to further strengthen children’s rights. 

    Last month, the Government presented a proposal for a new children’s act to Parliament, which included a new provision on the child’s right to privacy, and the parents’ responsibility in this regard.  Norway had introduced a range of measures in recent years to develop and improve the child welfare sector, including the new child welfare act, which entered into force in 2023, placing greater emphasis on prevention and helping children and parents as early as possible.  For the first time, a white paper on “Safe digital upbringing” would soon be presented to Parliament to develop policies that empowered and protected children in their digital lives. 

    In closing remarks, Mr. Gudbrandsson said it was clear Norway was on an exciting journey in revisiting the fundamental principles of the Convention, which was reflected in the new legislation, guidelines and action plans; the Committee was very impressed and appreciated these efforts. 

    In her closing remarks, Ms. Vågslid thanked the Committee for the important questions and the dialogue.  Norway aimed to highlight that all sectors were working towards the best possible outcomes for children. 

    The delegation of Norway was comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Children and Families; the Ministry of Culture and Equality; the Ministry of Education and Research; the Ministry of Justice and Public Security; the Ministry of Health Services; the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion; and the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva. 

    Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here. The programme of work of the Committee’s ninety-ninth session and other documents related to the session can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3. pm on Wednesday, 14 May to begin its consideration of the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Indonesia (CRC/C/IDN/5-6).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Norway (CRC/C/NOR/7).

    Presentation of Report

    LENE VÅGSLID, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, said since the last dialogue with the Committee in 2018, Norway had taken significant steps to further strengthen children’s rights.  Fundamental children’s rights were included in the Norwegian Constitution, including that the best interests of the child must be a key consideration, and that children had a right to be heard regarding issues affecting them.  Moreover, the Convention was implemented through the human rights act, meaning it was applied as Norwegian law and prevailed if in conflict with other legislation. 

    Last month, the Government presented a proposal for a new children’s act to Parliament, which included a new provision on the child’s right to privacy, and the parents’ responsibility in this regard.  There were also several amendments to strengthen children’s rights when parents separated, including mandatory mediation for the parents and children. Additionally, the new education act of 2023 applied to all public primary and secondary education and contained general provisions stating that the best interests of pupils should be a fundamental consideration in actions and decisions concerning them. 

    Norway had introduced a range of measures in recent years to develop and improve the child welfare sector, including the new child welfare act, which entered into force in 2023, placing greater emphasis on prevention and helping children and parents as early as possible.  Last month, the Government launched the Quality Improvement Initiative, to give children relying on child welfare services greater predictability and stability. 

    It was only in exceptional cases, and as a matter of last resort, that the best interest of the child could lead to children being separated from their parents.  From 2023, children in health institutions had the right to be accompanied by a parent or guardian throughout their stay.  Families who had a child with a serious illness, injury or disability now had a right to a coordinator.  The Government also recently decided to incorporate the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities into the human rights act. 

    Since 2022, Norway had offered collective protection to around 90,000 refugees from Ukraine, many of them children.  The State had also increased the earmarked budget line for strengthened child expertise in asylum reception centres, and the County Governor’s supervision of unaccompanied minors was increased.  A national strategy for children in low-income families (2020-2023) was put forward in 2020 and renewed in 2024, aiming to strengthen the economy of low-income families and reduce economic barriers to kindergartens and after-school programmes. 

    In 2023, the Government introduced a “youth guarantee” which ensured young people close follow-up and individual support.  Since 2022, a cross-sector initiative called the Core Group for Vulnerable Children and Youth coordinated efforts across eight ministries and 14 agencies to address the needs of at-risk children.  Two weeks ago, Norway launched a national mission on the inclusion of children in education, work and societal life, with the key goal of reducing exclusion among children by 2035. 

    For the first time, a white paper on “Safe digital upbringing” would soon be presented to Parliament to develop policies that empowered and protected children in their digital lives.  Norway had also, for the first time, established a Ministry of Digitalisation, working closely together on children’s behalf.  Norway had high ambitions for all its children and was committed to advancing their well-being.  Ms. Vågslid concluded by commending the important role played by the United Nations treaty bodies in improving States’ implementation of human rights. 

    TORMOD C. ENDRESEN, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said Norway was looking forward to doing a deep dive with the Committee on the Rights of the Child in the country.  He then introduced the Norwegian delegation. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said the Committee was aware of Norway’s exemplary record in children’s rights, being the first country to incorporate the Convention into domestic legislation, and the first in the world to establish the position of Ombudsman for children.  For this reason, the Committee would do its best to give Norway a critical appraisal. 

    The Government of Norway had been criticised in the law-making process, including the lack of a child rights assessment impact, and that children’s views were not included in the process of lawmaking.  It was understood that steps had been taken to address this; could the delegation share these with the Committee?  Could some examples be provided?  How was it ensured that the public administration act contributed to strong policies for children?  It was interesting that Norway had not yet formulated a comprehensive implementation plan for the Convention on a national, regional or sectoral basis. Could the delegation comment on this? 

    Norway was commended for collaboration between the Ministries and the Core Group for Vulnerable People.  Had it addressed the discrepancies in resources between the different municipalities? Had a strategy been devised in this regard?  Were children regularly consulted by the Core Group?  Norway currently did not collect disaggregated data which was of concern to the Committee.  Could the State use a safeguard strategy, rather than simply not collecting the statistics?  How did the State address the concerns of unaccompanied minors in reception centres? What was the status of amendments to the legal aid act?  To what extent were local politicians aware of the Committee’s observations since 2018? What was being done to improve this situation?  How were the concluding observations applied in the Government? 

    Mr. Gudbrandsson commended Norway for the child welfare act which was a wonderful piece of legislation.  The lack of participation of children in Norway was of concern, with many pieces of legislation being implemented without children having a chance to provide their views.  Were steps being taken to follow-up the child welfare act to ensure children were heard? Was there a possibility to accommodate the views of the children during child abuse cases through the Barnahus model? Would the State consider the age limit for accessing Barnahus services to 18?  It was important to provide young offenders with inappropriate sexual behaviour with good therapy, and Norway was commended for thinking about this.  The Committee welcomed the State’s action plan to address violence against children.  Had an evaluation of the previous plans been conducted?  How had this impacted the new plan? 

    The Committee was concerned that Norway planned to use stronger force and constraints.  How had the country reached this situation? Would Norway ban child marriages completely without any exceptions?  There was a lack of specific prohibition of the sale and sexual exploitation of children; could this be explained? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, said Norway’s high-level delegation present before the Committee highlighted the country’s commitment to human rights.  Norway was an exemplary country in so many ways.  Why did discrimination still persist in such an egalitarian community, particularly when it came to Sami, migrant, asylum and refugee children? Where did the root causes lie? Were there any plans to diminish the levels of discrimination seen against children? 

    All State practices in Norway kept the best interests of the child in mind.  However, there were certain cases where questions arose. Was there an instrument for local and national authorities for this purpose?  How could the best interest of the child be reconciled with chemical restraints or practices of confinement?  How was it assessed whether the best interests of the children involved were satisfied? 

    If a child needed to be removed from their family, was there a protocol in place to ensure that the best interests of the child were still respected?  How was the situation of brothers and sisters assessed and the impact on children’s mental health?  Was there sufficient information to provide a solution to deportation or family reunification as it pertained to refugees?  How did “extended detention” reconcile with the best interests of the child?

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the proposed children’s act strengthened the rights of all children in Norway and put their safety first, with the best interests of the child always considered most important.  The act aimed to facilitate the child’s contact with both parents and reduce conflict in situations of separation of parents.  The new act also included special provisions for cases of abuse of children.

    Norway placed a great emphasis on human rights and had implemented human rights conventions in the national law; in case of conflict, the conventions would prevail.  Norway’s Parliament had considered the ratification of the third Optional Protocol on several occasions, most recently in 2022, but given several reservations expressed, had voted not to implement it by an 80 per cent majority.  Given that recent decision, the Government was currently not considering ratifying the third Optional Protocol.  The Government remained adamant to develop a national complaints procedure and had taken steps in this regard.  A child-friendly website had been designed, allowing children to access the complaints procedure more easily. 

    The participation of children was becoming an increasingly valued part of Norway’s decision-making process.  The right to be heard was enshrined in the Constitution, and there were now established youth councils and mandated conversations with the Government and youth-oriented non-governmental organizations.  In March this year, the Government developed and clarified the role of the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family which would now oversee all aspects pertaining to children and participation, and provide guidance to the public sector in this regard. 

    There were many national complaints bodies in Norway which had the competence to handle complaints concerning children.  Several measures had been taken to strengthen children’s right to complain. Politicians at all levels were responsible for following Norwegian law in all their decisions, and the Convention was part of Norwegian law.  Politicians received a copy of the Convention on the first day of work and an informative poster.  All general comments made by the Committee were published on the Government’s website in Norwegian and English. 

    The Norwegian Human Rights Institution had created a guide on children’s rights which was available online.  Since 2018, it was forbidden to enter a marriage with someone under 18 in Norway, and from this year, foreign marriages of a person under the age of 18 were not recognised. 

    In April, a bill was submitted to parliament for a new administrative procedural act.  The legal aid act stipulated the right to free legal aid for natural citizens, including minors.  The Norwegian Barnahus model was evaluated in 2021, with the system seeming to work well and in accordance with international conventions.  The Government aimed to strengthen the legal protection of child suspects, including around interrogation of minors. The evaluation of the Barnahus model did not delve further into the proposal to raise the age for access to services to 18. 

    Residents in asylum reception centres took part in an information programme about the Norwegian society and its fundamental values.  The objective was to help residents take care of their own living situations and also inform them of their rights.  In cases of expulsion, an extended right to free legal aid was granted. 

    In recent years, Norway had taken significant steps to strengthen the child welfare services through policies, research, and financial commitments.  The child welfare services aimed to do everything within their power to allow children to live at home.  The municipalities were vital in this regard.  In Norway, around 54,000 children and adolescents received help from child welfare services annually.  The new child welfare act entered into force in 2023, and children were provided with additional rights, including speaking to child welfare authorities without parental consent.  The new participation regulation came into force in 2024 and clarified the duty of the child welfare services to provide child participation in cases.  Norway was working to improve the system, including through evaluating the new rules, developing more child friendly processes, and ensuring access to qualified legal representation to children, among other measures.   

    Norway had been working hard on foster homes; nine out of 10 children living in alternative care lived in foster homes.  Several measures had been launched to improve the situation of foster parents, including for them to be given clearer decision-making authority.  Children who had lived in a foster home for at least two years could be proposed a permanent residence in the home, if the aim of reunification had been abandoned.  The State was currently investing in models for foster homes for siblings. 

    The responsibility of the treatment and follow-up of intersex children was assigned to two hospitals, and necessary medical treatment was initiated when relevant. Treatment practices in Norway were aligned with the rest of the Nordic countries.    Norway did not collect any data or statistics based on the ethnicity of the population.  The Government was strengthening and renewing its efforts to combat hate and discrimination based on ethnicity and religion, and had delivered four action plans, including against anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim racism and hate speech, as well as discrimination against the Sami.  A study showed that a high number of children with ethnic backgrounds had experienced racism. 

    The kindergarten act and education act stated that children had the right to an education free from discrimination.  The new education act introduced a broader scope for exercising force and restraint. Employees could now intervene against pupils when necessary.  Norway shared the Committee’s concerns and had tried to state explicitly in the provision that this was a last resort, with strict measures for physical restriction to take place.   

    Several guidelines had been produced by the immigration service and the appeals board on how to hear children in the case-handling process.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    THUWAYBA AL BARWANI, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, acknowledged the hard work Norway had put into the strategy of equality for persons with disabilities 2020 to 2030.  How had the strategy helped mitigate the discrimination of vulnerable children? What interventions were envisaged to address access to services for children with disabilities to ensure their rights were upheld?  The Committee had heard reports of abuse of children with psychosocial disabilities, particularly girls.  What measures had been taken to address this problem?  To what extent did these children know their rights?  Was the State party making efforts to give them opportunities to be heard and their views taken into account? 

    There had been violations found in 76 per cent of respite homes; how was the Government planning to regulate these homes?  Were there efforts to reduce and phase out these institutions and replace them with more community-based care? 

    Norway had excellent data but when it came to disability, there was no disaggregated data to better understand the situation of children with disabilities in the country. How many of these children lived with their families?  How many lived in residential care?  How many were receiving support services?  What awareness raising campaigns were in place to remove stigma and educate about disability? 

    What measures were in place to provide quality psychological care for children with mental health disabilities in all municipalities?   

    The Committee had received reports that children without resident permits could not be seen by a general practitioner, and could only receive emergency health care, which was of concern.  Was the Government planning to change this practice?  The Committee welcomed Norway’s commitment to protect intersex children from violence; however, it was concerned that unnecessary irreversible surgeries had been performed on intersex children without their informed consent.  Was this the case?  Had data been collected on these practices?  Had there been redress for these children?  How was the Government planning to protect children from these practices?  What measures did the Government have to combat family poverty?  What additional measures were in place to improve the living conditions of children in municipal housing? 

    FAITH MARSHALL HARRIS, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said Norway had been the envy of the world in terms of the environment and had an incredible record. Why was the State now granting more licenses for gas and extraction and exports?  The Committee was concerned about this change of direction.  Why was the State turning its back on the commitments made in the Paris Agreement?  Why was Norway undermining its incredible heritage in this direction?  Given the fact that this was so important to the lives of children, was there a mechanism in place for consulting them on these major decisions?

    Children with disabilities in Svalbard could not receive special education and had to move with their parents to the mainland; could more information be provided on this? The use of force by teachers in the classroom against disruptive pupils was concerning and seemed to escalate violence. Instead of teachers being trained to de-escalate violence, they were given the power to use more force than police officers.  It seemed that the Government had responded in a knee-jerk reaction to media pressure; however, the situation was more about training teachers to deal with these situations in a non-violent way.  Norway was encouraged to rethink this approach. 

    Could Norway provide more information about programmes and strategies for the Sami people?  Had Norway developed a national referral mechanism for trafficking?  Was legal representation available to children from the very start of an investigation?  How were children who had come out of warzones being rehabilitated? 

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, asked what services children with challenging behaviours were entitled to by law? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, asked how children were heard in cases where the State legally granted a sex change?  Had a legal definition of statelessness been adopted? What mechanisms existed to protect children who had been exposed on the internet?  Did children deprived of liberty receive information on their rights?

    A Committee Expert said Norway did not participate in the ministerial conference on ending violence against children; was there a specific reason for this? 

    Another Expert asked about the Norwegian children’s act.  When would this be finished?  How much were children involved in that act? 

    An Expert asked what was being done to prevent violence against children, including risks in the digital environment?  How was the birth declaration of refugee or stateless individuals conducted?  What was being done to support those parents?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said children’s rights would always be work in progress; it was important to evolve and improve.  Children in Norway were among the highest users of screens, social media and digital technology globally.  How could the State protect them in their everyday life?  This was a difficult problem to solve. 

    The work with the Core Group for Vulnerable Children and Youth started in 2021.  There was a need for a better cross-sectoral collaboration to ensure children, youth and their families received the necessary support and follow-up.  The Core Group was comprised of representatives from seven ministries. Last year, the Core Group was evaluated, with conclusions finding that it was well established.  The Core Group did not consult children directly in its work. 

    To combat complex forms of discrimination, it was important to apply a cross-sectional approach when developing legislation.  The action plan to combat hate speech and discrimination against the Sami was launched in January this year, and included 32 measures under headings such as dialogue, democracy, safety and security, among others.  Many valuable inputs from those concerned had been received, including from young people, as well as the Sami Parliament, which was actively involved in the development of the plan.

    The Norwegian strategy for equality for all ran until 2030, with an important competence to increase the visibility of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in all municipalities.  In 2025, the Government allocated 280 million kroner for grants for persons with disabilities.  Norway could not definitively say how many persons with disabilities were living in the country.  A recent report by Statistic Norway focused on the different definitions of disability, which would hopefully assist the State in the future.

    Every year, the Government submitted a forward-looking white paper to the Sami Parliament.  The Government aimed to get more qualified teachers in Sami schools and kindergartens.  The lack of Sami language competence was the biggest challenge to provide good services to the Sami population.  The Government had financed a school programme to assist students with a Roma background to complete primary and secondary education.  The unique framework of the Svalbard community determined what services could be provided.  It was not possible to ensure all needs could be met in the archipelago as on the mainland, including the educational offering, particularly special education, which required a tailored, individual approach.  Any additional needs needed to be met on the mainland. 

    The education act and the private school act that clarified employees to use physical interventions, included an obligation to prevent physical intervention from occurring. The Government and municipalities focused on the competence of the staff to put pre-emptive measures in place so that physical interventions were a last resort and only used when necessary. Schools should have an environment where all students thrived and benefited from education, including those who exhibited disruptive behaviours.  The solutions for these students needed to be adapted to each individual pupil.  This year, the Norwegian Government had allocated money to municipalities to address these issues.   

    Minors who came to Norway alone were a particularly vulnerable group and given high priority. In 2022, an independent evaluation of minors in asylum reception centres was conducted to ensure they received the necessary care, and violations were detected in several centres.  In 2025, the Government increased the funding of independent supervision and funding in several reception centres.  Norway worked systematically to improve the care provided to children in reception centres.  It was mandatory for reception centres to have routines in place to handle violence against children, with staff required to report any violent behaviour to relevant authorities.  The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration had instructed follow-up procedures for minor asylum seekers who may be victims of human trafficking, violence or child marriage. The Directorate of Immigration had developed specific action cards for the reception centres, for each of these specific issues.

    The Directorate of Immigration required that cooperation resident councils were established within asylum centres to ensure residents could express their views on the operation of the centre.  When applying for protection, all unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors were offered an asylum interview, either in person or online.  Clear child-friendly guidelines had been prepared on interviewing children which needed to be followed by police units.  The Immigration Appeal Board heard children orally if deemed necessary.  It was rare for children to be involved in the Board meetings.  Child hearings were conducted orally by the local police in Norway. The police had received guidance on how to hear children in a child-friendly manner. 

    A person charged with a criminal offence who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense would only be sentenced to preventive detention in extraordinary circumstances. Unfortunately, there were cases where the court had found there were no alternative ways to safeguard public security. In light of the recommendation from the Committee, the Norwegian Government was monitoring this situation. 

    Human trafficking was a grave violation of human rights and a crime with serious consequences. The level of trafficking was low in Norway.  The Government had decided to release a strategy on trafficking in human beings which would be presented in 2025.  Training to detect victims of torture and trafficking was of utmost importance; a national guideline was published in this regard in 2023.  There were several provisions in the criminal procedure act which granted the right to a publicly appointed defence council, which was an unconditional right if the individual was a minor at the time of the offence. 

    More than 89 per cent of children in Norway participated in kindergartens.  The Government’s strategy to 2030 aimed to ensure all children could participate in high quality kindergartens, regardless of where they lived and their financial situation.  The Government had taken steps in 2024 to reduce the price of kindergarten places, significantly lowering barriers for families to enrol their children in kindergartens.  Children of minority backgrounds had lower levels of enrolment.  Children in asylum reception centres were not entitled to a place in kindergarten, but grants were provided to assist them in this regard. 

    Municipalities were strengthening formal competence in education.  School absenteeism could have many different courses and the severity of cases varied.  Absenteeism early in the school year could have significant consequences for pupils. The Government was strengthening efforts to prevent students from developing school absenteeism.

    The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ project was an important measure to ensure the Convention was implemented throughout the whole country. A guide had been created to help the municipalities understand and implement the Convention, and films and other materials had been made to increase the understanding of using the Convention in practice. 

    Children and young people would have to live with the climate, and the decisions made today would affect their future.  It was crucial to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Norway was contributing to this effort by striving to complete its own climate goals and it collaborated with the European Union in this regard.  The Government involved children and young people in the development of the climate policy.  An agreement had been reached which safeguarded the rights of reindeer herders. The State had taken a responsibility to ensure that reindeer herders could utilise additional land for winter grazing.  Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the supply of gas from Norway to Europe had helped free Europe from Russian gas.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    FAITH MARSHALL HARRIS, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, congratulated Norway on the outcome for the reindeer herders.  The issues of violence and bullying in schools was an increasing worldwide phenomenon which had reached even Norway.  Did Norway consider that the socialisation in schools needed to increase?  What would be done about this?  Was the issue of displacement among indigenous peoples being addressed?  Was their free, prior and informed consent being obtained for development activities? 

    A Committee Expert asked if the Immigration Appeals Board had an administrative and judicial competency?  What kind of appeals did it hear?  Were there age assessment appeals before this Board?  How was the right of children to be heard guaranteed if the Board did not hear children directly?  Did the Board hear appeals from detention conditions?  Was there mandatory reporting with regards to the best interest of the child?  Did permanency only apply to children in residential care or those in all care settings?

    Another Expert said developing countries were most vulnerable to the impact of greenhouse gases. What was Norway doing for those countries? 

    A Committee Expert asked if children in Norway had been consulted regarding the ratification of the third Optional Protocol?  Norway should be commended regarding its commitment to the landmine treaty, as landmines were some of the worst arms affecting children.  Did the State plan to take a stronger stance?

    Another Committee Expert asked if there were positive parenting programmes in place in Norway? How was artificial intelligence used in Norway and how did the State protect children from its threats? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, asked why Norway did not feel the need to have a differentiated response between the ages of 15 to 18? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said three quarters of the country’s child and adolescent mental health services had implemented cognitive behaviour therapies to address trauma.  The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision conducted nationwide inspections of children in respite homes between 2022 and 2023, and had provided several recommendations, with follow-up measures now initiated.  Since 1991, Norway had implemented a reform for the care of people with developmental disabilities, with the goal to phase out institutional care.  Data showed that almost 20,000 children had received one or more municipal care services. 

    Children with disabilities should be treated equally and protected against discrimination. The Ombudsman for Children played an important role in raising awareness about children’s rights.  Illegal substance use among children and young people in Norway was relatively low.  However, there had been a concerning increase in cocaine use among young men and boys.  The Government was particularly focused on preventing substance use among children and young people.  Most children and young people in Norway reported a good quality of life and satisfaction; however, there had been an increase of poor self-mental health diagnosis among young people in Norway, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic. The Government aimed to ensure that everyone had access to good quality, low-threshold mental health services, and municipal capacities had been developed in this regard.

    Combatting violence against children was a high priority for the Norwegian Government and a national action plan had been developed.  A whitepaper on safe digital upbringing would soon be submitted to Parliament.  The development of social media was being debated, and Norway was assessing an age limit for social media services.  Most social media services were not developed with children’s wellbeing in mind. Children of any age could refuse a parent sharing videos or photos of them on social media.

    In cases of separation, parents should have shared daily authority as a general rule, to safeguard the child’s right to family life and reduce conflict.  Norway had a free and low threshold counselling service for families to prevent disputes.  The Norwegian Directorate of Children and Youth offered a wealth of online resources for parents to help them navigate different aspects of parenting. 

    The Government had proposed legislative amendments to ensure foster parents could be given direct authority to make decisions on behalf of the child.  Foster parents were given the right to appeal the decision to move a child.  The child welfare act regulated follow-up between parents and monitored the child’s development. 

    Children could be placed in child welfare institutions if they had serious behavioural problems; this was the case for approximately 20 per cent of children residing in these institutions.  The State had a duty to ensure these children received the necessary care and help required. 

    Norway’s housing allowance had been strengthened in 2024 and 2025 to help those struggling in the housing market.  The Government had strengthened the grants scheme for the inclusion of children and youth. Policies targeted newly arrived refugees and immigrants who had lived in Norway for years, to increase their access to the labour market.   

    The Government had initiated a series of measures to improve the school environment and was further strengthening this effort.  Studies showed that pupils who did not use their phones in school hours experienced less bullying, and for this reason there was a directive for schools to keep school-hours mobile free.  Schools and kindergartens had an obligation to act if a child was experiencing bullying.

    An age assessment was considered during the asylum decision.  It was not the case that the Immigration Appeal Board never heard the child. When it was assessed that the case was sufficiently informed, the Board could decide on the case without a hearing. Usually, it was assessed that the case was sufficiently informed, as the child had previously been heard through an asylum-seeking interview.  The detention of children was only used to carry out an immediate pending return. Minors above 16 years old could be granted a resident permit if they reached the age of 18.  This was important to reduce the number of asylum-seeking minors embarking on dangerous journeys to Norway and Europe.  There were special penal sentences in place for juvenile offenders.

    Norway regretted the decision of some countries to withdraw from the mine ban treaty and had no plans to withdraw. 

    Gender affirming treatment was not provided to intersex children based on this diagnosis alone; it was only after a diagnosis of gender dysmorphia where treatment could be received, following years of monitoring.  Surgeries were not performed on the psychosocial indications of intersex children.  The last time this occurred was several decades ago. 

    When giving birth in Norway, most births took place in a hospital, where the birth was then registered.  If the birth took place at home without a doctor or midwife present, it was up to the mother to report the birth within one month. 

    Closing Remarks

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, appreciated the rich, comprehensive information shared by the delegation.  It was clear Norway was on an exciting journey in revisiting the fundamental principles of the Convention, which was reflected in the new legislation, guidelines and action plans; the Committee was very impressed and appreciated these efforts.  The proposal to expand the use of force in schools and residential care was of concern to the Committee and it was hoped this would be carefully considered before being enacted. 

    LENE VÅGSLID, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the important questions and the dialogue.  Norway had seen a rise in the exclusion of children which it wished to turn around.  The proposed children’s act aimed to secure the child’s right to family life, provided it was in their best interest.  Norway aimed to highlight that all sectors were working towards the best possible outcomes for children.  Norway looked forward to receiving the Committee’s concluding observations.

    SOPIO KILADZE, Committee Chair, thanked Norway for the dialogue and for acknowledging the challenges faced by the country.  The concluding observations would contain recommendations to make Norway a better place for children.  Ms. Kiladze extended warm regards on behalf of the Committee to the children of Norway.

    ___________

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    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

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    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Addressing menstrual poverty in the EU – 13-05-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Menstrual poverty, defined as insufficient access to menstrual hygiene products and facilities, affects an estimated 10 % of the half of the EU population who menstruate, with a higher prevalence among people with a low income, refugees, young people, and people with disabilities. Studies from Belgium, France, Germany, and Spain highlight the economic burden menstruation imposes, particularly on vulnerable persons. The COVID 19 pandemic exacerbated this issue by disrupting supply chains and intensifying financial strains. To address menstrual poverty, the European Union has facilitated access to menstrual hygiene products primarily through fiscal reform. The revision of the EU VAT Directive introduced greater flexibility for Member States to apply reduced or zero VAT rates to female sanitary products, shifting their classification from luxury to essential goods. Practices remain quite divergent, with some Member States, such as Ireland, Cyprus and Malta, adopting a zero rate, while others, such as Hungary, Sweden and Denmark, maintain standard rates. EU funding programmes such as Erasmus+ and ESF+ have indirectly supported menstrual health initiatives through education, social inclusion, and material assistance projects. Partnerships with non-governmental organisations, such as the Red Cross, have helped distribute products to marginalised groups. Likewise, numerous local initiatives in Member States increasingly provide free menstrual products in schools, universities, and public spaces. The European Parliament recognises menstrual poverty as a gender equality issue and calls for greater access to free menstrual products. Members continue to urge Member States and the European Commission to introduce concrete initiatives to combat period poverty.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Commission, executive agencies and European Development Funds – P10_TA(2025)0077 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section III – Commission,

    –  having regard to its decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budgets of the executive agencies for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0074/2025),

    A.  whereas the eleventh EDF has reached its final stage as its sunset clause came into effect on 31 December 2020; whereas, however, specific contracts for existing financing agreements were signed until 31 December 2023, and the implementation of the ongoing projects funded by the EDF will continue until their final completion;

    B.  whereas the ninth, tenth and eleventh(1) EDFs were not incorporated into the Union general budget and continue to be implemented and reported on separately until their closure;

    C.  whereas, for the 2021-2027 MFF, development cooperation aid to ACP countries is integrated in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI-Global Europe’) as part of the EU general budget, and development cooperation aid to OCTs, including Greenland, has been incorporated into the Decision on the Overseas Association;

    D.  whereas the EDFs are managed almost entirely by the Commission’s DG INTPA with a small proportion (7 %) of the 2023 EDF expenditure being managed by DG NEAR;

    Political priorities

    1.  Underlines its strong commitment to the Union’s fundamental values and principles which are enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); in the framework of the discharge process, stresses especially the principles of sound financial management as set out in Article 317 TFEU and the combatting of fraud and protection of the financial interests of the Union as set out in Article 325 TFEU;

    2.  Underlines the importance of the principle of separation of powers in the Union and recalls that according to the Treaty, the institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation; believes that under no circumstances the actions of one Union institution should affect the independence of another institution; urges all other institutions to respect the role of the Parliament as the sole Union institution directly elected by the citizens and to refrain from any undue, direct or indirect interference in its legislative processes, thereby ensuring that Parliament’s decision making-process remains free and independent from other Union institutions or any other entities;

    3.  Highlights the importance of the Union budget for achieving the Union’s political priorities, as well as its role in assisting Member States in unforeseen situations such as international conflicts or crises and their consequences; points out in this regard the continuing relevance of investments and support from the Union budget for reducing disparities between Member States and regions, for promoting economic growth and employment, for combating poverty and social exclusion, and thus for improving the daily life of European citizens;

    4.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the Court) for the financial year 2023 has issued a clean opinion concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, regrets that the Court has had to issue for the 5th consecutive year an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of Union budget expenditure and a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

    5.  Expresses its deep concerns that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been on a rising trend since the financial year 2020 and has reached 5,6 % for the financial year 2023; notes that there are significant differences in the error rates between headings which range from spending areas with error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 % up to an error rate of 9,3 % in the case of cohesion policy; further notes that discharge is a political process where all issues related to a specific financial year may be taken into consideration and that the decision on whether to grant or refuse discharge should remain factual and anchored in the Union acquis, and that it is taken for the budget as a whole; urges the Commission, finally, to take into account the Court’s recommendations and to reduce the overall error rate over the coming years; further asks the Commission to present an Action Plan within the four months on reducing the error rate;

    6.  Is concerned that the Commission and the Court have different interpretations of what the “error rate” represents, thus generating confusion; expresses its support for a common audit approach and methodology and strongly calls on both institutions to find a solution to the divergent approaches before the 2024 discharge; is concerned that the Commission is systematically underestimating the existing error level and that this could lead to an ineffective protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    7.  Expresses again its deep its concern that the accumulated outstanding commitments (RAL – reste à liquider) have reached a record level of EUR 543 billion, equivalent to 3,2 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023 and representing more than double the Union annual budget for 2023; underlines that such a record high level of outstanding commitments risks creating challenges for the future smooth implementation of extraordinary high levels of payments and/or leading to significant decommitments to the detriment of the implementation of Union policy objectives;

    8.  Further expresses its concern that the outstanding debt from borrowing has reached EUR 458,5 billion, equivalent to 2,7 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023; notes that the increase in outstanding debt during 2023, equivalent to EUR 110,5 billion, has made the Union one of the largest debt issuers in Europe; further notes that the amount of outstanding debt is projected to increase further during the coming years, especially due to increased borrowing linked to the RRF and financial assistance to a number of countries including Ukraine which is the victim of a war of aggression by Russia; reiterates its deep concerns that the increase in debt makes the Union budget more vulnerable to increases in interest rates since a part of the debt will have to be serviced and repaid by the Union budget;

    9.  Recalls the importance of a strict application of the financial rules of the Union in all programmes and on all beneficiaries, in order to avoid all forms of fraud, conflicts of interest, corruption, double funding and money laundering;

    10.  Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect the principles of the rule of law; reiterates its deep concerns about the deteriorating rule of law situation in certain Member States including attacks or restrictions to the activities of civil society organisations, which not only poses a significant threat to democratic values but also leads to an increased risk of financial losses for the Union budget; calls for the provision of adequate support to civil society organisations active in the field; acknowledges the emergence of new forms of rule of law violations by national governments and calls on the Commission to address these evolving challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach the principles of the rule of law where such breaches affect, or risk affecting, the financial interests of the Union; at the same time, underlines the need for complete and timely information on decisions related to the implementation of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism; encourages the Commission to explicitly assess when shortcomings in the rule of law are of a systemic nature; calls for a stronger emphasis on the implementation of country-specific recommendations, coupled with effective follow-up mechanisms and measurable benchmarks; proposes the establishment of a comprehensive rule of law monitoring framework involving all Union institutions, Member States, and candidate countries, aimed at ensuring coherence and uniformity across the Union, while at the same time ensuring a fair and impartial application; calls on the Commission to propose measures to ensure the protection of final beneficiaries in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without undermining the application and effectiveness of the regulation;

    11.  Takes note of the innovative nature of the RRF and its contribution to supporting Member States in recovering from the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and creating a more resilient European economy; is of the opinion that any shift to a performance-based approach based on the RRF as a model requires addressing the many issues identified in its implementation, as well as assessing data on its full impact, before using such a model; recalls the many problems identified in the implementation of the RRF which would need to be addressed, including, but not limited to: the lack of adequate consultation of the regional and local authorities and other relevant stakeholders, such as social partners and civil society organisations and the lack of their involvement in the implementation; the weak cross border dimension, which may hint to a reduced EU added value in that respect; the lack of a clear definition of the milestones and targets and their satisfactorily fulfilment; the insufficient flexibility; the common debt with long-term debt payment as a consequence; the serious transparency, audit and control problems of the program which make it impossible for the citizens to be informed about the final beneficiaries of actions funded by the Union and pushes Member States to use RRF funds to cover projects very similar to those financed by Cohesion funds but with a much more limited capacity of control; reiterates the concern about the interpretation of the Commission and Member States on what a “final recipient” of RRF funding represents, which is not in line with the agreement of the REPowerEU negotiations and maintains that ministries, public authorities or other contracting authorities cannot be listed as final recipients of RRF funding; further expresses concern about the findings of the Court in relation to the risk of double funding and financing of recurring budgetary expenditure which are not in line with the RRF legal basis;

    12.  Notes that the set-up of the NGEU mechanism implies that the repayment of NGEU loans must start before the end of 2027 and be completed by 2058 at the latest; is concerned that the increase in interest rates over the last years has increased the borrowing costs under the NGEU significantly compared with original estimates; reiterates the need to fully respect the timeline of the legally binding roadmap for the introduction of new own resources and underlines that swift progress on new own resources is essential to repay NGEU and safeguard the current and future MFFs;

    13.  Stresses the urgent need for significant de-bureaucratisation, streamlining and simplification of all Union policies and their funding in line with the recommendations in the Draghi report(2) in order to ease the burdens for European businesses and increase European competitiveness, while ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union; underlines that simplification will also have a positive effect on error rates in the implementation of policies because many errors happen because of overcomplicated rules which are difficult to navigate, especially for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), new applicants, spin-offs and start-ups;

    14.  Reiterates the need to balance the further simplification of rules and procedures with much more systematic use of digitalised reporting, better and more robust controls and adequate ex post checks on the most repeated areas of irregular spending that do not add excessive bureaucratic complexity for beneficiaries, develop training sessions and practical information for applicants, in particular new applicants, and improve the assistance and guidelines for SMEs, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies and all other relevant stakeholders; reminds that a robust control system under the responsibility of the Commission is particularly needed for the RRF;

    15.  Stresses the need and highlights the importance of the NDICI programme for the support to global challenges, the promotion of human rights, freedoms and democracy; underlines the importance of reinforcing the Eastern Neighbourhood line in order to support political, economic and social reforms in this challenged region;

    16.  Underlines that it is imperative for the credibility of the Union that the Commission ensures that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to any kind of terrorist movements or any other movement expressing extremist views, inciting violence and/or hatred, that are directly in opposition to the European Union’s fundamental values, including Islamist anti-Semitic, anti-Christian and anti-Islamic movements; in this context, recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October; recalls that in 9 cases their employment was formally terminated in the interests of UNRWA; takes note of the results of the investigation launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS); underlines that the Commission should also establish better controls ensuring that no such funding happens indirectly through third parties and organise better traceability of Union funds to final beneficiaries;

    17.  Reiterates deep concerns about the increase in the exploitation of Union funds against Union principles and values, especially when the use of funds and transfers to other organisations are not entirely traceable; warns of the danger of Union funds ultimately being used within corrupt circles and being subject to fraud and irregularities, foreign interference or entrism; emphasises the importance of ‘final beneficiary transparency’ for Union funds;

    18.  Emphasises the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and preventing potential foreign interference; condemns any improper attempt to influence the legislative activities of the European Parliament; insists on the responsibility of OLAF to conduct all necessary in-depth investigations; stresses the importance of the work carried out by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in protecting the European Union’s financial interests; insists to provide to the EPPO adequate financial and human resources; recalls the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union, and insist on its swift implementation in all EU institutions;

    19.  Recalls the crucial role of civil society organisations (CSOs), including NGOs, in upholding democratic values to support a vibrant and lively democratic society, ensuring a sound basis for broad coverage of all relevant views in different debates and highlights that CSOs may receive support from Union funds to exercise these functions, as provided in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union;

    20.  Notes that there have been allegations from some Members of the Budgetary Control committee that grant agreements, concluded by the Commission included detailed lobbying activities which could be interpreted as potentially interfering with internal decision making in the Union Institutions; notes that the Commission took a series of measures to address the allegations by adopting guidance on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy, stating that while such grant agreements did not breach the EU legal framework, they could potentially entail a reputational risk for the Union; notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’; notes that such a disclaimer was further added in the 2024 call for proposals for operation grants;

    21.  Notes that a screening of grant agreements in all portfolios to verify their alignment with the new guidance is ongoing and that, so far, the Commission has not communicated to the Parliament the full results of the screening nor other measures that the Commission might take, if necessary; calls the Commission to keep the discharge authority informed at all times; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with Union institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability;

    22.  Recalls that EU funding requires stringent accountability and transparency standards; in line with the ECA recommendations in the Special Report 05/2024(3) and the recent special Report 11/2025(4), urges the Commission to ensure that the information disclosed in the Financial Transparency System is frequently updated, reliable, comparable and useful; stresses the need to allocate additional resources to the EUTR Secretariat to enable a systematic and thorough monitoring of the Transparency Register; this should include allocating resources towards AI implementation to develop an AI based search mechanism; recalls the need to proactively check that all entities beneficiaries of EU funds respect EU values;

    23.  Welcomes the reply of Commissioner Serafin to the written question(5), once again confirming EU funding was granted and used by NGOs in full respect of EU Treaties and LIFE Regulation(6); takes further note of the recent ECA Special Report on transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs(7), which, while stating that the use of EU funding for NGO advocacy is legal, also confirms it is in line with EU’s legal transparency requirements as laid down in the EU Financial Regulation; at the same time ECA SR 11/2025 points to the fact that more should be done to improve transparency of EU funding received by all beneficiaries; calls in this regard on the Commission to implement ECA recommendations regarding screening of self-declarations in the EU’s Financial Transparency System, as well as proactive monitoring of the respect to EU fundamental values and principles by the beneficiaries;

    24.  Welcomes the entry into force of the recast of the Financial Regulation; welcomes, in particular, the enhancements related to tracking Union funds through digital tools and interoperability that will bolster the protection of the Union Financial Interests, the targeted extension of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management following MFF 2027, the reference to the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism and the introduction of a conditionality based on Union values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as well as the opportunity to streamline SMEs and individual applicants with the introduction of very low-value grants;

    CHAPTER 1 – Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

    The European Court of Auditors’ statement of assurance and budgetary and financial management

    Reliability of the accounts

    25.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023(8), that the consolidated accounts of the European Union for that year are reliable; notes that the Court has issued a clean opinion on the reliability of the accounts every year since 2007;

    26.  Notes that on 31 December 2023, total liabilities amounted to EUR 679,9 billion, and total assets amounted to EUR 467,7 billion; notes that the difference of EUR 212,2 billion represents the negative net assets, comprising debt and the portion of expenses already incurred by the Union up to 31 December 2023 that must be funded by future budgets;

    27.  Notes that at the end of 2023, the estimated value of incurred but not yet claimed eligible expenses due to beneficiaries, recorded as accrued expenses, was EUR 155,2 billion (2021: EUR 148,7 billion), of which EUR 7,4 billion is related to accrued RRF expenditure;

    28.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion that the assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses, including those related to NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the estimate related to the UK’s withdrawal process, and the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are presented fairly in the consolidated annual accounts;

    Legality and regularity of Union revenue

    29.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the Union’s revenue is free from material error and that the managing systems examined by the Court were generally effective;

    Legality and regularity of Union expenditure

    30.  Strongly regrets the adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of the Union budget expenditure issued by the Court for the fifth year in a row; considers this increasingly problematic, as the Commission seems unable, or unwilling, to identify the cause and address the underlying issues; regrets the Commission is not accepting some recommendations of the Court of Auditors; notes in particular the importance of reinforcement of financial management of the Commission and Member States, that is considered as not reliable by the Court and therefore compromises the reliability of the Annual Management and Performance Report; calls on the Commission to present a clear action plan on reducing the error rate within the following four months; stresses that Parliament shall duly scrutinise such an action plan;

    31.  Is seriously concerned by the Court’s estimation of the error level of 5,6 % in 2023 expenditure; notes that this is an accelerated deterioration compared to the previous two years (4,2 % in 2022 and 3.0 % in 2021); notes with concern that the Court continues to detect substantial issues in reimbursement-based expenditure where the estimated level of error is 7,9 %; notes that the effect of the errors found by the Court is estimated to be both material and pervasive; calls for the Commission’s financial management to be tightened up, in accordance with the recommendations made by the Court in its Annual Reports and Special Reports, in order to resolutely tackle the high error rate over the next few years; underlines the Court’s warning that the increasing European debt is placing growing pressure on the Union budget;

    32.  Notes that the Commission in its Annual Management and Performance Report categorises the expenditure into higher, medium and lower risk categories, in order to focus action on high-risk areas; while the Court uses only two risk categories in order to produce an opinion on the legality and regularity of the expenditures; is worried that the Court’s work revealed limitations in the Commission’s ex-post work, which, taken together, affect the robustness of the Commission’s risk assessment; notes with concern that one of the areas most impacted was ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, where the Court assessed the majority of the spending to be high risk, while the Commission classified only a minority in this way;

    33.  Reiterates the concerns about the Court observation that the Commission’s risk assessment is likely to underestimate the level of risk in several areas; is also worried by recurrent weaknesses identified by the Court in Member States’ management and control systems, which are still not still preventing or detecting irregularities in heading 2, thus limiting the reliance that can be placed on their work, while the Commission’s error rates do still rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively;

    34.  Notes that the increase is primarily caused by the estimated level of error under MFF heading 2 – cohesion, resilience and values, where the Court found 9,3 % of expenditure to be in breach of Union rules and regulations; recalls the underlying issues that are reported by the Court and that have been known for several years;

    35.  Underlines that the estimated level of error in the Union’s expenditure, as presented in the Court’s statement of assurance, is an estimate of the money that should not have been paid out because it was not used in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations; considers that, though not an indicator of fraud or corruption, the estimated level of error represents expenditure where corrective actions are necessary, and thus shows a wasteful use of resources; regrets that, while being a problem in itself, this will also give a negative impression to citizens, and may even call into question the Commission’s ability to effectively protect the Union’s financial interests;

    36.  Notes with concern that the Commission´s own estimate of the risk at payment is only 1,9 % for 2023 and has been at that level since 2020; notes that the Commission estimates its capacity to correct and recover irregular expenditure during implementation of the associated programmes at 1,0 %, resulting in a risk at closure of 0,9 %; is concerned that again for this year the Commission’s risk at payment is not only below the Court estimated level of error of 5,6 % but also below the Court range, which is between 4,4 % and 6,8 %; highlights that the divergence between the Court’s overall error rate and the Commission’s risk at payment is also evident in some of the specific spending areas, in particular in heading 2, even more than in the past; welcomes the Court’s estimate of the level of error as an important indicator for the existing risks;

    37.  Notes the multi-annual perspective of the Commission’s risk at closure, as corrections and recoveries after year-end are not reflected in the Court’s estimate of the level of error; regrets, however, the confusion caused by the Commission’s presentation of the risk at payment;

    38.  Recalls the positions expressed in the 2022 discharge resolution and the exchanges of views in the discharge hearings for the financial year 2023 on the diverging methodologies and estimates between the Court and the Commission of errors made in Union expenditure; notes in particular that the Court’s error rate is based on a statistical sample, whereas the Commission’s risk at payment is to a large extent compiled from the error rates reported by national auditing authorities in Member States and calculated only after corrections and repayments; reminds that the Court’s error rate includes the errors that remained undetected by the Member States and the Commission, which demonstrates that the Commission’s error rates are an underestimation; notes with concern an even wider gap between the Court’s and Commission’s estimates; further notes that the Commission and the Court are organising joint workshops on this issue; notes that the Court recently aligned its methodology on procurement in the decentralised agencies with the methodology of the Commission; reiterates its support for the independent audit approach and methodology of the Court and invites the Commission to cooperate with the Court with a view to increasing harmonisation and providing for more comparable estimates of the level of error;

    39.  Recalls that the discharge authority needs a statement of assurance, provided by the Court, on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions at year-end for its decision on discharge for that year; notes that Union spending programmes are multiannual and that their management and control systems cover multiple years, allowing for corrections and recoveries after year-end;

    40.  Recalls that the Commission is responsible for preventing and detecting fraud; notes that the Court, in the exercise of its mandate, is obliged to report any cases of irregularity; notes that the Court forwards to the EPPO suspicions of criminal offences falling under its competences and to OLAF suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activity affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that, in 2023, the Court reported 20 cases of suspected fraud to OLAF, and in parallel reported 12 of these cases to the EPPO, resulting so far in four OLAF investigations and nine EPPO investigations; commends the Court for its reporting of cases of irregularity to OLAF and the EPPO, as information resulting from audit engagements usually has a high degree of reliability; reminds in this framework of the key role played by the whole Union’s anti-fraud architecture and expresses some concerns about the refusal of some Member States to cooperate with one of its elements, the EPPO;

    Budgetary and financial management

    41.  Notes that in 2023, 98,9 % of the available commitment appropriations were used (EUR 184,4 billion out of EUR 186,5 billion); notes that the available appropriations were higher than the MFF ceiling of EUR 182,7 billion due to the use of special instruments for new or unforeseen events; notes that 90,0 % of payment appropriations were used (EUR 162,0 billion of EUR 165,2 billion available);

    42.  Notes with concern that the total outstanding commitments, which represent future debts if not decommitted, reached an all-time high of EUR 543 billion (2022: EUR 450 billion); notes that the Commission foresees a decrease from 2025 to 2029 when committed amounts for both NGEU and the 2021-2027 programming period should be paid out; notes however that the actual amounts for 2023 (EUR 543 billion) are much higher than the forecasted amount (EUR 490 billion), calling the Commission’s estimates into question;

    43.  Recalls that the time available for implementing shared management funds under the 2021-2027 MFF is shorter than under previous MFFs because of the n+2 for the last year, which, coupled with the high RAL, will raise the risk of decommitments; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission has increased its forecasted amount of decommitments from EUR 7,6 billion for 2023-2027, to EUR 8,1 billion for 2024-2027 to EUR 8,8 billion for 2025-2027, a 15 % increase in 2 years; underlines with concern that the Commission has underestimated its projections for the RAL in the last two years, and that the Commission therefore likely underestimates the amount of decommitments that will be made until 2027; notes the introduction of the “cascade mechanism” following the mid-term review of the MFF 2021-2027 and the incentive to use decommitted amounts to cover increased interest costs for amounts borrowed by the Commission for NGEU;

    44.   Notes that the latest long-term payment forecast produced by the Commission foresees substantial decommitments as of 2027 unless Member States undertake additional efforts and implement at a much faster pace than in the period 2014-2020; notes that for the CF, ERDF, and ESF+ cohesion policy funds, the Commission forecast total decommitments for 2024-2027 at EUR 2,2 billion, more than five times its 2022 forecast of EUR 0,4 billion; warns that for the Just Transition Fund (JTF), the low implementation in 2023 puts important amounts at risk from 2025 onwards; calls on the Commission and on the Member States to use all of the available possibilities to avoid decommitments;

    45.  Notes with concern that Union debt increased from EUR 344,3 billion in 2022 to EUR 458,5 billion in 2023, 60 % of which is related to NGEU; notes that only for the debt issued for NGEU, associated interest costs need to be paid directly from the Union Budget and that, due to increased interest rates, these costs for the current MFF (until the end of 2027) are estimated to be between EUR 17 billion and EUR 27 billion higher than the initially forecasted EUR 14,9 billion;

    46.  Notes with concern that the total exposure of the Union budget because of guarantees and contingent liabilities for loans rose to EUR 298,0 billion; notes that assumptions on capital-market interest should be made conservatively, both for existing debt and new debt and that for both categories a viable plan for its repayment is necessary; notes that the Court received information from the Commission that indicates that the exposure will steadily increase in the coming years, putting additional pressure on the headroom of the budget and further reducing the flexibility of the Union budget; supports the Court recommendations to the Commission to act more proactively to ensure that its mitigating tools (such as the Common Provisioning Fund) have sufficient capacity as well as to provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure, making its estimate public;

    47.  Notes with concern that the Court in its Special Report 07/2024(9) observed that a significant share of recovery orders issued between 2014 and 2022 were still outstanding at the time of their audit; further notes that the Commission, in its replies to the Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control’s (CONT Committee) written questions for the 2023 discharge, mentioned that there are 1 357 overdue recovery orders for a total outstanding amount of approximately EUR 335 million for the period 2014-2023; calls on the Commission to prioritise collecting monies under overdue recovery orders and to keep the Committee on Budgetary Control informed about progress made;

    48.  Highlights that equality is a founding value of the Union and is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; recalls the commitment of the Union to gender mainstreaming in its policy-making and implementation of Union funds, including gender budgeting; encourages the Commission to continue the efforts made in gender budgeting and in tracking the impact of the Union budget to foster gender equality; recalls the obligation of the Commission to accompany all legislative proposals with an impact assessment when they are projected to have a significant economic, social, and environmental impact in order to guarantee, among other things, fair distribution of funds;

    49.  Notes that the review of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Transparency Register is due by July 2025; calls on the Commission to ensure that the process is as open as possible, to align financial reporting requirements across all categories of registrants (including funding sources and lobbying budgets), addressing also the risk identified in the Court’s Special Report on the EU Transparency Register (SR 05/2024) regarding self-declarations on the category of interest representation; believes that, in order to address the recommendations of the Court, the resources of the secretariat of the Transparency Register should be increased;

    50.  Recalls the following findings of the Court of Auditors’ Special Report 11/2025: (i) that the identification and registration of entities as NGOs are not always consistent and reliable; (ii) that despite a more streamlined granting process, issues with the completeness and accuracy of data remain; (iii) that the lack of a reliable overview of Union spending on NGOs hampers useful analysis; (iv) that the calls for proposals in the Court’s sample were transparent; (v) that respect for Union values is not pro-actively verified; and (vi) that transparency practices vary widely in the Court’s sample, with larger NGOs performing better. calls on the Commission to fully implement the recommendations in the Court’s Special Report;

    Recommendations

    51.  Strongly supports the recommendations of the Court in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (annual report for the 2023 financial year)(10) as well as in related special reports; calls on the Commission to implement them without delay and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    52.  Calls on the Court to look for ways, together with the Commission, to align their methodologies for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;

    53.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) continue to engage with the Court in order to increase understanding, convergence and comparability of the two approaches to the diverging estimates of errors in Union expenditure;
       (ii) qualify the impact of corrective measures on the overall level of error;
       (iii) look for ways, together with the Court, to align their methodologies as regards the evaluation of procurement errors, and the estimation of the level of error for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;
       (iv) present the discharge authority with a strategy to strengthen the use of funds for their intended purpose, increase absorption and prevent decommitments in order to maximise the EU-added value of the Union Budget;
       (v) increase the reliability of the forecast of the outstanding commitments with a more realistic estimate of the absorption of Union funds to give the discharge authority a better forecast of the development of the RAL over the years and better protect the Union budget;
       (vi) report on, and provide sufficient measures to, protecting the Union budget from the different risks identified beyond the RAL, such as decommitments in cohesion policy, the increasing debt, increased budget exposure and the impact of increasing inflation;
       (vii) provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure by presenting, in the Annual Management and Performance Report, a multi-annual outlook on the exposure of the Union Budget to budgetary guarantees;
       (viii) substantially simplify rules and procedures and improve the assistance to, and ensure consistent and user-friendly guidelines for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies, CSOs and all other relevant stakeholders, without compromising the quality of the controls;
       (ix) make sure that the mitigation tools in place have sufficient capacity to effectively face the exposure risks of the Union budget;
       (x) boost efforts to improve transparency in the use of funds, including as regards information on final beneficiaries, including on the funds that are allocated for the preparation of policy and legislative proposals;
       (xi) put in place all necessary means for ensuring that all interest representatives that approach Union institutions are registered in the Transparency Register; further asks the Commission to set up an effective mechanism to ensure that entities funded by the Union in the Transparency Register are aligned with Union values and demand full transparency on their financing, providing a deeper insight into the financing of all entities registered and which should be the condition to approach all Union institutions, bodies and agencies;
       (xii) together with Parliament and Council, guarantee adequate resources for the secretariat of the Transparency Register in order to ensure that the entries on the lobbying activities of all interest representatives can be checked for accuracy and that lobbying become more transparent as requested in the Court in Special Report 05/2024 on the EU Transparency Register; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to identify irregularities to guarantee a wide range of search capabilities;
       (xiii) require interest representatives in the Transparency Register to list their financial supporters by self-declaring that they are only representing their interests or the collective interests of their members and to propose an amendment to Annex II to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 to require them to list their financial supporters in the EU Transparency Register, even if they state in that register that they are only representing the interests of their own members; urges entities already registered that have not listed their financial resources by self-declaration to declare them voluntarily before the interinstitutional agreement is amended;
       (xiv) continue to support Member States in improving both the quality and the quantity of checks and to share best practices in the fight against fraud and corruption;
       (xv) address the situation regarding late recovery orders and to take all necessary measures to recover the majority of the amount outstanding for the period 2014-2023, including implementation of corporate escalation mechanisms, and keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in recovering the sums;
       (xvi) reinforce the capacity of the Anti-fraud Architecture of the Union, including the provision of sufficient financial and human resources, and facilitate the cooperation between them;

    Revenue

    54.  Welcomes that for 2023, the Court is also able to issue a clean opinion on the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, stresses that the problems with customs duties not being declared or being incorrectly declared (a customs gap) leading to a shortfall in collected import duties has been a persistent problem for many years and could potentially entail a loss of traditional own resources for the Union and for the Member States;

    55.  Notes with serious concern that the Court has examined the implementation of the Commission’s Customs Action Plan, which has the potential to lead to a significant reduction of the customs gap, and has again identified insufficient progress in the implementation of some actions from this plan; notes that the Commission, as part of this plan, proposed a customs reform in May 2023(11), including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub;

    56.  Recalls that the Court has highlighted the risks to the EU’s financial interests from inadequate or ineffective customs controls of imported goods; commends the efforts made by OLAF on the fight against Fraud linked to customs duties and VAT; underlines the rise of the ecommerce and the online platforms risks due to potential security and safety threats and risk of non-compliance with EU taxation and customs rules, product standards, intellectual property rights, prohibitions and restrictions;

    57.  Notes with concern that the Court revealed that the Commission did not charge late interest payments for six cases related to late corrections to GNI data by Member States where the Commission has expressed reservations; agrees with the Court that the Commission, as a matter of principle, ought to charge late interest payments in such cases in order to create an incentive for Member States to address the reservations within the deadlines;

    58.  Notes with satisfaction that the new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste generated by Member States in 2023 amounted to EUR 7,2 billion, equivalent to 4,0 % of the EU’s total revenue; further notes that the Court identified(12) some problems related to the reliability and comparability of data; stresses that it provides an excellent example of a new own resource, as it creates positive incentives for Member States to reduce the volume of non-recycled plastic packaging while at the same time generating a new revenue stream for the Union;

    59.  Stresses that the Commission’s proposals concerning new own resources from 2021 comprising three elements, the first based on revenues from emissions trading (ETS), the second drawing on the resources generated by the Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, and the third based on the share of residual profits from multinationals that will be re-allocated to Member States under the OECD/G20 agreement on a re-allocation of taxing rights (“Pillar One”) are obvious candidates for such new resources; at the same time, points out that other sources might also be considered if they should prove to be easier for Member States to approve; welcomes other initiatives that may lead to new own resources for the Union budget;

    60.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) increase focus and pressure on the implementation of the Customs Action Plan and not least the proposal for a significant customs reform from May 2023, including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub; ensure that Member States implement effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations; initiate infringement proceedings in those cases where there is sufficient evidence that Member States are implementing a manifestly inadequate penalty system for breaches of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 6(13) (DAC 6);
       (ii) insist on the importance of intensifying and diversifying the International customs cooperation with trade partners and stresses the need to strengthen the fight against cross-border tax and customs fraud in the context of the expansion of e-commerce;
       (iii) create incentives for Member States to address reservations related to corrections of GNI data by Member States within the deadlines by charging late interest payments;
       (iv) continue work towards the introduction of additional new own resources;

    Single market, Innovation and Digital

    61.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 1 ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ was EUR 25,3 billion (13,2 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: EUR 15,3 billion (60,5 %) for Research, EUR 4,1 billion (16,1 %) for Transport, Energy and Digital, EUR 2,3 billion (9,1 %) for the InvestEU Programme, EUR 2,2 billion (8,7 %) for Space, and EUR 1,4 billion (5,6 %) for other areas;

    62.  Notes that the Court has examined 127 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading, notably the Horizon 2020 programme (90 transactions), Horizon Europe (7 transactions), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), space programmes and financial instruments, and also that it has reviewed the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA) ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors and the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) and the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA);

    63.  Notes that the Court estimates that the level of error in spending on ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ in 2023 was material at 3,3 %; notes the Court’s observation that research and innovation expenditure is most affected by error, particularly in the area of personnel costs; further notes that the Commission estimates the risk at payment as 1,4 % for this heading, which is in the lower half of the range of the Court’s estimate; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that the Commission’s risk at payment for this heading remains an underestimate, because of weaknesses identified by the Court in the Commission’s ex post audits in this area since the financial year 2019(14);

    64.  Notes with concern that 39 (31 %) of the 127 transactions that the Court examined contained errors; is deeply concerned that for seven cases of quantifiable errors made by beneficiaries, the Commission (or the auditors contracted by the beneficiaries) had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure, and thus, had the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1,4 percentage points lower; highlights that this points to weaknesses in the Commission’s controls;

    Research and innovation

    65.  Highlights the importance of Union research and innovation (R&I) funding programmes for the scientific, societal, economic and technological development of the Union, reducing inequalities, achieving the green and digital transitions and decreasing the Union’s energy dependency on Russia; recalls that Horizon Europe is the most significant research and innovation programme in Europe, with a total budget of EUR 95,5 billion for 2021-2027, including EUR 5,4 billion from the NGEU instrument; notes that the RRF has allocated around EUR 48 billion in investments to R&I; underlines that in order to enhance the Union’s competitiveness and close the innovation gap, additional funding for R&I is needed, taking into account the Draghi report’s pertinent recommendations; highlights, in particular, the need to increase defence-related R&I spending due to the current geopolitical conditions, which could serve as an important component of the innovation policy strategy;

    66.  Notes that its predecessor, Horizon 2020, with a budget of EUR 75,6 billion funded more than 35 000 projects between 2014 and 2020 and its calls attracted over a million individual applications from 177 countries; further notes that in her hearing for the 2023 discharge, Commissioner Ivanova underlined the EU added value of EU R&I funding programmes, explaining that the final evaluation of Horizon 2020 estimated that, for each euro of costs linked to the programme five euros worth of benefits would be generated for society by 2040; deeply regrets that 74 % of proposals assessed as high quality by independent experts could not be funded due to budget constraints; notes that an additional EUR 159 billion would have been needed to fund all high-quality proposals; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for Union research and innovation, not the least to increase the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity, in line with the Union’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029;

    67.  Notes the late adoption of the Horizon Europe legal bases in 2021 and welcomes that the Commission managed to reach close to 100 % budget implementation in 2023; notes that the number of grant agreements signed by the end of 2023 was 10 674 and a further two framework agreements were signed;

    68.  Notes with concern that the Court found errors relating to ineligible costs in 30 of the 97 research and innovation transactions in its sample, and that these errors represent 71 % of the Court’s estimated level of error for this heading in 2023; reiterates its concern that after 9 years of implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme, the calculation of personnel costs remains a major source of errors, as 22 of the 30 research transactions with quantifiable errors in the Court’s sample (around 73 %) are affected by the incorrect application of the methodology for calculating personnel costs; acknowledges both the Commission’s and the Court’s continued efforts to remedy this situation; welcomes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendations to enhance beneficiaries’ compliance with the daily-rate rules and to ensure clarity concerning daily-rate rules in Horizon Europe documents;

    69.  Underlines the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures governing Union R&I funding; notes that in 2023 the Commission has continued the roll out of simplified cost options such as lump sums and unit costs in Horizon Europe; further notes the remarks made by the Director-General for Research and Innovation in the exchange of views with the CONT Committee that the Commission intends to increase the disbursement of Horizon Europe funds through lump sums to 50 % by 2027; welcomes that the Commission, taking the Court’s recommendations issued in its annual reports for 2022 into account, will further specify the requirements defining the proper implementation of lump sum grants, including the elements of each work package triggering payment, and will also provide detailed guidance to those involved in assessing the implementation of projects; further notes that, as described in the Commission’s assessment of Lump Sum Funding in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe 2018-2024, beneficiaries would welcome more clarity on how lump sum grants would be audited; is concerned that the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe is not yet developed;

    70.  Stresses the crucial role of the private sector in addressing the innovation gap in the Union and improving the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity; believes, in particular, that it is imperative to continue to promote and facilitate as much as possible the participation of SMEs in Union R&I funding programmes; notes the Court’s conclusion that SMEs and newcomers are more prone to making errors than other beneficiaries since they lack the experience and resources to administer the funds; welcomes the efforts made by the Commission to support SMEs specifically, for example through information campaigns, contacts with the system of National Contact Points and the dedicated helpdesk of the Research Enquiry Service; considers that the simplification of rules and procedures is the major driver for increased participation of SMEs;

    Energy, Transport and Digital

    71.  Highlights the importance of Union investments in the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services and notes that the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), with EUR 4,1 billion of expenditure in 2023, is a key Union instrument in delivering these objectives;

    72.  Draws attention to the need to simplify the application procedures under the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) in order to enable greater participation of smaller entities and local initiatives in the development of European transport infrastructure; regrets that the CEF-T budget does not cover all the needs for sustainable transport investments and that most of the CEF-T budget has already been allocated, leaving a funding gap until 2027;

    73.  Recalls that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting sanctions imposed on Russia continued to adversely impact the Union’s transport sector in 2023, leading to traffic shortages, supply chain bottlenecks, and the necessity to bypass traditional routes, thereby extending journey times and increasing costs; points out that the Eastern border regions, especially in the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Romania, have been particularly affected by economic losses and a halt of cross-border mobility as a consequence of the Russian aggression; calls on the Commission to introduce targeted measures, including in the next MFF, to facilitate recovery of the affected regions;

    74.  Calls on the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the funding allocated to the cross-border and multi-country infrastructure projects, facing significant implementation challenges, financial difficulties, or delays, such as Rail Baltica; points out that this review should address inefficiencies in planning and management as well as escalating construction costs that threaten project timelines and objectives; reiterates that greater transparency in the management of public funds increases citizens’ trust in the Union institutions;

    75.  Notes with concern that the Court found two errors in CEF projects in its 2023 sample, and that one of these relates to a serious breach of the Union’s public procurement rules, and has led to the contract being awarded to a consortium that did not fulfil the selection criteria and that this error contributed 28 % to the estimated error rate for heading 1;

    76.  Is deeply concerned by the Court’s findings in relation to the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA)ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors, in particular the Court’s conclusion that while the strategies for both CEF1 (2014-2020) and CEF2 (2021-2027) are based on a sound analysis of risks and past irregularities, the guidelines for ex-ante checks on procurement were not detailed enough; fully supports the Court’s recommendation that the Commission should further develop these guidelines;

    Recommendations

    77.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) secure the provision of adequate resources to support high-quality research and innovation project proposals with an EU added value in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework;
       (ii) continue to simplify rules and procedures in line with the new financial regulation, to support training sessions and user-friendly, consistent and practical information for applicants in Member States, in particular for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, CSOs or local action groups and to encourage applications from beneficiaries in Member States with more limited participation, as well as from smaller entities;
       (iii) continue to apply simplified rules and procedures, digitalisation measures and simplified cost options (SCOs) while addressing, in particular, the risk of irregularities and fraud and the costs of controls, and finalising the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe as soon as possible;
       (iv) further specify the requirements for defining proper implementation of lump sum grants, taking into account the Court’s pertinent recommendations from its 2022 Annual Report, and verify the actual implementation of projects using lump sums;
       (v) undertake a thorough analysis of procurement errors found and further develop the guidelines describing the extent of the checks to be performed for ex ante controls on procurement for CEF projects, as recommended by the Court;

    Cohesion, Resilience and Values

    78.  Stresses the importance of Union cohesion policy for economic and territorial convergence and development in the regions of the Union, as well as for supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 2 ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ was EUR 73,3 billion (38,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 47,8 % for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and other regional operations, 18,9 % for the European Social Fund (ESF), 9,8 % for the Cohesion Fund (CF), 3,8 % for Erasmus+, 2,1 % for CEF Transport, and 3,8 % for other areas;

    79.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 238 transactions covering the full range of spending under MFF Heading 2; notes with concern that the Court’s estimated overall level of error in expenditure under this heading in 2023 increased to 9,3 %, which is significantly above the materiality threshold; draws attention to the marked increase in the overall level of error estimated by the Court in 2023 compared to previous years (6,4 % in 2022, 3,6 % in 2021);

    80.  Is concerned about the Court’s observation that the significant additional resources made available under the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU), the approaching end of the eligibility period for 2014-2020 programmes (31 December 2023), and parallel implementation of the NGEU programme have put additional pressure on Member State’s administrations, increasing the risk of errors; is in particular concerned by the practice of reducing Member States’ co-funding, as is the case under REACT-EU, the Coronavirus Investment Initiative (CRII) and CRII+, which reduces the ownership and associated incentives for properly overseeing expenditure; notes from the Commission replies the acknowledgement that some authorities may have carried out less effective controls and verifications due to the heavy overload and increasing pressure of parallel implementation of 2014-2020 programmes and of additional funding under NGEU;

    81.  Notes the Court’s analysis of transactions with additional funding through REACT-EU and flexibility through CRII+ and Cohesion’s Action for Refugees (CARE) and their contribution to the estimated levels of error; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities, without either decreasing requirements or increasing preventive checks and controls at the same time, contributed to the high error rate;

    82.  Notes the Court’s Review 03/2024 “An overview of the assurance framework and the key factors contributing to errors in 2014-2020 cohesion spending” that provides a multi-annual overview covering six years of audit results, including an assessment of management and control issues, aiming to strengthen the assurance model; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that, although the assurance framework for cohesion policy has helped to reduce the level of error, it has not been effective in bringing the overall level of error below the materiality threshold of 2 %; is worried that the Commission can rely only to a limited degree on the work of the national audit authorities, because of the systematic weaknesses; supports the Court’s recommendation to the Commission to strengthen the implementation of the assurance framework for the 2021-2027 cohesion spending; reminds the Commission of the discharge authority’s call to work closely with the Member States to improve the management and control system for Union expenditure to reduce the high error rate to below the 2 % materiality threshold;

    83.  Notes the Court’s observation in its review on the reliability of the work of key actors in the control system for cohesion policy; is concerned by the Court’s finding that during a 6-year period managing authorities, the first line of defence for detection and prevention of errors, are not sufficiently effective in mitigating the inherent high risk of error in cohesion policy; considers it even more worrying that the Court found that the second line of defence, the Member States’ audit authorities, are not able to determine the correct error rate for the packages of expenditure they audit and provide assurance on, since the Court detected additional errors in at least 39 % of these packages; notes that these errors have been detected and reported by the Court annually for more than 6 years and that there is therefore a systemic issue;

    84.  Notes the Court’s categorisation of errors found in cohesion expenditure, with ineligible projects accounting for 29 %, ineligible costs for 26 % and serious non-compliance in public procurement procedures accounting for 21 % of errors and ERDF and CF related expenditure accounting for the largest share of errors (80 %); notes that expenditure under the ESF+, YEI and FEAD are proportionally less affected by error, as they together account for 16 % of errors, while they together account for around 20 % of the budget under this heading;

    85.  Notes the study commissioned by the Committee on Budgetary Control on ‘Lessons learned from the implementation of crisis response tools’ that shows that absorption of uncommitted cohesion resources was supported by the flexibilities introduced under CRII and CRII+; is concerned by the finding of the researchers that quality of fast-tracked projects might not have reached the same level as investments before the pandemic; is further concerned by the researchers’ observation that the risk of low-quality projects is entirely borne by the Union Budget, because of 100 % EU-funding in CRII, CRII+ and REACT-EU; considers that 100 % EU-funding might help absorption, but that absorption is not a goal in itself;

    86.  Stresses that, in its most recent discharge opinions, the Committee on Regional Development called for additional advisory support from the Commission to national, local and regional authorities to avoid a situation of administrative overload; recognises the Commission’s efforts but, observes that, regrettably, these have not been sufficient to mitigate the risk of error; warns that a similar administrative overload might occur at the end of the RRF eligibility period and the final years of the MFF; underlines the need to address the insufficient administrative capacity of national, local and regional authorities as a matter of urgency; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to provide them with clear guidance, and to increase its support for administrative capacity building, including through staff training, best practice sharing, peer-to-peer reviews and technical assistance to ensure effective fund management;

    87.  Notes the public discussions on the post-2027 multiannual financial framework that may indicate a shift towards a performance-based model, coupling investments and reforms, and a desire to simplify rules and procedures; calls on the Commission to prioritise the financial responses to the current threats resulting from the geopolitical situation; warns that any decision on the future design of spending programmes must not be to the detriment of oversight and control of Union expenditure in terms of transparency and information at Union level about non-compliance with rules and regulations; considers that the errors identified by the Court and the way the Commission handles those errors are also an indication of a properly functioning management and control system and notes that both institutions stated their commitment to improve the system and bring down the error rate;

    88.  Notes, as in previous years, the Court’s observation that the Commission’s desk reviews, to review and assess the work of audit authorities, are aimed at checking only consistency of regularity information, and that they are therefore too limited to confirm the residual error rate reported by the national authorities in their assurance packages; notes the Commission’s reply that it complements its desk review with on-the-spot audit work covering the programmes and assurance packages, which enables it to establish a reasonable and fair estimate of the error rates for each programme; considers that the Court’s observation is about the scope of the desk reviews and the fact that they are only aimed at consistency and therefore too limited to provide the Commission with information that is sufficiently reliable;

    89.  Is concerned about the persistent shortcomings observed by the Court in the work of national audit authorities as visible in the weaknesses identified in the assurance packages, with a residual error rate above the materiality threshold for more than 60 % of the value of assurance packages audited in 2023; stresses with concern that managing authorities consistently do not effectively succeed in preventing or detecting irregularities in expenditure declared by beneficiaries and that this reduces the extent to which the Commission can rely on their work;

    90.  Reminds that in shared management, it is the Commission’s responsibility to make sure that Member States set up management and control systems that function effectively during the implementation of programmes; is worried that both the Commission and the Court have identified that not all Member States’ management and control systems function effectively, thus negatively effecting the reliability of the Commission error rates, as they rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively; calls into question the possibility for the Commission to continue to rely on national systems;

    91.  Considers that for the single audit approach to work well, and in order to achieve reduced administrative burden for beneficiaries and managing authorities, adherence to audit standards at all levels of control and audit is of essential importance; is therefore worried by the Court’s finding in its annual report that essential supporting documents about compliance with eligibility conditions were not presented by programme authorities and beneficiaries, and also by the finding by the Court presented in its review that insufficient documentation of audit work from audit authorities limits the reliance that can be placed on audit work of national audit authorities;

    92.  Recalls that following Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council(15) (CPR) for the programming period 2021-2027, Member States need to comply with horizontal and thematic enabling conditions, which need to remain fulfilled and respected throughout the implementation period of the funds; recalls that when enabling conditions are not fulfilled at the time of submission of a payment application to the Commission for the specific objective concerned, the related expenditure will not be reimbursed from the Union budget until the Commission is satisfied that the enabling condition has been fulfilled; recalls the strong regrets of the discharge authority in relation to the Commission decision of 13 December 2023(16) considering that Hungary fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition related to judicial independence that enabled the Hungarian authorities to submit reimbursement claims of up to EUR 10,2 billion; notes with concern that since the release of these funds, the Hungarian government has not taken steps to reinstate the independence of the judiciary but on the contrary; reiterates its worries about the lack of adequate control mechanisms or unreliable public procurement procedures to guarantee sound financial management and the protection of the Union budget; believes that this decision politically contradicts the prolongation of the measures adopted under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(17) (the ‘Conditionality Regulation’);

    93.  Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2023 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm the increasing pressure on judicial independence, including concerns over the selection and promotion of judges, and recent reports of intimidation and interference in judicial decisions, as exemplified by the resignations of judges in protest against political influence; notes with concern in the same vein that the head of the Hungarian Integrity Authority, a key institution established as a condition set by the Commission for the release of Union funds under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, is facing increasing pressure from the Hungarian government; calls on the Commission to ensure a coordinated and holistic approach across all relevant Union funds and legislative tools, emphasizing that Union funds must not be allocated to activities undermining democracy or reinforcing authoritarianism;

    94.  Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation establishes a mechanism and measures to protect the Union Budget from breaches of the rule of law when other procedures set out in Union legislation would not protect the budget more efficiently; recalls that this mechanism was activated on 15 December 2022 in the case of Hungary over concerns related to its system of public procurement, resulting in a temporary suspension of 55 % of budgetary commitments for three cohesion policy programmes; recalls that the same regulation, in line with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093(18) (the ‘MFF Regulation’), stipulates that suspended commitments of 2022 (year n), may not be re-entered into the budget beyond 2024 (year n+2) and that therefore 55 % of commitments from 2022, around EUR 1 billion, were decommitted in December 2024; notes that no other procedures under the Conditionality Regulation are ongoing;

    95.  Notes that the Commission allocated an equivalent of five full-time staff members to the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation and reiterates the European Court of Auditor’s concerns raised in its Special Report 03/2024 that current staff numbers appear to be insufficient to ensure a strict and coherent application of the Regulation;

    96.  Reiterates the need to treat as a single, integral package all the measures required for the release of Union funding under the Conditionality Regulation, the CPR and Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council(19) (the ‘RRF Regulation’); stresses the importance of the protection of the Union financial interests also for disbursement of pre-financing;

    97.  Notes that some investments which would have been eligible for financing under cohesion are included in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans; recalls that the general objective of the RRF enshrined in Article 4 of the RRF Regulation is to promote the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion, and that one of its six pillars is specifically dedicated to this purpose; acknowledges that the wide scope of the RRF results in limited overlap with other Union funding programmes, as intended by the co-legislators when establishing the Article 9 of the RRF Regulation, which establishes additionality and complementarity funding as key principles; draws attention, however, to the risks of double funding emerging from such situations;

    98.  Expresses its preoccupation about the visible delays in implementation of cohesion policy in Member States and the lack of capacity of national administrations to deal in parallel with different spending programmes (e.g. cohesion programmes and RRF programmes) covering complementary or even similar objectives; calls on the Commission to ensure that sufficient technical assistance is provided to Member States facing difficulties in order to address existing delays in the implementation of cohesion programmes;

    99.  Recognises the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly direct public funding into security, defence and preparedness, while facing dramatically reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes, particularly Interreg programmes; notes the measures taken by the European Commission to support these regions, notably through flexibilities provided under cohesion policy; welcomes that providing support to eastern border regions most affected by Russia’s aggression is included in the mission letter of the Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms; calls on the Commission to ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression, both in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;

    100.  Stresses the importance of ESF+ which aims to achieve high employment, fair social protection, a skilled and resilient workforce, and inclusive/cohesive societies as key in eradicating poverty; expresses the need to provide it with the continued financial and political support of the Union, national and regional institutions in the delivery of its objectives and targets in the years to come; underlines the importance of closely involving regional actors, in particular civil society organisations and social partners working on the ground in the implementation of ESF+ funded activities;

    101.  Welcomes the frontloading of EUR 100 million from the 2027 budget of Erasmus+ to the 2023 budget of Erasmus+, which enabled continued support to pupils, students, teachers and qualified staff fleeing from Ukraine, and the extra EUR 20 million awarded to Erasmus+ in 2023 as a result of Parliament’s insistence; stresses that frontloading must remain an exception to rapid response to unforeseen acute crisis situations; underlines that any frontloading of Erasmus+ cannot result in cuts for the programme at the end of current MFF; emphasises that every effort must be made to respond to such situations preferentially with additional funding;

    102.  Emphasises the need for strict oversight of the allocation of funds to prevent misuse within the Erasmus programme; asks the Commission to gather evidence to investigate any case of fraudulent or suspicious recipients, in accordance with its duties outlined in the Financial Regulation and Erasmus+ grant agreements; calls for adequate safeguarding of the programme from abuse by organizations whose activities are not aligned with the fundamental values of the Union (human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights); recalls that the Commission is legally bound to ensure that programme beneficiaries commit to and ensure the respect of these values and do not commit professional misconduct;

    103.  Notes that in 2023, the budget of the EU4Health programme, the main financial instrument to support Union health initiatives, was EUR 735 million, mainly managed by Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and implemented through the European Health and Digital Executive Agency; acknowledges the progress of initiatives funded under this programme, notably in the areas of health emergency preparedness, the Beating Cancer Plan, the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe and in the implementation of Union health legislation;

    Recommendations

    104.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) re-consider the practice of 100 % Union funding in Union crisis response instruments, where increasing pre-financing might provide faster availability of funds, while maintaining a shared financial budgetary control responsibility in implementation of the funds by maintaining financial involvement from both national and Union level;
       (ii) ensure selection of qualitatively good projects with cohesion policy funds by favouring long-term investments, and duly justifying 100 % Union funding while limiting its application;
       (iii) address the systemic issue of non-detection of errors at Member State level in cohesion policy spending with an action plan, aimed at reporting an accurate error rate in assurance packages, and detection of errors at the first lines of defence by making available more, and/or better targeting existing resources and increase detection capacity at Member State and Commission level;
       (iv) calculate and report to the discharge authority the cost of control for all expenditure handled by national authorities concerning cohesion policy funds, and NGEU, and compare these figures with the cost of control when only Cohesion policy funds were handled by the same authorities;
       (v) address the recurrent issue of insufficient documentation at beneficiary, programme authority and audit authority level, not only through checks, awareness raising and information on requirements, but also through increased digitalisation and where possible, through financial incentives to penalise non-respect of the requirements for sound financial management;
       (vi) expand the scope of its desk review of assurance packages to review more quality criteria in addition to consistency to make a reliable estimate of the residual error rate for the assurance package under review, as well as of the risk at payment as a whole;
       (vii) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats for the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;
       (viii) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;
       (ix) continuously monitor the implementation by the Hungarian Government of measures foreseen in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022; assess to what extent the situation has improved or worsened, including in relation to the challenges faced by the Hungarian Integrity Authority, and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation;
       (x) provide Member States with increased technical assistance in order to address delays in the implementation of national programmes in order to increase the absorption rate;
       (xi) closely monitor and mitigate the increasing risk of double funding between Cohesion programmes and RRF funding and address any such occurrences without delay;
       (xii) further enhance simplification in the implementation of cohesion programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xiii) take all necessary measures to bring down the error rate in close cooperation with the Court of Auditors;
       (xiv) ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, both in the short-term and in the medium-term;

    Natural resources

    105.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 3 ‘Natural resources’ was EUR 59,5 billion (31,1 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 65,0 % for direct payments under the European Agricultural Guarantee fund (EAGF), 27,6 % for the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 4,2 % for market-related expenditure under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), 1,9 % for Maritime and Fisheries, 0,9 % for Environment and Climate (LIFE), and 0,4 % for other areas;

    106.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 218 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading; notes that the Court also examined the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) and the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), as well as selected systems in 20 Member States and the United Kingdom; notes that the Court estimates the level of error for ‘Natural Resources’ to be 2,2 % (2,2 % in 2022) and that the majority of the errors found affected rural development transactions;

    107.  Points out, however, that this is partly due to the complexity of environmental schemes in rural development programmes and the recognized negative issue of “gold plating” at national level;

    108.  Notes, in this context, the lower-than-expected implementation rate of EAFRD funding for the period 2023-2027, with an absorption rate of only 1 % at the end of 2023, with payments amounting to EUR 0,7 billion, and expects the absorption rate to increase significantly in the course of the next reporting period;

    109.  Notes that the Court found 16 quantifiable errors in rural development, 15 in direct payments, three in expenditure related to market measures, and three in non-CAP expenditure; is reassured by the Commission’s assessment that most errors concern clerical mistakes and by the actions taken by the Commission to prevent errors in the future;

    110.  Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with ineligible claims accounting for 35 % of the errors, and administrative errors and inaccurate information on areas or animals for 21 % and 20 % respectively; notes with concern, that as in previous years, that the Court found in several cases that the Member State authorities and the Commission had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities and the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1.0 percentage point lower;

    111.  Notes that 2023 was the first year of the CAP 2023-2027 new delivery model, which integrates performance elements, agreed with the Member States in Strategic Plans, as basis for payments; notes that 2023 was a modest start of the new delivery model, EUR 63,65 million declared on the basis of generated outputs and therefore subject to a ‘performance clearance’ by DG AGRI out of EUR 215,52 million declared under the CAP Strategic plans under sectoral interventions and rural development; notes that in 2024 payments under the new delivery model will have increased substantially; notes the Court’s observations as regards processing performance data for the Annual Performance Reports where Member States are in the process of setting-up systems and procedures and at times manually aggregate data, with associated risks for the reliability of data;

    112.  Recalls the farmers’ protests across Europe towards the end of 2023 and early 2024 and the Commission’s response aimed at simplification, in particular for small farmers, and increasing discretionary powers for Member States; stresses that simplification should go hand in hand with sound financial management and take into account the Union’s climate commitments; welcomes the Commission’s targeted approach, especially concerning the distinction between farm size in terms of agricultural land and number of farms; cautions that discretion given to Member States should also be accompanied by thorough oversight by the Commission;

    113.  Recalls that both the Commission and Member States are responsible for addressing fraud in CAP spending; welcomes in that regard the work done in terms of anti-fraud risk assessments and the update of its anti-fraud strategy by DG AGRI;

    114.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 07/2024 on the Commission’s systems for recovering irregular expenditure, and the Commission’s reply; notes the Court’s observation that recoveries concerning agricultural expenditure have been relatively successful, attributed in part to the so-called 50-50 rule that incentivised Member States to recover funds; notes that this rule has not been retained in the 2023-2027 CAP and the Court’s warning that this might lead to a deterioration of the rate of recovery for agricultural expenditure;

    115.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply; stresses the importance of ensuring that all key elements for assessing performance are provided; considers that plans need to account for specific situations in specific Member States and that therefore a certain level of divergence is even desirable, is however worried that divergence in ambitions may mean that there is no level playing field for farmers across Member States; is further disappointed by the Court’s finding that although the new monitoring framework has been simplified, the CAP objectives lack clarity and indicators focus on outputs rather than results, and that important result indicators are missing; notes that the Court recommends the Commission to promote exchange of best practices in the plans and strengthening the future CAP monitoring framework;

    116.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 19/2024 on Organic farming in the EU, and the Commission’s reply; is once more worried by the Court’s finding that a weak strategic framework and data constraints prevent the measurement of the impact of the policy; considers that the increased focus on performance and definition of targets and indicators, and the related monitoring of results across Union policies needs to be supported by an equal increase of the Commission’s capacity to define performance frameworks and monitor performance;

    117.  Welcomes the increased competitiveness achieved through market measures in the wine sector and encourages the Commission and Member States to persevere in their efforts to replicate this success in other sectors;

    118.  Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue; underlines that separation of powers between the institutions as laid down in Article 13 TEU must always be respected and that Union institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation;

    119.  Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme; recalls the provisions of the LIFE+ Regulation, including those related to operating grants, the eligibility conditions, the award criteria, the overall allocation for 2021-2027 and the distribution of funds within the programme;

    120.  Notes that some members of the Budgetary Control committee requested access to a series of grant agreements under the LIFE programme, as well as other Union funding programmes, and after scrutinising them expressed concerns on the content of several of the programmes in February 2024; notes that the Commission, including the Internal Audit Service (IAS), was initially not aware of any issue, but adopted a series of measures with the aim of addressing the concerns; recalls the discharge written questions and hearings with the Secretary-General of the Commission on 5 November 2024, the responsible Commissioners for MFF Heading 3 on 12 November, and the Commissioner responsible for Budget and administration on 9 December 2024 where the concerns and the Commission’s response were discussed;

    121.  Notes the concerns expressed by some members of the Budgetary Control Committee that certain grant agreements between the European Union Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) and beneficiaries, such as CSOs and private companies, under the LIFE Programme include ‘work plans’ containing detailed advocacy actions towards Union institutions or their representatives, as well as other actions directed towards certain trade agreements which the Union was negotiating, or litigation measures to be pursued by the respective entities; acknowledges that this could be potentially interpreted as interfering with internal decision making in Union institutions; notes that the Commission has performed a legal analysis of the grant agreements that raised concerns of some Members of the CONT Committee, which concluded that there was no evidence that the entities concerned had breached their contractual or code of conduct obligations, yet the Commission asked some beneficiaries to make amendments to the grant agreements that contained the specific provisions that potentially entailed a reputational risk; further notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’;

    122.  Underlines that Union financing should not contribute to undermining the rule of law, nor the values on which the Union is founded; recalls the provisions of Article 163 of the Financial Regulation; considers it crucial that there should be no funding without traceability of funds;

    123.  Notes the actions taken by the Commission to address the allegations which included the issuance of guidance for Commission services on funding activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy and screening of their contract portfolios to determine which agreements were not in line with the guidance; takes note of the measures adopted so far by the Commission while awaiting the results of the screening of the grant agreements with all the beneficiaries, which was requested by the Commission’s Corporate Management Board;

    124.  Notes the decision-making structure, including the evaluation board within CINEA, for deciding on contracts between the Commission and beneficiaries; urges the Commission to ensure that the decision-making structure of CINEA for deciding on contracts to be awarded features clear accountability, clear responsibilities and a practical structure;

    125.  Notes that the executive agency conducts annual bottom-up risk management exercises and that these bottom-up risk management exercises did not identify any critical risks; notes that irrespective of the financing programme, evaluation procedures should be constantly reviewed and adapted if needed;

    126.  Notes reports in the media that the President of the Commission hired a paid special adviser to deliver a report on the “Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture” who received a salary equal to a Director-General in the Commission; is concerned by the remuneration of all the special advisers and the discretion the Commission has in deciding their remuneration, which creates arbitrary inequalities;

    Recommendations

    127.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) closely monitor the Member States’ progress as regards the processing of performance data and the aggregation of data for the annual performance report and keep the discharge authority informed about issues with reliability of performance data, in particular where it concerns manually aggregated data;
       (ii) inform the discharge authority why the Court concludes that for several years several errors could have been prevented, had the Commission and Member States used all information at their disposal and why the Commission and Member States do not manage to address this issue appropriately;
       (iii) apply the lessons learned as regards the reduction of the administrative burden from its response to the farmers’ protests in future policy initiatives, while taking due account of the risk of abuse of funds where control measures are reduced, or risk of too much divergence between Member States when discretionary powers are used without proper oversight;
       (iv) keep the discharge authority informed about the recovery rates of agricultural expenditure, in particular if the rate deteriorates in comparison to the recovery rate under the previous CAP and swiftly mitigate the causes for the deterioration, including considering the introduction of new incentives for Member State authorities to recover funds;
       (v) assess the differences in ambition of strategic plans and inform the discharge authority whether there is divergence between Member States, threatening the level-playing field for farmers, and assess how the Commission addresses those differences;
       (vi) make better use of its capacity for setting-up performance frameworks, for defining objectives and indicators and holding those contributing to the achievements, be they Member States or beneficiaries, accountable for their contributions;
       (vii) update the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy to devote attention to advocating for and upholding a clear separation of executive and legislative power in the Union;
       (viii) have a clear and comprehensive strategy at Commission level as to how to better protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure that Union funds are spent for their intended purposes and diligently apply the Financial Regulation provisions, including by ensuring that grant agreements can be suspended or terminated when beneficiaries violate the Union’s legislation;
       (ix) ensure a fair distribution of Union funds to CSOs to contribute to a pluralistic and vibrant society;
       (x) ensure that the Commission’s guidance adopted in 2024 is applied by all authorising officers and, if necessary, further develop guidance to fully align grant agreements with Treaty provisions and existing legislation;
       (xi) make the results of the screening of grant agreements available to the discharge authority in order to allow an assessment of the extent to which the Commission may be exposed to a reputational risk;
       (xii) adequately address issues such as revolving doors, transparency in financing and donations, the fight against money laundering, limiting foreign interference, independence from political and economic influence, whistleblowing and transparent governance structures, in respect of all entities receiving Union funds;
       (xiii) review the template for MoUs between the Commission and executive agencies to ensure clearer division of responsibilities;
       (xiv) instruct the audit structure to review contracts with beneficiaries and to flag in case they identify contracts that are not in line with applicable financial rules;
       (xv) have the IAS review contracts between the Commission and grantees, specifically to search for content that is not in line with applicable financial rules within work packages;
       (xvi) evaluate the decision-making structure in the areas of the awarding of contracts and instruct Commission services and executive agencies to perform better checks on the content of contracts at all stages, including by ensuring that work packages and key performance indicators as listed by applicants align with the objectives of respective funding programmes;
       (xvii) adopt more precise categorisation of entities listed in the Financial Transparency System;
       (xviii) review its rules for special advisers to remove the arbitrary selection and remuneration;
       (xix) further enhance simplification in the implementation of programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xx) improve the quality of dialogue with farmers from all Member States;
       (xxi) react more quickly when serious concerns of the discharge authority are flagged to the Commission;
       (xxii) perform adequate checks of entities listed in the Transparency Register, in order to ensure that they comprehensively list their activities in the Register;
       (xxiii) draw clearer lines of responsibility when implementing collaborative platforms;
       (xxiv) instruct the Corporate Management Board to submit consolidated information on the list of critical risks to the internal audit service and ensure executive agencies address potential risks and ensure a transparent selection of independent evaluators to prevent conflict of interest and guarantee their independence;
       (xxv) instruct all DGs and executive agencies to review the distribution of funds dedicated to auditing in order to ensure sufficient resources;
       (xxvi) ensure that proposals for Multiannual Work Programmes of any Union funding instrument have clear guidelines on the activities eligible for funding, clearer rules on screening of applications and on admissible content as well as clearer requirements for transparency and traceability of the use of Union funds, including in relation to the disclosure requirements under the EU Transparency Register;
       (xxvii) ensure that all grant agreements respect the necessary requirements related to transparency, traceability and visibility of funds;

    Migration and Border management

    128.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 4 ‘Migration and Border Management’ was EUR 2,7 billion (1,4 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 1,2 billion (46,5 %) for three decentralised agencies, the European Boarder Coast Agency (FRONTEX), the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU- LISA); 1 billion (38,6 %) for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), and 0,4 billion (14,9 %) for the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF);

    129.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 4 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 18 % of AMIF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    130.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 23 transactions, which is not large enough to be representative of the spending under MFF headings 4 and 5 and, thus, it cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for these headings; further notes that the Court’s audit results show that the expenditure under MFF headings 4 and 5 is affected by eligibility and procurement issues and that it is a high-risk area (7 out of 23 transactions audited, i.e. 30,4 %, were affected by errors); is concerned that the Court detected four quantifiable errors which had a financial impact on the amounts charged to the Union budget and that it also found further ten cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions (which had no direct financial impact on the Union budget); therefore, invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for heading 4; notes that the Commission concludes that the risk at payment in 2023 is 1,1 % for the expenditure on migration and border management;

    131.  Notes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendation made in its annual report for 2023 to provide further guidance on applicable rules to the Member State authorities responsible for implementing DG HOME funding via shared management; regrets that the Commission has not yet fully implemented the Court’s previous recommendations that were due to be addressed by the end of 2023; notes that DG HOME is undertaking a reassessment of its ex-ante methodology to ensure the respect of the rules applicable to post-2021 generation of grants, and that this reassessment will also address the Court’s relevant recommendations and those of the IAS audit on the preparedness for closing actions and programmes funded under the Internal Security Fund (ISF) and the AMIF 2014-2020 through direct and shared management;

    132.  Notes with concern that two reservations on the declaration of assurance were issued in DG HOME’s Annual Activity Report for 2023 and that one reservation concerns the implementation of AMIF and ISF 2014-2020 in several Member States and the other reservation concerns the implementation of Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 2021-2027 in one Member State; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to take remedial measures for the underlying issues that necessitated the reservations;

    133.  Welcomes the progress identified by the Court in its review of the preparatory work done by five member state audit authorities in managing the transition of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF funds to the CPR of the 2021-2027 MFF; observes that these audit authorities reported to the Court that the support and guidance DG HOME provided to them was satisfactory; notes with concern that at the time of the Court’s audit four out of five Member State audit authorities had not finalised their audit strategies;

    134.  Takes note of the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; welcomes that the mid-term revision of the MFF 2021-2027 allocated an additional EUR 2 billion to migration and border management for 2024-2027 to address the growing challenges in migration and border management resulting from the current geopolitical context; notes, however, that additional funds might be needed with a view to ensuring the full implementation of the Pact; calls for the quick implementation of the Pact in the Member States;

    135.  Stresses that securing the Union’s external borders is a pillar of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; notes with concern that the Commission reported that the number of irregular border crossings in the Union increased in 2023 to 380 000, compared to 330 000 in 2022; observes that the BMVI can support frontline Member States to ensure they have the resources for infrastructure, facilities and installations necessary to secure the external borders of the Union, including electronic border security enhancements and other tools for border surveillance as provided for in annex III of the BMVI regulation; notes the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 that the Union will step up its action to prevent irregular departures and loss of life, to reduce pressure on the borders of the Union and on reception capacities, to fight against smugglers and to increase returns; underlines the need to better protect vulnerable people from smuggling and trafficking networks and address the negative effects of the instrumentalisation of migrants as part of hybrid attacks, notably by pro-Russian forces, as well as by the Belarusian regime;

    136.  Recalls that, according to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States and the Commission must ensure respect for fundamental rights and compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the implementation of Union funds;

    137.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the AMIF 2014-2020 was performing below expectations in terms of facilitating returns of migrants: also takes note of the fact that the Court and the Commission agree that progress in this area was particularly affected by COVID-19-related travel restrictions; further notes that in 2023 return measures were supported with EUR 29,8 million from the AMIF; considers that the Commission must provide stronger efforts to assist Member States in addressing irregular border crossing and in successfully implementing returns of third-country nationals, as well as the integration of legal migrants; looks forward to receiving consolidated information in 2025 on progress in this regard through the ex-post evaluation AMIF 2014-2020; highlights that the Commission should continue to take action on migration and asylum within the framework of external action, including the ‘Team Europe’ approach while also increasing the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries and safeguarding the role of the Parliament;

    Recommendations

    138.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) address the Court’s recommendations in a thorough and timely manner and share DG HOME’s revised ex-ante methodology, once completed, with the discharge authority;
       (ii) continue to support the Member State managing and audit authorities in the timely finalisation of their audit strategies for MFF 2021-2027 funds, paying particular attention to eligibility and procurement issues, as well as all other recurrent findings of the Court;
       (iii) take action to improve the performance of actions funded by the Union in terms of effective returns and combatting irregular migration, while ensuring the full respect of Union legislation and the fundamental values of the Union;
       (iv) take action to increase the efficiency of Union spending on the protection and management of the European Union’s external borders;
       (v) monitor, assist in and scrutinise the timely progress of the administrative, operational and legal steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full implementation of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum by 2026;
       (vi) increase the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries, while safeguarding the role of Parliament in ensuring the democratic scrutiny of Union spending;
       (vii) continuously assess, in the implementation of the Union Budget, compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulation;

    Security and Defence

    139.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ was EUR 1,4 billion (0,7 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 500 million (38,4 %) for the European Defence Fund (EDF), 300 million (19 %) for military mobility, 200 million (17,1 %) for decentralised agencies, namely the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Europol and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), 200 million (13,1 %) for the ISF, and 200 million (12,4 %) for nuclear safety, decommissioning and other areas;

    140.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 5 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 25 % of ISF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    141.  Notes with concern that, for the reasons explained in the section on migration and border management, the Court cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ and that, based on its audit results, the Court considers expenditure from this heading to be high-risk; therefore, invites the Court to provide an estimate of the error rate for this heading as well; notes that the Commission concludes that in 2023 the risk at payment was 0,5 % for the expenditure on security and defence;

    142.  Observes that the Commission has not accepted the Court’s recommendation to carefully check and document the technical aspects of military mobility grant applications to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) during the grant award procedure and that the Commission considers that its current processes already ensure a check on whether dual-use infrastructure projects meet the eligibility conditions;

    143.  Recalls the highly unstable geopolitical situation in the Union’s neighbourhood giving rise to greater security and defence challenges, including hybrid threats, and thereby to greater investment needs in security, defence and preparedness, since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; draws attention to the fact that MFF heading 5, dedicated to security and defence, is the smallest of all MFF headings and regrets that the Union’s current budget for ensuring the security and defence of its citizens is not equal to the challenges to be met either in the short or the long term; notes that in 2023 Union funding in support of the defence industry came exclusively from the EDF; recalls the role played by the EDF in supporting European technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies; welcomes that submissions to the 2023 EDF calls increased by 72 % compared to the previous year, demonstrating the strong and constantly growing interest of European defence industry actors and research organisations in the EDF and the high demand for funding in this sector; notes that under the 2023 calls, the Union committed EUR 1,15 billion for 61 defence R&D projects, benefiting 581 legal entities from 26 Member States and Norway; notes that on average 17 entities from eight different Member States and Norway participate in each project; underlines the importance of a level playing field in supporting cross-border defence R&D cooperation;

    144.  Welcomes the Commission’s actions to enhance support for SMEs in the defence sector, in particular appreciates that the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which provides a diverse range of instruments tailored to support SMEs within the defence ecosystem, became fully operational in 2023, with EUR 224 million allocated to it from the EDF budget; appreciates, further, the role of the SME bonus under the EDF in facilitating the access of smaller actors and innovators in defence supply chains; notes that in the 2023 EDF calls, 42 % of the entities selected for funding were SMEs, an increased share compared to 2022 (38,2 %), and that 18 % of the total funding available through the EDF calls is allocated to SMEs;

    145.  Recalls that the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) was a precursor programme of the EDF with a budget of EUR 90 million that funded 18 research projects selected following calls for proposals in the years 2017 to 2019; further recalls that the Court, in its Special Report 10/2023 ‘The Preparatory action on defence research’, has observed that the Union still lacked a long-term strategy for the projects under the EDF, particularly in terms of impact, additional research, development, manufacturing and procurement; welcomes that the Commission has accepted all of the Court’s recommendations and has confirmed that their implementation is ongoing; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s adoption of a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and legislative proposal establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as well as its commitment to build up the EDF; nevertheless, in view of the geopolitical realities the Union faces, is concerned that the full implementation of the Court’s recommendations is expected only in 2026;

    146.  Recalls the Court’s observations in its Special Report 10/2023 regarding the limited availability of human resources at the Commission and the subsequent risk for the EDF; notes that the growing number of proposals to evaluate and projects to manage puts considerable pressure on human resources; further notes the large share of seconded national experts (17 %) among DG DEFIS staff in 2023 and DG DEFIS’s intention to reinforce staff by the selection of officials through specialised EPSO competitions in the field of space and defence, for which the reserve lists were finalised in November 2023;

    147.  Notes that the implementation of ‘Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0’ is ongoing, with EUR 1,74 billion allocated for dual-use transport infrastructure projects under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) between 2021-2027; notes that so far the Union has co-funded 95 military mobility projects in 21 Member States and that 94 of these projects are still ongoing and most of them are expected to be finalised between 2026 and 2027; notes with concern that following three calls for proposals organised in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the entirety of the military mobility envelope under the CEF for the current programming period has thereby already been exhausted; considers that although making the budget quickly available by frontloading amounts into the 2022 and 2023 calls responded to the need to take into account the evolution of the security situation in Europe following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it simultaneously led to Union funding being unstable and unpredictable by leaving a gap of more than four years with no more Union funds available for military mobility calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects until the post-2027 MFF; recalls the Court’s conclusions in its Special Report 04/2025 that the Action Plan was not built on sufficiently solid foundations and that progress towards its objective, namely ensuring swift and seamless movement of personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale, has been variable due to design weaknesses and remaining obstacles to implementation; notes that the Commission considers that more action is needed to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure corridors, including on regulatory issues such as cross-border movement permission procedures; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission had not carried out a robust assessment of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable; regrets that only EUR 300 million was spent on military mobility in 2023 and is concerned that calls for proposals under the military mobility envelope faced a four-time oversubscription rate, demonstrating the increased interest among Member States and project beneficiaries;

    148.  Expresses deep concern over the Commission’s decision to proceed with the adoption of the “Rearm EU” initiative without prior consultation of the European Parliament; regrets that such a decision bypasses the principle of institutional balance and undermines Parliament’s role as co-legislator in shaping strategic and budgetary priorities; urges the Commission to refrain from initiating substantial policy instruments that impact the Union’s financial and strategic architecture without ensuring full respect for the prerogatives of the Parliament;

    149.  Notes that the European Parliament has called on the Union and its Member States to put in place a legal framework enabling Russia to be classified as a State sponsor of terrorism;

    Recommendations

    150.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) develop a longer-term strategy for the EDF, building on the experience with Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the Court’s recommendations, as soon as possible;
       (ii) secure the provision of adequate resources to enhance Union defence cooperation, in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and the timely recruitment of expert staff, and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;
       (iii) further strengthen military mobility in the Union by substantially increasing the funding available to improve dual-use transport infrastructure corridors and by taking action to eliminate administrative, procedural and regulatory barriers to cross-border military movements, while prioritising Union funding to projects that best respond to the current European threat landscape; taking into account the Court’s findings and recommendations in special report 04/2025;
       (iv) take action to ensure due diligence in relation to project criteria for dual-use military mobility infrastructure projects, in line with the Court’s recommendation;

    Neighbourhood and the world

    151.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ was EUR 15,2 billion (7,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 63,4 % for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe), 16,4 % for Humanitarian Aid (HUMA), 16 % for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) and 4.2 % for other actions and programmes; notes that in total, payments for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ reached 15,2 billion in 2023, representing approximatively 8 % of the overall Union expenditure excluding RRF;

    152.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 72 transactions, which is not adequately representative of the spending under this MFF heading and, therefore, cannot provide an estimate of the error rate; considering that the Court’s audit results show that this is a high-risk area (of 37 out of 72 transactions audited, i.e. 51.4 %, were affected by errors), invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for this chapter; notes that the Court found 31 errors that had a financial impact on the Union budget, relating to ineligible beneficiaries, ineligible costs, expenditure not incurred, and breaches of public procurement rules, areas that could point to risks of unreliable functioning of control mechanisms;

    153.  Notes, additionally, that the Court detected 19 cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions, none of which had direct financial impact on the Union budget, and which included issues such as ambiguous cost allocations, non-compliance with visibility rules, and inadequate documentation;

    154.  Is concerned that the Court found a significant non-compliance with visibility rules in an EU-funded project under indirect management by DG NEAR, which concerned a contribution agreement worth EUR 21,2 million signed with an international organisation in a project where the aim was to support Eastern partnership countries in tackling COVID-19; notes that the Court found that most donation certificates it checked did not contain any acknowledgment that the medical equipment donated was funded by the Union; recalls that beneficiaries of Union funds are required to clearly publicise the fact that the Union has financed or co-financed the action they are implementing; notes the Commission’s replies that it is discussing new communication and visibility guidelines with the United Nations to reduce the risks of errors on compliance with visibility rules;

    155.  Expresses concern that the Court, in its IT audit on the information system OPSYS’ component for managing user access and rights, found three shortcomings including (i) that the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) had not formalised a procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users; (ii) four cases in which standard users had more access rights than they needed for their jobs, which is not in line with the Commission’s IT standards; and that (iii) DG INTPA did not manage all administrator accounts belonging to staff of other directorates-general; is concerned that these weaknesses increase the risks of both inappropriate access to the system and non-compliance with the rules and procedures for implementing external action projects, and also undermine the integrity of system processes and data;

    156.  Notes that the Commission intensified communication with international organisations in order to raise awareness of the need to ensure that the Court’s auditors obtain full access to documents when auditing projects funded by the Union, and that the Commission has supported initiatives to find permanent solutions to the issues of access to and retention of documents; notes, however, the Commission’s acknowledgment that despite efforts, some constraints regarding access to documents persist due to the existing legal frameworks of the implementing partners, which are not expected to change in the near future;

    157.  Urges the Commission to enhance the rule of law conditionality-based approach of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) III funding in order for the instrument to serve its purpose of effectively preparing accession countries to fulfil the conditions of becoming Member States of the Union; reiterates its calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the Court’s Special Report 01/2022 in order to ensure an effective impact of Union financial assistance in support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans, in particular by developing guidelines on the application of the provisions on modulation and conditionality under IPA III;

    158.  Stresses that Union aid should under no circumstances – directly or indirectly – be financing terrorism, hence it should not support any entity connected to Hamas or any other terrorist or extremist organisation; notes to this end, it is legitimate and necessary to be able to clearly know and identify all the final beneficiaries of European aid in third countries; emphasises the need for strict control over the distribution and use of aid to ensure no misuse of funds;

    159.  Notes with regret that the European Commission financed the Gaziantep Islamic Science and Technology University, which has proven ties to terrorist organisation of Hamas; calls on the Commission to cancel all ties to this university and other universities with ties to terrorist organisations;

    160.  Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering enhanced support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, to also make full use of trusted partners, such as the WHO, WFP UNICEF or different Red Crescent organisations; recalls the importance for the Commission to guarantee independent controls of UNRWA by external experts, the Court and experienced international partners;

    161.  Notes that the Commission has been working in the last months with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS on the allegations of involvement of 19 of its staff in the 7th October 2023 attack, and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA on the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Group led by former French Minister of Foreign Affairs Colonna to strengthen control and oversight; notes that the Commission has reassessed the Union’s 2024 funding decision for UNRWA and that, through an exchange of letters between Commissioner Várhelyi and UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, the Union reached an agreement about the Union’s conditional assistance for UNRWA, linked to a number of milestones in relation to three work streams, including the screening of UNRWA staff, an audit by the Union, as well as the reinforcement of the Department of Internal Investigations and Ethics office; notes that Union assistance was resumed;

    162.  Recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards by the next school year, in particular those that contain antisemitism as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance classification endorsed by the Union, incitement to violence, hate speech, and glorification of terrorism; recalls the provisions of previous discharge resolutions; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards, that all anti-Semitic references are deleted, and that examples which incite to hatred and violence are removed, as repeatedly requested in the resolutions accompanying the discharge decisions; recalls the findings of the Georg Eckert Institute’s report funded by the Union, which revealed a complex picture on the textbooks; notes that the Union does not fund the Palestinian textbooks, and that neither are they the responsibility of UNRWA, which nevertheless reviews all issued textbooks to address any problematic content;); notes that the Commission will carry out close scrutiny to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly, to the drafting, teaching, or exposure of such educational materials to Palestinian children, including those provided by UN organisations;

    163.  Notes DG NEAR’s acknowledgement in its AAR 2023 that projects in Kyiv received regular visits but security constraints limited on-site monitoring and project visits in other Ukrainian regions; further notes that the constraints on adequately monitoring projects in Ukraine led to a renewed reservation in the 2023 AAR of DG NEAR and that corrective actions are being implemented, such as monitoring progress on project implementation through desk reviews, remote solutions and using a service provider;

    164.  Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO; welcomes, in addition, that, pursuant to article 36 of the Ukraine Facility Regulation, the Commission established in June 2024 an Audit Board, with the mission of assisting the Commission in assessing the effectiveness of Ukraine’s management and control systems regarding the funds provided under the Facility and in fighting mismanagement of Union funding under the Ukraine Facility; calls on the Commission to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

    165.  Notes with concern the recent reports on the findings of a draft audit report paid for by the Commission on the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) Secretariat which allege to suspected fraud, unpaid salaries and further liabilities; notes that as reported the Commission has contributed EUR 3,7 million to the Secretariat in 2023 and is trying to recover EUR 3,6 million as of March 2024; asks the Commission to ensure full transparency and accountability, grant access to the audit report and inform the members of Parliament on the concrete steps taken;

    166.  Calls on the Commission in line with the Court’s recommendations in its opinion 03/2024 to integrate into the new MFF legislative proposal the recommendations of the External Action Guarantee complementing the Commission’s evaluation, including increased use of blending (grants) in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society;

    167.  Is concerned about the allocation of EFSD+ under the new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope in favour of benefiting countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs, and fragile and conflict-affected countries; calls for reporting on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in these countries and for transparency on how the quota of allocations to LDCs within country MIPs is respected within allocations of the regional MIPs;

    168.  While recognising the Global Gateway strategy as a concerted Union response to global challenges, reiterates that actions bringing together public and private investment must always be guided by the legal framework as provided by the NDICI Regulation, the Agenda 2030, and the needs of partner countries, as communicated by way of an honest dialogue at eye level; is concerned about inconsistencies surrounding Global Gateway programmes; calls, therefore, for improved transparency, democratic accountability, robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in Global Gateway and Team Europe initiatives; calls for a centralised, publicly accessible platform, regularly updated, to detail Global Gateway projects, including their objectives, funding sources, implementing partners, and expected outcomes;

    European Development Fund (EDF)

    169.  Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 140 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 31 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 87 transactions authorised by 14 EU delegations(20) and 19 payments approved by Commission headquarters;

    170.  Notes with concern that, out of the 140 transactions examined, 62 (44,3 %) contained errors, compared to 57 (40,7 %) in 2022 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 52 errors (48 in 2022), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2023 to be 8,9 % (7,1 % in 2022);

    171.  Highlights with concern that the three most common types of errors in the financial year 2023 related to expenditure not incurred at 45 % (51 % in 2022), to absence of essential supporting documents at 31 % (7 % in 2022) and to ineligible expenditure at 23 % (24 % in 2022);

    172.  Notes the Commission’s replies to written questions to Commissioners Jutta Urpilainen and Oliver Varhelyi that in 2023 approximately 45 % of the total errors are due to excess clearing, a practice where expenditure not incurred is included in the accounts as expenditure incurred, and that therefore such errors are temporary, since they will no longer exist after the final clearings; notes furthermore that, to reduce these temporary errors, the Commission has requested its partners to review their reporting templates to allow for easier identification of incurred expenditure, and that DG INTPA launched a special working group to screen the compliance of relevant organisations through a risk management framework; also notes that DG INTPA is currently reviewing its control strategy, which aims also to identify how ex-ante controls can be strengthened and to improve the reporting of the pillar-assessed organisations to the Commission; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the effects of these actions;

    173.  Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and also on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of this review;

    174.  Is concerned that, as in previous years, some international organisations provided only limited access to documents (e.g., in read-only format), which hindered the planning, execution and quality control of the Court’s audit and led to delays; notes that audit and control issues were discussed with UN entities on several occasions, including in the context of joint technical reference group meetings and the relevant EU-UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) working group; notes furthermore that the Commission is working with the International Organisations concerned and has intensified communication with them on the Court’s access to documents; encourages, as in previous years, the Commission to increase these efforts;

    175.  Stresses that, according to Court’s assessment, the Residual Error Rate (RER) study does not constitute an assurance engagement or an audit and is based on the RER methodology and manual provided by DG INTPA; notes that DG INTPA clarifies that the RER study is meant to be a key indicator for the estimated financial impact of residual errors, i.e., it measures the proper functioning of the internal control system and thus, demonstrates the Commission’s corrective capacity; stresses that, as in previous years, the Court has found limitations in the study; notes, furthermore, the Court’s opinion, as in previous years, that the RER methodology allows the contractor to rely entirely on the results of DG INTPA´s controls, and that relying on the work of other auditors is contrary to the purpose of an RER study; highlights the Court’s finding that in cases where these previous checks were carried out under the FAFA between the European Commission and the United Nations, the contractor is not always able to carry out additional substantive testing as the FAFA limits the Commission’s verification rights; highlights the Commission’s reply which recognised the limitations in terms of controls set in the FAFA; urges the Commission to look for workable solutions to resolve this issue;

    176.  Recalls that two EUTFs were created under the EDFs; recalls that EUTF for Africa has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, with 88 % of contributions (EUR 4,4 billion) coming from the EDF and the Union budget; deplores that, despite several requests from Parliament, the process of managing and allocating these funds still lacks transparency; is concerned by the Court’s findings in its Special report 17/2024 “The EU trust fund for Africa Despite new approaches, support remained unfocused; notes that, despite an innovative approach to identifying human rights risks in a difficult environment, these risks were not comprehensively addressed and that the Court found that the assessment of potential risks to human rights was not comprehensive; recalls that the Commission is unable to identify and report on the most efficient and effective approaches to reducing irregular migration and forced displacements in Africa according to the Court; regrets that the new monitoring system aggregates information from all EUTF projects, but suffers from issues of data accuracy; notes that the Union’s Africa trust fund is set to be phased out in 2025;

    Recommendations

    177.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations:

       (i) as regards the OPSYS application system, formalise and enhance the procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users, enhance the quality of the new software, and allocate resources needed to enhance its maturity and robustness;
       (ii) strengthen guidance and controls to ensure that organisations implementing contracts under indirect management, including international organisations, international financial institutions and state agencies, comply with visibility rules;
       (iii) continue to intensify its communication with international organisations in order to provide the Court with complete, unlimited and timely access to documents necessary to carry out its task in accordance with the TFEU, and not just in read-only format;
       (iv) put in place adequate ex ante and ex post control measures in unstable or conflict zones to ensure the proper control of spending of Union funds and ways to recover the Union funds;
       (v) take measures to improve controls systems for the clearing of pre-financing paid to international organisations;
       (vi) strengthen ex ante controls before accepting expenditure;

    178.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) strictly monitor through all available mechanisms and work with UNRWA to ensure the implementation of all agreed actions to guarantee that UNRWA works in full compliance with humanitarian principles and neutrality, including in the forthcoming EU-UNRWA joint declaration and the upcoming financing decisions for conditional Union assistance;
       (ii) ensure that all contracts involving Union funds fully respect applicable Union legislation, including accountability, transparency, and sound financial management, and that this includes verifying that there are no subcontractors, natural persons, participants in workshops and/or trainings or recipients of financial support made to third parties subject to Union restrictive measures or involved in the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as well as other acts of hatred and incitement to hatred;
       (iii) increase evidence-based targeting of geographical areas and beneficiaries, and improve the accuracy of reported achievements of future development action, including through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe;

    European public Administration

    179.  Notes that the Commission is directly responsible for the implementation of 59,1 % of the overall administrative budget of the Union, equivalent to EUR 7,2 billion; further notes that 70 % of the administrative expenditure relates to human resources including pensions while the remaining primarily covers expenditure related to buildings, equipment, energy, communications and IT; notes with satisfaction that also for 2023 the Court concludes that the spending area is low risk;

    180.  Notes that during 2023, 2152 civil servants left the Commission primarily due to retirement, resignation or the end of their contracts; notes that this represents a relatively high turnover, which should give the Commission ample possibilities to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

    181.  Encourages the Commission together with EPSO to ensure that necessary technical systems are put in place as quickly as possible and that processes are accelerated in order for the Commission and other Union institutions to be able to rely on EPSO for the selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions;

    182.  Appreciates that female representation in management positions increased from 46,1 % in December 2022 to 47,8 % in December 2023; encourages the Commission to continue to focus on ensuring and maintaining gender balance on all levels of management;

    183.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission has implemented policies to enhance work-life balance and staff well-being, including the right to disconnect; at the same time commends that a new decision on the prevention and fight against harassment was adopted which establishes the position of a Chief Confidential Counsellor as key figure in the fight against harassment; stresses the need to provide this position with the appropriate resources to effectively carry out multiple challenging tasks;

    184.  Acknowledges the progress of the Commission with regard to the internalisation of crèche staff;

    185.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission issued updated versions of the guidelines on ethical standards for participation of the Members of the European Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament and guidelines for the participation of Members of the Commission in election campaigns at Member State level; further commends that in March 2023, the Commission adopted much needed strengthened rules on missions and costs paid by third parties;

    186.  Stresses the need to ensure that all the Union Institutions in Luxembourg can attract staff to all types of jobs and careers; notes that especially for servants in lower pay grades Luxembourg can be a less attractive option due to the costs of living; notes that with the agreement on the budget for 2025 the first step has been taken by establishing a special housing allowance for staff in lower grades working in Union institutions in Luxembourg;

    187.  Notes that the Commission has an ambitious goal of reducing the overall office space of the Commission by 25 % and the number of buildings by 50 % by 2030 compared to 2020; notes that the total reduction in overall space reached a little over 83 000 m2 in 2023, equal to a reduction of 11 %; welcomes that this goal is an important element in the Commission achieving carbon neutrality and reducing administrative costs; stresses that it is important that the reduction in the number of building and office space and the resulting roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;

    188.  Is concerned about the severe delays, including delays of up to 6 months, faced by civil servants across the institutions when receiving the reimbursements of healthcare costs under the institutions’ sickness insurance scheme; is also concerned about the inadequate treatment of civil servants and MEPs with autoimmune diseases, neurological disorders, COPD (obstructive pulmonary disease), long COVID, undiagnosed and rare diseases by the sickness insurance scheme of the institutions; notes that patients with these symptoms are often not reimbursed for their diagnostic tests;

    189.  Notes that, in 2023, the Ombudsman launched 398 inquiries concerning the Commission; further notes that during 2023 the Commission received 187 closing decisions without remarks and 17 decisions of maladministration; notes with concern that the Ombudsman receives many citizens’ complaints about extreme delays in gaining access to requested documents from the Commission and encourages the Commission to strive to speed up the processing of such requests and further reduce the number of decisions of maladministration and establish clear rules concerning access to all types of written texts whether on paper, email, text messages or any other form of communication, which is part of an administrative process related to Commission policies or decisions; notes that out of the nine investigations related to the Commission concluded by OLAF in 2023, seven were closed with recommendations; calls on the Commission to ensure transparency and accountability in the follow-up to these cases;

    190.  Expresses deep concern that there has been allegations of corruption linked to the Commission; at the same time deplores that there has been allegations about officials from the Commission that allegedly accepted gifts from a country that the Union was negotiating an agreement with; stresses the need for a clear and systematic approach to ensure that all OLAF cases involving relevant potential criminal offences are promptly referred to the EPPO and the competent national authorities; calls on the Commission to reinforce relevant rules and procedures in order to ensure that all cases are handled in a strict, correct and efficient way;

    191.  Notes that only very few cases of psychological and sexual harassment have been recognised as such in the past years and expresses concern that this may point to institutional blind spots in the Commission, given the significant number of employees of the institution;

    192.  Expresses deep concern regarding reports of an ongoing investigation involving the former Commissioner for Justice, who is alleged to have been engaged, during his time in office, in money laundering activities involving funds of unknown origin; calls on the Commission to fully cooperate with the Belgian authorities and to urgently clarify whether these activities were in any way connected to his official duties within the Commission;

    193.  Calls on the Commission to prioritise permanent staff over external consultants and contractual staff, in order to guarantee high quality working conditions and to prevent knowledge and experience from being lost; calls for flexibility for DGs with a high proportion of seconded national experts (SNE) in the establishment plan to convert SNE posts into temporary agent posts with the aim of ensuring better expertise retention, operational functionality and business continuity; further insists on avoiding the externalisation of tasks to consultancies when available know-how can be found in-house;

    194.  Notes that, in recent years, the Commission has increasingly outsourced impact assessments to external companies, raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to strengthen provisions to prevent possible conflicts of interest and to provide better guidance to staff handling public procurement procedures for policy-related service contracts;

    195.  Regrets the alleged espionage organised by the Hungarian Government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent any violations;

    196.  Welcomes the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2023/2841(21); takes note of cybersecurity investments, including EUR 30 million allocated to enhancing digital security in the Commission; calls on the Commission to spare no effort in further developing a cybersecurity culture, promoting training and awareness within the Union institution; stresses the importance of continued adequate investments in cybersecurity towards the longer term indicative target in the order of at least 10 % of total IT spending;

    197.  Reiterates its concern that the significant risks to the security and protection of the registry and operating mechanism of the Union system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading against cyberattacks have still not been adequately addressed; points out that this issue has been highlighted in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) since 2010, with reservations raised in each report; notes that this concern is once again emphasised in the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s 2023 AAR, further underscoring the persistent failure to prioritise the security of the system;

    European Schools

    198.  Notes that the European Schools’ overall budget for 2023 was EUR 417,5 million primarily funded by the Commission, other Union institutions, Member States and fees from parents; further notes that almost 80 % of the budget was spent on staff costs;

    199.  Notes with satisfaction that the Court is able to conclude that nothing has come to their attention that causes them to believe that the consolidated accounts for 2023 are not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards;

    200.  Observes that the Court found some systematic or recurrent weaknesses in payments and related human resources (HR) and procurement procedures including insufficient verification of supporting evidence affecting the regularity of some HR procedures and payments;

    201.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) ensure that Union Institutions can rely on EPSO to efficiently organise and complete selection procedures and other staff related procedures in order to provide Union Institutions with sufficient highly qualified and motivated candidates for open positions;
       (ii) explore all possibilities to correct significant geographical and gender imbalances in different categories of the staff;
       (iii) continue work on measures that will ensure that Union Institutions based in Luxembourg can continue to attract highly qualified staff for all types of job profiles;
       (iv) ensure that the roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;
       (v) make more staff available for processing of reimbursement requests for the sickness insurance scheme, to improve staff training and to have better IT software available to process requests more quickly;
       (vi) act as a role model, particularly for diseases that do not fall into classical fields and rare diseases; urges the Commission to expand their technical knowledge and handling of these cases; urges the Commission to expand the catalogue of tests eligible for reimbursement to include a wider bandwidth for laboratory tests and other diagnostic procedures and exams as well as treatments; urges the Commission to do this promptly;
       (vii) ensure the rapid introduction of strong protective mechanisms for Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and third countries, safeguarding their rights;
       (viii) support the European Schools in their implementation, as soon as possible, of recommendations by the Court from previous years and the recommendation from the report concerning the financial year 2023 which asks the schools to perform systematic checks of supporting evidence on allowances paid to seconded staff;
       (ix) prepare a report analysing the reasons why the vast majority of harassment complaints (requests for assistance) in the Commission are dismissed, most of them without even opening an administrative inquiry, and recommending how such dysfunctionality of the formal procedure can be addressed;
       (x) ensure that as of 2025, requests for assistance in harassment cases are followed up with a proper administrative inquiry by the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) or OLAF so as to ensure that harassers are held accountable and sanctioned proportionately to their wrongdoing;

    CHAPTER II – Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    General remarks

    202.  Notes that in 2023, 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) were revised, and that these revisions had an impact on the pace of implementation of the existing plans, causing delays; notes at the same time that the political priorities in Member States can change; notes that increased energy prices, high inflation and supply chain disruptions caused by Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, and, in some cases, natural disasters, contributed to the revision of the RRPs; underlines that the delays caused by the revisions of the RRPs came in addition to existing ones, as shown by the significant differences between the foreseen calendar of payments requests and the actual transmission of these requests by the Member States to the Commission; remains concerned by the risk of under-implementation and of failure to reach the milestones and targets (M&Ts) as agreed in the RRPs; emphasises the need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms to ensure that delays do not disproportionately impact key projects;

    203.  Notes that there should be a clear thematic link between reforms and investments and that there may be, in certain cases, a long delay between the creation of the national recovery plans and the completion of milestones and targets; regrets that the RRF design does not allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to emerging crises in a prompt manner;

    204.  Draws attention with utmost concern to the statement of the President of the Court, arguing that approximately half of the RRF disbursements had not reached the real economy, and questions if the other half may have been used either to substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or generate profit to Member States from the increased interest rates;

    205.  Recalls that the RRF is a temporary recovery instrument based on performance, i.e. that payments are linked to the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts related to reforms and investments included in the national RRPs; stresses that the effectiveness of the RRF must be assessed, not only in terms of disbursement, but also in terms of its ability to generate tangible, long-term improvements of the consequences of the pandemic; recalls that there is no definition in the RRF Regulation of the “satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts”; recalls that each national plan should effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the European Semester, particularly the country- specific recommendations (CSRs) adopted by the Council; notes the fact that, thanks to the RRF, the percentage of CSRs with progress has increased by 17 % between 2021 and 2023;

    206.  Notes that in 2023, the Commission disbursed a total of EUR 75 billion, and additional pre-financing payments of EUR 7,1 billion, which brought the total disbursements by the end of 2023 to EUR 220,8 billion, divided into EUR 141,6 billion in grants (40 % of the total EUR 357 billion for grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) envelope) and EUR 79,2 billion in loans (27 % of the total EUR 291 billion for loans under the RRF envelope); mandates detailed reporting requirements on how Member States allocate funds, preventing substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures, and ensuring funds reach intended beneficiaries;

    Court’s observations

    207.  Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; is concerned that the Court concluded that seven out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were affected by quantitative findings and that six of these payments were affected by material error; notes that in the Court’s opinion, except for those matters, the RRF expenditure accepted in the accounts for the year 2023 is legal and regular in all material respects; notes that the nature of the RRF spending model relies on the assessments of milestones and targets (M&Ts) to be made by the Commission; notes that in 2023, the Court checked 452 M&Ts included in 23 grant payments and that it does not provide an error rate due to the nature of the RRF’s spending model but estimates the minimum financial impact of its findings to be above the materiality threshold; is convinced that Member States should also bear responsibility for errors detected in post-disbursement;

    208.  Expresses deep concern that the Court was unable to verify the actual financial impact of erroneous or ineligible RRF payments due to the inherent limitations of the milestone and target-based assessment model; calls on the Commission to develop a more transparent error-tracking methodology to prevent misallocation and inefficiency;

    209.  Notes that the Court audited 325 out of 542 milestones and 127 out of 135 targets included in 2023 payment requests for grants; regrets that the Court considers that 16 of them were affected by regularity issues (2.4 % of the total); is concerned by the fact that the Court considers that the requirements had not been satisfactorily fulfilled for seven M&Ts in six payments and that the Commission had still made the corresponding payments; notes that the Court’s conclusions are based on extensive audit work and regrets that the Commission contests some of the Court’s conclusions; notes that all of the RRF payments must be assessed against the framework communicated and applied by the Commission, which must take into consideration for each payment the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee and the scrutiny by Member State experts under the comitology procedure; requests the Commission to ensure that all disputed payments related to unsatisfactorily fulfilled M&Ts undergo independent external review to strengthen public trust in the process; recommends an introduction of real-time tracking systems for disbursements and expenditures to prevent misallocations under the RRF and the MFF;

    210.  Notes with particular concern that the Court has identified nine potential cases of ineligible M&Ts linked to the continuation of a pre-existing project that either started before the eligibility period, or that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure; regrets the lack of clarity in the RRF Regulation, and does not share the Commission’s interpretation that the eligibility period concerns only the date of start of works on a specific project rather than the beginning of the preparatory or projection phase; regrets that such a view led to measures which were planned before the RRF eligibility period being included in the RRPs, and acknowledges that any measure must respect the scope, objectives and eligibility conditions set by the RRF Regulation; calls on the Commission to implement stricter verification mechanisms to prevent the inclusion of pre-existing projects that do not provide added value under the RRF framework;

    211.  Recalls that RRF funds shall not be used to replace recurring budgetary expenditure, unless in duly justified case; and is preoccupied by the Court’s findings that some M&Ts that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure were not adequately justified in the RRPs;

    212.  Notes with concern the Court’s finding that NGEU borrowing may more than double by 2026 while the bulk of repayment is deferred to future MFFs; recalls that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must start before the end of 2027, if unused appropriations remain available in the budget line to cover NGEU financing costs, and be completed by 2058 at the latest; notes that the Union budget exposure at the end of 2023 is expected to rise in 2024 and 2025, mainly due to RRF loans; is concerned that potential changes in market conditions might result in higher borrowing costs which, for the NGEU debt relating to grants, will have to be borne by the Union budget; is concerned that there is to date still no repayment plan for the NGEU common debt, and that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument, NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences for the Union’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas;

    213.  Notes the Court’s finding that payments from RRF were lower than expected in 2023; emphasises that the Court has criticised the slow disbursement and absorption of RRF funds; is concerned by the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that absorption of RRF funds has progressed with some delays, that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period for which a significant proportion of funds have already been paid out, and that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period is more challenging with an increase in number of M&Ts, a shift from reforms to investments and more advanced stage of implementation, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year;

    214.  Notes, conversely, that according to the Commission the achievement of M&Ts is broadly on track, as by 31 August 2024, over 40 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed to Member States, with the disbursement of grants reaching 48 % and loans slightly exceeding 30 %; notes that the pace of payment requests has also accelerated since the second half of 2023 with the revision of the RRPs linked to the introduction of the REPowerEU chapters was finalised in 2023;

    215.  Notes the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that additional reasons for slow absorption included measures not being suited to the RRF’s timeframe and underestimation of the time needed to implement them (due to public procurement and state aid rules); as well as uncertainties on implementing rules and how they should be applied including lacking guidance on the ‘do no significant harm’ principle (DNSH) and how to ascribe to it;

    216.  Expresses strong concerns about the Court’s observation that point to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member States control systems as this poses a risk to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the Union’s financial interests; recalls that, according to the RRF Regulation, Member State control systems have a key role to play in ensuring that the financial interests of the Union are protected effectively; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary, including imposing financial corrections, and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    217.  Expresses concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report N°22/2024 on ‘Double funding from the EU budget: Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to cost’; highlights that Member States can propose so-called ‘zero cost measures’, i.e. measures estimated to have no costs to be financed by the RRF, and for which there is no check at all for double-funding, as the Commission considers that measures which receive no RRF funds are free of risk from that perspective; also notes with concern the Court’s findings that from Member States’ perspective, the many layers of governance involved including national, regional or municipality level, make coordination and oversight very challenging; is concerned that when checks are performed, (i) they suffer from a very complicated environment with different IT tools used often not interoperable and data recorded in an often non-standardised way, leaving manual cross-checks across databases as the only possible tool to check for double funding, and (ii) Member States’ control systems rely to a large extent on self-declarations by recipients of Union funds; notes, however, that the Court did not find any case of double funding;

    218.  Notes the Commission’s observation that, according to the RRF Regulation, double funding is explicitly linked to budgetary costs and thus, there can be no double funding if the Member State has not submitted any cost estimate linked to a specific measure as part of its national plan; notes that the Commission underlines that no-cost reforms do not increase the financial envelope but are nevertheless essential criteria for the Commission’s positive assessment of RRPs, as well as their full implementation for the relevant payments; points out that the Commission, shortly after the Court audit field work, acknowledged it had identified the first two potential cases of double funding;

    219.  Recalls that Article 9 of the RRF Regulation establishes additionality and complementarity between Union programmes and instruments funding as key principles; believes that, to respect these principles but avoid the risk of double financing, the same measures already included in other national plans benefiting from Union funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should either not be included in RRPs or more thoroughly described, even if they do not incur any costs, in order to avoid double funding; underlines that due to the different model of implementation, double funding between RRF and other Union financing instruments might be more difficult to identify, and urges the Commission to remain vigilant and pro-active in identifying any potential situation of double funding;

    220.  Regrets the lack of adequate safeguards to prevent double funding of projects under both the RRF and other Union financial instruments; calls for an automated cross-checking system between RRF and cohesion Funds, the Common Agricultural Policy, and other Union funding programmes to detect and eliminate duplicate claims;

    221.  Expresses concern about the Court’s finding in its Review 01/2023: ‘EU financing through cohesion policy and the RRF: A comparative analysis’ that reporting of fraud involving RRF expenditure still lacks a standardised approach with strong coordination and cooperation between Member States, which are obliged to report on cases of suspected fraud not in an integrated IT system, but in the management declaration accompanying every payment request, although Member States have also reported cases outside of the management declarations; regrets that there are no clear guidelines about exactly when a case of suspected fraud should be reported, whether there is a reporting threshold, and what standard information should be reported for each case and about the remedial measures taken; furthermore supports the request made by the Court to the Commission in the same review 01/2023 to obtain sufficient assurance from the Member States on the effectiveness of national systems to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest;

    222.  Expresses concerns that in 2023 the Commission had to introduce 10 additional control milestones for seven Members States to address the weaknesses identified in their control systems; reminds and supports the Court’s evaluation that the fact control milestones were introduced, which means that Member states systems were not fully functional when the plans started to be implemented, posing a serious risk to the regularity of the of the RRF expenditure and to the protection of financial interests;

    223.  Regrets the findings of the Court’s Special Report No 26/2023 that several policy areas in the RRF’s pillar containing health policies lack a corresponding common indicator to measure progress; is concerned that this impedes the proper monitoring and understanding of progress made towards achieving milestones and targets linked to health policies;

    224.  Welcomes that, in 2023, the Commission made progress in eliminating any possibility of misinterpretation of figures of the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and that the Scoreboard further addressed the related recommendation of the Court to improve the presentation of data displayed on the Scoreboard and to improve explanations with regard to its limitations, in particular by better explaining the underlying methodologies and explicitly stating, where applicable, that the data is estimated;

    Audit and control

    225.  Welcomes that, based on the Court’s recommendations and the experience gained, the Commission, in 2023, published three methodological notes to clarify the application of the RRF Regulation, including its framework for (i) assessing the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts, upon conducting an assessment, and (ii) the application of the provisions related to the reversal of M&Ts, as well as a methodology to determine the amount to be suspended if a milestone or target is not satisfactorily fulfilled; takes note of the updated Guidance on RRPs, adopted on 19 July 2024, which provides additional guidance to ensure the continued adequacy of controls to identify and avoid any risk of double funding as well as the methodology for reductions and recoveries under the RRF in accordance with Article 24(8) of the RRF Regulation;

    226.  Calls on the Commission to increase the number of ex-post audits and on-the-ground inspections for RRF-funded projects, particularly in high-risk sectors such as digital infrastructure, energy where previous Union funding programmes have identified significant irregularities;

    227.  Warns that the inclusion of pre-existing projects and the substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures within the RRF framework undermines the additionality principle, effectively converting the instrument into a backdoor financing mechanism for Member States’ regular budgets, rather than fostering genuine post-crisis recovery and resilience; calls for an urgent review to prevent further dilution of the RRF’s purpose;

    228.  Advocates more decisiveness on the part of both the Commission and Member States in order to detect irregularities in the spending of RRF funds and to recover undue payments;

    229.  Is concerned with the Court’s counter-reply to the Commission’s replies on the existence of an assurance gap at Union level regarding compliance with Union and national rules on public procurement and State aid; notes that the Commission argues that the assurance provided by DG ECFIN covers the effectiveness of Member States’ controls on compliance with public procurement and state aid rules. however, stresses that while DG ECFIN’s AAR refers to Commission assessments of the existence and effectiveness of Member States’ controls, there is no conclusion regarding their effectiveness; expresses concern that, according to the Court, this represents an important limitation of the scope of the Commission’s declaration of assurance, meaning that the Commission still does not provide full assurance as to whether RRF expenditure – which the Commission manages directly – complies with the rules;

    230.  Stresses that delays in disbursement and absorption of RRF funds not only slow down economic recovery but also create substantial risks of last-minute, low-quality spending towards the end of the RRF period; calls on the Commission to introduce stricter interim evaluations to prevent a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rush that could lead to waste and misallocation;

    231.  Notes with serious concern that Member States may strategically forego their final payment requests to avoid fulfilling politically sensitive milestones and targets, thereby evading necessary but unpopular reforms; calls on the Commission to introduce financial penalties for incomplete RRF implementation to prevent manipulation of the payment structure;

    232.  Notes that the Commission’s replies that it extended the scope of its audit work beyond that required by the RRF Regulation to verify that the control procedures put in place in the Member States give the necessary assurance that Member States regularly and effectively verify compliance with public procurement and State aid rules and eligibility for RRF measures, but disagrees with the Commission’s opinion that the conclusions of DG ECFIN’s Annual activity report cover this;

    233.  Notes with concern that, as stated by the Commission in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, a majority of Member States consider that the payment suspension methodology remains unclear when it comes to reforms because of the discretion given to the Commission in applying the methodology; urges the Commission to revise this methodology in order to avoid any double standards in its application;

    234.  Notes that the Commission’s IAS, in its audit on ex-ante controls of the RRF payment requests carried out in 2023, identified a very important issue according to which DG ECFIN, in cooperation with the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, should further develop and formalise the existing guidance for the cases where DG ECFIN requests that Member States make additional commitments concerning action stemming from audit and control milestones, in particular that the guidance should define (i) how DG ECFIN should follow up the fulfilment of the formal confirmation on the Member State’s commitment, (ii) the criteria for determining the deadlines for the Member States to fulfil the commitments, and (iii) the relations between the ‘commitment framework’, the ‘framework for assessing M&Ts under the RRF Regulation’ and the ‘Reversal of M&Ts under the Facility’;

    235.  Notes that the Commission checks during its “Protection of the Financial Interest of the Union” audits that Member States have a clear and codified process for transmitting cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and double funding to all competent authorities, including the EPPO where relevant;

    236.  Is concerned by the Court reporting in its annual reports that by the end of 2023, the EPPO had 206 active investigations related to funds used to implement RRF measures and estimated potential damages of over EUR 1,8 billion (concerning both national and Union funding); notes that the 206 open investigations concern ten Member States, with around 75 % of these cases coming from one country; is worried that at the end of 2023 the Member States’ management declarations had not reported a single case of detected suspected fraud, meaning that none of the EPPO open cases were reported by Member States themselves, casting doubts on Member States’ ability to detect and fight frauds; stresses that, while no investigation has yet been completed, the figures presented by the EPPO confirm that the risk of fraud is present in the RRF, and that they call into question the reliability of Member State management declarations in terms of reporting detected fraud and the remedial measures taken; calls for urgent reinforcement of fraud detection mechanisms, including a mandatory fraud risk assessment for all large-scale RRF projects; calls on the Commission to ensure that the EPPO has adequate resources to investigate cases of fraud related to RRF expenditure, given the increasing number of investigations and high estimated damages;

    237.  Warns that Member States’ self-reported fraud cases under RRF remain significantly underreported, creating a misleading picture of financial integrity;

    238.  Strongly regrets the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations and use the Irregularity Management System (IMS);

    239.  Recalls that the Financial Regulation recast in force since 30 September 2024 (‘FR recast’) provides for the extension of its scope of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management and direct management in cases where the budget is implemented with Member States, for programmes adopted or financed as from 1 January 2028; calls on the Commission to act on the most serious grounds for exclusion in order to better protect the financial interests of the Union;

    240.  Notes that, with a view to reducing the margin between the Commission and the Court, for different interpretations of M&Ts, the Commission has published its approach to the concepts of the start date of a measure and the concept of ‘substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure’ as Annex II and Annex III of its 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the RRF; re-iterate its calls on the Commission to keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;

    Implementation and impact

    241.  Urges the Commission to minimise risks that Member States might chose not to receive parts or the entire amounts of the last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last M&Ts and jeopardising the overall implementation of the RRPs; is extremely concerned about the additional risks of measures being reversed after the RRF lifetime, and urges the Commission, when making the final payments, to ensure that such situations will not occur;

    242.  Emphasises that, according to the Commission’s mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, Member States highlighted the need to mobilise more resources than initially planned to revise the RRPs, and that the efficiency of the performance-based approach is reduced by the ‘excessively complex procedures’ for the plan modifications, which do not distinguish between major or minor amendments and require Council approval for any modification;

    243.  Stresses that for control and audits in the RRF, Member States should put in place arrangements to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests, and that the Commission performs ex-post and system audits on M&Ts; stresses that some confusion persists with respect to the role of the Court, which has developed a strategy (2021-2025 Strategy) for carrying out its responsibilities for the NGEU programme and the RRF, which some Member States perceive as an unnecessary overlap and administrative burden; is concerned that the Commission, both in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024 and its RRF Annual Report of 10 October 2024, acknowledged that Member States’ authorities at all levels found the audit and control procedures to be too complex, and that Member States complained about overlapping audits by national authorities, the Commission and the Court; fully supports the Court work on the RRF; welcomes that the Commission has admitted and accepted that the Court has a full audit mandate on RRF, which is one of the foundation for the Parliament discharge on the RRF funds; recommends to the Member States to cooperate with the European Court of Auditors;

    244.  Is concerned that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation highlighted the entry costs for Member States’ administrations, with room for further simplification; notes, according to this Commission’s Annual Report, that concerning the design of the instrument, in the mid-term evaluation Member States referred to the combined obligations linked to (i) the evidence needed to prove fulfilment of M&Ts, (ii) demanding reporting requirements, for example the common indicators and the bi-annual data; and (iii) the audit and control framework; recalls that Member States see room for simplifying control and audit procedures, ensuring better coordination among the actors involved and avoiding multiple checks; also notes, again according to the Commission RRF Annual Report 2024, that some national authorities also pointed to inflexibility in the Commission’s assessment of milestones and targets and the rigid and resource-intensive procedures to revise RRPs;

    245.  Notes that one of the objectives of the RRF is to help Member States to implement ambitious reforms and investments that make their economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and prepared for the green and digital transitions; highlights with concerns the finding of the Court in its Special Report 15/2024 underlining the lack of relevance, quality and comparability of data submitted by the Member States, with data insufficient to evaluate progress on climate adaptation in the Member States, and thus paving the way for possible greenwashing; expresses concern that the RRF could become a financial vehicle for superficial rebranding of conventional expenditures as ‘green’; encourages the Commission to introduce a mechanism within the RRF framework to track the environmental impact of investments and ensure alignment with the Union’s climate objectives;

    246.  Highlights the RRF impact on the Union business and SMEs; notes that RRF has provided EUR 78 billion in direct support to SMEs, representing 12 % of total RRF expenditure, and that broader measures benefiting businesses amount to EUR 152 billion (23 % of total RRF spending); notes that EUR 2,75 million SMEs, approximately 11 % of all active SMEs in the Union, have received support through the RRF; underlines that nearly 600 000 businesses have benefited from digitalisation initiatives, while EUR 5,2 billion have been allocated to green transition projects, including renewable energy and hydrogen;

    247.  Highlights with concern that the facilitation of cross-border projects has not worked out; deplores that, despite the inclusion in the RRPs of several measures linked to Important Projects of Common Interest (‘IPCEIs’) and cross-border measures in the REPowerEU chapters, the national governance of the Facility has not sufficiently promoted cross-border cooperation; strongly insists that Union financing should be better linked with the achievement of common Union objectives and should generate EU added value;

    248.  Emphasises that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation acknowledged the insufficient involvement of Member States of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations, social partners, and other relevant stakeholders in the preparation and the implementation of the national RRPs; calls for their close involvement in the implementation of the national RRPs on the ground;

    249.  Urges the Commission not to approve any revision of RRPs, which may lead to a re-packaging of planned reforms or investments into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation; notes that any revision should always aim to create added value and increase synergies;

    Transparency

    250.  Recalls that, while Member States are not required to publish all data on final recipients, Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council(22) amending the RRF Regulation requires Member States to publish information on the 100 final recipients receiving the highest amount of funding under the RRF; welcomes that on 10 October 2024, the Commission published, as part of the RRF Annual Report 2024, a dedicated Annex to provide further clarity on the concept of final recipients under the RRF Regulation and the scope of the publication of data on the largest 100 final recipients; expresses deep concern over the interpretation of the Commission of the concept of “final recipient” under the RRF, as often they are listed only at the ministry level, and that the descriptions are vague, with many examples available in almost all lists provided by Member States; reiterates its demand that the list of 100 largest final recipients provides the factual natural person or entity that is the last in a chain of money transfers to be made available in a publicly accessible database to enhance accountability and enable independent oversight, while respecting the legal framework of Union data protection; is concerned that otherwise it will be problematic to measure the impact and guarantee visibility of the RRF funds to the citizens, although also takes into account the RRF Scoreboard and the project map; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance, to prevent a similar interpretation from being applied to the transparency provisions in other financial regulations;

    251.  Reminds the Commission that the letter and spirit of the RRF Regulation must be strictly followed, and that the adoption of guidelines or other internal documents must be fully in line with the results of the negotiations between the co-legislators; is convinced that this has not been the case when the Commission adopted the provisions related to the interpretation of what a “final recipient” is in its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU;

    252.  Notes that not being able to ascertain final recipients of RRF funding poses a severe risk to the transparency and traceability of Union funds and thus to the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    253.  Recalls that a robust IT infrastructure is essential for data collection, programme monitoring and evaluation, and that managing authorities and beneficiaries are critical of the level of information required and duplication with other domestic systems; notes that, in contrast to the Cohesion Policy, the Court under the RRF pointed to the different structures and approaches used by national monitoring authorities, which could be perceived as less reliable by providing non-homogeneous information and leaving room for a potentially high number of errors; stresses that, in this respect, centralised interoperable systems facilitate efficient data collection and reporting, while fragmented systems underscore the need for streamlined approaches;

    254.  Welcomes that the ‘FR recast’ establishes horizontal measures for a centralised website (Financial Transparency System) at Union level, covering all recipients of Union funding, and notes that this website is due to overcome the current fragmentation, enhance transparency, and facilitate public scrutiny of recipients; notes that the Commission, as from the next MFF (i.e. post 2027) will be required to use the relevant data stored in the data mining and risk-scoring tool, Arachne, to feed the centralised website for transparency purposes, and that, in line with data protection rules, the website will include only public data, e.g. relevant data on recipients, contractors, subcontractors, and beneficiaries; further stresses that all Member States will have an obligation to provide the Commission with access to this data, to be fed into Arachne by automated means; regrets that the use of Arachne by Member States is not compulsory;

    255.  Notes that the final M&T of the national RRPs must be completed by 31 August 2026 according to Articles 18(4) and 20(5) of the Regulation; recalls the need for the Commission to work closely with every Member State to speed up implementation on the ground including through providing regular guidance and, upon request, technical assistance to help the implementation of the plans; re-iterates its concerns about the possibility of the reversal of M&Ts after the lifetime of the RRF, and urges the Commission to prevent such situations;

    256.  Calls on the Commission to reject any request of revision of RRPs which would lower the overall ambition of the plan or would eliminate important structural reforms from the RRPs, and to prioritise the completion of measures related to CSRs in RRPs; further calls on the Commission to step up its technical assistance to Member States lagging behind in the RRF implementation;

    Recommendations

    257.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its Annual Report as well as those of its related special reports, and welcomes that the Commission accepts the vast majority of them; calls on the Commission to implement them and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    258.  Calls on the Commission to grant full access to the Court to the new reporting tool on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), FENIX as soon as possible;

    259.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) carefully balance auditing and control requirements with the administrative burden imposed on Member States and beneficiaries of future performance-based instruments, while maintaining a sufficient level of control and audit that would grant a solid protection of the Union financial interests;
       (ii) closely monitor the continued fulfilment of M&Ts, in particular those related to audit, monitoring and control and ensure an adequate monitoring of any potential reversal of previously completed M&Ts;
       (iii) use the results of its checks on Member States control systems to express a clear conclusion on their effectiveness and take all appropriate measures;
       (iv) establish one single contact point for Member States on the Statement of Assurance at the Commission to which the Court can have access without further burdening Member States with requests for additional proofs;
       (v) record and monitor systematically all irregularities and all frauds affecting RRF funds;
       (vi) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the “final recipients”, of the RRF Regulation, by revising its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU, and to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of “final recipients”; calls on the Commission to come forward with proposals requiring Member States to publish details of all final recipients;
       (vii) streamline its control on the M&Ts through the implementation of a Single Audit approach, which would allow reduction of the administrative burden, the consolidation of audit responsibilities between the Commission and the Court, the coordination of audit timelines and requirements to avoid duplication and overlapping controls and audits, but at the same time ensuring the full protection of the Union financial interests;
       (viii) support Member States in making IT systems truly interoperable, so as to facilitate efficient data collection, reporting and exchange between various government departments and agencies to allow the minimisation of the risks of double funding, actively cross-check between relevant databases, and communicate with Member States about their administrative capacities to ensure double funding does not occur; notes in this regard, the positive examples provided at the Court Conference on Transparency and Traceability of EU Recovery and Resilience Funding in October 2024;
       (ix) work closely with Member States to ensure that M&Ts, in particular those of a structural nature or linked with CSRs, are fully and diligently implemented, and that no revision of RRPs will be approved in cases where ambition has been lowered or important measures have been weakened; avoid, to the extent possible, the revision of plans that would represent a “re-packaging” of planned measures into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation;
       (x) strictly apply the provisions of the RRF Regulation, including those regarding suspension of payments or recoveries of amounts, in particular if the protection of the financial interests of the Union is not ensured;
       (xi) apply very strictly the methodology on partial payments, including as regards structural measures and measures linked to the implementation of CSRs;
       (xii) develop a methodology based on quality and comparability of data to evaluate progress on green and digital transitions, as well as the tangible benefits, in the Member States;
       (xiii) ensure that Member States diligently apply the visibility provisions of the RRF, making sure that measures implemented through the Facility are adequately flagged as funded by the Union;
       (xiv) provide technical assistance, administrative support and advice to Member States to strengthen their administrative capacity, including through the organisation of regular meetings of the Informal Expert Group on the implementation of the RRF to discuss technical aspects and encourage the exchange of good practices amongst national authorities;
       (xv) perform, whenever a revision of the RRPs is proposed, a comprehensive analysis of new and existing measures and whether they would substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or would be in breach of other eligibility conditions of the RRPs;
       (xvi) provide training and support to Member States to increase administrative capacities including training on specialised skills, knowledge and providing examples of best practices;
       (xvii) keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;
       (xviii) use the recommendations of the Court from its work on the RRF and the experience gained in the implementation for the design of the next multiannual financial framework architecture including the implementation of future Union performance-based instruments;
       (xix) strengthen the design of future performance-based instruments by ensuring a closer link between disbursements and progress in implementation;
       (xx) ensure that any future revision, as well as the overall implementation, of RRPs is done in close cooperation with and consultation of local and regional authorities, and other relevant stakeholders in order to maximise the RRP’s impact;
       (xxi) analyse the weaknesses present in performance-based instruments, and address these weaknesses when designing new programmes in the future;
       (xxii) build, in the next MFF, on a high-level of interoperability and data exchange between various government departments and agencies to facilitate efficient data sharing and real-time updates across multiple platforms in order to allow to track overlapping projects, minimising the risks of double counting and double funding.
    (1) The 11th EDF covers the 2021-2027 MFF.
    (2) ‘The future of European competitiveness’, 9 September 2024.
    (3) Special report 05/2024: EU Transparency Register – provides useful but limited information on lobbying activities.
    (4) Special Report 11/2025 Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs – despite progress, the overview is still not reliable.
    (5) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (6) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783.
    (7) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (8) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (9) ECA Special Report 07/2024: The Commission’s systems for recovering irregular EU expenditure – Potential to recover more and faster.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (11) COM(2023) 258.
    (12) ECA Special Report 16/2024: EU revenue based on non‑recycled plastic packaging waste – A challenging start hindered by data that is not sufficiently comparable or reliable.
    (13) Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements (OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/822/oj).
    (14) ECA 2023 Annual Report para 1.35.
    (15) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).
    (16) Commission Decision of 13.12.2023 on the reassessment, on the Commission’s initiative, of the fulfilment of the conditions under Article 4 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 following Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 regarding Hungary, C(2023)8999.
    (17) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).
    (18) Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj).
    (19) Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).
    (20) Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, The Gambia, Togo and Uganda.
    (21) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj).
    (22) Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Combatting Menstrual Poverty and Improving Women’s Rights on Menstrual health – Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

    Source: European Parliament

    On Tuesday, 20 May 2025, the FEMM Committee with the participation of the Committee will hold a public hearing on “Combatting Menstrual Poverty and Improving Women’s Rights on Menstrual Health”.

    The hearing aims to examine the issues faced by many women and girls in the EU with regard to menstrual poverty. It will involve experts and representatives of women with menstrual health issues to address menstrual poverty and menstrual health.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Hearings – Combatting Menstrual Poverty and Improving Women’s Rights on Menstrual health – 20-05-2025 – Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

    Source: European Parliament

    On Tuesday, 20 May 2025, the FEMM Committee with the participation of the Committee on Public Health will hold a public hearing on “Combatting Menstrual Poverty and Improving Women’s Rights on Menstrual Health”

    The hearing aims to examine the issues faced by many women and girls in the EU with regard to menstrual poverty. It will involve experts and representatives of women with menstrual health issues to address menstrual poverty and menstrual health.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: ‘The red Welsh way’: Welsh Labour attempts to distance itself from the UK party

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Nye Davies, Lecturer in Politics, Cardiff University

    David Michael Bellis/Shutterstock

    More than two decades ago, Rhodri Morgan, then first minister of Wales, put “clear red water” between Welsh Labour and the UK party. It’s a phrase that became one of the most enduring cliches in Welsh politics.

    Now, his successor Eluned Morgan is trying to chart a fresh course with a new slogan: “the red Welsh way”. In a recent speech, Morgan set out Welsh Labour’s core values ahead of the 2026 Senedd (Welsh parliament) election: “Solidarity, equality, sustainability and justice.” These, she argued, are progressive principles rooted in Wales’ political traditions.

    But the speech also had a clear strategic purpose: to reassert Welsh Labour’s distinct identity at a time when its dominance in devolved politics is under pressure.

    Morgan pledged to stand up for Wales whenever she believed it was being neglected by Westminster or when UK government policies disproportionately harmed the nation. Deploying nationalistic language, while insisting she is not a nationalist, Morgan invoked a history of exploitation in Wales and vowed that such injustices would not be tolerated under Welsh Labour’s watch.


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    It was also a notable shift in rhetoric. During the 2024 general election, Welsh Labour leaned heavily on the idea of “two governments at both ends of the M4” working together. Morgan’s speech also represents her most forthright attempt yet to replenish the red waters between the Welsh government and Keir Starmer’s leadership, and her most passionate defence of Welsh Labour as a distinct entity.

    Poll pressure

    On the very same day, a new poll placed Welsh Labour in third place, behind Plaid Cymru and Reform UK. The polling comes with the familiar caveats. It is only one poll, a lot can change in the course of a year and it would be unwise to underestimate the strength of Welsh Labour’s electoral machine.

    Nevertheless, while the Senedd is expanding from 60 to 96 members, Welsh Labour’s presence within it is at risk of shrinking.

    Morgan’s speech implicitly recognises that the Labour brand is tainted. With the UK government chasing Reform UK’s voter base in light of recent election results, the red Welsh way feels like an effort to reclaim ground from Plaid Cymru, to which Welsh Labour appears to be losing support, particularly from left-leaning and Welsh-identifying voters.

    Morgan will hope that formulating a new image (or, rather, resurrecting an old one) can revive the party’s fortunes and allow it to continue its over 100 years dominance of Welsh politics.

    There is logic to this strategy. I have argued before that Welsh Labour thrives when it articulates a clear, values-driven Welsh identity. But there are now formidable obstacles in Morgan’s path.

    First, trying to position a party that has been in government for 26 years as an insurgent force is challenging. The clear red water rhetoric, rooted in progressive principles, has not always been matched in reality.
    Strained public services and entrenched poverty in Wales undermine Welsh Labour’s claims to achieving social justice. While constitutional constraints and funding limitations from Westminster are real, slogans alone do not shield people from hardship.




    Read more:
    Devolving justice and policing to Wales would put it on par with Scotland and Northern Ireland – so what’s holding it back?


    Ultimately, after years of austerity, people in Wales are looking for a party that will offer them hope of a brighter future. Instead of slogans, Welsh Labour will need to show the electorate that it is making a tangible difference to people’s lives. As Morgan herself insisted in the speech: “Less chat, and more do.”

    Second, Morgan faces a further challenge from an emboldened Welsh parliamentary Labour party (PLP). A recent Politico article documents the various ways in which the central Labour party is attempting to have a greater say in Welsh Labour’s affairs, from manifesto writing to candidate selection. One Labour figure was quoted as stating: “The Welsh PLP hate the Senedd group.”

    Amid reports that Morgan accused Welsh MPs of not standing up for Wales, a Labour Senedd member has warned of “simmering discontent” with Westminster.

    A party at a crossroads

    Among these challenges, Welsh Labour will struggle with its claim to be standing up for Wales when judged against outcomes. Repeated failures to secure rail funding, further devolution and even consideration for the effects of policy changes on Wales, suggest that Welsh Labour’s voice in Westminster still struggles to carry weight. That’s even under a Labour-led UK government.

    In truth, the red Welsh way reflects a party caught in a strategic bind. It’s eager to differentiate itself, but hamstrung by its own long-term incumbency, internal divisions and limited power.

    As the 2026 Senedd election draws closer, Welsh Labour will throw everything at shifting the narrative. But as things stand, the clear red water that once symbolised distance from Westminster has become muddied.

    Nye Davies does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. ‘The red Welsh way’: Welsh Labour attempts to distance itself from the UK party – https://theconversation.com/the-red-welsh-way-welsh-labour-attempts-to-distance-itself-from-the-uk-party-256496

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Booker, Schiff Reintroduce Bicameral Legislation to Boost Teacher Compensation

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Jersey Cory Booker
    WASHINGTON, D.C. — During Teacher Appreciation Week, U.S. Senators Cory Booker (D-N.J.) and Adam Schiff (D-CA) reintroduced the bicameral Respect, Advancement, and Increasing Support for Educators (RAISE) Act, legislation that would boost teacher compensation by putting tax money back in their pockets and help diversify the teaching workforce. The bill would provide educators with a minimum of $1000 in refundable tax credits and as much as $15,000.
    Teachers play a critical role in shaping young lives throughout our nation. Currently, public elementary and secondary teachers earn about 27 percent less than similarly educated professions. Based on a worldwide comparison, the average salary gap between teachers and others with comparable educational backgrounds is greater in the U.S. than in any other OECD country with available data.
    There were over 41,000 unfilled teacher positions that same year. Teacher shortages across the U.S. leave instruction in high-need subjects like science, math, special education, and English language development understaffed. Furthermore, according to a recent analysis of state-reported teacher shortage data, 49 states plus the District of Columbia employed over 365,000 teachers who were not fully certified for their teaching assignment in 2024. Additionally, high poverty districts also experience higher rates of teacher turnover, leaving students from families with low incomes at greater risk of experiencing a shortage. Low wages are often cited as a source of high turnover and teacher vacancies.
    Through refundable tax credits, the RAISE Act will help boost the compensation of early childhood, elementary, and secondary school teachers. Depending on the level of poverty in the schools educators serve, public school teachers would be eligible for a tax credit up to $15,000. The bill would also double the educator tax deduction, which teachers can use to offset the cost of school supplies and expand eligibility to early childhood educators.
    “Teachers are the backbone of our education system, and tasked every day with the responsibility to help shape and develop the minds of our nation’s children,” said Senator Booker. “It’s unacceptable that despite the invaluable role they play in our society, teachers are still underpaid and undervalued. This legislation aims to provide up to $15,000 in tax credits for public school teachers so we can close the wage gap and finally give our educators a much needed raise.”
    “Public education is the foundation of upward mobility in our society and the chance for a better life, and our teachers play the most vital role. If we want to attract and retain the best teachers amidst all of the challenges of staffing shortages, large classrooms and aging facilities, they need our support. We must provide teachers with the long-overdue wage increases they deserve for shaping the next generation of citizens and leaders,” said Senator Schiff.
    “The Trump agenda of gutting the Department of Education while slashing taxes for the ultra-wealthy will ultimately take money out of the pockets of hard-working New Jersey educators and families,” said NJEA President Sean Spiller. “Trump’s cuts to education funding and his billionaire tax giveaways will mean fewer resources for children, especially students with special needs, and less money to support New Jersey’s educators and our best-in-the-nation public schools. We applaud Senator Booker for the RAISE Act of 2025, which provides tax breaks where they belong: to working class educators and to parents.”
    “The RAISE Act introduced by Senator Booker recognizes the commitment and dedication of our early childhood, elementary and secondary school teachers. While giving tax credits doesn’t solve the underpaying of teachers, it will help with a school district’s recruiting and retention efforts. The bill also rewards districts that maintain or increase salaries with additional grants that can be used for more recruiting and retention efforts especially in our neediest districts. AFTNJ thanks Senator Booker for introducing and continuing to advocate for this important and necessary legislation,” said Jennifer S. Higgins, President, American Federation of Teachers New Jersey (AFTNJ).
    The RAISE Act would improve financial compensation for elementary, secondary, and early childhood teachers to help address the teacher shortage and wage disparity. Specifically, the legislation would:
    Create Refundable Tax Credits for Educators: 
    A sliding scale tax credit of up to $15,000 for public school teachers, with the highest credits for educators in high-poverty schools.
    Up to $15,000 for early childhood educators with a bachelor’s degree and up to $10,000 for those with an associate degree or CDA credential. 
    $1,000 refundable tax credit for all eligible early childhood and K–12 educators.

    Increase the educator tax deduction to $500 to offset teacher’s purchases of school supplies. 
    Increase, by nearly $3 billion, annual mandatory funding for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s Title II, which supports educator recruitment, retention, professional development, and class size reduction. 
    Create and fund a federal grant program to incentivize local educational agencies to increase teacher salaries and strengthen, retain, and diversify the educator workforce. 
    The RAISE Act is endorsed by the following organizations: National Education Association (NEA), New Jersey Education Association (NJEA), Prepared To Teach, Public Advocacy for Kids (PAK), The Teacher Salary Project, Council for Exceptional Children (CEC), National Writing Project, First Five Years Fund, Education Law Center (ELC), Association for Career and Technical Education (ACTE), Center for Black Educator Development, Educational Testing Service (ETS), National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE), AASA – The School Superintendents Association, National Center for Learning Disabilities (NCLD), Early Edge California, National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM), American Federation of Teachers (AFT), The Education Trust (EdTrust), National Association for Music Education (NAfME), First Focus Campaign for Children, Deans for Impact (DFI), National Parents Union, All4Ed, NAACP, Teacher Education Division of the Council for Exceptional Children, Joint National Committee for Languages (JNCL), Center for American Progress (CAP), American Association of School Personnel Administrators (AASPA), Institute for Educational Leadership (IEL), TEACH, Council of Administrators of Special Education (CASE), Education Reform Now, National Women’s Law Center (NWLC), Association of Latino Administrators and Superintendents (ALAS), Leading Educators, Association of Educational Service Agencies (AESA), Thurgood Marshall College Fund, Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU), Public Advocates, ZERO TO THREE, National PTA, National Center for Languages and International Studies, Advance CTE, AFL-CIO California Federation of Teachers (CFT), American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), UnidosUS, American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE), MomsRising, and Educators for Excellence, the Southern Education Foundation.
    The bill is cosponsored by U.S. Senators Alex Padilla (D-CA), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), and Angela Alsobrooks (D-MD).
    To read the full text of the bill, click here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Delivering on the Governor’s Affordability Committments

    Source: US State of New York

    overnor Kathy Hochul is celebrating a FY 2026 New York State Budget that delivers all of the Governor’s affordability commitments and will put thousands of dollars back in the pockets of millions of families on Long Island over the coming year and beyond. These huge wins include drastically expanding the size of New York’s Child Tax Credit, including tripling the credit for children four and under, cutting taxes for 1.2 million middle class Long Islanders, and sending inflation refund checks directly to 1.3 million households on Long Island.

    “The cost of living is too damn high for Long Island families, so I promised to put more money in your pockets — and we got it done,” Governor Hochul said.“Putting thousands of dollars back in the pockets of families means helping Long Islanders afford the rising costs of groceries, raising kids, and just enjoying life. When I said your family is my fight, I meant it – and I’ll never stop fighting for you.”

    The Governor’s FY 2026 Enacted Budget totals $254 billion and does not raise income taxes — all while delivering nearly $4 billion in affordability relief statewide. On Long Island, that means direct benefits for hundreds of thousands of families, workers, and students.

    Expanding New York’s Child Tax Credit
    The FY 2026 State Budget includes Governor Hochul’s plan to give 215,000 Long Island families an annual tax credit of up to $1,000 per child under age four and up to $500 per child from four through sixteen. This is the largest expansion of New York’s Child Tax Credit in its history — benefitting approximately 355,000 children on Long Island. Governor Hochul’s expansion of the credit will significantly increase the size of the average credit going out to families, helping cut child poverty statewide by upward of 8 percent.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi unveils roadmap for deepening cooperation with LAC countries 2025-05-13 22:12:54 Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday announced the launch of five programs to advance shared development and revitalization with Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – Ministry of National Defense

    Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum and delivers a keynote speech at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. (Xinhua/Yin Bogu)

    BEIJING, May 13 (Xinhua) — Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday announced the launch of five programs to advance shared development and revitalization with Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries.

    The five programs, ranging from solidarity, development and civilization to peace and people-to-people connectivity, were announced by Xi when delivering a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing.

    In 2015, Xi and LAC delegates attended the opening ceremony of the first ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing, which marked the launch of the forum.

    On Solidarity Program, Xi said China is willing to strengthen solidarity with LAC countries and continue to support each other on issues concerning their core interests and major concerns, to firmly safeguard the international system with the U.N. at its core and the international order underpinned by international law, and to speak with one voice in international and regional affairs.

    In the next three years, China will invite 300 members from political parties of CELAC member states every year to visit China to facilitate exchanges on national governance best practices, Xi said.

    On Development Program, China is willing to work with LAC countries to implement the Global Development Initiative, resolutely uphold the multilateral trading system, ensure stable, unimpeded global industrial and supply chains, and promote an international environment of openness and cooperation, Xi said.

    Noting that the two sides should foster greater synergy between their development strategies and expand high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, Xi said China will import more quality products from LAC countries and encourage Chinese enterprises to expand their investment in the region.

    On Civilization Program, Xi called for joint implementation of the Global Civilization Initiative. He said both sides should uphold the vision of equality, mutual learning, dialogue, and inclusiveness between civilizations, champion humanity’s common values of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy and freedom, and enhance China-LAC civilizational exchanges and mutual learning, including through a conference on China-LAC inter-civilizational dialogue.

    On Peace Program, Xi called for joint implementation of the Global Security Initiative. He said both sides should cooperate more closely in disaster governance, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, anti-corruption, narcotics control and combating transnational organized crime so as to safeguard security and stability in the region.

    On People-to-People Connectivity Program, Xi said in the next three years, China will provide CELAC member states with 3,500 government scholarships, 10,000 training opportunities in China, 500 International Chinese Language Teachers Scholarships, 300 training opportunities for poverty reduction professionals, and 1,000 funded placements through the Chinese Bridge program, initiate 300 “small and beautiful” livelihood projects, and support CELAC member states in developing Chinese language education.

    China has decided to offer a visa-free policy to five LAC countries, and will expand the policy to cover more regional countries in due course, Xi said.

    Gustavo Petro, president of Colombia, the CELAC rotating chair, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Chilean President Gabriel Boric, and Dilma Rousseff, president of the New Development Bank and former Brazilian president, addressed the event respectively.

    Special representative of Yamandu Orsi, president of Uruguay, the incoming CELAC rotating chair, read out the president’s congratulatory letter.

    Faced with a world full of uncertainties, LAC countries and China should work together to promote continuous new progress in building a community with a shared future, they said.

    Both sides should respect each other and firmly support each other in safeguarding sovereignty and choosing their own development path, they said, calling for strengthening the synergy between the development strategies of LAC countries and the Belt and Road Initiative, and promoting cooperation in trade, investment, infrastructure, agriculture, science and technology, new energy and education.

    The two sides should also promote exchanges and dialogues among civilizations, safeguard the authority of the U.N., support multilateralism and free trade, and oppose unilateralism, protectionism, power politics and bullying to safeguard the common interests of the Global South, they added.

    Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum and delivers a keynote speech at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. (Xinhua/Yin Bogu)

    Chinese President Xi Jinping poses for a group photo with guests attending the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. Xi attended the opening ceremony of the meeting and delivered a keynote speech. (Xinhua/Ding Haitao)

    Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum and delivers a keynote speech at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. (Xinhua/Xie Huanchi)

    Chinese President Xi Jinping and guests attend the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. Xi delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the meeting. (Xinhua/Ding Haitao)

    Chinese President Xi Jinping and guests attend the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. Xi delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the meeting. (Xinhua/Shen Hong)

    Colombian President Gustavo Petro, also rotating president of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. (Xinhua/Shen Hong)

    Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. (Xinhua/Yin Bogu)

    Chilean President Gabriel Boric delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. (Xinhua/Yin Bogu)

    Dilma Rousseff, president of the New Development Bank and former Brazilian president, delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. (Xinhua/Yin Bogu)

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why do cuts to Medicaid matter for Americans over 65? 2 experts on aging explain why lives are at stake

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Jane Tavares, Senior Research Fellow and Lecturer of Gerontology, UMass Boston

    Medicaid provides health insurance coverage for more than 82 million Americans. FatCamera/E+ via Getty Images

    Republicans in Congress intend to cut about US$880 billion in federal health care spending.

    One of their primary targets is Medicaid. That government program covers 82 million Americans with health insurance. Most of the people enrolled in the program are low income, have disabilities, or both.

    Medicaid, jointly funded by the federal government and the states, is also the biggest funder in the U.S. of long-term care services, whether they are delivered in the patient’s home, another location where they spend part of their day or a nursing home. That makes it particularly important for older adults and those with disabilities. All states must meet the basic federal guidelines for Medicaid coverage. But 41 states have opted to take advantage of the Affordable Care Act provision that expanded eligibility to cover more people under the program.

    We are gerontology researchers who study health and financial well-being in later life. We’ve been analyzing what the potential impacts of Medicaid cuts might be.

    While the debate about how to reduce the budget focuses largely on dollars and cents, we believe that cutting federal spending on Medicaid would harm the health and well-being of millions of Americans by reducing their access to care. In our view, it’s also likely that any savings achieved in the short term would be smaller than the long-term increase in health care costs born by the federal government, the states and patients – including for many Americans who are 65 and older.

    Republican lawmakers are weighing different strategies that could cut federal Medicaid spending.

    Weak track record

    Wary of backlash from their constituents, Republicans have agreed on a strategy that would largely cut Medicaid spending in a roundabout way.

    Previous efforts by the GOP in some states, such as imposing work requirements for some people to get Medicaid benefits, have not greatly reduced costs. That’s largely because there are relatively few people enrolled in the Medicaid program who are physically able to be employed and aren’t already in the workforce. Nor have past efforts to reduce fraud, waste and abuse led to significant savings.

    According to widespread media reports, Republicans are considering changes that would cut the amount of money that the federal government reimburses states for what they spend on Medicaid.

    In May 2025, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimated that 8.6 million Americans would lose their health insurance coverage should the GOP proposal become law.

    Historically, states have dealt with budget cuts by reducing their payments to health care providers, limiting eligibility or restricting benefits. These reductions all particularly affected home- and community-based services that many disabled and older adults rely on.

    About 3 in 4 of the people with Medicaid coverage who receive long-term care through the program get that care at home, in their communities or both, rather than residing in a nursing home. States save an estimated 26 cents for every dollar spent on those services delivered outside nursing homes.

    Losing coverage can be harmful for your health

    We recently analyzed data from a nationally representative study of approximately 6,000 people who had Medicaid coverage but lost it when they turned age 65 because their income exceeded 100% of the federal poverty level. In 2025, that cutoff is about $15,560 for a single person and $21,150 for a couple.

    Medicaid income eligibility generally drops from 138% to 100% of the federal poverty level at age 65 once Medicare becomes a person’s primary health insurer.

    The people who participated in the study had lost their Medicaid coverage upon turning 65 between 1998 and 2020. Our team followed the experiences of these participants over a 10-year period starting at age 65 to see how they fared compared with people who continue to be enrolled in Medicaid after their 65th birthday.

    What we found was both surprising and disturbing.

    Fewer activities of daily living

    Over the decade following that milestone, the people who lost their Medicaid coverage had more chronic conditions and could perform fewer activities of daily living, such as bathing and getting dressed, without any assistance as compared with those who still had Medicaid coverage. In addition, they were twice as likely to experience depression and be in fair or poor health.

    As people’s health worsened, they also went to the hospital more often and stayed there longer. They also used outpatient surgery services more frequently.

    These services are particularly expensive for the health care system. Depending on the service, it may also be costly for patients. Unlike the comprehensive coverage of Medicaid, the Medicare program fully covers only inpatient hospitalizations, short-term nursing facility care, hospice, some short-term home care, annual wellness visits, vaccines and some basic preventive care. Beyond that, Medicare requires the payment of premiums to help with uncovered services that can also include deductibles and copays.

    This arrangement can lead to significant out-of-pocket costs that make health care hard for low-income older adults to afford unless they have both Medicare and Medicaid coverage.

    We also found that older people who lost Medicaid coverage were less likely to see their primary care physician for routine and follow-up care, despite being enrolled in Medicare. This explains in part why they are going to the hospital more often, likely avoiding routine health care that may incur out-of-pocket costs and eventually utilizing Medicare-covered hospital care when needed.

    In short, we found that exiting the Medicaid program upon turning 65 actually leads to an increase in the use of some of the most expensive health care services, such as inpatient hospitalization and outpatient surgery. So although Medicaid may no longer pay for these costs, the rest of the health care system does.

    Just under 90% of older adults enrolled in Medicare have some kind of supplemental coverage that helps them pay for services that the program doesn’t cover. For 16% of the people with Medicare coverage, Medicaid covers those additional health care costs. The rest of that nearly 90% obtain supplemental coverage from private insurance companies or are enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan that’s run by a private company instead of the government.

    However, 11% of Americans covered by Medicare don’t have any additional coverage. It is likely that those who lost Medicaid benefits at age 65 may not be able to afford any other supplemental coverage options and fall into this group.

    People who lose Medicaid coverage may die sooner

    One of our more troubling findings was that people who lost Medicaid coverage at age 65 were 14% more likely to die within the next 10 years than were those who kept their coverage in addition to gaining Medicare coverage. This was true even though the people who lost their Medicaid access tended to start out in better health.

    Roughly 12 million Americans are enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid today. Much is at stake for them and other low-income people as Congress considers making major changes to the program to cut federal spending on it.

    For some Americans, it’s a matter of life and death. For others, it’s a matter of healthy versus unhealthy aging that leads to costlier health care not just for themselves but for the U.S. as a whole.

    Jane Tavares receives funding from the RRF Foundation for Aging.

    Marc Cohen receives funding from the RRF Foundation for Aging.

    ref. Why do cuts to Medicaid matter for Americans over 65? 2 experts on aging explain why lives are at stake – https://theconversation.com/why-do-cuts-to-medicaid-matter-for-americans-over-65-2-experts-on-aging-explain-why-lives-are-at-stake-254256

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Mashatile explores tourism’s potential to boost Africa’s economy

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Africa’s Travel Indaba 2025 officially kicked off today, with Deputy President Paul Mashatile using the platform to highlight the continent’s vast, untapped tourism potential. 

    Speaking at the opening ceremony in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal, Deputy President Mashatile highlighted Africa’s rich cultural heritage and economic opportunities in the tourism sector.

    According to the Deputy President, tourism is projected to contribute 10.4% to Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030, currently standing at 6.8%. 

    However, according to Mashatile, South Africa alone sees tourism contributing 8.9% to its GDP and supporting 1.6 million jobs, with plans to expand this to over two million jobs by 2030.

    Africa’s Travel Indaba is an iconic African leisure trade show, owned by South African Tourism, with the specific objective of creating market access for a vast array of African leisure tourism products.

    The three-day event, held during Africa Month, celebrates the continent’s unity and potential, with a focus on promoting inter-African travel and breaking down barriers. 
     

    PICTURES | Africa’s Travel Indaba 

    “This month, we are reminded to forge unity, strengthen the bonds of solidarity, and cooperation among the African states. This is a call we must never forsake until we witness a more integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa.”

    Key themes include sustainable tourism, regional integration, and leveraging the upcoming Group of 20 (G20) Leaders’ Summit to showcase the continent’s global economic significance.

    He also stressed the importance of intra-African trade, infrastructure development, and digital transformation to boost tourism.

    The leader also reflects on late President Nelson Mandela’s speech at the Indaba International Tourism Workshop, emphasising the commitment to boosting Africa’s tourism industry.

    The Deputy President also highlighted the contributions of African leaders like Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, and Thomas Sankara in achieving political independence and transforming the continent.

    “Due to their contributions in achieving political independence, Africa is now welcoming many tourists to explore its beauty, marvels, hospitality, and culture. Many travellers are drawn to uncover the roots that shaped these remarkable men and women of our continent, and for this, we should be proud.” 

    He believes that Africa’s attractions and influx of tourists also mean that the continent is an important part of the world’s economy, politics, growth, and humanity. 

    “Despite being separated by man-made borders, the humanity of the African people permeates the veins of all African countries.

    “Our unity is cemented by social cohesion.”

    He is of the view that this is a reminder of how unique Africans are, created with love, compassion, and care that are inextricably linked to their identities. 

    “Our humanity makes us stand out in the world’s melting pot of cultures, traditions, and heritage.”

    He acknowledged the challenges Africa faces, including political strife, poverty, unemployment, and inequality, which have led to widespread misery and violence.

    However, he took the time to call for collective action to confront these challenges and uncover enduring solutions, stressing the role of tourism as a significant economic engine and catalyst for social change.

    The Indaba serves as a platform for African nations to collaborate, showcase their attractions, and develop strategies for inclusive tourism growth that benefits local communities, women, youth, and people with disabilities.

    With the theme “Unlimited Africa,“ the conference aims to position the continent at the centre of global economic conversations and tourism development.

    READ | Africa Travel Indaba the ‘pride of African tourism’

    According to the Deputy President, Africa needs to invest more in skills development and digital transformation for the tourism sector to thrive. 

    “We must foster innovation and sustainable practices to ensure long-term economic growth. Let us celebrate the bond that unites Africa, honouring the vibrant cultures, breathtaking landscapes, and the incredible people that make this continent shine with brilliance.

    “Let us demonstrate to the world that Africa is ready for business.” – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: VATICAN – The Pope to journalists: choose consciously and courageously the path of communication in favour of peace

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    Monday, 12 May 2025

    VaticanMedia

    Vatican City (Agenzia Fides) – “You are at the forefront of reporting on conflicts and aspirations for peace, on situations of injustice and poverty, and on the silent work of so many people striving to create a better world. For this reason, I ask you to choose consciously and courageously the path of communication in favour of peace”. With these words, Pope Leo XIV addressed the representatives of the media from around the world gathered in Rome for the Conclave.A few days after his election, the new Pontiff granted his first public audience to journalists, as is tradition. More than 3,000 photographers, editors, and television crews filled the Paul VI Hall. Greeted with prolonged applause, the Pope broke the ice with humor: “Thank you for this wonderful reception! They say when they clap at the beginning it does not matter much, if you are still awake at the end and you still want to applaud…thank you very much”!After thanking the media for their work “in these days, which is truly a time of grace for the Church”, Leo XIV called upon every journalist “to strive for a different kind of communication, one that does not seek consensus at all costs, does not use aggressive words, does not follow the culture of competition”. He added: “we must reject the paradigm of war” “of words and images”.The Pope expressed the “Church’s solidarity with journalists who are imprisoned for seeking to report the truth and called for their release”. At the same time, he invited communication professionals to contribute to helping society emerge from “the confusion of loveless languages that are often ideological or partisan. Therefore, your service, with the words you use and the style you adopt, is crucial. As you know, communication is not only the transmission of information, but it is also the creation of a culture, of human and digital environments that become spaces for dialogue and discussion”.Leo XIV also called for “responsibility and discernment” in the use of artificial intelligence, a task that, he stressed “concerns everyone in proportion to his or her age and role in society”. In conclusion, he echoed the words of Pope Francis in his latest message for World Day of Social Communications which will be celebrated on June 1: “Let us disarm communication of all prejudice and resentment, fanaticism and even hatred; let us free it from aggression. Let us disarm words and we will help to disarm the world. Disarmed and disarming communication allows us to share a different view of the world and to act in a manner consistent with our human dignity”. (F.B.) (Agenzia Fides, 12/5/2025)
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    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Chris Hipkins: Pre-Budget speech

    Source: New Zealand Labour Party

    So as we gather here for an early conversation about next week’s Budget, it’s also a good time for us to have some hard, and honest, conversations about the crossroads our country finds itself at.

    We’re at a moment that demands honesty. A moment that demands leadership. And above all, a moment that demands hope.

    I want to say upfront that paying for your Budget at the expense of women, cutting their chance at fair pay, is the opposite of all of those things.

    I think the reaction over the past week has been swift, strong and utterly justified.

    Women all over this country rightly felt like pay equity was something they had fought for, in some cases devoting their lives to it. It was hard fought, and we were making progress.

    Let’s be clear – this Government is gaslighting all Kiwi women.

    Telling them they aren’t cutting women’s pay on one hand, while cancelling 33 active claims representing hundreds of thousands of women with no due process on the other.

    Claiming it wasn’t to pay for their Budget, then admitting their changes will see billions slashed from that same Budget.

    I think one of the many reasons this is resonating so strongly is because for many Kiwis, the promises they were sold at the last election have turned to dust.

    They were told the economy would be stronger. But it’s slower.

    They were told the cost of living would come down. But prices have gone up.

    They were told families with kids would get an extra $250 a fortnight to help with the cost of living, yet only a handful, if that, are getting it.

    They were told a new government would get things moving, and yet building projects have ground to a halt and 13,000 people working in construction lost their jobs.

    They were told the country would be united. But it’s more divided than ever.

    And at every turn, when people ask ‘why can’t we invest in our schools, in our hospitals, in our future?’ the government is giving them the same answer:

    “There’s no alternative.”

    Well, let me be clear: there is always an alternative. There are always choices.

    And this government is making the wrong ones.

    A $3 billion tax break for landlords while cutting funding for pay equity for women.

    A rollback of our world-leading smoke-free laws while giving tobacco companies over $200 million in tax breaks.

    Borrowing $12 billion for tax cuts while cutting jobs, cutting investment, and cutting hope for future generations.

    They are choosing austerity. Nicola Willis doesn’t like that word, but it is absolutely true. Choosing decline. Choosing division.

    But we in Labour are choosing a different path. A better path. A fairer path. One that puts people at the heart of our economy and decency back at the heart of our politics.

    Because we’ve done it before, and we can do it again.

    There are challenges ahead. Challenges like the rise of artificial intelligence and the changing nature of work that’s going to prompt.

    The climate crisis, and the energy transition that’s going to demand.

    An ageing population, in need of care and dignity.

    The widening gap between rich and poor, between city and region, between young and old.

    And the creeping polarisation that seeks to divide us, when what we need most is to come together.

    What’s this government’s response now to these challenges?

    Deregulate here. Privatise there.

    If it moves, sell it. If it breaks, blame someone else.

    This is a government more interested in finding someone else to blame than solving the problems facing the country.

    They’re trying to solve the challenges of the 21st century with ideas from the 19th.

    They have no plan for the future. Just slogans and spreadsheets.

    But we do have a plan. A serious, credible, ambitious plan one that is rooted in fairness, decency, and community. One that believes in people. One that backs New Zealand.

    Labour is the party that governs for all, not just a few.

    Let’s start with the economy—because you can’t build anything if your foundations are crumbling.

    The current government loves to repeat the myth that New Zealand is drowning in debt.

    Let’s look at the facts. Before COVID-19 arrived, our net core Crown debt was around 18%. After the pandemic, it peaked at 40%. That’s an increase—but it’s broadly in line with what National borrowed during the Global Financial Crisis, when they increased debt by 20%.

    And if you include our assetts—like the New Zealand Super Fund—our net debt falls closer to 25%. That’s still one of the lowest levels in the developed world.

    You wouldn’t sell your house because of a mortgage you can easily manage. And we shouldn’t sell our public assets because of debt that’s low by international standards.

    And net debt isn’t the full story either. The government’s net worth more than doubled over the past decade —from $81 billion in 2014 to $191 billion in 2023.

    We need a more mature conversation about government debt and assets than the one that we are having at the moment.

    Borrowing more money to support a higher number of people on unemployment benefits because you’ve slashed government investment in areas like infrastructure and housing simply isn’t sustainable.

    Now is exactly the time for government to make the investments we need in infrastructure, housing, health, and our environment so we are creating jobs and get New Zealand moving again.

    Anchor projects funded by government have helped us get through major economic shocks before, like the rollout of broadband during the GFC. They create jobs, stimulate the economy, and leave a positive legacy for the future.

    Yet all we’ve seen from this government so far is big talk about a pipeline of future projects that’s yet to eventuate. In fact, the opposite has happened. They spent less last year than the year before.

    All the big talk about infrastructure is actually resulting in less investment in it.

    Talking about economic growth without actually having a plan to deliver it just doesn’t cut it.

    Labour will get New Zealand back to work, just as we’ve done before.

    We didn’t get everything right in government, but let’s put a few facts on the table.

    GDP per person grew by $18,000 under the last Labour government—more than under either the Clark or Key governments, despite the fact we were in office for 3 years less than both of those predecessor governments.

    And wages? Under Bolger and Shipley, ordinary hourly pay grew by $3.30 over nine years. Under Clark, $7.22. Under Key and English, $6.29. Under Ardern and Hipkins? $9.98.

    We grew the economy faster. We lifted wages faster. We created more jobs. Unemployment was lower.

    So when the government tells you there is no alternative to cuts—don’t believe it. There is.

    But it’s not just about numbers. It’s about values.

    If we are genuinely going to turn things around, and provide New Zealanders with hope and the opportunity of a better future, this year’s Budget will need to do three things.

    First, it will need to properly fund our frontline public services like health, education, aged care and police.

    National promised New Zealanders before the election frontline public services wouldn’t be cut, yet hiring freezes in health, cuts to specialist teachers, and cruel cuts to disability support all serve as vivid examples that just wasn’t true.

    Second, it will need to provide a credible answer to how the government is going to fund all of its promises, and that should not be at the expense of working New Zealand women.

    They’ve committing billions in infrastructure investment, for example, but still haven’t said how they will pay for it all.

    Third, they need to show they have a plan to invest in our future. To rebuild our ageing schools, hospitals, public homes and infrastructure. To create jobs, upskill our workers, and raising wages and living standards.

    Because fundamentally, good economic management is about people. Shifting numbers around on a page while making life harder for everyday working Kiwis is not a sign of success.

    How can we look our kids in the eye when we give $3 billion tax break to landlords—while cutting funding for food banks?

    How can we justify increasing returns for landlords while we cut the pay of those who clean our hospitals and protect our schools?

    We can’t. We won’t and we shouldn’t.

    Labour is not anti-wealth. We are anti-poverty. And we are pro-opportunity—for everyone.

    We believe in a fair tax system, and you’ll hear more from us on that soon. Not to punish success, but to ask those who have benefitted most to contribute their fair share—to the schools that taught them, the roads that connect them, and the hospitals that care for their families.

    Because you can’t build a strong economy on a weak society.

    We want to build a country where our kids don’t feel they have to leave New Zealand to build a life for themselves.

    Where our elders can live with dignity.

    Where no child goes hungry.

    Where our businesses thrive.

    Where being a nurse, a teacher, or a farmer isn’t a path to burnout—but a path to pride.

    We want New Zealand to be a place where our best and brightest don’t just want to stay—but they can stay. Because there is opportunity here. Hope here. A future here.

    We know the future will test us. Artificial intelligence is going to change how we work. Climate change is going to challenge how we live. New technologies will transform jobs and our industries.

    But these aren’t reasons to fear the future. They are reasons to shape it.

    And that’s exactly what Labour will do.

    We will invest in green energy and the industries of tomorrow.

    We will reform our education system so that we prepare young people for the jobs of the future—not the jobs of the 19th century.

    We will make sure that new technologies benefit everyone, not just the few.

    We will build homes—not sell them off.

    We will protect our environment—not carve it up and privatise it.

    And need to focus on uniting this country—not driving division.

    Because diversity is not a weakness. It is our greatest strength.

    Whether you are Māori, Pākehā, Pasifika, Asian, or new to this land—you are all Kiwis.

    Whether you’re a nurse in Palmerston North, a teacher in Ōtaki, a small business owner in Timaru, a cleaner in South Auckland, a builder in Rotorua, or a farmer in Wairoa – your contribution matters.

    Whether you’re young or old, rich or poor, gay or straight or transgender, Labour sees you. Labour hears you. Labour is fighting for you.

    Because what unites us is far greater than what divides us.

    We are a nation of workers and dreamers, of creators and carers.

    We believe in fairness. In decency. In community.

    And we believe the role of government is not to sit on the sidelines—it’s to step up, to help, to serve.

    This government is making different choices. Choosing a lucky few, over the rest of us.

    And those choices show us, more than anything, what kind of country this government wants to build.

    But I ask you: is that the country we want?

    A broken health system.

    Children going to school hungry.

    People sleeping in cars.

    And a generation—our kids—growing up believing they may never own a home, never raise a family, never build a future here.

    Or do we want a New Zealand where everyone gets a fair go?

    Where the dignity of work is restored, the promise of opportunity renewed, and the bonds of community rebuilt?

    We’re not here to manage decline. We are here to build the future.

    A future where prosperity is shared.

    Where no one is left behind.

    Where we choose hope over fear.

    Where we say to the next generation: yes—you can dream here. You can build here. You can stay here.

    We’ve done it before.

    And with your support, we’ll do it again.

    Let’s build a better way. Together.

    Kia kaha. Kia māia. Kia manawanui.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: SCHUMER – WITH WESTERN NY RELIGIOUS LEADERS & FOOD BANKS – SOUNDS ALARM THAT UNDER GOP PLAN TO CUT SNAP – AMERICA’S LARGEST ANTI-HUNGER PROGRAM – THOUSANDS OF KIDS, SENIORS, & FAMILIES COULD GO…

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New York Charles E Schumer
    Already 8,000 Cases Of Food For FeedMore WNY Have Already Been Canceled Due To Trump’s Cruel USDA Cuts – Now GOP Wants To Steal Up To $230 Billion From SNAP To Fund Trump’s Tax Breaks For Corporations & Billionaires
    Schumer, With Church Leaders & Advocates, Say This Double Whammy Could Hurtle Families To A Hunger Crisis, Impacting 208,000+ In WNY, Millions Nationwide; Demands GOP Block Cruel Cut To SNAP And Protect Anti-Hunger Programs
    Schumer: No Child Should Go To Bed Hungry. This Is Not A Partisan Issue; This Is A Moral Issue
    As Congressional Republicans look to advance the largest potential cut to the anti-hunger program SNAP in American history this week, U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer stood with Western NY religious leaders, food banks, & farmers to issue a stark warning and demand action against the devastating proposed $230 billion SNAP cut to fund Trump’s tax cuts for corporations & billionaires, that would leave thousands of seniors, families and children hungry. The senator joined with church leaders and hunger advocates to say how this is a moral issue that we should all unite to stop, and Schumer called on the administration to reverse its hunger program cuts and for the NY House Republicans to stand against stealing from SNAP, which over 208,000 in Western NY rely on for food.
    “No child should ever go to bed hungry. But Trump’s slashing of anti-hunger programs at the USDA has already cancelled 8,000 cases of food for FeedMore Western NY.  Now, House Republicans are trying to rush through the budget process and make the largest cut to SNAP in history. With food insecurity on the rise, this is a double whammy that could hurtle families to a hunger crisis,” said Senator Schumer. “Stealing from SNAP to pay for Trump’s tax breaks for corporations & billionaires is as backwards as it gets, and will result in thousands of kids, seniors, and families going hungry. It is not a partisan issue, it is a moral issue. That is why I am here to show what these cuts mean for the nuns, priests, and food banks on the frontlines of fighting against hunger. Together we are demanding a stop to this all-out assault on our federal anti-hunger programs and to protect SNAP for our children, veterans, seniors, and families.”
    “We need to recognize that food insecurity is not just a problem for someone else—it’s our problem. Catholic Charities of Buffalo, alongside FeedMore WNY and others, is committed to addressing it. But we cannot do it alone and we are grateful for the efforts of Senator Schumer and those of his colleagues who truly understand this problem,” said Deacon Steve Schumer, president and CEO of Catholic Charities of Buffalo.
    Schumer added, “It only takes a few NY House Republicans to join us to stop this cruel cut to SNAP. We need NY Republicans to show us which side they are on with their actions. For feeding corporate & billionaires’ greed or for feeding hungry families here in Western NY. We need them to join us in demanding the USDA reverse all of Trump’s cuts to our farmers, food banks, and anti-hunger programs and keep their hands off SNAP to fund Trump’s tax breaks.”
    Schumer explained how Trump’s USDA has already cruelly canceled $1 billion in food assistance, hurting Western New York’s FeedMore WNY, and if these SNAP cuts move forward it would be a double whammy, hurtling us to a hunger crisis. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is a lifeline for nearly 3 million NY seniors, veterans and families who rely on the critical funding to purchase groceries. Schumer said that we should be investing more not less in anti-hunger programs, but under the Republican proposal, the average family would be reduced to just $5.00 per day per person. A breakdown of SNAP recipients in Western NY from the Center for American Progress can be found below:

    County

    SNAP Recipients

    % of County on SNAP

    Cattaraugus

    10,959

    14.4%

    Chautauqua

    23,926

    19.1%

    Erie

    147,427

    15.5%

    Niagara

    26,650

    12.7%

    TOTAL

    208,962

     
    Schumer explained the Republican proposal to cut up to $230 billion from SNAP would inevitably mean costs of feeding families shift to states, who simply do not have the capacity to absorb this massive increase in expenses, risking families going hungry. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, mandating New York State to cover even a modest share of SNAP benefits would shift astronomical costs to the state with even just 5% increasing New York State’s costs by nearly $3.5 billion from FY2026 to FY2034. The senator said it is impossible to cut this much from federal SNAP funding without ripping food away from hungry children, seniors, veterans, people with disabilities, and more.
    These agonizing decisions would be amplified even further at the local level, with non-profits, many of whom have already had their funding cut, unable to fill in the gap. Counties could even be forced to shoulder the burden of increased costs in SNAP, using more local dollars to provide coverage because less federal funding will be coming in.
    According to New York’s Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, in New York’s 26th Congressional District – which represents parts of Erie and Niagara counties – nearly 77,000 households receive an estimated $337 million in annual benefits. 35% of SNAP recipients are children, 14% are elderly, and 10% are people with disabilities. In New York’s 23rd Congressional District over 51,000 households receive an estimated $200 million in annual benefits. 31% of SNAP recipients are children, 17% are elderly, and 12% are people with disabilities.
    Schumer said, “SNAP is a lifeline that helps uplift everyone, from the NY farms who get direct assistance from the program to Western NY families’ kitchen tables. NY Republicans are tying themselves in knots to try to justify these SNAP cuts, but the math shows you cannot make the massive cuts the House’s tax bill proposes without risking the food security for thousands of families. I’m all for reducing any waste or fraud to make the program more efficient, but rushing to pass these massive damaging cuts with no plan while they slash our food banks is a recipe for disaster.”
    The proposed SNAP cuts would be a blow to Western NY food banks which have already been hit hard by Trump’s funding freezes and canceled payments. Earlier this year, the USDA canceled $1 billion in food assistance for organizations to purchase locally grown food. USDA programs provide food banks, schools, and other organizations with federal support to purchase local food products from NY farms.
    FeedMore WNY is facing a projected $3.5M loss in food for 2025, as 12 critical orders of protein, dairy, and produce scheduled for delivery between May and August have already been canceled, resulting in the loss of over 8,000 cases of food, including thousands of dozens of eggs. In 2024, TEFAP CCC purchases accounted for 13% of all food distributed by FeedMore WNY. This loss comes as hunger continues to surge across the region, with FeedMore experiencing a 46% increase in demand since 2021, serving tens of thousands of children, seniors, and working families each year.
    Schumer said these proposed cuts will limit food banks’ ability to keep shelves stocked as more people have been forced to rely on food banks to feed their families. Food bank workers and religious leaders across Upstate New York are concerned about the impact of potential cuts to SNAP on the people they serve, and farmers are worried there will be nowhere to sell their food if SNAP funding levels drop.
    “No matter which way you slice it, this Congressional Republican plan will screw Western New York families, food banks and farmers from farm to table. We need everyone to stand up to these cuts that would take away food from our neighbors in need,” added Schumer.
     “Deeply embedded in many religious traditions is the call to care for the vulnerable, forgotten, and poor in our midst. Offering them as we do, not just charity, but also justice that upholds their dignity and worth as human beings. And what is more basic in providing human dignity and worth for people, than providing them with the food they need? For 16 years I have pastored in WNY, and during that time I have witnessed over and over again the injustices that exist around our food system.  I have seen people who depend on programs like SNAP for their survival, especially the elderly and the children in my congregation, torn down and made to feel like they are unworthy because they cannot afford to eat. We cannot let the people we call our neighbors, our family, and our friends, go hungry in order to save those who already have more than what they need. That is why I am proud to stand with Senator Schumer, and other leaders in our community, to demand justice. To demand that our leaders uphold the dignity of all people, instead of choosing to take the food off their plates,” said Pastor Rebecca Mentzer, Prince of Peace Lutheran Church.
    “As the director of Primera’s Food Pantry, I see firsthand how many of our neighbors have to make impossible choices—between paying bills or putting food on the table,” said Pastor Cesar Galarza, Community Church Jehovah Jireh. “In recent months, we have seen a 50% increase in individuals who come to our pantry because they can no longer afford groceries. We are grateful to Senator Schumer for being here today and hearing about the nutritional insecurity that many people in our community face, and we urge more lawmakers to follow his lead. Our communities are struggling—not in theory, but in real life—and they need meaningful support to access the basic nutrition every person deserves.”
    “We hope for a day when we do not need millions of dollars in funding because the need in the community is lower – but that day is not today. Food insecurity remains a massive and growing problem across the country, including Western New York. Last year alone, more than 165,700 individuals relied on FeedMore WNY for food assistance, which was a 46 percent increase in just three years’ time. The federal government plays a critical role in alleviating food insecurity, and we appreciate the work Senator Chuck Schumer is doing to fight for this mission critical funding. In 2024, FeedMore WNY received more than $14.9 million in federal funding to purchase food for our food bank distribution network, offer community outreach with SNAP assistance, and provide prepared meals for our community dining sites and home-delivered meal clients. It is imperative that the federal government continue to fund and support food assistance programs including SNAP, TEFAP and Meals on Wheels. Any reduction or elimination of these vital funds would has a devastating effect on the charitable food assistance network and further exacerbate the already massive problem of hunger in WNY and throughout the nation,” said Collin Bishop, Chief Communications Officer FeedMore WNY.
    Proposed rollbacks to the country’s most widely utilized nutrition assistance program would strain budgets for Western NY families. Schumer said decimating funding for SNAP right as costs at grocery stores across the country are skyrocketing will hit the Western NY hard. According to the New York State Community Action Association, more than 14% of people in Erie County live in poverty, including more than 20% of children. According to No Kid Hungry, over half of New Yorkers reported going into debt in the past year due to rising food costs, with over 60% of families with children.
    SNAP not only supplements families’ food budgets, it has also generated great economic benefits for New York State and NY-26 specifically. According to the National Grocers Association, grocery stores across New York State sold over $2.1 billion in groceries to people using SNAP benefits, including $146.1 million in NY-26. This created more than 18,500 New York jobs in the grocery industry, including 1,288 in NY-26, and generated more than $820.8 million in grocery industry wages, including $356.9 million in NY-26.
    Schumer has been a strong advocate for addressing food insecurity in Western New York. Schumer last year secured $3 million for FeedMore WNY to build a new, 197,700-square-foot facility in the fiscal year (FY) 2024 spending bill. The senator secured $2 million to expand FeedMore WNY’s facility in the omnibus end-of-year spending package for FY2023. Additionally, in November 2023, Schumer announced over $40 million for food organizations across the state through the USDA funded New York Food for New York Families program with Governor Hochul, including $2 million for FeedMore and millions more for other Western NY food organizations and school districts.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Nick Langworthy Releases Statement Supporting House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Budget Reconciliation Legislation

    Source: US Congressman Nick Langworthy (NY-23)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today,Congressman Nick Langworthy (NY-23) released the following statement regarding the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s reconciliation bill text. This legislation will be marked up tomorrow, May 13 at 2:00 pm. 

     

    “After five months of tough negotiations and in-depth discussions with key stakeholders, the House Energy and Commerce Committee has delivered a bold reconciliation bill that achieves our top priorities: protecting Medicaid for those who genuinely need it, advancing American energy independence, and ending the hemorrhaging of taxpayer dollars through waste, fraud, and abuse.

     

    “From day one, I made it clear that I would fight relentlessly to protect rural hospitals and safeguard access to care—and as the only Republican from New York serving on the Energy and Commerce Committee, I was proud to help lead that charge alongside my colleagues and the White House.

     

    “This bill strengthens the social safety net while restoring fiscal responsibility. Its passage marks a critical step toward delivering on a pro-growth, pro-taxpayer agenda that puts America’s working and middle class first.

     

    “Let’s be clear: if we do nothing, the system goes broke. Medicaid and other essential programs will collapse under the weight of wasteful spending, fraud, and abuse. For too long, these programs have operated with little accountability—broken systems with no safeguards for taxpayers. That’s unacceptable. We have a duty to protect both the people who depend on these services and the taxpayers who fund them.

     

    “That’s why this legislation includes commonsense work requirements for able-bodied adults without dependents—just as President Bill Clinton enacted in the 1990s. It was one of the most popular and effective policies of his presidency, helping lift millions out of poverty and into the workforce. We are building on that bipartisan legacy to ensure assistance is tied to opportunity, not lifelong dependency.

     

    “We are also removing illegal aliens from the Medicaid rolls. American taxpayers should never be forced to subsidize healthcare for those who have broken our immigration laws. These benefits are meant for American citizens and lawful residents—not for those who enter the country illegally and exploit the system. This reform is about restoring fairness, accountability, and the rule of law.

     

    “Unfortunately, powerful Democrats like Chuck Schumer are already resorting to lies, fear-mongering, and deception to protect the failed status quo. They’d rather mislead the public than admit that change is urgently needed. But we know the truth—and the American people are demanding action.

     

    “While Democrats and their special interest allies cling to bloated bureaucracy and broken programs, we are delivering real solutions, restoring integrity to our institutions, and honoring the clear mandate voters gave us to put America back on the right track.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Scotland: ‘Consciously cruel’ – UK social security system is pushing people beyond the brink – new report

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Human rights in the UK in crisis as new report exposes crushing evidence of a social security system ruining lives

    • Discrimination and dehumanisation reported as rife as punitive system drives poverty by policy 

    • ‘I am barely holding on financially. I always feel just one step away from rock bottom’ – Isla

    • ‘Lives are being ruined by a system that is consciously cruel – it erodes dignity by design’– Neil Cowan, Amnesty 

    Amnesty International UK’s new report takes a deep dive into the UK social security system. The unique research is an extensive look through the lens of human rights violations across our basic rights to housing, food, education, healthcare and social security.  

    The evidence delivers damning conclusions on how the system processes, punishes, harms and dehumanises people and fails to meet international legal obligations. Successive UK governments have ignored the UN’s pleas to take urgent action to fix this. 

    Poverty is a visible sign of a failing social security system. When the UK government knowingly makes choices to make poverty worse, it is deliberately violating basic human rights. We have moved from a society that supports people to a punitive system that drives poverty by policy. 

    The rate of poverty in the UK is now higher than at any point in the 21st century. Sixteen million people in the UK are living in families in poverty – almost a quarter of the UK*. Of these, 5.2 million are children, 9.2 million are working-age adults, and 1.5 million are pension-age adults. While poverty rates in Scotland are now marginally lower than in the rest of the UK, 20% of people in Scotland are living in the grip of poverty including almost one in four children. 

    For its report ’Social Insecurity’ Amnesty’s collaborated with over 700 benefit claimants – including 74 claimant interviews in Scotland – and advisors to provide a platform for the people most gravely affected and show how politicians are playing with people’s lives and ignoring our most basic rights. In 2024 86% of low-income families on Universal Credit went without essentials such as heating, food and clothing. 

    With the backdrop of the Spring Statement and devastating disability social security cuts, Amnesty’s report delivers a crushing blow of evidence on the UK’s social security system and political choices that have pushed people into poverty and centres real-life experiences throughout, demonstrating the depth of dehumanisation. 

    Recommendations from the report call for: 

    • System overhaul: A landmark, independent Social Security Commission with statutory powers to overhaul the UK’s broken social security system—rooted in dignity and human rights. 

    •  Urgent protection from harm: The UK Government to urgently reverse harmful social security cuts, sanctions and caps including the two-child limit and ensure upcoming reforms of PIP, ESA and Universal Credit, meet international human rights standards and are shaped by those most affected. 

    •  Legal protections: The UK Government to put in place legal frameworks protecting economic, social and cultural rights to ensure everyone’s basic human rights to food, housing, and dignity are protected in law and prevent failures in social security policy from causing wider harms. 
       


    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Committee on the Rights of the Child Opens Ninety-Ninth Session, Adopts New Bureau with Sopio Kiladze as Chairperson

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Rights of the Child this morning opened its ninety-ninth session, which is being held in Geneva from 12 to 30 May, during which the Committee will review reports on the efforts to adhere to the Convention on the Rights of the Child of Brazil, Indonesia, Iraq, Norway, Qatar and Romania, as well as on Brazil’s efforts to implement the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.

    In an opening statement, Andrea Ori, Chief, Groups in Focus Section, Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Representative of the Secretary-General, said the Committee’s work was more crucial than ever.  Significant progress in children’s rights, which seemed secure until recently, was now severely disrupted.  Children worldwide were increasingly affected by a convergence of crises, including economic downturns, climate change, public health emergencies, and armed conflicts.

    Mr. Ori warned that the recent global funding crisis exacerbated the situation of children, with a daunting forecast ahead.  The United Nations Children’s Fund had projected that in 2025, at least 14 million children would experience interruptions in vital nutrition support and services due to current and anticipated funding cuts, putting them at increased risk of severe malnutrition and death.  The capacity to vaccinate over 15 million vulnerable children against measles in fragile and conflict-affected countries would also be drastically reduced.

    Considering the troubling outlook for children, Mr. Ori said, there was an urgent need for coordinated global efforts to safeguard children’s rights and ensure their well-being.  Now, more than ever, it was crucial for governments to fulfil their commitments under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

    Mr. Ori concluded by wishing the Committee all the best for a productive session.

    During the meeting, the Committee elected a new Chair and Bureau.  Sopio Kiladze (Georgia) was elected as Chair, and Cephas Lumina (Zambia), Thuwayba Al Barwani (Oman), Philip D. Jaffe (Switzerland), and Mary Beloff (Argentina) were elected as Vice-Chairs. 

    The Committee also welcomed four new members – Timothy. P.T. Ekesa (Kenya), Mariana Ianachevici (Republic of Moldova), Juliana Scerri Ferrante (Malta), and Zeinebou Taleb Moussa (Mauritania) – and welcomed back Mr. Lumina, who previously served as a member from 2017 to 2021.   They made their solemn declaration. 

    Ms. Kiladze said it was a pleasure and honour to be elected as Chair of the Committee.  She said her election came at a difficult time in which many children around the world were affected by violations of their rights. She said it was vital that the Committee continued to work for the protection of the rights of children everywhere.

    Before adopting the session’s agenda, the Committee also heard statements from representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Children’s Fund, Child Rights Connect, and the Secretary of the Committee.

    Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.  The programme of work of the Committee’s ninety-ninth session and other documents related to the session can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. this afternoon to consider the seventh periodic report of Norway (CRC/C/NOR/7).

    Statements

    ANDREA ORI, Chief, Groups in Focus Section, Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Representative of the Secretary-General, welcomed the four new members of the Committee: Timothy Ekesa (Kenya), Mariana Ianachevici (Republic of Moldova), Juliana Scerri Ferrante (Malta), and Zeinebou Taleb Moussa (Mauritania), and the returning member Cephas Lumina (Zambia).  Each member brought valuable and diverse experiences that would greatly enhance the Committee’s work.  Additionally, he congratulated the members who had been re-elected for another term: Rinchen Chophel (Bhutan); Sopio Kiladze (Georgia); Benyam Dawit Mezmur (Ethiopia); and Benoit Van Keirsbilck (Belgium).

    The Committee’s work was more crucial than ever.  Significant progress in children’s rights, particularly in health and education, which seemed secure until recently, was now severely disrupted.  Children worldwide were increasingly affected by a convergence of crises, including economic downturns, climate change, public health emergencies, and armed conflicts.  The recent global funding crisis exacerbated their situation, with a daunting forecast ahead. 

    The United Nations Children’s Fund had projected that in 2025, at least 14 million children would experience interruptions in vital nutrition support and services due to current and anticipated funding cuts, putting them at increased risk of severe malnutrition and death.  The capacity to vaccinate over 15 million vulnerable children against measles in fragile and conflict-affected countries would be drastically reduced.  Immunisation services, disease surveillance, and outbreak responses in nearly 50 countries were already facing disruptions.

    Mr. Ori said, quoting the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “human rights are like air: we need them to live— but we only notice them when we are suffocating.”  Today, countless children worldwide were suffocating as their rights were denied and overlooked.  Considering the troubling outlook for children, there was an urgent need for coordinated global efforts to safeguard their rights and ensure their well-being. Now, more than ever, it was crucial for governments to fulfil their commitments under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

    The global funding crisis was also affecting the Committee’s work directly.  Its pre-sessional working group, scheduled to be held after this session, was cancelled as funding was not available.  Altogether, 15 sessions across 10 treaty bodies were at stake, and it was highly likely that, for those treaty bodies with three sessions, the Office of the High Commissioner would not be able to secure the funding to hold the third session.  The lack of predictability and the piecemeal approach with last-minute confirmation created huge uncertainty, led to wasted time and effort, and higher costs.

    The Office of the High Commissioner had received only 73 per cent of its approved regular budget in 2025, and 87 per cent of its approved regular budget in 2024.  As a result, the United Nations Secretariat was implementing a hiring freeze until August 2025.  This would impact on regular budget posts approved to support the treaty body system, which currently could not be filled.  The Secretariat was in a similar situation last year, and this had led to increased backlogs in reviewing State party reports and backlogs in registering and analysing individual communications.

    The United Nations Office at Geneva’s conference services had also adopted cash conservation measures, which would impact on the conference support provided to the United Nations human rights treaty bodies, particularly in terms of documentation, meeting time, and interpretation, with an overall reduction of 10 per cent.  This meant treaty bodies’ mandated activities would be even more affected in 2025 than in 2024, impacting their ability to have dialogues with States parties and to make decisions on individual communications, resulting in further delays and backlogs.  The Office was also forced to significantly reduce treaty body capacity building activities, which provided support for States to report to, and interact with, treaty bodies.

    All this caused real damage to predictability, which was so important for States, civil society organizations and rights-holders to engage with treaty bodies.  Given the overall reduction in funds and availability of support services, “business as usual” would no longer be possible and the treaty bodies needed to plan on doing less with less.

    On a more positive note, the annual meeting of Chairpersons of human rights treaty bodies would be held in Geneva from 2 to 6 June.  The Chairs would dedicate the meeting to the liquidity crisis, which was affecting the very existence of treaty bodies if they could no longer fulfil their mandates, and to discuss what could be done to increase predictability within the current financial and human constraints, including reviewing the decisions and recommendations from their last meeting and their working methods.

    The 2025 full-day meeting on the rights of the child at the Human Rights Council on 13 March, which focused on early childhood development, featured speeches by children and an informal dialogue on the topic between a group of young people, Member States and the High Commissioner.

    The first session of the Open Ended Inter-Governmental Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the Convention on education would be held from 1 to 5 September in Geneva.  The Office was working closely with the sponsors of the resolution to establish the modalities for the process leading up to the first session of the Inter-Governmental Working Group and its programme of work. A call for submissions was issued in March for the attention of States, civil society, United Nations agencies and children, for whom a toolkit for consultations had been prepared.

    In conclusion, Mr. Ori wished the Committee all the best for a productive session, saying that he looked forward to working with the new Chair and Bureau of the Committee for the next two years.

    SOPIO KILADZE, newly elected Committee Chair, said it was a pleasure and honour to be elected as Chair of the Committee.  She said her election came at a difficult time in which many children around the world were affected by violations of their rights.  It was vital that the Committee continued to work for the protection of the rights of children everywhere.

    Regarding the session’s agenda, Ms. Kiladze said that the Committee would hold dialogues to consider the reports of six States parties: Brazil, Indonesia, Iraq, Norway, Qatar and Romania.  The scheduled review of Pakistan was postponed to a later session at the request of the State party.

    During the session, the Committee would continue its discussions on how its cooperation with various relevant bodies could be further strengthened to enhance the promotion and protection of the rights of the child.  It would also discuss the organisation of its future work and consideration of States parties’ reports, focusing on issues related to its methods of work and follow-up to the treaty body strengthening process.

    In addition, the Committee would consider any communication and information it had received through its communication procedure and would continue to consider how to integrate days of general discussion into the process of developing general comments.  The Committee would also continue its work on its new general comment on children’s right to access to justice and to an effective remedy.

    ALLEGRA FRANCHETTI, Secretary of the Committee, said that no reports had been received under the Convention since the last session, with the total number of reports pending consideration remaining at 62.  The total number of ratifications of the Convention remained at 196, while 64 periodic reports were overdue, of which 10 for more than five years and five for more than 10 years.

    There had been one new accession to an Optional Protocol to the Convention since the last session, with Estonia acceding to the Optional Protocol on a communications procedure.  The total number of ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict remained at 173, while ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography remained at 178, and ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on a communications procedure was now at 53. 

    No new reports had been received under any of the Optional Protocols.  There were 37 initial reports overdue under the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict; and 47 overdue under the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.

    Statements by United Nations Bodies and Civil Society Representatives

    Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said the current global political and financial environment was difficult and complex.

    The Office introduced reports to be presented at the upcoming June session of the Human Rights Council related to children’s rights, including the second report of the High Commissioner on child rights mainstreaming, a report on the use of digital technologies to achieve universal birth registration, and a report on ensuring quality education for children.

    The Office was also preparing a report on the rights of the child and violations of the human rights of children in armed conflicts, which would be presented at the September session of the Human Rights Council, and a report on the safety of the child in the digital environment, which would be presented at the Council in 2026. 

    In addition, the Office had held a capacity-building roundtable with Member States on 5 June on strengthening child participation at the Human Rights Council, and it continued to contribute to the civil society and academia-led process to develop global guidelines on child participation in global events, helping to convene two participatory surveys that had reached over 200 children worldwide.

    The Office encouraged Committee members and other parties to participate in the Fifth World Conference on Justice for Children, to be held in Spain for 2 to 4 June.  The Office would work with the Committee to protect children’s rights in this difficult time.

    United Nations Children’s Fund commended the work of the Committee’s outgoing bureau and expressed its desire to work with the new Bureau and all Committee Experts.  Perhaps more than ever, the Committee was meeting at a time of great constraint for the international human rights system.  It was regrettable that the pre-sessional working group was cancelled. The Fund was discussing with the Committee regarding alternative means of engaging with children and civil society from the countries concerned in preparation for the next session.

    Armed conflicts, climate change, poverty, violence and inequalities, among other trends, continued to deprive millions of children of their rights, and the mere recognition that children had rights continued to be challenged in all parts of the world.  There was a normative pushback against children’s rights at the last Human Rights Council.  Most statements focused exclusively on children’s vulnerability and their right to protection, and did not highlight children’s agency, empowerment and participation.  In negotiations on a resolution on child rights defenders, there was much resistance to attempts to recognise their contributions.

    The Fund had held consultations with more than 7,000 children related to the Committee’s general comment 27 on children’s right to access to justice and to an effective remedy and had worked to develop a child-friendly version of the draft general comment. 

    The Fund had also worked on a child rights training course for its staff and had updated its handbook on the jurisprudence of the Committee.  Later in the year, the Fund would start to develop guidance on general measures of implementation, following the online guidance on children’s rights legislative reform launched last year.

    Child Rights Connect expressed its renewed commitment to supporting the Committee.  It welcomed the holding of the session, despite uncertainty due to the United Nations’ liquidity crisis, and requested the Committee to discuss the organisation of its future work, including how and when it would engage with children and civil society.

    Child Rights Connect raised deep concern about the impact on children of the funding crisis affecting the child rights sector.  Despite these circumstances, it continued to collaborate with stakeholders and carry out its mandate.  It welcomed the development of general comment 27, and had mobilised children and civil society around it, producing a methodology for consulting with children along with supporting child-friendly materials.  It had also recently launched a global survey on the digital protection of child human rights defenders, which collected the opinions and experiences of children who had stood up to protect human rights in the digital space.

    At a time when manifold crises affected children of the world, all persons holding mandates for children needed to strengthen joint efforts and find new ways of working with creativity to better serve children.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CRC25.009E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – European strategy to support single-parent families – E-001793/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001793/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Loucas Fourlas (PPE)

    Single-parent families face higher rates of poverty, social exclusion and difficulties in accessing services. The EU is committed to strengthening social cohesion.

    Does the Commission envisage a European support framework for single-parent families, with strengthened funding tools and targeted social policies?

    Submitted: 2.5.2025

    Last updated: 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Ninth report on economic and social cohesion – P10_TA(2025)0098 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

    –  having regard to Articles 4, 162, 174 to 178, and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(1) (Common Provisions Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments(3),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013(4),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund(5),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013(6),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the healthcare systems of Member States and in other sectors of their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak (Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative)(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/558 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013 and (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide exceptional flexibility for the use of the European Structural and Investments Funds in response to the COVID-19 outbreak(8),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency(9),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU)(10),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/562 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 223/2014 as regards Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)(11),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2039 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) – CARE(12),

    –  having regard to the URBACT programme for sustainable urban cooperation, established in 2002,

    –  having regard to the Urban Agenda for the EU of 30 May 2016,

    –  having regard to the Territorial Agenda 2030 of 1 December 2020,

    –  having regard to the 9th Cohesion Report, published by the Commission on 27 March 2024(13), and the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘The future of EU cohesion: Scenarios and their impacts on regional inequalities’, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service in December 2024,

    –  having regard to the Commission report of February 2024 entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’(14),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 31 May 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report(15),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 21 November 2024 entitled ‘A renewed Cohesion Policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind – CoR responses to the 9th Cohesion Report and the Report of the Group of High-Level Specialists on the Future of Cohesion Policy’,

    –  having regard to the report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe’, published by the Commission on 9 September 2024,

    –  having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘Streamlining EU Cohesion Funds: addressing administrative burdens and redundancy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union in November 2024(16),

    –  having regard to a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 May 2025 on the Border Regions’ Instrument for Development and Growth in the EU (BRIDGEforEU)(17),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

    –  having regard to the opinion in the form of a letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on cohesion policy and regional environment strategies in the fight against climate change(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on reversing demographic trends in EU regions using cohesion policy instruments(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU: the 8th Cohesion Report(22),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 21 November 2023 on possibilities to increase the reliability of audits and controls by national authorities in shared management(23),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions(24),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2024 entitled ‘Cohesion policy 2014-2020 – implementation and outcomes in the Member States(25),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0066/2025),

    A.  whereas cohesion policy is at the heart of EU policies and is the EU’s main tool for investments in sustainable economic, social and territorial development, and contributing to the Green Deal objectives, across the EU under its multiannual financial frameworks for the periods of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027; whereas cohesion policy, as mandated by the Treaties, is fundamental for a well-functioning and thriving internal market by promoting the development of all regions in the EU, and especially the less developed ones;

    B.  whereas cohesion policy has fostered economic, social and territorial convergence in the EU, notably by increasing the gross domestic products, for example, of central and eastern EU Member States, which went from 43 % of the EU average in 1995 to around 80 % in 2023; whereas the 9th Cohesion Report highlights that, by the end of 2022, cohesion policy supported over 4,4 million businesses, creating more than 370 000 jobs in these companies; whereas it also underlines that cohesion policy generates a significant return on investment, and that each euro invested in the 2014–2020 and 2021–2027 programmes will have generated 1,3 euros of additional GDP in the Union by 2030; whereas cohesion policy constituted, on average, around 13 % of total public investment in the EU(26);

    C.  whereas the Commission report entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’, presented alongside the ninth Cohesion Report, underlines that EUR 24,6 billion, or 8 % of the rural development pillar of the common agricultural policy, is directed towards investments in rural areas beyond farming investments, setting the scene for a debate on the future of rural areas;

    D.  whereas between 2021 and 2027, cohesion policy will have invested over EUR 140 billion in the green and digital transitions(27), to help improve networks and infrastructure, support nature conservation, improve green and digital skills and foster job creation and services for the public;

    E.  whereas despite the widely acknowledged and proven positive impact of cohesion policy on social, economic and territorial convergence, significant challenges remain, marked notably by development disparities at sub-national level, within regions and in regions caught in a development trap, and by the impact of climate change, in terms of demography, the digital and green transitions, and connectivity, but also in terms of sustainable economic development, in particular in least developed regions and rural and remote areas;

    F.  whereas cohesion policy and sectoral programmes of the EU have repeatedly and efficiently helped regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters, even though it is a long-term, structural policy and not a crisis management instrument or the ‘go-to’ emergency response funding mechanism; whereas such crises have delayed the implementation of the European Structural and Investment Funds and whereas a considerable number of projects financed with Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds have been taken for the most part from projects that had been slated for investment under cohesion policy;

    G.  whereas despite measures already taken for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods, the regulatory framework governing the use and administration of cohesion policy instruments and funds should be further simplified and interoperable digital tools better used and developed, including the establishment of one-stop digitalised service centres, with the objective of streamlining procedures, enhancing stakeholder trust, reducing the administrative burden, increasing flexibility in fund management and speeding up payments, not only for the relevant authorities but also for the final beneficiaries; whereas it is necessary to increase the scope for using funds more flexibly, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products; whereas it is of utmost importance to formulate any future cohesion policy with a strategic impetus throughout the funding period, which could, however, be reassessed at midterm;

    H.  whereas the low absorption rate of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy funds, currently at just 6 %, is not because of a lack of need from Member States or regions, but rather stems from delays in the approval of operational programmes, the transition period between financial frameworks, the prioritisation of NextGenerationEU by national managing authorities, limited administrative capacity and complex bureaucratic procedures; whereas Member States and regions may not rush to absorb all available funds as they anticipate a possible extension under the N+2 or N+3 rules;

    I.  whereas radical modifications to the cohesion regulatory framework, from one programming period to the next, contribute to generating insecurity among the authorities responsible and beneficiaries, gold-plating legislation, increasing error rates (and the accompanying negative reputational and financial consequences), delays in implementation and, ultimately, disaffection among beneficiaries and the general population;

    J.  whereas there is sometimes competition between cohesion funds, emergency funds and sectoral policies;

    K.  whereas demographic changes vary significantly across EU regions, with the populations of some Member States facing a projected decline in the coming years and others projected to grow; whereas demographic changes also take place between regions, including movement away from outermost regions, but are generally observed as movement from rural to urban areas within Member States, wherein women are leaving rural areas in greater numbers than men, but also to metropolitan areas, where villages around big cities encounter difficulties in investing in basic infrastructure; whereas the provision of essential services such as healthcare, education and transportation must be reinforced in all regions, with a particular focus on rural and remote areas; whereas a stronger focus is needed on areas suffering from depopulation and inadequate services, requiring targeted measures to encourage young people to remain through entrepreneurship projects, high-quality agriculture and sustainable tourism;

    L.  whereas taking account of the ageing population is crucial in order to ensure justice among the generations and thereby to strengthen participation, especially among young people;

    M.  whereas urban areas are burdened by new challenges resulting from the population influx to cities, as well as rising housing and energy prices, requiring the necessary housing development, new environmental protection and energy-saving measures, such as accelerated deep renovation to combat energy poverty and promote energy efficiency; whereas the EU cohesion policy should help to contribute to an affordable and accessible housing market for all people in the EU, especially for low- and middle-income households, urban residents, families with children, women and young people;

    N.  whereas effective implementation of the Urban Agenda for the EU can enhance the capacity of cities to contribute to cohesion objectives, thereby improving the quality of life of citizens and guaranteeing a more efficient use of the EU’s financial resources;

    O.  whereas particular attention needs to be paid to rural areas, as well as areas affected by industrial transition and EU regions that suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, brain drain, climate-related risks and water scarcity, such as the outermost regions, and in particular islands located at their peripheries or at the periphery of the EU, sparsely populated regions, islands, mountainous areas and cross-border regions, as well as coastal and maritime regions;

    P.  whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical reality that has had a strong impact on the employment, economic development and opportunities, and general well-being of the population living in regions bordering Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, which therefore require special attention and support, including by accordingly adapting cohesion policy; whereas this war has led to an unprecedented number of people seeking shelter in the EU, placing an additional burden on local communities and services; whereas the collective security of the EU is strongly dependent on the vitality and well-being of regions situated at the EU’s external borders;

    Q.  whereas the unique situation of Northern Ireland requires a bespoke approach building on the benefits of PEACE programmes examining how wider cohesion policy can benefit the process of reconciliation;

    R.  whereas 79 % of citizens who are aware of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy believe that EU-funded projects have a positive impact on the regions(28), which contributes to a pro-EU attitude;

    S.  whereas overall awareness of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy has decreased by 2 percentage points since 2021(29), meaning that greater decentralisation should be pursued to bring cohesion policy even closer to the citizen;

    1.  Insists that the regional and local focus, place-based approach and strategic planning of cohesion policy, as well as its decentralised programming and implementation model based on the partnership principle with strengthened implementation of the European code of conduct, the involvement of economic and civil society actors, and multi-level governance, are key and positive elements of the policy, and determine its effectiveness; is firmly convinced that this model of cohesion policy should be continued in all regions and deepened where possible as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies, protecting the environment, and as a key contributor to EU competitiveness and just transition, as well as helping to cope with new challenges ahead;

    2.  Calls for a clear demarcation between cohesion policy and other instruments, in order to avoid overlaps and competition between EU instruments, ensure complementarity of the various interventions and increase visibility and readability of EU support; in this context, notes that the RRF funds are committed to economic development and growth, without specifically focusing on economic, social and territorial cohesion between regions; is concerned about the Commission’s plans to apply a performance-based approach to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF); acknowledges that performance-based mechanisms can be instrumental in making the policy more efficient and results-orientated, but cautions against a one-size-fits-all imposition of the model and expresses serious doubt about ideas to link the disbursement of ESIF to the fulfilment of centrally defined reform goals, even more so if the reform goals do not fall within the scope of competence of the regional level;

    3.  Is opposed to any form of top-down centralisation reform of EU funding programmes, including those under shared management, such as the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy, and advocates for greater decentralisation of decision-making to the local and regional levels; calls for enhanced involvement of local and regional authorities and economic and civil society actors at every stage of EU shared management programmes, from preparation and programming to implementation, delivery and evaluation, keeping in mind that the economic and social development of, and territorial cohesion between, regions can only be accomplished on the basis of good cooperation between all actors;

    4.  Emphasises that the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) plays a key role, alongside cohesion policy funds, in supporting rural areas; stresses that the EAFRD’s design must align with the rules of cohesion policy funds to boost synergies and facilitate multi-funded rural development projects;

    5.  Is convinced that cohesion policy can only continue to play its role if it has solid funding; underlines that this implies that future cohesion policy must be provided with robust funding for the post-2027 financial period; stresses that it is necessary to provide funding that is ambitious enough and easily accessible to allow cohesion policy to continue to fulfil its role as the EU’s main investment policy, while retaining the flexibility to meet potential new challenges, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products, and to enable local authorities, stakeholders and beneficiaries to effectively foster local development; is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy;

    6.  Underlines the importance of the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the mid-term review of cohesion policy programmes 2021-2027 in shaping the future of cohesion policy; reiterates the need for a more ambitious post-2027 cohesion policy in the next MFF 2028-2034; calls, therefore, for the upcoming MFF to ensure that cohesion policy continues to receive at least the same level of funding as in the current period in real terms; furthermore calls for cohesion policy to remain a separate heading in the new MFF; stresses that cohesion policy should be protected from statistical effects that may alter the eligibility of regions by changing the average EU GDP; reiterates the need for new EU own resources;

    7.  Proposes, therefore, that next MFF be more responsive to unforeseen needs, including with sufficient margins and flexibilities from the outset; emphasises in this regard, however, that cohesion policy is not a crisis instrument and that it should not deviate from its main objectives, namely from its long-term investment nature; calls for the European Union Solidarity Fund to be strengthened, including in its pre-financing, making it less bureaucratic and more easily accessible, in order to develop an appropriate instrument capable of responding adequately to the economic, social and territorial consequences of future natural disasters or health emergencies; emphasises the need for Parliament to have adequate control over any emergency funds and instruments;

    8.  Recognises the need to also use nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) 3 classification for specific cases, in a manner that recognises that inequalities in development exist within all NUTS 2 regions; is of the opinion that regional GDP per capita must remain the main criterion for determining Member States’ allocations under cohesion policy; welcomes the fact that, following Parliament’s persistent calls, the Commission has begun considering additional criteria(30) such as greenhouse gas emissions, population density, education levels and unemployment rates, in order to provide a better socio-economic overview of the regions;

    9.  Stresses that the rule of law conditionality is an overarching conditionality, recognising and enforcing respect for the rule of law, also as an enabling condition for cohesion policy funding, to ensure that Union resources are used in a transparent, fair and responsible manner with sound financial management; considers it necessary to reinforce respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and to ensure that all actions are consistent with supporting democratic principles, gender equality and human rights, including workers’ rights, the rights of disabled people and children’s rights, in the implementation of cohesion policy; highlights the important role of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in protecting the financial interests of the Union;

    10.  Calls for further efforts to simplify, make more flexible, strengthen synergies and streamline the rules and administrative procedures governing cohesion policy funds at EU, national and regional level, taking full advantage of the technologies available to increase accessibility and efficiency, building on the existing and well-established shared management framework, in order to strengthen confidence among users, thus encouraging the participation of a broader range of economic and civil society actors in projects supported and maximising the funds’ impact; calls for further initiatives enabling better absorption of cohesion funds, including increased co-financing levels, higher pre-financing and faster investment reimbursements; calls for local administration, in particular representing smaller communities, to be technically trained for better administrative management of the funds; stresses, therefore, the importance of strengthening the single audit principle, further expanding simplified cost options and reducing duplicating controls and audits that overlap with national and regional oversight for the same project and beneficiary, with a view to eliminating the possibility of repeating errors in subsequent years of implementation;

    11.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to give regions greater flexibility already at the programming stage, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, emphasising the need to involve the economic and civil society actors; underlines that thematic concentration was a key element in aligning cohesion policy with Europe 2020 objectives; asks the Commission, therefore, to present all findings related to the implementation of thematic concentration and to draw lessons for future legislative proposals;

    12.  Acknowledges that the green, digital and demographic transitions present significant challenges but, at the same time, opportunities to achieve the objective of economic, social and territorial cohesion; recognises that, statistically, high-income areas can hide the economic problems within a region; is aware of the risk of a widening of regional disparities, a deepening of social inequalities and a rising ‘geography of discontent’ related to the transition process; underlines the need to reach the EU’s sustainability and climate objectives, and to maintain shared economic growth by strengthening the Union’s competitiveness; calls, therefore, for a European strategy that guarantees harmonious growth within the Union, meeting the respective regions’ specific needs; reaffirms its commitment to pursuing the green and digital transitions, as this will create opportunities to improve the EU’s competitiveness; underlines the need to invest in infrastructure projects that enhance connectivity, particularly in sustainable, intelligent transport, and in energy and digital networks, ensuring that all regions, including remote and less-developed ones, are fully integrated into the single market and benefit equitably from the opportunities it provides; emphasises, in this context, the need to support the development of green industries, fostering local specificities and traditions to increase the resilience of the economic environment and civil society to future challenges;

    13.  Urges that the cohesion policy remain consistent with a push towards increasing innovation and completing the EU single market, in line with the conclusions of the Draghi report on European competitiveness; underlines, in the context of regional disparities, the problem of the persisting innovation divide and advocates for a tailored, place-based approach to fostering innovation and economic convergence across regions and reducing the innovation gap; calls for a stronger role for local and regional innovation in building competitive research and innovation ecosystems and promoting territorial cohesion; points to new EU initiatives, such as regional innovation valleys and partnerships for regional innovation, that aim to connect territories with different levels of innovation performance and tackle the innovation gap; considers that this approach will reinforce regional autonomy, allowing local and regional authorities to shape EU policies and objectives in line with their specific needs, characteristics and capacities, while safeguarding the partnership principle;

    14.  Is convinced that cohesion policy needs to continue to foster the principle of just transition, addressing the specific needs of regions, while leaving no territory and no one behind; calls for continued financing of the just transition process, with the Just Transition Fund being fully integrated into the Common Provisions Regulation and endowed with reinforced financial means for the post-2027 programming period; emphasises, nonetheless, the need to assess the impact of the Just Transition Fund on the transformation of eligible regions and, while ensuring it remains part of cohesion policy, refine its approach in the new MFF on the basis of the findings and concrete measures to ensure the economic and social well-being of affected communities;

    15.  Underlines the need to improve the relationship between cohesion policy and EU economic governance, while avoiding a punitive approach; stresses that the European Semester should comply with cohesion policy objectives under Articles 174 and 175 TFEU; calls for the participation of the regions in the fulfilment of these objectives and for a stronger territorial approach; calls for a process of reflection on the concept of macroeconomic conditionality and for the possibility to be explored of replacing this concept with new forms of conditionality to better reflect the new challenges ahead;

    16.  Is concerned about the growing number of regions in a development trap, which are stagnating economically and are suffering from sharp demographic decline and limited access to essential services; calls, therefore, for an upward adjustment in co-financing for projects aimed at strengthening essential services; stresses the role of cohesion policy instruments in supporting different regions and local areas that are coping with demographic evolution affecting people’s effective right to stay, including, among others, challenges related to depopulation, ageing, gender imbalances, brain drain, skills shortages and workforce imbalances across regions; recognises the need for targeted economic incentives and structural interventions to counteract these phenomena; in this context, calls for the implementation of targeted programmes to attract, develop and retain talent, particularly in regions experiencing significant outflows of skilled workers, by fostering education, culture, entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystems that align with local and regional economic needs and opportunities;

    17.  Recognises the importance of supporting and financing specific solutions for regions with long-standing and serious economic difficulties or severe permanent natural and demographic handicaps; reiterates the need for maintaining and improving the provision of quality essential services (such as education and healthcare), transport and digital connectivity of these regions, fostering their economic diversification and job creation, and helping them respond to challenges such as rural desertification, population ageing, poverty, depopulation, loneliness and isolation, as well as the lack of opportunities for vulnerable people such as persons with disabilities; underlines the need to prioritise the development and adequate funding of strategic sectors, such as renewable energy, sustainable tourism, digital innovation and infrastructure, in a manner that is tailored to the economic potential and resources of each region, in order to create broader conditions for endogenous growth and balanced development across all regions, especially rural, remote and less-developed areas, border regions, islands and outermost regions; recalls the importance of strong rural-urban linkages and particular support for women in rural areas;

    18.  Emphasises the need for a tailored approach for the outermost regions, as defined under Article 349 TFEU, which face unique and cumulative structural challenges due to their remoteness, small market size, vulnerability to climate change and economic dependencies; underlines that these permanent constraints, including the small size of the domestic economy, great distance from the European continent, location near third countries, double insularity for most of them, and limited diversification of the productive sector, result in additional costs and reduced competitiveness, making their adaptation to the green and digital transition particularly complex and costly; underlines their great potential to further develop, inter alia through improved regional connectivity, key sectors such as blue economy, sustainable agriculture, renewable energies, space activities, research or eco-tourism; reiterates its long-standing call on the Commission to duly consider the impact of all newly proposed legislation on the outermost regions, with a view to avoiding disproportionate regulatory burdens and adverse effects on these regions’ economies;

    19.  Underlines the fact that towns, cities and metropolitan areas have challenges of their own, such as considerable pockets of poverty, housing problems, traffic congestion and poor air quality, generating challenges for social and economic cohesion created by inharmonious territorial development; emphasises the need for a specific agenda for cities and calls for deepening their links with functional urban areas, encompassing smaller cities and towns, to ensure that economic and social benefits are spread more evenly across the entire territory; highlights the need to strengthen coordination between the initiatives of the Urban Agenda for the EU and the instruments of cohesion policy, favouring an integrated approach that takes into account territorial specificities and emerging challenges; calls, furthermore, for more direct access to EU funding for regional and local authorities, as well as cities and urban authorities, by inter alia widening the use of integrated territorial investments (ITI);

    20.  Stresses the need to continue and strengthen investments in affordable housing within the cohesion policy framework, recognising its significance for both regions and cities; highlights the need to foster its changes relevant to investing in housing beyond the two current possibilities (energy efficiency and social housing); emphasises the important role that cohesion policy plays in the roll-out and coordination of these initiatives; believes, furthermore, that it is important to include housing affordability in the URBACT initiative;

    21.  Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; calls on the Commission to support the Member States and regions affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the regions on the EU’s eastern border, by revising the Guidelines on regional State aid(31), through tailor-made tools and investments under the cohesion policy, as well as supporting them to make the most of the possibilities offered by the cohesion policy funds, including Interreg, in a flexible way, to help cope with the detrimental socio-economic impact of the war on their populations and territories; calls, furthermore, for support to be given to regions bordering candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to strengthen connections and promote their EU integration;

    22.  Highlights the added value of territorial cooperation in general and cross-border cooperation in particular; underlines the importance of Interreg for cross-border regions, including outermost regions; emphasises its important role in contributing to their development and overcoming cross-border obstacles, including building trust across borders, developing transport links, identifying and reducing legal and administrative obstacles and increasing the provision and use of cross-border public services, among others; considers Interreg as the main EU instrument for tackling the persistent cross-border obstacles faced by emergency services, and proposes that there be a more prominent focus on these services; underlines the fact that cross-border areas, including areas at the EU’s external borders, bordering aggressor countries often face specific challenges; believes that EU border regions, facing multiple challenges, must be supported and is of the opinion that they must be provided with increased means; welcomes the new regulation on BRIDGEforEU; emphasises the importance of small-scale and cross-border projects and stresses the need for effective implementation on the ground; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to actively support awareness-raising campaigns in bordering regions to maximise the impact of cross-border cooperation;

    23.  Recalls the need to ‘support cohesion’, rather than just rely on the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, which means that no action should hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities; calls for a stronger integration of these principles as cross-cutting in all EU policies, to ensure that they support the objectives of social, economic and territorial cohesion, as set out in Articles 3 and 174 TFEU; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to issue specific guidelines on how to implement and enforce these principles across EU policies, paying particular attention to the impact of EU laws on the competitiveness of less developed regions; reiterates that new legislative proposals need to take due account of local and regional realities; suggests that the Commission draw on innovative tools such as RegHUB (the network of regional hubs) to collect data on the impact of EU policies on the regions; to this end, underlines the need to strengthen the territorial impact assessment of EU legislation, with a simultaneous strengthening of the territorial aspects of other relevant policies; insists that promoting cohesion should also be seen as a way of fostering solidarity and mutual support among Member States and their regions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue their efforts regarding communication and visibility of the benefits of cohesion policy, demonstrating to citizens the EU’s tangible impact and serving as a key tool in addressing Euroscepticism; welcomes the launch of the multilingual version of the Kohesio platform;

    24.  Notes with concern the severe decline in recent years of adequate levels of national funding by Member States towards their poorer regions; recalls the importance of respecting the EU rule on additionality; calls on the Commission to ensure that national authorities take due account of internal cohesion in drafting and implementing structural and investment fund projects;

    25.  Insists that, in addition to adjusting to regional needs, cohesion policy must be adapted to the smallest scale, i.e. funds must be accessible to the smallest projects and project bearers; points out that their initiatives are often the most innovative and have a significant impact on rural development; reiterates that these funds should be accessible to all, regardless of their size or scope; approves of the Cohesion Alliance’s call for ‘a post-2027 Cohesion Policy that leaves no one behind’;

    26.  Stresses that delays in the MFF negotiations, together with the fact that Member States have placed a greater focus on the programming of the RRF funds, led to considerable delays in the programming period 2021-2027; stresses the importance of a timely agreement in the next framework, and therefore calls for the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) and the budget negotiations to be finalised at least one year before the start of the new funding period so that Member States can develop their national and regional funding strategies in good time to ensure a successful transition to the next funding period and the continuation of existing ESIF projects;

    27.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions and the national and regional parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.
    (2) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 60, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1058/oj.
    (3) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 94, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1059/oj.
    (4) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj.
    (5) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1056/oj.
    (6) OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.
    (7) OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 5, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/460/oj.
    (8) OJ L 130, 24.4.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/558/oj.
    (9) OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/461/oj.
    (10) OJ L 437, 28.12.2020, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2221/oj.
    (11) OJ L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/562/oj.
    (12) OJ L 275, 25.10.2022, p. 23, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2039/oj.
    (13) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, 2024.
    (14) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, Forging a sustainable future together: Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe – Report of the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy, February 2024.
    (15) OJ C, C/2024/4668, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4668/oj.
    (16) European Parliament: Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Streamlining EU Cohesion funds – addressing administrative burdens and redundancy, 2024.
    (17) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
    (18) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
    (19) OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 26.
    (20) OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 125.
    (21) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 18.
    (22) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 100.
    (23) OJ C, C/2024/4207, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4207/oj.
    (24) OJ C, C/2024/4225, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4225/oj.
    (25) OJ C, C/2024/6562, 12.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6562/oj.
    (26) European Commission, Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, op.cit.
    (27) European Commission: Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, op. cit.
    (28) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy and Directorate-General for Communication, Citizens’ awareness and perceptions of EU Regional Policy, Flash Eurobarometer 531, 2023.
    (29) Flash Eurobarometer 531, op. cit.
    (30) European Court of Auditors, Rapid case review – Allocation of Cohesion policy funding to Member States for 2021-2027, March 2019.
    (31) Commission communication of 29 April 2021 entitled ‘Guidelines on regional State aid’ (OJ C 153, 29.4.2021, p. 1).

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