Category: China

MIL-OSI Europe: The Atlantic Council hosted French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot on Europe and the new world order.

Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

Frederick Kempe: Good afternoon to those joining us in our headquarters, our relatively new global headquarters here in Washington today. Good evening to those watching online from Europe and the globe, to everyone joining us from throughout the world. My name is Frederick Kempe. I’m President and CEO of the Atlantic Council, and I’m delighted to welcome you to Atlantic Council Front Days. This is our premier platform for global leaders. And it’s an honor to host today the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Jean-Noël Barrot. Today’s discussion turns our attention to one of the most enduring and consequential bilateral relationships in U.S. history.

In the nearly two and a half centuries since France became the first country to formalize diplomatic relations with the newly born United States. Next year, Mr. Minister, is the anniversary of the revolution here. France became the first country to formalize diplomatic relations with the newly born United States. Since that time, this pillar of the transatlantic relationship has seen moments of triumph and moments of trial. From Lafayette and Washington to the beaches of Normandy, the United States, and France have forged partnership unlike any other based on common values in history. However, this relationship goes beyond just sentiment. At each major inflection point in recent history, our countries have stood together, not just because of friendship, but because of shared interests. And now, facing a war on European soil, basing an unfolding trade war, potentially rapidly evolving technological disruptions, and more, the United States and France must consider how to recalibrate and perhaps how to reinvent its partnership and the broader Atlantic alliance with it in order to achieve our common goals of security, prosperity, and freedom.

As we think through how best to address these challenges, we are delighted to welcome Minister Barrot for today’s event and on the occasion of his first visit to the United States in his current role. The Minister has held numerous positions in the French government, including most recently Minister Delegate for Europe and then Minister Delegate for Digital Affairs, making him well-placed to share the French perspective on the political dynamics at the EU level as well as critical issues of digital and tech policy, and it may help in these times also to be a policy. Minister, welcome to the Atlantic Council. Before we begin let me just say to our audience that we will be taking questions. First, the Minister will make some opening comments Then I will join him on the stage and ask a few questions and then turn to the audience for questions. For those in person, we’ll have a microphone to pass around. For those online, please go to askac.org, askac.org to send your question in virtually. Minister Barrot, it’s always a pleasure to have someone speak at the end of meetings in Washington instead of the beginning of the meetings in Washington. So we look very much forward to your attention.

Jean-Noël Barrot : Thank you very much, Mr. President. Hello, everyone. One week from now, on May 8th, we mark an important anniversary, the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. This was the starting point of an extraordinary endeavor, a formidable building, a building of rule-based international order, a building of multilateralism. Who was the architect of this formidable building? Well, the architect of this building were the United States of America. They did not do this out of charity. They did this as out of enlightened self-interest. They collected substantial dividends from multilateralism throughout the eight decades that have just passed by. The dividends of multilateralism. Think about security. Thanks to the nonproliferation treaty, we collectively have avoided a raise to the nuclear bomb that would have caused so much instability and raised the cost of defense for all our countries.

NATO has allowed the US, alongside its European partners, to ensure security in the North Atlantic, but also to offer major investment opportunities for its defense industry. Think about trade. WTO has allowed the US economy to grow, has allowed US services to thrive, digital services, financial services around the world. Think about currency. The Bretton Woods framework has made the dollar a global reserve currency. What does it mean to be a global reserve currency? It means that everyone wants to hold it. So that the yields on your treasury bonds are the lowest on earth. And even more than that, when there is a crisis, even when there is a crisis in the US, people rush to buy your treasury bonds, and the cost of borrowing goes down. This exorbitant privilege, as a French president coined it, is part of the dividends of multilateralism that the US brought to the world and that they also benefited from.

This formidable building, the building of multilateralism, was designed 80 years ago for a unipolar world, where a benevolent hegemon, the United States of America, was the guarantor of rule-based international order. A world in which US leadership was unchallenged, untested. But eight years later, indeed, the world has changed. It has become multipolar, US leadership is challenged, And sometimes multilateralism seems powerless or unfit for power. And therefore, and gradually, a temptation arises for the US to perhaps let go of multilateralism, quit multilateralism, to pull back, to restrain it. This is our choice that belongs to the American people. But this would be a major shift, a major shift for the US, who would not be able to collect the dividends of multilateralism any longer, a major shift for the world, because the multilateralism will survive whether or not the US quits multilateralism. And so someone will fill the void starting with China, which was already getting ready to step up and to become the new hegemon of this new era of multilateralism, in the case where the US would decide to let them play this role.

Now there is another route, there is an alternative route. Rather than quitting multilateralism, reshaping it, adjusting it, making it fit for the 21st century. The first step, and this is a difficult step, is accepting to share the power. in order not to lose it altogether. This means reforming the UN and its Security Council, reforming the financial infrastructure to make space for big emerging countries and share the burden with them, but also hold them responsible because they have part of the burden to share in handling the global issues and challenges. The second step when building multilateral for a multipolar world is to be ready to build coalitions of the willing to overcome obstruction in multilateral forum like the UN Security Council when they arise. It’s not because something won’t happen at the UN, at the IMF, or the World Bank, that you cannot design a coalition of the willing with willing and able countries in order to overcome this obstruction. This is the new era of multilateralism. This is the route that Europe is willing to take and that Europe is hoping to take alongside the United States of America.

One week from now, we’ll celebrate another anniversary, not on May 8th, but on May 9th, the 75th anniversary of the birth of Europe. On May 9th of 1950, my distant predecessor, Robert Schuman, woke up in a country, France, that was five years past World War II, where tensions were rising with the neighbor and rival, Germany. Germany was recovering from the war faster than France was. And so what was the tendency in Paris on that day, in that year? Well, the tendency was protectionism, was raising tariffs, raising barriers to prevent Germans from thriving and fully recovered. And so Robert Schuman, as he was heading to the Council of Ministers, he had this crazy idea in mind to put in common steel and coal across France and Germany, swimming against the tide to favor cooperation over confrontation. At the Council of Ministers, he barely mentioned his initiative for his prime minister not to prevent him from announcing it. And at 6 p.m., in a one-minute and 30-second speech, he made this unilateral offer to create the European steel and coal community and make the foundation of a multilateral, cooperative European Union. So you see, when times are hard, and when the tendency is to restrain, pull back, raise barriers, Those visionary men that brought us prosperity and that brought us peace in the European continent, they swung against the tide and offered innovative models for cooperation. So let us find inspiration in the great work of these visionary people. Thank you very much.

Frederick Kempe : I feel that was a very important statement and I’m gonna start with that. You see by the audience and standing room only that there was a lot of interest in this conversation and what you had to say : 75th anniversary of the birth of Europe, the 80th anniversary of the E.A., all next weekend, we’re calling attention to that. And it seemed really to be a call to your American allies and to the current administration to stay the course on multilateralism and transatlantic engagement, et cetera. So, A, do you intend to do that? And it’s no accident that no one in this audience who’s following the news, everyone knows that there are doubts right now in the transatlantic stream. Not all of them do I share, but I just wonder if you could give us a little bit more of the context of your statement.

Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, we deeply care about the world-based international model of multilateralism. So I spent two days in New York at the Security Council as we were wrapping up our presence. You know, 15 members of the Security Council, they get one month’s presidency every 15 months. And so we try and make the most of your months-long presence. And to give you a sense of what our commitment is, I am, we are very committed to the three fundamental missions of the United Nations, peace and security, human rights, sustainable development. That’s why we had three bottom security meetings, Ukraine, Middle East, but also non-proliferation, in a closed-door Security Council meeting that was on proliferation. that was first convened in 15 years, or last convened in 15 years, 15 years ago. On human rights, we brought together, mentioning coalitions of the wing, international humanitarian law is under attack, let’s say. And we brought together countries from all around the world, east, south, west, and north, in a coalition of the willing to support politically and better implement in practice the rules of international humanitarian law. And then third, on sustainable development, we took this opportunity to bring together the countries that are the most committed, like we are, to the preservation of oceans, 40 days ahead of the third United Nations Conference on Oceans that will take place in Nice, south of France, and that is aimed to be the equivalent for ocean as what the Paris Accord has been for carbon emissions. So we’re very ambitious with this event as many countries as possible to rally some of the key deliverables of these countries. And so I decided I would spend some time at the UN talking about that.

So we think this is the right way to go, adjusting multilateralism to make it more efficient in the multi-border world that we’re living in. And I hear that the new leadership in the US is considering what its course of action is going to be. And I think amongst friends that are actually oldest friends, we owe each other an honest discussion on what we see our common interest to be. And I think that was the sense of my introductory remarks. Thank you so much.

Frederick Kempe : And I think you’ve seen a signal of commitment today, I think, toward the United Nations with the nomination of National Security Advisor Mike Walz to be the UN ambassador, so also an interesting piece of news. Speaking of news, you have had meetings here. We do have media, French, US, other here, and I wonder whether you could tell us your perspective on what do you take away from the conversations, Secretary Rubio, others, anything specific that we can take away from that? And then in that context, as you’re looking at what your greatest challenges are, what were the priorities in your conversations with U.S. leadership?

Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, I mentioned the 9th of May and 75th anniversary of this declaration by Robert Truman. This year will be Ukraine, because I think a very important, significant chunk of our future, and I’m not talking about the future of Europeans only, depends on how this war of aggression is going to end. So we’ll be with my fellow European ministers of foreign affairs there to express our support to Ukraine and our willingness for this war to end in accordance with the UN Charter international rule. So that was clearly an important topic that I discussed with the US leadership at the State Department as well as Capitol Hill. But we also discussed Middle East, where France and the US have been leading the efforts to put an end to the war that was basically destroying Lebanon eight months ago. We managed to broker a ceasefire five months ago to monitor the ceasefire through a joint mechanism. We managed to bring the conditions for the end of the political crisis with the election of President Joseph Aoun. that then appointed the government, that is now at work trying to implement reforms that are long due in Lebanon. And we want to do the same thing, same food for cooperation in Syria, where this, after overturning the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad, there is an opportunity to build a strong sovereign country that will be a source of stability rather than instability for the region. I cannot let aside Gaza and the Israel-Palestinian conflict, where again, we converge on the necessity to bring back stability and peace to the region. We have praised the Arab accord logic, and we’re working in the same direction, bringing peace to the region. Muslim and Arabic countries in the region and Israel towards security architecture that would ensure the security of all peace and stability. We also discussed Africa, where the U.S. made a breakthrough in handling or in sort of moving towards a cessation of hostilities in the Great Lakes regions in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the second worst humanitarian crisis is happening right now. This is good. And after they were received or they were hosted by the Department of State, a few days ago, the DRC and Rwanda gathered in Qatar with France and with the United States. So as you can see, some of the major, major issues, major crises. France and the U.S. are working together in order to find the right solution. Sometimes it isn’t we. Sometimes we don’t start from the same point, but look at Lebanon. It’s because of our complementarity, because of different history in the region, because of the different nature of our partnership, relationship, friendship with the stakeholders of that crisis that we were able.

Frederick Kempe : Thank you for that answer. Let’s start with Ukraine. News yesterday about critical minerals deal with Ukraine almost more interested in the political side of this than the economic side of this. Talking to Ukrainian officials over the last few months, they’ve been concerned that the U.S. gone more from being an actual partner of Ukraine in trying to counter Russian threat and the Russian attack, and more of an arbitrator, more of a moderator. This critical mineral deal, if you read the language of it, suggests a little bit of a change of direction. And I just wonder, and that is an area where France and the U.S. have not always been entirely singing from the same song sheet. What did you hear during your trip there? How do you assess this new agreement and its political meaning?

Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, I think it’s a very good agreement. I think it’s a very good agreement for Ukraine and also for the U.S. But I also think that it tells us something very important about what’s happening right now. Let’s go back to the Oval Office when President Zelensky was there. What was the expectation by President Trump with respect to Ukraine? Well, actually, there were two expectations. Ceasefire and sign of a new deal. Since then, on March 9, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine accepted a comprehensive ceasefire. And yesterday night, they agreed to a mineral deal with the United States of America. They’ve done their part of the job. They’ve walked their part of the talk. But in the meantime, we haven’t seen Vladimir Putin send any signal, any sign of his willingness to comply with the requests of President Trump, to the very contrary. So let’s face it, right now, the main obstacle to peace is Vladimir Putin. So what I found very interesting in my meetings here in Washington is the efforts, the commendable efforts by Senator Lindsey Graham, who put together a massive package of sanctions that he collected bipartisan support for, with almost 70 senators now signing the bill which is aimed at threatening Russia into accepting a ceasefire, or else those sanctions will apply. And here again, we agree that we will try to coordinate because we, Europeans, are in the process of putting together the 17th sanction package that we are going to try, on substance and timing, to coordinate with Senator Graham’s own package. That was, perhaps, a bit of a long answer. But in summary, it’s good news that this deal was struck. It’s good news that the US, and I heard Secretary Besant express what he had in mind, the US was considering deep economic cooperation with Ukraine. It goes in the right direction. It’s the right course that they should, that should be taken.

Frederick Kempe : And Secretary Bessent also said this is meant to be a signal to Putin. You see this as well.

Jean-Noël Barrot : Yeah, put together this deal. The package by Lindsey Graham, who last time I checked is not a political adversary of President Trump, as well as the pressure that Europe is building up on Russia. And you get, the sense of the variant, it’s now basically Putin’s fault if we don’t yet have a ceasefire in the world.

Frederick Kempe : So in recent discussions with US envoy Steve Witkoff, what divergences existed between France and the United States? And how do you hope to close those divergences? I guess part of this has to do with European troops, American backstop, but it also gets to the conditions behind a peace deal.

Jean-Noël Barrot : If Ukraine was to capitulate, this would have long-lasting, wide-ranging consequences for the entire world. because it would basically replace rule-based international order by the law of the strongest. It would create massive incentives for countries around the world that that have border issues with their neighbors to consider that they can invade, that they can use military threats or force to obtain territorial concessions. This would be major, and this would be very costly for all of us, at least for responsible powers like the US and France that tend to get involved when there are issues around the world. When we would see issues exploding all around, it would be a major threat. In addition to that, should Ukraine capitulate after Ukraine has agreed to let go of its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees. This will send the signal that the only ultimate security guarantee is the possession of nuclear weapons. And there we have a nuclear proliferation crisis, which again raises global instability at levels that we haven’t seen for the past 80 years, and will increase the cost massively of security in the US, security in Europe. And I think this view is shared between the U.S. and France. But of course, there is one difference between the perspective of the U.S. and the European perspective of this crisis, which is that our own security is at stake because we are neighbors of Russia or because we don’t want to be neighbors of this Russia that is now spending 40% of its budget on its military spending, 10% of its GDP, that just conscribed 160,000 additional soldiers, the largest conscription in 14 years. I’ve heard many, many times Russia say that they don’t want NATO at their borders. Well, we don’t want this Russia at our borders either. And that’s why we are so serious about what’s happening and about how the war will end. And that’s why we’ve been insisting so much about the security guarantees. And I think our message went through. And I think the US are counting on us to build the security arrangements such that when the peace deal is struck, that we can provide those security arrangements in order for the peace to be lasting and durable. But I think it’s well understood, and I’ve heard President Trump, but also officials from the US, clearly saying that of course they want this peace to be lasting, and of course this means that there is security guarantee.

Frederick Kempe : And can it work without an American backstop where you’re getting closer to a conversation about that? Or, alternatively, is this critical minerals deal a security guarantee in a different form?

Jean-Noël Barrot : So you should put things in two perspectives. We have been supporters of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. Namely, we said that we were open to extend an invitation, a NATO invitation to Ukraine. We understand that NATO members, not all NATO members, agree with our view, so we have to find an alternative path. The sense of this coalition of the able of the willing that France and the UK has been putting together in order to design those security arrangements. This is ongoing work. This starts with making the Ukrainian army strong enough to be able to deter any further aggression by Russia, but it also very likely means some form of military capacity as a second layer of sanction or guarantee. When those detailed discussions will have been wrapped up, they’re currently ongoing, it will appear whether or not and how much any contribution or backstop by the US is needed. It’s possible that it is needed. Why? Well, because as far as Europeans are concerned, we’ve been working. We’ve been working and planning for our defense. It’s a little bit different for France, the UK, and Poland. But for the rest of European armies, we’ve been working within NATO. So if you’re going to work on a security arrangement outside of NATO framework, then at some point, you might need some kind of NATO-like enablers or make items that are going to make sure that the security arrangements are robust. But that being said, in the same way, do we understand that the US have decided that they will likely reduce their commitment to. We also understand that they are counting on us to bear the burden of providing the security arrangements. But we also need to be honest with them once we’ve done our homework. If there are pieces of these security arrangements that cannot be found outside of US contribution, we’ll just be honest.

Frederick Kempe : Thank you so much. The one thing you didn’t mention in your opening comments is you didn’t talk about tariffs. You knew I was going to say that. And I wondered if it came up at all in your discussions. And also, I wonder if you could talk a little bit about what this 90-day pause gives a potential for an agreement. What sort of agreement can you imagine, or what is the direction of agreement with the European Union and the United States? How concerned are you about the tariffs driving a more lasting wedge across the Atlantic?

Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, the good thing when you’re a foreign minister or an FF minister from France is that you’re not in France working tariffs. That being said, you’re allowed to have your own view on things. And indeed, as an economist, I have to say, otherwise I would be a traitor to my profession, that tariffs are not a good idea. President Trump wants to bring jobs back to America, and this is a perfectly legitimate ambition. In fact, we have the same in Europe. We want to bring jobs back to Europe. But tariffs are probably not the best way to achieve this objective. Tariffs are a tax on our economy. It’s a tax on the middle class. And it will make us Europeans, as well as Americans, poor. We do have research on what happened during the last trade war, the 2018 trade war. What happened? Well, the effect on the economy on this side of the Atlantic was limited. It’s basically a $7 billion loss, $7 billion loss on the economy. That’s not big. But it led to a massive transfer from the US consumer, middle class, of $50 billion. So the loss for the US consumer of $50 billion transferred to producers, $9 billion, to the government, $35 billion. And the rest is what’s lost for the US economy. So it’s a mild loss. But it’s a massive transfer from the US consumers to the US government. That’s what happened last time around. And those numbers are small because the trade war at the time was very big. Multiply this by 10. And you’ll get the kind of effects that you’re going to see on European economies, U.S. economies, and so on. So our hope is to reach the same type of outcome that we got the last time around. The U.S. retaliated, we retaliated, and then at some point we suspended those who lifted those tariffs. It was not the same administration that did it, but still, those tariffs were lifted. And I really hope that we get to this objective because, again, we’re very closely intertwined economies, so we have a lot to lose, but we have major rivals, adversaries, competitors that are going to benefit massively from this framework if we sort of choose confrontation over cooperation.

Frederick Kempe : So let me ask one more follow-up there, and then I’ll go to the audience. On the tariffs, didn’t you raise this issue when you were here, when you are the foreign minister, but it is a political as well as an economic issue. And did you get any indications of what direction ?

Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, the good thing about being Marco Rubio is that you’re not in charge of terrorists either. But when we met in NATO, I told him that if there was only one positive aspect of those tariffs, is that by lowering GDPs, it would allow us to reach our NATO targets.

First question from an author and journalist : We see re-entering a phase, a new intensive phase of big power rivalry with the United States retreating from security commitments in Europe, Russian military militarizing its society and having designs on other neighbors besides Ukraine and China seeking economic domination of the world. President Macron has spoken often about the need for Europe to achieve greater strategic autonomy. Do you think Europe should seek to constitute a fourth bloc, even at the risk of putting greater space with its principal ally, the United States? And a quick follow-up, you spoke about the need to share power in a multilateral context. In terms of UN Security Council reform, is France prepared to fold its seat into the European Union presence, or would you also agree to the idea of expanding the Security Council to have 10 to 12 nations? Thank you.

Jean-Noël Barrot : So you mentioned Russia. You mentioned the four months. That was your first question. I wouldn’t go Russia a block. Russia has a GDP that is 20 times smaller than the EU. I wouldn’t call that a block. Russia is a big country geographically. It is one of the winning nations of the Second World War. So, there are a number of consequences coming with that, including the permanent seat of the Security Council. But I wouldn’t call Russia a block. And we don’t see ourselves, when we speak about strategic autonomy, we don’t see ourselves as entering into a logic of blocks or spheres of influence and stuff like that. We remain committed to multilateralism, rule-based international world order, balance. The only thing is that in a more brutal world, if you want to be heard and be respected, when you’re upholding the values that Europe and the EU upholding, freedom, democracy, free speech and so on, you’re going to need to be much stronger, much less dependent on other regions. And so we see our strategic autonomy as a way to defend the model, which is an open model, which is a balanced model, which is a multilateral model of governance for the world. And we see a lot of appetite for this approach, because since those trade wars started, we cannot count the number of countries that are knocking at EU’s door to strike a trade deal or even to become a candidate. And it’s not only Iceland and Norway that seem to be interested. I heard that on this side of the Atlantic, there are people considering. And you know that there is one geographical criteria. But I just want to mention that even though it’s a very, very, very, very tiny island in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, no one lives there. I think it’s like 20 meters long. But this island is split between Canada and Denmark, which gives Canada an actual border with the European Union. And the second question is about… I went quickly because I was told that we should not be long in the introduction of those conversations, but I really think that if we want to adjust those institutions, Security Council and so on, To the new era, we need to accept that others have grown over the past 18 years and they need to be represented, but they also need to take their responsibility. Some of them are no longer developing countries. They are actual major economies, major powers. So they should have a seat at the table, but they should also behave as major powers. So what’s our position? Our position is a permanent seat of the Security Council for India, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and two African countries with all associated priorities. This is what we want for the reform of the Security Council. But we also want the same kind of thing to happen with international financial institutions. And this is the spirit of what President Macron has called the Paris Act, or the Act for the People and the Planet, where the ideal is reform. No country in the south should have to choose between fighting against poverty and fighting against climate change. So it should be more balanced, more equal, equitable funding for southern countries. But those emerging countries from the South that are now developed economies should also bear their responsibilities with respect to the least developed countries, the poorest countries. Because right now, some of them are sort of bunching with the least advanced countries sort of take their responsibility with respect to the poor countries. So that’s the spirit in which we’re pushing. And in fact, I had a meeting dedicated to security council reform on Monday in New York with some of the African countries that were working on it.

Frederick Kempe : Thank you for that good answer. While we’re open, we’ve got a lot of questions now. I saw this gentleman first. and then we’ll go, I’ll figure it out, we’ll figure it out. Anyone here that wants to, there we go, that’s what I’m gonna do next. There we go, please.

Second question : In context with President Macron’s call to Prime Minister Modi of India in solidarity after the terror attack in Palgakush, India, do you see a justifiable response by India against this attack as another roadblock to ensuring the India-Middle East Corridor gets off the ground. Of course, it was set back after the Israel-Hamas war. And did that conversation come up in your discussion with Secretary Rubio today? And if not, then what do we need to do collectively as the international community to make sure this gets off the ground?

Jean-Noël Barrot : Thank you, so President Macron has been in touch with Prime Minister Modi, I have been in touch two times with my fellow foreign minister from India. We expressed solidarity. We hope tensions not to escalate and I heard Secretary Rubio call Pakistan to formally recognize the terrorist nature of this attack and to condemn it in the strongest possible way. And I would happily join this call to Pakistan to recognize the terrorist nature of what happened. And we’ll keep in touch with Marco Rubio, but also with my fellow minister David Lamb from Great Britain, UK, and my Indian colleague, in order to ensure or to try and avoid procrastination in the region.

Third question : Good afternoon, journalist from the French newspaper Le Monde. I have two questions, the first one regarding security guarantees for Ukraine. For months, France supported the idea of the deployment of some international monitoring force in Ukraine, but with a very strong American security guarantees. The Trump administration doesn’t seem to see eye to eye on this. They’re not inclined to offer any sort of serious security guarantees, so what’s the plan B? Have you given up on this two-fold idea or not? And the second question regarding Iran, there are currently very important discussions between the Trump administration directly and indirect with the Iranian representatives. For a very long time, France was in favor of putting on the table as well with Iran the ballistic issue. It doesn’t seem the case at all right now. The Trump administration is basically considering a sort of GCPOA revisited or maybe an interim agreement. So what’s your view exactly on the current discussions? Thank you.

Jean-Noël Barrot : So on the first question, let me just clarify, because I think it’s important that everyone gets this right. There are two things. First, there is a ceasefire, and a ceasefire needs to be monitored. And the coalition of the able and willing put together by France and the UK have been working on proposals so that at the minute the ceasefire is broken, that the US have in their hands, because there will be that sort of origins of the ceasefire, solutions for this ceasefire to be monitored. And this might involve some European capacity just to check what’s happening in the line of contact and to be able to attribute violations. So that’s one thing. But the ceasefire is only one step towards what’s our end goal, which is a full-fledged peace treaty or peace agreement. This peace agreement that the Ukrainians and Russians will be discussing, but that was President Trump’s intuition, this discussion cannot happen while the war is happening in Ukraine. That’s why he did a ceasefire for the discussion. It will end up with discussions on territories and a discussion on security. And with the same question of the coalition of willing, we’re working on this second piece, which is security guarantee. But security guarantee has nothing to do with monitoring the ceasefire. Security guarantee is deterrence against any further aggression. How do you do that? As I was saying earlier, the first layer is to porcupine the Ukrainian army for it to be deterrent enough for anyone to try and invade. But then you probably have other layers, so military capacity deployed in Ukraine or around Ukraine, and that’s what we’re working on, and when the moment is right, we get to the Americans and ask them or tell them what is it we need for this security guarantee. And we’re working on this, and we’re confident, and again, as I was saying, I’ve heard President Trump in several occasions speak in a way that shows that he understands the importance of the security terms. And then on Iran, a very important topic that I should have mentioned in response to your first question, Mr. President, because this is a topic in which we’ve been coordinating with Marco Rubio from day one. We are supporting, encouraging the discussion that the U.S. opened with Iran. Why? Because Iran is posing a major threat to our security interests. Because we France, Marseille are within reach. And because our partners, close partners, in the region are also within reach. So we are very serious about this question. But we believe that there is no other route, no other path, and a diplomatic path to solve this issue. That there is no military solution to this issue and that any form of military attempt to solve this issue will have very large costs that we would not like to bear. So, in order for this discussion to be as successful as possible, we’ve been coordinating with the US on a substance and timing. substance because our teams have been working for the last few months ahead from the expiration of the GCP area, the nuclear agreement that was struck 10 years ago and that is expiring in the fall. So we were getting ready for this expiration a clear idea of indeed what might be a robust and protected field for us, and this would include indeed some of the ballistic components, but also the regional activities components. And the substance is sort of at the disposal of U.S. negotiators because it’s for free and there is no copyright. But we’re also coordinated on timing because we will not hesitate to reapply all the sanctions that we lifted in 10 years ago when GCPOA was struck. In the case where the IAEA confirms that Iran has violated its obligations under GCPOA, and if it happens that by the summer we will have a protected frontier that is sufficiently protected of our security interests.

Frederick Kempe : So this has got to be the last question. I really apologize to others, but I saw that gentleman’s hand approach right through the middle. So, no, no. Yes, thank you. Yes. Thank you.

Last question from a student from Sciences Po : I’d like to know what’s your opinion what’s your take on how france will balance its relationship with the U.S. and at the same time with China in light of the fact that France needs new partners and also in light of the fact that President Trump openly asked European leaders to direct ties with the PRC. Thank you.

Frederick Kempe : And since this is the last question, let me add to it on the terror front because You know, in your conversations here, and you’ve spoken before about the relationship between the European Union and China on the trade front, does this terror policy drive Europe more into the hands of trade and economic relationships with China? And if you believe that, have you said that to your interlocutors here watching during your visit?

Jean-Noël Barrot : I mean, it’s obvious, no? Whether you want it or not, look at one and read economic research. The numbers I quoted earlier are from a paper in the Portal Reform of Economics called the Returns to Protection. It’s the last paper on the 2018 trade war, last economic paper, research paper. But anyway, I will tell you that what happened last time is that during the 2018 trade war, it’s not like suddenly factories moved from one country to another. It was a reshuffling of international trade. So you’re going to see a lot of reshuffling. You mentioned, or you recall what I said, on China and filling the void. Listen to Chinese officials’ speeches now. And again, we take all of this with lots of grains of salt, but my colleague, Wang Li, now in all his speeches, he’s saying how much he cares about multilateralism. And I’m sure… No, seriously. And he will, I mean, I’m pretty sure that they will consider filling the void at the World Health Organization. I’m pretty sure that they will, anytime they will see some pullback, they will try to step in. Because they have two, there are two possible strategies. Either the U.S. are there, filling the void, then they will try to build sort of formats outside of the established formats that we’ve seen them do or they will see U.S. pull back and they will try fill the void. Now, what’s our relationship with China? As far as Europe is concerned. Again, we’re lucid. We’re not blind. And so we think there can be a trade agenda with China. So that’s some of the issues that we’ve are sold, which is not quite the case now. We’ve also had our trade war with China these past few years, with us sanctioning Chinese EVs and then sanctioning European cognac and armagnac. So this is dear to our hearts. And of course, it’s going to be difficult to engage into a natural trade agenda until those sort of contentious issues are solved. Then we can. But of course, our discussion cannot only touch upon trade. And when China is supporting Russia’s war on Russia, when China is on the side of DPRK, on the side of Iran, proliferating countries that are threatening this non-proliferation treaty and sort of the global stability, it’s difficult to build trust. If China was to establish a sort of trusted relationship with European countries, it will have to show also that it takes our security interests into account. Otherwise, it might be challenging.

Frederick Kempe : Thank you. Do you have your answer? Yes, Fred, thank you. So, look, this, Minister Barrot, on behalf of the audience, on behalf of the Atlantic Council, thank you for three things. First of all, for your visit to the United States, a very timely visit, a very crucial moment. Second of all, for taking so much time with us at the Atlantic Council and talking so frankly and clearly in your opening statement and in this fascinating engagement, and then most of all for our enduring alliance. Thank you so much.

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 3, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Creative industries and growth boosted with new UK-India cultural agreement
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Press release

Creative industries and growth boosted with new UK-India cultural agreement

UK’s arts and culture, creative industries, tourism and sport sectors are set to benefit from a major new cooperation agreement with India
UK’s arts and culture, creative industries, tourism and sport sectors are set to benefit from a major new cooperation agreement with India

Culture Secretary leading a delegation of cultural leaders and UK institutions to Mumbai and New Delhi this week

Agreement to boost collaboration between British and Indian creative businesses and cultural institutions, delivering on Plan for Change to drive growth and opportunity

The UK’s arts and culture, creative industries, tourism and sport sectors are set to benefit from a major new cooperation deal and economic links with India, as the government delivers on its Plan for Change to boost growth and opportunity.

Culture Secretary Lisa Nandy, who is of Indian heritage, arrived on Thursday for a three-day visit to Mumbai and New Delhi. She has today (Friday) signed a new bilateral Cultural Cooperation Agreement with India’s Minister for Culture and Tourism, Shri Gajendra Singh Shekhawat. She has been joined on the trip by a delegation of senior leaders from VisitBritain, the British Film Institute and the Science Museum, to drive further collaboration between British and Indian creative businesses and cultural institutions.

The agreement will open the door for increased UK creative exports to India and enable more partnerships between UK and Indian museums and cultural institutions, helping to grow UK soft power.

On Thursday the Culture Secretary delivered a keynote speech at the World Audio Visual and Entertainment Summit (WAVES) in Mumbai, which was also attended by the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi. Her speech celebrated the living bridge that connects the UK and India, and showcased the strength and attractiveness of the UK’s creative industries, one of the growth-driving sectors identified in the UK government’s Industrial Strategy.

The Culture Secretary then toured Yash Raj Films Studio, where some of the most popular Bollywood films with audiences in the UK are made. Both the UK and India boast rich cinematic traditions and share a deep mutual interest in each other’s storytelling cultures, and the Culture Secretary wants to see more collaboration between UK and Indian film productions.

UK Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport Lisa Nandy said:

In the arts and creative industries, Britain and India lead the world and I look forward to this agreement opening up fresh opportunities for collaboration, innovation and economic growth for our artists, cultural institutions and creative businesses.

Growing up as a mixed race child with proud Indian heritage, I saw first hand how the UK’s culture – from food, fashion and film to music, sport and literature – is enriched by the unique contribution of the Indian diaspora. It has given me a deep connection to India’s culture and people and it is an honour to be visiting this magnificent country to forge a closer cultural partnership.

During the visit:

This evening the Culture Secretary will attend a marquee event at the British Council in Delhi, where she will preview performances from India’s Serendipity Arts Festival which is due to hold a mini festival in Birmingham in May and a large-scale event in London next year.

At the same reception, Visit Britain CEO Patricia Yates will launch the Starring GREAT Britain campaign in India, which will draw upon film and TV locations as a driver for inward tourism to the UK.

In the Okhla neighbourhood of Delhi, she will tour boutique fashion houses and workshops and meet a range of Indian fashion designers with UK links.

Earlier today the Culture Secretary met female cricketers at the Sharad Pawar Sports Club, ahead of India hosting the Women’s Cricket World Cup in October 2025. On Saturday she will meet football coaches involved in the Premier League Primary Stars programme in India, a partnership between the Premier League and the British Council to improve physical and sports education in primary schools. Earlier this week the Premier League announced it was opening a new office in Mumbai.

As well as her meetings with the Minister for Culture and senior Indian government ministers, the Culture Secretary is also expected to meet with significant Indian investors and business leaders.

Actor and writer Sanjeev Bhaskar said:

The creative industries are a powerful, enjoyable way to bring people together so I hope this visit further solidifies a mutual appreciation not just of the long established arts of both countries but also the evolving areas of film, music and theatre that are successfully combining artistic traditions from India and the UK to explore and cement what is a unique relationship.

Film director Gurinder Chadha said:

As a filmmaker who has spent my career celebrating being British Punjabi and honouring the connections between Britain and India, it is great to see our cultural bonds further strengthened through this new agreement from my friend and colleague Lisa Nandy.

Now we have a real opportunity to unlock exciting new creative opportunities for artists and storytellers to the benefit of both our countries.

ENDS

UK-India Programme of Cultural Cooperation Agreement

The Culture Secretary and Minister for Culture are expected to formally sign the UK-India Programme of Cultural Cooperation. The two nations will commit to enhancing cultural exchange between the UK and India through the arts and heritage, and to encourage long-term partnerships between UK and Indian businesses and cultural institutions.

Implementation will involve the British Council in India and the Indian Ministry of Culture, with participation from major UK cultural institutions including Arts Council England, the British Library, the British Museum, Natural History Museum, Science Museum Group and the V&A Museum. This has the potential for British museums to launch new partnerships on exhibitions or public programmes that engage the Indian diaspora in the UK.

The UK will work with India to support best practice and expertise on heritage conservation, museum management and digitisation of collections – including making knowledge contained in South Asian manuscripts more widely accessible, and the protection of cultural property, with both nations committing to combat illicit trafficking of cultural artifacts.

Further quotes:

Sir Ian Blatchford, Director and Chief Executive of the Science Museum Group, said:

This commitment from the British and Indian Governments to deeper cultural cooperation will further strengthen our relationships with Indian cultural and scientific organisations, helping the Science Museum Group to share ever more fascinating stories of scientific discovery with audiences in both the UK and India.

Visitors to Science City in Kolkata can explore our Injecting Hope exhibition – which delves into the rapid development of COVID-19 vaccines and was created in partnership with India’s National Council of Science Museums – now on display as part of an international tour that has inspired nearly five million visitors in museums across India, China and the UK.”

Tristram Hunt, Director of the V&A, said:

The V&A is delighted to contribute to the new UK-India cultural partnership. It will increase our ability to loan more objects from our world-class collection, and build strategic relationships with the booming Indian arts scene across design, fashion, photography, and performance.

Dr Nicholas Cullinan, Director of the British Museum, said:

The British Museum’s collaboration with partner museums across India are some of our deepest and most successful. For example, in Mumbai, we have a groundbreaking partnership with the CSMVS Museum – one of India’s biggest – which is based around the reciprocal exchange of objects, knowledge, and ideas.

I’m delighted that the UK-India Cultural Cooperation Agreement recognises, at the highest level, the importance of cultural collaboration between our two countries and we look forward to strengthening these partnerships further.”

Director of the Natural History Museum Doug Gurr said:

India is clearly a nation of talented, passionate and prolific wildlife photographers! Indian photographers have consistently been well-represented in our prestigious photography competition Wildlife Photography of the Year – and this year we had a record-breaking number of over 300 entrees from India, an increase of 79 per cent!

It has been our honour to share the awe-inspiring images of our Indian alumni to millions of people worldwide and we have had the pleasure of collaborating with Dhritiman Mukherjee, Ripan Biswas and Nayan Khanolkar to deliver conservation photography workshops for young people in Kolkata. We are thrilled that our connection continues at the Visual Poetries Photography Festival in Gujarat this summer, with our Competition Manager joining their jury and our Wildlife Photography of the Year Highlights on display throughout.

Rebecca Lawrence, Chief Executive of the British Library, said:

The British Library has a long history of successful collaboration with our peers in India, including on the landmark ‘Two Centuries of Indian Print’ project and through our Endangered Archives Programme.

We warmly welcome this agreement which will provide opportunities to further deepen our partnerships, exchange valuable professional skills and insights, and strengthen our shared networks of knowledge and culture.

More information:

VisitBritain forecasts a record 766,000 visits from India to the UK in 2025, up 7 percent on 2024, with travellers spending £1 billion – a 12 per cent year-on-year growth.

The BPI has reported that British music exports to India experienced a significant 26.3 percent increase in revenue. This moves India into the top 20 biggest overseas territories for UK recorded music, and there have recently been tours by major British acts including Coldplay in January and Ed Sheeran in February.

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Published 2 May 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
May 3, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Vibrant snapshots of China during Labor Day holiday

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Vibrant snapshots of China during Labor Day holiday

Updated: May 2, 2025 20:26 Xinhua

Tourists take a boat to enjoy the night view at Gaozhuang Xishuangjing scenic spot in Jinghong City, southwest China’s Yunnan Province, May 1, 2025. People across China enjoy the ongoing May Day holiday in various ways. [Photo/Xinhua]

A drone light show is staged in Nan’an District of Chongqing, southwest China, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Tourists visit Fuzimiao, or the Confucius Temple, in Nanjing, east China’s Jiangsu Province, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Tourists interact with performers at a Chinese rose garden in Nanyang City, central China’s Henan Province, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Tourists watch a fireworks show in Jurong City, east China’s Jiangsu Province, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

A drone photo shows tourists enjoying street snacks in Jiyuan City, central China’s Henan Province, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

An aerial drone photo shows a bustling night market in Changsha, central China’s Hunan Province, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Tourists take cruise ships to enjoy the night view in Chongqing, southwest China, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Tourists watch a performance in Jiande City, east China’s Zhejiang Province, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

MIL OSI China News –

May 3, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Xi’s diplomacy injects certainty, stability into turbulent world

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

BEIJING, May 2 — Chinese President Xi Jinping has engaged in extensive diplomatic efforts both at home and abroad this spring, cementing a closer bond with neighboring countries, advocating unity and cooperation, and injecting certainty and stability into a turbulent world.

CLOSER BOND WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

In a world grappling with growing uncertainty and instability fueled by protectionism and unilateralism, China has reaffirmed the continuity and stability of its neighborhood diplomacy and its vision for lasting peace and shared development in Asia.

The first major international event that China hosted in 2025 is the 9th Asian Winter Games from Feb. 7 to 14 in the city of Harbin, capital of northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province. It brought together leaders from many of China’s neighboring countries, including Brunei, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Thailand and the Republic of Korea.

At a banquet hosted by Xi and his wife, Peng Liyuan, ahead of the opening ceremony of the games, the Chinese leader called on Asia to uphold the common dream of peace and harmony, jointly respond to all sorts of security challenges, and contribute to building an equal and orderly multipolar world.

Xi’s Southeast Asia visit, his first overseas trip this year, highlighted China’s dedication to deepening traditional ties, expanding practical cooperation, and advancing its vision of building a community with a shared future with its neighbors.

From April 14 to 18, Xi paid state visits to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia. China signed a record 108 cooperation documents with the three countries in total, which span a wide range of fields, from infrastructure to digital and green economy. A focal point of the tour was high-quality Belt and Road cooperation with the aim of enhancing regional connectivity and creating development opportunities.

The trip came after a central conference on work related to neighboring countries held in Beijing from April 8 to 9. At the conference, Xi called for building a community with a shared future with neighboring countries and striving to open new ground for the country’s neighborhood work.

The conference noted China’s relations with its neighboring countries are currently at their best in modern times, and are also entering a critical phase where regional dynamics and global transformations are deeply intertwined.

A flurry of diplomatic activities show how China, a major country, gets along with its neighbors, international observers said.

In his talks with Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake on Jan. 15, Xi said China will continue to support Sri Lanka in maintaining its national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Extending condolences to Myanmar leader over the massive earthquake in late March, Xi said China is ready to provide assistance, and support efforts to overcome the disaster and rebuild homes at an early date.

INJECTING CERTAINTY INTO WORLD

Amid the international trade chaos caused by the so-called “reciprocal tariffs” of the United States, China has taken swift and firm countermeasures not only to safeguard its own legitimate rights and interests, but also to protect the common interests of the international community and defend international fairness and justice.

On April 11, Xi had a three-hour-long meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, who made his third trip to China in three years. Xi called on China and the EU to fulfill their international responsibilities, work together to safeguard economic globalization and the international trade environment, and jointly reject unilateral and bullying actions.

Noting that China is an important partner of the EU, Sanchez said Spain always supports the stable development of EU-China relations. Facing the complex and challenging international situation, Spain and the EU are willing to strengthen communication and coordination with China to maintain the international trade order, he said.

Malaysia is ASEAN chair and the Country Coordinator for ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations for 2025. On April 16, during a meeting with the visiting Chinese president, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said facing the rise of unilateralism, Malaysia is willing to strengthen cooperation with China to jointly address risks and challenges, noting that ASEAN will not endorse any unilaterally imposed tariffs, and will promote collective advancement through cooperation to maintain economic growth.

On April 24, Xi held talks with Kenyan President William Ruto in Beijing, saying the fundamental purpose of China-Africa cooperation for win-win results and common development will not change, which is a welcome policy statement from a major country in a world full of uncertainty.

Trade wars undermine the existing international rules and order, and Kenya appreciates China’s role as a stabilizer in the current volatile situation, Ruto said.

After the talks, the two heads of state witnessed the signing of 20 cooperation documents in areas such as the Belt and Road Initiative, new and high technology, people-to-people and cultural exchanges, economy and trade, and media.

As certainty and stability increasingly become scarce globally, not only political leaders but also business community turn to China for certainty and stability.

On March 28, Xi met with more than 40 global chairmen and chief executive officers of foreign businesses as well as representatives of business councils, including leaders from FedEx Corporation, Mercedes-Benz Group AG, Sanofi SA, HSBC Holdings Plc, Hitachi Ltd., SK Hynix Inc and Saudi Aramco.

A key message Xi sent is that China has been and will remain an ideal, secure, and promising destination for foreign investors, and that investing in China is investing in the future. He pointed out that China offers a vast stage for business development, vast market prospects, stable policy outlook, and a secure environment, making it a favored choice for foreign investment and business operations.

Having the world’s second-largest consumer market and largest middle-income group, China offers great potential for investment and consumption. China is now a major trading partner with more than 150 countries and regions. China continues to build up industrial strength and foster institutional opening-up, drawing influential foreign investors such as tech giants and automakers into the world’s second-largest economy.

Aramco is currently investing in projects in China that have a collective and total value of over 240 billion yuan, covering petrochemical projects and equity acquisition deals. Amin H. Nasser, president and CEO of the company, said: “China is becoming an oasis of certainty in an increasingly unpredictable global environment.”

CALLING FOR SOLIDARITY

This year marks the 80th anniversary of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and the founding of the United Nations. In response to the provocative actions of certain nations inciting great power strategic competition, China emphasizes the roles of major countries, the Global South and the UN in global peace and development.

Xi talked with Russian President Vladimir Putin via video meeting on Jan. 21 and held a phone conversation with him on Feb. 24, conducting in-depth strategic communication on major international and regional issues and steering China-Russia relations at a critical moment.

Despite changes in the international situation, China-Russia relations will proceed with ease, which will help each other’s development and revitalization, and inject stability and positive energy into international relations, Xi said.

To develop relations with China is a strategic choice made by Russia with a long-term perspective, rather than an expedient measure, Putin told Xi, adding that the strategy is not subject to any temporary trend or external interference.

In his phone conversation with European Council President Antonio Costa on Jan. 14, Xi said there exists no clash of fundamental interests or geopolitical conflicts between China and the EU, making them partners that can contribute to each other’s success.

Both the EU and China respect the principles of the UN Charter, uphold multilateralism, safeguard free trade, and oppose bloc confrontation, and they should cooperate rather than compete, Costa said, adding that in this era full of challenges, the world needs closer EU-China cooperation to tackle global challenges such as climate change, and to contribute to world peace, stability and development.

Global South is also a priority in Xi’s diplomatic agenda.

On April 29, Xi visited the New Development Bank in Shanghai and met with Dilma Rousseff, president of the institution, calling the bank “a pioneering initiative for the unity and self-improvement of the Global South” and noting that the Global South countries have risen collectively into an important force in maintaining world peace, promoting common development and improving global governance.

His other interactions on the Global South include sending congratulations respectively to the 38th African Union Summit and the 9th summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), having in-depth exchanges on regional cooperation with leader of Malaysia, and hosting leaders of Grenada, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan and Kenya.

As the rotating chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China will host an SCO summit this autumn in the northern city of Tianjin. China will also host the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing.

Xi delivered a speech via video link at the Leaders Meeting on Climate and the Just Transition on April 23. Calling for adherence to multilateralism, Xi said that all countries should firmly safeguard the UN-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law, and firmly safeguard international fairness and justice.

“However the world may change, China will not slow down its climate actions, will not reduce its support for international cooperation, and will not cease its efforts to build a community with a shared future for mankind,” Xi said.

“In these trying times, the world yearns for steadiness, reliability and purpose. We see this in China’s conduct,” said Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. “Amid this turbulence, China has been a rational, strong and reliable partner. Malaysia values this consistency,” he said.

MIL OSI China News –

May 3, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Meta-Analysis Links Intimate Partner Violence Among Sexual Minority Men to Mental Health Outcomes

Source: US State of Connecticut

Sexual minority men on the receiving end of intimate partner violence also have worse mental health outcomes including depression, suicide ideation, and suicide attempts, according to a new meta-analysis by UConn professor Chenglin Hong.

“Looking at the larger context, intimate partner violence as a public health issue is still under-studied among men, particularly sexual minority men,” Hong says. “It’s usually considered under the heterosexual umbrella: men as perpetrators, women as victims or survivors. But the issue affects sexual minority men just as much, or more, as heterosexual women.”

Hong’s meta-analysis “The Associations Between Intimate Partner Violence and Mental Health Outcomes Among Sexual Minority Men: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis” looked at 22 studies on the topic conducted between 2003 and 2022, both in the U.S. and around the world, including China and the United Kingdom.

Published in January by the academic journal Trauma, Violence, and Abuse, it marks the first of its kind in more than a decade, with the prior meta-analysis on the topic conducted in 2014.

Among his findings, Hong determined that sexual minority men experiencing intimate partner violence are almost 3x more likely to have suicide ideation or attempts, compared to sexual minority men who didn’t experience such violence.

“Men in general experience higher rates of suicide-related outcomes, but they often don’t seek mental health services due to stigmas around masculinity,” Hong explains. “But those who experience intimate partner violence may be even more limited. For example, they might be scared to see a provider because their partners may find out.”

The meta-study, which Hong says was not funded but purely volunteer work, included a team of researchers across the country from institutions including Washington University in St. Louis, UC Davis, Michigan, UCLA, and Penn State.

At the end of the study, Hong makes several recommendations, including incorporating intimate partner violence screening as a standard part of healthcare and mental health assessments for men.

“I’m a social worker,” Hong says. “A lot of the time, when we work with clients and refer them to different agencies, there are logistics: transportation, insurance issues. So the idea here is how to optimize integrated care by providing health care, mental health care, and intimate partner violence services in the same setting.”

If Hong’s proposed changes become more widespread, hopefully such issues of intimate male-male partner violence can dramatically decreased.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 3, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: ICE Targets Major Human and Drug Smuggling Property In Oklahoma City

Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

Headline: ICYMI: ICE Targets Major Human and Drug Smuggling Property In Oklahoma City

strong>WASHINGTON – Today, the Department of Homeland Security set the record straight regarding an April 24, 2025, execution of court-authorized search warrant at a home owned by a human smuggling suspect in Oklahoma City

This lawful operation conducted by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), led by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), targeted a property that is involved in a transitional human and drug smuggling organization which trafficked illegal aliens from Guatemala, Mexico, Colombia, Central South America and China around the interior of the United States

Statement Attributable to Senior DHS Official:
“The April 24 Oklahoma ICE operation was a lawful, court-authorized action explicitly targeting a property, that was a hub for human smuggling, not specific individuals, as falsely suggested by media reports

“The day prior to the search warrant issuance and the day of the search warrant, HSI agents conducted surveillance, and confirmed via utility records that a member of the Lima Lopez Transnational Criminal Organization was still paying utilities at the residence

The warrant, issued by a Federal Judge was based on an 84-page affidavit detailing probable cause that the address served as a “stash house” for human smuggling, authorizing the seizure of evidence such as electronic devices and documents, regardless of who was present

“The warrant targeted the property itself, not specific individuals, and its execution was not contingent on the presence of any person

HSI, with Oklahoma state police support, executed the warrant with precision, seizing electronic devices as authorized

This court-authorized search was a critical strike against a dangerous human smuggling network in furtherance of our mission to protect American communities from the chaos unleashed by the Biden administration’s open-border policies

“This is an ongoing investigation, and we have not ruled out current occupants involvement in the smuggling ring

”
ICYMI: Get the Facts: Oklahoma home raided by ICE is owned by human smuggling suspect The indictment obtained by KOCO 5 shows eight Guatemalan nationals were the targets of the investigation

KEY FACTS ABOUT THE OPERATION:
FACT: As reported by KOCO 5, the indictment against, “shows eight Guatemalan nationals were the targets of the investigation as part of the ‘Lima Lopez Transnational Criminal Organization

’ Their charges range from drugs, fraud, money laundering to re-entry after deportation

”
FACT: The day prior to the search warrant issuance and the day of the search warrant, HSI agents conducted surveillance, and confirmed via utility records that known and confirmed gang members of the Lima Lopez Transnational Criminal Organization, were still paying utilities at the residence

KOCO 5 reported that the owner of the home, Cidia Marleny Lima Lopez, “is allegedly a major player in the human smuggling case that agents have been working for years

”
“Records show that she owns the home that was raided as well as another one in Oklahoma City,” KOCO added

“Eight arrests were made in that investigation, which was years in the making and not part of any new immigration enforcement

”
FACT: The warrant, issued by a Federal Judge was based on an 84-page affidavit detailing probable cause that the address served as a “stash house” for human and drug smuggling, authorizing the seizure of evidence such as electronic devices and documents, regardless of who was present

FACT: The warrant targeted the property itself, not specific individuals, and its execution was not contingent on the presence of any person

HSI, with Oklahoma state police support, executed the warrant with precision, seizing electronic devices as authorized

KOCO 5 reported that this investigation began “prior to any recent changes to ICE policies

”
CONCLUSION: This court-authorized search was a critical strike against a dangerous human and drug smuggling network in furtherance of our mission to protect American communities from the chaos unleashed by the Biden administration’s open-border policies

MIL OSI USA News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI: Radware Launches New Cloud Security Service Centers in India and Kenya

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

MAHWAH, N.J., May 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Radware® (NASDAQ: RDWR), a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments, announced the launch of new cloud security service centers in Chennai and Mumbai, India, and Nairobi, Kenya. Today, Radware supports a network of more than 50 cloud security service centers worldwide with a mitigation capacity up to 15Tbps.

Radware’s global network of data centers mitigates attacks closest to their point of origin. This helps organizations improve application response times for in-region traffic and reduce mitigation response times against a variety of attacks, including denial-of-service attacks, web application attacks, malicious bot traffic, and attacks on APIs. It also helps them keep data within their borders to meet strict data privacy regulations.

According to Radware’s 2025 Global Threat Analysis Report, Web DDoS attacks, which appear as high intensity, Layer 7 application attacks, surged globally 550%, while web application and API attacks rose 41% between 2023 and 2024.

“Our ongoing investments in our security network continue to play an important role in our cloud security growth strategy,” said Haim Zelikovsky, vice president of cloud security services for Radware. “Cloud innovation is central to our mission in providing customers industry-leading cyber protection, reliability, and availability at a time when cyber threats are not only increasing in frequency and magnitude but also sophistication.”

Radware has received numerous awards for its DDoS mitigation, application and API protection, web application firewall, and bot detection and management solutions. Industry analysts such as Aite-Novarica Group, Forrester, Gartner, GigaOm, IDC, KuppingerCole and QKS Group continue to recognize Radware as a market leader in cyber security.

About Radware
Radware® (NASDAQ: RDWR) is a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments. The company’s cloud application, infrastructure, and API security solutions use AI-driven algorithms for precise, hands-free, real-time protection from the most sophisticated web, application, and DDoS attacks, API abuse, and bad bots. Enterprises and carriers worldwide rely on Radware’s solutions to address evolving cybersecurity challenges and protect their brands and business operations while reducing costs. For more information, please visit the Radware website.

Radware encourages you to join our community and follow us on: Facebook, LinkedIn, Radware Blog, X, and YouTube.

©2025 Radware Ltd. All rights reserved. Any Radware products and solutions mentioned in this press release are protected by trademarks, patents, and pending patent applications of Radware in the U.S. and other countries. For more details, please see: https://www.radware.com/LegalNotice/. All other trademarks and names are property of their respective owners.

Radware believes the information in this document is accurate in all material respects as of its publication date. However, the information is provided without any express, statutory, or implied warranties and is subject to change without notice.

The contents of any website or hyperlinks mentioned in this press release are for informational purposes and the contents thereof are not part of this press release.

Safe Harbor Statement
This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Any statements made herein that are not statements of historical fact, including statements about Radware’s plans, outlook, beliefs, or opinions, are forward-looking statements. Generally, forward-looking statements may be identified by words such as “believes,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “intends,” “estimates,” “plans,” and similar expressions or future or conditional verbs such as “will,” “should,” “would,” “may,” and “could.” For example, when we say in this press release that cyber threats are not only increasing in frequency and magnitude but also sophistication, we are using forward-looking statements. Because such statements deal with future events, they are subject to various risks and uncertainties, and actual results, expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements, could differ materially from Radware’s current forecasts and estimates. Factors that could cause or contribute to such differences include, but are not limited to: the impact of global economic conditions, including as a result of the state of war declared in Israel in October 2023 and instability in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, tensions between China and Taiwan, financial and credit market fluctuations (including elevated interest rates), impacts from tariffs or other trade restrictions, inflation, and the potential for regional or global recessions; our dependence on independent distributors to sell our products; our ability to manage our anticipated growth effectively; our business may be affected by sanctions, export controls, and similar measures, targeting Russia and other countries and territories, as well as other responses to Russia’s military conflict in Ukraine, including indefinite suspension of operations in Russia and dealings with Russian entities by many multi-national businesses across a variety of industries; the ability of vendors to provide our hardware platforms and components for the manufacture of our products; our ability to attract, train, and retain highly qualified personnel; intense competition in the market for cybersecurity and application delivery solutions and in our industry in general, and changes in the competitive landscape; our ability to develop new solutions and enhance existing solutions; the impact to our reputation and business in the event of real or perceived shortcomings, defects, or vulnerabilities in our solutions, if our end-users experience security breaches, or if our information technology systems and data, or those of our service providers and other contractors, are compromised by cyber-attackers or other malicious actors or by a critical system failure; our use of AI technologies that present regulatory, litigation, and reputational risks; risks related to the fact that our products must interoperate with operating systems, software applications and hardware that are developed by others; outages, interruptions, or delays in hosting services; the risks associated with our global operations, such as difficulties and costs of staffing and managing foreign operations, compliance costs arising from host country laws or regulations, partial or total expropriation, export duties and quotas, local tax exposure, economic or political instability, including as a result of insurrection, war, natural disasters, and major environmental, climate, or public health concerns; our net losses in the past and the possibility that we may incur losses in the future; a slowdown in the growth of the cybersecurity and application delivery solutions market or in the development of the market for our cloud-based solutions; long sales cycles for our solutions; risks and uncertainties relating to acquisitions or other investments; risks associated with doing business in countries with a history of corruption or with foreign governments; changes in foreign currency exchange rates; risks associated with undetected defects or errors in our products; our ability to protect our proprietary technology; intellectual property infringement claims made by third parties; laws, regulations, and industry standards affecting our business; compliance with open source and third-party licenses; complications with the design or implementation of our new enterprise resource planning (“ERP”) system; our reliance on information technology systems; our ESG disclosures and initiatives; and other factors and risks over which we may have little or no control. This list is intended to identify only certain of the principal factors that could cause actual results to differ. For a more detailed description of the risks and uncertainties affecting Radware, refer to Radware’s Annual Report on Form 20-F, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the other risk factors discussed from time to time by Radware in reports filed with, or furnished to, the SEC. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date on which they are made and, except as required by applicable law, Radware undertakes no commitment to revise or update any forward-looking statement in order to reflect events or circumstances after the date any such statement is made. Radware’s public filings are available from the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov or may be obtained on Radware’s website at www.radware.com.

Media Contact:
Gerri Dyrek
Radware
Gerri.Dyrek@radware.com

The MIL Network –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Coal Production and Dispatch from Captive and Commercial Mines in April 2025 Shows Robust Growth Compared to Last Year
Source: Government of India

Posted On: 02 MAY 2025 2:58PM by PIB Delhi

Coal production from captive and commercial mines in the country stood at 14.01 million tonnes (MT) in April 2025, while coal dispatch was recorded at 16.81 million tonnes (MT), reflecting a robust start to FY 2025–26.

This marks a notable year-on-year growth compared to April figures from FY 2023- 24 and FY 2022-23, underlining the sector’s upward trajectory. The attached graph clearly illustrates the consistent performance improvement across three consecutive years, with both production and dispatch showing strong gains.

The Ministry attributes this success to continuous policy interventions, close monitoring, and handholding of stakeholders to fast-track operational clearances and enhance production capacity. One of the key contributors to this achievement is the commencement of operations in newly developed coal blocks:
- Kotre Basantpur Pachmo block of M/s Central Coalfields Limited (CCL), with a Peak Rated Capacity (PRC) of 5 MT per annum (opencast), started operations on 15 April 2025.
- Naini coal block of M/s Singareni Collieries Company Limited (SCCL), with a PRC of 10 MT per annum (opencast), commenced operations on 16 April 2025.
Going forward, the Ministry of Coal reaffirms its commitment to unlocking the full potential of captive and commercial coal mining in India. The focus remains on ensuring seamless production, minimizing supply disruptions, and contributing significantly to the country’s growing energy demand.

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Shuhaib T

(Release ID: 2126112) Visitor Counter : 56

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –
May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Fraudulent websites and internet banking login screens related to Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Fraudulent websites and internet banking login screens related to Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited
The HKMA wishes to remind the public that banks will not send SMS or emails with embedded hyperlinks which direct them to the banks’ websites to carry out transactions. They will not ask customers for sensitive personal information, such as login passwords or one-time password, by phone, email or SMS (including via embedded hyperlinks).

Anyone who has provided his or her personal information, or who has conducted any financial transactions, through or in response to the websites or login screens concerned, should contact the bank using the contact information provided in the press release, and report the matter to the Police by contacting the Crime Wing Information Centre of the Hong Kong Police Force at 2860 5012.
Issued at HKT 17:00

NNNN

CategoriesMIL-OSI

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Shenzhen launches pilot program to support departure tax refund policy

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Shenzhen launches pilot program to support departure tax refund policy

Updated: May 2, 2025 16:22 Xinhua

Tourists have their purchases checked at the Wenjindu port in Shenzhen, south China’s Guangdong Province, April 30, 2025. To further streamline the departure tax refund process for overseas travelers, Shenzhen launched a new pilot program featuring a “one order, one bag” model at three designated malls on April 27. Under the scheme, purchases and departure tax refund forms are packed together in sealed bags, enabling customs officials to quickly verify the packaging’s authenticity and cut inspection time by more than 50 percent. At the same time, a nationwide shift in departure tax refunds from a refund-upon-departure mode to a refund-upon-purchase mode enables foreign visitors to claim value-added tax rebates instantly. [Photo/Xinhua]

An instruction of the “one order, one bag” model is pictured inside a DJI drone store at a MixC shopping mall in Shenzhen, south China’s Guangdong Province, April 30, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Customs officials check “refund-upon-purchase” goods at the Wenjindu port in Shenzhen, south China’s Guangdong Province, April 30, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Staff members offer tax refund service for a tourist at a MixC shopping mall in Shenzhen, south China’s Guangdong Province, April 30, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

People shop for Sundan products at a MixC shopping mall in Shenzhen, south China’s Guangdong Province, April 30, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Staff members offer tax refund service for a Hong Kong tourist (L) at a MixC shopping mall in Shenzhen, south China’s Guangdong Province, April 30, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Customs officials check the integrity of a sealed bag at the Wenjindu port in Shenzhen, south China’s Guangdong Province, April 30, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

A staff member packs a DJI drone in a sealed bag at a MixC shopping mall in Shenzhen, south China’s Guangdong Province, April 30, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

MIL OSI China News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Darryl Chan: Global outlook – unlocking market potential through financial connectivity
Source: Bank for International Settlements

Mr Peng Yang (CEO, Ant International), distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

Good morning. To those of you who have travelled from far and wide, a very warm welcome to Hong Kong!

It gives me great pleasure to join you today for MO·MENTS 2025 organised by Ant International. This is a great gathering of forward-looking, innovative people who bring and share remarkable expertise, experience and ideas to shape the future of payments. Indeed, payments is shaping the future of finance by unlocking the many possibilities and immense potential.

The theme of this event is global connectivity.  In my discussion today, I will share with you the exciting journey Hong Kong is going through to promote connectivity in the payments space, both locally and globally.  Our objective is to achieve cheaper, faster, more transparent, and more accessible payment services.  Before going global, we started with local. There were two starting points: stored value facilities (or SVF in short) and faster payment system, or FPS.

In 2015, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) introduced a regime to regulate SVF operators who take the form of e-wallets or prepaid cards.  Today we have a robust SVF ecosystem of 15 operators. These operators serve a wide range of institutional and retail customers from mass market to more niched segments. In less than a decade, the number of SVF accounts have doubled, from around 40 million in end 2016 to 80 million in end 2024; and the total number of transactions has grown by almost 60%, from around 15 million per day in Q4 2016 to 24 million in Q4 2024.

The FPS is another success story.  Launched in 2018, it is a platform that supports full connectivity among banks and SVFs.  It provides real-time, 24×7 interbank transfers with just a few clicks on mobile devices.  Since its launch, FPS has experienced phenomenal growth.  It now has 16.4 million registrations in total, on the back of a local population of 7.5 million.

The SVF and FPS, working individually or in combination, provide a powerful tool that facilitates cheaper, faster payments and enhances user experience.  They promote not just financial inclusion but also the growth of e-commerce.

The use of SVF and FPS goes beyond Hong Kong.  For example, Hong Kong e-wallets can now be used at over 30 million merchants in Mainland China. Between 2021 and 2024, the number of cross-border transactions in the Mainland has grown by almost 50 times.

In the case of FPS, in 2023 the HKMA joined hands with the Bank of Thailand to link up FPS and Thailand’s PromptPay, enabling cross-border QR payments between the two jurisdictions.  Meanwhile, we are working closely with the People’s Bank of China to connect FPS with the Mainland’s Internet Banking Payment System.  Our plan is to formally roll out the link by the middle of this year.  Looking ahead, we are also exploring the possibility of further expanding the linkage of FPS with other fast payment systems in the region.

There is enough to keep us busy just by enhancing the interoperability and connectivity of the existing payment systems and networks. Yet we are keenly aware of the need to keep taps on developments that bring new dimensions to the form and functioning of money. Here I am referring to the emergence of central bank digital currency or CBDC, tokenised bank deposits, and stablecoins.

In terms of CBDC, our flagship project mBridge achieved the minimum viable product stage in 2024. It is a seamless cross-border wholesale CBDC platform co-founded by the HKMA and several other central banks. Supported by a comprehensive legal framework and a fit-for-purpose governance structure, the platform seeks to address the typical pain points in cross-border payments by enhancing efficiency and reducing costs through central bank digital money. Going forward, the project will continue to expand the participation of public and private institutions with a view to achieving greater network effect.

We also leverage on our CBDC research to support the development of the tokenisation market. Last year, the HKMA initiated Project Ensemble and established an Architecture Community to develop common industry standards that support interoperability between CBDC, tokenised money and tokenised assets. In August, we launched the Ensemble Sandbox, working with our securities regulator and the private sector to explore and experiment with tokenisation of financial assets and real-world assets. Currently, the use cases cover liquidity management, supply chain finance, green finance, and investment funds. We are pleased that Ant Group is an active participant of the Sandbox. Project Ensemble also goes beyond Hong Kong. We are partnering with other central banks including Thailand, Brazil and France to explore cross-border tokenisation use cases.

On stablecoin, we are in the final stage of passing the law that empowers the HKMA to license and supervise stablecoin issuers in Hong Kong. Together with other regulatory efforts governing the exchange, trading and custody of crypto assets, the stablecoin licensing regime is an important element to nurture a responsible and sustainable crypto ecosystem in Hong Kong.

Running in parallel to the legislative process, a stablecoin sandbox was set up last year to provide a controlled environment for potential issuers to test the various features and controls of their proposed schemes, as well as their use cases that cover supply chain, capital market activities, cross-border payments, and Web3.0 applications. The sandbox also enables the HKMA team to gain insights that inform the formulation of specific regulatory requirements and ensure they are fit-for-purpose.

Ladies and gentlemen, the payments industry has seen exponential growth in recent years and we should expect the momentum to sustain-if we do the right things. On this, I don’t think people in this room need to be convinced. Let me share some thoughts on how to capture those opportunities.

First is to make good use of technology. Technology is the key driver in this growth story and it keeps pushing the possibility frontier. Just imagine the potential of combining the ever growing computing power, artificial intelligence (A.I.), machine learning and big data.

What technology can deliver is amazing:
- in terms of making payment so much easier through one-click payment or voice-automated payments;
- in terms of capturing new customer demands such as buy-now-pay later or subscription payments; and
- in terms of tailoring payment service to the needs of individual customers.
What we need is to stretch our imagination and be innovative.

In the process, one thing we always need to bear in mind is the fundamental value proposition of payment services-how payments can be made easier, faster, cheaper, and equally important, more accessible. It is therefore heartening that we have a session today dedicated to inclusive growth.

Technology is a double-edged sword. One increasingly troubling aspect related to banking and payments is the prevalence of fraud and scams. In Hong Kong, more than 44,000 deception cases were reported last year, an increase of close to 12% year-on-year. In a way we are victim of our own success by making payments much faster and more convenient. This has now become one of the top challenges facing financial regulators across jurisdictions. If unchecked, it will seriously undermine public confidence in the safety of the banking and payments sector, not to mention the issue of how to apportion the loss.

The HKMA and the banking and payments industries have therefore been in close collaboration with law enforcement agencies to raise public awareness, share intelligence and good practices, and use Scameter data to alert potentially at-risk customers. This is a never ending battle, and technology can help address the risk. We look forward to payments operators leveraging A.I. and machine learning in fraud detection and prevention of money laundering. We at the HKMA stand ready to work with the industry in testing and deploying such technology.

My second point is about collaboration. Deglobalisation, reglobalisation, fragmentation-it may take on different names or different forms, but one thing is for sure, the global economy is entering uncharted waters, in search of the more stable state when the dust gets a little settled.

For an industry like payments that thrives on interoperability and connectivity, this is not good news. But the reshaping of the global economic order and the realignment of global supply chain can also mean new business opportunities for the payments sector:
- think about the possible shifts, within a relatively short timeframe, in trade patterns and trade flows;
- think about new relationships to be established between buyers and suppliers; and
- think about the new payment corridors across countries and regions that may involve more local currencies.
These changes call for more timely, in-depth collaboration between different players in the payments space to better support customers. And as long as payments remains a regulated space, we also need cross-border collaboration in the official sector, either through system linkage or policy coordination, to make this happen.

If I may quickly turn to my third point, which is the significance of operational resilience. With increased connectivity and collaboration, system outage or cyber incidents will have much pronounced consequences. It is crucial therefore, that operational resilience is a core objective and KPI. And always have a contingency plan ready should anything untoward happen.

Ladies and gentlemen, as we look to the future, we need to be resilient, be agile, embrace technology, and, most importantly, remain customer-centric. This should be the winning formula to unlock market potentials and promote a more efficient and inclusive financial ecosystem.

With that, I wish the event a great success. Thank you very much.
MIL OSI Economics –
May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Denis Beau: Our payment system at a time of geopolitical risks
Source: Bank for International Settlements

Slides accompanying the speech

[Slide 1 Cover slide]

The payments sector has undergone significant changes in recent decades, driven by digitalisation and the rise of new technologies. While the latter provide opportunities, they also bring risks, particularly in terms of financial stability and sovereignty. These risks have been amplified since the inauguration of the new US administration and the upheavals to the international order that its challenges to multilateralism and its deregulatory and protectionist policies could cause.

Against this backdrop of great uncertainty and the major shocks to the financial system since the start of the month, the financial authorities have an important role to play in fostering stability and trust among the players in the French and European economy and financial system. Accordingly, in addition to ensuring price stability, the objective of the Banque de France, in keeping with its monetary and financial stability mandates, is to help maintain stable access to financial services, particularly credit, and to encourage innovation and diversification. It also strives to ensure the smooth functioning of our economy and the infrastructures on which it relies, and especially our payment system.

In my presentation this morning, I would first like to review the main trends and challenges facing the European payments ecosystem, and then present the levers we are using at the Banque de France to ensure its efficient operation and the security of payment systems and payment means, and to help strengthen Europe’s sovereignty over its payment system.

[Slide 2 – I. Trends and challenges for payments in France and Europe]

I. The digitalisation of payments and its implications

A. Progress in technology is leading to the rapid digitalisation of the payments ecosystem

[Slide 3: A rapid payment digitalisation process]

For a little over a decade now, we have been witnessing a strong move towards digitalisation and the increasing use of electronic payment solutions, with an attendant decrease in the use of cash. Payment cards are now the most commonly used means of payment at the points of sale, accounting for more than 48% of transactions in France in 2024. Conversely, cash payments are gradually decreasing, falling to 43% of point-of-sale transactions in France in 2024, whereas they stood at 50% in 2022, and as high as 68% in 2016.

This trend accelerated even further with the rise of online shopping and the Covid pandemic. The share of e-commerce in the number of transactions thus doubled between 2019 and 2024 to reach a quarter of all transactions in France. At the same time, contactless payments and mobile payments have developed rapidly, with the aim of making payments increasingly seamless and almost invisible to consumers. This trend has been facilitated by the development of new technologies that have modernised payments, such as near-field communication (NFC) and QR codes, which have enabled the roll-out of contactless payments.

Against this backdrop, new players in payments have emerged, whose value added stems from technological innovation. These new players are now competing with traditional financial institutions such as banks. They include not only FinTechs but also “non-financial” players, namely telecom operators, technical service providers (specialising, for example, in the tokenisation of payment card data), and BigTechs, in particular the American GAFAMs – ApplePay, GooglePay – which dominate the mobile payments market. They also include Chinese and Korean platforms such as AliPay and WeChatPay.

The growth in the tokenisation of financial instruments, driven by the use of distributed ledger technologies (DLT) such as blockchain, represents a significant opportunity for our markets. Significant benefits are expected: faster exchanges, lower operating costs and greater transparency of transactions. However, this trend is now going hand in hand with a plethora of uncoordinated DLT initiatives, giving rise to the emergence of new private settlement assets, most notably stablecoins. These initiatives are largely controlled by non-European players and mechanisms, whose reference currency is the dollar.

B. The challenges raised by changes in the payments landscape

[Slide 4: Issues and challenges posed by the digitalisation of the European payments system]

While the digitalisation of payment means has delivered many benefits, in particular by enabling simpler, faster, more convenient and more secure payments, it also poses challenges.

The decline in the use of cash raises questions about the sustainability of some of its characteristics, particularly confidentiality, universal acceptance and accessibility, which are not currently available in the digital sphere. Furthermore, the increase in the use of digital payments raises questions about the role of central bank money, as opposed to commercial money used for card payments, even though central bank money plays a key role in anchoring confidence in our monetary system.

Furthermore, expanding the use of digital solutions has steadily upped our reliance on non-European entities (particularly from the United States and China), which already leverage significant network effects, thanks notably to their ability to harness extensive datasets and customer bases. They also control a number of widely used proprietary standards (Visa, Mastercard). Beyond the question of operational resilience, this situation raises concerns over competition, strategic autonomy and data protection. With the emergence of these international players, European payment solutions appear highly fragmented and their market share has been eroding.¹

The growing digitalisation of payments also represents a challenge to maintain a high level of payment security. Fraud schemes are becoming increasingly complex, involving the manipulation of payers and the circumvention of the strong authentication mechanisms put in place to ensure the security of digital payments in Europe. In particular, artificial intelligence (AI) is a double-edged sword.

AI amplifies cyber risk and, in payments, it can considerably facilitate payment scams, for example through deepfakes. But this technology can also become an invaluable ally in the fight against fraud, by enabling fraud schemes to be more rapidly and effectively identified. Against this backdrop, integrating AI into anti-fraud models could help to improve the security of the digital payment means available to the public.

It should also be noted that digitalisation could extend to financial assets, through tokenisation, although at present there are no suitable and really secure payment solutions available for these financial transactions. Therefore, without a central bank money-based payment solution for these “wholesale” transactions, private non-European solutions could become dominant, in particular stablecoins. However, almost all stablecoins are currently pegged to the dollar, and their issuance in the United States is not currently subject to any protective federal regulatory framework. If the tokenisation of financial assets were to gather pace, the lack of a central bank money payment solution in euro might therefore threaten the role of central bank money as the anchor of the euro area’s monetary architecture, with concrete adverse consequences: an increase in counterparty and liquidity risks, increased fragmentation of settlement, and ultimately a loss of sovereignty and a weakening of financial stability.

In this context, the recent positions adopted by the new US administration, and in particular the adoption on 23 January of an Executive order, are likely to amplify these risks as this Executive Order (i) prohibits all work related to the development of a new form of central bank money compatible with technological changes, (ii) promotes the development of dollar-backed stablecoins, and (iii) encourages citizens and businesses to use public blockchains. This new political direction reinforces the need for Europe to preserve its monetary sovereignty, which means developing its payment sovereignty.

II. To meet these challenges, the Banque de France is using several additional levers for action

[Slide 5: Transition – Two additional responses: regulation/support and innovation.]

A. Adapting regulatory frameworks and supporting innovation within a framework of trust

[Slide 6: Adapting regulatory frameworks at national and international level]

First and foremost, the Banque de France promotes clear, standardised and balanced regulatory frameworks that allow innovation to flourish within a framework of trust conducive to their sustainable deployment. It therefore supports and contributes to the development of frameworks that aim to:
- Maintain a level playing field between players. For example, this has made it possible for operators other than Apple to have access to NFC antennae on iPhones at the European level to promote better competition.
- Adapt to technological progress to support the development of new players, while ensuring they are adequately regulated, based on the principle of “same activity, same risk, same regulation”. This approach has guided the deployment of the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation, which standardises the rules applicable to crypto-asset service providers, enabling them to develop their business while ensuring that risks to users and the financial system are properly managed.
- Protect consumers. This was, for example, the aim of the second European Payment Services Directive (PSD2), which introduced “strong customer authentication” (SCA) for more secure payments. The Instant Payment Regulation (IPR) follows the same logic, requiring payment service providers (PSPs) to deploy fraud protection measures (e.g. checking the name of the beneficiary against the IBAN) to ensure the orderly development of instant payments.
[Slide 7: Strengthening the security of means of payment]

As part of its statutory mission, which includes ensuring the security of means of payment, the Banque de France supports innovation by ensuring that it does not jeopardise the security of payment methods. The following tasks are performed within the framework of the Observatory for the Security of Payment Means (OSMP).
- Communication campaigns targeting the general public, such as “never give out your data”, carried by various audio-visual media and radio, and aiming to raise awareness of the personal nature of passwords in particular,
- Initiatives aimed at boosting cooperation with data protection, cybersecurity and telecommunications authorities to limit fraud as much as possible.
[Slide 8: Promoting innovation by supporting private initiatives]

Support for innovation also seeks to ensure that private initiatives help to strengthen European sovereignty over the euro payment system:
- At the national level, this support aims to consolidate the position of high-performance French payment solutions, such as the Groupement carte bancaire (CB bank card group), which has been allocated specific support within the framework of the new national retail payments strategy for 2025-30, implemented by the National Payments Committee (CNMP) last October.
- At the European level, pan-European solutions, such as the European Payments Initiative (EPI), are strongly supported. EPI launched the ‘Wero’ digital payment wallet for consumers last autumn, providing instant payments across five European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). This initiative with pan-European ambition aims to promote competition and strengthen Europe’s strategic autonomy in retail payments.
B. The provision of new central bank money services to preserve the key role of central bank money in a digitalised world

Alongside regulating and supporting private initiatives, the Banque de France is making a strong and decisive contribution to the Eurosystem’s work on developing its services through the creation of a central bank digital currency for both retail and wholesale transactions. This work has become more strategically important in terms of ensuring European sovereignty over its payment system since the policy shift initiated by the new US administration that I referred to a few minutes ago.

[Slide 9: Innovating with the digital euro: a European payment solution]

1. The digital euro

Given the strong dependence on American payment solutions and networks, the Banque de France thus supports and participates fully in the digital euro project spearheaded by the Eurosystem, which will constitute a public alternative, preserving the freedom to choose means of payment, sovereignty and competition in the euro area.

The digital euro aims to provide everyone with the possibility to use a ‘digital banknote’ in the digital payments sphere that incorporates the main features of a ‘physical’ banknote. Its off-line mechanism will provide a cash-like level of privacy and will be a guarantee of resilience. It will be free of charge for individuals. Its characteristics will foster digital financial inclusion, including for people without bank accounts or smartphones. It will also be a new form of public money, which will safeguard the anchoring role of central bank money and trust in our single currency.

The digital euro also aims to strengthen European integration and strategic autonomy in payments thanks to the legal tender status it would be given, making it usable anywhere and in any circumstances within the euro area. It will also be based on open and harmonised standards, which private payment solutions such as Wero will be able to use to expand their reach. In this way, the digital euro aims to foster the development of private solutions under European governance, which can be used across the euro area, whereas most solutions are currently restricted to certain countries or use cases.

The Eurosystem is currently in a preparation phase that will last until the end of 2025. At the same time, a democratic debate is taking place at the European level to define, by means of legislation, the conditions in which the digital euro may be used. A decision on issuance can be taken once this legislation has been approved by the European Parliament and the Council.

[Slide 10: From Wholesale CBDC to a shared European ledger]

2. Wholesale central bank digital currency

With the development of tokenised assets, the Banque de France is also firmly committed to providing a payment solution in central bank money that includes making it available in tokenised form, in other words, a “wholesale CBDC”.

The Banque de France has been resolutely committed to this solution since 2020, playing a pioneering role at the European level in an experimental programme conducted between 2020 and 2022, in partnership with various private and institutional sector players. This work, which allowed the Banque de France to develop and test its own blockchain (DL3S), was followed by that of the Eurosystem in 2024. This was used to test three solutions for settling tokenised assets in central bank currency through around 40 or so experiments.

Drawing on the lessons learned from these experiments and their confirmation of a demand for adapting central bank money services, in February 2025, the ECB Governing Council decided to quickly make available a settlement service in CB money adapted for tokenised assets, which will include money in token form, i.e. a “wholesale” CB digital currency.

This decision also paves the way for discussions on building a European shared ledger that could be used to adapt European payment infrastructures to the digital era to ensure sovereignty. By providing a credible alternative to non-European solutions, based on a standardised legal and regulatory framework, a European shared ledger could support financial integration within the EU and help strengthen the resilience and attractiveness of our financial market.

Conclusion : As a central bank tasked with safeguarding monetary and financial stability, and notably the security and efficiency of payment systems and means of payment for the euro, the Banque de France is fully committed to monitoring, understanding and supporting the major transformations currently taking place in the payments landscape. These transformations have recently assumed major strategic importance for the monetary sovereignty of euro area countries, necessitating the mobilisation of all the European players concerned to respond in an appropriate and adequate manner. This involves developing secure, efficient public and private pan-European payment solutions that contribute to European sovereignty over its payment system. As both supervisor and provider of central bank money services, we are determined to play our part.

[Slide 11: Thank you for your attention]
MIL OSI Economics –
May 2, 2025

MIL-OSI: Shell Plc 1st Quarter 2025 Unaudited Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS



SUMMARY OF UNAUDITED RESULTS
Quarters				$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹		Reference
4,780	928	7,358	+415	Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders
5,577	3,661	7,734	+52	Adjusted Earnings	A
15,250	14,281	18,711	+7	Adjusted EBITDA	A
9,281	13,162	13,330	-29	Cash flow from operating activities
(3,959)	(4,431)	(3,528)		Cash flow from investing activities
5,322	8,731	9,802		Free cash flow	G
4,175	6,924	4,493		Cash capital expenditure	C
8,575	9,401	8,997	-9	Operating expenses	F
8,453	9,138	9,054	-7	Underlying operating expenses	F
10.4%	11.3%	12.0%		ROACE	D
76,511	77,078	79,931		Total debt	E
41,521	38,809	40,513		Net debt	E
18.7%	17.7%	17.7%		Gearing	E
2,838	2,815	2,911	+1	Oil and gas production available for sale (thousand boe/d)
0.79	0.15	1.14	+427	Basic earnings per share ($)
0.92	0.60	1.20	+53	Adjusted Earnings per share ($)	B
0.3580	0.3580	0.3440	—	Dividend per share ($)

1.Q1 on Q4 change

Quarter Analysis1

Income attributable to Shell plc shareholders, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected lower exploration well write-offs, lower operating expenses and higher Products margins.

First quarter 2025 income attributable to Shell plc shareholders also included a charge of $0.5 billion related to the UK Energy Profits Levy and impairment charges. These items are included in identified items amounting to a net loss of $0.8 billion in the quarter. This compares with identified items in the fourth quarter 2024 which amounted to a net loss of $2.8 billion.

Adjusted Earnings and Adjusted EBITDA2 were driven by the same factors as income attributable to Shell plc shareholders and adjusted for the above identified items.

Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was $9.3 billion and primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, partly offset by tax payments of $2.9 billion and working capital outflows of $2.7 billion. The working capital outflows mainly reflected accounts receivable and payable movements.

Cash flow from investing activities for the first quarter 2025 was an outflow of $4.0 billion, and included cash capital expenditure of $4.2 billion, and net other investing cash outflows of $0.9 billion which included the drawdowns on loan facilities provided at completion of the sale of The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC) in Nigeria, partly offset by divestment proceeds of $0.6 billion.

Net debt and Gearing: At the end of the first quarter 2025, net debt was $41.5 billion, compared with $38.8 billion at the end of the fourth quarter 2024. This reflects free cash flow of $5.3 billion, which included working capital outflows of $2.7 billion, more than offset by share buybacks of $3.3 billion, cash dividends paid to Shell plc shareholders of $2.2 billion, lease additions of $1.3 billion including those related to the Pavilion Energy Pte. Ltd. acquisition and interest payments of $0.8 billion. Gearing was 18.7% at the end of the first quarter 2025, compared with 17.7% at the end of the fourth quarter 2024, mainly driven by higher net debt.

SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

Shareholder distributions

Total shareholder distributions in the quarter amounted to $5.5 billion comprising repurchases of shares of $3.3 billion and cash dividends paid to Shell plc shareholders of $2.2 billion. Dividends declared to Shell plc shareholders for the first quarter 2025 amount to $0.3580 per share. Shell has now completed $3.5 billion of share buybacks announced in the fourth quarter 2024 results announcement. Today, Shell announces a share buyback programme of $3.5 billion which is expected to be completed by the second quarter 2025 results announcement.

This Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, together with supplementary financial and operational disclosure for this quarter, is available at www.shell.com/investors 3.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and depreciation, depletion and amortisation (DD&A) expenses.

3.Not incorporated by reference.

PORTFOLIO DEVELOPMENTS

Integrated Gas

In March 2025, we completed the previously announced acquisition of 100% of the shares in Pavilion Energy Pte. Ltd. (Pavilion Energy). Pavilion Energy, headquartered in Singapore, operates a global LNG trading business with contracted supply volume of approximately 6.5 million tonnes per annum (mtpa).

Upstream

In January 2025, we announced the start of production at the Shell-operated Whale floating production facility in the Gulf of America. The Whale development is owned by Shell (60%, operator) and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (40%).

In February 2025, we announced production restart at the Penguins field in the UK North Sea with a modern floating, production, storage and offloading (FPSO) facility (Shell 50%, operator; NEO Energy 50%). The previous export route for this field was via the Brent Charlie platform, which ceased production in 2021 and is being decommissioned.

In February 2025, we signed an agreement to acquire a 15.96% working interest from ConocoPhillips Company in the Shell-operated Ursa platform in the Gulf of America. The transaction completed on May 1, 2025 which increases Shell’s working interest in the Ursa platform from 45.3884% to 61.3484%.

In March 2025, we completed the sale of SPDC to Renaissance, as announced in January 2024.

In March 2025, we announced the Final Investment Decision (FID) for Gato do Mato, a deep-water project in the pre-salt area of the Santos Basin, offshore Brazil. The Gato do Mato Consortium includes Shell (operator, 50%), Ecopetrol (30%), TotalEnergies (20%) and Pré-Sal Petróleo S.A. (PPSA) acting as the manager of the production sharing contract (PSC).

Chemicals and Products

In January 2025, CNOOC and Shell Petrochemicals Company Limited (CSPC), a 50:50 joint venture between Shell and CNOOC Petrochemicals Investment Ltd, took an FID to expand its petrochemical complex in Daya Bay, Huizhou, south China.

In April 2025, we completed the previously announced sale of our Energy and Chemicals Park in Singapore to CAPGC Pte. Ltd. (CAPGC), a joint venture between Chandra Asri Capital Pte. Ltd. and Glencore Asian Holdings Pte. Ltd.

In April 2025, we agreed to sell our 16.125% interest in Colonial Enterprises, Inc. (“Colonial”) to Colossus AcquireCo LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P. and its institutional partners (collectively, “Brookfield”), for $1.45 billion. The transaction is subject to regulatory approvals and is expected to close in the fourth quarter of 2025.

Renewables and Energy Solutions

In January 2025, we completed the previously announced acquisition of a 100% equity stake in RISEC Holdings, LLC, which owns a 609-megawatt (MW) two-unit combined-cycle gas turbine power plant in Rhode Island, USA.

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PERFORMANCE BY SEGMENT



INTEGRATED GAS
Quarters				$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹		Reference
2,789	1,744	2,761	+60	Income/(loss) for the period
306	(421)	(919)		Of which: Identified items	A
2,483	2,165	3,680	+15	Adjusted Earnings	A
4,735	4,568	6,136	+4	Adjusted EBITDA	A
3,463	4,391	4,712	-21	Cash flow from operating activities	A
1,116	1,337	1,041		Cash capital expenditure	C
126	116	137	+9	Liquids production available for sale (thousand b/d)
4,644	4,574	4,954	+2	Natural gas production available for sale (million scf/d)
927	905	992	+2	Total production available for sale (thousand boe/d)
6.60	7.06	7.58	-6	LNG liquefaction volumes (million tonnes)
16.49	15.50	16.87	+6	LNG sales volumes (million tonnes)

1.Q1 on Q4 change

Integrated Gas includes liquefied natural gas (LNG), conversion of natural gas into gas-to-liquids (GTL) fuels and other products. It includes natural gas and liquids exploration and extraction, and the operation of the upstream and midstream infrastructure necessary to deliver these to market. Integrated Gas also includes the marketing, trading and optimisation of LNG.

Quarter Analysis1

Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected lower exploration well write-offs ($277 million), partly offset by lower LNG liquefaction volumes (decrease of $68 million). The net effect of contributions from trading and optimisation and realised prices was in line with the fourth quarter 2024 despite higher unfavourable (non-cash) impact of expiring hedging contracts.

Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included favourable movements of $362 million due to the fair value accounting of commodity derivatives, that as part of Shell’s normal business are entered into as hedges for mitigation of economic exposures on future purchases, sales and inventory. These favourable movements compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included impairment charges of $339 million and a loss of $96 million related to sale of assets, partly offset by favourable movements of $109 million due to the fair value accounting of commodity derivatives.

Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

Cash flow from operating activities for the quarter was primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, and net cash inflows related to derivatives of $542 million, partly offset by tax payments of $773 million and working capital outflows of $687 million.

Total oil and gas production, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, increased by 2% mainly due to lower planned maintenance in Pearl GTL (Qatar), partly offset by unplanned maintenance and weather constraints in Australia. LNG liquefaction volumes decreased by 6% mainly due to unplanned maintenance and weather constraints in Australia.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

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UPSTREAM
Quarters				$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹		Reference
2,080	1,031	2,272	+102	Income/(loss) for the period
(257)	(651)	339		Of which: Identified items	A
2,337	1,682	1,933	+39	Adjusted Earnings	A
7,387	7,676	7,888	-4	Adjusted EBITDA	A
3,945	4,509	5,727	-13	Cash flow from operating activities	A
1,923	2,076	2,010		Cash capital expenditure	C
1,335	1,332	1,331	—	Liquids production available for sale (thousand b/d)
3,020	3,056	3,136	-1	Natural gas production available for sale (million scf/d)
1,855	1,859	1,872	—	Total production available for sale (thousand boe/d)

1.Q1 on Q4 change

The Upstream segment includes exploration and extraction of crude oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids. It also markets and transports oil and gas, and operates the infrastructure necessary to deliver them to the market.

Quarter Analysis1

Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected lower exploration well write-offs ($346 million), lower depreciation, depletion and amortisation expenses (decrease of $330 million), lower operating expenses ($194 million) and comparative favourable tax movements ($179 million), partly offset by lower volumes (decrease of $359 million).

Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included a charge of $509 million related to the UK Energy Profits Levy, partly offset by gains of $159 million from disposal of assets and gains of $95 million related to the impact of the strengthening Brazilian real on a deferred tax position. These charges and favourable movements compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included a loss of $161 million related to the impact of the weakening Brazilian real on a deferred tax position, and impairment charges of $152 million.

Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, partly offset by tax payments of $1,999 million and working capital outflows of $913 million.

Total production, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, decreased mainly due to the SPDC divestment, largely offset by new oil production.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

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MARKETING
Quarters				$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹		Reference
814	103	896	+688	Income/(loss) for the period
(49)	(736)	(7)		Of which: Identified items	A
900	839	781	+7	Adjusted Earnings	A
1,869	1,709	1,686	+9	Adjusted EBITDA	A
1,907	1,363	1,319	+40	Cash flow from operating activities	A
256	811	465		Cash capital expenditure	C
2,674	2,795	2,763	-4	Marketing sales volumes (thousand b/d)

1.Q1 on Q4 change

The Marketing segment comprises the Mobility, Lubricants, and Sectors and Decarbonisation businesses. The Mobility business operates Shell’s retail network including electric vehicle charging services and the Wholesale commercial fuels business which provides fuels for transport, industry and heating. The Lubricants business produces, markets and sells lubricants for road transport, and machinery used in manufacturing, mining, power generation, agriculture and construction. The Sectors and Decarbonisation business sells fuels, speciality products and services including low-carbon energy solutions to a broad range of commercial customers including the aviation, marine, and agricultural sectors.

Quarter Analysis1

Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected lower operating expenses (decrease of $69 million), and higher Marketing margins (increase of $54 million) mainly due to higher Lubricants unit margins and seasonal impact of higher volumes partly offset by lower Mobility margins due to seasonal impact of lower volumes and lower Sectors and Decarbonisation margins. These net gains were partly offset by unfavourable tax movements ($109 million).

Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included net losses of $61 million related to sale of assets. These losses compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included impairment charges of $458 million, and net losses of $247 million related to sale of assets.

Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, inflows relating to the timing impact of payments related to emission certificates and biofuel programmes of $540 million, and dividends (net of profits) from joint ventures and associates of $203 million. These inflows were partly offset by working capital outflows of $344 million and tax payments of $174 million.

Marketing sales volumes (comprising hydrocarbon sales), compared with the fourth quarter 2024, decreased mainly due to seasonality.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

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CHEMICALS AND PRODUCTS
Quarters				$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹		Reference
(77)	(276)	1,311	+72	Income/(loss) for the period
(581)	(99)	(458)		Of which: Identified items	A
449	(229)	1,615	+296	Adjusted Earnings	A
1,410	475	2,826	+197	Adjusted EBITDA	A
130	2,032	(349)	-94	Cash flow from operating activities	A
458	1,392	500		Cash capital expenditure	C
1,362	1,215	1,430	+12	Refinery processing intake (thousand b/d)
2,813	2,926	2,883	-4	Chemicals sales volumes (thousand tonnes)

1.Q1 on Q4 change

The Chemicals and Products segment includes chemicals manufacturing plants with their own marketing network, and refineries which turn crude oil and other feedstocks into a range of oil products which are moved and marketed around the world for domestic, industrial and transport use. The segment also includes the pipeline business, trading and optimisation of crude oil, oil products and petrochemicals, and Oil Sands activities (the extraction of bitumen from mined oil sands and its conversion into synthetic crude oil).

Quarter Analysis1

Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected higher Products margins (increase of $546 million) mainly driven by higher margins from trading and optimisation and higher refining margins. Adjusted Earnings also reflected higher Chemicals margins (increase of $115 million). In addition, the first quarter 2025 reflected lower operating expenses (decrease of $134 million). These net gains were partly offset by comparative unfavourable tax movements ($96 million).

In the first quarter 2025, Chemicals had negative Adjusted Earnings of $137 million and Products had positive Adjusted Earnings of $586 million.

Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included impairment charges of $277 million, and unfavourable movements of $202 million due to the fair value accounting of commodity derivatives, that as part of Shell’s normal business are entered into as hedges for mitigation of economic exposures on future purchases, sales and inventory. These charges and unfavourable movements compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included impairment charges of $224 million, partly offset by favourable deferred tax movements of $114 million..

Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was primarily driven by Adjusted EBITDA, and inflows relating to the timing impact of payments relating to emission certificates and biofuel programmes of $125 million. These inflows were partly offset by working capital outflows of $1,081 million, and net cash outflows relating to commodity derivatives of $508 million.

Chemicals manufacturing plant utilisation was 81% compared with 75% in the fourth quarter 2024, mainly due to lower planned and unplanned maintenance.

Refinery utilisation was 85% compared with 76% in the fourth quarter 2024, mainly due to lower planned maintenance.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

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RENEWABLES AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS
Quarters				$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹		Reference
(247)	(1,226)	553	+80	Income/(loss) for the period
(205)	(914)	390		Of which: Identified items	A
(42)	(311)	163	+87	Adjusted Earnings	A
111	(123)	267	+190	Adjusted EBITDA	A
367	850	2,466	-57	Cash flow from operating activities	A
403	1,277	438		Cash capital expenditure	C
76	76	77	+1	External power sales (terawatt hours)2
184	165	190	+12	Sales of pipeline gas to end-use customers (terawatt hours)3

1.Q1 on Q4 change

2.Physical power sales to third parties; excluding financial trades and physical trade with brokers, investors, financial institutions, trading platforms, and wholesale traders.

3.Physical natural gas sales to third parties; excluding financial trades and physical trade with brokers, investors, financial institutions, trading platforms, and wholesale traders. Excluding sales of natural gas by other segments and LNG sales.

Renewables and Energy Solutions includes activities such as renewable power generation, the marketing and trading and optimisation of power and pipeline gas, as well as carbon credits, and digitally enabled customer solutions. It also includes the production and marketing of hydrogen, development of commercial carbon capture and storage hubs, investment in nature-based projects that avoid or reduce carbon emissions, and Shell Ventures, which invests in companies that work to accelerate the energy and mobility transformation.

Quarter Analysis1

Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected higher margins (increase of $99 million) mainly due to higher trading and optimisation in the Americas as a result of higher seasonal demand and volatility, lower operating expenses (decrease of $90 million) and comparative favourable tax movements ($89 million). Most Renewables and Energy Solutions activities were loss-making in the first quarter 2025, which was partly offset by positive Adjusted Earnings from trading and optimisation.

Identified items in the first quarter 2025 included a charge of $143 million related to the disposal of assets. These charges compare with the fourth quarter 2024 which included impairment charges of $996 million mainly relating to renewable generation assets in North America, partly offset by favourable movements of $50 million due to the fair value accounting of commodity derivatives, that as part of Shell’s normal business are entered into as hedges for mitigation of economic exposures on future purchases, sales and inventory.

Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

Cash flow from operating activities for the first quarter 2025 was primarily driven by net cash inflows relating to working capital of $380 million and Adjusted EBITDA, partially offset by outflows related to derivatives of $169 million.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

Additional Growth Measures


Quarters
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024	%¹
				Renewable power generation capacity (gigawatt):
3.5	3.4	3.2	+4	– In operation2
4.0	4.0	3.5	-1	– Under construction and/or committed for sale3

1.Q1 on Q4 change

2.Shell’s equity share of renewable generation capacity post commercial operation date. It excludes Shell’s equity share of associates where information cannot be obtained.

3.Shell’s equity share of renewable generation capacity under construction and/or committed for sale under long-term offtake agreements (PPA). It excludes Shell’s equity share of associates where information cannot be obtained.

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CORPORATE
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024		Reference
(483)	(335)	(354)	Income/(loss) for the period
(26)	45	14	Of which: Identified items	A
(457)	(380)	(368)	Adjusted Earnings	A
(261)	(24)	(92)	Adjusted EBITDA	A
(531)	16	(545)	Cash flow from operating activities	A

The Corporate segment covers the non-operating activities supporting Shell. It comprises Shell’s holdings and treasury organisation, headquarters and central functions, self-insurance activities and centrally managed longer-term innovation portfolio. All finance expense, income and related taxes are included in Corporate Adjusted Earnings rather than in the earnings of business segments.

Quarter Analysis1

Income/(loss) for the period was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings and includes identified items.

Adjusted Earnings, compared with the fourth quarter 2024, reflected unfavourable currency exchange rate effects, partly offset by lower operating expenses.

Adjusted EBITDA2 was driven by the same factors as Adjusted Earnings.

1.All earnings amounts are shown post-tax, unless stated otherwise.

2.Adjusted EBITDA is without interest, taxation, exploration well write-offs and DD&A expenses.

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OUTLOOK FOR THE SECOND QUARTER 2025

Full year 2024 cash capital expenditure was $21 billion. Our cash capital expenditure range for the full year 2025 is expected to be within $20 – $22 billion.

Integrated Gas production is expected to be approximately 890 – 950 thousand boe/d. LNG liquefaction volumes are expected to be approximately 6.3 – 6.9 million tonnes. Second quarter 2025 outlook reflects scheduled maintenance across the portfolio.

Upstream production is expected to be approximately 1,560 – 1,760 thousand boe/d. Production outlook reflects the SPDC divestment in March 2025 and the scheduled maintenance across the portfolio.

Marketing sales volumes are expected to be approximately 2,600 – 3,100 thousand b/d.

Refinery utilisation is expected to be approximately 87% – 95%. Chemicals manufacturing plant utilisation is expected to be approximately 74% – 82%. Second quarter 2025 utilisation outlook reflects the sale of the Energy and Chemicals Park in Singapore which was completed in April 2025.

Corporate Adjusted Earnings1 were a net expense of $457 million for the first quarter 2025. Corporate Adjusted Earnings are expected to be a net expense of approximately $400 – $600 million in the second quarter 2025.

1.For the definition of Adjusted Earnings and the most comparable GAAP measure see reference A.

FORTHCOMING EVENTS



Date			Event
May 20, 2025			Annual General Meeting
July 31, 2025			Second quarter 2025 results and dividends
October 30, 2025			Third quarter 2025 results and dividends

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UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED INTERIM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS



CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
69,234	66,281	72,478	Revenue1
615	(156)	1,318	Share of profit/(loss) of joint ventures and associates
302	683	907	Interest and other income/(expenses)2
70,152	66,807	74,703	Total revenue and other income/(expenses)
45,849	43,610	46,867	Purchases
5,549	5,839	5,810	Production and manufacturing expenses
2,840	3,231	2,975	Selling, distribution and administrative expenses
185	331	212	Research and development
210	861	750	Exploration
5,441	7,520	5,881	Depreciation, depletion and amortisation2
1,120	1,213	1,164	Interest expense
61,194	62,605	63,659	Total expenditure
8,959	4,205	11,044	Income/(loss) before taxation
4,083	3,164	3,604	Taxation charge/(credit)2
4,875	1,041	7,439	Income/(loss) for the period
95	113	82	Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest
4,780	928	7,358	Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders
0.79	0.15	1.14	Basic earnings per share ($)3
0.79	0.15	1.13	Diluted earnings per share ($)3

1.See Note 2 “Segment information”.

2.See Note 7 “Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements”.

3.See Note 3 “Earnings per share”.



CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
4,875	1,041	7,439	Income/(loss) for the period
			Other comprehensive income/(loss) net of tax:
			Items that may be reclassified to income in later periods:
1,711	(4,899)	(1,995)	– Currency translation differences1
6	(11)	(6)	– Debt instruments remeasurements
(25)	224	53	– Cash flow hedging gains/(losses)
(42)	(50)	(14)	– Deferred cost of hedging
74	(91)	(12)	– Share of other comprehensive income/(loss) of joint ventures and associates
1,723	(4,827)	(1,974)	Total
			Items that are not reclassified to income in later periods:
306	239	439	– Retirement benefits remeasurements
(16)	(50)	78	– Equity instruments remeasurements
(36)	46	10	– Share of other comprehensive income/(loss) of joint ventures and associates
254	235	528	Total
1,977	(4,592)	(1,445)	Other comprehensive income/(loss) for the period
6,852	(3,552)	5,994	Comprehensive income/(loss) for the period
105	50	56	Comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest
6,748	(3,602)	5,937	Comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders

1.See Note 7 “Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements”.

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CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
$ million
	March 31, 2025	December 31, 2024
Assets
Non-current assets
Goodwill	16,072	16,032
Other intangible assets1	11,365	9,480
Property, plant and equipment	183,712	185,219
Joint ventures and associates	24,236	23,445
Investments in securities	2,284	2,255
Deferred tax	6,989	6,857
Retirement benefits	10,266	10,003
Trade and other receivables	7,269	6,018
Derivative financial instruments²	400	374
	262,593	259,683
Current assets
Inventories	22,984	23,426
Trade and other receivables	48,247	45,860
Derivative financial instruments²	8,941	9,673
Cash and cash equivalents	35,601	39,110
	115,773	118,069
Assets classified as held for sale1	10,881	9,857
	126,654	127,926
Total assets	389,248	387,609
Liabilities
Non-current liabilities
Debt	65,120	65,448
Trade and other payables	5,487	3,290
Derivative financial instruments²	1,565	2,185
Deferred tax	13,257	13,505
Retirement benefits	6,756	6,752
Decommissioning and other provisions	20,313	21,227
	112,498	112,407
Current liabilities
Debt	11,391	11,630
Trade and other payables	60,870	60,693
Derivative financial instruments²	6,371	7,391
Income taxes payable	4,343	4,648
Decommissioning and other provisions	5,104	4,469
	88,079	88,831
Liabilities directly associated with assets classified as held for sale1	8,001	6,203
	96,080	95,034
Total liabilities	208,578	207,441
Equity attributable to Shell plc shareholders	178,813	178,307
Non-controlling interest	1,856	1,861
Total equity	180,670	180,168
Total liabilities and equity	389,248	387,609

1. See Note 7 “Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements”.

2. See Note 6 “Derivative financial instruments and debt excluding lease liabilities”.

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CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN EQUITY
	Equity attributable to Shell plc shareholders
$ million	Share capital1	Shares held in trust	Other reserves²	Retained earnings	Total	Non-controlling interest	Total equity
At January 1, 2025	510	(803)	19,766	158,834	178,307	1,861	180,168
Comprehensive income/(loss) for the period	—	—	1,967	4,780	6,748	105	6,852
Transfer from other comprehensive income	—	—	11	(11)	—	—	—
Dividends³	—	—	—	(2,179)	(2,179)	(86)	(2,265)
Repurchases of shares4	(8)	—	8	(3,513)	(3,513)	—	(3,513)
Share-based compensation	—	500	(663)	(405)	(567)	—	(567)
Other changes	—	—	—	23	22	(24)	(2)
At March 31, 2025	502	(304)	21,090	157,527	178,813	1,856	180,670
At January 1, 2024	544	(997)	21,145	165,915	186,607	1,755	188,362
Comprehensive income/(loss) for the period	—	—	(1,420)	7,358	5,937	56	5,994
Transfer from other comprehensive income	—	—	138	(138)	—	—	—
Dividends3	—	—	—	(2,210)	(2,210)	(68)	(2,278)
Repurchases of shares4	(7)	—	7	(3,502)	(3,502)	—	(3,502)
Share-based compensation	—	543	(426)	(392)	(275)	—	(275)
Other changes	—	—	—	8	8	(4)	4
At March 31, 2024	537	(455)	19,445	167,038	186,565	1,739	188,304

1. See Note 4 “Share capital”.

2. See Note 5 “Other reserves”.

3. The amount charged to retained earnings is based on prevailing exchange rates on payment date.

4. Includes shares committed to repurchase under an irrevocable contract and repurchases subject to settlement at the end of the quarter.

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CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
8,959	4,205	11,044	Income before taxation for the period
			Adjustment for:
636	665	576	– Interest expense (net)
5,441	7,520	5,881	– Depreciation, depletion and amortisation1
28	649	554	– Exploration well write-offs
127	288	(10)	– Net (gains)/losses on sale and revaluation of non-current assets and businesses
(615)	156	(1,318)	– Share of (profit)/loss of joint ventures and associates
523	1,241	738	– Dividends received from joint ventures and associates
854	131	(608)	– (Increase)/decrease in inventories
(2,610)	751	(195)	– (Increase)/decrease in current receivables
(907)	1,524	(1,949)	– Increase/(decrease) in current payables
(244)	111	1,386	– Derivative financial instruments
(100)	(58)	(61)	– Retirement benefits
(480)	(256)	(600)	– Decommissioning and other provisions
570	(856)	509	– Other1
(2,900)	(2,910)	(2,616)	Tax paid
9,281	13,162	13,330	Cash flow from operating activities
(3,748)	(6,486)	(3,980)	Capital expenditure
(413)	(421)	(500)	Investments in joint ventures and associates
(15)	(17)	(13)	Investments in equity securities
(4,175)	(6,924)	(4,493)	Cash capital expenditure
559	493	323	Proceeds from sale of property, plant and equipment and businesses
33	305	133	Proceeds from joint ventures and associates from sale, capital reduction and repayment of long-term loans
5	6	569	Proceeds from sale of equity securities
508	581	577	Interest received
506	1,762	857	Other investing cash inflows
(1,394)	(655)	(1,494)	Other investing cash outflows1
(3,959)	(4,431)	(3,528)	Cash flow from investing activities
80	65	(107)	Net increase/(decrease) in debt with maturity period within three months
			Other debt:
139	(13)	167	– New borrowings
(2,514)	(2,664)	(1,532)	– Repayments
(846)	(1,379)	(911)	Interest paid
326	(833)	(297)	Derivative financial instruments
(25)	(10)	(4)	Change in non-controlling interest
			Cash dividends paid to:
(2,179)	(2,114)	(2,210)	– Shell plc shareholders
(86)	(53)	(68)	– Non-controlling interest
(3,311)	(3,579)	(2,824)	Repurchases of shares
(768)	(309)	(462)	Shares held in trust: net sales/(purchases) and dividends received
(9,183)	(10,889)	(8,248)	Cash flow from financing activities
353	(985)	(379)	Effects of exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents
(3,509)	(3,142)	1,175	Increase/(decrease) in cash and cash equivalents
39,110	42,252	38,774	Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of period
35,601	39,110	39,949	Cash and cash equivalents at end of period

1.See Note 7 “Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements”.

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NOTES TO THE UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED INTERIM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

1. Basis of preparation

These unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements of Shell plc (“the Company”) and its subsidiaries (collectively referred to as “Shell”) have been prepared in accordance with IAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”) and adopted by the UK, and on the basis of the same accounting principles as those used in the Company’s Annual Report and Accounts (pages 240 to 312) for the year ended December 31, 2024, as filed with the Registrar of Companies for England and Wales and as filed with the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (the Netherlands) and Form 20-F (pages 223 to 296) for the year ended December 31, 2024, as filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, and should be read in conjunction with these filings.

The financial information presented in the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements does not constitute statutory accounts within the meaning of section 434(3) of the Companies Act 2006 (“the Act”). Statutory accounts for the year ended December 31, 2024, were published in Shell’s Annual Report and Accounts, a copy of which was delivered to the Registrar of Companies for England and Wales. The auditor’s report on those accounts was unqualified, did not include a reference to any matters to which the auditor drew attention by way of emphasis without qualifying the report and did not contain a statement under sections 498(2) or 498(3) of the Act.

Key accounting considerations, significant judgements and estimates

Future commodity price assumptions and management’s view on the future development of refining and chemicals margins represent a significant estimate and were subject to change in 2024. These assumptions continue to apply for impairment testing purposes in the first quarter 2025. As per the normal process outlined in the 2024 Annual Report and Accounts and Form 20-F, these assumptions are subject to review later this year.

The discount rates applied for impairment testing and the discount rate applied to provisions are reviewed on a regular basis. Both discount rates applied in the first quarter 2025 remain unchanged compared with 2024.

2. Segment information

With effect from January 1, 2025, segment earnings are presented on an Adjusted Earnings basis (Adjusted Earnings), which is the earnings measure used by the Chief Executive Officer, who serves as the Chief Operating Decision Maker, for the purposes of making decisions about allocating resources and assessing performance. This aligns with Shell’s focus on performance, discipline and simplification.

The Adjusted Earnings measure is presented on a current cost of supplies (CCS) basis and aims to facilitate a comparative understanding of Shell’s financial performance from period to period by removing the effects of oil price changes on inventory carrying amounts and removing the effects of identified items. Identified items are in some cases driven by external factors and may, either individually or collectively, hinder the comparative understanding of Shell’s financial results from period to period.

The segment earnings measure used until December 31, 2024 was CCS earnings. The difference between CCS earnings and Adjusted Earnings are the identified items. Comparative periods are presented below on an Adjusted Earnings basis.

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REVENUE AND ADJUSTED EARNINGS BY SEGMENT
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
			Third-party revenue
9,602	9,294	9,195	Integrated Gas
1,510	1,652	1,759	Upstream
27,083	27,524	30,041	Marketing
21,610	19,992	23,735	Chemicals and Products
9,417	7,808	7,737	Renewables and Energy Solutions
12	10	11	Corporate
69,234	66,281	72,478	Total third-party revenue1
			Inter-segment revenue
2,675	2,024	2,404	Integrated Gas
9,854	9,931	10,287	Upstream
1,849	984	1,355	Marketing
8,255	8,656	10,312	Chemicals and Products
1,164	1,879	1,005	Renewables and Energy Solutions
—	—	—	Corporate
			Adjusted Earnings
2,483	2,165	3,680	Integrated Gas
2,337	1,682	1,933	Upstream
900	839	781	Marketing
449	(229)	1,615	Chemicals and Products
(42)	(311)	163	Renewables and Energy Solutions
(457)	(380)	(368)	Corporate
5,670	3,766	7,804	Total Adjusted Earnings2
5,577	3,661	7,734	Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders
94	106	70	Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest

1.Includes revenue from sources other than from contracts with customers, which mainly comprises the impact of fair value accounting of commodity derivatives.

2.See Reconciliation of income for the period to Adjusted Earnings below.

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Cash capital expenditure is a measure used by the Chief Executive Officer for the purposes of making decisions about allocating resources and assessing performance.



CASH CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BY SEGMENT
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
			Capital expenditure
943	1,123	858	Integrated Gas
1,727	2,205	1,766	Upstream
252	798	427	Marketing
451	1,121	474	Chemicals and Products
358	1,214	421	Renewables and Energy Solutions
17	25	34	Corporate
3,748	6,486	3,980	Total capital expenditure
			Add: Investments in joint ventures and associates
174	214	184	Integrated Gas
197	(117)	244	Upstream
4	13	38	Marketing
7	271	26	Chemicals and Products
30	36	8	Renewables and Energy Solutions
1	4	—	Corporate
413	421	500	Total investments in joint ventures and associates
			Add: Investments in equity securities
—	—	—	Integrated Gas
—	(11)	—	Upstream
—	—	—	Marketing
—	—	—	Chemicals and Products
14	28	10	Renewables and Energy Solutions
—	—	3	Corporate
15	17	13	Total investments in equity securities
			Cash capital expenditure
1,116	1,337	1,041	Integrated Gas
1,923	2,076	2,010	Upstream
256	811	465	Marketing
458	1,392	500	Chemicals and Products
403	1,277	438	Renewables and Energy Solutions
19	30	37	Corporate
4,175	6,924	4,493	Total Cash capital expenditure

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RECONCILIATION OF INCOME FOR THE PERIOD TO ADJUSTED EARNINGS
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
4,780	928	7,358	Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders
95	113	82	Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest
4,875	1,041	7,439	Income/(loss) for the period
(15)	(75)	(360)	Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation
(2)	23	84	Add: Tax on current cost of supplies adjustment
(510)	(3,008)	(1,244)	Less: Identified items adjustment before taxation
301	(230)	(604)	Add: Tax on identified items adjustment
5,670	3,766	7,804	Adjusted Earnings
5,577	3,661	7,734	Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders
94	106	70	Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest

Identified items

The objective of identified items is to remove material impacts on net income/loss arising from transactions which are generally uncontrollable and unusual (infrequent or non-recurring) in nature or giving rise to a mismatch between accounting and economic results, or certain transactions that are generally excluded from underlying results in the industry.

Identified items comprise: divestment gains and losses, impairments and impairment reversals, redundancy and restructuring, fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts that gives rise to a mismatch between accounting and economic results, the impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on certain deferred tax balances, and other items.



Q1 2025	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation
Divestment gains/(losses)	(106)	(1)	154	(57)	(15)	(187)	—
Impairment reversals/(impairments)	(341)	—	(21)	10	(293)	(38)	—
Redundancy and restructuring	(44)	(1)	(15)	(9)	(13)	(9)	4
Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1	194	420	(1)	12	(258)	20	—
Other2	(212)	(70)	4	—	(101)	(46)	—
Total identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation	(510)	348	121	(44)	(679)	(260)	4
Less: Total identified items included in Taxation charge/(credit)	301	43	378	4	(99)	(54)	29
Identified items included in Income/(loss) for the period
Divestment gains/(losses)	(208)	—	8	(61)	(12)	(143)	—
Impairment reversals/(impairments)	(317)	—	(15)	6	(277)	(31)	—
Redundancy and restructuring	(24)	(1)	(5)	(1)	(12)	(7)	2
Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1	187	362	—	7	(202)	20	—
Impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on tax balances3	108	4	132	—	—	—	(28)
Other2	(558)	(59)	(377)	—	(77)	(45)	—
Impact on Adjusted Earnings	(811)	306	(257)	(49)	(581)	(205)	(26)
Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders	(811)	306	(257)	(49)	(581)	(205)	(26)

1.Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts: In the ordinary course of business, Shell enters into contracts to supply or purchase oil and gas products, as well as power and environmental products. Shell also enters into contracts for tolling, pipeline and storage capacity. Derivative contracts are entered into for mitigation of resulting economic exposures (generally price exposure) and these derivative contracts are carried at period-end

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market price (fair value), with movements in fair value recognised in income for the period. Supply and purchase contracts entered into for operational purposes, as well as contracts for tolling, pipeline and storage capacity, are, by contrast, recognised when the transaction occurs; furthermore, inventory is carried at historical cost or net realisable value, whichever is lower. As a consequence, accounting mismatches occur because: (a) the supply or purchase transaction is recognised in a different period; or (b) the inventory is measured on a different basis. In addition, certain contracts are, due to pricing or delivery conditions, deemed to contain embedded derivatives or written options and are also required to be carried at fair value even though they are entered into for operational purposes. The accounting impacts are reported as identified items.

2.Other identified items represent other credits or charges that based on Shell management’s assessment hinder the comparative understanding of Shell’s financial results from period to period.

3.Impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on tax balances represents the impact on tax balances of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments arising on: (a) the conversion to dollars of the local currency tax base of non-monetary assets and liabilities, as well as recognised tax losses (this primarily impacts the Integrated Gas and Upstream segments); and (b) the conversion of dollar-denominated inter-segment loans to local currency, leading to taxable exchange rate gains or losses (this primarily impacts the Corporate segment).



Q4 2024	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation
Divestment gains/(losses)	(288)	(99)	(66)	(216)	42	51	—
Impairment reversals/(impairments)	(2,554)	(523)	(183)	(493)	(288)	(1,065)	(1)
Redundancy and restructuring	(175)	(27)	(62)	(70)	(5)	(11)	(1)
Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1	209	136	(14)	58	(38)	67	—
Other1	(200)	—	(165)	(33)	(2)	—	—
Total identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation	(3,008)	(514)	(491)	(753)	(291)	(958)	(2)
Less: Total identified items included in Taxation charge/(credit)	(230)	(92)	160	(17)	(191)	(43)	(47)
Identified items included in Income/(loss) for the period
Divestment gains/(losses)	(321)	(96)	(51)	(247)	33	40	—
Impairment reversals/(impairments)	(2,170)	(339)	(152)	(458)	(224)	(996)	(1)
Redundancy and restructuring	(115)	(16)	(34)	(52)	(3)	(8)	(1)
Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1	184	109	(4)	46	(17)	50	—
Impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on tax balances1	(210)	(57)	(199)	—	—	—	46
Other1	(147)	(22)	(212)	(25)	113	—	—
Impact on Adjusted Earnings	(2,778)	(421)	(651)	(736)	(99)	(914)	45
Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders	(2,778)	(421)	(651)	(736)	(99)	(914)	45

1.For a detailed description, see the corresponding footnotes to the Q1 2025 identified items table above.

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Q1 2024	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation
Divestment gains/(losses)	10	(3)	27	(15)	(9)	10	—
Impairment reversals/(impairments)	(227)	(8)	(96)	(4)	(178)	59	—
Redundancy and restructuring	(74)	(1)	(13)	(20)	(18)	(15)	(6)
Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1	(1,079)	(1,068)	(2)	6	(416)	400	—
Other1	126	4	38	23	45	16	—
Total identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation	(1,244)	(1,075)	(46)	(11)	(575)	469	(6)
Less: Total identified items included in Taxation charge/(credit)	(604)	(157)	(385)	(4)	(118)	80	(20)
Identified items included in Income/(loss) for the period
Divestment gains/(losses)	(4)	(2)	10	(11)	(7)	6	—
Impairment reversals/(impairments)	(186)	(5)	(102)	(3)	(152)	77	—
Redundancy and restructuring	(53)	(1)	(9)	(15)	(14)	(11)	(4)
Fair value accounting of commodity derivatives and certain gas contracts1	(896)	(887)	—	5	(319)	306	—
Impact of exchange rate movements and inflationary adjustments on tax balances1	403	(27)	412	—	—	—	18
Other1	95	3	28	17	34	12	—
Impact on Adjusted Earnings	(641)	(919)	339	(7)	(458)	390	14
Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to non-controlling interest	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Impact on Adjusted Earnings attributable to Shell plc shareholders	(641)	(919)	339	(7)	(458)	390	14

1.For a detailed description, see the corresponding footnotes to the Q1 2025 identified items table above.

The identified items categories above may include after-tax impacts of identified items of joint ventures and associates which are fully reported within “Share of profit/(loss) of joint ventures and associates” in the Consolidated Statement of Income, and fully reported as identified items included in Income/(loss) before taxation in the table above. Identified items related to subsidiaries are consolidated and reported across appropriate lines of the Consolidated Statement of Income.

3. Earnings per share



EARNINGS PER SHARE
Quarters
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
4,780	928	7,358	Income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders ($ million)

			Weighted average number of shares used as the basis for determining:
6,033.5	6,148.4	6,440.1	Basic earnings per share (million)
6,087.8	6,213.9	6,504.3	Diluted earnings per share (million)

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4. Share capital

ISSUED AND FULLY PAID ORDINARY SHARES OF €0.07 EACH

Number of shares

Nominal value
($ million)

At January 1, 2025

6,115,031,158

510

Repurchases of shares

(98,948,766)

(8)

At March 31, 2025

6,016,082,392

502

At January 1, 2024

6,524,109,049

544

Repurchases of shares

(88,893,999)

(7)

At March 31, 2024

6,435,215,050

537

At Shell plc’s Annual General Meeting on May 21, 2024, the Board was authorised to allot ordinary shares in Shell plc, and to grant rights to subscribe for, or to convert, any security into ordinary shares in Shell plc, up to an aggregate nominal amount of approximately €150 million (representing approximately 2,147 million ordinary shares of €0.07 each), and to list such shares or rights on any stock exchange. This authority expires at the earlier of the close of business on August 20, 2025, or the end of the Annual General Meeting to be held in 2025, unless previously renewed, revoked or varied by Shell plc in a general meeting.

5. Other reserves



OTHER RESERVES
$ million	Merger reserve	Share premium reserve	Capital redemption reserve	Share plan reserve	Accumulated other comprehensive income	Total
At January 1, 2025	37,298	154	270	1,417	(19,373)	19,766
Other comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders	—	—	—	—	1,967	1,967
Transfer from other comprehensive income	—	—	—	—	11	11
Repurchases of shares	—	—	8	—	—	8
Share-based compensation	—	—	—	(663)	—	(663)
At March 31, 2025	37,298	154	279	754	(17,394)	21,090
At January 1, 2024	37,298	154	236	1,308	(17,851)	21,145
Other comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to Shell plc shareholders	—	—	—	—	(1,420)	(1,420)
Transfer from other comprehensive income	—	—	—	—	138	138
Repurchases of shares	—	—	7	—	—	7
Share-based compensation	—	—	—	(426)	—	(426)
At March 31, 2024	37,298	154	244	882	(19,132)	19,445

The merger reserve and share premium reserve were established as a consequence of Shell plc (formerly Royal Dutch Shell plc) becoming the single parent company of Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and The “Shell” Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c., now The Shell Transport and Trading Company Limited, in 2005. The merger reserve increased in 2016 following the issuance of shares for the acquisition of BG Group plc. The capital redemption reserve was established in connection with repurchases of shares of Shell plc. The share plan reserve is in respect of equity-settled share-based compensation plans.

6. Derivative financial instruments and debt excluding lease liabilities

As disclosed in the Consolidated Financial Statements for the year ended December 31, 2024, presented in the Annual Report and Accounts and Form 20-F for that year, Shell is exposed to the risks of changes in fair value of its financial assets and liabilities. The fair values of the financial assets and liabilities are defined as the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. Methods and assumptions used to estimate the fair values at March 31, 2025, are consistent with those used in the year ended December 31, 2024, though the carrying amounts of derivative financial instruments have changed since that date.

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The movement of the derivative financial instruments between December 31, 2024 and March 31, 2025 is a decrease of $732 million for the current assets and a decrease of $1,020 million for the current liabilities.

The table below provides the comparison of the fair value with the carrying amount of debt excluding lease liabilities, disclosed in accordance with IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures.



DEBT EXCLUDING LEASE LIABILITIES
$ million	March 31, 2025	December 31, 2024
Carrying amount1	48,023	48,376
Fair value2	44,240	44,119

1. Shell issued no debt under the US shelf or under the Euro medium-term note programmes during the first quarter 2025.

2. Mainly determined from the prices quoted for these securities.

7. Other notes to the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim Financial Statements

Consolidated Statement of Income

Interest and other income



Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
302	683	907	Interest and other income/(expenses)
			Of which:
481	548	588	Interest income
1	25	23	Dividend income (from investments in equity securities)
(127)	(288)	10	Net gains/(losses) on sales and revaluation of non-current assets and businesses
(137)	267	66	Net foreign exchange gains/(losses) on financing activities
85	131	219	Other

Depreciation, depletion and amortisation



Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
5,441	7,520	5,881	Depreciation, depletion and amortisation
			Of which:
5,130	5,829	5,654	Depreciation
311	1,797	382	Impairments
(1)	(106)	(154)	Impairment reversals

Impairments recognised in the first quarter 2025 of $311 million pre-tax ($287 million post-tax) principally relate to Chemicals and Products.

Impairments recognised in the fourth quarter 2024 of $2,659 million pre-tax ($2,245 million post-tax), of which $1,797 million recognised in depreciation, depletion and amortisation and $863 million recognised in share of profit of joint ventures and associates, mainly relate to Renewables and Energy Solutions ($1,068 million pre-tax; $1,000 million post-tax), Integrated Gas ($532 million pre-tax; $345 million post-tax), Marketing ($495 million pre-tax; $459 million post-tax), Chemicals and Products ($315 million pre-tax; $247 million post-tax) and Upstream ($248 million pre-tax; $194 million post-tax).

Impairments recognised in the first quarter 2024 of $382 million pre-tax ($332 million post-tax) include smaller

impairments in various segments.

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Taxation charge/credit

Quarters

$ million

Q1 2025

Q4 2024

Q1 2024

4,083

3,164

3,604

Taxation charge/(credit)

Of which:

4,024

3,125

3,525

Income tax excluding Pillar Two income tax

Income tax related to Pillar Two income tax

As required by IAS 12 Income Taxes, Shell has applied the exception to recognising and disclosing information about deferred tax assets and liabilities related to Pillar Two income taxes.

Consolidated Statement of Comprehensive Income

Currency translation differences

Quarters

$ million

Q1 2025

Q4 2024

Q1 2024

1,711

(4,899)

(1,995)

Currency translation differences

Of which:

1,618

(5,028)

(1,983)

Recognised in Other comprehensive income

129

(12)

(Gain)/loss reclassified to profit or loss

Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet

Other intangible assets



$ million
	March 31, 2025	December 31, 2024
Other intangible assets	11,365	9,480

The increase in other intangible assets as at March 31, 2025 compared with December 31, 2024 is mainly related to initial recognition at fair value of favourable LNG, gas offtake and sales contracts. These were recognised following completion of the acquisition of Pavilion Energy Pte. Ltd. during the first quarter 2025. The fair value of unfavourable LNG, gas offtake and sales contracts acquired was recognised under trade and other payables.

Assets classified as held for sale



$ million
	March 31, 2025	December 31, 2024
Assets classified as held for sale	10,881	9,857
Liabilities directly associated with assets classified as held for sale	8,001	6,203

Assets classified as held for sale and associated liabilities at March 31, 2025 principally relate to Shell’s UK offshore oil and gas assets in Upstream, mining interests in Canada and an energy and chemicals park in Singapore, both in Chemicals and Products. Upon completion of the sale, Shell’s UK offshore assets will be derecognised in exchange for a 50% interest in a newly formed joint venture.

The major classes of assets and liabilities classified as held for sale at March 31, 2025, are Property, plant and equipment ($8,866 million; December 31, 2024: $8,283 million), Inventories ($1,003 million; December 31, 2024: $1,180 million), Decommissioning and other provisions ($3,228 million; December 31, 2024: $3,053 million), deferred tax liabilities ($2,823 million; December 31, 2024: $2,042 million), Trade and other payables ($1,000 million; December 31, 2024: $484 million) and Debt ($839 million; December 31, 2024: $624 million).

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SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows

Cash flow from operating activities – Other

Quarters

$ million

Q1 2025

Q4 2024

Q1 2024

570

(856)

509

Other

‘Cash flow from operating activities – Other’ for the first quarter 2025 includes $652 million of net inflows (fourth quarter 2024: $1,447 million net outflows; first quarter 2024: $188 million net inflows) due to the timing of payments relating to emission certificates and biofuel programmes in Europe and North America and $255 million in relation to reversal of currency exchange gains on Cash and cash equivalents (fourth quarter 2024: $672 million losses; first quarter 2024: $253 million losses).

Cash flow from investing activities – Other investing cash outflows

Quarters

$ million

Q1 2025

Q4 2024

Q1 2024

(1,394)

(655)

(1,494)

Other investing cash outflows

‘Cash flow from investing activities – Other investing cash outflows’ for the first quarter 2025 includes $818 million secured term loans provided to The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC) upon completion of the sale of SPDC. The first quarter 2024 includes $645 million of debt securities acquired in the Corporate segment.

8. Reconciliation of Operating expenses and Total Debt



RECONCILIATION OF OPERATING EXPENSES
Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
5,549	5,839	5,810	Production and manufacturing expenses
2,840	3,231	2,975	Selling, distribution and administrative expenses
185	331	212	Research and development
8,575	9,401	8,997	Operating expenses

RECONCILIATION OF TOTAL DEBT

March 31, 2025

December 31, 2024

March 31, 2024

$ million

11,391

11,630

11,046

Current debt

65,120

65,448

68,886

Non-current debt

76,511

77,078

79,931

Total debt

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SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE (NON-GAAP) MEASURES

A.Adjusted Earnings, Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (“Adjusted EBITDA”) and Cash flow from operating activities

The “Adjusted Earnings” measure aims to facilitate a comparative understanding of Shell’s financial performance from period to period by removing the effects of oil price changes on inventory carrying amounts and removing the effects of identified items. These items are in some cases driven by external factors and may, either individually or collectively, hinder the comparative understanding of Shell’s financial results from period to period. This measure excludes earnings attributable to non-controlling interest when presenting the total Shell Group result but includes these items when presenting individual segment Adjusted Earnings as set out in the table below.

We define “Adjusted EBITDA” as “Income/(loss) for the period” adjusted for current cost of supplies; identified items; tax charge/(credit); depreciation, amortisation and depletion; exploration well write-offs and net interest expense. All items include the non-controlling interest component. Management uses this measure to evaluate Shell’s performance in the period and over time.



Q1 2025	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Income/(loss) for the period	4,875	2,789	2,080	814	(77)	(247)	(483)
Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation	(15)			52	(67)
Add: Tax on current cost of supplies adjustment	(2)			(14)	12
Less: Identified items	(811)	306	(257)	(49)	(581)	(205)	(26)
Less: Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest	95
Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to non-controlling interest	(1)
Add: Identified items attributable to non-controlling interest	—
Adjusted Earnings	5,577
Add: Non-controlling interest	94
Adjusted Earnings plus non-controlling interest	5,670	2,483	2,337	900	449	(42)	(457)
Add: Taxation charge/(credit) excluding tax impact of identified items	3,784	803	2,619	391	99	63	(191)
Add: Depreciation, depletion and amortisation excluding impairments	5,130	1,404	2,213	566	852	90	6
Add: Exploration well write-offs	28	—	29
Add: Interest expense excluding identified items	1,119	51	200	12	14	2	841
Less: Interest income	481	4	11	—	4	2	461
Adjusted EBITDA	15,250	4,735	7,387	1,869	1,410	111	(261)
Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation	(15)			52	(67)
Joint ventures and associates (dividends received less profit)	(178)	(286)	(159)	203	54	10	—
Derivative financial instruments	(38)	542	14	10	(508)	(169)	73
Taxation paid	(2,900)	(773)	(1,999)	(174)	63	52	(68)
Other	(206)	(68)	(386)	396	125	(17)	(257)
(Increase)/decrease in working capital	(2,663)	(687)	(913)	(344)	(1,081)	380	(19)
Cash flow from operating activities	9,281	3,463	3,945	1,907	130	367	(531)

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1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS



Q4 2024	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Income/(loss) for the period	1,041	1,744	1,031	103	(276)	(1,226)	(335)
Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation	(75)			(2)	(73)
Add: Tax on current cost of supplies adjustment	23			2	21
Less: Identified items	(2,778)	(421)	(651)	(736)	(99)	(914)	45
Less: Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest	113
Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to non-controlling interest	(7)
Add: Identified items attributable to non-controlling interest	—
Adjusted Earnings	3,661
Add: Non-controlling interest	106
Adjusted Earnings plus non-controlling interest	3,766	2,165	1,682	839	(229)	(311)	(380)
Add: Taxation charge/(credit) excluding tax impact of identified items	3,371	635	2,618	266	(198)	97	(46)
Add: Depreciation, depletion and amortisation excluding impairments	5,829	1,440	2,803	587	896	96	8
Add: Exploration well write-offs	649	277	372	—	—	—	—
Add: Interest expense excluding identified items	1,213	54	201	17	16	2	923
Less: Interest income	548	3	—	—	10	7	529
Adjusted EBITDA	14,281	4,568	7,676	1,709	475	(123)	(24)
Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation	(75)			(2)	(73)
Joint ventures and associates (dividends received less profit)	451	110	(22)	172	139	51	—
Derivative financial instruments	319	120	(28)	(8)	230	533	(527)
Taxation paid	(2,910)	(635)	(2,019)	(130)	36	(41)	(120)
Other	(1,461)	114	(486)	(1,227)	(313)	77	375
(Increase)/decrease in working capital	2,407	114	(611)	845	1,394	353	312
Cash flow from operating activities	13,162	4,391	4,509	1,363	2,032	850	16



Q1 2024	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Income/(loss) for the period	7,439	2,761	2,272	896	1,311	553	(354)
Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation	(360)			(153)	(207)
Add: Tax on current cost of supplies adjustment	84			30	54
Less: Identified items	(641)	(919)	339	(7)	(458)	390	14
Less: Income/(loss) attributable to non-controlling interest	82
Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to non-controlling interest	(12)
Add: Identified items attributable to non-controlling interest	—
Adjusted Earnings	7,734
Add: Non-controlling interest	70
Adjusted Earnings plus non-controlling interest	7,804	3,680	1,933	781	1,615	163	(368)
Add: Taxation charge/(credit) excluding tax impact of identified items	4,124	996	2,522	358	338	—	(91)
Add: Depreciation, depletion and amortisation excluding impairments	5,654	1,410	2,727	535	870	106	6
Add: Exploration well write-offs	554	8	546	—	—	—	—
Add: Interest expense excluding identified items	1,163	42	169	12	17	1	922
Less: Interest income	588	—	10	—	14	4	560
Adjusted EBITDA	18,711	6,136	7,888	1,686	2,826	267	(92)
Less: Current cost of supplies adjustment before taxation	(360)			(153)	(207)
Joint ventures and associates (dividends received less profit)	(582)	(197)	(546)	93	56	13	—
Derivative financial instruments	306	(1,080)	(3)	(39)	(402)	1,978	(149)
Taxation paid	(2,616)	(467)	(1,802)	(175)	(19)	(244)	91
Other	(97)	45	(231)	393	(378)	(30)	104
(Increase)/decrease in working capital	(2,752)	275	421	(792)	(2,639)	481	(499)
Cash flow from operating activities	13,330	4,712	5,727	1,319	(349)	2,466	(545)

Identified items

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SHELL PLC
1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS

See Note 2 “Segment information” for details.

B. Adjusted Earnings per share

Adjusted Earnings per share is calculated as Adjusted Earnings (see Reference A), divided by the weighted average number of shares used as the basis for basic earnings per share (see Note 3).

C. Cash capital expenditure

Cash capital expenditure represents cash spent on maintaining and developing assets as well as on investments in the period. Management regularly monitors this measure as a key lever to delivering sustainable cash flows. Cash capital expenditure is the sum of the following lines from the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows: Capital expenditure, Investments in joint ventures and associates and Investments in equity securities.

See Note 2 “Segment information” for the reconciliation of cash capital expenditure.

D. Capital employed and Return on average capital employed

Return on average capital employed (“ROACE”) measures the efficiency of Shell’s utilisation of the capital that it employs.

The measure refers to Capital employed which consists of total equity, current debt, and non-current debt reduced by cash and cash equivalents.

In this calculation, the sum of Adjusted Earnings (see Reference A) plus non-controlling interest (NCI) excluding identified items for the current and previous three quarters, adjusted for after-tax interest expense and after-tax interest income, is expressed as a percentage of the average capital employed excluding cash and cash equivalents for the same period.



$ million	Quarters
	Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
Current debt	11,046	9,931	9,044
Non-current debt	68,886	71,610	76,098
Total equity	188,304	188,362	195,530
Less: Cash and cash equivalents	(39,949)	(38,774)	(42,074)
Capital employed – opening	228,286	231,128	238,598
Current debt	11,391	11,630	11,046
Non-current debt	65,120	65,448	68,886
Total equity	180,670	180,168	188,304
Less: Cash and cash equivalents	(35,601)	(39,110)	(39,949)
Capital employed – closing	221,580	218,134	228,286
Capital employed – average	224,933	224,630	233,442

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1st QUARTER 2025 UNAUDITED RESULTS



$ million	Quarters
	Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
Adjusted Earnings – current and previous three quarters (Reference A)	21,558	23,716	26,338
Add: Income/(loss) attributable to NCI – current and previous three quarters	441	427	295
Add: Current cost of supplies adjustment attributable to NCI – current and previous three quarters	25	14	(24)
Less: Identified items attributable to NCI (Reference A) – current and previous three quarters	18	18	(11)
Adjusted Earnings plus NCI excluding identified items – current and previous three quarters	22,005	24,139	26,620
Add: Interest expense after tax – current and previous three quarters	2,639	2,701	2,718
Less: Interest income after tax on cash and cash equivalents – current and previous three quarters	1,329	1,389	1,368
Adjusted Earnings plus NCI excluding identified items before interest expense and interest income – current and previous three quarters	23,315	25,452	27,971
Capital employed – average	224,933	224,630	233,442
ROACE on an Adjusted Earnings plus NCI basis	10.4%	11.3%	12.0%

E. Net debt and gearing

Net debt is defined as the sum of current and non-current debt, less cash and cash equivalents, adjusted for the fair value of derivative financial instruments used to hedge foreign exchange and interest rate risk relating to debt, and associated collateral balances. Management considers this adjustment useful because it reduces the volatility of net debt caused by fluctuations in foreign exchange and interest rates, and eliminates the potential impact of related collateral payments or receipts. Debt-related derivative financial instruments are a subset of the derivative financial instrument assets and liabilities presented on the balance sheet. Collateral balances are reported under “Trade and other receivables” or “Trade and other payables” as appropriate.

Gearing is a measure of Shell’s capital structure and is defined as net debt (total debt less cash and cash equivalents) as a percentage of total capital (net debt plus total equity).



$ million
	March 31, 2025		December 31, 2024		March 31, 2024
Current debt	11,391		11,630		11,046
Non-current debt	65,120		65,448		68,886
Total debt	76,511		77,078		79,931
Of which: Lease liabilities	28,488		28,702		26,885
Add: Debt-related derivative financial instruments: net liability/(asset)	1,905		2,469		1,888
Add: Collateral on debt-related derivatives: net liability/(asset)	(1,295)		(1,628)		(1,357)
Less: Cash and cash equivalents	(35,601)		(39,110)		(39,949)
Net debt	41,521		38,809		40,513
Total equity	180,670		180,168		188,304
Total capital	222,190		218,974		228,817
Gearing	18.7	%	17.7	%	17.7	%

F. Operating expenses and Underlying operating expenses

Operating expenses

Operating expenses is a measure of Shell’s cost management performance, comprising the following items from the Consolidated Statement of Income: production and manufacturing expenses; selling, distribution and administrative expenses; and research and development expenses.

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Q1 2025	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Production and manufacturing expenses	5,549	947	2,139	349	1,621	486	8
Selling, distribution and administrative expenses	2,840	38	42	2,053	442	153	111
Research and development	185	22	32	42	25	21	43
Operating expenses	8,575	1,006	2,213	2,444	2,088	661	162



Q4 2024	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Production and manufacturing expenses	5,839	982	2,470	270	1,632	480	5
Selling, distribution and administrative expenses	3,231	39	96	2,258	471	241	126
Research and development	331	40	69	73	46	37	66
Operating expenses	9,401	1,061	2,635	2,602	2,149	757	196



Q1 2024	$ million
	Total	Integrated Gas	Upstream	Marketing	Chemicals and Products	Renewables and Energy Solutions	Corporate
Production and manufacturing expenses	5,810	956	2,269	366	1,634	579	5
Selling, distribution and administrative expenses	2,975	62	58	2,188	420	158	89
Research and development	212	26	58	34	34	12	49
Operating expenses	8,997	1,044	2,385	2,587	2,088	749	144

Underlying operating expenses

Underlying operating expenses is a measure aimed at facilitating a comparative understanding of performance from period to period by removing the effects of identified items, which, either individually or collectively, can cause volatility, in some cases driven by external factors.

Quarters

$ million

Q1 2025

Q4 2024

Q1 2024

8,575

9,401

8,997

Operating expenses

(44)

(174)

(73)

Redundancy and restructuring (charges)/reversal

(101)

(88)

—

(Provisions)/reversal

—

130

Other

(121)

(262)

Total identified items

8,453

9,138

9,054

Underlying operating expenses

G. Free cash flow and Organic free cash flow

Free cash flow is used to evaluate cash available for financing activities, including dividend payments and debt servicing, after investment in maintaining and growing the business. It is defined as the sum of “Cash flow from operating activities” and “Cash flow from investing activities”.

Cash flows from acquisition and divestment activities are removed from Free cash flow to arrive at the Organic free cash flow, a measure used by management to evaluate the generation of free cash flow without these activities.

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Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
9,281	13,162	13,330	Cash flow from operating activities
(3,959)	(4,431)	(3,528)	Cash flow from investing activities
5,322	8,731	9,802	Free cash flow
597	805	1,025	Less: Divestment proceeds (Reference I)
45	1	—	Add: Tax paid on divestments (reported under “Other investing cash outflows”)
130	525	62	Add: Cash outflows related to inorganic capital expenditure1
4,899	8,453	8,839	Organic free cash flow2

1.Cash outflows related to inorganic capital expenditure includes portfolio actions which expand Shell’s activities through acquisitions and restructuring activities as reported in capital expenditure lines in the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows.

2.Free cash flow less divestment proceeds, adding back outflows related to inorganic expenditure.

H. Cash flow from operating activities excluding working capital movements

Working capital movements are defined as the sum of the following items in the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows: (i) (increase)/decrease in inventories, (ii) (increase)/decrease in current receivables, and (iii) increase/(decrease) in current payables.

Cash flow from operating activities excluding working capital movements is a measure used by Shell to analyse its operating cash generation over time excluding the timing effects of changes in inventories and operating receivables and payables from period to period.

Quarters

$ million

Q1 2025

Q4 2024

Q1 2024

9,281

13,162

13,330

Cash flow from operating activities

854

131

(608)

(Increase)/decrease in inventories

(2,610)

751

(195)

(Increase)/decrease in current receivables

(907)

1,524

(1,949)

Increase/(decrease) in current payables

(2,663)

2,407

(2,752)

(Increase)/decrease in working capital

11,944

10,755

16,082

Cash flow from operating activities excluding working capital movements

I. Divestment proceeds

Divestment proceeds represent cash received from divestment activities in the period. Management regularly monitors this measure as a key lever to deliver free cash flow.



Quarters			$ million
Q1 2025	Q4 2024	Q1 2024
559	493	323	Proceeds from sale of property, plant and equipment and businesses
33	305	133	Proceeds from joint ventures and associates from sale, capital reduction and repayment of long-term loans
5	6	569	Proceeds from sale of equity securities
597	805	1,025	Divestment proceeds

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CAUTIONARY STATEMENT

All amounts shown throughout this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report are unaudited. All peak production figures in Portfolio Developments are quoted at 100% expected production. The numbers presented throughout this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report may not sum precisely to the totals provided and percentages may not precisely reflect the absolute figures, due to rounding.

The companies in which Shell plc directly and indirectly owns investments are separate legal entities. In this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, “Shell”, “Shell Group” and “Group” are sometimes used for convenience to reference Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general. Likewise, the words “we”, “us” and “our” are also used to refer to Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general or to those who work for them. These terms are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular entity or entities. ‘‘Subsidiaries’’, “Shell subsidiaries” and “Shell companies” as used in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, refer to entities over which Shell plc either directly or indirectly has control. The terms “joint venture”, “joint operations”, “joint arrangements”, and “associates” may also be used to refer to a commercial arrangement in which Shell has a direct or indirect ownership interest with one or more parties. The term “Shell interest” is used for convenience to indicate the direct and/or indirect ownership interest held by Shell in an entity or unincorporated joint arrangement, after exclusion of all third-party interest.

Forward-Looking statements

This Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report contains forward-looking statements (within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) concerning the financial condition, results of operations and businesses of Shell. All statements other than statements of historical fact are, or may be deemed to be, forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are statements of future expectations that are based on management’s current expectations and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in these statements. Forward-looking statements include, among other things, statements concerning the potential exposure of Shell to market risks and statements expressing management’s expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions. These forward-looking statements are identified by their use of terms and phrases such as “aim”; “ambition”; ‘‘anticipate’’; “aspire”, “aspiration”, ‘‘believe’’; “commit”; “commitment”; ‘‘could’’; “desire”; ‘‘estimate’’; ‘‘expect’’; ‘‘goals’’; ‘‘intend’’; ‘‘may’’; “milestones”; ‘‘objectives’’; ‘‘outlook’’; ‘‘plan’’; ‘‘probably’’; ‘‘project’’; ‘‘risks’’; “schedule”; ‘‘seek’’; ‘‘should’’; ‘‘target’’; “vision”; ‘‘will’’; “would” and similar terms and phrases. There are a number of factors that could affect the future operations of Shell and could cause those results to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements included in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, including (without limitation): (a) price fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas; (b) changes in demand for Shell’s products; (c) currency fluctuations; (d) drilling and production results; (e) reserves estimates; (f) loss of market share and industry competition; (g) environmental and physical risks, including climate change; (h) risks associated with the identification of suitable potential acquisition properties and targets, and successful negotiation and completion of such transactions; (i) the risk of doing business in developing countries and countries subject to international sanctions; (j) legislative, judicial, fiscal and regulatory developments including tariffs and regulatory measures addressing climate change; (k) economic and financial market conditions in various countries and regions; (l) political risks, including the risks of expropriation and renegotiation of the terms of contracts with governmental entities, delays or advancements in the approval of projects and delays in the reimbursement for shared costs; (m) risks associated with the impact of pandemics, regional conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the conflict in the Middle East, and a significant cyber security, data privacy or IT incident; (n) the pace of the energy transition; and (o) changes in trading conditions. No assurance is provided that future dividend payments will match or exceed previous dividend payments. All forward-looking statements contained in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report are expressly qualified in their entirety by the cautionary statements contained or referred to in this section. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. Additional risk factors that may affect future results are contained in Shell plc’s Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024 (available at www.shell.com/investors/news-and-filings/sec-filings.html and www.sec.gov). These risk factors also expressly qualify all forward-looking statements contained in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report and should be considered by the reader. Each forward-looking statement speaks only as of the date of this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report, May 2, 2025. Neither Shell plc nor any of its subsidiaries undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement as a result of new information, future events or other information. In light of these risks, results could differ materially from those stated, implied or inferred from the forward-looking statements contained in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report.

Shell’s net carbon intensity

Also, in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report we may refer to Shell’s “net carbon intensity” (NCI), which includes Shell’s carbon emissions from the production of our energy products, our suppliers’ carbon emissions in supplying energy for that production and our customers’ carbon emissions associated with their use of the energy products we sell. Shell’s NCI also includes the emissions associated with the production and use of energy products produced by others which Shell purchases for resale. Shell only controls its own emissions. The use of the terms Shell’s “net carbon intensity” or NCI is for convenience only and not intended to suggest these emissions are those of Shell plc or its subsidiaries.

Shell’s net-zero emissions target

Shell’s operating plan and outlook are forecasted for a three-year period and ten-year period, respectively, and are updated every year. They reflect the current economic environment and what we can reasonably expect to see over the next three and ten years. Accordingly, the outlook reflects our Scope 1, Scope 2 and NCI targets over the next ten years. However, Shell’s operating plan and outlook cannot reflect our 2050 net-zero emissions target, as this target is outside our planning period. Such future operating plans and outlooks could include changes to our portfolio, efficiency improvements and the use of carbon capture and storage and carbon credits. In the future, as society moves towards net-zero emissions, we expect Shell’s operating plans and outlooks to reflect this movement. However, if society is not net zero in 2050, as of today, there would be significant risk that Shell may not meet this target.

Forward-Looking non-GAAP measures

This Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report may contain certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures such as cash capital expenditure and Adjusted Earnings. We are unable to provide a reconciliation of these forward-looking non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile those non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside the control of Shell, such as oil and gas prices, interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, estimating such GAAP measures with the required precision necessary to provide a meaningful reconciliation is extremely difficult and could not be accomplished without unreasonable effort. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future periods which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are calculated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied in Shell plc’s consolidated financial statements.

The contents of websites referred to in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report do not form part of this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report.

We may have used certain terms, such as resources, in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) strictly prohibits us from including in our filings with the SEC. Investors are urged to consider closely the disclosure in our Form 20-F, File No 1-32575, available on the SEC website www.sec.gov.

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This announcement contains inside information.

May 2, 2025


The information in this Unaudited Condensed Interim Financial Report reflects the unaudited consolidated financial position and results of Shell plc. Company No. 4366849, Registered Office: Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, England, UK.

Contacts:

– Sean Ashley, Company Secretary

– Media: International +44 (0) 207 934 5550; U.S. and Canada: https://www.shell.us/about-us/news-and-insights/media/submit-an-inquiry.html

LEI number of Shell plc: 21380068P1DRHMJ8KU70

Classification: Inside Information

Page 31

The MIL Network –

May 2, 2025

MIL-OSI: Golar entered into 20-year agreements for 5.95mtpa nameplate capacity in Argentina – one of the world’s largest FLNG development projects.
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Golar LNG Limited (“GLNG”, “Golar” or “the Company”) is pleased to announce the Final Investment Decision (“FID”) and fulfilment of all conditions precedent for the 20-year re-deployment charter of the FLNG Hilli Episeyo (“FLNG Hilli” or “Hilli”), first announced on July 5, 2024. The vessel will be chartered to Southern Energy S.A. (“SESA”), offshore Argentina. In addition, Golar and SESA have signed definitive agreements for a 20-year charter for the MKII FLNG, currently under conversion at CIMC Raffles shipyard in Yantai, China. The MKII FLNG charter remains subject to FID and the same regulatory approvals as granted to the FLNG Hilli project, expected within 2025.

Key commercial terms for the respective 20-year charter agreements include:
- FLNG Hilli (nameplate capacity of 2.45 MTPA): Expected contract start-up in 2027, net charter hire to Golar of US$ 285 million per year, plus a commodity linked tariff component of 25% of Free on Board (“FOB”) prices in excess of US$ 8/mmbtu.
- MKII FLNG (nameplate capacity of 3.5 MTPA): Expected contract start-up in 2028, net charter hire to Golar of US$ 400 million per year, plus a commodity linked tariff component of 25% of FOB prices in excess of US$ 8/mmbtu.
The two FLNG agreements are expected to add US$ 13.7 billion in earnings backlog to Golar over 20 years, before adjustments (based on US-CPI) to the charter hire and before commodity linked tariff upside. For every US$ 1/mmbtu above the US$ 8/mmbtu, the total upside for Golar will be approximately US$ 100 million when both FLNGs are in operation. Subject to a 3-year notice and payment of a fee, SESA may reduce the term of the agreement to 12 years for the FLNG Hilli and to 15 years for the MKII FLNG.

The commodity linked tariff component is upside oriented. Golar will make 25% of realized FOB prices above a threshold of US$ 8/mmbtu, with no cap to the upside for gas prices. Golar has also agreed to a mechanism where the charter hire can be partially reduced for FOB prices below US$ 7.5/mmbtu down to a floor of US$ 6/mmbtu. Under this mechanism, the maximum accumulated discount over the life of both contracts has a cap of US$ 210 million, and any outstanding discounted charter hire amounts will be repaid through an additional upside sharing if FOB prices return to levels above US$ 7.5/mmbtu. Golar is not exposed to further downside in the commodity linked FLNG charter mechanism.

SESA is a company formed to enable LNG exports from Argentina. SESA is owned by a consortium of leading Argentinian gas producers including Pan American Energy (30%), YPF (25%), Pampa Energia (20%) and Harbour Energy (15%), as well as Golar (10%). The gas producers have committed to supply their pro-rata share of natural gas to the FLNGs under Gas Sales Agreements (“GSA”) at a fixed price per mmbtu before adjustments (based on US-CPI). Golar’s 10% shareholding in SESA provides additional commodity exposure.

The project has received the full support of the National and Provincial Governments in Argentina that granted all necessary approvals including (i) the first ever unrestricted 30-year LNG export authorization in Argentina; (ii) qualification for the Incentive Regime for Large Investments (“RIGI”); and (iii) provincial approval by the province of Río Negro for the offshore and onshore Environmental Impact Assessments for FLNG Hilli.

The FLNGs will be located in close proximity of each other, offshore in the Gulf of San Matias Gulf in the province of Rio Negro, Argentina. The vessels will monetize gas from the Vaca Muerta formation, the world’s second largest shale gas resource, located onshore in the province of Neuquen, Argentina. FLNG Hilli will initially utilize spare volumes from the existing pipeline network. SESA intends to facilitate for a dedicated pipeline to be constructed from Vaca Muerta to the Gulf of San Matias to serve gas supply to the FLNGs. The project expects to benefit from significant operational efficiencies and synergies from two FLNGs in the same area.

Golar’s CEO, Karl Fredrik Staubo commented: “Golar is excited to partner with the leading gas producers in Argentina in establishing the country as an LNG exporter. The vast resources of the Vaca Muerta formation will provide the LNG market with a reliable long-term source of attractive LNG supplies, and a significant contribution to Argentina. For Golar, the project adds robust earnings backlog, attractive commodity upside potential in the FLNG tariff and strong partner alignment through our shareholding in SESA.”

About SESA:
Southern Energy S.A. is a company founded in 2024 for the purpose of LNG exports of Argentinian natural gas. SESA’s shareholders comprise Pan American Energy (30%), YPF (25%), Pampa Energia (20%), Harbour Energy (15%) and Golar LNG Ltd. (10%). SESA will be responsible for procuring natural gas from the domestic market, and facilitating the necessary infrastructure to bring the natural gas to the flange of the FLNGs in the Gulf of San Matias. SESA will also be responsible for the operations of the FLNGs with support from Golar, and for the marketing and sale of the LNG produced.

About Golar LNG Ltd:
Golar LNG Limited (“GLNG”) is a NASDAQ listed maritime LNG infrastructure company. Through its 79-year history, the company has pioneered maritime LNG infrastructure including the world’s first Floating LNG liquefaction terminal (FLNG) and Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) projects based on the conversion of existing LNG carriers. Today Golar is a leading pure play FLNG company, and the only proven provider of FLNG as a service.

FORWARD LOOKING STATEMENTS
This press release contains forward-looking statements (as defined in Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) which reflect management’s current expectations, estimates and projections about its operations. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, that address activities and events that will, should, could or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Words such as “may,” “could,” “should,” “would,” “expect,” “plan,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “forecast,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “propose,” “potential,” “continue,” “subject to” or the negative of these terms and similar expressions are intended to identify such forward-looking statements.

These statements are not guarantees of future performance and are subject to certain risks, uncertainties and other factors, some of which are beyond our control and are difficult to predict. Therefore, actual outcomes and results may differ materially from what is expressed or forecasted in such forward-looking statements. You should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this press release. Golar LNG Limited undertakes no obligation to update publicly any forward-looking statements whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, unless required by applicable law.

Hamilton, Bermuda
2 May 2025

Investor Questions: +44 207 063 7900
Karl Fredrik Staubo – CEO
Eduardo Maranhão – CFO
Stuart Buchanan – Head of Investor Relations

This information is subject to the disclosure requirements pursuant to Section 5-12 the Norwegian Securities Trading Act

The MIL Network –
May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Transnational Narcotics Trafficker Sentenced to 25 Years in Federal Prison

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

Saipan, MP – SHAWN N. ANDERSON, United States Attorney for the Districts of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, announced that Ye Fang, aka “BATU”, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), was sentenced by Chief Judge Ramona V. Manglona in District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands to 25 years imprisonment, after being convicted of Conspiracy to Possess over 500 Grams of Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). The court also ordered 5 years of supervised release and a $100 special assessment fee. He was also ordered to report to immigration officials for deportation proceedings upon release from prison.

Ye Fang arrived in the CNMI from China in 2016 under a tourist visa waiver program. After his waiver term elapsed, he remained on Saipan where he ran a birth tourism business for three years. Ye Fang hosted at least 200 women and their families from China so that pregnant women could give birth on island. He later began trafficking methamphetamine.

In November 2022, CNMI police executed a search warrant at Ye Fang’s home. They seized more than one kilogram of methamphetamine. A CNMI arrest warrant was issued, but Ye Fang remained a fugitive, escaping from Saipan by boat and traveling to Guam in the summer of 2023. From Guam, Ye Fang continued to organize methamphetamine trafficking in the CNMI. In September 2023, he arranged the shipment of methamphetamine hidden inside lava lamps, which were sent to Saipan from California. The packages were intercepted by CNMI Customs, who coordinated with the DEA to conduct a controlled delivery. That resulted in the arrest of co-conspirator Liang Yang, another out of status PRC national. A total of eight pounds of liquid methamphetamine was seized.

Ye Fang eventually fled Guam in November 2023 via commercial airline using the identification of another person. He then traveled to Palau, where he organized the murder of another PRC citizen. In January 2024, Ye Fang and three others were arrested in Palau for that crime. Ye Fang pled guilty to manslaughter in March 2024 and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. In May 2024, he was extradited to the CNMI where he pled guilty to the lava lamp drug scheme.

“Law enforcement has brought Ye Fang’s Indo-Pacific crime spree to an end,” stated United States Attorney Anderson. “He will now serve many years in a United States prison with other high-risk offenders. Every day of his sentence is day made safer for the people of the CNMI. We will continue to use our resources to combat transnational criminals and protect our communities from perpetrators of violent crime.”

“Methamphetamine is potent and highly addictive. This synthetic stimulant has contributed to the overdose crisis facing America. DEA, along with federal and international partners, are in lockstep in our commitment to combat drug networks,” said Anthony Chrysanthis, Deputy Special Agent in Charge of the DEA Los Angeles Field Division, which oversees Saipan. “We will vehemently pursue all criminals who flood our communities with this poison.”

“Today’s sentencing is the direct result of sustained commitment and collaboration between the FBI and our law enforcement partners,” said FBI Honolulu Special Agent in Charge David Porter. “Mr. Fang led a violent, transnational narcotics trafficking organization; his crimes significantly contributed to the ongoing drug epidemic facing America and plaguing our island communities. The FBI—standing in resolve with our local, state, and federal partners—is prepared to confront and disrupt these dangerous criminal organizations, wherever they may operate.”

“The conviction of Mr. Fang is a testament to HSI’s enduring commitment to keep harmful substances out of Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Island,” said Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent in Charge Lucy Cabral-DeArmas. “Understanding the damage that illegal narcotics do to our communities, we will stop at nothing to hold those accountable for their contributions to drug trafficking within our islands.”

“As the law enforcement and security arm of the U.S. Postal Service, the safety of postal employees and the public is our top priority,” said Inspector in Charge Stephen Sherwood of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. “Anyone who misuses the U.S. Postal Service will be held accountable for their actions. I would like to thank our federal and local law enforcement partners, including our task force partners from the Guam Customs and Quarantine Agency, Guam Police Department, and Army National Guard Counterdrug Program.”

This investigation was led by the Drug Enforcement Administration with the support from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, U.S. Marshal Service for extradition, CNMI Customs, CNMI Department of Public Safety, Republic of Palau Bureau of Public Safety, and in collaboration with the CNMI Attorney General’s Office, the Department of Justice Office of International Affairs, and the Republic of Palau.

Assistant United States Attorney Albert S. Flores, Jr., and former Assistant United States Attorney Ashley Kost prosecuted this case in the District of the Northern Mariana Islands.

This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) and Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN).

MIL Security OSI –

May 2, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Keith Rankin Analysis – The Great World War 1914-1945: Germany, Russia, Ukraine

Analysis by Keith Rankin.

Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

On Anzac Day we remembered World War One and World War Two, or at least the peripheral little bits of those imperial wars that New Zealand was involved in. There was and is little context given to how New Zealand got involved with such far-away wars which need never have become world wars. There were the usual cliches about ‘our’ young men, invading the Ottoman Empire, somehow fighting for freedom and democracy; and, through making ‘supreme sacrifices’, establishing the invaders’ national identities. There was very little context about what these anti-German and anti-Japanese wars were really about, and on why we thought anybody could possibly benefit from Aotearoa New Zealand contributing in its own small way to their escalation.

The Great World War 1914-1945

If we step back, we can see that there was really only one very big war; best dubbed as The Great World War 1914-1945 (the GWW, which itself morphed into another in 1945, The Cold War 1945-1990).

The Great World War is really the 1914 to 1945 Russo-German War, embedded in a wider state of conflict that might be called The Great Imperial War.

The subsequent Cold War, essentially the ‘great hegemonic war’, reframed world war; from 1945 it was between the United States imperium and the Communist powers of Russia and China; it was a ‘proxy war’ rather than a passive-aggressive ‘cold war’. The years 1991 to 2021 may prove to have been an intermission, just as 1919 to 1939 was an intermission in the Great World War; and noting that, in the GWW, Russia and Germany became ‘Communist’ and ‘Nazi’ during that intermission. The most important early ‘hot’ conflict in the Cold War was the Korean War, a deadly proxy conflict – at its core between the ‘Anti-Communist’ United States and ‘Communist’ China – ending as a ‘score-draw’; an armistice in 1953 which took the hostile parties back to an almost identical position as to where they started in 1950. For the second phase of the Great Hegemonic War, the ‘Communist’ factor was waned; the prevailing ideology in the west in 2025 is a distorted form of self-congratulatory ‘democratic imperialism’, not unlike the prevailing ideology in the west in 1914.

By looking at 1914 to 1945 in this way, as a single albeit complex conflict, we can more easily see that the essence of the struggle was a conflict between the waxing German and Russian Empires; and that the central prizes of that conflict were the Russian imperial territories of Ukraine and the Caucasus, and the waning Ottoman Empire: food, oil and sea-access in the strategic pivot of central Eurasia.

All (except one) of the world’s ‘great’ empires of the early twentieth century became involved: the waxing empires of Germany, Russia, Japan, and the United States of America; and the waning empires of United Kingdom, France, Ottoman Türkiye, Austria-Hungary and Netherlands. And the would-be empire of Italy. (The exception was the empire of Portugal, a neutral party; in 1898 the United States had acquired Spain’s remnant empire.)

The Result of the Great World War

Wikipedia has page entries for every war ever fought in reality or mythology. And the Wikipedia format likes to give a binary result, as if a war was a series of football matches with a grand finale. Winners and losers. It’s not like that in reality: most wars formally end in an armistice; albeit an armistice in which one party – one nation or coalition of nations – has an advantage and is largely able to dictate terms.

The core war within the Great World War was the Russo-German War, which ended in 1945 with a victory to Russia; then Rusia was the imperium of the ‘Communist’ Soviet Union. The victor of the wider Great Imperial War was the United States; Imperator Americanus inherited a beaten-up world, much as Emperor Augustus inherited the Roman Empire in 27 BCE after about two decades of strife between warring would-be overlords.

The Great World War began in 1914, essentially as the Third Balkan War. The reasons this local war expanded from a part of the world politically and geographically distant from the British Empire – the empire of which New Zealand understood itself to be an integral part – related to a contested set of quasi-scientific socio-economic and supremacist utopias (which will only be addressed here in passing), and to a basic reality that an expansionist western ‘civilisation’ was confronting diminished returns.

Possibly the most important and least understood year of the whole GWW was 1918. The context here is that Russia – Germany’s new great foe, the Russian Empire – had been defeated late in 1917, following both a successful democratic revolution (the February Revolution) and a German-facilitated ‘Communist’ ‘Bolshevik’ coup d’etat (the October Revolution). The formality of Russian defeat – the Brest-Litovsk Treaty – was signed by Leon Trotsky in March 1918. The problem for Germany was that there was still an unresolved western front, there was a British naval blockade of Germany, and that the United States had been persuaded in 1917 to enter the war as an Entente power. Nevertheless, in March 1918, the Germans were winning on the western front having already settled the more-important eastern front; but Germany had no thought-through exit strategy. They were in no position to occupy Belgium, let alone France.

After the trench warfare stalemate that had characterised the western front for more than three years, it was Germany that broke through in the winter of 1917/18; indeed, Germany advanced to just-about big-gun-firing distance from Paris. The western powers were in a state of panic, as Germany redeployed soldiers from the eastern front to the west.

The United States had entered the war in France, but their soldiers were green and initially of little help against battle-hardened Germans. But the American soldiers, without realising the significance, had brought with them a secret weapon, influenza. (The deadly strain of influenza in 1918 – popularly known as the Spanish Flu – was almost certainly a hybrid of the Kansas strain and an Asian strain already in France.) The tide of the war only turned against Germany in August 1918, mainly due to economic limitations but also due in some part to soldiers getting very sick. The sickness had a bigger military impact on Germany, given that Germany’s soldiers (including one A. Hitler) were more hardened fighters than the Americans.

Germany went from winners to losers only in the last three months, from August to November 1918; it was like a basketball game in which defeat was snatched from the jaws of victory (or vice versa, from a western viewpoint!). But they were never losers in the absolute sense that they later were, in 1945. On 11 November 1918, Germany settled for an armistice in which they were on the back foot. It was not an absolute defeat, and should never have been seen as such. Nevertheless, that sensible armistice came to be treated by the Entente Powers (especially France, the United Kingdom and the United States) as an absolute victory; Germany, victor over Russia, was subsequently treated with great and unnecessary humiliation, creating the seeds for a resumption of the Great World War. Part of that humiliation was the stripping of the territories in the incipient Soviet Union that had been won by Germany (especially the loss of Ukraine); another important part was the imposition of a ‘Polish Corridor’, through Eastern Germany to the Baltic Sea at the then-German city of Danzig, physically dividing Germany.

A third humiliation was a set of reparations that were imposed using similar mercantilist logic to that which is upsetting the world economic order today; Germany was supposed to pay France in particular huge amounts of gold, but the only way Germany could acquire that gold was for Germany to run a trade surplus and for the Entente Powers to run trade deficits. But the ‘victorious’ powers wanted to run trade surpluses, not trade deficits; they wanted Germany to increase its debt to the west while claiming that they wanted Germany to pay off its debt to the west.

(Today, the United States wants its Treasury to accumulate treasure in the same way that it and France sought to do in the 1920s, not realising that the countries they want to extract ‘modern treasure’ from – China and the European Union – can only get that treasure if they run trade surpluses. The great ‘modern treasure’ mine is actually in Washington, not in Eurasia.)

One result of all this mercantilism imposed upon the 1920s’ world order by the liberal Entente powers was the Great Depression; that was probably the number-one catalyst towards the resumption of the Great World War in 1939 and the Russo-German War in 1941. This ‘liberal mercantilism’ was the first of the pseudo-scientific utopias to fail. Other aggravating factors were the intensification of the contradictions of the other two ‘scientific utopias’: the unachievable ‘Communist’ experiment in Russia, and the exacerbation of the supremacist eugenics which was widely subscribed to throughout Europe and which reached their apotheosis in Hitler’s Germany.

A defeated Russia played no part in the formal hostilities of the GWW in 1918. Likewise, when the Great World War resumed in 1939, Russia appeared to be on the sideline; though that’s another story. The true nature of the resumed GWW – known as World War Two in the west – became apparent in June 1941. The war continued for nearly four terrible years, with Soviet Russia prevailing over Nazi Germany in 1945, with some help from the western powers. Russia will celebrate Victory Day in a few days on 9 May; the end of the Russo-German War, though the Great World War continued until 15 August of that year. As regards the result of the Russo-German War, the western Entente powers were kingmakers rather than kings.

Overall, freedom and democracy were casualties of the GWW, not outcomes. By 1950, there were many more unfree people in the world, and few (India notwithstanding) who were more free than they had been in 1913. Indians’ post-GWW freedoms came at a huge cost in damaged and lost lives. And they were freedoms from Britain, not freedoms fought for by Britain.

Ukraine

Chief among the territories won-and-lost by Germany was Ukraine. Considered in its entirety, Ukraine was the number-one prize and the number-one battleground of the Great World War.

The territory of Ukraine had been occupied by Germany for five years: 1918, and 1941 to 1944. In 1918, Germany lost Ukraine because of events on the western front; in 1945 the Soviet Union recovered Ukraine on the battlefield. Soviet Russia was helped by three imperial nations throughout the active phases of the GWW; by the British, the French, and the Americans. Otherwise, Germany – the Prussian Empire – would have almost certainly prevailed in its quest for Ukraine, and the oilfields around the Caspian Sea (and possibly the so-called ‘Middle East’, though that may have been permanently lost to Germany in 1918).

With Ukraine once again being centre-stage in geopolitics – the contested ground between conflicting quasi-academic narratives – the world may be set for a resumption of both the Cold War (especially in its mercantilist Sino-American guise) and the Russo-German war. Together, these have the makings of ‘World War Three’; especially if we add in the Levantine conflict, the present supremacist conflict in the ‘Middle East’.

In the geopolitics of early 2025, the ‘elephant in the room’ is Friedrich Merz, who will (eventually!) become Chancellor of Germany on 6 May. Merz is a military hawk, who has already shown all the signs that he would like to take the Ukraine War to Russia (ref. Berlin Briefing, DW, 24 April 2015), and elite public opinion in Germany seems to be staunchly ‘pro-Ukraine’. In the event of a new global Great Depression – or the Geoeconomic Chaos Crisis that seems to be starting – could Merz become the new Führer, a ‘willing’ militarist leader of the Fourth Reich? At age 69 he’s a young man compared to Donald Trump, and he looks to be fighting fit. Germany has many of the same issues today that it had in 1910 and in 1930; a people seeking to re-flex their nationalist muscles while severely constrained, within their German and EU boundaries, in terms of natural resources. Will Merz try to shore up (and militarize) the flagging European Union, much as Trump has been trying (unsuccessfully to be sure) to unite the whole of the Americas under his triumphalist banner? (Q. How do you get to run a small superpower? A. Get yourself a large superpower, and wait.) The battle for Ukraine may have a while to run yet; possibly as a European ‘civil’ war, a new Russo-German War.

Anzac Day

My sense is that if there’s one thing that Aotearoa’s post-2023 leadership are even more attracted to than fiscal austerity, then that’s a good geopolitical scrap. We start to see war as glorious rather than ugly. We bring out all the false clichés and narratives, we extoll the likes of Winston Churchill, we self-suppress the inconvenient truth that war is a nasty, nasty, nasty business; indeed, we self-suppress this truth even when we see war’s brutality – or could see it if we choose to watch Freeview Channel 20 – unfolding every day.

Now that the 80th anniversary of the Great World War has nearly passed, Anzac Day risks becoming a day of martial geo-nationalism, and not a day of remembrance.

Anzac Day has already become a day of highly selective remembrance; probably it always was. I visited Würzburg (the German firebombed city that suffered more than any other on a per capita basis) in 1974, and I visited West and East Berlin (via Checkpoint Charlie) that same year. I visited Arras in 1975, near to where my father’s first cousin died in November 1918. I visited Derry and Belfast in 1976, cities in a then-active civil war zone. I visited the magnificently-sited Khartoum in 1978, now the capital-centre of the world’s most complicit and under-narrated tragedy. I visited Cassino in 1984, the 40th anniversary of the battles that pointlessly took so many lives, including Kiwi lives such as that of my mother’s first cousin. I visited Dandong and Seoul in 2008, gaining a first-hand insight into the Korean War, including a walk on the American-destroyed bridge and an oversight of the North Korean city of Sinuiju. (And I visited Port Arthur – Lüshun – key site and sight of the Russia-Japan War of 1905, with its natural harbour and its extant Russian train station.)

And in 2014, on the day after Anzac Day, I visited Nagasaki, site of the first plutonium bomb ever dropped over a city; and, that same month, I visited Ginza and Asakusa in Tokyo, rebuilt sites of the worst example every of a conventional fire holocaust; 100,000 mostly civilian deaths in one March night eighty years ago. (I was also lucky to get to walk through unbombed streets to the northwest of Ueno Park, getting a sense of what the neighbourhoods of Asakusa were once like.)

Lest we forget. Mostly, we have forgotten. (Including the worst of The Holocaust. Who commemorates Treblinka today? Or Minsk? Only Poland and Russia and Belarus.)

Our amnesia extends to one place New Zealanders fought in. This week Al Jazeera has done a series of news vignettes and a longer documentary, to remember the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War. This anniversary has not been prominent in New Zealand’s Anzac Day media-scape. (RNZ did run a Reuters-syndicated website-only story on 30 April: Vietnamese celebrate 50 years since end of Vietnam War. And, to its credit, TV3 News ran an overseas-sourced story yesterday, not a story about New Zealand’s largely-forgotten participation.) By-and-large, the still-living anti-Vietnam-War generation is now silent, apparently forgetful.

When martial narratives are not sufficiently contested, then wars – big wars – happen, almost by accident. That’s how the Great World War began in the first place.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Rosanna Law visits Riyadh

Source: Hong Kong Information Services

Secretary for Culture, Sports & Tourism Rosanna Law, after concluding her trip in the United Arab Emirates, commenced her visit to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Miss Law paid a courtesy call on Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary of the People’s Republic of China to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Chang Hua. She briefed Mr Chang on her visit to the UAE during the last three days, noting that the trip combined cultural exploration and artistic exchange, fostering a deeper understanding of the country’s inclusive values.

After remarking that the visit marked a promising beginning for strengthening mutual ties between Hong Kong and the UAE, particularly in enhancing cultural dialogue, Miss Law shared with Mr Chang the latest initiatives aimed at boosting tourism in Hong Kong, and emphasised the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s interest in Hong Kong’s horse racing tourism.

In the afternoon, she met Diriyah Gate Development Authority Chief Marketing Officer Kiran Haslam. In addition to exchanging views on cultural heritage preservation, they explored potential investment and business opportunities. Miss Law also toured the At-Turaif UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Earlier in the day, she visited the Saudi National Museum where she viewed artistic and historical exhibits.

Miss Law departed for Hong Kong tonight.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai meets Japan’s LDP Youth Division delegation

Source: Republic of China Taiwan

Details
2025-04-29
President Lai meets NBR delegation
On the morning of April 29, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation from the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). In remarks, President Lai stated that as Taiwan stands at the very frontline of defense of global democracy, we are actively implementing our Four Pillars of Peace action plan, which includes continuing to enhance our national defense capabilities, demonstrating our commitment to defending freedom and democracy. The president said he hopes to further advance national security and industrial cooperation between Taiwan and the United States. He also expressed hope that this will help boost economic resilience for both sides and establish each as a key pillar of regional security, elevating our relations to even higher levels. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I am delighted to meet with Admiral John Aquilino again today. I also warmly welcome NBR President Michael Wills and our distinguished guests from the bureau to Taiwan. I look forward to exchanging views with you all on Taiwan-US relations and the regional situation. During his tenure as commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Aquilino placed much attention on the Taiwan Strait issue. And the NBR has conducted a wealth of research and analysis focusing on matters of regional security. Thanks to all of your outstanding contributions and efforts, the international community has gained a better understanding of the role Taiwan plays in the Indo-Pacific region and in global democratic development. For this, I want to extend my deepest gratitude. Taiwan stands at the very frontline of defending global democracy and is located at a strategically important location in the first island chain. We are actively implementing our Four Pillars of Peace action plan, which includes continuing to enhance our national defense capabilities, building economic security, demonstrating stable and principled cross-strait leadership, and standing side-by-side with the democratic community to jointly demonstrate the strength of deterrence and safeguard regional peace and stability. At the beginning of this month, I announced an increase in military allowances for volunteer service members and combat troops. The government will also continue to reform national defense and enhance self-sufficiency in defense. In addition, we will prioritize special budget allocations to ensure that Taiwan’s defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP. These efforts continue to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities and demonstrate our commitment to defending freedom and democracy. As we mark the 46th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, we thank the US government for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan and strengthening the Taiwan-US partnership over the years. We believe that, in addition to engaging in military exchanges and cooperation, Taiwan and the US can build an even closer economic and trade relationship, boosting each other’s economic resilience and establishing each as a key pillar of regional security. I expect that your continued assistance will help advance national security and industrial cooperation between Taiwan and the US, elevating our relations to even higher levels. Once again, I welcome our distinguished guests to Taiwan and wish you a pleasant and successful trip. I hope that through this visit, you gain a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding of Taiwan’s economy and national defense. Admiral Aquilino then delivered remarks, thanking the Ministry of National Defense for the invitation and President Lai for receiving and spending time with them. Mentioning that this is his second visit in five months, he said he continues to be incredibly impressed with the president’s leadership and the actions he has taken to secure Taiwan and defend its people. Admiral Aquilino said that he has watched the efforts of the ministers on whole-of-society defense to demonstrate deterrence and added that the pace of the work is nothing short of inspiring. Admiral Aquilino noted that Taiwan’s thriving democracy is incredibly important to the peace and stability of the region. He stated that he, alongside the NBR, will continue to offer support, noting that President Wills and his team are an asset to Taiwan and the US that helps continue our close relationship and ensure peace and stability in the region.

Details
2025-04-28
President Lai meets Japanese Diet Member and former Minister of State for Economic Security Takaichi Sanae
On the afternoon of April 28, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Member of the Japanese House of Representatives and former Minister of State for Economic Security Takaichi Sanae. In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of Japan for repeatedly emphasizing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait at important international venues. The president expressed hope that in the face of China’s continually expanding red supply chains, Taiwan and Japan can continue to cooperate closely in such fields as semiconductors, energy, and AI technology to create non-red supply chains that enhance economic resilience and industrial competitiveness for both sides, and jointly pave the way for further prosperity and growth in the Indo-Pacific region. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: First, I would like to extend a warm welcome to Representative Takaichi as she returns for another visit to Taiwan. I am also very happy to have Members of the House of Representatives Kikawada Hitoshi and Ozaki Masanao, and Member of the House of Councillors Sato Kei all gathered together here to engage in these very important exchanges. Our visitors will be taking part in many exchange activities during this trip. Earlier today at the Indo-Pacific Strategy Thinktank’s International Political and Economic Forum, Representative Takaichi delivered a speech in which she clearly demonstrated the great importance she places upon the friendship between Taiwan and Japan. For this I want to express my deepest appreciation to each of our guests. The peoples of Taiwan and Japan have a deep friendship and mutual trust. We have a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights, but beyond that, we both have striven to contribute to regional peace and stability. I also want to thank the government of Japan for repeatedly emphasizing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait at important international venues. Tomorrow you will all make a trip to Kaohsiung to visit a bronze statue of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who once said, “If Taiwan has a problem, then Japan has a problem.” We will always remember the firm support and friendship he showed Taiwan. Since taking office last year, I have worked hard to improve Taiwan’s whole-of-society defense resilience and implement our Four Pillars of Peace action plan. By strengthening our national defense capabilities, building up economic security, demonstrating stable and principled cross-strait leadership, and deepening partnerships with democratic countries including Japan, we can together maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and across the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, in the face of China’s continually expanding red supply chains, we hope that Taiwan and Japan, as important economic and trade partners, can continue to cooperate closely in such fields as semiconductors, energy, and AI technology to create non-red supply chains that further enhance economic resilience and industrial competitiveness for both sides. Going forward, Taiwan will work hard to play an important role in the international community and contribute its key strengths. I hope that, with the support of our guests, Taiwan can soon accede to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and sign an economic partnership agreement (EPA) with Japan so that we can jointly pave the way for further prosperity and growth in the Indo-Pacific region. Lastly, I thank each of you once again for taking concrete action to support Taiwan. I am confident that your visit will help deepen Taiwan-Japan ties and create even greater opportunities for cooperation. Let us all strive together to keep propelling Taiwan-Japan relations forward. Representative Takaichi then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai and Taiwanese political leaders for the warm hospitality they extended to the delegation, and mentioning that the visiting delegation members are all like-minded partners carrying on the legacy of former Prime Minister Abe. July 8 this year will mark the third anniversary of the passing of former Prime Minister Abe, she said, and when the former prime minister unfortunately passed away, President Lai, then serving as vice president, was among the first to come offer condolences, for which she expressed sincere admiration and gratitude. Representative Takaichi stated that Taiwan and Japan are island nations that face the same circumstances and problems, and that Japan’s trade activities rely heavily on ocean transport, so once a problem arises nearby that threatens maritime shipping lanes, it will be a matter of life and death for Japan. Taiwan and Japan are similar, as once a problem arises, both will face food and energy security issues, and supply chains may even be threatened, she said. Regarding Taiwan-Japan cooperation, Representative Takaichi stated that both sides must first protect and strengthen supply chain resilience. President Lai has previously said that he wants to turn Taiwan into an AI island, she said, and in semiconductors, Taiwan has the world’s leading technology. Representative Takaichi went on to say that Taiwan and Japan can collaborate in the fields of AI and semiconductors, quantum computing, and dual-use industries, as well as in areas such as drones and new energy technologies to build more resilient supply chains, so that if problems arise, we can maintain our current standard of living with peace of mind. Representative Takaichi indicated that cooperation in the defense sector is also crucial, and that by uniting like-minded countries including Taiwan, the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, and even countries in Europe, we can build a stronger network to jointly maintain our security guarantees. Representative Takaichi expressed hope that Taiwan and Japan will continue to strengthen substantive non-governmental relations, including personnel exchange visits and information sharing, so that we can jointly face and respond to crises when they arise. Regarding the hope to sign a Taiwan-Japan EPA that President Lai had mentioned earlier, she also expressed support and said she looks forward to upcoming exchanges and talks. The visiting delegation also included Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Taipei Office Chief Representative Katayama Kazuyuki.

Details
2025-04-23
President Lai delivers remarks at International Holocaust Remembrance Day event
On the afternoon of April 23, President Lai Ching-te attended an International Holocaust Remembrance Day event and delivered remarks, in which he emphasized that peace is priceless, and war has no winners, while morality, democracy, and respect for human rights are powerful forces against violence and tyranny. The president stated that Taiwan will continue to expand cooperation with democratic partners and safeguard regional and global peace and stability, defending democracy, freedom, and human rights. He said we must never forget history, and must overcome our differences and join in solidarity to ensure that the next generations live in a world that is more just and more peaceful. Upon arriving at the event, President Lai heard a testimony from the granddaughter of a Holocaust survivor, followed by a rabbi’s recitation of the prayer “El Maleh Rachamim.” He then joined other distinguished guests in lighting candles in memory of the victims. A transcript of President Lai’s remarks follows: To begin, I want to thank the Israel Economic and Cultural Office (ISECO) in Taipei, German Institute Taipei, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs for co-organizing this deeply significant memorial ceremony again this year. I also want to thank everyone for attending. We are here today to remember the victims of the Holocaust, express sympathy for the survivors, honor the brave individuals who protected the victims, and acknowledge all who were impacted by this atrocity. It was deeply moving to hear Ms. [Orly] Sela share the story of how her grandmother, Yehudit Biksz, escaped the Nazi regime. I want to thank her specially for traveling so far to attend this event. From the 1930s through World War II, the Nazi regime sought to exclude Jewish people from society. In their campaign, they perpetrated systematic genocide driven by their ideology. Policies and directives under the authoritarian Nazi regime resulted in the deaths of approximately 6 million Jews. Millions of others were persecuted, including Romani people, persons with disabilities, the gay community, and anyone who disagreed with Nazi ideology. It is one of the darkest chapters in human history. Many countries, including Taiwan, have enacted anti-massacre legislation, and observe a remembrance day each year. Those occasions help us remember the victims, preserve historical memory, and most importantly, reinforce our resolve to fight against hatred and discrimination. Twenty-three years ago, Chelujan (車路墘) Church in Tainan founded the Taiwan Holocaust Memorial Museum. It is the first Jewish museum in Taiwan, and the second Holocaust museum in Asia. Its founding mission urges us to forget hatred and love one another; put an end to war and advocate peace. Many of the exhibition items come from Jewish people, connecting Taiwan closer with Israel and helping Taiwanese better understand the experiences of Jewish people. In this way, we grow to more deeply cherish peace. When I was mayor of Tainan, I took part in an exhibition event at Chelujan Church. I was also invited by the Israeli government to join the International Mayors Conference in Israel, where I visited the World Holocaust Remembrance Center. I will never forget how deeply that experience moved me, and as a result, peace and human rights became even more important issues for me. These issues are valued by Taiwan and our friends and allies. They are also important links connecting Taiwan with the world. Peace is priceless, and war has no winners. We will continue to expand cooperation with democratic partners and safeguard regional and global peace and stability. We will also continue to make greater contributions and work with the international community to defend democracy, freedom, and human rights. This year also marks the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. However, we still see wars raging around the world. We see a resurgence of authoritarian powers, which could severely impact global democracy, peace, and prosperous development. Today’s event allows for more than reflection on the past; it also serves as a warning for the future. We are reminded of the threats that hatred, prejudice, and extremism pose to humanity. But we are also reminded that morality, democracy, and respect for human rights are powerful forces against violence and tyranny. We must never forget history. We must overcome our differences and join in solidarity for a better future. Let’s work together to ensure that the next generations live in a world that is more just and more peaceful. Also in attendance at the event were Member of the Israeli Knesset (parliament) and Taiwan friendship group Chair Boaz Toporovsky, ISECO Representative Maya Yaron, and German Institute Taipei Deputy Director General Andreas Hofem.

Details
2025-04-23
President Lai pays respects to Pope Francis
On the morning of April 23, President Lai Ching-te visited the Taipei Archdiocesan Curia to pay respects in a memorial ceremony for His Holiness Pope Francis. As officiant of the ceremony, President Lai burned incense and presented flowers, fruits, and wine to pay his respects to Pope Francis. At the direction of the master of ceremonies, the president then bowed three times in front of Pope Francis’s memorial portrait, conveying his grief and deep respect for the late pope. After hearing of Pope Francis’s passing on April 21, President Lai promptly requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to express sincere condolences from the people and government of Taiwan to the Vatican. The president also instructed Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) to convey condolences to the Holy See’s Apostolic Nunciature in Taiwan.

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2025-04-23
President Lai meets US CNAS NextGen fellows
On the morning of April 23, President Lai Ching-te met with fellows from the Shawn Brimley Next Generation National Security Leaders Program (NextGen) run by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of the United States for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan over the years, supporting Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capabilities and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The president pointed out that we will promote our “Taiwan plus one” policy, that is, new arrangements for Taiwan plus the US, and form a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to expand investment and bring about even closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, allowing us to reduce the trade deficit and generate development that benefits both sides. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: Ms. Michèle Flournoy, chair of the CNAS Board of Directors, is a good friend of Taiwan, and she has made major contributions to Taiwan-US relations through her long-time efforts on various aspects of our cooperation. I am happy to welcome Chair Flournoy, who is once again leading a NextGen Fellowship delegation to Taiwan. CNAS is a prominent think tank focusing on US national security and defense policy based in Washington, DC. Its NextGen Fellowship has fostered talented individuals in the fields of national security and foreign affairs. This year’s delegation is significantly larger than those of the past, demonstrating the increased importance that the next generation of US leaders attach to Taiwan. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I extend my sincerest welcome to you all. The Taiwan Strait, an issue of importance for our guests, has become a global issue. There is a high degree of international consensus that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are indispensable elements in global security and prosperity. Facing military threats from China, Taiwan proposed the Four Pillars of Peace action plan. First, we are actively implementing military reforms, enhancing whole-of-society defense resilience, and working to increase our defense budget to more than 3 percent of GDP. Second, we are strengthening our economic resilience. As Taiwan’s economy must keep advancing, we can no longer put all our eggs in one basket. We are taking action to remain firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence and marketing worldwide. In these efforts, we are already seeing results. Third, we are standing side-by-side with other democratic countries to demonstrate the strength of deterrence and achieve our goal of peace through strength. And fourth, Taiwan is willing, under the principles of parity and dignity, to conduct exchanges and cooperate with China towards achieving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This April 10 marked the 46th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. We thank the US government for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan over the years, supporting Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capabilities and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. We look forward to Taiwan and the US continuing to strengthen collaboration on the development of both our defense industries as well as the building of non-red supply chains. This will yield even more results and further deepen our economic and trade partnership. The US is now the main destination for outbound investment from Taiwan. Moving forward, we will promote our “Taiwan plus one” policy, that is, new arrangements for Taiwan plus the US. And our government will form a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to expand investment. We hope this will bring Taiwan-US economic and trade cooperation even closer and, through mutually beneficial assistance, allow us to generate development that benefits both our sides while reducing our trade deficit. In closing, thank you once again for visiting Taiwan. We hope your trip is fruitful and leaves you with a deep impression of Taiwan. We also hope that going forward you continue supporting Taiwan and advancing even greater development for Taiwan-US ties. Chair Flournoy then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for making time to receive their delegation. Referring to President Lai’s earlier remarks, she said that it is quite an impressive group, as past members of this program have gone on to become members of the US Congress, leading government experts, and leaders in the think-tank world and in the private sector. She remarked that investing in this group is a wonderful privilege for her and that they appreciate President Lai’s agreeing to take the time to engage in exchange with them. Chair Flournoy emphasized that they are visiting Taiwan at a critical moment, when there is so much change and volatility in the geostrategic environment, a lot of uncertainty, and a lot of unpredictability. She stated that given our shared values, our shared passion for democracy and human rights, and our shared interests in peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, this is an important time for dialogue, collaboration, and looking for additional opportunities where we can work together towards regional peace and stability.

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2025-04-06
President Lai delivers remarks on US tariff policy response
On April 6, President Lai Ching-te delivered recorded remarks regarding the impact of the 32 percent tariff that the United States government recently imposed on imports from Taiwan in the name of reciprocity. In his remarks, President Lai explained that the government will adopt five response strategies, including making every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations, adopting a support plan for affected domestic industries, adopting medium- and long-term economic development plans, forming new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements, and launching industry listening tours. The president emphasized that as we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and expressed hope that all parties, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: My fellow citizens, good evening. The US government recently announced higher tariffs on countries around the world in the name of reciprocity, including imposing a 32 percent tariff on imports from Taiwan. This is bound to have a major impact on our nation. Various countries have already responded, and some have even adopted retaliatory measures. Tremendous changes in the global economy are expected. Taiwan is an export-led economy, and in facing future challenges there will inevitably be difficulties, so we must proceed carefully to turn danger into safety. During this time, I want to express gratitude to all sectors of society for providing valuable opinions, which the government regards highly, and will use as a reference to make policy decisions. However, if we calmly and carefully analyze Taiwan’s trade with the US, we find that last year Taiwan’s exports to the US were valued at US$111.4 billion, accounting for 23.4 percent of total export value, with the other 75-plus percent of products sold worldwide to countries other than the US. Of products sold to the US, competitive ICT products and electronic components accounted for 65.4 percent. This shows that Taiwan’s economy does still have considerable resilience. As long as our response strategies are appropriate, and the public and private sectors join forces, we can reduce impacts. Please do not panic. To address the reciprocal tariffs by the US, Taiwan has no plans to adopt retaliatory tariffs. There will be no change in corporate investment commitments to the US, as long as they are consistent with national interests. But we must ensure the US clearly understands Taiwan’s contributions to US economic development. More importantly, we must actively seek to understand changes in the global economic situation, strengthen Taiwan-US industry cooperation, elevate the status of Taiwan industries in global supply chains, and with safeguarding the continued development of Taiwan’s economy as our goal, adopt the following five strategies to respond. Strategy one: Make every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations using the following five methods: 1. Taiwan has already formed a negotiation team led by Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun (鄭麗君). The team includes members from the National Security Council, the Office of Trade Negotiations, and relevant Executive Yuan ministries and agencies, as well as academia and industry. Like the US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement, negotiations on tariffs can start from Taiwan-US bilateral zero-tariff treatment. 2. To expand purchases from the US and thereby reduce the trade deficit, the Executive Yuan has already completed an inventory regarding large-scale procurement plans for agricultural, industrial, petroleum, and natural gas products, and the Ministry of National Defense has also proposed a military procurement list. All procurement plans will be actively pursued. 3. Expand investments in the US. Taiwan’s cumulative investment in the US already exceeds US$100 billion, creating approximately 400,000 jobs. In the future, in addition to increased investment in the US by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, other industries such as electronics, ICT, petrochemicals, and natural gas can all increase their US investments, deepening Taiwan-US industry cooperation. Taiwan’s government has helped form a “Taiwan investment in the US” team, and hopes that the US will reciprocate by forming a “US investment in Taiwan” team to bring about closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, jointly creating a future economic golden age. 4. We must eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade. Non-tariff barriers are an indicator by which the US assesses whether a trading partner is trading fairly with the US. Therefore, we will proactively resolve longstanding non-tariff barriers so that negotiations can proceed more smoothly. 5. We must resolve two issues that have been matters of longstanding concern to the US. One regards high-tech export controls, and the other regards illegal transshipment of dumped goods, otherwise referred to as “origin washing.” Strategy two: We must adopt a plan for supporting our industries. For industries that will be affected by the tariffs, and especially traditional industries as well as micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises, we will provide timely and needed support and assistance. Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) and his administrative team recently announced a package of 20 specific measures designed to address nine areas. Moving forward, the support we provide to different industries will depend on how they are affected by the tariffs, will take into account the particular features of each industry, and will help each industry innovate, upgrade, and transform. Strategy three: We must adopt medium- and long-term economic development plans. At this point in time, our government must simultaneously adopt new strategies for economic and industrial development. This is also the fundamental path to solutions for future economic challenges. The government will proactively cooperate with friends and allies, develop a diverse range of markets, and achieve closer integration of entities in the upper, middle, and lower reaches of industrial supply chains. This course of action will make Taiwan’s industrial ecosystem more complete, and will help Taiwanese industries upgrade and transform. We must also make good use of the competitive advantages we possess in such areas as semiconductor manufacturing, integrated chip design, ICT, and smart manufacturing to build Taiwan into an AI island, and promote relevant applications for food, clothing, housing, and transportation, as well as military, security and surveillance, next-generation communications, and the medical and health and wellness industries as we advance toward a smarter, more sustainable, and more prosperous new Taiwan. Strategy four: “Taiwan plus one,” i.e., new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements: While staying firmly rooted in Taiwan, our enterprises are expanding their global presence and marketing worldwide. This has been our national economic development strategy, and the most important aspect is maintaining a solid base here in Taiwan. We absolutely must maintain a solid footing, and cannot allow the present strife to cause us to waver. Therefore, our government will incentivize investments, carry out deregulation, and continue to improve Taiwan’s investment climate by actively resolving problems involving access to water, electricity, land, human resources, and professional talent. This will enable corporations to stay in Taiwan and continue investing here. In addition, we must also help the overseas manufacturing facilities of offshore Taiwanese businesses to make necessary adjustments to support our “Taiwan plus one” policy, in that our national economic development strategy will be adjusted as follows: to stay firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence, strengthening US ties, and marketing worldwide. We intend to make use of the new state of supply chains to strengthen cooperation between Taiwanese and US industries, and gain further access to US markets. Strategy five: Launch industry listening tours: All industrial firms, regardless of sector or size, will be affected to some degree once the US reciprocal tariffs go into effect. The administrative teams led by myself and Premier Cho will hear out industry concerns so that we can quickly resolve problems and make sure policies meet actual needs. My fellow citizens, over the past half-century and more, Taiwan has been through two energy crises, the Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis, and pandemics. We have been able to not only withstand one test after another, but even turn crises into opportunities. The Taiwanese economy has emerged from these crises stronger and more resilient than ever. As we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and I hope that all parties in the legislature, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. Let us join together and give it our all. Thank you.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

May 2, 2025

MIL-OSI New Zealand: Research – Latest insolvency report urges Kiwi business owners to heed early warning signs

Source: BWA Insolvency

Latest insolvency figures reveal a sharp rise in business failures, highlighting both challenges and opportunities for New Zealand business owners.

The BWA Insolvency Quarterly Market Report released today shows insolvency rates between January and March 2025 surged by 31% compared to the same period in the previous year. Liquidations rose by 40%, while receiverships and voluntary administrations saw a decline.

The report’s author, BWA Insolvency principal Bryan Williams, says that despite the data there is a path forward for those with strategic foresight.

“These numbers, while concerning, serve as a crucial alert for business owners to review their financial strategies,” Williams says.

Key Data
NZ Insolvencies Q1 2025 vs. Q1 2024 – Annual Comparison

Liquidations: Up from 504 to 705 (40%)
Receiverships: Down from 40 to 39 (-3%)
Voluntary Administrations: Down from 25 to 4 (-84%)
Total Insolvencies: Up from 569 to 748 (31%)

NZ Insolvencies Q1 2025 vs. Q4 2024 – Quarterly Comparison

Liquidations: Up from 666 to 705 (5.86%)
Receiverships: Up from 37 to 39 (5.41%)
Voluntary Administrations: Down from 6 to 4 (-33.33%)
Total Insolvencies: Up from 709 to 748 (5.5%)

Williams says the rise is partially attributed to global economic factors, including trade instabilities and market uncertainties, but is also a carryover of COVID-19 and the accumulated debt that resulted.

“Insolvency is always late to the party. It has a long incubation period and often doesn’t show itself until the conditions that caused it have moved on.”

Williams believes that amid rising insolvency rates, companies should remain vigilant in looking for ways to minimise the impact of the current turbulence. “Hedge against the potential for risk wherever and whenever you can,” he says. “By identifying warning signs early, businesses can adapt and thrive despite the economic pressures.”

Industries hit hardest in the last quarter were tourism, transport and delivery, construction and manufacturing. The construction industry has seen continued high rates of business failures, with this quarter’s figures showing no reprieve—insolvencies increased by 44%, up from 130 in Q1 2024 to 187 in Q1 2025.

“Companies with solid balance sheets can expect to ride out the challenges immediately ahead. Focusing on efficiency and innovation will be the wet weather coat for these companies.”

Acknowledging the impact of the current “arm wrestle” between the United States and China, Williams hopes both parties will soon recognise that fighting it out may cost more than it will gain.

“The best that can be hoped for is that leaders will pull back and let their respective societies grow as they will. The interplay of global tensions and local economic factors means New Zealand businesses must be agile and prepared. Our current insolvency figures are a reflection of these broader issues.”

Looking ahead, Williams believes there are reasons to be optimistic: “Though the short-term outlook remains challenging, New Zealand’s inherent resilience and adaptability are its greatest assets.

“Even one or two major projects within the country can dramatically shift business optimism, reinvigorating growth and opportunity,” he says. “Such developments can serve as a catalyst for broader economic revival.

“There is a road of turbulence ahead and this will damage plans that were made during more stable times. The effects will be universal and avoiding them will be like a rally driver trying to avoid potholes.

“Businesses that stay nimble, focus on core strengths, and prepare for future opportunities will be well-positioned when stability returns.”

The full Quarterly Market Report is available here: https://bwainsolvency.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/BWA_Insolvency-Market-Report_Q1-2025_FINAL.pdf

About BWA Insolvency
BWA Insolvency is a leading insolvency firm that supports New Zealand businesses through liquidations, receiverships and voluntary administrations (VA), specialising in VA in particular. Founder Bryan Williams has 30 years’ experience in the industry and has recently become just the second person in New Zealand and one of 200 people worldwide to be named a Fellow of global insolvency organisation Insol International.

About the BWA Insolvency Quarterly Market Report
BWA Insolvency has been tracking data on liquidations, receiverships and voluntary administrations since 2012. The Registrar of Companies Office records the filings of companies that have gone into a formal state of insolvency. BWA Insolvency then does a deeper investigation to show industry trends and provide a detailed snapshot of what’s happening in the market for the Quarterly Market Report.

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

May 2, 2025

MIL-Evening Report: ER Report: A Roundup of Significant Articles on EveningReport.nz for May 2, 2025

ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on May 2, 2025.

Unexpected humour and reflections on a complex past: my top 5 films from the 2025 German Film Festival
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Claudia Sandberg, Senior Lecturer, Technology in Culture and Society, The University of Melbourne Foreign audiences often associate German cinema with tragedy, trauma and death. Certainly, major historical events such as the second world war and the Fall of the Berlin Wall — cornerstones of German film —

Explainer: what mental health support do refugees and asylum seekers get in Australia?
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Philippa Specker, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Refugee Trauma and Recovery Program, School of Psychology, UNSW Sydney PeopleImages.com – Yuri A/Shutterstock When Australia signed the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention, it committed to providing protection to people who have fled war, persecution and human rights violations. Refugees

Dark money: Labor and Liberal join forces in attacks on Teals and Greens for Australian election
Teals and Greens are under political attack from a new pro-fossil fuel, pro-Israel astroturfing group, adding to the onslaught by far-right lobbyists Advance Australia for Australian federal election tomorrow — World Press Freedom Day. Wendy Bacon and Yaakov Aharon investigate. SPECIAL REPORT: By Wendy Bacon and Yaakov Aharon On February 12 this year, former prime

How the US ‘war on woke’ and women risks weakening its own military capability
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Bethan Greener, Associate Professor of Politics, Te Kunenga ki Pūrehuroa – Massey University US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth during a visit with Michigan Air National Guard troops, April 29. Getty Images With US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s “proud” cancellation this week of the military’s Women, Peace

What are the symptoms of measles? How long does the vaccine last? Experts answer 6 key questions
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Phoebe Williams, Paediatrician & Infectious Diseases Physician; Senior Lecturer & NHMRC Fellow, Faculty of Medicine, University of Sydney fotohay/Shutterstock So far in 2025 (as of May 1), 70 cases of measles have been notified in Australia, with all states and territories except Tasmania and the Australian Capital

Logging devastated Victoria’s native forests – and new research shows 20% has failed to grow back
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Maldwyn John Evans, Senior Research Fellow, Fenner School of Environment and Society, Australian National University Old growth mountain ash forest in the Maroondah water supply catchment, Victoria. Chris Taylor Following the end of native logging in Victoria on January 1 2024, the state’s majestic forests might be

Schools today also teach social and emotional skills. Why is this important? And what’s involved?
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kristin R. Laurens, Professor, School of Psychology and Counselling, Queensland University of Technology DGLImages/Shutterstock The school curriculum has changed a lot from when many parents and grandparents were at school. Alongside new approaches to learning maths and increasing attention on technology, there is a compulsory focus on

As Dutton champions nuclear power, Indigenous artists recall the profound loss of land and life that came from it
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Josephine Goldman, Sessional Academic, School of Languages and Cultures, Discipline of French and Francophone Studies, University of Sydney Opposition Leader Peter Dutton’s promise to power Australia with nuclear energy has been described by experts as a costly “mirage” that risks postponing the clean energy transition. Beyond this,

Grattan on Friday: Key markers on the bumpy road to this election
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra When we look back, we can see the road to election day has had a multitude of signposts, flashing red lights, twists, turns and potholes. Some came before the formal campaign; others in the final countdown days; some have been

NZ doctors defend nationwide strike action over recruitment
By Ruth Hill, RNZ News reporter Striking senior New Zealand doctors have hit back at the Health Minister’s attack on their union for “forcing” patients to wait longer for surgery and appointments, due to their 24-hour industrial action. Respiratory and sleep physician Dr Andrew Davies, who was on the picketline outside Wellington Regional Hospital, said

Gallery: Doctors, health workers challenge NZ government over national crisis
Asia Pacific Report Thousands of senior hospital doctors and specialists walked off the job today for an unprecedented 24-hour strike in protest over stalled contract negotiations and thousands of other health workers protested across Aotearoa New Zealand against the coalition government’s cutbacks to the public health service Te Whatu Ora. In spite of the disruptive

The Coalition’s costings show some savings, but a larger deficit than Labor in the first two years
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Stephen Bartos, Professor of Economics, University of Canberra The Coalition’s policy costings have been released, just two days ahead of the federal election. The costings show the Coalition would run up a larger budget deficit than Labor in the first two years of government, but make a

Tourism to the US is tanking. Flight Centre is facing a $100m hit as a result
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Anita Manfreda, Senior Lecturer in Tourism, Torrens University Australia Doubletree Studio/Shutterstock Flight Centre, one of the world’s largest travel agencies, has warned it could lose more than A$100 million in earnings this year, citing weakening demand for travel to the United States. In a statement to the

The rise of right-wing Christian populism and its powerful impact on Australian politics
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Elenie Poulos, Adjunct Fellow, Macquarie University As Australians cast pre-poll votes in record numbers, it is not only political parties and candidates who are trying to influence votes. Australian Christian Right (ACR) groups have produced “scorecards” that rate party policies according to so-called Christian values. And they

Election quiz: have you been paying attention?
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Digital Storytelling Team, The Conversation We’re at the tail end of five weeks of intense campaigning for the federal election. The major and minor parties, as well as independents, have thrown a slew of policies at the Australian people, most of which we’ve catalogued in our Policy

Major YouGov poll has Labor easily winning a majority of seats in election
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adrian Beaumont, Election Analyst (Psephologist) at The Conversation; and Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne A YouGov MRP poll has Labor clearly winning a majority of seats in the federal election – 84 of the 150 seats in the House of Representatives.

Which medications are commonly prescribed for autistic people and why?
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Hiran Thabrew, Senior Lecturer in Child Psychiatry and Paediatrics, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau Arlette Lopez/Shutterstock Autism is a neurodevelopmental condition. Someone may have social and communication differences, sensory issues and/or restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour or interests. There has been increased awareness and an expanded

How do candidates skirt Chinese social media bans on political content? They use influencers
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Fan Yang, Research fellow at Melbourne Law School, the University of Melbourne and the ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society., The University of Melbourne This election, social media has been a major battleground as candidates try to reach younger voters. As Gen Z and

Who would win in a fight between 100 men and 1 gorilla? An evolutionary expert weighs in
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Renaud Joannes-Boyau, Professor in Geochronology and Geochemistry, Southern Cross University Hung Hung Chih/Shutterstock The internet’s latest absurd obsession is: who would win in a no-rules fight between 100 average human men and one adult male gorilla? This hypothetical and strange question has taken over Reddit, TikTok, YouTube

The global costs of the US-China tariff war are mounting. And the worst may be yet to come
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kai He, Professor of International Relations, Griffith University The United States and China remain in a standoff in their tariff war. Neither side appears willing to budge. After US President Donald Trump imposed massive 145% tariffs on Chinese imports in early April, China retaliated with its own

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Australia: International visitors flock to Greater Bendigo

Source: New South Wales Ministerial News

International visitors are spending more money and staying longer in the Bendigo Loddon region, according to the latest figures from Tourism Australia.

New data for the year ending 2024 shows the region is almost back to pre-pandemic international tourist numbers and smashing international visitor spend records.

There were 27,000 overnight international visitors compared to 16,000 in 2023. This is a 68 per cent increase. International visitor spending has significantly increased to $37 million, compared to $14 million ten years ago.

City of Greater Bendigo Manager Economy & Experience James Myatt said the Bendigo Loddon region was a key destination of choice for international tourists visiting Victoria.

“It is fantastic to see more people from overseas coming to the region and spending a lot more time here,” Mr Myatt said.

“We know that international visitors are drawn to our Gold Rush heritage, arts and cultural experiences, farm stays, beautiful natural landscapes, and food and wine offerings.

“Popular attractions amongst international visitors include Bendigo Tramways, Central Deborah Gold Mine, The Great Stupa, Bendigo Art Gallery, Bendigo Pottery, Dumawul Tours, and the Golden Dragon Museum.

“Greater Bendigo is also a key destination on the Sydney Melbourne Inland Discovery drive, a self-drive touring route promoted primarily in the United States, UK, Europe, and New Zealand tourism markets throughout the year.

“Over the past ten years, the City has focused on attracting and marketing major events and developing highly engaging destination marketing and activation campaigns.

“The figures show strong growth in the international market and people want to visit Greater Bendigo for the range of experiences we offer all year round.

“The survey results prove our strategies are working. The passion and commitment from many tourism operators contribute to this very positive trend.”

The City has hosted over 50 travel agents from across the world over the past nine months, giving them the opportunity to experience attractions firsthand. That knowledge is shared with their teams and potential visitors from their countries.

The City held a training session with Visit Victoria earlier this year to guide local tourism and service operators on how to attract international visitors.

Key destination campaigns, such as the tulip displays during Bloom and major events like the Bendigo Easter Festival are promoted to Melbourne’s Indian and Chinese communities, attracting families and their visiting friends and relatives from overseas.

The Greater Bendigo region is being represented at the Australian Tourism Exchange (ATE) this week in Brisbane, the largest international trade show hosted by Tourism Australia. Over 100 meetings are organised with media and travel agents from around the world to promote Greater Bendigo’s unique visitor destination offerings. For the first time, representatives from Greater Bendigo have also been invited to showcase Agri-tourism experiences in the region.

“We see some great opportunities to build business at ATE with key decision makers who promote Australia across the world. In particular, our focus is on attracting visitation from the UK, Europe, New Zealand, India, China and South East Asia markets,” Mr Myatt said.

Tourism Research Australia is the country’s leading provider of quality tourism intelligence across both international and domestic markets. Their data underpins government tourism policy and helps improve the performance of the tourism industry for the benefit of the Australian community.

MIL OSI News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI China: South China Sea enters annual fishing moratorium

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

GUANGZHOU, May 1 — At noon on Thursday, South China Sea waters north of the 12th parallel north entered a three-and-a-half-month annual fishing moratorium, according to China Coast Guard.

The South China Sea branch of China Coast Guard, in conjunction with marine fishery law enforcement departments and public security authorities in Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan, has launched a special law enforcement operation for the 2025 South China Sea fishing moratorium to ensure its effective implementation.

Before the moratorium began, task forces boarded fishing boats and patrolled docks to make known relevant laws and regulations to local fishermen, ensuring that all boats were returned to port, all crew members came ashore and all fishing nets were stored. Law enforcement vessels have also been dispatched to patrol the jurisdictional waters to establish a strict presence from the start of the moratorium.

MIL OSI China News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Park built on Yuanmou ape-man archaeological site opens to public

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

KUNMING, May 1 — A park built on the Yuanmou ape-man archaeological site in southwest China’s Yunnan Province opened to the public on Thursday.

Located in the Chuxiong Yi Autonomous Prefecture, the park aims to become an integrated cultural space where visitors can experience millions of years of human history.

The Yuanmou ape-man site, located on a hillside about 200 meters from Danawu Village in Yuanmou County, was where two fossils of ancient human teeth were discovered in 1965. These fossils date back some 1.7 million years.

The park has a planned total area of over 370 hectares and is being developed in three phases. “We will strive to build the park into a comprehensive base that integrates paleogeological research and education, the scientific exploration of human origins, and the in-depth study of prehistoric cultural development,” said Zhang Wenwang, head of the prefecture.

Gao Xing, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Vertebrate Paleontology and Paleoanthropology, said that the Yuanmou ape-man and culture were significant discoveries of ancient human remains in China. They are the first chapters in China’s elementary and middle school history textbooks, and an important testament to the survival and evolution of the early Homo erectus in East Asia.

Also on Thursday, an event marking the 60th anniversary of the discovery of the Yuanmou ape-man site was held in the county. Scholars and researchers from diverse fields convened to discuss topics such as human migration tracing, Paleolithic archaeology, site value transformation and digital cultural innovation.

MIL OSI China News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI China: China’s space station delivers new samples for research

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

BEIJING, May 1 — The latest samples from 25 scientific experiments conducted aboard China’s Tiangong space station, totaling approximately 37.25 kilograms, were brought back to Earth on Wednesday.

Marking the eighth batch of experimental materials from the orbiting laboratory, the samples were brought back to Earth aboard the Shenzhou-19 return capsule. According to a news release from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) on Thursday, the returned materials originated from experiments in space life sciences, materials science and new space technologies.

The time-sensitive samples from the space life science experiments were swiftly transported from the landing site to Beijing. At around 9:40 p.m. on Wednesday, following an inspection by the Technology and Engineering Center for Space Utilization under the CAS, the samples were handed over to scientists for further research.

The biological samples comprise 20 different types, the largest variety ever returned during the operational phase of the space station. They include bone cells, human stem cells, bronchial epithelial cells, human and animal embryos, protein samples, and fruit flies, according to the CAS.

Researchers will analyze these samples to explore key questions, such as the cellular mechanisms behind bone loss in space, the impact of microgravity on the growth and maintenance of human stem cells, and the role of space radiation in cancer development.

Studies will also explore how the space environment affects early mammalian embryonic development and alters protein structure-function relationships in microgravity. Additional experiments involving fruit flies will investigate their adaptation to the unique conditions of space.

The findings are expected to offer crucial data and theoretical support for safeguarding human health during space missions, while also potentially contributing valuable insights to medical research on Earth.

Materials science samples, including tungsten alloys, high-strength steel, specialized crystals, semiconductor materials, lunar soil reinforcement compounds and novel lubricants, are scheduled to be transported to Beijing later.

This research also aims to support the development of next-generation materials for a range of advanced applications — including jet engine components, deep-ultraviolet lithography, lunar construction, large deployable space structures such as flexible solar arrays, and durable space lubricants — all of which are vital for future deep-space exploration, according to the CAS.

MIL OSI China News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI China: 3 cruise ships berth simultaneously at Tianjin Port on 1st day of May Day holiday

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

3 cruise ships berth simultaneously at Tianjin Port on 1st day of May Day holiday

Updated: May 2, 2025 08:17 Xinhua

An aerial drone photo shows three cruise ships berthing at Tianjin International Cruise Home Port in north China’s Tianjin Municipality, May 1, 2025. Tianjin International Cruise Home Port welcomed the simultaneous berthing of three international cruise ships on the first day of the May Day holiday, which was the first time since its resumption of operations. According to statistics, on May 1, the number of inbound and outbound passengers reached nearly 15,000, with over 400 travelers applying for visa-free entry with a period of 240 hours. [Photo/Xinhua]

Tourists exchange currency at Tianjin International Cruise Home Port in north China’s Tianjin Municipality, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

A foreign tourist poses for photos with a performer at Tianjin International Cruise Home Port in north China’s Tianjin Municipality, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Tourists line up to pass through passenger clearance procedures at Tianjin International Cruise Home Port in north China’s Tianjin Municipality, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Tourists line up at Tianjin International Cruise Home Port in north China’s Tianjin Municipality, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Passengers line up for embarkation procedures at Tianjin International Cruise Home Port in north China’s Tianjin Municipality, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

An aerial drone photo shows three cruise ships berthing at Tianjin International Cruise Home Port in north China’s Tianjin Municipality, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

This photo shows the waiting hall of Tianjin International Cruise Home Port in north China’s Tianjin Municipality, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

An aerial drone photo shows three cruise ships berthing at Tianjin International Cruise Home Port in north China’s Tianjin Municipality, May 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

MIL OSI China News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Tuberville, Colleagues Push to Revitalize Domestic Nuclear Shipbuilding

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Alabama Tommy Tuberville

WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-AL) joined his Republican colleagues on the Senate Armed Services Committee in urging President Trump to fully implement the Shipbuilder Accountability and Workforce Support (SAWS) proposal to accelerate domestic nuclear shipbuilding, including at Austal USA in Mobile. The Biden administration previously rejected this proposal, which would be the largest shipbuilding deal in American history.

“SAWS consolidates over $100 billion in past and future submarine contracts into a coordinated negotiation,” the senators wrote. “This proposal will maximize your leverage, allowing you to gain concessions from industry that would be unattainable through piecemeal approaches. By redirecting unspent funds, it delivers an immediate a pay raise for 45,000 shipbuilders, accelerates nuclear submarine production, and frees $5.7 billion from the last continuing resolution to support your Office of Shipbuilding. It will also help draw innovative tech firms into the maritime industrial base. A potential repayment of $5 to $8 billion arises only decades later if nuclear shipbuilding is shut down. This historical deal—the largest defense negotiation ever—will create a stronger Navy, a thriving workforce, and support the reindustrialization of America.”

The SAWS proposal would return attack submarine production to two per year instead of the current rate of 1.2 submarines per year and give a pay raise to 45,000 blue-collar shipbuilders. As Alabama’s voice on the Senate Armed Services Committee and Chairman of the SASC Subcommittee on Personnel, Senator Tuberville has long advocated for bolstering our U.S. Navy, especially as China’s shipbuilding capacity continues to outpace our own.

Complete text of the senators’ letter to President Trump can be found here.

Senator Tommy Tuberville represents Alabama in the United States Senate and is a member of the Senate Armed Services, Agriculture, Veterans’ Affairs, HELP and Aging Committees.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Shaheen Grills Armed Services Nominees on Effectiveness of Women, Peace and Security Law Hegseth is Attempting to Scrap; Nominees Affirm Program’s Importance
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen

**In Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, Shaheen highlighted how senior military officials have underscored the strategic advantage WPS provides**

(Washington, DC) – As Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth attempts to “end” implementation of the bipartisan Women, Peace and Security (WPS) law at the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), a top member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), spoke in a SASC nomination hearing this morning about the operational value WPS provides in countering China and Russia, preventing radicalization by violent extremist organizations and disrupting the smuggling of narcotics, weapons and humans into the United States. Shaheen pressed the nominees on the effectiveness of the program – all of whom reaffirmed its importance. You can watch Senator Shaheen’s remarks and questions here.

Key quotes from Senator Shaheen:
- “Since that time, WPS has been used by the warfighters to identify victims of human trafficking, in joint exercises on noncombatant evacuations, to provide human intelligence on violent extremist groups like ISIS and Al-Shabaab and to understand the human terrain to improve kinetic and non-kinetic targeting. I’m very concerned that taking away these tools does not make us a stronger or more lethal fighting force, and in fact it takes away some of the options we have to be successful.”
- “Secretary Hegseth also claimed that warfighters hate it, and yet the newly-confirmed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs not only told this committee about WPS’s operational value, but he was very clear that this is not DEI.”
- “This is information that’s not new to this committee. Every 4-star combatant commander has told us about the strategic advantage that WPS provides to our forward deployed forces.”
During the hearing, Shaheen raised a memo made public in an article last night from the Joint Staff providing their best military advice to Secretary Hegseth. The memo acknowledged that China and Russia have no equivalent of WPS, and that the combatant commands’ engagements with partners over the next two years under the program “counter China by gaining access to a population China largely ignores.”

In 2017, Shaheen led the bipartisan Women, Peace and Security law through Congress to prioritize the promotion of women’s participation in foreign policy and national security efforts, such as conflict prevention, peace negotiations and democratic institutions. Women’s participation in peace negotiations increases the probability by 35 percent of agreements lasting at least 15 years.

After Shaheen’s bill passed the Republican-led Senate by unanimous consent and was approved by the Republican-led U.S. House of Representatives, President Trump signed the bipartisan legislation into law in October 2017. Members of President Trump’s current cabinet were integral to its passage through Congress – Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem was the sponsor of the bill in the U.S. House of Representatives, Secretary of State Marco Rubio was an original cosponsor in the Senate and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz chaired the House WPS caucus for many years.

In a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing earlier this month on Lieutenant General John D. Caine’s nomination to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Caine told Shaheen about how WPS is a program that provides operational advantage for the U.S. military – not DEI.
MIL OSI USA News –
May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Cortez Masto Introduces Bipartisan Legislation to Combat Rising Tech Threat from China

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Nevada Cortez Masto

Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.) and Jim Risch (R-Idaho) introduced the Partner with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Act. This bipartisan bill would enhance cooperation with key partners in technology and scientific research, while combating the rising influence of the Chinese Communist Party.

“Communist China is using illegal practices to gain an unfair advantage in the tech world,” said Senator Cortez Masto. “Now is the time to stand together with our allies and partners across the globe to counter these aggressive tactics. This commonsense, bipartisan legislation will make our country more secure and spur job-creating technology innovations here at home.”

The Partner with ASEAN, CERN, and PIF Act amends the International Organizations Immunities Act to expand diplomatic privileges and immunities to these three international organizations. It provides the legal authorities to streamline the movement of people and materials between these organizations and the U.S., deepening U.S. ties with Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, and a key scientific research partner.

You can find the full text of the legislation here.

Senator Cortez Masto has led efforts in Congress to stand up to the Chinese government’s aggression. She introduced the PASS Act to ban individuals and entities controlled by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea from purchasing agricultural land and businesses located near U.S. military installations or sensitive sites and the Strengthening Exports Against China Act, which would incentivize economic growth by eliminating barriers for American businesses competing directly with China in emerging industries like artificial intelligence and semiconductors. She’s also introduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the domestic supply chain for rare-earth magnets, which are critical components of cell phones, computers, defense systems, and electric vehicles, but are almost exclusively made in China.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Sullivan Presses Commerce Nominee on NOAA Surveys Needed for Alaska Fishermen

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Alaska Dan Sullivan
05.01.25
WASHINGTON—U.S. Senator Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska), a member of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, today pressed the nominee to serve as deputy secretary of the Department of Commerce, Mr. Paul Dabbar, on concerns about the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) ability to complete fisheries stock surveys in Alaska if staffing and approved funding from the department are not prioritized. Sen. Sullivan noted in the committee hearing that conducting surveys is one of the Commerce Department’s core responsibilities with regard to fisheries, and surveys are needed in order for Alaskans to harvest in various fisheries across the state. Sen. Sullivan also demanded that Dabbar and Commerce officials work promptly with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick to sign the pending maintenance contract for the Kodiak, Alaska-based NOAA research vessel, Oscar Dyson, which conducts these critically important surveys.
“When you don’t do stock assessment surveys, you know what happens? My fishermen can’t fish,” said Sen. Sullivan. “All they need is a survey and it’s not happening. I have a whole list and I’m going to mention them here. I hope to hell someone from Commerce is watching. Okay? Because if you’re not doing surveys, that’s the basic stuff you’re supposed to do at NOAA, then my guys can’t fish. They don’t want subsidies. They just want to fish.”
Fishing and seafood processing employ more Alaskans than any other industry and are vital to the economic well-being of dozens of coastal communities throughout the state. Roughly two-thirds of all seafood harvested in America comes from Alaska’s waters.
[embedded content]
Below is a transcript of Sen. Sullivan’s exchange with Mr. Dabbar.
SEN. SULLIVAN: I think we’re off to a good start, certainly on fisheries. We have this “Unleashing Alaska’s Extraordinary Resource Potential” executive order from President Trump on day one. This includes fisheries, LNG, all kinds of great things in Alaska. Then, just a couple days ago, the “Restoring America’s Seafood Competitiveness” EO. So we’re off to a good start. I want to commend the President, Secretary Lutnick, and their team. But I am concerned, to Senator Cantwell’s point—and this is a big issue—that we’re not having the staffing to do the two things that Commerce has to do for fisheries. American fisheries, unlike CHIPS and Science—a quarter of $1 trillion in subsidies—my guys don’t get subsidized at all. The federal government has to do two things: They need to do robust surveys to inform accurate stock assessments, and they need to do timely promulgation of regulations to open fisheries. That’s it. When the federal government doesn’t do that, you screw the hard-working fishermen of Alaska and America. Just think of “Deadliest Catch.” They do have to compete with Russia and China. To be honest, right now, it’s starting not to look good. I’m starting to get really upset, because when you got—Biden was horrible on the surveys. Horrible. We threw a ton of money at NOAA and the guy did climate change and all this BS. He didn’t do the blocking and tackling of NOAA, which is stock assessment surveys. You guys came in: “Hey, we’re not going to be like Biden.” But you’re not…I’m getting really worried that you guys aren’t doing this either. When you don’t do stock assessment surveys, you know what happens? My fishermen can’t fish. They don’t get $240 billion in subsidies. All they need is a survey and it’s not happening. I got a whole list and I’m going to mention them here. And I hope to hell someone from Commerce is watching. Okay? Because if you’re not doing surveys, that’s the basic stuff you’re supposed to do at NOAA. Then my guys can’t fish. They don’t want subsidies and they just want to fish. Can I get your commitment—and I hope to hell someone from NOAA’s watching this. I got a whole list of surveys right now that looks like you’re not going to complete. So what happens? My fishermen don’t fish. That is wrong. Can I get your commitment—and I hope to hell someone from NOAA and Commerce is watching this right now—get on with the surveys. Can I get your commitment? You can tell I’m a little rattled about this.
DABBAR: Yes, Senator, and I know that I’ve read your proposed bill, the latest one, and also how understanding research of, for example, salmon in Alaska, where some things are going well strong, and some things are weaker, and why. So I’m certainly committed on that also.
SULLIVAN: I just need your commitment to get the staffing and money to do the surveys. That’s it. If we’re failing on this, this is not good. Let me ask one final question. This relates. There’s a contract we’re trying to get the Secretary to sign, like right now. It’s for the Oscar Dyson. It’s a NOAA survey vessel homeported in Kodiak, Alaska. It’s coming up for its contract. It needs to be signed this week. Again, I hope Commerce people are watching. Okay? Just sign the contract so we can do the surveys from the Oscar Dyson. That’s a NOAA survey vessel ship. If that’s not signed in the next couple of days, that vessel won’t be able to do surveys. Again, this is blocking and tackling to take care of our fishermen, which is in the President’s EOs. But we’ve got to be able to support them with science. Can I get your commitment on that and maybe have someone get to the Secretary and sign this contract on the Oscar Dyson like today?
DABBAR: I’ll follow up, and there are people behind me watching, listening to you. I’m certain.
SULLIVAN: It’s really, really important. Thank you.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 2, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Reed Condemns Secretary Hegseth’s Dysfunctional Management of the Pentagon

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Rhode Island Jack Reed
WASHINGTON, DC – Over the past 100 days, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s tenure at the Pentagon has been marked by sweeping ideological purges, scandals, and the unjustified firings of senior military leaders.
On Thursday, U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, spoke on the Senate floor to address Secretary Hegseth’s damaging misconduct and the long-term consequences for the U.S. military.
A video of Senator Reed’s remarks may be viewed here.
A transcript of Senator Reed’s floor speech follows:
REED: Mr. President, I rise to discuss my concern about the chaos that is roiling the Department of Defense. Sunday will mark the 100th day of Pete Hegseth serving as Secretary of Defense. During his confirmation hearing, Mr. Hegseth said, quote, “[President Trump] wants a Pentagon laser focused on warfighting, lethality, meritocracy, standards and readiness. That’s it. That is my job.” Well, Mr. President, Secretary Hegseth is failing the mission President Trump gave him. His actions over the past 100 days have done nothing but distract the Pentagon and undermine its warfighting, lethality, meritocracy, standards, and readiness.
In his first 100 days, Secretary Hegseth has terminated or weakened programs and processes that are the bedrock upon which the military recruits personnel and trains servicemembers to go into battle. For example, in February, the Secretary announced his plan to slash the civilian workforce by 5 to 8 percent, terminate probationary workers, and institute a hiring freeze. These severe measures have only meant more work for the remaining employees, and more costly work for military officers and contractors to cover the gaps, or simply not carry out missions.
The Secretary has also launched a number of efforts to eliminate diversity and inclusion programs, which have led to more limited recruiting efforts, attempts to separate honorably serving transgender servicemembers, dissolving social clubs at the military academies, banning and removing books from the Naval Academy, and inspiring walkouts by students at DOD schools abroad over book bans and curriculum changes. I joined the Army in 1967 and served on active duty for 12 years, and the idea that dependent children of military personnel, in DOD schools, would protest the Secretary of Defense, to me was inconceivable, but it’s happened. This shows, I think, great anxiety in the ranks of our military personnel all across the globe.
The Secretary is also failing his duty to lead the Department by example. On March 24, Mr. Hegseth demonstrated a severe lack of judgment when he texted classified military intelligence on the unclassified and unsecure Signal app to at least two group chats, including one with his wife, brother, and personal lawyer. That information, if intercepted by an adversary, would endanger the lives of our servicemembers deployed downrange. The Secretary also installed a “dirty line” – an unsecure internet connection – in his Pentagon office so he could more easily send texts and personal emails. Such actions violate the laws and protocols that every other military servicemember is required to follow. The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General is conducting an investigation of Mr. Hegseth’s mishandling of classified information, and I look forward to its findings.
Just hours ago, we learned of press reports that National Security Adviser Mike Waltz may be fired this week because of his own actions around the Signal incident. If true, I welcome the message of accountability that it would send. Mr. Waltz made a significant mistake in adding a reporter to a sensitive Signal chat, and his failure of judgment could have had serious national security consequences. I respect that he took responsibility for his mistake. In contrast, Secretary Hegseth has refused to take responsibility for his own misconduct, which in my view was far more egregious than Mr. Waltz’s.
Indeed, the fallout from this incident has further eroded the already dismal credibility that the Secretary brought to the Pentagon. The Secretary’s inner circle of hand-picked advisers have nearly all resigned or been fired. His chief of staff was dismissed amid allegations of incompetence and unsettling personal behavior. Three of his senior policy advisors were fired for allegedly leaking sensitive information, which they all staunchly deny. And his top spokesman resigned after losing confidence in the Secretary, writing, quote, “The building is in disarray under Hegseth’s leadership,” and, quote, “The last month has been a full-blown meltdown at the Pentagon — and it’s becoming a real problem for the administration.” This chain of events is extraordinary and underscores the concerns I raised at Secretary Hegseth’s nomination hearing. He does not possess the temperament nor the management skills needed to lead the Pentagon.
There have been multiple news reports that Secretary Hegseth spends much of his day focused on perceived leaks and that he has become paranoid, lashing out at aides and senior military leaders, convinced that they are undermining him. He has threatened his top military advisors, including then-acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Grady and Joint Chiefs Director General Sims, with polygraph tests in order to prove that these distinguished military leaders are not liars.
The Secretary’s office should be leading the Pentagon, allowing the rest of the Department to be laser-focused on their missions. But again, President Trump and Secretary Hegseth have made that very difficult due to the internal disarray they have created by firing key military leaders.
These firings include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander of Cyber Command, the U.S. Military Representative to NATO, the Vice Chief of the Air Force, the Secretary of Defense Senior Military Aide, and the top uniformed lawyers, or Judge Advocates General, of each of the military services. As I’ve said before, if you want to break the law, you start by getting rid of the lawyers.
These are not minor positions. They are vital to the Department’s mission, and when left unfilled, the military loses focus and missions are compromised.   These officers were fired without a plan to replace them, which is crippling our military’s effectiveness during a perilous time. More importantly, these officers were fired without explanation, which leads to the worst possible outcome for a military force – fear throughout the ranks that one should not speak up, should not refuse an illegal order, and should not call out abuse nor question decisions.
General and flag officers are charged with providing their unbiased “best military advice” to the civilian leaders of the Department of Defense. Servicemembers are expected to give candid feedback to their leaders and peers, and commanders expect troops to give them the facts, straight and true, because lives are on the line. Similarly, Congress expects candor from senior officers to provide their best judgment — without fear of retribution — for both the security of our country, and that of the 2 million servicemembers who put themselves in harm’s way.
But firing officers as a political litmus test poisons this military ethos. It sends an immediate signal to troops that providing their unbiased best military advice might have career-ending consequences.
I will take a brief moment to discuss the officers who have been dismissed.
General CQ Brown
General CQ Brown served as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was fired, without explanation, not even halfway into his four-year term. He was visiting our troops on the southern border when he was abruptly dismissed by the President without even the courtesy of a warning. General Brown served our nation honorably for more than four decades and led the Joint Chiefs with dedication and skill. The Senate approved his nomination by a vote of 83-11. To date, the Trump Administration has given no justification for his dismissal.
Seven full weeks passed without a confirmed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. General Dan Caine has now been confirmed and is working hard to get up to speed. Given what happened to his predecessor, General Caine must realize that in addition to his duties as the Chairman, he must also deal with the political intrigue consuming the Pentagon. I hope that General Caine will always provide his best military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense, even if that advice not what they would want to hear.
Admiral Lisa Franchetti
Secretary Hegseth also dismissed Admiral Lisa Franchetti, who served as the 33rd Chief of Naval Operations. She was the first woman to lead the Navy, and the first to serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral Franchetti served in leadership roles at every level throughout the Navy, both ashore and at sea, and with postings around the globe. She was a trailblazer, team builder, and inspiration to many. The Senate approved her nomination by a vote of 95-1. Again, the Trump Administration has given no justification for her dismissal.
To date, the Administration has not nominated a new Chief of Naval Operations. It has been two months since Admiral Franchetti was dismissed, and the Navy remains without a Senate-confirmed Chief of Naval Operations at a time when the service is involved in the most combat operations since World War II in the Red Sea.
General Timothy Haugh
General Timothy Haugh served as the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the National Security Agency. As the commander of Cyber Command, General Haugh led the most formidable cyber warfighting force in the world, responsible for detecting, deterring, and overseeing cyber operations against America’s adversaries – particularly China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and various terrorist organizations. General Haugh had a distinguished 34-year career within Air Force cyber and intelligence organizations, including multiple command assignments.
I am extremely concerned that press reports indicate that Laura Loomer, a fringe conspiracy theorist, convinced President Trump to dismiss General Haugh and fire a slew of expert staff on the National Security Council for no discernible reason.   Now, when a conspiracy theorist can get into the President’s office and convince him to fire an officer of General Haugh’s caliber – and others on the National Security Council – there’s not only something wrong with that individual, there’s something wrong with the President who would listen to them without consulting others.
The Senate unanimously confirmed General Haugh to his post in December 2023, and, once again, the Trump Administration has given no explanation for his dismissal. The Trump Administration has not selected a new CYBERCOM commander, and it’s unclear if there is any sense of urgency to fill this position. Secretary Hegseth has given a priceless gift to China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea by purging leadership from one of our most vital national security commands.
Vice Admiral Shoshana Chatfield
Vice Admiral Shoshana Chatfield served as the United States Military Representative to NATO, the first woman to hold this position. She held a vital leadership role within the alliance, particularly as it related to coordinating international support to Ukraine. Admiral Chatfield was among the finest military officers our nation had to offer, with a 38-year career as a Navy helicopter pilot, foreign policy expert, and preeminent military educator, including as President of the Naval War College.
The Senate unanimously confirmed Vice Admiral Chatfield to her post in December 2023. The Trump Administration has given no justification for her dismissal, and has not nominated any replacement to this critical posting at NATO.
General James Slife
General James Slife was the U.S. Air Force Vice Chief of Staff – the second highest ranking officer in the Air Force. He spent most of his 36-year career as a special operations helicopter pilot. He deployed many times around the world and flew countless combat missions in perilous conditions. General Slife risked his life repeatedly for our nation and led his fellow special operators and Airmen with distinction.
The Senate unanimously confirmed General Slife to his post in December 2023. The Trump Administration has given no explanation for his dismissal, nor nominated any officer to help lead the Air Force.
Lieutenant General Jennifer Short
Lieutenant General Jennifer Short was the first female Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. She advised the Secretary and served as the representative for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coordinating policy and operations across the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and with the U.S. interagency. A command pilot with more than 1,800 flight hours, including more than 430 combat hours in the A-10, she flew in operations Southern Watch, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom, and commanded Airmen at the squadron, wing, major command, and combatant command levels.
The Senate unanimously confirmed her to her post. The Trump Administration has given no explanation for her dismissal.
Judge Advocates General
Finally, I am deeply concerned by Secretary Hegseth’s dismissal of the Judge Advocates General of the military services. These officers, known as “TJAGs,” are the most senior uniformed lawyers in the military.
These officers each served more than 30 years in uniform as military lawyers. They were strictly apolitical and held fundamental roles ensuring that balanced, legal counsel was part of every military policy discussion. These officers provided legal oversight that spanned military justice, operational law, administrative compliance, government ethics, and U.S. adherence to the Law of Armed Conflict.
These unprecedented firings, along with the firings of the Inspectors General, should alarm everyone about the commitment of the President, and the Secretary of Defense, to the rule of law for the military, and also within the United States and across the world.
Mr. President, the Defense Department is one of the most complex institutions in the world, with a budget of nearly $900 billion and a workforce of nearly 3 million military and civilian personnel. It is an organization that requires strong leadership, stability, predictability, and trust. These qualities are critical because we ask the Department’s men and women to risk their lives every day in service of their country. Mr. President, those men and women who gave their lives, and all those who still serving at this moment, deserve the best. They deserve a leader who is as laser focused on readiness, lethality and the mission as they are. Not someone who treats his position as Secretary as a performative exercise complete with a Twitter feed dominated with workout videos.
Our servicemembers deserve better. They deserve someone who is focused on them, not focused on himself.   If Secretary Hegseth does not improve his job performance, the conditions at the Pentagon will continue to deteriorate and something worse is bound to happen. I hope Secretary Hegseth takes note.
I yield the floor.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 2, 2025

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I. The digitalisation of payments and its implications

A. Progress in technology is leading to the rapid digitalisation of the payments ecosystem

B. The challenges raised by changes in the payments landscape

II. To meet these challenges, the Banque de France is using several additional levers for action

A. Adapting regulatory frameworks and supporting innovation within a framework of trust

B. The provision of new central bank money services to preserve the key role of central bank money in a digitalised world

1. The digital euro

2. Wholesale central bank digital currency