Category: China

MIL-OSI China: AI innovates China’s education landscape

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

BEIJING, March 19 — Picture this: the classroom blackboard is replaced with a big screen, and students click on learning tablets to answer questions instead of writing with pencils. AI makes it a reality, offering novel learning pathways for Chinese students and bridging the urban-rural digital divide.

At a middle school in Guiyang, capital of southwest China’s Guizhou Province, English teacher Zeng Xing found AI had become a game changer during her 17 years of teaching, thanks to a smart classroom system developed by Chinese AI giant iFLYTEK.

Zeng assigns exercises to her students via teaching tablets in the classroom, and students can instantly submit their answers on their personal learning tablets. Simultaneously, the big screen at the front of the classroom shows the detailed answers of every student.

By analyzing results with AI and big data, the system enables Zeng to deliver tailored instructions that address the specific needs of each student. “We can now quickly identify students’ weaknesses and make teaching plans accordingly, which is far more efficient than before,” she said.

The smart classroom system also enables students to improve their speaking skills through personalized, interactive dialogues sourced from a vast database of English movies, news and poetry. AI can evaluate students’ pronunciation and provide feedback, helping them speak more accurately and with greater confidence.

“AI has created opportunities for basic education in remote areas like Guizhou,” said Huang Hui, head of the middle school in Guizhou Province, where complex terrain and challenging transportation systems limit educational resources.

AI-powered tools play a very important role in helping bridge urban-rural education gaps through expanding teaching resources and improving accessibility, Huang added.

Besides improving the effectiveness of classroom learning, AI also enriches students’ extracurricular experiences.

At Tsinghua University Primary School, students participate in AI-assisted physical activities during break time. By simply waving their hands, they can activate smart sports equipment to track their exercise duration and frequency.

In addition to basic education, AI also has a significant impact on higher education. As Chinese AI assistant DeepSeek gains popularity, many colleges and universities have announced its integration into their server systems.

Colleges and universities, as innovation hubs and talent incubators, should actively embrace new technologies and take on a leading role, said Wang Lei, professor at Beijing Normal University’s School of Government.

“When conducting scientific research, tasks like project design, mass data collection and literature collation are time-intensive,” said Qian Minghui, who works at the Renmin University of China. “Using DeepSeek with a dedicated document database can greatly improve efficiency. It acts as a research assistant and is even able to help provide research clues and identify suitable partners.”

The AI-led technological revolution brings major opportunities for education, China’s Minister of Education Huai Jinpeng told Xinhua during an interview on the sidelines of the national legislature’s annual session.

He revealed that China will release a white paper on AI education in 2025 to help equip students with enhanced literacy and skills for the digital and AI era.

Starting from the upcoming fall semester, primary and secondary schools in Beijing will offer at least eight class hours of AI instruction per academic year to students to nurture future-oriented and innovative talent.

Despite AI’s advantages in transforming education, it also raises concerns about data security, privacy and academic integrity.

“It is crucial that we establish policies on AI usage, enhance technological oversight, and strengthen ethics education for teachers and students,” said Tang Liang, deputy director of the information center at the Beijing Academy of Educational Sciences.

MIL OSI China News –

March 20, 2025
MIL-OSI: Australian Oilseeds Sees Surging Demand for its Canola Oil from China

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

COOTAMUNDRA, Australia, March 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Australian Oilseeds Holdings Limited, a Cayman Islands exempted company (the “Company”) (NASDAQ: COOT) today announced that it is seeing surging demand for its canola oil products from China in response to the ongoing trade war between China and Canada.

“Our high-quality oils are well positioned for growth in China and the partnership with Shanghai Maiwei Trading Co., which we announced in January 2025, provides a strong foundation to capitalize on the recent surge in demand for our canola oil,” said Gary Seaton, Chief Executive Officer. “We have received numerous inquiries from both private and state-owned enterprises and anticipate entering into several long-term supply agreements with Chinese companies over the next 12 months.”

According to the United States Trade Representative (USTR), in 2024, the United States (US) goods trade with Australia totaled an estimated $51.3 billion, with US goods exports to Australia at $34.6 billion and imports from Australia at $16.7 billion, resulting in a trade surplus of $17.9 billion for the US. Currently, a majority of sales are from the domestic market through major supermarkets and retailers, thus any current or future trade tariff’s implemented by US are expected to have no significant impact on sales or profitability of business.

About Australian Oilseeds Investments Pty Ltd. Australian Oilseeds Investments Pty Ltd. is an Australian proprietary company that, directly and indirectly through its subsidiaries, is focused on the manufacture and sale of sustainable oilseeds (e.g., seeds grown primarily for the production of edible oils) and is committed to working with all suppliers in the food supply chain to eliminate chemicals from the production and manufacturing systems to supply quality products to customers globally. The Company engages in the business of processing, manufacture and sale of non-GMO oilseeds and organic and non-organic food-grade oils, for the rapidly growing oilseeds market, through sourcing materials from suppliers focused on reducing the use of chemicals in consumables in order to supply healthier food ingredients, vegetable oils, proteins and other products to customers globally. Over the past 20 years, the Company’s cold pressing oil plant has grown to become the largest in Australia, pressing strictly GMO-free conventional and organic oilseeds.

Forward-Looking Statements: This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the “safe harbor” provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, including but not limited to, statements regarding our financial outlook, business strategy and plans, market trends and market size, opportunities and positioning. These forward-looking statements are based on current expectations, estimates, forecasts and projections. Words such as “expect,” “anticipate,” “should,” “believe,” “hope,” “target,” “project,” “goals,” “estimate,” “potential,” “predict,” “may,” “will,” “might,” “could,” “intend,” “shall” and variations of these terms and similar expressions are intended to identify these forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain these identifying words. Forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, many of which involve factors or circumstances that are beyond our control. For example, global economic conditions could in the future reduce demand for our products; we could in the future experience cybersecurity incidents; we may be unable to manage or sustain the level of growth that our business has experienced in prior periods; our financial resources may not be sufficient to maintain or improve our competitive position; we may be unable to attract new customers, or retain or sell additional products to existing customers; we may experience challenges successfully expanding our marketing and sales capabilities, including further specializing our sales force; customer growth could decelerate in the future; we may not achieve expected synergies and efficiencies of operations from recent acquisitions or business combinations, and we may not be able to pay off our convertible notes when due. Further information on potential factors that could affect our financial results is included in our most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K and our other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The forward-looking statements included in this press release represent our views only as of the date of this press release and we assume no obligation and do not intend to update these forward-looking statements.

Contact
Australian Oilseeds Holdings Limited
126-142 Cowcumbla Street
Cootamundra New South Wales 2590
Attn: Bob Wu, CFO
Email: bob@energreennutrition.com.au

Investor Relations Contact
Reed Anderson
(646) 277-1260
reed.anderson@icrinc.com

The MIL Network –

March 20, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s phone call with Putin fails to deliver ceasefire – here’s what could happen next

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

After more than two hours on the phone on Tuesday, March 17, the US president, Donald Trump, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, agreed agreed only to confidence-building measures, not a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia. The two leaders came away from the call having agreed on a limited prisoner exchange, a suspension of attacks on energy infrastructure, and the creation of working groups to explore further steps towards a ceasefire and ultimately a peace agreement.

A less charitable way of looking at the outcome of the second call between the two presidents since Trump returned to the White House would be that the ball is now back in America’s court. Putin made it crystal clear to Trump that he is not (yet) in the mood for any compromise.

This is hardly surprising given recent events.

The US has pressured Ukraine mercilessly into accepting a proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, which Trump hoped Russia would also agree to. But apart from a vague statement by Trump that he might consider sanctions against Russia, he has so far seemed unwilling to contemplate putting any meaningful equivalent pressure on Putin.

Sign up to receive our weekly World Affairs Briefing newsletter from The Conversation UK. Every Thursday we’ll bring you expert analysis of the big stories in international relations.

On the ground, Russia has gained the upper hand in the Kursk region where Ukrainian troops have ceded most of the territory they captured after a surprise offensive last summer. Once Putin’s forces, assisted by thousands of North Korean soldiers, have succeeded in driving the Ukrainians out of Russia, Kyiv will have lost its most valuable bargaining chip in negotiations with Moscow.

Meanwhile, Russia has also made further gains on the frontlines inside Ukraine especially in parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. These are two of the four regions (the other two are Donetsk and Luhansk) that Putin has claimed for Russia in their entirety since sham referendums in September 2022, despite not yet having full control of them.

If Russia were to capture yet more Ukrainian territory, Putin would probably find it even easier to convince Trump that his demands are reasonable. The fact that Trump already hinted at a “dividing of assets”, including the nuclear power plant at Zaporizhzhia – Europe’s largest before its forced shutdown in September 2022 – is a worrying indication of how far the Russian president has already pushed the envelope.

Ukraine war: territory occupied by Russia as at March 18 2025.
Institute for the Study of War

But a deal solely between Russia and the US is not going to work. In that sense, time is not only on Putin’s side but also on Zelensky’s.

The Russian readout of the call between the two presidents claimed that they had discussed “the complete cessation of foreign military assistance and the provision of intelligence information to Kyiv” as a key condition for moving forward – something that Trump subsequently denied in an interview with Fox. This means that, for now, Kyiv is likely to continue to receive US aid.

Europe at the ready

Perhaps more importantly in the long term, Europe is also doubling down on support for Ukraine. While Trump and Putin were discussing a carve-up of Ukraine over the phone, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, left no doubt on where the EU stands.

In a speech at the Royal Danish Military Academy foreshadowing the publication of the commission’s Readiness 2030 white paper on bolstering European defences, she recommitted to developing European “capabilities to have credible deterrence” against a hostile Russia.

A few hours later, the German parliament passed a multi-billion Euro package that loosens the country’s tight borrowing rules to enable massive investments in defence. This follows announcements of increased defence elsewhere on the continent, including in the UK, Poland, and by the EU itself.

Meanwhile, the UK and France are leading efforts to assemble a coalition of the willing to help Ukraine. Representatives of the 30-member group gathered in London on March 15 for further talks.

Afterwards, the UK prime minister, Keir Starmer, released a statement saying that Ukraine’s western partners “will keep increasing the pressure on Russia, keep the military aid flowing to Ukraine and keep tightening the restrictions on Russia’s economy”.

Undoubtedly, these measures would be more effective if they had Washington’s full buy-in – but they send a strong signal to both the Kremlin and the White House that Ukraine is not alone in its fight against Russia’s continuing aggression.

Putin’s options

Putin, meanwhile, may have time on his side in the short term – but he should take note of this. Russian manpower and firepower may dwarf that of Ukraine, but it would be no match for a Ukraine backed by such a coalition of the willing.

Putin’s apparent plan to drag Trump into the minutiae of negotiating a comprehensive deal may eventually backfire in more ways than one. For a start, really detailed discussions will test the US president’s notoriously short attention span.

But this will also buy time for Ukraine and its supporters to strengthen Kyiv’s position in future negotiations. And it will continue to strain – but not immediately break – Russia’s economy.

For now, Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine have stalled. He is attempting to broker a complex ceasefire deal that involves separate agreements with Kyiv and Moscow, pressure on Nato allies, and an attempt to drive a wedge between Russia and China. It’s not clear how this will succeed or indeed where it will end.

The only certainty is that they are not bringing a just and stable peace for Ukraine any closer.

Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump’s phone call with Putin fails to deliver ceasefire – here’s what could happen next – https://theconversation.com/trumps-phone-call-with-putin-fails-to-deliver-ceasefire-heres-what-could-happen-next-252417

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

March 20, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: RBI Bulletin – March 2025
Source: Reserve Bank of India

Today, the Reserve Bank released the March 2025 issue of its monthly Bulletin. The Bulletin includes four speeches, five articles and current statistics.

The five articles are: I. State of the Economy; II. Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production; III. Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey; IV. Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: A LMDI Decomposition Analysis; and V. Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe.

I. State of the Economy

The resilience of the global economy is being tested by escalating trade tensions and a heightened wave of uncertainty around the scope, timing, and intensity of tariffs. While engendering heightened volatility in global financial markets, these have also caused apprehensions about the slowdown in global growth. Amidst these challenges, the Indian economy continues to demonstrate resilience as evident in the robust performance of the agriculture sector and improving consumption. The reverberations of a tumultuous external environment, however, are being reflected in sustained foreign portfolio outflows. India’s macroeconomic strength to face these challenges is bolstered by a decline in headline CPI inflation to a seven-month low of 3.6 per cent in February 2025 on account of a further correction in food prices.

II. Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production

By Abhinav Narayanan and Harendra Kumar Behera

This article analyses the impact of spatial variation of rainfall across districts on production of Kharif crops. It also examines how deficient or excess rainfall during specific periods impact the production of specific crops.

Highlights:
- Extreme weather events such as excessive or insufficient rainfall cause significant crop damages leading to disruptions in production resulting in reduced yields or lower quality of produce.
- The timing of extreme weather events is crucial, as crop production cycles vary.
- Insufficient rainfall in the months of June and July negatively impacts cereal and pulses production, while oilseeds are particularly vulnerable to excessive rainfall during the harvesting period (August-September).
III. Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey

By Dhirendra Gajbhiye, Sujata Kundu, Alisha George, Omkar Vinherkar, Yusra Anees, Jithin Baby

This article analyses the results of the sixth round of India’s remittances survey conducted for 2023-24. It captures various dimensions of inward remittances to India – country-wise source of remittances, state-wise destination of remittances, transaction-wise size of remittances, prevalent mode of transmission, cost of sending remittances and share of remittances transmitted through the digital modes vis-à-vis cash.

Highlights:
- India’s inward remittances have more than doubled during 2010-11 to 2023-24 and have been a stable source of external financing during this period. Following a pandemic-led contraction during 2020-21, remittances to India in the post pandemic period recorded a significant surge.
- The survey results indicate that the share of inward remittances from advanced economies has risen, surpassing the share of Gulf economies in 2023-24, reflecting a shift in migration pattern towards skilled Indian diaspora.
- Maharashtra, followed by Kerala and Tamil Nadu, continue to be the dominant recipient of remittances.
- The cost of sending remittances to India has moderated significantly, driven by digitalisation, but remains higher than the SDG target of 3 per cent.
- Additionally, on an average, 73.5 per cent of total remittances received by the money transfer operators in 2023-24 were through digital mode.
- Furthermore, fintech companies offer affordable cross-border remittance services, fostering competition among different remittance service providers.
IV. Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: A LMDI Decomposition Analysis

By Madhuresh Kumar, Shobhit Goel, Manu Sharma, Muskan Garg

This article examines the drivers behind India’s CO₂ emissions growth from 2012 to 2022 using the Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) decomposition method. It breaks down total emissions into key contributing factors, including the impact of GDP growth (activity effect), improvements in energy efficiency (energy intensity effect), shifts in the economic structure (structural effect), changes in the composition of fuel (fuel mix effect), and the growing share of renewable energy in electricity generation, which reduces the carbon intensity of electricity (emission factor effect).

Highlights:
- During 2012-22, energy-related CO2 emissions increased by 706 million tons. The main contributor was economic growth (+1073 Mt), with a smaller impact from the change in fuel mix of the economy (+78 Mt). However, gains in energy efficiency (-399 Mt), structural changes (-15 Mt), and improvements in emission intensity of electricity due to increased use of renewables (-30 Mt) helped curb emissions.
- India’s energy efficiency improved by 1.9 per cent annually, exceeding the global average.
- India’s growth decoupled from emissions, with a decoupling elasticity of 0.59, comparable to other lower-middle-income countries.
- Renewables have had a small but significant impact on emission reduction over the past decade, with solar and wind accounting for 2.1 percent of total primary energy in 2022-23.
- Going ahead, the emission factor effect is expected to play a more prominent role as renewables increasingly replace fossil fuels and green hydrogen usage expands in industries.
V. Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe

By Shruti Joshi and PSS Vidyasagar

The article analyses loans availed by various countries from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during 2000-2023 and finds a negative relation between market access and dependence on IMF’s loan for those countries which resorted to IMF loans.

Highlights:
- During 2000-2023, dependence of Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs) on IMF resources increased on account of their limited access to international financial markets and alternate sources of funding. Several fast growing large EMDEs, including India and China, however, did not have to take recourse to the IMF loans.
- During the crisis periods, especially the Global Financial Crisis and Euro-Zone Crisis, some Advanced Economies also resorted to IMF loans due to their reduced market access on account of sovereign rating downgrades.
- Among countries that resorted to IMF loans, those which faced a larger country risk premium availed larger funding.
- Access to alternative sources of funding such as Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs) and swap lines reduces the dependence on IMF loans.
The views expressed in the Bulletin articles are of the authors and do not represent the views of the Reserve Bank of India.

(Puneet Pancholy)
Chief General Manager

Press Release: 2024-2025/2418
MIL OSI Economics –
March 20, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Trump releases JFK assassination documents

Source: China State Council Information Office

Unredacted documents related to the assassination of former U.S. President John F. Kennedy (JFK) were released by the Donald Trump administration on Tuesday.

Currently, about 2,200 files consisting of over 63,000 pages were posted on the website of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration.

The vast majority of the National Archives’ collection of over 6 million pages of records, photographs, motion pictures, sound recordings and artifacts related to the assassination had previously been released.

Trump told reporters on Monday that the release was coming, though he estimated it at about 80,000 pages. “We have a tremendous amount of paper. You’ve got a lot of reading,” he said while visiting the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington.

He said people have been waiting for decades for the release.

JFK, the 35th president of the United States, was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, while riding in a motorcade. Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested for the murder, yet numerous conspiracy theories about the circumstances of Oswald’s dramatic death two days after the assassination remain prevalent even today.

On Jan. 23, Trump signed an executive order to declassify any remaining files from the assassinations of JFK, his brother Robert F. Kennedy and civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr.

MIL OSI China News –

March 20, 2025

MIL-OSI: GDS Holdings Limited Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

SHANGHAI, China, March 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — GDS Holdings Limited (“GDS Holdings”, “GDS” or the “Company”) (NASDAQ: GDS; HKEX: 9698), a leading developer and operator of high-performance data centers in China, today announced its unaudited financial results for the fourth quarter and full year ended December 31, 2024.

DayOne Data Centers Limited (“DayOne”), previously known as GDS International or GDSI, completed and closed its Series B equity raise on December 31, 2024. At closing, GDS’s equity interest in DayOne was diluted from 52.7% to 35.6%. Accordingly, GDS deconsolidated DayOne as a subsidiary and recognized DayOne as an equity investee. In the consolidated financial statements for the quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, DayOne’s operational results and cash flows have been excluded from the Company’s financial results from continuing operations and have been separately itemized under discontinued operations. Retrospective adjustments to the historical statements of operations and cash flows have also been made to provide a consistent basis of comparison for the financial results. Furthermore, retrospective adjustments were made to categorize and label DayOne’s assets and liabilities as “assets or liabilities of discontinued operations” on balance sheets for the comparative periods. Additionally, DayOne’s operating metrics have also been excluded from the Company’s operating metrics and have been separately itemized under discontinued operations.

Fourth Quarter 2024 Financial Highlights For Continuing Operations

Net revenue increased by 9.1% year-over-year (“Y-o-Y”) to RMB2,690.7 million (US$368.6 million) in the fourth quarter of 2024 (4Q2023: RMB2,465.3 million).
Net loss from continuing operations was RMB173.4 million (US$23.8 million) in the fourth quarter of 2024 (4Q2023: RMB3,074.6 million).
Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP) increased by 13.9% Y-o-Y to RMB1,297.7 million (US$177.8 million) in the fourth quarter of 2024 (4Q2023: RMB1,139.2 million). See “Non-GAAP Disclosure” and “Reconciliations of GAAP and non-GAAP results” elsewhere in this earnings release.
Adjusted EBITDA margin (non-GAAP) was 48.2% in the fourth quarter of 2024 (4Q2023: 46.2%).

Full Year 2024 Financial Highlights For Continuing Operations

Net revenue increased by 5.5% Y-o-Y to RMB10,322.1 million (US$1,414.1 million) in 2024 (2023: RMB9,782.4 million).
Net loss from continuing operations was RMB770.9 million (US$105.6 million) in 2024 (2023: RMB3,926.0 million).
Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP) increased by 3.0% Y-o-Y to RMB4,876.4 million (US$668.1 million) in 2024 (2023: RMB4,733.0 million). See “Non-GAAP Disclosure” and “Reconciliations of GAAP and non-GAAP results” elsewhere in this earnings release.
Adjusted EBITDA margin (non-GAAP) was 47.2% in 2024 (2023: 48.4%).

Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Operating Highlights For Continuing Operations

Total area committed and pre-committed increased by 1.8% Y-o-Y to 629,997 sqm as of December 31, 2024 (December 31, 2023: 618,942 sqm).
Area utilized increased by 11.8% Y-o-Y to 453,094 sqm as of December 31, 2024 (December 31, 2023: 405,302 sqm).
Utilization rate for area in service was 73.8% as of December 31, 2024 (December 31, 2023: 73.9%).

“In 2024, we executed our business strategy in a disciplined way,” stated Mr. William Huang, Chairman and CEO of GDS. “We focused on backlog delivery while being selective on new commitments. At the same time, we made significant progress with our asset monetisation program with first ever data center ABS issue in China. Looking forward, we are well positioned strategically and financially to capture new business opportunities arising from AI.”

Fourth Quarter 2024 Financial Results For Continuing Operations

Net revenue in the fourth quarter of 2024 was RMB2,690.7 million (US$368.6 million), a 9.1% increase over the same period last year of RMB2,465.3 million. The Y-o-Y increase was mainly due to continued ramp-up of our data centers.

Cost of revenue in the fourth quarter of 2024 was RMB2,112.5 million (US$289.4 million), a 3.9% increase over the same period last year of RMB2,032.4 million. The Y-o-Y increase was in line with the continued growth of our business.

Gross profit was RMB578.1 million (US$79.2 million) in the fourth quarter of 2024, a 33.5% increase over the same period last year of RMB432.9 million.

Gross profit margin was 21.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with 17.6% in the same period last year. The Y-o-Y increase was mainly due to a lower level of depreciation and amortization costs as percentage of net revenue as the data centers continue to ramp up.

Adjusted Gross Profit (“Adjusted GP”) (non-GAAP) is defined as gross profit excluding depreciation and amortization, operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights, accretion expenses for asset retirement costs and share-based compensation expenses allocated to cost of revenue. Adjusted GP was RMB1,396.7 million (US$191.3 million) in the fourth quarter of 2024, an 11.8% increase over the same period last year of RMB1,249.3 million. See “Non-GAAP Disclosure” and “Reconciliations of GAAP and non-GAAP results” elsewhere in this earnings release.

Adjusted GP margin (non-GAAP) was 51.9% in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with 50.7% in the same period last year. The Y-o-Y increase was mainly due to a lower level of cash cost components as percentage of net revenue.

Selling and marketing expenses, excluding share-based compensation expenses of RMB6.9 million (US$0.9 million), were RMB23.7 million (US$3.2 million) in the fourth quarter of 2024, a 4.1% decrease over the same period last year of RMB24.7 million (excluding share-based compensation of RMB9.3 million). The Y-o-Y decrease was mainly due to less marketing activities.

General and administrative expenses, excluding share-based compensation expenses of RMB55.9 million (US$7.7 million), depreciation and amortization expenses of RMB79.0 million (US$10.8 million) and operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights of RMB15.6 million (US$2.1 million), were RMB108.5 million (US$14.9 million) in the fourth quarter of 2024, a 3.3% increase over the same period last year of RMB105.1 million (excluding share-based compensation expenses of RMB35.8 million, depreciation and amortization expenses of RMB88.9 million and operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights of RMB16.6 million). The Y-o-Y increase was due to an increase in corporate activities as business continues to grow.

Research and development costs were RMB6.9 million (US$0.9 million) in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with RMB12.8 million in the same period last year.

Impairment losses of long-lived assets was zero in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with RMB3,013.4 million in the same period last year.

Net interest expenses for the fourth quarter of 2024 were RMB458.7 million (US$62.8 million), a 1.8% increase over the same period last year of RMB450.7 million. The Y-o-Y increase was mainly due to a higher level of total borrowings.

Foreign currency exchange gain for the fourth quarter of 2024 was RMB8.1 million (US$1.1 million), compared with a loss of RMB6.0 million in the same period last year.

Others, net for the fourth quarter of 2024 was RMB29.7 million (US$4.1 million), compared with RMB30.3 million in the same period last year.

Income tax expenses for the fourth quarter of 2024 were RMB34.1 million (US$4.7 million), compared with income tax benefits of RMB225.3 million in the same period last year.

Net loss from continuing operations in the fourth quarter of 2024 was RMB173.4 million (US$23.8 million), compared with RMB3,074.6 million in the same period last year.

Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP) is defined as net income (loss) excluding income (loss) from discontinued operations, net interest expenses, income tax expenses (benefits), depreciation and amortization, operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights, accretion expenses for asset retirement costs, share-based compensation expenses, gain from purchase price adjustment and impairment losses of long-lived assets. Adjusted EBITDA was RMB1,297.7 million (US$177.8 million) in the fourth quarter of 2024, a 13.9% increase over the same period last year of RMB1,139.2 million.

Adjusted EBITDA margin (non-GAAP) was 48.2% in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with 46.2% in the same period last year. The Y-o-Y increase was mainly due to a lower level of cash cost components as percentage of net revenue and a decrease in corporate expenses as percentage of net revenue.

Full Year 2024 Financial Results For Continuing Operations

Net revenue in 2024 was RMB10,322.1 million (US$1,414.1 million), a 5.5% increase from RMB9,782.4 million in 2023, or a 6.3% increase excluding previously disclosed one-time items in 2023.

Cost of revenue in 2024 was RMB8,099.4 million (US$1,109.6 million), a 3.4% increase from RMB7,831.2 million in 2023.

Gross profit was RMB2,222.6 million (US$304.5 million) in 2024, a 13.9% increase from RMB1,951.2 million in 2023. Gross profit margin was 21.5% in 2024, compared with 19.9% in 2023.

Selling and marketing expenses, excluding share-based compensation expenses of RMB25.0 million (US$3.4 million), were RMB91.4 million (US$12.5 million) in 2024, a 5.9% decrease from RMB97.1 million (excluding share-based compensation of RMB43.8 million) in 2023.

General and administrative expenses, excluding share-based compensation expenses of RMB165.6 million (US$22.7 million), depreciation and amortization expenses of RMB291.7 million (US$40.0 million) and operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights of RMB65.3 million (US$8.9 million), were RMB395.3 million (US$54.2 million) in 2024, a 13.9% increase from RMB347.1 million (excluding share-based compensation expenses of RMB162.9 million, depreciation and amortization expenses of RMB387.8 million and operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights of RMB68.2 million) in 2023.

Research and development costs were RMB36.3 million (US$5.0 million) in 2024, compared with RMB38.2 million in 2023.

Impairment losses of long-lived assets was zero in 2024, compared with RMB3,013.4 million in 2023.

Net interest expenses were RMB1,834.9 million (US$251.4 million) in 2024, a 0.4% decrease from RMB1,842.5 million in 2023.

Others, net was RMB49.1 million (US$6.7 million) in 2024, compared with RMB109.7 million in 2023.

Net loss from continuing operations was RMB770.9 million (US$105.6 million) in 2024, compared with RMB3,926.0 million in 2023.

Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP) was RMB4,876.4 million (US$668.1 million) in 2024, a 3.0% increase from RMB4,733.0 million in 2023, or a 5.1% increase excluding previously disclosed one-time items in 2023.

Adjusted EBITDA margin (non-GAAP) was 47.2% in 2024, compared with 48.4% in 2023, or 47.8% excluding previously disclosed one-time items in 2023.

Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Financial Results for Discontinued Operations

Net revenue was RMB443.4 million (US$60.7 million) in the fourth quarter of 2024, a 331.1% increase from RMB102.9 million in the same period last year. For the full year 2024, net revenue was RMB1,262.1 million (US$172.9 million), a 618.2% increase from RMB175.7 million in 2023.

Loss from operations of discontinued operations, net of income taxes in the fourth quarter of 2024 was RMB190.5 million (US$26.1 million), compared with RMB90.0 million in the same period last year. Loss from operations of discontinued operations, net of income taxes in 2024 was RMB400.8 million (US$54.9 million), compared with RMB359.4 million in 2023.

Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP) for discontinued operations is defined as loss from operations of discontinued operations, net of income taxes excluding net interest expenses, income tax expenses (benefits), depreciation and amortization, operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights and accretion expenses for asset retirement costs. Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP) was RMB109.7 million (US$15.0 million) in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with RMB3.8 million in the same period last year. For the full year 2024, Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP) was RMB332.3 million (US$45.5 million), compared with negative RMB98.5 million in 2023.

Adjusted EBITDA margin (non-GAAP) was 24.7% in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with 3.7% in the same period last year. For the full year 2024, adjusted EBITDA margin (non-GAAP) was 26.3% compared with negative 56.1% in 2023.

Gain on Deconsolidation of Subsidiaries

Gain on deconsolidation of subsidiaries in the fourth quarter of 2024 and full year of 2024 was RMB4,475.5 million (US$613.1 million), arising from the difference between the aggregate of the fair value of retained non-controlling equity interest and the carrying amount of equity interest owned by other investors in former subsidiaries at the date of deconsolidation, and the carrying amount of the deconsolidated subsidiaries’ assets and liabilities.

Net Income

Net income in the fourth quarter of 2024 was RMB4,111.6 million (US$563.3 million), compared with a net loss of RMB3,164.6 million in the same period last year.

Net income was RMB3,303.8 million (US$452.6 million) in 2024, compared with a net loss of RMB4,285.4 million in 2023.

Basic and diluted income per ordinary share in the fourth quarter of 2024 was RMB2.81 (US$0.39), compared with loss of RMB2.16 in the same period last year.

Basic and diluted income per American Depositary Share (“ADS”) in the fourth quarter of 2024 was RMB22.51 (US$3.08), compared with loss of RMB17.30 in the same period last year.

Basic and diluted income per ordinary share was RMB2.29 (US$0.31) in 2024, compared with loss of RMB2.96 in 2023.

Basic and diluted income per ADS was RMB18.28 (US$2.50) in 2024, compared with loss of RMB23.67 in 2023.

Liquidity for GDS Excluding DayOne

GDS deconsolidated DayOne as a subsidiary on December 31, 2024. As a result, the following financial information excludes DayOne’s assets and liabilities.

As of December 31, 2024, cash was RMB7,867.7 million (US$1,077.9 million).

Total short-term debt was RMB4,978.4 million (US$682.0 million), comprised of short-term borrowings and the current portion of long-term borrowings of RMB4,341.6 million (US$594.8 million), the current portion of convertible bonds payable of RMB575 thousand (US$79 thousand) and the current portion of finance lease and other financing obligations of RMB636.2 million (US$87.2 million). Total long-term debt was RMB38,084.2 million (US$5,217.5 million), comprised of long-term borrowings (excluding current portion) of RMB21,906.0 million (US$3,001.1 million), the non-current portion of convertible bonds payable of RMB8,576.6 million (US$1,175.0 million) and the non-current portion of finance lease and other financing obligations of RMB7,601.7 million (US$1,041.4 million).

During the fourth quarter of 2024, the Company obtained new debt financing and refinancing facilities of RMB960.0 million (US$131.5 million) for continuing operations.

During the full year of 2024, the Company obtained new debt financing and refinancing facilities of RMB5,734.0 million (US$785.5 million) for continuing operations.

Liquidity For DayOne

As of December 31, 2024, upon deconsolidation, cash was RMB9,930.9 million (US$1,360.5 million). Total gross debt, including borrowings and finance lease and other financing obligations, was RMB10,417.6 million (US$1,427.2 million).

Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Operating Results For Continuing Operations

Sales

Total area committed and pre-committed at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024 was 629,997 sqm, compared with 618,942 sqm at the end of the fourth quarter of 2023 and 626,783 sqm at the end of the third quarter of 2024, an increase of 1.8% Y-o-Y and 0.5% quarter-over-quarter (“Q-o-Q”), respectively. In the fourth quarter of 2024, gross additional total area committed was 9,387 sqm, mainly contributed by data centers in Shanghai. Net additional total area committed was 3,214 sqm. In the full year of 2024, gross additional total area committed was 49,452 sqm, and net additional total area committed was 11,055 sqm.

Data Center Resources

Area in service at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024 was 613,583 sqm, compared with 548,352 sqm at the end of the fourth quarter of 2023 and 595,606 sqm at the end of the third quarter of 2024, an increase of 11.9% Y-o-Y and 3.0% Q-o-Q. In the fourth quarter of 2024, net additional area in service for China was 17,977 sqm, mainly from data centers in Changshu, Langfang and Huizhou.

Area under construction at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024 was 102,691 sqm, compared with 151,602 sqm at the end of the fourth quarter of 2023 and 120,422 sqm at the end of the third quarter of 2024, a decrease of 32.3% Y-o-Y and 14.7% Q-o-Q, respectively.

Commitment rate for area in service was 91.9% at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with 92.5% at the end of the fourth quarter of 2023 and 92.1% at the end of the third quarter of 2024. Pre-commitment rate for area under construction was 64.1% at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with 73.8% at the end of the fourth quarter of 2023 and 65.1% at the end of the third quarter of 2024.

Move-In

Area utilized at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024 was 453,094 sqm, compared with 405,302 sqm at the end of the fourth quarter of 2023 and 438,654 sqm at the end of the third quarter of 2024, an increase of 11.8% Y-o-Y and 3.3% Q-o-Q. In the fourth quarter of 2024, gross additional area utilized was 16,390 sqm, mainly contributed by data centers in Langfang, Huizhou and Shanghai. Net additional area utilized was 14,440 sqm. In the full year of 2024, gross additional area utilized was 79,431 sqm, and net additional area utilized was 47,792 sqm.

Utilization rate for area in service was 73.8% at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024, compared with 73.9% at the end of the fourth quarter of 2023 and 73.6% at the end of the third quarter of 2024.

Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Operating Results for Discontinued Operations

Total power committed was 469 MW as of December 31, 2024, an increase from 433 MW as of September 30, 2024. The contribution was mainly from the two sites in Johor, Malaysia.

Power Capacity in Service was 132 MW as of December 31, 2024, compared to 131 MW as of September 30, 2024. Power Capacity Under Construction was 369 MW as of December 31, 2024, an increase from 320 MW as of September 30, 2024. This increase was primarily driven by the progress of two new data centers under construction in Johor sites.

Power utilized was 123 MW as of December 31, 2024, an increase from 105 MW as of September 30, 2024. Utilization Rate was 93.6% as of December 31, 2024.

Recent Development

Reference is made to the Company’s press release on March 10, 2025 where it announced that it has entered into definitive agreements to monetize, on a net basis, a 70% equity interest in certain of its data centers, at an implied enterprise value (“EV”) to EBITDA multiple of around 13 times. In such transaction, GDS is selling a 100% equity interest in certain data center project companies to a purchaser which is special purpose vehicle involving the issue of an Asset Backed Security (“ABS”). The ABS is 70% subscribed by top tier institutional investors in China, led by China Life Insurance Company Limited (“China Life”), whilst GDS subscribes for the remaining 30% and retains the rights for on-going operation of the underlying data centers. The ABS will be registered on the Shanghai Stock Exchange as a privately-held standardized security product. The ABS is specifically designed to facilitate an eventual injection into a public REIT vehicle (commonly referred to as “C-REIT”) for public offering and listing in the future, when certain qualification requirements under the ABS scheme are satisfied. Notwithstanding the above, such potential injection remains subject to, among other things, the satisfaction of relevant regulatory and disclosure requirements (including but not limited to the Hong Kong Listing Rules requirement on spin-off listing) and there is currently no concrete or definitive plan in this regard.

Business Outlook For Continuing Operations

For the full year of 2025, the Company expects its total revenues to be between RMB11,290 million to RMB11,590 million, implying a year-on-year increase of between approximately 9.4% to 12.3%; and its Adjusted EBITDA to be between RMB5,190 million to RMB5,390 million, implying a year-on-year increase of between approximately 6.4% to 10.5%. In addition, the Company expects capex to be around RMB4,300 million for the full year of 2025.

This forecast assumes completion of the ABS transaction and deconsolidation of the underlying data center project companies. However, the gain on sale is not included in Adjusted EBITDA.

This forecast reflects the Company’s preliminary view on the current business situation and market conditions, which are subject to change.

Conference Call

Management will hold a conference call at 8:00 a.m. U.S. Eastern Time on March 19, 2025 (8:00 p.m. Beijing Time on March 19, 2025) to discuss financial results and answer questions from investors and analysts.

Participants should complete online registration using the link provided below at least 15 minutes before the scheduled start time. Upon registration, participants will receive the conference call access information, including dial-in numbers, a personal PIN and an e-mail with detailed instructions to join the conference call.

Participant Online Registration:
https://register-conf.media-server.com/register/BI4cc739e1f3c748ffa22f7df4125e5079

A live and archived webcast of the conference call will be available on the Company’s investor relations website at investors.gds-services.com.

Non-GAAP Disclosure

Our management and board of directors use Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA margin, Adjusted GP and Adjusted GP margin, which are non-GAAP financial measures, to evaluate our operating performance, establish budgets and develop operational goals for managing our business. We believe that the exclusion of the income and expenses eliminated in calculating Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted GP can provide useful and supplemental measures of our core operating performance. In particular, we believe that the use of Adjusted EBITDA as a supplemental performance measure captures the trend in our operating performance by excluding from our operating results the impact of our capital structure (primarily interest expense), asset base charges (primarily depreciation and amortization, operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights, accretion expenses for asset retirement costs and impairment losses of long-lived assets), other non-cash expenses (primarily share-based compensation expenses), and other income and expenses which we believe are not reflective of our operating performance, whereas the use of adjusted gross profit as a supplemental performance measure captures the trend in gross profit performance of our data centers in service by excluding from our gross profit the impact of asset base charges (primarily depreciation and amortization, operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights and accretion expenses for asset retirement costs) and other non-cash expenses (primarily share-based compensation expenses) included in cost of revenue. In addition, we exclude the income (loss) from discontinued operation from our Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA margin to measure our financial performance from continuing operations, which will be consistent with our future financial performance disclosure.

We note that depreciation and amortization is a fixed cost which commences as soon as each data center enters service. However, it usually takes several years for new data centers to reach high levels of utilization and profitability. The Company incurs significant depreciation and amortization costs for its early stage data center assets. Accordingly, gross profit, which is a measure of profitability after taking into account depreciation and amortization, does not accurately reflect the Company’s core operating performance.

We also present these non-GAAP measures because we believe these non-GAAP measures are frequently used by securities analysts, investors and other interested parties as measures of the financial performance of companies in our industry.

These non-GAAP financial measures are not defined under U.S. GAAP and are not presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP. These non-GAAP financial measures have limitations as analytical tools, and when assessing our operating performance, cash flows or our liquidity, investors should not consider them in isolation, or as a substitute for gross profit, net income (loss), cash flows provided by (used in) operating activities or other consolidated statements of operations and cash flow data prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP. There are a number of limitations related to the use of these non-GAAP financial measures instead of their nearest GAAP equivalent. First, Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA margin, Adjusted GP, and Adjusted GP margin are not substitutes for gross profit, net income (loss), cash flows provided by (used in) operating activities or other consolidated statements of operation and cash flow data prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP. Second, other companies may calculate these non-GAAP financial measures differently or may use other measures to evaluate their performance, all of which could reduce the usefulness of these non-GAAP financial measures as tools for comparison. Finally, these non-GAAP financial measures do not reflect the impact of income (loss) from discontinued operations, net interest expenses, incomes tax benefits (expenses), depreciation and amortization, operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights, accretion expenses for asset retirement costs, share-based compensation expenses, gain from purchase price adjustment and impairment losses of long-lived assets, each of which have been and may continue to be incurred in our business.

We mitigate these limitations by reconciling the non-GAAP financial measure to the most comparable U.S. GAAP performance measure, all of which should be considered when evaluating our performance. We do not provide forward-looking guidance for certain financial data, such as depreciation, amortization, accretion, share-based compensation and net income (loss); the impact of such data and related adjustments can be significant. As a result, we are not able to provide a reconciliation of forward-looking U.S. GAAP to forward-looking non-GAAP financial measures without unreasonable effort. Such forward-looking non-GAAP financial measures include the forecast for Adjusted EBITDA in the section captioned “Business Outlook For Continuing Operations” set forth in this press release.

For more information on these non-GAAP financial measures, please see the table captioned “Reconciliations of GAAP and non-GAAP results” set forth at the end of this press release.

Exchange Rate

This announcement contains translations of certain RMB amounts into U.S. dollars (“USD”) at specified rates solely for the convenience of the reader. Unless otherwise stated, all translations from RMB to USD were made at the rate of RMB7.2993 to US$1.00, the noon buying rate in effect on December 31, 2024 in the H.10 statistical release of the Federal Reserve Board. The Company makes no representation that the RMB or USD amounts referred could be converted into USD or RMB, as the case may be, at any particular rate or at all.

Statement Regarding Preliminary Unaudited Financial Information

The unaudited financial information set out in this earnings release is preliminary and subject to potential adjustments. Adjustments to the consolidated financial statements may be identified when audit work has been performed for the Company’s year-end audit, which could result in significant differences from this preliminary unaudited financial information.

About GDS Holdings Limited

GDS Holdings Limited (NASDAQ: GDS; HKEX: 9698) is a leading developer and operator of high-performance data centers in China. The Company’s facilities are strategically located in and around primary economic hubs where demand for high-performance data center services is concentrated. The Company’s data centers have large net floor area, high power capacity, density and efficiency, and multiple redundancies across all critical systems. GDS is carrier and cloud-neutral, which enables its customers to access the major telecommunications networks, as well as the largest PRC and global public clouds, which are hosted in many of its facilities. The Company offers co-location and a suite of value-added services, including managed hybrid cloud services through direct private connection to leading public clouds, managed network services, and, where required, the resale of public cloud services. The Company has a 24-year track record of service delivery, successfully fulfilling the requirements of some of the largest and most demanding customers for outsourced data center services in China. The Company’s customer base consists predominantly of hyperscale cloud service providers, large internet companies, financial institutions, telecommunications carriers, IT service providers, and large domestic private sector and multinational corporations. The Company also holds a non-controlling 35.6% equity interest in DayOne Data Centers Limited which develops and operates data centers in International markets.

Safe Harbor Statement

This announcement contains forward-looking statements. These statements are made under the “safe harbor” provisions of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements can be identified by terminology such as “aim,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “continue,” “estimate,” “expect,” “future,” “guidance,” “intend,” “is/are likely to,” “may,” “ongoing,” “plan,” “potential,” “target,” “will,” and similar statements. Among other things, statements that are not historical facts, including statements about GDS Holdings’ beliefs and expectations regarding the growth of its businesses and its revenue for the full fiscal year, the business outlook and quotations from management in this announcement, as well as GDS Holdings’ strategic and operational plans, are or contain forward-looking statements. GDS Holdings may also make written or oral forward-looking statements in its periodic reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on Forms 20-F and 6-K, in its current, interim and annual reports to shareholders, in announcements, circulars or other publications made on the website of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the “Hong Kong Stock Exchange”), in press releases and other written materials and in oral statements made by its officers, directors or employees to third parties. Forward-looking statements involve inherent risks and uncertainties. A number of factors could cause GDS Holdings’ actual results or financial performance to differ materially from those contained in any forward-looking statement, including but not limited to the following: GDS Holdings’ goals and strategies; GDS Holdings’ future business development, financial condition and results of operations; the expected growth of the market for high-performance data centers, data center solutions and related services in China and regions in which GDS’ major equity investees operate, such as South East Asia; GDS Holdings’ expectations regarding demand for and market acceptance of its high-performance data centers, data center solutions and related services; GDS Holdings’ expectations regarding building, strengthening and maintaining its relationships with new and existing customers; the results of operations, growth prospects, financial condition, regulatory environment, competitive landscape and other uncertainties associated with the business and operations of our significant equity investee DayOne; the continued adoption of cloud computing and cloud service providers in China and other major markets that may impact the results of our equity investees, such as South East Asia; risks and uncertainties associated with increased investments in GDS Holdings’ business and new data center initiatives; risks and uncertainties associated with strategic acquisitions and investments; GDS Holdings’ ability to maintain or grow its revenue or business; fluctuations in GDS Holdings’ operating results; changes in laws, regulations and regulatory environment that affect GDS Holdings’ business operations and those of its major equity investees; competition in GDS Holdings’ industry in China and in markets that affect the business of our major equity investees, such as South East Asia; security breaches; power outages; and fluctuations in general economic and business conditions in China and globally, and assumptions underlying or related to any of the foregoing. Further information regarding these and other risks, uncertainties or factors is included in GDS Holdings’ filings with the SEC, including its annual report on Form 20-F, and with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. All information provided in this press release is as of the date of this press release and are based on assumptions that GDS Holdings believes to be reasonable as of such date, and GDS Holdings does not undertake any obligation to update any forward-looking statement, except as required under applicable law.

For investor and media inquiries, please contact:

GDS Holdings Limited
Laura Chen
Phone: +86 (21) 2029-2203
Email: ir@gds-services.com

Piacente Financial Communications
Ross Warner
Phone: +86 (10) 6508-0677
Email: GDS@tpg-ir.com

Brandi Piacente
Phone: +1 (212) 481-2050
Email: GDS@tpg-ir.com

GDS Holdings Limited

GDS HOLDINGS LIMITED UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS (Amount in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and US dollars (“US$”))

		As of December 31, 2023		As of December 31, 2024
		RMB		RMB		US$

	Assets
Current assets
	Cash	7,354,809		7,867,659		1,077,865
	Accounts receivable, net of allowance for credit losses	2,493,059		3,021,956		414,006
	Value-added-tax (“VAT”) recoverable	214,385		240,506		32,949
	Prepaid expenses and other current assets	483,833		482,950		66,164
	Current assets of discontinued operations	437,567		0		0
	Total current assets	10,983,653		11,613,071		1,590,984

Non-current assets
	Long-term investments in equity investees	7,298		7,544,555		1,033,600
	Property and equipment, net	40,098,423		40,204,133		5,507,944
	Prepaid land use rights, net	22,388		21,774		2,983
	Operating lease right-of-use assets	5,310,723		5,193,408		711,494
	Goodwill and intangible assets, net	6,574,669		6,367,493		872,343
	Other non-current assets	2,538,542		2,704,194		370,473
	Non-current assets of discontinued operations	8,910,994		0		0
	Total non-current assets	63,463,037		62,035,557		8,498,837
	Total assets	74,446,690		73,648,628		10,089,821

	Liabilities, Mezzanine Equity and Equity
Current liabilities
	Short-term borrowings and current portion of long-term borrowings	2,582,350		4,341,649		594,803
	Convertible bonds payable, current	0		575		79
	Accounts payable	2,749,896		2,593,305		355,281
	Accrued expenses and other payables	1,265,259		1,389,072		190,302
	Operating lease liabilities, current	132,811		117,345		16,076
	Finance lease and other financing obligations, current	547,847		636,152		87,152
	Current liabilities of discontinued operations	1,027,313		0		0
	Total current liabilities	8,305,476		9,078,098		1,243,693

Non-current liabilities
	Long-term borrowings, excluding current portion	23,088,055		21,905,985		3,001,108
	Convertible bonds payable, non-current	8,434,766		8,576,583		1,174,987
	Operating lease liabilities, non-current	1,344,264		1,279,726		175,322
	Finance lease and other financing obligations, non-current	7,894,185		7,601,651		1,041,422
	Other long-term liabilities	1,586,012		1,537,952		210,699
	Non-current liabilities of discontinued operations	3,670,129		0		0
	Total non-current liabilities	46,017,411		40,901,897		5,603,538
	Total liabilities	54,322,887		49,979,995		6,847,231

Mezzanine equity
	Redeemable preferred shares	1,064,766		1,080,656		148,049
	Total mezzanine equity	1,064,766		1,080,656		148,049

GDS Holdings Limited shareholders’ equity
	Ordinary shares	516		527		72
	Additional paid-in capital	29,337,095		29,596,268		4,054,672
	Accumulated other comprehensive loss	(974,393	)	(1,094,377	)	(149,929	)
	Accumulated deficit	(9,469,758	)	(6,044,372	)	(828,075	)
	Total GDS Holdings Limited shareholders’ equity	18,893,460		22,458,046		3,076,740
Non-controlling interests		165,577		129,931		17,801
	Total equity	19,059,037		22,587,977		3,094,541

	Total liabilities, mezzanine equity and equity	74,446,690		73,648,628		10,089,821

GDS HOLDINGS LIMITED UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS (Amount in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and US dollars (“US$”) except for number of shares and per share data)

		Three months ended								Year ended
		December 31, 2023		September 30, 2024		December 31, 2024					December 31, 2023		December 31, 2024
		RMB		RMB		RMB		US$			RMB		RMB		US$

Net revenue
Service revenue		2,465,283		2,619,578		2,690,482		368,595			9,781,884		10,321,888		1,414,093
Equipment sales		0		0		180		25			564		180		25
Total net revenue		2,465,283		2,619,578		2,690,662		368,620			9,782,448		10,322,068		1,414,118
Cost of revenue		(2,032,352	)	(2,061,995	)	(2,112,545	)	(289,417	)		(7,831,222	)	(8,099,439	)	(1,109,619	)
Gross profit		432,931		557,583		578,117		79,203			1,951,226		2,222,629		304,499

Operating expenses
	Selling and marketing expenses	(34,050	)	(32,356	)	(30,571	)	(4,188	)		(140,890	)	(116,440	)	(15,952	)
	General and administrative expenses	(246,274	)	(211,392	)	(259,048	)	(35,490	)		(965,982	)	(917,877	)	(125,748	)
	Research and development expenses	(12,800	)	(8,588	)	(6,862	)	(940	)		(38,159	)	(36,319	)	(4,976	)
	Impairment losses of long-lived assets	(3,013,416	)	0		0		0			(3,013,416	)	0		0
(Loss) income from continuing operations		(2,873,609	)	305,247		281,636		38,585			(2,207,221	)	1,151,993		157,823
Other income (expenses):
	Net interest expenses	(450,700	)	(463,327	)	(458,745	)	(62,848	)		(1,842,529	)	(1,834,851	)	(251,374	)
	Foreign currency exchange (loss) gain, net	(5,991	)	586		8,117		1,112			(1,573	)	18,942		2,595
	Others, net	30,347		5,001		29,727		4,072			109,729		49,057		6,721
Loss from continuing operations before income taxes		(3,299,953	)	(152,493	)	(139,265	)	(19,079	)		(3,941,594	)	(614,859	)	(84,235	)
Income tax benefits (expenses)		225,342		347		(34,144	)	(4,678	)		15,577		(156,053	)	(21,379	)
Net loss from continuing operations		(3,074,611	)	(152,146	)	(173,409	)	(23,757	)		(3,926,017	)	(770,912	)	(105,614	)

Discontinued operations
	Loss from operations of discontinued operations, net of income taxes	(90,033	)	(78,963	)	(190,491	)	(26,097	)		(359,376	)	(400,796	)	(54,909	)
	Gain on deconsolidation of subsidiaries	0		0		4,475,539		613,146			0		4,475,539		613,146
(Loss) income from discontinued operations		(90,033	)	(78,963	)	4,285,048		587,049			(359,376	)	4,074,743		558,237

Net (loss) income		(3,164,644	)	(231,109	)	4,111,639		563,292			(4,285,393	)	3,303,831		452,623

Net loss from continuing operations		(3,074,611	)	(152,146	)	(173,409	)	(23,757	)		(3,926,017	)	(770,912	)	(105,614	)
Net income from continuing operations attributable to non-controlling interests		(1,676	)	(1,755	)	(1,268	)	(174	)		(5,026	)	(6,209	)	(851	)
Net loss from continuing operations attributable to GDS Holdings Limited shareholders		(3,076,287	)	(153,901	)	(174,677	)	(23,931	)		(3,931,043	)	(777,121	)	(106,465	)

(Loss) income from discontinued operations		(90,033	)	(78,963	)	4,285,048		587,049			(359,376	)	4,074,743		558,237
Net loss from discontinued operations attributable to non-controlling interests		366		5,092		3,373		462			366		7,317		1,003
Net loss from discontinued operations attributable to redeemable non-controlling interests		0		35,432		75,550		10,350			0		120,447		16,501
Net (loss) income from discontinued operations attributable to GDS Holdings Limited shareholders		(89,667	)	(38,439	)	4,363,971		597,861			(359,010	)	4,202,507		575,741

Net (loss) income attributable to GDS Holdings Limited shareholders		(3,165,954	)	(192,340	)	4,189,294		573,930			(4,290,053	)	3,425,386		469,276
Cumulative dividend on redeemable preferred shares		(13,679	)	(13,618	)	(13,679	)	(1,874	)		(53,625	)	(54,232	)	(7,430	)
Net (loss) income available to GDS Holdings Limited ordinary shareholders		(3,179,633	)	(205,958	)	4,175,615		572,056			(4,343,678	)	3,371,154		461,846

(Loss) income per ordinary share
Basic and diluted		(2.16	)	(0.14	)	2.81		0.39			(2.96	)	2.29		0.31

Weighted average number of ordinary share outstanding
Basic and diluted		1,469,982,015		1,476,130,132		1,484,083,188		1,484,083,188			1,468,187,956		1,475,079,754		1,475,079,754

GDS HOLDINGS LIMITED UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF COMPREHENSIVE (LOSS) INCOME (Amount in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and US dollars (“US$”))

	Three months ended								Year ended
	December 31, 2023		September 30, 2024		December 31, 2024				December 31, 2023		December 31, 2024
	RMB		RMB		RMB		US$		RMB		RMB		US$

Net (loss) income	(3,164,644	)	(231,109	)	4,111,639		563,292		(4,285,393	)	3,303,831		452,623
Foreign currency translation adjustments, net of nil tax	117,674		538,739		(391,639	)	(53,654	)	(125,118	)	74,741		10,239
Defined benefit plan, net of nil tax	0		0		(41	)	(6	)	0		(41	)	(6	)
Amounts reclassified from accumulated other comprehensive loss	0		0		(96,957	)	(13,283	)	0		(96,957	)	(13,283	)
Comprehensive (loss) income	(3,046,970	)	307,630		3,623,002		496,349		(4,410,511	)	3,281,574		449,573
Comprehensive (income) loss attributable to non-controlling interests	(1,678	)	(5,287	)	6,631		908		(5,575	)	(1,076	)	(147	)
Comprehensive (income) loss attributable to redeemable non-controlling interests	0		(107,365	)	126,721		17,361		0		24,904		3,412
Comprehensive (loss) income attributable to GDS Holdings Limited shareholders	(3,048,648	)	194,978		3,756,354		514,618		(4,416,086	)	3,305,402		452,838

GDS HOLDINGS LIMITED UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS (Amount in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and US dollars (“US$”))

	Three months ended								Year ended
	December 31, 2023		September 30, 2024		December 31, 2024				December 31, 2023		December 31, 2024
	RMB		RMB		RMB		US$		RMB		RMB		US$

Net (loss) income	(3,164,644	)	(231,109	)	4,111,639		563,292		(4,285,393	)	3,303,831		452,623
Net loss (income) from discontinued operations	90,033		78,963		(4,285,048	)	(587,049	)	359,376		(4,074,743	)	(558,237	)
Depreciation and amortization	865,485		803,535		865,896		118,627		3,368,474		3,243,004		444,290
Amortization of debt issuance cost and debt discount	34,010		33,467		18,290		2,506		140,625		110,724		15,169
Share-based compensation expense	80,765		61,194		82,965		11,366		336,616		296,487		40,619
Impairment losses of long-lived assets	3,013,416		0		0		0		3,013,416		0		0
Others	(202,637	)	(63,810	)	(29,703	)	(4,069	)	(187,844	)	(115,941	)	(15,884	)
Changes in operating assets and liabilities	326,171		(42,362	)	315,821		43,267		(385,994	)	(543,700	)	(74,487	)
Net cash provided by operating activities from continuing operations	1,042,599		639,878		1,079,860		147,940		2,359,276		2,219,662		304,093
Net cash (used in) provided by operating activities from discontinued operations	(93,209	)	1,636		(150,554	)	(20,626	)	(294,019	)	(281,297	)	(38,538	)
Net cash provided by operating activities	949,390		641,514		929,306		127,314		2,065,257		1,938,365		265,555

Purchase of property and equipment and land use rights	(282,591	)	(788,123	)	(381,382	)	(52,249	)	(3,175,406	)	(2,965,384	)	(406,256	)
(Payments) receipts related to acquisitions and investments	(396,051	)	0		27,000		3,699		(1,339,639	)	1,125,023		154,128
Net cash used in investing activities from continuing operations	(678,642	)	(788,123	)	(354,382	)	(48,550	)	(4,515,045	)	(1,840,361	)	(252,128	)
Net cash used in investing activities from discontinued operations	(784,990	)	(2,110,682	)	(3,011,040	)	(412,511	)	(2,827,863	)	(6,920,177	)	(948,060	)
Net cash used in investing activities	(1,463,632	)	(2,898,805	)	(3,365,422	)	(461,061	)	(7,342,908	)	(8,760,538	)	(1,200,188	)

Net cash (used in) provided by financing activities from continuing operations	(271,778	)	(392,325	)	(612,447	)	(83,905	)	1,266,936		174,295		23,878
Net cash provided by financing activities from discontinued operations	958,799		2,334,112		11,441,448		1,567,472		2,892,824		16,883,042		2,312,967
Net cash provided by financing activities	687,021		1,941,787		10,829,001		1,483,567		4,159,760		17,057,337		2,336,845
Effect of exchange rate changes on cash and restricted cash	4,705		(28,109	)	(6,457	)	(885	)	154,302		(13,592	)	(1,862	)

Net increase (decrease) of cash and restricted cash	177,484		(343,613	)	8,386,428		1,148,935		(963,589	)	10,221,572		1,400,350
Cash and restricted cash at beginning of period	7,740,395		10,096,689		9,753,076		1,336,166		8,882,066		7,917,932		1,084,752
Reclassification as assets of disposal group classified as held for sale	53		0		0		0		(545	)	0		0
Cash and restricted cash at end of period	7,917,932		9,753,076		18,139,504		2,485,101		7,917,932		18,139,504		2,485,102
Less: Cash and restricted cash of discontinued operations at end of period or deconsolidation date	(420,610	)	(1,760,719	)	(10,045,974	)	(1,376,293	)	(420,610	)	(10,045,974	)	(1,376,293	)
Cash and restricted cash of continuing operations at end of period	7,497,322		7,992,357		8,093,530		1,108,808		7,497,322		8,093,530		1,108,809

GDS HOLDINGS LIMITED
RECONCILIATIONS OF GAAP AND NON-GAAP RESULTS
(Amount in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and US dollars (“US$”)
except for percentage data)

Three months ended

Year ended

December 31,
2023

September 30,
2024

December 31, 2024

December 31, 2023

December 31, 2024

RMB

US$

RMB

US$

Gross profit

432,931

557,583

578,117

79,203

1,951,226

2,222,629

304,499

Depreciation and amortization

775,122

731,630

786,869

107,801

2,974,546

2,947,444

403,798

Operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights

10,615

11,536

11,996

1,643

38,792

44,872

6,147

Accretion expenses for asset retirement costs

1,588

1,730

1,709

234

6,599

6,827

935

Share-based compensation expenses

29,066

20,549

18,002

2,466

116,467

92,402

12,659

Adjusted GP

1,249,322

1,323,028

1,396,693

191,347

5,087,630

5,314,174

728,038

Adjusted GP margin

50.7%

50.5%

51.9%

52.0%

51.5%

GDS HOLDINGS LIMITED RECONCILIATIONS OF GAAP AND NON-GAAP RESULTS (Amount in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and US dollars (“US$”) except for percentage data)

	Three months ended								Year ended
	December 31, 2023		September 30, 2024		December 31, 2024				December 31, 2023		December 31, 2024
	RMB		RMB		RMB		US$		RMB		RMB		US$

Net (loss) income	(3,164,644	)	(231,109	)	4,111,639		563,292		(4,285,393	)	3,303,831		452,623
Loss (income) from discontinued operations	90,033		78,963		(4,285,048	)	(587,049	)	359,376		(4,074,743	)	(558,237	)
Net loss from continuing operations	(3,074,611	)	(152,146	)	(173,409	)	(23,757	)	(3,926,017	)	(770,912	)	(105,614	)
Net interest expenses	450,700		463,327		458,745		62,848		1,842,529		1,834,851		251,374
Income tax (benefits) expenses	(225,342	)	(347	)	34,144		4,678		(15,577	)	156,053		21,379
Depreciation and amortization	865,485		803,535		865,896		118,627		3,368,474		3,243,004		444,290
Operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights	27,199		27,602		27,609		3,782		106,964		110,126		15,087
Accretion expenses for asset retirement costs	1,588		1,730		1,709		234		6,599		6,827		935
Share-based compensation expenses	80,765		61,194		82,965		11,366		336,616		296,487		40,619
Impairment losses of long-lived assets	3,013,416		0		0		0		3,013,416		0		0
Adjusted EBITDA	1,139,200		1,204,895		1,297,659		177,778		4,733,004		4,876,436		668,070
Adjusted EBITDA margin	46.2%		46.0%		48.2%		48.2%		48.4%		47.2%		47.2%

Additional Information for Discontinued Operations (Amount in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and US dollars (“US$”))

	As of December 31, 2023	As of December 31, 2024
	RMB	RMB	US$
Property and equipment, net	7,401,071	16,646,191	2,280,519
Cash	355,902	9,930,915	1,360,530
Gross debt	5,169,734 ⁽¹⁾	10,417,647	1,427,212

Note:

Including amounts due to GDSH.

Additional Information for Discontinued Operations Cont’d (Amount in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and US dollars (“US$”) except for percentage data)

	Three months ended				Year ended
	December 31, 2023	September 30, 2024	December 31, 2024		December 31, 2023	December 31, 2024
	RMB	RMB	RMB	US$	RMB	RMB	US$

Net revenue	102,853	363,209	443,413	60,747	175,737	1,262,063	172,902
Cost of revenue	(90,862)	(252,211)	(290,131)	(39,748)	(194,570)	(859,254)	(117,717)
Operating expenses	(66,214)	(88,776)	(150,543)	(20,624)	(233,249)	(400,336)	(54,846)
(Loss) income from operations	(54,223)	22,222	2,739	375	(252,082)	2,473	339
Other expenses, net	(35,020)	(110,846)	(126,457)	(17,324)	(106,494)	(346,145)	(47,422)
Loss from operations of discontinued operations before income taxes	(89,243)	(88,624)	(123,718)	(16,949)	(358,576)	(343,672)	(47,083)
Income tax (expenses) benefits	(790)	9,661	(66,773)	(9,148)	(800)	(57,124)	(7,826)
Loss from operations of discontinued operations, net of income taxes	(90,033)	(78,963)	(190,491)	(26,097)	(359,376)	(400,796)	(54,909)
Net interest expenses	42,060	76,069	102,991	14,110	107,286	280,652	38,449
Income tax expenses (benefits)	790	(9,661)	66,773	9,148	800	57,124	7,826
Depreciation and amortization	50,650	107,739	128,662	17,627	151,271	393,735	53,941
Operating lease cost relating to prepaid land use rights	295	0	1,778	244	1,290	1,782	244
Accretion expenses for asset retirement costs	52	0	(1)	0	206	(211)	(29)
Adjusted EBITDA	3,814	95,184	109,712	15,032	(98,523)	332,286	45,522
Adjusted EBITDA margin	3.7%	26.2%	24.7%	24.7%	(56.1)%	26.3%	26.3%

Net cash (used in) provided by operating activities	(93,209)	1,636	(150,554)	(20,626)	(294,019)	(281,297)	(38,538)
Net cash used in investing activities	(784,990)	(2,110,682)	(3,011,040)	(412,511)	(2,827,863)	(6,920,177)	(948,060)
Net cash provided by financing activities	958,799	2,334,112	11,441,448	1,567,472	2,892,824	16,883,042	2,312,967

The MIL Network –

March 20, 2025

MIL-OSI Economics: Members consider trade agreements involving Australia, Cambodia, China, India, Nicaragua

Source: World Trade Organization

The India-Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement , covering trade in goods and services, came into force on 29 December 2022. Australia will eliminate customs duties on 98.3% of its tariff lines by the end of the implementation period in 2026, while India will do so for 69.8% by 2031. For trade in services, both parties have enhanced sectoral commitments beyond those under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), including the movement of natural persons.

Australia said the landmark Agreement represents a significant development in the economic relationship between Australia and India and supports both countries’ deeper integration into the global economy. Australia added that the Agreement includes provisions on strengthening investment certainty, promoting regulatory cooperation and enhancing mobility for skilled professionals.

India said the Agreement has driven mutual growth and showcases the complementarity of both economies. The Agreement has significantly advanced trade ties and created new opportunities for business and employment. India added that both countries are committed to building on the momentum to deepen economic integration.

The Free Trade Agreement between China and Nicaragua, goods and services, entered into force on 1 January 2024. At the end of the transition period in 2038, 95.2% of tariff lines of China and 94.8% of tariff lines of Nicaragua will be duty-free under the Agreement. Each party will retain tariffs on approximately 5% of tariff lines after full implementation. On trade in services, the Agreement follows a negative list approach and adds new or improved commitments compared to the parties’commitments under the GATS in a number of areas including business services and health services. Moreover, the Agreement includes, among other things, provisions on the environment, competition, dispute settlement, small and medium enterprises, and e-commerce.

China said the Agreement establishes a high level of openness between both economies in terms of trade in goods and services and for investment. China noted that both economies are highly complementary and that there is a great potential for trade and investment cooperation.

Nicaragua said the Agreement, which builds upon the July 2022 Early Harvest Agreement, will produce mutual benefits for both countries. Nicaragua added that the Agreement provides an opportunity to transform the country’s structure of production, trading and investment.

The Free Trade Agreement between China and Cambodia, covering trade in goods and services, came into force on 1 January 2022. Under the Agreement, China has committed to eliminating customs duties on 97.3% of its tariffs by 2041, while Cambodia has committed to eliminating 90% of its tariffs during the same period. Much of the tariff elimination has been “front loaded” by both parties, with most tariff reductions already applied since 2022. For trade in services, Cambodia’s sectoral commitments remain the same as in its GATS commitments, except for a limited number of sectors, while China’s existing GATS commitments are further enhanced for a number of sectors under the Agreement. The Agreement also contains provisions on cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

China said the Agreement is its first bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) signed with a least-developed country (LDC), noting that this sets a good example of cooperation with LDCs. China said it is also the first FTA that sets an independent chapter on cooperation under the BRI and that it will enhance value chains between the two countries.

Cambodia said the Agreement is consistent with WTO commitments as it eliminates duties on a substantial amount of trade between the two countries. Cambodia noted the Agreement provides benefits beyond the economic aspect as it also contributes to Cambodia’s broader development strategies.

Implementation of the RTA Transparency Mechanism

The Committee also took note of one new notification of an RTA, as well as five notifications of changes since its last session in November 2024. The signature of one Agreement was also the subject of an early announcement.

The outgoing chair, Ambassador Salomon Eheth (Cameroon), noted that there are 30 RTAs involving only WTO members and 38 involving non-members for which a factual presentation has to be prepared, counting goods and services separately. In addition, there are at least 58 RTAs currently in force that have not been notified to the WTO, with an updated list of these circulated prior to the Committee meeting and available on the RTA database. A number of delegations encouraged members to notify these agreements as soon as possible, while noting that delays may be due to constrained capacities of small delegations.

The Committee took note of the updated schedule for the submissions of implementation reports on RTAs. It noted that as of 1 March 2025, such reports were due for 223 RTAs with an additional 15 becoming due in 2025.

Election of new Chair

Members elected Ambassador José Valencia of Ecuador as the new Committee Chair. He replaces Ambassador Eheth.

Next meeting

The next Committee meetings for 2025 are scheduled for 17 June and 10 November.

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MIL OSI Economics –

March 20, 2025
MIL-OSI NGOs: Hong Kong: Article 23 law used to ‘normalize’ repression one year since enactment

Source: Amnesty International –

Just one year after its passage, Hong Kong’s Article 23 law has further squeezed people’s freedoms and enabled authorities to intensify their crackdown on peaceful activism in the city and beyond, Amnesty International said.

“Over the past year, Article 23 has been used to entrench a ‘new normal’ of systematic repression of dissent, criminalizing peaceful acts in increasingly absurd ways,” said Amnesty International’s China Director Sarah Brooks.

“People have been targeted and harshly punished for the clothes they wear as well as the things they say and write, or for minor acts of protest, intensifying the climate of fear that already pervaded Hong Kong. Freedom of expression has never been under greater attack.”

MIL OSI NGO –

March 20, 2025
MIL-OSI China: US judge finds Musk’s USAID cuts likely unconstitutional

Source: China State Council Information Office

A U.S. federal judge ruled on Tuesday that the dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has likely violated the Constitution, and ordered an indefinite pause on further cuts to the agency.

U.S. District Judge Theodore Chuang in Maryland ordered the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump to restore email and computer access to all USAID employees, including those on administrative leave, though the ruling does not reverse firings or fully restore the agency.

The lawsuit was filed by USAID employees and contractors, arguing that Elon Musk and his Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) are wielding power reserved by the Constitution for elected officials or those confirmed by the Senate.

The judge rejected DOGE’s argument that Musk’s role is merely an adviser to Trump, finding that Musk has “firm control over DOGE.”

DOGE’s fast-moving destruction of USAID likely harmed the public interest by depriving elected lawmakers of their “constitutional authority to decide whether, when and how to close down an agency created by Congress,” ruled the judge.

The ruling came as a significant setback for Musk and the Trump administration, which had been rapidly dismantling USAID over the past two months. The administration has also placed top security officials on forced leave, terminated a large portion of the agency’s program contracts and ordered most staff members off the job through forced leaves and firings.

Chuang did not stop the mass terminations of USAID’s contracts and the firing of personnel. Though likely unconstitutional, these moves were approved by unnamed government officials, said the judge.

The judge’s decision is seen as a milestone in pushback against DOGE, with critics arguing that the rapid dismantling of USAID has disrupted global humanitarian relief efforts and harmed the public interest.

Trump told Fox News that his administration would appeal the ruling. “I guarantee you we will be appealing it. We have rogue judges that are destroying our country,” Trump said.

MIL OSI China News –

March 20, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Admission campaign for foreign citizens has started

Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

The Polytechnic University held Open Day for international applicants online. The event was dedicated to the start of the admissions campaign. Representatives of SPbPU international services spoke about the admissions process, educational opportunities and answered questions from future students.

For more than a century of history, Polytechnic University has established itself as one of the leading engineering universities in Russia and the world. We are proud of our graduates — talented engineers, scientists, entrepreneurs and government officials who contribute to the development of technology, economy and society. We invite you to become part of our energetic and multifaceted community. Polytechnic University is a place where you can unleash your potential, find friends from all over the world and take the first step towards a successful career. We are looking forward to seeing you at Polytechnic University. Let’s create the future together, — Vice-Rector for International Affairs Dmitry Arsenyev greeted future students.

Students from the Institute of Computer Science and Cybersecurity, the Civil Engineering Institute, the Institute of Mechanical Engineering, Materials and Transport, and the Institute of Industrial Management, Economics and Trade shared their impressions of studying at the university.

Learning the language and adapting were difficult at first, but over time they opened up new opportunities. I would like to acknowledge the efforts of the teachers who create additional materials to help students in their studies. The atmosphere at the university is inspiring: the polytechnics are incredibly responsive and always ready to support, – said Marvin Bethel, a student from Botswana.

ISI student Mustafa Ibrahim is from Ethiopia. He chose Polytechnic University because of its high international rankings, its status as one of the best universities in Russia, and its campus with modern infrastructure.

The academic environment at the university is conducive to development. The teachers are always ready to help and share knowledge in their field. Here I met students from Russia, India, Egypt, China and other countries, which significantly expanded my cultural and educational experience. The training at the Polytechnic is intensive, with an emphasis on practical skills and research, – shared Mustafa Ibrahim.

Activists from PolyUnion, the Council of Fellowships and Tutor Forces spoke about communities and extracurricular activities for international students at the Polytechnic University.

Useful links:

Admission procedure

Personal Account of a Foreign Applicant

Polunion

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

MIL OSI Russia News –

March 20, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ21: Promoting development of Hong Kong’s capital market

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

LCQ21: Promoting development of Hong Kong’s capital market
Question:

     Recently, six departments of the Central Authorities jointly announced the Implementation Plan on Promoting the Inflow of Medium to Long-term Capital into the Market, so as to steadily expand the scale of investment and improve the supply and structure of funds in the capital market. Moreover, it has been reported that as pointed out by the Governor of the People’s Bank of China, the proportion of the country’s foreign exchange reserves allocated to Hong Kong’s assets will be substantially increased to support the development of Hong Kong’s capital market. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) whether the Government has discussed with the relevant Mainland authorities the specific details (such as the target level of the allocation proportion, the types of assets to be allocated and the amount involved) and the implementation timetable for increasing the allocation of the country’s foreign exchange reserves to Hong Kong’s assets; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

(2) whether the Government will study with the Mainland regulatory authorities the establishment of a mechanism for channelling capital, so as to promote the investment of the country’s foreign exchange reserves and some of the Mainland medium to long-term capital (such as the National Social Security Fund, commercial insurance funds and pension funds) in Hong Kong’s capital market;

(3) whether the Government will actively consider making good use of the funds under its control, such as charitable trust funds, university endowment funds and funds managed by different government departments, to jointly increase investment in Hong Kong stocks, so as to play a leading role and boost market confidence; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that; and

(4) as it has been reported that the Deputy Director of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) has recently proposed to promote the publication of a White Paper on Hong Kong’s Capital Market (the White Paper), whether the SAR Government will implement the formulation of the White Paper; if so, whether it will study collecting various financial institutions’ views in areas such as market regulation, transaction costs and corporate governance?

Reply:

President,

     In consultation with the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX), my consolidated reply to the four parts of the question is as follows:

     During his remarks at the Asian Financial Forum in January 2025, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China said that a thriving capital market serves as the core and backbone of Hong Kong as an international financial centre. It will encourage quality enterprises to get listed and issue bonds in Hong Kong, and continuously enhance and expand the connectivity mechanisms between the Mainland and Hong Kong for stocks, bonds, wealth management products and interest rate swaps. It will also deepen the financial co-operation within the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, and increase the allocation of our country’s foreign exchange reserves in assets in Hong Kong, so that the financial development in Hong Kong will embrace a broader future. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government and financial regulators will continue to co-ordinate closely with relevant Mainland authorities as always to support the integration and healthy development of the Mainland and Hong Kong capital markets. We will also discuss with the Mainland further expansion and enhancement arrangements for mutual market access between capital markets of the two places, so as to better meet the needs of residents in both places for cross-market and diversified asset allocation, as well as attract more Mainland and international fund flows into Hong Kong.

     The Government very much welcomes and is grateful to the increase in allocation of the national foreign exchange reserves in assets in Hong Kong, which is a recognition of Hong Kong’s investment environment and the quality of our products. The specific details (such as funding distribution or timetable) will be considered by relevant Mainland institutions and announced as necessary. The Government and financial regulators have been maintaining communication with the Mainland financial regulators on financial market matters and will fully support related work. In fact, we need to strengthen our efforts in optimising the market and utilising our own attractiveness to encourage more Mainland and overseas institutions and individual investors to participate in trading Hong Kong stocks. In the face of challenges from the external environment in the past few years, the Government has been striving to continuously improve market liquidity through taking forward specific enhancement measures. Specifically, the Government set up the Task Force on Enhancing Stock Market Liquidity in 2023 to review the factors affecting market liquidity and put forward improvement recommendations on different areas such as listing regime, market structure, trading mechanism, etc. The Government together with the SFC and HKEX have taken forward various measures, including enhancing the specialist technology listing regime, reforming GEM, facilitating listing of overseas issuers, implementing arrangements for trading under severe weather, establishing the regime for share repurchase and treasury, narrowing the trading spread, etc. We have also been actively attracting overseas capital through different channels, including consolidating traditional sources of funds and opening up new capital sources.

     As our country’s economy demonstrates resilience with breakthroughs in key technologies, and as the enhancement measures that we have implemented begin to bear fruit, the sentiment and trading in the Hong Kong stock market have improved since last year. From the beginning of this year, stock market trading has become even more active, with average daily turnover until February exceeding $220 billion, an increase of close to 70 per cent over that of 2024. Last year, Hong Kong was one of the world’s four largest initial public offering (IPO) markets, with total IPO funds raised exceeding $87 billion, up nearly 90 per cent year-on-year. As of the end of February this year, HKEX was processing over 100 listing applications, demonstrating increasing confidence of companies in raising funds in Hong Kong. HKEX and the SFC will continue their efforts in strengthening the competitiveness of the stock market by facilitating corporate financing, promoting product innovation, and improving trading and risk management efficiency.

     As regards investment of funds under the Government, funds established by the Government or operated by Government departments have specific purposes and management mechanisms. The relevant funds need to formulate appropriate investment strategies based on factors such as its size, overall risk tolerance, liquidity needs, etc, so as to achieve target returns, cash flow or specific policy objectives through different asset allocations. It is not appropriate to formulate uniform asset allocation recommendations or restrictions for the investment of relevant funds.

     The Government has been implementing various reforms for the development of the capital market, including establishing listing avenues for new economy and technology enterprises with weighted voting rights structures, facilitating overseas issuers to raise funds in Hong Kong, etc. As also mentioned in the 2025-26 Budget, the key to consolidating and enhancing the strengths of Hong Kong as an international financial centre lies in institutional innovation, product innovation, a critical mass of enterprises and financial connectivity. To dovetail with the latest economic trends and corporate needs, HKEX and the SFC are taking forward a comprehensive review of the listing regime, which will review listing requirements and post-listing ongoing obligations, evaluate listing-related regulations and arrangements to improve the vetting process, optimise the thresholds for dual primary listing and secondary listing, and review the market structure, including exploring the establishment of an over-the-counter trading market. HKEX and the SFC will conduct in-depth review in each area, with a view to putting forward enhancement proposals in different areas by batches when they are ready within this year for market consultation. Meanwhile, the Government will also collect market views through various channels from time to time, including the financial regulators and the Financial Services Development Council, so as to formulate relevant development strategies in a timely manner.
Issued at HKT 15:15

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Categories24-7, Asia Pacific, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government special administrative region, MIL OSI

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 20, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ12: Non-governmental organisations’ acceptance of advantages from overseas organisations

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

LCQ12: Non-governmental organisations’ acceptance of advantages from overseas organisations
Question:

     It has been reported that the new-term United States Government has recently planned to substantially reduce the spending of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It is learnt that USAID has been providing funding support for overseas non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on a long-term basis, and assisting such NGOs in carrying out work that endangers the national security of the place where the NGOs are based, such as exporting Western values, performing infiltration and sabotage, and inciting riots. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) whether the Government currently has a mechanism in place to verify if local NGOs have accepted advantages from overseas organisations (such as USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy of the United States); if it has, of the details;

(2) whether it has assessed if the acceptance of financial contributions from overseas organisations by NGOs in Hong Kong violates the Hong Kong National Security Law and the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance; and

(3) whether the Government will consider establishing a mechanism to regulate the acceptance of financial contributions from overseas organisations by NGOs in Hong Kong, and regularly review if the financial contributions accepted by NGOs pose risks to national security?

Reply:

President,

     The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government has all along been steadfast in safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, fully and faithfully upholding the highest principle of “one country, two systems”, while protecting the legal interests, rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents and other people in Hong Kong in accordance with the law. It will resolutely safeguard the overall interest of the community and the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, ensuring the steadfast and successful implementation of “one country, two systems”.

     With the promulgation of the Hong Kong National Security Law (HKNSL) on June 30, 2020 and the commencement upon gazettal of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO) on March 23, 2024, the legal system and enforcement mechanisms of the HKSAR for safeguarding national security have been improved. The HKNSL and the SNSO are compatible and complementary, building a strong line of defence to safeguard national security in the HKSAR, ensuring the effective protection of national security, and enabling the HKSAR to make good use of the relevant laws to effectively prevent, suppress and punish acts and activities endangering national security in accordance with the law.

     As a cosmopolitan city and an international financial centre, Hong Kong welcomes exchanges between local institutions, organisations and individuals and those from all parts of the world, as well as foreign institutions or organisations to set up offices and establish operations in Hong Kong. On the other hand, given the increasingly complicated geopolitical situation, the HKSAR faces ever-changing risks to national security. External forces, anti-China and destabilising individuals are waiting for opportunities to make malicious attacks and smears. The HKSAR Government will definitely take all necessary countermeasures to safeguard national security if any of them uses improper means to carry out acts of foreign interference in violation of the principle of non-intervention under international law, in an attempt to undermine the stability and prosperity of the HKSAR, posing national security risks.

     My reply to the three parts of the question is as follows:

     Various measures have been put in place under the legal system of the HKSAR for safeguarding national security to prevent external forces from interfering in the normal operation of the HKSAR, and to prevent external forces from unlawfully interfering in the affairs of our country or of the HKSAR through agents or agent organisations, thus undermining the sovereignty and political independence of our country, and endangering national security.

     In particular, Division 1 of Part 6 of the SNSO provides for offences relating to external interference endangering national security. Under section 52 of the SNSO, a person (including any organisation) who, with intent to bring about an interference effect, collaborates with an external force to do an act and uses improper means when so doing the act commits an offence of “external interference endangering national security”. The elements of this offence are clearly defined in sections 53 to 55. “Bringing about interference effect” covers influencing the executive authorities, the legislature and the judiciary in performing functions, interfering with an election, prejudicing the relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR, the relationship between the HKSAR and any foreign country, etc. “Collaborating with external force” covers the circumstance that a person does the act with the financial contributions, or the support by other means, of an external force. “Using improper means” covers the making of a material misrepresentation, the commission of acts of violence or acts constituting criminal offences, etc.

     In addition, Division 2 of Part 6 of the SNSO has improved the mechanism originally provided for in the Societies Ordinance for prohibiting organisations endangering national security from operating in the HKSAR. Under section 60, if the Secretary for Security reasonably believes that it is necessary for safeguarding national security to prohibit the operation or continued operation of an organisation, or if a local organisation is a political body and has a connection with a political organisation of an external place (including the acceptance of financial contributions or substantive support by other means from a political organisation of an external place), the Secretary for Security may prohibit the operation or continued operation of the organisation in the HKSAR. In addition, the mechanism for prohibiting organisations endangering national security from operating in the HKSAR also applies to any organisation which is established outside the HKSAR but is related to the HKSAR. For example, a person in the HKSAR conducts activities in the HKSAR under the control, supervision or direction of that organisation; or that organisation provides financial contributions, or aid of other kinds to any person in the HKSAR.

     The HKSAR Government has all along been committed to resolutely, fully and faithfully implementing the HKNSL, the SNSO, and other laws of the HKSAR relating to safeguarding national security, with a view to effectively preventing, suppressing and punishing acts and activities endangering national security in accordance with the law. If any individual or organisation is suspected of committing an offence endangering national security, the law enforcement agencies will take decisive actions to enforce the law and pursue their legal liabilities in accordance with the law, and will not allow them to evade justice. The HKSAR Government’s actions to safeguard national security have all along been taken in strict accordance with the statutory procedures and relevant laws.

     Safeguarding national security is a top priority for the HKSAR and the most important task of the HKSAR Government. Details of relevant efforts of the HKSAR is information about the work on safeguarding national security and therefore cannot be disclosed.
Issued at HKT 12:05

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Categories24-7, Asia Pacific, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government special administrative region, MIL OSI

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 20, 2025
MIL-OSI Banking: Asian Development Review: Volume 42, Number 1

Source: Asia Development Bank

The opening article underscores the importance of knowledge sharing among city governments. Other articles discuss how urban green spaces can reduce flooding and the burning of waste, how growing mungbeans can reduce reliance on chemical fertilizers, and how internet access can increase farmers’ incomes. Authors also examine trade costs in Central Asia and participation in global value chains.

For print subscription, e-mail: [email protected]

Using a newly constructed index of trade openness, this paper finds a significant direct effect of openness on poverty reduction.

Open Submissions

This paper exploits the staggered roll-out of a landmark Air Quality Monitoring Program in the People’s Republic of China to study the migration response to pollution information disclosure and labor market outcomes.

This study explores how local elites’ traits influence environmental performance, both before and after the amendment to the Environmental Protection Law.

This study investigates the impact of green open spaces in reducing the probability of flooding and open waste burning in urban areas in Indonesia’s three largest metropolitan cities: Surabaya, Jakarta, and Medan.

This paper studies participation by developing Asian economies in global value chains (GVCs) and uses an input–output framework to measure the impacts that GVCs of final manufactured products have on jobs and income.

This paper investigates whether engagement with e-commerce is linked to increased sales and productivity gains for informal firms in South Asia.

This study in Nepal assesses the determinants of mungbean adoption and its impact on fertilizer use, agricultural productivity, and food security.

This paper measures the impact of a micronutrient training among women farmers with young children on the demand for zinc-enhanced varieties.

This study examines the association between internet use in agriculture and farm earnings in Indonesia.

This paper identifies and examines income shock and price shock channels through which climatic disasters affect domestic consumption in the case of Bangladesh.

Mini Symposium on Trade Costs in Central Asia

This paper analyzes the impact of trade costs on the exports in five Central Asian countries using a structural gravity model and Corridor Performance Measurement and Monitoring trade cost indicators.

This study examines the effects of at-the-border and behind-the-border measures on the intraregional perishable goods trade in the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation region.

This paper examines the effect of COVID-19 mobility measures on the time required for cargo to clear the border crossing points of Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation countries.

MIL OSI Global Banks –

March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Reappointment of a member to the Family Procedure Rule Committee
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

News story

Reappointment of a member to the Family Procedure Rule Committee

The Lord Chancellor has announced the reappointment of Robert Edwards as a member of the Family Procedure Rule Committee.
The Lord Chancellor reappointed Robert Edwards as a member, nominated by Welsh Ministers to represent the interests of Welsh family proceedings officers, to the Family Procedure Rule Committee (FPRC) from 1 October 2024 until 28 February 2027.

The Lord Chancellor also confirmed the decision of previous ministers to extend Mr Edward’s tenure from 1 March to 30 September 2024.

The FPRC is a non-departmental public body, established – in 2004 – under the Courts Act 2003 (‘the Act’), to make Family Procedure Rules. Its aim is to make clear, easily understandable rules to create an accessible, fair, and efficient family justice system.

Appointments to the FPRC are made under Section 77(2) of the Act. The Act provides that a member is nominated by the Welsh Ministers to represent the interests of Welsh family proceedings officers and appointed by the Lord Chancellor in consultation with the President of the Family Division.

The appointment of the FPRC member, nominated by Welsh Ministers to represent the interests of Welsh family proceedings officers, is not regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments.

Biography

Robert Edwards is a lawyer at the Welsh Government and principal adviser to Cafcass Cymru, with responsibility for providing advice, representation and training to the organisation. Robert specialises in children law and previously worked in Welsh local authorities and private practice.

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Published 19 March 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Traveling back to the last days of Pompeii in Beijing

Source: China State Council Information Office 3

Have you ever imagined the life of the people in the ancient Roman city of Pompeii, and how they must have felt when Mount Vesuvius erupted?

An exhibition at Universal Creative Park in Beijing, titled “The Last Days of Pompeii,” allows audiences to experience the final moments of Pompeii from a first-person perspective. Running from Tuesday this week to Aug. 31, the exhibition was jointly launched by China Dream Live Entertainment (CDE Live) and Madrid Artes Digitales (MAD).

It not only showcases archaeological artifacts discovered in Italy, but also provides an immersive experience for visitors via video and projection. By putting on VR headsets, visitors can travel back in time to almost 1,900 years ago — finding themselves strolling in an ancient courtyard, exploring the villa of a Roman family, and attending a gladiator fight in a packed amphitheater.

“Pompeii is one of the major topics in history, and the city is so well preserved due to the fact that all the volcano ash covered it and really captured that moment,” said Jelle de Jong, CEO of MAD.

He also told Xinhua that by using modern technology, they are attempting to take audiences “back to the old days of Pompeii and let them feel what was like to live there.”

Zhu Ranhua, CEO of CDE Live, which brought this exhibition to China, noted that they hope this exhibition will inspire people to cherish the happiness they encounter in their daily lives.

The exhibition was previously staged in Madrid, Vienna and Berlin, where it attracted more than 500,000 visits combined.

Zhu and her team made some changes for the China stop to make the exhibition more suitable for local audiences. For instance, they added the courtyard experience in a bid to reveal details of the artistic life of Roman people back then. They also launched postcards which can be stamped by people to document their visits — as stamp collecting has become a popular hobby among young Chinese.

When asked if the volcano eruption scene would be scary for children, Zhu dismissed the concern. “I once asked a five-year-old girl if she was afraid, and she shook her head,” said Zhu. “They see disasters, but they also see more beautiful things at the exhibition, such as the prosperous culture that we marvel at.”

Míriam Huéscar, curator of the exhibition, said that the ultimate aim of the exhibition is to bring people around the world closer by revealing the cultural roots and ancient foundations of many peoples, and not only that of Europe. “Culture is the key to communication between East and West,” she said in an interview with Xinhua. “It is a very useful tool to get to know other people, to learn about them and their customs — and thus understand them better.”

This view was shared by Jelle de Jong, who believes that during the past week of preparation for the exhibition, he had already learned a lot about Chinese culture.

The year 2025 marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the European Union. “I have noticed that cross-cultural exchanges between the cultures are getting more and more frequent,” he said.

Thanks to this increase of exchanges, resulting from the improvement of people’s living standards and China’s opening up, Zhu has observed that Chinese people are increasingly interested in and accepting of cultural events with Western themes.

Last year, a Mariah Carey concert in China attracted fans from across the country, while shows like “The Phantom of the Opera” also proved successful.

Notably, Zhu is also witnessing Chinese culture becoming more and more popular among young people. “Our traditional culture is equally fascinating,” she said, while adding that they are now planning an exhibition featuring Chinese culture — which they will take to Europe.

MIL OSI China News –

March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Getting world drawn to China

Source: China State Council Information Office 3

China is very, very different. Jessica Rawson repeatedly underlines this point.

This idea might seem obvious, but she believes that people often underplay the divergence that China inherits.

“The big trouble is Westerners don’t think they need to study China. They think, if China had a past, it would be like the Greeks, the Romans, or something they’re familiar with here,” she says. “The West doesn’t really notice China, doesn’t understand the difference, doesn’t understand why your culture is not like ours.”

Rather than digging into the similarities we share, recognizing how ancient China charted its unique course may lead to adjustment, and then better mutual understanding, she argues.

For the 82-year-old archaeologist, who is a former keeper of the Department of Oriental Antiquities at the British Museum — one of her many titles, her career over the past 50 years has been consistent: China’s distinctive path of development, explored through the eyes of objects, like ceramics, jades and bronze vessels.

By looking into China’s material culture, Rawson has provided a new perspective on one of the world’s oldest civilizations, uncovering the values, beliefs, and customs embedded in the shapes, colors and motifs of its remains.

China’s distinctiveness was revealed to Rawson long before she set foot in the country.

During a trip to the British Museum at the age of 10 or 12, the Rosetta Stone, inscribed with Egyptian hieroglyphs — a writing system that used pictures as signs — taught her that there is a language in the world not based on alphabetic letters.

“Why not look at Chinese if you’re interested in this,” her parents said and then gave her a small book called Teach Yourself Chinese.

“When you’re 12, you can’t teach yourself Chinese,” she jokes. “But I started to copy the Chinese characters into a notebook.”

“Pioneering” is a word often associated with her and her approach to looking beyond and looking around was described as “Rawsonian” by Robert Harrist Jr, professor of Chinese art history at Columbia University in the United States.

And she has been determined to study Chinese archaeology and get inside the cosmology of others.

“I’ve dedicated my entire life to this field,” she has written in a letter. “There had been a few resistance along the journey, but I have never thought of giving up.”

“Since the Neolithic era, China’s developmental path has been uniquely its own. Throughout my academic career, I have increasingly recognized the importance of introducing more people to China’s history and the latest results in archaeology. Only by doing so can they cultivate a genuine interest in China.”

Language of objects

In 1968, when Rawson joined the British Museum, she was tasked with cataloging thousands of ceramics and jades from the Shang (c.16th-11th century BC), Zhou (c.11th century-256 BC) and Han (206 BC-AD 220) dynasties — relics she found “very surprising” at first sight.

Seeing some objects as “China’s greatest works of art”, Rawson found that those exquisite things are often not vehicles for self-expression but functional forms for ancestor worship, crafted according to strict standards dictating their shapes, patterns, and decorations, exemplified by bronze vessels.

She wondered why the Chinese were so obsessed with this particular type of object, but not gold or gems. Breaking it down step by step, what stands out to Rawson is that the ancients’ fascination with bronze vessels reveals the distinctiveness of China, from its climate and terrain to the cosmology of the inhabitants.

The Loess Plateau in north-central China once buried the ores or metals under layers of heavy windblown dust. The mining alone required an immense workforce, not to mention the demanding craftsmanship needed to smelt and cast even a single piece, which explains why bronze vessels were mostly evacuated from the tombs of royalty and nobility, Rawson says.

Life and the afterlife in China unveil fundamental differences in the nation’s ancient society, in how the ancestors were treated as being at the top of a generational hierarchy, and how families, united by shared ancestry and kinship ties, became central, she says.

In her latest book Life and Afterlife in Ancient China Rawson explores 12 grand tombs and a major sacrificial deposit from across China.

The “master interpreter”, as the former director of the National Gallery in London and British Museum Neil MacGregor describes Rawson, never treats an object in isolation but traces down to the usage, customs, and beliefs — shaped by climate and geology — all pointing to why the Chinese are not like Westerners or anyone else in the world.

While China is fascinated with bronze, the West prizes gold and gems. While the Chinese eat rice from ceramic bowls, the West uses plates for salad. What Rawson believes is that every culture develops its material system.

There are no shortcuts for a foreigner to study Chinese archaeology, Rawson once said.

In 1975, she set foot in China for the first time. It was a time when the country only owned trains in green that chugged her through the vast landscape, from the plains with fields of rice to the endlessly stretching plateau.

“It’s a shock to realize how big China is, how many regions are different from each other, and how they’re all different from the West and, above all, from Western Asia,” she says.

To truly get an impression of the place, the only way is by traveling it, she believes. For the next 44 years, Rawson returned to China nearly every year, traveled alone sometimes, and even once slept at a train station to catch the earliest service.

“China is not a quick thing to learn,” Rawson says. But she did not give up trying to get closer to that dream path. “I always wanted to work in China. In a way, people would say I am always addicted to China. I am happier thinking about China or reading about China than doing anything else.”

What might be more difficult is introducing what sets China apart from the West, Rawson admits, yet she remains committed to doing so.

As the British Museum stands as one of the most-visited attractions in the UK, the former keeper prioritized her work, especially the refurbishment of the China Gallery, both in 1992 and 2016, as a top priority.

Her career as a curator did not mark a break, even after leaving the museum. She continued to curate blockbuster China-related exhibitions in the UK, such as China: The Three Emperors, 1662-1795, which was opened by Queen Elizabeth II in 2005 at the Royal Academy of Arts in London.

During her years at the University of Oxford, a major grant by the Leverhulme Trust, which she bid on and received, not only supported the founding of a contemporary China studies program in 2002 but also led to the creation of a China center in 2008.

Her efforts to promote exchanges somehow mirror another of her research achievements — the interactions in ornament culture between China, Inner Asia, and the West. While China’s path has been independent, it has never been completely isolated, and “we need to see how much we get from each other,” she says.

MIL OSI China News –

March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: China responds to Putin-Trump call

Source: China State Council Information Office

China has advocated resolving the Ukraine crisis through dialogue and negotiation from the very beginning, and is pleased to see all efforts towards a ceasefire as a necessary step towards peace, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said on Wednesday.

Mao made the remarks at a regular news briefing when asked to comment on the phone call between U.S. President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on Tuesday.

The White House said in a statement that the two leaders agreed that the three-year Ukraine conflict needs to end with a lasting peace, and the two leaders stressed the need for improved U.S.-Russia relations.

MIL OSI China News –

March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Tourists enjoy blooming plum flowers in Xi’an, China’s Shaanxi

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Tourists enjoy blooming plum flowers in Xi’an, China’s Shaanxi

Updated: March 19, 2025 17:24 Xinhua

An aerial drone photo taken on March 18, 2025 shows tourists enjoying blooming plum flowers at a plantation in Huyi District of Xi’an, northwest China’s Shaanxi Province. [Photo/Xinhua]

An aerial drone photo taken on March 18, 2025 shows blooming plum flowers at a plantation in Huyi District of Xi’an, northwest China’s Shaanxi Province. [Photo/Xinhua]

An aerial drone photo taken on March 18, 2025 shows tourists enjoying leisure time amid blooming plum flowers at a plantation in Huyi District of Xi’an, northwest China’s Shaanxi Province. [Photo/Xinhua]

An aerial drone photo taken on March 18, 2025 shows blooming plum flowers at a plantation in Huyi District of Xi’an, northwest China’s Shaanxi Province. [Photo/Xinhua]

An aerial drone photo taken on March 18, 2025 shows tourists enjoying blooming plum flowers at a plantation in Huyi District of Xi’an, northwest China’s Shaanxi Province. [Photo/Xinhua]

An aerial drone photo taken on March 18, 2025 shows tourists enjoying blooming plum flowers at a plantation in Huyi District of Xi’an, northwest China’s Shaanxi Province. [Photo/Xinhua]

MIL OSI China News –

March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Taiwan, EU hold 7th Human Rights Consultations, focusing on cooperation and emerging challenges

Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

March 7, 2025

No. 059

The 7th Taiwan-EU Human Rights Consultations were held in Taipei on March 5. The meeting was chaired by Minister without Portfolio Lin Ming-hsin, who led a group of representatives from various Taiwan government agencies. On the EU side, the consultations were attended by Nicoletta Pusterla, Deputy Head of the China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Mongolia Division of the European External Action Service, and Domenica Bumma, Policy Officer from the EEAS Human Rights Team. This regular dialogue underscores the long-standing Taiwan-EU exchanges and cooperation on human rights and the two sides’ shared commitment to global human rights development.

The consultations were conducted in an open and constructive manner, with the two sides first exchanging views on recent human rights developments, policy initiatives, actions following Constitutional Court Judgment no. 8 of 2024, and priority action plans. Taiwan shared the progress it has made on multiple national human rights action plans, emphasizing transparency and public participation to ensure an open, inclusive process that effectively responds to societal needs. The participants reaffirmed their steadfast commitment to promoting and defending human rights, democracy, and the rule of law and engaged in in-depth discussions on several key issues.

With regard to business and human rights, the EU addressed the latest developments concerning the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. Taiwan shared updates to its National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights, which stresses a soft-law approach to promoting corporate human rights protection while also exploring potential legislative measures.

Furthermore, a working luncheon was cohosted by Minister Lin Ming-hsin and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs François Chihchung Wu. Discussions during the luncheon extended to digital human rights and human rights education. The EU side spoke about its Artificial Intelligence Act and Digital Services Act, which emphasize the need to balance technological development with human rights and privacy protection. Representatives from the Taiwan side provided an introduction to the draft AI basic act, which highlights risk management and data governance. On human rights education, Taiwan presented efforts it has made in schools and public institutions and proposed exploring the feasibility of establishing a Taiwan-EU human rights education cooperation framework to promote academic and educational exchanges.

The consultations further explored gender equality and the rights of the elderly. The two sides reviewed the achievements under the Taiwan-EU Gender Equality Cooperation and Training Framework, and the Taiwan side proposed launching a second phase, focusing on combating online gender-based violence, protecting the rights of diverse gender communities, and deepening gender equality cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Regarding elderly rights, the two sides shared their policies on long-term care and age-friendly initiatives, discussing ways to safeguard the rights of older adults in an aging society, including economic security, healthcare, and social participation, while exchanging policy experiences.

On migrant workers’ rights, Taiwan outlined measures to protect foreign domestic workers and distant-water fishermen, including setting up direct hiring mechanisms, improving working conditions, and strengthening legal supervision. The two sides also discussed ways to enhance the rights of disadvantaged migrant workers.

The consultations were followed by an exchange between nongovernmental members of the Executive Yuan’s Human Rights Protection and Promotion Task Force and the EU representatives, marking the first time they engaged in dialogue on the challenges and opportunities in human rights policies faced by both sides.

Taiwan and the EU both uphold the core values of democracy, freedom, and human rights. The two sides have laid a strong foundation for cooperation in these areas. The Taiwan government will continue to enhance human rights standards and ensure alignment with international norms, with the Executive Yuan coordinating interagency efforts. Both sides have expressed that they look forward to developing more concrete cooperation initiatives, fostering experience sharing and policy dialogues to further strengthen the Taiwan-EU partnership, jointly advancing global human rights, and benefiting the international community. (E)

MIL OSI China News –

March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: ROC (Taiwan) government congratulates diplomatic ally Belize on successful completion of general elections
Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

ROC (Taiwan) government congratulates diplomatic ally Belize on successful completion of general elections
- Date：2025-03-13
- Data Source：Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs
March 13, 2025

No. 061

Belize, a diplomatic ally of the Republic of China (Taiwan), held general elections on March 12. The ruling People’s United Party won the elections and its leader, John Briceño, will serve a consecutive term as prime minister and form a new government. After the elections, ROC (Taiwan) Ambassador to Belize Lily Li-wen Hsu promptly expressed sincere congratulations to Prime Minister Briceño on behalf of the government of Taiwan.

The election process was peaceful and smooth, underscoring the staunch commitment to and belief of the Belizean government and people in safeguarding democracy. Under Prime Minister Briceño’s leadership, the government of Belize has spoken up for Taiwan at numerous international events. The government of Taiwan will build on existing foundations to further foster friendships with high-level Belizean officials and continue to deepen the two nations’ close and cordial cooperation.

Last year marked 35 years of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Belize. In May, Prime Minister Briceño led a delegation to attend the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te and Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim. In late October, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung led a delegation to visit Belize. During his visit, Minister Lin issued a joint statement with Belizean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Francis Fonseca on the 35 years of diplomatic ties between Taiwan and Belize, reaffirming the two countries’ robust friendship. (E)

MIL OSI China News –
March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: MOFA sincerely appreciates G7 foreign ministers’ joint statement reaffirming importance of cross-strait peace and stability
Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFA sincerely appreciates G7 foreign ministers’ joint statement reaffirming importance of cross-strait peace and stability
- Date：2025-03-15
- Data Source：Department of North American Affairs
March 15, 2025

No. 064

The Group of Seven (G7) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was convened in Charlevoix, Quebec, Canada, from March 12 to 14. In a joint statement released after the meeting, G7 members reaffirmed the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, reiterated their opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, and called for the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues. They also expressed support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) highly welcomes and sincerely appreciates G7 members continuing to take concrete action to demonstrate their staunch support for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

In the statement, G7 members reiterated their commitment to upholding a free, open, prosperous, and secure Indo-Pacific and conveyed concern over China’s military buildup and the continued, rapid increase in its nuclear weapons arsenal. They urged China not to conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the safety of communities and the integrity of democratic institutions in other countries. They also expressed concerns about China’s nonmarket policies and practices, which they said were leading to harmful overcapacity and market distortions.

In addition, the G7 foreign ministers issued a declaration stressing the importance of maritime security and prosperity. Expressing concern that undersea communications cables and other critical undersea infrastructure have been subject to damage through sabotage, they pledged to enhance cooperation with industry, strengthen repair capacities, and improve infrastructure resilience.

Since the G7 Leaders’ Summit held in Cornwall, United Kingdom, in 2021, G7 members have issued joint communiqués or statements at several high-level meetings and summits over the past five consecutive years emphasizing a high regard and support for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. As an important country in the Indo-Pacific and a responsible member of the international community, Taiwan will continue to bolster cooperation with G7 members, allies, and friendly countries to collectively ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific, safeguard the rules-based international order, firmly protect the core values of democracy and freedom, create non-red supply chains, and strengthen the economic resilience of the democratic community. (E)

MIL OSI China News –
March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: MOFA thanks US Department of State for affirming Belize’s staunch commitment to maintaining diplomatic partnership with Taiwan
Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFA thanks US Department of State for affirming Belize’s staunch commitment to maintaining diplomatic partnership with Taiwan
- Date：2025-03-15
- Data Source：Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs
March 15, 2025

No. 065

The United States Department of State issued a press statement on May 14 congratulating Belize on the completion of its democratic elections and Prime Minister John Briceño on his successful reelection to a second term. The statement also lauded Taiwan as a democratic force for good in the region and affirmed Belize’s staunch commitment to maintaining its diplomatic partnership with Taiwan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) sincerely thanks the United States for reiterating its support for democratic Taiwan and Taiwan’s diplomatic alliance with Belize.

Taiwan and Belize share robust diplomatic relations, and bilateral ties continue to deepen. The government of Taiwan and the embassy in Belize expressed sincere congratulations to the Belizean people and Prime Minister Briceño immediately following Belize’s general elections. As a rock-solid partner of Belize and the United States, Taiwan will continue to do its utmost to strengthen and expand trilateral cooperation and to jointly safeguard the values of democracy and freedom, as well as regional peace and security. (E)

MIL OSI China News –
March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Global leaders attend eighth Yushan Forum in concrete show of support for Taiwan’s integrated diplomacy

Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

March 16, 2025

No. 067

The eighth Yushan Forum will take place from March 17 to 18 at the Taipei Marriott Hotel. The theme of the event is “New Southbound Policy+: Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific, and a New World.” In line with President Lai Ching-te’s Smart Nation 2.0 policy vision, the meeting is being held parallel to the 2025 Smart City Summit and Expo and the 2050 Net Zero City Expo. The expanded forum will be attended by key political figures, industrial leaders, and experts from New Southbound Policy partner countries and other like-minded nations worldwide, including Denmark, Slovenia, the United States, Japan, the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Canada, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and India. Participants will discuss how Taiwan leverages its digital state power and innovative technology to promote a digital New Southbound initiative and develop smart solutions with partner countries to jointly advance sustainable prosperity in the region.

On the first day of the event, President Lai will deliver opening remarks in the morning, Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim will hold a luncheon for important guests in the afternoon, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung will host a welcome dinner for participants in the evening. Leading political figures attending the forum include Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former Danish Prime Minister and current Chairman of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation; Janez Janša, former Slovenian Prime Minister; Keiji Furuya, Chairman of the Japan-ROC Diet Members’ Consultative Council and member of the Japanese House of Representatives; Pavel Fischer, member of the Czech Senate and Chairman of its Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Security; Anna Fotyga, former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mantas Adomenas, former Lithuanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Secretary General of the Polish-based Community of Democracies; and Tony Clement, former Canadian Minister of Health. Other guests include leaders of Taiwanese companies and industrial associations; representatives of globally renowned corporate groups such as Merck, US-based Coupang and Uber, and Thai-based AMATA; and delegates of the US-based Pacific Forum, the Asia Centre from Thailand, and various think tanks and nongovernmental organizations based in Indonesia, India, and other New Southbound Policy partner countries.

Taiwan held the first Yushan Forum in 2017. Now in its eighth iteration, the event has fully demonstrated the achievements of the New Southbound Policy. In line with integrated diplomacy, this year’s forum has been further transformed and elevated into a key discussion platform to connect Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific, and the world, and to incorporate Taiwan’s successful advancements and experiences in various fields into regional dialogue. The forum will make an indispensable contribution to sustainable democracy, sustainable prosperity, and sustainable peace in the Indo-Pacific region. (E)

MIL OSI China News –

March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: MOFA response to false claims by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson regarding Taiwan and its president

Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFA response to false claims by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson regarding Taiwan and its president

March 14, 2025

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) strongly refutes false claims made at a regular press conference on March 13 by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, who said that “Taiwan is part of China” and that “there is no so-called president in Taiwan.” These statements not only completely ignore the facts and status quo across the Taiwan Strait but also aim to mislead the international community.

The Republic of China (Taiwan) successfully held its eighth presidential election on January 13, 2024, setting another milestone in its democratic development. Government officials and parliamentarians of 50 nations—including 12 diplomatic allies and other friendly countries, such as the United States, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia—praised this achievement and offered congratulations to Taiwan. Many democracies hope that the people of China will one day also be able to hold direct presidential elections, thereby determining their nation’s leaders and future.

MOFA solemnly reiterates that neither the Republic of China (Taiwan) nor the People’s Republic of China is subordinate to the other, that the PRC regime has never governed Taiwan, and that no narratives distorting Taiwan’s sovereign status can change the objective reality and internationally recognized status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s future must be collectively decided by the 23.5 million people of Taiwan. China has no right to interfere.

MIL OSI China News –

March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: MOFA response to South Africa’s DIRCO changing name of Taiwan’s liaison office on official website

Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFA response to South Africa’s DIRCO changing name of Taiwan’s liaison office on official website

March 16, 2025

In January, South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) sent another letter to the Taipei Liaison Office in the Republic of South Africa (TLO) demanding that it relocate by the end of March. Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung promptly convened an emergency meeting and requested that the TLO, on the principles of parity and dignity, continue to negotiate with DIRCO. The two sides are currently exchanging views on the possibility of amending the content of the legal framework governing their bilateral relations. Taiwan has urged South Africa to accelerate talks on details regarding formal negotiations, such as the location, time, composition of the delegation, and method of signing an agreement.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has closely followed developments and noted that South Africa recently changed the name of the TLO on DIRCO’s official website while bilateral negotiations were still underway and before both sides had reached a consensus. This violated a 1997 agreement between Taiwan and South Africa. In response, Foreign Minister Lin immediately instructed MOFA’s Department of West Asian and African Affairs and the TLO to lodge solemn protests with the Liaison Office of South Africa in Taipei and DIRCO, respectively. The TLO subsequently issued a note verbale to the South African government formally expressing Taiwan’s stance and reiterating that DIRCO’s citing of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and South Africa’s “one China policy” in an effort to force the TLO to relocate was unreasonable, unjustifiable, and unacceptable. The TLO added that South Africa’s collusion with China in attempting to suppress Taiwan violated the spirit of democracy and freedom long advocated by South Africa, and called on the South African government to respect the agreement it concluded with Taiwan in 1997.

The South African government has recently engaged in repeated violations of international norms, attracting the attention of the international community. This was reflected in recent remarks made by then-South African Ambassador to the United States Ebrahim Rasool, which the United States deemed unacceptable. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared him persona non grata on March 15.

MOFA once again solemnly urges the South African government to proactively discuss the relevant details of this matter with Taiwan as soon as possible and not to take any actions that violate the 1997 bilateral agreement before both sides have reached a consensus.

MIL OSI China News –

March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: MOFA response to Chinese Foreign Ministry’s statement that recent PLA drills near Taiwan Strait were directed at United States

Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFA response to Chinese Foreign Ministry’s statement that recent PLA drills near Taiwan Strait were directed at United States

March 17, 2025

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has taken note that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted joint combat readiness patrols near the Taiwan Strait on March 17, undermining regional peace and stability. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently made a number of claims, including that the action was in response to revisions made to the fact sheet on US-Taiwan relations on the United States Department of State website. It also demanded that the United States avoid causing severe damage to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

MOFA strongly denounces China for jeopardizing the cross-strait status quo of peace and stability through military actions around the Taiwan Strait, using the aforementioned revisions to deflect attention from its own disruptive behavior and push its skewed narrative, and attempting to maliciously discredit Taiwan-US relations.

The US Department of State on February 13 updated the abovementioned section on its official website, emphasizing the United States’ abiding interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, opposition to any unilateral changes to the status quo, and expectation that cross-strait differences be resolved by peaceful means. It also reiterated that the United States would honor its security commitments to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. The website, in addition to reflecting the status quo and the consistent US approach to Taiwan across decades and administrations, underscored the importance that the United States places on cross-strait peace and stability.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung welcomes the support for Taiwan-US relations and the shared goal of promoting peace and prosperity as expressed on the related webpage. He stresses that the international community is cognizant of the fact that it is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that has been pursuing expansion in the region in recent years, attempting to challenge the status quo, and employing gray-zone coercion, thereby repeatedly jeopardizing the stable status quo. The CCP cannot claim that it seeks stability when, in fact, it continues to adopt provocative means that disrupt regional and global peace and stability. As a responsible member of the international community, Taiwan will remain steadfast and do its utmost to ensure peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.

MIL OSI China News –

March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: MOFA response to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s false claims regarding Taiwan

Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFA response to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s false claims regarding Taiwan

March 18, 2025

A spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs made false and outrageous statements at a regular press conference on March 17, such as claiming that “Taiwan is never a country, not in the past, and never in the future.” Such tired rhetoric, which deviates from the truth, distorts the facts, and contravenes the will of Taiwan’s 23.5 million people, is not worthy of further discussion.

MOFA solemnly reiterates that the Republic of China (Taiwan) is undeniably a sovereign and independent country. China has no right to interfere with a sovereign nation exercising its legitimate rights.

MIL OSI China News –

March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI China: MOFA strongly denounces Chinese Foreign Minister Wang’s misrepresentation of UNGA Resolution 2758 and false claims regarding Taiwan
Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFA strongly denounces Chinese Foreign Minister Wang’s misrepresentation of UNGA Resolution 2758 and false claims regarding Taiwan
- Date：2025-03-07
- Data Source：Department of Policy Planning
March 7, 2025

No. 058

At a press conference held on March 7 during sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi falsely claimed that United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 had once and for all resolved the issue of the representation of the whole of China, including Taiwan, in the UN. He also alleged that the “only reference to the Taiwan region in the UN is ‘Taiwan, Province of China,’” promoting spurious narratives that distorted the facts and deviated from the truth. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) solemnly condemns and expresses strong disappointment at this renewed and blatant attempt to unilaterally disrupt the status quo and this malicious conduct aimed at deceiving and misleading the international community.

As a matter of fact, UNGA Resolution 2758 made no mention of Taiwan throughout its entire text and thus could not have stated that Taiwan was a part of the People’s Republic of China, nor did it legally authorize the PRC to represent Taiwan or the Taiwanese people in the UN and its specialized agencies. China’s deliberate manipulations contradict the principle of universality enshrined in the UN Charter. Additionally, its military provocations in the Taiwan Strait, East and South China Seas, and other areas in recent years have clearly jeopardized peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. The claims that China made regarding Taiwan and its actions in the region represent blatant attempts to undermine the status quo.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung calls on the international community to oppose China’s repeated misrepresentation of UNGA Resolution 2758 and its attempts to alter the status quo of neither side being subordinate to the other. Minister Lin also urges nations worldwide to jointly condemn China for again resorting to flagrant provocation and disruption of the status quo. MOFA reiterates that the Republic of China (Taiwan) is an independent and sovereign country; that Taiwan has never been a part of the PRC; and that neither democratic Taiwan nor authoritarian China being subordinate to the other is the status quo across the Taiwan Strait and a long-standing, internationally recognized, and objective fact. Only Taiwan’s democratically elected government has the right to represent the 23.5 million people of Taiwan in the UN system and the international arena. The PRC has no right to interfere. (E)

MIL OSI China News –
March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Taiwan, EU hold 7th Human Rights Consultations, focusing on cooperation and emerging challenges

Source: Republic of China Taiwan 3

March 7, 2025
No. 059

The 7th Taiwan-EU Human Rights Consultations were held in Taipei on March 5. The meeting was chaired by Minister without Portfolio Lin Ming-hsin, who led a group of representatives from various Taiwan government agencies. On the EU side, the consultations were attended by Nicoletta Pusterla, Deputy Head of the China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Mongolia Division of the European External Action Service, and Domenica Bumma, Policy Officer from the EEAS Human Rights Team. This regular dialogue underscores the long-standing Taiwan-EU exchanges and cooperation on human rights and the two sides’ shared commitment to global human rights development.

The consultations were conducted in an open and constructive manner, with the two sides first exchanging views on recent human rights developments, policy initiatives, actions following Constitutional Court Judgment no. 8 of 2024, and priority action plans. Taiwan shared the progress it has made on multiple national human rights action plans, emphasizing transparency and public participation to ensure an open, inclusive process that effectively responds to societal needs. The participants reaffirmed their steadfast commitment to promoting and defending human rights, democracy, and the rule of law and engaged in in-depth discussions on several key issues.
With regard to business and human rights, the EU addressed the latest developments concerning the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. Taiwan shared updates to its National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights, which stresses a soft-law approach to promoting corporate human rights protection while also exploring potential legislative measures.

Furthermore, a working luncheon was cohosted by Minister Lin Ming-hsin and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs François Chihchung Wu. Discussions during the luncheon extended to digital human rights and human rights education. The EU side spoke about its Artificial Intelligence Act and Digital Services Act, which emphasize the need to balance technological development with human rights and privacy protection. Representatives from the Taiwan side provided an introduction to the draft AI basic act, which highlights risk management and data governance. On human rights education, Taiwan presented efforts it has made in schools and public institutions and proposed exploring the feasibility of establishing a Taiwan-EU human rights education cooperation framework to promote academic and educational exchanges.

The consultations further explored gender equality and the rights of the elderly. The two sides reviewed the achievements under the Taiwan-EU Gender Equality Cooperation and Training Framework, and the Taiwan side proposed launching a second phase, focusing on combating online gender-based violence, protecting the rights of diverse gender communities, and deepening gender equality cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Regarding elderly rights, the two sides shared their policies on long-term care and age-friendly initiatives, discussing ways to safeguard the rights of older adults in an aging society, including economic security, healthcare, and social participation, while exchanging policy experiences.

On migrant workers’ rights, Taiwan outlined measures to protect foreign domestic workers and distant-water fishermen, including setting up direct hiring mechanisms, improving working conditions, and strengthening legal supervision. The two sides also discussed ways to enhance the rights of disadvantaged migrant workers.

The consultations were followed by an exchange between nongovernmental members of the Executive Yuan’s Human Rights Protection and Promotion Task Force and the EU representatives, marking the first time they engaged in dialogue on the challenges and opportunities in human rights policies faced by both sides.

Taiwan and the EU both uphold the core values of democracy, freedom, and human rights. The two sides have laid a strong foundation for cooperation in these areas. The Taiwan government will continue to enhance human rights standards and ensure alignment with international norms, with the Executive Yuan coordinating interagency efforts. Both sides have expressed that they look forward to developing more concrete cooperation initiatives, fostering experience sharing and policy dialogues to further strengthen the Taiwan-EU partnership, jointly advancing global human rights, and benefiting the international community. (E)

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: ROC (Taiwan) government congratulates diplomatic ally Belize on successful completion of general elections

Source: Republic of China Taiwan 3

ROC (Taiwan) government congratulates diplomatic ally Belize on successful completion of general elections

Date：2025-03-13
Data Source：Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs

March 13, 2025
No. 061

Belize, a diplomatic ally of the Republic of China (Taiwan), held general elections on March 12. The ruling People’s United Party won the elections and its leader, John Briceño, will serve a consecutive term as prime minister and form a new government. After the elections, ROC (Taiwan) Ambassador to Belize Lily Li-wen Hsu promptly expressed sincere congratulations to Prime Minister Briceño on behalf of the government of Taiwan.

The election process was peaceful and smooth, underscoring the staunch commitment to and belief of the Belizean government and people in safeguarding democracy. Under Prime Minister Briceño’s leadership, the government of Belize has spoken up for Taiwan at numerous international events. The government of Taiwan will build on existing foundations to further foster friendships with high-level Belizean officials and continue to deepen the two nations’ close and cordial cooperation.

Last year marked 35 years of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Belize. In May, Prime Minister Briceño led a delegation to attend the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te and Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim. In late October, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung led a delegation to visit Belize. During his visit, Minister Lin issued a joint statement with Belizean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Francis Fonseca on the 35 years of diplomatic ties between Taiwan and Belize, reaffirming the two countries’ robust friendship. (E)

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 19, 2025

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ROC (Taiwan) government congratulates diplomatic ally Belize on successful completion of general elections

MOFA sincerely appreciates G7 foreign ministers’ joint statement reaffirming importance of cross-strait peace and stability

MOFA thanks US Department of State for affirming Belize’s staunch commitment to maintaining diplomatic partnership with Taiwan

MOFA response to false claims by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson regarding Taiwan and its president

MOFA response to South Africa’s DIRCO changing name of Taiwan’s liaison office on official website

MOFA response to Chinese Foreign Ministry’s statement that recent PLA drills near Taiwan Strait were directed at United States

MOFA response to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s false claims regarding Taiwan

MOFA strongly denounces Chinese Foreign Minister Wang’s misrepresentation of UNGA Resolution 2758 and false claims regarding Taiwan