Category: China

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Global Financial Stability Report Press Briefing

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 22, 2025

    GFSR PRESS BRIEFING

    Speakers:

    Tobias Adrian, Financial Counsellor and Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF
    Jason Wu, Assistant Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF
    Caio Ferreira, Deputy Division Chief, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF

    Moderator: Meera Louis, Communications Officer, IMF

    Ms. LOUIS: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the GFSR press conference. And thank you for joining us today. I am Meera Louis with the Communications Department at the IMF.

    Joining us here today is Tobias Adrian, Financial Counsellor of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department. Also with us is Jason Wu, Assistant Director, and Caio Ferreira, Deputy Division Chief of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department.

    So, Tobias, before we turn the floor over for questions, I wanted to start by asking you, what were some of the challenges you and your team faced in preparing for this report? We are in uncharted territory now. So how did you come up with a strategy to shape this report?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thank you so much, Meera. And welcome, everybody, to the International Monetary Fund.

    We are launching the Global Financial Stability Report, and let me give you a couple of headline messages from the report.

    Our baseline assessment for global financial stability is that risks have been increasing, and there are really two main factors here: One is that the overall level of policy uncertainty has increased; and the second factor is that the forecast of economic activity going forward is slightly lower, as Pierre‑Olivier presented at the World Economic Outlook press conference just now. So, it’s a combination of a lower baseline and larger downside risks. Having said that, we do see both downside and upside risks, and we will certainly explain more about the two sides of uncertainty throughout the press conference.

    So let me highlight three vulnerabilities that are driving our assessment.

    The first one is the level of risky asset values. We have certainly seen some adjustment in risky asset values. It’s important to see that in the broader context of where we are coming from. And, in recent years, we saw quite a bit of appreciation—particularly in equity markets and in some sectors, such as technology. So valuations were quite stretched and credit spreads were very tight by historical standards. And we have certainly seen some decline in valuations; but by historical standards, price-earnings ratios in equity markets, for example, continue to be fairly elevated and credit spreads and sovereign spreads have widened to some degree, but they are still fairly contained by historical standards. The stretching of asset valuations continues to be a vulnerability we are watching closely.

    The second vulnerability is about leverage and maturity transformation in the financial system, particularly in the nonbank sector, where we are looking closely at how leverage is evolving. As market volatility has increased, we have seen some degree of deleveraging, but market functioning has been sound so far. With higher volatility, we would expect asset prices to come down, but the functioning of how those asset prices adjusted has been very orderly to date.

    The third vulnerability that we are watching is the overall level of debt globally. In the past decade, and particularly since the pandemic in 2020, sovereign debt levels have been increasing around the world. It’s the backdrop of higher debt that can interact with financial stability and that’s particularly true for emerging markets and frontier economies, where we have certainly seen some widening of sovereign spreads. Issuance year to date has been strong, but, of course, the tightening of financial conditions that we observed in the past three weeks has an outsized impact on those more vulnerable countries.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And now I will open up the floor to questions. If you could please identify yourself and your outlet. You also have the report online, if need be. And you can also join us online via the Webex link. Thank you.

    So, the lady here in the front.

    QUESTION: Hi. My name is Ray. I am with 21st Century Business Herald, Guangdong, China.

    So, my question is that, you’ve highlighted a series of vulnerabilities and risks. So how does the IMF assess the risk of these tensions triggering broader macro‑financial instability, especially in emerging markets with weaker buffers?

    My second question is that during times of global uncertainty, safe haven assets, such as gold and US treasuries, have been very volatile recently. So how does the IMF assess the volatility affecting currency stability? Thank you so much.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Tobias?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    So, starting with the second part of your question. We have seen a strong rally in gold prices, which is the sort of usual relationship we see in safe haven flows. When there is a high level of uncertainty, risky assets are selling off, oftentimes gold is viewed as a hedge asset and it has been appreciating.

    Of course, US treasuries remain the baseline reserve asset globally. It’s the largest and most liquid sovereign market. And  we have seen yields move. They have been increasing in the past two weeks, which is somewhat similar to the episode in 2020, when longer‑duration assets had yields increasing, as well. What is somewhat unusual is that the dollar has been falling, to some degree, but it’s important to keep that in the context of the strong dollar rally previously.

    Concerning the emerging markets and frontier economies, yes, the tightening of global financial conditions has an outsized the impact on weaker economies. We have seen a number of weaker emerging markets and frontier economies with high levels of debt. We have seen issuance throughout last year and earlier this year, but tighter financial conditions certainly adversely impact the financing conditions for those countries.

    Mr. WU: Maybe just to quickly add on emerging markets.

    I think it’s important to distinguish the major larger emerging markets versus the frontiers, as Tobias has mentioned. I think so far, we have seen currencies and capital flows being relatively muted in this episode. And I think this speaks to the ongoing theme that we have mentioned for several rounds now, that there’s resilienc among the emerging market economies for a whole host of reasons.

    However, as Tobias has pointed out, the external environment is not favorable and financial conditions are tightening globally. At this time, we need to worry about, countries where they are seeing sovereign spreads increasing, with large debt maturities forthcoming. Policy can be proactive to head off these risks by, for example, making sure that fiscal sustainability is being sent the right message.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Jason. The gentleman in the first row, at that end.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Rotus Oddiri with Arise News.

    So theoretically, if the dollar is weakening, isn’t that, to some degree, relatively good for countries with dollar debts?

    And secondly, how are you seeing fund flows to cash? If there’s a lot of volatility, are you seeing more movements to cash? And are there implications there in terms of [M&A] activity and so on and so forth?

    Mr. ADRIAN: So let me take this in three parts.

    The first question is about sort of like the strength of the dollar and the impact for emerging markets. When we look at exchange rates relative to emerging markets, there’s some heterogeneity. The dollar has appreciated against some emerging markets and depreciated against others. But it’s not the only impact on those financing conditions. We certainly have seen a notable widening of financing spreads. And that is probably the more important determinant for external financing conditions in emerging markets.

    Now, having said that, in some of the larger emerging markets with developed local government bond markets, we have seen some inflows into those local markets, but it’s very country‑specific.

    Turning to the question of investment decisions. We think that the first‑order impact here is the overall level of uncertainty. So, generally, investment decisions are easier in an environment with certainty. Given that some uncertainty remains about how policies are going to play out going forward, that can be a temporary headwind to investments or merger activity.

    Mr. WU: Just to quickly respond to your question about cash. I think during periods where markets are volatile, it’s reasonable that market participants and investors demand more liquidity, thereby moving in cash. We have not seen this happening en masse so far during this episode. So, we have seen bank deposits increase a little bit in the United States, but I think the magnitude is significantly smaller compared to previous episodes of stress.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason. So, the lady here in the second row, with the glasses.

    QUESTION: Hi. Szu Chan from the Telegraph.

    Do you see any parallels between recent moves in the bond market, particularly in US treasuries, with what happened in the wake of the Liz Truss mini budget? And do you think any lasting damage has been done?

    Mr. ADRIAN:

    Just for everybody’s recollection, in October 2022, there was some turbulence in UK gilt markets when the budget announcements were larger than expected and the Bank of England intervened to stabilize markets at that time. Clearly, we haven’t seen interventions by central banks, and the market conditions have been very orderly in recent weeks. There’s a repricing relative to the higher level of uncertainty but as I said at the beginning, there is both upside and downside risk. And we could certainly see upside risk if uncertainty is reduced going forward.

    And market conditions have been quite orderly. The moves are notable in treasuries, in equities, in exchange rates, but they are within movements we have seen in recent years and really reflect the higher level of volatility.

    Mr. Ferreira: I don’t think I have much to add to this, Tobias.

    I think that what we are seeing is some moves that have not been historically deserved in this kind of situation. But these mostly respond to these higher uncertainties and a repricing to the new macro scenario.

    Ms. LOUIS: So, before I go back to the floor, we do have a question on Webex, Pedro da Costa from Market News International. Pedro?

    QUESTION: Thank you so much, Meera. Thank you, guys, for doing this.

    My question is, given the market concerns about the threat to central bank independence, if the threat were exercised in a greater way, what would be the financial stability implications of a potential firing of either the Fed Chair or Fed Governors?

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Pedro. Are there any other questions on central bank independence? I don’t see any in the room. So over to you, Tobias 

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    So, the International Monetary Fund has been advising central banks for many decades. Helping central banks in terms of governance and monetary policy frameworks is really one of the core missions of the IMF. And we have seen time and time again that central bank independence is an important foundation for central banks to achieve their goals, which are primarily price stability and financial stability. We do advise our membership to, have a degree of independence that is aimed at achieving those overarching goals for monetary policy and financial stability policies.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. The gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you so much. My name is Simon Ateba. I am with Today News Africa in Washington, DC.

    I want to ask you about AI. It seems that is the big thing now. First, are you worried about AI? And what type of safeguards is the IMF putting in place to make sure that advanced countries—that AI doesn’t increase risk?

    And maybe, finally, on tariffs. We know that President Trump is imposing tariffs today, removing them tomorrow. China is retaliating. How much will that affect the financial stability of the world? Thank you. 

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much. Let me start with the question on artificial intelligence, and Jason can complement me.

    We have done quite a bit of work on that. In October, we actually had a chapter specifically focused on the impact of artificial intelligence on capital market activity, but, of course, the impact of AI is broader. And in our view, there are both risks and opportunities. I think the main opportunity is that it’s actually potentially quite inclusive, right?

    Everybody that has access to the internet via a smartphone or a computer or a tablet, in principle, can use those very powerful artificial intelligence tools. And we have seen examples in emerging markets and lower‑income economies where entrepreneurs are actually using these new tools to innovate. That can boost productivity around the world.

    In financial markets, we do quite a bit of outreach to market participants. And financial institutions—including banks and capital market institutions—are very actively exploring avenues to use artificial intelligence productively. There’s a lot of innovation going on. At the moment, we see a lot of that concentrated in back‑office kind of applications, so keeping your house in order in terms of getting processes done. But in trading and in credit decisions, these are also quite promising.

    In terms of risks, our primary concerns are cybersecurity risks. Many financial institutions are already under cyber attack., AI can be used to make defenses more efficient, but it can also be used for malicious purposes and making attacks more powerful. So, there’s really a bit of a power game on both sides. And we certainly advise many of our members to help them get to a more resilient financial system, relative to those cyber threats.

    Mr. WU: Maybe just quickly, to complement.

    I would encourage everybody to read Chapter 3 of the October 2024 GFSR, which addresses the issue of artificial intelligence in financial markets. Tobias is right, that there are benefits and risks on both sides.

    In addition to cybersecurity, I just wanted to highlight a couple more things, which is that, many of the financial institutions that we spoke to are still at their infancy in terms of deploying AI to make decisions—meaning, for trading or for investment allocation, they are at very early stages. But suppose that this trend rapidly gains? What would happen to risks?

    I think I will highlight two. One is concentration. Will it be a situation where the largest firms with the best models tend to win out and, therefore, dominate the marketplace? And then what are the implications for this? The second is that the speed of adjustment in financial markets might be much quicker if everything is based on high‑powered, artificial intelligence-type algorithms.

    With regard to these two risks, I think there’s great scope for supervisors to gather more information and understand who the key players are and what they are doing. International collaboration obviously is a crucial aspect of this. Market conduct needs to be taken into account, the future possibility that markets will be very much faster and more volatile, perhaps.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. The gentleman in the second row, please, in the middle here. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Good morning. I am [Fabrice Nodé‑Langlois] from the French newspaper Le Figaro.

    I have a question on the US public debt. There is a widespread opinion that whatever the level of the public debt—because of the significant role of the dollar, because of the might of the American military and economic power—it’s not a big concern. But under what circumstances, under what financial conditions would the US public debt become a concern for you?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much for the question. We are certainly watching sovereign debt around the world, including in the US. I do want to point out that there will be a briefing for the Western Hemisphere region that will specifically focus on the Americas, including the United States.

    When you look at our last Article IV for the United States, we certainly find that the debt situation is sustainable. You know, The U.S. has many ways to adjust its expenditures and revenues. And we think that this makes the debt levels manageable.

    Having said that, as I explained at the beginning, we have seen broadly around the world an increase in debt‑to‑GDP levels, particularly since the start of the pandemic in 2020. And it is an important backdrop in terms of pricing and financial stability. So, we are watching the nexus between sovereign debt and financial intermediaries very carefully.

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe one issue related with that— I think that we flagged it in the GFSR—is that I think there is an anticipation that—not only in the US but in several countries—there will be a lot of issuance of new debt going forward. Particularly in a moment where several central banks are doing some quantitative tightening, this might bring some challenges in terms of the function of the financial sector.

    Everything that we are seeing now seems to be working very well, even when we have this kind of shock. This is not a major concern. But going forward, we feel that it’s important to continue monitoring market liquidity. There are some flags that have been raised, particularly in terms of broker‑dealers’ capacity to continue intermediating and providing liquidity to public debt. It’s important to keep monitoring this, as central banks keep going in the direction of quantitative tightening.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Caio.

    And just to add to Tobias’s point, we will have a lot of regional pressers this week. And the Western Hemisphere presser will be on Friday if you have any US‑specific questions. Thank you.

    The lady here in the front row.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you for taking my question. My name is Nume Ekeghe from This Day newspaper, Nigeria.

    The report mentions Nigeria’s return to Eurobond markets. And we know it was received positively by investors. So how does Nigeria’s return to Eurobond markets signal renewed investor confidence? And what specific macroeconomic reforms or improvements contributed to the shift in sentiments? Thank you.

    Mr. WU: Thank you for that question. Let me make some remarks about Nigeria and then sub‑Saharan Africa, in general.

    In the case of Nigeria, macroeconomic performance has held up,  GDP growth has been fairly consistent, and inflation has been coming down. Earlier this year, we have seen Nigeria’s sovereign credit spreads lowering. I think the reforms that the authorities have done, including the liberalization of exchange rates, has helped in that regard.

    That said, I think I want to go back to the theme that Tobias has mentioned, which is that during a time where global financial markets are volatile and risk appetite, in particular, is wavering, this is when we might see increases in sovereign spreads that will challenge the external picture for Nigeria, as well as other frontier economies. So, for example, Nigeria’s sovereign spread has increased in recent weeks, as stock markets globally have declined.

    The other challenge, of course, is for large commodity exporters, like Nigeria. If trade tensions are going to lead to lower global demand for commodities, this will obviously weigh on the revenue that they will receive. So, I think both of those developments would counsel that authorities remain quite vigilant to these developments and take appropriate policies to counter them.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason.

    And just before I come back to the floor, we have another question online, from Lu Kang, Sina Finance. The question is, in light of the IMF’s recent GFSR warning about rising debt, volatile capital flows, and diverging monetary policy paths, how should countries, especially emerging markets, balance financial stability with the imperative to finance climate transitions and digital infrastructure?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    We do a lot of work on debt management with countries. We are providing technical assistance and we are doing a lot of policy work on debt market developments. I think the two main takeaways are, No. 1, the plumbing matters. Putting into place mechanisms such as primary dealers and clearing systems, and pricing mechanisms in government bond markets. It is important all over the world. That includes the most advanced economies, as well as emerging markets. And we have seen tremendous progress in many countries, particularly the major emerging markets in terms of developing those bond markets.

    The second key aspect, of course, is fiscal sustainability. Here again, we engage very actively with our membership to make sure that fiscal frameworks are in place that keep debt trajectories on a path that is commensurate with the economic prospects of the countries.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. A question here in the front row, please.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Kemi Osukoya with The Africa Bazaar magazine.

    I wanted to follow up on the question that my colleague from Nigeria mentioned, regarding sovereign debts. As you know, African nations, after a period of pause, are just right now returning back to the Eurobond. But at the same time, there is unsustainable high borrowing costs that many of these countries face. So, in your recommendation, what can governments do regarding their bond to use it strategically, as well as to make it sustainable?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much for this question. And you know, we are working very closely with many sub‑Saharan African countries to support the countries either via programs or via policy advice and technical assistance to have a macro environment that is conducive for growth. So let me mention three things.

    I think the first one is to recognize that we have been through a period of extraordinarily adverse shocks. Particularly in sub‑Saharan Africa, the pandemic had an outsized impact on many countries. The inflation that ensued was very costly for many countries, particularly for those that are importing commodities. So, the adverse economic shocks have been extraordinary. And I would just note that we have engaged more actively in programs with sub‑Saharan Africa in the past five years than we ever did previously.

    The second point is about the financing costs. And, of course, there are two main components. One is the overall level of financial conditions globally. All countries in the world are part of the global capital markets. And that really depends on overall financing conditions. But more specifically, of course, there are country‑specific conditions—the macroeconomic performance of each country, the buffers in the countries—and the mandate of the Fund is very much focused on macro‑financial stability. So, getting back to a place with buffers, which then can lead to lower financing costs is the main goal. Our work with those countries is very much focused on the kind of catalytic role of the Fund, where we are trying to get growth back and stability back. Let me stop here.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. And a question here in the front row, please. And then I will come back to the middle.

    QUESTION: Thank you very much. My name is [Shuichiro Takaoka]. I am working for Jiji Press.

    Just I would like to make clear the risk of a depreciation of the US dollar. And what are the implications of the recent depreciation of US dollar, especially regarding the global financial stability viewpoint?

    Mr. ADRIAN: As I mentioned earlier, we had seen quite a bit of an appreciation of the dollar earlier in the year and late [next] year. And now we have seen a depreciation that is roughly of commensurate magnitude. The volatility in the exchange rates is reflecting the broader volatility. There are some indications that the exchange rate movements are related to flows to investor reallocations, but the magnitudes of those flows are relatively small, relative to the run‑up of inflows into US assets in recent years. The cumulative inflows into bonds and stocks from around the world have been quite pronounced. So, to what extent these movements in the exchange rate and the associated flows are just a temporary or a more permanent impact remains to be seen. It really depends on how the current uncertainty is going to be resolved. As I said at the beginning, there are various scenarios. For the moment, it’s highly uncertain. As I said earlier, it is notable that the dollar declined, but I would not jump to conclusions in terms of how permanent that move may be.

    Mr. WU: Just to complement. I think when exchange rates are very volatile, one of the key channels for financial stability could be pressures in various funding markets. And this includes in cross currency markets, as well as in repo markets and other secure financing markets. I think this is something that we will be watching very closely. So far, we have not seen any major disruptions in those markets, despite the very volatile exchange rates.

    Mr. ADRIAN: So as a comparison, you can think of last August when there was a risk‑off moment. That was very short, but that did lead to dislocations in those cross‑currency funding markets. And we haven’t really seen that in recent weeks.

    Ms. LOUIS: So just on that line, I think you may have captured it, but I just wanted to get in this question that came in online from Greg Robb from MarketWatch. And it’s, have treasuries and the dollar lost their safe haven status? If not, what accounts for their recent performance?

    Mr. ADRIAN: So, again, it is somewhat unusual to see the dollar decline in the recent two weeks, really, when equity prices traded down with a negative tone and when longer‑term yields increased. But how lasting that is, is really too early to tell.

    US capital markets remain the largest and most liquid capital markets in the world. When you look at US dollars as a reserve asset, that remains over 60 percent among reserve managers. Global stock market capitalizations increased to 55 percent most recently, up from 30 percent in 2010. So, we have seen price movements that are notable; but in the big picture, the depth and size of the markets remain where they have been.

    Ms. LOUIS: And just on the same line, of capital markets. We have another question that came in online, [Anthony Rowley] from the South China Morning Post. And he says, both the EU and ASEAN are seeking more actively to promote capital market integration. Do you see this as reducing global dependence on US capital markets to any significant extent in the short to the medium term?

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are generally of the view that deep capital markets are beneficial everywhere. So, we are helping countries around the world to get to solid regulations and market mechanisms in sovereign bond markets but also, more broadly, in capital markets. And, for emerging markets and advanced economies, deepening capital markets has been a key priority.

    We have seen many firms from around the world come to US markets to issue stocks and bonds. And we think that’s related to the depth of the market and the sophistication of the financial sector in the US markets. So, it does provide a service to corporations and financial institutions around the world. But there are certainly many other markets that are deep, that are developing, and that are providing opportunities for both corporations and governments to issue. So, we have seen that trend continue.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Caio?

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe just more broadly on the development of capital markets, as Tobias was saying, I think that it’s an important goal. And this has come hand‑in‑hand with the growth of non‑banking financial institutions that we are seeing across the globe. We see this as a potential positive development. You diversify the sources of funding and the credit to the real economy, diversify the risks across a broader set of institutions, this is good for the economy and financial stability.

    There are risks that need to be mitigated. We discuss some of them in the GFSR—leverage, interconnectedness between different kinds of institutions. But overall, there are policies created by the standard setters that, if implemented, can mitigate these risks.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Caio and Tobias. 

    Going back to the room. There’s a lady in the second row.

    QUESTION: Hi. Riley Callanan from GZERO Media.

    The IMF downgraded the US, the most of all advanced economies. And I was wondering, is this a short‑term hit that in a year could lead to greater growth and investment in the US? Or is this a long‑term downgrade? Or is it too soon to tell, as you said, with capital markets?

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are really looking more at the financial stability aspects. And I would just note that there has been a readjustment in expectations. Where the US and other economies are going to end up remains to be seen. But I think what is notable is that with the sharp adjustment in asset prices, the increase in uncertainty has been absorbed well in capital markets. And as Caio alluded to, it is the policy framework around the banking system and the non‑banks that is so important to create resilient and deep financial markets that are then facilitating adjustments, relative to new policy developments. And from that vantage point, I think even though we have seen the level of uncertainty increase, markets have been very orderly. And we think that the regulatory and policy framework is key for that achievement.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And if you would like to flesh out any more details on the growth ramifications, we have a conference on Friday. And I can send you the details.

    Another question here, in the second row. I will come back to you.

    QUESTION: Hi. Gabriela Viana from Galapagos Capital in Brazil.

    So, in Brazil, commodities prices play an important role for currency [and] international capital inflows, especially in the stock market. Do you see commodities prices as a main important constraint for markets or the economic policy’s uncertainties or maybe the monetary tightening? Thank you.

    Mr. WU: All these factors are related to each other, obviously. So, I think the commodity prices, if the WEO forecast were to play out, the global economy is going to be slowing. It’s certainly an impact on the revenue side.

    I think for many emerging markets, the silver lining here is that they do have policy room. Many of them do have monetary policy room. Some of them have fiscal room, although only a few of them. So, it seems like this is going to be a challenging period, and uncertainty [and] commodity channels are both going to weigh on economies for emerging markets.

    We have seen broad‑based resilience among emerging markets over the last few years compared to, let’s say, five years before the pandemic. So, I think this speaks to the institutional quality having improved in emerging markets. And hopefully this would continue to buffer emerging markets from these external shocks.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason.

    And the lady in the middle. And then I will come back to Agence France‑Presse.

    QUESTION: Hi. Thank you for taking my question. I am Stephanie Stacey from the Financial Times.

    I wanted to expand on the previous questions about the dollar and treasuries. And I know you mentioned it’s hard to assess at this point how lasting the impact will be. But I wanted to ask what risks and future factors you think could drive a real shift in their safe haven status.

    Ms. LOUIS: Before we continue, are there any other questions on the dollar and the safe haven status? Yes. There is a question here.

    QUESTION: Hi. Mehreen Khan from The Times. I’m sorry. I will stand up.

    You mentioned the importance of swap lines and central banks cooperating at times of market stress. I mean, how much are we taking this type of cooperation for granted? And how much is the idea of the Fed providing swap lines to other central banks now in question, given the nature of the scrutiny that the institution is under from the Trump administration?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Let me start with the swap lines.

    In previous episodes of distress, such as the COVID-19 shock in 2020 or the global financial crisis in 2008, we have seen that swap lines from the major central banks—including Bank of England, ECB, Bank of Japan, and the Federal Reserve—have played an important role in terms of stabilizing market liquidity. The way to think about that is that the central banks are providing funding to partner central banks in the currency of the foreign assets that those institutions own. So, it’s an important underpinning to provide market functioning and resilience to your own assets in the hands of foreign financial institutions.

    As we mentioned earlier central banks have not intervened for liquidity purposes in recent weeks. And, despite a heightened market volatility, the VIX, for example, went from below 20 to between 40 and 50, which is fairly elevated. We have seen a very, very smooth market functioning across the board.

    Concerning the role of treasuries we are looking at the pricing of longer duration treasuries very carefully. We particularly look at supply factors, demand factors, and technical factors. We have seen volatility in the price moves, but we think that those are within reasonable historical norms.

    Mr. WU: Just to complement, I think in the treasury market, we have seen market functioning held up—meaning that buyers can find sellers and transactions are going through. I think that’s a very important sign.

    One thing that I wanted to mention also is that a year ago in our report, we pointed out that there are leveraged trades in the treasury market. These are trades that have not very much to do with economic fundamentals in the US or elsewhere but, rather, are using leverage to capture arbitrage opportunities in markets. When these trades are unwound, there will be impact in the treasury market. And this is something that we have pointed out before. These include the so‑called treasury cash‑futures basis trade, as well as a swap spread trade, which we have documented before. And I think during this episode, given the very heightened volatility, we have seen evidence of some of these positions being unwound, potentially having an impact on treasury yields as well. So, I just wanted to put this into context. This is not about capital outflows, but it’s about unwinding these trades having amplified the recent price movements in treasury markets.

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are seeing some indication that there’s some lowering in terms of the leverage in these trades, but we haven’t heard of disorderly deleveraging at this point. So, of course, with market volatility increasing, financial institutions naturally reduce their leverage. But we haven’t seen the kind of adverse feedback loop that was common, say, in 2008 or even as recent as the COVID-19 shock initially.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And there’s a question from Agence France‑Presse, in the middle. And then I will come back to you, and you. We are running out of time. So, we will take very, very few questions left.

    QUESTION: Thanks for taking my question. Just a quick question. In your report, you talk about geopolitical risk, including the risk of military conflicts. I just wonder how seriously you think people should take that and where you rate that when it comes to the global financial stability risks you have discussed already.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. And I have just been told we are running out of time. So, we will just clump those questions, if you could be very quick. The gentleman over there and the lady there. And then we will wrap it up. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Hi. [Rafia] from Nigeria. I work on [Arise TV].

    The IMF keeps talking about building resilience to face the global challenge of the state of the economy of the world. How do you build resilience in a world economic climate when one man’s decision can tip the scale? Just one man. He could wake up tomorrow and all our projections falter. One man.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. And then the last question.

    QUESTION: Laura Noonan, Bloomberg News. Thanks for taking the question. It’s actually a related question.

    You spoke in the report about the need for policymakers to try to do what they can to guard against these future financial shocks. Do you have any practical suggestions on what those measures could be? And also, are you expecting people to take measures to make the financial system safer when the overall political mood, as you have seen, has very much been about trying to liberalize things, trying to deregulate, and trying to simplify? Thank you.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Tobias?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Let me address the three sets of questions and then turn to my colleagues as well.

    On geopolitical risk, we do have a chapter that was released last week that is looking at capital market performance relative to geopolitical risks. And the good news is that, generally, when adverse risks realize, there is an asset price adjustment. But on average, relative to recent decades, those risks are absorbed well by the financial system in general. Now, of course, when conflicts directly impact countries, that can have a pronounced impact on their financial systems, and it’s something that we are discussing in more detail in the chapter.

    Secondly, in terms of the exposure of countries to physical risk, we have certainly seen in some countries around the world, a heightened incidence of drought and floods, even those can be macro‑critical. To the extent that these developments impact macro stability, we are certainly there to support countries and help them, either via programs or policy frameworks.

    Thirdly, in terms of the regulation of financial institutions and financial markets. You know, I think the last couple of weeks are very good illustrations for the importance of resilience of financial institutions. I mean, we have seen a tremendous increase in the level of volatility, which reflects the higher level of uncertainty. Last October, our overarching message in the GFSR was that there was this wedge between policy uncertainty and financial market volatility, which at the time was very low. And we have seen financial market volatility catch up with the high level of policy uncertainty. But that has been orderly, and financial institutions have been resilient. That is really the main objective of financial sector regulation—to get to a place where the financial system can do its job in terms of adjusting to unexpected developments. And when you have resilience in banks and in non‑banks, these adjustments are smooth. And that is the point of finance, right? It’s a kind of an insurance mechanism for the global economy and for individual country macro economies. Good regulation leads to good stability. And we have a lot of detail on that in the GFSR.

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe I could add a little bit on this about how to build resilience.

    I think that as Tobias was saying, trying to anticipate shocks is very hard. And it is very hard to do it. So, I think the way to build the resilience is focusing on vulnerabilities. In the GFSR, we have mentioned some vulnerabilities that we feel are important at this time. So, the valuations issues that makes the risk of repricing more likely, leveraging in some segments of the financial sector and in the interconnectedness with the banks, and also, of course, rising and high debt in several countries.

    How do you build the resilience in the face of these vulnerabilities? We do feel that banks in most countries are actually the cornerstone of the financial sector and so ensuring that they have appropriate levels of capital and liquidity is key. And the international standards do provide the basis for doing that. To address some of the other vulnerabilities, like leveraging an interconnection between different types of institutions, excessive [transformations], maybe.

    Finally, I think that on the issue of rising debt, one common theme that we have been talking about is about the need to credibly rebuild fiscal buffers.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you very much. I know we have covered a lot of ground, and I apologize that we could not get to everybody. If you do have any follow‑ups or any questions, please feel free to reach out to me. You can find the report online, and we can also send it to you bilaterally.

    Again, thank you very much for coming and thank you for your time. Take care.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/22/tr-04222024-gfsr-press-briefing

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Statement On Secretary of State Rubio Announcing “Sweeping Reorganization” At The State Department

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin

    April 22, 2025

    CHICAGO – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL) released the following statement after Secretary of State Marco Rubio unveiled a plan to significantly reorganize the State Department, including targeting human rights programs and others focused on war crimes and democracy:

    “The chaos and cruelty of this Administration knows no bounds. After dismantling USAID, the Trump Administration is now going after the State Department—a critical department that executes our foreign policy goals, maintains our alliances around the world, and promotes the long-term security of the United States.

    “As more information becomes available, I will be monitoring these ‘reforms’ closely. I am particularly concerned over reports that the Trump Administration plans to target human rights programs and the monitoring of war crimes and democracy abroad. Secretary Rubio and I worked closely on many of these priorities during his time in the Senate and I know he understand the importance of American leadership on these issues. 

    “With instability continuing in challenging corners of the globe, now, more than ever, we need America’s top diplomats engaged—not ceding our leadership to China and Russia.”   

    In Congress and as Co-Chair of the Senate Ukraine Caucus, Durbin has continuously called out Russia for committing war crimes in Ukraine. Durbin and Senator Chuck Grassley’s (R-IA) bipartisan Justice for Victims of War Crimes Act – which updates the current war crimes statute to enable prosecution of war criminals in the United States regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or victim – was signed into law by President Biden. 

    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Global Financial Stability Report Press Briefing

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 22, 2025

    GFSR PRESS BRIEFING

    Speakers:

    Tobias Adrian, Financial Counsellor and Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF
    Jason Wu, Assistant Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF
    Caio Ferreira, Deputy Division Chief, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF

    Moderator: Meera Louis, Communications Officer, IMF

    Ms. LOUIS: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the GFSR press conference. And thank you for joining us today. I am Meera Louis with the Communications Department at the IMF.

    Joining us here today is Tobias Adrian, Financial Counsellor of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department. Also with us is Jason Wu, Assistant Director, and Caio Ferreira, Deputy Division Chief of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department.

    So, Tobias, before we turn the floor over for questions, I wanted to start by asking you, what were some of the challenges you and your team faced in preparing for this report? We are in uncharted territory now. So how did you come up with a strategy to shape this report?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thank you so much, Meera. And welcome, everybody, to the International Monetary Fund.

    We are launching the Global Financial Stability Report, and let me give you a couple of headline messages from the report.

    Our baseline assessment for global financial stability is that risks have been increasing, and there are really two main factors here: One is that the overall level of policy uncertainty has increased; and the second factor is that the forecast of economic activity going forward is slightly lower, as Pierre‑Olivier presented at the World Economic Outlook press conference just now. So, it’s a combination of a lower baseline and larger downside risks. Having said that, we do see both downside and upside risks, and we will certainly explain more about the two sides of uncertainty throughout the press conference.

    So let me highlight three vulnerabilities that are driving our assessment.

    The first one is the level of risky asset values. We have certainly seen some adjustment in risky asset values. It’s important to see that in the broader context of where we are coming from. And, in recent years, we saw quite a bit of appreciation—particularly in equity markets and in some sectors, such as technology. So valuations were quite stretched and credit spreads were very tight by historical standards. And we have certainly seen some decline in valuations; but by historical standards, price-earnings ratios in equity markets, for example, continue to be fairly elevated and credit spreads and sovereign spreads have widened to some degree, but they are still fairly contained by historical standards. The stretching of asset valuations continues to be a vulnerability we are watching closely.

    The second vulnerability is about leverage and maturity transformation in the financial system, particularly in the nonbank sector, where we are looking closely at how leverage is evolving. As market volatility has increased, we have seen some degree of deleveraging, but market functioning has been sound so far. With higher volatility, we would expect asset prices to come down, but the functioning of how those asset prices adjusted has been very orderly to date.

    The third vulnerability that we are watching is the overall level of debt globally. In the past decade, and particularly since the pandemic in 2020, sovereign debt levels have been increasing around the world. It’s the backdrop of higher debt that can interact with financial stability and that’s particularly true for emerging markets and frontier economies, where we have certainly seen some widening of sovereign spreads. Issuance year to date has been strong, but, of course, the tightening of financial conditions that we observed in the past three weeks has an outsized impact on those more vulnerable countries.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And now I will open up the floor to questions. If you could please identify yourself and your outlet. You also have the report online, if need be. And you can also join us online via the Webex link. Thank you.

    So, the lady here in the front.

    QUESTION: Hi. My name is Ray. I am with 21st Century Business Herald, Guangdong, China.

    So, my question is that, you’ve highlighted a series of vulnerabilities and risks. So how does the IMF assess the risk of these tensions triggering broader macro‑financial instability, especially in emerging markets with weaker buffers?

    My second question is that during times of global uncertainty, safe haven assets, such as gold and US treasuries, have been very volatile recently. So how does the IMF assess the volatility affecting currency stability? Thank you so much.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Tobias?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    So, starting with the second part of your question. We have seen a strong rally in gold prices, which is the sort of usual relationship we see in safe haven flows. When there is a high level of uncertainty, risky assets are selling off, oftentimes gold is viewed as a hedge asset and it has been appreciating.

    Of course, US treasuries remain the baseline reserve asset globally. It’s the largest and most liquid sovereign market. And  we have seen yields move. They have been increasing in the past two weeks, which is somewhat similar to the episode in 2020, when longer‑duration assets had yields increasing, as well. What is somewhat unusual is that the dollar has been falling, to some degree, but it’s important to keep that in the context of the strong dollar rally previously.

    Concerning the emerging markets and frontier economies, yes, the tightening of global financial conditions has an outsized the impact on weaker economies. We have seen a number of weaker emerging markets and frontier economies with high levels of debt. We have seen issuance throughout last year and earlier this year, but tighter financial conditions certainly adversely impact the financing conditions for those countries.

    Mr. WU: Maybe just to quickly add on emerging markets.

    I think it’s important to distinguish the major larger emerging markets versus the frontiers, as Tobias has mentioned. I think so far, we have seen currencies and capital flows being relatively muted in this episode. And I think this speaks to the ongoing theme that we have mentioned for several rounds now, that there’s resilienc among the emerging market economies for a whole host of reasons.

    However, as Tobias has pointed out, the external environment is not favorable and financial conditions are tightening globally. At this time, we need to worry about, countries where they are seeing sovereign spreads increasing, with large debt maturities forthcoming. Policy can be proactive to head off these risks by, for example, making sure that fiscal sustainability is being sent the right message.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Jason. The gentleman in the first row, at that end.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Rotus Oddiri with Arise News.

    So theoretically, if the dollar is weakening, isn’t that, to some degree, relatively good for countries with dollar debts?

    And secondly, how are you seeing fund flows to cash? If there’s a lot of volatility, are you seeing more movements to cash? And are there implications there in terms of [M&A] activity and so on and so forth?

    Mr. ADRIAN: So let me take this in three parts.

    The first question is about sort of like the strength of the dollar and the impact for emerging markets. When we look at exchange rates relative to emerging markets, there’s some heterogeneity. The dollar has appreciated against some emerging markets and depreciated against others. But it’s not the only impact on those financing conditions. We certainly have seen a notable widening of financing spreads. And that is probably the more important determinant for external financing conditions in emerging markets.

    Now, having said that, in some of the larger emerging markets with developed local government bond markets, we have seen some inflows into those local markets, but it’s very country‑specific.

    Turning to the question of investment decisions. We think that the first‑order impact here is the overall level of uncertainty. So, generally, investment decisions are easier in an environment with certainty. Given that some uncertainty remains about how policies are going to play out going forward, that can be a temporary headwind to investments or merger activity.

    Mr. WU: Just to quickly respond to your question about cash. I think during periods where markets are volatile, it’s reasonable that market participants and investors demand more liquidity, thereby moving in cash. We have not seen this happening en masse so far during this episode. So, we have seen bank deposits increase a little bit in the United States, but I think the magnitude is significantly smaller compared to previous episodes of stress.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason. So, the lady here in the second row, with the glasses.

    QUESTION: Hi. Szu Chan from the Telegraph.

    Do you see any parallels between recent moves in the bond market, particularly in US treasuries, with what happened in the wake of the Liz Truss mini budget? And do you think any lasting damage has been done?

    Mr. ADRIAN:

    Just for everybody’s recollection, in October 2022, there was some turbulence in UK gilt markets when the budget announcements were larger than expected and the Bank of England intervened to stabilize markets at that time. Clearly, we haven’t seen interventions by central banks, and the market conditions have been very orderly in recent weeks. There’s a repricing relative to the higher level of uncertainty but as I said at the beginning, there is both upside and downside risk. And we could certainly see upside risk if uncertainty is reduced going forward.

    And market conditions have been quite orderly. The moves are notable in treasuries, in equities, in exchange rates, but they are within movements we have seen in recent years and really reflect the higher level of volatility.

    Mr. Ferreira: I don’t think I have much to add to this, Tobias.

    I think that what we are seeing is some moves that have not been historically deserved in this kind of situation. But these mostly respond to these higher uncertainties and a repricing to the new macro scenario.

    Ms. LOUIS: So, before I go back to the floor, we do have a question on Webex, Pedro da Costa from Market News International. Pedro?

    QUESTION: Thank you so much, Meera. Thank you, guys, for doing this.

    My question is, given the market concerns about the threat to central bank independence, if the threat were exercised in a greater way, what would be the financial stability implications of a potential firing of either the Fed Chair or Fed Governors?

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Pedro. Are there any other questions on central bank independence? I don’t see any in the room. So over to you, Tobias 

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    So, the International Monetary Fund has been advising central banks for many decades. Helping central banks in terms of governance and monetary policy frameworks is really one of the core missions of the IMF. And we have seen time and time again that central bank independence is an important foundation for central banks to achieve their goals, which are primarily price stability and financial stability. We do advise our membership to, have a degree of independence that is aimed at achieving those overarching goals for monetary policy and financial stability policies.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. The gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you so much. My name is Simon Ateba. I am with Today News Africa in Washington, DC.

    I want to ask you about AI. It seems that is the big thing now. First, are you worried about AI? And what type of safeguards is the IMF putting in place to make sure that advanced countries—that AI doesn’t increase risk?

    And maybe, finally, on tariffs. We know that President Trump is imposing tariffs today, removing them tomorrow. China is retaliating. How much will that affect the financial stability of the world? Thank you. 

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much. Let me start with the question on artificial intelligence, and Jason can complement me.

    We have done quite a bit of work on that. In October, we actually had a chapter specifically focused on the impact of artificial intelligence on capital market activity, but, of course, the impact of AI is broader. And in our view, there are both risks and opportunities. I think the main opportunity is that it’s actually potentially quite inclusive, right?

    Everybody that has access to the internet via a smartphone or a computer or a tablet, in principle, can use those very powerful artificial intelligence tools. And we have seen examples in emerging markets and lower‑income economies where entrepreneurs are actually using these new tools to innovate. That can boost productivity around the world.

    In financial markets, we do quite a bit of outreach to market participants. And financial institutions—including banks and capital market institutions—are very actively exploring avenues to use artificial intelligence productively. There’s a lot of innovation going on. At the moment, we see a lot of that concentrated in back‑office kind of applications, so keeping your house in order in terms of getting processes done. But in trading and in credit decisions, these are also quite promising.

    In terms of risks, our primary concerns are cybersecurity risks. Many financial institutions are already under cyber attack., AI can be used to make defenses more efficient, but it can also be used for malicious purposes and making attacks more powerful. So, there’s really a bit of a power game on both sides. And we certainly advise many of our members to help them get to a more resilient financial system, relative to those cyber threats.

    Mr. WU: Maybe just quickly, to complement.

    I would encourage everybody to read Chapter 3 of the October 2024 GFSR, which addresses the issue of artificial intelligence in financial markets. Tobias is right, that there are benefits and risks on both sides.

    In addition to cybersecurity, I just wanted to highlight a couple more things, which is that, many of the financial institutions that we spoke to are still at their infancy in terms of deploying AI to make decisions—meaning, for trading or for investment allocation, they are at very early stages. But suppose that this trend rapidly gains? What would happen to risks?

    I think I will highlight two. One is concentration. Will it be a situation where the largest firms with the best models tend to win out and, therefore, dominate the marketplace? And then what are the implications for this? The second is that the speed of adjustment in financial markets might be much quicker if everything is based on high‑powered, artificial intelligence-type algorithms.

    With regard to these two risks, I think there’s great scope for supervisors to gather more information and understand who the key players are and what they are doing. International collaboration obviously is a crucial aspect of this. Market conduct needs to be taken into account, the future possibility that markets will be very much faster and more volatile, perhaps.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. The gentleman in the second row, please, in the middle here. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Good morning. I am [Fabrice Nodé‑Langlois] from the French newspaper Le Figaro.

    I have a question on the US public debt. There is a widespread opinion that whatever the level of the public debt—because of the significant role of the dollar, because of the might of the American military and economic power—it’s not a big concern. But under what circumstances, under what financial conditions would the US public debt become a concern for you?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much for the question. We are certainly watching sovereign debt around the world, including in the US. I do want to point out that there will be a briefing for the Western Hemisphere region that will specifically focus on the Americas, including the United States.

    When you look at our last Article IV for the United States, we certainly find that the debt situation is sustainable. You know, The U.S. has many ways to adjust its expenditures and revenues. And we think that this makes the debt levels manageable.

    Having said that, as I explained at the beginning, we have seen broadly around the world an increase in debt‑to‑GDP levels, particularly since the start of the pandemic in 2020. And it is an important backdrop in terms of pricing and financial stability. So, we are watching the nexus between sovereign debt and financial intermediaries very carefully.

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe one issue related with that— I think that we flagged it in the GFSR—is that I think there is an anticipation that—not only in the US but in several countries—there will be a lot of issuance of new debt going forward. Particularly in a moment where several central banks are doing some quantitative tightening, this might bring some challenges in terms of the function of the financial sector.

    Everything that we are seeing now seems to be working very well, even when we have this kind of shock. This is not a major concern. But going forward, we feel that it’s important to continue monitoring market liquidity. There are some flags that have been raised, particularly in terms of broker‑dealers’ capacity to continue intermediating and providing liquidity to public debt. It’s important to keep monitoring this, as central banks keep going in the direction of quantitative tightening.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Caio.

    And just to add to Tobias’s point, we will have a lot of regional pressers this week. And the Western Hemisphere presser will be on Friday if you have any US‑specific questions. Thank you.

    The lady here in the front row.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you for taking my question. My name is Nume Ekeghe from This Day newspaper, Nigeria.

    The report mentions Nigeria’s return to Eurobond markets. And we know it was received positively by investors. So how does Nigeria’s return to Eurobond markets signal renewed investor confidence? And what specific macroeconomic reforms or improvements contributed to the shift in sentiments? Thank you.

    Mr. WU: Thank you for that question. Let me make some remarks about Nigeria and then sub‑Saharan Africa, in general.

    In the case of Nigeria, macroeconomic performance has held up,  GDP growth has been fairly consistent, and inflation has been coming down. Earlier this year, we have seen Nigeria’s sovereign credit spreads lowering. I think the reforms that the authorities have done, including the liberalization of exchange rates, has helped in that regard.

    That said, I think I want to go back to the theme that Tobias has mentioned, which is that during a time where global financial markets are volatile and risk appetite, in particular, is wavering, this is when we might see increases in sovereign spreads that will challenge the external picture for Nigeria, as well as other frontier economies. So, for example, Nigeria’s sovereign spread has increased in recent weeks, as stock markets globally have declined.

    The other challenge, of course, is for large commodity exporters, like Nigeria. If trade tensions are going to lead to lower global demand for commodities, this will obviously weigh on the revenue that they will receive. So, I think both of those developments would counsel that authorities remain quite vigilant to these developments and take appropriate policies to counter them.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason.

    And just before I come back to the floor, we have another question online, from Lu Kang, Sina Finance. The question is, in light of the IMF’s recent GFSR warning about rising debt, volatile capital flows, and diverging monetary policy paths, how should countries, especially emerging markets, balance financial stability with the imperative to finance climate transitions and digital infrastructure?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    We do a lot of work on debt management with countries. We are providing technical assistance and we are doing a lot of policy work on debt market developments. I think the two main takeaways are, No. 1, the plumbing matters. Putting into place mechanisms such as primary dealers and clearing systems, and pricing mechanisms in government bond markets. It is important all over the world. That includes the most advanced economies, as well as emerging markets. And we have seen tremendous progress in many countries, particularly the major emerging markets in terms of developing those bond markets.

    The second key aspect, of course, is fiscal sustainability. Here again, we engage very actively with our membership to make sure that fiscal frameworks are in place that keep debt trajectories on a path that is commensurate with the economic prospects of the countries.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. A question here in the front row, please.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Kemi Osukoya with The Africa Bazaar magazine.

    I wanted to follow up on the question that my colleague from Nigeria mentioned, regarding sovereign debts. As you know, African nations, after a period of pause, are just right now returning back to the Eurobond. But at the same time, there is unsustainable high borrowing costs that many of these countries face. So, in your recommendation, what can governments do regarding their bond to use it strategically, as well as to make it sustainable?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much for this question. And you know, we are working very closely with many sub‑Saharan African countries to support the countries either via programs or via policy advice and technical assistance to have a macro environment that is conducive for growth. So let me mention three things.

    I think the first one is to recognize that we have been through a period of extraordinarily adverse shocks. Particularly in sub‑Saharan Africa, the pandemic had an outsized impact on many countries. The inflation that ensued was very costly for many countries, particularly for those that are importing commodities. So, the adverse economic shocks have been extraordinary. And I would just note that we have engaged more actively in programs with sub‑Saharan Africa in the past five years than we ever did previously.

    The second point is about the financing costs. And, of course, there are two main components. One is the overall level of financial conditions globally. All countries in the world are part of the global capital markets. And that really depends on overall financing conditions. But more specifically, of course, there are country‑specific conditions—the macroeconomic performance of each country, the buffers in the countries—and the mandate of the Fund is very much focused on macro‑financial stability. So, getting back to a place with buffers, which then can lead to lower financing costs is the main goal. Our work with those countries is very much focused on the kind of catalytic role of the Fund, where we are trying to get growth back and stability back. Let me stop here.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. And a question here in the front row, please. And then I will come back to the middle.

    QUESTION: Thank you very much. My name is [Shuichiro Takaoka]. I am working for Jiji Press.

    Just I would like to make clear the risk of a depreciation of the US dollar. And what are the implications of the recent depreciation of US dollar, especially regarding the global financial stability viewpoint?

    Mr. ADRIAN: As I mentioned earlier, we had seen quite a bit of an appreciation of the dollar earlier in the year and late [next] year. And now we have seen a depreciation that is roughly of commensurate magnitude. The volatility in the exchange rates is reflecting the broader volatility. There are some indications that the exchange rate movements are related to flows to investor reallocations, but the magnitudes of those flows are relatively small, relative to the run‑up of inflows into US assets in recent years. The cumulative inflows into bonds and stocks from around the world have been quite pronounced. So, to what extent these movements in the exchange rate and the associated flows are just a temporary or a more permanent impact remains to be seen. It really depends on how the current uncertainty is going to be resolved. As I said at the beginning, there are various scenarios. For the moment, it’s highly uncertain. As I said earlier, it is notable that the dollar declined, but I would not jump to conclusions in terms of how permanent that move may be.

    Mr. WU: Just to complement. I think when exchange rates are very volatile, one of the key channels for financial stability could be pressures in various funding markets. And this includes in cross currency markets, as well as in repo markets and other secure financing markets. I think this is something that we will be watching very closely. So far, we have not seen any major disruptions in those markets, despite the very volatile exchange rates.

    Mr. ADRIAN: So as a comparison, you can think of last August when there was a risk‑off moment. That was very short, but that did lead to dislocations in those cross‑currency funding markets. And we haven’t really seen that in recent weeks.

    Ms. LOUIS: So just on that line, I think you may have captured it, but I just wanted to get in this question that came in online from Greg Robb from MarketWatch. And it’s, have treasuries and the dollar lost their safe haven status? If not, what accounts for their recent performance?

    Mr. ADRIAN: So, again, it is somewhat unusual to see the dollar decline in the recent two weeks, really, when equity prices traded down with a negative tone and when longer‑term yields increased. But how lasting that is, is really too early to tell.

    US capital markets remain the largest and most liquid capital markets in the world. When you look at US dollars as a reserve asset, that remains over 60 percent among reserve managers. Global stock market capitalizations increased to 55 percent most recently, up from 30 percent in 2010. So, we have seen price movements that are notable; but in the big picture, the depth and size of the markets remain where they have been.

    Ms. LOUIS: And just on the same line, of capital markets. We have another question that came in online, [Anthony Rowley] from the South China Morning Post. And he says, both the EU and ASEAN are seeking more actively to promote capital market integration. Do you see this as reducing global dependence on US capital markets to any significant extent in the short to the medium term?

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are generally of the view that deep capital markets are beneficial everywhere. So, we are helping countries around the world to get to solid regulations and market mechanisms in sovereign bond markets but also, more broadly, in capital markets. And, for emerging markets and advanced economies, deepening capital markets has been a key priority.

    We have seen many firms from around the world come to US markets to issue stocks and bonds. And we think that’s related to the depth of the market and the sophistication of the financial sector in the US markets. So, it does provide a service to corporations and financial institutions around the world. But there are certainly many other markets that are deep, that are developing, and that are providing opportunities for both corporations and governments to issue. So, we have seen that trend continue.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Caio?

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe just more broadly on the development of capital markets, as Tobias was saying, I think that it’s an important goal. And this has come hand‑in‑hand with the growth of non‑banking financial institutions that we are seeing across the globe. We see this as a potential positive development. You diversify the sources of funding and the credit to the real economy, diversify the risks across a broader set of institutions, this is good for the economy and financial stability.

    There are risks that need to be mitigated. We discuss some of them in the GFSR—leverage, interconnectedness between different kinds of institutions. But overall, there are policies created by the standard setters that, if implemented, can mitigate these risks.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Caio and Tobias. 

    Going back to the room. There’s a lady in the second row.

    QUESTION: Hi. Riley Callanan from GZERO Media.

    The IMF downgraded the US, the most of all advanced economies. And I was wondering, is this a short‑term hit that in a year could lead to greater growth and investment in the US? Or is this a long‑term downgrade? Or is it too soon to tell, as you said, with capital markets?

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are really looking more at the financial stability aspects. And I would just note that there has been a readjustment in expectations. Where the US and other economies are going to end up remains to be seen. But I think what is notable is that with the sharp adjustment in asset prices, the increase in uncertainty has been absorbed well in capital markets. And as Caio alluded to, it is the policy framework around the banking system and the non‑banks that is so important to create resilient and deep financial markets that are then facilitating adjustments, relative to new policy developments. And from that vantage point, I think even though we have seen the level of uncertainty increase, markets have been very orderly. And we think that the regulatory and policy framework is key for that achievement.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And if you would like to flesh out any more details on the growth ramifications, we have a conference on Friday. And I can send you the details.

    Another question here, in the second row. I will come back to you.

    QUESTION: Hi. Gabriela Viana from Galapagos Capital in Brazil.

    So, in Brazil, commodities prices play an important role for currency [and] international capital inflows, especially in the stock market. Do you see commodities prices as a main important constraint for markets or the economic policy’s uncertainties or maybe the monetary tightening? Thank you.

    Mr. WU: All these factors are related to each other, obviously. So, I think the commodity prices, if the WEO forecast were to play out, the global economy is going to be slowing. It’s certainly an impact on the revenue side.

    I think for many emerging markets, the silver lining here is that they do have policy room. Many of them do have monetary policy room. Some of them have fiscal room, although only a few of them. So, it seems like this is going to be a challenging period, and uncertainty [and] commodity channels are both going to weigh on economies for emerging markets.

    We have seen broad‑based resilience among emerging markets over the last few years compared to, let’s say, five years before the pandemic. So, I think this speaks to the institutional quality having improved in emerging markets. And hopefully this would continue to buffer emerging markets from these external shocks.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason.

    And the lady in the middle. And then I will come back to Agence France‑Presse.

    QUESTION: Hi. Thank you for taking my question. I am Stephanie Stacey from the Financial Times.

    I wanted to expand on the previous questions about the dollar and treasuries. And I know you mentioned it’s hard to assess at this point how lasting the impact will be. But I wanted to ask what risks and future factors you think could drive a real shift in their safe haven status.

    Ms. LOUIS: Before we continue, are there any other questions on the dollar and the safe haven status? Yes. There is a question here.

    QUESTION: Hi. Mehreen Khan from The Times. I’m sorry. I will stand up.

    You mentioned the importance of swap lines and central banks cooperating at times of market stress. I mean, how much are we taking this type of cooperation for granted? And how much is the idea of the Fed providing swap lines to other central banks now in question, given the nature of the scrutiny that the institution is under from the Trump administration?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Let me start with the swap lines.

    In previous episodes of distress, such as the COVID-19 shock in 2020 or the global financial crisis in 2008, we have seen that swap lines from the major central banks—including Bank of England, ECB, Bank of Japan, and the Federal Reserve—have played an important role in terms of stabilizing market liquidity. The way to think about that is that the central banks are providing funding to partner central banks in the currency of the foreign assets that those institutions own. So, it’s an important underpinning to provide market functioning and resilience to your own assets in the hands of foreign financial institutions.

    As we mentioned earlier central banks have not intervened for liquidity purposes in recent weeks. And, despite a heightened market volatility, the VIX, for example, went from below 20 to between 40 and 50, which is fairly elevated. We have seen a very, very smooth market functioning across the board.

    Concerning the role of treasuries we are looking at the pricing of longer duration treasuries very carefully. We particularly look at supply factors, demand factors, and technical factors. We have seen volatility in the price moves, but we think that those are within reasonable historical norms.

    Mr. WU: Just to complement, I think in the treasury market, we have seen market functioning held up—meaning that buyers can find sellers and transactions are going through. I think that’s a very important sign.

    One thing that I wanted to mention also is that a year ago in our report, we pointed out that there are leveraged trades in the treasury market. These are trades that have not very much to do with economic fundamentals in the US or elsewhere but, rather, are using leverage to capture arbitrage opportunities in markets. When these trades are unwound, there will be impact in the treasury market. And this is something that we have pointed out before. These include the so‑called treasury cash‑futures basis trade, as well as a swap spread trade, which we have documented before. And I think during this episode, given the very heightened volatility, we have seen evidence of some of these positions being unwound, potentially having an impact on treasury yields as well. So, I just wanted to put this into context. This is not about capital outflows, but it’s about unwinding these trades having amplified the recent price movements in treasury markets.

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are seeing some indication that there’s some lowering in terms of the leverage in these trades, but we haven’t heard of disorderly deleveraging at this point. So, of course, with market volatility increasing, financial institutions naturally reduce their leverage. But we haven’t seen the kind of adverse feedback loop that was common, say, in 2008 or even as recent as the COVID-19 shock initially.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And there’s a question from Agence France‑Presse, in the middle. And then I will come back to you, and you. We are running out of time. So, we will take very, very few questions left.

    QUESTION: Thanks for taking my question. Just a quick question. In your report, you talk about geopolitical risk, including the risk of military conflicts. I just wonder how seriously you think people should take that and where you rate that when it comes to the global financial stability risks you have discussed already.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. And I have just been told we are running out of time. So, we will just clump those questions, if you could be very quick. The gentleman over there and the lady there. And then we will wrap it up. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Hi. [Rafia] from Nigeria. I work on [Arise TV].

    The IMF keeps talking about building resilience to face the global challenge of the state of the economy of the world. How do you build resilience in a world economic climate when one man’s decision can tip the scale? Just one man. He could wake up tomorrow and all our projections falter. One man.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. And then the last question.

    QUESTION: Laura Noonan, Bloomberg News. Thanks for taking the question. It’s actually a related question.

    You spoke in the report about the need for policymakers to try to do what they can to guard against these future financial shocks. Do you have any practical suggestions on what those measures could be? And also, are you expecting people to take measures to make the financial system safer when the overall political mood, as you have seen, has very much been about trying to liberalize things, trying to deregulate, and trying to simplify? Thank you.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Tobias?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Let me address the three sets of questions and then turn to my colleagues as well.

    On geopolitical risk, we do have a chapter that was released last week that is looking at capital market performance relative to geopolitical risks. And the good news is that, generally, when adverse risks realize, there is an asset price adjustment. But on average, relative to recent decades, those risks are absorbed well by the financial system in general. Now, of course, when conflicts directly impact countries, that can have a pronounced impact on their financial systems, and it’s something that we are discussing in more detail in the chapter.

    Secondly, in terms of the exposure of countries to physical risk, we have certainly seen in some countries around the world, a heightened incidence of drought and floods, even those can be macro‑critical. To the extent that these developments impact macro stability, we are certainly there to support countries and help them, either via programs or policy frameworks.

    Thirdly, in terms of the regulation of financial institutions and financial markets. You know, I think the last couple of weeks are very good illustrations for the importance of resilience of financial institutions. I mean, we have seen a tremendous increase in the level of volatility, which reflects the higher level of uncertainty. Last October, our overarching message in the GFSR was that there was this wedge between policy uncertainty and financial market volatility, which at the time was very low. And we have seen financial market volatility catch up with the high level of policy uncertainty. But that has been orderly, and financial institutions have been resilient. That is really the main objective of financial sector regulation—to get to a place where the financial system can do its job in terms of adjusting to unexpected developments. And when you have resilience in banks and in non‑banks, these adjustments are smooth. And that is the point of finance, right? It’s a kind of an insurance mechanism for the global economy and for individual country macro economies. Good regulation leads to good stability. And we have a lot of detail on that in the GFSR.

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe I could add a little bit on this about how to build resilience.

    I think that as Tobias was saying, trying to anticipate shocks is very hard. And it is very hard to do it. So, I think the way to build the resilience is focusing on vulnerabilities. In the GFSR, we have mentioned some vulnerabilities that we feel are important at this time. So, the valuations issues that makes the risk of repricing more likely, leveraging in some segments of the financial sector and in the interconnectedness with the banks, and also, of course, rising and high debt in several countries.

    How do you build the resilience in the face of these vulnerabilities? We do feel that banks in most countries are actually the cornerstone of the financial sector and so ensuring that they have appropriate levels of capital and liquidity is key. And the international standards do provide the basis for doing that. To address some of the other vulnerabilities, like leveraging an interconnection between different types of institutions, excessive [transformations], maybe.

    Finally, I think that on the issue of rising debt, one common theme that we have been talking about is about the need to credibly rebuild fiscal buffers.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you very much. I know we have covered a lot of ground, and I apologize that we could not get to everybody. If you do have any follow‑ups or any questions, please feel free to reach out to me. You can find the report online, and we can also send it to you bilaterally.

    Again, thank you very much for coming and thank you for your time. Take care.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Security: Chinese Nationals Sentenced to Federal Prison for Participating in a Fraudulent Gift Card Conspiracy Involving the Purchase and Export of Apple Products to China

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    CONCORD – Three Chinese nationals were sentenced in federal court for their roles in a sophisticated Chinese gift card fraud conspiracy, Acting U.S. Attorney Jay McCormack announces.

    Naxin Wu, 26, a Chinese national unlawfully residing in Nashua, was sentenced by Chief Judge Landya B. McCafferty to 33 months in prison and one year of supervised release.  Mengying Jiang, 34, a Chinese national residing in Nashua, was sentenced by Chief Judge McCafferty to 60 months in prison and one year of supervised release. Mingdong Chen, 28, a Chinese national unlawfully residing in Brooklyn, New York, was sentenced by Judge Joseph N. Laplante to 24 months in prison and one year of supervised release.  Earlier this year, the defendants each pleaded guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud.  All three defendants face deportation to China after completing their sentences.

    “The defendants played a critical role in laundering proceeds of romance and other online scams by purchasing the stolen gift cards and using them to purchase Apple products,” said Acting U.S. Attorney McCormack. “While they may not have committed the initial fraud, the defendants’ actions helped convert stolen funds into tangible goods, enabling a large-scale financial crimes conspiracy. We remain committed to dismantling every link in the fraud supply chain.”

    “These individuals were part of a Chinese transnational criminal organization that used a complex scheme to steal and launder millions of dollars through gift card theft. After a sophisticated criminal investigation with our partners, their scheme was uncovered and their crimes brought to light. Now, they’ll serve federal prison sentences and face deportation back to China,” said Special Agent in Charge of Homeland Security Investigations New England Michael J. Krol.

    “The sentences imposed in New Hampshire emphasize the expansive reach of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service when it comes to dismantling criminal organizations. Anytime a criminal uses the U.S. Mail to further their illegal activity, postal inspectors will be there to bring them to justice. I’d like to thank our law enforcement partners involved in this case who, together with postal inspectors, brought these defendants to justice. This collaboration and dedication from law enforcement professionals plays a vital role in protecting the integrity of our communities from those who seek to exploit vulnerable Americans for personal gain,” said Ketty Larco-Ward, Inspector in Charge, U.S. Postal Inspection Service – Boston Division.

    According to court documents, organized criminal elements in China acquired well over $100 million in gift cards through multiple fraudulent means. For example, gift card data is obtained by hacking U.S. companies, tampering with physical gift cards, and targeting U.S. citizens through romance and elder fraud schemes. The criminal elements then send the gift card data to multiple cells of Chinese nationals operating in the United States through a Chinese-based messaging platform in exchange for cryptocurrency.

    Once U.S.-based cells receive the gift card data, they then spend the gift cards to purchase high-value electronics, principally Apple products. After purchasing the Apple products, cell members consolidate the electronics in warehouses for shipment to China, Hong Kong, or countries in Southeast Asia. The cells primarily operate in states with no sales tax, such as New Hampshire, to maximize their profits.

    Wu, Jiang, and Chen were members of one cell in New Hampshire. Wu and Jiang purchased fraudulent gift cards at a discount from their face value. They then either personally used the cards or disseminated them to others, including Chen, to use. Wu was responsible for $1.4 million, Jiang for $3 million, and Chen for $400,000 of fraudulent gift cards.

    Homeland Security Investigations, Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigations, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and the Concord Police Department led the investigation.  The Merrimack County Attorney’s Office provided valuable assistance. Assistant U.S. Attorney Alexander S. Chen prosecuted the case.

    This effort is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-Evening Report: Port of Darwin’s struggling Chinese leaseholder may welcome an Australian buy-out

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Colin Hawes, Associate professor of law, University of Technology Sydney

    Slow Walker/Shutterstock

    Far from causing trade frictions, an Australian buyout of the Port of Darwin lease may provide a lifeline for its struggling Chinese parent company Landbridge Group.

    Both Labor and the Coalition have proposed such a buyout based on national security grounds.

    But neither party has placed a dollar amount on a potential buyout, preferring to seek out private investors first. Any enforced acquisition would need to provide fair market value compensation to Landbridge.

    The previous Northern Territory government leased the port to Landbridge for 99 years in 2015. The A$506 million contract was supported by the then Turnbull government.

    Finding a buyer

    This could put Australian taxpayers on the hook for hundreds of millions of dollars. Private investors might baulk at taking on a port lease that has consistently lost money for many years.

    It is not clear why the national security situation has changed. The latest government inquiry found there were no security risks requiring Landbridge to divest their lease.

    The more pressing risk threatening the port is a financial one.

    Troubled times

    If Landbridge Group, which holds the lease through its Australian subsidiary, declares insolvency, it will no longer be able to sustain the port’s operations. And the terminal could not support itself.

    Several hundred employees would lose their jobs, and serious disruptions to trade and cruise ship tourism would follow.

    The closure of the port would cause significant disruptions.
    Claudine Van Massenhove/Shutterstock

    The Australian media reported last November that the Port of Darwin racked up losses of $34 million in the 2023–24 financial year. Yet this figure is overshadowed by the financial liabilities Landbridge has in China.

    Where the problems started

    The problems started with Landbridge Group’s ambitious expansion between 2014 and 2017.

    In that time it shelled out almost $5 billion on international and Chinese assets. Purchases included Australian gas producer WestSide Corporation Ltd, ($180 million in 2014); the Port of Darwin lease ($506 million in 2015); and another port in Panama ($1.2 billion in 2016). Landbridge reportedly planned to plough a further $1.5 billion into that port.

    In China, the Landbridge Group also signed a partnership deal with Beijing Gas Co in 2019 to construct a huge liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal at its main port site in Rizhao City, Shandong Province. The planned co-investment was worth $1.4 billion.

    Rushing to invest

    This was a heady time for Chinese private firms to invest overseas. Their often charismatic founders took advantage of the central government’s devolution of approval powers to the provinces and dressed up their pet investment projects as Belt and Road initiatives.

    Much of this breakneck expansion was funded by high-interest bonds issued on the Chinese commercial interbank debt markets or so-called shadow banking.

    Most private Chinese firms did not have easy access to the generous bank loans available to state-owned enterprises.

    Landbridge, a private firm controlled by Shandong entrepreneur Ye Cheng and his sister Ye Fang, was no exception. They borrowed heavily to fund their acquisitions.

    Mounting debt

    Unfortunately, Landbridge’s income from its Chinese and international operations has not kept pace with its debt obligations. As early as 2017, the group was already struggling to pay debts.

    Landbridge has been struggling to pay down debt.
    lovemydesigns/Shutterstock

    By 2021, Landbridge had been sued by at least 14 major financial or trade creditors. Outstanding judgment debts were issued by the Shanghai People’s Court amounting to about $600 million.

    Since then, all of the group’s main assets have been frozen in lieu of payment. Unpaid debts and interest amounting to more than $1 billion have been passed on to state asset management companies to collect or sell off at knockdown prices, an indication the group is effectively insolvent.

    Time to restructure

    In early 2025, a restructuring committee was formed by the local government in Rizhao City, where Landbridge is headquartered. Its job is to find a way to keep the company’s Rizhao Port operating and avoid losing thousands of local jobs.

    As recently as 2021, Ye Cheng was still ranked among the top 300 richest entrepreneurs in China, with an estimated net worth of more than $3 billion.

    He is currently on the hook for his company’s debts after mortgaging all his business assets and giving personal guarantees to major creditors. He has also been fined by China’s corporate regulator for failing to lodge any annual financial reports for Landbridge Group since 2021.

    Landbridge’s plans to develop its Panama port were cut short and its lease there was terminated in 2021 due to financial shortfalls.

    Ye’s next move?

    Ye Cheng may be unwilling to sell off his remaining overseas assets as this would be an admission of defeat. Yet an enforced buyout of the Darwin Port lease arranged by Australia may provide his businesses with a temporary financial lifeline in China.

    It would also absolve Landbridge of its previously announced commitments to invest about $35 million in expanding Darwin Port’s infrastructure.

    Far from causing trade frictions between Australia and China, such an enforced buyout – or more accurately, a bail-out – should be privately welcomed by both Landbridge and the Chinese government.

    Colin Hawes is a research associate at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney.

    ref. Port of Darwin’s struggling Chinese leaseholder may welcome an Australian buy-out – https://theconversation.com/port-of-darwins-struggling-chinese-leaseholder-may-welcome-an-australian-buy-out-254716

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: In Seattle, Senator Murray Hears from U District Small Businesses About How Trump’s Trade War is Affecting Them

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

    ***AUDIO HERE; PHOTOS and B-ROLL HERE***

    Seattle, WA— Today, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, met with small business owners in Seattle’s University District to hear how Trump’s chaotic trade war is impacting them. Trump is currently taxing goods from every country—including close allies like Canada—at a minimum 10 percent tariff rate across-the-board. He has also significantly escalated his trade war with China, with 145 percent tariffs on Chinese goods—meaning higher prices and serious pain for families and small businesses across Washington state and the country. Even with his 90-day “pause” on reciprocal tariffs, Trump’s new tariffs are still the highest tariff rates in decades, and are estimated to cost American families more than $4,000 each year—the largest tax increase since 1968.

    During the visit, Senator Murray heard from small business owners about how the Trump administration’s reckless trade war is leading to serious uncertainty for businesses and consumers in Seattle. Businesses are worried that tariffs will push them to raise prices—potentially driving customers away—and lay off workers to cut costs. Participating in the discussion with Senator Murray, held at Café Allegro, were: Yasuaki Saito, Owner of Saint Bread; Miles Richardson, General Manager of University Volkswagen/Audi Seattle; Trevor Peterson, CEO of the University Book Store; Efrem Fesaha, CEO of Boon Boona coffee; Jennifer Antos, Executive Director of Seattle Neighborhood Farmers’ Markets; Chris Peterson, Owner of Cafe Allegro since 1985; Lois Ko, Owner of Sweet Alchemy ice cream shops in the U District, Ballard, and Capitol Hill, and Anson Lin, Owner of Astora Construction.

    “These small businesses are at the heart of the U District community, and it was important to hear from them about how Trump’s tariffs and his pointless trade war are affecting their bottom lines—it’s something I’m hearing about everywhere I go across Washington state,” said Senator Murray. “Trump’s ham-fisted trade war is threatening livelihoods here in Washington state—small businesses are worrying about whether they can keep their doors open without laying people off, families that are already scrambling to pay the bills are worried about rising costs at the grocery store, and our farmers are deeply concerned about retaliatory tariffs from other nations in response to Trump’s tariffs. Trump’s tariffs are an enormous new tax on hardworking Americans and businesses. I will continue to share the stories and raise the voices of the people in Washington state who are being affected by Trump’s thoughtless trade war. There is no good reason for us to be picking fights with our trading partners and close allies like Canada—it’s time for Republicans in Congress to stand up and vote with us to end this chaos.”

    Washington state has one of the most trade-dependent economies of any state in the country, with 40 percent of jobs tied to international commerce. Washington state is the top U.S. producer of apples, blueberries, hops, pears, spearmint oil, and sweet cherries—all of which risk losing vital export markets due to retaliatory tariffs from key trading partners including Canada. Additionally, more than 12,000 small and medium-sized companies in Washington state export goods and will struggle to absorb the impact of retaliatory tariffs. Canada is Washington’s largest trading partner, accounting for nearly $20 billion in imports and $10 billion in exports. China is the world’s second-largest economy and Washington state exported over $12 billion in goods to China last year—making China Washington state’s top export partner—and imported $11.2 billion in goods, the most in imports from any country aside from Canada. Trump’s tariffs during his first term were extremely costly for Washington state—for example, India imposed a 20 percent retaliatory tariff on U.S. apples, causing Washington apple shipments to India to fall by 99 percent and growers to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in exports.

    Senator Murray has been a vocal opponent of Trump’s chaotic trade war and has been lifting up the voices of people in Washington state harmed by this administration’s approach to trade and calling on Republicans to end Trump’s trade war—which Congress has the power to do—and take back Congress’ Constitutionally-granted power to impose tariffs. Earlier this month, Senator Murray brought together leaders across Washington state who highlighted how Trump’s ongoing trade war is already a devastating hit to Washington state’s economy, businesses, and our agriculture sector. Senator Murray also took to the Senate floor to lay out how Trump’s chaotic trade war is seriously threatening our economy, American businesses, families’ retirement savings, and so much else. Last week, Senator Murray joined her colleagues in pressing U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Jamieson Greer on how the Trump administration’s tariffs are affecting farmers across the country. Last week, Senator Murray also held a roundtable discussion in Tacoma with local businesses and ports, toured local businesses in downtown Vancouver, and held a roundtable discussion in Vancouver with local businesses and ports, to highlight how Trump’s chaotic trade war and senseless tariffs are harming the overall economy in Washington state.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Enphase Energy Reports Financial Results for the First Quarter of 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    FREMONT, Calif., April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Enphase Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ: ENPH), a global energy technology company and the world’s leading supplier of microinverter-based solar and battery systems, announced today financial results for the first quarter of 2025, which included the summary below from its President and CEO, Badri Kothandaraman.

    We reported quarterly revenue of $356.1 million in the first quarter of 2025, along with 48.9% for non-GAAP gross margin. We shipped approximately 1.53 million microinverters, or 688.5 megawatts DC, and 170.1 megawatt hours (MWh) of IQ® Batteries.

    Highlights for the first quarter of 2025 are listed below:

    • Completed IQ® Meter Collar testing with PG&E and four other U.S. utilities
    • Strong U.S. manufacturing: shipped approximately 1.21 million microinverters and 44.1 MWh of IQ Batteries
    • Revenue of $356.1 million
    • GAAP gross margin of 47.2%; non-GAAP gross margin of 48.9% with net IRA benefit
    • Non-GAAP gross margin of 38.3%, excluding net IRA benefit of 10.6%
    • GAAP operating income of $31.9 million; non-GAAP operating income of $94.6 million
    • GAAP net income of $29.7 million; non-GAAP net income of $89.2 million
    • GAAP diluted earnings per share of $0.22; non-GAAP diluted earnings per share of $0.68
    • Free cash flow of $33.8 million; ending cash, cash equivalents, restricted cash and marketable securities of $1.53 billion

    Our revenue and earnings for the first quarter of 2025 are provided below, compared with the prior quarter:

    (In thousands, except per share and percentage data)

      GAAP   Non-GAAP
      Q1 2025   Q4 2024   Q1 2024   Q1 2025   Q4 2024   Q1 2024
    Revenue $ 356,084     $ 382,713     $ 263,339     $ 356,084     $ 382,713     $ 263,339  
    Gross margin   47.2 %     51.8 %     43.9 %     48.9 %     53.2 %     46.2 %
    Operating expenses $ 136,319     $ 143,489     $ 144,607     $ 79,423     $ 83,322     $ 82,587  
    Operating income (loss) $ 31,922     $ 54,804     $ (29,099 )   $ 94,637     $ 120,434     $ 38,994  
    Net income (loss) $ 29,730     $ 62,160     $ (16,097 )   $ 89,243     $ 125,862     $ 47,956  
    Basic EPS $ 0.23     $ 0.46     $ (0.12 )   $ 0.68     $ 0.94     $ 0.35  
    Diluted EPS $ 0.22     $ 0.45     $ (0.12 )   $ 0.68     $ 0.94     $ 0.35  
                                                   

    Total revenue for the first quarter of 2025 was $356.1 million, compared to $382.7 million in the fourth quarter of 2024. Our revenue in the United States for the first quarter of 2025 decreased approximately 13%, compared to the fourth quarter. The decline was the result of seasonality and softening in U.S. demand, partially offset by safe harbor revenue of $54.3 million. Our revenue in Europe increased approximately 7% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to the fourth quarter. The increase in revenue was primarily due to higher battery sales as we ramped shipments of our IQ® Battery 5P with FlexPhase.

    Our non-GAAP gross margin was 48.9% in the first quarter of 2025, compared to 53.2% in the fourth quarter, primarily due to lower bookings of 45X production tax credits and product mix. Our non-GAAP gross margin, excluding net benefit from the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), was 38.3% in the first quarter of 2025, compared to 39.7% in the fourth quarter, primarily due to product mix.

    Our non-GAAP operating expenses were $79.4 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $83.3 million in the fourth quarter. The decrease was the result of restructuring actions initiated in the fourth quarter of 2024. Our non-GAAP operating income was $94.6 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $120.4 million in the fourth quarter.

    We exited the first quarter of 2025 with $1.53 billion in cash, cash equivalents, restricted cash and marketable securities and generated $48.4 million in cash flow from operations in the first quarter. During the first quarter of 2025, we paid off the entire principal amount of $102.2 million in convertible senior notes that matured on March 1, 2025. Our capital expenditures were $14.6 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $8.1 million in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    In the first quarter of 2025, we repurchased 1,594,105 shares of our common stock at an average price of $62.71 per share for a total of approximately $100.0 million. We also spent approximately $12.1 million by withholding shares to cover taxes for employee stock vesting that reduced the diluted shares by 203,358 shares.

    We shipped 170.1 MWh of IQ Batteries in the first quarter of 2025, compared to 152.4 MWh in the fourth quarter. More than 10,900 installers worldwide are certified to install our IQ Batteries, compared to more than 10,300 installers worldwide in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    During the first quarter of 2025, we shipped approximately 1.21 million microinverters from our contract manufacturers in the United States that we booked for 45X production tax credits. We continued to ship our IQ8HC™ Microinverters, IQ8P-3P™ Commercial Microinverters, and IQ® Battery 5Ps from our contract manufacturers in the United States. When paired with other U.S.-made solar components, our products enable lease and power purchase agreement (PPA) providers to qualify for the domestic content bonus tax credit under the IRA.

    We continued to make progress with recent product introductions. We are now shipping our IQ Battery 5P with FlexPhase into Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Poland. Customers appreciate the reliable backup power the product delivers for both single-and three-phase installations. Our IQ® EV Charger 2, currently shipping to 14 countries in Europe, is our most advanced residential charger to date. This product can support up to 22 kW of three-phase charging and operate either as a standalone charger or fully integrated with Enphase microinverters and batteries. Finally, our customers are enjoying the plug-and-play simplicity of our IQ® PowerPack 1500, our first foray into the portable consumer market.

    In the second quarter of 2025, we expect to introduce our fourth-generation IQ® Battery 10C, IQ Meter Collar, and IQ® Combiner 6C products in the United States. Together, these products will make backup installations easy and help reduce costs. We also expect to launch our IQ® Balcony Solar Kit, a simple and efficient solution for harnessing solar energy from panels installed on apartment balconies, in Germany and Belgium.

    BUSINESS HIGHLIGHTS

    On April 8 and 9, 2025, Enphase Energy announced the launch of its IQ Battery 5P with FlexPhase with backup capability for customers in Luxembourg and Poland.

    On April 3, 2025, Enphase Energy announced the introduction of its IQ® System Controller in France and the Netherlands, enabling backup power.

    On April 1, 2025, Enphase Energy announced that more than 2,500 SunPower customers have transitioned to Enphase monitoring since SunPower’s bankruptcy filing in August 2024.

    On March 18, 2025, Enphase Energy welcomed Brazil’s ABNT NBR 17193 fire safety standard, which outlines stringent recommendations like rapid shutdown requirements for solar installations in all buildings.

    On March 11, 2025, Enphase Energy announced production shipments of its newest electric vehicle (EV) charger, the IQ EV Charger 2, in 14 European markets. 

    On March 3, 2025, Enphase Energy announced increased deployments of its solution for expanding legacy net energy metering (NEM) solar energy systems in California as utilities streamline their approval process. 

    On Feb. 11, 2025, Enphase Energy announced the launch of an expanded IQ Battery 5P product with support for both single-phase 120/208 V and split-phase 120/240 V, for new home projects in California. 

    On Feb. 6, 2025, Enphase Energy announced that it is expanding its support for grid services programs – or virtual power plants (VPPs) – in Puerto Rico, Colorado, and Nova Scotia, Canada, powered by the IQ Battery 5P.

    SECOND QUARTER 2025 FINANCIAL OUTLOOK

    For the second quarter of 2025, Enphase Energy estimates both GAAP and non-GAAP financial results as follows:

    • Revenue to be within a range of $340.0 million to $380.0 million, which includes shipments of 160 to 180 MWh of IQ Batteries. The second quarter of 2025 financial outlook includes approximately $40.0 million of safe harbor revenue. We define safe harbor revenue as any sales made to customers who plan to install the inventory over more than one year.
    • GAAP gross margin to be within a range of 42.0% to 45.0% with net IRA benefit, including approximately two percentage points of new tariff impact.
    • Non-GAAP gross margin to be within a range of 44.0% to 47.0% with net IRA benefit and 35.0% to 38.0% excluding net IRA benefit, including approximately two percentage points of new tariff impact. Non-GAAP gross margin excludes stock-based compensation expense and acquisition related amortization.
    • Net IRA benefit to be within a range of $30.0 million to $33.0 million based on estimated shipments of 1,000,000 units of U.S. manufactured microinverters.
    • GAAP operating expenses to be within a range of $136.0 million to $140.0 million.
    • Non-GAAP operating expenses to be within a range of $78.0 million to $82.0 million, excluding $58.0 million estimated for stock-based compensation expense, acquisition related expenses and amortization, restructuring and asset impairment charges.

    For 2025, Enphase expects a GAAP tax rate of 21-23% and a non-GAAP tax rate of 15-17%, including IRA benefits.

    Follow Enphase Online

    Use of non-GAAP Financial Measures

    Enphase Energy has presented certain non-GAAP financial measures in this press release. Generally, a non-GAAP financial measure is a numerical measure of a company’s performance, financial position, or cash flows that either exclude or include amounts that are not normally excluded or included in the most directly comparable measure calculated and presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the United States (GAAP). Reconciliation of each non-GAAP financial measure to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure can be found in the accompanying tables to this press release. Non-GAAP financial measures presented by Enphase Energy include non-GAAP gross profit, gross margin, operating expenses, income from operations, net income, net income per share (basic and diluted), net IRA benefit, and free cash flow.

    These non-GAAP financial measures do not reflect a comprehensive system of accounting, differ from GAAP measures with the same captions and may differ from non-GAAP financial measures with the same or similar captions that are used by other companies. In addition, these non-GAAP measures have limitations in that they do not reflect all of the amounts associated with Enphase Energy’s results of operations as determined in accordance with GAAP. As such, these non-GAAP measures should be considered as a supplement to, and not as a substitute for, or superior to, financial measures calculated in accordance with GAAP. Enphase Energy uses these non-GAAP financial measures to analyze its operating performance and future prospects, develop internal budgets and financial goals, and to facilitate period-to-period comparisons. Enphase Energy believes that these non-GAAP financial measures reflect an additional way of viewing aspects of its operations that, when viewed with its GAAP results, provide a more complete understanding of factors and trends affecting its business.

    As presented in the “Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Financial Measures” tables below, each of the non-GAAP financial measures excludes one or more of the following items for purposes of calculating non-GAAP financial measures to facilitate an evaluation of Enphase Energy’s current operating performance and a comparison to its past operating performance:

    Stock-based compensation expense. Enphase Energy excludes stock-based compensation expense from its non-GAAP measures primarily because they are non-cash in nature. Moreover, the impact of this expense is significantly affected by Enphase Energy’s stock price at the time of an award over which management has limited to no control.

    Acquisition related expenses and amortization. This item represents expenses incurred related to Enphase Energy’s business acquisitions, which are non-recurring in nature, and amortization of acquired intangible assets, which is a non-cash expense. Acquisition related expenses and amortization of acquired intangible assets are not reflective of Enphase Energy’s ongoing financial performance.

    Restructuring and asset impairment charges. Enphase Energy excludes restructuring and asset impairment charges due to the nature of the expenses being unusual and arising outside the ordinary course of continuing operations. These costs primarily consist of fees paid for cash-based severance costs, accelerated stock-based compensation expense and asset write-downs of property and equipment and acquired intangible assets, and other contract termination costs resulting from restructuring initiatives.

    Non-cash interest expense. This item consists primarily of amortization of debt issuance costs and accretion of debt discount because these expenses do not represent a cash outflow for Enphase Energy except in the period the financing was secured and such amortization expense is not reflective of Enphase Energy’s ongoing financial performance.

    Non-GAAP income tax adjustment. This item represents the amount adjusted to Enphase Energy’s GAAP tax provision or benefit to exclude the income tax effects of GAAP adjustments such as stock-based compensation, amortization of purchased intangibles, and other non-recurring items that are not reflective of Enphase Energy ongoing financial performance.

    Non-GAAP net income per share, diluted. Enphase Energy excludes the dilutive effect of in-the-money portion of convertible senior notes as they are covered by convertible note hedge transactions that reduce potential dilution to our common stock upon conversion of the Notes due 2025, Notes due 2026, and Notes due 2028, and includes the dilutive effect of employee’s stock-based awards and the dilutive effect of warrants. Enphase Energy believes these adjustments provide useful supplemental information to the ongoing financial performance.

    Net IRA benefit. This item represents the advanced manufacturing production tax credit (AMPTC) from the IRA for manufacturing microinverters in the United States, partially offset by the incremental manufacturing cost incurred in the United States relative to manufacturing in Mexico, India, and China. The AMPTC is accounted for by Enphase Energy as an income-based government grants that reduces cost of revenues in the condensed consolidated statements of operations.

    Free cash flow. This item represents net cash flows from operating activities less purchases of property and equipment.

    Conference Call Information

    Enphase Energy will host a conference call for analysts and investors to discuss its first quarter 2025 results and second quarter 2025 business outlook today at 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time (1:30 p.m. Pacific Time). The call is open to the public by dialing (833) 634-5018. A live webcast of the conference call will also be accessible from the “Investor Relations” section of Enphase Energy’s website at https://investor.enphase.com. Following the webcast, an archived version will be available on the website for approximately one year. In addition, an audio replay of the conference call will be available by calling (877) 344-7529; replay access code 9557806, beginning approximately one hour after the call.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements, including statements related to Enphase Energy’s expectations as to its second quarter of 2025 financial outlook, including revenue, shipments of IQ Batteries by MWh, gross margin with net IRA benefit and excluding net IRA benefit, estimated shipments of U.S. manufactured microinverters, operating expenses, and annualized effective tax rate with IRA benefit; its expectations regarding the expected net IRA benefit; its expectations on the timing and introduction of new products and updates to existing products, including the IQ Battery 10C, IQ Meter Collar, and IQ Combiner 6C products in the United States, and the IQ Balcony Solar Kit in Germany and Belgium; its expectations regarding the domestic content bonus tax credit for its product offerings; and the capabilities, advantages, features, and performance of its technology and products. These forward-looking statements are based on Enphase Energy’s current expectations and inherently involve significant risks and uncertainties. Enphase Energy’s actual results and the timing of events could differ materially from those anticipated in such forward-looking statements as a result of certain risks and uncertainties including those risks described in more detail in its most recently filed Annual Report on Form 10-K, Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, and other documents on file with the SEC from time to time and available on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. Enphase Energy undertakes no duty or obligation to update any forward-looking statements contained in this release as a result of new information, future events or changes in its expectations, except as required by law.

    A copy of this press release can be found on the investor relations page of Enphase Energy’s website at https://investor.enphase.com.

    About Enphase Energy, Inc.

    Enphase Energy, a global energy technology company based in Fremont, CA, is the world’s leading supplier of microinverter-based solar and battery systems that enable people to harness the sun to make, use, save, and sell their own power—and control it all with a smart mobile app. The company revolutionized the solar industry with its microinverter-based technology and builds all-in-one solar, battery, and software solutions. Enphase has shipped approximately 81.5 million microinverters, and approximately 4.8 million Enphase-based systems have been deployed in over 160 countries. For more information, visit https://investor.enphase.com.

    © 2025 Enphase Energy, Inc. All rights reserved. Enphase Energy, Enphase, the “e” logo, IQ, IQ8, and certain other marks listed at https://enphase.com/trademark-usage-guidelines are trademarks or service marks of Enphase Energy, Inc. Other names are for informational purposes and may be trademarks of their respective owners.

    Contact:
    Zach Freedman
    Enphase Energy, Inc.
    Investor Relations
    ir@enphaseenergy.com

     
    ENPHASE ENERGY, INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (In thousands, except per share data)
    (Unaudited)
       
      Three Months Ended
      March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net revenues $ 356,084     $ 382,713     $ 263,339  
    Cost of revenues   187,843       184,420       147,831  
    Gross profit   168,241       198,293       115,508  
    Operating expenses:          
    Research and development   50,174       50,390       54,211  
    Sales and marketing   48,948       51,799       53,307  
    General and administrative   34,035       31,901       35,182  
    Restructuring and asset impairment charges   3,162       9,399       1,907  
    Total operating expenses   136,319       143,489       144,607  
    Income (loss) from operations   31,922       54,804       (29,099 )
    Other income, net          
    Interest income   17,032       18,417       19,709  
    Interest expense   (2,047 )     (2,252 )     (2,196 )
    Other income (expense), net   (14 )     (1,270 )     87  
    Total other income, net   14,971       14,895       17,600  
    Income before income taxes   46,893       69,699       (11,499 )
    Income tax provision   (17,163 )     (7,539 )     (4,598 )
    Net income (loss) $ 29,730     $ 62,160     $ (16,097 )
    Net income (loss) per share:          
    Basic $ 0.23     $ 0.46     $ (0.12 )
    Diluted $ 0.22     $ 0.45     $ (0.12 )
    Shares used in per share calculation:          
    Basic   131,869       133,815       135,891  
    Diluted   136,208       138,128       135,891  
                           
     
    ENPHASE ENERGY, INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (In thousands)
    (Unaudited)
           
      March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
    ASSETS      
    Current assets:      
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 350,077     $ 369,110  
    Restricted cash   65,013       95,006  
    Marketable securities   1,116,780       1,253,480  
    Accounts receivable, net   225,625       223,749  
    Inventory   144,025       165,004  
    Prepaid expenses and other assets   295,725       220,735  
    Total current assets   2,197,245       2,327,084  
    Property and equipment, net   142,219       147,514  
    Intangible assets, net   37,408       42,398  
    Goodwill   212,359       211,571  
    Other assets   211,447       205,542  
    Deferred tax assets, net   305,408       315,567  
    Total assets $ 3,106,086     $ 3,249,676  
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY      
    Current liabilities:      
    Accounts payable $ 115,374     $ 90,032  
    Accrued liabilities   212,169       196,887  
    Deferred revenues, current   167,771       237,225  
    Warranty obligations, current   33,298       34,656  
    Debt, current   630,677       101,291  
    Total current liabilities   1,159,289       660,091  
    Long-term liabilities:      
    Deferred revenues, non-current   333,704       341,982  
    Warranty obligations, non-current   170,149       158,233  
    Other liabilities   61,032       55,265  
    Debt, non-current   571,214       1,201,089  
    Total liabilities   2,295,388       2,416,660  
    Total stockholders’ equity   810,698       833,016  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 3,106,086     $ 3,249,676  
                   
     
    ENPHASE ENERGY, INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    (In thousands)
    (Unaudited)
       
      Three Months Ended
      March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Cash flows from operating activities:          
    Net income (loss) $ 29,730     $ 62,160     $ (16,097 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash provided by operating activities:          
    Depreciation and amortization   19,915       20,665       20,137  
    Net accretion of premium (discount) on marketable securities   3,512       (7,490 )     2,825  
    Provision (benefit) for doubtful accounts   62       2,206       (130 )
    Asset impairment   27       4,702       332  
    Non-cash interest expense   1,679       2,188       2,132  
    Net gain from change in fair value of debt securities   (323 )     (3,697 )     (942 )
    Stock-based compensation   55,633       51,830       60,833  
    Deferred income taxes   8,560       (30,675 )     (8,292 )
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:          
    Accounts receivable   1,760       2,684       77,359  
    Inventory   20,979       (6,167 )     5,702  
    Prepaid expenses and other assets   (75,553 )     (16,487 )     (10,897 )
    Accounts payable, accrued and other liabilities   54,232       (27,396 )     (66,284 )
    Warranty obligations   10,558       8,657       (11,923 )
    Deferred revenues   (82,357 )     104,112       (5,554 )
    Net cash provided by operating activities   48,414       167,292       49,201  
    Cash flows from investing activities:          
    Purchases of property and equipment   (14,608 )     (8,064 )     (7,371 )
    Investment in tax equity fund   (6,904 )            
    Purchases of marketable securities   (200,826 )     (93,138 )     (472,268 )
    Maturities and sale of marketable securities   335,398       351,843       497,373  
    Net cash provided by investing activities   113,060       250,641       17,734  
    Cash flows from financing activities:          
    Settlement of Notes due 2025   (102,168 )           (2 )
    Repurchase of common stock   (99,964 )     (199,666 )     (41,996 )
    Payment of excise tax on net stock repurchases         (2,773 )      
    Proceeds from issuance of common stock under employee equity plans   67       4,719       1,186  
    Payment of withholding taxes related to net share settlement of equity awards   (12,110 )     (5,012 )     (60,042 )
    Net cash used in financing activities   (214,175 )     (202,732 )     (100,854 )
    Effect of exchange rate changes on cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash   3,675       (7,410 )     (1,177 )
    Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash   (49,026 )     207,791       (35,096 )
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash—Beginning of period   464,116       256,325       288,748  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash—End of period $ 415,090     $ 464,116     $ 253,652  
                           
     
    ENPHASE ENERGY, INC.
    RECONCILIATION OF NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES
    (In thousands, except per share data and percentages)
    (Unaudited)
       
      Three Months Ended
      March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Gross profit (GAAP) $ 168,241     $ 198,293     $ 115,508  
    Stock-based compensation   4,239       3,678       4,182  
    Acquisition related amortization   1,580       1,784       1,891  
    Gross profit (Non-GAAP) $ 174,060     $ 203,755     $ 121,581  
               
    Gross margin (GAAP)   47.2 %     51.8 %     43.9 %
    Stock-based compensation   1.2       0.9       1.6  
    Acquisition related amortization   0.5       0.5       0.7  
    Gross margin (Non-GAAP)   48.9 %     53.2 %     46.2 %
               
    Operating expenses (GAAP) $ 136,319     $ 143,489     $ 144,607  
    Stock-based compensation(1)   (50,885 )     (47,884 )     (56,651 )
    Acquisition related expenses and amortization   (2,849 )     (2,884 )     (3,462 )
    Restructuring and asset impairment charges(1)   (3,162 )     (9,399 )     (1,907 )
    Operating expenses (Non-GAAP) $ 79,423     $ 83,322     $ 82,587  
               
    (1)Includes stock-based compensation as follows:          
    Research and development $ 21,647     $ 20,951     $ 24,550  
    Sales and marketing   16,396       15,893       18,178  
    General and administrative   12,842       11,041       13,923  
    Restructuring and asset impairment charges   509       267        
    Total $ 51,394     $ 48,152     $ 56,651  
               
    Income (loss) from operations (GAAP) $ 31,922     $ 54,804     $ (29,099 )
    Stock-based compensation   55,124       51,563       60,833  
    Acquisition related expenses and amortization   4,429       4,668       5,353  
    Restructuring and asset impairment charges   3,162       9,399       1,907  
    Income from operations (Non-GAAP) $ 94,637     $ 120,434     $ 38,994  
               
    Net income (loss) (GAAP) $ 29,730     $ 62,160     $ (16,097 )
    Stock-based compensation   55,124       51,563       60,833  
    Acquisition related expenses and amortization   4,429       4,668       5,353  
    Restructuring and asset impairment charges   3,162       9,399       1,907  
    Non-cash interest expense   1,678       2,188       2,132  
    Non-GAAP income tax adjustment   (4,880 )     (4,116 )     (6,172 )
    Net income (Non-GAAP) $ 89,243     $ 125,862     $ 47,956  
               
    Net income (loss) per share, basic (GAAP) $ 0.23     $ 0.46     $ (0.12 )
    Stock-based compensation   0.42       0.39       0.45  
    Acquisition related expenses and amortization   0.04       0.03       0.04  
    Restructuring and asset impairment charges   0.02       0.07       0.01  
    Non-cash interest expense   0.01       0.02       0.02  
    Non-GAAP income tax adjustment   (0.04 )     (0.03 )     (0.05 )
    Net income per share, basic (Non-GAAP) $ 0.68     $ 0.94     $ 0.35  
               
    Shares used in basic per share calculation GAAP and Non-GAAP   131,869       133,815       135,891  
               
    Net income (loss) per share, diluted (GAAP) $ 0.22     $ 0.45     $ (0.12 )
    Stock-based compensation   0.42       0.39       0.44  
    Acquisition related expenses and amortization   0.04       0.04       0.04  
    Restructuring and asset impairment charges   0.03       0.07       0.01  
    Non-cash interest expense   0.01       0.02       0.02  
    Non-GAAP income tax adjustment   (0.04 )     (0.03 )     (0.04 )
    Net income per share, diluted (Non-GAAP) $ 0.68     $ 0.94     $ 0.35  
               
    Shares used in diluted per share calculation GAAP   136,208       138,128       135,891  
    Shares used in diluted per share calculation Non-GAAP   132,133       134,053       136,730  
               
    Income-based government grants (GAAP) $ 53,631     $ 68,040     $ 18,617  
    Incremental cost for manufacturing in U.S.   (15,773 )     (16,123 )     (4,882 )
    Net IRA benefit (Non-GAAP) $ 37,858     $ 51,917     $ 13,735  
               
    Net cash provided by operating activities (GAAP) $ 48,414     $ 167,292     $ 49,201  
    Purchases of property and equipment   (14,608 )     (8,064 )     (7,371 )
    Free cash flow (Non-GAAP) $ 33,806     $ 159,228     $ 41,830  
                           

    This press release was published by a CLEAR® Verified individual.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congresswoman Cherfilus-McCormick Statement on Reorganization of State Department

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick (D-Florida 20th district))

    WASHINGTON, DC – Today, Congresswoman Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick (D-FL), Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, issued the following statement on the Administration’s reorganization of the State Department.

    “I have grave concerns that such a sweeping overhaul of the State Department will have a devastating impact on America’s standing and be felt in every corner of the globe. 

    “We have reached a critical juncture — one in which our allies have rapidly lost faith in our security commitments and our trading partners are worried about the U.S. economy. Confidence in America is slipping. This move — coming on the heels of chaotic tariff negotiations, our diminished role in international alliances, and China openly mocking the U.S. on social media — could appear as a retreat. 

    “At this moment, when so many fear that they cannot count on America, the last thing we should be doing is upending our diplomatic footprint. We should be living up to our commitments, not continually reneging on them. We also should serve and protect American families abroad, while protecting our national security at home. 

    “As I have emphasized, I am open to reforms where necessary — but these proposals must be approached with caution and in close consultation with Congress.”

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: World Economic Outlook Press Briefing

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 22, 2025

    Speakers:

    Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas, Director, Research Department, IMF
    Petya Koeva Brooks, Deputy Director, Research Department, IMF
    Deniz Igan, Division Chief, Research Department, IMF

    Moderator:
    Jose Luis De Haro, Communications Officer, IMF   

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I think we can start and we have a quorum. So good morning, everyone, and welcome. I want to welcome also those joining us online. I am Jose Luis de Haro with the Communications Department at the IMF and we are gathered here today for the presentation of our latest edition of the World Economic Outlook titled, “A Critical Juncture Amid Policy Shifts.” I hope by this time you all have had access to the document. If not, I am going to encourage you, as always, to go to IMF.org. There, you are going to find the document, the World Economic Outlook, also Pierre‑Olivier’s blog and many other assets, including the underlying data for some of the charts that are published on the World Economic Outlook.

    I also want to plug in that we have a new database portal that I encourage you to use, and what’s best, that to discuss the new outlook that having here with us today, Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas. He is the Economic Counsellor, the chief economist, and the Director of the Research Department. Next to him are Petya Koeva Brooks, she is the Deputy Director of the Research Department and last, but not least, we also have Deniz Igan, she is the division chief also with the Research Department.

    Pierre‑Olivier, as usual is going to start with some opening remarks, and then we are going to open the floor to your questions. I just want to remind everyone that this press briefing, it’s on the record and that we also have simultaneous translation.

    So let me stop here. Pierre‑Olivier, the floor is yours.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Jose. And good morning, everyone. The landscape has changed since our last World Economic Outlook update in January. We are entering a new era as the global economic system that has operated for the last 80 years is being reset. Since late January, many tariff announcements have been made, culminating on April 2, with near universal levies from the United States and counterresponses from some trading partners. The U.S. effective tariff rate has surged past levels reached more than 100 years ago, while tariff rates on the U.S. have also increased.

    Beyond the abrupt increase in tariffs, the surge in policy uncertainty is a major driver of the economic outlook. If sustained, the increasing trade tensions and uncertainty will slow global growth significantly. Reflecting this complexity, our report presents a reference forecast which incorporates policy announcements up to April 4 by the U.S. and trading partners. Under these reference forecasts, global growth will reach 2.8 percent this year and 3 percent next year, a cumulative downgrade of about 0.8 percentage points relative to our January 2025 WEO update. Our report also offers a range of forecasts under different policy assumptions.

    Under an alternative path that excludes the April tariff announcements, global growth would have seen only a modest downgrade to 3.2 percent this year. We will also use a model‑based forecast to incorporate the temporary suspension of most tariffs announced on April 9, together with the increase in bilateral tariffs between China and the U.S. to prohibitive levels. This pause, even if extended permanently, delivers a similar growth outlook as a reference forecast, 2.8 percent, even if some highly tariffed countries could benefit.

    Now, while global growth remains well above recession levels, all regions are negatively impacted this year and next. And the global disinflation process continues, but at a slower pace with inflation revised up by 0.1 percentage point in both years. These trade tensions will greatly impact global trade. We project that global trade growth will be more than cut in half from 3.8 percent last year to 1.7 percent this year. The tariffs will play out differently in different countries. For the United States, the tariffs represent a supply shock that reduces productivity and output permanently and increases price pressures temporarily. This adds to an already weakening outlook and leads us to revise growth down by 0.9 percentage points to 1.8 percent, with a 0.4 percentage point downgrade from the tariffs only. While inflation is revised upwards.

    For trading partners, tariffs act mostly as a negative external demand shock. Weakening activity and prices, even if some countries could benefit from trade diversion. This is why we have lowered our China growth forecast this year to 4 percent, while inflation is revised down by 0.8 percentage points, increasing deflationary pressures. All countries are negatively affected by the surge in trade policy uncertainty, as businesses cut purchases and investment, while financial institutions reassess their borrowers’ exposure. Uncertainty also increases because of the complex sectoral disruptions that tariffs could cause up and down supply chains, as we saw during the pandemic.

    The effect of these shocks on exchange rates is complex. The tariffs could appreciate the US dollar, as in previous episodes. However, greater policy uncertainty, lower U.S. growth prospects, and an adjustment in the global demand for dollar assets are weighing down on the dollar.

    Risks to the global economic have increased and are firmly to the downside.

    First, while we are not projecting a global downturn, the risks it may happen this year have increased substantially, from 17 percent projected back in October to 30 percent now. An escalation of trade tensions would further depress growth. Financial conditions could also tighten, as markets react negatively to diminished growth prospects and increased uncertainty. On the flip side, growth prospects could immediately improve if countries ease from their current trade policy stance and promote a new, clear, and stable trade environment.

    Addressing domestic imbalances can also help raise growth while contributing significantly to closing external imbalances. For Europe, this means spending more on public infrastructure to accelerate productivity growth. For China, it means boosting support for domestic demand. While for the U.S., it means stepping up fiscal consolidation.

    Turning to policies. Our recommendations call for prudence and improved collaboration. Let me outline some key ones. First, an obvious priority is to restore trade policy stability. The global economy needs a clear, stable, and predictable trading environment, one that addresses some of the longstanding gaps in international trading rules. Monetary policy will need to remain agile and respond by tightening where inflation pressures re‑emerge, while easing where weak demand dominates. Monetary policy credibility will be key, especially where inflation expectations might de‑anchor. And central bank independence remains a cornerstone.

    Many fiscal authorities will face new spending needs to bolster defense spending or to offset the trade dislocations, likely to come. Some of the poorest countries also hit with reduced official aid could experience debt distress. Yet debt levels are still elevated and most countries still need to rebuild fiscal space, including by implementing structural reforms. Support, where needed, should remain narrowly targeted and temporary. It is easier to turn on the fiscal tap than to turn it off. Where new spending needs are permanent, as for defense spending in some countries, planning for offsetting cuts elsewhere or new revenues should be made.

    Finally, even if some of the grievances against our trading system have merit, we should all work toward fixing the system so that it can deliver better opportunities to all. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. Before we open the floor to your questions, some ground rules. First of all, if you want to ask a question, raise your hand. If I call on you, please identify yourself and the media outlet you represent. Try to be succinct. Stick to one question. We want to answer as many questions as possible.

    And also, a reminder. We are here to discuss the World Economic Outlook. Those questions regarding country programs, institutional issues are going to be better placed for the regional press briefings that are happening later this week and also the Managing Director’s press briefing this Thursday.

    With that said, I want hands up. OK. So I am going to start here in the center. Then I am going to move the room to my left. Then to my right. I am going to start with the lady with the green jacket there.

    QUESTION: Thank you.. Thanks so much for doing this.

    Pierre‑Olivier, I wonder if you can speak a little bit to the fact that you haven’t called out a recession. And you know, we are hearing lots of economists in the United States and other places‑‑most recently yesterday, the IIF is now also forecasting a small recession in the second half of the year. What we see in the WEO is that the percentage of risk of a recession has increased pretty dramatically. Can you walk us through why you are not at this point calling a recession, for instance, likely in the United States and what it would take to tip it that way? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Andrea.

    So for the United States, we are projecting a significant slowdown. We are projecting growth will be at 1.8 percent in 2025. And that’s a 0.9 percentage‑point slowdown‑‑revision in our projections from January. But 1.9 percent is obviously not a recession. And the reason for this is is that we have a U.S. economy that, in our view, is coming from a position of strength. We had an economy that was growing very rapidly. We have a labor market that is still very robust. We have seen some signs of weakening and slowdown in the U.S. economy, even before the tariff announcements. So, in fact, the 0.9 percentage point downward revision that I just mentioned, only a part of this‑‑maybe 0.4 percentage points‑‑is coming from the tariffs. Some of that is also coming from weakening momentum. This was an economy that was doing very, very well but was self‑correcting and cooling off a bit on its own. And we were seeing already consumption numbers coming down. We are seeing consumer confidence coming down. So all of that was already factored in. But we are not seeing a recession in our reference forecast.

    As you mentioned, Andrea, we are‑‑when we do our risk assessment, if you want, we are seeing the probability of a recession increasing, from about 25 percent back in October to around 40 percent when we assess it now.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to move to this side. The lady here in red.

    QUESTION: Good morning.

    Pierre, I wanted to ask you about the downward pressure on the dollar now. To what extent you believe it can provide some relief from the pressure on highly indebted emerging economies with a large share of dollar‑denominated debt? And has this downward pressure on the dollar changed your outlook on all of those emerging economies that are still, you know, under the impact of the high debt‑‑as mentioned by the MD in previous meetings, where this high debt is really one of the impediments to growth? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So we are seeing a weakening of the dollar that is fairly broad‑based over the last few weeks, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, some of that is coming from the weaker growth prospects in the U.S. Some it is coming from the increased uncertainty. And it’s leading to a reassessment of the global demand for dollar assets. When we step back, we also have to realize we are coming from a position where, over the last few years, there have been tremendous capital inflows into U.S. markets, in particular, risk markets. That’s something that, of course, my colleague Tobias Adrian will talk about in the GFSR press conference. So we are seeing some adjustment, some contradiction. The markets are handling it. We don’t see signs of stress, even in currency markets.

    Now, the interesting development is, what does it mean for emerging markets? And you are right to point out that, in the past, when the dollar would strengthen, that would not necessarily be good news for emerging markets because they have dollar‑denominated debts, so that increases their liabilities and the pressure on them to service their debts. And this can lead to some tightening of financial conditions. So we are not seeing that right now. And so that’s a plus. The flip side of this is, of course, the appreciation of some of these emerging markets’ currencies means that they are also losing a little bit on the competitiveness side, so there is maybe something that is a bit easier on the finance conditions, something that is not as easy on the trade side.

    Finally, this is an environment of enormous uncertainty, increased volatility. And that I think is something that will dominate for many of the emerging markets. So when we are looking at our assessment, we are actually downgrading the emerging market economies for 2025 and 2026, most of them. Some of them may, as I mentioned, benefit. But overall, as a group, they are downgraded. While because they are also very plugged into the global supply chains, the uncertainty is leading to a pause in investment and activity, and they are going to suffer from the decline in demand for their products coming from the tariffs.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to go with the gentleman here with the glasses.

    QUESTION: Thank you. I just have one question. Could you elaborate a little bit on what will happen with the trade flows in your models? I saw that in the basic assumption, the exports from the U.S. are [breaking quite heavily but not that much from China. Why is this so?

    And do I understand it right that this basic model does not yet integrate the additional hikes after ‑‑ happening after basically April 9, so above 100 percent on import tariffs by the U.S.? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So we are seeing a large impact on global trade coming from the tariffs and that’s going to be the case under any combination of tariffs where the effective tariff rates remains very elevated. And the reason why when we looked at the different scenarios that I mentioned, whether it’s a reference scenario or our April 9 scenario which includes lower tariffs on many countries but sharply increased tariffs between the U.S. and China. The overall impact on the global economy is not very different because the effective tariff rate is, if anything, even higher under that pause. So global trade is going to be significantly affected. The particular configuration of trade, which bilateral trade flows are going to be affected versus others that will depend on the final landscape in terms of tariffs so we can anticipate that there will be much lower bilateral trade under either the reference scenario or the April 9, between the U.S. and China. And that is weighing down on global trade growth. This is weighing down on global trade generally.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to turn here to the center. I am going to go to the first row. I am going to go with the lady with the yellow bottle.

    QUESTION: Thank you,

    You have downgraded the U.K.’s growth forecast quite sharply and given the range of explanations, from higher tariff barriers to more domestic issues, like cost‑of‑living pressures. Out of those, so the global challenges versus domestic challenges, which one is weighing more heavily on the U.K.’s growth forecasts?

    Mr. De Haro: OK we are going to open the round of U.K. questions so if you have questions on the U.K., raise your hand. And I will pass the mic to you. I see  two there. Yep.

    QUESTION: Hi.

    In a world where everyone is warning about the impact of tariffs on U.S. inflation and how much it will raise U.S. prices, why do you have the U.K. with the highest inflation rate in the G‑7 this year? And do you believe tariffs will be inflationary or disinflationary for the U.K.?

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Joe here in the first row.

    QUESTION: Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very much. So Joel hills from ITV news. Obviously it’s impacting the tariffs are impacting the U.K. They are impacting most countries. I just wonder this, President Trump did say there would be some disruption. He suggested it would be sort of temporary. Is it possible that President Trump is actually a genius? That he knows something you do not?

    Mr. De Haro: And I think we have a last question on the U.K. and this is going to be the last question on the U.K. There on the back of the room.

    QUESTION: Yeah.

    The U.K. inflation forecast is, you know, much higher than we expected it to be, 0.7 percent higher. Is that going to impact on lowering interest rates in the U.K.? And does that affect the growth rate, which seems to be rather optimistic, compared with some of the other European countries?

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to be done with the U.K. questions and then we will move along. So Pierre‑Olivier.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. So many questions. Let me address them as best I can. First, on the revision for growth in the U.K. and inflation. So the tariffs are playing a role, as they are in most countries and uncertainty is also playing a role, as it is in all countries. And it’s weighing down on growth in the U.K. But there are some U.K.‑specific factors and I would say that in terms of the zero point 5 percentage point downward revision that we are saying for the U.K., the domestic factors are probably the biggest ones. And in particular, there is a lower carryover from weaker growth in the second half of last year. There is also some tightening of financial conditions, as interest rates have risen, longer‑term interest rates.

    On inflation, the revision in inflation in the U.K. is coming, again, from domestic factors, and in particular some change in regulated energy prices. So that’s expected to be temporary but it’s also very U.K.‑specific. The effect of the tariffs on countries like the U.K., like it is on the EU or China is like a negative demand shock. It’s weakening activity but it’s also lowering price pressures, not increasing them.

    Now, what is the impact of the tariffs in the medium and long term? Not just what’s going to happen this year and next but what’s going to happen longer term? Our assessment is it’s going to be negative. We have a box in our report that looks at the long‑term impact of the tariffs, if they are maintained. And it is negative for all regions, just like the short‑term impact. So we are seeing a negative impact in the short term, in the medium term, in the long term. Again, there are nuances. Some countries might benefit, depending on the particular configuration of tariffs. It might benefit from some trade diversion; but the broad picture is it’s negative for the outlook.

    Now, our ‑‑ and I will end with that. Our forecast for 2025 is slightly higher than OBR’s forecast. Some of this has to do with some of the underlying monetary policy assumptions for the U.K. The bank‑‑

    Our assumption for this year is that there are going to be four cuts through the year. One cut already happened. We expect three more.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. I am not going to forget about the people that are on WebEx, and I am going to pass a question there. I see Anton from TAS.

    QUESTION: Good morning. Thank you for doing this.

    Given the projected slowdown of Russia’s GDP growth from 4.1 in 2024 to 1.5 in 2025, what are the primary factors driving this sharp decline? And how sustainable is Russia’s growth model going forward? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Go ahead.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Petya, would you like to answer?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. We are indeed expecting a slowdown in growth to 1.5 this year, and this, to a large extent is kind of the natural slowing of the economy after growing quite robustly in previous years. And also as a result of policy tightening that we have seen, both on the fiscal as well as on the monetary policy side. It is also due to the lower oil prices that have come about as a result of the‑‑as a response to the round of tariffs, as well as the uncertainty about global growth. So all these factors are behind that lower growth number, although I should point out that it is actually a slight upward revision, relative to what we had back in January. And the reason for that is that, again, we actually had seen upward surprises in 2024, which kind of carried into 2025.

    When it comes to the medium‑term growth outlook, we do expect that to be relatively weak. We are‑‑we have penciled in growth number of about 1.2, which is down from 1.7 which is what we had before the start of the war.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Let’s continue. I am going to go again in the center and then I am going to go to that side. The lady with the glasses there.

    QUESTION: Hi.

    In Latin America, we received almost every country 10 percent. So I want to know about the impact of the tariffs in Latin America and if the impact is going to be limited, versus other regions, and when we are going to start to feeling this impact. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: And before we answer the question, are there any questions on Mexico, Brazil, Argentina? OK. Argentina friends, go ahead.

    QUESTION: Hello.

    You’ve kept 5.5 growth projection that was decided in the latest program that Argentina signed with the IMF. I would like to know why you are not seeing so much impact yet about‑‑of this general context.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We can go ahead first with the Latin America overview and then we can go to Argentina.

    Mr. Gourinchas: I will just say something briefly and then ask my colleague Petya to come in. So for Latin America, as a whole, we are saying activity that is largely driven by consumption on the back of resilient labor markets while investment remains somewhat sluggish. And the slowdown in our projection reflects the impact of tariffs and the global growth slowdown, of course, which is also affecting countries in the region. Policy uncertainty. And the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus and in some countries monetary policy tightening.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: I don’t have a lot to add. Just to say that the disinflation process has also slowed a bit, and this is also‑‑also makes the policy trade‑offs a bit more complicated with slow‑‑with growth slowing down and at the same time, you know, having still challenges on the inflation side.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So we are going to move on. I am going to ask the gentleman in the first row there because‑‑

    Oh, sorry. Sorry. I forgot about Argentina. Please go ahead.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: We cannot forget about Argentina.

    So the growth forecast for this year‑‑you are right‑‑we still have the upgrade of .5. And this is related to just the positive surprises that we had seen, in spite of a very strong fiscal adjustment, the recovery in confidence I think has definitely played a role in kind of driving us to have this forecast. That said, there are a number of risks related to tighter financial conditions, commodity prices, and a lot of others, which is true for many if not most other countries.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So now we can move on. I am going to go with the gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you. In the October 2024 outlook you saw a stable but slow growth for Africa. What’s new now? And what kind of initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area do for African economies amidst these trade tensions?

    Mr. De Haro: And before we answer, I think‑‑

    QUESTION: Hi. Good morning.

    One of the things that you mentioned in your report is the demographic shift and the rise in the silver economy. Africa, on the other hand, has the reverse of that. So what is your recommendation in the short and medium term on how to deal with some of these challenges pertaining to tariffs, monetary policy, and now currency exchange? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: OK.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. Thank you. I will just say one word about the outlook in sub‑Saharan Africa and then I will ask my colleague Deniz to come in to add more color and answer also the question on the demographic trends.

    So regional growth in sub‑Saharan Africa improved significantly last year, to 4 percent. And it will ease in 2025. And this is in line with a softer global outlook. So we are seeing the same forces at play in the region, as we are seeing more globally. And a downturn‑‑and a downward revision in our projection that is of a similar magnitude at about 0.4 percentage point. Deniz?

    Ms. Igan: Thank you for the question. So on the demographic shifts, our Chapter 2 basically points out that countries’ age structures are evolving at different rates, as you pointed out as well. We have most western economies, some Asian economies that are aging fast. And you know in a health way some of them. And then we have many sub‑Saharan African countries that have a very young population. And what the chapter shows is actually, there are important medium‑term consequences of that, both for growth, as well as external balances of countries.

    In Africa’s case, basically, what we would see is a demographic dividend coming from having a young population. And the question then becomes how best to leverage that, how best to use that and channel it into growth. And the answer there, first and foremost, depends on the structural reforms, the investment that’s necessary on healthcare, on education, on human capital more generally and also international cooperation because our Chapter 3 looks more carefully into migration flows. And again, there, we see migration policy shifts in destination countries has spillovers for other countries. And this is especially true for emerging market economies and lower income economies. So, again, international cooperation there, making sure that growth dividends are utilized in the best way is what we delve into in the chapter.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to go to the gentleman with‑‑raise your hand. Yeah. You. No, I am going back. Then I will go‑‑there you go.

    QUESTION: OK. I have a question about China’s growth.

    In your World Economic Outlook, you say China’s growth forecast has been cut to 4 percent for this year, which is a 0.6 percentage drop from an earlier projection. But China’s National Bureau of Statistics a couple of days ago predicted China’s growth GDP growth in the first quarter was 5.4 percent. So my question is, how do you see the disparity in the forecast? Is China more optimistic than you are? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. So, yes, we are revising our growth projections for China down by 0.6 percentage points, as you have noted. I should flag that this number does not incorporate the latest release for Q1. That came after we closed our round of projections. So this is not reflected there. And we will have to see how it affects our projections when we have our next round of WEO updates.

    But let me give you a little bit of perspective on the rationale behind our revision for China. The tariff increase in tariffs especially since China is one of the countries that is facing the most elevated tariffs right now, is going to have a very significant impact in our projections on the Chinese economy. In fact, when we do a decomposition, which I showed during my opening remarks, the impact of the tariffs on the Chinese economy would be a negative 1.3 percentage point revision on growth.

    So why do we only have 0.6? Well, because there are other factors that are helping to support Chinese growth in 2025 and 2026. One of which‑‑which is quite important‑‑is the fiscal support that has been announced since the beginning of the year. And that is adding up, something of the amount of 0.5 percentage points. So the impact of the current trade tensions is very significant. It’s partly offset. We expect it to remain quite significant also in 2026 when we also have a downward revision by about 0.5 percentage points.

    The other side of this, where we are seeing the impact of the tariffs is on inflation, which is revised down. Our headline inflation projection for 2025 is actually at zero. So it’s down from 0.8 percent to zero. So China is facing stronger deflationary forces as a result of these trade tensions.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to move to this side. The gentleman with the glasses here.

    QUESTION: What impact did the oil price also have in exporting and importing countries in the Middle East? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Go ahead.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So we have seen oil prices declining since our last projections, and the decline in oil prices in our and our interpretation is coming mostly from weaker global demand, so it’s the weakening of global activity that is driving the decline in prices. There has been some increase in supply coming from OPEC Plus countries, but broadly speaking, the decline is mostly coming from weaker demand.

    So that is going to play out in ways you sort of would expect. The commodity exporters are going to face lower export revenues from the decline in oil prices. That’s going to weigh on their fiscal outlook, on their growth.

    For those countries that are oil importers, it’s going to lower inflation pressures because that‑‑lower oil prices is going to feed into lower headline inflation. It’s going to also provide some modest support to economic activity there.

    Deniz, anything to add on oil prices or‑‑or Petya?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: No, I don’t.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to move to the center. I am going to get the gentleman with the white shirt there.

    QUESTION: h I am not going to ask another question about the U.K., you will be pleased to know. Over the last week we have seen a number of attacks by the White House on the independence of the Federal Reserve. How destabilizing do you think this might be for financial markets?

    Mr. Gourinchas: So central banks are facing a delicate moment. As I have explained in many countries, the impact of the tariffs is going to be to increase recessionary forces and it is going to lower price pressures. And that will help central banks cut interest rates faster and provide some support to their economies. But in other countries ‑‑ and in our projections, the U.S. is in that category‑‑the tariffs are going to increase price pressures. Price pressures in the U.S. are increasing for other reasons as well. Service prices have been quite‑‑inflation of service prices have been quite strong. And that is something that we are seeing already. But the tariffs are likely to increase price pressures. We are projecting inflation to remain at 3 percent in the U.S. this year, the same level as last year, headline inflation.

    So in that context, if you also think about where we are coming from, we are coming from a period of very elevated inflation. We are just coming off the cost‑of‑living crisis, a surge in inflation rates to double digits that we haven’t seen in more than a generation. So the critical thing is to make sure that inflation expectations remain anchored, that everyone remains convinced that central banks will do what is necessary to bring inflation back to central bank targets in an orderly manner. And central banks have instruments to do this. They have their interest rate instruments. They have various instruments of monetary policy. But one critical aspect of what they do is coming from their credibility. So central banks need to remain credible. And part of that credibility is built upon their central bank independence. And so from that perspective, it’s very important to preserve that.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to have time for two questions. One of them is going back to WebEx. I see Weier, please. Come in.

    QUESTION: Yes.I have a question.

    You mentioned that the global economic system is being reset. And I am not sure if one of the early signs in the financial markets, as we see that the markets moving from American exceptionalism to the sort of sell the U.S. narrative. So could you assess the implications for the financial markets and the world economy, as a whole?

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yeah, well we have seen some volatility in the markets, of course, whenever there is going to be potentially a significant change in the economic structure of the global economy. I think we are bound to see some reassessment. And investors are going to try to figure out what’s happening, and that’s going to inject volatility. And we are seeing some of that.

    The good news is a lot of that volatility we have seen in the last few weeks has not led to significant market dislocations or market stress to levels that would, for instance, have necessitated the interventions by central banks around the world.

    So whether you are looking at equity markets, whether you are looking at bond markets, whether you are looking at currency markets, what we are saying is a reassessment of the world we are in now and that means that there is a reassessment of valuations of risk assets, of different currencies. But that is happening in an orderly manner. So from that perspective, we are seeing a system that is quite resilient, that remained resilient but, of course, we are watching carefully and there has been some tightening of financial conditions and that’s something to be looking out for. We want to make sure that it doesn’t get to a level where the stress in the financial system would become too extreme.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. The lady here in the first row has been waiting patiently. Please go ahead.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose. I want to ask about the trading tensions impact on low‑income countries. You mentioned there are like downgrading for emerging markets but how about like those small countries who have lower income as a group, have you assessed the particular impact on them in these ongoing trade tensions? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. Well thanks. For low‑income countries as a group, we are also seeing a downgrade in which we report in our report of 0.4 percentage points. We are expecting growth of 4.2 percent in 2025. So the 0.4 is very similar to what we are seeing at the aggregate levels, 0.5. So from that perspective it looks quite the same. However, there are also a lot of differences across countries, and when we look more carefully, you might see some vulnerable countries, especially in sub‑Saharan Africa. But elsewhere as well‑‑who could face very challenging conditions as a result of the tariffs in an environment in which many of the countries, low‑income countries have been facing a funding squeeze for a number of years now, private capital flows to this region have been drying up or have been coming on very expensive terms. We are seeing a drying up also of some official aid flows. So some of these countries have very limited fiscal space. Near a situation where the situation could become more challenging.

    Now, on the flip side, the fact that we are seeing commodity prices coming down for many commodities will help some of them. The commodity importers in that group will hurt the ones who are commodity exporters. And there are a number of countries among the low-income group that are commodity exporters, so that is adding some additional pressure on them.

    Mr. De Haro: I am going to make an exception and just one last question. I am going to go with the gentleman in the white shirt there. He has been waiting patiently, too. And don’t get frustrated. There are going to be many opportunities for you to ask questions.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose. AFP.

    I had a quick question about Spain because that’s the only countries among advanced economies where you had an upward revision. It’s going to be way better than the eurozone and even better than other advanced economies. What are the underlying reasons for that? And you formally talked much about tourism but are there any other things that might be pointed out? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes, indeed. Spain is doing better than its peers. Petya, would you like to talk about it?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. Indeed. We are actually having an upgrade for Spain this year, which is a rare occurrence in the many, many downgrades that we have had for many other countries. This is partly because the Spanish economy just had such strong momentum in 2024, coming into 2025. And part of that was due to the very strong services exports as well as the very strong labor accumulation. Part of that related to immigration. But all of that being said, Spain is still being affected indirectly and directly by the tariffs and the uncertainty associated with that. It’s just that, as I said, that underlying [strength is kind of having a bigger impact in the near term. But then again, in 2026, we do project kind of a slowing of growth to about 1.8.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. And on that point, I want to thank you, everyone, on behalf of Pierre‑Olivier, Petya, Deniz, the Research Department, the Communications Department. Some reminders. Next press briefing is going to happen in this same room, Global Financial Stability Report, please stay tuned. Tomorrow you have the Fiscal Monitor, and then later in the week, you have the Managing Director’s press briefing and also all the regional press briefings that we have been talking about. Thank you very much for your time. If you have questions, comments, send them my way to media@imf.org and hopefully you have a great week. I am sure it’s going to be busy.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Jose De Haro

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/22/tr-04222025-weo-press-briefing

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: World Economic Outlook Press Briefing

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 22, 2025

    Speakers:

    Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas, Director, Research Department, IMF
    Petya Koeva Brooks, Deputy Director, Research Department, IMF
    Deniz Igan, Division Chief, Research Department, IMF

    Moderator:
    Jose Luis De Haro, Communications Officer, IMF   

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I think we can start and we have a quorum. So good morning, everyone, and welcome. I want to welcome also those joining us online. I am Jose Luis de Haro with the Communications Department at the IMF and we are gathered here today for the presentation of our latest edition of the World Economic Outlook titled, “A Critical Juncture Amid Policy Shifts.” I hope by this time you all have had access to the document. If not, I am going to encourage you, as always, to go to IMF.org. There, you are going to find the document, the World Economic Outlook, also Pierre‑Olivier’s blog and many other assets, including the underlying data for some of the charts that are published on the World Economic Outlook.

    I also want to plug in that we have a new database portal that I encourage you to use, and what’s best, that to discuss the new outlook that having here with us today, Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas. He is the Economic Counsellor, the chief economist, and the Director of the Research Department. Next to him are Petya Koeva Brooks, she is the Deputy Director of the Research Department and last, but not least, we also have Deniz Igan, she is the division chief also with the Research Department.

    Pierre‑Olivier, as usual is going to start with some opening remarks, and then we are going to open the floor to your questions. I just want to remind everyone that this press briefing, it’s on the record and that we also have simultaneous translation.

    So let me stop here. Pierre‑Olivier, the floor is yours.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Jose. And good morning, everyone. The landscape has changed since our last World Economic Outlook update in January. We are entering a new era as the global economic system that has operated for the last 80 years is being reset. Since late January, many tariff announcements have been made, culminating on April 2, with near universal levies from the United States and counterresponses from some trading partners. The U.S. effective tariff rate has surged past levels reached more than 100 years ago, while tariff rates on the U.S. have also increased.

    Beyond the abrupt increase in tariffs, the surge in policy uncertainty is a major driver of the economic outlook. If sustained, the increasing trade tensions and uncertainty will slow global growth significantly. Reflecting this complexity, our report presents a reference forecast which incorporates policy announcements up to April 4 by the U.S. and trading partners. Under these reference forecasts, global growth will reach 2.8 percent this year and 3 percent next year, a cumulative downgrade of about 0.8 percentage points relative to our January 2025 WEO update. Our report also offers a range of forecasts under different policy assumptions.

    Under an alternative path that excludes the April tariff announcements, global growth would have seen only a modest downgrade to 3.2 percent this year. We will also use a model‑based forecast to incorporate the temporary suspension of most tariffs announced on April 9, together with the increase in bilateral tariffs between China and the U.S. to prohibitive levels. This pause, even if extended permanently, delivers a similar growth outlook as a reference forecast, 2.8 percent, even if some highly tariffed countries could benefit.

    Now, while global growth remains well above recession levels, all regions are negatively impacted this year and next. And the global disinflation process continues, but at a slower pace with inflation revised up by 0.1 percentage point in both years. These trade tensions will greatly impact global trade. We project that global trade growth will be more than cut in half from 3.8 percent last year to 1.7 percent this year. The tariffs will play out differently in different countries. For the United States, the tariffs represent a supply shock that reduces productivity and output permanently and increases price pressures temporarily. This adds to an already weakening outlook and leads us to revise growth down by 0.9 percentage points to 1.8 percent, with a 0.4 percentage point downgrade from the tariffs only. While inflation is revised upwards.

    For trading partners, tariffs act mostly as a negative external demand shock. Weakening activity and prices, even if some countries could benefit from trade diversion. This is why we have lowered our China growth forecast this year to 4 percent, while inflation is revised down by 0.8 percentage points, increasing deflationary pressures. All countries are negatively affected by the surge in trade policy uncertainty, as businesses cut purchases and investment, while financial institutions reassess their borrowers’ exposure. Uncertainty also increases because of the complex sectoral disruptions that tariffs could cause up and down supply chains, as we saw during the pandemic.

    The effect of these shocks on exchange rates is complex. The tariffs could appreciate the US dollar, as in previous episodes. However, greater policy uncertainty, lower U.S. growth prospects, and an adjustment in the global demand for dollar assets are weighing down on the dollar.

    Risks to the global economic have increased and are firmly to the downside.

    First, while we are not projecting a global downturn, the risks it may happen this year have increased substantially, from 17 percent projected back in October to 30 percent now. An escalation of trade tensions would further depress growth. Financial conditions could also tighten, as markets react negatively to diminished growth prospects and increased uncertainty. On the flip side, growth prospects could immediately improve if countries ease from their current trade policy stance and promote a new, clear, and stable trade environment.

    Addressing domestic imbalances can also help raise growth while contributing significantly to closing external imbalances. For Europe, this means spending more on public infrastructure to accelerate productivity growth. For China, it means boosting support for domestic demand. While for the U.S., it means stepping up fiscal consolidation.

    Turning to policies. Our recommendations call for prudence and improved collaboration. Let me outline some key ones. First, an obvious priority is to restore trade policy stability. The global economy needs a clear, stable, and predictable trading environment, one that addresses some of the longstanding gaps in international trading rules. Monetary policy will need to remain agile and respond by tightening where inflation pressures re‑emerge, while easing where weak demand dominates. Monetary policy credibility will be key, especially where inflation expectations might de‑anchor. And central bank independence remains a cornerstone.

    Many fiscal authorities will face new spending needs to bolster defense spending or to offset the trade dislocations, likely to come. Some of the poorest countries also hit with reduced official aid could experience debt distress. Yet debt levels are still elevated and most countries still need to rebuild fiscal space, including by implementing structural reforms. Support, where needed, should remain narrowly targeted and temporary. It is easier to turn on the fiscal tap than to turn it off. Where new spending needs are permanent, as for defense spending in some countries, planning for offsetting cuts elsewhere or new revenues should be made.

    Finally, even if some of the grievances against our trading system have merit, we should all work toward fixing the system so that it can deliver better opportunities to all. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. Before we open the floor to your questions, some ground rules. First of all, if you want to ask a question, raise your hand. If I call on you, please identify yourself and the media outlet you represent. Try to be succinct. Stick to one question. We want to answer as many questions as possible.

    And also, a reminder. We are here to discuss the World Economic Outlook. Those questions regarding country programs, institutional issues are going to be better placed for the regional press briefings that are happening later this week and also the Managing Director’s press briefing this Thursday.

    With that said, I want hands up. OK. So I am going to start here in the center. Then I am going to move the room to my left. Then to my right. I am going to start with the lady with the green jacket there.

    QUESTION: Thank you.. Thanks so much for doing this.

    Pierre‑Olivier, I wonder if you can speak a little bit to the fact that you haven’t called out a recession. And you know, we are hearing lots of economists in the United States and other places‑‑most recently yesterday, the IIF is now also forecasting a small recession in the second half of the year. What we see in the WEO is that the percentage of risk of a recession has increased pretty dramatically. Can you walk us through why you are not at this point calling a recession, for instance, likely in the United States and what it would take to tip it that way? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Andrea.

    So for the United States, we are projecting a significant slowdown. We are projecting growth will be at 1.8 percent in 2025. And that’s a 0.9 percentage‑point slowdown‑‑revision in our projections from January. But 1.9 percent is obviously not a recession. And the reason for this is is that we have a U.S. economy that, in our view, is coming from a position of strength. We had an economy that was growing very rapidly. We have a labor market that is still very robust. We have seen some signs of weakening and slowdown in the U.S. economy, even before the tariff announcements. So, in fact, the 0.9 percentage point downward revision that I just mentioned, only a part of this‑‑maybe 0.4 percentage points‑‑is coming from the tariffs. Some of that is also coming from weakening momentum. This was an economy that was doing very, very well but was self‑correcting and cooling off a bit on its own. And we were seeing already consumption numbers coming down. We are seeing consumer confidence coming down. So all of that was already factored in. But we are not seeing a recession in our reference forecast.

    As you mentioned, Andrea, we are‑‑when we do our risk assessment, if you want, we are seeing the probability of a recession increasing, from about 25 percent back in October to around 40 percent when we assess it now.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to move to this side. The lady here in red.

    QUESTION: Good morning.

    Pierre, I wanted to ask you about the downward pressure on the dollar now. To what extent you believe it can provide some relief from the pressure on highly indebted emerging economies with a large share of dollar‑denominated debt? And has this downward pressure on the dollar changed your outlook on all of those emerging economies that are still, you know, under the impact of the high debt‑‑as mentioned by the MD in previous meetings, where this high debt is really one of the impediments to growth? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So we are seeing a weakening of the dollar that is fairly broad‑based over the last few weeks, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, some of that is coming from the weaker growth prospects in the U.S. Some it is coming from the increased uncertainty. And it’s leading to a reassessment of the global demand for dollar assets. When we step back, we also have to realize we are coming from a position where, over the last few years, there have been tremendous capital inflows into U.S. markets, in particular, risk markets. That’s something that, of course, my colleague Tobias Adrian will talk about in the GFSR press conference. So we are seeing some adjustment, some contradiction. The markets are handling it. We don’t see signs of stress, even in currency markets.

    Now, the interesting development is, what does it mean for emerging markets? And you are right to point out that, in the past, when the dollar would strengthen, that would not necessarily be good news for emerging markets because they have dollar‑denominated debts, so that increases their liabilities and the pressure on them to service their debts. And this can lead to some tightening of financial conditions. So we are not seeing that right now. And so that’s a plus. The flip side of this is, of course, the appreciation of some of these emerging markets’ currencies means that they are also losing a little bit on the competitiveness side, so there is maybe something that is a bit easier on the finance conditions, something that is not as easy on the trade side.

    Finally, this is an environment of enormous uncertainty, increased volatility. And that I think is something that will dominate for many of the emerging markets. So when we are looking at our assessment, we are actually downgrading the emerging market economies for 2025 and 2026, most of them. Some of them may, as I mentioned, benefit. But overall, as a group, they are downgraded. While because they are also very plugged into the global supply chains, the uncertainty is leading to a pause in investment and activity, and they are going to suffer from the decline in demand for their products coming from the tariffs.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to go with the gentleman here with the glasses.

    QUESTION: Thank you. I just have one question. Could you elaborate a little bit on what will happen with the trade flows in your models? I saw that in the basic assumption, the exports from the U.S. are [breaking quite heavily but not that much from China. Why is this so?

    And do I understand it right that this basic model does not yet integrate the additional hikes after ‑‑ happening after basically April 9, so above 100 percent on import tariffs by the U.S.? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So we are seeing a large impact on global trade coming from the tariffs and that’s going to be the case under any combination of tariffs where the effective tariff rates remains very elevated. And the reason why when we looked at the different scenarios that I mentioned, whether it’s a reference scenario or our April 9 scenario which includes lower tariffs on many countries but sharply increased tariffs between the U.S. and China. The overall impact on the global economy is not very different because the effective tariff rate is, if anything, even higher under that pause. So global trade is going to be significantly affected. The particular configuration of trade, which bilateral trade flows are going to be affected versus others that will depend on the final landscape in terms of tariffs so we can anticipate that there will be much lower bilateral trade under either the reference scenario or the April 9, between the U.S. and China. And that is weighing down on global trade growth. This is weighing down on global trade generally.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to turn here to the center. I am going to go to the first row. I am going to go with the lady with the yellow bottle.

    QUESTION: Thank you,

    You have downgraded the U.K.’s growth forecast quite sharply and given the range of explanations, from higher tariff barriers to more domestic issues, like cost‑of‑living pressures. Out of those, so the global challenges versus domestic challenges, which one is weighing more heavily on the U.K.’s growth forecasts?

    Mr. De Haro: OK we are going to open the round of U.K. questions so if you have questions on the U.K., raise your hand. And I will pass the mic to you. I see  two there. Yep.

    QUESTION: Hi.

    In a world where everyone is warning about the impact of tariffs on U.S. inflation and how much it will raise U.S. prices, why do you have the U.K. with the highest inflation rate in the G‑7 this year? And do you believe tariffs will be inflationary or disinflationary for the U.K.?

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Joe here in the first row.

    QUESTION: Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very much. So Joel hills from ITV news. Obviously it’s impacting the tariffs are impacting the U.K. They are impacting most countries. I just wonder this, President Trump did say there would be some disruption. He suggested it would be sort of temporary. Is it possible that President Trump is actually a genius? That he knows something you do not?

    Mr. De Haro: And I think we have a last question on the U.K. and this is going to be the last question on the U.K. There on the back of the room.

    QUESTION: Yeah.

    The U.K. inflation forecast is, you know, much higher than we expected it to be, 0.7 percent higher. Is that going to impact on lowering interest rates in the U.K.? And does that affect the growth rate, which seems to be rather optimistic, compared with some of the other European countries?

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to be done with the U.K. questions and then we will move along. So Pierre‑Olivier.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. So many questions. Let me address them as best I can. First, on the revision for growth in the U.K. and inflation. So the tariffs are playing a role, as they are in most countries and uncertainty is also playing a role, as it is in all countries. And it’s weighing down on growth in the U.K. But there are some U.K.‑specific factors and I would say that in terms of the zero point 5 percentage point downward revision that we are saying for the U.K., the domestic factors are probably the biggest ones. And in particular, there is a lower carryover from weaker growth in the second half of last year. There is also some tightening of financial conditions, as interest rates have risen, longer‑term interest rates.

    On inflation, the revision in inflation in the U.K. is coming, again, from domestic factors, and in particular some change in regulated energy prices. So that’s expected to be temporary but it’s also very U.K.‑specific. The effect of the tariffs on countries like the U.K., like it is on the EU or China is like a negative demand shock. It’s weakening activity but it’s also lowering price pressures, not increasing them.

    Now, what is the impact of the tariffs in the medium and long term? Not just what’s going to happen this year and next but what’s going to happen longer term? Our assessment is it’s going to be negative. We have a box in our report that looks at the long‑term impact of the tariffs, if they are maintained. And it is negative for all regions, just like the short‑term impact. So we are seeing a negative impact in the short term, in the medium term, in the long term. Again, there are nuances. Some countries might benefit, depending on the particular configuration of tariffs. It might benefit from some trade diversion; but the broad picture is it’s negative for the outlook.

    Now, our ‑‑ and I will end with that. Our forecast for 2025 is slightly higher than OBR’s forecast. Some of this has to do with some of the underlying monetary policy assumptions for the U.K. The bank‑‑

    Our assumption for this year is that there are going to be four cuts through the year. One cut already happened. We expect three more.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. I am not going to forget about the people that are on WebEx, and I am going to pass a question there. I see Anton from TAS.

    QUESTION: Good morning. Thank you for doing this.

    Given the projected slowdown of Russia’s GDP growth from 4.1 in 2024 to 1.5 in 2025, what are the primary factors driving this sharp decline? And how sustainable is Russia’s growth model going forward? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Go ahead.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Petya, would you like to answer?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. We are indeed expecting a slowdown in growth to 1.5 this year, and this, to a large extent is kind of the natural slowing of the economy after growing quite robustly in previous years. And also as a result of policy tightening that we have seen, both on the fiscal as well as on the monetary policy side. It is also due to the lower oil prices that have come about as a result of the‑‑as a response to the round of tariffs, as well as the uncertainty about global growth. So all these factors are behind that lower growth number, although I should point out that it is actually a slight upward revision, relative to what we had back in January. And the reason for that is that, again, we actually had seen upward surprises in 2024, which kind of carried into 2025.

    When it comes to the medium‑term growth outlook, we do expect that to be relatively weak. We are‑‑we have penciled in growth number of about 1.2, which is down from 1.7 which is what we had before the start of the war.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Let’s continue. I am going to go again in the center and then I am going to go to that side. The lady with the glasses there.

    QUESTION: Hi.

    In Latin America, we received almost every country 10 percent. So I want to know about the impact of the tariffs in Latin America and if the impact is going to be limited, versus other regions, and when we are going to start to feeling this impact. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: And before we answer the question, are there any questions on Mexico, Brazil, Argentina? OK. Argentina friends, go ahead.

    QUESTION: Hello.

    You’ve kept 5.5 growth projection that was decided in the latest program that Argentina signed with the IMF. I would like to know why you are not seeing so much impact yet about‑‑of this general context.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We can go ahead first with the Latin America overview and then we can go to Argentina.

    Mr. Gourinchas: I will just say something briefly and then ask my colleague Petya to come in. So for Latin America, as a whole, we are saying activity that is largely driven by consumption on the back of resilient labor markets while investment remains somewhat sluggish. And the slowdown in our projection reflects the impact of tariffs and the global growth slowdown, of course, which is also affecting countries in the region. Policy uncertainty. And the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus and in some countries monetary policy tightening.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: I don’t have a lot to add. Just to say that the disinflation process has also slowed a bit, and this is also‑‑also makes the policy trade‑offs a bit more complicated with slow‑‑with growth slowing down and at the same time, you know, having still challenges on the inflation side.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So we are going to move on. I am going to ask the gentleman in the first row there because‑‑

    Oh, sorry. Sorry. I forgot about Argentina. Please go ahead.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: We cannot forget about Argentina.

    So the growth forecast for this year‑‑you are right‑‑we still have the upgrade of .5. And this is related to just the positive surprises that we had seen, in spite of a very strong fiscal adjustment, the recovery in confidence I think has definitely played a role in kind of driving us to have this forecast. That said, there are a number of risks related to tighter financial conditions, commodity prices, and a lot of others, which is true for many if not most other countries.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So now we can move on. I am going to go with the gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you. In the October 2024 outlook you saw a stable but slow growth for Africa. What’s new now? And what kind of initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area do for African economies amidst these trade tensions?

    Mr. De Haro: And before we answer, I think‑‑

    QUESTION: Hi. Good morning.

    One of the things that you mentioned in your report is the demographic shift and the rise in the silver economy. Africa, on the other hand, has the reverse of that. So what is your recommendation in the short and medium term on how to deal with some of these challenges pertaining to tariffs, monetary policy, and now currency exchange? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: OK.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. Thank you. I will just say one word about the outlook in sub‑Saharan Africa and then I will ask my colleague Deniz to come in to add more color and answer also the question on the demographic trends.

    So regional growth in sub‑Saharan Africa improved significantly last year, to 4 percent. And it will ease in 2025. And this is in line with a softer global outlook. So we are seeing the same forces at play in the region, as we are seeing more globally. And a downturn‑‑and a downward revision in our projection that is of a similar magnitude at about 0.4 percentage point. Deniz?

    Ms. Igan: Thank you for the question. So on the demographic shifts, our Chapter 2 basically points out that countries’ age structures are evolving at different rates, as you pointed out as well. We have most western economies, some Asian economies that are aging fast. And you know in a health way some of them. And then we have many sub‑Saharan African countries that have a very young population. And what the chapter shows is actually, there are important medium‑term consequences of that, both for growth, as well as external balances of countries.

    In Africa’s case, basically, what we would see is a demographic dividend coming from having a young population. And the question then becomes how best to leverage that, how best to use that and channel it into growth. And the answer there, first and foremost, depends on the structural reforms, the investment that’s necessary on healthcare, on education, on human capital more generally and also international cooperation because our Chapter 3 looks more carefully into migration flows. And again, there, we see migration policy shifts in destination countries has spillovers for other countries. And this is especially true for emerging market economies and lower income economies. So, again, international cooperation there, making sure that growth dividends are utilized in the best way is what we delve into in the chapter.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to go to the gentleman with‑‑raise your hand. Yeah. You. No, I am going back. Then I will go‑‑there you go.

    QUESTION: OK. I have a question about China’s growth.

    In your World Economic Outlook, you say China’s growth forecast has been cut to 4 percent for this year, which is a 0.6 percentage drop from an earlier projection. But China’s National Bureau of Statistics a couple of days ago predicted China’s growth GDP growth in the first quarter was 5.4 percent. So my question is, how do you see the disparity in the forecast? Is China more optimistic than you are? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. So, yes, we are revising our growth projections for China down by 0.6 percentage points, as you have noted. I should flag that this number does not incorporate the latest release for Q1. That came after we closed our round of projections. So this is not reflected there. And we will have to see how it affects our projections when we have our next round of WEO updates.

    But let me give you a little bit of perspective on the rationale behind our revision for China. The tariff increase in tariffs especially since China is one of the countries that is facing the most elevated tariffs right now, is going to have a very significant impact in our projections on the Chinese economy. In fact, when we do a decomposition, which I showed during my opening remarks, the impact of the tariffs on the Chinese economy would be a negative 1.3 percentage point revision on growth.

    So why do we only have 0.6? Well, because there are other factors that are helping to support Chinese growth in 2025 and 2026. One of which‑‑which is quite important‑‑is the fiscal support that has been announced since the beginning of the year. And that is adding up, something of the amount of 0.5 percentage points. So the impact of the current trade tensions is very significant. It’s partly offset. We expect it to remain quite significant also in 2026 when we also have a downward revision by about 0.5 percentage points.

    The other side of this, where we are seeing the impact of the tariffs is on inflation, which is revised down. Our headline inflation projection for 2025 is actually at zero. So it’s down from 0.8 percent to zero. So China is facing stronger deflationary forces as a result of these trade tensions.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to move to this side. The gentleman with the glasses here.

    QUESTION: What impact did the oil price also have in exporting and importing countries in the Middle East? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Go ahead.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So we have seen oil prices declining since our last projections, and the decline in oil prices in our and our interpretation is coming mostly from weaker global demand, so it’s the weakening of global activity that is driving the decline in prices. There has been some increase in supply coming from OPEC Plus countries, but broadly speaking, the decline is mostly coming from weaker demand.

    So that is going to play out in ways you sort of would expect. The commodity exporters are going to face lower export revenues from the decline in oil prices. That’s going to weigh on their fiscal outlook, on their growth.

    For those countries that are oil importers, it’s going to lower inflation pressures because that‑‑lower oil prices is going to feed into lower headline inflation. It’s going to also provide some modest support to economic activity there.

    Deniz, anything to add on oil prices or‑‑or Petya?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: No, I don’t.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to move to the center. I am going to get the gentleman with the white shirt there.

    QUESTION: h I am not going to ask another question about the U.K., you will be pleased to know. Over the last week we have seen a number of attacks by the White House on the independence of the Federal Reserve. How destabilizing do you think this might be for financial markets?

    Mr. Gourinchas: So central banks are facing a delicate moment. As I have explained in many countries, the impact of the tariffs is going to be to increase recessionary forces and it is going to lower price pressures. And that will help central banks cut interest rates faster and provide some support to their economies. But in other countries ‑‑ and in our projections, the U.S. is in that category‑‑the tariffs are going to increase price pressures. Price pressures in the U.S. are increasing for other reasons as well. Service prices have been quite‑‑inflation of service prices have been quite strong. And that is something that we are seeing already. But the tariffs are likely to increase price pressures. We are projecting inflation to remain at 3 percent in the U.S. this year, the same level as last year, headline inflation.

    So in that context, if you also think about where we are coming from, we are coming from a period of very elevated inflation. We are just coming off the cost‑of‑living crisis, a surge in inflation rates to double digits that we haven’t seen in more than a generation. So the critical thing is to make sure that inflation expectations remain anchored, that everyone remains convinced that central banks will do what is necessary to bring inflation back to central bank targets in an orderly manner. And central banks have instruments to do this. They have their interest rate instruments. They have various instruments of monetary policy. But one critical aspect of what they do is coming from their credibility. So central banks need to remain credible. And part of that credibility is built upon their central bank independence. And so from that perspective, it’s very important to preserve that.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to have time for two questions. One of them is going back to WebEx. I see Weier, please. Come in.

    QUESTION: Yes.I have a question.

    You mentioned that the global economic system is being reset. And I am not sure if one of the early signs in the financial markets, as we see that the markets moving from American exceptionalism to the sort of sell the U.S. narrative. So could you assess the implications for the financial markets and the world economy, as a whole?

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yeah, well we have seen some volatility in the markets, of course, whenever there is going to be potentially a significant change in the economic structure of the global economy. I think we are bound to see some reassessment. And investors are going to try to figure out what’s happening, and that’s going to inject volatility. And we are seeing some of that.

    The good news is a lot of that volatility we have seen in the last few weeks has not led to significant market dislocations or market stress to levels that would, for instance, have necessitated the interventions by central banks around the world.

    So whether you are looking at equity markets, whether you are looking at bond markets, whether you are looking at currency markets, what we are saying is a reassessment of the world we are in now and that means that there is a reassessment of valuations of risk assets, of different currencies. But that is happening in an orderly manner. So from that perspective, we are seeing a system that is quite resilient, that remained resilient but, of course, we are watching carefully and there has been some tightening of financial conditions and that’s something to be looking out for. We want to make sure that it doesn’t get to a level where the stress in the financial system would become too extreme.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. The lady here in the first row has been waiting patiently. Please go ahead.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose. I want to ask about the trading tensions impact on low‑income countries. You mentioned there are like downgrading for emerging markets but how about like those small countries who have lower income as a group, have you assessed the particular impact on them in these ongoing trade tensions? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. Well thanks. For low‑income countries as a group, we are also seeing a downgrade in which we report in our report of 0.4 percentage points. We are expecting growth of 4.2 percent in 2025. So the 0.4 is very similar to what we are seeing at the aggregate levels, 0.5. So from that perspective it looks quite the same. However, there are also a lot of differences across countries, and when we look more carefully, you might see some vulnerable countries, especially in sub‑Saharan Africa. But elsewhere as well‑‑who could face very challenging conditions as a result of the tariffs in an environment in which many of the countries, low‑income countries have been facing a funding squeeze for a number of years now, private capital flows to this region have been drying up or have been coming on very expensive terms. We are seeing a drying up also of some official aid flows. So some of these countries have very limited fiscal space. Near a situation where the situation could become more challenging.

    Now, on the flip side, the fact that we are seeing commodity prices coming down for many commodities will help some of them. The commodity importers in that group will hurt the ones who are commodity exporters. And there are a number of countries among the low-income group that are commodity exporters, so that is adding some additional pressure on them.

    Mr. De Haro: I am going to make an exception and just one last question. I am going to go with the gentleman in the white shirt there. He has been waiting patiently, too. And don’t get frustrated. There are going to be many opportunities for you to ask questions.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose. AFP.

    I had a quick question about Spain because that’s the only countries among advanced economies where you had an upward revision. It’s going to be way better than the eurozone and even better than other advanced economies. What are the underlying reasons for that? And you formally talked much about tourism but are there any other things that might be pointed out? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes, indeed. Spain is doing better than its peers. Petya, would you like to talk about it?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. Indeed. We are actually having an upgrade for Spain this year, which is a rare occurrence in the many, many downgrades that we have had for many other countries. This is partly because the Spanish economy just had such strong momentum in 2024, coming into 2025. And part of that was due to the very strong services exports as well as the very strong labor accumulation. Part of that related to immigration. But all of that being said, Spain is still being affected indirectly and directly by the tariffs and the uncertainty associated with that. It’s just that, as I said, that underlying [strength is kind of having a bigger impact in the near term. But then again, in 2026, we do project kind of a slowing of growth to about 1.8.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. And on that point, I want to thank you, everyone, on behalf of Pierre‑Olivier, Petya, Deniz, the Research Department, the Communications Department. Some reminders. Next press briefing is going to happen in this same room, Global Financial Stability Report, please stay tuned. Tomorrow you have the Fiscal Monitor, and then later in the week, you have the Managing Director’s press briefing and also all the regional press briefings that we have been talking about. Thank you very much for your time. If you have questions, comments, send them my way to media@imf.org and hopefully you have a great week. I am sure it’s going to be busy.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Jose De Haro

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Unlocking $25+ Billion Exports in India’s Hand & Power Tools Sector

    Source: Government of India

    Unlocking $25+ Billion Exports in India’s Hand & Power Tools Sector

    Forging India’s Future

    Posted On: 22 APR 2025 3:23PM by PIB Delhi

    Introduction

    The tools industry—comprising hand and power tools—is a foundational pillar of the global manufacturing ecosystem, enabling production across multiple sectors such as construction, automotive, electronics, and infrastructure. In April 2025, NITI Aayog and the Foundation for Economic Development jointly published the report “Unlocking $25+ Billion Exports: India’s Hand & Power Tools Sector”, laying out a comprehensive roadmap to scale up India’s global exports from the current $1 billion to over $25 billion by 2035.

     

    India’s current export footprint in this sector remains modest, yet it possesses key strengthslow-cost labor, strategic trade positioning, and a growing manufacturing base—that offer significant potential to transform the nation into a competitive global player.

     

    This report is both a clarion call and a roadmap,

    urging policymakers, industry leaders, and stakeholders to seize a transformative export opportunity worth over $25 billion in the next decade.

     

    Overview

    • Global Market Size (2022): ~$100 billion
      • Hand Tools: $34 billion
      • Power Tools: $63 billion
    • Projected Market Size (2035): $190 billion (CAGR: 53%)
      • Hand Tools: $60 billion
      • Power Tools: $134 billion
    • India’s exports in 2025:
      • Hand Tools: $600 million (1.8% global share)
      • Power Tools: $425 million (0.7% global share)

     

    Targets by 2035 for India:

    • Hand Tools: 25% market share → $15 billion exports
    • Power Tools: 10% market share → $12 billion exports
    • Total Export Opportunity: Over $25 billion
    • Employment Generation: 3.5 million direct and indirect jobs

     

    India’s Current Export Profile

    Hand Tools

    India’s hand tools sector has developed a robust MSME ecosystem with key manufacturing clusters in Punjab (Jalandhar, Ludhiana), Maharashtra (Mumbai, Nagpur), and Rajasthan (Nagaur). Common exports include wrenches, pliers, screwdrivers, and hand saws. The sector’s success is linked to labor-intensive processes, localized supply chains, and historical evolution post-Independence.

    Power Tools

    The country currently lacks a comprehensive electronic manufacturing ecosystem for power tools, which require precision components like motors and batteries.

    Export Destinations and Trade Opportunities

     

    • Top Importers: USA and European Union account for 55–60% of global imports.
    • Although India’s exports have also grown by 24% year-on-year,

      there remains considerable untapped potential for further expansion.

      Tariff Advantage: U.S. imposed 7.5–25% additional tariffs on Chinese tools, creating new opportunities for alternative suppliers like India.

     

    Existing Government Support Mechanisms

    • Remission of Duties and Taxes on Exported Products (RoDTEP): RoDTEP provides rebates to exporters for taxes and duties on exported goods to help make Indian exporters more competitive in international markets. Under this scheme, hand tools exporters get rebates of 1.1% as a percentage of their Free on Board (FOB) value, and power tools get rebates of 0.9% as a percentage of their FOB value.
    • Duty Drawback Scheme: Duty Free Import Authorisation (DFIA) allows duty-free import of inputs but on a post export basis only. Inputs imported under this scheme are exempted of the Basic Customs Duty only. To qualify, the inputs must be listed under the Standard Input Output Norms (SION), and a minimum value addition of 20% must be achieved. Under this scheme, manufacturers of hand and power tools are eligible for duty drawbacks of 1.5% to 2% on their input costs, as per the Duty drawback rates, 2023.

     

    Strategic Policy Recommendations

    1. Create World-Class Clusters for Hand Tools

    • Goal: 3–4 clusters spanning ~4000 acres by 2035
    • Estimated Investment: ₹12,000 crore (Government) + ₹45,000 crore (Industry)
    • Cluster Features:
      • Plug-and-play industrial infrastructure
      • Worker housing, R&D centers, testing labs
      • Convention facilities, 24×7 power and water supply
    • To build world class clusters, it is important to invest in

      infrastructure such as effluent treatment plants, guaranteed 24×7 power supply, and plug and play factories.

      Governance Model: Public-Private Partnership (PPP) via a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), state Cluster Authority, and private developers

     

    2. Structural Reforms

    • Reduce import duties and rationalize Quality Control Orders (QCOs).
    • Reform Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG) scheme to ease compliance.
    • Align labor laws with global standards (e.g., 300 hours quarterly overtime).
    • Liberalize Floor Area Ratio (FAR) and ground coverage norms.
    • Ensure 24×7 low-cost electricity and improve logistics.
    • If factor market reforms are implemented, no additional

      fiscal incentive will be required from the government.

      Encourage domestic R&D and ease technology transfer.

     

    3. Bridge Support (Contingent)

    If reforms are delayed, bridge support worth ₹5,800 crore over 5 years is recommended.

    • Hand Tools: ₹3,450 crore
      • Logistics: ₹450 crore
      • Interest Subvention: ₹700 crore
      • Competitiveness Incentive: ₹700 crore
      • Capital Subsidy: ₹1,600 crore
    • Power Tools: ₹2,230 crore
      • Interest Subvention: ₹430 crore
      • Competitiveness Incentive: ₹1,500 crore
      • Support should be treated as a strategic investment,

        not a subsidy, with a projected return of 2–3 times in tax revenues.

        Capital Subsidy: ₹300 crore

     

    Conclusion

    India stands at a pivotal juncture in its industrial transformation. The tools sector, though currently underrepresented in global trade, offers a rare and time-sensitive opportunity to reposition India as a reliable manufacturing alternative to China. The roadmap presented by NITI Aayog focuses on leveraging India’s inherent strengths—abundant labor, a rising manufacturing base, and sectoral synergies—while urgently addressing its structural weaknesses.

    References

    https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2025-04/India_Hand_Power_Tools_Sector_Report.pdf

    Click here to see PDF.

    ****

    Santosh Kumar | Sarla Meena | Rishita Aggarwal

    (Release ID: 2123437) Visitor Counter : 71

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Acting SFST’s speech at Earth Forum 2025 (English only)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         Following is the speech by the Acting Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Mr Joseph Chan, at the Earth Forum 2025 today (April 22):
     
    Plato (Chairperson of Friends of the Earth (HK), Mr Plato Yip), King (Executive Director of the Financial Services Development Council (FSDC), Dr King Au), Dr Leng (Board Member of the International Sustainability Standards Board of the IFRS Foundation, Dr Bing Leng), Dr Guo (Chairman of the China Sustainable Investment Forum (China SIF), Dr Guo Peiyuan), distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,
     
         Good afternoon. It is my great honour and pleasure to join you today at the Earth Forum 2025, a gathering of visionaries committed to shaping a sustainable future. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to Friends of the Earth, FSDC and China SIF for organising this pivotal event and to all of you for your unwavering dedication to advancing green finance.
     
         As Asia’s leading international financial centre, Hong Kong has also become Asia’s premier hub for green and sustainable finance. To align with the target of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, Hong Kong has made significant commitments of its own. These targets are not merely aspirational; they are driving systemic reforms across various sectors, including energy, transportation, and finance.
     
         In 2024, the total green and sustainable debts issued in Hong Kong exceeded US$84 billion, among which the volume of green and sustainable bonds arranged in Hong Kong amounted to around US$43 billion, ranking first in the Asian market for seven consecutive years since 2018 and capturing around 45 per cent of the regional total. This accomplishment solidifies our position as the region’s premier platform for scaling climate-positive investments and also underscores our dedication to fostering a robust green finance ecosystem.
     
         Hong Kong’s status as a strategic nexus for green finance in Asia is central to advancing global sustainability objectives. As of the end of December last year, there are more than 220 ESG (environmental, social and governance) funds in Hong Kong authorised by our regulator, with assets under management (AUM) of around HK$1.2 trillion. This represents a remarkable increase of 136 per cent in the number of funds and a 15 per cent rise in AUM from just three years ago. These elements will solidify Hong Kong’s role as the gateway to sustainable finance in Asia.
     
         As an international financial centre, Hong Kong is uniquely positioned to mobilise the necessary capital for climate solutions while ensuring robust integrity within our financial markets. Hong Kong’s multifaceted approach encompasses policy frameworks, market infrastructure, innovation ecosystems, and cross-border collaboration. Our Government Sustainable Bond Programme stands as a testament to this transformation. Having raised HK$220 billion since 2019, including the groundbreaking tokenised bond charge, we’re not just starting green projects but creating new benchmarks for the market in different currencies and across different tenors. The recent expansion of the programme to include sustainable projects reflects our commitment to financing a broader range of climate solutions.
     
         As we navigate the complexities of climate change and strive for a sustainable future, transparency and robust governance remain fundamental to our approach. In December 2024, we launched a roadmap on sustainability disclosure in Hong Kong. The roadmap sets out Hong Kong’s approach to require publicly accountable entities (PAEs) to adopt the ISSB Standards (International Financial Reporting Standards – Sustainability Disclosure Standards). Assuming the role of the sustainability reporting standard setter in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants (HKICPA) published in December 2024 following a public consultation the Hong Kong Sustainability Disclosure Standards (Hong Kong Standards) fully aligned with the ISSB Standards, with an effective date of August 1, 2025. All these ensure our regulatory framework remains aligned with international best practices while addressing the specific needs of the evolving markets.
     
         Our regulatory framework is fundamental to creating a robust and dynamic sustainable finance ecosystem. By establishing clear guidelines and standards, we can ensure that all stakeholders are aligned in their efforts towards sustainability. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) published the Hong Kong Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance in May 2024, aligns with the two mainstream taxonomies of the Mainland and the European Union (EU), and currently encompasses 12 economic activities under four sectors, namely power generation, transportation, construction, and water and waste management. It serves as a pivotal tool to raise awareness about green finance, promote common understanding of green activities, facilitate green finance flows, and provide a foundation for further applications. In its Phase 2 development, the Taxonomy will introduce transition activities and add new green activities to make it more usable and support the transition of the region.
     
         We recognise that developing green finance talent is vital for sustaining our leadership position. Our Pilot Green and Sustainable Finance Capacity Building Support Scheme has successfully approved over 6 400 applications with a total amount of reimbursement of about HK$35.8 million. As mentioned in the 2025-2026 Budget, we will extend the scheme to 2028 to continuously support local green finance talent training.
     
         Our progress reflects the Government’s commitment to not only human capital development but also technological innovation. The Green and Sustainable Fintech Proof-of-Concept Funding Support Scheme, launched by the Government in June last year, aims to nurture an advanced green fintech ecosystem by providing vital support for innovative projects. The Scheme facilitates the commercialisation of the solutions and the completion of the proof-of-concept stage, enabling wider adoption of green and sustainable fintech solutions with potential in the business landscape of Hong Kong. A total of 39 applicants involving 60 projects were approved, with a grant of HK$150,000 for each project. These initiatives are building the expertise required to sustain Hong Kong’s leadership in sustainable finance.
     
         Ladies and gentlemen, the transition to a sustainable future is both our greatest challenge and our most exciting opportunity. Hong Kong stands ready to play its part – as a financial hub, as an innovator and, most importantly, as your partner in this vital work. Looking ahead, we will leverage Hong Kong’s unique position as an international financial centre to connect capital with climate solutions. This strategic role positions Hong Kong to make significant contributions to global climate action through financial innovation.
     
         I look forward to today’s constructive dialogue and to our continued collaboration in translating these strategic initiatives into tangible outcomes that advance Hong Kong’s sustainable finance leadership. Let us work together to build a sustainable future.
     
         Thank you.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Strong Garners Support for Legislation to Counter the CCP

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Dale Strong (Alabama)

    WASHINGTON— Congressman Dale Strong’s legislation, the Strategic Homeland Intelligence and Enforcement Legislation to Defend (SHIELD) Against the CCP Act is gaining nationwide support. This week, the legislation was endorsed by the Major County Sheriffs of America (MCSA), the National Narcotic Officers’ Associations’ Coalition (NNOAC), and the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA).  

    “China represents one of the most aggressive and dangerous threats to our national security today. This bill ensures DHS has a dedicated team working to combat this threat. I’m proud this legislation has broad support from my colleagues in the House and our law enforcement partners. It’s past time to get this legislation to the President’s desk and to protect the American people,” said Representative Dale Strong. 

    “The Chinese Communist Party is actively involved—both directly and indirectly—in supporting transnational criminal organizations engaged in the importation and trafficking of fentanyl, illicit drug precursors, and other controlled substances that have significantly contributed to drug poisonings and deaths across our country. We are grateful to Representative Strong for introducing the SHIELD Against CCP Act and for his commitment to dedicating resources, personnel, and programming to confront these deadly threats. The NNOAC is on the front lines of this fight, and we are committed to working with Congressman Strong and our partners at DHS to confront and dismantle the networks behind illicit drug trafficking,” said Eric Brown, President, National Narcotic Officers’ Associations’ Coalition. 

    “We applaud Representative Dale Strong for championing the SHIELD Against the CCP Act, legislation that takes critical steps to coordinate efforts in addressing the growing threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party to our homeland. This bill importantly acknowledges the vital role of the National Network of Fusion Centers and the importance of intelligence sharing and collaboration across federal, state, and local levels to protect national security. We are especially grateful for the recognition of our dedicated state and local public safety professionals, both sworn and civilian, who work tirelessly every day to track criminal trends and share timely, credible threat information. Their commitment and expertise are essential to protecting our communities and enhancing our nation’s ability to respond to emerging threats,” said Mike Sena, President, National Fusion Center Association. 

    BACKGROUND: 

    • During a March 9, 2023, House Committee on Homeland Security hearing, national security experts testified on the CCP’s efforts to circumvent U.S. homeland security.  

    • Specifically, witnesses highlighted the CCP’s exploitation of American universities, its theft of intellectual property (IP) and technology, risks to economic supply chain security, the threat it poses to critical infrastructure, and its alarming surveillance activities across the U.S. homeland.  

    • It is estimated that the People’s Republic of China’s theft of U.S. intellectual property extends to the billions, amounting to approximately $4,000 to $6,000 per American family of four after paying taxes.  

    This legislation would establish a dedicated Department of Homeland Security working group to counter threats posed by the CCP and, specifically, would require the group to examine, assess, and report on the spectrum of nontraditional tactics employed by the government of China and the efforts of DHS to counter these malign activities. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: On Earth Day, We Finally Have a President Who Follows Science

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    Under President Donald J. Trump, America is back — leveraging environmental policies rooted in reality to promote economic growth while maintaining the standards that have afforded Americans the cleanest air and water in the world for generations.
    Unlike the previous administration, which wasted billions of taxpayer dollars on virtue signaling and ineffective grifts, the Trump Administration’s policies are rooted in the belief that Americans are the best stewards of our vast natural resources — no “Green New Scam” required.
    Here are key actions President Trump is taking on the environment:
    President Trump is promoting energy innovation for a healthier future.
    By supporting cutting-edge technologies like carbon capture and storage, nuclear energy, and next-generation geothermal, the Trump Administration is ensuring America leads in both energy production and environmental innovation — producing the cleanest energy in the world. Moreover, by ending the Biden-era pause on liquefied natural gas export approvals, the U.S. is sharing cleaner energy with allies, reducing global emissions, and creating American jobs — building on President Trump’s first-term successes, where the U.S. led the world in greenhouse gas emission reductions.
    President Trump is championing sound forest management.
    The Trump Administration’s proactive forest management policies protect America’s forests, reduce catastrophic wildfires, and promote sustainable land use. By streamlining regulations and expanding responsible logging, President Trump is safeguarding millions of acres of forestland, improving wildlife habitats, and supporting rural economies at the same time.
    President Trump is ending the forced use of paper straws.
    Not only are paper straw mandates flawed in their alleged scientific backing, they’re also bad for humans and the environment. According to a new report, paper straws contain dangerous PFAS chemicals — “forever chemicals” linked to significant long-term health conditions — that infiltrate the water supply. Moreover, studies have found producing paper straws can have a larger carbon footprint and require more water than plastic straws for “approximately zero environmental impact.”
    President Trump is cutting wasteful regulations that stifle innovation and raise costs.
    Actions like pausing restrictive emissions rules for coal plants and revising the National Environmental Policy Act implementation have accelerated responsible energy and infrastructure projects while maintaining rigorous environmental standards — saving American families thousands annually on energy bills and proving that a strong economy and a healthy environment go hand-in-hand.
    President Trump is protecting public lands.
    The Trump Administration has prioritized access to federal lands for energy development while ensuring responsible management. By opening more federal lands and waters for oil, gas, and critical mineral extraction, the U.S. is strengthening energy security and reducing reliance on foreign resources. Simultaneously, investments in conservation, such as $38 billion in clean water infrastructure during President Trump’s first term, continue to safeguard America’s natural heritage for future generations.
    President Trump is pushing back on unfair trade practices that harm the environment and undercut U.S. producers and exporters.
    For years, foreign countries have taken advantage of our generosity at the expense of American workers and the environment. Deforestation in Brazil is at a 15-year high, China’s unfair, harmful fishing practices flood the global market with illegal fish and deplete stocks, and Mexico fails to deter illegal fishing — all while enjoying massive trade deficits with the U.S. and contributing to global environmental degradation.
    President Trump is cracking down on China — the most prolific polluter in the world.
    According to Reuters, China is “responsible for the most ocean plastic pollution per year with an estimated 2.4 million tons, about 30 percent of the global total.” By imposing tough trade measures and promoting American manufacturing, the Administration is reducing reliance on China’s high-pollution industries, ensuring the U.S. leads by example with cleaner production and responsible global stewardship.
    President Trump is protecting wildlife.
    By pausing certain wind projects, President Trump is recognizing wind turbines’ detrimental environmental impact, particularly on wildlife, which often outweighs their benefits.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Outbreak of a mysterious infectious disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – E-002832/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) have been monitoring the disease outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) via epidemic intelligence and regular contacts with the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the African CDC (Af-CDC).

    The Health Security Committee held an ad-hoc meeting on the topic on 12 December 2024[1]. The WHO Regional Office for Africa provided an overview of the epidemiological situation and informed on mortality, severity, and etiological agents. The ECDC explained that the risk posed to EU/European Economic Area countries is low.

    On 27 December 2024, the WHO informed that the undiagnosed disease reported in the DRC’s Kwango province is due to the combination of malaria and common respiratory infections in groups facing food insecurity[2].

    The Af-CDC receives support via the EU4Health and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (NDICI-GE)[3] Programmes to strengthen its prevention, preparedness and response capacities (PPRC) for emerging epidemics.

    The Commission works to strengthen third countries’ health systems, including in the DRC, to support their PPRC through Global, regional and bilateral programmes[4].

    The Commission acts against serious cross-border threats to health (SCBTH) with a variety of tools and mechanisms defined in Regulations 851/2004[5], 2022/2371[6] and 2022/2372[7] and Decision No 1313/2013/EU[8].

    It is developing a Union PPR plan to promote a coordinated response to SCBTH. It will consider provisions on joint arrangements for governance, capacities and resources, and cross-border interregional preparedness elements[9].

    • [1] https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/5c977252-7aa8-4219-a57b-b853bb2531d1_en?filename=security_20241212_sr_en.pdf
    • [2] As published in WHO’s Disease Outbreak News Item https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2024-DON547
    • [3] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/funding-technical-assistance/neighbourhood-development-and-international-cooperation-instrument-global-europe-ndici-global-europe_en
    • [4] E.g.: the Pandemic Fund, Global Fund, Gavi Alliance, etc.
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02004R0851-20221226
    • [6] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2371/oj
    • [7] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:314:FULL&from=EN
    • [8] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013D1313-20231218
    • [9] As included in Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2371/oj
    Last updated: 22 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Increased import tariffs on Chinese cars – E-002523/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    As stated in the impact assessment supporting the Commission’s proposal for amending the CO2 emission standards for cars and vans[1], one of the objectives was to stimulate innovation in zero-emission technologies to tackle the risk of the EU automotive value chain losing its technological leadership.

    The analysis pointed at the developments in the Chinese automotive sector and its competitive advantage in electric vehicle battery production.

    The trend towards zero-emission vehicles creates new business opportunities for automotive manufacturers, especially those taking an innovative approach, promoting and selling electric vehicles.

    Clear regulatory signals facilitate making appropriate investment decisions, to the benefit of EU industry’s competitiveness. The revised CO2 emission targets[2] provide a long-term regulatory signal.

    Delaying regulatory action would increase the uncertainty for the investments and the risk of the EU automotive industry losing its technological leadership and lose market share in the EU.

    The countervailing duties on battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from China are the result of a thorough anti-subsidy investigation, conducted according to the EU and World Trade Organisation rules.

    The Commission concluded that the BEV value chain in China benefits from unfair subsidisation, which is causing a threat of injury to EU BEV producers. The investigation also examined the likely impact of these measures on the EU producers, importers, users and suppliers of BEVs.

    Finally, with regard to the future of the car industry in Europe, the Commission released an industrial action plan for the automotive sector on 5 March 2025[3] after the President of the Commission conducted a Strategic Dialogue on this specific issue.

    • [1] Impact assessment accompanying Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in line with the Union’s increased climate ambition.
    • [2] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/851/oj
    • [3] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/business-and-industry/boosting-european-car-sector_en
    Last updated: 22 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Key Tronic Corporation Announces Third Quarter Reporting Date

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SPOKANE VALLEY, Wash., April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Key Tronic Corporation (Nasdaq: KTCC), announced today that it plans to report its results for the third quarter of fiscal 2025 after market close on May 6, 2025.

    Key Tronic will host a conference call to discuss its financial results at 2:00 PM Pacific (5:00 PM Eastern) on May 6, 2025. A broadcast of the conference call will be available at www.keytronic.com under “Investor Relations” or by calling 888-394-8218 or +1-313-209-4906 (Access Code: 2003797). A replay will be available at www.keytronic.com under “Investor Relations”.

    About Key Tronic

    Key Tronic is a leading contract manufacturer offering value-added design and manufacturing services from its facilities in the United States, Mexico, China and Vietnam. The Company provides its customers full engineering services, materials management, worldwide manufacturing facilities, assembly services, in-house testing, and worldwide distribution. Its customers include some of the world’s leading original equipment manufacturers. For more information about Key Tronic visit: www.keytronic.com.

    CONTACTS:   Anthony G. Voorhees   Michael Newman
        Chief Financial Officer   Investor Relations
        Key Tronic Corporation   StreetConnect
        (509) 927-5345   (206) 729-3625

     

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Canada: The CBSA launches an investigation into the alleged dumping of certain carbon and alloy steel wire from the People’s Republic of China, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, the Republic of India, the Italian Republic, the Federation of Malaysia, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Republic of Türkiye, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

    Source: Government of Canada News

    April 22, 2025
    Ottawa, Ontario

    The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) announced today that it is initiating an investigation to determine whether certain carbon and alloy steel wire originating in or exported from the People’s Republic of China, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, the Republic of India, the Italian Republic, the Federation of Malaysia, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Republic of Türkiye, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is being sold at unfair prices in Canada. This practice of dumping goods into Canada can harm Canadian industries by undercutting Canadian prices, which undermines fair competition.

    The CBSA is investigating because of a complaint filed by Sivaco Wire Group 2004, L.P. and ArcelorMittal Long Products Canada G.P. The complainants allege that as a result of an increase in the volume of the dumped imports, they have suffered material injury in the form of price undercutting, price depression, lost sales, lost market share, reduced net income and profitability, reduction in capacity utilization, inability to raise capital for investments, and reduced employment.

    The CBSA and the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) both play a role in the investigation. The CITT will begin a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the imports are harming Canadian producers and will issue a decision by June 20, 2025. Concurrently, the CBSA will investigate whether the imports are being sold in Canada at unfair prices, and will make a preliminary decision by July 21, 2025.

    Currently, there are 158 special import measures in force in Canada, covering a wide variety of industrial and consumer products. These measures have directly helped to protect approximately 31,000 Canadian jobs and $11.6 billion in Canadian production.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Global: The focus on manufacturing in the federal election misses what could truly help Canadian workers

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Gerard Di Trolio, PhD candidate, Labour Studies, McMaster University

    Canada’s major political parties have been pledging support for the manufacturing sector ahead of next week’s election, but Canada’s working class is much broader than just manufacturing.

    Canadians are on edge because as many as 600,000 jobs are at stake due to tariffs levied by United States President Donald Trump.

    But the focus on manufacturing obscures what truly ails the working class in an advanced economy like Canada’s. Manufacturing’s share of employment hovers at around 8.9 per cent, while nearly 80 per cent of Canadians work in the service sector.

    A recent report from the non-partisan Cardus think tank notes that Canada’s working class today is “likely to be a female, recently immigrated worker in the services-producing sector. The new working class, in other words, is now more personified by a Walmart cashier or an Amazon delivery driver than a General Motors factory worker or a Domtar mill hand.”




    Read more:
    Canada’s labour market is failing racialized immigrant women, requiring an urgent policy response


    Manufacturing gives way to services

    So why is there such emphasis on manufacturing?

    It’s easy to understand. Manufacturing has been essential to industrialization, from the British Empire to China’s unprecedented growth in recent years.

    The late British-Hungarian economist Nicholas Kaldor argued that manufacturing is the engine of growth due to increasing returns to scale, strong links to other sectors and its role in technological development.

    But as countries become wealthier, an increased demand for services follows, creating jobs in that sector. Manufacturing sectors in wealthier countries tend to invest in labour-saving technologies. The U.S., for example, has seen manufacturing employment fall while output has increased.

    Labour-intensive sectors like clothing cannot compete with Bangladeshi wages, but discussions about manufacturing jobs in Canada and other advanced economies too often focus on wage competition instead of job losses through automation and increasing productivity.

    There were losers when the globalization era began, but countries like Canada and the U.S. are wealthier today than they were in 1994, when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed. As American economist Jeffrey Sachs has pointed out, governments have failed to redistribute the wealth created by gains from trade to those at the bottom of the income scale.




    Read more:
    Beyond NAFTA: Canada must find new global markets


    Four policies of a real working-class agenda

    There are several key policies that politicians should be proposing that would really help the working class.

    First is one that all politicians are talking about: building more housing.

    Second is related to key elements of social reproduction — that is, care work. There must be strong funding commitments to ensure a national childcare system functions properly.

    With Canada on track to experience a surge of its elderly population, long-term care also needs to be a focus. Personal support workers must earn a living wage and must have better working conditions. Canada’s aging population is also why decreased immigration is a bad idea.

    The third policy requires the federal and provincial governments to get serious about active labour market policies. This means building a labour market training system that actually works, something Canada has lacked.

    These policies are generally not implemented in liberal market economies like Canada and the U.S.

    But in countries like Sweden with active labour market policies in place, 80 per cent of the population has a favourable opinion of robots and AI compared to two-thirds of Americans who are concerned about technological job loss. The state’s ability — or lack of it — to provide social protections and job re-training has real impacts on how people perceive technological change.

    Canada also needs to recognize foreign credentials. Its reluctance to do so has had a negative impact on the economic prospects of immigrants. Canada should also consider making higher education free.

    The fourth policy involves better worker protections that include a strengthened Employment Insurance that is easier to qualify for, improved protections for gig workers and increasing union membership.

    Apart from the public sector, Canadian unions have not fared well organizing in service industries. Unions need to make a serious effort to organize in retail, food service, the gig economy and logistics, despite the challenges. Canadian unions may find that they have little choice but to do so, as their presence in the private sector continues to decline.




    Read more:
    Canada Post strike highlights labour struggle over gig economy and precarious work


    Inequality, wealth redistribution

    The most significant barrier of these four policy proposals is that most require an increased redistribution of wealth. Canada over the past several decades has retreated from wealth redistribution and as a result, economic inequality has surged.

    White blue-collar workers in the U.S. in areas hit by factory job losses swung to Trump. A Canadian version of this is happening with some blue-collar unions endorsing the Conservatives under Pierre Poilievre.




    Read more:
    Pierre Poilievre is popular among union members. What’s it really all about?


    Fixating on manufacturing is not a solution. After 2012, China began shedding manufacturing employment. Job demand in Chinese manufacturing today is in sectors that require skilled workers for software and AI systems. Services like retail, technology and transportation are also drawing in workers from manufacturing.

    Building infrastructure, green energy

    Not all blue-collar work will disappear. Canada needs labour to build not just homes, but high-speed rail.




    Read more:
    Canada is one step closer to high-speed rail, but many hurdles remain


    Active labour market policies will be key to ensuring manufacturing workers transition into building infrastructure and green energy. Canada can also remain competitive in areas like aluminum production .

    Policymakers need to understand our post-industrial moment, and focus on a just transition for manufacturing workers.

    Labour and progressive movements have long championed a just transition for fossil fuel workers. Like factory workers, fossil fuel workers have been courted by right-wing politicians who tell them environmental policies will destroy their jobs. At the same time, oil companies automate their jobs anyway.

    These policies are not easy to achieve, but there are few other options for Canada if it wants to be carbon-free, open to the world and more equal. Canada’s economic nostalgia for manufacturing is ultimately strange given it’s also a common talking point of Trump, a politician who’s wildly unpopular in Canada.

    Gerard Di Trolio does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. The focus on manufacturing in the federal election misses what could truly help Canadian workers – https://theconversation.com/the-focus-on-manufacturing-in-the-federal-election-misses-what-could-truly-help-canadian-workers-254651

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI China: New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor boosts development of mechanical equipment industry

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor boosts development of mechanical equipment industry

    Updated: April 22, 2025 21:52 Xinhua
    A staff member conducts performance test on an excavator at an equipment manufacturing company in southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality, April 21, 2025. Launched in 2017, the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor is a trade and logistics passage jointly built by provincial-level regions in western China and ASEAN members. In recent years, along with the development of the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor, equipment manufacturing companies in China’s western regions have sped up digital and intelligent transformation, as a way to boost high-quality development of companies themselves as well as assist the building of the corridor with better mechanical equipment. According to statistics, as of early March, the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor’s cargo services connect 158 locations across 73 domestic cities and reach 556 ports in 127 countries and regions. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Customs officers inspect loaders for export to Vietnam at the port of the Friendship Pass in Pingxiang, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, March 17, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on March 21, 2025 shows loaders for export to Vietnam in Guangxi Pingxiang Integrated Free Trade Zone in Pingxiang, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Staff members work on an assembly line of excavators for export to Laos and Myanmar at an equipment manufacturing company in southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality, April 21, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on March 21, 2025 shows trucks loaded with equipment for export to Vietnam in Guangxi Pingxiang Integrated Free Trade Zone in Pingxiang, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A staff member works on a production line of loaders at an equipment manufacturing company in Liuzhou, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, March 11, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A staff member conducts test at an equipment manufacturing company in Liuzhou, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, March 12, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A staff member verifies the information of machine parts for export to Qatar at a logistics center in Liuzhou, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, March 12, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Suzhou Port’s three-month fee waiver boosts foreign trade

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    From April 18 to July 17, Suzhou Port’s container terminals will offer a three-month free storage service for heavy containers imported and exported by foreign trade enterprises, according to the Suzhou Port Management Committee.

    During the first quarter of this year, Suzhou Port managed a container throughput of 2.514 million TEUs, marking a 4.5 percent year-on-year growth.

    The export of automobiles from Suzhou Port’s Taicang Port area saw a significant increase, reaching 147,600 vehicles, up by 18.35 percent compared to the same period last year.

    According to the committee, it aims to establish a business environment emphasizing cost-effectiveness, top-notch services and ample market opportunities, all contributing to the port’s sustained high-quality development.

    The Suzhou government recently formed an interdisciplinary task force to address challenges faced by foreign trade enterprises.

    The city intends to introduce financial policies to boost funding for businesses and reduce operational costs by lowering loan interest rates and water, electricity and gas prices.

    Suzhou is an economic hub city in the Yangtze River Delta.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: China to advance development of multivalent, novel vaccines: official

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, April 22 — China will continue to advance the research and development of multivalent and novel vaccines, said an official of the National Disease Control and Prevention Administration on Tuesday.

    Li Xiaocui, an official of immunization planning at the administration, said at a press conference that efforts would be made to guide and support the transformation of research outcomes related to vaccines based on disease prevention needs and vaccine demand.

    The administration will accelerate the promotion of electronic vaccination certificates and facilitate the cross-provincial sharing of immunization data, Li said.

    She added that the administration had ordered further optimization of vaccination services and encouraged local authorities to innovate service models to meet the diverse vaccination needs of the public.

    Li also noted that the coverage rate of vaccines included in the national immunization program among eligible children in China had consistently remained above 90 percent.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Immersive art exhibition of Sanxingdui opens in China’s Tianjin

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Immersive art exhibition of Sanxingdui opens in China’s Tianjin

    Updated: April 22, 2025 21:37 Xinhua
    People visit an immersive art exhibition of Sanxingdui at National Maritime Museum of China in north China’s Tianjin, April 22, 2025. Through aesthetic design, music, lighting and other digital multimedia means, the recently opened art exhibition provides visitors with an immersive historical space showcasing the art aesthetics, bronze ware culture, sacrificial culture, and spiritual inheritance of the Sanxingdui Ruins. Discovered in the late 1920s in the city of Guanghan, southwest China’s Sichuan Province, the Sanxingdui Ruins have been dubbed as one of the world’s greatest archaeological finds of the 20th century. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A child visits an immersive art exhibition of Sanxingdui at National Maritime Museum of China in north China’s Tianjin, April 22, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    This photo shows a view of the naked-eye holographic exhibition area at an immersive art exhibition of Sanxingdui at National Maritime Museum of China in north China’s Tianjin, April 22, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    People visit an immersive art exhibition of Sanxingdui at National Maritime Museum of China in north China’s Tianjin, April 22, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    People visit an immersive art exhibition of Sanxingdui at National Maritime Museum of China in north China’s Tianjin, April 22, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    People visit an immersive art exhibition of Sanxingdui at National Maritime Museum of China in north China’s Tianjin, April 22, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A visitor experiences an interactive game at an immersive art exhibition of Sanxingdui at National Maritime Museum of China in north China’s Tianjin, April 22, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Ukraine war: path to peace looks increasingly narrow as Kyiv’s western backers scramble to focus on their own interests

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    After more than three years of war, the prospects of peace for Ukraine remain slim. There is no obvious credible pathway even to a ceasefire, given Russia’s refusal to extend a brief and shaky truce over Easter. This, despite the US, UK and Ukraine all signalling their support for this idea.

    And even if the considerable hurdles impeding a ceasefire deal could be overcome, a more fundamental problem would remain. None of the key players in the conflict appear to have a plan for an agreement that is likely to be acceptable to Kyiv and Moscow.

    Previous plans, such as a joint proposal by China and Brazil in May last year which was supported by a Chinese-led “Friends of Peace” group were primarily focused on a ceasefire as a stepping stone to negotiations about an actual peace agreement.

    This and other plans were all light on detail of what a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine would entail but were nonetheless roundly rejected by Ukraine and its western allies as favouring Russia. Given that a ceasefire would simply freeze the front lines and very likely make them permanent with or without a subsequent peace agreement, this was not an unreasonable position.

    What Ukraine proposed instead, however – and what its western allies backed, at least rhetorically – was hardly more viable. The peace plan proposed by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in December 2022 was already on life support at the time of the first “Summit on Peace in Ukraine” in Switzerland in June 2024.

    Only 84 of the 100 delegations attending the summit (out of 160 invited) supported a watered-down version of Zelensky’s plan in their final communique – and there was no agreement on a follow-up meeting. Ukraine’s peace plan was clearly dead in the water.

    Ukraine then proposed an “internal resilience plan”. With its its focus on ensuring that the country can survive a long war of attrition with Russia, this is anything but a peace plan.

    But it serves Kyiv’s needs to avoid an unconditional surrender to Moscow. This is also high on the agenda for Ukraine’s European allies who remain committed to supporting Kyiv.

    For the emerging European coalition of the willing, it is important to keep Ukraine in the fight while they build up their own defences. They face the possibility of a new international order in which the world might well be carved up into US, Russian and Chinese spheres of influence.

    Where the White House stands

    Such a carve-up is at the heart of efforts by the US president, Donald Trump. Trump is trying to secure a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine as well as a deal that would give the US privileged access to Ukrainian resources.

    Having initially fallen apart during an extraordinarily acrimonious press conference in the White House on February 28, this deal now appears to be relatively close to conclusion.

    The ceasefire deal Trump appears to envisage would divide Ukraine itself into spheres of influence according to a plan recently suggested by Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg. Yet even such a pro-Moscow arrangement that would offer Putin control of 20% of Ukraine continues to elude negotiators.

    At present, the Russian president has few incentives to settle for less than his maximum demands and stop a war that he thinks he is still able to win on the battlefield – particularly given Trump’s unwillingness to exert any meaningful pressure on Russia.

    At times, it now appears more likely that Trump will simply abandon his efforts to end the fighting in Ukraine. From a Russian perspective, this would be preferable to a ceasefire that freezes the conflict but doesn’t lead to a peace deal reflecting Moscow’s demands.

    The likely calculation in the Kremlin is that even if the 2026 mid-term elections in the US water down Trump’s power, that still leaves two more years to conquer more Ukrainian territory. Should Washington then make another push for a ceasefire, Moscow could claim any additional conquests as a price for Ukraine to pay for a settlement.

    Even if Trump does not walk away from the negotiations now, and even if his special envoy Steve Witkoff ultimately manages to cobble together a deal, this will more likely look like a ceasefire than like a peace agreement.

    Gulf remains between Russia and Ukraine

    The simple reason for this is that Russia’s and Ukraine’s positions on an acceptable outcome have not shifted. Putin remains committed to the full annexation of four complete Ukrainian regions as well as retaining Crimea. Zelensky has repeatedly ruled out territorial concessions and is broadly supported by Ukrainians in this stance.

    For the west, the reality that a peace agreement is close to impossible on terms satisfying all sides has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. To the extent that there are any joint efforts by Ukraine, the US and the European coalition of the willing, they are completely centred on a workable ceasefire.

    At a meeting of foreign ministers and high-level officials in Paris on April 17, discussions were focused on making such a ceasefire sustainable.

    While details of how this can be achieved remain unclear, the fact that there now appears to be a more inclusive negotiations track signals progress, at least on the process of negotiations. Whether this will lead to an actual breakthrough towards a sustainable ceasefire, however, will depend on their substance and whether Ukraine and Russia can ultimately agree on terms about disengagement of forces, monitoring, and guarantees and enforcement mechanisms.

    This is an already incredibly high bar, and the bar for a subsequent peace agreement is higher yet. In the current stage of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a ceasefire is clearly a precondition for a peace agreement. But the sole focus on the former will not make the latter any more likely.

    What’s more, given Russia’s track record of reneging on the Minsk ceasefire agreements of September 2014 and February 2015, investing everything in a ceasefire deal might turn out not just a self-fulfilling but a self-defeating prophecy for Ukraine and its supporters.

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Ukraine war: path to peace looks increasingly narrow as Kyiv’s western backers scramble to focus on their own interests – https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-path-to-peace-looks-increasingly-narrow-as-kyivs-western-backers-scramble-to-focus-on-their-own-interests-254864

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: China’s solar capacity installations grew rapidly in 2024

    Source: US Energy Information Administration

    In-brief analysis

    April 22, 2025


    Utility-scale solar power capacity in China reached more than 880 gigawatts (GW) in 2024, according to China’s National Energy Administration. China has more utility-scale solar than any other country. The 277 GW of utility-scale solar capacity installed in China in 2024 alone is more than twice as much as the 121 GW of utility-scale solar capacity installed in the United States at the end of 2024.

    Planned solar capacity projects will likely lead to continued growth in China’s solar capacity. More than 720 GW of solar capacity are in development: about 250 GW under construction, nearly 300 GW in pre-construction phases, and 177 GW of announced projects, according to the Global Solar Power Tracker compiled by Global Energy Monitor.

    Some of the largest projects under development are in the Inner Mongolia region in northern China. The Kubuqi Desert in Inner Mongolia is the planned site of the largest collection of solar projects called the Great Solar Wall.

    Plans for the Great Solar Wall, which is scheduled to be completed by 2030, provide for around 100 GW of installed capacity covering an area more than 250 miles long and 3 miles wide across Inner Mongolia and neighboring regions. Two components of the Great Solar Wall, the Inner Mongolia Kubuqi Desert North and South Megabase, are in pre-construction stages with planned installed capacities of 7 GW and 6 GW, respectively.

    More projects are announced but not yet in pre-construction phases, such as Ordos Desert Control solar farm and the Xinjiang-Sichuan Power Export solar farms, which register the largest planned capacity among the announced developments. Each of those projects has an intended capacity of 8.5 GW.

    Data source: Global Energy Monitor (GEM), Global Solar Power Tracker, February 2025
    Note: The GEM data include projects of at least 1 megawatt of installed capacity.

    Principal contributor: Katherine Antonio

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Obagi Medical Announces the Launch of Retinol + PHA Refining Night Cream

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    A Scientific Breakthrough in Skin Renewal: A Clinically Proven Dual-Action, Slow-Release, Overnight Skin Renewal Cream for a Resurfaced, Smoother, and More Even-Looking Complexion

    NEW YORK, April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Obagi Medical (“Obagi”), the fastest-growing professional skincare brand in the U.S. in 2024* and a subsidiary of Waldencast plc, (NASDAQ: WALD) (“Waldencast”), proudly introduces its latest breakthrough: Retinol + PHA Refining Night Cream. This advanced formulation is engineered to optimize skin renewal by leveraging the efficacy of Entrapped Retinol with the scientifically proven gentle exfoliating properties of Polyhydroxy Acid (PHA) Gluconolactone. This synergistic combination enhances cell turnover while reinforcing the skin barrier, resulting in a visibly refined, smoother, and more even complexion.

    Expanding on Obagi’s trusted retinol portfolio, this innovative formula incorporates PHA—a next-generation exfoliant with a larger molecular structure than Alpha Hydroxy Acids (AHAs) and Beta Hydroxy Acids (BHAs). This distinction allows for effective resurfacing with minimal irritation, making it ideal for individuals seeking to improve skin texture and tone while maintaining hydration and skin barrier integrity. Additionally, the formula features Entrapped Retinol, a slow-release delivery technology that gradually delivers retinol into multiple layers of the skin over time. This controlled release helps maximize efficacy while minimizing the irritation commonly associated with vitamin A products. The result is an effective yet gentle introduction to retinol, suitable for beginners and those with sensitive skin who may struggle with stronger retinoids.

    “Patient compliance is the key to achieving visible results. By using a slow-release, encapsulated retinol combined with a gentle exfoliating and hydrating PHA, this formula makes it easier for patients to tolerate nightly use,” said Dr. Suzan Obagi, Chief Medical Director at Obagi. “As a result, they may experience improved skin texture and a noticeable reduction in blemishes.”

    Retinol + PHA Refining Night Cream is fortified with eight additional dermatologically recognized ingredients to support hydration, minimize irritation, and enhance skin resilience. These ingredients include:

    • Sodium Hyaluronate – A potent humectant that deeply hydrates and retains moisture.
    • Vitamin E (Tocopherol) – A powerful antioxidant that shields against oxidative stress while nourishing the skin.
    • Squalane – A bio-compatible lipid that enhances hydration, reinforces the skin barrier, and improves texture.
    • Glycerin – A clinically proven hydrating agent that maintains moisture balance and supports skin resilience.

    A four-week clinical study demonstrated the efficacy of Retinol + PHA Refining Night Cream, with participants experiencing significant improvements in skin texture and tone, including:

    • 29% increase in skin smoothness*
    • 10% improvement in skin tone evenness*
    • 90% of users reporting visibly smoother skin texture*
    • 90% observing a reduction in the appearance of blemishes*

    “At Obagi, our mission is to transform skin. We wanted to create a retinol solution that delivers real results while being accessible to those with sensitive skin, blemish concerns, or who aren’t ready for higher-strength retinoids,” said Justin Giouzepis, Chief Marketing Officer of Obagi. “This formula was designed with both professionals and their patients in mind—addressing unmet needs with a gentle yet effective approach. We’re thrilled to report that our clinical data found that in just eight weeks, there was a 2.3x increase in the number of participants who felt comfortable in their own skin.”

    The Retinol + PHA Refining Night Cream, priced at $135 is now available through partnering professional channels. They will be available for customers to purchase on Obagi.com on 5.5.2025.

    *Results based on a 2024-2025 8-week clinical test. Data on file at Obagi Cosmeceuticals LLC.

    About Obagi Medical

    Obagi Medical is an industry-leading, advanced skincare line rooted in research and skin biology, with a legacy of 35+ years of experience. Initially known for its leadership in the treatment of hyperpigmentation with the Obagi Nu-Derm® System, Obagi products are designed to address a variety of skin concerns, including premature aging, photodamage, skin discoloration, acne, and sun damage. As the fastest-growing professional skincare brand in the U.S. in 2024,* Obagi empowers individuals to achieve healthy, beautiful skin. The brand continues to lead in physician-recommended skincare solutions and is recognized as the #1 Physician-Recommended Brand for At-Home Skincare Products for Hyperpigmentation, Fine Lines & Wrinkles, and Sagging Skin & Loss of Elasticity.** More information about Obagi is available on the brand’s website, https://www.obagi.com.

    *Among the Top 10 Professional Skin Care Brands in the U.S., According to Kline’s 2024 Global Professional Skin Care Series (China, Europe and the U.S.)

    **According to Kline’s Physician- Dispensed Skin Care: U.S. Perception and Satisfaction Survey 2023.

    About Waldencast
    Founded by Michel Brousset and Hind Sebti, Waldencast’s ambition is to build a global best-in-class beauty and wellness operating platform by developing, acquiring, accelerating, and scaling conscious, high-growth purpose-driven brands. Waldencast’s vision is fundamentally underpinned by its brand-led business model that ensures proximity to its customers, business agility, and market responsiveness, while maintaining each brand’s distinct DNA. The first step in realizing its vision was the business combination with Obagi Cosmeceuticals and Milk Makeup. As part of the Waldencast platform, its brands will benefit from the operational scale of a multi-brand platform; the expertise in managing global beauty brands at scale; a balanced portfolio to mitigate category fluctuations; asset-light efficiency; and the market responsiveness and speed of entrepreneurial indie brands. For more information please visit: https://ir.waldencast.com/.

    Media Contact:
    obagi@purplepr.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/19348f80-4f45-44c4-990a-dc3de7df67b7

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-Evening Report: Dutton promises Coalition would increase defence spending to 3% of GDP ‘within a decade’

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

    Opposition Leader Peter Dutton will promise a Coalition government would boost Australia’s spending on defence to 2.5% of GDP within five years and 3% within a decade.

    Launching the Coalition’s long-awaited defence policy on Wednesday in Western Australia, Dutton will commit to investing more than $21 billion to take spending to 2.5%.

    Australia’s current defence spending is about 2% of GDP, and due to rise to 2.3% by 2033-34. The Trump administration has flagged it wants allies to raise their spending to 3%.

    Trump’s under-secretary of defence for policy, Elbridge Colby, has said:

    The main concern the United States should press with Australia […] is higher defence spending. Australia is currently well below the 3% level advocated for by NATO Secretary General Rutte, and Canberra faces a far more powerful challenge in China.

    The opposition statement, from Dutton and shadow Defence Minister Andrew Hastie, does not go into detail about how the bigger allocation would be spent, or how it would be paid for.

    Defence Minister Richard Marles gave notice of Labor’s line of attack if there is no detail provided. He said on Tuesday:

    It won’t cut it to have vague numbers, to have aspirations, to have signposts in the future. There needs to be a great deal of specificity in respect of what that defence policy looks like.

    In its statement, the opposition accuses Labor of overseeing “more than $80 billion in cuts and delays to defence in just three years, degrading morale and capability, and putting Australia at risk”.

    It says the commitment to 2.5% is “significantly higher than under Labor and demonstrates the Coalition’s commitment to keeping Australia safe in uncertain times”.

    Under Labor, defence spending has stayed static at 2% of GDP for three years – and Labor has walked away from its own target of increasing defence spending to 2.4% of GDP by 2033-34, dropping it instead to ‘over 2.3%’.

    In its most recent budget, Labor delivered no new funding for defence.

    In stark contrast, a Dutton Coalition government will increase defence spending to 3% of GDP within a decade, while Labor’s spend plateaus at around 2.3%.

    The opposition says Australia is facing the most complex and serious strategic circumstances since the second world war.

    The rise of authoritarian powers, and conflict in Europe and the Middle East are a reminder that Australia cannot take peace for granted.

    “Under the Coalition, there will be clarity around the risks we face and a strategy to deter them,” the opposition says.

    “We believe that investing in Defence is an investment in peace – which is maintained through a strong army, navy, air force and enhanced cyber security.”

    This week’s statement follows an earlier Coalition commitment to reinstate the fourth squadron of F-35A Joint Strike Fighters.

    Dutton said: “The Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister regularly tell Australians that we live in the most precarious period since the end of the second world war. Yet, over the last three years, Labor has done nothing about it, other than rip money out of Defence, weakening strength and morale.”

    Hastie said: “A Dutton Coalition government will back Australian workers and businesses in defence industry to develop the sovereign capabilities our country needs. They are a critical enabler to the Australian men and women in uniform”.

    Hastie has been little seen on the campaign trail.

    Marles said over the last three years the government had engaged “in the biggest peacetime increase in defence spending that Australia has seen”.

    “We’ll continue to look at what the appropriate levels of defence spending are.

    “Increases in defence spending will happen under this government […] because that is, in fact, what we’ve done over the last three years”.

    Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Dutton promises Coalition would increase defence spending to 3% of GDP ‘within a decade’ – https://theconversation.com/dutton-promises-coalition-would-increase-defence-spending-to-3-of-gdp-within-a-decade-254993

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Azule Energy Joins Angola Oil & Gas (AOG) 2025 as Gold Sponsor Ahead of Major Project Launches

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    LUANDA, Angola, April 22, 2025/APO Group/ —

    International energy company Azule Energy has confirmed its participation as a Gold Sponsor at the upcoming Angola Oil & Gas (AOG) 2025 conference, taking place in Luanda on September 3-4. As Angola’s largest independent equity producer of oil and gas, Azule Energy’s return to the event underscores its continued commitment to working closely with operators, service providers and government partners to drive forward the country’s energy agenda.

    Azule Energy is advancing a series of large-scale oil and gas projects across the country, including Angola’s first non-associated gas project. Led by the New Gas Consortium (NGC) with Azule Energy as operator, the project will tap gas resources from the Quiluma and Maboqueiro (Q&M) shallow water fields. In February 2025, the NGC completed the offshore platforms for the project, with the Quiluma platform departing shortly thereafter for the installation site. The full development includes two offshore platforms and an onshore gas processing plant and will supply feedstock to Angola LNG, the country’s sole LNG facility. Production is expected to start in late 2025 or early 2026, with the platforms delivered six months ahead of schedule.  

    AOG is the largest oil and gas event in Angola. Taking place with the full support of the Ministry of Mineral Resources, Oil and Gas; the National Oil, Gas and Biofuels Agency; the Petroleum Derivatives Regulatory Institute; national oil company Sonangol; and the African Energy Chamber; the event is a platform to sign deals and advance Angola’s oil and gas industry. To sponsor or participate as a delegate, please contact sales@energycapitalpower.com.

    Another major development underway is the Agogo Integrated West Hub Development in Block 15/06. In February 2025, Azule Energy and its project partners announced the sail-away of the Agogo FPSO from the shipyard in China to Angola. The FPSO is expected to begin operations by late 2025, joining the existing Ngoma FPSO and producing hydrocarbons from the Agogo and Ndungu fields. The new unit will boost production by 120,000 barrels per day (bpd) and features cutting-edge carbon capture and storage technology. Notably, it incorporates the world’s first post-combustion CO₂ capture plants installed on an FPSO, marking a significant step forward in reducing emissions from offshore production.

    Azule Energy’s broader portfolio includes 18 licenses – 11 of which the company operates – spanning both Angola and Namibia. In December 2024, the company finalized a strategic farm-in to Block 2914A in Namibia’s PEL 85, marking its first international expansion. In 2024, Azule’s net production reached 210,000 bpd, with oil and condensates making up 80% of output. The company is targeting 250,000 bpd by 2027 as it advances its upstream operations.

    In addition to oil and gas, Azule Energy is leading efforts to deliver low-carbon energy solutions in Angola. In partnership with Sonangol, the company is developing the Caraculo Solar Project in Namibe Province, with a total capacity of 50 MW. Phase one came online in 2023, delivering 25 MW of clean power to the grid.

    Azule Energy is also deeply committed to local content and social development. In 2024, the company inaugurated a new school in Huambo, offering educational access to 720 students. Alongside its Block 15/06 partners, it also handed over two education facilities to the Government of Cabinda in 2024, funded by project revenues and reinforcing the social impact of Angola’s energy industry

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI China: China prolongs policies to keep job market stable, enhance skills

    Source: China State Council Information Office 2

    China will extend key unemployment insurance policies through 2025 to help companies retain jobs and support workers in enhancing their skills, authorities announced Tuesday.
    The announcement was made through a circular, jointly issued by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Taxation Administration, outlining measures to help enterprises maintain stable employment.
    Until the end of 2025, companies that do not lay off employees or minimize layoffs will continue to receive refunds of a certain percentage of unemployment insurance premiums paid in the previous year, according to the policy.
    To help workers improve their skills, the extended policy relaxes eligibility requirements and expands coverage for skills-upgrading subsidies.
    These measures also ensure continued provision of basic living allowances — including unemployment benefits, basic medical insurance coverage, and support for older unemployed individuals.
    China has set a target of maintaining the surveyed urban unemployment rate at around 5.5 percent in 2025, while aiming to create over 12 million new urban jobs this year. The average surveyed urban unemployment rate stood at 5.3 percent in the first quarter of 2025.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI: Hanover Bank Announces Core Banking System Conversion to Drive Digital Growth

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MINEOLA, N.Y., April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Hanover Bank, the bank subsidiary of Hanover Bancorp (Nasdaq “HNVR”), is excited to announce its conversion to a new core banking system, a significant technological upgrade designed to improve the banking experience for our clients, streamline operations for employees, and drive greater value for all our stakeholders. Our core banking system conversion was successfully completed on Tuesday, February 18, 2025.

    As the bank continues to evolve into a more business-focused financial institution, we remain committed to providing the best possible service to our customers. This upgrade strengthens Hanover Bank’s ability to offer digitally forward business banking solutions that are agile and expected to drive success in today’s economy.

    Further, this transition will enhance our ability to offer innovative services and solutions while maintaining the security, reliability, and trust that our clients have come to expect. With a focus on improving our customer experience, the new system will offer:

    • Faster and More Efficient Services: Clients will benefit from improved user interfaces and digital banking tools, enabling us to provide an even higher level of convenience and responsiveness.
    • Enhanced Security: As digital banking continues to grow, security is of paramount importance, and our new core system features state-of-the-art security protocols, ensuring that client data and transactions are safeguarded at the highest level.
    • Customizable Business Solutions: Our new core banking system allows for more tailored product offerings and integrated banking solutions designed to streamline banking and financial management for our clients.

    “Our core banking conversion is not just about technology – it’s about creating long-term value for our clients, helping them grow and succeed in an increasingly digital and competitive marketplace,” stated Michael P. Puorro, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer of Hanover Bank.

    Hanover Bank’s employees have undergone comprehensive training to leverage the full capabilities of the new system, empowering them to serve clients with more speed and accuracy. With more automated and simplified back-office functions due to the efficiencies created by the conversion, our focus on delivering top-tier, unparalleled service will only continue to grow.

    Better functionality on more competitive financial terms bolsters our sustained commitment to efficient operations. The conversion also brings advantages for all stakeholders, including:

    • Operational Efficiency: The new core system will allow for better management of resources, reduce operational costs, and improve profitability. This translates into a stronger, more sustainable financial institution poised for continued growth.
    • Improved Reporting and Insights: Enhanced reporting tools will provide real-time, actionable insights, supporting more informed decision-making and business strategies.

    “We are proud to make this investment in the future of our bank. Our core conversion marks a significant milestone in Hanover Bank’s journey toward creating an even more efficient, secure, and client-focused banking experience. Our commitment to innovation means we are always seeking ways to increase our value to clients, employees, stakeholders, and the communities in which we operate. With this new system in place, we are poised for a future where banking is not only faster and more robust, but also more personalized and responsive to our clients’ needs,” concluded Mr. Puorro.

    About Hanover Community Bank and Hanover Bancorp, Inc.

    Hanover Bancorp, Inc. (NASDAQ: HNVR), is the bank holding company for Hanover Community Bank, a community commercial bank focusing on highly personalized and efficient services and products responsive to client needs. Management and the Board of Directors are comprised of a select group of successful local businesspeople who are committed to the success of the Bank by knowing and understanding the metro-New York area’s financial needs and opportunities. Backed by state-of-the-art technology, Hanover offers a full range of financial services. Hanover offers a complete suite of consumer, commercial, and municipal banking products and services, including multi-family and commercial mortgages, residential loans, business loans and lines of credit. Hanover also offers its customers access to 24-hour ATM service with no fees attached, free checking with interest, telephone banking, advanced technologies in mobile and internet banking for our consumer and business customers, safe deposit boxes and much more. The Company’s corporate administrative office is located in Mineola, New York where it also operates a full-service branch office along with additional branch locations in Garden City Park, Hauppauge, Forest Hills, Flushing, Sunset Park, Rockefeller Center and Chinatown, New York, and Freehold, New Jersey, with a new branch opening in Port Jefferson, New York in mid 2025.

    Hanover Community Bank is a member of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and is an Equal Housing/Equal Opportunity Lender. For further information, call (516) 548-8500 or visit the Bank’s website at www.hanoverbank.com.

    Press Contact:
    Ms. Annette Esposito
    First VP – Director of Marketing
    (516) 548-8500

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