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Category: China

  • MIL-OSI: Qorvo® Announces Fiscal 2025 Third Quarter Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    GREENSBORO, N.C., Jan. 28, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Qorvo® (Nasdaq:QRVO), a leading global provider of connectivity and power solutions, today announced financial results for the Company’s fiscal 2025 third quarter ended December 28, 2024.

    On a GAAP basis, revenue for Qorvo’s fiscal 2025 third quarter was $916.3 million, gross margin was 42.7%, operating income was $53.0 million, and diluted earnings per share was $0.43. On a non-GAAP basis, gross margin was 46.5%, operating income was $177.9 million, and diluted earnings per share was $1.61.

    Bob Bruggeworth, president and chief executive officer of Qorvo, said, “Qorvo is executing on a broad set of strategic initiatives to expand margin, generate strong free cash flow, and increase shareholder value. During the December quarter, we continued to successfully support our largest customer, who represented approximately 50% of sales. Within our Android 5G product portfolio, we are narrowing our focus to the higher-value flagship and premium tiers, where customers value Qorvo’s differentiated products. In HPA, we had record Defense & Aerospace quarterly revenue and expect continued strength in the March quarter. As we continue to execute on our growth and diversification strategy, we expect HPA and CSG to deliver double-digit growth in fiscal 2025 and next fiscal year.”

    Financial Commentary and Outlook

    Grant Brown, chief financial officer of Qorvo, said, “Qorvo exceeded the midpoint of our December quarter non-GAAP guidance in revenue, gross margin, and EPS. During the quarter, we took proactive steps to change how we support our Android business. These actions will reduce operating expense and are expected to benefit gross margin in our fiscal 2026. Subsequent to the quarter, we divested our silicon carbide business. These actions, in aggregate, are expected to support a high-40%’s gross margin in seasonally strong quarters of fiscal 2026 and additional gross margin improvement in fiscal 2027.”

    Qorvo’s current outlook for the March 2025 quarter is:

    • Quarterly revenue of approximately $850 million, plus or minus $25 million1
    • Non-GAAP gross margin between 43% and 44%
    • Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share between $0.90 and $1.10

    1 Includes immaterial silicon carbide revenue, versus silicon carbide revenue of approximately $9 million in the December 2024 quarter

    See “Forward-looking non-GAAP financial measures” below. Qorvo’s actual quarterly results may differ from these expectations and projections, and such differences may be material.

    Selected Financial Information

    The following tables set forth selected GAAP and non-GAAP financial information for Qorvo for the periods indicated. See the more detailed financial information for Qorvo, including reconciliations of GAAP and non-GAAP financial information, attached.

    SELECTED GAAP RESULTS
    (In millions, except for percentages and EPS)
    (Unaudited)
                           
      Q3 Fiscal 2025   Q2 Fiscal 2025   Q3 Fiscal 2024   Sequential Change   Year-over-Year Change
    Revenue $ 916.3     $ 1,046.5     $ 1,073.9     $ (130.2 )   $ (157.6 )
    Gross profit $ 391.4     $ 445.3     $ 387.9     $ (53.9 )   $ 3.5  
    Gross margin   42.7 %     42.6 %     36.1 %   0.1 ppt   6.6 ppt
    Operating expenses $ 338.4     $ 435.6     $ 429.4     $ (97.2 )   $ (91.0 )
    Operating income (loss) $ 53.0     $ 9.7     $ (41.6 )   $ 43.3     $ 94.6  
    Net income (loss) $ 41.3     $ (17.4 )   $ (126.9 )   $ 58.7     $ 168.2  
    Weighted-average diluted shares   95.0       94.9       97.2       0.1       (2.2 )
    Diluted EPS (loss per share) $ 0.43     $ (0.18 )   $ (1.31 )   $ 0.61     $ 1.74  
                           
                           
    SELECTED NON-GAAP RESULTS(1)
    (In millions, except for percentages and EPS)
    (Unaudited)
                           
      Q3 Fiscal 2025   Q2 Fiscal 2025   Q3 Fiscal 2024   Sequential Change   Year-over-Year Change
    Revenue $ 916.3     $ 1,046.5     $ 1,073.9     $ (130.2 )   $ (157.6 )
    Gross profit $ 426.3     $ 492.0     $ 470.5     $ (65.7 )   $ (44.2 )
    Gross margin   46.5 %     47.0 %     43.8 %   (0.5) ppt   2.7 ppt
    Operating expenses $ 248.4     $ 279.8     $ 234.0     $ (31.4 )   $ 14.4  
    Operating income $ 177.9     $ 212.2     $ 236.5     $ (34.3 )   $ (58.6 )
    Net income $ 152.8     $ 179.8     $ 205.9     $ (27.0 )   $ (53.1 )
    Weighted-average diluted shares   95.0       95.8       97.8       (0.8 )     (2.8 )
    Diluted EPS $ 1.61     $ 1.88     $ 2.10     $ (0.27 )   $ (0.49 )

    (1) Adjusted for stock-based compensation expense, amortization of intangible assets, restructuring-related charges, acquisition and integration-related costs, goodwill and other asset impairments, net adjustments related to a terminated capacity reservation agreement, gain or loss on assets, other expense or income, gain or loss on investments, and an adjustment of income taxes.

    SELECTED GAAP RESULTS BY OPERATING SEGMENT
    (In millions, except percentages)
    (Unaudited)
      Q3 Fiscal 2025   Q2 Fiscal 2025   Q3 Fiscal 2024   Sequential Change   Year-over-Year Change
    Revenue                  
    HPA $ 171.7     $ 148.3     $ 118.9     15.8 %   44.4 %
    CSG   109.5       146.8       108.9     (25.4 )%   0.6 %
    ACG   635.1       751.4       846.1     (15.5 )%   (24.9 )%
    Total revenue $ 916.3     $ 1,046.5     $ 1,073.9     (12.4 )%   (14.7 )%
    Operating income (loss)                  
    HPA $ 32.6     $ 13.1     $ 1.6     148.9 %   1,937.5 %
    CSG   (11.7 )     (9.0 )     (25.6 )   (30.0 )%   54.3 %
    ACG   161.2       215.1       263.8     (25.1 )%   (38.9 )%
    All other(1)   (129.1 )     (209.5 )     (281.4 )   38.4 %   54.1 %
    Total operating income (loss) $ 53.0     $ 9.7     $ (41.6 )   446.4 %   227.4 %
    Operating income (loss) as a % of revenue                      
    HPA   19.0 %     8.8 %     1.3 %   10.2 ppt   17.7 ppt
    CSG   (10.7 )     (6.1 )     (23.5 )   (4.6) ppt   12.8 ppt
    ACG   25.4       28.6       31.2     (3.2) ppt   (5.8) ppt
    Total operating income (loss) as a % of revenue   5.8 %     0.9 %   (3.9 )%   4.9 ppt   9.7 ppt

    (1) Includes stock-based compensation expense, amortization of intangible assets, restructuring-related charges, acquisition and integration-related costs, goodwill and other asset impairments, net adjustments related to a terminated capacity reservation agreement, gain or loss on assets, other expense or income, costs associated with upgrading certain of the Company’s core business systems and other miscellaneous corporate overhead expenses.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    In addition to disclosing financial results calculated in accordance with United States (U.S.) generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), this earnings release contains some or all of the following non-GAAP financial measures: (i) non-GAAP gross profit and gross margin, (ii) non-GAAP operating expenses, operating income and operating margin, (iii) non-GAAP net income, (iv) non-GAAP net income per diluted share, (v) free cash flow, (vi) EBITDA, (vii) non-GAAP return on invested capital (ROIC), and (viii) net debt or positive net cash. Each of these non-GAAP financial measures is either adjusted from GAAP results to exclude certain expenses or derived from multiple GAAP measures, which are outlined in the “Reconciliation of GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures” tables, attached, and the “Additional Selected Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Reconciliations” tables, attached.

    In managing Qorvo’s business on a consolidated basis, management develops an annual operating plan, which is approved by our Board of Directors, using non-GAAP financial measures. In developing and monitoring performance against this plan, management considers the actual or potential impacts on these non-GAAP financial measures from actions taken to reduce costs with the goal of increasing gross margin and operating margin. In addition, management relies upon these non-GAAP financial measures to assess whether research and development efforts are at an appropriate level, and when making decisions about product spending, administrative budgets, and other operating expenses. Also, we believe that non-GAAP financial measures provide useful supplemental information to investors and enable investors to analyze the results of operations in the same way as management. We have chosen to provide this supplemental information to enable investors to perform additional comparisons of our operating results, to assess our liquidity and capital position and to analyze financial performance excluding the effect of expenses unrelated to operations, and stock-based compensation expense, which may obscure trends in Qorvo’s underlying performance.

    We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures offer an additional view of Qorvo’s operations that, when coupled with the GAAP results and the reconciliations to corresponding GAAP financial measures, provide a more complete understanding of Qorvo’s results of operations and the factors and trends affecting Qorvo’s business. However, these non-GAAP financial measures should be considered as a supplement to, and not as a substitute for, or superior to, the corresponding measures calculated in accordance with GAAP.

    Our rationale for using these non-GAAP financial measures, as well as their impact on the presentation of Qorvo’s operations, are outlined below:

    Non-GAAP gross profit and gross margin. Non-GAAP gross profit and gross margin exclude amortization of intangible assets, stock-based compensation expense, restructuring-related charges, acquisition and integration-related costs, and certain other expense (income). We believe that exclusion of these costs in presenting non-GAAP gross profit and gross margin facilitates a useful evaluation of our historical performance and projected costs and the potential for realizing cost efficiencies.

    We view amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets, such as the amortization of the cost associated with an acquired company’s research and development efforts, trade names, and customer relationships, as items arising from pre-acquisition activities, determined at the time of an acquisition, rather than ongoing costs of operating Qorvo’s business. While these intangible assets are continually evaluated for impairment, amortization of the cost of purchased intangible assets is a static expense, which is not typically affected by operations during any particular period. Although we exclude the amortization of purchased intangible assets from these non-GAAP financial measures, management believes that it is important for investors to understand that such intangible assets were recorded as part of purchase price accounting and contribute to revenue generation.

    We believe that presentation of non-GAAP gross profit and gross margin and other non-GAAP financial measures that exclude the impact of stock-based compensation expense assists management and investors in evaluating the period-over-period performance of Qorvo’s ongoing operations because (i) the expenses are non-cash in nature, and (ii) although the size of the grants is within our control, the amount of expense varies depending on factors such as short-term fluctuations in stock price volatility and prevailing interest rates, which can be unrelated to the operational performance of Qorvo during the period in which the expense is incurred and generally are outside the control of management. Moreover, we believe that the exclusion of stock-based compensation expense in presenting non-GAAP gross profit and gross margin and other non-GAAP financial measures is useful to investors to understand the impact of the expensing of stock-based compensation to Qorvo’s gross profit and gross margins and other financial measures in comparison to prior periods. We also believe that the adjustments to profit and margin related to restructuring-related charges, and acquisition and integration-related costs do not constitute part of Qorvo’s ongoing operations and therefore the exclusion of these items provides management and investors with better visibility into the actual costs required to generate revenues over time and facilitates a useful evaluation of our historical and projected performance. We believe disclosure of non-GAAP gross profit and gross margin has economic substance because the excluded expenses do not represent continuing cash expenditures and, as described above, we have little control over the timing and amount of the expenses in question.

    Non-GAAP gross profit and gross margin also exclude net adjustments related to a terminated capacity reservation agreement. In October 2023, a long-term capacity reservation agreement with a foundry supplier was amended. Pursuant to the amendment, Qorvo is no longer obligated to order silicon wafers from the foundry supplier and the agreement was terminated effective December 31, 2023. Included in the net adjustments to our cost of goods sold for the third quarter of fiscal 2024 is a contract termination fee which we paid during the fourth quarter of fiscal 2024. We believe these net adjustments are not reflective of the performance of our ongoing business.

    Non-GAAP operating expenses, operating income and operating margin. Non-GAAP operating expenses, operating income and operating margin exclude stock-based compensation expense, amortization of intangible assets, acquisition and integration-related costs, goodwill and other asset impairments, restructuring-related charges, net adjustments related to a terminated capacity reservation agreement, (gain) loss on assets and certain other expense (income). We believe that presentation of a measure of operating expenses, operating income and operating margin that excludes amortization of intangible assets and stock-based compensation expense is useful to both management and investors for the same reasons as described above with respect to our use of non-GAAP gross profit and gross margin. We believe that acquisition and integration-related costs, goodwill and other asset impairments, restructuring-related charges, net adjustments related to a terminated capacity reservation agreement, (gain) loss on assets and certain other expense (income) do not constitute part of Qorvo’s ongoing operations and therefore, the exclusion of these costs provides management and investors with better visibility into the actual costs required to generate revenues over time and facilitates a useful evaluation of our historical and projected performance. We believe disclosure of non-GAAP operating expenses, operating income and operating margin has economic substance because the excluded expenses are either unrelated to ongoing operations or do not represent current cash expenditures.

    Non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per diluted share. Non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per diluted share exclude the effects of stock-based compensation expense, amortization of intangible assets, acquisition and integration-related costs, goodwill and other asset impairments, restructuring-related charges, net adjustments related to a terminated capacity reservation agreement, (gain) loss on assets, certain other expense (income), gain or loss on investments, and also reflect an adjustment of income taxes. The income tax adjustment primarily represents the use of research and development tax credit carryforwards, deferred tax expense (benefit) items not affecting taxes payable, adjustments related to the deemed and actual repatriation of historical foreign earnings, non-cash expense (benefit) related to uncertain tax positions and other items unrelated to the current fiscal year or that are not indicative of our ongoing business operations. We believe that presentation of measures of net income and net income per diluted share that exclude these items is useful to both management and investors for the reasons described above with respect to non-GAAP gross profit and gross margin and non-GAAP operating expenses, operating income and operating margin. We believe disclosure of non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per diluted share has economic substance because the excluded expenses are either unrelated to ongoing operations or do not represent current cash expenditures.

    Free cash flow. Qorvo defines free cash flow as net cash provided by operating activities during the period minus property and equipment expenditures made during the period, and free cash flow margin is calculated as free cash flow as a percentage of revenue. We use free cash flow as a supplemental financial measure in our evaluation of liquidity and financial strength. Management believes that this measure is useful as an indicator of our ability to service our debt, meet other payment obligations and make strategic investments. Free cash flow should be considered in addition to, rather than as a substitute for, net income as a measure of our performance and net cash provided by operating activities as a measure of our liquidity. Additionally, our definition of free cash flow is limited, in that it does not represent residual cash flows available for discretionary expenditures due to the fact that the measure does not deduct the payments required for debt service and other contractual obligations. Therefore, we believe it is important to view free cash flow as a measure that provides supplemental information to our entire statement of cash flows.

    EBITDA. Qorvo adjusts GAAP net income for interest expense, interest income, income tax expense (benefit), depreciation and intangible amortization expense, stock-based compensation and other charges that are not representative of Qorvo’s ongoing operations (including goodwill and other asset impairments, investment activity, acquisition-related costs and restructuring-related costs and certain net adjustments related to a terminated capacity reservation agreement) when presenting EBITDA. Management believes that this measure is useful to evaluate our ongoing operations and as a general indicator of our operating cash flow (in conjunction with a cash flow statement which also includes among other items, changes in working capital and the effect of non-cash charges).

    Non-GAAP ROIC. Return on invested capital (ROIC) is a non-GAAP financial measure that management believes provides useful supplemental information for management and the investor by measuring the effectiveness of our operations’ use of invested capital to generate profits. We use ROIC to track how much value we are creating for our shareholders. Non-GAAP ROIC is calculated by dividing annualized non-GAAP operating income, net of an adjustment for income taxes (as described above), by average invested capital. Average invested capital is calculated by subtracting the average of the beginning balance and the ending balance of equity plus net debt, less certain goodwill.

    Net debt or positive net cash. Net debt or positive net cash is defined as unrestricted cash, cash equivalents and short-term investments minus any borrowings under our credit facility and the principal balance of our senior unsecured notes. Management believes that net debt or positive net cash provides useful information regarding the level of Qorvo’s indebtedness by reflecting cash and investments that could be used to repay debt.

    Inventory days on hand. Inventory days on hand is defined as (a) average net inventory for the period, divided by (b) the result of non-GAAP cost of goods sold for the period divided by the number of days in the period.

    Forward-looking non-GAAP financial measures. Our earnings release contains forward-looking free cash flow, gross margin, income tax rate and diluted earnings per share. We provide these non-GAAP measures to investors on a prospective basis for the same reasons (set forth above) that we provide them to investors on a historical basis. We are unable to provide a reconciliation of the forward-looking non-GAAP financial measures to the most directly comparable forward-looking GAAP financial measures without unreasonable effort due to variability and difficulty in making accurate projections for items that would be required to be included in the GAAP measures, such as stock-based compensation, acquisition and integration-related costs, restructuring-related charges, gain or loss on assets, goodwill and other asset impairments, gain or loss on investments and the provision for income taxes, which could have a potentially significant impact on our future GAAP results.

    Limitations of non-GAAP financial measures. The primary material limitations associated with the use of non-GAAP financial measures as an analytical tool compared to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures are these non-GAAP financial measures (i) may not be comparable to similarly titled measures used by other companies in our industry, and (ii) exclude financial information that some may consider important in evaluating our performance, thus limiting their usefulness as a comparative tool. We compensate for these limitations by providing full disclosure of the differences between these non-GAAP financial measures and the corresponding GAAP financial measures, including a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measures to the corresponding GAAP financial measures, to enable investors to perform their own analysis of our gross profit and gross margin, operating expenses, operating income, net income, net income per diluted share and net cash provided by operating activities. We further compensate for the limitations of our use of non-GAAP financial measures by presenting the corresponding GAAP measures more prominently.

    Qorvo will conduct a conference call at 4:30 p.m. ET today to discuss today’s press release. The conference call will be broadcast live over the Internet and can be accessed by any interested party at the following URL: https://ir.qorvo.com (under “Events & Presentations”). A telephone playback of the conference call will be available approximately two hours after the call’s completion and can be accessed by dialing 1-412-317-0088 and using the passcode 8143934. The playback will be available through the close of business February 4, 2025.

    About Qorvo

    Qorvo (Nasdaq:QRVO) supplies innovative semiconductor solutions that make a better world possible. We combine product and technology leadership, systems-level expertise and global manufacturing scale to quickly solve our customers’ most complex technical challenges. Qorvo serves diverse high-growth segments of large global markets, including automotive, consumer, defense & aerospace, industrial & enterprise, infrastructure and mobile. Visit www.qorvo.com to learn how our diverse and innovative team is helping connect, protect and power our planet.

    Qorvo is a registered trademark of Qorvo, Inc. in the U.S. and in other countries. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners.

    This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements about our plans, objectives, representations and contentions, and are not historical facts and typically are identified by terms such as “may,” “will,” “should,” “could,” “expect,” “plan,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “predict,” “potential,” “continue” and similar words, although some forward-looking statements are expressed differently. You should be aware that the forward-looking statements included herein represent management’s current judgment and expectations as of the date the statement is first made, but our actual results, events and performance could differ materially from those expressed or implied by forward-looking statements. We caution you not to place undue reliance upon any such forward-looking statements. We do not intend to update any of these forward-looking statements or publicly announce the results of any revisions to these forward-looking statements, other than as is required under U.S. federal securities laws. Our business is subject to numerous risks and uncertainties, including those relating to fluctuations in our operating results on a quarterly and annual basis; our substantial dependence on developing new products and achieving design wins; our dependence on several large customers for a substantial portion of our revenue; a loss of revenue if defense and aerospace contracts are canceled or delayed; our dependence on third parties; risks related to sales through distributors; risks associated with the operation of our manufacturing facilities; business disruptions; poor manufacturing yields; increased inventory risks and costs, due to timing of customers’ forecasts; our inability to effectively manage or maintain relationships with chipset suppliers; our ability to continue to innovate in a very competitive industry; underutilization of manufacturing facilities; unfavorable changes in interest rates, pricing of certain precious metals, utility rates and foreign currency exchange rates; our acquisitions, divestitures and other strategic investments failing to achieve financial or strategic objectives; our ability to attract, retain and motivate key employees; warranty claims, product recalls and product liability; changes in our effective tax rate; enactment of international or domestic tax legislation, or changes in regulatory guidance; changes in the favorable tax status of certain of our subsidiaries; risks associated with social, environmental, health and safety regulations, and climate change; risks from international sales and operations; economic regulation in China; changes in government trade policies, including imposition of tariffs and export restrictions; we may not be able to generate sufficient cash to service all of our debt; restrictions imposed by the agreements governing our debt; our reliance on our intellectual property portfolio; claims of infringement of third-party intellectual property rights; security breaches, failed system upgrades or regular maintenance and other similar disruptions to our IT systems; theft, loss or misuse of personal data by or about our employees, customers or third parties; provisions in our governing documents and Delaware law may discourage takeovers and business combinations that our stockholders might consider to be in their best interests; and volatility in the price of our common stock. These and other risks and uncertainties, which are described in more detail under “Risk Factors” in Part I, Item 1A of our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended March 30, 2024, and Qorvo’s subsequent reports and statements that we file with the SEC, could cause actual results and developments to be materially different from those expressed or implied by any of these forward-looking statements.

    # # #

    Financial Tables to Follow

    QORVO, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (In thousands, except per share data)
    (Unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended   Nine Months Ended
      December 28, 2024   December 30, 2023   December 28, 2024   December 30, 2023
    Revenue $ 916,317     $ 1,073,861     $ 2,849,497     $ 2,828,518  
                   
    Costs and expenses:              
    Cost of goods sold   524,901       685,983       1,680,471       1,721,880  
    Research and development   179,126       164,329       567,778       502,366  
    Selling, general and administrative   90,360       86,914       313,043       296,033  
    Other operating expense   68,905       178,204       220,899       246,516  
    Total costs and expenses   863,292       1,115,430       2,782,191       2,766,795  
                   
    Operating income (loss)   53,025       (41,569 )     67,306       61,723  
    Interest expense   (18,655 )     (17,581 )     (58,343 )     (51,963 )
    Other income, net   14,526       15,359       41,713       34,286  
                   
    Income (loss) before income taxes   48,896       (43,791 )     50,676       44,046  
    Income tax expense   (7,625 )     (83,147 )     (26,426 )     (117,103 )
    Net income (loss) $ 41,271     $ (126,938 )   $ 24,250     $ (73,057 )
                   
    Net income (loss) per share:              
    Basic $ 0.44     $ (1.31 )   $ 0.26     $ (0.75 )
    Diluted $ 0.43     $ (1.31 )   $ 0.25     $ (0.75 )
                   
    Weighted-average shares of common stock outstanding:              
    Basic   94,341       97,152       94,942       97,905  
    Diluted   95,031       97,152       95,808       97,905  
     
    QORVO, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES
    (In thousands, except per share data)
    (Unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended
      December 28, 2024   September 28, 2024   December 30, 2023
               
    GAAP operating income (loss) $ 53,025     $ 9,675     $ (41,569 )
    Stock-based compensation expense   28,384       38,181       21,755  
    Amortization of intangible assets   26,085       29,482       29,787  
    Restructuring-related charges   68,072       34,396       6,075  
    Acquisition and integration-related costs   1,382       1,211       2,529  
    Goodwill impairment   —       96,458       173,414  
    Net adjustments related to a terminated capacity reservation agreement   (1,253 )     885       51,864  
    Other expense (income)   2,216       1,926       (7,333 )
    Non-GAAP operating income $ 177,911     $ 212,214     $ 236,522  
               
    GAAP net income (loss) $ 41,271     $ (17,435 )   $ (126,938 )
    Stock-based compensation expense   28,384       38,181       21,755  
    Amortization of intangible assets   26,085       29,482       29,787  
    Restructuring-related charges   68,072       34,396       6,075  
    Acquisition and integration-related costs   1,382       1,211       2,529  
    Goodwill impairment   —       96,458       173,414  
    Net adjustments related to a terminated capacity reservation agreement   (1,253 )     885       51,864  
    Other expense (income)   600       (506 )     (12,252 )
    (Gain) loss on investments   (1,721 )     780       464  
    Adjustment of income taxes   (10,067 )     (3,611 )     59,161  
    Non-GAAP net income $ 152,753     $ 179,841     $ 205,859  
               
    GAAP weighted-average outstanding diluted shares   95,031       94,886       97,152  
    Dilutive stock-based awards   —       867       666  
    Non-GAAP weighted-average outstanding diluted shares   95,031       95,753       97,818  
               
    Non-GAAP net income per share, diluted $ 1.61     $ 1.88     $ 2.10  
     
    QORVO, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES
    (Unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended
    (in thousands, except percentages) December 28, 2024   September 28, 2024   December 30, 2023
    GAAP gross profit/margin $ 391,416   42.7 %   $ 445,306   42.6 %   $ 387,878   36.1 %
    Stock-based compensation expense   5,742   0.6       6,047   0.6       5,575   0.5  
    Amortization of intangible assets   23,462   2.6       25,523   2.4       25,457   2.4  
    Restructuring-related charges   6,931   0.7       15,414   1.4       (250 ) —  
    Acquisition and integration-related costs   1   —       636   0.1       1   —  
    Net adjustments related to a terminated capacity reservation agreement   (1,253 ) (0.1 )     (885 ) (0.1 )     51,864   4.8  
    Non-GAAP gross profit/margin $ 426,299   46.5 %   $ 492,041   47.0 %   $ 470,525   43.8 %
     
      Three Months Ended
    Non-GAAP Operating Income December 28, 2024
    (as a percentage of revenue)  
       
    GAAP operating income 5.8 %
    Stock-based compensation expense 3.1  
    Amortization of intangible assets 2.8  
    Restructuring-related charges 7.4  
    Acquisition and integration-related costs 0.2  
    Net adjustments related to a terminated capacity reservation agreement (0.1 )
    Other expense 0.2  
    Non-GAAP operating income 19.4 %
      Three Months Ended
    Free Cash Flow(1) December 28, 2024
    (in millions)  
       
    Net cash provided by operating activities $ 214.1  
    Purchases of property and equipment   (37.8 )
    Free cash flow $ 176.3  

    (1) Free Cash Flow is calculated as net cash provided by operating activities minus property and equipment expenditures.

    QORVO, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    ADDITIONAL SELECTED NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES AND RECONCILIATIONS
    (In thousands)
    (Unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended
      December 28, 2024   September 28, 2024   December 30, 2023
    GAAP research and development expense $ 179,126   $ 201,050   $ 164,329  
    Less:          
    Stock-based compensation expense   13,650     13,468     11,830  
    Acquisition and integration-related costs   1     2     2  
    Non-GAAP research and development expense $ 165,475   $ 187,580   $ 152,497  
               
      Three Months Ended
      December 28, 2024   September 28, 2024   December 30, 2023
    GAAP selling, general and administrative expense $ 90,360   $ 107,760   $ 86,914  
    Less:          
    Stock-based compensation expense   8,985     18,488     4,336  
    Amortization of intangible assets   2,623     3,959     4,330  
    Acquisition and integration-related costs   —     1     —  
    Non-GAAP selling, general and administrative expense $ 78,752   $ 85,312   $ 78,248  
               
      Three Months Ended
      December 28, 2024   September 28, 2024   December 30, 2023
    GAAP other operating expense $ 68,905   $ 126,821   $ 178,204  
    Less:          
    Stock-based compensation expense   7     178     14  
    Restructuring-related charges   61,141     18,982     6,325  
    Acquisition and integration-related costs   1,380     572     2,526  
    Goodwill impairment   —     96,458     173,414  
    Other expense (income)   2,216     3,696     (7,333 )
    Non-GAAP other operating expense $ 4,161   $ 6,935   $ 3,258  
               
      Three Months Ended
      December 28, 2024   September 28, 2024   December 30, 2023
    GAAP total operating expense $ 338,391   $ 435,631   $ 429,447  
    Less:          
    Stock-based compensation expense   22,642     32,134     16,180  
    Amortization of intangible assets   2,623     3,959     4,330  
    Restructuring-related charges   61,141     18,982     6,325  
    Acquisition and integration-related costs   1,381     575     2,528  
    Goodwill impairment   —     96,458     173,414  
    Other expense (income)   2,216     3,696     (7,333 )
    Non-GAAP total operating expense $ 248,388   $ 279,827   $ 234,003  
     
    QORVO, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (In thousands)
    (Unaudited)
     
      December 28, 2024   March 30, 2024
    ASSETS      
    Current assets:      
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 769,432   $ 1,029,258
    Accounts receivable, net   427,863     412,960
    Inventories   656,216     710,555
    Other current assets   126,917     133,983
    Assets of disposal group held for sale   116,435     159,278
    Total current assets   2,096,863     2,446,034
           
    Property and equipment, net   820,874     870,982
    Goodwill   2,437,234     2,534,601
    Intangible assets, net   332,338     509,383
    Long-term investments   25,692     23,252
    Other non-current assets   250,095     170,383
    Total assets $ 5,963,096   $ 6,554,635
           
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY      
    Current liabilities:      
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities $ 551,676   $ 589,760
    Current portion of long-term debt   —     438,740
    Other current liabilities   227,110     113,215
    Liabilities of disposal group held for sale   29,075     88,372
    Total current liabilities   807,861     1,230,087
           
    Long-term debt   1,549,230     1,549,272
    Other long-term liabilities   225,572     218,904
    Total liabilities   2,582,663     2,998,263
           
    Stockholders’ equity   3,380,433     3,556,372
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 5,963,096   $ 6,554,635
     

    At Qorvo®
    Doug DeLieto
    VP, Investor Relations
    1.336.678.7968

    The MIL Network –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: January 28th, 2025 Heinrich: Trump’s Blockade on Federal Funding Pummels New Mexicans and American Economy

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Mexico Martin Heinrich
    Published: January 28th, 2025

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.), a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, is condemning President Trump’s unlawful direction to unilaterally blockade all federal grant funding.
    “Our economy, our healthcare system, our schools, our law enforcement and fire departments, our newborns, our elders, our veterans – everyone, everywhere in New Mexico. President Trump is attempting to shove all of this over a cliff,” said Heinrich. “In New Mexico alone, Trump’s blockade on federal funding will make it impossible for thousands to pay rent on February 1st, force tens of thousands of New Mexico students to drop out of college without Pell Grant funding, close hundreds of preschool programs across the state, deprive 7 out of 10 New Mexico children their daily lunch, and cut off federal Medicaid reimbursement – impacting 7 out of 10 nursing home residents, 55% of newborn births, and all health care providers in our state.”
    Heinrich continued, “Trump is clearly willing to pummel New Mexicans and the American economy for his twisted and deranged agenda and fragile ego. But the Constitution is clear: the president cannot override, delay, or rescind Congress’s funding laws. We passed these laws to help working families get ahead and put food on the table and create jobs New Mexicans can build their families around. I will fight like hell to undo this brazen, barbaric blockade from this wannabe dictator and his weird billionaire lackeys.”
    The Constitution explicitly gives Congress, not the president, the power of the purse. The president does not have the power to override spending laws that Congress has passed and the president has signed into law. Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution says: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Fact sheets from the Senate and House Appropriations Committees detailing how presidents lack power to unilaterally override congressional spending laws and deny enacted funding to communities can be found here and here.
    Examples of the impacts of this funding blockade:
    PUBLIC SAFETY: Grants for law enforcement and homeland security activities will cease to go out the door, undermining public safety in every state and territory.
    DISASTER RELIEF: Public assistance and hazard mitigation grants from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) to state, tribal, territorial, and local governments and non-profits to help communities quickly respond to, recover from, and prepare for major disasters will be halted—right as so many communities are struggling after severe natural disasters, including Roswell flooding and Ruidoso fires and severe storms and wildfires in Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and California.
    INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS: All federally-funded transportation projects across the country—roads, bridges, public transit, and more—will be halted, including projects already under construction.
    COMBATTING THE FENTANYL CRISIS: Funding for communities to address the substance use disorder crisis and combat the fentanyl crisis will be cut off.
    988 SUICIDE AND CRISIS LIFELINE: Funding for the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline, as well as grants for mental health services, will be cut off.
    MEDICAL RESEARCH: There will be immediate pauses on all funding for critical health research, including research on cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, and diabetes, as well as clinical trials at the NIH Clinical Center and all across the country—disrupting lifesaving and often time-sensitive research.
    EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: Critical preparedness and response capability funding used to prepare for disasters, public health emergencies, and chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear events will be frozen.
    FIREFIGHTING: Grants to support firefighters across the country will be halted—this includes grants that help states and localities purchase essential firefighting equipment.
    HEAD START: Funding for Head Start programs that provide comprehensive early childhood education for more than 800,000 kids and their families will be cut off. Teachers and staff would not get paid and programs may not be able to stay open.
    CHILD CARE: Child care programs across the country will not be able to access the funding they rely on to keep their doors open.
    K-12 SCHOOLS: Federal funding for our K-12 schools will be halted. School districts may not be able to access key formula grant funding including Title I, IDEA, Impact Aid, and Career and Technical Education, which would pose tremendous financial burdens on schools in the middle of the school year.
    HIGHER EDUCATION AND JOB TRAINING: Millions of students relying on Pell grants, federal student loans, and federal work study will have their plans to pursue postsecondary education and further their careers thrown into chaos as federal financial aid disbursements are paused.
    HEALTH SERVICES: Federal funding for community health centers that provide health care for over 30 million Americans will be immediately frozen, creating chaos for patients trying get their prescriptions, a regular checkup, and more.
    SMALL BUSINESSES: The Small Business Administration will have to halt loans to small businesses—including those in disaster ravaged communities in North Carolina, Texas, and Florida.
    VETERANS CARE: Federal grants to help veterans in rural areas access health care and grants to help veterans get other critical services, including suicide prevention resources, transition assistance, and housing for homeless veterans, will be cut off.
    NUTRITION ASSISTANCE: Millions of American families and children who rely on nutrition assistance programs like SNAP, WIC, and school lunch programs will be left hungry as funding is cut off and non-profits who provide additional assistance lose federal funding.
    TRIBES: Funding to Tribes for basic government services like health care, public safety, law enforcement, Tribal schools, housing, and food assistance will be halted.
    PREVENTING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: All Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) grants, as well as funding for victims assistance and state and local police, will be cut off.
    U.S. COMPETITIVENESS: Existing grants to support research for AI and quantum computing will be halted and any new grant funding would be paused—undermining U.S. innovation and competitiveness with China and putting American jobs at risk.
    ENERGY JOBS: Grants for critical energy projects nationwide will be cut off—halting billions of dollars in investment nationwide and jeopardizing good-paying American jobs. The Department of Energy Loan Program Office will halt loans in 28 states, impacting hundreds of thousands construction and operations jobs.
    FOOD INSPECTIONS: Some states will have to take on the full financial burden of ensuring the nation’s meat supply is safe if federal cooperative agreements for meat inspection are halted.
    SUPPORT FOR SERVICE MEMBERS: Support for a host of Department of Defense financial assistance and grant programs supporting service members and their families will be halted, including the Fisher House, Impact Aid, community noise mitigation, ROTC language training, STEM programs, and the USO.
    WEAKENS MILITARY READINESS: Grants and other assistance appropriated to strengthen military effectiveness and defense capacity will be halted, including Defense Production Act support for the defense industrial base, basic research grants necessary to advance key technologies, and small business support to strengthen supply chains.
    AMERICANS OVERSEAS: Programs that track and combat the spread of infectious diseases, create business opportunities for American companies in emerging markets, combat terrorism, and counter the influence of China, Russia, and Iran—and efforts to ensure the safety and security of Americans implementing these programs—are all suspended and could be terminated.
    An extensive list of potentially impacted federal programs can be found here.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Fischer Joins “Mornings with Maria” to Discuss Delivering for Americans

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Nebraska Deb Fischer

    U.S. Senator Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) joined Maria Bartiromo on FOX Business today to discuss how Republicans will deliver for the American people. Senator Fischer condemned the Democrats for stalling President Trump’s Cabinet nominees, risking America’s national security, and playing political games instead of serving their constituents.

    Senator Fischer also highlighted her plans to continue working for the American people during reconciliation by making her Paid Family Medical Leave tax credit permanent.

    Click the image above to watch a video of Senator Fischer’s remarks

    Click here to download audio

    Click here to download video

     


    Republicans Are Here To Work:

    Maria Bartiromo: You will be part of Howard Lutnick’s confirmation hearing. Tell us about your expectations for Howard Lutnick and the rest of these nominees. Do you think they’ll all get past the finish line?

    Senator Fischer:
     It is so very important that we do get these nominees confirmed, and that we do it quickly. Of course, as you’re well aware, Maria, the Democrats are slow walking everything. Republicans have shown that we will stay late. We will stay over the weekends in order to get this done. 

    On Democrats Stalling President Trump’s Cabinet Nominees:


    Maria Bartiromo:
     The President needs his team on the ground. Do you feel like your colleagues on the left have been stalling these hearings?

    Senator Fischer:
     Oh, most definitely. You know, you especially saw it on Armed Services Committee where the Democrat members wanted to have another round of questions. They wanted to postpone the vote. They just wanted to drag it out.

    Let’s remember that, I think it was in the first 12 days of President Obama’s administration. He had 12 or 15 nominees already confirmed. We need to do that for national security reasons, for reasons that the American people are tired of waiting. You know, we want to see things happen, we need to move ahead. But we’ve got to do our job, we have to be thorough in it, and I can guarantee that we are.

    On Democrats Playing Political Games:


    Maria Bartiromo:
     Yeah, I mean, more than that, people are sick and tired of the political tricks. We’ve been watching political games since President Trump walked down that escalator 10 years ago. From the Russia collusion lie, to hiding things about the Biden family, to now this obstruction of justice… 

    Senator Fischer: It’s just nonsense. We heard J.D. Vance answer a question this weekend, “You know, I don’t really care Margaret.” That is a calling that I hear all across Nebraska and all across America. You know, I don’t really care anymore. We have work to do. We need to get it done. Stop with the tricks, stop with all this stalling, and let’s get to work for the American people, on energy, on inflation, on reconciliation. There is so much to do.

    On Working for the American People During Reconciliation:


    Maria Bartiromo:
     House Republicans are set to meet with VP Vance today at the Trump Doral Resort in Florida, as part of their annual conference. Committee chairs will also hold reconciliation meetings on how to pass President Trump’s agenda. Trump joined lawmakers for dinner last night with a speech on his priorities. Here’s what he said. Watch:

    President Trump: 
    In the coming weeks, I’m looking forward to working with Congress on a reconciliation bill that financially takes care of our plans to totally and permanently restore the sovereign borders of the United States once and for all. I’m also eager to get to work with Congress on the largest package of tax cuts and reforms in American history. We got to get that done, and we don’t want to get hung up on the budget process. We just want whether it’s one bill, two bills, I don’t care.

    Maria Bartiromo: Senator, how do you see this playing out?

    Senator Fischer:
     Well, I agree with the President on his goals here, and I agree with him when he says whether it’s one bill or two bills, you know, I don’t care. We need to make sure that we’re going to deliver for the American people. What I’m worried about are American families. You know, they have to choose right now between making ends meet and taking care of their families.

    My top priority in reconciliation is my Paid Family Medical Leave tax credit. That was included in the 2017 Tax Reform, and I want to make that permanent in this reconciliation package. So we are working hard on that with a number of my colleagues. In the Senate, we are working together, as you know, in reconciliation, we just need to keep our guys together. And we’re trying to do that through a number of committees to make sure that we protect this country, that we protect our borders. That we can provide for families and meet their needs, so that they can have a better life for themselves and their children. These are promises made, and they’re going to be promises kept.

    On Putting America First:


    Maria Bartiromo:
     I’m glad that you’re focused on families, whether it be their economic progress or their security. President Trump declared a national energy emergency in an effort to increase U.S. oil production. Gas executives told the New York Times they don’t plan on doing so unless prices rise significantly. This is another potentially economic yet also national security issue. And I spoke with your colleague, the Leader of the U.S. Senate, John Thune, on Sunday, and we talked about military spending being lifted. Here’s what he said. Watch: “What are you looking for in terms of specifics in bulking up America’s defense?

    Senate Majority Leader Thune:
     Well, obviously our Navy, and if you look at the number of ships we have relative to our adversaries, particularly China, that’s something the President is interested in, an American Iron Dome concept. But, frankly, the thing we’ve got to do Maria is we’ve got to increase the top line. We have not, we have underfunded and in the Biden budget, there wasn’t a single Biden budget that kept up with the rate of inflation when it comes to the military, and so we’ve got some making up to do. I think there’s a very compelling argument on Panama, very compelling argument on Greenland and optimism in America that we haven’t seen in a long time. I think there’s been a real this has been a sluggish country, a country that’s been bogged down under the weight of government, regulation and red tape and taxation.

    Maria Bartiromo: Senator, I’ve got the Iron Dome for America Executive Order in front of me, and this is one of the ways that President Trump says he will be protecting America from a national security standpoint. What are you considering in terms of defense spending? And tell us where the priorities are in this plan.

    Senator Fischer:
     Right. You know, on Armed Services Committee the last three years that President Biden sent us his top line for his budget, we increased that in the Senate Armed Services Committee, because we are well aware of the threats that face this nation. I happen to chair the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. So not only do we have jurisdiction over STRATCOM and Space Command, but we also have jurisdiction over our nuclear triad to make sure that we have that strong deterrence policy.

    You’ve heard President Trump and the Vice President talk about deterrence that is so important to keep this country safe. We also have jurisdiction on strategic forces over missile defense, and we have been putting funding into missile defense in this country since I have been here and on that committee for now into my third term. So I am very, very pleased to hear that President Trump is prioritizing that with a focus on Iron Dome. We need to continue to look at our missile defense, the capabilities that we have, the capabilities that we need in order to defend and protect our homeland. 

    On Curbing Government Spending:


    Maria Bartiromo:
     Yeah, I’m so glad to hear you talk this way. I could not agree more. Unfortunately, something has got to give. Senator, can you name one or two important offsets that you think will be significant? Interest is the single largest item in the budget behind Social Security. More than spending on defense, Medicare, and on children? Senator, what’s your most important offset to pay for all this?

    Senator Fischer:
     You know, there’s a number of things, as you know, Maria, that all of us are looking at and being able to go through a budget. On Appropriations Committee, we’re going to be really having a strong oversight with our agencies that we have jurisdiction over and hold them accountable for programs. I think we can look, for example, on job training programs. I know a few years ago, across agencies, there were like 37 different job training programs. I am all for job training, but I think we need to figure out what the balance is. And I think that’s a private enterprise. A private business does training in conjunction with our community colleges, in conjunction with our state universities.

    I mean, just simple things like that. You’re going to see a lot of things like that. And I know we’ve heard some in the past. What I want to see, though, is a return to energy dominance. That is going to bring in, it’s going to help lower prices for families in this country. I want to be able to see inflation addressed, which we will. 

    Maria Bartiromo:
     Of course. 

    Senator Fischer:
     I know, I know many are saying, well, we’ve seen the price of eggs go up. Why hasn’t it dropped yet? I’m going, it’s been a week, folks, it’s been a week. You know, we are, we are focused, and we’re getting it done.

    Maria Bartiromo:
     Senator, we’ll be watching your work. It’s a great point, the oversight alone may actually save a lot, given the reckless spending in the past. We’ll be watching. Thank you so much. Senator Deb Fisher, joining us this morning.

    Senator Fischer:
     Thank you. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: As the Myanmar junta’s hold on power weakens, could the devastating war be nearing a conclusion?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South Australia

    It has now been four years since the Myanmar military launched its cataclysmic coup against the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi on February 1 2021, starting a civil war that has devastated the country.

    Suu Kyi remains locked up, as do countless other activists and regime opponents. There is no easy resolution in sight.

    Indeed, the country is at a nadir. The war has sparked an economic crisis that has destroyed Myanmar’s health and education systems. Half the population now lives in poverty, double the rate from before the coup. The deteriorating electricity network causes widespread blackouts.

    According to the United Nations, more than 5,000 civilians have been killed and 3.3 million people have been displaced by the fighting. More than 27,000 people have also been arrested, with reports of sexual violence and torture rife.

    Nevertheless, opposition forces – including ethnic armies and the People’s Defence Force militias drawn from the civilian population – have been gathering strength, with a string of victories against the junta’s army.

    The regime now controls less than half the country. And recent strategic losses are weighing heavily on the military leaders, raising questions about whether the government could suddenly collapse like the Assad regime in Syria late last year.

    As the war enters a fifth year, there are two significant things to watch that could determine the country’s future – the battleground gains made by the opposition forces and the state of the failing economy.

    Junta under pressure on the battlefield

    Following the opposition Three Brotherhood Alliance’s battleground successes in late 2023, China brokered a ceasefire between the junta and alliance in northern Shan State.

    When that ceasefire ended last June, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), one of the members of the alliance, captured the key trading town of Lashio, as well as the junta’s nearby Northeast Regional Military Command. It was the first time one of the 14 regional military commands had fallen to an opposition group in more than 50 years of military rule.

    China has recently brokered another ceasefire between the MNDAA and the military, according to the Chinese foreign ministry. The terms have not been made public, but unless the insurgents relinquish Lashio and the military command – which is unlikely – it won’t alter the balance of power.

    In December, the military lost another command centre in Rakhine State in western Myanmar to the Arakan Army, another member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The Arakan Army now controls 14 of that state’s 17 townships.

    The Arakan Army, too, said recently it is open to political dialogue to potentially end the fighting. But it, too, is only likely to stop its military offensives for extremely favourable terms.

    In a major study undertaken in late 2024, the BBC assessed the junta only had full control of 21% of Myanmar’s territory. Ethnic armies and other opposition forces controlled 42% of the country, while the remaining areas were contested.

    In response, the junta has intensified its “scorched earth” tactics in areas outside its control, including indiscriminate and deliberate strikes against civilians. With dwindling reserves of willing fighters, air power is the main combat advantage it holds over the opposition forces.

    Economic woes

    Myanmar’s economic situation four years after the coup shows, starkly, just how much has been lost.

    Myanmar is now experiencing a full-blown economic and currency crisis.

    The incremental gains in economic development, education, nutrition and health care of recent decades have been reversed very quickly. Three-quarters of the population is now living a subsistence existence.

    Many young people are fleeing abroad, joining resistance groups, or eking out dangerous livelihoods on the margins. To make matters worse, the junta activated a longstanding but dormant conscription law last February to boost its dwindling forces. Those who refuse the draft face five years in prison.

    In response to the Arakan Army’s successes, the junta is also isolating much of Rakhine State. This is contributing to widespread poverty and a looming famine, which could affect two million people.

    And in an attempt to control the digital space, the junta enacted a sweeping new cybersecurity law earlier this month. People can now be imprisoned for using a virtual private network or sharing information from banned websites, among many other offences.

    Could Myanmar fall apart?

    The ASEAN regional bloc, chaired by Malaysia this year, has done little to solve the crisis, although it hasn’t accepted the junta’s hollow plans to hold elections this year.

    Disagreements among the ASEAN members over strategy have ensured that little progress has been made. Thailand recently broke ranks to invite the junta’s foreign minister to regional talks about border security, even though the junta currently controls few of the country’s borders.

    An accelerated economic deterioration could contribute to further unrest and drive even more migrants to neighbouring countries. Already, the millions of Myanmar migrants living in Thailand have precipitated anti-migrant protests and mass arrests.

    So, given the combustible state of the country, could the junta’s hold on power suddenly collapse like the Assad regime in Syria last year?

    It’s not likely. Unlike Syria, the opposition in Myanmar is not heavily backed by major international players. China’s support for various insurgent actors comes and goes depending on political calculations, while the United States and European Union have provided little material support.

    In addition, the military has been effectively running Myanmar for 60 years and is well practised in counterinsurgency strategies. Although defections from the military continue, the conscription law is bolstering its numbers of – mostly reluctant – soldiers.

    However, the fall of Syria’s oppressive government – as well as the government in Myanmar’s neighbour, Bangladesh – demonstrates how fragile long-standing regimes can be, particularly when faced with persistent challenges from armed groups and a motivated population.

    And as in Syria, there are fears – particularly within China – that Myanmar could splinter along ethnic lines. The deteriorating security situation has led China to send its own private security corporations to secure its strategic investments in the country and become an active ceasefire deal-maker.

    Even if the junta can be ousted, creating a workable federal system that involves power-sharing among the complex patchwork of ethnic groups will be a difficult task. The question of how to reintegrate nearly a million Rohingya displaced across the border in Bangladesh is another daunting challenge.

    However, for the first time in years, there is optimism that opposition forces could eventually succeed in vanquishing the junta. Then begins the arduous task of rebuilding a shattered nation.

    As a pro vice-chancellor at the University of Tasmania, Nicholas Farrelly engages with a wide range of organisations and stakeholders on educational, cultural and political issues, including at the ASEAN-Australia interface. He has previously received funding from the Australian government for Southeast Asia-related projects and from the Australian Research Council. Nicholas is on the advisory board of the ASEAN-Australia Centre, which is a new Australian government body, and also deputy chair of the board of NAATI, Australia’s government-owned accreditation authority for translators and interpreters. He writes in his personal capacity.

    Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. As the Myanmar junta’s hold on power weakens, could the devastating war be nearing a conclusion? – https://theconversation.com/as-the-myanmar-juntas-hold-on-power-weakens-could-the-devastating-war-be-nearing-a-conclusion-247987

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Cameroon could do with some foreign help to solve anglophone crisis – but the state doesn’t want it

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Julius A. Amin, Professor of History, University of Dayton

    What began in late 2016 as a peaceful protest by lawyers and teachers in Cameroon’s North West and South West regions quickly turned violent and developed into what’s become known as Cameroon’s anglophone crisis.

    The protest was instigated by perceived marginalisation of Cameroon’s anglophone region, which makes up 20% of the nation’s 29 million people.

    The conflict has resulted in immense destruction and casualties. Cameroon’s military responded to the protest with arrests and torture. Voices that called for complete secession of the anglophone regions from the Republic of Cameroon gained momentum.

    They created a virtual Ambazonia Republic and an interim government in exile, and vowed to fight back. They formed a military wing, Ambazonia Self-Defence Force, which attacked and disrupted economic and social services in the region.

    As of October 2024, over 1.8 million people have needed humanitarian assistance. Over 584,000 have been internally displaced. Over 73,000 have become refugees in next-door Nigeria. Over 6,500 have been killed.


    Read more: Cameroon: how language plunged a country into deadly conflict with no end in sight


    And the conflict still rages.

    One possible avenue that could be pursued to end the impasse is mediation, with help from other countries. But the Cameroonian government has repeatedly rebuffed intervention from organisations such as the African Union, arguing that the conflict is an internal affair.

    It also ended a government-sponsored mediation by the Swiss in 2022.

    It is clear to me, as a historian who has studied Cameroon foreign policy for the past three decades, that Cameroon’s leadership will not look to external actors to help solve their crisis.

    Founding leader Ahmadou Ahidjo, and later his successor Paul Biya, did not respond to external pressure to address issues. Cameroon’s diplomatic relations are based on respect of national sovereignty and nonintervention in each other’s internal affairs.

    My research shows that the Cameroonian leadership rejects outside intervention on issues it regards as within its sovereignty and internal affairs.

    Removing Cameroon from aid programmes such as the United States Agency for International Development programme and the African Growth and Opportunity Act has not deterred its leaders.

    An understanding of this background is crucial in the search for solutions to the ongoing anglophone crisis.


    Read more: Cameroon spends 90% of Chinese development loans on its French region: this could deepen the country’s divisions


    Use of force

    In the 1960s, Ahidjo used brutal force against a nationalist organisation called the Maquisard. His presidency was characterised by murders, imprisonments and torture.

    Political rivals were imprisoned or forced to go into exile. Biya, who served in Ahidjo’s government, learned that repressive measures work. As president, he used similar tactics against rivals and the opposition.

    But the use of force as a response to the anglophone protest was a miscalculation. The Biya regime failed to see the crisis in its context of changing times, misunderstood the sources of the conflict, and misread the role of social media in protest activities in the 21st century.

    The crisis originated from a series of grievances: poverty, unemployment, political and economic neglect of the anglophone region, failure to treat French and English as equal languages in the country, and disrespect and disregard of English-speaking Cameroonians.

    At the beginning protesters were generally peaceful, but things changed in 2017. Biya stated that Cameroon was being hijacked by “terrorists masking as secessionists” and vowed to eliminate them.

    To anglophone leaders it was a formal declaration of war, and the message spread quickly on social media. The Biya team did little to slow or stop its spread, and anglophones inside and outside the country accepted the message as fact. It mobilised the region. And few took the time to read the full text of his remarks.

    The brutality of the war on both sides intensified. Everything had all happened so quickly, and most did not anticipate the intensity of the violence.


    Read more: Cameroon after Paul Biya: poverty, uncertainty and a precarious succession battle


    Resistance to outside intervention

    In its diplomatic relations, Cameroon has a long history of protecting what it sees as its own business.

    One example was in 1992, after the US administration criticised Biya for electoral fraud. The Cameroon government fired back. Biya withdrew Cameroon’s ambassador from Washington DC, and informed the US ambassador that America should stay clear of Cameroon’s internal affairs.

    In 2008, tension erupted again when Biya changed Cameroon’s constitution to eliminate presidential term limits. The US ambassador criticised the move in the Cameroonian press. Again, Cameroonian officials pushed back, asking the ambassador not to interfere in the nation’s internal politics.

    America’s disposition towards the anglophone crisis has been one of non-interference. Other major powers have responded similarly, asking both sides to end the violence.

    The Cameroon government has rebuffed initiatives from Switzerland and Canada, both friendly to the country, publicly stating it asked no nation to mediate.

    The rejection of the Swiss initiative was surprising, given that Biya spends much time in that country. Unlike the Swiss plan, in which conversations began, the Canadian initiative did not even take off.


    Read more: Cameroon’s rebels may not achieve their goal of creating the Ambazonian state – but they’re still a threat to stability


    Looking ahead

    Measurable indicators show that the Biya regime is failing to end the anglophone crisis. The killings – including those of law enforcement officers – kidnaps, brutality and ransom demands are now normalised in the anglophone region, especially in rural areas.

    Biya’s Grand National Dialogue and National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism have failed to address the sources of the crisis. Locals dismiss them as a joke.

    People are exasperated by public service announcements about what the government has achieved. Their condition remains much worse than it was in the pre-crisis period.

    Ordinary people are focused on bread-and-butter issues and the desire for dignity and respect. But they don’t see it.

    Young Cameroonians need to see both anglophone and francophone residents at every level of government, on every rung of the business ladder, in every management position, at every school — even on every billboard advertisement.

    Only such a widespread and visible approach can convincingly challenge Cameroon’s pattern of discrimination and exclusion.

    The Biya regime must commit to doing that and not be distracted by supporters urging him to be a candidate in the upcoming presidential election.

    It is important to track and bring to justice the apparent sponsors of the killings in the country. This must be done while government keeps its promises to make things right for those living in the anglophone regions.

    Finally, given China’s investment in Cameroon, it can do more to engage the Biya regime on the anglophone crisis. Like Cameroon, China’s policy also stipulates a policy of nonintervention, but it has repeatedly changed course when its strategic interests are threatened.

    Major power status demands major responsibilities, and showing the will to stop chronic human rights violations remains an important obligation.

    – Cameroon could do with some foreign help to solve anglophone crisis – but the state doesn’t want it
    – https://theconversation.com/cameroon-could-do-with-some-foreign-help-to-solve-anglophone-crisis-but-the-state-doesnt-want-it-244770

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Cameroon could do with some foreign help to solve anglophone crisis – but the state doesn’t want it

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Julius A. Amin, Professor of History, University of Dayton

    What began in late 2016 as a peaceful protest by lawyers and teachers in Cameroon’s North West and South West regions quickly turned violent and developed into what’s become known as Cameroon’s anglophone crisis.

    The protest was instigated by perceived marginalisation of Cameroon’s anglophone region, which makes up 20% of the nation’s 29 million people.

    The conflict has resulted in immense destruction and casualties. Cameroon’s military responded to the protest with arrests and torture. Voices that called for complete secession of the anglophone regions from the Republic of Cameroon gained momentum.

    They created a virtual Ambazonia Republic and an interim government in exile, and vowed to fight back. They formed a military wing, Ambazonia Self-Defence Force, which attacked and disrupted economic and social services in the region.

    As of October 2024, over 1.8 million people have needed humanitarian assistance. Over 584,000 have been internally displaced. Over 73,000 have become refugees in next-door Nigeria. Over 6,500 have been killed.




    Read more:
    Cameroon: how language plunged a country into deadly conflict with no end in sight


    And the conflict still rages.

    One possible avenue that could be pursued to end the impasse is mediation, with help from other countries. But the Cameroonian government has repeatedly rebuffed intervention from organisations such as the African Union, arguing that the conflict is an internal affair.

    It also ended a government-sponsored mediation by the Swiss in 2022.

    It is clear to me, as a historian who has studied Cameroon foreign policy for the past three decades, that Cameroon’s leadership will not look to external actors to help solve their crisis.

    Founding leader Ahmadou Ahidjo, and later his successor Paul Biya, did not respond to external pressure to address issues. Cameroon’s diplomatic relations are based on respect of national sovereignty and nonintervention in each other’s internal affairs.

    My research shows that the Cameroonian leadership rejects outside intervention on issues it regards as within its sovereignty and internal affairs.

    Removing Cameroon from aid programmes such as the United States Agency for International Development programme and the African Growth and Opportunity Act has not deterred its leaders.

    An understanding of this background is crucial in the search for solutions to the ongoing anglophone crisis.




    Read more:
    Cameroon spends 90% of Chinese development loans on its French region: this could deepen the country’s divisions


    Use of force

    In the 1960s, Ahidjo used brutal force against a nationalist organisation called the Maquisard. His presidency was characterised by murders, imprisonments and torture.

    Political rivals were imprisoned or forced to go into exile. Biya, who served in Ahidjo’s government, learned that repressive measures work. As president, he used similar tactics against rivals and the opposition.

    But the use of force as a response to the anglophone protest was a miscalculation. The Biya regime failed to see the crisis in its context of changing times, misunderstood the sources of the conflict, and misread the role of social media in protest activities in the 21st century.

    The crisis originated from a series of grievances: poverty, unemployment, political and economic neglect of the anglophone region, failure to treat French and English as equal languages in the country, and disrespect and disregard of English-speaking Cameroonians.

    At the beginning protesters were generally peaceful, but things changed in 2017. Biya stated that Cameroon was being hijacked by “terrorists masking as secessionists” and vowed to eliminate them.

    To anglophone leaders it was a formal declaration of war, and the message spread quickly on social media. The Biya team did little to slow or stop its spread, and anglophones inside and outside the country accepted the message as fact. It mobilised the region. And few took the time to read the full text of his remarks.

    The brutality of the war on both sides intensified. Everything had all happened so quickly, and most did not anticipate the intensity of the violence.




    Read more:
    Cameroon after Paul Biya: poverty, uncertainty and a precarious succession battle


    Resistance to outside intervention

    In its diplomatic relations, Cameroon has a long history of protecting what it sees as its own business.

    One example was in 1992, after the US administration criticised Biya for electoral fraud. The Cameroon government fired back. Biya withdrew Cameroon’s ambassador from Washington DC, and informed the US ambassador that America should stay clear of Cameroon’s internal affairs.

    In 2008, tension erupted again when Biya changed Cameroon’s constitution to eliminate presidential term limits. The US ambassador criticised the move in the Cameroonian press. Again, Cameroonian officials pushed back, asking the ambassador not to interfere in the nation’s internal politics.

    America’s disposition towards the anglophone crisis has been one of non-interference. Other major powers have responded similarly, asking both sides to end the violence.

    The Cameroon government has rebuffed initiatives from Switzerland and Canada, both friendly to the country, publicly stating it asked no nation to mediate.

    The rejection of the Swiss initiative was surprising, given that Biya spends much time in that country. Unlike the Swiss plan, in which conversations began, the Canadian initiative did not even take off.




    Read more:
    Cameroon’s rebels may not achieve their goal of creating the Ambazonian state – but they’re still a threat to stability


    Looking ahead

    Measurable indicators show that the Biya regime is failing to end the anglophone crisis. The killings – including those of law enforcement officers – kidnaps, brutality and ransom demands are now normalised in the anglophone region, especially in rural areas.

    Biya’s Grand National Dialogue and National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism have failed to address the sources of the crisis. Locals dismiss them as a joke.

    People are exasperated by public service announcements about what the government has achieved. Their condition remains much worse than it was in the pre-crisis period.

    Ordinary people are focused on bread-and-butter issues and the desire for dignity and respect. But they don’t see it.

    Young Cameroonians need to see both anglophone and francophone residents at every level of government, on every rung of the business ladder, in every management position, at every school — even on every billboard advertisement.

    Only such a widespread and visible approach can convincingly challenge Cameroon’s pattern of discrimination and exclusion.

    The Biya regime must commit to doing that and not be distracted by supporters urging him to be a candidate in the upcoming presidential election.

    It is important to track and bring to justice the apparent sponsors of the killings in the country. This must be done while government keeps its promises to make things right for those living in the anglophone regions.

    Finally, given China’s investment in Cameroon, it can do more to engage the Biya regime on the anglophone crisis. Like Cameroon, China’s policy also stipulates a policy of nonintervention, but it has repeatedly changed course when its strategic interests are threatened.

    Major power status demands major responsibilities, and showing the will to stop chronic human rights violations remains an important obligation.

    Julius A. Amin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Cameroon could do with some foreign help to solve anglophone crisis – but the state doesn’t want it – https://theconversation.com/cameroon-could-do-with-some-foreign-help-to-solve-anglophone-crisis-but-the-state-doesnt-want-it-244770

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: How people will be ringing in the year of the snake

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sijing Lu, Assistant Professor in Translation and Transcultural Studies, University of Warwick

    SeventyFour/Shutterstock

    Lunar new year is the most important traditional festival for the Chinese people, symbolising unity, prosperity and hope for the future. It is, however, celebrated all over Asia and in the diaspora.

    Unlike, the new year that is celebrated only on December 31 and January 1, lunar new year celebrations begin the month before and end days after the start of the new year.

    In the Chinese tradition, new year celebration begins on the eighth day of the 12th lunar month with the Laba festival (腊八节). On this day, it is customary to eat Laba congee, a porridge which is also known as “eight-treasure congee” because it’s often made with eight or more ingredients. This year the Laba festival fell on January 7.

    The biggest day in this period of celebration is, of course, new year, which this year falls on January 29.

    According to historical records, the Chinese people have been celebrating the lunar new year for over 4,000 years. Around 2,000BC, Shun, an ancient Chinese leader, ascended to the throne and led his followers in a worship ceremony to honour heaven and earth.

    This day was regarded as the beginning of the year, corresponding to the first day of the first lunar month. This event is believed to mark the origin of the lunar new year.

    During this festival, people typically express their hopes for prosperity and health in the coming year through family reunions and ancestor worship. Communities also host traditional activities to celebrate, such as lion dances, the giving of red envelopes, and putting up of spring couplets (pairs of poems written on red paper with black or gold characters), all of which symbolise good fortune and abundance.

    The traditional Chinese lunar new year reunion dinner includes many symbolic dishes. For example, eating fish represents abundance, dumplings symbolise reunion and wealth, and rice cakes signify progress and success.


    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.


    But this day isn’t the end of celebrations. Instead, new year is celebrated up until the 15th day of the first lunar month when the lantern festival (元宵节) is celebrated. This festival coincides with the first full moon of the lunar year. On this day reconciliation, peace and forgiveness are sought.

    To celebrate, people will cover their houses with colourful lanterns, often with riddles written on them. Children will go out and try to solve these to win small gifts. There might be lion and dragon dances as well as parades and fireworks. People eat small glutinous rice balls, known as yuanxiao or tangyuan. The round shape symbolises wholeness and unity within the family.

    This year’s lantern festival – and the end of lunar new year celebrations – is on February 12. By this time, we will be well into 2025, which is the year of the snake.

    The year of the snake

    The year of the snake holds profound meaning and special significance in Chinese culture. The animal symbolises wisdom, spirituality, elegance and renewal.

    In Chinese traditions, the snake is also considered a “small dragon” and has a unique presence. Many scholars believe that the basic form of the dragon has evolved from the snake, with the snake’s body forming the main structure of the mythical beast.

    In ancient art, images of dragons and snakes often overlap, with motifs that appear simultaneously dragon-like and snake-like being very common.

    In ancient China, the snake was regarded as a mysterious and powerful creature. Its strong reproductive ability symbolised a continuous lineage and abundant offspring, while its ability to shed its skin and renew itself represented life and longevity. This process of renewal and rebirth highlighted the snake’s connection to cycles of growth and the passage of time.

    Beyond its physical traits, the snake was also revered for its intelligence and adaptability, often being portrayed as a creature of wisdom and strategy.

    These qualities have translated into cultural beliefs about people born in the year of the snake. For instance, for those born in this year, the snake’s flexibility and patience are seen as representing wisdom in problem-solving and overcoming challenges.

    Sijing Lu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. How people will be ringing in the year of the snake – https://theconversation.com/how-people-will-be-ringing-in-the-year-of-the-snake-248468

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: The US stock market does better under Democrat presidents than Republicans – here’s what the data shows

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex

    The US has been experiencing a long “bull” stock market, that is rapid growth in stock prices, although this week tech stocks tumbled over the future prospects for US-built AI.

    But could the market hit a significant downturn during Trump’s second term in the White House? At first sight this seems unlikely because it did well during his first term, from 2016 to 2020 (see chart below). However, long term trends in the US stock market reveal a pattern suggesting that stock prices might be quite vulnerable during his second term.

    The Nobel prize-winning economist, Robert Shiller, who studies financial markets thinks that the US stock market has peaked, and future returns will be much more modest than in recent history although he does not suggest that a crash is on the horizon.

    The market under different presidents

    Shiller’s data makes it possible to look at the relationship between who is the president and stock prices since 1925. By examining the performance of the stock market over that period we can identify the extent to which eight Democrat and nine Republican presidents have influenced the growth of the market.

    Changes in stock prices during Republican presidents 1925 to 2024:

    The chart shows the percentage changes in the Standard and Poor’s monthly stock price index (which gives a snapshot of the market), corrected for inflation, during the incumbencies of Republican presidents since January 1925.

    The average increase in stock prices for Republican presidents was 25%. But the thing that stands out in the chart is that three major crashes in the stock market also took place under these Republicans incumbents.

    The first of these, known as the Wall Street Crash, occurred on October 28 1929 when Herbert Hoover was president. This was the trigger event for the Great Depression of the 1930s and resulted in a fall of 64% in the stock market during his presidency.

    His reaction to the crash (when share values fell dramatically) was to do nothing in the belief that the economy would eventually recover on its own. This cost him the 1932 presidential election when Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected for the first time. He was subsequently elected a record four times, thanks to his New Deal policies for dealing with the crisis.




    Read more:
    DeepSeek: how a small Chinese AI company is shaking up US tech heavyweights


    The second crash occurred during Richard Nixon’s incumbency. He would have been impeached by Congress had he not resigned in August 1974 following the revelations of the Watergate scandal.

    This occurred when the White House employed burglars to break into the Democrat party headquarters in the Watergate building in Washington DC. Once Nixon’s attempt to spy on his opponents became public he was forced to resign and overall the stock market fell by 47% during his incumbency.

    The third crash occurred in December 2007 when George W Bush was the president. It had its origins in the deregulation of the financial sector which had occurred in the US after Ronald Reagan became president in 1980. Lax financial regulations led to ever increasingly risky assets and trading practices on Wall Street starting in the real estate market.

    US stock market opens.

    The crisis spread rapidly throughout the world’s financial system and a recession of the scale of the 1930s was only averted by prompt action by the Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, who worked with political leaders in other countries such as UK prime minister Gordon Brown to stabilise the system. The stock market fell by 45% during Bush’s period of office.

    Many factors are at work to explain this, but the overriding fact is that Republicans are less likely to regulate the financial sector, or across the board, than Democrats. Their voters are more likely to be optimistic about the prospects for the economy, and therefore to take risks when investing in the stock market, when a Republican is in the White House.

    Changes in stock prices during Democratic presidents 1925 to 2024:

    The second chart shows changes in stock prices during the incumbencies of eight Democratic presidents during this period. It is very different from the Republican chart, since, of those presidents shown, only Jimmy Carter left office with the stock market lower than when he arrived, and that by a modest 13%.

    Bill Clinton was the most successful president, achieving an increase of 151% during his two terms in the White House. Overall, the stock market rose by an average of 51% during Democrat incumbencies, more than twice the size of the Republican increases.

    These results are surprising given that the Republicans are the traditional party of big business and so might be expected to be good for the stock market.

    Donald Trump has promised to increase tariffs on imports from the rest of the world, particularly those from China. In addition, there is a burgeoning budget deficit caused by the gap between spending and taxation.

    Most economists think these policies will create inflation and slow growth.

    Many investors are currently quite nervous about a possible recession after the long bull market of the last few years. The drop in the price of tech stocks this week confirms this. One effect of this has been to cause a rise in yields on US Treasury long-term bonds, reflecting fears of further inflation.

    Recent comparative research shows that countries can pay a high price for populist economic policies. So, it would be well worth Trump studying the history of US stock markets rises and falls, if he wants to avoid a severe economic downturn during his second term.

    Paul Whiteley has received funding from the British Academy and the ESRC.

    – ref. The US stock market does better under Democrat presidents than Republicans – here’s what the data shows – https://theconversation.com/the-us-stock-market-does-better-under-democrat-presidents-than-republicans-heres-what-the-data-shows-246652

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Tea ceremonies, pandas and xiangqi: the Chinese New Year festival in Moscow has begun

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    The Chinese New Year in Moscow festival has begun in the capital. It will last until February 9 and will unite two dozen venues, including Manezhnaya, Tverskaya and Bolotnaya squares, Kamergersky and Stoleshnikov lanes, Tverskoy Boulevard, Novy Arbat, VDNKh, Moscow Zoo and others. The festival is held as part of a cross-program dedicated to the mutual Years of Culture of Russia and China.

    The opening ceremony was attended by the Director of the Department of Information and Press, official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Maria Zakharova, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People’s Republic of China to the Russian Federation Zhang Hanhui and the Deputy Mayor of Moscow Natalia Sergunina.

    “We invite everyone to celebrate the New Year in Moscow once again, this time according to the Eastern calendar. The January holidays were a great success, and the New Year’s venues welcomed millions of visitors. In the next two weeks, we will also have a rich and interesting program. More than 400 events are planned – theatrical performances, master classes, lectures, film screenings and tea ceremonies. The central streets are decorated with light installations,” noted Natalia Sergunina.

    A bright discovery

    The festival opened with a procession of symbols of the outgoing and incoming year – a dragon and a snake. Participants set off from the monument to Kliment Timiryazev on Tverskoy Boulevard and reached Manezhnaya Square. Here a drum show was organized for the guests.

    “The festival’s events are aimed at getting Russians and Chinese to know each other’s customs and traditions better. Guests can expect a colorful program that will last 13 days. Last year, the festival was held for the first time, but already then it was visited by more than 700 thousand people. I think this year the record will be broken,” shared Maria Zakharova.

    In 2024, the holiday received many positive responses from city residents and tourists. Famous Chinese bloggers attended the event and told their subscribers about it. In total, their videos collected about 45 million views. Reports from the Russian capital were shown on China’s central television channel.

    “In 2024, a large-scale celebration of the Spring Festival was held for the first time in the center of the Russian capital. Russia also brightly celebrated Maslenitsa in Beijing, Xi’an and other Chinese cities, which was to the liking of the Chinese people. The holding of traditional holidays by China and Russia in each other’s countries contributes to further strengthening mutual understanding and ties between us. This year, the Chinese New Year in Moscow festival will be even larger and, I believe, will definitely attract even more Chinese tourists who will share the joy of this holiday with their Russian friends,” Zhang Hanhui emphasized.

    Immersive shows and tea ceremonies

    Manezhnaya Square, the festival’s central venue, will host performances featuring Chinese artists for two weeks. In festive pagoda-style chalets, visitors will be offered traditional cuisine, from Hong Kong waffles to Peking duck. Anyone can also play xiangqi, the Chinese equivalent of chess.

    On Tverskaya Square, Muscovites and tourists can expect tea ceremonies, culinary competitions and oriental music in a modern arrangement.

    At VDNKh, dance master classes will be held on the skating rink and themed excursions. During them, experts will talk about the similarities and differences in celebrating the New Year in Russia and China, about painting styles and the space programs of the two countries.

    The Moscow Zoo invites you to watch immersive shows and documentaries about its inhabitants, including the favorite of the capital’s residents – panda Katyusha. On February 1 and 2, admission will be free for all guests named Ekaterina or in a panda costume.

    More than 120 restaurants in the city will join the event’s gastronomic program. They will present special menus with authentic dishes prepared according to traditional Chinese recipes.

    You can view the event schedule and learn about the conditions for visiting individual venues in the online publication “Russpass-magazine”.

    Traditional lanterns and panda figurines: how the capital was decorated in honor of the Chinese New YearDragon on Ice, Guohua Painting, and Go: VDNKh to Celebrate Chinese New Year

    Guests from China

    Today, China is a confident leader among foreign countries in the number of travelers coming to Moscow. And their number is constantly growing. In just nine months of last year, 335 thousand people from the Celestial Empire visited the capital. For comparison: in all of 2023, 245 thousand Chinese guests came to Moscow.

    Many tourists choose independent travel, their share is up to 83 percent of all guests from China. This provides an additional economic effect, since they spend on average four to six times more than participants in tourist groups.

    In addition, the share of business tourism has more than doubled in five years: now every fifth tourist from China comes to the capital for business purposes.

    Chinese New Year Festival will become part of large-scale project “Winter in Moscow”, which unites over 1.9 thousand sites. City residents and tourists are invited to warm up with tea and hot buns, go skating, skiing and tubing, participate in master classes, watch ice shows and theatrical performances, and show concern for those who need it.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/149448073/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Fort Belvoir woman pleads guilty to brutally beating her 10-year-old child

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    ALEXANDRIA, Va. – A Fort Belvoir woman pled guilty yesterday to assault with a dangerous weapon; assault by striking, beating, and wounding; and cruelty to children.

    According to court documents, on Oct. 8, 2024, China Ashley Charles, 38, was enraged at her 10-year-old child because his bedroom was messy. She struck him with a chair, dresser drawers, a hot iron, a charging wire, a hairbrush, and a large serving spoon. She attempted to strike his face with the iron, but he blocked it with his hands.  When Charles hit the child with the charging wire, his finger was cut and began bleeding.

    Charles tried to hide her crime by making the child sit in a cold bath and splashing cold water on his face.

    The child dropped onto the roof from his second-floor bedroom and then jumped down from the roof and fled. He was recovered by police with substantial bruises, abrasions, a knot on the back of his head, and a cut and bleeding finger. The child was transported to the emergency room at Fort Belvoir Community Hospital by ambulance.

    Law enforcement recovered numerous items from China’s residence, including the iron, chair, hairbrush, spoon, multiple dresser drawers, and a sweater and a shirt with “I’M ON PUNISHMENT” written on them in black marker. Several of these items appeared to have blood on them, and further examination confirmed that the child’s blood was located on the iron and at least one dresser drawer.  The child’s sister reported that China had been beating him for the past four years.

    Charles is scheduled to be sentenced on May 9 and faces up to 16 years in prison. Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Erik S. Siebert, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, and Jake Cameron, Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office, Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division, made the announcement after U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema accepted the plea.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys April N. Russo and Marc J. Birnbaum and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Claire M. Horrell are prosecuting the case.

    A copy of this press release is located on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Related court documents and information are located on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 1:24-cr-248.

    MIL Security OSI –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Sudan and Eastern DRC: Foreign Secretary’s statement

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    The Foreign Secretary made a statement to the House of Commons on the situation in Sudan and Eastern DRC on 28 January.

    With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will make a statement on the situation in Sudan and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    The latest conflict in Sudan has now lasted twenty-one months.

    This weekend, the Rapid Support Forces attacked the last functional hospital in the besieged city of El-Fasher, in Darfur.

    The World Health Organisation assess some seventy patients and their families were killed.

    This attack is far from isolated.

    In recent weeks, the RSF shelled the ZamZam camp, where displaced people are trapped outside El-Fasher.

    While there are widespread reports of extrajudicial killings by militias aligned to the Sudanese armed forces in Wad Medani.

    The Government condemns these attacks in the strongest possible terms.

    They show a callous disregard for international humanitarian law and innocent Sudanese civilians.

    Exact figures for those killed and displaced in Sudan are hard to come by.

    But we know aid is being blocked from reaching those in need.

    And this is without a shadow of a doubt one of the biggest humanitarian catastrophes of our lifetimes.

    I saw this for myself, Madam Deputy Speaker, last week in Adré, on the Chad-Sudan border.

    This was the first ever Foreign Secretary to visit Chad.

    I felt it was my duty to confront the true horror of what is unfolding.

    To bear witness.

    And raise up the voices of those suffering, mainly women, so horrendously.

    88 per cent of the refugees at Adré are women and children.

    I met nurses in a clinic, fighting to save the lives of starving children.

    I met a woman who showed me her scars.

    She had been burned.

    She had been beaten.

    She had been raped.

    Turning to DRC, conflict there has gripped the east for over thirty years.

    An M23 rebel offensive at the start of this year had already seized Masisi and Minova.

    This weekend saw them enter Goma, the region’s major city, which M23 last occupied in 2012.

    Brave UN peacekeepers from South Africa, Malawi and Uruguay have tragically been killed.

    And with hundreds of thousands having already fled M23 to Goma, there is potential for a further humanitarian catastrophe.

    I have not yet travelled as Foreign Secretary to meet those fleeing Eastern DRC

    But the reports speak for themselves.

    This is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a woman or girl with children as young as nine reportedly attacked and mutilated by machete-wielding militias. 

    Around a quarter of DRC’s population are facing acute food insecurity.

    And frequent bombardment of the makeshift camps which shelter those who have fled their homes.

    I regret to say, Madam Deputy Speaker, that Foreign Secretaries updating the House on conflicts in Africa is something of a rarity.

    As I discussed yesterday with African Ambassadors and High Commissioners, the surge of conflict globally includes the number in Africa almost doubling in the past decade.

    This is causing untold damage and holding back economic growth – the bedrock of our future partnership with African countries.  

    But where is the outrage?

    Again and again in Adré, I was asked:

    What is the world doing to help us?

    The truth is, if we were witnessing the horrors of El-Fasher and Goma on any other continent, or, for that matter, seeing the extremist violence in the Sahel and Somalia anywhere else in the world, there would be far more attention across the Western world.

    Indeed, one recent survey of armed conflict in 2024 contained spotlights on Europe, Eurasia, Asia and the Americas, but none on Africa.

    There should be no hierarchy of conflicts, but there is one.

    Every human life is of equal worth.

    The impact of these wars, Madam Deputy Speaker, is clear for all to see.

    You only have to be willing to look.

    I could not see atrocities such as these, and shrug my shoulders.

    However, the House will also understand the UK’s national interest in addressing these conflicts.

    Irregular migration from Sudan to Britain alone increased by 16% last year. 

    Unscrupulous smuggling gangs are looking to profit from the misery in places such as Sudan and DRC. 

    And the longer these wars last, the greater their ripple effects.

    Neighbours like Chad and many others are working hard to manage this crisis alongside others nearby.

    But further escalation only increases instability and the risks of conflict elsewhere.

    With Sudan sitting along the major trade routes of the Red Sea and eastern DRC one of the most resource-rich regions in the world.

    This is something we cannot tolerate.

    This Government therefore refuses to let these conflicts be forgotten.

    Working with Sierra Leone, the UK prepared a UN Security Council Resolution on Sudan to address the humanitarian catastrophe.

    Shockingly, despite support from every other member, including China, Russia wielded their veto.

    But Russian cynicism will not deter us.

    We will continue to use our Security Council seat to shine a light on what is happening and work with our African partners on broader UN reform.

    We have also doubled UK aid, supporting over one million displaced people.

    I saw our impact at the Adré crossing, and announced a further twenty million pounds to support food production and sexual and reproductive services.

    The UK is the third largest humanitarian donor on the crisis, having offered almost 250 million pounds in support this financial year.

    We have been redoubling our diplomatic efforts as well.

    In the spring, I am looking to gather Ministers in the UK to galvanise international support for peace.

    We need to see three things.

    First, the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces committing a permanent ceasefire and protection of civilians.

    Second, unrestricted humanitarian access into and within Sudan, and a permanent UN presence.

    And finally, an international commitment to a sustained and meaningful political process.

    Instead of new and even more deadly weapons entering the conflict, we want to see consistent calls for all political parties to unite behind a common vision of a peaceful Sudan.

    We will engage with all those willing to work on bringing the conflict to an end.

    On DRC, the UK, has also reacted quickly to the current crisis, we now advise British Nationals not to the Rubavu district in Western Rwanda on the border with Goma.

    And we are continuing our humanitarian assistance , having provided 62 million pounds this financial year.

    This enables lifesaving assistance such as clean drinking water, treatment for malnourished children, and support for victims of sexual violence.

    Ultimately however, we need a political solution.

    We know that M23 rebels could not have taken Goma without material support from Rwandan Defence Forces.

    My Noble Friend, Lord Collins of Highbury, and I have been urging all sides to engage in good faith in African-led processes.

    Lord Collins spoke to the Rwandan and Angolan Foreign Ministers last week.

    And in the last few days, I have spoken to both Rwandan President Kagame and South African Foreign Minister Lamola.

    For all the complexities of such a long-running conflict, we must find a way to stop the killing.

    Madam Deputy Speaker, civilians in Sudan and eastern DRC must feel so powerless.

    Power seems gripped by those waging war around them.

    The Government, our partners, cannot simply will a ceasefire into being.

    But this is not a licence for inaction.

    As we have seen in Gaza, it can take hundreds of days of diplomatic failure to reach even the most fragile of ceasefires.

    So for our part, Madam Deputy Speaker, the UK will keep doing all in our power to get the world focused on these conflicts.

    And, somehow, to bring them to an end.

    I comment this statement to the House.

    Updates to this page

    Published 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: France’s military withdrawal presents opportunities and risks to West African states

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Yolaine Frossard de Saugy, PhD Candidate, International Relations, McGill University

    In early January, Côte d’Ivoire announced that French troops would be withdrawing from the country and the military base of Port-Bouët would be handed over to Côte d’Ivoire’s army. The announcement is part of a seismic shift in France’s decades-long presence across francophone Africa.

    It is the latest echo of a larger trend that’s seen French troops withdraw or be expelled from its former sphere of influence, losing diplomatic and military weight in countries France had formerly colonized. Since 2022, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and now Côte d’Ivoire, have terminated defence agreements with France.

    This may present an opportunity for a long overdue assertion of sovereignty by the region’s countries. However, an ongoing threat from terror groups and the eagerness of other entities to step in could instead lead to more instability and a reinforcement of authoritarianism or regime fragmentation.

    France’s withdrawal

    Following the wave of independence in the 1960s, France entered in an array of agreements with its former colonies. These helped ensure France’s continued influence in Western Africa and its international standing.

    In addition to close political and economic ties, which included currency control by France and support to friendly leaders, this also involved the largest permanent military presence by a former colonial power, with troops stationed at various times in Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Djibouti, Chad, Niger, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as military assistance to others.

    This large military presence has long been controversial. Historically, France was involved in a number of covert or overt military operations with dubious ends, including deadly interventions in Cameroon in the 1960s and support for the Rwandan government during the 1994 genocide.

    More recently, it was criticized for backing of authoritarian regimes and leaders and an inadequate approach to anti-terrorism, including through the Serval and Barkhane missions in Mali and the broader Sahel region — the vast semi-arid region of Africa separating the Sahara Desert to the north and tropical savannahs to the south — between 2012 and 2022.

    Criticism has also been leveraged at the neocolonial intent of France’s policy, especially in the wake of comments such as President Emmanuel Macron’s remark that African countries were not sufficiently grateful for France’s interventions, which many decried as insensitive to the historical context and implications of France’s role.

    Change was therefore long overdue, and over the past three years, a number of developments have seemed to show that France’s star was waning.

    A surge of anti-French sentiment spread across the Sahel and beyond. A series of coups in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso put in power military leaders who were eager to shake off French presence, leading to the departure of French forces from bases there.

    Leaving Côte d’Ivoire’s Port-Bouët was done in a more orderly fashion, and France presented it as part of a voluntary reorganization of its presence.

    Still, it is hard not to read this withdrawal as part of a wider reckoning with the failure of past policies and a rising desire of African leaders to reclaim sovereignty. This was indeed voiced out loud in the cases of Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal, where a symbolic repudiation of French heritage is also taking place through the changing of street names.

    Risks of foreign influence

    This moment could provide an opportunity for West African states to shake off the remnants of the power imbalance that characterized France’s presence, and reshuffle the cards of military and diplomatic co-operation. This could lead to an era of more equal partnerships and responsiveness to popular aspirations.

    There are signs that such moves are taking place in the economic area, with Mali, for instance, asserting its sovereignty on resource extraction.

    However, the security situation in the Sahel has continued to deteriorate since the French withdrawal. New partners of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger — such as the new iterations of the Wagner group, a Russian mercenary corps used as a proxy by the Russian government to widen its influence — have failed to protect civilians or undermine insurgencies.

    In some cases, they have even been accused of taking part in the violence. The military juntas in power have delayed promised democratic transitions, and sometimes turned to the scapegoating of minorities as a litmus test of their anti-western credentials instead.

    This situation is therefore more likely to lead to further instability, especially as Russia is consolidating its involvement in the Sahel, China seeks to make further inroads in the region to strengthen its stance as the alternative to western support, and new nations such as Turkey and even Ukraine are seeking to widen their influence and reach.




    Read more:
    Ukrainian special operations abroad are part of its broader war effort against Russia


    Governments in countries like Chad seem to be turning to multiple new partners for support in maintaining security. This could help them conclude fairer agreements, but it also heightens the risk of regime fragmentation and internal violence if competing forces vie for influence.

    Sudan’s civil war, fuelled by the support of external countries =like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, offers a cautionary tale of what is at risk when multiple new entities seek access or export their rivalries to the continent.

    Asserting sovereignity

    The political landscape across West Africa is rapidly changing. France seeks new partners outside of its traditional area but sees its influence diminishing across the board. The potential for a more isolationist United States under President Donald Trump is likely to leave a power vacuum in many parts of the world, further opening the door to new forces drawn to Africa’s natural resources and geostrategic importance.

    These trends provide African countries with an opportunity to change longstanding patterns. However, they also come with heightened risks, especially in an emerging multipolar world order where mid-level powers, rising major powers and reconstituting great powers seek opportunities to assert their influence.

    The only potential counterbalance to these dangers is strong regional co-ordination between West African states.

    Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have left the historical regional grouping ECOWAS, whose effectiveness had been hampered by its historical dependence on western funding. They have, however, formed their own alliance and there are now talks of expanding co-operation with neighbours, including Togo and Ghana.

    Whether this can at last provide truly African solutions to the continent’s challenges and offset the centrifugal forces already at play remains to be seen.

    Yolaine Frossard de Saugy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. France’s military withdrawal presents opportunities and risks to West African states – https://theconversation.com/frances-military-withdrawal-presents-opportunities-and-risks-to-west-african-states-248098

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: Premier’s statement on Lunar New Year

    Premier David Eby has issued the following statement marking Lunar New Year:

    “This year, Lunar New Year begins tomorrow and heralds the start of the Year of the Snake.

    “As we join people in B.C. and millions of celebrants around the world, we say goodbye to the Year of the Dragon and celebrate the beginning of a new year.

    “The Year of the Snake represents wisdom, transformation, calmness and creativity – all things that will help us meet the opportunities and challenges that we will see this coming year.

    “Beginning with the first new moon of the lunar calendar and ending with the first full moon, Lunar New Year marks a time for people to gather with family and friends, enjoy traditional foods and hand out lucky red envelopes or ‘lucky money.’

    “Throughout the province, people will be celebrating Lunar New Year with banquets, festivals and other cultural events. Every year my family looks forward to the Vancouver Chinatown Spring Festival Celebration, which features a colourful procession with lion and dragon dancers and other cultural performers.

    “This is also a time for all the people in British Columbia to reflect and appreciate the cultural diversity that has strengthened our province for generations, and is a reminder of the incredible contributions that Asian Canadians make to B.C.

    “From my family to yours, I wish you a prosperous Year of the Snake!

    “Kung Hei Fat Choi! Gong Xi Fa Cai! Chúc Mừng Năm Mới! Saehae bok mani badeuseyo!”

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: International Winter Academy on Nuclear Energy for Students from China Concluded

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    The International Winter Academy on Energy has ended at the Institute of Energy. This project is aimed at developing international educational cooperation in energy with universities in different countries. This winter, the Nuclear Energy module was organized for Chinese students from Harbin Engineering University, Sichuan University, Shandong University, and Tsinghua University.

    The staff of the Higher School of Nuclear and Thermal Energy of the Institute of Power Engineering have been conducting classes in a hybrid format since the pandemic. The transition to online classes was inevitable then, and now it has become a convenient option for students who, for various reasons, cannot come.

    We will continue to accept students both online and in person, as there is demand for this. Our program is short-term, it covers both basic and special aspects of energy, so we provide some participants with the opportunity to study after their main classes and after finishing work, – said Ekaterina Sokolova, associate professor at HSE and founder of the academy.

    The Winter Academy received the “status” of an academy when the organizers and founders of the project realized that education is not the only area of cooperation in which students, teachers from foreign universities and polytechnics are interested.

    Now the program includes not only lectures and intensive courses, but also case studies and presentations of scientific research. The Academy participants presented projects on various topics: “Artificial Intelligence on the Path to Sustainable Energy”, “Small Modular Reactors”, “Nuclear Energy and Climate Change”, etc.

    Students wrote review articles and provided examples of the latest developments in their country, Russia and the world, based on the knowledge they had gained during the program. They presented their research results on the final day at the energy forum.

    The guys visited the laboratory of the Scientific and Educational Center “Thermal Physics in Power Engineering”, where Professor Vladimir Mityakov of the Higher School of Engineering and Technology gave a tour in English, showed the work of the wind tunnel and the results of experiments conducted with its help. Associate Professors of the Higher School of Engineering and Technology Khashayar Sadeghi and Hadi Seyed accompanied the students of the Academy, assistant Alexey Tarasenko gave a lecture on the basics of probabilistic safety analysis.

    We would like our academy to be able to provide not only knowledge, but also the skills required for conducting scientific activities and writing articles. The guys get acquainted with the Polytechnic, with teachers and students. We hold events that teach them to work in a team, overcome the language barrier and develop the skill of communicating with future colleagues and scientists. The language of science is, first of all, the language of cooperation, both in education and in culture, – shared Ekaterina Andreyevna.

    A cultural program was prepared for the Academy participants. The children visited the Hermitage and the Yusupov Palace. Senior lecturer of the Higher School of Architecture and Technical Ethics Natalia Donmez and specialist of the SPbPU History Museum Maria Zavyalova conducted a bilingual excursion dedicated to the history of the Polytechnic University.

    The academy’s organizers plan to attract Russian students and students from international educational programs to obtain different opinions and come to new solutions.

    In the near future, IE employees will begin preparing for the spring program on hydrogen energy, which is very popular. Scientists Competence Center for Advanced Nuclear Technologies in the Area of Sustainable Development and Decarbonization of Energy create a course taking into account the latest industry developments.

    In the summer, the team is preparing for the arrival of several delegations from China and students from other countries for modules on electric power, oil and gas industry, nuclear power, and renewable energy sources.

    Students can follow the updates and recruitment to the academy as tutors on the IE website.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Canada and Greenland aren’t likely to join the US anytime soon – but ‘GrAmeriCa’ is a revealing thought experiment

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Peter A. Coclanis, Professor of History and Director of the Global Research Institute, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

    For some time now, pundits have been debating whether to take Donald Trump “seriously” or “literally,” as the clever binary coined by journalist Salena Zito in 2016 has it.

    This choice comes to mind when I think about the 47th president’s frequent comments recently about incorporating Greenland and Canada into the United States. A few cases in point: Before delivering an inaugural address in which he vaguely but forcefully expressed a desire for the U.S. to expand its territory, Trump raised the issue on a confrontational phone call with the prime minister of Denmark, which handles Greenland’s international affairs. More recently, he spoke of Canada becoming a U.S. state to reporters on Air Force One.

    It’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario in which either, let alone both, joins the United States. The governments of Canada and Greenland alike have made it clear that they’re not for sale.

    But as an economic historian, I believe that thought experiments can be a useful way of understanding truths about the world. And one such truth is that Greenland and Canada play a key role in the global economy. If the U.S. were to absorb either or both, it would be a strategic, economic and political game changer.

    So, for a moment, let’s take Trump both seriously and literally. Below, I’ve laid out some very rough measures of how a reconstituted megastate including the U.S., Canada or Greenland would look in comparison to other leading countries and blocs.

    Bigger, but not more crowded

    At first glance, the most obvious thing to note about the new country would be its physical size. Today the U.S. is the third-largest nation-state in terms of area – about 57.5% of the size of Russia, by far the world’s largest country.

    By incorporating Canada, the second-largest country in the world in terms of area, the U.S., so reconstituted, would be 14% larger than Russia. If both Canada and Greenland became part of the reconstituted U.S., the country would be 22% larger than Russia.

    How about China? Today, China is slightly smaller than the U.S. in area, but China would be less than half the size of a combined U.S. and Canada, and only about 44% of the size of the U.S.-Canada-Greenland. And the European Union? It would be less than 20% of the size of a U.S.-Canada-Greenland combo.

    Incorporating Canada and Greenland into the U.S would have less of an impact in demographic terms, adding just under 40 million people to the current U.S. total of 342 million.

    Similarly, if the U.S. absorbed Canada and Greenland — two countries that are wealthy, but not nearly as wealthy as the U.S. — it wouldn’t have much of an impact on gross domestic product per capita. Why not? Because the U.S. would comprise about 90% of the total population of the new megastate. Given the figures for GDP per capita (PPP, international dollars) in Canada and Greenland and weighting for population, GDP per capita in the megastate would be about $79,000.

    A strategic shift

    The biggest effects of absorbing either country into the U.S. would come in the geopolitical, strategic and resource realms. Here, the changes would be seismic. First, by incorporating both countries into the U.S., the new entity would not only consolidate its already considerable power in the Western Hemisphere, but it would also establish a much more formidable position in the Arctic region. This is increasingly important as sea lanes are opening up with climate change.

    By adding territory, the U.S. could potentially enhance its strategic and defense posture, forcing its principal adversaries, Russia and China, to pursue more cautious tacks. These geopolitical and strategic effects would be magnified by the bounty of natural resources in the new megastate.

    Consider that the U.S. is already the largest oil-producing country in the world – producing over 13.3 million barrels a day in 2023 – and Canada is No. 4, with 5 million. Together, the two countries produced over 18 million barrels per day in 2023, while Russia produced about 10.3 million, Saudi Arabia about 9 million, and China 4.2 million. In other words, the U.S. and Canada together produce 8 million barrels of oil more than Russia does each day – a staggering differential.

    The U.S. is also by far the largest producer of natural gas in the world, with Russia a distant second. Incorporating Canada, currently the fifth-largest producer, would add considerably to the U.S. lead.

    Nor does the resource bounty begin and end with oil and natural gas. Greenland is rich in minerals of all types, particularly the rare earth elements in such demand for batteries, electronics and the like.

    And perhaps most important of all is the impact of integration regarding freshwater resources. Integrating the U.S. and Canada would bring that new entity into a virtual tie with Brazil as the leading repository of freshwater resources in the world. Canada and the U.S. are currently Nos. 3 and 4, respectively, in the world in freshwater resources; together, their freshwater stock far surpasses Russia, which is currently No. 2.

    And this doesn’t factor in Greenland, with its massive – if declining – freshwater ice shield. In any case, given the increasing demand for water around the world, control over freshwater resources will prove more and more important for the overall security posture of the U.S. going forward.

    So what do we make of this little exercise? One thing seems clear: “GrAmeriCa” would be amazingly rich in resources, as the president likely knows well. But should we take Trump literally or seriously – or both – on this issue? It may be a case of “Too soon to tell,” to invoke Zhou Enlai’s famous line about one or another revolutionary upheaval in France. But the world will know soon enough.

    Peter A. Coclanis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Canada and Greenland aren’t likely to join the US anytime soon – but ‘GrAmeriCa’ is a revealing thought experiment – https://theconversation.com/canada-and-greenland-arent-likely-to-join-the-us-anytime-soon-but-gramerica-is-a-revealing-thought-experiment-248214

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Director General David Cheng-Wei Wu and His Family Attend New Year Gala Dinner Hosted by the Taiwanese Community in Sydney

    Source: Republic Of China Taiwan 2

    Director General David Cheng-Wei Wu and his family, along with the TECO Sydney team, were delighted to attend the New Year Gala Dinner of the Taiwanese community in Sydney, organized by the Association of Overseas Alumni in Australia.
    In his remarks, DG Wu highlighted:

    Taiwan’s resilience in 2024, standing firm against challenges and achieving remarkable progress despite threats to the rules-based international order and regional stability.
    A warm welcome to OCAC Director Ms. May Chiang and Council Members Mr. Johnson Hsiung and Ms. Shirley Chen. TECO Sydney remains committed to working with our community to turn Taiwan’s achievements into global opportunities.
    Australia’s role as CPTPP chair in 2025 and the hope for Taiwan’s early accession to strengthen democratic supply chains and complete the CPTPP.
     Gratitude to NSW Parliament for passing PMB No. 1414, countering China’s misinterpretation of UNGA Resolution 2758—the first and only state legislature globally to do so.
    The need for Taiwan and Australia to deepen cooperation and exchange ideas, talent, technology, and social initiatives for regional peace and prosperity.

    Leaders in the NSW Parliament, including Rod Roberts MLC, Dr. Hugh McDermott MP, Jacqui Munro MLC, and Tania Mihailuk MLC, along with Cr Alex Yang from Burwood Council, attended the gala dinner to celebrate the Lunar New Year.
    In their remarks, they praised Taiwan’s democratic and economic achievements and expressed hopes for a stronger and more dynamic TW-AU relationship in all aspects in the Year of the Snake!

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: FINNOVATE ACQUISITION CORP. ANNOUNCES POSTPONEMENT OF SHAREHOLDER MEETING TO 10:00 AM EASTERN TIME FEBRUARY 27, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Boston, MA, Jan. 28, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Finnovate Acquisition Corp. (“Finnovate”) (OTC: “FNVUF”, “FNVTF”, “FNVWF”) announced today that its upcoming extraordinary general meeting of shareholders (the “Special Meeting”) to approve its proposed initial business combination has been postponed to 10:00 a.m., Eastern Time on Thursday, February 27, 2025. At the meeting, shareholders of Finnovate will be asked to vote on proposals to approve, among other things, its proposed initial business combination (the “Business Combination”) with Scage International Limited, a Cayman Islands exempted company (“Scage International” or the “Company”), Scage Future, a Cayman Islands exempted company (“Pubco”), Hero 1, a Cayman Islands exempted company and a direct wholly owned subsidiary of PubCo (“Merger Sub I”), and Hero 2, a Cayman Islands exempted company and a direct wholly owned subsidiary of PubCo (“Merger Sub II”) pursuant to a Business Combination Agreement (as amended, the “Business Combination Agreement”). There is no change to the location, the record date, the purpose or any of the proposals to be acted upon at the Special Meeting.

    The Special Meeting is being postponed to allow for additional time for Scage International to obtain requisite listing approvals from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”), which is a condition for consummating the Business Combination. Therefore, Finnovate has decided to postpone the Special Meeting to allow more time for the closing conditions under the Business Combination Agreement to be met.

    As a result of this change, the Special Meeting will now be held at 10:00 a.m., Eastern time, on Thursday, February 27, 2025, via a live webcast at https://www.cstproxy.com/finnovateacquisition/2025. Also as a result of this change, the deadline for holders of Finnovate’s Class A ordinary shares issued in its initial public offering to submit their shares for redemption in connection with the Business Combination, is being extended to 5:00 p.m., Eastern time, on Tuesday, February 25, 2025.

    Finnovate plans to continue to solicit proxies from shareholders during the period prior to the Special Meeting. Only the holders of Finnovate’s ordinary shares as of the close of business on January 6, 2025, the record date for the Special Meeting, are entitled to vote at the Special Meeting.

    About Finnovate Acquisition Corp.

    Finnovate Acquisition Corp. is a blank check company incorporated in the Cayman Islands with the purpose of acquiring one and more businesses and assets, via a merger, capital stock exchange, asset acquisition, stock purchase, and reorganization.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    The information in this Press Release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the federal securities laws. Forward-looking statements may be identified by the use of words such as “estimate,” “plan,” “project,” “forecast,” “intend,” “may,” “will,” “expect,” “continue,” “should,” “would,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “seek,” “target,” “predict,” “potential,” “seem,” “future,” “outlook” or other similar expressions that predict or indicate future events or trends or that are not statements of historical matters, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. These forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements regarding estimates and forecasts of financial and performance metrics and projections of market opportunity and market share; references with respect to the anticipated benefits of the proposed transactions contemplated by the Business Combination Agreement (the “Business Combination”) and the projected future financial performance of Finnovate and the Company’s operating companies following the proposed Business Combination; changes in the market for the Company’s products and services and expansion plans and opportunities; the Company’s ability to successfully execute its expansion plans and business initiatives; ability for the Company to raise funds to support its business; the sources and uses of cash of the proposed Business Combination; the anticipated capitalization and enterprise value of the combined company following the consummation of the proposed Business Combination; the projected technological developments of the Company and its competitors; ability of the Company to control costs associated with operations; the ability to manufacture efficiently at scale; anticipated investments in research and development and the effect of these investments and timing related to commercial product launches; and expectations related to the terms, approvals and timing of the proposed Business Combination. These statements are based on various assumptions, whether or not identified in this press release, and on the current expectations of the Company’s and Finnovate’s management and are not predictions of actual performance. These forward-looking statements are provided for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to serve as, and must not be relied on by any investor as, a guarantee, an assurance, a prediction or a definitive statement of fact or probability. Actual events and circumstances are difficult or impossible to predict and will differ from assumptions. Many actual events and circumstances are beyond the control of the Company and Finnovate. These forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, including the occurrence of any event, change or other circumstances that could give rise to the termination of the Business Combination Agreement; the risk that the Business Combination disrupts current plans and operations as a result of the announcement and consummation of the transactions described herein; the inability to recognize the anticipated benefits of the Business Combination; the ability to obtain or maintain the listing of the Pubco’s securities on The Nasdaq Stock Market, following the Business Combination, including having the requisite number of shareholders; costs related to the Business Combination; changes in domestic and foreign business, market, financial, political and legal conditions; risks relating to the uncertainty of certain projected financial information with respect to the Company; the Company’s ability to successfully and timely develop, manufacture, sell and expand its technology and products, including implement its growth strategy; the Company’s ability to adequately manage any supply chain risks, including the purchase of a sufficient supply of critical components incorporated into its product offerings; risks relating to the Company’s operations and business, including information technology and cybersecurity risks, failure to adequately forecast supply and demand, loss of key customers and deterioration in relationships between the Company and its employees; the Company’s ability to successfully collaborate with business partners; demand for the Company’s current and future offerings; risks that orders that have been placed for the Company’s products are cancelled or modified; risks related to increased competition; risks relating to potential disruption in the transportation and shipping infrastructure, including trade policies and export controls; risks that the Company is unable to secure or protect its intellectual property; risks of product liability or regulatory lawsuits relating to the Company products and services; risks that the post-combination company experiences difficulties managing its growth and expanding operations; the uncertain effects of certain geopolitical developments; the inability of the parties to successfully or timely consummate the proposed Business Combination, including the risk that any required shareholder or regulatory approvals are not obtained, are delayed or are subject to unanticipated conditions that could adversely affect the combined company or the expected benefits of the proposed Business Combination; the outcome of any legal proceedings that may be instituted against the Company, Finnovate, Pubco or others following announcement of the proposed Business Combination and transactions contemplated thereby; the ability of the Company to execute its business model, including market acceptance of its planned products and services and achieving sufficient production volumes at acceptable quality levels and prices; technological improvements by the Company’s peers and competitors; and those risk factors discussed in documents of Pubco and Finnovate filed, or to be filed, with the SEC. If any of these risks materialize or our assumptions prove incorrect, actual results could differ materially from the results implied by these forward-looking statements. There may be additional risks that neither Finnovate nor the Company presently know or that Finnovate and the Company currently believe are immaterial that could also cause actual results to differ from those contained in the forward-looking statements. In addition, forward-looking statements reflect Finnovate’s, Pubco’s and the Company’s expectations, plans or forecasts of future events and views as of the date of this press release. Finnovate, Pubco and the Company anticipate that subsequent events and developments will cause Finnovate’s, Pubco’s and the Company’s assessments to change. However, while Finnovate, Pubco and the Company may elect to update these forward-looking statements at some point in the future, Finnovate, Pubco and the Company specifically disclaim any obligation to do so. Readers are referred to the most recent reports filed with the SEC by Finnovate. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance upon any forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date made, and we undertake no obligation to update or revise the forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. 

    Additional Information

    Pubco has filed with the SEC a Registration Statement on Form F-4, which has been declared effective by SEC (the “Registration Statement”), which includes a definitive proxy statement of Finnovate and a prospectus in connection with the proposed Business Combination involving Finnovate, Pubco, Hero 1, Hero 2 and the Company pursuant to the Business Combination Agreement. The definitive proxy statement and other relevant documents has been mailed to shareholders of Finnovate as of the record date of January 6, 2025. SHAREHOLDERS OF FINNOVATE AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES ARE URGED TO READ, THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT, AND AMENDMENTS THERETO IN CONNECTION WITH FINNOVATE’S SOLICITATION OF PROXIES FOR THE SPECIAL MEETING OF ITS SHAREHOLDERS TO BE HELD TO APPROVE THE BUSINESS COMBINATION BECAUSE THESE DOCUMENTS WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT FINNOVATE, THE COMPANY, PUBCO AND THE BUSINESS COMBINATION.

    Participants in The Solicitation

    Pubco, Finnovate, the Company, and their respective directors and executive officers may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from the shareholders of Finnovate in connection with the Business Combination. Information regarding the officers and directors of Finnovate is set forth in the Registration Statement. Additional information regarding the interests of such potential participants are also included in the Registration Statement and other relevant documents to be filed or has been filed with the SEC.

    No Offer Or Solicitation

    This Press Release is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any securities, nor shall there be any sale of securities in any jurisdiction in which the offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to the registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction. No offering of securities shall be made except by means of a prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

    INVESTOR RELATIONS CONTACT

    Finnovate Acquisition Corp.
    Calvin Kung
    265 Franklin Street
    Suite 1702
    Boston, MA 02110
    +1 (424) 253-0908

    The MIL Network –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: NANO Nuclear Energy Expands Intellectual Property Portfolio with Acquisition of Key Worldwide Patents for Composite Moderator for Nuclear Reactor Systems

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New York, N.Y., Jan. 28, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — NANO Nuclear Energy Inc. (NASDAQ: NNE) (“NANO Nuclear” or “the Company”), a leading advanced nuclear energy and technology company focused on developing clean energy solutions, today highlighted additional important patents recently acquired from Ultra Safe Nuclear Corp. (USNC), which augment protections for NANO Nuclear’s modular microreactor technologies under development.

    Patent No. US 11,264,141 B2, titled “Composite Moderator for Nuclear Reactor Systems,” relates to the design and construction of composite moderators with a view towards improving safety and waste management by addressing graphite oxidation found in conventional, individual moderator systems. Additionally, the patented advanced design reduces waste and structural deterioration, enabling the moderator to serve throughout the fuel’s lifecycle without requiring replacement in the reactor core. This intellectual property is expected to enhance the protections for NANO Nuclear’s own proprietary advanced portable ZEUS and ODIN microreactors, as well the KRONOS MMR™ and LOKI MMR™ reactors, all of which are currently in development.

    The U.S. patent is accompanied by related patents issued in Canada, the Russian Federation, Japan, The People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and by the European Patent Office. An application with the World Intellectual Property Organization is currently in progress. Today’s announcement follows last week’s announcement of NANO Nuclear’s acquisition of patents from USNC supporting modular transportable reactors with variable operations and multiple core configurations and applications, including the generation of electric power and process heat.

    Figure 1 – NANO Nuclear expands intellectual property portfolio to protect proprietary advanced portable ZEUS and ODIN microreactors, as well the KRONOS MMR™ and LOKI MMR™ reactors, all of which are currently in development.

    “As our technical teams continue their deeper exploration of the various nuclear technology patents we acquired from USNC, the benefits that these pivotal patents will provide to our development plans becomes more apparent,” said James Walker, Chief Executive Officer and Head of Reactor Development of NANO Nuclear Energy. “Regarding the composite moderator patent highlighted today, this innovative design is expected to reduce the maintenance requirements of our modular, portable nuclear reactors while improving overall performance. We believe it will also play a key role in eliminating excess waste byproducts, enabling NANO Nuclear to build cleaner, more robust and cost-effective energy systems.”

    “The addition of this world-class intellectual property to our portfolio is key in the development and eventual deployment of our innovative, portable and secure nuclear energy systems,” said Jay Yu, Founder and Chairman of NANO Nuclear Energy. “Improving the functionality of these critical parts enables us to cut down the waste produced during operation and create a safer and more efficient product. These important patents not only create the potential to improve performance but also underscores our commitment to sustainability and thoughtful design.”

    About NANO Nuclear Energy, Inc.

    NANO Nuclear Energy Inc. (NASDAQ: NNE) is an advanced technology-driven nuclear energy company seeking to become a commercially focused, diversified, and vertically integrated company across five business lines: (i) cutting edge portable and other microreactor technologies, (ii) nuclear fuel fabrication, (iii) nuclear fuel transportation, (iv) nuclear applications for space and (v) nuclear industry consulting services. NANO Nuclear believes it is the first portable nuclear microreactor company to be listed publicly in the U.S.

    Led by a world-class nuclear engineering team, NANO Nuclear’s reactor products in development include “ZEUS”, a solid core battery reactor, and “ODIN”, a low-pressure coolant reactor, each representing advanced developments in clean energy solutions that are portable, on-demand capable, advanced nuclear microreactors. NANO Nuclear is also developing patented stationary KRONOS MMR™ Energy System and space focused, portable LOKI MMR™.

    Advanced Fuel Transportation Inc. (AFT), a NANO Nuclear subsidiary, is led by former executives from the largest transportation company in the world aiming to build a North American transportation company that will provide commercial quantities of HALEU fuel to small modular reactors, microreactor companies, national laboratories, military, and DOE programs. Through NANO Nuclear, AFT is the exclusive licensee of a patented high-capacity HALEU fuel transportation basket developed by three major U.S. national nuclear laboratories and funded by the Department of Energy. Assuming development and commercialization, AFT is expected to form part of the only vertically integrated nuclear fuel business of its kind in North America.

    HALEU Energy Fuel Inc. (HEF), a NANO Nuclear subsidiary, is focusing on the future development of a domestic source for a High-Assay, Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) fuel fabrication pipeline for NANO Nuclear’s own microreactors as well as the broader advanced nuclear reactor industry.

    NANO Nuclear Space Inc. (NNS), a NANO Nuclear subsidiary, is exploring the potential commercial applications of NANO Nuclear’s developing micronuclear reactor technology in space. NNS is focusing on applications such as the LOKI MMR™ system and other power systems for extraterrestrial projects and human sustaining environments, and potentially propulsion technology for long haul space missions. NNS’ initial focus will be on cis-lunar applications, referring to uses in the space region extending from Earth to the area surrounding the Moon’s surface.

    For more corporate information please visit: https://NanoNuclearEnergy.com/

    For further NANO Nuclear information, please contact:
    Email: IR@NANONuclearEnergy.com
    Business Tel: (212) 634-9206

    PLEASE FOLLOW OUR SOCIAL MEDIA PAGES HERE:

    NANO Nuclear Energy LINKEDIN
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    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward Looking Statements

    This news release and statements of NANO Nuclear’s management in connection with this news release contain or may contain “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. In this context, forward-looking statements mean statements related to future events, which may impact our expected future business and financial performance, and often contain words such as “expects”, “anticipates”, “intends”, “plans”, “believes”, “potential”, “will”, “should”, “could”, “would” or “may” and other words of similar meaning. In this press release, forward-looking statements include, without limitation, statements regarding the anticipated benefits of the recently acquired intellectual property described herein. These and other forward-looking statements are based on information available to us as of the date of this news release and represent management’s current views and assumptions. Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance, events or results and involve significant known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, which may be beyond our control. For NANO Nuclear, particular risks and uncertainties that could cause our actual future results to differ materially from those expressed in our forward-looking statements include but are not limited to the following: (i) risks related to our U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) or related state or non-U.S. nuclear fuel licensing submissions, (ii) risks related the development of new or advanced technology and the acquisition of complimentary technology or businesses, including difficulties with design and testing, cost overruns, regulatory delays, integration issues and the development of competitive technology, (iii) our ability to obtain contracts and funding to be able to continue operations, (iv) risks related to uncertainty regarding our ability to technologically develop and commercially deploy a competitive advanced nuclear reactor or other technology in the timelines we anticipate, if ever, (v) risks related to the impact of U.S. and non-U.S. government regulation, policies and licensing requirements, including by the DOE and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, including those associated with the recently enacted ADVANCE Act, and (vi) similar risks and uncertainties associated with the operating an early stage business a highly regulated and rapidly evolving industry. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which apply only as of the date of this news release. These factors may not constitute all factors that could cause actual results to differ from those discussed in any forward-looking statement, and NANO Nuclear therefore encourages investors to review other factors that may affect future results in its filings with the SEC, which are available for review at www.sec.gov and at https://ir.nanonuclearenergy.com/financial-information/sec-filings. Accordingly, forward-looking statements should not be relied upon as a predictor of actual results. We do not undertake to update our forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances that may arise after the date of this news release, except as required by law.

    Attachment

    • NANO Nuclear Energy Inc.

    The MIL Network –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Hainan enhances ferry services for Spring Festival travel rush

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Hainan enhances ferry services for Spring Festival travel rush

    Updated: January 28, 2025 21:28 Xinhua
    A drone photo taken on Jan. 27, 2025 shows a ferry departing Xinhai Port, Haikou City of south China’s Hainan Province. To brace for the Spring Festival travel rush and better manage the influx of tourists and vehicles in Hainan, authorities have enhanced ferry services across the Qiongzhou Strait and upgraded piers to ensure safe ocean transport. Ferries specifically designated for transporting new energy vehicles (NEVs) have also been put into operation. At least 20 voyages of this ferries have been scheduled daily, which can guarantee 3,500 NEVs in or out of the island, during this travel rush. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A staff member guides a new energy vehicle to drive into a ferry at Xinhai Port, Haikou City of south China’s Hainan Province, Jan. 27, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A drone photo taken on Jan. 26, 2025 shows a ferry carrying new energy vehicles preparing to cross the sea at Xiuying Port, Haikou City of south China’s Hainan Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Staff members check before the departure of a ferry carrying new energy vehicles at Xiuying Port, Haikou City of south China’s Hainan Province, Jan. 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A drone photo taken on Jan. 26, 2025 shows a ferry carrying new energy vehicles departing Xiuying Port, Haikou City of south China’s Hainan Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
    New energy vehicles are seen on a ferry at Xinhai Port, Haikou City of south China’s Hainan Province, Jan. 27, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    New energy vehicles are driven into a ferry at Xiuying Port, Haikou City of south China’s Hainan Province, Jan. 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Staff members check before the departure of a ferry carrying new energy vehicles at Xiuying Port, Haikou City of south China’s Hainan Province, Jan. 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A drone photo taken on Jan. 27, 2025 shows new energy vehicles queuing up to board a ferry at Xinhai Port, Haikou City of south China’s Hainan Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
    New energy vehicles are driven into a ferry at Xiuying Port, Haikou City of south China’s Hainan Province, Jan. 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A drone photo taken on Jan. 26, 2025 shows a ferry carrying new energy vehicles departing Xiuying Port, Haikou City of south China’s Hainan Province. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: People stick to their posts on China’s Lunar New Year’s eve

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    People stick to their posts on China’s Lunar New Year’s eve

    Updated: January 28, 2025 21:40 Xinhua
    Workers sort express deliveries at a branch of China Post in Luancheng District of Shijiazhuang City, north China’s Hebei Province, Jan. 28, 2025. Tuesday marks China’s Lunar New Year’s eve, with many people from all walks of life still sticking to their posts. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Cleaners sweep a street in Xinhua District of Shijiazhuang City, north China’s Hebei Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Policemen have meal during a break at Furong police station of Hefei public security bureau in Hefei, east China’s Anhui Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Rangers patrol on Qilian Mountain in Qilian Mountain national park in Menyuan County, northwest China’s Qinghai Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An attendant works on a train at Harbin Railway Station in Harbin, northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Staff members of the Sus Environment Co., Ltd. check the operation of equipment at a factory in Jiaxing City, east China’s Zhejiang Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A staff member works on a train platform at the Yangzhou Railway Station in Yangzhou, east China’s Jiangsu Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A worker is seen at a steel studio of Masteel (Group) Holding Co., Ltd. in Ma’anshan City, east China’s Anhui Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Workers clean a train at a high-speed train maintenance base in Nanjing, east China’s Jiangsu Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Workers of Hai’an branch of State Grid measure the temperature of equipment at a transformer substation in Hai’an City, east China’s Jiangsu Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A staff member of an electronic technology company patrols to check the operation of equipment at a production line in Jiaxing City, east China’s Zhejiang Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Rangers patrol on Qilian Mountain in Qilian Mountain national park in Menyuan County, northwest China’s Qinghai Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A worker of an electronic technology company checks data at a laboratory in Jiaxing City, east China’s Zhejiang Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A ranger pastes the Chinese character “Fu” meaning good luck on the window of her office at the Laohugou station of Qilian Mountain national park in Menyuan County, northwest China’s Qinghai Province, Jan. 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Law Library’s Newly Published Legal Report Titled, “Access to Information for Persons with Disabilities in Selected Jurisdictions”

    Source: US Global Legal Monitor

    The Law Library of Congress recently published a multinational report, Access to Information for Persons with Disabilities in Selected Jurisdictions, which provides individual surveys of selected jurisdictions and gives an overview of their legislation on access to information for persons with disabilities. Providing access constitutes one of the human rights protections specifically guaranteed under article 21 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

    Our research surveyed 27 jurisdictions, namely, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic), Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, England, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, and Taiwan.

    This report surveys how the rights of persons with disabilities are protected, notably, if a jurisdiction’s constitution expressly protects persons with disabilities. It further describes the rights to information, in particular legal information, access to justice, and culture, and includes current legislative proposals as they concern persons with disabilities. The report also surveys which jurisdictions offer publicly funded libraries that specifically serve the blind and visually impaired.

    A majority of the jurisdictions surveyed are parties to the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled and the jurisdictions have adopted legislation and procedures to make convenience copies of copyrighted material available to persons with disabilities. Several jurisdictions are also part of networks facilitating such access, such as the Accessible Books Consortium, or provide access to Bookshare.

    The report is accompanied by maps and a table of primary resources. The maps reflect our findings on surveyed jurisdictions with the first map describing whether jurisdictions expressly protect persons with disabilities in their constitutions. The second map illustrates whether the jurisdiction has specific legislation that addresses access to information for persons with disabilities. Additional maps show which countries have ratified the Marrakesh Treaty and what countries have designated “NLS-style” libraries, specifically mandated to provide access and services to persons with disabilities.

    The report supported the Law Library’s Human Rights Day Webinar on Laws Governing Accessibility from Around the World.

    We invite you to review our report, here.

    The report is an addition to the Law Library’s Legal Reports (Publications of the Law Library of Congress) collection, which includes over 4,000 historical and contemporary legal reports covering a variety of jurisdictions, researched and written by foreign law specialists with expertise in each area. To receive alerts when new reports are published, you can subscribe to email updates for Law Library Reports (click the “subscribe” button on the Law Library’s website). The Law Library also regularly publishes articles related to human rights and civil liberties in the Global Legal Monitor.

    Subscribe to In Custodia Legis – it’s free! – to receive interesting posts drawn from the Law Library of Congress’s vast collections and our staff’s expertise in U.S., foreign, and international law.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump pulls out of WHO and Paris – how did international bodies get through deglobalisation last time around?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Perri 6, Emeritus Professor of Public Management, Queen Mary University of London

    Donald Trump has ordered the US to leave the World Health Organization. Skorzewiak / Shutterstock

    Following Donald Trump’s return to the White House, much attention has been given to his plans for tariffs on imported goods, deportations of illegal migrants, and cuts to federal government spending. Fewer column inches have addressed the implications of his presidency for global regulatory bodies.

    Just as he did during his first term, Trump has announced the withdrawal of the US from the World Health Organization (WHO) and from the Paris climate accords.

    And because his tariffs programme will challenge World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, Trump is likely to continue the US policy of stymieing the WTO’s appellate body, which adjudicates on trade disputes between states. US withdrawals from other international regulatory bodies are also possible.

    Each of the bodies from which Trump withdrew last time around survived. However, threats to global regulatory bodies today could be greater than they were during Trump’s first term.

    In the US and beyond, deglobalisation has so far been evident only in state policies, and not in trade flows. China, for example, has set up and now dominates several regional investment and trade organisations to provide alternatives to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

    However, tariff retaliation and bloc-based regulatory standards could soon turn “slowbalisation” – a trend whereby political support for open trade has gradually weakened and the rate of growth in world trade has slowed – into trade deglobalisation.

    We have been here before. The 1930s were characterised by high tariffs, breakup of trade into blocs, and withdrawals and expulsions of major powers from global bodies. In the 1940s, which saw the breakout of the second world war, trade was conducted almost exclusively among allies.

    Yet almost all international regulatory bodies survived during this period, albeit they were bruised and were able to achieve less as a result.

    Our study, which was published in 2021, distinguished pathways through which three distinct groups of global regulatory bodies either survived or else handed over their archives, networks and organisational capacity to their UN-era successors.

    Preserving rule sets

    One inter-war group of industry-specific global regulators oversaw capital-intensive and infrastructure-heavy international industries such as telecommunications and railways. This group included the International Telecommunications Union and a modest alphabet soup of closely cooperating railway bodies.

    In these fields, interconnection depended on common but frequently updated and adjusted rule sets for technology, accounting and routing management. They also required continuous statistical collections by international bureaus.

    Unable to agree major regulatory innovation after the global economic crisis began in 1931, these bodies reduced their focus to managing and maintaining their existing rule sets and information services.

    On the outbreak of war in Europe, their bureaus went into a phase of severely reduced activity, with many of their activities suspended. However, they continued to collect and publish statistics, maintained their networks within member states, and developed ambitious plans for peacetime.

    The International Telecommunications Union and the railway authorities resumed operations shortly after the end of hostilities with their rule sets intact.

    Individual brokering work

    A second cluster were generic bodies, responsible for the oversight of labour relations and aspects of capital flows. These are faster-moving fields than infrastructure-heavy industries. These bodies included the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Economic and Financial Organisation of the League of Nations (EFO).

    They provided expertise for negotiating agreements on particular problems. In the case of the ILO, this included conventions on working time, women’s working conditions, and forced labour. The EFO brokered financial support with strict conditions for Austria and Hungary, then new and struggling states which faced acute financial crises in the early 1920s.

    These organisations faced increasing difficulties during the deglobalisation of the 1930s. But they continued to provide bilaterally negotiated support for many countries. The ILO, for example, provided technical assistance to some south American governments on the design of social insurance schemes, while the EFO’s financial committee worked with central banks.

    Survival or bequest was secured by the brokering work of key individual leaders who were able to exploit fluid networks among states, firms and unions in global labour and capital debates.

    The EFO secured the transfer of key staff, networks and traditions to post-war bodies including the UN Economic and Social Council and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. And the ILO’s director-general, Edward Phelan, was crucial in negotiating with the US to relaunch the organisation with a new programme for the post-war era.

    New international clubs

    A third group of regulatory bodies was created precisely in response to the 1930s global economic crisis. These were international commodity unions for goods such as tin, rubber, tea and sugar.

    Most were publicly run cartels, often backed by the imperial blocs that dominated the fragmenting world trade system. Like many cartels, their cohesion was fragile. But many of those that were successfully established managed to survive the 1930s and the war that followed.

    Their survival depended less on the formal administrative organisation of the infrastructure bodies or the individual brokering work that sustained the capital and labour bodies. It was dependent more on their ability to draw upon club-like collective bonds both among major producing and exporting firms and among officials across key producer states and imperial authorities.

    Within the tightly bonded International Tin Committee, for example, a succession of agreements on prices, quotas and voting rights were settled. Despite initial US reluctance to see these international commodity unions continue into peacetime, President Harry Truman was persuaded of their temporary value for economic order during reconstruction.

    Some even continued until the 1970s, when they collapsed in that decade’s global economic turmoil. Freer markets then superseded intergovernmental cartels.

    Trump’s policies, as well as those of China, Russia and other major powers, may again endanger the roles of global regulatory bodies. But some will survive by focusing on the routine maintenance services provided by their bureaus, and some will empower individual leaders to negotiate their way to reinvention and survival.

    Others will pass their capacity to new agencies when deglobalisation eventually abates. And some new international bodies may emerge in response to conditions in industries most adversely affected by the changing terms of trade.

    Our work has led us to conclude that which strategy is chosen depends on two things. First, on the features of the field being regulated. And second on the informal social organisation within the international bodies and member states, which shapes how people can act and the skills they can sustain.

    It remains to be seen how informal social organisation in the WHO and climate treaty system will now evolve after US withdrawal.

    Eva Heims has received funding from the ESRC.

    Martha Prevezer and Perri 6 do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump pulls out of WHO and Paris – how did international bodies get through deglobalisation last time around? – https://theconversation.com/trump-pulls-out-of-who-and-paris-how-did-international-bodies-get-through-deglobalisation-last-time-around-247919

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: How do Chinese people celebrate Spring Festival?

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, Jan. 28 — Even though the Spring Festival officially falls on Jan. 29 this year, the Chinese people have already entered the festive “Guonian” period, which translates to “crossing the year.” This special time is filled with a rich array of traditions and celebrations that mark the end of the old year and the joyful arrival of the new one.

    In December 2024, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) added the Spring Festival, the social practices of the Chinese people in celebration of the traditional new year, to its Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. This means the Year of the Snake marks the first “heritage edition” of the Chinese New Year.

    How do the Chinese celebrate their most important festival, now recognized as a cultural heritage of humanity? Here’s a guide to the traditions and festivities.

    WHAT ARE TYPICAL CELEBRATIONS OF SPRING FESTIVAL?

    According to UNESCO, “In China, the Spring Festival marks the beginning of the new year. It falls on the first day of the first month of the Chinese calendar.”

    While the new year technically begins at midnight, the real celebrations start a week earlier with the Little New Year. The festivities stretch all the way to the Lantern Festival, which falls on the fifteenth day and marks the end of the Chinese New Year celebrations.

    The festive atmosphere begins even earlier. The Laba Festival, celebrated on the eighth day of the twelfth month in the Chinese calendar, is often seen as the precursor to the Spring Festival. A popular rhyme in northern China says, “Kids, kids, don’t be greedy. After the Laba Festival, it’s New Year already!”

    On Laba, families enjoy porridge made from various grains and beans, which symbolizes harvest and prosperity. They celebrate the abundance of the past year and wish for a bountiful year ahead.

    The rhyme also outlines the preparations that begin with the Little New Year, including house cleaning, buying new clothes, and preparing delicious food. Families decorate their homes with red couplets, window paper cuts and New Year posters.

    Little New Year, observed on the 23rd and 24th days of the twelfth month in northern and southern China, respectively, is also known as the Kitchen God Festival. It is a time to honor the Kitchen God, the deity believed to protect the household. Families clean their homes to sweep away bad luck and prepare for a fresh start.

    After a week of bustling preparations, New Year’s Eve arrives, a day filled with the longing for family reunions. The centerpiece of the Spring Festival is the New Year’s Eve reunion dinner. No matter how far apart, families make an effort to gather and share this special meal. A popular song captures this sentiment perfectly: “Whether you have money or not, always return home to celebrate the New Year with your family.”

    As midnight strikes, the old year is symbolically cast away with the sound of firecrackers. The line, “Amid the boom of firecrackers, a year has come to an end,” from the Song Dynasty poet Wang Anshi, remains familiar to all Chinese people. Today, firecrackers continue to mark the end of the old year and serve as a tradition that dates back to scaring away the mythical beast Nian.

    Another custom is staying up late, or even all night, on New Year’s Eve. Families gather to welcome the New Year, creating a cherished moment of unity and celebration.

    The celebrations continue into New Year’s Day, which marks the beginning of a new wave of festivities. From this point, the focus shifts from family gatherings to exchanges of greetings and rituals with relatives, neighbors and friends. A common tradition is giving red envelopes filled with cash, typically from older generations to younger ones, as a symbol of good fortune.

    From the first to the tenth day of the New Year, relatives visit one another, and public events like temple fairs, Shehuo (folk performances), and lantern shows bring communities together. People extend New Year greetings to loved ones and enjoy the vibrant celebrations until the Lantern Festival, the first full-moon day of the year. This marks the end of the New Year celebrations and the conclusion of the festive period.

    WHAT VALUES DOES SPRING FESTIVAL CONVEY?

    The Spring Festival is not only the highlight of China’s cultural calendar but also embodies continuity and transformation. Families gather to honor their traditions, and the past and present intertwine through rituals, storytelling and communal gatherings.

    Far beyond a celebration, the Spring Festival promotes values deeply embedded in Chinese culture. It fosters social cohesion by uniting people around shared traditions and celebrations, strengthening community bonds. On a broader scale, the festival serves as a reminder of Chinese cultural identity, connecting people across generations and reinforcing a sense of pride in their heritage.

    It emphasizes family values, encouraging people to reunite with loved ones and honor ancestors through rituals. The goal is to seek protection from misfortune and wish for prosperity, stability, and a bright future. These values, along with the traditions passed down both informally within families and formally through education, shape the national character of the Chinese people.

    The values celebrated during the Spring Festival also align with China’s commitment to multilateralism and global cooperation. “The festival is celebrated with diverse customs, including the preparation of traditional dishes, the hanging of red lanterns, and vibrant performances featuring lion and dragon dances. These practices, deeply rooted in history, reflect the values of harmony, prosperity and renewal — values that resonate across cultures,” said Ljiljana Stevic, director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Banja Luka in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said in his video message for the upcoming Year of the Snake that the snake symbolizes wisdom, resilience, and renewal. “In the strained times, let us be guided by these qualities and renew our commitment to peace, equality, and justice.”

    Guterres also expressed gratitude to China and the Chinese people for their support to the United Nations. “I thank China and the Chinese people for your steadfast support of the United Nations, multilateralism and global cooperation. Let us embrace new beginnings with hope and determination to create a better future for all.”

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Macao SAR eyes new progress in Lunar New Year of Snake

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    MACAO, Jan. 28 — The chief executive of the Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR) Sam Hou Fai said on Tuesday that in the Year of the Snake, Macao will strive to enhance governance capacity, promote economic diversification, and proactively integrate into the national development paradigm.

    Sam made the remarks in his Spring Festival message, extending New Year wishes to the residents of Macao.

    Noting that the snake symbolizes wisdom, sensitivity, flexibility, and auspiciousness in Chinese culture, Sam said that while there may be uncertainties on the path toward the future and rapid changes may occur in the international landscape, the motherland “will always be our staunch supporter.”

    The chief executive noted that this new year marks the first year of the inauguration of the sixth-term SAR government, adding, “We will continue to strengthen the implementation of the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and uphold national security with a greater sense of responsibility.”

    In constructing the Guangdong-Macao In-depth Cooperation Zone in Hengqin, Sam underlined that he and his team will make achievements in implementing innovative policies and integrating regulations, bolster advancements in industry development and foundation building, and expedite a new stage of Macao-Hengqin integration in the areas of systems, mechanisms, policies, and others.

    Zheng Xincong, director of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Macao SAR, said on Tuesday that with the care of the central government, strong support of the motherland, and joint efforts of the SAR government and all sectors of society, the “one country, two systems” policy will certainly take new steps and present a new outlook.

    Standing at a new historic starting point, he added, it is believed that Macao will make the path toward appropriate economic diversification broader and more solid.

    Liu Xianfa, commissioner of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Macao SAR, said in his message that in the new year, the foreign affairs office will further strengthen safeguarding national security, fully support the chief executive and the SAR government in governing by law, and assist the SAR in expanding foreign exchanges and cooperation.

    Liu added that the office will also promote the introduction of more measures to facilitate the movement of people between China and foreign countries, increase efforts to attract international investment to the in-depth cooperation zone in Hengqin, and better protect the rights and interests of Macao compatriots overseas.

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Snow scenery of Mount Fanjing in Tongren City, Guizhou

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Snow scenery of Mount Fanjing in Tongren City, Guizhou

    Updated: January 28, 2025 20:39 Xinhua
    An aerial drone photo taken on Jan. 26, 2025 shows the snow scenery of Mount Fanjing in Tongren City, southwest China’s Guizhou Province. Boasting rich natural resources and high vegetation coverage, Mount Fanjing was listed as a UNESCO World Natural Heritage Site in 2018. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on Jan. 26, 2025 shows the snow scenery of Mount Fanjing in Tongren City, southwest China’s Guizhou Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on Jan. 26, 2025 shows the snow scenery of Mount Fanjing in Tongren City, southwest China’s Guizhou Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on Jan. 26, 2025 shows the snow scenery of Mount Fanjing in Tongren City, southwest China’s Guizhou Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
    This photo taken on Jan. 26, 2025 shows the snow scenery of Mount Fanjing in Tongren City, southwest China’s Guizhou Province. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Form 8.3 – [LOUNGERS PLC – 27 01 2025] – (CGWL)

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    FORM 8.3

    PUBLIC OPENING POSITION DISCLOSURE/DEALING DISCLOSURE BY
    A PERSON WITH INTERESTS IN RELEVANT SECURITIES REPRESENTING 1% OR MORE
    Rule 8.3 of the Takeover Code (the “Code”)

    1.        KEY INFORMATION

    (a)   Full name of discloser: CANACCORD GENUITY WEALTH LIMITED (for Discretionary Clients)
    (b)   Owner or controller of interests and short positions disclosed, if different from 1(a):
            The naming of nominee or vehicle companies is insufficient. For a trust, the trustee(s), settlor and beneficiaries must be named.
    N/A
    (c)   Name of offeror/offeree in relation to whose relevant securities this form relates:
            Use a separate form for each offeror/offeree
    LOUNGERS PLC
    (d)   If an exempt fund manager connected with an offeror/offeree, state this and specify identity of offeror/offeree: N/A
    (e)   Date position held/dealing undertaken:
            For an opening position disclosure, state the latest practicable date prior to the disclosure

    27 JANUARY 2025

    (f)   In addition to the company in 1(c) above, is the discloser making disclosures in respect of any other party to the offer?
            If it is a cash offer or possible cash offer, state “N/A”
    N/A

    2.        POSITIONS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE DISCLOSURE

    If there are positions or rights to subscribe to disclose in more than one class of relevant securities of the offeror or offeree named in 1(c), copy table 2(a) or (b) (as appropriate) for each additional class of relevant security.

    (a)      Interests and short positions in the relevant securities of the offeror or offeree to which the disclosure relates following the dealing (if any)

    Class of relevant security: 1p ORDINARY
      Interests Short positions
    Number % Number %
    (1)   Relevant securities owned and/or controlled: 1,293,414 1.2441    
    (2)   Cash-settled derivatives:        
    (3)   Stock-settled derivatives (including options) and agreements to purchase/sell:        
    TOTAL: 1,293,414 1.2441    

    All interests and all short positions should be disclosed.

    Details of any open stock-settled derivative positions (including traded options), or agreements to purchase or sell relevant securities, should be given on a Supplemental Form 8 (Open Positions).

    (b)      Rights to subscribe for new securities (including directors’ and other employee options)

    Class of relevant security in relation to which subscription right exists:  
    Details, including nature of the rights concerned and relevant percentages:  

    3.        DEALINGS (IF ANY) BY THE PERSON MAKING THE DISCLOSURE

    Where there have been dealings in more than one class of relevant securities of the offeror or offeree named in 1(c), copy table 3(a), (b), (c) or (d) (as appropriate) for each additional class of relevant security dealt in.

    The currency of all prices and other monetary amounts should be stated.

    (a)        Purchases and sales

    Class of relevant security Purchase/sale Number of securities Price per unit
    1p ORDINARY SALE 1,325 320.52p

    (b)        Cash-settled derivative transactions

    Class of relevant security Product description
    e.g. CFD
    Nature of dealing
    e.g. opening/closing a long/short position, increasing/reducing a long/short position
    Number of reference securities Price per unit
    NONE        

    (c)        Stock-settled derivative transactions (including options)

    (i)        Writing, selling, purchasing or varying

    Class of relevant security Product description e.g. call option Writing, purchasing, selling, varying etc. Number of securities to which option relates Exercise price per unit Type
    e.g. American, European etc.
    Expiry date Option money paid/ received per unit
    NONE              

    (ii)        Exercise

    Class of relevant security Product description
    e.g. call option
    Exercising/ exercised against Number of securities Exercise price per unit

    (d)        Other dealings (including subscribing for new securities)

    Class of relevant security Nature of dealing
    e.g. subscription, conversion
    Details Price per unit (if applicable)
    NONE      

    4.        OTHER INFORMATION

    (a)        Indemnity and other dealing arrangements

    Details of any indemnity or option arrangement, or any agreement or understanding, formal or informal, relating to relevant securities which may be an inducement to deal or refrain from dealing entered into by the person making the disclosure and any party to the offer or any person acting in concert with a party to the offer:
    Irrevocable commitments and letters of intent should not be included. If there are no such agreements, arrangements or understandings, state “none”

    NONE

    (b)        Agreements, arrangements or understandings relating to options or derivatives

    Details of any agreement, arrangement or understanding, formal or informal, between the person making the disclosure and any other person relating to:
    (i)   the voting rights of any relevant securities under any option; or
    (ii)   the voting rights or future acquisition or disposal of any relevant securities to which any derivative is referenced:
    If there are no such agreements, arrangements or understandings, state “none”

    NONE

    (c)        Attachments

    Is a Supplemental Form 8 (Open Positions) attached? NO
    Date of disclosure: 28 JANUARY 2025
    Contact name: MARK ELLIOTT
    Telephone number: 01253 376539

    Public disclosures under Rule 8 of the Code must be made to a Regulatory Information Service.

    The Panel’s Market Surveillance Unit is available for consultation in relation to the Code’s disclosure requirements on +44 (0)20 7638 0129.

    The Code can be viewed on the Panel’s website at www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk.

    The MIL Network –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Direct flights between Chinese mainland and India to resume

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, Jan. 28 — China and India agreed Monday to resume direct flights between the Chinese mainland and India, according to a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on Tuesday.

    Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong and Indian Foreign Secretary Shri Vikram Misri held a meeting of the Foreign Secretary-Vice Minister mechanism between China and India on Monday in Beijing, focusing on promoting the implementation of the common understandings reached between Chinese and Indian leaders at their meeting in Kazan and discussing measures to improve and develop China-India relations, the statement said.

    The two sides reached common understandings on the following specific measures:

    First, India is willing to fully support China’s work as the rotating chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and will actively participate in various activities hosted by China under the framework of the SCO.

    Second, the two sides agreed to utilize bilateral and multilateral occasions to carry out active interactions at all levels, strengthen strategic communication, and enhance political mutual trust.

    Third, the two sides agreed to jointly commemorate the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India in 2025, and carry out media and think tank exchanges, Track II talks and other people-to-people and cultural exchanges.

    Fourth, the two sides agreed to resume direct flights between the Chinese mainland and India, support the coordination and promotion of the competent departments of the two countries, and take measures to facilitate personnel exchanges and mutual dispatch of journalists between the two countries.

    Fifth, the two sides agreed to promote the resumption of pilgrimage by Indian pilgrims to the sacred mountain and lake of Xizang in China in 2025, and will negotiate relevant arrangements as soon as possible.

    Sixth, the two sides agreed to continue cooperation on cross-border rivers and to maintain communication on the early holding of a new round of meeting of the expert level mechanism on cross-border rivers.

    The Chinese side emphasized that both sides should act in the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, adhere to viewing and handling China-India relations from a strategic and long-term perspective, and adopt an open and constructive attitude to actively promote dialogue, exchanges and practical cooperation, guide public opinion and popular support toward the positive direction, enhance trust and remove suspicion, properly handle differences, and promote China-India relations to move forward along a sound and stable track.

    The Chinese side and the Indian side also had a candid and in-depth exchange of views on issues of respective concerns.

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Deepseek: China’s gamechanging AI system has big implications for UK tech development

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Feng Li, Chair of Information Management, Associate Dean for Research & Innovation, Bayes Business School, City St George’s, University of London

    Koshiro K

    DeepSeek sent ripples through the global tech landscape this week as it soared above ChatGPT in Apple’s app store. The meteoric rise has shifted the dynamics of US-China tech competition, shocked global tech stock valuations, and reshaped the future direction of artificial intelligence (AI) development.

    Among the industry buzz created by DeepSeek’s rise to prominence, one question looms large: what does this mean for the strategy of the third leading global nation for AI development – the United Kingdom?

    The generative AI era was kickstarted by the release of ChatGPT on November 30 2022, when large language models (LLMs) entered mainstream consciousness and began reshaping industries and workflows, while everyday users explored new ways to write, brainstorm, search and code. We are now witnessing the “DeepSeek moment” – a pivotal shift that demonstrates the viability of a more efficient and cost-effective approach for AI development.

    DeepSeek isn’t just another AI tool. Unlike ChatGPT and other major LLMs developed by tech giants and AI startups in the USA and Europe, DeepSeek represents a significant evolution in the way AI models are developed and trained.

    Most existing approaches rely on large-scale computing power and datasets (used to “train” or improve the AI systems), limiting development to very few extremely wealthy market players. DeepSeek not only demonstrates a significantly cheaper and more efficient way of training AI models, its open-source “MIT” licence (after the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where it was developed) allows users to deploy and develop the tool.

    This helps democratise AI, taking up the mantle from US company OpenAI – whose initial mission was “to build artificial general intelligence (AGI) that is safe and benefits all of humanity” – enabling smaller players to enter the space and innovate.

    By making cutting-edge AI development accessible and affordable to all, DeepSeek has reshaped the competitive landscape, allowing innovation to flourish beyond the confines of large, resource-rich organisations and countries.

    It has also set a new benchmark for efficiency in its approach, by training its model at a fraction of the cost, and matching – even surpassing – the performance of most existing LLMs. By employing innovative algorithms and architectures, it is delivering superior results with significantly lower computational demands and environmental impact.

    Why DeepSeek matters

    DeepSeek was conceived by a group of quantitative trading experts in China. This
    unconventional origin holds lessons for the UK and US.

    While the UK – particularly London – has long attracted scientific and technological excellence, many of the highest achieving young graduates have tended to disproportionately opt for careers in finance, something that has come the expense of innovation in other critical sectors such as AI. Diversifying the pathways for Stem (science, technology, engineering and maths) professionals could yield transformative outcomes.

    The UK government’s recent and much-publicised 50-point action plan on AI offers glimpses of progressive intent, but also displayed a lack of boldness to drive real change. Incremental steps are not sufficient in such a fast-moving environment. The UK needs a new plan – one that leverages its unique strengths while addressing systemic weaknesses.

    Firstly, it’s important to recognise that the UK’s comparative advantage lies in its leading interdisciplinary expertise. World-class universities, thriving fintech and dynamic professional services and creative sectors offer fertile ground for AI applications that extend beyond traditional tech silos. The intersection of AI with finance, law, creative industries and medicine presents opportunities to lead in some niche but high-impact areas.

    The UK’s funding and regulatory frameworks are due an overhaul. DeepSeek’s development underscores the importance of agile, well-funded ecosystems that can support big, ambitious “moonshot” projects. Current UK funding mechanisms are bureaucratic and fragmented, favouring incremental innovations over radical breakthroughs, at times stifling innovation rather than nurturing it. Simplifying grant applications and offering targeted tax incentives for AI startups would represent a healthy start.

    Finally, it will be critical for the UK to keep its talent in the country. The UK’s AI sector faces a brain drain as top talent gravitates toward better-funded opportunities in the US and China. Initiatives such as public-private partnerships for AI research development can help anchor talent at home.

    DeepSeek’s rise is an excellent example of strategic foresight and execution. It doesn’t merely aim to improve existing models, but redefines the very boundaries of how AI could be developed and deployed – while demonstrating efficient, cost-effective approaches that can yield astounding results. The UK should adopt a similarly ambitious mindset, focusing on areas where it can set global standards rather than playing catch-up.

    AI’s geopolitics cannot be ignored either. As the US and China compete with one another, the UK has a critical role to play as the trusted intermediary and ethical leader in AI governance. By championing transparent AI standards and fostering international collaboration, the UK can punch above its weight on the global stage.

    DeepSeek’s success should serve as a wake-up call. Britain has the talent, institutions and entrepreneurial spirit to be a significant leading player in AI – but it must act decisively, and now.

    It is time to remove token gestures and embrace bold strategies that move the needle and position the UK as a leader in an AI-driven future. This moment calls for action, not just more conversation.

    DeepSeek has raised the bar. It is now up to the UK to meet it.

    Feng Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Deepseek: China’s gamechanging AI system has big implications for UK tech development – https://theconversation.com/deepseek-chinas-gamechanging-ai-system-has-big-implications-for-uk-tech-development-248387

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 29, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: ROC (Taiwan) government congratulates Donald Trump and JD Vance on inauguration as 47th president and 50th vice president of United States

    Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    ROC (Taiwan) government congratulates Donald Trump and JD Vance on inauguration as 47th president and 50th vice president of United States

    • Date:2025-01-21
    • Data Source:Department of North American Affairs

    January 21, 2025
    No. 024

    Donald John Trump and James David Vance were sworn into office as the 47th president and 50th vice president of the United States, respectively, on January 20. The government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) sincerely congratulates President Trump and Vice President Vance on their inauguration. 

    Building on the friendly and solid relations that exist between Taiwan and the United States, and in accordance with the principles of mutual trust, reciprocity, and mutual benefits, the government of Taiwan looks forward to working with the Trump administration to strengthen the close bilateral partnership in such domains as security, the economy and trade, technology, and education so as to enhance the well-being of both peoples and advance peace, stability, and prosperity across the Indo-Pacific and the world. (E)

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 28, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: JOINT PRESS RELEASE- Agreement between the Government of Samoa and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Mutual Visa Exemption

    Source: Government of Western Samoa

    Share this:

    [PRESS RELEASE]- The Government of the Independent State of Samoa and the Government of the People’s Republic of China has reaffirmed its joint commitment and partnership to strengthen relations and cooperation between both countries and to facilitate exchange of visits between citizens of both countries including promotion of people to people linkages and sub-national cooperation.

    An Agreement on Mutual Visa Exemption was signed today (23rd January 2025) between the Chief Executive Officer of the Ministry of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Mr Agafili Shem Leo and the Chinese Ambassador to Samoa His Excellency Mr Fei Mingxing during the celebration of the Chinese Spring Festival. On conclusion of the signing, the Prime Minister of Samoa, Honourable Fiame Naomi Mataafa delivered a few remarks followed by an Address by His Excellency Ambassador Fei . Both the Hon Prime Minister and Ambassador acknowledged that the visa exemption arrangement would benefit both countries substantially through ease of international travel. It was further recognized that this important development would also align with this year’s 50th Anniversary since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1975.

    The Agreement on Mutual Visa Exemption was one of the discussion issues at the bilateral meeting between the Honorable Prime Minister of Samoa and the President of the People’s Republic of China His Excellency Xi Jinping during the Prime Minister’s official visit to China from 20-28 November last year.

    Aside from the Mutual Visa Exemption, the culmination of the Bilateral Meetings between the Hon Prime Minister and the Chinese Leaders included the signing of the:

    • Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement

    • MOU on Exchange and Cooperation in the field of Economic Development

    • MOU on Establishing a Working Group on Promoting Unimpeded Trade

    • MOU on the Global Development Initiative

    • MOU on Education Collaboration and Exchanges

    • Handover Certificate for the Fingerprint Testing Laboratory

    The collaborative efforts and cooperation between the Governments of Samoa and China illustrate a shared commitment and mutual trust to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation.

    The Government of Samoa and the Government of the People’s Republic of China will continue to pursue greater collaboration that will deliver on joint interests and agreed commitments to address key national development priorities that are in line with the Pathway for the Development of Samoa, and for the benefit of our two Peoples.

    CAPTION- An Agreement on Mutual Visa Exemption was signed today (23rd January 2025) between the Chief Executive Officer of the Ministry of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Mr Agafili Shem Leo and the Chinese Ambassador to Samoa His Excellency Mr Fei Mingxing during the celebration of the Chinese Spring Festival.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

    Government of Samoa.

    Share this:

    January 28, 2025

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    January 28, 2025
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