Category: Commerce

  • MIL-OSI USA: Disaster Recovery Centers in Kentucky Adjusting Operation Hours

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: Disaster Recovery Centers in Kentucky Adjusting Operation Hours

    Disaster Recovery Centers in Kentucky Adjusting Operation Hours

    FRANKFORT, Ky

    –Beginning April 4, Disaster Recovery Centers in Kentucky will have hours and days of operation

    Friday, April 4, all Disaster Recovery Centers are scheduled to operate 9 a

    m

    to 7 p

    m

    Saturday, April 5, all Disaster Recovery Centers are scheduled to operate 9 a

    m

    to 5 p

    m

    Sunday, April 6, all Disaster Recovery Centers are scheduled to be closed

    The center in Simpson County remains closed through April 6

    Beginning April 7, working hours at all centers are scheduled to operate 9 a

    m

    to 7 p

    m

    , Monday through Saturday and closed on Sunday

    FEMA representatives can explain available assistance programs, how to apply to FEMA, and help connect survivors with resources for their recovery needs

    Representatives from the Kentucky Office of Unemployment Insurance, the Kentucky Department of Insurance and the U

    S

    Small Business Administration (SBA) will also be available at the recovery centers to assist survivors

    Click here to find centers that are already open in Kentucky

    You can visit any open center to meet with representatives of FEMA, the commonwealth of Kentucky and the U

    S

    Small Business Administration

    No appointment is needed

     To find all other center locations, including those in other states, go to fema

    gov/drc or text “DRC” and a Zip Code to 43362

     FEMA is encouraging Kentuckians affected by the February storms to apply for federal disaster assistance as soon as possible

    The deadline to apply for FEMA assistance is April 25

    Kentucky homeowners and renters in Breathitt, Clay, Estill, Floyd, Harlan, Johnson, Knott, Lee, Leslie, Letcher, Martin, Owsley, Perry, Pike, Simpson and Woodford counties can apply for federal assistance

    If you are unable to visit the center, there are other ways to apply: online at DisasterAssistance

    gov, use the FEMA App for mobile devices or call 800-621-3362

    If you use a relay service, such as Video Relay Service (VRS), captioned telephone or other service, give FEMA the number for that service

    When you apply, you will need to provide:A current phone number where you can be contacted

    Your address at the time of the disaster and the address where you are now staying

    Your Social Security Number

    A general list of damage and losses

    Banking information if you choose direct deposit

    If insured, the policy number or the agent and/or the company name

    For an accessible video on how to apply for FEMA assistance, go to youtube

    com/watch?v=WZGpWI2RCNw

    For more information about Kentucky flooding recovery, visit www

    fema

    gov/disaster/4860

    Follow the FEMA Region 4 X account at x

    com/femaregion4

    martyce

    allenjr
    Fri, 04/04/2025 – 13:29

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Empowering Indian Startups: Union Minister Shri Piyush Goyal Reaffirms Government’s Commitment at Startup Mahakumbh

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 04 APR 2025 9:57PM by PIB Delhi

    Following the grand inauguration of the Startup Mahakumbh on April 3, 2025, Union Minister for Commerce and Industry, Shri Piyush Goyal, returned to Bharat Mandapam for a walk through of the mega exhibition on Day 2 of the event.

    Addressing the media during his walk through, the minister heaped lavish praise on the work of startups. “Having visited the exhibition, the flavor that I got–the taste of innovative work that our young men and women have created through their sheer tenacity, hardwork, spirit of enquiry, research and innovation–is music to one’s ears,” he added.  “You can see the work of world-class quality, experience the technologies created on energy efficiency, powering electronics, see the defence equipment that young startups are creating, and realise how fintech is becoming a source of empowerment for the common citizen…” he said, referring to his visit to Startup Mahakumbh as “truly an experience of a lifetime.”

    The second edition of Startup Mahakumbh features 10 thematic pavilions covering key industries such as AI, DeepTech & Cybersecurity, HealthTech & BioTech, AgriTech, Climate Tech, Incubators & Accelerators, D2C, FinTech, Gaming & Sports, B2B & Precision Manufacturing, Defence & Space Tech, and Mobility. Shri Piyush Goyal visited a number of exhibits showcasing groundbreaking innovations in Climate Tech, BioTech, AI, and DeepTech and more, ranging from intelligent air purifiers and EV tractors to AI-driven platforms for functional brain mapping and cutting-edge manufacturing drones for defense applications.

    Specially curated Startup Booths/Pods within each pavilion offer startups and organizations a platform to showcase their innovations to key stakeholders, including angel investors, venture capitalists, corporate and ecosystem-driven incubators, accelerators, government agencies, and international investors. Startup Mahakumbh features over 3,000 startups, 1,000+ investors and incubators, and 10,000+ delegates from 50+ countries, making it a prime opportunity for startups to pitch their businesses, build investor relationships, and secure crucial funding.
    The union minister emphasized that he was confident India would emerge as a global leader in innovation and technology-driven growth. “This is the base–the foundation–on which I am confident, India will foray in a very big way into the world of innovation. We will make our presence felt on the global stage. I go back extremely satisfied with the work done with our young startups. Young India is raring to go. And they are ready to capture the world,” he said. 

    A landmark moment in India’s fintech journey with the launch of the India Fintech Foundation was also witnessed in the esteemed presence of Shri Amitabh Kant, Shri Sanjiv Singh, Joint Secretary, DPIIT, and Shri NS Vishwanathan, former deputy governor of Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This initiative marks a significant step towards fostering a sustainable, innovative, and self-regulated fintech ecosystem in India.

    Shri Amardeep Bhatia, Secretary, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade also engaged with startups from various sectors today at the Startup Mahakumbh. During the event, he also visited the startups showcased at the SCO Pavilion.

    Building on the success of the inaugural edition, which featured over 1,300 exhibitors and attracted more than 48,000 visitors, Startup Mahakumbh 2025 is one of India’s largest innovation and entrepreneurship events and promises an even bigger and more impactful platform for startups, investors, and industry leaders. The event witnessed a remarkable turnout, with a footfall of 107823 over two days.

    About Startup Mahakumbh

    Startup Mahakumbh is a first-of-its-kind event bringing together the entire startup ecosystem of India including startups, investors, incubators and accelerators, and industry leaders from several sectors. led by FICCI, ASSOCHAM, NASSCOM, TiE, IVCA and Bootstrap Foundation, and supported by GEM, SIDBI, ECGC, DPIIT and MeitY.

    The second edition of Startup Mahakumbh is set to make a grand return in 2025, building on the tremendous success of its inaugural edition. The flagship startup event was an extraordinary success, attracting over 50,000 business visitors engaging with 3000 exhibitors including finest startups, soonicorns, and unicorns, from 26+ states and 50+ countries. It also hosted 1000+ incubators and accelerators and 1000+ leading angel investors, VCs, and family offices.

    For more information, visit www.startupmahakumbh.org.

     

    ***

    Abhishek Dayal/ Abhijith Narayanan/ Ishita Biswas

    (Release ID: 2119100) Visitor Counter : 25

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Joint Declaration on the Establishment of India-Thailand Strategic Partnership

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 04 APR 2025 6:47PM by PIB Delhi

    During 03-04 April 2025, H.E. Shri Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India paid an Official Visit to Thailand and participated in the 6th BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok, on the invitation of H.E. Ms. Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand. Prime Minister Modi was accorded a ceremonial welcome by Prime Minister Shinawatra at the Government House in Bangkok.

    Acknowledging the deep civilisational, cultural, religious and linguistic bonds and 78 years of establishment of diplomatic ties between India and Thailand, both leaders held wide ranging discussions on various areas of bilateral cooperation including defence and security, trade and investment, connectivity, science and technology, innovation, space, education, health, culture, tourism and people-to-people exchanges. They also exchanged views on sub-regional, regional, and multilateral issues of mutual interest. Both leaders witnessed exchange of several MoUs covering various areas of cooperation. They also welcomed the establishment of an India-Thailand Consular Dialogue.

    Prime Minister Shinawatra and Prime Minister Modi also visited Wat Phra Chetuphon Wimon Mangkhalaram Rajwaramahawihan to pay homage to the historic Reclining Buddha.

    Taking into consideration the existing cooperation and the potential for closer cooperation not only at the bilateral and regional levels but also in the global context in view of the rapidly evolving global geopolitical situation, the two leaders agreed to elevate the existing bilateral relations to a Strategic Partnership. This marks a new chapter of enhanced partnership for realising the full potential of cooperation between the two countries.

    The Strategic Partnership is based on mutual commitment to strengthen bilateral relations for the continuing peace, stability and prosperity of the two countries and their respective regions. The Strategic Partnership will serve as an important foundation for the two countries to chart a future-oriented and mutually-beneficial path towards increasing opportunities, closer cooperation and to jointly respond to common challenges.

    The Strategic Partnership will build upon existing agreements and mechanisms of cooperation which encompass partnering in political, defence and security, trade and investment, connectivity, education, socio-cultural development and people-to-people exchanges, as well as other areas of mutual interest.

    In declaring this Strategic Partnership, the two leaders reaffirmed their shared interests in a free, open, transparent, rules-based, inclusive, prosperous and resilient Indo-Pacific region and reiterated their strong support for ASEAN Centrality. They also reaffirmed their commitment to exploring concrete activities to implement the ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) for Peace, Stability and Prosperity in the Region through enhanced cooperation between the AOIP and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) including Thailand’s constructive role to co-lead the Maritime Ecology Pillar of the IPOI with Australia.

    In an effort to further broaden and deepen the relationship between the two countries, the two leaders agreed to the following:

    ­Political Cooperation

    Strengthen political engagement through regular high-level exchanges at the Leadership level, including on the sidelines of multilateral meetings with a view to discuss shared regional interests, as well as to address regional and global security challenges.

    Convene regular meetings between the Foreign Ministers and Senior Officials from respective Ministry of Foreign Affairs/External Affairs under existing mechanisms of Joint Committee for Bilateral Cooperation at the Foreign Ministers’ level and Foreign Office Consultations at the Senior Officials’ level.

    Promote regular Parliamentary exchanges between both countries.

    Defence and Security Cooperation

    Strengthen the existing mechanisms of defence cooperation, as well as to promote further collaboration between the defence sectors of the two countries, with particular emphasis on defence technology, defence industry, research, training, exchanges, exercises and capacity building including by establishing appropriate mechanisms.

    Enhance security cooperation through regular dialogues and exchanges between the respective security and law enforcement agencies/ organisations, also by including a Deputy National Security Adviser/ Secretary General level strategic dialogue between the Thai National Security Council and the National Security Council Secretariat of India, to address the increasingly challenging global and regional security environment and cooperate on both traditional and non-traditional security issues such as defence, maritime security, cybersecurity, counter terrorism, law enforcement issues and combating transnational organised crime like cyber-crimes, international economic crimes, anti-money laundering and human, drug, arms and wildlife trafficking, through exchange of information and intelligence, and sharing of best practices.

    Economic, Trade and Investment Cooperation

    To organise regular meetings and exchanges between the respective Ministry of Commerce/Commerce & Industry under existing mechanism of the Joint Trade Committee between India and Thailand. It was also agreed to ensure annual meetings of existing mechanisms to promote trade and investment between the two countries; to facilitate trade and resolve market access issues with a view to strengthening both countries’ linkages to the global supply chain and to enhance the confidence of the private sectors of both countries; including through cooperation in harmonization, equivalence and Mutual Recognition of Standards of mutually agreed areas; and to prepare for new areas of trade and investment, especially in future-oriented industries, such as renewable energy, electric vehicles, digital technology, robotics, ICT, space technology, biotechnology, creative industry and startups.

    Welcome the increasing bilateral trade, which reached approximate US$ 15 billion in 2023-24 and seek to enhance sustainable bilateral trade to realise its full potential, through an expansion of economic linkages in potential areas. Promote sustainable trade in sectors such as value-added marine products, smartphones, electrical vehicles, food processing, petroleum products, auto components, services and pharmaceuticals.

    Promote trade facilitation and to deepen cooperation under the existing agreements and frameworks, including the Framework Agreement for Establishing Comprehensive Free Trade Area between Thailand and India and the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA). Provide greater impetus to bilateral trade by exploring the establishment of local currency-based settlement mechanism.

    To support and expedite the review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) to make it more user-friendly, simple and trade facilitative for businesses, aiming to achieve substantial conclusion in 2025 and to strengthen supply chains between India and ASEAN Countries.

    Promote closer collaboration between the investment promotion agencies of the two countries, including the Board of Investment of Thailand and Invest India, to promote effective utilisation of existing investment policies and schemes, particularly those driving forward the vision of Ignite Thailand through Act East Policy and Make In India, as well as the utilisation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) & Industrial Corridors in both countries for increasing bilateral investment.

    Organise regular meetings on annual basis of the India-Thailand Joint Business Forum (ITJBF) to serve as the main mechanism for exchanges and the promotion of joint projects and collaboration between the private sectors of the two countries.

    Explore appropriate mechanisms to promote exchanges between entrepreneurs, SMEs, and startups. Keeping in mind the common strategic goals of capacity building and increased market access for India and Thailand startup ecosystems, both sides agreed to conduct startup related activities including mentorship programmes and expert sessions on sectors of mutual importance, focused investor pitching, business matchmaking with corporates and business associations, innovation challenges, integration of academic institutes in both countries and supporting cross-incubation models.

    Promote closer collaboration between the financial service providers in India and Thailand to facilitate trade, investment, and cross-border payments to strengthen economic and financial linkages between the two countries.

    Promote cooperation for sustainable economic growth, including Bio-Circular- Green Economy and Life Style for Environment, especially in the areas of renewable energy, and energy efficiency technologies, to meet both sides’ respective climate change goals.

    Connectivity

    Enhance all modes of connectivity such as physical, digital and financial between India and Thailand and strengthen regional linkages, including through expediting the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and its eastward extension, as well as the India, Myanmar and Thailand Motor Vehicles Agreement, strengthening regional maritime connectivity through coastal shipping and enhancing port-to-port connections and to encourage the civil aviation authorities of the two countries to continue engaging in discussions for enhancing air connectivity between both countries.

    Socio-cultural, Educational and People-to-People Exchanges

    Foster the positive momentum of people-to-people exchanges, as well as promote potential areas of tourism between the two countries.

    Strengthen mechanisms of cooperation between the Ministries responsible for education in both countries in order to promote educational cooperation, including through mutual recognition of qualifications, increased exchanges of scholarships for students pursuing university-level education in India and Thailand, to facilitate student exchanges, joint research and fellowships. Promote cooperation in skill development, English Language training, Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), Thai and Hindi Studies, and collaboration between educational and training institutions in both countries.

    Strengthen the links between the two countries through the deepening of cultural relations and cooperation, including in performing arts, exhibitions, seminars, conference, archaeology, archives, museums, research and documentation, and festivals as identified in the Cultural Exchange Programme (CEP).

    Explore potential areas of collaboration in sports, such as sports integrity, sports governing bodies, sport sciences & research, sports industry, and sports tourism, as well as exchanges of experts and practitioners in areas of mutual interest.

    Promote closer collaboration between India and Thailand in establishing closer cooperation with the North Eastern Region (NER) of India and to increase exchanges, particularly in the areas of tourism, culture, education, vocation and technical cooperation.

    Strengthen cooperation between Ministries responsible for science and technology to address new challenges and create opportunities with increased exchanges and closer collaboration in science and technology, through joint research projects, workshops, and exchanges in priority areas such as agriculture, biotechnology, ICT and space technology.

    Promote closer cooperation between the two countries in the areas of health, medical products, as well as traditional medicine, including through increased exchanges of information, research and development, and human resource development.

    Establish exchanges and cooperation involved in women’s all-round development, including leadership, decision-making and vocational skills to enhance women entrepreneurship.

    Regional, Multilateral and International Cooperation

    Enhance cooperation between India and Thailand especially at the United Nations to promote constructive role of both sides on global issues of mutual concern and interest.

    Strengthen cooperation between India and Thailand within regional and sub-regional frameworks, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) and Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) and promote synergies and complementarities among these frameworks with the aim to comprehensively and effectively address regional and sub-regional challenges.

    Strengthen cooperation between Thailand and India in multilateral frameworks such as G77 and South-South Cooperation to jointly advocate the voice of developing countries.

    Jointly strengthen the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership established at the 19th ASEAN-India Summit to commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations in 2022 in Phnom Penh and welcome India’s continued support for ASEAN Centrality and active cooperation in ASEAN-led mechanisms in the evolving regional architecture.

    Further strengthen cooperation under the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) framework for enhancing socio-economic development and connectivity of the region, and further strengthen the centuries old civilisational ties.

    Promote the leading and proactive role of India and Thailand as founding members and the two largest economies of BIMSTEC in working towards a prosperous, resilient and open Bay of Bengal community, while capitalising on the commitment from the recent adoption of the BIMSTEC Charter as well as the unique character of BIMSTEC as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia. Strengthen BIMSTEC transport connectivity through implementation of the BIMSTEC Master Plan for Transport Connectivity and related agreements, including the Agreement on Maritime Transport Cooperation.

    The Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Prime Minister of the Republic of India agreed to task the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Ministry of External Affairs of the Republic of India to coordinate with relevant agencies to formulate a Joint Plan of Action towards the effective implementation of the Strategic Partnership.

     

    ***

    MJPS/SR

    (Release ID: 2118985) Visitor Counter : 22

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Budget Session, 2025 of Parliament adjourns sine-die

    Source: Government of India

    Budget Session, 2025 of Parliament adjourns sine-die

    Productivities of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha during Budget Session were approximately 118% and 119% respectively

    16 Bills passed by both Houses of Parliament 

    Posted On: 04 APR 2025 6:14PM by PIB Delhi

    The Budget Session, 2025 of Parliament which commenced on Friday, the 31st of January, 2025, adjourned sine-die on Friday, the 4th of April, 2025. In between both Houses were adjourned for recess on Thursday, the 13th of February, 2025 to reassemble on Monday, the 10th of March, 2025 to enable Department related Standing Committees to examine and report on the Demands for Grants relating to various Ministries/Departments.

    The Union Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and Minority Affairs Shri Kiren Rijiju held a press conference today after the end of the Budget Session, 2025 of Parliament. The Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Law and Justice & Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, Shri Arjun Ram Meghwal and the Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting and Parliamentary Affairs, Dr. L. Murugan were also present on the occasion. Union Minister Shri Kiren Rijiju informed that the first part of the Budget Session yielded a total of 9 sittings of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.  In the second part of the Session, there were 17 sittings of both Houses.  During the entire Budget Session, in total, there were 26 sittings.

     

    This being the first Session of the year, the President addressed both Houses of Parliament assembled together in terms of Article 87(1) of the Constitution, on 31st of January, 2025. Motion of Thanks on the President’s Address in Lok Sabha was moved by Shri Ramvir Singh Bidhuri and seconded by Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad.  This item engaged the Lok Sabha for 17 Hours 23 minutes against allotted time of 12 Hours. 173 Members participated in the discussion. In Rajya Sabha it was moved by Smt. Kiran Choudhary and seconded by Shri Neeraj Shekhar. This item engaged the Rajya Sabha for 21 Hours 46 minutes against allotted time of 15 Hours. 73 Members participated in the debate. The Motions of Thanks on President’s Address were discussed and adopted after reply from the Prime Minister by the two Houses during the first part of the Session.

    The Union Budget for 2025-26 was presented on Saturday, the 1stof February, 2025. General Discussion on the Union Budget was held in both Houses in the first part of the Session.  This engaged the Lok Sabha for 16 Hours 13 minutes against allotted time of 12 Hours and 169 Members took part in the debate and Rajya Sabha for 17 Hours 56 minutes against allotted time of 15 Hours and 89 Members participated in the discussion.

    During the second part of the Session, Demands for Grants of individual Ministries of Railways, Jal Shakti and Agriculture & Farmers Welfare were discussed and voted in Lok Sabha. In the end the Demands for Grants of the remaining Ministries/ Departments were put to the Vote of the House on Friday, the 21stof March, 2025. The related Appropriation Bill was also introduced, considered and passed by Lok Sabha on 21.03.2025 itself.

    Appropriation Bills relating to Second and Final Batch of Supplementary Demands for Grants for the year 2024-25; Excess Demands for Grants for the year 2021-22 and Supplementary Demands for Grants of Manipur for the year 2024-25 and Demands for Grant on Account for the year 2025-26 in respect of the State of Manipur were also passed on 11.03.2025 in Lok Sabha. 

    The Finance Bill, 2025 was passed by Lok Sabha on 25.03.2025.

    In the Rajya Sabha the working of the Ministries of Education, Railways, Health & Family Welfare and Home Affairs were discussed. 

    The Rajya Sabha returned the Appropriation Bills related to Second and Final Batch of Supplementary Demands for Grants for the year 2024-25; Excess Demands for Grants for the year 2021-22 and Supplementary Demands for Grants for Manipur for the year 2024-25 and Demands for Grant on Account for the year 2025-26 in respect of the State of Manipur on 18.03.2025.

    The Appropriation Bill relating to the Demands for Grants for Union for the year 2025-26 and the Finance Bill, 2025 were also returned by Rajya Sabha on 27.03.2025. 

    As such the entire Financial Business was completed in the Houses of Parliament before 31stof March, 2025.

    Statutory Resolution approving the proclamation issued by the President on 13thFebruary, 2025 under Article 356(1) of the Constitution in relation to the State of Manipur was also adopted in both the Houses in their extended sittings on 3rdand 4thof April, 2025, respectively.

    After the presentation of the report of the Joint Committee, the Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2025 was passed, which seeks to focus on improving the management of waqf properties, empowerment of stakeholders relevant to management of waqf properties, improving the efficiency in survey, registration and case disposal process, and development of waqf properties. While the core purpose remains to manage waqf properties, the aim is to implement modern and scientific methods for better governance.” The Mussalman Wakf Act, 1923 was also repealed.

    The Disaster Management (Amendment) Bill, 2025, seeks to bring more clarity and convergence in the roles of different organizations working in the field of Disaster Management to strengthen the efficient working of the National Disaster Management Authority and the State Disaster Management Authorities, empower the National Disaster Management Authority and the State Disaster Management Authorities to prepare the disaster plan at national level and state level,  provide for creation of disaster database at national and state level, make provision for constitution of “Urban Disaster Management Authority” for State Capital and large cities having Municipal Corporation and make provision for constitution of “State Disaster Response Force” by the State Government has also been passed.

    The “Tribhuvan” Sahkari University Bill, 2025 relating to establishment of “Tribhuvan” Sahakri University to provide education, training, and capacity building in the cooperative sector and undertake research and development activities in related areas. It will offer degree programs, distance learning and e-learning courses, and develop centres of excellence in co-operative sector was also passed. 

    The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025 has been passed to simplify the laws for requirement of passports or other travel documents in respect of persons entering into and exiting from India and for regulating matters related to foreigners including requirement of visa and registration.

    The Banking Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2025 was also passed to improve governance standards, provide consistency in reporting by banks to the RBI, ensure better protection for depositors and investors, improve audit quality in public sector banks and bring customer convenience in respect of nominations etc.

    During this Session a total of 11 Bills (10 in Lok Sabha and 1 in Rajya Sabha) were introduced. 16 Bills were passed by Lok Sabha and 14 Bills were passed/returned by Rajya Sabha. Total number of Bills passed by both Houses of Parliament is 16.

    A list of Bills introduced in Lok Sabha, Bills passed by Lok Sabha, Bills passed/returned by Rajya Sabha, Bills passed by both Houses of Parliament is attached in Annexure.

    The productivity of Lok Sabha during the Budget Session, 2025 was approx. 118% and that of Rajya Sabha was approx. 119%.

    ***

    SS/ISA

    Annexure

    LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS TRANSACTED DURING THE 4th   SESSION OF 18th LOK SABHA AND 276th SESSION OF RAJYA SABHA

    (BUDGET SESSION, 2025)

     

    1.      Bills introduced in Lok Sabha

    1. The Finance Bill, 2025
    2. The Tribhuvan Sahkari University Bill, 2025
    3. The Income-Tax Bill, 2025
    4. The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025
    5. The Appropriation Bill (No.2), 2025
    6. The Appropriation Bill, 2025;
    7. The Manipur Appropriation (Vote on Account) Bill, 2025
    8. The Manipur Appropriation Bill, 2025
    9. The Appropriation Bill (No.3), 2025
    10. The Indian Ports Bill, 2025.

     

    2.      Bill introduced in Rajya Sabha

              1. The Protection of Interests in Aircraft Objects Bill, 2025

     

    3.      Bills Passed by Lok Sabha

    1. The Bills of Lading Bill, 2025
    2. The Appropriation (No.2) Bill, 2025
    3. The Appropriation Bill, 2025
    4. The Manipur Appropriation (Vote on Account) Bill, 2025
    5. The Manipur Appropriation Bill, 2025
    6. The Oilfields (Regulation and Development) Amendment Bill, 2025
    7. The Appropriation (No. 3) Bill, 2025
    8. The Finance Bill, 2025
    9. The Boilers Bill, 2025
    10. The “Tribhuvan” Sahkari University Bill, 2025
    11. The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025
    12. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Bill, 2025.
    13. The Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2025.
    14. The Mussalman Wakf (Repeal) Bill, 2025
    15. The Coastal Shipping Bill, 2025.
    16. The Protection of Interests in Aircraft Objects Bill, 2025.

    4.      Bills Passed/Returned by Rajya Sabha

    1. The Railways (Amendment) Bill, 2025
    2. The Appropriation (No.2) Bill, 2025
    3. The Appropriation Bill, 2025
    4. The Manipur Appropriation (Vote on Account) Bill, 2025
    5. The Manipur Appropriation Bill, 2025
    6. The Disaster Management (Amendment) Bill, 2025
    7. The Banking Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2025
    8. The Appropriation (No. 3) Bill, 2025
    9. The Finance Bill, 2025.
    10. The Protection of Interests in Aircraft Objects Bill, 2025
    11. The “Tribhuvan” Sahkari University Bill, 2025
    12. The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025
    13. The Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2025.
    14. The Mussalman Wakf (Repeal) Bill, 2025

    5.      Bills Passed by Both Houses.

    1. The Railways (Amendment) Bill, 2025
    2. The Oilfields (Regulation and Development) Amendment Bill, 2025
    3. The Appropriation (No.2) Bill, 2025
    4. The Appropriation Bill, 2025
    5. The Manipur Appropriation (Vote on Account) Bill, 2025
    6. The Manipur Appropriation Bill, 2025
    7. The Disaster Management (Amendment) Bill, 2025
    8. The Boilers Bill, 2025
    9. The Banking Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2025
    10. The Appropriation Bill (3), 2025
    11. The Finance Bill, 2025.
    12. The “Tribhuvan” Sahkari University Bill, 2025
    13. The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025
    14. The Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2025.
    15. The Mussalman Wakf (Repeal) Bill, 2025
    16. The Protection of Interests in Aircraft Objects Bill, 2025.

    ***

    (Release ID: 2118954) Visitor Counter : 21

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: PRODUCTIVITY DURING FOURTH SESSION OF 18TH LOK SABHA WAS AROUND 118 PERCENT: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

    Source: Government of India

    PRODUCTIVITY DURING FOURTH SESSION OF 18TH LOK SABHA WAS AROUND 118 PERCENT: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

    26 SITTINGS OF LOK SABHA WERE HELD DURING FOURTH SESSION, WHICH LASTED FOR 160 HOURS 48 MINUTES: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

    DISCUSSION ON VOTE OF THANKS ON PRESIDENT’S ADDRESS LASTED FOR 17 HOURS 23 MINUTES AND 173 MEMBERS PARTICIPATED IN THE DISCUSSION: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

    GENERAL DISCUSSION ON UNION BUDGET 2025-26 LASTED FOR 16 HOURS 13 MINUTES AND 169 MEMBERS PARTICIPATED IN DISCUSSION: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

    10 GOVERNMENT BILLS WERE INTRODUCED IN LOK SABHA AND 16 BILLS WERE PASSED: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

    RECORD 202 MATTERS OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE WERE RAISED DURING ZERO HOUR ON 3 APRIL, 2025: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

    FOURTH SESSION OF EIGHTEENTH LOK SABHA CONCLUDES

    Posted On: 04 APR 2025 6:05PM by PIB Delhi

    The Fourth Session of the Eighteenth Lok Sabha, which commenced on 31 January, 2025, concluded today. Shri Birla informed the House that 26 sittings were held during the Session which lasted for around 160 hours 48 minutes. The productivity of the House during the Session was 118 percent, informed Shri Birla.

    Hon’ble President of India addressed Members of both the Houses of Parliament on 31 January, 2025 and the discussion on Vote of Thanks on the President’s Address lasted for 17 hours 23 minutes. 173 Members participated in the discussion, informed Shri Birla.

    The Finance Minister presented Union Budget 2025-2026 on the floor of the House on 1 February, 2025. General Discussion on the Union Budget 2025-26 lasted for 16 hours 13 minutes. Shri Birla informed that 169 Members participated in the discussion. Finance Minister replied to the discussion on 11 February, 2025.

    Demands for Grants of selected Ministries/ Departments were discussed in the House from 17 to 21 March, 2025 and subsequently the Demands for Grants were passed by the House. Appropriation Bill was passed in the Lok Sabha on 21 March, 2025 and the Finance Bill was passed on 25 March, 2025.

    Shri Birla further informed that, 10 Government Bills were introduced and 16 Bills were passed, during the session. Some of the important bills which were passed are as follows:

    (i)            The Finance Bill, 2025;

    (ii)           The Appropriation Bill, 2025;

    (iii)          The “Tribhuvan” Sahkari University Bill, 2025;

    (iv)         The Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2025; and

    (v)          The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025

    During the Session, 134 starred questions were answered orally. A total of 691 Matters of Public Importance were raised by the Members during the Zero Hour, out of which a record number of 202 Matters of Public Importance were raised during Zero Hour on 3 April, 2025, Shri Birla informed. A total of 566 matters were taken up under Rule 377 during the Session.

    Shri Birla informed that during the Session, a total number of 32 Statements, including 23 Statements under Direction 73A. 61 Reports were presented by Departmentally Related Standing Committees and as many as, 2518 papers were laid on the Table of the House, he further said.

    A Calling Attention Motion on hardships faced by fishermen community was discussed under Rule 197 on 1 April, 2025.

    As regards Private Members’ Business, a Private Member’s Resolution moved by Shri Shafi Parambil, MP, regarding appropriate measure to regulate airfare in the country was discussed in the House on 28 March, 2025 however, the discussion remained inconclusive. On 2 April, 2025, Statutory Resolution ratifying President’s Rule in Manipur was adopted by the House.

    During the Session, the House welcomed the Russian Parliamentary Delegation led by Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, H.E., Mr. Vyacheslav Volodin on 3 February 2025. On 11 February 2025, the House welcomed the Parliamentary Delegation from Maldives led by H.E. Mr. Abdul Raheem Abdulla, Speaker of the People’s Majlis of Maldives. Similarly, on 12 March 2025, the House welcomed the Parliamentary Delegation from Madagascar led by H.E. Mr. Justin Tokley, President of the National Assembly of Madagascar.

    ***

    AM

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Indian Railways and DMRC Sign MoU for Automatic Wheel Profile Measurement Systems

    Source: Government of India

    Indian Railways and DMRC Sign MoU for Automatic Wheel Profile Measurement Systems

    Indian Railways partners with DMRC to introduce state-of-the-art Automatic Wheel Profile Measurement Systems

    The system enables automatic, non-contact measurement of train wheel profiles for enhanced safety and efficiency

    DMRC to procure, supply, install and commission four AWPMS units for Indian Railways

    Posted On: 04 APR 2025 5:42PM by PIB Delhi

    Indian Railways has taken a major step towards automation and efficiency in rolling stock maintenance by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) for the procurement and installation of Automatic Wheel Profile Measurement Systems (AWPMS). The agreement was formalized today at Rail Bhawan, New Delhi.

    AWPMS is an advanced system that allows for automatic, non-contact measurement of train wheel profiles, ensuring real-time assessment of wheel geometry and wear. Utilizing laser scanners and high-speed cameras, the system provides accurate and rapid measurements without manual intervention. In case of deviations, automated alerts will ensure timely corrective actions, enhancing both safety and operational efficiency.

    The MoU signing ceremony was attended by senior officials, including:

    • Shri B.M. Agrawal, Member (Traction & Rolling Stock)

    • Shri S.K. Pankaj, Additional Member (Production Units)

    • Shri Ashish Sharma, Additional Member (Mechanical Engineering)

    • Shri Parmit Garg, Director (Business Development), DMRC

    Under this partnership, DMRC will take responsibility for the procurement, supply, installation and commissioning of four AWPMS units for Indian Railways.

    This collaboration marks a significant milestone in the modernization of Railway maintenance practices. By integrating cutting-edge technology, Indian Railways is enhancing its rolling stock management, reducing maintenance time and improving overall service efficiency. The partnership also promotes technology exchange and skill development between Indian Railways and DMRC, reinforcing their commitment to innovation, safety and operational excellence.

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: GROWTH OF VILLAGE e-COMMERCE FOR STRENGTHENING RURAL ECONOMY

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 04 APR 2025 4:38PM by PIB Delhi

    The Ministry has taken steps to accelerate the growth of village e-Commerce, for consolidation of the rural economy. The Ministry has launched an e-Saras portal in year 2022 for online marketing of Self-Help Group (SHG) products as a marketing initiative under Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana- National Rural Livelihoods Mission (DAY-NRLM). The portal is facilitating direct market access for SHGs through e-commerce. e-Saras has achieved initial milestones, including over 34 lakh product sales and are delivering more than 8,000 products to 30 States/UTs, making rural products accessible across country. Further, the Ministry in collaboration with Government e-Marketplace (GeM) has created “SARAS Collection” as a Store Front in GeM for marketing of SHG products. Also, Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) have been entered between Ministry and Flipkart Internet Pvt. Ltd., Amazon and Fashnear Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Meesho) respectively to allow the SHGs producers including the artisans, weavers and craftsmen to access national markets through the Flipkart Samarth programme, Amazon Saheli initiative and Meesho for marketing of SHGs products. An MoU has also been signed between MoRD and JioMart for onboarding and marketing of SHGs products. The Ministry has converged with ONDC for promotion and sales of rural women SHG products on ONDC platform. Some States have also developed their own e-Commerce platform to support marketing of products of SHGs.

    SHGs products are now available on various platforms such as Amazon, Flipkart, JioMart, Meesho, and GeM. Concurrently, digital marketing efforts are focused on building awareness for Saras Aajeevika.

    Some major challenges being faced by rural entrepreneurs in adopting e- commerce platforms and steps taken to address them are as under:

     

    S. No.

    Challenges

    Steps

    1

    Lack of awareness about e-commerce operations – Product packaging, Pricing, Quality, Fulfillment etc.)

    Trainings have given to more than 4500 SHGs Members.

    2

    Inadequate internet connectivity

    The BharatNet project of Ministry of Communications aims to provide broadband connectivity to all Gram Panchayats (GPs) in country, in a phase manner.

    3

    Logistical hurdles

    eSaras onboarded 2700 plus products from 170 SHGs on eSaras portal and fulfilling customer orders from it’s fulfilment centre.

     

    Various training programmes under DAY-NRLM have been conducted to onboard SHG members under DAY-NRLM on eCommerce Platforms like GeM, ONDC, Amazon, Flipkart, Meesho, JioMart etc.

    Under Digital India Initiative, various technology-led startups and innovation schemes like Technology Incubation and Development of Entrepreneurs (TIDE 2.0), Gen-Next Support for Innovative Startups (GENESIS), domain specific Centres of Excellence (CoEs) and Next Generation Incubation Scheme (NGIS) have been undertaken. Also, BharatNet Project, which connects rural areas with Optical Fibre Cable, and USOF (Universal Service Obligation Fund) schemes that bring 4G services to remote villages have been implemented by Ministry of Communications to expand broadband access. These initiatives also support village e-commerce expansion.

    This information was given by Minister of State for Rural Development, Shri Dr. Chandra Sekhar Pemmasani in a written reply in Rajya Sabha today.

    ******

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Ranking Member Huffman Statement on Billionaire-Backed Plan to Dismantle Key NOAA Weather Services

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Jared Huffman Representing the 2nd District of California

    April 04, 2025

    Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. House Natural Resources Ranking Member Jared Huffman (D-Calif.) issued the following statement following reports that key NOAA websites and databases will go dark at midnight under the Trump administration’s proposed contract cuts:

    “Three reckless billionaires – Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, President Donald Trump, and DOGE vandal Elon Musk – are dismantling one of our government’s most important public functions, the National Weather Service. The data management contracts they are cancelling include critical weather and climate data, geographic information, and extensive modeling infrastructure that enables end users to utilize these data. As we heard in our forum on Wednesday, those who depend on NOAA weather tools include the Department of Defense, first responders, and local businesses across the country. Trump and his oligarchs are clearing the way for their corporate mega-polluter cronies by erasing science and scientists, pushing America into the dark ages. They are delivering another Project 2025 promise but betraying the American people by making us less safe and shredding our global scientific leadership. Secretary Lutnick should be working to maintain and expand NOAA’s lifesaving data and services, instead of burning this critical agency to the ground. Lutnick must reverse course on NOAA or resign and go back to Wall Street.”
     

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    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Shop smarter, not harder. How gentle messaging can help the planet more than tough talk

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jasmine Mohsen, Doctoral Researcher in Consumer Psychology and Consumer Behaviour, University of Leeds

    Heavy-handed messaging? Andy Soloman/Shutterstock

    Fast fashion is booming, but so is its environmental toll. With up to 10% of global carbon emissions linked to the industry, the over-consumption of cheap clothing has made sustainability campaigns more vital than ever. Yet, even as awareness of fast fashion’s environmental harm grows, many consumers remain resistant to changing their shopping habits.

    My recent research investigated a surprising obstacle to these campaigns: the language used to drive change. I explored how assertive messages such as: “Stop shopping to save the planet!” fare when pitted against softer suggestions along the lines of: “Consider shopping less for a greener future.”

    The results reveal that pushy messaging not only fails but actively backfires, triggering anger and resistance that can undermine the campaign’s goals.

    At the heart of this resistance lies psychological reactance – a defensive reaction to perceived threats to personal freedom. Humans value autonomy, and messages that come across as commands (“must”, “stop”, “don’t”) can spark a “boomerang effect”, prompting people to defy the directive – even if they agree with its underlying intent.

    This reluctance may be attributed to the fact that buying clothes is frequently linked to self-esteem, social desirability and confidence. Shopping is often an enjoyable and empowering experience, driven by personal choice and satisfaction. But when marketing relies on guilt or pressure, this positive engagement can shift to discomfort and resistance. Rather than nurturing real connections with brands’ messages, forceful campaigns risk weakening trust and consumer loyalty.

    In the study, 196 participants in the US were shown posters designed as part of a campaign to reduce consumption. One group saw an assertive poster demanding they stop shopping to help the environment. The other saw a suggestive poster encouraging wise shopping for the same goal. Participants then completed surveys assessing their emotional responses and willingness to alter their behaviour.

    The findings were clear. Assertive messages provoked stronger feelings of anger and defensiveness in the face of a perceived threat than suggestive ones. These negative emotions led to lower compliance with the campaign’s goals, showing that pushy language can diminish – rather than enhance – effectiveness.

    The role of anger

    The emotional fallout of assertive messaging doesn’t stop there. The study found that anger, sparked by perceived restrictions, affects consumer behaviour. Participants who felt their freedom was threatened were not only less likely to reduce shopping but also more likely to dismiss the campaign altogether. Anger adds another barrier to encouraging sustainable habits.

    However, this anger can also fuel a desire to regain autonomy, pushing consumers toward action that reaffirms their independence. This could be resisting the message or making choices that feel self-directed – it may even drive consumers towards unsustainable choices.

    The findings uncovered several insights for anyone designing campaigns to encourage sustainable consumption.




    Read more:
    Five consumer myths to ditch in 2025


    First, go with suggestion over command. Messages framed as friendly suggestions, such as “consider” or “you might”, are less likely to provoke resistance and more likely to inspire positive change.

    Second, focus on empowerment. Highlighting the autonomy of the consumer and the benefits of participation can encourage them to cooperate without threatening their individual freedom.

    Third, educate with empathy. Campaigns that inform consumers about the environmental impact of their habits, without using forceful language, are better received.

    In 2011, outdoor clothing brand Patagonia launched an advert with the message “Don’t Buy This Jacket” – a good example of assertive language and reverse psychology. The campaign sent a message about buying less and taking care of the environment. As a strategy, this is known as “demartketing”.

    Interestingly, although it used the “don’t” command, Patagonia was giving people a choice to ignore the message or question why they were buying the jacket in the first place. Although Patagonia’s sales jumped by 30% the following year, the campaign was about more than selling. The company wanted to encourage people to think about the impact of Black Friday as well as their wider buying habits, and to consider repairing things, reusing them or buying clothing that would last longer.

    Of course, these insights extend beyond fast fashion. Judgemental messaging has been shown to fail in areas such as smoking cessation, exercise and diet campaigns, suggesting that softer approaches may work better across a range of public health and environmental initiatives.

    The environmental cost of fast fashion is undeniable, with millions of tons of clothing wasted annually and more than a billion tons of greenhouse gases emitted each year. Encouraging consumers to embrace sustainable habits, from buying secondhand to adopting minimalism, is vital. However, as our research shows, how we ask for that change makes all the difference.

    If we want people to shop less for the planet’s sake, it might be worth abandoning the “here’s what you must do” messaging in favour of strategies that respect their freedom. This could be a powerful way to shift behaviour towards a sustainable future – one suggestion at a time.

    Jasmine Mohsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Shop smarter, not harder. How gentle messaging can help the planet more than tough talk – https://theconversation.com/shop-smarter-not-harder-how-gentle-messaging-can-help-the-planet-more-than-tough-talk-249217

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Keeping the acquisition of military equipment independent and upholding the ‘buy European’ mantra following the appointment of Rudy Priem – E-001235/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001235/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mathilde Androuët (PfE), Pierre-Romain Thionnet (PfE), Matthieu Valet (PfE)

    La Lettre[1] has revealed that the Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) has made Rudy Priem the Vice-Chair of its Economic, Legal and Trade Commission. Three years ago, Rudy Priem chaired the defence committee of the American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union (AmCham EU), and he is currently the Director of Government Relations at RTX, a US arms giant.

    While the ASD cooperates and takes part in the Commission’s public consultations[2], AmChamEU is known for opposing all programmes aimed at strengthening Europe’s autonomy in defence. Meanwhile, Rudy Priem has been touting the supposed ‘industrial benefits’ that the purchase of F-35 fighters would bring European countries.

    In March, the Commission announced its plan to borrow EUR 150 billion for the purchase of defence systems[3], stressing that the money should help boost Europe’s arms industry[4].

    • 1.Was the Commission aware of this revelation? If so, how can it be sure there is no conflict of interest?
    • 2.Given that trade relations with the US administration are currently strained, what plans and suggestions does it have to promote and anchor the much-needed ‘buy European’ approach to military acquisitions?

    Submitted: 25.3.2025

    • [1] ‘Un “Américain” infiltré au cœur du lobby européen de la défense’ [‘an American intruder at the heart of the European defence lobby’], 18 March 2025, Matthieu Fauroux, https://www.lalettre.fr/fr/entreprises_defense-et-aeronautique/2025/03/18/un-americain-infiltre-au-coeur-du-lobby-europeen-de-la-defense,110388728-eve
    • [2] Feedback from: the Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), 6 February 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13928-European-Defence-Fund-interim-evaluation/F3453543_en
    • [3] ‘Ursula von der Leyen says €150bn EU defence loans should be spent in Europe’, Henry Foy, Andy Bounds and Paola Tamma in Brussels, Leila Abboud in Paris and Amy Kazmin in Rome, 11 March 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/c20530ca-1b31-46ce-bf90-16fc45cc0b62
    • [4] Press statement by President von der Leyen on the defence package, 4 March 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_673
    Last updated: 4 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 – P10_TA(2025)0059 – Wednesday, 2 April 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

    –  having regard to Articles 2, 3, 8, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

    –  having regard to Articles 17 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations human rights treaties and instruments,

    –  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

    –  having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

    –  having regard to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,

    –  having regard to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 43/29 of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 18 December 2002,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 12 December 2006 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 13 December 2006,

    –  having regard to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1976,

    –  having regard to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 18 December 1992,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144 on 9 December 1998,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 13 September 2007,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas of 28 September 2018,

    –  having regard to the Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference of Population and Development in 1994 and its review conferences,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto, adopted on 25 May 2000,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 5 June 1998,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of September 1995 and its review conferences,

    –  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 25 September 2015, in particular goals 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 thereof,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted on 19 December 2018 and the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees adopted on 17 December 2018,

    –  having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002,

    –  having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the International Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance of 10 April 2006(1),

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Conventions of 4 April 1997 for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, and the Additional Protocols thereto, of 16 May 2005 on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and of 25 October 2007 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which not all Member States have ratified but which entered into force for the EU on 1 October 2023,

    –  having regard to Protocols Nos 6 and 13 to the Council of Europe Convention of 28 April 1983 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe(3),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2024 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, adopted by the Council on 17 November 2020 and its Mid-term Review adopted on 9 June 2023,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on the alignment of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 with the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027,

    –  having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – an ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action (JOIN(2020)0017),

    –  having regard to the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0152),

    –  having regard to the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0698),

    –  having regard to the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),

    –  having regard to the EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021)0101),

    –  having regard to the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0565),

    –  having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation (COM(2020)0620),

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders, adopted by the Council on 14 June 2004 and revised in 2008, and the second guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation, endorsed in 2020,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, adopted by the Council on 8 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of 2005, as updated in 2009,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, as updated by the Council on 12 April 2013,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons, adopted on 24 June 2013,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, adopted by the Council on 18 March 2019,

    –  having regard to the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, adopted by the Council on 17 June 2019,

    –  having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on EU policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019,

    –  having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with partner/third countries, approved by the Council on 22 February 2021,

    –  having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict, approved by the Council on 24 June 2024,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 March 2023 on the role of the civic space in protecting and promoting fundamental rights in the EU,

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859(4),

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453),

    –  having regard to the joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 for a Council regulation on restrictive measures against serious acts of corruption (JOIN(2023)0013),

    –  having regard to the 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,

    –  having regard to its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, which in 2024 was awarded to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy(6),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act)(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023(9), and to its previous resolutions on earlier annual reports,

    –  having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure, in particular those adopted in 2023 and 2024,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0012/2025),

    A.  whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Articles 2 and 21 TEU; whereas the EU’s action worldwide must be guided by the universality and indivisibility of human rights and by the fact that the effective protection and defence of human rights and democracy is at the core of the EU’s external action;

    B.  whereas rulings of the European Court of Human Rights are an essential part of the human rights architecture in Europe;

    C.  whereas consistency and coherence across the EU’s internal and external policies are key for achieving an effective and credible EU human rights policy, and in defending and supporting freedom and democracy;

    D.  whereas democratic systems are the most suitable to guarantee that every person has the ability to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas effective rules-based multilateralism is the best organisational system to defend democracies;

    E.  whereas the EU strongly believes in and fully supports multilateralism, a rules-based global order and the set of universal values, principles and norms that guide the UN member states and that the UN member states have pledged to uphold, in accordance with the UN Charter; whereas a world of democracies, understood as a world of political systems that defend and protect human rights worldwide, is a safer world, as democracies have significant checks and balances in place to prevent the unpredictability of autocracies;

    F.  whereas gender equality is paramount to the development of free and equal societies; whereas the human rights of women, girls and non-binary people are still not guaranteed throughout the world, and the space for civil society organisations, especially women’s rights, indigenous and grassroots organisations, is shrinking in many countries;

    G.  whereas the rise in authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism threatens the global rules-based order, the protection and promotion of freedom and human rights in the world, as well as the values and principles on which the EU is founded;

    H.  whereas in December 2023, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrated its 75th anniversary; whereas today, more than ever since the UN’s foundation, totalitarian regimes challenge the UN Charter’s basic principles, seek to rewrite international norms, undermine multilateral institutions and threaten peace and security globally;

    I.  whereas in November 2024, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child celebrated its 35th anniversary;

    J.  whereas the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is regarded as a turning point for the global agenda on gender equality and will celebrate its 30th anniversary in 2025;

    K.  whereas the legitimacy and functioning of the international rules-based order are dependent on compliance with the orders of, and respect for, international bodies, such as United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and orders and decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC); whereas multilateralism is being challenged by increasing global threats, such as terrorism and extremism, which threaten compliance with such orders and decisions, as well as, generally, with provisions of international law, human rights law and international humanitarian law in emerging and ongoing conflict situations; whereas international institutions, their officials, and those cooperating with them, are the subject of attacks and threats; whereas the international community, including the EU, has a responsibility to uphold the international rules-based order by enforcing universal compliance, including by its partners;

    L.  whereas the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes a framework of accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; whereas the independence of the ICC is vital to ensure that justice is delivered impartially and without political interference;

    M.  whereas the 2023 Mid-term Review of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, now extended to 2027, has shown that, despite the progress achieved so far, more needs to be done, in cooperation with like-minded democratic partners, especially in the context of the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption;

    N.  whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) are crucial partners in the EU’s efforts to safeguard and advance human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as to prevent conflicts globally; whereas state and non-state actors around the world are increasingly censoring, silencing and harassing, among others, HRDs, CSOs, journalists, religious communities, opposition leaders and other vulnerable groups in their work, shrinking the civil space ever further; whereas this behaviour includes measures encompassing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), restrictive government policies, transnational repression, defamation campaigns, discrimination, intimidation and violence, including extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, abductions, and arbitrary arrests and detention; whereas attacks on HRDs are increasingly extending to their families and communities, including those living in exile;

    O.  whereas gender equality is a core EU value, and the human rights of women and girls, including their sexual and reproductive rights, continue to be violated across the world; whereas women experience unique and disproportionate impacts from conflicts, climate change and migration, including increased risks of gender-based violence, economic marginalisation and barriers to accessing resources; whereas women HRDs and CSOs continue to experience shrinking space for their critical work, as well as threats of violence, harassment and intimidation;

    P.  whereas the past year has been marked by a further proliferation of laws on ‘foreign agents’ or foreign influence, including in countries with EU candidate status, targeting CSOs and media outlets and attempting to prevent them from receiving financial support from abroad, including from the EU and its Member States, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship;

    Q.  whereas in 2024, more than half the world’s population went to the polls, and many of these elections were marked by manipulation, disinformation and attempts at interference from inside or outside the country;

    R.  whereas the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) warns of a decline in the intent of states and other political forces to protect press freedom; whereas, according to the RSF’s 2024 Round-up, 54 journalists and media workers were killed, most of them in conflict zones, 550 were being detained, 55 were being held hostage, and 95 were missing in 2024;

    S.  whereas 251 million children and young people are deprived of their fundamental right to education and remain out of school, according to the UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report 2024; whereas girls and women are affected not only by poverty but also by cultural norms, gender bias, child marriage and violence through official, discriminatory policies that prevent them from accessing education and the labour market and attempt to erase them from public life;

    T.  whereas at least one million people are unjustly imprisoned for political reasons, among them several laureates and finalists of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;

    U.  whereas, according to Article 21 TEU, the Union must seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries based, among other principles, on democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law; whereas numerous EU partners, despite benefiting for years from various preferences and advantages stemming from agreements with the EU, fail to comply with their obligations;

    V.  whereas environmental harm and the impacts of climate change are intensifying precariousness, marginalisation and inequality, and increasingly displacing people from their homes or trapping them in unsafe conditions, thereby heightening their vulnerability and jeopardising their human rights;

    Global challenges to democracy and human rights

    1.  Reasserts the universality, interdependence, interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights and the inherent dignity of every human being; reaffirms the duty of the EU and its Member States to promote and protect democracy and the universality of human rights around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead by example, in line with its values, to promote and strictly uphold human rights and international justice;

    2.  Insists that respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be the cornerstone of the EU’s external policy, in line with its founding principles; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States, to that end, to strive for a continued ambitious commitment to make freedom, democracy and human rights and their protection a central part of all EU policies in a streamlined manner and to enhance the consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies in this field, including through all of its international agreements;

    3.  Stresses that the EU must be fully prepared to counter the rise of authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism, as well as the increasing violations of the principles of universality of human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law;

    4.  Condemns the increasing trend of violations and abuses of human rights and democratic principles and values across the world, such as, among others, threats of backsliding on human rights, notably women’s rights, as well as executions, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill treatment, gender-based violence, clampdowns on civil society, political opponents, marginalised and vulnerable groups including children and elderly people, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and ethnic and religious minorities; condemns, equally, slavery and forced labour, excessive use of violence by public authorities, including violent crackdowns on peaceful protests and other assemblies, systematic and structural discrimination, instrumentalisation of the judiciary, censorship and threats to independent media, including threats in the digital sphere such as online surveillance and internet shutdowns, political attacks against international institutions and the rules-based international order, and increasing use of unlawful methods of war in grave breach of international humanitarian law and human rights law; deplores the weakening of the protection of democratic institutions and processes, and the shrinking space for civil societies around the world; denounces the transnational repression, by illiberal regimes, of citizens and activists who have sought refuge abroad, including on EU soil; condemns the arrest and sentencing by an Algerian court to five years in prison of the Franco-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal; calls for his immediate release and hopes that the Algerian authorities will see the urgent need for this;

    5.  Notes with deep concern the ongoing international crisis of accountability and the challenge to the pursuit of ending impunity for violations of core norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in conflicts around the world; reaffirms the neutrality and importance of humanitarian aid in all conflicts and crises; underlines the serious consequences of discrediting and attacking the organisations of multilateral forums, such as the UN, which can foster a culture of impunity and undermine the trust in and functioning of the UN system; calls for the EU to uphold the international legal system and take effective measures to enforce compliance;

    6.  Notes with satisfaction that there are also ‘human rights bright spots’ within this context of major challenges to human rights worldwide; highlights, in particular, the work of CSOs and HRDs; underlines the need for a more strategic communication on human rights and democracy by spreading news about positive results, policies and best practices; supports the Good Human Rights Stories initiative as a way of promoting positive stories about human rights and recommends that it be updated; underlines the role of the EU’s public and cultural diplomacy, as well as international cultural relations, in the promotion of human rights, and calls for the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to increase its efforts in this regard;

    Strengthening the EU’s toolbox for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy around the world

    7.  Notes with concern the increasing divide worldwide; stresses the shared responsibility of the EU to continue defending democratic values and principles and human rights, international justice, peace and dignity around the world, which are even more important to defend in the current volatile state of global politics; calls upon the EU to keep communication channels open with different stakeholders and to continue to develop a comprehensive toolbox to strengthen human rights and democracy globally;

    EU action plan on human rights and democracy

    8.  Observes that the EU and its Member States have made substantial progress in implementing the EU action plan on human rights and democracy, although they have not reached all of its goals, in part also due to the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption; welcomes, in this sense, the extension of the action plan until 2027, with a view to maximising the synergies and complementarity between human rights and democracy at local, national and global levels;

    EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Human Rights

    9.  Fully supports the work of the EUSR for Human Rights in contributing to the visibility and coherence of the EU’s human rights actions in its external relations; upholds the EUSR’s central role in the EU’s promotion and protection of human rights by engaging with non-EU countries and like-minded partners; underlines the need for close cooperation between the EUSR for Human Rights and other EUSRs and Special Envoys in order to further improve this coherence, and calls for greater visibility for the role of the EUSR for Human Rights; calls for the EUSR to be supported in his work with increased resources and better coordination with EU delegations around the world; regrets, despite continuous calls, Parliament’s exclusion from the process of selecting the EUSR; insists on the need for the EUSR to report back to Parliament regularly;

    Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe and the human rights and democracy thematic programme

    10.  Recalls the fundamental role of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, including its thematic programme on human rights and democracy, as a flagship EU instrument in promoting and protecting human rights and democracy around the world; highlights the need to engage with civil society in all the EU’s relevant external activities, including the Global Gateway Strategy which is financed through the NDICI-Global Europe; reiterates the importance of streamlining a human-rights based approach in the EU’s external action instruments; underlines Parliament’s role in the instrument’s programming process and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to share all relevant information in a timely manner in order to enable Parliament to play its role accordingly, in particular during high-level geopolitical dialogues with the Commission and in the mid-term review process as well as in its resolutions; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that a response is provided to the recommendation letters following each geopolitical dialogue and each resolution; urges the Commission to develop and launch a comprehensive, centralised website dedicated to the NDICI-Global Europe, including information on all the multiannual indicative programmes, detailing their respective budgets, associated actions and the financial allocations they are backing, organised both by country and by theme; notes that the NDICI-Global Europe and all future instruments must focus on the fundamental drivers of ongoing challenges, including the need to strengthen the resilience of local communities and democracy support activities by supporting economic development;

    11.  Calls for independent, ex ante assessments to determine the possible implications and risks of projects with regard to human rights, in line with Article 25(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947; calls for independent human rights monitoring throughout the implementation of projects in third countries, especially in relation to projects entailing a high risk of violations; calls for a suspension of projects that (in)directly contribute to human rights violations in non-EU countries; reiterates the prohibition on allocating EU funds to activities that are contrary to EU fundamental values, such as terrorism or extremism; calls on the Commission to share all human rights-related assessments with Parliament in a proactive manner;

    EU trade and international agreements

    12.  Reiterates its call to integrate human rights assessments and include robust clauses on human rights in agreements between the EU and non-EU countries, supported by a clear set of benchmarks and procedures to be followed in the event of violations; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the human rights clauses in current international agreements are actively monitored and effectively enforced and to improve their communication with Parliament concerning considerations and decisions regarding this enforcement; reiterates that in the face of persistent breaches of human rights clauses by its partner countries, including those related to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus programme, the EU should react swiftly and decisively, including by suspending the agreements in question if other options prove ineffective; calls for the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal to be implemented, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, or for the Commission’s Single Entry Point to be adapted to allow complaints regarding failure to comply with human rights clauses to be submitted; calls on the EU institutions to engage regularly with the business community and civil society in order to strengthen the links between international trade, human rights and economic security; calls for the EU to ensure human rights promotion and protection through its Global Gateway investments and projects, by ensuring that they do no harm;

    EU human rights dialogues

    13.  Stresses the important role of human rights dialogues within the EU’s human rights toolbox and as a key vehicle for the implementation of the EU action plan on human rights and democracy; highlights that these dialogues must address the overall situation of human rights and democracy with the relevant countries; notes that human rights dialogues should be seen as a key element of sustained EU engagement and not as a free-standing instrument, and that the persistent failure of non-EU countries to genuinely engage in dialogues and to implement key deliverables should lead to the use of other appropriate foreign policy tools; recalls that these dialogues need to be used in conjunction and synergy with other instruments, using a more-for-more and a less-for-less approach; reiterates the need to raise individual cases, in particular those of Sakharov Prize laureates and those highlighted by Parliament in its resolutions, and ensure adequate follow-up; calls on the EEAS and EU delegations to increase the visibility of these dialogues and their outcomes, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that can be included in a published joint press statement, and to conduct suitable follow-up action on it; calls for the enhanced and meaningful involvement of civil society in the dialogues; stresses that genuine CSOs must not be impeded from participating in human rights dialogues and that any dialogue must include all genuine CSOs without any limitations;

    EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act)

    14.  Welcomes the increasing use of the EU GHRSR as a key political tool in the EU’s defence of human rights and democracy across the world; regrets, however, that its use has continued to be limited, especially in the current geopolitical landscape; notes, however, the challenges that the requirement of unanimity poses in the adoption of sanctions and reiterates its call on the Council to introduce qualified majority voting for decisions on the GHRSR; recalls, in this regard, the formal request submitted by Parliament to the Council in 2023, on calling an EU reform convention, with the aim, among others, of increasing the number of decisions taken by qualified majority; calls for a stronger use of the GHRSR and other ad hoc sanctions regimes on those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including high-level officials; fully supports the possibility of imposing targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework in this regard, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the GHRSR or under a different regime; highlights the need for the complete enforcement of sanctions and calls for circumventions to be tackled;

    Democracy support activities

    15.  Reiterates its concern regarding the increasing attacks by authoritarian and illiberal regimes on democratic principles, values and pluralism; stresses that the defence and support of democracy around the world is increasingly becoming of geopolitical and strategic interest; emphasises the importance of Parliament’s efforts in capacity-building for partner parliaments, promoting mediation and encouraging a culture of dialogue and compromise, especially among young political leaders, and empowering women parliamentarians, HRDs and representatives from civil society and independent media; reiterates its call on the Commission to continue and expand its activities in these areas by increasing funding and support for EU bodies, agencies and other grant-based organisations; stresses the critical importance of directly supporting civil society and persons expressing dissenting views, particularly in the current climate of growing global tensions and repression in increasing numbers of countries; reiterates the importance of EU election observation missions and Parliament’s contribution to developing and enhancing their methodology; calls for the development of an EU toolbox to be used in cases of disputed or non-transparent election results in order to prevent political and military crises in the post-election environment; calls for enhanced EU action to counter manipulative and false messages against the EU in election campaigns, in particular in countries that receive significant EU humanitarian and development assistance and in countries that are candidates for EU membership; calls for enhanced collaboration between Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group, the relevant Commission directorates-general and the EEAS; calls on the EU to raise gender equality issues, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, with non-EU countries; calls for human rights dialogues to be given more visibility, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that enable effective monitoring, including through effective ex ante and ex post consultation with civil society and through the publication of joint press statements and the execution of appropriate follow-up actions;

    16.  Underlines the importance of strengthening the participation of women in democratic systems order to tackle the discrepancy in the representation of women in decision-making; calls for the EU’s external action to facilitate better participation of women in politics, business and civil society;

    EU support for human rights defenders

    17.  Is extremely concerned by the continuing restriction of civil society space and rising threats to the work of HRDs and members of CSOs, as well as their families, communities and lawyers, and finds particularly concerning the increasingly sophisticated means used to persecute them; strongly condemns their arbitrary detentions and killings; deplores the harassment of CSOs through legislative provisions such as foreign agents laws and similar, and other restrictions they face; deplores the fact that women HRDs continue to face relentless and ever more sophisticated violations against them, including targeted killings, physical attacks, disappearances, smear campaigns, arrests, judicial harassment and intimidation; notes with concern that these attacks seem designed to systematically silence women HRDs and erase their voices from the public sphere; supports wholeheartedly the work of HRDs and EU action to ensure their protection worldwide; underscores the pressing need for a comprehensive and timely revision of the EU Guidelines on HRDs, with a view to addressing the emerging challenges and threats, and to ensuring their applicability and effectiveness in the protection of HRDs globally, while integrating gender-sensitive and intersectional approaches in the updated Guidelines, reflecting the diverse backgrounds and experiences of HRDs, and taking into account the specific vulnerabilities they may face; calls for the complete and consistent application of the EU Guidelines on HRDs by the EU and its Member States; calls for efforts to enhance communication strategies to increase the visibility of EU actions and channels for the protection of and the support mechanisms for HRDs;

    18.  Raises serious concerns over the increasing phenomenon of transnational repression against HRDs, journalists and civil society; calls for the formulation of an EU strategy harmonising national responses to transnational repression;

    19.  Expresses deep concern regarding the increasingly precarious financial landscape faced by HRDs and communities advocating for rights, particularly within a global context characterised by intensifying repression; notes that, as a result of the current geopolitical context, HRDs’ need for support has increased; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to make full use of their financial support for HRDs, ensuring the establishment of flexible, accessible and sustained funding mechanisms that enable these defenders to continue their vital work in the face of mounting challenges;

    20.  Insists that the EEAS, the Commission and the EU delegations pay particular attention to the situation of the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk and take resolute action, in coordination with the Member States and Parliament, to ensure their well-being, safety or liberation; pays tribute to the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists who have lost their lives in the fight for human rights, democracy and freedom;

    21.  Welcomes the update of the EU Visa Code Handbook in relation to HRDs and calls for its full and consistent application by the Member States; reiterates its call for the Commission to take a proactive role in the establishment of a coordinated approach among the Member States for HRDs at risk;

    Combating impunity and corruption

    22.  Underlines that both impunity and corruption enable and aggravate human rights violations and abuses and the erosion of democratic principles; welcomes the anti-corruption actions in EU external policies in the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012), which should be followed by the implementation of a strict anti-corruption framework into law, such as through the EU’s Anti-Corruption Directive, and by comprehensively addressing this issue within the EU’s anti-corruption strategy; supports the anti-corruption provisions included in the EU trade agreements with non-EU countries; stresses the important role of civil society and journalists in non-EU countries in the oversight of the fight against impunity and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their efforts in justice reforms, the fight against impunity, and the improvement of transparency and of anti-corruption institutions in non-EU countries; encourages the EU and its Member States to coordinate more closely with allies and partners wherever possible in order to counter systemic corruption that enables autocrats to maintain power, deprives societies of key resources and undermines democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    23.  Insists on the need for the EU to take clear steps to recognise the close link between corruption and human rights violations in order to target economic and financial enablers of human rights abusers;

    EU actions at multilateral level

    24.  Reaffirms that promoting the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights around the world requires strong international cooperation at a multilateral level; underlines the particularly important role of the UN and its bodies as the main forum which must be able to effectively advance efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and respect for human rights and international law; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting the work of the UN, its agencies and special procedures, both politically and financially, to ensure that it is fit for purpose, and to push back against the influence of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; stresses that the current multilateral order needs to fully incorporate into its architecture the new global actors, especially those focusing on democracy and human rights; reiterates the need for the EU and its Member States to speak with one voice at the UN and in other multilateral forums in order to effectively tackle global challenges to human rights and democracy in multilateral forums and to support the strongest possible language in line with international human rights standards; calls, to this end, for progress in ensuring that the EU has a seat in international organisations, including the UN Security Council, in addition to the existing Member States’ seats; calls for EU delegations to play a stronger role in multilateral forums, for which they should have appropriate resources available;

    25.  Is deeply concerned by growing attacks against the rules-based global order by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, including through unprovoked and unjustified aggression against peaceful neighbours and through the undermining of the functioning of UN bodies, namely the abuse of veto power at the UN Security Council; underlines that the diminished effectiveness of these bodies brings with it real costs in terms of conflicts, lives lost and human suffering, and seriously weakens the general ability of countries to deal with global challenges; calls on the Member States and like minded partners to develop a robust strategy and to intensify their efforts to reverse this trend and to send a united and strong message of support to those organisations when they are attacked or threatened; believes that the UN, its bodies, and other multilateral organisations are in need of reform, in order to address these growing challenges and threats;

    26.  Strongly regrets the decision of some countries to withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council;

    27.  Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the International Court of Justice and the ICC as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions amid a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls that a well-funded ICC is essential for the effective prosecution of serious international crimes; welcomes the political and financial support the EU has given to the ICC, including the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, and the launch of the ‘Global initiative to fight against impunity for international crimes’ offering financial support to CSOs dedicated to fostering justice and accountability for international crimes and serious human rights violations, including by facilitating survivors’ participation in legal proceedings; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and intensify their support to the ICC – including to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims – with the necessary means, including resources and political backing, and to use all instruments at their disposal to combat impunity worldwide and enable the ICC to fulfil its mandate effectively; calls on all the Member States to respect and implement the actions and decisions of the International Court of Justice and all organs of the ICC, including the OTP and the Chambers, to urge other countries to join and cooperate with the court, including to enforce ICC arrest warrants, and to support their work as an independent and impartial international justice institution everywhere in the world; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the court’s work; calls for the EU to urge non-EU countries, including its major partners, to recognise the ICC and become a state party to the Rome Statute;

    28.  Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the European Court of Human Rights; urges all signatory States to the European Convention on Human Rights to fully abide by rulings of the Court;

    29.  Stresses the importance of not politicising the ICC, as trust in the court is eroded if its mandate is misused; condemns, in particular and in the most critical terms, the political attacks, sanctions and other coercive measures introduced or envisaged against the ICC itself and against its staff; calls on the Member States and the EU institutions to cooperate to work on solutions in order to protect the institution of the ICC and its staff from any future sanctions that would threaten the functioning of the court;

    30.  Expresses its utmost concern over the sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff, which constitute a serious attack on the international justice system; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the Blocking Statute and on the Member States to increase their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;

    31.  Recognises universal jurisdiction as an important tool of the international criminal justice system to prevent and combat impunity and promote international accountability; calls on the Member States to apply universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity;

    32.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to lead the global fight against all forms of extremism and welcomes the adoption of an EU strategy to this end; demands that the fight against terrorism be at the top of the EU’s domestic and foreign affairs agenda;

    Upholding international humanitarian law

    33.  Notes with concern the increasing disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly in the form of ongoing conflicts around the world; strongly condemns the increase in deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in multiple conflict settings; underlines that it is of the utmost importance that all UN and humanitarian aid agencies are able to provide full, timely and unhindered assistance to all people in vulnerable situations and calls on all parties to armed conflicts to fully respect the work of these agencies and ensure they can meet the basic needs of civilians without interference; denounces attempts to undermine UN agencies delivering humanitarian aid; urges all parties to armed conflicts to protect civilian populations, humanitarian and medical workers, and journalists and media workers; calls on all parties to armed conflicts to respect the legitimacy and inviolability of UN peacekeeping missions; calls on all states to unconditionally and fully conform with international humanitarian law; calls on the international community, and the Member States in particular, to promote accountability and the fight against impunity for grave breaches of international humanitarian law; calls for the systematic creation of humanitarian corridors in regions at war and in combat situations, whenever necessary, in order to allow civilians at risk to escape conflicts, and strongly condemns any attacks on them; demands unhindered access for humanitarian organisations monitoring and assisting prisoners of war, as provided for in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War; expects international organisations to abide by international law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war; calls for international cooperation and assistance in the return of forcibly deported persons, in particular children and hostages;

    34.  Is seriously concerned by the persistence of the scourge of protracted occupation or annexation of territories; calls for special attention to be paid to the human rights situation in the illegally occupied territories, including in cases of protracted occupation, and for effective measures to be taken with the aim of preventing grave human rights abuses on the ground, including the violation of right to life, restriction of freedom of movement, and discrimination;

    35.  Reiterates its call on the Member States to help contain armed conflicts and serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law by strictly abiding by the provisions of Article 7 of the UN Arms Trade Treaty of 2 April 2013 on Export and Export Assessment and Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment;

    36.  Urges reliable, like-minded third countries to strengthen their defence, resilience and civil preparedness capabilities, in order to effectively deter aggression and uphold human rights globally;

    37.  Given the gendered impacts of armed conflicts, deplores the insufficient priority and focus given to sexual and gender-based violence and to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) across the EU’s humanitarian and refugee response; reiterates that humanitarian crises intensify SRHR- and gender-related challenges and recalls that in crisis zones, particularly among vulnerable groups such as refugees and migrants, women and girls are particularly exposed to sexual violence, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual exploitation, rape as a weapon of war and unwanted pregnancies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to give high priority to gender equality and SRHR in their humanitarian aid and refugee response, as well as accountability and access to justice and redress for sexual and reproductive rights violations and gender-based violence, including in terms of training for humanitarian actors, and existing and future funding;

    Team Europe approach

    38.  Recognises the potential for stronger alignment in approaches to human rights protection and promotion between EU institutions, Member States’ embassies and EU delegations in non-EU countries, particularly in encouraging those countries to comply with their international obligations and to refrain from harassment and persecution of critical voices; emphasises the opportunity for Member States’ embassies to take an increasingly active role in advancing and safeguarding human rights, while also supporting civil society in these countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all possible means to assess detention conditions, and observe trials and court procedures, to increase pressure and awareness, and in order to urge countries and actively work towards the release of political prisoners; highlights the importance of shared responsibility between Member States and EU delegations in these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify their collective efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and to support democracy worldwide; encourages careful monitoring and assessment of the capacity of EU delegations to ensure that each one has a designated point of contact for cases of human rights violations, and that this mandate is allocated sufficient resources to respond in an effective and timely manner; reiterates, in this context, the importance, for the EU delegations, of existing EU guidelines related to specific areas of human rights;

    Responding to universal human rights and democracy challenges

    Right to freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

    39.  Condemns any action or attempt to legalise, instigate, authorise, consent or acquiesce to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment methods under any circumstances; condemns the increasing reports of the use of torture by state actors in many different contexts, including in custodial and extra-custodial settings – of political prisoners, among others – and in conflict situations around the world, notably in violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as well as the killing of prisoners of war, which amounts to a war crime, and reiterates the non-derogable nature of the right to be free from torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment; reiterates the EU’s zero-tolerance policy to torture and other ill-treatment and calls on the relevant institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights, to take a thorough stance on any such case;

    40.  Reiterates its calls for universal ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol thereto, and for the need for states to bring their national provisions in this respect in line with international standards; reiterates, in accordance with the revised Guidelines on the EU’s policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019, the importance of engaging with relevant stakeholders in the fight to eradicate torture, and to monitor places of detention;

    Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association

    41.  Reiterates the need to protect the EU democratic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms therein, particularly freedoms of assembly and association; highlights the growing violent repression of protest and peaceful assemblies within the EU civic space, with cases of torture and ill-treatment resulting in deaths and other serious violations; underscores the need to strengthen this fundamental right in conjunction with the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment;

    Right to food, water and sanitation

    42.  Recalls that the right to food, including having physical and economic access to adequate food or the means to its procurement, is a human right; is extremely concerned about the challenges to the right to food worldwide, especially in situations of war and conflicts; condemns the increasing reports of the weaponisation of food in situations of armed conflict; calls for the EU and its Member States to promote mandatory guidelines on the right to food without discrimination within the UN system; urges the EU and the Member States to fully support, politically and financially, organisations and agencies working to secure the right to food in conflict zones; recalls the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas in view of attaining food security; commends the work of the UN World Food Programme, in this regard;

    43.  Reaffirms the rights to safe drinking water and to sanitation as human rights, both rights being complementary; underlines that access to clean drinking water is indispensable to a healthy and dignified life and is essential for the maintenance of human dignity; highlights the fact that the right to water is a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest, and in common public and global goods; underscores the importance of the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, and urges the EU institutions and the Member States to implement and promote their application in non-EU countries and in multilateral forums;

    Climate change and the environment

    44.  Highlights that climate change and its impact on the environment has direct effects on the effective enjoyment of all human rights; recognises the important work of CSOs, indigenous peoples and local communities, land and environmental HRDs and indigenous activists for the protection of a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, including access to land and water sources; deplores the risks that environmental HRDs and indigenous activists face and calls for their effective protection to be guaranteed; notes that communities contributing the least to climate change are the ones more likely to be affected by climate risks and natural disasters and calls, in this regard, for increasing support to the most vulnerable groups; recalls that indigenous peoples and local communities play an important role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; recalls that the transition to clean energy must be fair and respect everyone’s fundamental rights; reiterates the importance of the achievement of the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the protection of the human rights of present and future generations;

    45.  Notes with deep concern the increasing threats to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment posed by the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of warfare that adversely and disproportionately affect the environment; stresses the need to effectively address the displacement of people caused by environmental destruction and climate change, which increases the risk of human rights violations and heightens vulnerabilities to different forms of exploitation; recognises that children face more acute risks from climate-related disasters and are also one of the largest groups to be affected; calls for the EU to focus on addressing the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of the rights of the child;

    Rights of the child

    46.  Calls for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights, including for those most marginalised and those in the most vulnerable situations, through all of the EU’s external policies; calls for more concerted efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of children’s rights in crisis or emergency situations; condemns the decline in respect for the rights of the child and the increasing violations and abuses of these rights, including through violence, early and forced marriage, sexual abuse including genital mutilation, trafficking, child labour, honour killings, recruitment of child soldiers, lack of access to education and healthcare, malnutrition and extreme poverty; further condemns the increase in deaths of children in situations of armed conflict and stresses the need for effective protection of children’s rights in active warfare; calls for new EU initiatives to promote and protect children’s rights, with a view to rehabilitating and reintegrating conflict-affected children, ensuring that they have a protected, family- and community-based environment as a natural context for their lives, in which assistance and education are fundamental elements; reiterates its call for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights through all EU external policies; calls on all countries to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as a matter of urgency, in order to allow for the universal ratification of this foundational instrument;

    47.  Emphasises the urgent necessity to uphold the rights of pregnant women, ensuring that they receive comprehensive support for their health, safety and dignity that includes guaranteed access to maternal healthcare services, availability of childcare facilities such as nurseries, and the establishment of fair workplace policies that protect their well-being, income and career advancement;

    48.  Stresses the importance of closing the financing gap that would enable countries to meet their SDG 4 targets on quality education and ensure access to education for all children and young people; reiterates its calls to address cultural norms and gender biases that prevent girls and women from receiving an education and urges the creation of gender-responsive education systems worldwide;

    49.  Stresses that education represents the starting point for cultivating principles and values that contribute to the personal development of children, as well as to social cohesion and democracy, and the rule of law around the world; to that end calls for the EU to promote its values through supporting access to education and learning for women and girls;

    Rights of women and gender equality

    50.  Stresses that women’s rights and gender equality are indispensable and indivisible human rights, as well as a basis for the rule of law and inclusive resilient democracies; deplores the fact that millions of women and girls continue to experience discrimination and violence, especially in the context of conflicts, post-conflict situations and displacements, and are denied their dignity, autonomy and even life; condemns the impunity with which perpetrators commit violations against women HRDs; is appalled by the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war and stresses the need to shed light on these instances, and for better international cooperation on fighting impunity for these crimes; calls for the EU, its Member States and like-minded partners to step up their efforts to ensure the full enjoyment and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights, and to incorporate a gender mainstreaming approach across all policies, taking into account the differentiated impacts of global challenges such as climate change or conflicts; emphasises that SRHR are fundamental human rights that must be upheld globally and in the Member States and expresses deep concern over global setbacks in gender equality and SRHR; reaffirms that the denial of quality and comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services constitutes a form of gender-based violence; stresses the importance of leading by example; calls for the EU to prioritise access to SRHR as part of the promotion of human rights and the achievement of sustainable development goals; condemns in the strongest terms the increasing attacks on SRHR around the world, as well as gender-based violence, including the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war; calls for the EU and its Member States to uphold SRHR as human rights, enshrine the right to legal and safe abortion in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and prioritise access to SRHR in order to advance human rights and sustainable development goals; strongly deplores cases of female genital mutilation, honour killings, child marriages and forced marriages; welcomes the accession of the EU to the Istanbul Convention and strongly encourages the remaining Member States to ratify the Istanbul Convention without further delay; calls for the EU and its international partners to strengthen their efforts to ensure that women fully enjoy human rights and are treated equally to men; emphasises the importance of safeguarding the rights of women, ensuring that their health, safety and dignity are protected, particularly in the context of healthcare access and workplace protections; underlines the need to keep opposing and condemning, in the strongest terms, anti-abortion laws that punish women and girls with decades-long jail sentences, even in cases of rape, incest or when the life of the pregnant woman is at risk; stresses the need to pursue efforts to fully eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation; fully supports the role of the EU Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;

    51.  Recognises that the promotion and protection of SRHR is essential to achieving gender equality and affirms the right to access comprehensive SRHR services, including modern contraception, free, safe and legal abortion, maternal, prenatal and postnatal healthcare, assisted reproduction and access to education and information on SRHR, including comprehensive sexuality education, without any form of discrimination, coercion or violence; echoes human rights bodies’ recognition that banning abortion may subject women to suffering amounting to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;

    52.  Recognises that gender apartheid constitutes a systematic and institutionalised form of oppression, depriving women and girls of fundamental rights solely on the basis of their gender; notes with deep concern the entrenchment of gender apartheid in certain regions, where women face extensive restrictions on education, employment, healthcare and freedom of movement, often underpinned by legal and cultural frameworks that reinforce gender-based discrimination; urges the EU and the Member States to proactively address gender apartheid through strengthened diplomatic efforts, targeted economic measures and accountability mechanisms that support civil society organisations advocating for gender equality; calls for the formal recognition of gender apartheid as a distinct human rights violation and for support for international initiatives for its classification as a crime against humanity, thus contributing to the establishment of a global accountability standard;

    Rights of refugees and asylum seekers

    53.  Denounces the erosion of the human rights and the safety of refugees, asylum seekers and forcibly displaced persons; reaffirms their inalienable human rights and fundamental right to seek asylum; recalls the obligation of states to protect them in accordance with international law; underlines the importance of identification and registration of individuals, including children, as a key tool for protecting refugees and ensuring the integrity of refugee protection systems, preventing human trafficking and the recruitment of children into armed militias; calls for the EU and its Member States to effectively uphold their rights in the EU’s asylum and migration policy and in the EU’s cooperation with partner countries in this regard; deplores the increasing xenophobia, racism and discrimination towards migrants, as well as the different forms of violence they face, including during their displacement, and the many barriers they face, including in access to healthcare; condemns the instrumentalisation of migration at EU borders by foreign actors, which constitutes hybrid attacks against the Member States as well as a dehumanisation of migrants; stresses that the EU should step up its efforts to acknowledge and develop ways to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, building the resilience of migrants’ communities of origin and helping them offer their members the possibility to enjoy a decent life in their home country; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and, where possible, step up their support for countries hosting the most refugees, as well as for transit countries; reiterates that close cooperation and engagement with non-EU countries, with full respect for fundamental rights, remain key to preventing migrant smuggling; stresses, in this regard, that the dissemination of information and awareness-raising campaigns on the risks of smuggling are crucial, as well as of the migration laws of the destination countries, in order to prevent the undertaking of unnecessarily risky journeys by those who do not have grounds for asylum; calls for EU-funded humanitarian operations to take into consideration the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children and to ensure their protection while they are displaced; underlines the importance of developing an effective framework of safe and legal pathways to the EU and welcomes, in this regard, the Commission communication on attracting skills and talent to the EU(10), including the development of talent partnerships with partner countries; calls for respect for the principle of non-refoulement to countries where the life and liberty of people would be threatened; calls for the EU and its Member States to discuss the phenomenon of instrumentalised migration orchestrated by authoritarian regimes and organised crime groups, and emphasises the need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, develop effective countermeasures, and consider its implications for the human rights framework;

    Rights of LGBTIQ+ persons

    54.  Condemns the human rights violations, including discrimination, persecution, violence and killings, stigmatisation, hate crimes, hate speech, conversion therapies, intersex genital mutilation and sexual violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to denounce these injustices and commit to protecting the rights, dignity and safety of LGBTIQ+ individuals; is extremely concerned by the spreading of hatred and anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives and legislation that target LGBTIQ+ persons and HRDs; denounces, in this regard, conversion practices targeting LGBTIQ+ persons aimed at changing, repressing or suppressing the sexual orientation, gender identity and/or gender expression of their victims; calls for the implementation of an EU-wide policy to illegalise practices of this kind; calls for the adoption of policies that protect LGBTIQ+ people and give them the tools to safely report a violation of their rights, in line with the EU Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by LGBTI Persons; emphasises the increasing concerns and fears within LGBTIQ+ communities and urges the EU to take a firm stance against any legislative or social actions that endanger LGBTIQ+ people; expresses special concern over LGBTIQ+ people living under non-democratic regimes or in conflict situations, and calls for rapid response mechanisms to protect them as well as their defenders; reiterates its calls for the full implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as the EU’s tool for improving the situation of LGBTIQ+ people around the world; calls for the use of the death penalty to be rejected under all circumstances, including any legislation that would impose the death penalty for homosexuality; calls for the EU and its Member States to further engage the countries with such legislation in reconsidering their position on the death penalty; notes further that the imposition of the death penalty on the basis of such legislation is arbitrary killing per se, and a breach of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

    Rights of persons with disabilities

    55.  Is concerned by the challenges to the full enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities; reiterates its calls for the EU to assist partner countries in the development of policies in support of carers of persons with disabilities; calls for the raising of social awareness and the combating of discriminatory behaviours against persons with disabilities; points to the additional complications faced by persons with disabilities in conflict situations and natural disasters, as they are more vulnerable to violence and often do not receive adequate support; urges all parties to conflict situations worldwide to take adequate measures to mitigate the risks to them as much as possible; emphasises the need to safeguard children with disabilities from any form of exploitation; calls for the EU, in its external policy, to make use of the strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 as a tool to improve the situation of persons with disabilities, particularly concerning poverty and discrimination, but also problems with access to education, healthcare and employment, and participation in political life; encourages the EU to support partner countries in developing inclusive economic policies that promote accessible vocational training and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, fostering their full and active economic participation;

    Rights of elderly people

    56.  Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to develop new avenues to strengthen the rights of elderly people, taking into account the multiple challenges they face, such as age-based discrimination, poverty, violence and a lack of social protection, healthcare and other essential services, as well as barriers to employment; calls for the implementation of specific measures to combat the risk of poverty for older women through increased social support; underlines the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on Ageing on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the protection of the human rights of older people and calls for the EU and its Member States to consider actively supporting that work; stresses the need for a cross-cutting intergenerational approach in EU policies, in order to build and encourage solidarity between young people and elderly people;

    Right to equality and non-discrimination

    57.  Reiterates its condemnation of all forms of racism, intolerance, antisemitism, Islamophobia, persecution of Christians, xenophobia and discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, social class, disability, caste, religion, belief, age, sexual orientation or gender identity; condemns the growing international threat of hate speech and speech that incites violence, including online; reiterates the crucial role of education and dialogue in promoting tolerance, understanding and diversity; calls for the adoption or the strengthening of mechanisms for reporting discriminatory behaviours as well as access to effective legal remedies, to help end the impunity of those who engage in this behaviour;

    Right to life: towards the universal abolition of the death penalty

    58.  Reiterates its principled opposition to the death penalty, which is irreversible and incompatible with the right to life and with the prohibition of torture, and a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment; stresses that the EU must be relentless in its pursuit of the universal abolition of the death penalty as a major objective of its human rights foreign policy; notes that despite the trend in some non-EU countries to take steps towards abolishing the death penalty, significant challenges in this regard still exist; deplores the fact that in other non-EU countries the number of death sentences that have been carried out has reached its highest level in the last five years; reiterates its call for all countries to completely abolish the death penalty or establish an immediate moratorium on the use of the death penalty (sentences and executions) as a first step towards its abolition; urges, in this regard, the EU to intensify diplomatic engagement with countries that continue to practise the death penalty, encouraging dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues and providing support for the development of judicial reforms that could lead towards its abolition;

    Right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief

    59.  Reiterates its concern regarding violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; is concerned about the worldwide increase in intolerance towards different religious communities; deplores the instrumentalisation of religious or belief identities for political purposes and the exclusion of persons belonging to religious and belief minorities and religious communities, including from political participation, as well as the destruction and vandalism of sites and works of art of cultural and historical value, in certain non-EU countries; stresses that the freedom to choose one’s religion, to believe or not to believe is a human right that cannot be punished; condemns, therefore, the existence and implementation of so-called apostasy laws and blasphemy laws that lead to harsh penalties, degrading treatment and, in some cases, even to death sentences; calls for the abolition of apostasy laws and blasphemy laws; stresses that the Special Envoy for the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU should be granted more resources so that he can efficiently carry out his mandate; highlights the need for the Special Envoy to continue to work closely and in a complementary manner with the EUSR for Human Rights and the Council Working Party on Human Rights; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, to raise these issues at UN human rights forums and to continue working with the relevant UN mechanisms and committees; calls for the EU to request and consolidate reports by EU delegations on the state of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief;

    60.  Recalls that most of the drivers of violent conflicts worldwide involve minority grievances of exclusion, discrimination and inequalities linked to violations of the human rights of minorities, as observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues; stresses the need to mainstream the protection of the rights of minorities and for the development of protection mechanisms at the level of the UN; recalls the obligations of states to protect the rights of their national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic minorities within their respective territories; calls on the Commission to support the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities worldwide, including this as a priority under the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the EU’s NDICI-Global Europe;

    Right to freedom of expression, academic freedom, media freedom and the right to information

    61.  Emphasises the critical significance of freedom of expression and access to trustworthy and diverse sources of information for sustaining democracy and a thriving civic space; recalls that democracies can only function when citizens have access to independent and reliable information, making journalists key players in the safeguarding of democracy; is therefore seriously concerned about the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression in numerous countries worldwide, particularly for journalists, through censorship, enforced self-censorship, so-called foreign agents laws and the misuse of counter-terrorism or anti-corruption laws to suppress journalists and civil society groups; is concerned by the use of hate speech against journalists, both online and offline, leading to a deterrent effect; raises concerns, additionally, about the physical security of journalists and media workers and their being targeted in conflict zones; deplores the fact that in 2024, 54 journalists and media workers were killed – most of them in conflict zones – 550 were being detained, 55 were being held hostage, and 95 were missing;

    62.  Calls urgently for the EU to back trustworthy media and information outlets that promote the accountability of authorities and support democratic transitions, while stressing the need to preserve the principles of pluralism, transparency and independence; highlights the role played by fact checkers in the media landscape, ensuring that the public can trust the information they receive; is concerned that they are therefore major targets for attacks by illiberal regimes that originate and disseminate disinformation, propaganda and fake news; condemns the extensive use of SLAPPs to silence journalists, activists, trade unionists and HRDs globally; welcomes, in this context, the directive designed to shield journalists and HRDs from abusive legal actions and SLAPPs; encourages lawmakers in non-EU countries to develop legislation with the same goal, as part of broader efforts to promote and protect media freedom and pluralism; requests that attacks on media freedom, as well as the persistent and systematic erosion of the right to information, be taken into account in the EU’s monitoring of the compliance of international agreements;

    63.  Welcomes the Commission’s plan to finance initiatives that support journalists on legal and practical matters, including beyond the EU, through the European Democracy Action Plan; calls for the EU to strengthen its efforts to aid targeted journalists globally, recalling that independent journalists are on the frontline of the fight against disinformation, which undermines democracies; acknowledges the contribution to achieving this goal of programmes such as the now-defunct Media4Democracy and other EU-funded activities, including those of the European Endowment for Democracy; strongly regrets the decision to halt funding to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia and Voice of America, which are outlets with a vital role in combating disinformation, promoting democratic values and reporting in places where press freedom is severely curtailed or non-existent; calls for the EU to urgently step in and provide the funding needed in order to ensure that reliable news sources available in countries that restrict press freedom;

    64.  Remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating state of press freedom around the world; condemns the censorship of journalists, HRDs and CSOs through the application of so-called foreign agents laws, as well as other legislative and non-legislative measures adopted by authoritarian and illiberal regimes;

    65.  Reaffirms its commitment to protecting and promoting academic freedom as a key component of open and democratic societies; underlines the attacks to academic freedom not only by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but also by extreme and populist forces worldwide; calls for the development of benchmarks for academic freedom into institutional quality assurance within academic rankings, procedures and criteria;

    66.  Underlines the indispensable work of organisations such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in their promotion of democracy, media pluralism and access to neutral information; draws attention to the fact that where the voice of democracy is cancelled, it is easy for propaganda against democratic values to take over; highlights the need to ensure the consistent financing of such institutions, and calls for the EU to step up the financing of such organisations and fill researching gaps that may occur;

    67.  Notes with concern that more than half of the world’s population lives within environments of completely or severely restricted levels of academic freedom, which has severe consequences for the right to education, the enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress and the freedom of opinion and expression; urges the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to halt censorship, threats or attacks on academic freedom, and especially the imprisonment of scholars worldwide; welcomes the inclusion of academics at risk in the EU Human Rights Defenders Mechanism; calls on the Commission to ensure continued high-level support for the Global Campus of Human Rights, which has provided a safe space for students and scholars who had to flee their countries for defending democracy and human rights;

    Rights of indigenous peoples

    68.  Notes with regret that indigenous peoples continue to face widespread and systematic discrimination and persecution worldwide, including forced displacements; condemns arbitrary arrests and the killing of human rights and land defenders who stand up for the rights of indigenous peoples; stresses that the promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples and their traditional practices are key to achieving sustainable development, combating climate change and conserving biodiversity; urges governments to pursue development and environmental policies that respect economic, social and cultural rights, and that are inclusive of indigenous peoples and local populations, in line with the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for the EU, its Member States and their partners in the international community to adopt all necessary measures for the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous people, including as regards their languages, lands, territories and resources, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the principle of free, prior and informed consent; calls on all states to ensure that indigenous peoples and local communities are included in the deliberations and decision-making processes of international climate diplomacy; encourages the Commission to continue to promote dialogue and collaboration between indigenous peoples and the EU;

    Right to public participation

    69.  Deplores that the right to participate in free and fair elections is not respected in authoritarian, illiberal, and totalitarian regimes; highlights that these regimes conduct fake elections with the aim of entrenching their power, as they lack real political contestation and pluralism; is alarmed by current trends in electoral processes, such as the increasing decline in electoral participation and democratic performance or the growing disputes concerning the credibility of elections; highlights with deep concern the growing interference by some states in other countries’ elections through hybrid tactics; reaffirms the necessity of increasing political representation of women, young people and vulnerable groups and to guarantee the public participation of minorities; underlines that distrust in the electoral process can be exacerbated not only by irregularities but also by public statements, including from participants; emphasises that public perception of electoral process is as crucial as the process itself, as its manipulation can lead to polarisation or targeted attacks; calls on non-EU countries to reinforce their efforts to clearly communicate all the steps of their respective electoral processes and systems, as well as the existing accountability mechanisms in case of irregularities; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to analyse and report to Parliament their initiatives to tackle the challenges posed by artificial intelligence (AI) in electoral processes;

    Human rights, business and trade

    70.  Stresses the role of trade as a major instrument to promote and improve the human rights situation in the EU’s partner countries; urges the Commission to improve coordination between the EU’s trade, investment and development policies and prioritise and promote the development of human rights through EU trade policies, including the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus; notes, however, that there has been little to no improvement in some of the countries concerned; stresses the responsibilities of states and other actors, such as corporations, to mitigate the effects of climate change, prevent their negative impact on human rights and promote appropriate policies in compliance with human rights obligations; deplores the detrimental effects of some excessive and exploitative business activities on human rights and democracy; welcomes the harmonisation resulting from the adoption of the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence with binding EU rules on responsible corporate behaviour with regard to human, labour and environmental rights; further welcomes the Regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market(11) and calls for its swift implementation at Member State level; calls for the implementation of the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, and for the adaptation of the Commission’s Single Entry Point to allow for the submission of complaints regarding failures to comply with human rights clauses, which should be accessible, citizen-friendly and transparent; calls for the EU to continue its efforts to eliminate child labour, and forced and bonded labour; stresses the importance of remediation and access to justice measures that are in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, including financial and non-financial measures in consultation with the victims; calls on the Council to adopt an ambitious mandate for the EU to engage in the ongoing negotiations on the UN legally binding instrument on business and human rights as soon as possible;

    71.  Highlights that in many regions of the world, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are often the driving force of local economies with an increasing number of women running them; underlines that MSMEs account for 90 % of businesses, 60 to 70 % of employment and 50 % of gross domestic product worldwide; highlights the importance of MSMEs in their contribution to the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of the SDGs, namely those on the eradication of poverty and decent working conditions for all;

    Human rights and digital technologies

    72.  Is concerned by the threat that AI can pose to democracy and human rights, especially if it is not duly regulated; highlights the need for oversight, robust transparency and appropriate safeguards for new and emergent technologies, as well as a human-rights based approach; welcomes the Council conclusions on Digital Diplomacy of 26 June 2023 to strengthen the EU’s role and leadership in global digital governance, in particular its position as a shaper of the global digital rulebook based on democratic principles; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act which aims to harmonise the rules on AI for protecting human rights, and the advantages that AI can bring to human wellbeing; is deeply concerned about the harmful consequences of the misuse of AI and deepfakes, particularly for women and children; notes with concern the adverse effects of the ‘fake content industry’ on the right to information and press freedom, including the rapid development of AI and the subsequent empowerment of the disinformation industry(12); condemns the use of new and emerging technologies, such as facial recognition technology and digital surveillance, as coercive instruments and their use in the increasing harassment, intimidation and persecution of HRDs, activists, journalists and lawyers; calls on the Council for the listing under the EUGHRSR of state and non-state actors that are engaging in these practices; notes with concern the rapid development of AI in military applications, as well as the potential development and deployment of autonomous systems that could make life-or-death decisions without human input;

    73.  Recalls that the international trade in spyware to non-EU countries where such tools are used against human rights activists, journalists and government critics, is a violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter;

    74.  Welcomes the adoption in May 2024 of the first Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, aimed at ensuring that activities within the entire life cycle of AI systems are fully consistent with human rights, democracy and the rule of law; reiterates the need for greater legislative attention to be paid to the profound changes arising from activities within the life cycle of AI systems, which have the potential to promote human prosperity, individual and social well-being, sustainable development, gender equality, and the empowerment of all women and girls, but also pose the risk of creating or exacerbating inequalities and incentivising cyber and physical violence, including violence experienced by women and individuals in vulnerable situations;

    75.  Stresses that the internet should be a place where freedom of expression prevails; considers, nevertheless, that the rights of individuals need to be respected; is of the opinion that, where applicable, what is considered to be illegal offline, should be considered illegal online; expresses concern for the growing number of internet shutdowns; highlights that internet shutdowns are often used by authoritarian regimes, among others, to silence political dissidence and curb political freedom; calls urgently for the EU to combat this alarming phenomenon, including considering allowing EU-based providers to offer safe communication tools to people who have been thereby deprived of online access; urges the EU to take a firm stance against any attempts by tech giants to circumvent or undermine national legal systems and independent court decisions, and to protect democratic principles and implement measures to maintain the integrity of elections, as well as to protect the right to information, especially during electoral periods;

    o
    o   o

    76.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Union Heads of Delegation.

    (1) OJ L 115, 28.4.2006, p. 50, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2006/313/oj.
    (2) OJ L 410 I, 7.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/1998/oj.
    (3) OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/1760, 5.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1760/oj.
    (5) OJ C 411, 27.11.2020, p. 30.
    (6) OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 202.
    (7) OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 70.
    (8) OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 152.
    (9) OJ C, C/2024/6741, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6741/oj.
    (10) Commission communication of 27 April 2022 on attracting skills and talent to the EU (COM(2022)0657).
    (11) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453).
    (12) Reporters Without Borders, ‘2023 World Press Freedom Index – journalism threatened by fake content industry’ https://rsf.org/en/2023-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-threatened-fake-content-industry.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: News 04/4/2025 Blackburn, Cornyn, Baldwin, Kelly Introduce Bill to Address School Bus Driver Shortage

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.), John Cornyn (R-Texas), Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), and Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) today introduced the Driving Forward Act, which would continue to exempt new school bus drivers from the “Under-the-Hood” Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) testing requirement to help alleviate the nationwide shortage of drivers:

    “The school bus driver shortage poses a threat to student safety and access to reliable transportation for students across Tennessee,” said Senator Blackburn. “The Driving Forward Act is a commonsense piece of legislation that would get more qualified individuals into the driver’s seat by extending the current under-the-hood test exemption.”

    “Young Americans are our nation’s most valuable resource, and it is essential that they have safe and reliable transportation to their schools,” said Senator Cornyn. “This legislation would help ensure there are school bus drivers available in every neighborhood across the country by removing an antiquated and unnecessary obstacle to their certification.”

    “Children in Wisconsin and across the country should be able to take the bus and get to school safely and on time,” said Senator Baldwin. “Unfortunately, many communities are struggling to find school bus drivers, and that’s why I am working with my Republican and Democratic colleagues to cut red tape, get good drivers behind the wheel, and ensure kids can get to school safely.”

    “Kids in Arizona deserve to get to school safe and on time,” said Senator Kelly. “This bipartisan bill cuts red tape to help more people become school bus drivers, directly addressing driver shortages and making the drive to school a better one.” 

    Companion legislation is being led in the House of Representatives by Congressman John Carter (R-Texas).

    BACKGROUND

    A significant barrier to entry for new bus drivers is the “Under-the-Hood” testing requirement necessary to obtain a CDL. Federal regulations require CDL holders to be able to lift the hood of a school bus and identify engine parts and functions—a requirement that is mainly for the long-haul trucking industry and adds on average an additional three to four days of training time. Texas has used this exemption over 600 times since 2024. Because school bus drivers must remain on the bus with students at all times, an exemption from this testing requirement will not have any effect on the safety level of school bus operations. Should a school bus break down, trained mechanics would complete roadside diagnostics and repairs of mechanical issues. 

    The exemption does not change the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)’s vehicle maintenance requirements, including that every motor carrier must systematically inspect, repair, and maintain all vehicles and that unsafe operations of a motor vehicle are forbidden. Any state or local school bus inspection maintenance standards would continue to apply under this exemption. The FMCSA has confirmed that this exemption does not have an adverse impact on safety. 

    This legislation is endorsed by the National School Transportation Association, School Superintendent Association, National Rural Education Association, National Association for Pupil Transportation, School Business Officials, and Association of Educational Service Agencies.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Consumers are boycotting US goods around the world. Should Trump be worried?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Alan Bradshaw, Professor of Marketing, Royal Holloway University of London

    US alcohol has been removed from sale in the Canadian province of British Columbia. lenic/Shutterstock

    As politicians around the world scramble to respond to US “liberation day” tariffs, consumers have also begun flexing their muscles. “Boycott USA” messages and searches have been trending on social media and search engines, with users sharing advice on brands and products to avoid.

    Even before Donald Trump announced across-the-board tariffs, there had been protests and attacks on the president’s golf courses in Doonbeg in Ireland and Turnberry in Scotland in response to other policies. And in Canada, shoppers avoided US goods after Trump announced he could take over his northern neighbour.

    His close ally Elon Musk has seen protests at Tesla showrooms across Europe, Australia and New Zealand. New cars have been set on fire as part of the “Tesla take-down”, while Tesla sales have been on a deep downward trend. This has been especially noticeable in European countries where electric vehicles sales have been high, and in Australia.

    This targeting of Trump and Musk’s brands are part of wider boycotts of US goods as consumers look for ways to express their anger at the US administration.

    Denmark’s biggest retailer, Salling Group, has given the price label of all European products a black star, making it easy for customers to avoid US goods.

    Canadian shoppers are turning US products upside down in retail outlets so it’s easier for fellow shoppers to spot and avoid them. Canadian consumers can also download the Maple Scan app that checks barcodes to see if their grocery purchases are actually Canadian or have parent companies from the USA.

    Who owns what?

    The issue of ostensibly Canadian brands being owned by US capital illustrates the complexity of consumer boycotts – it can be difficult to identify which brands are American and which are not.

    In the UK, for example, many consumers would be surprised to learn how many famous British brands are actually American-owned – for example, Cadbury, Waterstones and Boots. So entwined are global economies that attempts by consumers to boycott US brands may also damage their local economies.

    This complexity is also present in Danish and Canadian Facebook groups that are dedicated to boycotting US goods. Consumers exchange tips on how to swap alternatives for American products.

    The fact that Facebook is a US-based company only demonstrates how deeply embedded consumer culture is in US technologies. European businesses often depend on American operating systems and cloud storage while consumers rely on US-owned social media platforms for communication.

    Even when consumers succeed in weeding out American products, if they pay using Visa, Mastercard or Apple Pay, a percentage of the price will nonetheless be rerouted to the US. If a touch payment is made with Worldpay, the percentage could be even greater.

    These American financial services show just how embedded US businesses are in retail in ways that consumers may not appreciate. In practice, an absolute boycott of US business is almost unimaginable.

    All-American brands

    But American branding is not always subtle. In addition to brands directly connected to the US administration – such as the Trump golf courses and Tesla – many other companies have always been flamboyantly American. Coca-Cola, Starbucks and Budweiser are just some examples where their American identities and proudly on show.

    As such, it’s possible that consumers will increasingly avoid blatantly American brands. They may be less concerned about the complexities and contradictions of a more comprehensive boycott.

    Consumer actions where the goal is political change are known as “proxy boycotts” because no particular company is the ultimate target. Rather, the brands and firms are targeted by consumers as a means to an end.

    Do boycotts work?

    A classic example of a proxy boycott took aim at French goods, particularly wine, in the mid-1990s. This was in response to president Jacques Chirac’s decision to conduct nuclear tests in the Pacific. The large-scale consumer boycotts contributed to France’s decision to abandon its nuclear tests in 1996.

    In Britain, for example, French wines in all categories lost market share as demand fell during the boycott. At the time, it cost the French wine sector £23 million (about £46 million today).

    These boycotts are a reminder that the interplay between corporations, brands and consumer culture are inevitably embedded in politics. The current political impasse demonstrates that consumers can participate in politics, not just with their votes, but also with their buying power.

    Trump clearly wants to demonstrate American strength. The “liberation day” tariffs, which were higher than most observers expected, bear this out. But many US corporations will now be worrying about how consumers in the US and around the world might respond. Trump could see a mass mobilisation of consumer power in ways that will give the president something to think about.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Consumers are boycotting US goods around the world. Should Trump be worried? – https://theconversation.com/consumers-are-boycotting-us-goods-around-the-world-should-trump-be-worried-253389

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: Coface SA: Coface announces the publication of its 2024 Universal Registration Document

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Coface announces the publication of its 2024 Universal Registration Document

    Paris, 4 April 2025 – 17.45

    Communication setting out the arrangements for the supplying of the Universal Registration Document

    The Universal Registration Document of COFACE SA for 2024 (Document d’enregistrement universel 2024 in French) was filed with the French financial market authority (Autorité des marchés financiers – AMF) on April 3, 2025 under the number D.25-0227.

    Copies of the 2024 Universal Registration Document are available free of charge at COFACE SA, 1 Place Costes et Bellonte, 92270 Bois-Colombes, France as well as on the website of the Company at the following address:
    https://www.coface.com/investors/regulated-information/universal-registration-document.

    The 2024 Universal Registration Document includes the following information:

    • The 2024 Annual financial report;
    • The Report on corporate governance (attached to the management report);
    • The Statutory Auditors’ reports and the news release concerning their fees;
    • The description of the share buyback program;
    • The draft resolutions submitted to the vote of the Combined Shareholders’ Meeting of 14 May 2025;
    • The Sustainability Statement.

    CONTACTS

    ANALYSTS / INVESTORS
    Thomas JACQUET: +33 1 49 02 12 58 – thomas.jacquet@coface.com
    Rina ANDRIAMIADANTSOA: +33 1 49 02 15 85 – rina.andriamiadantsoa@coface.com

    MEDIA RELATIONS
    Saphia GAOUAOUI: +33 1 49 02 14 91 – saphia.gaouaoui@coface.com
    Adrien BILLET: +33 1 49 02 23 63 – adrien.billet@coface.com

    FINANCIAL CALENDAR 2025
    (subject to change)

    Q1-2025 results: 5 May 2025 (after market close)
    Annual General Shareholders’ Meeting: 14 May 2025
    H1-2025 results: 31 July 2025 (after market close)
    9M-2025 results: 3 November 2025 (after market close)

    FINANCIAL INFORMATION
    This press release, as well as COFACE SA’s integral regulatory information, can be found on the Group’s website: http://www.coface.com/Investors

    For regulated information on Alternative Performance Measures (APM), please refer to our Interim Financial Report for H1-2024 and our 2024 Universal Registration Document (see part 3.7 “Key financial performance indicators”).

    Regulated documents posted by COFACE SA have been secured and authenticated with the blockchain technology by Wiztrust.
    You can check the authenticity on the website www.wiztrust.com.
     

    COFACE: FOR TRADE
    As a global leading player in trade credit risk management for more than 75 years, Coface helps companies grow and navigate in an uncertain and volatile environment.
    Whatever their size, location or sector, Coface provides 100,000 clients across some 200 markets. with a full range of solutions: Trade Credit Insurance, Business Information, Debt Collection, Single Risk insurance, Surety Bonds, Factoring.
    Every day, Coface leverages its unique expertise and cutting-edge technology to make trade happen, in both domestic and export markets.
    In 2024, Coface employed ~5,236 people and registered a turnover of €1.84 billion.

    www.coface.com

    COFACE SA is listed in Compartment A of Euronext Paris
    ISIN: FR0010667147 / Ticker: COFA

    DISCLAIMER – Certain declarations featured in this press release may contain forecasts that notably relate to future events, trends, projects or targets. By nature, these forecasts include identified or unidentified risks and uncertainties, and may be affected by many factors likely to give rise to a significant discrepancy between the real results and those stated in these declarations. Please refer to chapter 5 “Main risk factors and their management within the Group” of the Coface Group’s 2024 Universal Registration Document filed with AMF on 3 April 2025 under the number D.25-0227 in order to obtain a description of certain major factors, risks and uncertainties likely to influence the Coface Group’s businesses. The Coface Group disclaims any intention or obligation to publish an update of these forecasts, or provide new information on future events or any other circumstance.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn, Colleagues Introduce Bill to Address School Bus Driver Shortage

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators John Cornyn (R-TX), Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), and Mark Kelly (D-AZ) today introduced the Driving Forward Act, which would continue to exempt new school bus drivers from the “Under-the-Hood” Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) testing requirement to help alleviate the nationwide shortage of drivers:

    “Young Americans are our nation’s most valuable resource, and it is essential that they have safe and reliable transportation to their schools,” said Sen. Cornyn. “This legislation would help ensure there are school bus drivers available in every neighborhood across the country by removing an antiquated and unnecessary obstacle to their certification.”

    “Children in Wisconsin and across the country should be able to take the bus and get to school safely and on time,” said Sen. Baldwin. “Unfortunately, many communities are struggling to find school bus drivers, and that’s why I am working with my Republican and Democratic colleagues to cut red tape, get good drivers behind the wheel, and ensure kids can get to school safely.”

    “The school bus driver shortage poses a threat to student safety and access to reliable transportation for students across Tennessee,” said Sen. Blackburn. “The Driving Forward Act is a commonsense piece of legislation that would get more qualified individuals into the driver’s seat by extending the current under-the-hood test exemption.”

    “Kids in Arizona deserve to get to school safe and on time,” said Sen. Kelly. “This bipartisan bill cuts red tape to help more people become school bus drivers, directly addressing driver shortages and making the drive to school a better one.” 

    Companion legislation is being led in the House of Representatives by Congressman John Carter (TX-31).

    Background:

    A significant barrier to entry for new bus drivers is the “Under-the-Hood” testing requirement necessary to obtain a CDL. Federal regulations require CDL holders to be able to lift the hood of a school bus and identify engine parts and functions—a requirement that is mainly for the long-haul trucking industry and adds on average an additional three to four days of training time. Texas has used this exemption over 600 times since 2024. Because school bus drivers must remain on the bus with students at all times, an exemption from this testing requirement will not have any effect on the safety level of school bus operations. Should a school bus break down, trained mechanics would complete roadside diagnostics and repairs of mechanical issues.

    The exemption does not change the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)’s vehicle maintenance requirements, including that every motor carrier must systematically inspect, repair, and maintain all vehicles and that unsafe operations of a motor vehicle are forbidden. Any state or local school bus inspection maintenance standards would continue to apply under this exemption. The FMCSA has confirmed that this exemption does not have an adverse impact on safety.

    This legislation is endorsed by the National School Transportation Association, School Superintendent Association, National Rural Education Association, National Association for Pupil Transportation, School Business Officials, and Association of Educational Service Agencies.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Momentum Builds for Bipartisan Cantwell Bill to Reassert Congressional Trade Role

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

    04.04.25

    Momentum Builds for Bipartisan Cantwell Bill to Reassert Congressional Trade Role

    Legislation requires president to explain reasoning & impacts of new tariffs to Congress within 48 hours

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – ICYMI, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), a senior member of the Senate Finance Committee, and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, introduced bipartisan legislation to reaffirm Congress’ key role in setting and approving U.S. trade policy. In addition to Sen. Cantwell, Sens. Jerry Moran (R-KS), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Mark Warner (D-VA), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), and Michael Bennet (D-CO) have co-sponsored the bill. The Trade Review Act of 2025, modeled after the War Powers Resolution of 1973, would reestablish limits on the president’s ability to impose unilateral tariffs without the approval of Congress.

    “Trade wars can be as devastating, which is why the Founding Fathers gave Congress the clear Constitutional authority over war and trade. This bill reasserts Congress’s role over trade policy to ensure rules-based trade policies are transparent, consistent, and benefit the American public. Arbitrary tariffs, particularly on our allies, damage U.S. export opportunities and raise prices for American consumers and businesses,” Sen. Cantwell said. “As representatives of the American people, Congress has a duty to stop actions that will cause them harm.”

    The bill restores Congress’ authority and responsibility over tariffs as outlined in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution by placing the following limits on the president’s power to impose tariffs:

    • To enact a new tariff, the president must notify Congress of the imposition of (or increase in) the tariff within 48 hours.
      • The Congressional notification must include an explanation of the president’s reasoning for imposing or raising the tariff, and
      • Provide analysis of potential impact on American businesses and consumers.
    • Within 60 days, Congress must pass a joint resolution of approval on the new tariff, otherwise all new tariffs on imports expire after that deadline.
    • Under the bill, Congress has the ability to end tariffs at any time by passing a resolution of disapproval.
    • Anti-dumping and countervailing duties are excluded.

    The full bill text is available HERE.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Keynote Remarks of Commissioner Johnson for Governing Data at IIB&L Center and Yale Law Journal of Law & Technology at Yale Law School

    Source: US Commodity Futures Trading Commission

    Remarks as Prepared
    Introduction
    Good afternoon. Springtime is always a nice time of year to be in New Haven and it is generous of the Yale Law School to host this symposium. Thank you Milhailis [Diamantis], Rishab [Nithyanand], the Iowa Innovation Business & Law Center, and the Yale Journal of Law & Technology for the significant time and effort you expended to organize and execute this symposium. 
    As I have indicated throughout my time as a Commissioner, I am delighted to join you in carefully thinking about the increasing salience of better data governance.[1] I am hopeful that the discussions at this symposium will articulate and enhance guardrails for comprehensive privacy law and better data governance. I am also hopeful that our discussions and advocacy will influence federal and state legislatures and financial market regulators, among others, to adopt, implement, and enforce law, regulation, and policy that lead to better data governance. 
    In my time with you, I would like to highlight two issues that may deeply impact the shape and development of data governance in financial markets – emerging artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and critical third-party service providers.[2] We can describe these two issues as twin peaks – arising rapidly and substantially altering the structure of financial markets.
    The twin peaks at the center of our markets reflect a shift to data-centered markets influenced by the rise of increasingly sophisticated machine learning and generative AI technologies and a remarkable uptick in market participants’ reliance on critical third-party service providers. The peaks are similar but not identical. Yet, each has the potential to deeply impact market structure and how we supervise financial markets. 
    First, the integration of data-fueled artificial intelligence (AI) technologies is indisputably altering financial markets infrastructure. As AI takes center stage in many sectors of our economy and society, financial services firms report interests, investments, and incorporation of AI technologies in data analytics, trade data analysis, trade clearing, reconciliation, and settlement, risk management, surveillance, margin and collateral determinations, and administrative, compliance and back-office services.   
    Second, developing and updating data-fueled technologies can be expensive. Firms often lack the resources to independently develop certain technologies. The cost of acquiring or developing AI or data-centered technologies may be prohibitive for many businesses. As a result, many financial services firms and others must outsource or seek to license data-centered technologies or models. For smaller and medium sized firms, reliance on third-party service providers is often imperative.
    As we begin to consider these twin peaks impacting the operational infrastructure and supervision of our markets, it is worth examining the benefits of novel technologies, whether these changes in market infrastructure may lead to new risks or distinct risks, and the extent to which existing risk management practices and regulations are fit for purpose. 
    I. Evolving Market Infrastructure 
    A recent study of nearly two thousand financial services firms reports that more than three-quarters of the firms included rely on AI to assist with various aspects of financial reporting and other compliance obligations.[3] Another study shows a significant amount of investment capital moving forward will be dedicated to implementing and integrating AI-based technologies.[4] Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulated market participants have long relied on predictive technologies – a category of technologies that comprise part of the universe of technologies that may be described as AI.[5] In recent years, a number of CFTC-regulated market participants have entered into strategic partnerships with major technology providers.[6] Today, market participants use AI for diverse trade execution, operational, and administrative functions including market intelligence, monitoring, fraud detection, and cybersecurity risk management.[7]
    The CFTC supervises areas of financial markets where market participants create, distribute, trade, and transfer financial market products. For financial market regulators, governing data proves challenging, in part, because market participants may rely on intermediaries that are not registered with financial market regulators. Regulators may lack visibility or supervisory authority over these intermediaries. As the market for novel assets such as digital assets grow, this challenge continues to present similar concerns.
    As noted at the outset, adoption of critical third-party service providers parallels the rapid adoption of AI. According to recent studies, in 2021 cloud services accounted for less than 10% of critical business initiatives. By 2027, it is expected that cloud services will account for 50% of critical business initiatives.[8] To that end, and to bolster capabilities to utilize AI, cloud services have seen massive investments to infrastructure, with $79 billion spent in the second quarter of 2024 alone.[9]
    A. The Rise of AI
    While the use cases within and beyond finance are quite diverse, common threads bind the “algorithmic revolution” and increased reliance on critical third-party service providers. Artificial intelligence technologies can automate decision-making tasks and certain subsets of artificial intelligence may execute these tasks autonomously. 
    For decades, market participants, researchers, academics, and public interest advocates have assessed the impacts of algorithmic trading in conventional financial markets. Some suggest that artificial intelligence introduces existential questions for markets;[10] others underscore the ethical, civil, or human rights implications of adopting artificial intelligence.[11] As debates proliferate regarding the merits and limitations of automated decision-making technologies, a steady drumbeat declares the future of finance.[12] 
    Notwithstanding the utility and benefits that accompany AI, there are risks and notable limitations. A robust literature has developed cataloguing and analyzing the ethical implications that may arise.[13] In addition, bad actors have discovered AI and the potential to use AI to manipulate markets.[14]
    Voices at international convenings of market participants and regulators increasingly reflect a call for an open dialogue regarding benefits and thorny issues that arise as we increasingly rely on AI and third-party service providers. Before turning to proposed interventions, let’s explore the second phenomenon changing market infrastructure – the increasing importance of technology-based critical-third party service providers. 
    B. Critical Third-Party Service Providers 
    Commission-regulated market participants often use third-party vendors to support their operations, risk management, compliance, and technology infrastructure. In an era of data-fueled technologies, cloud-based storage platforms and data centers serve as an increasingly important group of critical third-party service providers. The services of cloud-based platforms, data centers, and other third-party service providers vary; and, in some instances, the services are not critical to the continuity of the market participant’s business. In other instances, third-party services providers offer services which are essential to market participants’ day-to-day operations. 
    A glance around the “trading floor” of any financial services firm these days reveals significant reliance on technology. Many firms rely on innovative technologies for the continuous and adequate functioning of their operations.[15] As data-driven technologies proliferate, markets have witnessed a growing trend for participants to rely on cloud-based technologies. In fact, several of our largest market participants have entered strategic partnerships with cloud providers to enable them to handle exceptional volumes of data and enhance their scalability.[16] Cloud based architecture also offers on-demand computing power for risk analytics and trade processing, allowing firms to handle massive amounts of transactions and data in times of high volume, and scale down during slower periods. In many ways, cloud services and AI fit hand-in-glove because of the cloud-based computing power required to execute certain AI technologies.[17] 
    Congress, regulators, market participants, and many stakeholders have identified risks related to how our markets operate – robust information security management, reliability and resilience, effective contingency planning, and communication risks.[18] 
    Our regulations reflect expectations regarding how registered market participants will comply with this framework. In my role as a Commissioner and sponsor for the Market Risks Advisory Committee, I have led a diverse group of stakeholders in detailing the benefits and concerns that arise as these twin peaks increasingly influence our markets. Here, let’s consider two specific risks that have emerged as we navigate this rise of data-fueled, innovative technologies – concentration and cyber risks – which will be central questions for regulators in the era of data governance. 
    II. Managing Data Governance and Data Security Risks 
    A few large firms comprise the most prevalent AI and cloud-based technology services providers.[19] The limited diversity of service providers and lack of competition may raise market concentration concerns.[20]
    A. Concentration Risks
    Evidence indicates that there are a limited number of both AI and critical service providers for financial market participants. A recent survey of the AI industry suggests that ten foundational model providers account for almost ninety percent of the market.[21]
    The top three cloud providers, Amazon, Microsoft, and Google, respectively, account for 73% percent of the cloud infrastructure market.[22] Given that software as a service is the most widely adopted form of cloud computing by financial institutions, the United States Department of the Treasury has indicated that the concentration among critical service providers may be cause for concern.[23]
    Microsoft and AWS are two of the largest data center providers and among the largest cloud providers; together these firms manage over five hundred and fifteen data centers. Google manages twenty-five data centers.[24] Simply stated, the number of service providers capable of handling the needs of many market participants may be limited. 
    Studies also report a decline in the number of Futures Commission Merchants (FCMs).[25] In 2023, the MRAC launched a workstream to analyze the current state and trends of the FCM market over the twenty-year period from 2003 to 2023.[26] The report notes increased operating costs and the capital requirements for FCMS and increased minimum net capital requirements. Markets have also witnessed consolidation in FCM markets. 
    In contrast to the decline in the total number of FCMs, clearing volume during this same period has dramatically increased.[27] The total number of non-carrying FCMs declined by 91% and the number of carrying FCMs fell by 58%.[28] This represents a significant reduction in the capacity of FCMs over the course of a relatively short period of time. 
    This reduction means that there is far fewer FCMs available to provide the critical functions they traditionally perform.
    B. Cyber Risks 
    Our registered market participants must comply with the regulatory framework for system safeguards. In many instances, technology service providers also have robust cyber defense capabilities designed to anticipate, prevent, or lessen the effect of sophisticated cyber-attacks.  
    In recent years, however, there has been notable disruption in traditional markets and the markets for novel financial products. Two recent events underscore the vulnerability of markets and market infrastructure to cyber threats. These incidents – the ION ransomware attack and the Bybit exchange hack – illustrate the difficulties many firms face when a third-party service provider or a technology employed through a third-party service provider experiences a cyberattack. 
    In January of 2023, a critical third-party service provider in derivatives markets, ION Cleared Derivatives (ION), a UK-based trading software partner, experienced a significant cyberattack. ION’s services are widely used by FCMs and other market participants for critical functions, including trade order management, trade processing, and settlement of exchange-traded derivatives. Because a significant number of FCMs rely on ION for back-office trading capabilities, the disruption caused by the ransomware attack on ION cascaded through our derivatives markets. During the period that ION’s operations were impacted by the ransomware attack, affected firms reverted to manual processes to match and settle trades, creating difficulties in recording and reporting trade reconciliation data.[29] Consequently, the Commission was unable to deliver timely Commitments to Traders reports and determining material transactional obligations such as margin and collateral were similarly impacted. 
    In a more recent cyberattack in crypto-asset markets, a crypto exchange experienced significant losses related to reliance on a third-party software platform that enables wallet services. In February of 2023, Bybit, a crypto exchange that offers crypto derivatives and other financial products lost over $1.4 billion when the firm suffered a breach of its multi-signature wallets.[30] Hackers infiltrated a developer workstation at a third-party that enables customers to access wallet software that interfaces with Bybit’s exchange. The hackers obtained credentials for the third party’s Amazon Web Services (AWS) repository.[31] Using stolen AWS tokens, the attackers introduced malicious code into the third party’s software, enabling the hackers to alter Bybit’s wallet interface and reroute a scheduled transfer of funds without immediate detection. 
    These losses were introduced to market participants through their link to critical third-party service providers and, in the case of Bybit, indirectly with a third party that was using another vendor for the compromised process. These losses can cascade through the markets when that breach occurs in a critical third-party service provider who is linked to a significant number of market participants.
    III. Reflections on Proposed and Potential Interventions 
    The Commodity Exchange Act and implementing regulations and related guidance provide a principles-based approach to regulating governance, risk management, and cybersecurity measures for CFTC-regulated entities. At the CFTC, we are increasingly focused on how to ensure markets benefit from responsible innovation and mitigate the threats to risk management that may lead to market disruption. 
    A. Existing DCO System Safeguard Regulation
    Derivatives clearing organizations (DCOs), are subject to core principles established under the CEA, including Section 5b, which establishes that DCOs shall (i) establish and maintain a program of risk analysis and oversight to identify and minimize sources of operational risk through the development of appropriate controls and procedures, and automated systems, that are reliable, secure, and have adequate scalable capacity; and (ii) establish and maintain emergency procedures, backup facilities, and a plan for disaster recovery (and establishes certain criteria for such plans and procedures, including timely recovery and resumption of operations, fulfillment of the DCO’s obligations, and periodic testing).[32] The DCO Core Principles were added to the CEA in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. After the financial crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act expanded the CFTC’s authority to “establish a more comprehensive statutory framework to reduce risk, increase transparency and promote market integrity,” including by enhancing the Commission’s rulemaking authority with respect to registered entities, including DCOs.[33]
    Additional requirements for compliance with DCO Core Principle I, System Safeguards, are enumerated in more detail in Rule 39.18, following Dodd-Frank. When the rule was first proposed, and ultimately codified in 2011, it sought to “delineate the minimum requirements that a DCO would be required to satisfy in order to comply with Core Principle I.”[34] With time, as technology continued to evolve, and the world became more reliant on it, the regulation has evolved to include more specific requirements. For example, in 2016, the Commission amended Rule 39.18, clarifying certain requirements and enhancing others, motivated in large part by escalating and evolving cybersecurity threats. The December 2015 proposing release discussed roundtables held by the Commission and the MRAC that focused on cybersecurity, and a number of important topics surrounding cybersecurity that financial institutions should take into consideration. These include: (i) more cyber adversaries, that are more dangerous, and have expanding and worsening motivations and goals, (ii) increasing cyber capabilities from both non-state actors and state-sponsored intruders, (iii) more sophisticated and longer duration cyberattacks, (iv) a broadening cyber threat field where computers, mobile devices and the cloud are all potential points of vulnerability and, finally, (v) the interconnectedness of financial services firms and the threat that poses.[35] 
    As currently in effect, Rule 39.18 includes “(1) the requisite elements, standards, and resources of a DCO’s program of risk analysis and oversight with respect to its operations and automated systems; (2) the requirements for a DCO’s business continuity and disaster recovery plan, emergency procedures, and physical, technological, and personnel resources described therein; (3) the responsibilities, obligations, and recovery time objective of a DCO following a disruption of its operations; and (4) other system safeguards requirements related to reporting, recordkeeping, testing, and coordination with a DCO’s clearing members and service providers.”[36] With respect to third-party service providers, subsection (d)(2) specifies that a DCO can maintain some of the resources required by other subsections of the rule “through written contractual arrangements with another [DCO] or other service provider,”[37] but notes that “[a] [DCO] that enters into a contractual outsourcing arrangement shall retain complete responsibility for any failure to meet [the rules requirements]” and that the DCO “must employ personnel with the expertise necessary to enable it to supervise the service provider’s delivery of the services.”[38] 
    B. Opening a Dialogue to Explore Emerging Risks 
    In light of the ION attack, as well as the increasing risk of cyber threat events, the Market Risk Advisory Committee (MRAC) has spent significant attention to examining third-party service provider relationships and best practices for managing risks to central counterparties (CCPs). In January of 2023, the MRAC hosted a forum on cyber risks in our markets and focused on the ransomware attack that disrupted ION’s operations. 
    Later in 2023, MRAC launched a workstream focused on managing risks that arise from reliance on critical third-party service providers.[39] The workstream led by the CCP Risk and Governance Subcommittee examined the need to consider updating the operational resilience frameworks for CCPs in light of the concentration and cyber risks, among other concerns, that arise as registrants increasingly rely on critical third-party service providers. 
    On November 25, 2024, the MRAC published  a report from the CCP Risk and Governance Subcommittee which set forth recommendations on DCO System Safeguard Standards for Third Party Service Providers (Report).[40] The Report addresses recommendations to Rule 39.18, acknowledging that, while the System Safeguards do explicitly say that a DCO retains responsibility regardless of any contractual outsourcing of regulatory requirements and requires a DCO to provide certain information to the Commission with respect to those outsourced resources.[41] The Report recommends that any proposed regulation build upon and incorporate the principles and language set forth in the System Safeguards Rule with respect to DCOs and further that DCOs be required to establish and maintain a robust Third-Party Relationship Management Program that identifies, assesses, mitigates and monitors the full scope of risks that are associated with the use of third part arrangements.[42]
    The examples of the MRAC’s efforts illustrate the need for a continuing dialogue regarding the concentration and cyber risks that may accompany increased adoption of sophisticated technologies or reliance on third party service providers for technologies that operate at the center of our markets. Moreover, DCOs are only one the diverse types of registrants in our markets navigating these questions. 
    Other registrants, such as designated contract markets and boards of trade, swap execution facilities, and swap data repositories are subject to similar CFTC regulatory system safeguards.[43] Some registrants such as FCMs, commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators, and introducing brokers who are members of the National Futures Association (NFA) may also be subject to NFA guidance on information systems security programs and third-party service providers.[44] However, similar to DCOs, it is important to consider instances in which reliance on critical third party service providers may introduce risk management concerns.  
    The growing concentration of critical third-party service providers present risk implications that may lead to disruption of our markets. While the Commission has broad authority to promulgate regulations consistent with our statutory authority, many technology firms may not be CFTC registrants subject to direct oversight and, absent conduct in violation of Commission regulation, the Commission may have limited oversight authority with respect to these technology firms. 
    Conclusion
    The issues outlined reflect neither an exhaustive nor a definitive list of the challenges of governing data and providing effective oversight for data integrity, security, and governance. There are many lessons that markets and regulators are yet to learn about the integration of novel technologies such as AI and our evolving market infrastructure.
    The illustration of each of these phenomenon – the rise of data-fueled AI and the increasing role of a concentrated group of critical third-party service providers – merits careful consideration. 
    I am ever working to enhance the stability and integrity of and strengthen the resilience of our domestic markets. As a Commissioner and throughout my career, I have long emphasized corporate governance, compliance, and risk management as central pillars in market oversight.
    Thank you so very much for allowing me to join you this afternoon. I have learned so much from each of the papers presented and the proposals. I am hopeful that other important decision-makers are tracking the issues you outline and solutions that you propose. 

    [2] The thoughts and perspectives that I share with you today are my own; they are not the views and perspectives of my fellow Commissioners, the Commission, or the staff of the CFTC.

    [10] Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 815 (2019); Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 Geo. L. J. 235, 275 (2019); Rory Van Loo, Technology Regulation by Default: Platforms, Privacy, and the CFPB, 2 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 531, 544-45 (2018). 

    [11] Harry Surden, Ethics of AI in Law: Basic Questions, 719 The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of AI (July 9, 2020) (exploring ethical issues arising from the adoption of artificial intelligence).

    [12] See, e.g., Exec. Order No.13,859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3,967 (Feb. 11, 2019), see also Christopher K. Odinet, AI Risks, Research Handbook on Artificial Intelligence & The Law, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming 2025). 

    [13] See, e.g., Kimberly A. Houser & Anjanette H. Raymond, It Is Time to Move Beyond the ‘AI Race’ Narrative: Why Investment and International Cooperation Must Win The Day, 18 Nw. J. Tech. & Intel. Prop. 129, 185 (2021); Dr. Axel Walz & Kay Firth-Butterfield, Implementing Ethics Into Artificial Intelligence: A Contribution, From A Legal Perspective, To The Development Of An Ai Governance Regime, 18 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 176, 198; Ross P. Buckley et al., Regulating Artificial Intelligence in Finance: Putting the viHuman in the Loop, 43 Sydney L. Rev. 43, 45 (2021).

    [14] Deborah W. Denno & Ryan Surujnath, Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law: Foreword, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 381, 383 (2019); Ross P. Buckley et al., Regulating Artificial Intelligence in Finance: Putting the Human in the Loop, 43 Sydney L. Rev. 43, 47 (2021).

    [15] Bank for Int’l Settlements & Bd. of the Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’n, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures: Assessment Methodology for the Oversight Expectations Applicable to Critical Service Providers (Dec. 2014), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d123.pdf.

    [25] FCMs serve as intermediaries that facilitate the clearing and execution of trades in swaps and futures products.

    [27] Holdings of customer funds increased by more than 700% and the overall adjusted net capital rose by 296%. Id.

    [28] Non-carrying FCMs are FCMs which do not hold customer funds. Id.

    [32] 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(I).

    [33] Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69334 (Nov. 8, 2011).

    [34] 76 Fed. Reg. at 69397.

    [35] System Safeguards Testing Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 80 Fed. Reg. 80114, 80115 (Dec. 23, 2015).

    [36] System Safeguards Testing Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 81 Fed. Reg. 64322 (Sept. 19, 2016).

    [37] 17 C.F.R. § 39.18(d)(1).

    [38] 17 C.F.R. § 39.18(d)(2).

    [41] Form DCO, Appendix A to 17 C.F.R. pt. 39.

    [42] The Report contains 8 principles in which the CCP Risk and Governance Subcommittee recommends a DCO should consider, at minimum, when developing a TPRM. The Report also recommends that the Commission consider requiring DCOs to obtain assurances from their critical service providers that they comply with the expectations set forth in Annex F of the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure (PFMIs), which sets forth oversight expectations applicable to critical service providers. See Bank for Int’l Settlements & Bd. of the Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’n, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures: Assessment Methodology for the Oversight Expectations Applicable to Critical Service Providers (Dec. 2014), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d123.pdf.

    [43] See 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(20), 17 C.F.R. § 38.1050-1051 (designated contract markets and boards of trade), 7 U.S.C. § 7b-3(f)(14), 17 C.F.R. § 37.1400-1401 (swap execution facilities), and 7 U.S.C. § 24a(c)(8), 17 C.F.R. § 49.24) (swap data repositories).

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Unlock 100x Leverage with No KYC, Double Deposit Bonus, and $50 Welcome Bonus on BexBack

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: TODAY: Join us at 9:30 a.m. PT to learn about the latest Copilot news and innovations

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: TODAY: Join us at 9:30 a.m. PT to learn about the latest Copilot news and innovations

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    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Global: AI is automating our jobs – but values need to change if we are to be liberated by it

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Robert Muggah, Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow na Bosch Academy e Co-fundador, Instituto Igarapé

    Artificial intelligence may be the most significant disruptor in the history of mankind. Google’s CEO Sundar Pichai famously described AI as “more profound than the invention of fire or electricity”. OpenAI’s CEO Sam Altman claims it has the power to cure most diseases, solve climate change, provide personalized education to the world, and lead to other “astounding triumphs”.

    AI will undoubtedly help solve vast problems, while generating vast fortunes for technology companies and investors. However, the rapid spread of generative AI and machine learning will also automate vast swathes of the global workforce, eviscerating white-collar and blue-collar jobs alike. And while millions of new jobs will surely be created, it is not clear what happens when potentially billions more are lost.


    The Insights section is committed to high-quality longform journalism. Our editors work with academics from many different backgrounds who are tackling a wide range of societal and scientific challenges.


    Amid the breathless promises of productivity gains from AI, there are rising concerns that the political, social and economic fallout from mass labour displacement will deepen inequality, strain public safety nets, and contribute to social unrest.

    A 2023 survey in 31 countries found that over half of all respondents felt “nervous” about the impacts of AI on their daily lives and believed it will negatively impact their jobs. Concerns are also mounting about the ways in which AI is being weaponized and could hasten everything from geopolitical fragmentation to nuclear exchanges. While experts are sounding the alarm, it is increasingly clear that governments, businesses and societies are unprepared for the AI revolution.

    The coming AI upheaval

    The idea that machines would one day replace human labour is hardly new. It features in novels, films and countless economic reports stretching back over centuries. In 2013, Carl-Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne of the University of Oxford attempted to quantify the human costs, estimating that “47% of total US employment is in the high risk category, meaning that associated occupations are potentially automatable”. Their study triggered a global debate about the far-reaching consequences of automation not just for manufacturing jobs, but also service and knowledge-based work.

    Fast forward to today, and AI capabilities are advancing faster than almost anyone expected. In November 2022, OpenAI launched ChatGPT, which dramatically accelerated the AI race. By 2023, Goldman Sachs projected that “roughly two-thirds of current jobs are exposed to some degree of AI automation” and that up to 300 million jobs worldwide could be displaced or significantly altered by AI.

    A more detailed McKinsey analysis estimated that “Gen AI and other technologies have the potential to automate work activities that absorb up to 70% of employees’ time today”. Brookings found that “more than 30% of all workers could see at least 50% of their occupation’s tasks disrupted by generative AI”. Although the methodologies and estimates differ, all of these studies point to a common outcome: AI will profoundly upset the world of work.

    While it is tempting to compare the impacts of AI automation to past industrial revolutions, it is also short-sighted. AI is arguably more transformative than the combustion engine or Internet because it represents a fundamental shift in how decisions are made and tasks are performed. It is not just a new tool or source of power, but a system that can learn, adapt, and make independent decisions across virtually all sectors of the economy and aspects of human life. Precisely because AI has these capabilities, scales exponentially, and is not confined by geography, it is already starting to outperform humans. It signals the advent of a post-human intelligence era.

    Goldman Sachs estimates that 46% of administrative work and 44% of legal tasks could be automated within the next decade. In finance and legal sectors, tasks such as contract analysis, fraud detection, and financial advising are increasingly handled by AI systems that can process data faster and more accurately than humans. Financial institutions are rapidly deploying AI to reduce costs and increase efficiency, with many entry-level roles set to disappear. Global banks could cut as many as 200,000 jobs in the next three to five years on account of AI.

    Ironically, coding and software engineering jobs are among the most vulnerable to the spreading of AI. While there are expectations that AI will increase productivity and streamline routine tasks with many programmers and non-programmers likely to benefit, some coders confess that they are becoming overly reliant on AI suggestions (which undermines problem-solving skills).

    Anthropic, one of the leading developers of generative AI systems, recently launched an Economic Index based on millions of anonymised uses of its Claude chatbot. It reveals massive adoption of AI in software engineering: “37.2% of queries sent to Claude were in this category, covering tasks like software modification, code debugging, and network troubleshooting”.

    AI is also outperforming humans in a growing array of medical imaging and diagnosis roles. While doctors may not be replaced outright, support roles are particularly vulnerable and medical professionals are getting anxious. Analysts insist that high-skilled jobs are not at risk even as AI-driven diagnostic tools and patient management systems are steadily being deployed in hospitals and clinics worldwide.

    Meanwhile, the creative sectors also face significant disruption as AI-generated writing and synthetic media improve. The demand for human journalists, copywriters, and designers is already falling just as AI-generated content (including so-called “slop”: the growing amount of low-quality text, audio and video flooding social media) expands. And in education, AI tutoring systems, adaptive learning platforms, and automated grading could reduce the need for human teachers, not only in remote learning environments.

    Arguably the most dramatic impact of AI in the coming years will be in the manufacturing sector. Recent videos from China offer a glimpse into a future of factories that run 24/7 and are nearly entirely automated (except a handful in supervising roles). Most tasks are performed by AI-powered robots and technologies designed to handle production and, increasingly, support functions.

    Unlike humans, robots do not need light to operate in these “dark factories”. CapGemini describes them as places “where raw materials enter, and finished products leave, with little or no human intervention”. Re-read that sentence. The implications are profound and dizzying: efficiency gains (capital) that come at the cost of human livelihoods (labor) and rapid downward spiral for the latter if no safeguards are put in place.

    Some have confidently argued that, as with past technological shifts, AI-driven job losses will be offset by new opportunities. AI enthusiasts add that it will mostly handle repetitive or boring tasks, freeing humans for more creative work — like giving doctors more time with patients, teachers more time to engage with students, lawyers more time to concentrate on client relationships, or architects more time to focus on innovative design. But this historical comfort overlooks AI’s radical novelty: for the first time, we’re confronted with a technology that is not just a tool but an autonomous agent, capable of making decisions and directly shaping reality. The question is not just what we can do with AI, but what AI might do to us.

    AI will certainly save time. Machine learning already interprets scans faster and cheaper than doctors. But the idea that this will give professionals more time for creative or human-centered work is less convincing. Already doctors are not short on technology; they are short on time because healthcare systems prioritise efficiency and cost-cutting over “time with patients”. The rise of technology in healthcare has coincided with doctors spending less time with patients, not more, as hospitals and insurers push for higher throughput and lower costs. AI may make diagnosis quicker, but there is little reason to think it will loosen the grip of a system designed to maximise output rather than human connection.

    Nor is there much reason to expect AI to liberate office workers for more creative tasks. Technology tends to reinforce the values of the system into which it is introduced. If those values are cost reduction and higher productivity, AI will be deployed to automate tasks and consolidate work, not to create breathing room. Workflows will be redesigned for speed and efficiency, not for creativity or reflection. Unless there is a deliberate shift in priorities — a move to value human input over raw output — AI is more likely to tighten the screws than to loosen them. That shift seems unlikely anytime soon.

    AI’s uneven impacts

    AI’s impact on employment will not be felt equally around the world. It will impact different countries differently. Disparities in political systems, economic development levels, labour market structures and access to AI infrastructure (including energy) are shaping how regions are preparing for and are likely to experience AI-driven disruption. Smaller, wealthier countries are potentially in a better position to manage the scale and speed of job displacement. Some lower-income societies may be cushioned by the disruption owing to limited market penetration of AI services altogether. Meanwhile, high and medium income countries may experience social turbulence and potentially unrest as a result of rapid and unpredictable automation.

    The United States, the current leader in AI development, faces significant exposure to AI-driven disruption, particularly in services. A 2023 study found that highly educated workers in professional and technical roles are most vulnerable to displacement. Knowledge-based industries such as finance, legal services, and customer support are already shedding entry-level jobs as AI automates routine tasks.

    Technology companies have begun shrinking their workforces, using that also as signals to both government and business. Over 95,000 workers at tech companies lost their jobs in 2024. Despite its AI edge, America’s service-heavy economy leaves it highly exposed to automation’s downsides.

    Asia stands at the forefront of AI-driven automation in manufacturing and services. It is not just China, but countries like South Korea that are deploying AI in so-called “smart factories” and logistics with fully automated production facilities becoming increasingly common. India and the Philippines, major hubs for outsourced IT and customer service, face pressure as AI threatens to replace human labour in these sectors. Japan, with its shrinking workforce, sees AI more as a solution than a threat. But the broader region’s exposure to automation reflects its deep reliance on manufacturing and outsourcing, making it highly vulnerable to AI-driven job displacement in a geopolitically turbulent world.

    Europe is taking early regulatory steps to manage AI’s labour market impact. The EU’s AI Act aims to regulate high-risk AI applications, including those affecting employment. Yet in Eastern Europe, where manufacturing and low-cost labour underpin economic competitiveness, automation is already cutting into job security. Poland and Hungary, for example, are seeing a rise in automated production lines. Western Europe’s knowledge-based economies face risks similar to those in America, particularly in finance and professional services.

    Oil-rich Gulf states are investing heavily in AI as part of diversification efforts away from a dependence on hydrocarbons. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are building AI hubs and integrating AI into government services and logistics. The UAE even has a Minister of State for AI. But with high youth unemployment and a reliance on foreign labour, these countries face risks if AI reduces demand for low-skill jobs, potentially worsening inequality.

    In Latin America, automation threatens to disrupt manufacturing and agriculture, but also sectors like mining, logistics, and customer service. As many as 2-5% of all jobs in the region are at risk, according to the International Labor Organization and World Bank. And it is not just young people in the formal service sectors, but also human labour in mining operations, logistics and warehouse workers. Call centers in Mexico and Colombia face pressure as AI-powered customer service bots reduce demand for human agents. And AI-driven crop monitoring, automated irrigation, and robotic harvesting threaten to replace farm labourers, particularly in Brazil and Argentina. Yet the region’s large informal labour market may cushion some of the shock.

    While most Africans are optimistic about the transformative potential of AI, adoption remains low due to limited infrastructure and investment. However, the continent’s rapidly growing digital economy could see AI play a transformative role in financial services, logistics, and agriculture. A recent assessment suggests AI could boost productivity and access to services, but without careful management, it risks widening inequality. As in Latin America, low wages and high levels of informal employment reduce the financial incentive to automate. Ironically, weaker economic incentives for automation may shield these economies from the worst of AI’s labour disruption.

    No one is prepared

    The scale and speed of recent AI developments have taken many governments and businesses by surprise. To be sure, some are proactively taking steps to prepare workforces for the transformation. Hundreds of AI laws, regulations, guidelines, and standards have emerged in recent years, though few of them are legally binding. One exception is the EU’s AI Act, which seeks to establish a comprehensive legal framework for AI deployment, addressing risks such as job displacement and ethical concerns. China and South Korea have also developed national AI strategies with an emphasis on industrial policy and technological self-sufficiency, aiming to lead in AI and automation while boosting their manufacturing sectors.

    Notwithstanding recent attempts to increase oversight over AI, the US has adopted an increasingly laissez-faire approach, prioritising innovation by reducing regulatory barriers. This “minimal regulation” stance, however, raises concerns about the potential societal costs of rapid AI adoption, including widespread job displacement, the deepening of inequality and undermining of democracy.

    Other countries, particularly in the Global South, have largely remained on the sidelines of AI regulation, lacking the awareness, capabilities or infrastructure to tackle these issues comprehensively. As such, the global regulatory landscape remains fragmented, with significant disparities in how countries are preparing for the workforce impacts of automation.

    Businesses are under pressure to adopt AI as fast and deeply as possible, for fear of losing competitiveness. That’s, at least, the hyperbolic narrative that AI companies have succeeded in putting forward. And it’s working: a recent poll of 1,000 executives found that 58% of businesses are adopting AI due to competitive pressure and 70% say that advances in technology are occurring faster than their workforce can incorporate them.

    Another new survey suggests that over 40% of global employers planned to reduce their workforce as AI reshapes the labour market. Lost in the rush to adopt AI is a serious reflection on workforce transition. Financial institutions, consulting firms, universities and nonprofit groups have sounded alarms about the economic impact of AI but have provided few solutions other than workforce up-skilling and Universal Basic Income (UBI). Governments and businesses are wrestling with a basic challenge: how to manage the benefits of AI while protecting workers from displacement.

    AI-driven automation is no longer a future prospect; it is already reshaping labour markets. As automation reduces human workforces, it will also diminish the power of unions and collective bargaining furthering entering capital over labour. Whether AI fosters widespread prosperity or deepens inequality and social unrest depends not just on the imperatives of tech company CEOs and shareholders, but on the proactive decisions made by policymakers, business leaders, union representatives, and workers in the coming years.

    The key question is not if AI will disrupt labour markets — this is inevitable — but how societies will manage the upheaval and what kinds of “new bargains” will be made to address its negative externalities. It is worth recalling that while the last three industrial revolutions created more jobs than they destroyed, the transitions were long and painful. This time, the pace of change will be faster and more profound, demanding swift and enlightened action.

    At a minimum, governments must prepare their societies to develop a new social contract, prioritise retraining programs, bolster social safety nets, and explore UBI to help workers displaced by automation. They should also proactively foster new industries to absorb the displaced workforce. Businesses, in turn, will need to rethink workforce strategies and adopt human-centric AI deployment models that prioritise collaboration between humans and machines, rather than substitution of the former by the latter.

    The promise of AI is immense, from boosting productivity to creating new economic opportunities and indeed helping solving big collective problems. Yet, without a focused and coordinated effort, the technology is unlikely to develop in ways that benefit society at large.

    Dr. Robert Muggah is the co-founder of the Igarapé Institute, an independent think and do tank that develops research, solutions and partnerships to address global public, digital and climate security challenges. Dr. Muggah is also a principal of the SecDev Group, and an advisor to the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank. An advisor to AI start-ups and a climate tech venture firms, Dr. Muggah has experience developing new technologies and testing AI systems for security and governance. He also coordinated a global task force on predictive analytics and AI in the Global South since in 2023.

    Bruno Giussani não presta consultoria, trabalha, possui ações ou recebe financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que poderia se beneficiar com a publicação deste artigo e não revelou nenhum vínculo relevante além de seu cargo acadêmico.

    ref. AI is automating our jobs – but values need to change if we are to be liberated by it – https://theconversation.com/ai-is-automating-our-jobs-but-values-need-to-change-if-we-are-to-be-liberated-by-it-253806

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Video: Session 1: How is AI transforming the labour market?

    Source: European Central Bank (video statements)

    Session 1: How is AI transforming the labour market?

    Session chair: Luc Laeven, ECB

    AI, task changes in jobs, and worker reallocation

    Christina Gathmann*, LISER, University of Luxembourg and CEPR
    Felix Grimm, LISER
    Erwin Winkler, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, IZA and LASER
    Discussant: Antonio Dalla Zuanna, Banca d’Italia

    AI adoption and the demand for managerial expertise

    Liudmila Alekseeva*, KU Leuven
    José Azar, University of Navarra and IESE Business School
    Mireia Giné, IESE Business School
    Sampsa Samila, IESE Business School
    Discussant: Juan F. Jimeno, Banco de España

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5b1Er1KDyE

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Video: Session 2: Is this time different? Will AI have a significant effect on productivity?

    Source: European Central Bank (video statements)

    Session 2: Is this time different? Will AI have a significant effect on productivity?

    Session chair: Oscar Arce, ECB

    Generative AI and firm-level productivity: evidence from startup funding dynamics

    Dominik Asam* and David Heller, both Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

    Discussant: Paul E. Soto, Federal Reserve Board

    Generative AI and the nature of work

    Manuel Hoffmann*, Harvard Business School and Stanford University
    Sam Boysel, Harvard Business School
    Frank Nagle, Harvard Business School
    Sida Peng, Microsoft
    Kevin Xu, GitHub

    Discussant: Peter Gal, OECD

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tGchsf1_KNQ

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Global: More than just chips: Chinese threats and Trump tariffs could disrupt lots of ‘made in Taiwan’ imports − disappointing US builders, cyclists and golfers alike

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Jay L. Zagorsky, Associate Professor Questrom School of Business, Boston University

    A cargo ship and containers are seen at the Port of Keelung in Taiwan on April 3, 2025. I-HWA CHENG/AFP via Getty Images

    What would the United States stand to lose economically if its current access to the Taiwanese market were upended or totally restricted?

    This seemingly theoretical question about the longtime U.S. trading partner has taken on more relevance in the past several weeks. First, longtime fears about a potential Chinese invasion of the island – which Beijing claims as its own – were magnified as China increased military pressure by sending patrols, firing live ammunition nearby, practicing blockading the island and even publicly revealing the existence of new barges that might be used in an invasion. If China uses force, Taiwan’s manufacturing capacity could be destroyed.

    Then on April 2, 2025, President Donald Trump announced a new 32% tariff on imports from Taipei, excluding semiconductors. Taiwan described the new tariffs, part of a radical upending of U.S. trade practices, as “deeply unreasonable.” They could also be deeply painful to U.S. consumers given the outsize role Taiwan imports play.

    The U.S. State Department calls Taiwan an important U.S. partner in “semiconductors and other critical supply chains.” But as I learned studying trade data and visiting the small but thriving island last fall, the U.S. depends on Taiwan for more than just sophisticated computer chips. In 2024, Taiwanese products constituted 3.6% of all U.S. imports.

    Overall trade figures

    Trade figures are known in detail because almost every government carefully tracks the contents of all shipping containers, cargo flights and bulk deliveries that legally leave and enter their borders. These figures are published online and broken down into very fine detail using a system called the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, or HTS. The HTS shows the tax or duty that must be paid for each kind of item and from every kind of country.

    In 2024, the U.S. exported US$1.7 trillion worth of goods to the world. Since few of us can conceptualize trillions, that is about $5,000 for every man, woman and child in the U.S.

    For its part, Taiwan in 2024 exported about that same amount per resident of the island just to the U.S., $5,000 – or about $90 billion overall. The U.S. is Taiwan’s second-biggest trading partner, after mainland China. Looking at their total exports, Taiwan shipped to the entire world about $20,000 worth of items for every resident.

    The vital technology component

    Not surprisingly, Taiwan’s biggest exports to the U.S. are computers, chips and other electronic hardware such as power supplies. These computer chips are so important that they were specifically excluded from the new tariffs.

    However, $90 billion of exports dramatically underestimates the amount of Taiwanese electronics that end up in U.S. hands. For example, the main chip inside all Apple iPhones is Taiwanese. However, these chips are sent from Taiwan to mainland Chinese factories where the phones are assembled. When these iPhones are exported from mainland China, the value of the chips inside the phone is not counted as U.S. imports from Taiwan. Instead, the whole phone is counted as an import from mainland China and slapped with a tariff.

    The building industry

    But while high-technology equipment often gets the headlines, imports from Taiwan are far broader – and the U.S. would face several economic shocks if Taiwan suddenly stopped exporting.

    First, the U.S. building industry could grind to a halt because Taiwan is a major producer of drywall screws. Though small and cheap, that’s a very significant product, given the prominence of drywall in the interior walls of almost every house, office and factory.

    Microchip and Taiwanese flag displayed on a phone screen.
    Jakub Porzycki/NurPhoto via Getty Images

    Overall, the U.S. uses a massive amount of drywall for new construction and remodeling. In 2024, the country consumed about 28 billion square feet of wallboard. That amount is enough to cover almost the state of Rhode Island.

    To hang drywall, every 100 square feet of the sheets needs about 125 screws. And the vast majority came last year from Taiwan. The U.S. imported over two-thirds of a billion dollars’ worth of the screws; the screws weighed over half a billion pounds.

    While the U.S. does make screws, domestic screw manufacturers primarily focus on high-value parts such as screws needed for airplanes, rocket ships and other performance vehicles, not lower-value screws whose wholesale cost is slightly more than a dollar a pound.

    Beyond screws, Taiwan is a major producer of tools. For example, approximately two-thirds of all socket wrenches, band saws, blowtorches, air compressors and grinders imported into the U.S. come from that island. Losing access to tools is not as crucial as losing access to the screws because many tools last a long time. But finding new suppliers is not trivial.

    The other basket of imports

    Finally, Taiwan is also a big U.S. supplier of sports goods.

    The country is a major producer of bicycles, with manufacturers such as Giant. In 2024, the U.S. imported from Taiwan over a quarter of a billion dollars in just bike parts, which U.S. manufacturers such as Specialized and Trek use when assembling bikes.

    Moreover, Taiwan controls a few key parts of the bike market. For example, over half of all bicycle crank sets, derailleurs and brake parts came from Taiwan. Without these products it is impossible to pedal, shift and even stop a bike.

    Taiwan is also one of the world’s leading suppliers of golf clubs, with the U.S. in 2024 importing about a quarter of a billion dollars’ worth of clubs from the island. To go along with the clubs, Taiwan also sent half a billion golf balls. Given that about 25 million people play on golf courses in the U.S. each year, that works out to 20 balls per player in just 2024.

    Finally, the island sent over a third of a million lacrosse sticks last year, which is almost one new stick for every member of the USA Lacrosse federation.

    All together, the data shows that not just Silicon Valley should be worried about geopolitical factors that disrupt imports from Taiwan. Taiwan might be a small island, but as the story of David and Goliath reminds us, size and impact are not related.

    Jay L. Zagorsky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. More than just chips: Chinese threats and Trump tariffs could disrupt lots of ‘made in Taiwan’ imports − disappointing US builders, cyclists and golfers alike – https://theconversation.com/more-than-just-chips-chinese-threats-and-trump-tariffs-could-disrupt-lots-of-made-in-taiwan-imports-disappointing-us-builders-cyclists-and-golfers-alike-253729

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: King Introduces Legislation Banning Energy Exports to China and Other Foreign Adversaries

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Maine Angus King

    WASHINGTON, D.C. U.S. Senator Angus King (I-ME), a member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee (ENR), has introduced legislation banning energy exports to China and other foreign adversaries. Having long warned that America is “exporting our principal advantage in the world economy,” Senator King joined with colleagues to introduce the Protecting American Households From Rising Energy Costs Act. The legislation would ban the export of crude oil or liquefied natural gas (LNG) to China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

    Senator King has repeatedly warned against “subsidizing Chinese manufacturing” by exporting natural gas to our adversaries without studying how it could be counterproductive for America’s domestic energy costs.

    “The Protecting American Households from Rising Energy Costs Act would ensure that America provides our nation with its power needs before subsidizing industries in adversarial countries. This is a commonsense approach that will support America’s national defense and help to keep energy costs lower for everyday Americans,” said Senator King.

    In 2021, 1.2 billion cubic feet per day of LNG were exported to China, making it the second largest destination for American LNG at 12.7 percent of exports. Exports to China dropped in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine, but China is locking up long-term LNG contracts from the U.S. for proposed projects. The Protecting American Households From Rising Energy Costs Act would increase American energy security and protect American consumers by ensuring that valuable national resources are not being exported to adversarial nations.

    In addition to King, this legislation is sponsored by Senators Jeff Merkley (D-OR) and Jack Reed (D-RI).

    Senator King has consistently worked to lower energy prices for Maine people. During his first term in Congress, Senator King introduced the Natural Consumer Gas Protection Act, which would have required the Department of Energy (DOE) to consider the effect that any natural gas export proposal would have on domestic prices and employment, regional impacts, and any impact on U.S. industrial competitiveness. Senator King has also worked to support the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program and to support Maine people struggling to heat their homes.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: British High Commission Accra hosts Ambassador for a Day Awards

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    World news story

    British High Commission Accra hosts Ambassador for a Day Awards

    6 young Ghanaian girls have been selected to shadow the High Commissioners of UK, Italy, Barbados and selected female CEOs for a day.

    Winners of the Ambassador for a Day Competition 2025

    The British High Commission is proud to announce winners for the fourth annual Ambassador for a Day (AfD) competition; a flagship initiative dedicated to empowering young women to assume leadership roles, advocate for women’s rights and play an active role in diplomacy. This year’s event is being held in partnership with the Barbados High Commission, the Italian Embassy, the UK-Ghana Chamber of Commerce, Omni Group of Companies, and Cyndex Limited.  

    The Ambassador for a Day (AfD) competition provides winners with an opportunity to spend a day with Female Heads of Missions- and for the first time, Female CEOs, as well as engage in other mentorship activities with them.  

    This year, the six (6) winners who topped the competition were: Fafali Dorgbetor (matched with the British High Commissioner), Emelia Yaabi (matched with the Barbados High Commissioner), Miriam Nasigri (matched with Italian Ambassador), Issahaku Barichisu (matched with the Executive Director of the UK-Ghana Chamber of Commerce), Deborah Jonah (matched with the Group Managing Director of the Omni Group of Companies) and Nafisa Osman (matched with the CEO of Cyndex Limited). They will have the opportunity to act as Ambassadors and Corporate Executives for a Day. They will also receive soft skills training to strengthen their leadership and advocacy skills.   

    The following Heads of Missions and Female corporate CEOs will participate as mentors in the 2025 AfD competition – British High Commissioner, H.E. Harriet Thompson, the Barbados High Commissioner, H.E. Juliette Bynoe-Sutherland, the Italian Ambassador, H.E. Laura Ranalli, Adjoba Kyiamah – Executive Director of the UK-Ghana Chamber of Commerce, Pamela Zormelo – Group Managing Director, Omni Group of Companies, Cynthia Johanna Baffour – Chief Executive Officer of Cyndex Limited. 

    Congratulating the winners at the Awards Ceremony, the British High Commissioner, H.E. Harriet Thompson said:  

    Ghana is charting a new course. The Affirmative Action Act and the historic election of your female Vice-President are powerful indicators of your commitment to gender equality. There is however more to do to achieve the full realisation of the tenets of the Affirmative Action Act and beyond.

    Ambassador for a Day, with its mentorship component, is a powerful platform to build ambition and momentum for future female leaders. It’s not just a matter of fairness; it’s a matter of national development. Investing in women, who make up over half our population, is an investment in Ghana’s future.

    The AfD competition, is part of the British High Commission’s ‘Ghana Gender and Equalities Month initiative;’ an annual campaign which takes place in March – where Ambassadors / High Commissioners and female CEOs unite to inspire and promote the leadership and entrepreneurial potential of selected young women in Ghana, while supporting the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 5) to promote Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, not only as a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. 

    Between March and December all 6 winners will participate in Mentorship Learning and Sharing engagements organised by participating missions and organisations.  

    The winners will serve as Community Based Ambassadors (CBAs), catalysts and champions of change advocating for gender equality and female empowerment within their own communities. 

    The British High Commission partnered with Women’s Right and Youth Organisations such as Power to Girls Foundation, Fulani Youth Association of Ghana (FUYAG), Foundation of Security Development in Africa (FOSDA), Campaign for Female Education (CAMFED), Plan Ghana, Amnesty International, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Purim African Youth Development Platform (PAYDP), Eclectic Love, African Women Leaders Network (Ghana Chapter) and the Affirmative Action Youth Coalition who allowed the girls to participate in this year’s competition.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: SUM presented educational programs for citizens of the EAEU countries at an international session

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    Representatives of the State University of Management spoke at the international expert session “Business and Continuous Education: Strategy for Growth and Sustainable Development in the Kyrgyz Republic”, which was held at the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University named after B.N. Yeltsin, located in Bishkek.

    The event was attended by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Kyrgyz Republic Sergey Vakunov, Head of the Representative Office of Rossotrudnichestvo in the Kyrgyz Republic Albert Zulkharneev, Director of the Center for Public-Private Partnership at the National Investment Agency under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Nurbek Anarbek, as well as representatives of the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and industrial partners of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University named after B.N. Yeltsin.

    The State University of Management was represented at the event by Vice-Rector Dmitry Bryukhanov and Director of the Center for Eurasian Cooperation of the International Cooperation Department Dinara Sadieva.

    The session included several blocks, including a plenary discussion “Business and Continuous Education: New Opportunities in the Context of Sustainable Development” and organizational issues of network cooperation.

    Dmitry Bryukhanov presented the activities of the scientific and educational consortium “Eurasian Network University” (ENU) and made a report on the topic “Experience of the Eurasian Network University in implementing programs of additional professional education in the EAEU space”, dedicated to joint educational programs of the State University of Management within the framework of the ENU activities. During the report, it was emphasized that the implementation of such projects will allow the formation of a new generation of managers in the EAEU space, operating on the basis of specially formed competencies and practical skills in building international economic cooperation.

    It was noted that in 2024, the State University of Management implemented 18 programs of additional professional education for citizens of the EAEU countries in the field of management, marketing and management of specific sectors of the economy. The total number of graduates in these areas of the programs was 324 students.

    The participants of the plenary discussion discussed issues related to the growing role of continuous education and the demands of the labor market for additional education, presented current directions of state policy in the field of additional professional education in the Russian Federation and the Kyrgyz Republic, and also identified trends in the development of business education, corporate and online training.

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 04.04.2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Portsmouth rogue trader sentenced

    Source: City of Portsmouth

    Last Friday (28 March) Bradley Willis-Chambers was sentenced to 24 months suspended for two years, 220 hours of unpaid work, and ten days of rehabilitation activity.

    Willis-Chambers was found guilty at Portsmouth Crown Court in January 2025 of fraudulent trading between 8 April 2022, and 22 February 2023, against four victims to a value of £35,132.48.

    Cllr Lee Hunt, cabinet member for Community Safety, Leisure and Sport at Portsmouth City Council, said:

    “We welcome this conviction.  Justice doesn’t end at sentencing; working with the police and partners Portsmouth City Council will go after rogue traders using the full weight of the law to win justice, gain compensation for victims and fight this form of criminal activity. This sentence reflects the seriousness of the crime and our determination to stamp it out.”

    A financial investigation under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is ongoing, aimed at recovering funds obtained by Willis-Chambers and to compensate the victims of his fraudulent activities. Additionally, Portsmouth City Council is seeking a Criminal Behaviour Order (CBO) to prevent Willis-Chambers from actions that could expose consumers to further risk. The terms of the CBO are yet to be finalised.

    If you or someone you know has been a victim of a rogue trader incident, we urge you to report it to The Citizens Advice Consumer Service at 08082231133 and Action Fraud at 0300 123 2040.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: Faced with new tariffs and a truculent Trump, Japan and South Korea toe a cautious line

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Sebastian Maslow, Associate Professor, International Relations, University of Tokyo

    Two months into US President Donald Trump’s second term, the liberal international order is on life support.

    Alliances and multilateral institutions are now seen by the United States as burdens. Europe and NATO are framed as bad business, “ripping off” the US. On his so-called “Liberation Day”, Trump also imposed 20% tariffs on all European Union imports.

    The Trump administration has been far less critical of the US’ alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. On a visit to Tokyo this week, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth described Japan as America’s “indispensable partner” in deterring Chinese aggression.

    Yet, Japan and South Korea fared even worse than the EU with Trump’s new tariffs. Trump slapped Japan with 24% tariffs and South Korea 25%. (Both countries enjoy a trade surplus with the US.)

    So, how are the US’ two main allies in the Indo-Pacific dealing with the mercurial US leader? Will they follow Europe’s lead in reassessing their own security relationships with the US?

    Japan: a positive summit but concerns remain

    America’s post-war security strategy in Asia differs from Europe. While NATO was built on the premise of collective defence among its members, the US adopted a “hub-and-spokes” model in Asia, relying on bilateral alliances to contain the spread of communism.

    Japan and South Korea have long sheltered under the US nuclear umbrella and hosted major US military bases. Both are also highly sensitive to changes in the US’ Indo-Pacific policies.

    Japan, in particular, has a long history of careful alliance management with the US, epitomised by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s courting of Trump.

    During Trump’s first term in office, Abe’s policy goals aligned closely with the US: transforming Japan’s security posture to make it a serious military and diplomatic power. Japan increased military spending, lifted arms export restrictions and deepened ties with India and Australia.

    Prime Minister Fumio Kishida continued to raise Japan’s security profile from 2021-24, again increasing military spending and taking a tough line on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He emphasised “Europe today could be Asia tomorrow”.

    His successor, Shigeru Ishiba, had a successful summit with Trump in February, immediately after his inauguration. The joint statement reaffirmed US security guarantees to Japan, including over the Senkaku Islands, which are claimed by China.

    Japan also agreed to import American liquefied natural gas, and later committed to working with South Korea to develop a US$44 billion (A$70 billion) plan to export LNG from Alaska.

    However, these positive developments do not mean the relationship is on firm ground.

    In early March, Trump complained the US-Japan security agreement signed in 1960 was “one-sided” and a top administration official again called for Japan to increase its defence spending to 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) – a huge increase for a country facing serious demographic and fiscal pressures.

    Reports also emerged the US was considering cancelling a new joint headquarters in Japan aimed at deeper integration between US and Japanese forces.

    South Korea: extremely vulnerable on trade

    South Korea faces similar pressures. Ties between the two countries were strained during Trump’s first term over his demand South Korea increase the amount it pays to host US forces by
    nearly 400%. A 2021 agreement restored some stability, but left Seoul deeply worried about the future of the alliance.

    South Korea’s acting president, Choi Sang-mok, has expressed a desire to strengthen ties with the US, though Trump has reportedly been cool to his advances.

    With a US$66 billion (A$105 billion) trade surplus with the US, South Korea is considered the country most vulnerable to trade risk with the Trump administration, according to a Swiss research group.

    Trump’s past suggestions that both South Korea and Japan develop nuclear weapons or pay for US nuclear protection has also rattled some nerves. As confidence in the US alliance erodes, both countries are engaging in an urgent public debate about the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons.

    Tensions moving forward

    Potential for conflict is on the horizon. For example, Tokyo and Washington are set to renegotiate the deal that dictates how much Japan pays to host US troops next year.

    Both allies pay huge sums to host US bases. South Korea will pay US$1.14 billion (A$1.8 billion) in 2026, and Japan pays US$1.72 billion (A$2.7 billion) annually.

    A trade war could also prompt a reassessment of the costs of US efforts to decouple from China, potentially leading to closer economic ties between Japan, South Korea and China. The three countries have agreed to accelerate talks on a trilateral free trade agreement, which had been on hold since 2019.

    Another challenge is semiconductors. Japan’s new semiconductor revitalisation strategy is prioritising domestic investment, raising questions about whether Trump will tolerate “friendshoring” if Japan diverts investments from the US.

    In 2024, Japan outspent the US in semiconductor subsidies (as a share of GDP), while Taiwan’s TSMC, the world’s largest contract chipmaker, expanded its production capacity in Japan.

    Seoul remains an important partner to Washington on semiconductors. Samsung and SK Hynix are both boosting their investments on new semiconductor plants in the US. However, there is now uncertainty over the subsidies promised to both companies to invest in America under the CHIPS Act.

    Ultimately, the strength of these alliances depends on whether the Trump administration views them as long-term bulwarks against China’s rise in the region, or merely vassals that can be extorted for financial gain.

    If the US is serious about countering China, its regional alliances are key. This would give Japan and South Korea some degree of leverage – or, in Trump terms, they’ll hold valuable cards. Whether they get to play them, however, depends on what Trump’s China policy turns out to be.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Faced with new tariffs and a truculent Trump, Japan and South Korea toe a cautious line – https://theconversation.com/faced-with-new-tariffs-and-a-truculent-trump-japan-and-south-korea-toe-a-cautious-line-244172

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Louise Smyth CBE ends presidency of global business registry network

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Louise Smyth CBE ends presidency of global business registry network

    The Chief Executive of Companies House is stepping down as president of the Corporate Registers Forum.

    Louise Smyth CBE, Chief Executive of Companies House and Registrar of Companies for England and Wales will be stepping down from her role as president of the Corporate Registers Forum (CRF) after a 4 year tenure.

    The CRF’s most recent event in Malta, which took place from 25 to 27 March 2025, marks Louise’s last appearance as president ahead of her retirement in summer 2025.

    The CRF is a leading international association of business registries from more than 60 nations across the world. Members meet regularly to share ideas, examples of best practice and benchmark performance.

    Over Louise’s tenure as CRF president, the association has seen considerable transformation under her leadership. Notably, the publication of the 2023 constitution enshrined gender and regional diversity in CRF board membership. This constitution created specific board seats for registries in Africa and Middle East, the Americas, Europe, and Asia and the Pacific, to ensure the globe is equitably represented.

    Louise Smyth said:

    It has been a privilege serving two terms as the elected president of the Corporate Registers Forum (CRF). I am extremely proud of the work that has been done over the past few years to promote the diversification and professionalisation of the CRF.

    As well as helping to continually drive international standards, I look forward to seeing the continued progress the association makes in supporting global business growth as my tenure reaches its close and a new chapter begins.

    At the hybrid meeting of the CRF’s global working group on beneficial ownership in Malta, Louise announced an innovation for the CRF, widening its membership base beyond corporate registries for the very first time. The new class of ‘associate membership’ will allow noncommercial bodies including international financial institutions to join the association. This will make sure the conversation between members is broader and more transparent in the global fight against financial crime.

    Geraldine Spiteri Lucus, Registrar of the Malta Business Registry, said:

    Louise Smyth fostered an environment of open dialogue, inspiring proactive engagement and a strong commitment to international collaboration.

    Her dedication ensured productive and insightful conferences, where diverse perspectives were valued and impactful discussions thrived.

    Datuk Nor Azimah Abdul Aziz, Chief Executive Officer of the Companies Commission of Malaysia, said:

    Louise leaves behind an indelible mark on the CRF.

    Through her leadership and dedication, she has advanced initiatives and strengthened collaboration in corporate registries through numerous working groups, inspiring the overall CRF community.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Matthew Campbell Joins CPSC as Agency’s General Counsel

    Source: US Consumer Product Safety Commission

    Release Date: March 12, 2025

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) today announced that Matthew Campbell has joined the agency as its new General Counsel.
    Campbell is an experienced litigator and most recently served in the Office of the General Counsel at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).  In that role, he represented the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in a number of administrative law challenges under the Administrative Procedures Act.  
    Prior to his government service, Campbell was a partner at the law firm of Winston & Strawn LLP where he co-chaired the firm’s product liability and mass tort practice.  There, he focused on products liability and other complex commercial litigation matters and developed deep knowledge of various legal and regulatory issues affecting product safety.
    “Matt brings more than two decades of experience in complex commercial litigation to CPSC,” said CPSC’s Acting Chairman Peter Feldman. “The agency, and the American consumers we are charged to protect, will benefit greatly from Matt’s leadership. I thank him for his willingness to serve.” 
    Campbell holds a bachelor’s degree from the College of William and Mary and a Juris Doctor from the University of Pennsylvania Law School.

    Release Number
    25-185

    About the U.S. CPSCThe U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is charged with protecting the public from unreasonable risk of injury associated with the use of thousands of types of consumer products. Deaths, injuries, and property damage from consumer product-related incidents cost the nation more than $1 trillion annually. Since the CPSC was established more than 50 years ago, it has worked to ensure the safety of consumer products, which has contributed to a decline in injuries associated with these products. 
    Federal law prohibits any person from selling products subject to a Commission ordered recall or a voluntary recall undertaken in consultation with the CPSC.
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    MIL OSI USA News