Category: China

MIL-OSI: Veeco Reports Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2024 Financial Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Fourth Quarter 2024 Highlights:

Revenue of $182.1 million, compared with $173.9 million in the same period last year
GAAP net income of $15.0 million, or $0.26 per diluted share, compared with $21.6 million, or $0.37 per diluted share in the same period last year
Non-GAAP net income of $24.2 million, or $0.41 per diluted share, compared with $29.8 million, or $0.51 per diluted share in the same period last year

Fiscal Year 2024 Highlights:

Revenue of $717.3 million, compared with $666.4 million in the same period last year
GAAP net income of $73.7 million, or $1.23 per diluted share, compared with GAAP net loss of $30.4 million or $0.56 loss per diluted share in the same period last year
Non-GAAP net income of $104.3 million, or $1.74 per diluted share, compared with $98.3 million, or $1.69 per diluted share in the same period last year

PLAINVIEW, N.Y., Feb. 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Veeco Instruments Inc. (Nasdaq: VECO) today announced financial results for its fourth quarter and fiscal year ended December 31, 2024. Results are reported in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) and are also reported adjusting for certain items (“Non-GAAP”). A reconciliation between GAAP and Non-GAAP operating results is provided at the end of this press release.


U.S. Dollars in millions, except per share data

	4th Quarter				Full Year
GAAP Results	Q4 ’24		Q4 ’23		2024		2023
Revenue	$	182.1	$	173.9	$	717.3	$	666.4
Net income (loss)	$	15.0	$	21.6	$	73.7	$	(30.4	)
Diluted earnings (loss) per share	$	0.26	$	0.37	$	1.23	$	(0.56	)

	4th Quarter				Full Year
Non-GAAP Results	Q4 ’24		Q4 ’23		2024		2023
Operating income	$	27.4	$	32.1	$	116.1	$	109.6
Net income	$	24.2	$	29.8	$	104.3	$	98.3
Diluted earnings per share	$	0.41	$	0.51	$	1.74	$	1.69

“Veeco had a successful year in 2024, highlighted by our Semiconductor business outperforming WFE growth for the 4^th consecutive year,” commented Bill Miller, Ph.D., Veeco’s Chief Executive Officer. “We achieved several strategic milestones, grew the top-line and delivered solid profitability, all while continuing to allocate capital toward our largest growth opportunities. Looking ahead, our solutions in Laser Annealing, Ion Beam Deposition, and Advanced Packaging are well-positioned to take advantage of growth in leading edge investment in the coming years.”

Guidance and Outlook

The following guidance is provided for Veeco’s first quarter 2025:

Revenue is expected in the range of $155 million to $175 million
GAAP diluted earnings per share are expected in the range of $0.11 to $0.22
Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share are expected in the range of $0.26 to $0.36

Conference Call Information

A conference call reviewing these results has been scheduled for today, February 12, 2025 starting at 5:00pm ET. To join the call, dial 1-877-407-8029 (toll-free) or 1-201-689-8029. Participants may also access a live webcast of the call by visiting the investor relations section of Veeco’s website at ir.veeco.com. A replay of the webcast will be made available on the Veeco website that evening. We will post an accompanying slide presentation to our website prior to the beginning of the call.

About Veeco

Veeco (NASDAQ: VECO) is an innovative manufacturer of semiconductor process equipment. Our laser annealing, ion beam, chemical vapor deposition (CVD), metal organic chemical vapor deposition (MOCVD), single wafer etch & clean and lithography technologies play an integral role in the fabrication and packaging of advanced semiconductor devices. With equipment designed to optimize performance, yield and cost of ownership, Veeco holds leading technology positions in the markets we serve. To learn more about Veeco’s systems and service offerings, visit www.veeco.com.

Forward-looking Statements

This press release contains “forward-looking statements”, within the meaning of the safe harbor provisions of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, as amended, that are based on management’s expectations, estimates, projections and assumptions. Words such as “expects,” “anticipates,” “plans,” “believes,” “scheduled,” “estimates” and variations of these words and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, those regarding anticipated growth and trends in our businesses and markets, industry outlooks and demand drivers, our investment and growth strategies, our development of new products and technologies, our business outlook for current and future periods, our ongoing transformation initiative and the effects thereof on our operations and financial results; and other statements that are not historical facts. These statements and their underlying assumptions are subject to risks and uncertainties and are not guarantees of future performance. Factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied by such statements include, without limitation: the level of demand for our products; global economic and industry conditions; global trade issues, including the ongoing trade disputes between the U.S. and China, and changes in trade and export license policies; our dependency on third-party suppliers and outsourcing partners; the timing of customer orders; our ability to develop, deliver and support new products and technologies; our ability to expand our current markets, increase market share and develop new markets; the concentrated nature of our customer base; our ability to obtain and protect intellectual property rights in key technologies; the effects of regional or global health epidemics; our ability to achieve the objectives of operational and strategic initiatives and attract, motivate and retain key employees; the variability of results among products and end-markets, and our ability to accurately forecast future results, market conditions, and customer requirements; the impact of our indebtedness, including our convertible senior notes and our capped call transactions; and other risks and uncertainties described in our SEC filings on Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K, and from time-to-time in our other SEC reports. All forward-looking statements speak only to management’s expectations, estimates, projections and assumptions as of the date of this press release or, in the case of any document referenced herein or incorporated by reference, the date of that document. The Company does not undertake any obligation to update or publicly revise any forward-looking statements to reflect events, circumstances or changes in expectations after the date of this press release.

–financial tables attached-


Veeco Contacts:

Investors:	Anthony Pappone	(516) 500-8798	apappone@veeco.com
Media:	Brenden Wright	(410) 984-2610	bwright@veeco.com


Veeco Instruments Inc. and Subsidiaries Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations (in thousands, except per share amounts) (unaudited)

	Three months ended December 31,						Year ended December 31,
	2024			2023			2024			2023
Net sales	$	182,131		$	173,924		$	717,301		$	666,435
Cost of sales		108,146			95,269			413,296			381,376
Gross profit		73,985			78,655			304,005			285,059
Operating expenses, net:
Research and development		30,953			29,091			124,507			112,853
Selling, general, and administrative		25,077			23,493			99,663			92,756
Amortization of intangible assets		1,580			2,123			6,983			8,481
Asset impairment		28,131			—			28,131			—
Other operating expense (income), net		(15,635	)		(235	)		(22,260	)		1,029
Total operating expenses, net		70,106			54,472			237,024			215,119
Operating income		3,879			24,183			66,981			69,940
Interest income (expense), net		476			—			1,853			(1,187	)
Other income (expense), net		—			—			—			(97,091	)
Income (loss) before income taxes		4,355			24,183			68,834			(28,338	)
Income tax expense (benefit)		(10,610	)		2,546			(4,880	)		2,030
Net income (loss)	$	14,965		$	21,637		$	73,714		$	(30,368	)

Income (loss) per common share:
Basic	$	0.26		$	0.39		$	1.31		$	(0.56	)
Diluted	$	0.26		$	0.37		$	1.23		$	(0.56	)

Weighted average number of shares:
Basic		56,536			55,537			56,426			53,769
Diluted		60,499			59,821			61,596			53,769


Veeco Instruments Inc. and Subsidiaries Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets (in thousands)

	December 31,		December 31,
	2024		2023
	(unaudited)
Assets
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents	$	145,595	$	158,781
Restricted cash		224		339
Short-term investments		198,719		146,664
Accounts receivable, net		96,834		103,018
Contract assets		37,109		24,370
Inventories		246,735		237,635
Prepaid expenses and other current assets		39,316		35,471
Total current assets		764,532		706,278
Property, plant and equipment, net		113,789		118,459
Operating lease right-of-use assets		26,503		24,377
Intangible assets, net		8,832		43,945
Goodwill		214,964		214,964
Deferred income taxes		120,191		117,901
Other assets		2,766		3,117
Total assets	$	1,251,577	$	1,229,041

Liabilities and stockholders’ equity
Current liabilities:
Accounts payable	$	43,519	$	42,383
Accrued expenses and other current liabilities		55,195		57,624
Contract liabilities		64,986		118,026
Income taxes payable		2,086		—
Current portion of long-term debt		26,496		—
Total current liabilities		192,282		218,033
Deferred income taxes		689		6,552
Long-term debt		249,702		274,941
Long-term operating lease liabilities		34,318		31,529
Other liabilities		3,816		25,544
Total liabilities		480,807		556,599

Total stockholders’ equity		770,770		672,442
Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity	$	1,251,577	$	1,229,041

Note on Reconciliation Tables

The below tables include financial measures adjusted for the impact of certain items; these financial measures are therefore not calculated in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). These Non-GAAP financial measures exclude items such as: share-based compensation expense; charges relating to restructuring initiatives; non-cash asset impairments; certain other non-operating gains and losses; and acquisition-related items such as transaction costs, non-cash amortization of acquired intangible assets, and certain integration costs.

These Non-GAAP financial measures may be different from Non-GAAP financial measures used by other companies. Non-GAAP financial measures should not be considered a substitute for, or superior to, measures of financial performance prepared in accordance with GAAP. By excluding these items, Non-GAAP financial measures are intended to facilitate meaningful comparisons to historical operating results, competitors’ operating results, and estimates made by securities analysts. Management is evaluated on key performance metrics including Non-GAAP Operating income (loss), which is used to determine management incentive compensation as well as to forecast future periods. These Non-GAAP financial measures may be useful to investors in allowing for greater transparency of supplemental information used by management in its financial and operational decision-making. In addition, similar Non-GAAP financial measures have historically been reported to investors; the inclusion of comparable numbers provides consistency in financial reporting. Investors are encouraged to review the reconciliation of the Non-GAAP financial measures used in this news release to their most directly comparable GAAP financial measures.


Reconciliation of GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Data (Q4 2024) (in thousands) (unaudited)

				Non-GAAP Adjustments
				Share-Based
Three months ended December 31, 2024	GAAP			Compensation		Amortization		Other			Non-GAAP
Net sales	$	182,131									$	182,131
Gross profit		73,985		1,523								75,508
Gross margin		40.6	%									41.5	%
Operating expenses		70,106		(7,582	)	(1,580	)	(12,876	)			48,068
Operating income		3,879		9,105		1,580		12,876		^		27,440
Net income		14,965		9,105		1,580		(1,443	)	^		24,207

____________________________
^ – See table below for additional details.


Other Non-GAAP Adjustments (Q4 2024) (in thousands) (unaudited)

Three months ended December 31, 2024
Asset impairment	$	28,131
Changes in contingent consideration		(16,466	)
Other		1,211
Subtotal		12,876
Non-cash interest expense		322
Tax benefits associated with asset impairments		(12,239	)
Non-GAAP tax adjustment *		(2,402	)
Total Other	$	(1,443	)

____________________________
* – The ‘with or without’ method is utilized to determine the income tax effect of all Non-GAAP adjustments.


Net Income per Common Share (Q4 2024) (in thousands, except per share amounts) (unaudited)

	Three months ended December 31, 2024
	GAAP		Non-GAAP
Numerator:
Net income	$	14,965	$	24,207
Interest expense associated with 2025 and 2027 Convertible Senior Notes		513		466
Net income available to common shareholders	$	15,478	$	24,673

Denominator:
Basic weighted average shares outstanding		56,536		56,536
Effect of potentially dilutive share-based awards		1,070		1,070
Dilutive effect of 2025 Convertible Senior Notes		1,104		1,104
Dilutive effect of 2027 Convertible Senior Notes⁽¹⁾		1,789		1,354
Diluted weighted average shares outstanding		60,499		60,064

Net income per common share:
Basic	$	0.26	$	0.43
Diluted	$	0.26	$	0.41

____________________________
⁽¹⁾ – The non-GAAP incremental dilutive shares includes the impact of the Company’s capped call transaction issued concurrently with our 2027 Notes, and as such, an effective conversion price of $18.46 is used when determining incremental shares to add to the dilutive share count. The GAAP incremental dilutive shares does not include the impact of the Company’s capped call transaction, and as such, an effective conversion price of $13.98 is used when determining incremental shares to add to the dilutive share count.


Reconciliation of GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Data (Q4 2023) (in thousands) (unaudited)

				Non-GAAP Adjustments
				Share-based
Three months ended December 31, 2023		GAAP		Compensation		Amortization		Other			Non-GAAP
Net sales	$	173,924									$	173,924
Gross profit		78,655		334								78,989
Gross margin		45.2	%									45.4	%
Operating expenses		54,472		(5,845	)	(2,123	)	363				46,867
Operating income		24,183		6,179		2,123		(363	)	^		32,122
Net income		21,637		6,179		2,123		(116	)	^		29,823

____________________________
^ – See table below for additional details.


Other Non-GAAP Adjustments (Q4 2023) (in thousands) (unaudited)

Three months ended December 31, 2023
Changes in contingent consideration	$	(465	)
Other		102
Subtotal		(363	)
Non-cash interest expense		294
Non-GAAP tax adjustment *		(47	)
Total Other	$	(116	)

____________________________
* – The ‘with or without’ method is utilized to determine the income tax effect of all Non-GAAP adjustments.


Net Income per Common Share (Q4 2023) (in thousands, except per share amounts) (unaudited)

	Three months ended December 31, 2023
	GAAP		Non-GAAP
Numerator:
Net income	$	21,637	$	29,823
Interest expense associated with 2025 and 2027 Convertible Senior Notes		511		466
Net income available to common shareholders	$	22,148	$	30,289

Denominator:
Basic weighted average shares outstanding		55,537		55,537
Effect of potentially dilutive share-based awards		1,391		1,391
Dilutive effect of 2025 Convertible Senior Notes		1,104		1,104
Dilutive effect of 2027 Convertible Senior Notes⁽¹⁾		1,789		1,355
Diluted weighted average shares outstanding		59,821		59,387

Net income per common share:
Basic	$	0.39	$	0.54
Diluted	$	0.37	$	0.51

____________________________
(1) – The non-GAAP incremental dilutive shares includes the impact of the Company’s capped call transaction issued concurrently with our 2027 Notes, and as such, an effective conversion price of $18.46 is used when determining incremental shares to add to the dilutive share count. The GAAP incremental dilutive shares does not include the impact of the Company’s capped call transaction, and as such, an effective conversion price of $13.98 is used when determining incremental shares to add to the dilutive share count.


Reconciliation of GAAP Net Income to Non-GAAP Operating Income (Q4 2024 and 2023) (in thousands) (unaudited)

	Three months ended			Three months ended
	December 31, 2024			December 31, 2023
GAAP Net income	$	14,965		$	21,637
Share-based compensation		9,105			6,179
Amortization		1,580			2,123
Asset impairment		28,131			—
Changes in contingent consideration		(16,466	)		(465	)
Transition expenses related to San Jose expansion project		—			57
Acquisition related		—			45
Interest (income) expense, net		(476	)		—
Other		1,211			—
Income tax expense (benefit)		(10,610	)		2,546
Non-GAAP Operating income	$	27,440		$	32,122


Reconciliation of GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Data (FY 2024) (in thousands) (unaudited)

				Non-GAAP Adjustments
				Share-based
For the year ended December 31, 2024		GAAP		Compensation		Amortization		Other			Non-GAAP
Net sales	$	717,301									$	717,301
Gross profit		304,005		6,263				162				310,430
Gross margin		42.4	%									43.3	%
Operating expenses		237,024		(29,616	)	(6,983	)	(6,067	)			194,358
Operating income		66,981		35,879		6,983		6,229		^		116,072
Net income (loss)		73,714		35,879		6,983		(12,233	)	^		104,343

____________________________
^ – See table below for additional details.


Other Non-GAAP Adjustments (FY 2024) (in thousands) (unaudited)

For the year ended December 31, 2024
Asset impairment	$	28,131
Changes in contingent consideration		(21,242	)
Sale of productive assets		(2,033	)
Other		1,373
Subtotal		6,229
Non-cash interest expense		1,257
Tax benefits associated with asset impairments		(12,239	)
Non-GAAP tax adjustment *		(7,480	)
Total Other	$	(12,233	)

____________________________
* – The ‘with or without’ method is utilized to determine the income tax effect of all Non-GAAP adjustments.


Net Income per Common Share (FY 2024) (in thousands, except per share amounts) (unaudited)

	Year ended December 31, 2024
	GAAP		Non-GAAP
Numerator:
Net income	$	73,714	$	104,343
Interest expense associated with convertible notes		2,054		1,865
Net income available to common shareholders	$	75,768	$	106,208

Denominator:
Basic weighted average shares outstanding		56,426		56,426
Effect of potentially dilutive share-based awards		1,010		1,010
Dilutive effect of 2025 Convertible Senior Notes		1,104		1,104
Dilutive effect of 2027 Convertible Senior Notes⁽¹⁾		1,788		1,354
Dilutive effect of 2029 Convertible Senior Notes		1,268		1,268
Diluted weighted average shares outstanding		61,596		61,162

Net income per common share:
Basic	$	1.31	$	1.85
Diluted	$	1.23	$	1.74


Reconciliation of GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Data (FY 2023) (in thousands) (unaudited)

					Non-GAAP Adjustments
					Share-based
For the year ended December 31, 2023		GAAP			Compensation		Amortization		Other			Non-GAAP
Net sales	$	666,435										$	666,435
Gross profit		285,059			4,913				232				290,204
Gross margin		42.8		%									43.5	%
Operating expenses		215,119			(23,645	)	(8,481	)	(2,363	)			180,630
Operating income		69,940			28,558		8,481		2,595		^		109,574
Net income (loss)		(30,368	)		28,558		8,481		91,668		^		98,339

____________________________
^ – See table below for additional details.


Other Non-GAAP Adjustments (FY 2023) (in thousands) (unaudited)

For the year ended December 31, 2023
Acquisition related	$	1,056
Changes in contingent consideration		701
Transition expenses related to San Jose expansion project		838
Subtotal		2,595
Non-cash interest expense		1,118
Other (income) expense, net		97,091
Non-GAAP tax adjustment *		(9,136	)
Total Other	$	91,668

____________________________
* – The ‘with or without’ method is utilized to determine the income tax effect of all Non-GAAP adjustments.


Net Income per Common Share (FY 2023) (in thousands, except per share amounts) (unaudited)

	Year ended December 31, 2023
	GAAP			Non-GAAP
Numerator:
Net income (loss)	$	(30,368	)	$	98,339
Interest expense associated with convertible notes		—			4,768
Net income (loss) available to common shareholders	$	(30,368	)	$	103,107

Denominator:
Basic weighted average shares outstanding		53,769			53,769
Effect of potentially dilutive share-based awards		—			850
Dilutive effect of 2023 Convertible Senior Notes		—			21
Dilutive effect of 2025 Convertible Senior Notes		—			2,786
Dilutive effect of 2027 Convertible Senior Notes⁽¹⁾		—			3,417
Diluted weighted average shares outstanding		53,769			60,843

Net income per common share:
Basic	$	(0.56	)	$	1.83
Diluted	$	(0.56	)	$	1.69


Reconciliation of GAAP Net Income to Non-GAAP Operating Income (FY 2024 and 2023) (in thousands) (unaudited)

	Year ended			Year ended
	December 31, 2024			December 31, 2023
GAAP Net income (loss)	$	73,714		$	(30,368	)
Share-based compensation		35,879			28,558
Amortization		6,983			8,481
Asset impairment		28,131			—
Acquisition related		—			1,056
Changes in contingent consideration		(21,242	)		701
Transition expenses related to San Jose expansion project		—			838
Sales of productive assets		(2,033	)		—
Interest (income) expense, net		(1,853	)		1,187
Other		1,373			97,091
Income tax expense (benefit)		(4,880	)		2,030
Non-GAAP Operating income (loss)	$	116,072		$	109,574


Reconciliation of GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Data (Q1 2025) (in millions, except per share amounts) (unaudited)

								Non-GAAP Adjustments
Guidance for the three months ending								Share-based
March 31, 2025	GAAP							Compensation		Amortization		Other		Non-GAAP
Net sales	$	155		–	$	175								$	155		–	$	175
Gross profit		63		–		72		2		—		—			65		–		74
Gross margin		41	%	–		41	%								42	%	–		42	%
Operating expenses		56		–		58		(8	)	(1	)	—			47		–		49
Operating income		7		–		14		10		1		—			18		–		25
Net income	$	7		–	$	13		10		1		(2	)	$	16		–	$	22

Income per diluted common share	$	0.11		–	$	0.22								$	0.26		–	$	0.36


Income per Diluted Common Share (Q1 2025) (in millions, except per share amounts) (unaudited)

Guidance for the three months ending March 31, 2025	GAAP					Non-GAAP
Numerator:
Net income available to common shareholders	$	7	–	$	13	$	16	–	$	22

Denominator:
Basic weighted average shares outstanding		58			58		58			58
Effect of potentially dilutive share-based awards		1			1		1			1
Dilutive effect of 2027 Convertible Senior Notes⁽¹⁾		—			2		1			1
Diluted weighted average shares outstanding		59			61		60			60

Net income per common share:
Income per diluted common share	$	0.11	–	$	0.22	$	0.26	–	$	0.36


Reconciliation of GAAP Net Income to Non-GAAP Operating Income (Q1 2025) (in millions) (unaudited)

Guidance for the three months ending March 31, 2025
GAAP Net income	$	7	–	$	13
Share-based compensation		10	–		10
Amortization		1	–		1
Income tax expense		—	–		1
Non-GAAP Operating income	$	18	–	$	25

Note: Amounts may not calculate precisely due to rounding.

The MIL Network –

February 13, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: Government meeting (2025, No. 4)

Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

1. On the draft federal law “On Amendments to Article 19 of the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Status of Judges in the Russian Federation” and Article 1 of the Federal Law “On Social Guarantees and Compensations for Military Personnel Serving in Military Formations of the Russian Federation Stationed in the Territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, as well as Persons Working in These Formations”

The bill is aimed at establishing a uniform level of social protection for judges of military courts stationed outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

2. On the draft federal law “On the creation of state information systems to combat offenses (crimes) committed using information and telecommunications technologies, and on amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”

The bill is aimed at preventing, suppressing and increasing liability for illegal acts committed using information technologies.

3. On the draft federal law “On the ratification of the Protocol on Amendments to the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the facilitation of travel for citizens”

The bill aims to ratify the protocol signed in Moscow on August 21, 2024.

4. On the draft federal law “On Amendments to Articles 2463 and 427 of Part Two of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation”

The bill is aimed at eliminating the constraints affecting the investment attractiveness of the preferential regime created in the Kuril Islands in accordance with Federal Law No. 50-FZ of March 9, 2022 “On Amendments to Part Two of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation”.

5. On the draft federal law “On Amendments to Articles 247 and 2593 of Part One, Articles 689 and 700 of Part Two and Article 1137 of Part Three of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation”

The bill is aimed at amending parts one, two and three of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation in terms of displaying in the Unified State Register of Real Estate information on the existence of rights of third parties in relation to real estate objects that are not their owners.

6. On the allocation of budgetary allocations to the Ministry of Agriculture of Russia in 2025 from the reserve fund of the Government of the Russian Federation for the provision of one-time financial assistance in the form of a subsidy from the federal budget to the budget of the Kursk region

The draft order is aimed at improving the financial condition of agricultural producers in the Kursk region.

Moscow, February 12, 2025

The content of the press releases of the Department of Press Service and References is a presentation of materials submitted by federal executive bodies for discussion at a meeting of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

MIL OSI Russia News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI New Zealand: Speech to New Zealand Economics Forum

Source: New Zealand Government

Tēna koutou katoa. Greetings everyone.
Thank you Matt for the introduction and can I acknowledge the presence of former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. It’s a pleasure to have you back in the country.
It’s also a pleasure to be here to speak at this event for the third year in a row.
The world is changing. Fast. Orthodoxies are being challenged. De-globalisation, tariffs, counter tariffs, artificial intelligence, conflict, cynicism about national institutions, extreme climatic events, increasing competition for food, energy, minerals and other resources.
Leaders around the world are being compelled to act more boldly than they have for several decades.
Where once countries could take for granted their position in the world, it is now unquestionable that we need to place ourselves in the driver’s seat for our national interests.
These issues are not just the concern of diplomats, leaders and elites.
People the world over are increasingly feeling the effects of declining living standards, soaring prices, unaffordable housing and incomes that are not keeping up.
Is it any wonder that there is a growing sense that the benefits of progress are not being evenly shared or that citizens are questioning the institutions and conventions they were raised to rely on?
It’s hard not to look back on the past few decades and see complacency.
Where once there was an assumption about the inevitability of economic growth – a given to be traded off against a host of other values – that stance now seems blissfully naïve.
From the United Kingdom, to the European Union, to China, to the United States, there is a growing realisation that growth must be fought for and that, even once achieved, can easily slide away.
We in New Zealand are not immune to these trends. In fact, we are at a moment of inflection.
After three years of struggle, many Kiwis feel poorer, less financially secure and less hopeful about their futures. The cost of living is a daily concern.
New Zealanders have been through the wringer. Where once there was triumphalism about our response to, and recovery, from the COVID-19 pandemic, there is now a realisation that we are still paying the economic price for the disruption it wreaked.
The aftershocks of extended lock-downs included a generational spike in inflation and the cost of living, extraordinary interest rate hikes, ongoing disruption to migration flows, massive increases in Government debt and a structural deficit in the government books.
These blows landed on an economy that had being showing cracks for decades.
New Zealand already faced longstanding issues of low productivity growth, low capital intensity in our firms, low levels of competition in many sectors, challenges in attracting and retaining skills and talent, low uptake of innovation, declining housing affordability and a growing tail of New Zealanders leaving school without basic skills. Today, as Kiwis suffer the real-life effects of economic problems, it’s become even more urgent that we address these complex challenges.
For the economists in this room these observations about our economic problems can be understood as data points.
For many Kiwis, it is more personal, more visceral and far harder to stomach. The cost of living is too high and they need to see a path out.
Despite falling inflation and interest rates and rising business and consumer confidence, many New Zealanders tell me they still can’t get on top of their bills – even though they’re working harder than ever, that they are worried about whether they’ve saved enough for their retirement, and are concerned about their kids’ prospects should they stay in New Zealand.
My message to those New Zealanders is this: it’s tough right now, but our country has far better years ahead of it.
It’s easy to lose sight of the reasons to be optimistic, but let’s be confident about how great New Zealand’s potential is.
In a world facing multiple challenges, we have some extraordinary advantages. We’re a safe, secure country with established trading relationships and a reputation as a good place to do business. We are blessed with abundant natural resources – everything from ocean to freshwater, fertile land to minerals and temperate weather.
In a world worried about food security, we have the world’s best farmers, feeding more than 40 million people with levels of efficiency and sustainability that are the envy of the world. We have a long history of stable democracy, strong institutions and rule of law. We’ve produced world-leading scientific breakthroughs from splitting the atom to the Hamilton Jet Boat. Our entrepreneurs and innovators have converted their ideas into world-beating successes – from Oscar-winning digital effects to rockets in space.
New Zealand has what it takes to succeed, but for too long we’ve put up stop signs and road cones when we should have been putting our pedal to the metal.
Our Government’s mission is to make the most of New Zealand’s potential so we can grow the economy and ease the cost of living for New Zealanders.
Our plan is simple: remove the barriers that have held back growth and create the conditions that will allow businesses to create better paying jobs, more financial security for our families, and more income to pay for world-class education and health services.
Today I am releasing a document that shows how our Government is putting that plan into action. “Going for Growth” is a snapshot of the Government’s activity in five key areas, all designed to ease the cost of living and grow our economy.
The document identifies more than 80 separate initiatives that have been completed or are underway. Don’t worry, I’m not about to list them all.
But I do encourage you to give it a read. Going for Growth will be updated on a regular basis and we are actively seeking your feedback on its content and any actions you think should be added or prioritized.
The document focusses on five areas which are essential to improving the performance of the New Zealand economy.

Developing talent by lifting education and skills: Too many of our kids have been leaving school without the basics they need to succeed in an increasingly demanding world. This is a moral failure. It’s also a fiscal and economic timebomb. Our Government is improving our education system to deliver a better deal for Kiwi kids.
Competitive business settings: Excessive and badly-designed regulations have slowed New Zealand down, added costs and prevented too many good ideas from become reality. Several of our major sectors lack competition and consumers are paying the price. Our Government is removing red tape, reducing compliance costs and promoting competition to deliver a better deal for Kiwi consumers.
Promoting global trade and investment: New Zealand is a small country, geographically distant from many of the world’s large economies. We need to keep pursuing trade relationships and international connections not only to get good prices for our exports, but also to keep up with emerging technologies and to access the world’s talent and capital. Our Government is growing our trade relationships and rolling out the welcome mat for international investment so we can deliver better paying jobs for Kiwis.
Innovation, technology and science: New Zealand’s science system is not geared up for the future economy. Our businesses have often been slow to invest in the technology needed to make them more productive. We’re modernizing our science and innovation system so we can deliver a better deal for Kiwi businesses who want to use science and tech to grow.
Infrastructure for growth: New Zealand’s Resource Management system has been weaponised against development, adding cost, slowing things down and stopping too many projects. Despite abundant land, housing remains unaffordable for too many. Major infrastructure projects are too slow, too expensive and too few. Our Government is removing roadblocks to delivery of housing and infrastructure and fast-tracking major developments so we can deliver better living standards for New Zealanders.

Some of you will be familiar with the work we already have underway in each of these areas. Today I want to share some thoughts about a few areas where I think more reform is needed.
Number One. Driving greater competition in sectors that are vital to our national interests, including banking, grocery and electricity.
The economic impetus for this is clear. Strong competition protects consumer interests, it puts downward pressure on costs, it incentivises innovation and investment, it supports efficient allocation of resources and it drives productivity.
When I look around the business landscape today I see too many sectors where market power has been entrenched to the detriment of everyday people.
New Zealand has seen significant mergers and consolidation across major industries. Big fish have been swallowing the little fish and regulatory barriers have stopped new fish from entering the pond.
While many super-sized businesses have flourished, in too many cases the Kiwis they sell to have experienced higher prices, fewer choices and a worse deal all round.
In my view, law-makers and regulators have been far too complacent about diminishing levels of competition in vital areas. Large-scale mergers have been repeatedly allowed in major industries, with so-called efficiency prioritised over the interests of consumers.
Well-intended regulations have become a moat, stopping challengers from disrupting the status quo.
The result? A raw deal for Kiwi consumers.
The dominance of big fish has also made it difficult for many small businesses to grow into larger businesses.
We see it in the banking industry which the Commerce Commission has described as a highly profitable, two-tier oligopoly. The Government is taking action to address this.
And we see it in the supermarket sector in which three large entities, two of whom don’t compete in the same island, effectively control 82 per cent of the market.
The result, as the Commerce Commission reported in 2022, is that competition between grocery retailers is muted, profits are high, product ranges are limited and shoppers pay higher prices than people in many other countries.
In this environment it is almost impossible for a new entrant to establish a foothold in the New Zealand market.
Even if they are able to battle their way through the thicket of resource management and overseas investment regulation, they are confronted in many cases by an absence of suitable land for new supermarket developments. It has been land-banked by the established players.
Some of our best food producers also tell me they are struggling because of the duopolistic practices of the major players.
If Kiwi food producers can’t afford to keep their products on New Zealand supermarket shelves, how are they ever going to grow to the point where they can export overseas?
The supermarket lobby will find 1000 different ways to say this is not the case, but it is.
The OECD has this to say about the New Zealand supermarket sector:
“Two major players dominate the market through their portfolio of different brands. As a result, they can extract higher prices from consumers (oligopoly power) but also exert ‘oligopsony power’ on their suppliers, passing on costs and uncertainty to them, with the threat of removing products from shelves if suppliers disagree”
Studies have shown that New Zealand supermarkets were the most expensive for kitchen staples compared with the UK, Ireland and Australia.
If you doubt the findings of the OECD, research papers, or the Commerce Commission, just ask the everyday Mums and Dads at the checkout:
Kiwi shoppers feel ripped-off.
I think of PK, the Kiwi man who went viral on Tik Tok, sharing how he cried when he discovered how much cheaper the food was when he moved to Australia. I think of the parents in the supermarket aisle, putting back the chocolate biscuits as the weekly shop blows their budget – again. And I think of all those people who endure gut-wrenching anxiety as they watch their items being scanned and the numbers tallying up on the till.
The weekly supermarket shop makes up a significant proportion of most people’s weekly budget and contributes massively to their cost of living.
They deserve to know they are getting a fair deal.
Right now, I don’t think they are. I’m ready to pull out all the stops to get them a fairer deal.
The supermarkets will fight back I’m sure. It’s a fight worth having.
So what can the Government do?
Let me reassure you, we are not going to open our own grocery chain. There will be no KiwiShop.
Instead I’d like to see another competitor enter the supermarket scene to disrupt the major players, drive down prices and increase options for Kiwi shoppers.
Over the past 12 months, international supermarket chains and local investors have expressed interest in entering the New Zealand grocery market.
I want to help them succeed.
We owe it to Kiwi shoppers to help remove the barriers that could get in the way of a new entrant.
That could include removing unnecessary regulatory hurdles in the Overseas Investment Act, Resource Management Act and the entire regulatory maze; helping them to access suitable land and properties for development; helping them to attract capital; cracking down on predatory pricing and ensuring they have fair access to products.
If a new grocery chain opened up here it would deliver massive gains for Kiwi shoppers. So I’m up for actions needed to help make it happen.
At the same time, the Government must continue our efforts to hold the existing supermarket chains accountable to their customers and suppliers.
That means enhancing consumer protections and correcting power imbalances between suppliers and supermarkets. It means strengthening the Grocery Supply Code, enforcing action against non-compliance and illegal conduct, introducing a Wholesale Code to enhance access for smaller retailers, introducing disclosure standards for consumer complaints and responding to further recommendations the Commerce Commission makes.
Commerce Minister Andrew Bayly has already been pushing hard in this space. This year we’re dialling up the pressure.
The major supermarket chains should listen up: our Government is on the side of Kiwi shoppers and we will act to defend their interests.
Number two: The Government’s approach to procurement.
The Government is a huge player in the New Zealand economy. Every year it procures billions of dollars worth of goods and services.
Those doing the procuring understandably play close attention to prices. That is as it should be. We want value for money.
But getting value is not just about cost. Getting value is also about assessing the contribution particular contracts can make to New Zealand as a whole.
The Government wants the Government agencies doing the procuring to assess the value as well as the cost of contracts.
Small and medium-sized businesses say that too often they can’t effectively bid for Government contracts because of the complexity of official procurement processes.
I am reviewing the Government procurement rules that cause this and will soon be recommending changes to Cabinet. I want to ensure value to New Zealand is properly considered when government agencies are picking suppliers, ensuring a more level playing field, improving the ability of smaller businesses to bid and giving more small and medium sized Kiwi businesses the opportunity to grow and become global players.
Third, tax settings.
New Zealand must ensure our tax settings are competitive with other countries who seek to lure our talent, ideas and jobs.
We need to ensure the New Zealand tax system does not discourage businesspeople from investing in their businesses and does not deter foreign investment.
I am considering a range of proposals to make our tax settings more competitive over time.
Fourth, affordable energy.
Alongside the supermarket bill, electricity prices are a major pain point for Kiwi households. Spiking prices and uncertain supply are also a major barrier to industry and the jobs it supports.
As we look out to the world, it’s clear that those choosing to invest in manufacturing, data centers and technological parks will increasingly ask themselves: does the country that we want to invest in have secure, affordable and renewable energy?
New Zealand is pretty well-positioned for that. We already have abundant levels of renewable energy.
The question is, are we well positioned to bring on new generation at the pace needed to keep both security of supply and affordability?
That’s a question the Government is very much engaged in.
The Energy Competition Task Force has published proposals to give consumers more control over energy costs. In addition, independent reviewers will report to Ministers in the middle of the year on the performance of the energy market.
My view is that the world’s surging demand for renewable energy has changed the game. It’s time to think much more boldly about the actions the Government may need to take to incentivise new generation, security of supply and affordable electricity.
Fifth, savings.
Finally, I want to see KiwiSaver working as well as possible for New Zealanders. Commerce Minister Andrew Bayly already has work underway to enable Kiwisaver providers to make greater investments in private assets, to generate good returns for savers and ensure more Kiwi savings can be deployed for investment here at home.
I want to see KiwiSaver balances grow, both to make Kiwis better off in retirement and to grow our collective national savings. I am taking advice on options for achieving that with a view to taking recommendations to Cabinet.
Let me finish by providing you with some perspective.
Our domestic context is challenging. Internationally we are arguably operating in a more complex, faster changing world than at any time in history.
But, when I look around the world, there is nowhere I would rather build a business or raise a family than here in New Zealand.
But the world doesn’t owe us a living. We have to compete hard to deliver for our national interests and the interests of New Zealanders.
Our Government’s plan to grow the economy is about making the most of New Zealand’s many advantages, removing barriers that are holding Kiwis back and competing for our share of the world’s wealth.
This is not an abstract mission. It goes to the heart of what matters to New Zealanders.
To create better paying jobs and make Kiwis more financially secure, we must grow our economy.
To deliver better health services and schools, we must grow our economy.
To make New Zealand more resilient to global challenges, we must grow our economy.
This Government backs New Zealanders to succeed. I know you do too. I wish you a successful conference and look forward to hearing your ideas. Let’s go for growth.

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Attorney’s Office Collects more than $1.5 Billion in Criminal and Civil Actions in Fiscal Year 2024

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

Criminal Payment by Crypto Exchange Binance for failing to have money laundering protections boosts collections to new record

Seattle — U.S. Attorney Tessa M. Gorman announced today that the Western District of Washington collected $1,518145,143 in criminal and civil actions in Fiscal Year 2024. Of this amount, $1,509,282,780 was collected in criminal actions and $8,862,362 was collected in civil actions.

The Western District of Washington worked with the Criminal Division’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section and the National Security Division to obtain the $1.5 billion payment from cryptocurrency exchange Binance.

“Our office worked closely with Department of Justice components on the criminal case against Binance, in which Binance pleaded guilty to failing to register as a money transmitting business, willfully violating the Bank Secrecy Act and willfully causing violations of U.S. sanctions,” said U.S. Attorney Gorman. “That $1.5 billion coming through our office, is part of the $4.3 billion criminal fine and forfeiture. It is a record in the Western District of Washington.”

Independently, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington collected $3.8 million in criminal restitution payments, and an additional $8.8 million civil collections. Many of the criminal collections were for cases in which people intentionally failed to pay their income taxes. The owner of a string of coffee stands paid $96,000 in restitution to the Internal Revenue Service for intentionally underreporting his income from the business. A Snohomish County restaurant owner paid over $511,000 for tax fraud and a Tukwila restaurant owner paid $376,000 so that his $926,902 tax fraud debt was paid in full.

Of the civil collections, the district obtained $217,000 following the sale of Dr. Frank Li’s Spokane medical office building. The payment was applied to Dr. Li’s $2.85 million civil settlement for health care fraud.

Additionally, we collected $1.23 million from Yakima Products, Inc. These payments (which were in addition to payments made in 2023) satisfied Yakima’s $3 million settlement with the United States, for failing to pay duties on aluminum components imported from the People’s Republic of China. Learn more about the case here: https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/automobile-accessory-company-yakima-products-inc-settles-allegations-failed-pay-duties

The U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, along with the department’s litigating divisions, are responsible for enforcing and collecting civil and criminal debts owed to the U.S. and criminal debts owed to federal crime victims. The law requires defendants to pay restitution to victims of certain federal crimes who have suffered a physical injury or financial loss. While restitution is paid to the victim, criminal fines and felony assessments are paid to the department’s Crime Victims Fund, which distributes the funds collected to federal and state victim compensation and victim assistance programs.

Additionally, the U.S. Attorney’s office in the Western District of Washington, working with partner agencies and divisions, collected $2,864,850 in asset forfeiture actions in FY 2024. Forfeited assets deposited into the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund are used to restore funds to crime victims and for a variety of law enforcement purposes. A large portion of the forfeitures relate to the indictment of two men operating a business that posted stolen items for sale via online websites. You can learn more about the case here: https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/two-indicted-buying-stolen-goods-and-selling-them-online-amazon-or-ebay-more-3-million.

MIL Security OSI –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: The European Financial Industry of the Future | 6. Frankfurt Digital Finance Conference & European Fintech Day
Source: Bundesbank

Check against delivery.
Ladies and gentlemen,

I’m glad to join you today at the “Gesellschaftshaus Palmengarten”. Its history goes back to the 19^th century. It was the “Gründerzeit” or “founders’ period” – an era of strong economic expansion in Germany – when this building was constructed. And when Germany was developed as an industrial location. Developed by people, men and women, lead by curiosity, innovation, and a desire to achieve.

We have to cast our minds back a few years to see times of growth, real innovation and increasing productivity in Europe.

1 The role of the financial industry

In the 2010s Germany had a period of solid growth that some called “the golden decade”.

Today, however, we see a need for growth and increasing productivity. Hence, our competitiveness is at stake. Not only in Germany, but also in other parts of Europe. And this comes at a time, when we are facing numerous major challenges:

Consider the significant geopolitical uncertainties of our time – which make a rethink necessary in many respects. Also consider the digitalisation of large parts of our economy, incl. disruptive AI. And think about the climate-related need for an ecological transformation.

Financing all of this requires a substantial amount of capital.

This is where the financial industry comes in: The financial industry can act as an enabler of growth in the real economy. Growth that is so much needed right now.

Looking forward, the financial industry could translate growth potential into real growth in many fields – digitalisation, AI, clean tech, pharma, biotech any many more.

In sum, there are huge business opportunities for Germany and the EU. And we need the Financial industry to take advantage of the business opportunities.

But let us not forget that innovation happens in many places – at start-ups but also at well established companies. We need to make sure that a variety of funding sources are available to support our real economies.

We need a specific financial ecosystem that enables young, innovative companies to flourish. Be it VC, PE, etc. We need established capital markets. Above all, we need a strong and healthy banking sector that supplies our economy with sufficient credit.

That means: We need both traditional loans and venture capital. In any case, all the pockets of the financial industry provide the basis for a growing economy. It’s also the basis for the ecological transformation.

The German Council of Experts on Climate Change published [a week ago] new figures on the investment needs estimated for the transition towards net-zero economic activity. Those investment needs range between 135 and 255 billion euro – each year for Germany alone.[1] That’s a lot.

Let’s now have a closer look at the digitalization including AI.

2 Artificial intelligence: innovation and competitiveness

The term artificial intelligence (AI) was coined in the middle of the 20th century. But it was the release of ChatGPT in November 2022 that marked a breakthrough. For the first time it became possible to use an AI system without detailed technical knowledge.

Nowadays almost anyone can use AI. The importance of responsible AI practices on the increase – as highlighted in the latest Declaration by the G20.[2]

There are important questions – to which, to be honest, there are no simple answers:

Are the opportunities and risks of AI balanced?

Does AI lead to a global fragmentation, to a new barrier between those who use AI and those who don’t?

Does AI, as a general-purpose technology, help us better manage economic challenges?[3]

One example of the latter point: Many societies are lacking skilled labour due to demographic change. Here, the use of AI could provide a solution by increasing efficiency or substituting human services. AI can also help drive innovation.

AI enables both incremental and disruptive innovation across all parts of society:

by facilitating faster decision-making

optimizing existing processes,

or by collecting, processing and using huge amounts of data.

It fosters creativity, supports scientific breakthroughs, and unlocks opportunities for entirely new industries and business models – a potential, albeit disruptive, growth engine.

Nevertheless, human creativity is still a key driver of innovation. In 2023, individuals or SMEs filed almost one in four patent applications in Europe.[4]

Today, we are at a crucial stage: With international competition on the one side and technical and intellectual skills on the other. AI models from the United States are well-known and often considered state of the art. China in particular has recently come up with new and apparently very efficient language models. However, the discussion about the background is not yet complete.

In Europe, we have to do our utmost to keep up with the pace. An important initiative recently came from France: In Paris the “EU AI Champions Initiative”, a high-level summit, was held at the beginning of this week.

President Macron mentioned a funding volume of roundabout € 109 billion for AI in France. This approach is very encouraging for other EU member states. By comparison: US–President Trump has mentioned USD 500 billion for his “Stargate” plan in the US.

Despite these substantial investments, there is no guarantee of success. On the other hand, we must not allow ourselves to be deterred by possible failures. One example is the French AI chatbot LUCIE, which has been taken offline after giving some weird answers. I am sure France will take this as a chance to try even harder.

The narrative with all kind of innovation is: Accept failure to grow. The pioneers of the “Gründerzeit” – which I mentioned earlier – knew this only too well.

We need this kind of courage to embrace a “culture of trial and error”. It provides an important impetus to do things better. On the other hand, we have to ensure that new technology does not cause severe damage. Especially because AI is a relatively new technology with unknown potential and consequences for the entire society.

Risks can arise for the financial system, but much further afield as well. Imagine, risk management or investment advice would be provided mainly by AI. Would this mean that investment recommendations are becoming more and more similar? Would we have concentration of risks? And what consequences would this have for financial stability?[5]

Even more far-reaching questions concern our society.

The core question is: What does AI mean for our democracies, for our constitutions, for our fundamental rights? Specifically, we need to ask ourselves: Where is AI beneficial and where do we need clear rules.

In other words: What are the basic rules for using this technology?

It is therefore necessary to find a compromise between having the courage to innovate – and clear rules.

3 Strengthening the financial industry

Regardless of how we deal with AI, we have to return to the issue of financing its development. As indicated earlier, the financial industry, as an enabler, has an important role to play.

Given the challenges of our time I mentioned earlier, it is vital to strengthen the European financial industry.

Let me highlight only two measures:

First, we need to get started on improving start-up funding. In 2024, more than 2,700 innovative start-ups were founded in Germany, the second-highest count after the record year of 2021. There is no shortage of innovative concepts and entrepreneurship per se, but implementation is lacking.

Further completing the European capital markets union (CMU) is essential in this respect – promoting the development of the VC and private equity market as well as exit options for start-ups. The European Commission’s “Competitiveness Compass”, published recently, 29 January 2025, is a good start.

Second, we need to leverage digital technologies to create efficient, integrated and resilient European financial markets. The digital CMU could be a game changer in this respect.

Let me make it perfectly clear: Europe is a leader in this field.

We at the Bundesbank are engaged in several initiatives. And we have a prominent role to play in the development of a central bank digital currency (wholesale CBDC).

4 Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen, let me sum up: And I can be very brief, but still to the point.

The European Financial industry has to become an enabler of growth. Our Financial industry is key to ensure that the European economy stays competitive.

Thank you very much.
MIL OSI Economics –
February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: WAVES offers a golden opportunity for Reel Makers and Professional Ad Filmmakers to shine as celebrites
Source: Government of India

WAVES offers a golden opportunity for Reel Makers and Professional Ad Filmmakers to shine as celebrites

Hurry up! Only two days left, don’t miss this chance to have your work recognized on a global stage, Submit your entry by February 15th

WAVES Awards of Excellence as part of the Create in India Challenge, attracts global submissions, uniting creators from over dozen countries & more than 52 Indian institutes like NIDs, IITs & SRFTI

Posted On: 12 FEB 2025 6:46PM by PIB Delhi

Do you have a vision that speaks through the lens and a story that unfolds in every frame? If creativity runs through your veins the WAVES Awards of Excellence presents a golden opportunity

The much-anticipated Student Showreels & Professional Ad Film Competition is officially open for submissions! Submit your entry by February 15th.

Ministry of Information & Broadcasting in collaboration with ASIFA India, a UNESCO-recognized global NGO promoting animation, is hosting WAVES Awards of Excellence as part of the Create in India Challenge. These awards celebrate exceptional achievements in Animation, Visual Effects, and Extended Reality (XR), reinforcing India’s creative leadership on the global stage.

About the awards

There are two competition categories: Student Showreels (No time restriction) and Professional Ad Films (limit 60 seconds). The submissions reflect themes of India’s socio-cultural landscape, and modern technology like:
- Wellness & Yoga
- Gaming for Social Impact
ASIFA India has witnessed an exceptional response with enthusiastic participation

ASIFA India has received an overwhelming response with 1238 submissions of finished works from various demographics: Students (75%), Professionals (25%), Women (35%) and Emerging Creators (50%). The participation of women and young creators underscores the challenge’s role in promoting diversity, inclusivity, and fresh perspectives in India’s AVGC sector.

Submissions have been promoted across various continents, resulting in over 60 global entries from 13 countries, such as Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States, Greece, Cyprus, Iran, Finland, the Philippines, Germany, Sri Lanka, Puerto Rico, China, and Mexico. Global Animated Film association Asifa (Association Internationale du Film d’Animation) is promoting the competition globally via its 40 Chapters in various counties.

ASIFA also received submissions from more than 52 institutions in India and abroad. Leading global educational institutions like BAU Centro Universitario de Artes y Diseño de Barcelona, Bass School of Arts, Humanities, and Technology at UTD, Tehran University of Art, Filmakademie Baden-Württemberg, Academy Of Art University, Academy of Design, Colombo, Kennesaw State University student have submitted their top entries to this prestigious festival.
Students from Prestigious Indian Institutions including all NID, IITs (IDC School of Design and DOD at various IIT’s), SRFTI, Symbiosis, Sir JJ Institute of Applied Art, Banasthali Vidyapith, Ajeenkya D Y Patil University, BIT Mesra, UID, Srishti Manipal have also submitted their best work.

Glimpses of Submissions of Waves Awards of Excellence

WAVES Winners Gain Global Opportunities

Winners will receive in-person support for portfolio review by experts, opportunity to interact with global jury from US, Greece & India. They will also receive networking opportunities by direct engagement with key stakeholders, including international studios, producers, and government officials for potential career opportunities. Animation studios and independent developers will receive guidance on funding, IP development, and business scalability.

ASIFA India organized series Meet ups across 15 Indian sub-chapters to inspire creators from various cities for their participation in the upcoming WAVES Awards of Excellence. In the session ‘Deep Dive into Excellence from Mentors’ eminent global Jury like Briana Yarhouse from USA & Dr. Anastasia Dimitra from Athens, Greece gave tips to participants.

Global Jury Members Briana Yarhouse, Dr.Anastasia Dimitra sharing their expertise during a Virtual Meet recently, joined by Deanna Morse(Member of Oscars), Celebrity Artist Dhimant Vyas, BN Vichar& Others..Session Moderated by Sanjay Khimesara, President, Asifa India & Vinita Bachani, Core Committee Member

For more information and to submit your work, visit the submission portal here:

https://www.asifaindia.com/waoe/

About ASIFA INDIA

ASIFA India is a non-profit organization established in 2000 with the goal of promoting the art, craft, and profession of VFX, Animation & Gaming in India. ASIFA India has been working tirelessly to create a platform for creators including- Animators, Vfx & Gaming artists, students, and professionals to network, learn, and showcase their work.

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Dharmendra Tewari/Kshitij Singha/Shatrunjay kumar

(Release ID: 2102429) Visitor Counter : 28

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –
February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Holds Media Availability in Stuttgart, Germany

Source: United States Department of Defense

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: How’s it going everybody? Sir. Good to see you. It’s been a great day, really. Any day we can spend with the troops from the very early morning of PT with some high speed guys and gals to two COCOMs that are right in the front lines of advancing American interests. Proud to be here today.

Just an impressive display of what Americans are doing in far flung places for the American people, so proud to be here for sure. I think we have a local — where’s our local reporter? I’d like to go first to our local.

Q: Thank you so much. So —

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Where are you from?

Q: I’m from Suddeutsche Zeitung. That’s the second biggest newspaper in Germany.

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, it’s my favorite now.

Q: And you are visiting Africom as one of your first points in your duty. Does that mean that the American strategic aims in Africa are going to change?

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, I think it’s a reflection of the importance of that command as well as EUCOM. We spent this morning at EUCOM, as well; made sense to come to both if we’re here in Germany.

But it’s also a reflection that, you know, the PRC’s intentions are pernicious, not just in their part of the world, but also in South America and on the African continent. And America’s posture there along with allies and partners is going to matter about contesting that space. So, it certainly remains a priority.

You saw the strike in Somalia on February 1st. That — as we talked to the command, that’s a reflection also of pushing decision authority down, untying the hands of war fighters who in the previous administration made multiple requests and were often denied for that kind of kinetic action, or the decision had to be made at the White House when it should be made at the four star level or at the Secretary of Defense level more quickly based on the ability to degrade the enemy.

So, this is a very important part of the world for us. The President feels that way, as well, and we’re honored to be here. Thank you.

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you planning to cut the number of American forces in Europe, shift to the Pacific and focus on China?

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: There are no plans right now in the making to cut anything.

There is an understanding that we’re going to review force posture across the world, right. President Trump’s planning assumptions are different in many ways, or at least strategic assumptions than Joe Biden’s were. We certainly don’t want to plan on the back of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and what happened on October 7th and the war that was unleashed in Ukraine.

You have to manage and mitigate those things by coming alongside your friends in Israel, ensuring their defense and peacefully resolving the conflict in Ukraine. But those shouldn’t define how we orient and with hopefully a rapid peace deal in Ukraine, which the President is committed to delivering, we can then review force posture and encourage as we’re going to — you’re going to see tomorrow in Ukraine and — or at the Ukraine Contact Group and the NATO ministerial, we’re going to have straight talk with our friends.

This kind of urgency of this moment requires friends talking to friends about capabilities, about leadership, about stepping up, about burden sharing and the incentives to say the European continent deserves to be free from any aggression.

But it ought be those in the neighborhood, investing the most in that collective — individual and collective defense. That’s common sense. As the President talks a lot about, common sense is you defend your neighborhood and the Americans will come alongside you in helping in that defense. If and when that happens, and I believe it will because of President Trump, most NATO countries are already close to 2 percent.

We believe that needs to be higher. The president has said 5 percent. I think he’s right. That’s a reflection of a need to invest on the continent. If and when that happens through investments in the defense industrial base, as well, then yes, America as the leader of the free world defending American interests is going to need to make sure we’re focused properly on the Communist Chinese and their ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, and as I mentioned before, around the world.

So, we would be remiss in not reviewing force posture everywhere, but it would be the wrong planning assumption to say, oh, America is abandoning something or America is leaving. No, America is smart to observe, plan, prioritize and project power where we need to deter conflict. We don’t want conflict with China.

We don’t want — the President has ran on being a peace president, and he’s delivered that. But being strong, peace through strength is how you deter that, and we want to posture for that just like we believe the Europeans alongside our support need to on the continent, as well.

Q: Is China the biggest threat to the United States?

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, right now, the biggest threat was securing our own border, which we are addressing rapidly. And I’m proud of what NORTHCOM has done and the Defense Department has done is shifting there. You don’t have a country if you don’t have borders, as the President has pointed out. And we’ve been defending other people’s borders for a long time; time to defend ours. So we’re sealing that border. We continue to do that. But as far as external threats, there’s just no doubt the communist Chinese ambitions are robust. Their view of the world is quite different than ours. And whoever carries that mantle is going to set the tone for the 21st century.

UNKNOWN: Christine —

Q: You made the point to do PT with tenth group this morning on very little sleep. Why was it so important for you to do this? And tell us about the workout?

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: I did do PT with the troops this morning. Listen, it’s not that long ago that I was right there with them. I probably — no offense, General — I probably connect more with those guys than I do with four-star Generals. But now I get the chance of working with four stars and others who are committed to the troops.

But when I can get down, do push ups and deadlifts with the troops, and just hear from them, what’s working, what isn’t, how do you see your mission set, I love that. So there was never a doubt. even though we got in at 2:00 in the morning, that we were getting up a couple hours later to go do PT. It’s a reminder that — you guys — the press in Washington might think I’m young, but in military terms, I’m old.

And that showed this morning with these young guys who ran circles around me in that parking lot.

UNKNOWN: We’ll [Inaudible] then Zach.

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Go ahead.

Q: Thanks for doing this. Uh, you mentioned earlier that President Trump wants, uh, NATO countries to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense. Do you think the US should also spend 5 percent of its GDP on defense?

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, I think the US needs to spend more than the Biden administration was willing to, who historically underinvested in the capabilities of our military. So the president is committed, as he was in the first term, to rebuilding America’s military by investing. And you’re going to see that in the conversations on Capitol Hill.

We’ve already been intimately involved with the folks on HASC and SASC and appropriations, talking about the capabilities we’re going to need, not just next year and the year after that or for the next four years, but for power projection going forward and then the reforms needed to make sure that every dollar goes further.

Now at a minimum, we should not go below 3 percent. That’s a view I know the President shares. But as far as going forward in that, those are decisions he will make based on my consultations with him. Listen, any defense secretary would be lying if they said they didn’t want more. You always want more.

But we live in fiscally constrained times where we need to be responsible with taxpayer dollars. We’re $37 trillion in debt. That’s a national security liability, as well. So, we’re going to work with Capitol Hill. The President is going to lead the way on making sure the troops have the resources they need and that we truly rebuild our military just like President Trump did in the first term.

Q: And President Biden — President Biden vowed against sending US troops into Ukraine. Would you be open to sending US troops into Ukraine to track weapons shipments?

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: We are not sending US troops to Ukraine.

Q: You talked about wanting to welcome Elon Musk and DOGE into the Pentagon potentially in the next few weeks. Do you expect him to start unilaterally cutting programs and contracts the way he’s done at USAID and other agencies? And are there any limits or supervision you’d want to place on his team, given his conflicts of interest [Inaudible]?

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, we’ve been in touch with — I’ve been in touch with Elon Musk, who’s a great patriot, interested in advancing the America First agenda, knows that President Trump got 77 million votes and a mandate from the American people. And part of that is bringing actual businesslike efficiency to government; hence, what DOGE is doing.

Uh, we’ve been talking to them, in partnership with them. And as I said on social media, we welcome DOGE to the Pentagon, and I hope to welcome Elon to the Pentagon very soon and his team, working in collaboration with us. There are waste, redundancies and headcounts in headquarters that need to be addressed.

There’s just no doubt. Look at a lot of the climate programs that have been pursued at the Defense Department. The Defense Department is not in the business of climate change, solving the global thermostat. We’re in the business of deterring and winning wars. So, things like that we want to look for to find efficiencies and many others – the way we acquire weapons, system procurement.

There’s plenty of places where we want the keen eye of DOGE, but we’ll do it in coordination. We’re not going to do things that are to the detriment of American operational or tactical capabilities. There’s just — President Trump is committed to delivering the best possible military. The Defense Department is not USAID. USAID has got a lot of problems that I talked about with the troops, pursuing globalist agendas that don’t have a connection to America First.

That’s not the Defense Department, but we’re also not perfect, either. So where we can find billions of dollars — and he’s right to say billions — inside the Defense Department, every dollar we save there is a dollar that goes to warfighters, and that’s good for the American people.

Q: [Inaudible] Mr. Secretary, Since we’re here at AFRICOM, I have a question about Africa. Now when you served, you fought jihadists in the Middle East, and there’s a lot of jihadists in Africa, whether it’s ISIS, al-Qaida, al-Shabab, go on and on. How do you plan to handle that threat?

I’m not saying put troops on the ground in Africa to fight them, but are you concerned that there could be some sort of cell that might be plotting attacks against other parts of the world, trying to recruit soldiers because it’s Africa with a growing population? How concerned are you about the jihadist threat in Africa today?

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Definitely concerned. I mean, anybody of our — anybody of my generation that served in Iraq and Afghanistan or have been a part of post-9-11 understands the threat of global jihad, especially the desire to export that against our allies in Europe or Israel or certainly the United States of America. So the counterterrorism threat focused on those who would seek to do us harm is of the highest priority, which is why you saw what AFRICOM did so well in that strike in Somalia.

Where we see those growing, plotting or planning with increased capabilities we will strike. And that pertains to Islamist organizations all across the continent. But it also — we have to work with partners and allies. I mean, foreign internal defense and security force assistance — I was with Green Berets this morning.

You know, we think of Green Berets in the context of post-9-11, right – kicking down doors, and they’re really good at that. But what they’re best at is doing security force assistance and foreign internal defense where they work with local security forces to build up their capabilities so that it’s indigenous forces fighting Islamists because they want to secure their country, as well.

And AFRICOM is very directly committed to doing that. That’s a mission very much worth resourcing. I mean Africa is very much the front lines of a fight from Islamists. You’ve got Christian populations that are under siege in Africa and have been ignored for far too long and American interests there. It matters a great deal. And Islamists — we’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.

UNKNOWN: We’re going to finish up with two questions from these two [Inaudible].

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Ok. One more here and then here.

Q: John Barrowman, Stars and Stripes. Also related to AFRICOM and Somalia, during the end of President Trump’s first term, he elected to pull forces out of Somalia and switched to more of a rotational concept.

President Biden sent troops back in there on a full time basis. What’s your vision going forward for Somalia? Do you want to maintain troops there continuously, or are you looking more towards pulling them back?

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, I mean, I’m going to listen to the commanders on the ground, first and foremost, as is the President.

And he’s charged me with, hey, give me your best advice, but also keep your ear to the ground of what’s most effective. But he’s also been very clear that we’re not trying to have American boots all over the globe. Where we can do counterterrorism effectively over the horizon, that’s the preference. But we’ll review the force posture there and with the generals doing the heavy lifting and take it into consideration, no doubt.

But thankfully, we have the intelligence capabilities to do the kind of strike that we saw, and we believe we can do more of that.

UNKNOWN: Last question.

Q: So — so you renamed the name of Fort Liberty into Fort Bragg, and you honored the private first class who lost his life while liberating Germany. What does that mean for the US forces?

DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, first, it means Bragg is back. It means the legacy of an institution that generations of Americans have mobilized through and served at is back.

I mean, it’s a shame what was done to vets, service members, their families who were born there, deployed out of there, lived there, gave there — I was with airborne troops here, some of which spent 25 years at Fort Bragg and never called it Fort Liberty because it wasn’t Fort Liberty, it’s Fort Bragg.

And so I was honored to be able to put my signature on that. By the way, with the support of the President of the United States who set the tone on this and said, I want Fort Bragg back.

And we’re honored to support a private first class who received a Purple Heart and the Silver Star at the battle of the bulge. We’re honoring a private first class and I’m proud that we have a Marine corporal as the vice president of the United States too. Junior enlisted have never seen better days. But it’s about that legacy.

It’s about the connection to the community, to those who served. And we’re not, as the President has said and I’ve said as well, we’re not done there. There are other bases that have been renamed that erodes that very same legacy. There’s a reason I said Bragg and Benning when I walked into the Pentagon on day one.

But it’s not just Bragg and Benning. There are a lot of other service members that have connections and we’re going to do our best to restore it. It’s an honor to do so. Thank you all for your time. Appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

MIL OSI USA News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: The Paris AI summit marks a tipping point on the technology’s safety and sustainability

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Robert Diab, Professor, Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University

United States Vice President JD Vance made headlines this week by refusing to sign a declaration at a global summit in Paris on artificial intelligence.

In his first appearance on the world stage, Vance made clear that the U.S. wouldn’t be playing ball. The Donald Trump administration believes that “excessive regulation of the AI sector could kill a transformative industry just as it’s taking off,” he said. “We’ll make every effort to encourage pro-growth AI policies.”

His remarks confirmed a widespread fear that Trump’s return to the White House will signal a sharp turn in tech policy. American tech companies and their billionaire owners will now be shielded from effective oversight.

But upon a closer look, events this week point to signs that just the opposite may be unfolding. A host of nations took notable steps towards address growing safety and environmental concerns about AI, indicating that a regulatory tipping point has been reached.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau delivered the keynote address at the AI Action Summit in Paris, France.

Wide consensus

The two-day global summit in Paris, chaired by France and India, led to broad consensus. Some 60 countries signed on to a Statement on Inclusive and Sustainable AI. This included Canada, the European Commission, India and China.

Both the U.S. and the United Kingdom declined to sign on. But the prevailing winds are against them.

The meeting in Paris was the third global summit on AI, following meet-ups at Bletchley Park in the U.K. in 2023 and in Seoul, South Korea, in 2024. Each of them ended with similar declarations widely endorsed.

The Paris communiqué calls for an “inclusive approach” to AI, seeking to “narrow inequalities” in AI capabilities among countries. It encourages “avoiding market concentration” and affirms the need for openness and transparency in building and sharing technology and expertise.

The document is not binding. It does little more than tout principles, or affirm a collective sentiment among the parties. One of these — perhaps the most important — is to keep talking, meeting and working together on the common concerns that AI raises.

Environmental challenges

Meanwhile, a smaller group of countries at the Paris summit, along with 37 tech companies, agreed to form a Coalition for Sustainable AI — setting out a series of goals and deliverables.

While nothing is binding on the parties, the goals are notably specific. They include coming up with standards for measuring AI’s environmental impact and more effective ways for companies to report on the impact. Parties also aim to “optimize algorithms to reduce computational complexity and minimize data usage.”

Even if most of this turns out to be merely aspirational, it’s important that the coalition offers a platform for collaboration on these initiatives. At the very least, it signals a likelihood that sustainability will be at the forefront of debate about AI moving forward.

Read more:
AI is bad for the environment, and the problem is bigger than energy consumption

Signing the first international treaty on AI

A further notable event at the summit was that Canada signed the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. In recent months, 12 other countries had signed, including the U.S. (under former president Joe Biden), the U.K., Israel and the European Union.

The convention commits parties to pass domestic laws on AI that deal with privacy, bias and discrimination, safety, transparency and environmental sustainability.

The treaty has been criticized for containing no more than “broad affirmations” and imposing few clear obligations. But it does show that countries are committed to passing law to ensure that AI development unfolds within boundaries — and they’re eager to see more countries do the same.

If Canada were to ratify the treaty, Parliament would likely revive Bill C-27, which contained the AI and Data Act.

Read more:
The federal government’s proposed AI legislation misses the mark on protecting Canadians

The act aimed to do much of what Canada agrees to do under the convention: impose greater oversight of the development and use of AI. This includes transparency and disclosure requirements on AI companies, and stiff penalties for failure to comply.

What does this really mean?

While the U.S. signed the convention on AI and human rights, democracy and rule of law in the fall of 2024, it likely won’t be implemented by a Republican Congress. The same might happen in Canada under a Conservative government led by Pierre Poilievre. He could also decide not to fulfil commitments made under other agreements about AI.

And if Poilievre comes to power by the time Canada hosts the next G7 meeting in June, he might decline to honour the Trudeau government’s commitment to make AI regulation a central focus of the meeting.

The Trump administration may have ushered in a period of more lax tech regulation in the U.S., and Silicon Valley is indeed a key player in tech — especially AI. But it’s a wide world, with many other important players in this space, including China, Europe and Canada.

The events in Paris have revealed a strong interest among nations around the globe to regulate AI, and specifically to foster ideas about inclusion and sustainability. If the Paris summit was any indication, the hope of sheltering AI from effective regulation won’t last long.

Robert Diab does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The Paris AI summit marks a tipping point on the technology’s safety and sustainability – https://theconversation.com/the-paris-ai-summit-marks-a-tipping-point-on-the-technologys-safety-and-sustainability-249706

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Senator Murray Remarks at Senate Budget Resolution Markup

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

Murray calls for Budget hearing with Elon Musk

Murray: “Republicans are going down this partisan path because they know Democrats are not going to join them in throwing Medicaid, nutrition assistance, and veterans’ benefits into the wood chipper so they can throw more tax cuts at billionaires.”

Murray: “There is a serious, bipartisan path forward for our country–but it is one where Congress works together to avoid a shutdown, stops the de facto shutdown that is already happening, and reasserts its authority to protect the funding our communities need. Unfortunately, that is a far cry from the path Republicans are setting out on today with this pro-billionaire, anti-middle-class budget resolution.”

***VIDEO HERE***

Washington, D.C. — Today, at the Senate Budget Committee’s mark up of Senate Republicans’ budget resolution, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee and a senior member and former Chair of the Senate Budget Committee, underscored in opening comments that the resolution Senate Republicans have put forth is a roadmap to devastating cuts to programs families count on every day—from Medicaid to SNAP to veterans benefits—so that Republicans can later pass more tax breaks for the ultra-rich.

Senator Murray underscored that right now Congress’ focus should be on addressing the fast-approaching March 14 funding deadline and addressing President Trump and Elon Musk’s sweeping, illegal funding freeze—not a partisan measure to gut investments in working people. She also called for Elon Musk to come before the Committee to discuss his already in-motion efforts to decimate programs people count on.

Senator Murray’s remarks, as delivered, are below:

“I would like to remind my colleagues that we are just a month away from a deadline to pass bills to fund our government and as we approach that deadline, the entire world is watching as President Trump and Elon Musk effectively shut the government down piece by piece, bit by bit–whatever parts Elon doesn’t like.

“I want to repeat that: we are already in a partial shutdown. Trump and Musk are shuttering entire agencies, locking workers out of their devices and out of their buildings, and demanding the work of the American people come to a screeching halt.

“They are illegally blocking hundreds of billions in funding we all secured for the people we represent back home–putting good-paying jobs on the chopping block, creating incredible uncertainty for businesses, and choking off key funds for infrastructure and energy projects, and a lot more.

“Remember, this is the richest man on earth—with deep ties to China and a direct line to Putin—unilaterally, clandestinely, and illegally deciding if our constituents will see the taxpayer dollars they are owed.

“What they are doing is not just illegal–it is devastating for working people in every single zip code.

“Right now, we need to be speaking out with a unified voice to ensure that when Congress passes a bill, that law is followed. And we need to focus on negotiating serious funding bills on a bipartisan basis ahead of the fast-approaching March 14 deadline. That is what I am trying to do right now.

“But–and this is really critical–we’ve got to know that once those bills become law, Trump will actually follow them.

“We cannot just reach an agreement, pass a bill, and then stand by while President Trump rips our laws in half.

“There is a serious, bipartisan path forward for our country–but it is one where Congress works together to avoid a shutdown, stops the de facto shutdown that is already happening, and reasserts its authority to protect the funding that our communities need.

“Unfortunately, that is a far cry from the path Republicans are setting out on today with this pro-billionaire, anti-middle-class budget resolution.

“Let’s be clear: the Chairman’s mark doesn’t just accept, but doubles down on what Trump and Musk are doing—adding both another distraction from the urgent bipartisan work that needs to happen to fund our government and a roadmap for partisan policies and absolutely painful cuts to programs families count on each and every day.

“Republicans are going down this partisan path because they know Democrats are not going to join them in throwing Medicaid, nutrition assistance, and veterans benefits into the wood chopper so they can throw more tax cuts at billionaires.

“Make no mistake: this budget resolution is the DOGE resolution, as it assumes the staggering amount of $1 trillion in unspecified cuts in 2025 alone and $9 trillion over 10 years.

“Where do we think those sort of dramatic cuts are going to come from? It’s going to come out of SNAP benefits that keep kids from going hungry. It is going to come out of public schools and community health centers. It is going to come out of life-saving medical research.

“Make no mistake: if you are cutting that deeply, that painfully, you are going to start cutting things like veteran’s health care, assistance to our farmers, Medicare, and Medicaid, which, for the information of all Senators, 30 million children rely on.

“There is just no other way to make these numbers work–especially when we know that this is just step one in the plan and step two is more tax breaks for billionaires and massive corporations.

“So, first they are handing Elon Musk a chainsaw to cut programs families rely on with no accountability and then they are rewarding him with enormous tax breaks.

“That is completely unacceptable to me. We should not be cutting health care for working families to deliver massive tax breaks for the wealthiest billionaires.

“So I urge all of my colleagues: hit the breaks, and not just on this devastating, partisan budget resolution. Hit the breaks on what President Trump and Elon Musk are doing right now. Let’s come together, and work on a serious, bipartisan bill to fund the government—and get investments that are sorely needed out to the folks we represent. And let’s come together to demand real accountability for the shutdown they are conducting right now.

“Instead of a markup to hand Elon Musk more power, we need a hearing to hold him accountable. This billionaire is operating completely in the dark, hoping his lies about corruption are loud enough to drown out any calls for truth.

“When he tweeted out the names of government employees months ago, that was ‘accountability’ – but when reporters name people gaining illegal access to Treasury’s payment system, that is a ‘crime?’

“He gets to look at all of our most sensitive data–but no one gets to look at what he is actually doing? That cannot be the standard.

“So when are we going to have a hearing with the people who are illegally firing workers who protect families from scams, illegally cancelling grants to community health centers, illegally freezing funds to rebuild your local highway, illegally shuttering entire agencies that are keeping our country safe, and now this plan is outsourcing $1 trillion in cuts for this year alone?

“That is not rhetorical: I hope the Chair will answer. When will we have a hearing with Elon Musk? He seems to be central to your budget plan–but no one, at least no one on our side of the aisle, has heard from him. No one.

“And he is making big decisions about our country’s spending, and he is not just doing it without Congress–he is doing it in spite of what Congress has decided.

“We should not be giving up our power of the purse. We should be getting answers. If Elon Musk really has nothing to hide, then he should try to leave his safe place on X and Trump rallies and come before this Committee, Mr. Chairman, to be accountable to the public.”

MIL OSI USA News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Luján: Gabbard Has and Will Continue to Undermine U.S. National Security

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-New Mexico)
Gabbard Has History of Defending Our Adversaries, Will Use Intelligence Agencies for Political Retribution
Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M) issued the following statement after Senate Republicans voted to confirm Tulsi Gabbard as the Director of National Intelligence on a party-line vote:
“At a time when we should focus on strengthening our national security and defending Americans from adversaries like Russia and China, the confirmation of Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence is a troubling move that will make us less safe. The Trump administration is abandoning our allies around the world, undermining our long-standing alliances, and politicizing our national security.
“Ms. Gabbard has a long history of spreading lies, defending America’s adversaries, and sympathizing with dictators like Vladimir Putin and Bashar al-Assad. As Director of National Intelligence, Ms. Gabbard will oversee every intelligence agency and be entrusted to provide the president with our most sensitive intelligence, and I believe that her lack of qualifications and history of poor judgment will make her a liability for American intelligence. Put simply, Ms. Gabbard has and will continue to undermine our country’s national security.”

MIL OSI USA News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: DeepSeek: how China’s embrace of open-source AI caused a geopolitical earthquake
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Peter Bloom, Professor of Management, University of Essex

Lightspring/Shutterstock

We are in the early days of a seismic shift in the global AI industry. DeepSeek, a previously little-known Chinese artificial intelligence company, has produced a “game changing”“ large language model that promises to reshape the AI landscape almost overnight.

But DeepSeek’s breakthrough also has wider implications for the technological arms race between the US and China, having apparently caught even the best-known US tech firms off guard. Its launch has been predicted to start a “slow unwinding of the AI bet” in the west, amid a new era of “AI efficiency wars”.

In fact, industry experts have been speculating for years about China’s rapid advancements in AI. While the supposedly free-market US has often prioritised proprietary models, China has built a thriving AI ecosystem by leveraging open-source technology, fostering collaboration between government-backed research institutions and major tech firms.

This strategy has enabled China to scale its AI innovation rapidly while the US – despite all the tub-thumping from Silicon Valley – remains limited by restrictive corporate structures. Companies such as Google and Meta, despite promoting open-source initiatives, still rely heavily on closed-source strategies that limit broader access and collaboration.

What makes DeepSeek particularly disruptive is its ability to achieve cutting-edge performance while reducing computing costs – an area where US firms have struggled due to their dependence on training models that demand very expensive processing hardware.

Where once Silicon Valley was the epicentre of global digital innovation, its corporate behemoths now appear vulnerable to more innovative, “scrappy” startup competitors – albeit ones enabled by major state investment in AI infrastructure. By leveraging China’s industrial approach to AI, DeepSeek has crystallised a reality that many in Silicon Valley have long ignored: AI’s centre of power is shifting away from the US and the west.

It highlights the failure of US attempts to preserve its technological hegemony through tight export controls on cutting-edge AI chips to China. According to research fellow Dean Ball: “You can keep [computing resources] away from China, but you can’t export-control the ideas that everyone in the world is hunting for.”

DeepSeek’s success has forced Silicon Valley and large western tech companies to “take stock”, realising that their once-unquestioned dominance is suddenly at risk. Even the US president, Donald Trump, has proclaimed that this should be a “wake-up call for our industries that we need to be laser-focused on competing”.

But this story is not just about technological prowess – it could mark an important shift in global power. Former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo has framed DeepSeek’s emergence as a “shot across America’s bow”, urging US policymakers and tech executives to take immediate action.

DeepSeek’s rapid rise underscores a growing realisation: globally, we are entering a potentially new AI paradigm, one where China’s model of open-source innovation and state-backed development is proving more effective than Silicon Valley’s corporate-driven approach.

The Insights section is committed to high-quality longform journalism. Our editors work with academics from many different backgrounds who are tackling a wide range of societal and scientific challenges.

I’ve spent much of my career analysing the transformative role of AI on the global digital landscape – examining how AI shapes governance, market structures and public discourse, and exploring its geopolitical and ethical dimensions, now and far in the future.

I also have personal connections with China, having lived there while teaching at Jiangsu University, then written my PhD thesis on the country’s state-led marketisation programme. Over the years, I have studied China’s evolving tech landscape, observing firsthand how its unique blend of state-driven industrial policy and private-sector innovation has fuelled rapid AI development.

I believe this moment may come to be seen as a turning point not just for AI, but for the geopolitical order. If China’s AI dominance continues, what could this mean for the future of digital governance, democracy, and the global balance of power?

China’s open-source AI takeover

Even in the early days of China’s digital transformation, analysts predicted the country’s open-source focus could lead to a major AI breakthrough. In 2018, China was integrating open-source collaboration into its broader digitisation strategy, recognising that fostering shared development efforts could accelerate its AI capabilities.

Unlike the US, where proprietary AI models dominated, China embraced open-source ecosystems to bypass western gatekeeping, scale innovation faster, and embed itself in global AI collaboration. China’s open-source activity surged dramatically in 2020, laying the foundation for the kind of innovation seen today. By actively fostering an open-source culture, China ensured that a broad range of developers had access to AI tools, rather than restricting them to a handful of dominant companies.

The trend has continued in recent years, with China even launching its own state-backed open-source operating systems and platforms in 2023, to further reduce its dependence on western technology. This move was widely seen as an effort to cement its AI leadership and create an independent, self-sustaining digital ecosystem.

Video: BBC.

While China has been steadily positioning itself as a leader in open-source AI, Silicon Valley firms remained focused on closed, proprietary models – allowing China to catch up fast. While companies like Google and Meta promoted open-source initiatives in name, they still locked key AI capabilities behind paywalls and restrictive licenses.

In contrast, China’s government-backed initiatives have treated open-source AI as a national resource, rather than a corporate asset. This has resulted in China becoming one of the world’s largest contributors to open-source AI development, surpassing many western firms in collaborative projects. Chinese tech giants such as Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent are driving open-source AI forward with frameworks like PaddlePaddle, X-Deep Learning (X-DL) and MindSpore — all now core to China’s machine learning ecosystem.

But they’re also making major contributions to global AI projects, from Alibaba’s Dragonfly, which streamlines large-scale data distribution, to Baidu’s Apollo, an open-source platform accelerating autonomous vehicle development. These efforts don’t just strengthen China’s AI industry, they embed it deeper into the global AI landscape.

Read more:
Putting DeepSeek to the test: how its performance compares against other AI tools

This shift had been years in the making, as Chinese firms (with state backing) pushed open-source AI forward and made their models publicly available, creating a feedback loop that western companies have also – quietly – tapped into. A year ago, for example, US firm Abicus.AI released Smaug-72B, an AI model designed for enterprises that built directly upon Alibaba’s Qwen-72B and outperformed proprietary models like OpenAI’s GPT-3.5 and Mistral’s Medium. But the potential for US companies to further build on Chinese open-source technology may be limited by political as well as corporate barriers.

In 2023, US lawmakers highlighted growing concerns that China’s aggressive investment in open-source AI and semiconductor technologies would eventually erode western leadership in AI. Some policymakers called for bans on certain open-source chip technologies, due to fears they could further accelerate China’s AI advancements.

But by then, China’s AI horse had already bolted.

AI with Chinese characteristics

DeepSeek’s rise should have been obvious to anyone familiar with management theory and the history of technological breakthroughs linked to “disruptive innovation”. Latecomers to an industry rarely compete by playing the same game as incumbents – they have to be disruptive.

China, facing restrictions on cutting-edge western AI chips and lagging behind in proprietary AI infrastructure, had no choice but to innovate differently. Open-source AI provided the perfect vehicle: a way to scale innovation rapidly, lower costs and tap into global research while bypassing Silicon Valley’s resource-heavy, closed-source model.

From a western and traditional human rights perspective, China’s embrace of open-source AI may appear paradoxical, given the country’s strict information controls. Its AI development strategy prioritises both technological advancement and strict alignment with the Chinese Communist party’s ideological framework, ensuring AI models adhere to “core socialist values” and state-approved narratives. AI research in China has thrived not only despite these constraints but, in many ways, because of them.

Video: CNBC.

China’s success goes beyond traditional authoritarianism; it embodies what Harvard economist David Yang calls “Autocracy 2.0”. Rather than relying solely on fear-based control, it uses economic incentives, bureaucratic efficiency, and technology to manage information and maintain regime stability.

The Chinese government has strategically encouraged open-source development while maintaining tight control over AI’s domestic applications, particularly in surveillance and censorship. Indeed, authoritarian regimes may have a significant advantage in developing facial-recognition technology due to their extensive surveillance systems. The vast amounts of data collected through these networks enable private AI companies to create advanced algorithms, which can then be adapted for commercial uses, potentially accelerating economic growth.

China’s AI strategy is built on a dual foundation of state-led initiatives and private-sector innovation. The country’s AI roadmap, first outlined in the 2017 new generation artificial intelligence development plan, follows a three-phase timeline: achieving global competitiveness by 2020, making major AI breakthroughs by 2025, and securing world leadership in AI by 2030. In parallel, the government has emphasised data governance, regulatory frameworks and ethical oversight to guide AI development “responsibly”.

A defining feature of China’s AI expansion has been the massive infusion of state-backed investment. Over the past decade, government venture capital funds have injected approximately US$912 billion (£737bn) into early-stage firms, with 23% of that funding directed toward AI-related companies. A significant portion has targeted China’s less-developed regions, following local investment mandates.

Read more:
Three lessons the west can learn from China’s economic approach to AI

Compared with private venture capital, government-backed firms often lag in software development but demonstrate rapid growth post-investment. Moreover, state funding often serves as a signal for subsequent private-sector investment, reinforcing the country’s AI ecosystem.

China’s AI strategy represents a departure from its traditional industrial policies, which historically emphasised self-sufficiency, support for a handful of national champions, and military-driven research. Instead, the government has embraced a more flexible and collaborative approach that encourages open-source software adoption, a diverse network of AI firms, and public-private partnerships to accelerate innovation. This model prioritises research funding, state-backed AI laboratories, and AI integration across key industries including security, healthcare, and infrastructure.

Despite strong state involvement, China’s AI boom is equally driven by private-sector innovation. The country is home to an estimated 4,500 AI companies, accounting for 15% of the world’s total.

As economist Liu Gang told the Chinese Communist Party’s Global Times newspaper: “The development of AI is fast in China – for example, for AI-empowered large language models. Aided with government spending, private capital is flowing to the new sector. Increased capital inflow is anticipated to further enhance the sector in 2025.”

China’s tech giants including Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent and SenseTime have all benefited from substantial government support while remaining competitive on the global stage. But unlike in the US, China’s AI ecosystem thrives on a complex interplay between state support, corporate investment and academic collaboration.

Recognising the potential of open-source AI early on, Tsinghua University in Beijing has emerged as a key innovation hub, producing leading AI startups such as Zhipu AI, Baichuan AI, Moonshot AI and MiniMax — all founded by its faculty and alumni. The Chinese Academy of Sciences has similarly played a crucial role in advancing research in deep learning and natural language processing.

Unlike the west, where companies like Google and Meta promote open-source models for strategic business gains, China sees them as a means of national technological self-sufficiency. To this end, the National AI Team, composed of 23 leading private enterprises, has developed the National AI Open Innovation Platform, which provides open access to AI datasets, toolkits, libraries and other computing resources.

DeepSeek is a prime example of China’s AI strategy in action. The company’s rise embodies the government’s push for open-source collaboration while remaining deeply embedded within a state-guided AI ecosystem. Chinese developers have long been major contributors to open-source platforms, ranking as the second-largest group on GitHub by 2021.

Founded by Chinese entrepreneur Liang Wenfeng in 2023, DeepSeek has positioned itself as an AI leader while benefiting from China’s state-driven AI ecosystem. Liang, who also established the hedge fund High-Flyer, has maintained full ownership of DeepSeek and avoided external venture capital funding.

Though there is no direct evidence of government financial backing, DeepSeek has reaped the rewards of China’s AI talent pipeline, state-sponsored education programs, and research funding. Liang has engaged with top government officials including China’s premier, Li Qiang, reflecting the company’s strategic importance to the country’s broader AI ambitions.

In this way, DeepSeek perfectly encapsulates “AI with Chinese characteristics” – a fusion of state guidance, private-sector ingenuity, and open-source collaboration, all carefully managed to serve the country’s long-term technological and geopolitical objectives.

Recognising the strategic value of open-source innovation, the government has actively promoted domestic open-source code platforms like Gitee to foster self-reliance and insulate China’s AI ecosystem from external disruptions. However, this also exposes the limits of China’s open-source ambitions. The government pushes collaboration, but only within a tightly controlled system where state-backed firms and tech giants call the shots.

Reports of censorship on Gitee reveal how Beijing carefully manages innovation, ensuring AI advances stay in line with national priorities. Independent developers can contribute, but the real power remains concentrated in companies that operate within the government’s strategic framework.

The conflicted reactions of US big tech

DeepSeek’s emergence has sparked intense debate across the AI industry, drawing a range of reactions from leading Silicon Valley executives, policymakers and researchers. While some view it as an expected evolution of open-source AI, others see it as a direct challenge to western AI leadership.

Microsoft’s CEO, Satya Nadella, emphasised its technical efficiency. “It’s super-impressive in terms of both how they have really effectively done an open-source model that does this inference-time compute, and is super-compute efficient,” Nadella told CNBC. “We should take the developments out of China very, very seriously”.

Silicon Valley venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, a prominent advisor to Trump, was similarly effusive. “DeepSeek R1 is one of the most amazing and impressive breakthroughs I’ve ever seen – and as open source, a profound gift to the world,” he wrote on X.

For Yann LeCun, Meta’s chief AI scientist, DeepSeek is less about China’s AI capabilities and more about the broader power of open-source innovation. He argued that the situation should be read not as China’s AI surpassing the US, but rather as open-source models surpassing proprietary ones. “DeepSeek has profited from open research and open source (e.g. PyTorch and Llama from Meta),” he wrote on Threads. “They came up with new ideas and built them on top of other people’s work. Because their work is published and open source, everyone can profit from it. That is the power of open research and open source.”

Not all responses were so measured. Alexander Wang, CEO of Scale AI – a US firm specialising in AI data labelling and model training – framed DeepSeek as a competitive threat that demands an aggressive response. He wrote on X: “DeepSeek is a wake-up call for America, but it doesn’t change the strategy: USA must out-innovate & race faster, as we have done in the entire history of AI. Tighten export controls on chips so that we can maintain future leads. Every major breakthrough in AI has been American.”

Elon Musk added fuel to speculation about DeepSeek’s hardware access when he responded with a simple “obviously” to Wang’s earlier claims on CNBC that DeepSeek had secretly acquired 50,000 Nvidia H100 GPUs, despite US export restrictions.

Beyond the tech world, US policymakers have taken a more adversarial stance. House speaker Mike Johnson accused China of leveraging DeepSeek to erode American AI leadership. “They abuse the system, they steal our intellectual property. They’re now trying to get a leg up on us in AI.”

For his part, Trump took a more pragmatic view, seeing DeepSeek’s efficiency as a validation of cost-cutting approaches. “I view that as a positive, as an asset … You won’t be spending as much, and you’ll get the same result, hopefully.”

The rise of DeepSeek may have helped jolt the Trump administration into action, leading to sweeping policy shifts aimed at securing US dominance in AI. In his first week back in the White House, the US president announced a series of aggressive measures, including massive federal investments in AI research, closer partnerships between the government and private tech firms, and the rollback of regulations seen as slowing US innovation.

The administration’s framing of AI as a critical national interest reflects a broader urgency sparked by China’s rapid advancements, particularly DeepSeek’s ability to produce cutting-edge models at a fraction of the cost traditionally associated with AI development. But this response is not just about national competitiveness – it is also deeply entangled with private industry.

Musk’s growing closeness to Trump, for example, can be viewed as a calculated move to protect his own dominance at home and abroad. By aligning with the administration, Musk ensures that US policy tilts in favour of his AI ventures, securing access to government backing, computing power, and regulatory control over AI exports.

At the same time, Musk’s public criticism of Trump’s US$500 billion AI infrastructure plan – claiming the companies involved lack the necessary funding – was as much a warning as a dismissal, signalling his intent to shape policy in a way that benefits his empire while keeping potential challengers at bay.

Not unrelated, Musk and a group of investors have just launched a US$97.4 billion (£78.7bn) bid for OpenAI’s nonprofit arm, a move that escalates his feud with OpenAI CEO Sam Altman and seeks to strengthen his grip on the AI industry. Altman has dismissed the bid as a “desperate power grab”, insisting that OpenAI will not be swayed by Musk’s attempts to reclaim control. The spat reflects how DeepSeek’s emergence has thrown US tech giants into what could be all-out war, fuelling bitter corporate rivalries and reshaping the fight for AI dominance.

And while the US and China escalate their AI competition, other global leaders are pushing for a coordinated response. The Paris AI Action Summit, held on February 10 and 11, has become a focal point for efforts to prevent AI from descending into an uncontrolled power struggle. France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, warned delegates that without international oversight, AI risks becoming “the wild west”, where unchecked technological development creates instability rather than progress.

But at the end of the two-day summit, the UK and US refused to sign an international commitment to “ensuring AI is open, inclusive, transparent, ethical, safe, secure and trustworthy … making AI sustainable for people and the planet”. China was among the 61 countries to sign this declaration.

Concerns have also been raised at the summit about how AI-powered surveillance and control are enabling authoritarian regimes to strengthen repression and reshape the citizen-state relationship. This highlights the fast-growing global industry of digital repression, driven by an emerging “authoritarian-financial complex” that may exacerbate China’s strategic advancement in AI.

Equally, DeepSeek’s cost-effective AI solutions have created an opening for European firms to challenge the traditional AI hierarchy. As AI development shifts from being solely about compute power to strategic efficiency and accessibility, European firms now have an opportunity to compete more aggressively against their US and Chinese counterparts.

Whether this marks a true rebalancing of the AI landscape remains to be seen. But DeepSeek’s emergence has certainly upended traditional assumptions about who will lead the next wave of AI innovation – and how global powers will respond to it.

End of the ‘Silicon Valley effect’?

DeepSeek’s emergence has forced US tech leaders to confront an uncomfortable reality: they underestimated China’s AI capabilities. Confident in their perceived lead, companies like Google, Meta, and OpenAI prioritised incremental improvements over anticipating disruptive competition, leaving them vulnerable to a rapidly evolving global AI landscape.

In response, the US tech giants are now scrambling to defend their dominance, pledging over US$400 billion in AI investment. DeepSeek’s rise, fuelled by open-source collaboration, has reignited fierce debates over innovation versus security, while its energy-efficient model has intensified scrutiny on AI’s sustainability.

Yet Silicon Valley continues to cling to what many view as outdated economic theories such as the Jevons paradox to downplay China’s AI surge, insisting that greater efficiency will only fuel demand for computing power and reinforce their dominance. Companies like Meta, OpenAI and Microsoft remain fixated on scaling computational power, betting that expensive hardware will secure their lead. But this assumption blinds them to a shifting reality.

DeepSeek’s rise as the potential “Walmart of AI” is shaking Silicon Valley’s foundation, proving that high-quality AI models can be built at a fraction of the cost. By prioritising efficiency over brute-force computing power, DeepSeek is challenging the US tech industry’s reliance on expensive hardware like Nvidia’s high-end chips.

This shift has already rattled markets, driving down the stock prices of major US firms and forcing a reassessment of AI dominance. Nvidia, whose business depends on supplying high-performance processors, appears particularly vulnerable as DeepSeek’s cost-effective approach threatens to reduce demand for premium chips.

Video: CBS News.

The growing divide between the US and China in AI, however, is more than just competition – it’s a clash of governance models. While US firms remain fixated on protecting market dominance, China is accelerating AI innovation with a model that is proving more adaptable to global competition.

If Silicon Valley resists structural change, it risks falling further behind. We may witness the unravelling of the “Silicon Valley effect”, through which tech giants have long manipulated AI regulations to entrench their dominance. For years, Google, Meta,and OpenAI shaped policies that favoured proprietary models and costly infrastructure, ensuring AI development remained under their control.

DeepSeek is redefining AI with breakthroughs in code intelligence, vision-language models and efficient architectures that challenge Silicon Valley’s dominance. By optimising computation and embracing open-source collaboration, DeepSeek shows the potential of China to deliver cutting-edge models at a fraction of the cost, outperforming proprietary alternatives in programming, reasoning and real-world applications.

More than a policy-driven rise, China’s AI surge reflects a fundamentally different innovation model – fast, collaborative and market-driven – while Silicon Valley holds on to expensive infrastructure and rigid proprietary control. If US firms refuse to adapt, they risk losing the future of AI to a more agile and cost-efficient competitor.

A new era of geotechnopolitics

But China is not just disrupting Silicon Valley. It is expanding “geotechnopolitics”, where AI is a battleground for global power. With AI projected to add US$15.7 trillion to the global economy by 2030, China and the US are racing to control the technology that will define economic, military and political dominance.

DeepSeek’s advancement has raised national security concerns in the US. Trump’s government is considering stricter export controls on AI-related technologies to prevent them from bolstering China’s military and intelligence capabilities.

As AI-driven defence systems, intelligence operations and cyber warfare redefine national security, governments must confront a new reality: AI leadership is not just about technological superiority, but about who controls the intelligence that will shape the next era of global power.

China’s AI ambitions extend beyond technology, driving a broader strategy for economic and geopolitical dominance. But with over 50 state-backed companies developing large-scale AI models, its rapid expansion faces growing challenges, including soaring energy demands and US semiconductor restrictions.

China’s president, Xi Jinping, remains resolute, stating: “Whoever can grasp the opportunities of new economic development such as big data and artificial intelligence will have the pulse of our times.” He sees AI driving “new quality productivity” and modernising China’s manufacturing base, calling its “head goose effect” a catalyst for broader innovation.

To counter western containment, China has embraced a “guerrilla” economic strategy, bypassing restrictions through alternative trade networks, deepening ties with the global south, and exploiting weaknesses in global supply chains. Instead of direct confrontation, this decentralised approach uses economic coercion to weaken adversaries while securing China’s own industrial base.

Video: AP.

China is also leveraging open-source AI as an ideological tool, presenting its model as more collaborative and accessible than western alternatives. This narrative strengthens its global influence, aligning with nations seeking alternatives to western digital control. While strict state oversight remains, China’s embrace of open-source AI reinforces its claim to a future where innovation is driven not by corporate interests but through shared collaboration and global cooperation.

But while DeepSeek claims to be open access, its secrecy tells a different story. Key details on training data and fine-tuning remain hidden, and its compliance with China’s AI laws has sparked global scrutiny. Italy has banned the platform over data-transfer risks, while Belgium and Ireland launched privacy probes.

Under Chinese regulations, DeepSeek’s outputs must align with state-approved narratives, clashing with the EU’s AI Act, which demands transparency and protects political speech. Such “controlled openness” raises many red flags, casting doubt on China’s place in markets that value data security and free expression.

Many western commentators are seizing on reports of Chinese AI censorship to frame other models as freer and more politically open. The revelation that a leading Chinese chatbot actively modifies or censors responses in real time has fuelled a broader narrative that western AI operates without such restrictions, reinforcing the idea that democratic systems produce more transparent and unbiased technology. This framing serves to bolster the argument that free societies will ultimately lead the global AI race.

But at its heart, the “AI arms race” is driven by technological dominance. The US, China, and the EU are charting different paths, weighing security risks against the need for global collaboration. How this competition is framed will shape policy: lock AI behind restrictions, or push for open innovation.

DeepSeek, for all its transformational qualities, continues to exemplify a model of AI where innovation prioritises scale, speed and efficiency over societal impact. This drive to optimise computation and expand capabilities overshadows the need to design AI as a truly public good. In doing so, it eclipses this technology’s genuine potential to transform governance, public services and social institutions in ways that prioritise collective wellbeing, equity and sustainability over corporate and state control.

A truly global AI framework requires more than political or technological openness. It demands structured cooperation that prioritises shared governance, equitable access, and responsible development. Following a workshop in Shanghai hosted by the Chinese government last September, the UN’s general secretary, António Guterres, outlined his vision for AI beyond corporate or state control: “We must seize this historic opportunity to lay the foundations for inclusive governance of AI – for the benefit of all humanity. As we build AI capacity, we must also develop shared knowledge and digital public goods.”

Both the west and China frame their AI ambitions through competing notions of “openness” – each aligning with their strategic interests and reinforcing existing power structures.

Western tech giants claim AI drives democratisation, yet they often dominate digital infrastructure in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America, exporting models based on “corporate imperialism” that extract value while disregarding local needs. China, by contrast, positions itself as a technological partner for the rest of the global south; however, its AI remains tightly controlled, reinforcing state ideology.

China’s proclaimed view on international AI collaboration emphasises that AI should not be “a game of rich countries”“, as President Xi stated during the 2024 G20 summit. By advocating for inclusive global AI development, China positions itself as a leader in shaping international AI governance, especially via initiatives like the UN AI resolution and its AI capacity-building action plan. These efforts help promote a more balanced technological landscape while allowing China to strengthen its influence in global AI standards and frameworks.

However, beneath all these narratives, both China and the US share a strategy of AI expansion that relies on exploited human labour, from data annotation to moderation, exposing a system driven less by innovation than by economic and political control.

Seeing AI as a connected race for influence highlights the need for ethical deployment, cross-border cooperation, and a balance between security and progress. And this is where China may face its greatest challenge – balancing the power of open-source innovation with the constraints of a tightly controlled, authoritarian system that thrives on restriction, rather than openness.

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Peter Bloom does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. DeepSeek: how China’s embrace of open-source AI caused a geopolitical earthquake – https://theconversation.com/deepseek-how-chinas-embrace-of-open-source-ai-caused-a-geopolitical-earthquake-249563
MIL OSI – Global Reports –
February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Ahead of Gabbard confirmation vote, Senator Coons tells colleagues ‘we cannot’ trust her to be Director of National Intelligence in speech on Senate floor

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Delaware Christopher Coons
WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Chris Coons (D-Del.), the ranking member on the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, delivered remarks on the Senate floor yesterday opposing President Donald Trump’s nominee Tulsi Gabbard to be the Director of National Intelligence. Gabbard was confirmed with solely Republican votes this morning.
In his speech, Senator Coons highlighted how Gabbard’s confirmation poses a significant threat to the trust that is the foundation of our national security. He also raised significant concerns about Gabbard’s troubling past statements and actions undermining U.S. foreign policy. From defending whistleblower Edward Snowden, to blaming the U.S. and NATO for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, to defending recently deposed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad—Senator Coons pointed out these actions make America less safe and are directly opposed to the efforts of our intelligence services. Gabbard has also become a favorite with Russian state media for her habit of spewing pro-Kremlin talking points.
“Our nation faces massive threats that are growing day by day,” Senator Coons said on the floor. “Our nation is facing threats around the world from North Korea and Iran, from China and from Russia, and we need an intelligence service equipped to respond to these challenges. Can we trust Tulsi Gabbard to lead our intelligence services and to respond to these threats? I cannot, we cannot, and we should not.”
At a time when the United States faces an increasingly hostile world and threats from Russia, China, Iran, and other adversaries, Senator Coons believes our nation needs intelligence leadership that protects and strengthens American interests. Gabbard has shown she is not up to this role, and the Senate should have rejected her nomination.
A video and transcript of Senator Coons’ comments are available below.
WATCH HERE.
SENATOR COONS: Mr. President, trust––trust is at the very center of our national security. The trust that we share with allies and partners around the world, the trust that the American people have in us and in our armed services and in our intelligence services, the trust that vital allies have that causes them to share with us information about threats, challenges, opportunities—that’s the very foundation of our national security, and today I rise to warn my colleagues about the risks to our national security posed by the nomination of Tulsi Gabbard to be the Director of National Intelligence.
As the Ranking Member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I have a significant involvement in our nation’s intelligence apparatus, and over the course of the confirmation hearings and the debate here on the floor about former Congresswoman Gabbard, I’ve concluded that she has an alarming record, revealed more fully in her confirmation hearings, but also in a review of her speeches, her travels, her positions as a Democrat, as a Congresswoman, as a candidate for president, as a supporter for President Trump.
She has gone quite a distance. She has defended Edward Snowden. Snowden is widely viewed by folks in our intelligence community, our national security apparatus, our armed forces, and many here as a traitor who betrayed some of the most important secrets that are critical to keeping the United States secure. She would not in her confirmation hearings answer the question: is Edward Snowden a traitor?
Ms. Gabbard bemoaned the rise of [Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham] in Syria, which recently overthrew the brutal dictator Bashar al-Assad, without mentioning the fall of Assad. She mentioned how tragic it was that HTS overran Damascus, without mentioning the side benefit of the fall of a brutal dictator, and in her confirmation hearings repeatedly dodged questions about FISA and section 702, key tools for our intelligence community. All of this is in keeping with a long-standing record as an apologist for authoritarians and even enemies of the United States. She has repeatedly blamed the United States and NATO for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
I will tell you as someone who is about to go to the Munich Security Conference this weekend with a broad and bipartisan delegation from this body and from the House, I will never forget being at the Munich Security Conference just before Russia invaded Ukraine, broad spectrum.
They had been in Eastern Ukraine for years. They had occupied Crimea and then launched a war into the eastern part of Ukraine. It was days after the Munich Security Conference in February of 2022, that tens of thousands of Russian troops, whole divisions, poured over the line in a broad-spectrum invasion that included brutality against civilians, bombardment of the entire nation, ultimately—cruel acts of violence against women and children, fully documented in the press and courts around the world. And yet, Ms. Gabbard blamed the United States and NATO for provoking this invasion by Russia of a sovereign nation––a nation where the United States, in writing, guaranteed its sovereignty in the 1994 agreement that led to them giving up their nuclear weapons.
Ms. Gabbard visited Syria and met with Bashar al-Assad for several days in 2017 and relied on pro-Assad sources to cast doubt on the use of chemical weapons against his own people. She has a history of repeating pro-Kremlin talking points and is a favorite on Russian state media. She appears frequently because she frequently is attacking the United States in Russian state media.
Mr. President, this body will all too soon take up the confirmation of Tulsi Gabbard. We should not proceed. We should not vote for her. Our nation—our nation faces massive threats that are growing day by day. Our nation is facing threats around the world from North Korea and Iran, from China and from Russia, and we need an intelligence service equipped to respond to these challenges. Can we trust Tulsi Gabbard to lead our intelligence services and to respond to these threats? I cannot, we cannot, and we should not. This body should not vote to confirm Tulsi Gabbard as the next Director of National Intelligence. Thank you.

MIL OSI USA News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group (As Delivered)

Source: United States Department of Defense

Good afternoon, friends.

Thank you, Secretary Healy for your leadership, both in hosting and now leading the UDCG.

This is my first Ukraine Defense Contact Group. And I’m honored to join all of you today.

And I appreciate the opportunity to share President Trump’s approach to the war in Ukraine.

We are at, as you said Mr. Secretary, a critical moment. As the war approaches its third anniversary, our message is clear: The bloodshed must stop. And this war must end.

President Trump has been clear with the American people – and with many of your leaders – that stopping the fighting and reaching an enduring peace is a top priority.

He intends to end this war by diplomacy and bringing both Russia and Ukraine to the table. And the U.S. Department of Defense will help achieve this goal.

We will only end this devastating war – and establish a durable peace – by coupling allied strength with a realistic assessment of the battlefield.

We want, like you, a sovereign and prosperous Ukraine. But we must start by recognizing that returning to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective.

Chasing this illusionary goal will only prolong the war and cause more suffering.

A durable peace for Ukraine must include robust security guarantees to ensure that the war will not begin again.

This must not be Minsk 3.0.

That said, the United States does not believe that NATO membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement.

Instead any security guarantee must be backed by capable European and non-European troops.

If these troops are deployed as peacekeepers to Ukraine at any point, they should be deployed as part of a non-NATO mission. And they should not covered under Article 5. There also must be robust international oversight of the line of contact.

To be clear, as part of any security guarantee, there will not be U.S. troops deployed to Ukraine.

To further enable effective diplomacy and drive down energy prices that fund the Russian war machine, President Trump is unleashing American energy production and encouraging other nations to do the same. Lower energy prices coupled with more effective enforcement of energy sanctions will help bring Russia to the table.

Safeguarding European security must be an imperative for European members of NATO. As part of this Europe must provide the overwhelming share of future lethal and nonlethal aid to Ukraine.

Members of this Contact Group must meet the moment.

This means: Donating more ammunition and equipment. Leveraging comparative advantages. Expanding your defense industrial base. And importantly, leveling with your citizens about the threat facing Europe.

Part of this is speaking frankly with your people about how this threat can only be met by spending more on defense.

2% is not enough; President Trump has called for 5%, and I agree.

Increasing your commitment to your own security is a down payment for the future. A down payment as you said Mr. Secretary of peace through strength.

We’re also here today to directly and unambiguously express that stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe.

The United States faces consequential threats to our homeland. We must – and we are – focusing on security of our own borders.

We also face a peer competitor in the Communist Chinese with the capability and intent to threaten our homeland and core national interests in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing tradeoffs to ensure deterrence does not fail.

Deterrence cannot fail, for all of our sakes.

As the United States prioritizes its attention to these threats, European allies must lead from the front.

Together, we can establish a division of labor that maximizes our comparative advantages in Europe and Pacific respectively.

In my first weeks as Secretary of Defense, under President Trump’s leadership, we’ve seen promising signs that Europe sees this threat, understands what needs to be done, and is stepping up to the task.

For example, Sweden recently announced its largest ever assistance package. We applaud them for committing $1.2 billion in ammunition and other needed materiel.

Poland is spending 5% of GDP on defense already, which is a model for the continent.

And 14 countries are co-leading Capability Coalitions. These groups are doing great work to coordinate Europe’s contributions of lethal assistance across eight key capability areas.

These are first steps. More must still be done.

We ask each of your countries to step up on fulfilling the commitments that you have made.

And we challenge your countries, and your citizens, to double down and re-commit yourselves not only to Ukraine’s immediate security needs, but to Europe’s long-term defense and deterrence goals.

Our transatlantic alliance has endured for decades. And we fully expect that it will be sustained for generations to come. But this won’t just happen.

It will require our European allies to step into the arena and take ownership of conventional security on the continent.

The United States remains committed to the NATO alliance and to the defense partnership with Europe. Full stop.

But the United States will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency. Rather, our relationship will prioritize empowering Europe to own responsibility for its own security.

Honesty will be our policy going forward – but only in the spirit of solidarity.

President Trump looks forward to working together, to continuing this frank discussion amongst friends, and to achieve peace through strength – together.

Thank you.

MIL OSI USA News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into The United States

US Senate News:

Source: The White House
class=”has-text-align-center”>BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A PROCLAMATION
1.  On January 19, 2018, the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) transmitted to me a report on his investigation into the effect of imports of aluminum on the national security of the United States under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1862) (section 232). The Secretary found and advised me of the Secretary’s opinion that aluminum is being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States.
2.  In Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), I concurred in the Secretary’s finding that aluminum was being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States, and decided to adjust the imports of aluminum articles by imposing a 10 percent ad valorem tariff on such articles imported from most countries. Proclamation 9704 further stated that any country with which the United States has a security relationship is welcome to discuss alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national security caused by imports from that country, and noted that, should the United States and any such country arrive at a satisfactory alternative means to address the threat to the national security such that I determine that imports from that country no longer threaten to impair the national security, I may remove or modify the restriction on aluminum articles imports from that country and, if necessary, adjust the tariff as it applies to other countries, as the national security interests of the United States require.
3.  In Proclamation 9704, I also directed the Secretary to monitor imports of aluminum articles and inform me of any circumstances that in the Secretary’s opinion might indicate the need for further action under section 232 with respect to such imports. Pursuant to Proclamation 9704, the Secretary was authorized to provide relief from the additional duties, based on a request from a directly affected party located in the United States, for any aluminum article determined not to be produced in the United States in a sufficient and reasonably available amount or of a satisfactory quality, or based upon specific national security considerations. Proclamation 9776 of August 29, 2018, and Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020, similarly authorized the Secretary to provide relief from certain tariffs on other aluminum products and derivatives set forth in those proclamations.
4.  In subsequent proclamations, the President adjusted the tariffs applicable to aluminum articles imports from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Mexico, the European Union (EU), and the United Kingdom (UK), after engaging in discussions with each of those parties on alternative ways to address the threat to the national security from such imports.
5.  The Secretary has informed me that, notwithstanding the 10 percent ad valorem tariff imposed by Proclamation 9704 that mitigated the threatened impairment of our national security, aluminum imports into the United States have continued at unacceptable levels as the global aluminum excess capacity crisis continues. In addition, the exclusion of certain countries and products from the tariff and efforts by foreign producers to circumvent the tariff have undermined the purpose of Proclamation 9704, which was to adjust the level of imports of aluminum to remove the threatened impairment of the national security. This has again resulted in aluminum smelter capacity utilization rates in the domestic aluminum industry that are well below the target level recommended in the Secretary’s January 19, 2018, report. This indicates that the initial tariff of 10 percent ad valorem is not high enough to address the threatened impairment to our national security posed by aluminum imports.
6.  In particular, the Secretary has informed me that global primary aluminum capacity has continued to increase, fueled by expansions in the People’s Republic of China (China) and South America, which is seen in rising aluminum imports that continue to weigh on the price domestic aluminum producers may charge. There has also been a significant increase in Chinese investment in Mexico, driven by massive Chinese government subsidies and the continued ability to exploit loopholes in U.S. trade policy.
7.   Domestic aluminum producers have been forced to idle additional production and shut down facilities. Two primary aluminum smelters within the United States have closed since Proclamation 9704 was promulgated. In addition, U.S. primary aluminum production decreased by 30 percent from 2020 to 2024, and U.S. smelter capacity utilization was only 52 percent in 2024. Overcapacity for primary aluminum has harmed downstream aluminum producers, including producers of aluminum extrusions and aluminum sheet. To allow U.S. aluminum producers to restart production and to incentivize new capacity, additional adjustments to section 232 tariffs on aluminum need to be made, including limiting exemptions and increasing the tariff rate.
8.  The Secretary has informed me that imports of aluminum articles from countries that are excluded from the tariff regime or have alternative arrangements have remained significantly elevated at levels that once again threaten to impair the national security of the United States. The volume of U.S. imports of aluminum articles from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Mexico, EU countries, and the UK in 2024 was approximately 14 percent higher than the average volume of such imports in 2015 through 2017. In particular, the volume of U.S. imports of primary aluminum from Canada in 2024 was approximately 18 percent higher than the average volume for 2015 through 2017.
Notwithstanding Proclamation 10782 of July 10, 2024, which imposed higher tariffs on certain aluminum imports from Mexico, imports of aluminum from Mexico have continued to surge beyond historical volumes. The volume of U.S. imports of aluminum articles from Mexico in 2024 was approximately 35 percent higher than the average volume for 2015 through 2017. Proclamation 10782 did not resolve the surge of imports of aluminum from Mexico. Mexican producers are using unfair trade to gain market share in the United States and are leveraging their access to unfairly traded global primary aluminum to do so. I understand that Mexican producers are commingling primary aluminum from China and the Russian Federation (Russia) with primary aluminum from other countries to produce downstream aluminum articles. These practices are distortive and provide continued outlets to absorb the massive amount of global excess capacity and must be remedied. The volume of U.S. imports of primary aluminum from Australia has also surged and in 2024 was approximately 103 percent higher than the average volume for 2015 through 2017. Australia has disregarded its verbal commitment to voluntarily restrain its aluminum exports to a reasonable level.
9.  These volume increases occurred even though demand for aluminum in the United States and Canada (the market measured by industry) has generally remained flat, averaging about 20 percent since 2018.
10.  These increasing import volumes support the conclusion that aluminum producers in countries subject to the additional ad valorem tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 9704 are engaging in transshipment or further processing of upstream aluminum products in countries that have since been exempted from that tariff. Foreign producers have shifted assembly or manufacturing operations to third countries, such as Mexico. For example, Chinese producers are using Mexico’s general exclusion from the tariff to funnel Chinese aluminum to the United States through Mexico while avoiding the tariff.
11.  The Secretary has informed me that producers in countries that remain subject to the ad valorem tariff have continued to evade the tariff by processing covered aluminum articles into additional downstream derivative products that were not included in the additional ad valorem tariffs proclaimed in Proclamation 9704 and Proclamation 9980. Foreign producers are continuing to expand downstream production to absorb the global excess capacity. Imports of additional derivative aluminum products have increased significantly since the issuance of Proclamation 9704 and Proclamation 9980, eroding the domestic industry’s customer base and resulting in depressed demand for aluminum articles produced in the United States.
12.  The Secretary has also informed me of the impact of the product exclusion process authorized by Proclamation 9704, Proclamation 9776, and Proclamation 9980 and implemented by subsequent regulations. This process has resulted in exclusions for a significant volume of imports, in a manner that undermines the purpose of the section 232 measures and threatens to impair the national security of the United States. Certain general approved exclusions remain in effect for entire tariff lines of aluminum imports, notwithstanding the domestic industry’s potential to produce many excluded products.
13.  I determine that these developments and modifications to the original tariff regime as proclaimed in Proclamation 9704 have undermined the regime’s national security objectives by preventing the domestic aluminum industry (including derivatives) from achieving sustained production capacity utilization of at least 80 percent, as determined in the Secretary’s January 19, 2018, report. I also determine that the modifications failed to achieve their articulated objectives. As a result, I determine that these modifications have resulted in significantly increasing imports of aluminum articles that once again threaten to impair the national security of the United States.
14.  In light of the Secretary’s findings, I have determined that it is necessary and appropriate to adjust the tariff proclaimed by Proclamation 9704, as amended, and the tariff proclaimed by Proclamation 9980, as amended, to increase the tariff rate from 10 percent ad valorem to 25 percent ad valorem. These actions are necessary and appropriate to remove the threatened impairment of the national security of the United States.
15. In light of the Secretary’s findings regarding the alternative agreements with Argentina proclaimed in Proclamation 9758 of May 31, 2018; Australia proclaimed in Proclamation 9758; Canada proclaimed in Proclamation 9893 of May 19, 2019, and Proclamation 10106 of October 27, 2020; Mexico proclaimed in Proclamation 9893 and Proclamation 10782 of July 10, 2024; the European Union proclaimed in Proclamation 10327 of December 27, 2021, and Proclamation 10690 of December 28, 2023; and the United Kingdom proclaimed in Proclamation 10405 of May 31, 2022, I have decided that it is necessary to terminate these agreements as of March 12, 2025. As of March 12, 2025, all imports of aluminum articles and derivative aluminum articles from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Mexico, EU countries, and the UK shall be subject to the additional ad valorem tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 9704, as amended, with respect to aluminum articles and Proclamation 9980, as amended, with respect to derivative aluminum articles. Imports of aluminum articles and derivative aluminum articles from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Mexico, EU countries, and the UK shall be subject to the revised tariff rate of 25 percent ad valorem established in clause 2 of this proclamation, commensurate with the tariff rate imposed on such articles imported from most other countries. In my judgment, these modifications are necessary to address the significantly increasing imports of aluminum articles and derivative aluminum articles from these sources, which threaten to impair the national security of the United States. Replacing the alternative agreements with the additional ad valorem tariffs will be a more robust and effective means of ensuring that the objectives articulated in the Secretary’s January 19, 2018, report and subsequent proclamations are achieved.
16.  In light of the information provided by the Secretary that the significant increase of imports of certain derivative aluminum articles has depressed demand for aluminum articles produced by domestic aluminum producers, I have determined that it is necessary to adjust the tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 9704 and Proclamation 9980 to apply to additional derivative aluminum articles.
17.  I have also determined that it is necessary to terminate the product exclusion process as authorized in clause 3 of Proclamation 9704, clause 1 of Proclamation 9776, and clause 2 of Proclamation 9980.
18.  Section 232, as amended, authorizes the President to take action to adjust the imports of an article and its derivatives that are being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States.
19.  Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, authorizes the President to embody in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) the substance of statutes affecting import treatment, and actions thereunder, including the removal, modification, continuance, or imposition of any rate of duty or other import restriction.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 301 of title 3, United States Code, section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, and section 232, do hereby proclaim as follows:
(1) The provisions of Proclamation 9758 with respect to imports of aluminum articles from the Argentina; Proclamation 9758 with respect to imports of aluminum articles from the Australia; Proclamation 9893 and Proclamation 10106 with respect to imports of aluminum articles from Canada; Proclamation 9893 and Proclamation 10782 with respect to imports of aluminum articles and derivative aluminum articles from Mexico; Proclamation 10327 and Proclamation 10690 with respect to imports of aluminum articles and derivative aluminum articles from the European Union; and Proclamation 10405 with respect to imports of aluminum articles and derivative aluminum articles from the United Kingdom shall be ineffective as of 12:01 a.m. eastern time on March 12, 2025. The provisions of clause 1 of Proclamation 9980 as applicable to imports of derivative aluminum articles from Argentina, Australia, Canada, and Mexico shall be ineffective as of 12:01 a.m. eastern time on March 12, 2025; all imports of aluminum articles and derivative aluminum articles from these countries shall be subject to the additional ad valorem tariffs proclaimed in Proclamation 9704, as amended, and Proclamation 9980, as amended. Imports of aluminum articles and derivative aluminum articles from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Mexico, EU countries, and the United Kingdom will be subject to the revised tariff rate of 25 percent ad valorem established in clauses (2) and (3) of this proclamation, commensurate with the tariff rate imposed on such articles imported from most countries, as amended by this proclamation.
(2) As of 12:01 a.m. on March 12, 2025, the tariff proclaimed by Proclamation 9704, as amended, and the tariff proclaimed by Proclamation 9980, as amended, are adjusted to increase the respective tariff rates from an additional 10 percent ad valorem to an additional 25 percent ad valorem.
(3) Clause 2 of Proclamation 9704, as amended, is further amended in the second sentence by deleting “and” before “(k)”; replacing “11:59 p.m. eastern standard time on December 31, 2025” after (k) with “12:01 a.m. eastern time on March 12, 2025”; and inserting before the period at the end: “, and (l) on or after 12:01 a.m. on March 12, 2025, at a revised rate of an additional 25 percent ad valorem rate, from all countries except from Russia.”
(4) The first two sentences of clause 1 of Proclamation 9980 are revised to read as follows:
(5) Except as otherwise provided in this proclamation, all imports of derivative aluminum articles specified in Annex I to this proclamation or any subsequent annex published in the Federal Register pursuant to this Proclamation shall be subject to an additional 25 percent ad valorem rate of duty, with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after the Commerce certification date in accordance with clause 9. For any derivative aluminum article identified in Annex I that is not in Chapter 76 of the HTSUS, the additional ad valorem duty shall apply only to the aluminum content of the derivative article. These rates of duty, which are in addition to any other duties, fees, exactions, and charges applicable to such imported derivative aluminum articles, shall apply to imports of derivative aluminum articles described in Annex I to this proclamation from all countries, except Russia, but shall not apply to derivative aluminum articles processed in another country from aluminum articles that were smelted and cast in the United States. Further, all imports of derivative aluminum articles specified in Annex I to this proclamation that are the product of Russia and all imports of derivative aluminum articles specified in Annex I to this proclamation where any amount of primary aluminum used in the manufacture of the derivative aluminum articles is smelted in Russia, or the derivative aluminum articles are cast in Russia, shall be subject to the 200 percent ad valorem rate of duty established in Proclamation 10522, with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after the Commerce certification date in accordance with clause 9. Primary aluminum is defined as new aluminum metal that is produced from alumina (or aluminum oxide) by the electrolytic Hall-Heroult process. The Secretary shall continue to monitor imports of the derivative articles described in Annex I to this proclamation, and shall, from time to time, in consultation with the United States Trade Representative, the Secretary of Defense, or other officials as appropriate, review the status of such imports with respect to the national security of the United States.
(6) The Secretary shall not consider any new product exclusion requests under clause 3 of Proclamation 9704, clause 1 of Proclamation 9776, or clause 2 of Proclamation 9980, or renew any such product exclusions in effect as of the date of this proclamation. Granted product exclusions shall remain effective until their expiration date or until excluded product volume is imported, whichever occurs first. The Secretary shall take all actions, including publication in the Federal Register, necessary to terminate the product exclusion process. In addition, all general approved exclusions shall be ineffective as of March 12, 2025, and the Secretary shall publish a notice in the Federal Register to this effect. I have determined that this is necessary to ensure that these general exclusions do not allow high volumes of imports, including of products that the domestic industry can produce and supply, to undermine the objectives articulated in the Secretary’s January 2018 report and relevant subsequent proclamations. Following the elimination of quantitative restrictions on certain sources pursuant to this proclamation, and subject to any restrictions set forth in or pursuant to other provisions of applicable law, imports of any aluminum article or derivative article from any source and in any quantity will be available to domestic importers, provided that the additional ad valorem tariffs are paid upon entry or withdrawal from warehouse for consumption. For purposes of implementing the requirements in this proclamation, importers of aluminum derivative articles shall provide to CBP any information necessary to identify the aluminum content used in the manufacture of aluminum derivative articles imports covered by this Proclamation. CBP is hereby authorized and directed to publish regulations or guidance implementing this requirement as soon as practicable.
(7) Within 90 days after the date of this proclamation, the Secretary shall establish a process for including additional derivative aluminum articles within the scope of the ad valorem duties proclaimed in Proclamation 9704, as amended, Proclamation 9980, as amended, and clause 5 of this proclamation. In addition to inclusions made by the Secretary, this process shall provide for including additional derivative aluminum articles at the request of a producer of an aluminum article or derivative aluminum article within the United States, or an industry association representing one or more such producers, establishing that imports of a derivative aluminum article have increased in a manner that threatens to impair the national security or otherwise undermine the objectives set forth in the Secretary’s January 19, 2018 report or any Proclamation issued pursuant thereto. When the Secretary receives such a request from a domestic producer or industry association, it shall issue a determination regarding whether or not to include the derivative aluminum article or articles within 60 days of receiving the request.
(8) The provisions of clause 3 of Proclamation 9704, clause 1 of Proclamation 9776, and clause 2 of Proclamation 9980, or any other provisions authorizing the Secretary to grant relief for certain products from the additional ad valorem duties or quantitative restrictions set forth in the prior proclamations described herein are hereby revoked, except to the extent required to implement clause 5 of this proclamation.
(9) The modifications made by this proclamation with respect to derivative aluminum articles identified in the annex that are not in chapter 76 of the HTSUS shall be effective upon public notification by the Secretary of Commerce, that adequate systems are in place to fully, efficiently, and expediently process and collect tariff revenue for covered articles.
(10) Any aluminum article or derivative article, except those eligible for admission under “domestic status” as defined in 19 CFR 146.43, that is subject to the duty imposed by this proclamation and that is admitted into a U.S. foreign trade zone on or after the Commerce certification date, in accordance with clause 9, may be admitted only under “privileged foreign status” as defined in 19 CFR 146.41, and will be subject upon entry for consumption to any ad valorem rates of duty related to the classification under the applicable HTSUS subheading.
(11) The United States International Trade Commission, in consultation with the Secretary, the Commissioner of United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within the Department of Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall revise the HTSUS so that it conforms to the amendments and effective dates directed in this proclamation within ten days of the date of this proclamation. The Secretary is authorized and directed to publish any such modifications to the HTSUS in the Federal Register.
(12) CBP shall prioritize reviews of the classification of imported aluminum articles and derivative aluminum articles and, in the event that it discovers misclassification resulting in loss of revenue of the ad valorem duties proclaimed herein, it shall assess monetary penalties in the maximum amount permitted by law.In addition, CBP shall promptly notify the Secretary regarding evidence of any efforts to evade payment of the ad valorem duties proclaimed herein through processing or alteration of aluminum articles or derivative aluminum articles as a disguise or artifice prior to importation.In such circumstances, the Secretary shall consider the processed or altered aluminum articles or derivative aluminum articles for inclusion as derivative aluminum articles pursuant to clause 5 of this proclamation.
(13) No drawback shall be available with respect to the duties imposed pursuant to this proclamation.
(14) The Secretary may issue regulations and guidance consistent with this proclamation, including to address operational necessity.
(15) Any provision of a previous proclamation or Executive Order that is inconsistent with the actions taken in this proclamation is superseded to the extent of such inconsistency.
     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand thistenth day of February, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.

MIL OSI USA News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Unveiled: 2024 ICC Arbitration and ADR preliminary statistics

Source: International Chamber of Commerce

Headline: Unveiled: 2024 ICC Arbitration and ADR preliminary statistics

Alexander G. Fessas, Secretary General of the ICC International Court of Arbitration and Director of ICC Dispute Resolution Services, said:

“The preliminary figures highlight once more the confidence companies and states place in ICC as their preferred institution for resolving disputes. Staying close to the needs of ICC Arbitration and ADR users worldwide, we remain committed to delivering fair, efficient and transparent services that meet the evolving needs of domestic and international commerce”.

Caseload

In 2024, the number of new cases remained strong, with 831 cases filed under the ICC Arbitration Rules (of which 17 began with Emergency Arbitrator applications) and 10 cases under the ICC Appointing Authority Rules. This is similar to the average caseload of the last five years. In October, ICC reached a milestone when it registered its 29,000th case under the ICC Arbitration Rules. In total 1,789 cases were pending at the end of 2024.

Expedited procedure

In 2024, 152 new cases were administered under the Expedited Procedure Provisions (‘EPP’). The ICC Court has administered a total of 865 cases under the EPP since the procedure was established in 2017.

Parties

A total of 2,392 parties participated in ICC arbitrations in 2024, of which 1,100 were claimants and 1,292 were respondents. Parties originated from 136 jurisdictions, with an increased presence compared to 2023 in North and West Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, South and East Asia, and the Pacific.

For new cases, the top 10 countries from which parties originated were the United States (167 parties) followed by Brazil (156), Spain (137), Mexico (106), Italy (101), the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong SAR (98), Germany (85), Türkiye (80), and France and the United Arab Emirates (73 parties each).

A total of 45 states and 143 state-owned entities were involved in 159 cases filed during the year, accounting for 19% of new cases.

Place of arbitration

ICC arbitral tribunals were seated in 107 cities across 62 countries or independent territories on all continents. The top 10 jurisdictions were the United Kingdom (96 cases), France (91), Switzerland (83), the United States (72), the United Arab Emirates (38), Spain (33), Brazil and Mexico (30 each), Singapore (28), and Germany (20).

Amounts in dispute

Amounts in dispute in new cases varied significantly, ranging from just below US$10,000 to US$53 billion. The aggregate amount in dispute for new cases reached US$103 billion, with an average of US$130 million and a median of approximately US$5 million.

With a total of US$354 billion, the aggregate amount in dispute for pending cases sets an all-time record. The corresponding average and median amounts were US$211 million and US$14 million, respectively.

Claudia Salomon, President of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, said:

“The 2024 statistics underscore the ICC Court’s role as the leading arbitral institution. With so many parties from jurisdictions around the world and a record value of pending cases, it is clear that arbitration remains a vital tool for resolving domestic and cross-border disputes. As we move forward, we continue to prioritise accessibility, efficiency and innovation, ensuring that ICC remains a trusted and effective solution for businesses and States worldwide”.

ICC International Centre for ADR

A total of 61 requests were filed with the ICC ADR Centre in 2024: 37 under ICC Mediation Rules, 20 under the Expert Rules, three under DOCDEX Rules and one under the Dispute Board Rules.

The full 2024 ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics report will be released later this year. ICC DRS statistical reports since 1997 are available on the ICC Dispute Resolution Library (jusmundi.com).

Information presented herewith is subject to verification prior to publication in the complete 2024 annual statistical report.

Related news

MIL OSI Economics –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: China flexes its media muscle in Africa – encouraging positive headlines as part of a soft power agenda

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Mitchell Gallagher, Ph.D Candidate in Political Science, Wayne State University

An African journalist films President Xi Jinping delivering an opening ceremony speech for the China-Africa forum in Beijing in September 2024. AP Photo/Andy Wong

Every year, China’s minister of foreign affairs embarks on what has now become a customary odyssey across Africa. The tradition began in the late 1980s and sees Beijing’s top diplomat visit several African nations to reaffirm ties. The most recent visit, by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, took place in mid-January 2025 and included stops in Namibia, the Republic of the Congo, Chad and Nigeria.

For over two decades, China’s burgeoning influence in Africa was symbolized by grand displays of infrastructural might. From Nairobi’s gleaming towers to expansive ports dotting the continent’s shorelines, China’s investments on the continent have surged, reaching over US$700 billion by 2023 under the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s massive global infrastructure development strategy.

But in recent years, Beijing has sought to expand beyond roads and skyscrapers and has made a play for the hearts and minds of African people. With a deft mix of persuasion, power and money, Beijing has turned to African media as a potential conduit for its geopolitical ambitions.

Partnering with local outlets and journalist-training initiatives, China has expanded China’s media footprint in Africa. Its purpose? To change perceptions and anchor the idea of Beijing as a provider of resources and assistance, and a model for development and governance.

The ploy appears to be paying dividends, with evidence of sections of the media giving favorable coverage to China. But as someone researching the reach of China’s influence overseas, I am beginning to see a nascent backlash against pro-Beijing reporting in countries across the continent.

The media charm offensive

China’s approach to Africa rests mainly on its use of “soft power,” manifested through things like the media and cultural programs. Beijing presents this as “win-win cooperation” – a quintessential Chinese diplomatic phrase mixing collaboration with cultural diplomacy.

Key to China’s media approach in Africa are two institutions: the China Global Television Network (CGTN) Africa and Xinhua News Agency.

CGTN Africa, which was set up in 2012, offers a Chinese perspective on African news. The network produces content in multiple languages, including English, French and Swahili, and its coverage routinely portrays Beijing as a constructive partner, reporting on infrastructure projects, trade agreements and cultural initiatives. Moreover, Xinhua News Agency, China’s state news agency, now boasts 37 bureaus on the continent.

By contrast, Western media presence in Africa remains comparatively limited. The BBC, long embedded due to the United Kingdom’s colonial legacy, still maintains a large footprint among foreign outlets, but its influence is largely historical rather than expanding. And as Western media influence in Africa has plateaued, China’s state-backed media has grown exponentially. This expansion is especially evident in the digital domain. On Facebook, for example, CGTN Africa commands a staggering 4.5 million followers, vastly outpacing CNN Africa, which has 1.2 million — a stark indicator of China’s growing soft power reach.

China’s zero-tariff trade policy with 33 African countries showcases how it uses economic policies to mold perceptions. And state-backed media outlets like CGTN Africa and Xinhua are central to highlighting such projects and pushing an image of China as a benevolent partner.

Stories of an “all-weather” or steadfast China-Africa partnership are broadcast widely, and the coverage frequently depicts the grand nature of Chinese infrastructure projects. Amid this glowing coverage, the labor disputes, environmental devastation or debt traps associated with some Chinese-built infrastructure are less likely to make headlines.

Questions of media veracity notwithstanding, China’s strategy is bearing fruit. A Gallup poll from April 2024 showed China’s approval ratings climbing in Africa as U.S. ratings dipped. Afrobarometer, a pan-African research organization, further reports that public opinion of China in many African countries is positively glowing, an apparent validation of China’s discourse engineering.

Further, studies have shown that pro-Beijing media influences perceptions. A 2023 survey of Zimbabweans found that those who were exposed to Chinese media were more likely to have a positive view of Beijing’s economic activities in the country.

China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, center, holds hands with his counterparts, Senegal’s Yassine Fall, left, and the Republic of the Congo’s Jean-Claude Gakosso, after a joint news conference.
AP Photo/Andy Wong

Co-opting local voices

The effectiveness of China’s media strategy becomes especially apparent in the integration of local media. Through content-sharing agreements, African outlets have disseminated Beijing’s editorial line and stories from Chinese state media, often without the due diligence of journalistic skepticism.

Meanwhile, StarTimes, a Chinese media company, delivers a steady stream of curated depictions of translated Chinese movies, TV shows and documentaries across 30 countries in Africa.

But China is not merely pushing its viewpoint through African channels. It’s also taking a lead role in training African journalists, thousands of whom have been lured by all-expenses-paid trips to China under the guise of “professional development.” On such junkets, they receive training that critics say obscures the distinction between skill-building and propaganda, presenting them with perspectives conforming to Beijing’s line.

‘Win-win’ promises

Ethiopia exemplifies how China’s infrastructure investments and media influence have fostered a largely favorable perception of Beijing. State media outlets, often staffed by journalists trained in Chinese-run programs, consistently frame China’s role as one of selfless partnership. Coverage of projects like the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line highlights the benefits, while omitting reports on the substandard labor conditions tied to such projects — an approach reflective of Ethiopia’s media landscape, where state-run outlets prioritize economic development narratives and rely heavily on Xinhua as a primary news source.

In Angola, Chinese oil companies extract considerable resources and channel billions into infrastructure projects. The local media, again regularly staffed by journalists who have accepted invitations to visit China, often portray Sino-Angolan relations in glowing terms. Allegations of corruption, the displacement of local communities and environmental degradation are relegated to side notes in the name of common development.

The war for Africa’s media soul

Despite all of the Chinese influence, media perspectives in Africa are far from uniformly pro-Beijing.

In Kenya, voices of dissent are beginning to rise, and media professionals immune to Beijing’s allure are probing the true costs of Chinese financial undertakings. In South Africa, media watchdogs are sounding alarms, pointing to a gradual attrition of press freedoms that come packaged with promises of growth and prosperity. In Ghana, anxiety about Chinese media influence permeates more than the journalism sector, as officials have raised concerns about the implications of Chinese media cooperation agreements. Wariness in Ghana became especially apparent when local journalists started reporting that Chinese-produced content was being prioritized over domestic stories in state media.

Beneath the surface of China’s well-publicized projects and media offerings, and the African countries or organizations that embrace Beijing’s line, a significant countervailing force exists that challenges uncritical representations and pursues rigorous journalism.

Yet as CGTN Africa and Xinhua become entrenched in African media ecosystems, a pertinent question comes to the forefront: Will Africa’s journalists and press be able to uphold their impartiality and retain intellectual independence?

As China continues to make strategic inroads in Africa, it’s a fair question.

Mitchell Gallagher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. China flexes its media muscle in Africa – encouraging positive headlines as part of a soft power agenda – https://theconversation.com/china-flexes-its-media-muscle-in-africa-encouraging-positive-headlines-as-part-of-a-soft-power-agenda-245804

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Sofas that self-assemble when you heat them up? How 4D printing could transform manufacturing

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Mahdi Bodaghi, Associate Professor of Smart Materials & Manufacturing, Nottingham Trent University

Flat-pack, but not as we know it. This is an AI image created by OpenAI’s Dall-E., CC BY-SA

Imagine buying a flat sheet from a furniture store that changes into a sofa when you heat it with a hairdryer. Or consider the value of a stent that precisely expands inside a patient’s artery, adapting to their unique anatomy.

Welcome to 4D printing, a frontier in material and manufacturing science that has been rapidly expanding over the past decade. While 3D printing has captured global attention for its ability to create objects layer by layer, 4D printing adds the element of time.

It involves 3D-printing adaptable objects from materials such as polymers or alloys that can bend, twist or transform entirely when they come into contact with heat or moisture. By moving beyond the constrictions of static designs, it opens up remarkable possibilities in areas such as medicine, aerospace, robotics and construction.

I was recently the lead author on a comprehensive report published in the journal of Smart Materials and Structures, charting the advances and challenges in this field. We outlined this industry’s potential, offering a vision of a future where smart materials redefine design and manufacturing.

Here are some more of the main fields in which 4D printing could be transformative:

1. Healthcare

Like the stent I mentioned earlier, 4D printing raises the possibility of creating implants and prosthetics that adapt to patients’ needs in real time. Research teams working on these innovations include the Biomet4D project, coordinated by the IMDEA Materials Institute in Madrid, which is developing smart, biodegradable metallic implants for people with seriously damaged or defective bones. The implants can change shape and expand as the bone grows, supporting it much more effectively than a static implant.

Another area of focus is smarter ways to give patients drugs. For example, a team of researchers based at China’s Jilin University have created 4D-printed hydrogel capsules whose outer structure stays intact inside a patient’s body until it reaches a particular temperature, such as when there is an infection, meaning the drug only takes effect when it’s required. This could be useful in situations where it’s beneficial to release a drug into a patient’s body at exactly the right time and location.

2. Robotics and wearables

Integrating 4D materials into robotics and wearable devices enables them to adjust their functionality in response to their environment. For instance, researchers at Harvard University’s Wyss Institute have developed self-folding robotic devices based on insights from origami that change shape when exposed to heat. One potential application could involve sending these devices to carry out tasks in environments that are difficult to reach, such as in deep seas or oceans.

Similarly, scientists at Deakin University in Australia are researching 4D-printing robotic joints with variable stiffness that can help with rehabilitation. For example, an arm could get stiffer when the user tries to pick something up, making it easier for them to lift it.

3. Exploring the cosmos

In the extreme conditions of space, adaptability is critical, so again there’s a role for 4D-printed materials. For instance, Nasa’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory uses 4D-printed metallic space fabrics.

These can fold, change shape and adapt to varying thermal and mechanical environments. This makes them suitable for a wide range of space applications, including shielding spacecraft from meteorites, insulating against extreme temperatures and conforming to uneven terrain on Jupiter’s smallest moon, the icy Europa.

Challenges and opportunities

The current capabilities of 4D printing are nothing short of remarkable, yet the field still faces significant challenges. While we can now create materials that transform with precision, there’s still more research required to ensure they’re biologically safe and durable for the long term.

Also, scaling up production to meet industrial demands, particularly for high-resolution designs or nanoscale structures, requires not just new techniques but also new ways of thinking about manufacturing. Cost is another barrier – specialised materials and processes can often prove too expensive at present for widespread use.

And yet, the promise of 4D printing is tantalising. One of the big attractions is in sustainability. From water pipes that adjust flow rates to buildings that self-regulate carbon dioxide levels, 4D printing creates the potential for adaptive systems that help in this area. A prime example is the Solar Gate, developed by the University of Stuttgart’s Institute for Computational Design and Construction.

Inspired by the way that pine cones open in response to sunlight, the gate consists of a series of 4D-printed cellulose flaps that can be installed into buildings to open and close in response to certain levels of humidity and temperature. They curl upwards in winter to allow heat in, and flatten in the summer to block direct sunlight. It demonstrates how a building can be made more energy efficient without relying on an external source of power for, say, air conditioning.

Meanwhile, artificial intelligence is already accelerating progress by optimising the design and behaviour of 4D-printed objects. It is helping researchers to have more precise control over how these smart materials respond under different conditions, without having to rely so much on trial and error.

This is still a young industry, with limited venture capital investment and a workforce that is only beginning to take shape. But as more research institutions and companies recognise its potential, the pace of innovation should quicken. According to one report, the sector is due to grow at around 35% a year over the next five years.

We are now developing structures that recover or change their shape on demand at the 4D materials and printing laboratory at Nottingham Trent University and the 4D Printing Society. For example, we’ve already 4D-printed medical stents that can self-expand in response to body temperature (see images below).

Nottingam Trent University, CC BY-SA

We’re also developing materials for boat fenders and car bumpers whose shape can be restored by adding heat, as a way of removing dents, as well as shape-adaptive finger splints for broken bones, and self-assembling, extra-comfortable furniture.

So, the next time you marvel at the capabilities of 3D printing, remember: the future lies in 4D printing, where materials come alive and redefine the possibilities of tomorrow.

Mahdi Bodaghi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Sofas that self-assemble when you heat them up? How 4D printing could transform manufacturing – https://theconversation.com/sofas-that-self-assemble-when-you-heat-them-up-how-4d-printing-could-transform-manufacturing-246899

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Donald Trump’s war on global governance: lessons from the past on how to fight back
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

US president Donald Trump’s recent actions seem designed to reassert American power and demonstrate that it is still the dominant global power and is capable of bullying weaker nations into following America’s lead.

He has shown contempt for international collaboration by withdrawing from the UN climate negotiations and the World Health Organization. His officials have also indicated that they will not participate in upcoming G20 meetings because he does not like the policies of South Africa, the G20 president for 2025.

In addition, he’s shown a lack of concern for international solidarity by halting US aid programmes and by undermining efforts to keep businesses honest. He has demonstrated his contempt for allies by imposing tariffs on their exports.

These actions demand a response from the rest of the international community that mitigates the risk to the well-being of people and planet and the effective management of global affairs.

My research on global economic governance suggests that history can offer some guidance on how to shape an effective response.

Such a response should be based on a realistic assessment of the configuration of global forces. It should seek to build tactical coalitions between state and non-state actors in both the global south and the global north who can agree on clear and limited objectives.

The following three historical lessons help explain this point.

Cautionary lessons

The first lesson is about the dangers of being overoptimistic in assessing the potential for change.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the US was confronting defeat in the war in Vietnam, high inflation and domestic unrest, including the assassination of leading politicians and the murder of protesting students.

The US was also losing confidence in its ability to sustain the international monetary order it had established at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944.

In addition, the countries of the global south were calling for a new international economic order that was more responsive to their needs. Given the concerns about the political and economic situation in the US and the relative strength of the Soviet bloc at the time, this seemed a realistic demand.

In August 1971, President Richard Nixon, without any international consultations, launched what became known as the Nixon Shock. He broke the link between gold and the US dollar, thereby ending the international monetary system established in 1944. He also imposed a 10% surcharge on all imports into the US.

When America’s European allies protested and sought to create a reformed version of the old monetary order, US treasury secretary John Connolly informed them that the dollar was

our currency but your problem.

Over the course of the 1970s, US allies in western Europe, Asia and all countries that participated in the old Bretton Woods system were forced to accept what the US preferred: a market-based international monetary system in which the US dollar became the dominant currency.

The US, along with its allies in the global north, also defeated the calls for a new international economic order and imposed their neo-liberal economic order on the world.

The second cautionary lesson highlights the importance of building robust tactical coalitions. In 1969, the International Monetary Fund member states agreed to authorise the IMF to create special drawing rights, the IMF’s unique reserve asset. At the time, many IMF developing country member states advocated establishing a link between development and the special drawing rights. This would enable those countries most in need of additional resources to access more than their proportionate share of special drawing rights to fund their development.

All developing countries supported this demand. But they couldn’t agree on how to do it. The rich countries were able to exploit these differences and defeat the proposed link between the special drawing rights and development. As a result, the special drawing rights are now distributed to all IMF member states according to their quotas in the IMF. This means that most allocations go to the rich countries who do not need them and have no obligation to share them with developing countries.

A third lesson arises from the successful Jubilee 2000 campaign to forgive the debts of low-income developing countries experiencing debt crises. This campaign, supported by a secretariat in the United Kingdom, eventually involved:
- civil society organisations and activists in 40 countries
- a petition signed by 21 million people
- governments in both creditor and debtor countries.
These efforts resulted in the cancellation of the debts of 35 developing countries. These debts, totalling about US$100 billion, were owed primarily to bilateral and multilateral official creditors.

They were also a demonstration of the political power that can be generated by the combined actions of civil society organisations and governments in both rich and poor countries. They can force the most powerful and wealthy institutions and individuals in the world to accept actions that, while requiring them to make affordable sacrifices, benefit low-income countries and potentially poor communities within those states.

What conclusions should be drawn?

We shouldn’t under-estimate the power of the US or the determination of the MAGA movement to use that power. However, their power is not absolute. It is constrained by the relative decline in US power as countries such as China and India gain economic and political strength. In addition, there are now mechanisms for international cooperation, such as the G20, where states can coordinate their actions and gain tactical victories that are meaningful to people and planet.

But gaining such victories will require the following:

Firstly, the formation of tactical coalitions that include states from both the global south and the global north. If these states cooperate around limited and shared objectives they can counter the vested interests around the world that support Trump’s objectives.

Secondly, a special kind of public-private partnership in which states and non-state actors set aside their differences and agree to cooperate to achieve limited shared objectives. Neither states alone nor civil society groups alone were able to defeat the vested interests that opposed debt relief in the late 1990s. Working together they were able to defeat powerful creditor interests and gain debt relief for the poorest states.

Thirdly, this special partnership will only be possible if there’s general agreement on both the diagnosis of the problem and on the general contours of the solution. This was the case with the debt issue in the 1990s.

There are good candidates for such collaborative actions. For example, many states and non-state actors agree that international financial institutions need to be reformed and made more responsive to the needs of those member states that actually use their services but lack voice and vote in their governance. The institutions also need to be more accountable to those affected by their policies and practices. They also agree that large corporations and financial institutions should pay their fair share of taxes and should be environmentally and socially responsible.

The urgency of the challenges facing the global community demands that the world begin countering Trump as soon as possible. South Africa as the current chair of the G20 has a special responsibility to ensure that this year the G20, together with its engagement groups, acts creatively and responsibly in relation to people and planet.

– Donald Trump’s war on global governance: lessons from the past on how to fight back
– https://theconversation.com/donald-trumps-war-on-global-governance-lessons-from-the-past-on-how-to-fight-back-249666

MIL OSI Africa –
February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Donald Trump’s war on global governance: lessons from the past on how to fight back
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

US president Donald Trump’s recent actions seem designed to reassert American power and demonstrate that it is still the dominant global power and is capable of bullying weaker nations into following America’s lead.

He has shown contempt for international collaboration by withdrawing from the UN climate negotiations and the World Health Organization. His officials have also indicated that they will not participate in upcoming G20 meetings because he does not like the policies of South Africa, the G20 president for 2025.

In addition, he’s shown a lack of concern for international solidarity by halting US aid programmes and by undermining efforts to keep businesses honest. He has demonstrated his contempt for allies by imposing tariffs on their exports.

These actions demand a response from the rest of the international community that mitigates the risk to the well-being of people and planet and the effective management of global affairs.

My research on global economic governance suggests that history can offer some guidance on how to shape an effective response.

Such a response should be based on a realistic assessment of the configuration of global forces. It should seek to build tactical coalitions between state and non-state actors in both the global south and the global north who can agree on clear and limited objectives.

The following three historical lessons help explain this point.

Cautionary lessons

The first lesson is about the dangers of being overoptimistic in assessing the potential for change.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the US was confronting defeat in the war in Vietnam, high inflation and domestic unrest, including the assassination of leading politicians and the murder of protesting students.

The US was also losing confidence in its ability to sustain the international monetary order it had established at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944.

In addition, the countries of the global south were calling for a new international economic order that was more responsive to their needs. Given the concerns about the political and economic situation in the US and the relative strength of the Soviet bloc at the time, this seemed a realistic demand.

In August 1971, President Richard Nixon, without any international consultations, launched what became known as the Nixon Shock. He broke the link between gold and the US dollar, thereby ending the international monetary system established in 1944. He also imposed a 10% surcharge on all imports into the US.

When America’s European allies protested and sought to create a reformed version of the old monetary order, US treasury secretary John Connolly informed them that the dollar was

our currency but your problem.

Over the course of the 1970s, US allies in western Europe, Asia and all countries that participated in the old Bretton Woods system were forced to accept what the US preferred: a market-based international monetary system in which the US dollar became the dominant currency.

The US, along with its allies in the global north, also defeated the calls for a new international economic order and imposed their neo-liberal economic order on the world.

The second cautionary lesson highlights the importance of building robust tactical coalitions. In 1969, the International Monetary Fund member states agreed to authorise the IMF to create special drawing rights, the IMF’s unique reserve asset. At the time, many IMF developing country member states advocated establishing a link between development and the special drawing rights. This would enable those countries most in need of additional resources to access more than their proportionate share of special drawing rights to fund their development.

All developing countries supported this demand. But they couldn’t agree on how to do it. The rich countries were able to exploit these differences and defeat the proposed link between the special drawing rights and development. As a result, the special drawing rights are now distributed to all IMF member states according to their quotas in the IMF. This means that most allocations go to the rich countries who do not need them and have no obligation to share them with developing countries.

A third lesson arises from the successful Jubilee 2000 campaign to forgive the debts of low-income developing countries experiencing debt crises. This campaign, supported by a secretariat in the United Kingdom, eventually involved:
- civil society organisations and activists in 40 countries
- a petition signed by 21 million people
- governments in both creditor and debtor countries.
These efforts resulted in the cancellation of the debts of 35 developing countries. These debts, totalling about US$100 billion, were owed primarily to bilateral and multilateral official creditors.

They were also a demonstration of the political power that can be generated by the combined actions of civil society organisations and governments in both rich and poor countries. They can force the most powerful and wealthy institutions and individuals in the world to accept actions that, while requiring them to make affordable sacrifices, benefit low-income countries and potentially poor communities within those states.

What conclusions should be drawn?

We shouldn’t under-estimate the power of the US or the determination of the MAGA movement to use that power. However, their power is not absolute. It is constrained by the relative decline in US power as countries such as China and India gain economic and political strength. In addition, there are now mechanisms for international cooperation, such as the G20, where states can coordinate their actions and gain tactical victories that are meaningful to people and planet.

But gaining such victories will require the following:

Firstly, the formation of tactical coalitions that include states from both the global south and the global north. If these states cooperate around limited and shared objectives they can counter the vested interests around the world that support Trump’s objectives.

Secondly, a special kind of public-private partnership in which states and non-state actors set aside their differences and agree to cooperate to achieve limited shared objectives. Neither states alone nor civil society groups alone were able to defeat the vested interests that opposed debt relief in the late 1990s. Working together they were able to defeat powerful creditor interests and gain debt relief for the poorest states.

Thirdly, this special partnership will only be possible if there’s general agreement on both the diagnosis of the problem and on the general contours of the solution. This was the case with the debt issue in the 1990s.

There are good candidates for such collaborative actions. For example, many states and non-state actors agree that international financial institutions need to be reformed and made more responsive to the needs of those member states that actually use their services but lack voice and vote in their governance. The institutions also need to be more accountable to those affected by their policies and practices. They also agree that large corporations and financial institutions should pay their fair share of taxes and should be environmentally and socially responsible.

The urgency of the challenges facing the global community demands that the world begin countering Trump as soon as possible. South Africa as the current chair of the G20 has a special responsibility to ensure that this year the G20, together with its engagement groups, acts creatively and responsibly in relation to people and planet.

Danny Bradlow, in addition to his position at the University of Pretoria, is an advisor to the South African Institute of International Affairs on G20 issues and is a co-chair of the T20 Taskforce on the Financing of Sustainable Development.

– ref. Donald Trump’s war on global governance: lessons from the past on how to fight back – https://theconversation.com/donald-trumps-war-on-global-governance-lessons-from-the-past-on-how-to-fight-back-249666
MIL OSI – Global Reports –
February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Tariffs on Canadian Steel and Aluminum Would Be a Gut Punch to Workers

Source: US GOIAM Union

Brian Bryant, International President of the 600,000-member IAM Union, and David Chartrand, IAM Canadian General Vice President, issued the following statement regarding President Trump’s announcement of a 25% tariff on all steel and aluminum imports into the United States:

“A 25% tariff on Canadian steel and aluminum imports would be a gut punch to workers on both sides of the border. It will lead to job losses, higher consumer prices, and broken supply chains vital to industries like automotive, aerospace and defense.

“These proposed tariffs will not protect or grow American jobs – it will destroy them. The U.S. and Canadian economies are linked at the hip. Slapping a 25% tariff on these critical materials from Canada would put our national security at risk.

“Many of our members in aerospace and defense depend on parts and materials flowing freely between the U.S. and Canada. These tariffs will throw a wrench into the whole system, putting thousands of IAM Union and other jobs at risk. Our union doesn’t oppose tariffs, but we are advocates for strategic tariffs that protect domestic manufacturing and enhance national security.

“Instead of fighting with our closest ally, we should collaborate with Canada to take on real threats like China and Mexico. Unfair trade practices by China and Mexico have decimated the American aluminum industry, not Canada. We need cooperation, not conflict, to build a strong North American manufacturing sector.

“We urge President Trump to pull all stakeholders – government, business, and labor – together to forge a comprehensive strategy to protect and grow critical manufacturing in the United States and Canada.”

The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers is one of North America’s largest and most diverse industrial trade unions, representing approximately 600,000 active and retired members in the aerospace, defense, airlines, railroad, transit, healthcare, automotive, and other industries.

goIAM.org | @MachinistsUnion

Share and Follow:

MIL OSI USA News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: The European Financial Industry of the Future | 6. Frankfurt Digital Finance Conference & European Fintech Day

Source: Deutsche Bundesbank in English

Check against delivery.
Ladies and gentlemen,
I’m glad to join you today at the “Gesellschaftshaus Palmengarten”. Its history goes back to the 19th century. It was the “Gründerzeit” or “founders’ period” – an era of strong economic expansion in Germany – when this building was constructed. And when Germany was developed as an industrial location. Developed by people, men and women, lead by curiosity, innovation, and a desire to achieve.
We have to cast our minds back a few years to see times of growth, real innovation and increasing productivity in Europe.
1 The role of the financial industry
In the 2010s Germany had a period of solid growth that some called “the golden decade”.
Today, however, we see a need for growth and increasing productivity. Hence, our competitiveness is at stake. Not only in Germany, but also in other parts of Europe. And this comes at a time, when we are facing numerous major challenges:
Consider the significant geopolitical uncertainties of our time – which make a rethink necessary in many respects. Also consider the digitalisation of large parts of our economy, incl. disruptive AI. And think about the climate-related need for an ecological transformation.
Financing all of this requires a substantial amount of capital.
This is where the financial industry comes in: The financial industry can act as an enabler of growth in the real economy. Growth that is so much needed right now.
Looking forward, the financial industry could translate growth potential into real growth in many fields – digitalisation, AI, clean tech, pharma, biotech any many more.
In sum, there are huge business opportunities for Germany and the EU. And we need the Financial industry to take advantage of the business opportunities.
But let us not forget that innovation happens in many places – at start-ups but also at well established companies. We need to make sure that a variety of funding sources are available to support our real economies.
We need a specific financial ecosystem that enables young, innovative companies to flourish. Be it VC, PE, etc. We need established capital markets. Above all, we need a strong and healthy banking sector that supplies our economy with sufficient credit.
That means: We need both traditional loans and venture capital. In any case, all the pockets of the financial industry provide the basis for a growing economy. It’s also the basis for the ecological transformation.
The German Council of Experts on Climate Change published [a week ago] new figures on the investment needs estimated for the transition towards net-zero economic activity. Those investment needs range between 135 and 255 billion euro – each year for Germany alone.[1] That’s a lot.
Let’s now have a closer look at the digitalization including AI.
2 Artificial intelligence: innovation and competitiveness
The term artificial intelligence (AI) was coined in the middle of the 20th century. But it was the release of ChatGPT in November 2022 that marked a breakthrough. For the first time it became possible to use an AI system without detailed technical knowledge.
Nowadays almost anyone can use AI. The importance of responsible AI practices on the increase – as highlighted in the latest Declaration by the G20.[2]
There are important questions – to which, to be honest, there are no simple answers:
Are the opportunities and risks of AI balanced?
Does AI lead to a global fragmentation, to a new barrier between those who use AI and those who don’t?
Does AI, as a general-purpose technology, help us better manage economic challenges?[3]
One example of the latter point: Many societies are lacking skilled labour due to demographic change. Here, the use of AI could provide a solution by increasing efficiency or substituting human services. AI can also help drive innovation.
AI enables both incremental and disruptive innovation across all parts of society:
by facilitating faster decision-making
optimizing existing processes,
or by collecting, processing and using huge amounts of data.

It fosters creativity, supports scientific breakthroughs, and unlocks opportunities for entirely new industries and business models – a potential, albeit disruptive, growth engine.
Nevertheless, human creativity is still a key driver of innovation. In 2023, individuals or SMEs filed almost one in four patent applications in Europe.[4]
Today, we are at a crucial stage: With international competition on the one side and technical and intellectual skills on the other. AI models from the United States are well-known and often considered state of the art. China in particular has recently come up with new and apparently very efficient language models. However, the discussion about the background is not yet complete.
In Europe, we have to do our utmost to keep up with the pace. An important initiative recently came from France: In Paris the “EU AI Champions Initiative”, a high-level summit, was held at the beginning of this week.
President Macron mentioned a funding volume of roundabout € 109 billion for AI in France. This approach is very encouraging for other EU member states. By comparison: US-President Trump has mentioned USD 500 billion for his “Stargate” plan in the US.
Despite these substantial investments, there is no guarantee of success. On the other hand, we must not allow ourselves to be deterred by possible failures. One example is the French AI chatbot LUCIE, which has been taken offline after giving some weird answers. I am sure France will take this as a chance to try even harder.
The narrative with all kind of innovation is: Accept failure to grow. The pioneers of the “Gründerzeit” – which I mentioned earlier – knew this only too well.
We need this kind of courage to embrace a “culture of trial and error”. It provides an important impetus to do things better. On the other hand, we have to ensure that new technology does not cause severe damage. Especially because AI is a relatively new technology with unknown potential and consequences for the entire society.
Risks can arise for the financial system, but much further afield as well. Imagine, risk management or investment advice would be provided mainly by AI. Would this mean that investment recommendations are becoming more and more similar? Would we have concentration of risks? And what consequences would this have for financial stability?[5]
Even more far-reaching questions concern our society.
The core question is: What does AI mean for our democracies, for our constitutions, for our fundamental rights? Specifically, we need to ask ourselves: Where is AI beneficial and where do we need clear rules.
In other words: What are the basic rules for using this technology?
It is therefore necessary to find a compromise between having the courage to innovate – and clear rules.
3 Strengthening the financial industry
Regardless of how we deal with AI, we have to return to the issue of financing its development. As indicated earlier, the financial industry, as an enabler, has an important role to play.
Given the challenges of our time I mentioned earlier, it is vital to strengthen the European financial industry.
Let me highlight only two measures:
First, we need to get started on improving start-up funding. In 2024, more than 2,700 innovative start-ups were founded in Germany, the second-highest count after the record year of 2021. There is no shortage of innovative concepts and entrepreneurship per se, but implementation is lacking.
Further completing the European capital markets union (CMU) is essential in this respect – promoting the development of the VC and private equity market as well as exit options for start-ups. The European Commission’s “Competitiveness Compass”, published recently, 29 January 2025, is a good start.
Second, we need to leverage digital technologies to create efficient, integrated and resilient European financial markets. The digital CMU could be a game changer in this respect.
Let me make it perfectly clear: Europe is a leader in this field.
We at the Bundesbank are engaged in several initiatives. And we have a prominent role to play in the development of a central bank digital currency (wholesale CBDC).
4 Conclusion
Ladies and gentlemen, let me sum up: And I can be very brief, but still to the point.
The European Financial industry has to become an enabler of growth. Our Financial industry is key to ensure that the European economy stays competitive.
Thank you very much.

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI China: China builds over 2,100 ‘quiet communities’ to combat noise pollution

Source: China State Council Information Office 2

China has completed the construction of 2,132 “quiet communities” across the country as part of its efforts to tackle noise pollution, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment said on Wednesday.
The initiative aims to create residential areas with reduced noise levels to ensure improved sleep quality for residents, addressing one of the most common environmental complaints in urban areas.
The ministry has also expanded its noise-monitoring network, installing 4,005 automatic monitoring stations across 338 cities at or above the prefecture level by the end of 2024.
In a significant regulatory move, approximately 177,000 industrial enterprises have been brought under a noise-emissions permit system, which will achieve full coverage by the end of 2025.
In 2024, 11 provincial-level regions designated a total area of over 860 square kilometers as noise-sensitive building zones.
Urban noise levels have improved over the past five years, with compliance rates for both daytime and nighttime noise standards trending upward in designated functional zones, according to the ministry.

MIL OSI China News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Mainland spokesperson says Taiwan’s ban on DeepSeek anti-intellectual, absurd

Source: China State Council Information Office 2

A file photo of Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office. [Photo/Xinhua]
A mainland spokesperson on Wednesday called the ban imposed by Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities on AI models developed by mainland-based company DeepSeek an absurd move that uses anti-intellectual measures to pursue their anti-mainland agenda.
Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, made the remarks in response to a media query regarding the DPP authorities’ recent decision to impose a blanket ban on the use of DeepSeek AI models in government agencies and public schools.
Zhu criticized the DPP authorities for their fear and hostility toward both the mainland and mainland high-tech products, stressing that their arbitrary bans under the pretext of safeguarding security would ultimately harm the interests of businesses and the public on the island.
She added that the mainland welcomes Taiwan residents to use AI models developed by mainland enterprises and supports cross-Strait cooperation in the AI sector.
Zhu also responded to Lai Ching-te’s recent claims about increasing mainland espionage cases and intensified “united front” efforts against Taiwan. She said the DPP authorities repeatedly fabricated “mainland threat” and portrayed cross-Strait exchanges as a dire menace in pursuit of their separatist agenda.
This is the fundamental logic behind Lai and the DPP authorities’ continuous deception, fearmongering and deliberate efforts to escalate cross-Strait tensions, she added.
In response to a recent report by Taiwan’s mainland affairs council, which includes distorted information about the mainland, Zhu said Taiwan residents are warmly welcomed to visit the mainland.
As long as Taiwan compatriots see and feel the mainland in person, the rumors fabricated by the DPP authorities will surely collapse, she said.

MIL OSI China News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI China: China establishes over 30,000 smart factories: ministry

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

BEIJING, Feb. 12 — China has built over 30,000 basic-level smart factories as part of a nationwide push to accelerate industrial digitalization and intelligent upgrading, according to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT).

The initiative, under the smart factory gradient cultivation action, has also seen the creation of 1,200 advanced-level and 230 excellence-level smart factories. This achievement highlights the significant progress that has been made in reshaping the country’s manufacturing landscape, according to the ministry.

The 230 excellence-level factories, distributed across all 31 provincial regions in China and covering over 80 percent of manufacturing sectors, have carried out nearly 2,000 advanced scenarios, including smart warehousing, AI-powered quality inspections, and digital research and development, said MIIT.

On average, these factories are 28.4 percent shorter in product development cycles, 22.3 percent higher in production efficiency, 50.2 percent lower in defect rates and 20.4 percent lower in carbon emissions, said the ministry.

MIIT, alongside five other state agencies, jointly launched a smart factory gradient cultivation action last year and classified smart factories into four tiers based on technological maturity and integration depth, including the basic-level, the advanced-level, the excellence-level and the pioneer-level.

For instance, basic-level smart factories are required to develop foundational capabilities in digitization and networking. This involves deploying the necessary smart manufacturing equipment, industrial software, and systems centered around typical scenarios of smart manufacturing. By doing so, they can achieve real-time data collection, automation of key production processes, enhance the informatization of production and operational management, and utilize intelligence exploration in certain aspects.

Moving forward, MIIT will expand excellence-level smart factory promotion and prepare to launch pioneer-level cultivation, aiming to further promote the expansion, deeper integration, and elevated evolution of intelligent manufacturing, it said.

MIL OSI China News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI China: China’s icebreaker Xuelong-2 conducts marine ecosystem survey in Amundsen Sea

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

China’s icebreaker Xuelong-2 conducts marine ecosystem survey in Amundsen Sea

Updated: February 12, 2025 20:47 Xinhua

Members of China’s 41st Antarctic expedition team work on board of Chinese research icebreaker Xuelong 2, Feb. 4, 2025. Chinese research icebreaker Xuelong 2, or Snow Dragon 2, is conducting a month-long marine ecosystem survey in the Amundsen Sea, which include a comprehensive investigation and monitoring of biological ecology, water, sedimentary and atmospheric environment, and pollutant distribution. [Photo/Xinhua]

A member of China’s 41st Antarctic expedition team takes a picture of a zooplankter with microscope on board of Chinese research icebreaker Xuelong 2, Feb. 2, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Members of China’s 41st Antarctic expedition team release equipment to collect marine sediment samples on board of Chinese research icebreaker Xuelong 2, Feb. 9, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

A picture taken with a microscope shows a zooplankter caught in the Amundsen Sea, Jan. 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Members of China’s 41st Antarctic expedition team read riddles on the occasion of the Lantern Festival on board of Chinese research icebreaker Xuelong 2, Feb. 12, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

A member of China’s 41st Antarctic expedition team operates devices to release equipment for collecting marine sediment samples on board of Chinese research icebreaker Xuelong 2, Feb. 9, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

Members of China’s 41st Antarctic expedition team prepare to release equipment for collecting marine sediment samples on board of Chinese research icebreaker Xuelong 2, Feb. 9, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

MIL OSI China News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Singapore ETO holds Chinese New Year dinner to promote Hong Kong (with photos)

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Singapore ETO holds Chinese New Year dinner to promote Hong Kong (with photos)
Singapore ETO holds Chinese New Year dinner to promote Hong Kong (with photos)
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The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, Singapore (Singapore ETO) hosted a dinner at the Fullerton Bay Hotel Singapore in Singapore yesterday (February 11) to celebrate Chinese New Year and to promote Hong Kong. Over 200 guests from the government sector, foreign embassies in Singapore, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, business associations, academic institutions and cultural organisations attended, as well as the local Hong Kong community. Speaking at the dinner, the Director of the Singapore ETO, Mr Owin Fung, reviewed the work and achievements of Hong Kong and Singapore collaboration in recent years, including the visit by the Chief Executive, Mr John Lee, to Singapore in 2023, during which he led a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region business delegation and signed seven Memoranda of Understanding. In January this year, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry of Singapore, Mr Gan Kim Yong, also led a high-level business delegation to Hong Kong, engaging in high-level discussions on traditional and emerging business sectors. Furthermore, 23 Singaporean companies expanded or established operations in Hong Kong in 2023, demonstrating Singapore enterprises’ investment interest and confidence in Hong Kong. Both sides expect to further build bilateral ties. Mr Fung also took the opportunity to introduce, through a video, the Kai Tak Sports Park which is set to open on March 1. Major events and activities will be held at the park. Projects such as the Kai Tak Sports Park and the West Kowloon Cultural District exemplify Hong Kong’s cultural and soft power. During the dinner, Hong Kong singer-songwriter Chet Lam, along with four band members, performed as guest artists. They delivered a selection of Cantonese, English, and Putonghua songs, including “Singapore Pie”, a piece by Liang Wern Fook, a renowned Singaporean lyricist, composer and Xinyao singer. Earlier, they and other Hong Kong musicians participated in an outdoor concert and talk under the “Hong Kong Pop Culture Festival @ Huayi” held in Singapore. The events were sponsored and supported by the Leisure and Cultural Services Department and the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Singapore. Mr Fung concluded that the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), as Hong Kong’s second-largest merchandise trading partner, presents significant opportunities. Amid global economic challenges, Hong Kong has emphasised its unique advantages under the “one country, two systems” arrangement, serving as a gateway between Mainland China and global markets, while reinforcing connectivity with traditional markets and exploring emerging markets in ASEAN and the Middle East, with the Greater Bay Area as a key focus for collaboration. Looking ahead, Singapore ETO will host its first Chinese New Year dinner in Ho Chi Minh City on February 28 to celebrate the Year of the Snake and the 30th anniversary of the Office, while enhancing communication with local communities in Vietnam.

Ends/Wednesday, February 12, 2025Issued at HKT 13:39

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MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ8: Hosting events of 15th National Games, 12th National Games for Persons with Disabilities and 9th National Special Olympic Games

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

     Following is a question by the Hon Kenneth Lau and a written reply by the Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism, Miss Rosanna Law, in the Legislative Council today (February 12):

Question:

     The 15th National Games (NG), the 12th National Games for Persons with Disabilities (NGD) and the 9th National Special Olympic Games (NSOG) to be co-hosted by Guangdong Province, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region for the first time will be held from November 9 to 21 and from December 8 to 15 this year respectively. Hong Kong will host eight competition events and one mass participation event for the 15th NG, as well as four competition events and one mass participation event for the 12th NGD and the 9th NSOG. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the following information on the events to be hosted in Hong Kong: (i) the arrangements for event management and competition schedules, (ii) the number of participating athletes, (iii) the expected number of spectators, (iv) the details of the publicity and promotional activities, and (v) the ticketing arrangements;

(2) of the specific measures put in place by the authorities to enhance the ancillary transport facilities and capacity of the main stadiums and venues of the events to be hosted in Hong Kong (including Kai Tak Sports Park, Hong Kong Coliseum, Hong Kong Velodrome, Hong Kong Golf Club – Fanling Golf Course, Victoria Park, and Central Harbourfront Event Space and Victoria Harbour) during the events;

(3) as it is learnt that the recruitment of volunteers for the 15th NG, the 12th NGD and the 9th NSOG was conducted from July to November last year, of (i) the number of applications received, (ii) the number of volunteers finally selected and (iii) their age distribution;

(4) as it is learnt that the selected volunteers mentioned in (3) will mainly be responsible for tasks such as reception services upon arrival and departure, spectator services, guest reception, crowd control, transport and logistics, catering management and presentation ceremony support, and will receive training, of the details of the manpower establishment and training of volunteers for the aforesaid tasks; and

(5) whether it has assessed if the number of selected volunteers mentioned in (3) can meet the relevant manpower demand, and whether it will consider recruiting more volunteers or mobilising civil servants to participate in the support work for the 15th NG, the 12th NGD and the 9th NSOG; if it will, of the details; if not, the reasons for that?

Reply:

President,

     Co-hosted by Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao, the 15th National Games (15th NG), and the 12th National Games for Persons with Disabilities and the 9th National Special Olympic Games (12th NGD and 9th NSOG) will be held from November 9 to 21 and from December 8 to 15, 2025, respectively. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government has been maintaining close liaison with the General Administration of Sport of China (GASC), the China Disabled Persons’ Federation (CDPF), the People’s Government of Guangdong Province, and the Macao Special Administrative Region Government. In addition, the HKSAR Government has been working with the concerned National Sports Associations and other related organisations in Hong Kong to press ahead with the preparatory work. Bringing success to the 15th NG and the 12th NGD and 9th NSOG is a significant mission of the HKSAR Government this year, and they are also mega events. We will continue to dedicate the fullest efforts to taking forward the related work with a view to coâ€‘hosting a “simple, safe and wonderful” 15th NG as well as 12th NGD and 9th NSOG in collaboration with Guangdong and Macao, and thereby deepening the exchanges and collaborations in sports between Hong Kong and the Greater Bay Area cities, and also their overall integrated development.

     Our reply to the question raised by the Hon Kenneth Lau is as follows:

(1)(i) The 15th NG will have competition events for 34 sports and mass participation events for 23 sports. Hong Kong will host eight competition events (namely basketball (men U22), track cycling, fencing, golf, handball (men), rugby sevens, triathlon and beach volleyball) and one mass participation event (namely bowling). In addition, Hong Kong will assist Zhuhai and Shenzhen respectively in organising two cross-boundary events, namely road cycling and marathon.

     The 12th NGD and 9th NSOG will have competition events for 35 sports and mass participation events for 11 sports. Hong Kong will host four competition events (namely boccia, wheelchair fencing and table tennis (TT11) for NGD, and table tennis for NSOG) and one mass participation event (namely para dance sport).

     In view of the numerous events in the 15th NG and the 12th NGD and 9th NSOG, the Governments of Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao are co-ordinating the overall schedules of the Games for submission to the GASC and the CDPF for approval. We will continue to liaise closely with the GASC, the CDPF as well as the Governments of Guangdong and Macao with a view to finalising the schedules of the 15th NG and the 12th NGD and 9th NSOG as soon as possible. The details will be announced in due course.

(ii) Based on the competition prospectuses and guidelines promulgated by the GASC and the CDPF, it is estimated that about 1 800 and 700 athletes will participate respectively in the 15th NG events and the 12th NGD and 9th NSOG events in Hong Kong. In addition, it is estimated that about 1 000 delegation officials (including coaches, team physicians), 800 technical officials (including referees), and 750 members of the media will visit Hong Kong during the 15th NG and the 12th NGD and 9th NSOG.

(iii) It is estimated that the events in Hong Kong will attract more than 100 000 spectators from Hong Kong, the Mainland and other regions.

(iv) The Culture, Sports and Tourism Bureau (CSTB) is working with relevant government departments and organisations to launch territory-wide publicity and promotion campaigns through various online and offline channels, with a view to enhancing the awareness and interest in the 15th NG and the 12th NGD and 9th NSOG among different sectors of the community. The initiatives include conducting multi-channel publicity through traditional media, social media, city dress-up and roving exhibitions; organising community and school promotion programmes in co-operation with local organisations and schools; hosting feature events such as exchanges with athletes and sports experiential activities in collaboration with sports organisations; and launching a dedicated website and applications for digital marketing.

     The first stage of the publicity and promotion campaigns was launched during November to December last year to tie in with the one-year countdown to the 15th NG and the 12th NGD and 9th NSOG, which included rolling out a series of cityscape enhancement, roving exhibitions, publicity videos, thematic website (www.2025nationalgames.gov.hk) and social media pages (www.facebook.com/2025nationalgames.hk, www.instagram.com/2025nationalgames.hk) of Hong Kong for the Games. The second stage commenced in January this year, with initiatives including city dress-up and photo-taking spots featuring the mascots of the Games, enhancing the design of the thematic website, enriching social media content, etc. The third stage, covering the 100-day countdown, torch relay, etc, will begin in August 2025. We will do our utmost to foster a welcoming atmosphere and enhance the popularity and participation of the Games in Hong Kong, whilst encouraging Hong Kong people and tourists to watch the Games and cheer for the athletes.

(v) Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao are discussing the ticketing plans and sales arrangements for the 15th NG and the 12th NGD and 9th NSOG. The three places will adopt the same sales platform.

(2) The competition venues for the events in Hong Kong, including the soonâ€‘to-open Kai Tak Sports Park, have hosted various large-scale events and competitions previously, or undergone different drills and stress tests. The CSTB is, in collaboration with the relevant departments including the Hong Kong Police Force, the Transport Department, conducting a detailed assessment on the traffic and transport arrangements to and from the venues having regard to the transport facilities and capacity of the venues, their past experiences in staging competitions, and the number of participating athletes and spectators for each event. We will formulate specific transport measures and special transport arrangements having regard to the assessment, and discuss with the various public transport operators on strengthening the public transport service as appropriate.

(3) (i) to (iii) The recruitment of volunteers for the Hong Kong Volunteer Programme of the 15th NG and the 12th NGD and 9th NSOG was conducted from July to November last year. We received a total of over 30 000 applications for volunteer leaders or volunteers. In addition, about 2 000 young people aged between 15 and 17 have applied as youth volunteers. The selection interviews for volunteer leaders and volunteers were completed in January this year, and we plan to invite about 15 000 applicants to attend training. Individuals completing all the required training sessions will be appointed as the Games’ volunteers in Hong Kong. The final number of volunteers and their age distribution will only be available after completion of the whole recruitment exercise.

(4) We are formulating the detailed volunteer deployment plan. We will take into account the nature and arrangements of individual events as well as the numbers of participating athletes and spectators, and thereby assessing the requirements for supporting services and the types of volunteer positions. We will also estimate the manpower requirement for different volunteer positions having regard to factors such as the skills required, the service hours and the place of work of the positions involved.

     All volunteers are required to attend basic training and position-related training. The basic training, lasting for about two days, will cover various areas including the background of the 15th NG and the 12th NGD and 9th NSOG and a brief introduction of the events in Hong Kong; the principles, code of practice and etiquette of volunteer work; communication, response and problem-solving skills; the ways of assisting people with disabilities and basic first-aid knowledge. Volunteer leaders are required to receive additional advanced training of about two days, covering the roles of volunteer leaders, the ways of handling unexpected situations, expectation management, mental health management, media handling skills, operation of volunteer management system, skills in leading and bonding volunteers. We will start the training for volunteer leaders in February this year and that for volunteers in general in March.

(5) The response to the Hong Kong Volunteer Programme has been satisfactory, with the number of applicants succeeding in the selection far exceeding the original recruitment target of 10 000 volunteers. The volunteer applicants have already included members of civil service volunteer teams. At present, we have no plan to recruit additional volunteers.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ15: Promoting development of the fund industry

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

     Following is a question by the Hon Robert Lee and a written reply by the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Mr Christopher Hui, in the Legislative Council today (February 12):

Question:

     There are views that the Government should actively take forward a more comprehensive support policy to promote the development of the fund industry as a whole on all fronts. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) whether it has compiled statistics on the respective shares of capital allocations from Hong Kong’s offshore Renminbi (RMB) (liquidity pool to mutual funds, deposits, stocks, bonds and other investment vehicles, together with a breakdown by holders of such capital, i.e. retail investors, institutional investors, and enterprises; given that the Government is actively promoting the internationalisation of RMB, what measures it has in place to guide more offshore RMB capital to invest in various fund products, so as to promote the development of related businesses;

(2) whether it has compiled statistics on the respective shares of Mainland capital investments in Hong Kong funds and bank deposits under the constant enhancement of the Cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect (WMC) Scheme in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, and in which types of funds the investments are mainly made; of the Government’s plans in place to discuss with the Mainland regulatory authorities about further expansion of the scope of fund products under WMC, as well as all-‍round coverage of cross-border fund sales and promotional activities;

(3) whether the Government will step up negotiations with the Mainland regulatory authorities to further increase the number of funds and product types under the mutual recognition of funds scheme; whether it knows if information on such recognised funds will be included in the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited’s Integrated Fund Platform to facilitate trading by investors; and

(4) of the respective proportions of the amounts invested in “financial assets” and “non-financial assets” by applicants of the New Capital Investment Entrant Scheme after its implementation, together with a breakdown by the classification of assets; whether the Government will publish the relevant statistics on a regular basis; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that?

Reply:

President,

     Hong Kong is an international asset and wealth management centre, with assets under management exceeding HK$31 trillion. The Government has been attracting more global capital to be managed in Hong Kong through a series of measures with the aim of propelling the all-rounded development of the fund industry. In consultation with Invest Hong Kong (InvestHK), the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX), my reply to the various parts of the question is as follows:

(1) With the support of the Central People’s Government, Hong Kong is a premier global offshore Renminbi (RMB) business hub which possesses the world’s largest offshore pool of RMB funds, and operates the largest foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives market. Hong Kong also provides a diversified range of RMB products and services, with a leading position in RMB settlement, financing and asset management.

     The Government has been promoting the development of the offshore RMB business in Hong Kong, and has been actively deepening the mutual access between the Mainland and Hong Kong financial markets, so as to assist the high-level opening up of our country’s capital market. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced in April 2024 a series of measures to promote the expansion of the mutual access between the financial markets of the Mainland and Hong Kong. These measures include expanding the eligible product scope of equity exchange-traded funds (ETFs) under Stock Connect and including real estate investment trusts (REITs) under Stock Connect, which would support the Hong Kong financial market by increasing the availability of attractive investment products, providing more investment opportunities for domestic and international investors, and consolidating Hong Kong’s position as an offshore RMB business hub.

     In addition, the HKMA and the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) announced on January 13 this year new measures to further strengthen Hong Kong’s position as a global offshore RMB business hub. Relevant measures include the introduction of the HKMA RMB Trade Financing Liquidity Facility, further enhancement and expansion of Bond Connect (Southbound), development of offshore RMB repurchase business using Northbound Bond Connect bonds as collateral, inclusion of Northbound Bond Connect bonds as eligible margin collateral at OTC Clearing Hong Kong Limited, promoting cross-boundary payment facilitation and financial facilitation in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA). We will press ahead with the development of an offshore RMB ecosystem to promote the internationalisation of the RMB in a steady and prudent manner.

     In terms of financial products, besides RMB foreign exchange trading products, the offshore RMB investment products and services offered in Hong Kong also include RMB-denominated stocks, ETF, REIT, futures contracts for precious metals, and other diversified financial products. However, the Government does not maintain data on the allocation of funds within the offshore RMB pool to various investment products.

(2) Cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect (WMC) has seen continuous and steady development since its launch in September 2021. “WMC 2.0” commenced on February 26, 2024, with enhancement measures including increasing the individual investor quota from RMB1 million to RMB3 million, lowering the threshold for participating in the Southbound Scheme to support more GBA residents to participate in the scheme, expanding the scope of participating institutions to include eligible securities firms, expanding the scope of eligible investment products, and further enhancing the promotion and sales arrangements. According to the statistics published by the PBoC, up to end-2024, over 136 000 individual investors in the GBA participated in the WMC and cross-boundary fund remittances (including Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao) amounting to over RMB99.4 billion had been recorded.

     Currently, the scope of eligible products under the Southbound Scheme includes all “non-complex” funds domiciled in Hong Kong and authorised by the SFC that primarily invest in Greater China equity; low-risk to medium-high-risk “non-complex” funds domiciled in Hong Kong and authorised by the SFC (excluding high-yield bond funds and single emerging market equity funds); low-risk to medium-risk and non-complex bonds; and RMB, Hong Kong dollar and foreign currency deposits. The Government does not maintain data on the proportion of Mainland capital invested in these different products.

     The Government and Hong Kong regulatory authorities will continue to maintain close communication with the industry and the Mainland regulatory authorities, and continuously review the implementation of “WMC 2.0” with a view to exploring further enhancement measures, including the product scope and sales arrangements.

(3) The Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition of Funds (MRF) arrangement (the “Arrangement”) was launched in July 2015, where eligible Mainland and Hong Kong funds can be offered to retail investors in each other’s market through a streamlined vetting process. As of end-2024, a total of 83 funds were authorised by the regulators of the two places, with aggregate net subscription amount of around RMB43.5 billion.

     The Arrangement has been enhanced with effect from January 1, 2025. Enhancements include relaxing the sales restriction and allowing Hong Kong funds to delegate investment management functions to overseas asset management companies within the same group. The measures will significantly increase the diversity of fund products, enhance the scale of funds, and bring positive effect to the distribution of Hong Kong MRF funds in the Mainland. The SFC will maintain close co-operation with the CSRC to continuously explore and discuss enhancement measures, so as to fully leverage Hong Kong’s distinct advantage and role as an international financial centre and a bridge for two-way capital flow to facilitate a higher level of two-way opening in the country’s capital market.

     On the other hand, the Integrated Fund Platform (the Platform) developed by HKEX will help lower the entry threshold of the fund industry, broaden Hong Kong’s fund distribution network, and enhance market efficiency. The first phase of the Platform (the Fund Repository) was launched in December 2024 to facilitate investors’ access to information on fund investment options. Other services of the Platform will be rolled out gradually from this year with functionalities including fund subscription and redemption (including MRF funds), settlement, and nominee services.

(4) The New Capital Investment Entrant Scheme (New CIES) was open for application on March 1, 2024 to further enrich the talent pool and attract new capital to Hong Kong. An eligible applicant must make investment of a minimum of HK$30 million in the permissible investment assets, including investing a minimum of HK$27 million in permissible financial assets and/or real estate (subject to a cap of HK$10 million), and placing HK$3 million into a new Capital Investment Entrant Scheme Investment Portfolio (CIES Investment Portfolio).

     As of end-2024, InvestHK has received over 800 applications, and approved 240 applications for Assessment for Investment Requirements. Except for the applicants’ investment in Hong Kong under the New CIES, the Government does not maintain the data on the investments made by applicants in Hong Kong outside the New CIES. Excluding the sum for investing in the CIES Investment Portfolio, the approved investment distribution is as follows:

Investment amount (HK$ Million)

Eligible collective investment schemes
2,968

Equities
2,553

Debt securities
1,018

Real estate
10

Certificates of deposits
5

Total
6,554

     The Government will continuously review the applicants’ investment arrangement and room for enhancing the New CIES, including further enhancing the net asset assessment and calculation requirements and allowing applicants to hold assets through his/her wholly owned eligible private company with effect from March 1 this year, thereby attracting global asset owners to establish their presence in Hong Kong.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Mainland condemns US-Japan joint declaration for containing irresponsible Taiwan remarks

Source: China State Council Information Office

A file photo of Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. [Photo/Xinhua]

A mainland spokesperson on Wednesday condemned the recent U.S.-Japan joint declaration for its irresponsible remarks on Taiwan, calling it a blatant interference in China’s internal affairs.

Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, made the comments in response to a media query concerning the joint declaration reached between leaders of the United States and Japan after their recent meeting.

Zhu urged the United States to abide by the one-China principle and three China-U.S. joint communiques and stop sending any wrong signal to “Taiwan independence” separatist elements.

Noting that Japan is a country with historical responsibility regarding the Taiwan question, Zhu said Japan should learn from history, exercise caution in its words and actions, adhere to the four China-Japan political documents, and handle Taiwan-related issues prudently.

She also warned the Democratic Progressive Party authorities in Taiwan that any attempt to rely on external forces to divide the country is doomed to fail.

MIL OSI China News –

February 13, 2025
MIL-OSI China: China opposes any provocation under pretext of freedom of navigation: FM spokesperson

Source: China State Council Information Office

A file photo of Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun. [Photo/fmprc.gov.cn]

China firmly opposes any act of provocation by any country under the pretext of freedom of navigation, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said here on Wednesday.

Guo made the remarks at a daily news briefing in response to the U.S. warships’ transit through the Taiwan Strait this week, saying that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command has issued a response.

Guo stressed that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, and the Taiwan question is not about freedom of navigation but about China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

“The Chinese side firmly opposes any attempt by any country to make provocations and threaten China’s sovereignty and security under the pretext of freedom of navigation,” Guo said.

MIL OSI China News –

February 13, 2025

Category: China

1 The role of the financial industry

2 Artificial intelligence: innovation and competitiveness

3 Strengthening the financial industry

4 Conclusion

WAVES offers a golden opportunity for Reel Makers and Professional Ad Filmmakers to shine as celebritesHurry up! Only two days left, don’t miss this chance to have your work recognized on a global stage, Submit your entry by February 15th

Wide consensus

Environmental challenges

Signing the first international treaty on AI

What does this really mean?

China’s open-source AI takeover

AI with Chinese characteristics

The conflicted reactions of US big tech

End of the ‘Silicon Valley effect’?

A new era of geotechnopolitics

Caseload

Expedited procedure

Parties

Place of arbitration

Amounts in dispute

ICC International Centre for ADR

Related news

The media charm offensive

Co-opting local voices

‘Win-win’ promises

The war for Africa’s media soul

1. Healthcare

2. Robotics and wearables

3. Exploring the cosmos

Challenges and opportunities

Cautionary lessons

What conclusions should be drawn?

Cautionary lessons

What conclusions should be drawn?

WAVES offers a golden opportunity for Reel Makers and Professional Ad Filmmakers to shine as celebrites

Hurry up! Only two days left, don’t miss this chance to have your work recognized on a global stage, Submit your entry by February 15th