Category: coronavirus

  • MIL-OSI China: US withdrawal from WHO would be ‘catastrophic’

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Photo taken on Jan. 30, 2023 shows the World Health Organization (WHO) headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Donald Trump’s transition team is pushing to pull the United States out of the World Health Organization (WHO) on the first day of the new administration, according to experts who warn of the “catastrophic” impact it would have on global health, the Financial Times (FT) reported on Sunday.

    Members of Trump’s team told the experts of their intention to announce a withdrawal from the global health body on the president-elect’s January 20 inauguration, the FT said, noting that the departure would remove the WHO’s biggest source of funds, damaging its ability to respond to public health crises such as the coronavirus pandemic.

    U.S.’s plan to withdraw “on day one” would be “catastrophic” for global health, the FT quoted Lawrence Gostin, professor of global health at Georgetown Law, as saying.

    Gostin said there would be “very lean years for the WHO where it will struggle to respond to health emergencies and will have to reduce its scientific staff considerably.”

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Eight-year ban for former footballer who ran London sports academy

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Kieron Minto-St.Aimie received a director’s disqualification for claiming a £25,000 Covid loan his company was not entitled to.

    • Kieron Minto-St.Aimie is a former professional footballer who went on to run a sports academy in Brent. 
    • His company received the £25,000 Covid Bounce Back Loan after he overstated its turnover. 
    • He was disqualified as a company director for eight years at London’s Royal Courts of Justice.  

    A former professional footballer has been banned from being a company director for eight years.  

    Kieron Minto-St.Aimie claimed a £25,000 Covid Bounce Back Loan for the St Aimie’s Sports Academy Community Interest Company in Brent, when it was entitled to much less. 

    Elizabeth Pigney, Chief Investigator at the Insolvency Service, said: “Kieron Minto-St.Aimie successfully applied for a Covid Bounce Back loan by overstating his company’s turnover. 

    His eight-year disqualification should serve as a warning to others that the justice system will not allow business owners to make false declarations to obtain funds that were so crucially needed by other small and medium-sized businesses during the pandemic.

    The former footballer, aged 35, of Pound Lane in London, began his career at Queens Park Rangers before spells at clubs including Oxford United and Barnet. 

    He opened St.Aimie’s Sports Academy, on Harlesden Road in Brent, as its sole director in 2016.  

    Before its closure in January 2023, the academy was known in the local community for providing football coaching and mentoring to children and young people.  

    In May 2020, Minto-St.Aimie applied for a Covid Bounce Back loan of £25,000.  

    However, in order to obtain the £25,000 he overstated the company’s turnover by £60,000 as it should have only been entitled to around £10,000 under the scheme based on its actual turnover.  

    On 6 December 2024, the judge at London’s Royal Courts of Justice disqualified Minto-St.Aimie as a company director for eight years.

    Further information 

    Updates to this page

    Published 23 December 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI: Himax to Unveil State-of-the-Art WiseEye Module Solutions at CES 2025 Empowering Seamless AIoT Integration

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TAINAN, Taiwan, Dec. 23, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Himax Technologies, Inc. (“Himax” or “Company”) (Nasdaq: HIMX), an industry leader in fabless display driver ICs and other semiconductors, today announced that the Company and its AI ecosystem partners will unveil a suite of innovative, production-ready AIoT applications at CES 2025, powered by Himax’s groundbreaking ultralow power WiseEye Module solutions. These designs will showcase intuitive, user-friendly AI capabilities set to transform multiple industries by improving productivity, scalability, automation, and efficiency, all while delivering better performance and lower power consumption. Himax’s ultralow power WiseEye Module solutions are leading the AIoT revolution with their advanced, efficient, and scalable AI-driven technologies.

    The Himax WiseEye Module seamlessly integrates ultralow power WiseEye AI processors and proprietary always-on CMOS sensors, designed with compact form factors, high integration, and plug-and-play functionality. Characterized by remarkably low power consumption at just single-digit milliwatts, it is ideal for battery-powered endpoint devices that cater to everyday life. The WiseEye Module incorporates versatile AI models from in-house or third-party partners, enabling no-code/low-code AI development for use cases like people counting, gesture recognition, human detection, face recognition, and audio command classification. This simplifies the AI development process, reducing cost and time, allowing AI developers, even those with limited AI expertise, to easily integrate advanced AI features into their systems and applications. Given their versatility, WiseEye Modules are poised to become foundational technology for a wide range of IoT applications.

    At the event, a visionary and innovative lineup of ultralow power WiseEye Module solutions will be on display, showcasing their potential to revolutionize AI-powered applications across industries.

    • WiseEye PalmVein Module: Offers secure, reliable contactless biometric authentication by utilizing unique vein patterns, ensuring robust security and privacy through on-device inferencing
    • AI Baby Cry Detection Module: Accurately detects infant and child crying even in noisy environments, enhancing child safety and enabling timely, automated caregiving
    • Dynamic Gesture Module: Enables intuitive human-machine interaction, supporting a wide range of static and dynamic gestures for seamless control, enhancing accessibility and convenience without the need for traditional input methods
    • Human Sensing Module: Provides precise and energy-efficient human presence detection, creating more responsive and convenient environments in smart homes and offices
    • People Flow Management Solution: Improves space optimization and operational efficiency by analyzing human movement patterns, enabling better resource planning and allocation

    More compelling joint demonstrations with ecosystem partners will also be showcased at the event, including the world-first AI agent SenseCAP Watcher developed with Seeed Studio, mixed reality eye-tracking solutions with Ganzin, and AI-enabled thermal sensing modules in collaboration with leading thermal sensor partners, among others.

    “Our WiseEye™ Modules are designed to drive innovation and enhance lives through advanced, seamless AI integration, all while consuming ultralow power,” said Mark Chen, Vice President of Smart Sensing Business at Himax. “At Himax, we are dedicated to advancing the future of AI vision with innovative, ultralow power, easy-to-adopt AI solutions, enabling seamless integration of advanced vision AI into diverse IoT applications that power the next generation of intelligent, connected devices, enhancing everyday life,” concluded Mark.

    Himax invites all interested parties to stop by our exhibition booth at The Venetian Las Vegas Hotel (3355 Las Vegas Boulevard S, Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A.) Venetian Tower Suite 34-208 to experience the Company and partners’ cutting-edge WiseEye Module solutions. To schedule a meeting or booth tour, please contact Himax at: Himax_CES2025@himax.com.tw.

    About Himax Technologies, Inc.

    Himax Technologies, Inc. (NASDAQ: HIMX) is a leading global fabless semiconductor solution provider dedicated to display imaging processing technologies. The Company’s display driver ICs and timing controllers have been adopted at scale across multiple industries worldwide including TVs, PC monitors, laptops, mobile phones, tablets, automotive, ePaper devices, industrial displays, among others. As the global market share leader in automotive display technology, the Company offers innovative and comprehensive automotive IC solutions, including traditional driver ICs, advanced in-cell Touch and Display Driver Integration (TDDI), local dimming timing controllers (Local Dimming Tcon), Large Touch and Display Driver Integration (LTDI) and OLED display technologies. Himax is also a pioneer in tinyML visual-AI and optical technology related fields. The Company’s industry-leading WiseEyeTM Ultralow Power AI Sensing technology which incorporates Himax proprietary ultralow power AI processor, always-on CMOS image sensor, and CNN-based AI algorithm has been widely deployed in consumer electronics and AIoT related applications. Himax optics technologies, such as diffractive wafer level optics, LCoS microdisplays and 3D sensing solutions, are critical for facilitating emerging AR/VR/metaverse technologies. Additionally, Himax designs and provides touch controllers, OLED ICs, LED ICs, EPD ICs, power management ICs, and CMOS image sensors for diverse display application coverage. Founded in 2001 and headquartered in Tainan, Taiwan, Himax currently employs around 2,200 people from three Taiwan-based offices in Tainan, Hsinchu and Taipei and country offices in China, Korea, Japan, Germany, and the US. Himax has 2,683 patents granted and 390 patents pending approval worldwide as of September 30, 2024.

    http://www.himax.com.tw

    Forward Looking Statements

    Factors that could cause actual events or results to differ materially from those described in this conference call include, but are not limited to, the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Company’s business; general business and economic conditions and the state of the semiconductor industry; market acceptance and competitiveness of the driver and non-driver products developed by the Company; demand for end-use applications products; reliance on a small group of principal customers; the uncertainty of continued success in technological innovations; our ability to develop and protect our intellectual property; pricing pressures including declines in average selling prices; changes in customer order patterns; changes in estimated full-year effective tax rate; shortage in supply of key components; changes in environmental laws and regulations; changes in export license regulated by Export Administration Regulations (EAR); exchange rate fluctuations; regulatory approvals for further investments in our subsidiaries; our ability to collect accounts receivable and manage inventory and other risks described from time to time in the Company’s SEC filings, including those risks identified in the section entitled “Risk Factors” in its Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2023 filed with the SEC, as may be amended.

    Company Contacts:

    Eric Li, Chief IR/PR Officer
    Himax Technologies, Inc.
    Tel: +886-6-505-0880
    Fax: +886-2-2314-0877
    Email: hx_ir@himax.com.tw
    www.himax.com.tw

    Karen Tiao, Investor Relations
    Himax Technologies, Inc.
    Tel: +886-2-2370-3999
    Fax: +886-2-2314-0877
    Email: hx_ir@himax.com.tw
    www.himax.com.tw

    Mark Schwalenberg, Director
    Investor Relations – US Representative
    MZ North America
    Tel: +1-312-261-6430
    Email: HIMX@mzgroup.us
    www.mzgroup.us

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Health, medical research supported

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    The Health Bureau today said the Government provides comprehensive and dedicated support for health and medical research projects, research infrastructure and research capacity building in Hong Kong through setting up the Health & Medical Research Fund (HMRF).

    Making the statement in regard to some recent media reports on the Government’s funding support for infectious diseases-related research, the bureau emphasised that the Government has all along been highly supportive of the local health and medical sector to conduct health and medical research, including those related to infectious diseases.

    The bureau noted that funding commitment to the HMRF, established in 2011, has been increased repeatedly and the approved amount has increased to $4.22 billion to support Government-commissioned programmes and investigator-initiated projects. Among them, those related to infectious diseases research amount to $1.2 billion.

    Such projects involved six commissioned programmes on infectious diseases with approved funding of $792 million, covering COVID-19, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), influenza, avian flu, swine flu and other respiratory infectious diseases, human papilloma virus and anti-microbial resistance research.

    The above-mentioned commissioned programmes include a total of $556 million since April 2020 to support 105 individual COVID-19 related research studies from bench to bedside and at the community level through application of new technologies.

    These studies provide new evidence to support the Government to promptly tackle the COVID-19 epidemic by formulating health policies, identifying the transmission chains, implementing control measures, improving clinical management as well as developing and promoting the vaccination programme.

    One of the research projects successfully developed the sewage testing approach for quantitative detection of SARS-CoV-2, providing an important indicator for the Government to keep track of virus activity in the community during the COVID-19 epidemic.

    For investigator-initiated projects, infectious disease has always been one of the thematic priorities. As of end September 2024, a total of about 400 research studies have been funded amounting to $424 million.

    Such studies covered the prevention, detection, diagnosis and management of various infectious diseases, such as the hepatitis virus, tuberculosis, AIDS, and those related to preparedness and response to a pandemic and epidemic.

    The Government encourages researchers to continue to leverage the HMRF to amplify the value of their research projects into full play and usher in considerable and sustainable positive impacts on health policy making and implementation with their research outcomes and to unleash new quality productive forces.

    On combating infectious diseases, the Government will continue to support the health and medical sector in conducting related research in order to enhance the capacity in surveillance, early detection, prevention and control.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rapid Health Agrees to Pay $8.2M for Allegedly Billing Medicare for Over-the-Counter COVID-19 Tests That Were Not Provided to Beneficiaries

    Source: US State of California

    Covid Test DMV LLC, doing business as Rapid Health (Rapid Health), a pharmacy located in Los Angeles, has agreed to pay the United States $8,242,860 to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by knowingly submitting or causing the submission of false claims to Medicare for over-the-counter (OTC) Covid-19 tests that were not provided to Medicare beneficiaries.

    Between April 2022 and May 2023, Rapid Health distributed OTC Covid-19 tests in connection with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) OTC Covid-19 Test Demonstration Project (Demonstration Project). During the Demonstration Project, Medicare Part B beneficiaries could request OTC Covid-19 tests from participating providers, and CMS would reimburse those providers for up to eight OTC Covid-19 tests per Medicare Part B beneficiary per month at a fixed rate of $12 per test.

    The settlement announced today resolves allegations that Rapid Health knowingly submitted or caused the submission of claims to Medicare for OTC Covid-19 tests that Rapid Health never provided to Medicare beneficiaries. Medicare patients could order OTC Covid-19 tests from Rapid Health during the Demonstration Project through Rapid Health’s website. When Rapid Health received an order, it was supposed to process the order, generate a shipping label, and send the OTC Covid-19 test to the beneficiary. The United States alleged that issues with Rapid Health’s processing procedures caused Rapid Health to bill orders to Medicare without shipping the test to the beneficiary, and that although Rapid Health was aware of these issues it nevertheless continued to bill Medicare for tests that were not shipped.

    “The Demonstration Project was designed to increase the availability of OTC Covid-19 tests to Medicare beneficiaries in an unprecedented time of need,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian M. Boynton, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “Providers that knowingly billed for tests that were never given to patients failed to support the goals of the project and defrauded the American taxpayers.”

    “This outcome serves as a reminder of our unwavering commitment to combat health care fraud and investigate those who allegedly attempt to exploit and defraud Medicare and other federally funded health care programs,” said Special Agent in Charge Maureen Dixon of the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG). “With our local, state and federal partners, HHS-OIG will continue to work aggressively to ensure the dependability and the integrity of the Medicare program.”

    The resolution obtained in this matter was the result of a coordinated effort between the Justice Department’s Civil Division, Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section, and HHS-OIG.

    Trial Attorney Lindsay DeFrancesco of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section handled the matter.

    On May 17, 2021, the Attorney General established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Justice Department in partnership with agencies across the federal government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The task force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international actors committing civil and criminal fraud and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the department’s response to the pandemic, please visit www.justice.gov/coronavirus.

    Tips and complaints from all sources about potential fraud affecting COVID-19 government relief programs can be reported by visiting the webpage of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section, which can be found here. Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can also report it by calling the Justice Department’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    The claims resolved by the settlement are allegations only. There has been no determination of liability.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Rapid Health Agrees to Pay $8.2M for Allegedly Billing Medicare for Over-the-Counter COVID-19 Tests That Were Not Provided to Beneficiaries

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Covid Test DMV LLC, doing business as Rapid Health (Rapid Health), a pharmacy located in Los Angeles, has agreed to pay the United States $8,242,860 to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by knowingly submitting or causing the submission of false claims to Medicare for over-the-counter (OTC) Covid-19 tests that were not provided to Medicare beneficiaries.

    Between April 2022 and May 2023, Rapid Health distributed OTC Covid-19 tests in connection with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) OTC Covid-19 Test Demonstration Project (Demonstration Project). During the Demonstration Project, Medicare Part B beneficiaries could request OTC Covid-19 tests from participating providers, and CMS would reimburse those providers for up to eight OTC Covid-19 tests per Medicare Part B beneficiary per month at a fixed rate of $12 per test.

    The settlement announced today resolves allegations that Rapid Health knowingly submitted or caused the submission of claims to Medicare for OTC Covid-19 tests that Rapid Health never provided to Medicare beneficiaries. Medicare patients could order OTC Covid-19 tests from Rapid Health during the Demonstration Project through Rapid Health’s website. When Rapid Health received an order, it was supposed to process the order, generate a shipping label, and send the OTC Covid-19 test to the beneficiary. The United States alleged that issues with Rapid Health’s processing procedures caused Rapid Health to bill orders to Medicare without shipping the test to the beneficiary, and that although Rapid Health was aware of these issues it nevertheless continued to bill Medicare for tests that were not shipped.

    “The Demonstration Project was designed to increase the availability of OTC Covid-19 tests to Medicare beneficiaries in an unprecedented time of need,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian M. Boynton, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “Providers that knowingly billed for tests that were never given to patients failed to support the goals of the project and defrauded the American taxpayers.”

    “This outcome serves as a reminder of our unwavering commitment to combat health care fraud and investigate those who allegedly attempt to exploit and defraud Medicare and other federally funded health care programs,” said Special Agent in Charge Maureen Dixon of the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG). “With our local, state and federal partners, HHS-OIG will continue to work aggressively to ensure the dependability and the integrity of the Medicare program.”

    The resolution obtained in this matter was the result of a coordinated effort between the Justice Department’s Civil Division, Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section, and HHS-OIG.

    Trial Attorney Lindsay DeFrancesco of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section handled the matter.

    On May 17, 2021, the Attorney General established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Justice Department in partnership with agencies across the federal government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The task force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international actors committing civil and criminal fraud and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the department’s response to the pandemic, please visit www.justice.gov/coronavirus.

    Tips and complaints from all sources about potential fraud affecting COVID-19 government relief programs can be reported by visiting the webpage of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section, which can be found here. Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can also report it by calling the Justice Department’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    The claims resolved by the settlement are allegations only. There has been no determination of liability.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Two Maryland Men Indicted For Unemployment Insurance Fraud Scheme Of More Than $1,000,000

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Defendants Allegedly Committed Aggravated Identity Theft by Using Identities of Victims in Connection with a Scheme to Wrongfully Obtain More than $1,000,000 in Unemployment Insurance Benefits

    Baltimore, Maryland – A federal grand jury has returned an indictment charging two Maryland men on federal charges related to a scheme to fraudulently obtain more than $1 million in unemployment insurance benefits. On February 1, 2024, a grand jury returned a sealed indictment of Daiwor Woah-Tee, age 51, of Belcamp, Maryland, and Dekwii Woah-Tee, age 46, of Rosedale, Maryland with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and one count of aggravated identity theft, respectively, relating to a scheme to obtain more than $1,000,000 in unemployment insurance benefits. The indictment was unsealed upon the arrest of the defendants. 

    The defendants had an initial appearance on December 18, 2024, in the U.S. District Court in Baltimore before U.S. Magistrate Judge Charles Austin.

    The indictment was announced by Erek L. Barron, U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland, Special Agent in Charge Troy W. Springer of the Department of Labor Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations for the National Capital Region (DOL-OIG), and Inspector General Dr. Joseph V. Cuffari, Department Homeland Security – Office of Inspector General (DHS-OIG).

    As detailed in the indictment, unemployment insurance (“UI”) was a joint state and federal program that provided monetary benefits to eligible beneficiaries. UI payments were intended to provide temporary financial assistance to lawful workers who were unemployed through no fault of their own. Beginning in or around March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, several federal programs expanded UI eligibility and increased UI benefits, including the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance Program (PUA), Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC), and the Lost Wages Assistance Program (LWAP).

    In Maryland, those seeking UI benefits submitted online applications. Applicants had to answer specific questions to establish eligibility to receive UI benefits, including their name, Social Security Number (SSN), and mailing address, among other things.  Applicants also had to self-certify that they met a COVID-19-related reason for being unemployed, partially employed, or unable to work.  Maryland Department of Labor (MD-DOL) relied upon the information in the application to determine UI benefits eligibility. Once an application was approved, the MD-DOL typically distributed state and federal UI benefits electronically to a debit card, which claimants could use to withdraw funds and/or make purchases. 

    As alleged in the indictment, from March 2020 to September 2021, the defendants conspired to commit wire fraud defrauding State Workforce Agencies (SWA), including the MD-DOL, by impersonating victim individuals for the purpose of submitting fraudulent claims for unemployment insurance.  The defendants used victim personal identifying information (PII), including name, date of birth, and/or SSN submit applications for UI benefits.  The UI benefits obtained through the scheme was more than $1,000,000.

    If convicted, the defendants face a maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison for wire fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft carries a mandatory minimum sentence of two years in prison  that runs consecutive to any other sentence.  Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors. 

    An indictment is not a finding of guilt.  An individual charged by indictment is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty at some later criminal proceedings. 

    The District of Maryland Strike Force is one of five strike forces established throughout the United States by the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute COVID-19 fraud, including fraud relating to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act.  The CARES Act was designed to provide emergency financial assistance to Americans suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  The strike forces focus on large-scale, multi-state pandemic relief fraud perpetrated by criminal organizations and transnational actors.  The strike forces are interagency law enforcement efforts, using prosecutor-led and data analyst-driven teams designed to identify and bring to justice those who stole pandemic relief funds.  

    For more information on the Department’s response to the pandemic, please visit https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus.  Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at: https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    U.S. Attorney Barron commended the DOL-OIG, DHS-OIG, and IRS-CI for its work in the investigation.  Mr. Barron thanked Assistant U.S. Attorney John D’Amico and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Jared W. Murphy, who are prosecuting the federal case. 

    For more information on the Maryland U.S. Attorney’s Office, its priorities, and resources available to help the community, please visit www.justice.gov/usao-md and https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/community-outreach.

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    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former CEO of IT Company Charged with Wire Fraud, Money Laundering, and Bankruptcy Fraud in Connection with Various Fraudulent Schemes

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    BIRMINGHAM, Ala. – The former CEO of a Birmingham IT company has been charged with wire fraud, money laundering, and bankruptcy fraud in connection with schemes to defraud his customers and a Covid-19 program, announced U.S. Attorney Prim F. Escalona and U.S. Secret Service Special Agent in Charge Patrick Davis.

    A nineteen-count indictment filed in United States District Court charges Thomas Aaron Kane, 44, with twelve counts of wire fraud related to a scheme to defraud customers, five counts of wire fraud related to a scheme to commit Covid-19 program fraud, one count of money laundering, and one count of bankruptcy fraud. 

    According to the indictment, Kane was the owner and CEO of Keep Information Technology Simple, LLC and later Keepitsimple.us LLC, both of which provided IT services and support for businesses, particularly businesses in the healthcare industry. The indictment brings four different types of charges against Kane. First, the indictment alleges that between at least July 2017 and December 2021, Kane devised a scheme to defraud his customers. Kane’s customers would place a credit card or banking information on file to pay for a monthly service fee and any authorized expenses. However, Kane began using his customer’s credit cards and banking information to make unauthorized charges. When confronted about these charges, Kane would make up an excuse—such as claiming that there had been an accounting error. Kane would also often create false invoices that he would send to a customer. The indictment lists twelve different examples of these unauthorized charges.

    Second, the indictment alleges that between April 2020 and May 2021, Kane engaged in a scheme to receive unauthorized funds under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) from the Small Business Administration. Kane made false representations to obtain three PPP loans totaling more than $625,000 . Additionally, Kane attempted to receive two more PPP loans in the name of his second business, Keepitsimple.us, totaling more than $450,000. Kane made additional false representations in support of these two loan applications and submitted false tax documents with his applications to try and get them approved.

    Third, the indictment charges Kane with money laundering based on an unlawful monetary transaction exceeding $10,000. More specifically, Kane used $150,000 in PPP funds to repay a prior victim of his unauthorized-charges scheme.

    Fourth, the indictment alleges that Kane committed bankruptcy fraud when he withdrew a cashier’s check in the amount of $20,941.66 from a Keepitsimple.us bank account and deposited these funds into a personal bank account, even though these funds constituted property of the Keepitsimple.us bankruptcy estate and were funds that he was not allowed to use.

    The maximum penalty for wire fraud is twenty years in prison. The maximum penalty for money laundering is ten years in prison. The maximum penalty for bankruptcy fraud is five years in prison.

    The United States Secret Service investigated the case with assistance from the Trussville Police Department. Assistant United States Attorney Ryan S. Rummage is prosecuting the case.

    An indictment contains only charges. A defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: United States Joins Lawsuit Against Former Executives of Kabbage Inc. Alleging False Claims Act Violations in Connection with Paycheck Protection Program Lending

    Source: US State of California

    The United States has intervened and filed a complaint against Robert Frohwein, Kathryn Petralia and Spencer Robinson, three former executives of Kabbage Inc., a now-bankrupt financial technology company. The United States alleges that they violated the False Claims Act by submitting and causing the submission of false claims for loan forgiveness, loan guarantees and processing fees to the Small Business Administration (SBA) in connection with Kabbage’s participation in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP).

    “The PPP was intended to provide critical assistance to eligible businesses during the economic uncertainty caused by the pandemic,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian M. Boynton, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “The department is committed to ensuring that PPP lenders — including their executives — are held accountable for contributing to the misuse of PPP funds by knowingly failing to comply with applicable program requirements, including approving PPP loans in inflated amounts and to ineligible borrowers.”

    Congress created the PPP in March 2020, as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act, to provide federally guaranteed loans to small businesses suffering economic hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The SBA administered the PPP. The CARES Act authorized private lenders to approve PPP loans for eligible borrowers who could later seek forgiveness of the loans so long as they used loan funds on employee payroll and other eligible expenses. Among other things, participating PPP lenders were required to confirm borrowers’ average monthly payroll costs by reviewing the payroll documentation submitted with the borrower’s application. Lenders were also required to follow applicable Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering requirements to help combat fraud. Any unforgiven or defaulted PPP loans made by lenders were guaranteed by the SBA, so long as the lenders adhered to PPP requirements. Lenders who originated PPP loans were paid a fixed fee calculated as a percentage of the loan amount by the SBA.

    According to the government’s complaint, Frohwein and Petralia co-founded Kabbage in 2008 and served as the company’s chief executive officer and president, respectively, while Robinson formerly served as the company’s head of strategy. Kabbage was approved as a PPP lender in 2020 and approved more than $7 billion in PPP loans that year for which the company was paid more than $217 million in processing fees after certifying that it had complied with all applicable lending requirements.

    The complaint alleges that, between April and October 2020, the defendants knowingly submitted or caused the submission of false claims for loan guarantees, loan forgiveness and processing fees relating to tens of thousands of PPP loans that were systemically inflated due to calculation errors by Kabbage. These errors allegedly included Kabbage’s double-counting of state and local taxes paid by employees and the failure to exclude annual compensation in excess of $100,000 per employee from its calculation of payroll costs. Additionally, the lawsuit alleges that the defendants knowingly submitted or caused the submission of false claims for processing fees related to tens of thousands of PPP loans where Kabbage failed to implement appropriate fraud controls. The government’s complaint alleges that the defendants ignored these violations to maximize PPP processing fees before selling off the majority of Kabbage’s assets in October 2020.

    Kabbage Inc., which is now winding down its operations as KServicing Wind Down Corp. after filing for bankruptcy in the wake of the 2020 asset sale, previously agreed to resolve allegations relating to its role in the submission of false claims to the SBA. As part of that settlement, the United States received a general unsecured claim in the bankruptcy proceeding of up to $120 million, and the company received a credit for $12.5 million that Kabbage returned to SBA during the department’s investigation.

    “The PPP was a light providing hope to businesses in the midst of the shadow of a global pandemic,” said U.S. Attorney Damien M. Diggs for the Eastern District of Texas. “Unfortunately, some unscrupulous lenders and executives took advantage of that situation by lining their pockets with ill-gotten incentive payments from processing PPP loans despite not performing even the most cursory fraud checks or reviews of borrower documentation. Individuals who shirked their responsibilities at the expense of the public fisc must be held accountable. This lawsuit against Kabbage’s former executives demonstrates our firm commitment to holding all parties responsible for their part in causing the submission of false claims to the PPP.”

    “SBA’s lending partners have a responsibility to ensure only eligible borrowers gain access to SBA’s programs,” said Special Agent in Charge Brady Ipock of the SBA Office of Inspector General (SBA OIG)’s Central Region. “SBA OIG stands ready to support the Justice Department in rooting out greed and wrongful actions. I want to thank the U.S. Attorney’s Office and our law enforcement partners for their support and dedication to pursuing justice in this case.”

    The lawsuit was originally filed under the qui tam or whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act by Paul Pietschner, a former analyst in Kabbage’s collections department. The FCA permits private parties to file suit on behalf of the United States for false claims and to share in any recovery. The FCA also permits the United States to intervene in such an action, as it has done in this case. A defendant who violates the act is subject to liability for three times the government’s losses, plus applicable penalties. 

    On May 17, 2021, Attorney General Merrick B. Garland established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Justice Department in partnership with agencies across the federal government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The Task Force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international actors committing civil and criminal fraud and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the department’s response to the pandemic, please visit www.justice.gov/coronavirus.

    Tips and complaints from all sources about potential fraud affecting COVID-19 government relief programs can be reported by visiting the webpage of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section, which can be found here. Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can also report it by calling the Justice Department’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    Trial Attorney Sarah E. Loucks of the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Betty Young for the Eastern District of Texas are handling the matter, with assistance provided by the SBA’s Office of General Counsel and Office of the Inspector General.

    The case is captioned United States ex rel. Pietschner v. Kabbage, Inc., et al., No. 4:21-cv-110-SDJ (EDTX).

    The claims asserted by the United States are allegations only. There has been no determination of liability.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: United States Joins Lawsuit Against Former Executives of Kabbage Inc. Alleging False Claims Act Violations in Connection with Paycheck Protection Program Lending

    Source: United States Attorneys General 7

    The United States has intervened and filed a complaint against Robert Frohwein, Kathryn Petralia and Spencer Robinson, three former executives of Kabbage Inc., a now-bankrupt financial technology company. The United States alleges that they violated the False Claims Act by submitting and causing the submission of false claims for loan forgiveness, loan guarantees and processing fees to the Small Business Administration (SBA) in connection with Kabbage’s participation in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP).

    “The PPP was intended to provide critical assistance to eligible businesses during the economic uncertainty caused by the pandemic,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian M. Boynton, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “The department is committed to ensuring that PPP lenders — including their executives — are held accountable for contributing to the misuse of PPP funds by knowingly failing to comply with applicable program requirements, including approving PPP loans in inflated amounts and to ineligible borrowers.”

    Congress created the PPP in March 2020, as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act, to provide federally guaranteed loans to small businesses suffering economic hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The SBA administered the PPP. The CARES Act authorized private lenders to approve PPP loans for eligible borrowers who could later seek forgiveness of the loans so long as they used loan funds on employee payroll and other eligible expenses. Among other things, participating PPP lenders were required to confirm borrowers’ average monthly payroll costs by reviewing the payroll documentation submitted with the borrower’s application. Lenders were also required to follow applicable Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering requirements to help combat fraud. Any unforgiven or defaulted PPP loans made by lenders were guaranteed by the SBA, so long as the lenders adhered to PPP requirements. Lenders who originated PPP loans were paid a fixed fee calculated as a percentage of the loan amount by the SBA.

    According to the government’s complaint, Frohwein and Petralia co-founded Kabbage in 2008 and served as the company’s chief executive officer and president, respectively, while Robinson formerly served as the company’s head of strategy. Kabbage was approved as a PPP lender in 2020 and approved more than $7 billion in PPP loans that year for which the company was paid more than $217 million in processing fees after certifying that it had complied with all applicable lending requirements.

    The complaint alleges that, between April and October 2020, the defendants knowingly submitted or caused the submission of false claims for loan guarantees, loan forgiveness and processing fees relating to tens of thousands of PPP loans that were systemically inflated due to calculation errors by Kabbage. These errors allegedly included Kabbage’s double-counting of state and local taxes paid by employees and the failure to exclude annual compensation in excess of $100,000 per employee from its calculation of payroll costs. Additionally, the lawsuit alleges that the defendants knowingly submitted or caused the submission of false claims for processing fees related to tens of thousands of PPP loans where Kabbage failed to implement appropriate fraud controls. The government’s complaint alleges that the defendants ignored these violations to maximize PPP processing fees before selling off the majority of Kabbage’s assets in October 2020.

    Kabbage Inc., which is now winding down its operations as KServicing Wind Down Corp. after filing for bankruptcy in the wake of the 2020 asset sale, previously agreed to resolve allegations relating to its role in the submission of false claims to the SBA. As part of that settlement, the United States received a general unsecured claim in the bankruptcy proceeding of up to $120 million, and the company received a credit for $12.5 million that Kabbage returned to SBA during the department’s investigation.

    “The PPP was a light providing hope to businesses in the midst of the shadow of a global pandemic,” said U.S. Attorney Damien M. Diggs for the Eastern District of Texas. “Unfortunately, some unscrupulous lenders and executives took advantage of that situation by lining their pockets with ill-gotten incentive payments from processing PPP loans despite not performing even the most cursory fraud checks or reviews of borrower documentation. Individuals who shirked their responsibilities at the expense of the public fisc must be held accountable. This lawsuit against Kabbage’s former executives demonstrates our firm commitment to holding all parties responsible for their part in causing the submission of false claims to the PPP.”

    “SBA’s lending partners have a responsibility to ensure only eligible borrowers gain access to SBA’s programs,” said Special Agent in Charge Brady Ipock of the SBA Office of Inspector General (SBA OIG)’s Central Region. “SBA OIG stands ready to support the Justice Department in rooting out greed and wrongful actions. I want to thank the U.S. Attorney’s Office and our law enforcement partners for their support and dedication to pursuing justice in this case.”

    The lawsuit was originally filed under the qui tam or whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act by Paul Pietschner, a former analyst in Kabbage’s collections department. The FCA permits private parties to file suit on behalf of the United States for false claims and to share in any recovery. The FCA also permits the United States to intervene in such an action, as it has done in this case. A defendant who violates the act is subject to liability for three times the government’s losses, plus applicable penalties. 

    On May 17, 2021, Attorney General Merrick B. Garland established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Justice Department in partnership with agencies across the federal government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The Task Force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international actors committing civil and criminal fraud and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the department’s response to the pandemic, please visit www.justice.gov/coronavirus.

    Tips and complaints from all sources about potential fraud affecting COVID-19 government relief programs can be reported by visiting the webpage of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section, which can be found here. Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can also report it by calling the Justice Department’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    Trial Attorney Sarah E. Loucks of the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Betty Young for the Eastern District of Texas are handling the matter, with assistance provided by the SBA’s Office of General Counsel and Office of the Inspector General.

    The case is captioned United States ex rel. Pietschner v. Kabbage, Inc., et al., No. 4:21-cv-110-SDJ (EDTX).

    The claims asserted by the United States are allegations only. There has been no determination of liability.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: David Seymour: The State of the Nation in 2025 – Dire States

    Source: ACT Party

    Delivered by ACT Leader David Seymour the Akarana Event Centre, Ōrākei.

    Introduction

    Thank you, Brooke, for your kind introduction. I’m biased, but I think you’re the Government’s most quietly effective Minister. Your labour law reforms are making it easier to employ workers and to be employed. Your minimum wage increases are announced early to give business certainty, and relief. You are taking on two of the hardest chestnuts in the workplace – holiday pay and health and safety – by listening to the people affected. You’ve put together an honest Royal Commission on COVID-19, and got wait times down for new passports and Citizenships. All the while you attract growing respect as a hard-working local MP here in Tamaki.

    It’s easy to forget Brooke’s 32. She has the biggest future in New Zealand politics.

    The only problem with mentioning one ACT MP is they’re all kicking goals with both feet, so you have to mention the lot. Nicole McKee is speeding up the court system, rewriting the entire Arms Act to make New Zealand safer, and reforming anti-money laundering laws so people can business done.

    Andrew Hoggard handles the country’s biosecurity, managing would-be outbreaks with steady hands. He is also dealing to Significant Natural Areas that erode farmers’ property rights and correcting the naïve treatment of methane that punishes the whole country.

    He’s able to do that in large part because of the work Mark Cameron did, and continues to do. From 2020 onwards he scared the bejesus out of every other party in rural New Zealand. He shifted the whole political spectrum right on the split gas approach, SNAs, and freshwater laws. Now the Government is changing those policies. As Chair of the Primary Production Committee, Mark stays in the headlines championing rural New Zealand every week. He is the definition of an effective MP.

    Karen Chhour is the embodiment of ACT values. Her life gives her more excuses than anyone in Parliament, but she makes none, and she accepts none. She is reforming the government department that let her down when she was small. If every New Zealander had Karen’s attitude and values, we’d be a country with no problems.

    Perhaps the biggest single policy problem we face is the Resource Management Act. Somone once said you can fill a town hall to stop anything in this country, but you can’t fill a telephone box to get something started. In steps Simon Court who, with Chris Bishop, is designing new resource management laws based on property rights. That’s an ACT policy designed to unleash the latent wealth our country has by letting people develop and use the property they own.

    Our new MPs that you helped elect last year are also making their marks. Todd Stephenson has picked up the End of Life Choice baton, with a bill to extend compassion and choice to those who suffer the most: those with long-term, degenerative illnesses. Parmjeet Parmar is one of the hardest working MPs I have seen, and a great chair of the Economic Development, Science and Innovation Committee. Cam Luxton and Laura McClure speak to a new generation of young parents who want their children to grow up in a free society.

    If you gave your Party Vote to ACT last year, you can be proud of the New Zealanders you put in Parliament to represent you. I am proud to lead this team of free thinkers in our House of Representatives, and I think we can all be proud of their efforts.

    New Zealand’s origin story: a nation of immigrants

    The summer is a good time to think about the state of our nation, and I got to thinking about who we are and how we got here. Whatever troubles we may face today, I couldn’t help coming back to something that unites New Zealand.

    Our country at its best is a place that welcomes hopeful people from all over the earth. People with different languages, religions and cultures united by one thing. When you look at the map it jumps out at you. We are the most remote country on Earth. If you’ve never stood at Cape Reinga and looked out to see wide open spaces for 10,000 kilometres, you owe it to yourself just once.

    It shows that one thing makes us all different from the rest of the world. No matter when or where you came from, you or your ancestors once travelled farther than anyone to give your children and theirs a better tomorrow.

    That is the true Kiwi spirit. Taking a leap into the unknown for a chance at better. Compared with what divides us, our spirit as a nation of pioneers unites us ten times over. Migrating from oppression and poverty for freedom and prosperity is what it means to be Kiwi.

    If that bright and optimistic side of our psyche, got half as much time as the whinging, we would all be better off. We would see ourselves as people unafraid of challenges, freed from conformity, with the power to decide our best days are always ahead of us.

    New Zealand’s inherent tension: two tribes

    I got to wondering why that isn’t a more popular story. Why do we cut down tall poppies? Why do we value conformity over truth? Why do people who came here for a better life grow up disappointed and move away again?

    I believe our nation is dominated by two invisible tribes. One, I call ‘Change Makers’. People who act out the pioneering spirit that built our country every day. We don’t just believe it is possible to make a difference in our own lives; we believe it’s an obligation.

    Change makers load up their mortgage to start a business and give other people jobs. They work the land to feed the world. They save up and buy a home that they maintain for someone else to live in. They study hard to extend themselves. They volunteer and help out where they can. They take each person as they find them. They don’t need to know your ancestry before they know how to treat you.

    Too often, they get vilified for all of the above. I know there’s many people like that in this room today. ACT people are Change Makers; we carry the pioneering spirit in our hearts.

    Then there’s the other tribe – people building a Majority for Mediocrity. They would love nothing more than to go into lockdown again, make some more sourdough, and worry about the billions in debt another day.

    They blame one of the most successful societies in history for every problem they have. They believe that ancestry is destiny. They believe people are responsible for things that happened before they were born, but criminals aren’t responsible for what they did last week.

    Far from believing people can make a difference in their own lives, they believe that their troubles are caused by other people’s success. They look for politicians who’ll cut tall poppies down – politicians who say to young New Zealanders ‘if you study hard, get good grades, get a good job, save money, and invest wisely, we’ll tax you harder’.

    I wasn’t kidding about the lockdowns; they were a litmus test. In early 2022, after this city had been locked down for months, and the borders had been closed for two years, a pollster asked New Zealanders if they’d like to be locked down again for Omicron.

    Now, I know it’s painful to think back, but bear with me. Omicron spread more easily than any earlier variant. It was also less harmful if you caught it. That was especially so because we were then among the most vaccinated nations on earth. The damage to business, education, non-COVID healthcare, and the government’s books was already massive and painful.

    And yet, 48 per cent of New Zealanders wanted another lockdown for Omicron. 46 per cent didn’t. That for me put the tribes into sharp relief. If you were a business owner who needed to open, a parent worried about missed education, a migrant missing their family, or just someone who wanted their life back, you wanted to open.

    When the Government finally lifted restrictions, many of those people left. Real estate agents report people selling because they’re moving to Australia every day. This is where the balance between these two invisible tribes comes into focus.

    Remember the gap in that poll was two per cent. Since the borders opened a net 116,000 citizens have left New Zealand. That’s a touch over two per cent.

    A tipping point

    The more people with get up and go choose to get up and leave, the less attractive it is for motivated people to stay here.

    Muldoon once quipped, ‘New Zealanders who leave for Australia raise the IQ of both countries.’ Actually, New Zealanders who leave for Australia  are tipping us towards a Majority for Mediocrity. Motivated New Zealanders leaving is good news for the shoplifters, conspiracy theorists, and hollow men who make up the political opposition.

    A few more good people leaving is all they need for their Majority of Mediocrity. The more that aspirational, hardworking people get up and leave New Zealand, the more likely it is we’ll get left-wing governments in the future.

    That’s why I say we’re at a tipping point. 

    There’s another reason why the mediocrity majority is growing, young people feel betrayed and disillusioned.

    A new generation looks at the housing market and sees little hope. Imagine you’re someone who’s done it all right, you listened to your teacher and did your homework. You studied for a tertiary education like everyone told you. Now you have $34,000 in debt, you start on $60,000, and you see the average house is 900,000 or fifteen times your (before tax) income.

    Nobody can blame a young person for wondering if they aren’t better off overseas. Many decide they are. Those who stay are infected  by universities  with the woke mind viruses of identity politics, Marxism, and post-modernism.

    Feeling like you’ll never own your own capital asset at the same time as some professor left over from the Cold War tells you about Marx is a dangerous combination.

    This is the other political tipping point that risks manufacturing a majority for mediocrity. A bad housing market and a woke education system combined are a production line for left-wing voters.

    The hard left prey on young New Zealanders. They tell them that their problems are caused by others’ success. That they are held back by their identity, but if they embrace identity politics, they can take back what’s theirs. Their mechanism is a new tax on wealth.

    These are the opposite of the spirit brings New Zealanders to our shores in the first place. The state of our nation is that we’re at a tipping point , and what we do in the next few years will decide which way we go.

    The short-term outlook is sunny, but only because Labour was so bad.

    We can afford to hope that this year will be better than 2024. By that standard, 2025 will be a success. Interest rates will be lower. The Government will have stopped wasting borrowed money, banning things, punishing employers, landlords, farmers, and anyone else trying to make a difference, with another layer of red tape.

    In fact, we have a Government that’s saving money, cutting red tape, and paring back identity politics. With those changes we will see more hope than we’ve seen in years, and hopefully a slowdown in citizens leaving. That is good, it’s welcome, and ACT is proud to be part of the coalition Government that’s doing it.

    ACT is needed to be brave, articulate, and patriotic

    The truth is, though, it’s easy to do a better job of Labour over 12 months. It’s much harder to muster the courage to keep making difficult decisions over several years, even if they’re not immediately popular. Our nation is in a century of decline. Just stopping one Government’s stupid stuff and waiting for a cyclical recovery won’t change the long-term trend. We need to be honest about the challenges we face and the changes needed to overcome them.

    We need to act like a country at risk of reaching a tipping point and losing its first world status. We are facing some tough times, and tough times require tough choices to be made.

    ACT’s goal is to keep the Government, and make it better. We may have gone into Government, but we never went into groupthink. It’s the role of ACT to be the squeaky wheel, pointing out where the Government needs to do better.

    The Government cannot measure itself by just being better than Labour. Instead, we need to ask ourselves, is this policy good enough to make New Zealand a first world country that people want to stay in?

    It’s easy to have big plans, we are the world, but charity begins at home. We need to focus only on what the government does, and ensure it does it well.

    We need to think carefully about three areas of government activity: spending, owning, and regulating. There is nothing the government does that doesn’t come down to one of those three things.

    Why government spends a dollar it has taxed or borrowed, and whether the benefits of that outweigh the costs.

    Why government owns an asset, and whether the benefits to citizens outweigh the costs to taxpayers of owning it.

    Why a restriction is placed on the use and exchange of private property, and whether the benefits of that regulation outweigh the costs on the property owner.

    When it comes to spending, we have a burning platform.

    Last year the economy shrunk by one per cent, even as the population grew slightly thanks to births and inbound migration. This year the Government is planning to borrow $17 billion, about $10 billion is for interest on debt, and we’ll have to pay interest on that debt the following year. Next year, government debt will exceed $200 billion.

    There lots of reasons why this situation will get harder.

    We’ve claimed an exclusive economic zone of four million square kilometres by drawing a circle around every offshore island we could name. We spend less than one per cent of GDP defending it, while our only ally, across the ditch, spends twice that.

    Put another way, we’re a country whose government gives out $45 billion in payments each year but spends only $3.2 billion defending the place. Does that sound prudent to you? Doubling defense would cost another $3.2 billion per year, effectively paying more for what we already have. We may face pressure to do just that thanks to US foreign policy.

    There’s a tail wind on balancing the books, and it’s affecting every developed country, our population is ageing faster than it’s growing.

    Every year around 60,000 people turn sixty-five and become eligible for a pension. To the taxpayer, superannuation expenses increase by $1.4 billion each year.

    Healthcare spending has gone from $20 billion to $30 billion in five years, but people are so dissatisfied that healthcare is now the third biggest political issue. Put it another way, we are now spending nearly $6,000 per citizen on healthcare.

    How many people here would give up their right to the public healthcare system if they got $6,000 for their own private insurance? Should we allow people to opt out of the public healthcare system, and take their portion of funding with them so they can go private?

    Education is similar. We spend $20 billion of taxpayer money every year, and every year 60,000 children are born. By my count that’s $333,000 of lifetime education spending for each citizen.

    How many people would take their $333,000 and pay for their own education? How many young New Zealanders would be better off if they did it that way?

    Instead of spending next year because we did it this year, we need to ask ourselves, if we want to remain a first world country, then do New Zealanders get a return on this spending that justifies taking the money off taxpayers in the first place? If spending doesn’t stack up, it should stop so we can repay debt or spend the money on something that does.

    Then there’s the $570 billion, over half a trillion dollars of assets, the government owns. The one thing we know from state houses, hospital projects, and farms with high levels of animal death, is that the government is hopeless at owning things.

    But did you know you own Quotable Value, a property valuation company chaired by a former race relations conciliator that contracts to the government of New South Wales?

    What about 60,000 homes? The government doesn’t need to own a home to house someone. We know this because it also spends billions subsidising people to live in homes it doesn’t own. On the other hand, the taxpayer is paying $10 billion a year servicing debt, and the KiwiBuild and Kainga Ora debacles show the government should do as little in housing as possible.

    There are greater needs for government capital. We haven’t built a harbour crossing for nearly seven decades. Four hundred people die every year on a substandard road network. Beaches around here get closed thanks to sewerage overflow, but we need more core infrastructure. Sections of this city are being red zoned from having more homes built because the council cannot afford the pipes and pumping stations.

    We need to get past squeamishness about privatisation and ask a simple question: if we want to be a first world country, then are we making the best use of the government’s half a trillion dollars’ plus worth of assets? If something isn’t getting a return, the government should sell it so we can afford to buy something that does.

    Finally, there’s regulation. That is placing restrictions on the use and exchange of property that the government doesn’t own or hasn’t taxed off the people who earned it already. That is, your property. Bad regulation is killing our prosperity in three ways.

    It adds costs to the things we do. It’s the delays, the paperwork, and the fees that make too many activities cost more than they ought to. It’s the builder saying it takes longer to get the consent than it took to build the thing. It’s the anti-money laundering palaver that ties people in knots doing basic things but somehow doesn’t stop criminals bringing in half a billion dollars of P each year. It’s the daycare centre that took four years to open because different departments couldn’t agree about the road noise outside. I could go on all afternoon.

    Then there’s the things that just don’t happen because people decide the costs don’t add up once the red tape is factored in.

    Then there’s the big one that goes to the heart of our identity and culture. It’s all the kids who grow up in a country where people gave up or weren’t allowed to try. It’s the climbing wall at Sir Edmund Hillary’s old school with signs saying don’t climb. It’s the lack of nightlife because it’s too hard to get a license. It’s the fear that comes from worrying WorkSafe or some other regulator will come and shut you down. You can’t measure it, but we all know it’s there.

    The Kiwi spirit we are so proud of is being chipped away and killing our vibe. Nobody migrated here to be compliant, but compliance is infantilising our culture, and I haven’t even mentioned orange cones yet.

    If we want to remain first world, we need to change how we regulate. No law should be passed without showing what problem is being solved, whether the benefits outweigh the costs, and who pays the costs and gets the benefits. These are the basic principles of the Regulatory Standards Bill that the Government will pass this year.

    Conclusion

    Of course, the Government IS doing many things that will change how it operates. There is a drive to reduce waste. There is a drive to get more money from overseas investment. The Regulatory Standards Bill will change how we regulate. The Resource Management Act is being replaced. Anti-money laundering laws are being simplified. Charter schools are opening, more roads are being built. These are all good things.

    But make no mistake, our country has always been the site of a battle between two tribes. The effect of emigration, and the world faced by young New Zealanders risks creating a permanent majority for mediocrity. Our country is at a tipping point.

    We need honest conversations about why government spends, owns, and regulates, and whether those policies are good enough to secure our future as a first world nation.

    You may have seen the ACT Party has been involved in a battle to define the principles of the Treaty democratically. It’s caused quite a stir. If you missed it, please check out treaty.nz where we outline what it’s about. It may still succeed this time, or it may be one of those bills that simply breaks the ground so something like it can proceed in the future.

    Either way, the tribe of change makers has a voice. People who want equal rights for all New Zealanders to be treated with respect and dignity because they’re citizens have a position that others need to refute. Good luck to them arguing against equal rights.

    It also shows something else, that ACT is the party prepared to stand up when it’s not easy and it’s not popular. That’s exactly the type of party our country needs in our Government.

    To all the Change Makers who proudly put us there, thank you, and no matter how daunting this tipping point may feel, together we can ensure our best days are still ahead of us.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Prolonged Symptoms Attributable to Infection with COVID-19

    Source: New Zealand Ministry of Health

    Summary

    Fatigue, poor concentration/memory, shortness of breath and loss of taste or smell are the most prevalent symptoms following COVID-19 infection in adults when compared with non-COVID-19 infected controls (either population controls or those with infective symptoms but testing negative for COVID-19). Children and adolescents present with similar symptoms to adults, but may also include cough and headache. 

    Given the heterogeneity of evidence to date, and in the absence of high-powered, robust studies, a meta-analysis could not be undertaken to accurately determine the overall prevalence of one or more of these symptoms three or more months after infection with COVID-19. 

    While a precise measurement of symptom prevalence remains a challenge, the knowledge that a narrower subset of symptoms can be confidently attributed to infection with COVID-19 has important implications. In the absence of definitive diagnostic criteria, this subset can inform a refined, iterative definition of long COVID-19, both internationally and in New Zealand. 

    The finding that four symptoms appear to be attributable to infection with COVID-19 will enable focused attention on these symptoms. This will facilitate accurate surveillance and targeted resourcing for clinical and wellbeing support where it is most needed.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI: Alaris Equity Partners Income Trust Releases 2024 Third Quarter Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES.

    FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS RESTRICTION MAY CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAW.

    TSX-AD.UN

    CALGARY, Alberta, Nov. 05, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Alaris Equity Partners Income Trust (together, as applicable, with its subsidiaries, “Alaris” or the “Trust“) is pleased to announce its results for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2024. The results are prepared in accordance with IFRS Accounting Standards as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board. All amounts below are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.

    In January 2024, Alaris determined that it met the definition of an investment entity, as defined by IFRS 10, Consolidated financial statements. This change in status has fundamentally changed how Alaris prepares, presents and discusses its financial results relative to prior periods. IFRS requires that this change in accounting be made prospectively and as a result prior periods are not restated to reflect the change in Alaris’ investment entity status. Accordingly, the readers of this press release, Alaris’ third quarter interim MD&A and unaudited condensed consolidated interim financial statements should exercise significant caution in reviewing, considering, and drawing conclusions from period-to-period comparisons and changes, as the direct comparisons between dates or across periods can be inappropriate if not carefully considered in this context.

    Highlights:

    • For the three months ended September 30, 2024 Alaris generated $0.78 per unit of additional book value, improving this metric to $22.80;
    • For the three months ended September 30, 2024 the Trust, together with its wholly-owned subsidiaries (the “Acquisition Entities”), earned a total of $65.9 million of revenue, including, $65.4 million of Partner Distribution revenue net of foreign exchange, and $0.5 million of transaction fee income, which was ahead of previous guidance of $38.7 million, and compares to $47.2 million of Partner Revenue in Q3 2023, an increase of 40%;
      • Included in Partner Distribution revenue for the three months ended September 30, 2024, is $27.5 million of common Distributions, which included a one time distribution of US$5.1 million from Ohana Growth Partners LLC (“Ohana“) and US$14.7 million distribution from Fleet Advantage, LLC (“Fleet”). Common Distribution revenue for the nine months ended September 30, 2024 is $31.8 million, which for the second quarter in a row has outperformed the comparable period in the prior year by more than double. Alaris’ Run Rate Revenue (7) included in the outlook below has been increased to reflect overall higher expected annual common dividends from Partners of $19.4 million;
    • Alaris net distributable cash flow (6) for the nine months ended September 30, 2024 of $88.0 million or $1.93 per unit increased by 28%, from $68.6 million and $1.51 per unit in the nine months ended September 30, 2023 after adjusting the comparable period for non-recurring settlement and litigation costs that occurred in 2023;
    • The Actual Payout Ratio (2) for the Trust, based on Alaris net distributable cash flow (6) for the nine months ended September 30, 2024 was 53%;
    • The current weighted average combined Earnings Coverage Ratio (3) for Alaris’ Partners remains at approximately 1.5x with ten of nineteen Partners at 1.5x or above. In addition, eleven of our partners have either no debt or less than 1.0x Senior Debt to EBITDA on a trailing twelve-month basis;
    • During the quarter, the Trust, via the Acquisition Entities, invested approximately US$35 million into Ohana as a dividend recap in exchange for convertible preferred equity with a 14% yield fully paid-in-kind;
    • Subsequent to the quarter end, the Trust, via the Acquisition Entities, made a follow-on investment of US$10.0 million of additional preferred equity in Cresa LLC (“Cresa”), which has the same metrics as the initial preferred equity investment, bringing the total investment in Cresa to US$30.0 million. Following this transaction, the Trust has invested a total of approximately $139 million in the year.

    “In addition to highlighting the continued stability of Alaris’ portfolio and cash flow stream, the third quarter results continue to show the growing success and importance of our common equity portfolio. While some of this quarter’s common equity cash flow is non-recurring in nature, we are seeing more and more value from that strategy crystallizing into cash returns. Deployment activity is constructive for the end of the year and both interest rate cuts and US dollar strength provide us with tailwinds going into next year, ” said Steve King President and CEO.

    Results of Operations

    Note where the financial information for Q3 2024 is comparable to specific information from the prior period Q3 2023 condensed consolidated interim financial statements, amounts have been provided for comparative purposes. As noted above, users of this press release, interim management discussion and analysis and the unaudited condensed consolidated interim financial statements to which it relates should exercise significant caution in reviewing, considering and drawing conclusions from period-to-period comparisons and changes.

    Per Unit Results Three months ended Nine months ended
    Period ending September 30   2024   2023 % Change   2024   2023 % Change
    Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investment $ 2.16 $ 1.90 +13.7 % $ 4.11 $ 3.74 +9.9 %
    Adjusted EBITDA $ 1.98 $ 1.76 +12.5 % $ 3.62 $ 3.40 +6.5 %
    Alaris net distributable cashflow $ 0.72 $ 0.44 +63.6 % $ 1.93 $ 1.21 +59.5 %
    Adjusted earning per unit $ 1.37 $ 1.31 +4.6 % $ 2.35 $ 2.15 +9.3 %
    Weighted average basic units (000’s)   45,498   45,498     45,498   45,433  

    During the three months ended September 30, 2024, Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investments (5) per unit increased by 13.7% as compared to the three months ended September 30, 2023. During the current quarter common Partner Distribution revenue increased by more than 200%, primarily as a result of common Distributions received from Fleet of US$14.7 million, which was greater than their prior year Distribution of US$5.9 million, and a common Distribution received from Ohana of US$5.1 million, as compared to nil distribution received in Q3 2023. Partially offsetting this increase is a quarter over quarter decrease to the Net unrealized gain on partner investments of 16.3% to $33.0 million during the three months ended September 30, 2024. Q3 2024’s Net unrealized gain on Partner investments of $33.0 million is made up of notable increases to the fair value in Sono Bello, LLC (“Sono Bello“), Amur Financial Group Inc. (“Amur”), Fleet, Vehicle Leasing Holdings, LLC, dba D&M Leasing (“D&M”), and The Shipyard, LLC (“Shipyard”), which were partially offset by decreases to the fair value of Heritage Restoration, LLC (“Heritage”) and SCR Mining and Tunneling, LP (“SCR”). During the nine months ended September 30, 2024, Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investments (5) per unit increased by 9.9% as compared to the nine months ended September 30, 2023. This increase is reflective of increases in Partner Distribution revenue, partially offset by a lower net gain to the realized and unrealized fair value on Partner investments. Net realized gain on partner investments of $9.0 million and net unrealized gain of $32.4 million decreased in the nine months ended September 30, 2024 by 29.2% and 13.9%, respectively, as compared to the nine months ended September 30, 2023.

    For the three and nine months ended September 30, 2024, Adjusted EBITDA (1) per unit increased by 12.5% and 6.5%, respectively, as compared to the relative periods in 2023. Per unit increases are primarily due to higher Partner Distribution revenue. Partially offsetting these increases are decreases to the net realized and unrealized gain on Partner Investments relative to the comparable periods in 2023, and higher adjusted operating expenses; after non-reoccurring litigation and legal costs that were incurred in 2023 have been removed in the calculation Adjusted EBITDA (1).

    Alaris net distributable cashflow (6) provides a summary of third-party cash receipts, less operating cash outflows by the Trust in combination with the Acquisition Entities. Alaris net distributable cashflow (6) per unit increased by 63.6% in the three months ended September 30, 2024 and 59.5% in the nine months ended September 30, 2024, both as compared to the same periods in 2023. Period over period increases are due to the current periods higher common Distributions and lower cash taxes paid, all as compared to the relative periods in 2023. The nine months ended September 30, 2024 Alaris net distributable cashflow (6) is $88.0 million, after adjusting out non-recurring settlement and litigation costs of $13.7 million in the prior year, the nine months ended September 30, 2023 distributable cashflow amounts to $68.6 million, and results in an adjusted period over period increase of 28.3%.

    Adjusted earnings (10) per unit increased by 4.6% in the three months ended September 30, 2024 which is primarily driven by higher Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investments (5) as discussed above, and partially offset by higher total income tax expense in Q3 2024. The nine months ended September 30, 2024, Adjusted earnings (10) per unit increased by 9.3% which in addition to the changes listed for the three months ended September 30, 2024, is higher due to lower operating expenses during the nine months ended September 30, 2024 as compared to the prior year resulting from non-recurring litigation and legal costs incurred in 2023.

    Outlook

    During the three months ended September 30, 2024, the Trust, through its Acquisition Entities invested approximately $48 million, which was used to invest in convertible preferred units of Ohana. Subsequent to the quarter, Alaris invested an additional US$10.0 million into Cresa, bringing Alaris’ total investment in Cresa to US$30.0 million and as of the date of this MD&A the total invested during the year to approximately $139 million. These transactions are summarized in the outlook below, which includes Alaris’ Run Rate Revenue (7) for the next twelve months and is expected to be approximately $171 million. This includes current contracted amounts, an additional $1.2 million from LMS related to Distributions deferred in 2023 and an estimated $19.4 million of common dividends. In Q3 2024, the Trust together with its Acquisition Entities earned $65.9 million, $65.4 million in Partner Distributions net of foreign exchange and $0.5 million of third party transaction fee revenue, which was ahead of previous guidance of $38.7 million, primarily due to common distributions received from Fleet of $19.8 million, Ohana of $6.8 million and Amur of $0.5 million, as well as a higher realized foreign exchange rate on US denominated distributions. As with all common distributions, these distributions are not fixed or set in advance, but rather paid as declared and cashflow of partner permits. Alaris expects total revenue from its Partners in Q4 2024 of approximately $38.9 million.

    The Run Rate Cash Flow (8) table below outlines the Trust and its Acquisitions Entities combined expectation for Partners Distribution revenue, transaction fee revenue, general and administrative expenses, third party interest expense, tax expense and distributions to unitholders for the next twelve months. The Run Rate Cash Flow (8) is a forward looking supplementary financial measure and outlines the net cash from operating activities, less the distributions paid, that Alaris is expecting to generate over the next twelve months. The Trust’s method of calculating this measure may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, it may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other issuers.

    Run rate general and administrative expenses are currently estimated at $17.0 million and include all public company costs incurred by the Trust and its Acquisition Entities. The Trust’s Run Rate Payout Ratio (9) is expected to be within a range of 65% and 70% when including Run Rate Revenue (7), overhead expenses and its existing capital structure. The table below sets out our estimated Run Rate Cash Flow (8) as well as the after-tax impact of positive net investment, the impact of every 1% increase in Secure Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”) based on current outstanding USD debt and the impact of every $0.01 change in the USD to CAD exchange rate.

    Alaris’ financial statements and MD&A are available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca and on our website at www.alarisequitypartners.com.

    Run Rate Cash Flow ($ thousands except per unit) Amount ($) $ / Unit
    Run Rate Revenue, Partner Distribution revenue $ 171,300   $ 3.77  
    General and administrative expenses   (17,000 )   (0.37 )
    Third party Interest and taxes     (57,100 )   (1.26 )
    Net cash from operating activities $ 97,200   $ 2.14  
    Distributions paid     (61,900 )   (1.36 )
    Run Rate Cash Flow   $ 35,300   $ 0.78  
           
    Other considerations (after taxes and interest):    
    New investments Every $50 million deployed @ 14%   +2,426     +0.05  
    Interest rates Every 1.0% increase in SOFR   -2,600     -0.06  
    USD to CAD Every $0.01 change of USD to CAD   +/- 900     +/- 0.02  


    Earnings Release Date and Conference Call Details

    Alaris management will host a conference call at 9am MT (11am ET), Wednesday, November 6, 2024 to discuss the financial results and outlook for the Trust.

    Participants must register for the call using this link: Q3 2024 Conference Call. Pre-register to receive the dial-in numbers and unique PIN to access the call seamlessly. It is recommended that you join 10 minutes prior to the event start (although you may register and dial in at any time during the call). Participants can access the webcast here: Q3 Webcast. A replay of the webcast will be available two hours after the call and archived on the same web page for six months. Participants can also find the link on our website, stored under the “Investors” section – “Presentations and Events”, at www.alarisequitypartners.com.

    An updated corporate presentation will be posted to the Trust’s website within 24 hours at www.alarisequitypartners.com.

    About the Trust:

    Alaris’ investment and investing activity refers to providing, through the Acquisition Entities, alternative equity to private companies (“Partners”) to meet their business and capital objectives, which includes management buyouts, dividend recapitalization, growth and acquisitions. Alaris achieves this by investing its unitholder capital, as well as debt, through the Acquisition Entities, in exchange for distributions, dividends or interest (collectively, “Distributions”) as well as capital appreciation on both preferred and common equity, with the principal objectives of generating predictable cash flows for distribution payments to its unitholders and growing net book value through returns from capital appreciation. Distributions, other than common equity Distributions, from the Partners are adjusted annually based on the percentage change of a “top-line” financial performance measure such as gross margin or same store sales and rank in priority to common equity position.

    Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures

    The terms Adjusted Earnings, components of Corporate investments, EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA, Extended group net distributable cashflow, Earnings Coverage Ratio, Run Rate Payout Ratio, Actual Payout Ratio, Run Rate Revenue, Run Rate Cash Flow, and Per Unit amounts (collectively, the “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures”) are financial measures used in this MD&A that are not standard measures under International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) . The Trust’s method of calculating the Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, the Trust’s Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other issuers.

    (1) “Adjusted EBITDA” and “EBITDA”: are Non-GAAP financial measures and refer to earnings determined in accordance with IFRS, before depreciation and amortization, interest expense (finance costs) and income tax expense. EBITDA is used by management and many investors to determine the ability of an issuer to generate cash from operations. “Adjusted EBITDA” and “Adjusted EBITDA per unit”, which is a non-GAAP ratio that removes the impact from unrealized fluctuations in exchange rates and their impact on the Trust’s investments at fair value, as well as one time items and the impact of finance costs and taxes included within the net gain on Corporate Investments incurred by the Acquisition Entities and, on a per unit basis, is and the same amount divided by weighted average basic units outstanding. Management believes Adjusted EBITDA, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA per unit are useful supplemental measures from which to determine the Trust’s ability to generate cash available for servicing its loans and borrowings, income taxes and distributions to unitholders. The Trust’s method of calculating these Non-GAAP financial measures may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, they may not be comparable to similar measures and ratios presented by other issuers.

      Three months ended September 30 Nine months ended September 30
    $ thousands except per unit amounts   2024   2023   % Change   2024     2023 % Change
    Earnings $ 51,027 $ 63,770     $ 156,475   $ 97,710  
    Depreciation and amortization   135   58       396     169  
    Finance costs   1,150   8,510       3,445     21,909  
    Total income tax expense   251   11,611       554     20,902  
    EBITDA $ 52,563 $ 83,949   -37.4 % $ 160,870   $ 140,690 +14.3 %
    Adjustments:            
    Gain on derecognition of previously consolidated entities $ $     $ (30,260 ) $  
    Foreign exchange   11,334   (3,947 )     (19,224 )   156  
    Sandbox litigation and legal costs     21           13,697  
    Finance costs, senior credit facility and convertible debentures   6,962         22,193      
    Acquisition Entities income tax expense – current   2,987         10,018      
    Acquisition Entities income tax expense – deferred   16,109         21,272      
    Adjusted EBITDA $ 89,955 $ 80,023   +12.4 % $ 164,869   $ 154,543 +6.7 %
    Adjusted EBITDA per unit $ 1.98 $ 1.76   +12.5 % $ 3.62   $ 3.40 +6.5 %

    (2) “Actual Payout Ratio” is a supplementary financial measure and refers to Alaris’ total distributions paid during the period (annually or quarterly) divided by the actual net cash from operating activities Alaris generated for the period. It represents the net cash from operating activities after distributions paid to unitholders available for either repayments of senior debt and/or to be used in investing activities.

    (3) “Earnings Coverage Ratio (“ECR”)” is a supplementary financial measure and refers to the EBITDA of a Partner divided by such Partner’s sum of debt servicing (interest and principal), unfunded capital expenditures and distributions to Alaris. Management believes the earnings coverage ratio is a useful metric in assessing our partners continued ability to make their contracted distributions.

    (4) “Net book value” and “net book value per unit” are Non-GAAP financial measures and represents the equity value of the company or total assts less total liabilities and the same amount divided by weighted average basic units outstanding. Net book value and net book value per unit are used by management to determine the growth in assets over the period net of amounts paid out to unitholders as distributions. Management believes net book value and net book value per unit are useful supplemental measures from which to compare the Trust’s growth period over period. The Trust’s method of calculating these Non-GAAP financial measures may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, they may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other issuers.

        30-Sep   30-Jun   31-Dec
    $ thousands except per unit amounts   2024   2024   2023
    Total Assets $ 1,130,415 $ 1,093,177 $ 1,474,894
    Total Liabilities $ 93,236 $ 91,556 $ 514,071
    Net book value $ 1,037,179 $ 1,001,621 $ 960,823
    Weighted average basic units (000’s)   45,498   45,498   45,498
    Net book value per unit $ 22.80 $ 22.01 $ 21.12


    (5) “
    Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investments The components of Corporate Investments are Non-GAAP financial measures and are presented for better comparability to prior year reporting. These amounts are reconciled to information from note 3 of the condensed consolidated interim financial statements below. The Trust’s method of calculating these Non-GAAP financial measures may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, they may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other issuers.

      Three months ended September 30 Nine months ended September 30
    $ thousands   2024   2023 % Change   2024   2023 % Change
    Partner Distribution revenue – Preferred, including realized foreign exchange Note 1 $ 37,895 $ 37,844 +0.1 % $ 113,936 $ 108,543 +5.0 %
    Partner Distribution revenue – Common $ 27,501 $ 8,815 +212.0 % $ 31,807 $ 10,903 +191.7 %
    Net realized gain from Partners investments $ 29 $ 167 -82.6 % $ 9,005 $ 12,716 -29.2 %
    Net unrealized gain on Partners investments $ 33,006 $ 39,428 -16.3 % $ 32,463 $ 37,688 -13.9 %
    Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investment $ 98,431 $ 86,254 +14.1 % $ 187,211 $ 169,850 +10.2 %
    Partner related changes in net gain on Corporate Investment per unit $ 2.16 $ 1.90 +13.7 % $ 4.11 $ 3.74 +9.9 %

    Note 1 – In Q2 2023, Partner Distribution revenue – Preferred, including realized foreign exchange and Partner Distribution revenue – Common were presented as one line on the face of the income statement titled “Revenues, including realized foreign exchange gain” in the amount of $36,853 for the three months ended and $73,541 for the six months ended. Prior period Partner Distribution revenue – Preferred, including realized foreign exchange for the three and six months ended June 30, 2024 above has been adjusted to exclude Sono Bello’s management fee income (Q2 2023 three months – $496, Q2 2023 six months ended – $753) for period over period comparability, which in 2024 is recognized in the Trust’s Management and advisory fee income.

    (6) “Alaris net distributable cashflow is a non-GAAP measure that refers to all sources of external revenue in both the Trust and the Acquisition Entities less all general and administrative expenses, third party interest expense and tax expense. Alaris net distributable cashflow is a useful metric for management and investors as it provides a summary of the total cash from operating activities that can be used to pay the Trust distribution, repay senior debt and/or be used for additional investment purposes. The Trust’s method of calculating this Non-GAAP measure may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, it may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other issuers. The 2023 comparatives are presented prior to the Trust’s change in status as a investment entity and have been aligned with the most comparative balance in the 2024 presentation.

      Three months ended September 30 Nine months ended September 30
    $ thousands except per unit amounts   2024     2023   % Change   2024     2023   % Change
    Partner Distribution revenue – Preferred, including realized foreign exchange $ 37,895   $ 37,844     $ 113,936   $ 108,543    
    Partner Distribution revenue – Common   27,501     8,815       31,807     10,903    
    Third party management and advisory fees   504     506       1,526     1,260    
                 
    Expenditures of the Trust:            
    General and administrative   (4,484 )   (3,087 )     (13,308 )   (23,476 )  
    Current income tax expense   (509 )         (1,345 )      
    Third party cash interest paid by the Trust   (2,031 )   (2,032 )     (4,062 )   (4,062 )  
                 
    Expenditures incurred by Acquisition Entities:            
    Operating costs and other   (1,087 )   (928 )     (2,846 )   (2,046 )  
    Transactions costs   (378 )   (1,693 )     (2,531 )   (3,204 )  
    Acquisition Entities income tax expense – current   (2,987 )   (6,954 )     (10,018 )   (13,156 )  
    Cash interest paid, senior credit facility and convertible debentures   (6,668 )   (6,329 )     (18,038 )   (12,586 )  
                 
    Alaris’ changes in net working capital   (14,922 )   (6,063 )     (7,106 )   (7,253 )  
    Alaris net distributable cashflow $ 32,834   $ 20,079   +63.5 % $ 88,015   $ 54,923   +60.3 %
    Alaris net distributable cashflow per unit $ 0.72   $ 0.44   +63.6 % $ 1.93   $ 1.21   +59.5 %

    (7) “Run Rate Revenue” is a supplementary financial measure and refers to Alaris’ total revenue expected to be generated over the next twelve months based on contracted distributions from current Partners, excluding any potential Partner redemptions, it also includes an estimate for common dividends or distributions based on past practices, where applicable. Run Rate Revenue is a useful metric as it provides an expectation for the amount of revenue Alaris can expect to generate in the next twelve months based on information known.

    (8) “Run Rate Cash Flow” is a Non-GAAP financial measure and outlines the net cash from operating activities, net of distributions paid, that Alaris is expecting to have after the next twelve months. This measure is comparable to net cash from operating activities less distributions paid, as outlined in Alaris’ consolidated statements of cash flows.

    (9) “Run Rate Payout Ratio” is a Non-GAAP financial ratio that refers to Alaris’ distributions per unit expected to be paid over the next twelve months divided by the net cash from operating activities per unit calculated in the Run Rate Cash Flow table. Run Rate Payout Ratio is a useful metric for Alaris to track and to outline as it provides a summary of the percentage of the net cash from operating activities that can be used to either repay senior debt during the next twelve months and/or be used for additional investment purposes. Run Rate Payout Ratio is comparable to Actual Payout Ratio as defined above.

    (10) “Adjusted Earnings” is a Non-GAAP financial measure and Non-GAAP Ratio and refer to earnings determined in accordance with IFRS, before impact of the one time gain on derecognition of previously consolidated entities and foreign exchange gain (loss) and the same amount divided by weighted average basic units outstanding. Adjusted earnings and Adjusted earnings per unit are used by management to determine earnings excluding fluctuations due to unrealized changes in exchange rates that impact earnings and specifically the fair value of Corporate investment. Management believes Adjusted earning and Adjusted earnings per unit are useful measures from which to compare the Trust’s earnings period over period. The Trust’s method of calculating these Non-GAAP financial measures and ratio may differ from the methods used by other issuers. Therefore, they may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other issuers.

      Three months ended September 30 Nine months ended September 30
    $ thousands except per unit amounts   2024   2023   % Change   2024     2023 % Change
    Earnings $ 51,027 $ 63,770     $ 156,475   $ 97,710  
    Add back: Foreign exchange (gain) loss $ 11,334 $ (3,947 )   $ (19,224 ) $ 156  
    Add back: Gain on derecognition of previously consolidated entities $   na     $ (30,260 ) na  
    Adjusted earnings $ 62,361 $ 59,823   +4.2 % $ 106,991   $ 97,866 +9.3 %
    Adjusted earning per unit $ 1.37 $ 1.31   +4.6 % $ 2.35   $ 2.15 +9.3 %
                                 

    (11) “Per Unit” values, other than earnings per unit, refer to the related financial statement caption as defined under IFRS or related term as defined herein, divided by the weighted average basic units outstanding for the period.

    The terms Net Book Value, Components of Corporate investments, EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA, Alaris net distributable cashflow, Earnings Coverage Ratio, Run Rate Payout Ratio, Actual Payout Ratio, Run Rate Revenue, Run Rate Cash Flow and Per Unit amounts should only be used in conjunction with the Trust’s unaudited interim condensed consolidated financial statements, complete versions of which available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release contains forward-looking information and forward-looking statements (collectively, “forward-looking statements”) under applicable securities laws, including any applicable “safe harbor” provisions. Statements other than statements of historical fact contained in this news release are forward-looking statements, including, without limitation, management’s expectations, intentions and beliefs concerning the growth, results of operations, performance of the Trust and the Partners, the future financial position or results of the Trust, business strategy and plans and objectives of or involving the Trust or the Partners. Many of these statements can be identified by looking for words such as “believe”, “expects”, “will”, “intends”, “projects”, “anticipates”, “estimates”, “continues” or similar words or the negative thereof. In particular, this news release contains forward-looking statements regarding: the anticipated financial and operating performance of the Partners; the attractiveness of Alaris’ capital offering; the Trust’s Run Rate Payout Ratio, Run Rate Cash Flow, Run Rate Revenue and total revenue; the impact of recent new investments and follow-on investments; expectations regarding receipt (and amount of) any common equity distributions or dividends from Partners in which Alaris holds common equity, including the impact on the Trust’s net cash from operating activities, Run Rate Revenue, Run Rate Cash Flow and Run Rate Payout Ratio; the impact of future deployment; the Trust’s ability to deploy capital; the yield on the Trust’s investments and expected resets on Distributions; changes in SOFR and exchange rates; the impact of deferred Distributions and the timing of repayment there of; the Trust’s return on its investments; and Alaris’ expenses for 2024. To the extent any forward-looking statements herein constitute a financial outlook or future oriented financial information (collectively, “FOFI”), including estimates regarding revenues, Distributions from Partners (restarting full or partial Distributions and common equity distributions), Run Rate Payout Ratio, Run Rate Cash Flow, net cash from operating activities, expenses and impact of capital deployment, they were approved by management as of the date hereof and have been included to provide an understanding with respect to Alaris’ financial performance and are subject to the same risks and assumptions disclosed herein. There can be no assurance that the plans, intentions or expectations upon which these forward-looking statements are based will occur.

    By their nature, forward-looking statements require Alaris to make assumptions and are subject to inherent risks and uncertainties. Assumptions about the performance of the Canadian and U.S. economies over the next 24 months and how that will affect Alaris’ business and that of its Partners (including, without limitation, the impact of any global health crisis, like COVID-19, and global economic and political factors) are material factors considered by Alaris management when setting the outlook for Alaris. Key assumptions include, but are not limited to, assumptions that: the Russia/Ukraine conflict, conflicts in the Middle East, and other global economic pressures over the next twelve months will not materially impact Alaris, its Partners or the global economy; interest rates will not rise in a matter materially different from the prevailing market expectation over the next 12 months; global heath crises, like COVID-19 or variants thereof, will not impact the economy or our Partners operations in a material way in the next 12 months; the businesses of the majority of our Partners will continue to grow; more private companies will require access to alternative sources of capital; the businesses of new Partners and those of existing Partners will perform in line with Alaris’ expectations and diligence; and that Alaris will have the ability to raise required equity and/or debt financing on acceptable terms. Management of Alaris has also assumed that the Canadian and U.S. dollar trading pair will remain in a range of approximately plus or minus 15% of the current rate over the next 6 months. In determining expectations for economic growth, management of Alaris primarily considers historical economic data provided by the Canadian and U.S. governments and their agencies as well as prevailing economic conditions at the time of such determinations.

    There can be no assurance that the assumptions, plans, intentions or expectations upon which these forward-looking statements are based will occur. Forward-looking statements are subject to risks, uncertainties and assumptions and should not be read as guarantees or assurances of future performance. The actual results of the Trust and the Partners could materially differ from those anticipated in the forward-looking statements contained herein as a result of certain risk factors, including, but not limited to, the following: widespread health crises is, like COVID-19 (or its variants), other global economic factors (including, without limitation, the Russia/Ukraine conflict, conflicts in the Middle East, inflationary measures and global supply chain disruptions on the global economy, Trust and the Partners (including how many Partners will experience a slowdown of their business and the length of time of such slowdown)), the dependence of Alaris on the Partners, including any new investment structures; leverage and restrictive covenants under credit facilities; reliance on key personnel; failure to complete or realize the anticipated benefit of Alaris’ financing arrangements with the Partners; a failure to obtain required regulatory approvals on a timely basis or at all; changes in legislation and regulations and the interpretations thereof; risks relating to the Partners and their businesses, including, without limitation, a material change in the operations of a Partner or the industries they operate in; inability to close additional Partner contributions or collect proceeds from any redemptions in a timely fashion on anticipated terms, or at all; a failure to settle outstanding litigation on expected terms, or at all; a change in the ability of the Partners to continue to pay Alaris at expected Distribution levels or restart distributions (in full or in part); a failure to collect material deferred Distributions; a change in the unaudited information provided to the Trust; and a failure to realize the benefits of any concessions or relief measures provided by Alaris to any Partner or to successfully execute an exit strategy for a Partner where desired. Additional risks that may cause actual results to vary from those indicated are discussed under the heading “Risk Factors” and “Forward Looking Statements” in Alaris’ Management Discussion and Analysis and Annual Information Form for the year ended December 31, 2023, which is or will be (in the case of the AIF) filed under Alaris’ profile at www.sedarplus.ca and on its website at www.alarisequitypartners.com.

    Readers are cautioned that the assumptions used in the preparation of forward-looking statements, including FOFI, although considered reasonable at the time of preparation, based on information in Alaris’ possession as of the date hereof, may prove to be imprecise. In addition, there are a number of factors that could cause Alaris’ actual results, performance or achievement to differ materially from those expressed in, or implied by, forward looking statements and FOFI, or if any of them do so occur, what benefits the Trust will derive therefrom. As such, undue reliance should not be placed on any forward-looking statements, including FOFI.

    The Trust has included the forward-looking statements and FOFI in order to provide readers with a more complete perspective on Alaris’ future operations and such information may not be appropriate for other purposes. The forward-looking statements, including FOFI, contained herein are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement. Alaris disclaims any intention or obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law.

    For more information please contact:

    Investor Relations
    Alaris Equity Partners Income Trust
    403-260-1457
    ir@alarisequity.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Rosanna Costa: Medium – and long-run trends in interest rates – causes and implications for monetary policy

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    1. Welcome Remarks

    Good morning to all the speakers, discussants, the organizers of this event, Atif Mian, Sofia Bauducco, Mariana García and Lucciano Villacorta, and everyone who is here attending in person and to those following us via streaming. We welcome you to the twenty-seventh Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile entitled “Medium- and Long-Run Trends in Interest Rates: Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy.”

    Since 1997, the Central Bank of Chile (BCCh) has been convening prominent scholars and policymakers to this Conference to discuss major issues in central banking and their implications for emerging economies. Since its inception, this Conference has served as a bridge between academics and policymakers. This version is no exception: fresh and thoughtful research will support the discussion over the next two days on a topic that is very much front and center on the policy agenda. We will enjoy the presentations of seven authors, seven discussants, two keynote speakers, and a policy panel.

    2. Motivation and context

    This year’s conference tackles a topic that is increasingly at the forefront of economic discussions: the future trajectory of long-run real interest rates, their potential determinants, and the implications for monetary policy. The timing of this topic couldn’t be more relevant, especially in light of the sharpest and most synchronized monetary tightening we have seen in decades.

    As we all know, central banks in advanced economies have recently started lowering their policy rates and in many emerging economies this normalization process has been under way for some time now. Even so, policy rates had risen significantly over the past two years from their record lows in decades. This shift has sparked a lively debate regarding the future of medium- and long-run trends in the real rates; specifically, whether policy rates will revert to their pre-pandemic lows or will settle at a higher level.

    Opinions on this matter vary widely among experts and I think there is not a clear consensus on what the long run interest rates will look like in the future. On the one hand, there are reasons to believe that real interest rates are likely to revert to their historical lows, as the key factors that were mainly thought to have driven these rates down over the past forty years-such as demographic shifts, stagnant productivity growth, increased market power, higher risk aversion and sustained demand for safe assets-do not seem likely to revert sufficiently to produce a significant and lasting increase in real interest rates in the coming years.

    On the other hand, recent market indicators suggest that equilibrium long-term real interest rates have risen. Also, some new estimates of the natural interest rate-defined as the “long-run” equilibrium rate after shocks have dissipated-indicates that this rate may have risen in several advanced countries in the past few years. As I will discuss in a while, this shift could indicate that at least some structural drivers of real interest rates have changed direction or that the natural interest rate is adjusting to a new economic environment possibly characterized by higher levels of public debt.

    The future evolution of the natural interest rate has significant implications for monetary policy. Accurately assessing the long-run trend of the natural rate is essential for central banks, as this rate serves as a crucial reference point for monetary policy. The difference between the real interest rate and the natural rate provides valuable insight into a central bank’s monetary stance and aids in evaluating various policy options.

    However, the natural rate is an abstract concept, and its estimates often carry considerable uncertainty, particularly in the post-pandemic period. Since the natural rate is not directly observable, understanding its determinants has become vital for effective monetary policy. I am confident that the fruitful discussions we will have during this conference will deepen our understanding of these determinants and clarify where natural rates and other relevant interest rates may stand in the years ahead.

    In these opening remarks, I would like to take a moment to briefly review the key empirical long run trends we have observed in interest rates, as well as the primary explanations put forth in the literature. Following that, I will walk you through the main agenda of the Conference.

    3. Drivers behind the trends in interest rates

    Over the past forty years (up to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020-2021), we have seen a remarkable decline in nominal interest rates across the globe. For example, during the 1981 to 2020 period, nominal returns on U.S. Treasury bonds, both short and long term, dropped significantly. The 2-year Treasury Bills experienced a drop of around 14 percentage points, and 10-year bonds saw a decline of 13 percentage points. During this same period, inflation also fell, albeit to a lesser degree, leading to real rate declines of about 5 and 4 percentage points for the 2- and 10-year bonds, respectively, putting sovereign real interest rates close to zero and even in negative territory for some periods. The decline was not limited to sovereign bond rates; it was also present in the returns on other so-called “safe” assets. Importantly, this downward trend was not exclusive to the United States. Real long-term rates have declined by several percentage points since the early 1980s in both developed and emerging economies, so this appears to be a global phenomenon.

    The global downward trend in observed risk-free rates over an extended period suggests a significant decline in the natural interest rate, often referred to as the “long-run” equilibrium rate. This secular decline has coincided with a relatively stable trajectory in the marginal product of capital, a stable trajectory on the returns on risky assets, and a stable trajectory in the investment rate, particularly in advanced economies. As a result, these patterns are often attributed to factors that have increased the overall supply of savings over the years, alongside factors that have redirected this excess in savings toward the demand for safe assets rather than productive investments.

    In recent years, much of the literature has centered on the hypothesis of a “global saving glut.” This theory suggests that a significant excess of savings from certain countries and affluent groups has led to a marked shift toward safe assets. Consequently, there has been a notable increase in the prices of these assets, accompanied by a decline in interest rates.

    One contributor to this phenomenon was the increased savings from emerging economies, particularly since the 1990s. Factors such as robust economic growth, soaring commodity prices, and high risk aversion all fueled greater savings in these regions. As a result, these economies channeled substantial portions of their savings into global markets, with a significant impact on interest rates in developed countries.

    Another contributor to this saving glut was the increasing savings rates among the wealthiest households in developed nations. As income inequality has risen, rich households have saved a larger share of their income, further contributing to the excess savings phenomenon. Research indicates that the savings of the top 1% in the United States is comparable to the savings generated by the excess from emerging markets, a trend the literature refersto as the “saving glut of the rich.” This dynamic has profound implications for wealth distribution and economic stability.

    Other mentioned explanations for the excess savings are linked to more structural factors, such as the secular stagnation hypothesis, which suggests a persistent decline in potential economic growth that limits investment opportunities, thereby driving savings toward safer assets. Additionally, demographic changes-including declining population growth and longer life expectancy-have influenced savings behavior across generations and regions.

    Finally, rising risk aversion, the declining cost of investment goods, and the substantial increase in corporate power over recent years further explain why this increase in savings has been directed toward safe assets rather than productive investments.

    Over the past 40 years, all these factors have shaped the dynamics of savings, investment, and, consequently, interest rates, each contributing with varying significance during different phases. Looking ahead, the trajectory of interest rates will heavily depend on the uncertain evolution of these drivers.

    The outlook for these structural factors influencing real interest rates is mixed. On the one hand, several key factors behind the pre-pandemic decline in interest rates- such as low potential growth, rising inequality, increasing uncertainty, growing market power, and longer life expectancy- show no significant signs of changing direction. These forces suggest that real interest rates may revert to their declining pre-pandemic trend. On the other hand, additional factors could lead to a sustained rise in rates. These include a decrease in savings due to a growing inactive population, substantial fiscal deficits resulting in very high levels of debt, potential productivity gains from advancements in artificial intelligence, geopolitical risks and climate disasters affecting global savings, and significant investments in the green transition.

    I hope our upcoming discussion will help clarify the direction of these drivers and enhance our understanding of where the natural interest rate may be headed in the future.

    4. Conference contents

    Let me now give a very brief overview of what we will be hearing today and tomorrow:

    The Conference will start with the session “Interest Rates and Macroeconomic Policy” In this session, the paper by Francesco Bianchi, Renato Faccini and Leonardo Melosi examines the role of fiscal policy in shaping the future path of real interest rates. Then, the paper by Gabriel Jiménez, Dmitry Kuvshinov, José-Luis Peydró and Bjorn Richter will look at the links between the path of the monetary policy rate over time and the risk of banking crises from a historical perspective.

    Then, we will continue with the first keynote speech, delivered by Ricardo Reis. He will address the implications of interest rate trends on inflation, as well as the subsequent effects of inflation on these trends.

    We will then transition to our second academic session, which will focus on “Theories of Natural Interest Rates.” The natural interest rate, an abstract concept, is defined as the interest rate that prevails in long-term equilibrium once economic shocks have dissipated and prices are fully flexible. As a latent variable, understanding its determinants and refining its measurement is of paramount importance.

    This session will begin with a paper by Ozge Akinci, Gianluca Beningno, Marco del Negro, and Albert Queralto, who propose a complementary concept referred to as the Financial (In) Stability Real Interest Rate. While the natural interest rate is typically associated with macroeconomic stability, this new concept emphasizes the critical importance of financial stability. Following this presentation, Galo Nuño will discuss three theories concerning natural interest rates. Traditional theories often highlight structural drivers such as technological advancement and demographic changes. However, Galo’s paper will challenge this conventional view, exploring how factors such as public debt, household inequality, the zero lower bound, and persistent negative supply shocks may influence natural interest rates.

    To conclude this session, we will hear from Elías Albagli, Sofia Bauducco, Guillermo Carlomagno, Luis Gonzales, and Juan Marcos Wlasiuk, who will discuss the potential impacts of climate change and escalating geopolitical tensions on long-term interest rates.

    The second day will begin with the keynote speech titled “Long-Run Interest Rates: Past, Present, and Future” by Atif Mian. He will explore the interconnections between interest rates and both private and public debt over time. Atif will first address the role of inequality in explaining the simultaneous decline in interest rates and the rise in debt over the past few decades. He will then examine the dynamics of debt, discussing an appropriate constraint on interest rates to prevent explosive borrowing. Finally, he will focus on estimating future yields.

    Next, we will transition to the session titled “Interest Rates, Inflation, and Transmission to Emerging Markets.” This session will open with the paper “U.S. Anti-Inflationary Policy and Emerging Economies: 1980 vs. 2020s” by Drishan Banerjee, Galina Hale, and Harrison Shieh. Their paper analyzes macroeconomic data from advanced and emerging economies in the 1980s and 2020s to highlight differences in how U.S. monetary policies have impacted emerging markets in these two distinct periods. The second paper in this session, by Francisco Legaspe and Liliana Varela, will show how country-specific risks, such as political uncertainty and risk on debt repayment explain excess returns from investing in local currency assets in LATAM countries. Finally, a policy panel featuring Elias Albagli, Jean-Marc Natal, Boris Hofmann, and Ricardo Reis will offer insights into the future of interest rates and their implications for monetary policy in emerging economies. 

    5. Acknowledgements

    I would like to especially thank Atif Mian for being the external organizer of this Conference, as well as locals Sofia Bauducco, Mariana García and Lucciano Villacorta for putting togethersuch a wonderful program. I also thank all the speakers and contributors and look forward to the Conference volume that we will publish in some months with its formatted contents.

    Let me finish by thanking María José Reyes, Constanza Martinelli, Carolina Besa, Daniela Gaete, Daphne Guiloff, Pablo Barros, and both the Public Affairs Department and the Economic Research Department of the Central Bank of Chile for all their invaluable help managing the logistics of organizing this Annual Conference.

    I wish you a fruitful discussion over the next two days.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI: HighPeak Energy, Inc. Announces Third Quarter 2024 Financial and Operating Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    FORT WORTH, Texas, Nov. 04, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — HighPeak Energy, Inc. (“HighPeak” or the “Company”) (NASDAQ: HPK) today announced financial and operating results for the quarter and nine months ended September 30, 2024, and provided updated 2024 production guidance.

    Highlights
    Third Quarter 2024

    • Sales volumes averaged 51,346 barrels of crude oil equivalent per day (“Boe/d”), consisting of 88% liquids (crude oil and NGL), representing a 6% increase over the second quarter 2024.
    • Net income was $49.9 million, or $0.35 per diluted share, and EBITDAX (a non-GAAP financial measure defined and reconciled below) was $214.3 million, or $1.51 per diluted share.
    • Generated free cash flow (a non-GAAP financial measure defined and reconciled below) of $36.1 million, which marks the fifth consecutive quarter of positive free cash flow generation.
    • The Company reduced long-term debt by $30 million during the third quarter and has reduced long-term debt by $90 million year-to-date, paid a quarterly dividend of $0.04 per share and continued to execute its share buyback plan by repurchasing over 870,000 shares during the third quarter.

    Recent Events

    • Increased 2024 average production guidance by more than 5% from the second quarter guidance revision and 10% from our original 2024 guidance to a range of 48,000 to 51,000 Boe/d expected for the full year 2024.
    • On November 4, 2024, the Company’s Board of Directors declared a quarterly dividend of $0.04 per common share outstanding payable in December 2024.

    Statement from HighPeak Chairman and CEO, Jack Hightower:

    “We promised this would be a year marked by steady and reliable achievements, and I am proud we have continued to demonstrate that commitment. There are three main takeaways from our third quarter results. First, our current well performance has led us to increase our full year production guidance 10% higher than originally projected. Second, our operations team continues to tighten costs, resulting in more capital and operating efficiencies across the corporate structure. Third, we continue to generate free cash flow, more than $200 million over the last five quarters, which in turn has strengthened our balance sheet and positioned us to take advantage of opportunities that increase shareholder value.

    “With HighPeak’s core values of maintaining disciplined operations, strengthening our balance sheet and maximizing value for our shareholders, we will finish strong in 2024 and set the course for continued momentum in 2025. Concurrently, we will remain diligent in our strategic alternatives process, with the goal of identifying a line of sight that will realize optimal value of this high quality asset.”

    Third Quarter 2024 Operational Update

    HighPeak’s sales volumes during the third quarter of 2024 averaged 51,346 Boe/d, a 6% increase over second quarter of 2024. Third quarter sales volumes consisted of approximately 88% liquids (crude oil and NGL).

    The Company ran two drilling rigs and one frac crew during the third quarter, drilled 17 gross (16.9 net) horizontal wells and completed 14 gross (10.5 net) producing horizontal wells. At September 30, 2024, the Company had 24 gross (23.9 net) horizontal wells and 1 gross (1.0 net) salt-water disposal well in various stages of drilling and completion.

    HighPeak President, Michael Hollis, commented,

    “The third quarter was another operationally disciplined, beat-and-raise quarter for HighPeak Energy. We increased the midpoint of our yearly production guide by an additional 5%, which is up 10% from our original guide. We also have exciting results both in our northern extension areas and our first well in the Middle Spraberry zone. The results of these successful wells bolster our massive runway of over 1,150 sub $50 oil breakeven drilling location inventory. At our current development cadence, that is over two decades of highly economic inventory.

    “As most are aware, there are structural differences between the Delaware and the Midland Basins that results in the D,C&E cost to be less in the Midland Basin. These structural differences of depth, pressure and horse-power requirements for stimulation can lead to over $3 million of savings per well. HighPeak’s acreage enjoys similar structural differences compared with the more central portions of the Midland Basin. HighPeak’s D,C&E costs are roughly $2 million dollars cheaper per well than average Midland Basin wells. Generating similar oil recoveries for roughly 25% less cost per foot, generates superior returns. Sustaining this for decades will drive significant shareholder value.

    “The HighPeak team continues to be focused on reducing operational and capital costs. All the hard work and effort over the last few years is now paying off. HighPeak lowered the midpoint of its 2024 LOE guide by 12.5% last quarter and we reaffirm our LOE range and tightened capital expenditure range for 2024. As continuous improvement is in our DNA, we look forward to achieving additional efficiency gains in 2025.”

    Third Quarter 2024 Financial Results

    HighPeak reported net income of $49.9 million for the third quarter of 2024, or $0.35 per diluted share. The Company reported EBITDAX of $214.3 million, or $1.51 per diluted share.

    Third quarter average realized prices were $75.99 per barrel (“$/Bbl”) of crude oil, $21.14 per barrel of NGL and $0.42 per Mcf of natural gas, resulting in an overall realized price of $57.49 per Boe, or 76.3% of the weighted average of NYMEX crude oil prices, excluding the effects of derivatives. HighPeak’s cash costs for the third quarter were $11.81 per Boe, including lease operating expenses of $7.12 per Boe, workover expenses of $0.38 per Boe, production and ad valorem taxes of $3.26 per Boe and G&A expenses of $1.05 per Boe. As a result, the Company’s unhedged EBITDAX per Boe was $45.68, or 79.5% of the overall realized price per Boe for the quarter, excluding the effects of derivatives.

    HighPeak’s third quarter 2024 capital expenditures to drill, complete, equip, provide facilities and for infrastructure were $140.0 million. 

    Dividends

    During the third quarter of 2024, HighPeak’s Board of Directors approved a quarterly dividend of $0.04 per share, or $5.0 million in dividends paid to stockholders during the quarter. In addition, in November 2024, the Company’s Board of Directors declared a quarterly dividend of $0.04 per share, or approximately $5.0 million in dividends, to be paid on December 23, 2024 to stockholders of record on December 2, 2024.

    Conference Call

    HighPeak will host a conference call and webcast on Tuesday, November 5, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. Central Time for investors and analysts to discuss its results for the third quarter of 2024. Conference call participants may register for the call here. Access to the live audio-only webcast and replay of the earnings release conference call may be found here. A live broadcast of the earnings conference call will also be available on the HighPeak Energy website at www.highpeakenergy.com under the “Investors” section of the website. A replay will also be available on the website following the call.

    When available, a copy of the Company’s earnings release, investor presentation and Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q may be found on its website at www.highpeakenergy.com.

    About HighPeak Energy, Inc.

    HighPeak Energy, Inc. is a publicly traded independent crude oil and natural gas company, headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas, focused on the acquisition, development, exploration and exploitation of unconventional crude oil and natural gas reserves in the Midland Basin in West Texas. For more information, please visit our website at www.highpeakenergy.com.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    The information in this press release contains forward-looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties. When used in this document, the words “believes,” “plans,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “forecasts,” “intends,” “continue,” “may,” “will,” “could,” “should,” “future,” “potential,” “estimate” or the negative of such terms and similar expressions as they relate to HighPeak Energy, Inc. (“HighPeak Energy,” the “Company” or the “Successor”) are intended to identify forward-looking statements, which are generally not historical in nature. The forward-looking statements are based on the Company’s current expectations, assumptions, estimates and projections about the Company and the industry in which the Company operates. Although the Company believes that the expectations and assumptions reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable as and when made, they involve risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict and, in many cases, beyond the Company’s control. For example, the Company’s review of strategic alternatives may not result in a sale of the Company, a recommendation that a transaction occur or result in a completed transaction, and any transaction that occurs may not increase shareholder value, in each case as a result of such risks and uncertainties.

    These risks and uncertainties include, among other things, the results of the strategic review being undertaken by the Company’s Board and the interest of prospective counterparties, the Company’s ability to realize the results contemplated by its 2024 guidance, volatility of commodity prices, product supply and demand, the impact of a widespread outbreak of an illness, such as the coronavirus disease pandemic, on global and U.S. economic activity, competition, the ability to obtain environmental and other permits and the timing thereof, other government regulation or action, the ability to obtain approvals from third parties and negotiate agreements with third parties on mutually acceptable terms, litigation, the costs and results of drilling and operations, availability of equipment, services, resources and personnel required to perform the Company’s drilling and operating activities, access to and availability of transportation, processing, fractionation, refining and storage facilities, HighPeak Energy’s ability to replace reserves, implement its business plans or complete its development activities as scheduled, access to and cost of capital, the financial strength of counterparties to any credit facility and derivative contracts entered into by HighPeak Energy, if any, and purchasers of HighPeak Energy’s oil, natural gas liquids and natural gas production, uncertainties about estimates of reserves, identification of drilling locations and the ability to add proved reserves in the future, the assumptions underlying forecasts, including forecasts of production, expenses, cash flow from sales of oil and gas and tax rates, quality of technical data, environmental and weather risks, including the possible impacts of climate change, cybersecurity risks and acts of war or terrorism. These and other risks are described in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K, Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q, and Current Reports on Form 8-K and other filings with the SEC. The Company undertakes no duty to publicly update these statements except as required by law.

    Reserve engineering is a process of estimating underground accumulations of hydrocarbons that cannot be measured in an exact way. The accuracy of any reserve estimate depends on the quality of available data, the interpretation of such data and price and cost assumptions made by reserve engineers. Reserves estimates included herein may not be indicative of the level of reserves or PV-10 value of oil and natural gas production in the future. In addition, the results of drilling, testing and production activities may justify revisions of estimates that were made previously. If significant, such revisions could impact HighPeak’s strategy and change the schedule of any further production and development drilling. Accordingly, reserve estimates may differ significantly from the quantities of oil and natural gas that are ultimately recovered.

    Use of Projections

    The financial, operational, industry and market projections, estimates and targets in this press release and in the Company’s guidance (including production, operating expenses and capital expenditures in future periods) are based on assumptions that are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies, many of which are beyond the Company’s control. The assumptions and estimates underlying the projected, expected or target results are inherently uncertain and are subject to a wide variety of significant business, economic, regulatory and competitive risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in the financial, operational, industry and market projections, estimates and targets, including assumptions, risks and uncertainties described in “Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements” above. These projections are speculative by their nature and, accordingly, are subject to significant risk of not being actually realized by the Company. Projected results of the Company for 2024 are particularly speculative and subject to change. Actual results may vary materially from the current projections, including for reasons beyond the Company’s control. The projections are based on current expectations and available information as of the date of this release. The Company undertakes no duty to publicly update these projections except as required by law.

    Drilling Locations

    The Company has estimated its drilling locations based on well spacing assumptions and upon the evaluation of its drilling results and those of other operators in its area, combined with its interpretation of available geologic and engineering data. The drilling locations actually drilled on the Company’s properties will depend on the availability of capital, regulatory approvals, commodity prices, costs, actual drilling results and other factors. Any drilling activities conducted on these identified locations may not be successful and may not result in additional proved reserves. Further, to the extent the drilling locations are associated with acreage that expires, the Company would lose its right to develop the related locations.

           
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet Data
    (In thousands)
           
      September 30, 2024   December 31, 2023
    Current assets:          
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 135,573     $ 194,515  
    Accounts receivable   76,444       94,589  
    Derivative instruments   24,843       31,480  
    Inventory   7,966       7,254  
    Prepaid expenses   3,921       995  
    Total current assets   248,747       328,833  
    Crude oil and natural gas properties, using the successful efforts method of accounting:          
    Proved properties   3,798,128       3,338,107  
    Unproved properties   75,088       72,715  
    Accumulated depletion, depreciation and amortization   (1,079,113 )     (684,179 )
    Total crude oil and natural gas properties, net   2,794,103       2,726,643  
    Other property and equipment, net   3,483       3,572  
    Derivative instruments         16,059  
    Other noncurrent assets   15,133       5,684  
    Total assets $ 3,061,466     $ 3,080,791  
               
    Current liabilities:          
    Current portion of long-term debt, net $ 120,000     $ 120,000  
    Accounts payable – trade   52,557       63,583  
    Accrued capital expenditures   30,388       39,231  
    Revenues and royalties payable   28,532       29,724  
    Other accrued liabilities   25,499       19,613  
    Derivative instruments   1,937       13,054  
    Advances from joint interest owners   425       262  
    Operating leases   290       528  
    Accrued interest         1,398  
    Total current liabilities   259,628       287,393  
    Noncurrent liabilities:          
    Long-term debt, net   953,825       1,030,299  
    Deferred income taxes   227,966       197,068  
    Asset retirement obligations   14,231       13,245  
    Operating leases   126        
    Derivative instruments         65  
    Commitments and contingencies          
               
    Stockholders’ equity          
    Common stock   13       13  
    Additional paid-in capital   1,173,231       1,189,424  
    Retained earnings   432,446       363,284  
    Total stockholders’ equity   1,605,690       1,552,721  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 3,061,466     $ 3,080,791  
               
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (in thousands, except per share data)
                 
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Nine Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Operating revenues:                      
    Crude oil sales $ 270,636     $ 338,372     $ 827,595     $ 790,458  
    NGL and natural gas sales   942       7,214       7,013       19,682  
    Total operating revenues   271,578       345,586       834,608       810,140  
    Operating costs and expenses:                      
    Crude oil and natural gas production   35,413       39,820       98,482       107,696  
    Production and ad valorem taxes   15,412       18,839       46,410       44,395  
    Exploration and abandonments   362       1,728       1,027       4,372  
    Depletion, depreciation and amortization   136,578       117,420       395,121       291,562  
    Accretion of discount   241       122       722       360  
    General and administrative   4,971       6,934       14,391       11,952  
    Stock-based compensation   3,753       14,057       11,326       22,095  
    Total operating costs and expenses   196,730       198,920       567,479       482,432  
    Other expense   1,404       540       3,405       8,042  
    Income from operations   73,444       146,126       263,724       319,666  
    Interest income   2,172       730       6,964       923  
    Interest expense   (42,579 )     (37,022 )     (129,204 )     (103,278 )
    Loss on derivative instruments, net   32,334       (29,655 )     (23,411 )     (30,898 )
    Loss on extinguishment of debt         (27,300 )           (27,300 )
    Income before income taxes   65,371       52,879       118,073       159,113  
    Income tax expense   15,438       14,100       31,985       38,251  
    Net income $ 49,933     $ 38,779     $ 86,088     $ 120,862  
                           
    Earnings per share:                      
    Basic net income $ 0.36     $ 0.28     $ 0.62     $ 0.94  
    Diluted net income $ 0.35     $ 0.28     $ 0.60     $ 0.90  
                           
    Weighted average shares outstanding:                      
    Basic   124,988       123,159       125,595       115,164  
    Diluted   129,094       127,006       129,581       120,531  
                           
    Dividends declared per share $ 0.04     $ 0.025     $ 0.12     $ 0.075  
                                   

     

    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (in thousands)
               
      Nine Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023
    CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES:          
    Net income $ 86,088     $ 120,862  
    Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash provided by operations:          
    Provision for deferred income taxes   30,898       38,251  
    Loss on extinguishment of debt         27,300  
    Loss on derivative instruments   23,411       30,898  
    Cash paid on settlement of derivative instruments   (11,897 )     (21,032 )
    Amortization of debt issuance costs   6,199       9,352  
    Amortization of original issue discounts on long-term debt   7,385       12,660  
    Stock-based compensation expense   11,326       22,095  
    Accretion expense   722       360  
    Depletion, depreciation and amortization expense   395,121       291,562  
    Exploration and abandonment expense   386       3,747  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:          
    Accounts receivable   18,145       (29,385 )
    Prepaid expenses, inventory and other assets   (12,387 )     (1,628 )
    Accounts payable, accrued liabilities and other current liabilities   (4,524 )     16,700  
    Net cash provided by operating activities   550,873       521,742  
    CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES:          
    Additions to crude oil and natural gas properties   (452,148 )     (840,663 )
    Changes in working capital associated with crude oil and natural gas property additions   (13,214 )     (86,468 )
    Acquisitions of crude oil and natural gas properties   (10,367 )     (9,602 )
    Proceeds from sales of properties   118        
    Deposit and other costs related to pending acquisitions         (409 )
    Other property additions   (216 )     (103 )
    Net cash used in investing activities   (475,827 )     (937,245 )
    CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES:          
    Repayments under Term Loan Credit Agreement   (90,000 )      
    Repurchased shares under buyback program   (27,247 )      
    Dividends paid   (15,082 )     (8,706 )
    Dividend equivalents paid   (1,602 )     (903 )
    Debt issuance costs   (58 )     (26,401 )
    Proceeds from exercises of warrants   1       1,728  
    Borrowings under Term Loan Credit Agreement         1,170,000  
    Repayments under Prior Credit Agreement         (525,000 )
    Repayments of 10.000% Senior Notes and 10.625% Senior Notes         (475,000 )
    Borrowings under Prior Credit Agreement         255,000  
    Proceeds from issuance of common stock         155,768  
    Stock offering costs         (5,371 )
    Premium on extinguishment of debt         (4,457 )
    Proceeds from exercises of stock options         148  
    Net cash (used in) provided by financing activities   (133,988 )     536,806  
    Net (decrease) increase in cash and cash equivalents   (58,942 )     121,303  
    Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period   194,515       30,504  
    Cash and cash equivalents, end of period $ 135,573     $ 151,807  
               
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Summary Operating Highlights
                           
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Nine Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Average Daily Sales Volumes:                      
    Crude oil (Bbls)   38,710       44,381       38,581       37,171  
    NGLs (Bbls)   6,497       4,708       5,890       3,895  
    Natural gas (Mcf)   36,831       21,716       32,418       18,221  
    Total (Boe)   51,346       52,708       49,874       44,102  
                           
    Average Realized Prices (excluding effects of derivatives):                      
    Crude oil per Bbl $ 75.99     $ 82.87     $ 78.29     $ 77.90  
    NGL per Bbl $ 21.14     $ 20.08     $ 21.96     $ 22.23  
    Natural gas per Mcf $ 0.42     $ 1.89     $ 0.58     $ 1.58  
    Total per Boe $ 57.49     $ 71.27     $ 61.07     $ 67.29  
                           
    Margin Data ($ per Boe):                      
    Average price, excluding effects of derivatives $ 57.49     $ 71.27     $ 61.07     $ 67.29  
    Lease operating expenses   (7.12 )     (7.87 )     (6.74 )     (8.23 )
    Expense workovers   (0.38 )     (0.34 )     (0.47 )     (0.71 )
    Production and ad valorem taxes   (3.26 )     (3.89 )     (3.40 )     (3.69 )
    General and administrative expenses   (1.05 )     (1.43 )     (1.05 )     (0.99 )
      $ 45.68     $ 57.74     $ 49.41     $ 53.67  
                           
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Earnings Per Share Details
                           
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Nine Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Net income as reported $ 49,933     $ 38,779     $ 86,088     $ 120,862  
    Participating basic earnings   (4,835 )     (3,771 )     (8,280 )     (12,413 )
    Basic earnings attributable to common shareholders   45,098       35,008       77,808       108,449  
    Reallocation of participating earnings   66       54       102       192  
    Diluted net income attributable to common shareholders $ 45,164     $ 35,062     $ 77,910     $ 108,641  
                           
    Basic weighted average shares outstanding   124,988       123,159       125,595       115,164  
    Dilutive warrants and unvested stock options   1,952       1,688       1,832       3,208  
    Dilutive unvested restricted stock   2,154       2,159       2,154       2,159  
    Diluted weighted average shares outstanding   129,094       127,006       129,581       120,531  
                           
    Net income per share attributable to common shareholders:                      
    Basic $ 0.36     $ 0.28     $ 0.62     $ 0.94  
    Diluted $ 0.35     $ 0.28     $ 0.60     $ 0.90  
                           
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Reconciliation of Net Income to EBITDAX, Discretionary Cash Flow and Net Cash Provided by Operations
    (in thousands)
                 
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Nine Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Net income $ 49,933     $ 38,779     $ 86,088     $ 120,862  
    Interest expense   42,579       37,022       129,204       103,278  
    Interest income   (2,172 )     (730 )     (6,964 )     (923 )
    Income tax expense   15,438       14,100       31,985       38,251  
    Depletion, depreciation and amortization   136,578       117,420       395,121       291,562  
    Accretion of discount   241       122       722       360  
    Exploration and abandonment expense   362       1,728       1,027       4,372  
    Stock based compensation   3,753       14,057       11,326       22,095  
    Derivative related noncash activity   (33,775 )     15,883       11,514       9,866  
    Loss on extinguishment of debt         27,300             27,300  
    Other expense   1,404       540       3,405       8,042  
    EBITDAX   214,341       266,221       663,428       625,065  
    Cash interest expense   (38,020 )     (33,798 )     (115,620 )     (85,723 )
    Other (a)   53       4,480       1,831       (3,287 )
    Discretionary cash flow   176,374       236,903       549,639       536,055  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities   729       (78,837 )     1,234       (14,313 )
    Net cash provided by operating activities $ 177,103     $ 158,066     $ 550,873     $ 521,742  
                           
    (a) includes interest and other income net of current tax expense, other expense and operating portion of exploration and abandonment expenses.
     
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Free Cash Flow Reconciliation
    (in thousands)
               
      Three Months Ended September 30, 2024   Nine Months Ended September 30, 2024
               
    Net cash provided by operating activities $ 177,103     $ 550,873  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities   (729 )     (1,234 )
    Discretionary cash flow   176,374       549,639  
    Less: Additions to crude oil and natural gas properties (excluding acquisitions)   (140,251 )     (452,148 )
    Free cash flow $ 36,123     $ 97,491  
               

    Investor Contact:

    Ryan Hightower
    Vice President, Business Development
    817.850.9204
    rhightower@highpeakenergy.com

    Source: HighPeak Energy, Inc.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Liberia

    Source: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade – Safe Travel

    • Reviewed: 22 November 2022, 14:57 NZDT
    • Still current at: 5 November 2024

    Related news features

    If you are planning international travel at this time, please read our COVID-19 related travel advice here, alongside our destination specific travel advice below.

    Exercise increased caution in Liberia due to the unpredictable security situation and violent crime (level 2 of 4).  

    Liberia

    Violent Crime
    Violent crime occurs throughout Liberia, and there is a high incidence of armed robbery, sexual assault, mugging and residential burglary. Most crime is opportunistic but there are also organised criminal groups. Criminals are often armed, typically with a knife or a machete. The level of crime is much higher after dark. 

    As foreigners may be targeted due to their perceived wealth, avoid displaying or wearing items that appear valuable, such as mobile devices and jewellery. Walking alone or travelling after dark should be avoided. No resistance should be given if you are the victim of an armed robbery or mugging, as this could lead to an escalation in violence. Avoid travelling alone or after dark.

    Liberian police and authorities have a very limited capacity to respond and provide effective protective services, particularly outside the capital Monrovia.  

    Terrorism
    There is no history of terrorism in Liberia; however, terrorist groups remain active across West Africa and attacks in other countries have targeted beach resorts, hotels, cafes and restaurants visited by foreigners.

    New Zealanders in Liberia are advised to keep themselves informed of potential risks to safety and security by monitoring the media and other local information sources. We recommend following any instructions issued by the local authorities and exercising vigilance in public places.

    Local travel
    New Zealanders considering travel to Liberia are advised to make adequate security arrangements with a reliable organisation in advance of your arrival. 

    You should avoid local public transport. Pre-arrange transport for the duration of your stay, including to and from the airport, which is located some distance from downtown Monrovia. Taxis should be booked using a reputable company via a trusted friend or through your hotel. When travelling by road, keep doors locked and windows up at all times, as taxis have been occasionally targeted for robbery. Secure tourist facilities and accommodation are very limited and poorly maintained. Stay only in reputable accommodation with adequate guarding. Photo identification should be carried at all times.

    The security situation in Grand Gedeh and River Gee counties, which border Cote D’Ivoire, can be unstable. There are armed groups near the border and occasional cross-border attacks have occurred in the past.

    Civil Unrest
    The security situation in Liberia remains fragile. Sporadic demonstrations and local disturbances can turn violent and there is ongoing potential for unrest. Police may use tear gas and/or water cannons to disperse demonstrations.  New Zealanders in Liberia are advised to avoid all large crowds, political rallies and demonstrations as they have the potential to turn violent. 

    Scams
    Commercial and internet fraud is common in Liberia. New Zealanders should be wary of any offers that seem too good to be true, as they may be a scam. For further information see our advice on Internet Fraud and International Scams and Internet dating scams

    Ebola Virus Disease
    Following an Ebola outbreak in 2014, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared Liberia free of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) transmission in June 2016. For more information on Ebola, please see the Ministry of Health’s website and the WHO website. 

    General Travel Advice
    As there is no New Zealand diplomatic presence in Liberia, the ability of the government to provide consular assistance to New Zealand citizens is severely limited. We offer advice to New Zealanders about contingency planning that travellers to Liberia should consider. 

    Modern medical services in Liberia are very limited, so we advise New Zealanders travelling or living in Liberia to have a comprehensive travel insurance policy in place that includes provision for medical evacuation by air.

    Penalties for possession, use or trafficking of illegal drugs are severe and can include lengthy imprisonment or fines.

    Photography of government offices, airports, military establishments or officials, is prohibited, and could result in detention. If in doubt, don’t take a picture.

    Authorities may ask for proof of your identity, so carry a colour photocopy of your passport and visa for Liberia at all times. Checkpoints operate throughout the country.

    New Zealanders in Liberia are encouraged to register their details with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

    Travel tips

    See our regional advice for Africa

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former Miami-Dade Corrections Officer Pleads Guilty to $150,000 COVID-19 Fraud

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    MIAMI – Yesterday, Daniel Fleureme, 56, of Miami-Dade County, a former Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department (MDCRD) Corrections Officer, pled guilty to wire fraud for defrauding a COVID-19 relief program by fraudulently obtaining an Economic Injury Disaster Loan from the U. S. Small Business Administration (SBA).

    The Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act was designed to provide emergency financial assistance to the millions of Americans who were suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. One source of relief provided by the CARES Act were Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs) to eligible small businesses experiencing substantial financial disruptions. These EIDLs were provided directly to borrowers by the SBA.

    On July 27, 2020, Fleureme, while he was employed full-time by MDCRD as a Corrections Officer, submitted to the SBA a false and fraudulent EIDL application claiming to be the 100% owner of a sole proprietorship operating under the company legal and DBA names of “Daniel Fleureme.” In this fraudulent application, Fleureme claimed that he had owned the business since its creation on Feb. 15, 2017, and stated that the business had three employees as of Jan. 31, 2020. Fleureme’s EIDL application also falsely certified that for the 12-month period prior to Jan. 31, 2020, his sole proprietorship had gross revenues of $450,000 and a cost of goods sold of only $97,000. As a result of this fraudulent EIDL application, Fleureme received approximately $150,000 in EIDL proceeds from the SBA.

    He is scheduled to be sentenced on Jan. 7, 2025, at 11:00 a.m., before U.S. District Judge Jose E. Martinez in Miami. Fleureme faces up to 20 years in prison for the wire fraud conviction. The court will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida Markenzy Lapointe and Special Agent in Charge Jeffrey B. Veltri of the FBI, Miami Field Office, Inspector General Felix Jimenez of the Miami-Dade County Office of Inspector General (M-DC OIG), and Special Agent in Charge Amaleka McCall-Brathwaite, U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Inspector General (SBA OIG), Eastern Region, made the announcement.

    The FBI’s Miami Area Corruption Task Force, which includes task force officers from the M-DC OIG, working in conjunction with SBA OIG, investigated the case.  Assistant U.S. Attorney Edward N. Stamm is prosecuting the case.

    On May 17, 2021, the Attorney General established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Department of Justice in partnership with agencies across government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The Task Force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international criminal actors and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes, and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the department’s response to the pandemic, please visit https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus.

    On Sept. 15, 2022, the Attorney General selected the Southern District of Florida’s U.S. Attorney’s Office to head one of three national COVID-19 Fraud Strike Force Teams. The Department of Justice established the Strike Force to enhance existing efforts to combat and prevent COVID-19 related financial fraud.  The Strike Force combines law enforcement and prosecutorial resources and focuses on large-scale, multistate pandemic relief fraud perpetrated by criminal organizations and transnational actors, as well as those who committed multiple instances of pandemic relief fraud. The Strike Force uses prosecutor-led and data analyst-driven teams to identify and bring to justice those who stole pandemic relief funds. Additional information regarding the Strike Force may be found at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-covid-19-fraud-strike-force-teams.

    Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    Related court documents and information may be found on the website of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida at www.flsd.uscourts.gov or at http://pacer.flsd.uscourts.gov, under case number 24-cr-20407.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Global: Friends like these: What a second Trump term may mean for the CDC, and how it affects Canada

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Kevin Quigley, Scholarly Director of the MacEachen Institute for Public Policy and Governance, Dalhousie University

    Should Donald Trump be re-elected on Tuesday, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is likely facing a major shake-up. Many Republicans were frustrated by the CDC’s performance during the pandemic. Project 2025, authored by leading Republicans with ties to Trump, describes the CDC as incompetent and arrogant.

    In fact, no matter who wins the United States presidential election on Nov. 5, the Trump administration’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic is a cautionary tale for Canada.

    While there is significant and justifiable criticism to be leveled at Trump about his administration’s handling of the pandemic in the early stages, as former chief medical advisor to the president, Dr. Anthony Fauci noted to Congress in 2024, the U.S. health system is not designed for an effective co-ordinated response to a health crisis.

    Trump and the CDC

    There was clearly a disconnect between Trump and the CDC during the pandemic. For weeks in early 2020, President Trump had described the threat as low risk; he said that the situation was under control in the U.S. and that only a few cases had been reported.

    While the president was on a return flight from India, Dr. Nancy Messonnier, director of the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases at the CDC, announced that the situation in the U.S. was about to change quickly and severely. Officials say that Trump was very upset by the announcement and concerned about potential lockdowns causing panic and disruption to financial markets.

    Throughout the early stages of the pandemic, the actions of the CDC sparked a high degree of politicization. The Trump administration was criticized for interfering with the CDC’s operations and censoring internal experts. Disagreements between federal and state political leaders and public health experts led to inconsistencies in public health messaging, reporting, enforcement of directives and timing of public health restrictions.

    The CDC itself was not above criticism. The agency’s infrastructure had been neglected for decades, and years of declining funding resulted in insufficient preparations for a possible pandemic. The CDC had also been criticized for being too insular and academic.

    The CDC made key mistakes, particularly regarding surveillance and testing. It was criticized for underestimating the threat of the virus and overestimating its ability to design, manufacture and distribute a test quickly.

    Rapid responses are crucial during such events, and the early stages of the U.S.’s pandemic response provides salient lessons for Canada, both about its relationship with the U.S. and to global threats more generally.

    Pre-event planning is necessary, but audits and world rankings of emergency preparedness can be unreliable. In 2019, Johns Hopkins University ranked the U.S. as the best prepared country in the world to address a health crisis. The pandemic demonstrated that it was not.

    Canada needs to establish a strong and independent capacity to assess health threats. Trump’s early handling of the pandemic has been widely criticized, yet the Canadian government’s speaking points in the early stages were the same: the virus was low risk. It was only when the CDC and the World Health Organization increased its threat assessment that Canada followed suit.

    Lessons from the pandemic

    Borders can re-assert themselves. Despite decades of global political and economic agreements that saw a freer flow of goods, services and people, many western governments were unable or unwilling to assume the risks associated with letting those from other jurisdictions cross their borders, and as such, imposed strict rules to prevent non-citizens from entering. This aggressive stance was ironic and unforeseen, as during previous public health crises such as the H1N1 flu episode in 2009-10, many governments underscored that closing borders had little impact on disease spread.

    The weaknesses of supply chains were highlighted as the global economy shut down in March 2020. Canada’s Minister of Finance Chrystia Freeland described competition for medical supplies and personal protective equipment (PPE) as resembling the “wild west.” Shipment delays, order shortages, trade restrictions and defective or contaminated items prevented governments from effectively procuring supplies.

    Global manufacturing capabilities for vaccines were below what was needed, with only about a dozen countries able to produce COVID-19 vaccines early on, including the U.S. More than any other country, the U.S. enabled the rapid development and production of the vaccine, highlighting Canada’s considerable dependence on the U.S. Canada has since funded vaccine manufacturing initiatives, but the investments have produced little to-date.

    The adage “When the U.S. sneezes, the world catches a cold” applies nowhere more than in Canada. Should Trump be re-elected, the CDC will likely exist on a smaller budget with a reduced role internationally. This will increase Canadian vulnerabilities.

    Whatever the criticisms, the CDC has more capacity and influence than any other health agency in the world. If Canada cannot depend on strong and co-ordinated response from the U.S. administration during a health crisis, Canada has to be better prepared to adapt. Lessons from the pandemic provide a powerful to-do list.

    Kevin Quigley is the Scholarly Director of the MacEachen Institute for Public Policy and Governance, an independent, non-partisan research institute located at Dalhousie University.

    ref. Friends like these: What a second Trump term may mean for the CDC, and how it affects Canada – https://theconversation.com/friends-like-these-what-a-second-trump-term-may-mean-for-the-cdc-and-how-it-affects-canada-242673

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK to create world-first ‘early warning system’ for pandemics

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    The government is set to partner with Oxford Nanopore, which uses technology to rapidly diagnose a range of cancers, along with rare and infectious diseases

    • New partnership with cutting-edge life sciences company Oxford Nanopore will lead to better scientific research and could create tests and treatments for patients, saving lives

    • Patients suspected of having severe acute respiratory infections will be diagnosed within 6 hours, supporting the establishment of a new diagnostic system

    • Technology will allow potential outbreaks of bacterial or viral diseases to be monitored alongside antimicrobial resistance, shifting NHS from analogue to digital as part of 10-Year Health Plan

    The UK will create the world’s first real-time surveillance system to monitor the threat of future pandemics, prevent disease, and protect the public.

    Plans have been announced to form a new partnership between the government, Genomics England, UK Biobank, NHS England, and Oxford Nanopore – a UK-headquartered, world-leading life sciences company. 

    Oxford Nanopore uses long read sequencing technology to analyse genes and pathogens to rapidly diagnose a range of cancers, along with rare and infectious diseases. The technology can sequence long strands of DNA or RNA in one go, without breaking it up into smaller fragments.

    In infectious diseases, Oxford Nanopore’s technology will help to create an early warning system for future pandemics and potential biological threats, both preventing disease and protecting the public.

    It will be used in the expansion of NHS England’s Respiratory Metagenomics programme, being led by Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust (GSTT). It uses samples from patients with severe respiratory infections and rapid genetic testing to match those patients with the right treatments within 6 hours.

    This novel and world-leading application, developed in partnership with the NHS, will allow potential outbreaks of bacterial or viral diseases to be monitored alongside antimicrobial resistance across the country. 

    Following an initial successful pilot at St Thomas’ Hospital, the technology will now be rolled out from 10 to up to 30 NHS sites to address the current time lag between new pathogens emerging in the UK and action being taken to both treat affected patients and to prevent their spread, which will benefit people everywhere.

    Health and Social Care Secretary Wes Streeting said:

    If we fail to prepare, we should prepare to fail. Our NHS was already on its knees when the pandemic struck, and it was hit harder than any other comparable healthcare system.

    We cannot let history repeat itself. That’s why this historic partnership with Oxford Nanopore will ensure our world-leading scientists have the latest information on emerging threats at their fingertips.

    As we embrace the technological revolution, our 10-Year Health Plan will shift the NHS away from analogue to digital, saving countless more lives.

    Science and Technology Secretary Peter Kyle said:

    During the Covid pandemic, we saw the power of the UK life sciences sector very clearly, from the Oxford-Astra Zeneca vaccine that saved so many lives, through to operating one of the world’s most effective Covid surveillance systems, which spotted several emerging variants of the disease.

    This partnership will build on that expertise to monitor emerging diseases as they arise, putting our scientists and decision-makers one-step ahead and providing the information they need to make informed decisions.

    Together with the ability to better diagnose cancers and rare diseases, we are leveraging UK life sciences to protect the public and ultimately save lives.

    Professor Susan Hopkins, Chief Medical Advisor at UK Health Security Agency, said:

    Early detection is absolutely crucial in enabling us to respond effectively to any emerging pathogen. The UK already has a wealth of expertise in genomic surveillance, and this programme will build on that expertise and enable us to bring our resources and capability to tackle developing threats at greater speed. Enhancing the capacity for the NHS to determine new and emerging pathogens causing severe acute respiratory infections will improve the detection and emergence of infections.

    As part of the 100 days mission, this will enable the development of effective diagnostics for novel pathogens and enhance our pandemic preparedness.

    Oxford Nanopore CEO Gordon Sanghera said:

    The UK has a remarkable life science ecosystem, and we are delighted to be working more closely with the UK government and the NHS in this collaboration.

    The world-renowned Genomics England and UK Biobank have led the way in scaling genomics discovery and translating these advances into patient impact.

    By working alongside our partners on shared goals of improved patient outcomes – whether in cancer, genetic disease or infectious disease – and pandemic preparedness, we believe we can deploy our unique DNA sequencing technology in ways that are most impactful for the people of the UK.

    Professor Ian Abbs, chief executive of Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust, said:

    We’ve been working on the respiratory metagenomics programme for over 4 years and have clearly seen the benefit to our patients. It’s a momentous day now that we can ensure other hospitals, and more patients, can also benefit from faster and more accurate treatment for severe respiratory conditions thanks to new genomic technology.

    As part of the expansion to the metagenomics programme, the data gathered using Oxford Nanopore’s technology will be provided to the UK Health and Security Agency, allowing quicker detection and action on emerging infectious diseases to be taken.

    The collaboration between the government and Oxford Nanopore – which will also join up Genomics England and UK Biobank with NHS England – is another key vote of confidence in the UK’s life sciences sector, which will help kickstart economic growth and support the 10-Year Health Plan’s ambition to shift the health service from analogue to digital and from sickness to prevention, helping keep patients out of hospital. 

    Genomics England will work strategically with Oxford Nanopore to further insights from the data they hold, including on cancer and rare diseases, to enable future breakthroughs in identifying genomic mutations that may be treatable and preventing these devastating conditions. UK Biobank will also continue to work with Oxford Nanopore and the government to improve the insights from their data and translate these into impact for NHS patients.

    Along with the vast benefits to patients, this work will drive economic growth, supporting the expansion of one of our most promising life sciences companies. 

    This partnership comes hot on the heels of the Budget, where the government announced investment of £40m over 5 years in a Proof of Concept Fund for spinouts, companies formed based on academic research generated within and owned by a university. 

    This will build on the excellent example set by Oxford Nanopore, one of the UK’s most successful spinout companies, having been founded at Oxford University in 2005. This fund could help to unleash a raft of innovative new spinouts like Oxford Nanopore, helping to drive job creation and economic growth.

    Updates to this page

    Published 5 November 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: More pop up clinics arranged for winter vaccinations

    Source: City of Wolverhampton

    Similar to last year, those eligible for a free Covid-19 and flu vaccination include all adults aged 65 years and over, people who live in a care home for older adults, people aged 6 months to 64 years with health conditions that make them more vulnerable, frontline health and social care staff including those working in care homes for older adults, and pregnant women.

    Eligible people can get one or both vaccinations and are invited to book an appointment via the NHS website, on the NHS app or by calling 119.

    Alternatively, they can get their vaccinations at one of a number of community pop up clinics offering both vaccines without an appointment which are taking place across the city over the coming weeks, including:

    • Phoenix Park, Dudley Road, today (Monday 4 November) and Monday 18 November from 9am to 3pm
    • SMI Steps to Health, Showell Circus, tomorrow (Tuesday 5 November) from 9am to 3pm
    • Sainsburys Wolverhampton, Raglan Street, on Thursday (7 November) and Thursday 21 November from 9am to 3pm
    • Queen Square, Wolverhampton, on Friday (8 November) and Friday 22 November from 9am to 3pm
    • Sainsburys Wednesfield, Bentley Bridge, on Thursdays 14 and 28 November from 11am to 6pm.

    Anyone not eligible for a free flu vaccination is reminded that they can get it for a small charge at participating pharmacists.

    Sally Roberts, Chief Nursing Officer for the NHS Black Country Integrated Care Board, said: “It’s vital that everyone prepares for potential winter illnesses, especially those who are at higher risk.

    “It can be easy to become complacent, however it’s important for those who are eligible to top up their protection, even if they have had a vaccine or been ill with flu or Covid-19 before, as immunity fades over time and these viruses change each year.”

    Councillor Jasbir Jaspal, the City of Wolverhampton Council’s Cabinet Member for Adults and Wellbeing, said: “Getting vaccinated will help you get winter strong so, I would encourage anyone who is eligible to take up the offer of a free flu or Covid-19 vaccination, or both.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Write for Rights: Amnesty launches annual letter-writing campaign to help people imprisoned for speaking truth to power

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Amnesty International launches flagship Write for Rights campaign to help people facing human rights abuses around the world

    Millions of letters and emails will be sent to support these individuals and urge authorities to end injustices

    ‘Sending a letter or email might seem like a small act, but when sent in their thousands they can change lives: those in power are forced to take notice’ – Sacha Deshmukh

    Amnesty International is calling on people across the UK to take part in its flagship letter writing campaign, Write for Rights, in support of individuals from around the world who have been persecuted, jailed, or face human rights abuses for standing up for their rights.

    This year, Write for Rights will support nine individuals who are suffering abuses, including:

    Ana da Silva Miguel, also known as Neth Nahara, was arrested in August last year after broadcasting a video on TikTok criticising President João Lourenço. The next day, Angola’s first stage court convicted her of an “outrage against the state, its symbols and bodies”. She was sentenced to six months in prison and fined one million kwanza (approximately $1,200). Last September, Angola’s second stage court extended Neth’s sentence to two years, following an appeal by the public prosecutor. During her imprisonment, authorities denied Neth her daily HIV medication for eight months, which severely impacted her health.

    Oqba Hashad, an Egyptian business student, has been arbitrarily detained for nearly five years without trial solely because of his brother’s human rights activism. Despite a court order for his release, he remains detained in horrific conditions, including being denied a proper prosthetic leg. Prison authorities have interrogated Oqba on multiple occasions about his brother’s activism and contact with his family. Egypt, as a state party to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, must ensure detainees with disabilities are provided reasonable accommodation and health services.

    Professor Şebnem Korur Fincancı, head of the Turkish Medical Association, faces more than seven years in prison because of her human rights work. Professor Fincancı is a prominent human rights defender, anti-torture advocate and forensic medicine expert. In October 2022, she was arrested and put in pre-trial detention. A criminal investigation was launched against her after she called for an independent investigation into allegations that Turkish armed forces might have used chemical weapons in Kurdistan Region of Iraq in comments during a live TV interview. Professor Fincancı was later convicted of trumped-up charges of “making propaganda for a terrorist organisation”. She is currently awaiting the result of an appeal, but also faces additional charges linked to her human rights work.

    Sacha Deshmukh, Chief Executive of Amnesty International UK, said:

    “The people we have focused on this year are all imprisoned because the governments of their countries value power over free speech. By joining this campaign, people in the UK – and indeed around the world – can help improve their chances of getting justice.

    “Sending a letter or email might seem like a small act, but when sent in their thousands they can change lives: those in power are forced to take notice. 

    “Amnesty’s Write for Rights campaign helps to protect the lives of persecuted people every year. We hope to see people across the country getting involved to make as much noise as possible about the injustices these human rights defenders are facing.”

    Amnesty International’s Write for Rights campaign goes back to the roots of the organisation, which was founded in 1961, with early campaigners writing letters of support to those affected by human rights abuses, as well as letters of concern to governments around the world.

    Successes from previous Write for Rights campaigns:

    Human rights defender Rita Karasartova was arrested in 2022 along with 26 others for opposing a new border agreement that gave control of a freshwater reservoir to Uzbekistan. She was initially detained for organising ‘mass disorder’ and later charged with attempting to ‘violently overthrow the Government’, which carries a potential 15-year sentence. Rita and at least 21 others were acquitted on 14 June this year: a significant victory for justice and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, even though the prosecutor has filed an appeal against the ruling.

    She subsequently expressed her gratitude for the countless letters she received from Amnesty supporters during the campaign, emphasising that each one gave her immense hope and strength, reinforcing her belief in the power of solidarity.

    In 2021, Amnesty campaigned for Egyptian human rights lawyer Mohamed Baker, who received a presidential pardon in July last year and was released from prison the following day. He is now safely reunited with his loved ones.

    Cecillia Chimbiri and Joanah Mamombe were acquitted by the Zimbabwean High Court in July 2023 of communicating falsehoods and obstructing the course of justice. The two – together with Netsai Marova, who did not face trial as she is out of the country – were arrested and abducted in May 2020 following a protest on the Government’s failure to provide social protection during the Covid 19 pandemic. Amnesty campaigned for them during the 2022 Write for Rights campaign.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Global: Maia Sandu’s victory in second round of Moldovan election show’s limits to Moscow’s meddling

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    Following a campaign marred by widespread and credible allegations of massive interference by Russia and pro-Russian proxies, Moldova’s incumbent president, Maia Sandu, has won another term in the second round of presidential elections.

    According to preliminary results published by the country’s central electoral commission on November 3, Sandu beat her second-round challenger, Alexandr Stoianoglo, with 55% of the vote and on a higher turnout than in the first round of elections on October 20.

    There were more than 180,000 votes between the incumbent and her challenger. In a country with an electorate of just over three million people, this is a significant margin, especially when compared with the razor-thin yes vote in the EU referendum that was on the same day as the first round of the presidential election two weeks ago. In that election, Sandu came first with 42%, compared to Staionoglo’s 26%, but in the EU poll, just 10,000 votes separated the yes and the no votes.

    Sandu, who campaigned on a strongly pro-European platform, prevailed despite pro-Russian interference and fearmongering and a campaign by Stoianoglo that emphasised the importance of good relations with both Moscow and Brussels.

    Moldova’s election result will certainly have come as a relief not only to Sandu and her supporters but also to Moldova’s western partners. It is the first time that a popularly elected president has won a second term in the tiny landlocked former Soviet satellite. The country borders Romania and Ukraine and has a small but significant Russian breakaway region, Transnistria, as a constant reminder of Moscow’s influence in the region.

    Moldova’s election presents a clear difference to the Georgian parliamentary election results on October 26, which saw an openly pro-Russian Georgian Dream party win an election considered as neither particularly free nor fair, in results that the Georgia’s opposition-aligned president and western pollsters allege have been rigged.

    Sandu’s win, by contrast, demonstrates both the appeal of the idea of a European future and the limits of Russian interference. Yet the understandable enthusiasm about the result in Moldova also needs to be tempered by a more careful analysis of some of the deeply entrenched societal cleavages that the elections have all but confirmed and the difficulties that lie ahead.

    Deep divisions

    Sandu’s win overall looks impressive. But she did not win the vote in Moldova itself, where Stoianoglo beat her by some 30,000 votes. What saved Sandu, like the EU referendum, was the strong support for her among voters in the diaspora, where she captured almost five times as many votes as Stoianoglo.

    Just over 270,000 votes (83%) of the votes cast by Moldovans living abroad, predominantly in western Europe and north America, saw her comfortably across the finishing line. There may be good reasons not to distinguish between votes from inside and outside Moldova – but the optics are not good.

    Nor can the overall margin of Sandu’s victory gloss over the fact that her supporters inside the country are predominantly concentrated in the capital and the centre of the country. In the capital Chisinau, in the centre of Moldova, Sandu won with 57%, representing almost one-third of her total vote inside the country. In the north and south of the country, Stoianoglo generally took the largest vote share.

    In the country’s second-largest city, Balti in the north, he won 70% of the vote, compared to Sandu’s 30%. In the southern autonomous region of Gagauzia, a hotbed of pro-Russian, anti-European activism, Sandu obtained less than 3%. In Transnistria, Sandu came away with just 20% of the vote.

    Map of Moldova showing the breakaway regions of Transnistria and Gaugazia.
    Institute for the Study of War

    These results are not surprising, given the outcome of the first round of the elections. But they represent fall in support for Sandu compared to in 2020, when she beat the then incumbent, socialist party leader Igor Dodon. Four years ago, Sandu obtained over 250,000 votes more than Dodon, winning almost 58% of the total vote. While she took the overwhelming share of the diaspora vote then as well, she also bested Dodon in most constituencies in the south.

    Dodon campaigned for Stoianoglo in this election, but much of the challenger’s support was very probably due to a massive pro-Russian interference campaign that capitalised on many Moldovans’ fears and frustrations. Pro-Moscow messages aimed to capitalise on fears about being dragged into Russia’s war against Ukraine.

    But there was also frustration with a government that has made little progress on much needed anti-corruption reforms and presided over a serious cost-of-living crisis in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic and made worse by the war on Moldova’s eastern neighbour. Sandu’s party, the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won a commanding majority in the 2021 elections – so failures of the government are seen as failures of Sandu and her agenda.

    Challenges ahead

    That Sandu won the presidency again, and against these odds, demonstrates her resilience. But it can’t be taken for granted that her party will similarly prevail in parliamentary elections due by the autumn of 2025. She may well be forced into a difficult cohabitation with a potentially socialist-led government next year. In a parliamentary democracy, in which the powers of the government by far exceed those of the president, this could significantly slow down Moldova’s EU accession negotiations.

    But there are also some silver linings on the horizon. That Sandu won clearly demonstrates the limits of Russian interference. There is a core part of the Moldovan electorate that cannot be swayed by Russian misinformation or vote buying. This is a basis on which Sandu and PAS can build.

    Perhaps more importantly, Sandu and Stoianoglo both sent conciliatory signals on election eve. Stoianoglo emphasised the importance of respecting the outcome of the democratic process and expressed the hope that Moldovans would now move beyond hatred and division. Sandu acknowledged the concerns of those who had not voted for her and promised to serve as the president of all Moldovans and to work for the country’s further development.

    If they both stay true to their word, Moldova may finally break with a past of repeated political crises and economic stagnation.

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    ref. Maia Sandu’s victory in second round of Moldovan election show’s limits to Moscow’s meddling – https://theconversation.com/maia-sandus-victory-in-second-round-of-moldovan-election-shows-limits-to-moscows-meddling-242796

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Official Receivers celebrate 140-year history

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    2024 marks the 140th anniversary of the appointment of the first Official Receivers and a rich history of helping to keep the UK a safe place to do business

    Official Receiver court dress on display in the Insolvency Service Stratford Office.

    • The first Official Receivers were appointed in 1884 

    • Official Receivers originally conducted public examinations for every bankruptcy– now people can apply for bankruptcies online. 

    • Next chapter for Official Receivers includes planned new technology to help streamline case management 

    The office of Official Receiver is 140 years old this year, marking a history that has evolved from administering personal bankruptcies to overseeing major company liquidations and securing Bankruptcy Restrictions against people who pose a threat to the public through financial wrongdoing. 

    The Insolvency Service has 16 Official Receivers based across 16 locations in England and Wales, who act as trustees in people’s bankruptcies and liquidate companies that have been wound up, with the backing of hundreds of support staff.  

    They also investigate the causes of insolvencies and can secure stringent restrictions against bankrupt people where there is evidence they have been dishonest or are to blame for their debts, to protect the public from possible future harm. 

    Sharon Lewis, Interim Director of Official Receiver Services at the Insolvency Service, said: 

    Our work makes an impact on people’s lives, whether that’s helping those with overwhelming debt to make a fresh start, safeguarding the public from financial wrongdoing or helping creditors get back money they’re owed.  

    We have always been at the heart of the UK’s world-leading insolvency regime and there is a real pride in our work and strong connection to our long history of service.   

    As we continue to take a more digital focus to support an insolvency regime that is fit for the 21st Century, we look forward to the next chapter in our story in helping to deliver economic confidence for the UK.

    Official Receivers came into being following the Bankruptcy Act 1883 and the first cadre of 67 Official Receivers were appointed in 1884. Originally, the officials would conduct public examinations of bankrupts, and the Senior Official Receiver would appear at ceremonial occasions in formal court dress, including a sword and a bicorn hat. 

    Following rules introduced in 2016, people who choose to become bankrupt can now apply online rather than attend court. These changes reflect a move towards a more flexible service that recognises difficulties faced by people with overwhelming debt. 

    More planned changes to the service focus on new technology, including the introduction of a state-of-the-art case management system to help Official Receivers and their teams deliver a quicker, more efficient service for customers.  

    Official Receivers are supported by around 600 staff across the country, including teams of Deputy Official Receivers, examiners and case workers. The teams include a dedicated Public Interest Unit that deals with the most complex bankruptcy and liquidation cases, and a National Interest Case Executive that administers high-profile liquidations. 

    This year, Official Receivers have been appointed by the courts as liquidators of a number of high profile businesses.  

    Official Receivers in local offices have also dealt with cases including bankruptcies of high-profile individuals, and company insolvencies ranging from GP practices and dentists to funeral directors.  

    In 2023-4, Official Receivers also secured 134 Bankruptcy Restrictions – 93 of which were related to abuse of the Covid loan schemes. They also handled almost 11,000 new cases and returned almost £60million to creditors. 

    An Official Receiver: 

    • Is a civil servant working in the Insolvency Service 

    • Is an officer of the court 

    • Acts as a liquidator of companies – winds down the affairs of companies and investigates the causes of the insolvency and the conduct of current and former directors. 

    • Acts as a trustee in bankruptcy – someone who manages the bankruptcy. A bankrupt person’s assets transfer to the trustee who collects or sells them to make payments to creditors 

    • Applies to court to extend the period prior to a bankrupt person receiving a discharge, if they have failed to cooperate with the Official Receiver in the bankruptcy

    • Secures bankruptcy restrictions orders against those who have acted dishonestly, or are to blame for their bankruptcy, to extend the restrictions imposed on them. 

    Further Information 

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 November 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Release: Trade deal with Gulf states welcomed

    Source: New Zealand Labour Party

    Labour welcomes the conclusion of a trade deal with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that was restarted under a Labour government after languishing for many years.

    “Given the global situation, this deal paves the way for further trade and cooperation with the Gulf States,” Labour trade spokesperson Damien O’Connor said.

    “When in government, we understood that trade and export access would be a crucial part our country’s recovery from Covid-19.

    “This deal is a reflection and result of the decisions we made in government to explore where we could strengthen our ties and trade relationships to help our economic recovery,” Damien O’Connor said.


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    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Passengers vote with their feet and return to public transport

    Source: New South Wales Ministerial News

    Published: 2 November 2024

    Released by: Minister for Transport


    Public transport use is on the rise, growing by almost 20 per cent in the 2023/24 period compared to the same time in 2022/23.

    These latest patronage figures showing passengers are voting with their feet thanks to increased reliability, new travel options and better integration.

    After consecutive periods of growth, latest figures show public transport patronage nearly reached its pre-COVID high with more than 629 million ticketed trips made across all modes in the last financial year.

    That figure is edging closer to the network-high 735 million ticketed trips taken on public transport in the 2018/19 window.

    With the success of Sydney Metro City services and employers getting workers back to the office, public transport could set new post-Covid patronage highs through 2025.

    The new Metro line is seeing around 215,000 passenger trips daily, with people incorporating new ways of travel into their overall journey. There have been more than 12 million trips on the new Metro in its first 10 weeks.

    Transport for NSW is anticipating greater demand as it has listened to passengers, looked at the modelling and adapted services to fit in with how the community wants to use public transport, most notably in the shoulders of the peaks and for recreation.

    Weekend travel has been the big winner with families or visitors to the city overwhelmingly travelling by bus, train, tram, ferry, and metro to major events and to explore the city and attractions.

    Patronage on weekends is up 17 per cent on last year, and for ferries and light rail, has eclipsed pre-Covid travel rates – growing faster than weekday travel.

    Sydney Metro has three times the weekend travellers that it did when only operating as a Northwest route.

    Minister for Transport Jo Haylen said:

    “People are voting with their feet and are coming back to public transport, with ridership on light rail and ferries now surpassing pre-covid levels on weekends.

    “Our investment in rail maintenance and our new timetable means our network is more reliable and can recover more quickly when things go wrong.

    “Patronage figures for the new City Metro show that Metromania isn’t slowing down. The daily average of 200,000 trips during its opening week, has increased to an average of 215,000 trips per day.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Burkina Faso

    Source: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade – Safe Travel

    • Reviewed: 4 November 2024, 14:48 NZDT
    • Still current at: 4 November 2024

    Related news features

    If you are planning international travel at this time, please read our COVID-19 related travel advice here, alongside our destination specific travel advice below.

    Do not travel to Burkina Faso due to the volatile security situation and the high threat of kidnapping, terrorism and armed banditry (level 4 of 4). 

    Burkina Faso

    Terrorism
    There is a high threat of terrorism in Burkina Faso, particularly in border areas with Mali and Niger. States of emergencies remain in place in several border regions. In 2018, terrorist groups released a statement declaring their intention to target westerners and western companies in the Sahel. There have been multiple attacks in the capital and elsewhere in the country since 2016, including:

    • On 11 June 2022, over 100 people were killed in an attack in Seytenga, Seno Province.
    • On 4 and 5 June 2021, over 160 people were killed in attack on Solhan village, in the northeast.
    • On 26 April 2021, 3 foreign nationals were killed in an ambush on the PK 60 road between Fada-N’Gourma and Pama.
    • On 1 December 2019, at least 14 people were killed in a shooting attack inside a church in Hantoukoura.
    • On 5 November 2019, 37 people were killed and a further 60 injured in an attack on a convoy carrying workers to a Canadian gold mine near Boungou.
    • On March 2, 2018, extremists attacked the French Embassy and Burkina Faso’s military headquarters in downtown Ouagadougou. Eight security force personnel, including soldiers and police officers were killed and over 80 others were injured.
    • On 13 August 2017, gunmen attacked the Aziz Istanbul restaurant in Ouagadougou, killing at least 18 people.
    • On 15 January 2016, armed gunmen attacked the Splendid Hotel and Café Cappuccino in Ouagadougou resulted in 30 deaths, a large number of whom were foreign nationals.

    Terrorist attacks could occur at anytime, anywhere in Burkina Faso and may be directed at locations with foreign interests or known to be frequented by foreigners, such as embassies, hotels, bars, restaurants, markets, airports, shopping areas, tourist sites, public transport facilities, mining operations and places of worship.

    New Zealanders throughout Burkina Faso are advised to maintain a high degree of security awareness at all times, particularly in public areas. Avoid all large gatherings, including music festivals, concerts, sporting events and any public demonstrations or protests. Keep yourself informed of potential risks to safety and security by monitoring the media and other local sources of information and follow the instructions of local authorities at all times.

    Kidnapping
    There is a heightened threat of kidnapping in Burkina Faso. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have stated their intention to kidnap foreigners and may cross the borders from Mali and Niger to carry out kidnappings.

    A number of foreigners have previously been kidnapped in Burkina Faso and the wider Sahel region. In April 2022, a Polish national was kidnapped in north-eastern Burkina Faso and in September 2022, a US national was kidnapped in Yalgo, also in north-eastern Burkina Faso. The threat is likely to continue.

    New Zealanders in Burkina Faso are strongly advised to seek professional security advice or protection before travelling to areas of particular risk.

    Political Situation/Civil Unrest
    The security situation has deteriorated significantly in recent years. The political situation continues to evolve following the military coup on 30 September 2022. 

    Demonstrations occur regularly and have taken place in major cities. They have the potential to result in violence or clashes, gunfire has been reported in Ougadougou. Expect an increased security presence country-wide and comply with any instructions issued by the local authorities, including any curfews or restrictions of movement. Continued disruptions to internet and other telecommunication services are possible.

    New Zealanders in Burkina Faso are advised to avoid all protests, demonstrations and large gatherings. 

    Banditry
    Banditry is a security concern in Burkina Faso. There continue to be reports of attacks by armed criminals on vehicles, including buses, travelling on a variety of main and secondary roads across the country. Criminals have used road blocks to stop and rob travellers and have been known to open fire on vehicles that refuse to stop. While bandits mainly steal valuables, they may physically harm victims during the course of a robbery.

    The highest number of incidents occur in the eastern region but there have been a number of attacks in other regions and the threat exists throughout Burkina Faso. Remote and border regions are especially vulnerable.

    New Zealanders in Burkina Faso are advised to travel in convoy if possible, stay on clearly marked roads and avoid travel by night outside major centres. You should seek local advice before setting out and follow a police patrol where possible.

    Crime
    Street crime is prevalent in Burkina Faso and foreigners may be specifically targeted due to their perceived wealth. Bag-snatchings, muggings and theft from hotel rooms are common, particularly in Ouagadougou. The central market and the area around the United Nations circle are often targeted by thieves. Theft is often perpetrated by one or two people on motorbikes.

    Criminals in urban areas may carry knives in order to cut straps on bags and can become violent if the victim is non-compliant. Sexual assault occurs periodically in smaller towns and within Ouagadougou.

    New Zealanders are advised to exercise particular vigilance in crowded or public areas, avoid showing signs of affluence and keep personal belongings secure at all times.

    When driving you should keep doors locked, windows up and keep any valuables out of sight. Avoid travelling alone at night, as risks increase after dark.

    Scams
    Commercial and internet fraud is a common problem in Burkino Faso. New Zealanders in Burkina Faso should be wary of any offers that seem too good to be true, as they may be a scam. For further information see our advice on Internet Fraud and International Scams and Internet dating scams.

    General Travel Advice
    As there is no New Zealand diplomatic presence in Burkina Faso, the ability of the government to provide consular assistance to New Zealand citizens is extremely limited.

    We offer advice to New Zealanders about contingency planning that travellers to Burkina Faso should consider.

    New Zealanders are advised to respect religious and social traditions in Burkina Faso to avoid offending local sensitivities.

    Modern medical services in Burkina Faso are very limited, New Zealanders travelling or living in Burkina Faso should have a comprehensive travel insurance policy in place that includes provision for medical evacuation by air. 

    New Zealanders in Burkina Faso are strongly encouraged to register their details with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

     

    Travel tips

    See our regional advice for Africa

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former Miami-Dade Corrections Officer Pled Guilty to $150,000 COVID-19 Fraud

    Source: United States Department of Justice (National Center for Disaster Fraud)

    MIAMI – Yesterday, Daniel Fleureme, 56, of Miami-Dade County, a former Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department (MDCRD) Corrections Officer, pled guilty to wire fraud for defrauding a COVID-19 relief program by fraudulently obtaining an Economic Injury Disaster Loan from the U. S. Small Business Administration (SBA).

    The Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act was designed to provide emergency financial assistance to the millions of Americans who were suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. One source of relief provided by the CARES Act were Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs) to eligible small businesses experiencing substantial financial disruptions. These EIDLs were provided directly to borrowers by the SBA.

    On July 27, 2020, Fleureme, while he was employed full-time by MDCRD as a Corrections Officer, submitted to the SBA a false and fraudulent EIDL application claiming to be the 100% owner of a sole proprietorship operating under the company legal and DBA names of “Daniel Fleureme.” In this fraudulent application, Fleureme claimed that he had owned the business since its creation on Feb. 15, 2017, and stated that the business had three employees as of Jan. 31, 2020. Fleureme’s EIDL application also falsely certified that for the 12-month period prior to Jan. 31, 2020, his sole proprietorship had gross revenues of $450,000 and a cost of goods sold of only $97,000. As a result of this fraudulent EIDL application, Fleureme received approximately $150,000 in EIDL proceeds from the SBA.

    He is scheduled to be sentenced on Jan. 7, 2025, at 11:00 a.m., before U.S. District Judge Jose E. Martinez in Miami. Fleureme faces up to 20 years in prison for the wire fraud conviction. The court will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida Markenzy Lapointe and Special Agent in Charge Jeffrey B. Veltri of the FBI, Miami Field Office, Inspector General Felix Jimenez of the Miami-Dade County Office of Inspector General (M-DC OIG), and Special Agent in Charge Amaleka McCall-Brathwaite, U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Inspector General (SBA OIG), Eastern Region, made the announcement.

    The FBI’s Miami Area Corruption Task Force, which includes task force officers from the M-DC OIG, working in conjunction with SBA OIG, investigated the case.  Assistant U.S. Attorney Edward N. Stamm is prosecuting the case.

    On May 17, 2021, the Attorney General established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Department of Justice in partnership with agencies across government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The Task Force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international criminal actors and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes, and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the department’s response to the pandemic, please visit https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus.

    On Sept. 15, 2022, the Attorney General selected the Southern District of Florida’s U.S. Attorney’s Office to head one of three national COVID-19 Fraud Strike Force Teams. The Department of Justice established the Strike Force to enhance existing efforts to combat and prevent COVID-19 related financial fraud.  The Strike Force combines law enforcement and prosecutorial resources and focuses on large-scale, multistate pandemic relief fraud perpetrated by criminal organizations and transnational actors, as well as those who committed multiple instances of pandemic relief fraud. The Strike Force uses prosecutor-led and data analyst-driven teams to identify and bring to justice those who stole pandemic relief funds. Additional information regarding the Strike Force may be found at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-covid-19-fraud-strike-force-teams.

    Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    Related court documents and information may be found on the website of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida at www.flsd.uscourts.gov or at http://pacer.flsd.uscourts.gov, under case number 24-cr-20407.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Cotton Statement on CIA Findings on Covid Origins

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Arkansas Tom Cotton
    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEContact: Caroline Tabler or Patrick McCann (202) 224-2353January 25, 2025
    Chairman Cotton Statement on CIA Findings on Covid Origins
    Washington, D.C. — Senator Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas), Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, released the following statement about the CIA’s findings on the origins of the Coronavirus:
    “I’ve said from the beginning that Covid likely originated in the Wuhan labs. Communist China covered it up and the liberal media covered for them. I’m pleased the CIA concluded in the final days of the Biden administration that the lab-leak theory is the most plausible explanation of Covid’s origins and I commend Director Ratcliffe for fulfilling his promise to release this conclusion. Now, the most important thing is to make China pay for unleashing a plague on the world.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: The next president will play a key role in shaping US trade policy – here’s what voters need to know

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Bedassa Tadesse, Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota Duluth

    From the ports of Los Angeles to the cornfields of Iowa, the U.S.’s international trade policy is a force that shapes the lives of every American. With the presidential election looming in November 2024, discussing trade policy isn’t just an academic exercise – it’s a civic responsibility.

    As an economist, I have spent years studying this topic. Trade policy has profound effects on how industries operate, from production locations to competitive dynamics. These changes impact everyday life, from the cost of your morning coffee to the job security in your local community.

    And, because the president has extensive control over trade policy, every presidential election is a referendum on the issue.

    The two most recent administrations – President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence from 2017 to 2021 and President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris from 2021 to today – have had starkly different approaches to trade policy. The contrast shows how a president’s economic philosophy can reshape the nation’s global business strategy.

    Both Trump and Harris are on the ballot in November. Harris is expected to carry on Biden’s trade policies if she wins. This comparison offers insight into how the next U.S. president will govern on trade.

    2017-2021: Trump and Pence on trade

    Trump pursued a protectionist trade agenda during his time in office.

    Protectionism refers to government policies that limit international trade to benefit domestic industries. These measures include tariffs – taxes on imported goods – quotas and regulations that make imports more expensive.

    One of Trump’s first acts in office was withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership — a colossal 12-nation pact that would have covered 40% of global output. His decision cost America both access to lucrative Asian markets and a powerful counterweight to China’s economic influence.

    Closer to home, Trump renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement,
    tightening rules for automakers. The effect? While wages for workers in the automotive industry and vehicle prices for American consumers increased, it barely spurred any additional domestic car production.

    Trump also launched a tariff-driven trade war with China and the European Union, asserting it would address unfair practices and reduce the U.S. trade deficit. The strategy, however, prompted retaliatory tariffs, resulting in higher consumer prices and job losses in U.S. industries dependent on imported components. While some sectors benefited from the approach, American farmers suffered due to export losses, necessitating government subsidies.

    Trump and his new running mate, JD Vance, have signaled their intent to revive the “America First” trade strategy. Their campaign platform calls for sweeping tariffs, including a blanket 10% tariff on all goods and a more aggressive 60% tariff specifically targeting Chinese products.

    2021-today: Biden and Harris on trade

    In contrast, the Biden-Harris administration adopted a multilateral approach emphasizing cooperation between countries.

    The administration maintained most of Trump’s tariffs on Chinese goods and some on steel and aluminum imports from other countries. However, they reframed the measures as part of a broader push to rein in climate change and protect workers’ rights.

    The administration also launched initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, or IPEF, signaling a return to Obama-era trade strategies prioritizing regional partnerships in the Pacific. The IPEF aims to strengthen economic ties with Asian countries by coordinating policies to enhance supply chain resilience and promote clean energy rather than focusing solely on tariff reductions.

    The Biden-Harris approach emphasizes international cooperation while valuing domestic job creation, particularly in clean energy and manufacturing. However, maintaining many of Trump’s tariffs on Chinese goods, steel and aluminum has kept costs high for some U.S. businesses and consumers.

    Building on the Biden administration’s policies, the Harris campaign has signaled its aim to shield lower- and middle-income households from new tariffs that could raise prices while maintaining a tough stance on China through existing tariffs and trade restrictions.

    Presidential powers and influence on trade

    The president plays a critical role in setting America’s trade policy.

    The president can negotiate international trade deals, although Congress must approve them to become law. The executive branch also controls tariffs; under statutes such as the Trade Act of 1974, the president can impose them without congressional approval.

    In addition, the president can declare national emergencies related to trade, appoint trade representatives, issue executive orders to manage federal trade policies, and impose sanctions that can influence global trade dynamics.

    Free trade agreements can boost exports and promote economic growth, but they may also displace certain workers. In contrast, tariffs on imports protect some domestic industries but raise prices for American consumers. Studies show that tariffs imposed under Trump, and continued by Biden, have led to higher prices, reduced output and lower employment, harming the U.S. economy.

    Trade policies also affect diplomatic relationships and global supply chains. So, as voters sift through the candidates’ trade policy positions, they must look beyond the soundbites. Understanding how each approach affects job markets, consumer prices and global competitiveness will help voters cast an informed ballot that aligns with their vision for the country’s future.

    In the world of trade, every vote counts.

    Bedassa Tadesse does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. The next president will play a key role in shaping US trade policy – here’s what voters need to know – https://theconversation.com/the-next-president-will-play-a-key-role-in-shaping-us-trade-policy-heres-what-voters-need-to-know-241301

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Per Jacobsson Lecture 2024 — Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: “Delivering on new global challenges: How can we keep multilateral coherence whilst re-imagining the multilateral trading system?”

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Per Jacobsson Lecture 2024 — Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: “Delivering on new global challenges: How can we keep multilateral coherence whilst re-imagining the multilateral trading system?”

    Excellencies, Dear Raghu, Minouche, Maury, ladies and gentlemen, friends,
    Thank you. What an honor to follow in the footsteps of previous Per Jacobsson lecturers – all the more so in this 80th anniversary year of the Bretton Woods Conference.
    We are living in troubled times – something Per Jacobsson knew well. So far as trade is concerned, the times are not only troubled, they are tense. Trade is sometimes blamed and scapegoated for poor outcomes that really derive from macroeconomic, technology, or social policy, for which trade is not responsible.
    Trade policies and tools are being deployed not just to solve trade-related problems, but also to try to address security and geopolitical concerns.
    As unilateral measures or threats thereof become increasingly widespread, trade policy has been getting more restrictive. In recent months, the US, the EU, Turkey, and Canada have introduced new tariffs and countervailing duties on Chinese electric vehicles and other products, including steel. China has countered with WTO disputes and measures against EU products such as dairy, pork, and brandy. 
    These are among the over 130 new trade-restricting measures recorded by the WTO Secretariat since the start of this year. This number represents an 8% increase to the stockpile of over 1600 restrictive measures introduced between 2009 and 2023, which as of last year were already affecting over 10% of world goods trade. In addition, WTO members initiated 210 trade remedy investigations in the first half of 2024 – nearly as many as in all of 2023. While not all will culminate in the imposition of duties, investigations have a well-documented chilling effect on trade. And I haven’t even mentioned subsidies yet. 
    Frictions are manifesting as trade disputes. Six of the eight WTO disputes initiated this year deal with green technologies, particularly electric vehicles.
    I hope we are not on a path that leads back to the sort of economic disorder that came before Bretton Woods – disorder that was followed by political extremism and war.
    It was precisely to avoid a repeat of such circumstances that the multilateral economic institutions were created. My concern today is that we have forgotten this lesson – that we have forgotten the good these institutions have done.
    Walking away from the legacy of Bretton Woods, including the trading system, would diminish the world’s ability – collectively and at the national level – to respond to problems affecting people’s lives and opportunities.
    I will argue that there is a better path forward: re-imagining the global trading system and the rest of the multilateral economic architecture to help us meet the technological, environmental, social and geopolitical challenges of our time. To succeed, its various components must work in concert – an idea we have come to call ‘coherence’.
    In the 1940s, the overall thrust of coherence was that trade, reconstruction financing, and monetary policymaking need to be in harmony with each other, and anchored in institutions and rules across countries, to promote growth, prosperity, and peace.
    Today, delivering lasting improvements to people’s lives and livelihoods requires us to solve problems of the global commons.
    The notion of coherence across different policy areas would have made sense to Per Jacobsson. His convictions about sound money, and its importance for durable growth and recovery, were shaped by his own experiences. As a young man he saw the collapse of global economic integration amid the First World War. From his position at the League of Nations in the 1920s, he witnessed the failed attempts by leading economies to establish effective international coordination on global finance and trade – a memory that echoes uncomfortably today.
    We know what happened when the downturn came at the end of the decade. Vicious circles emerged: of falling output, deflation, banking and financial crises, trade protectionism and retaliation, and exchange rate chaos. Countries retreated into increasingly isolated economic blocs.
    The experience of those years was seared into the consciousness of the officials who gathered in Bretton Woods in July 1944. US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau opened the conference by looking back at what he called “the great economic tragedy of our time.” I quote “We saw currency disorders develop and spread from land to land, destroying the basis for international trade and international investment and even international faith. In their wake, we saw unemployment and wretchedness — idle tools, wasted wealth. We saw their victims fall prey, in places, to demagogues and dictators. We saw bewilderment and bitterness become the breeders of fascism and, finally, of war.”
    What Bretton Woods delivered
    The genius of Bretton Woods was that it turned the vicious circles of the 1930s into virtuous ones, by recognizing that macro-financial stability, reconstruction and development, and trade went hand-in-hand.
    Instead of beggar-thy-neighbor policies, countries would treat trade, monetary issues, and even domestic macro-economic policies as matters of common interest.
    Instead of excessively rigid or chaotically fluctuating currencies, there would be orderly, rules-based management of exchange rates and balance of payments problems.
    Instead of underinvestment, there would be long-term financing for reconstruction and expanding productive capacity.
    Instead of quantitative restrictions, prohibitive tariffs, and bilateral clearing, there would be a coordinated lowering of trade barriers, and freedom to undertake international payments and current account transactions.
    The idea of coherence across policy fields, with trade as a unifying theme, was baked into the system from day one. Promoting the “balanced growth of international trade” is written into the founding mandates of both the IMF and the World Bank – not as an end in itself, but as a means to higher employment, productivity, and incomes.
    The trade leg of the stool, alongside the Bank and the IMF, was supposed to be the International Trade Organization, but it ran aground in the US Congress. A parallel negotiating process in 1947 produced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was nominally temporary and did not require Congressional ratification. Successive rounds of GATT negotiations substantially reduced barriers to trade. The growing number of “contracting parties” used the GATT to resolve and avoid trade disputes. By the 1960s, global trade was growing faster than output.
    The decades that followed Bretton Woods and the Marshall Plan delivered a breathtaking recovery from the devastation of the Second World War.
    Strong growth in the 1950s and 1960s saw per capita incomes in Western Europe and Japan begin to converge with those in the United States.
    Major European currencies achieved full convertibility in 1958, when Per Jacobsson was leading the IMF.
    These gains, however, were largely confined to industrialized countries.
    Most newly independent developing countries continued to lose ground in relative terms, as they struggled with declining terms of trade for their commodities.
    But a handful of poor economies in East Asia started trying to use increasingly open external markets to pursue export-led development.
    Discordance and reinvention: the 1970s and 1980s
    Coherence gave way to discordance in the 1970s, with the oil shocks, stagflation, the advent of floating exchange rates, and a wave of emerging market debt crises.
    By the mid-1980s, the success of the so-called Asian tigers had become a compelling example, inspiring many developing country governments to pivot from inward-oriented to export-oriented development strategies.
    At the international level, growing frustration with ad hoc protectionism and “à la carte” approaches to GATT strictures created demand for more rules-based trade cooperation.
    The Uruguay Round negotiations from 1986 to 1994 broadened the reach of multilateral trade rules to cover services and intellectual property, filled longstanding gaps with respect to agriculture and textiles, and unwound much of the protectionism that had emerged in the preceding years.
    The nominally provisional GATT was transformed into the World Trade Organization, with a binding dispute resolution mechanism that enhanced the predictability offered by its expanded rulebook.
    The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO opened up new vistas for the organization, defining its purpose as using trade not just to raise living standards and create jobs but to advance sustainable development – thus introducing environmental concerns that were absent in the 1940s.
    1990 to 2020: A “golden period of economic development”, but clouds on the horizon
    The Uruguay Round and the end of the Cold War would mark a second era of coherence and virtuous circles across the trading system, the World Bank, and the IMF. And this time, the benefits were spread much more widely across countries and people.
    The WTO became an anchor for outward-oriented economic reforms in many emerging markets and developing economies.
    Increasingly open and predictable trade became a stronger driver of development, productivity, specialization and scale.
    Better macro-financial policies bolstered growth – and trade performance – in many emerging markets and developing countries. So did improved human capital and physical infrastructure.
    Trade and modern supply chains became powerful sources of disinflationary pressures.
    Market-oriented reforms in China, Eastern Europe, India and other developing economies brought them into the increasingly global division of labor. Trade boomed, incomes rose, and poverty plummeted.
    Between 1995 and 2022, as low- and middle-income economies nearly doubled their share in global exports from 16 to 32%, the share of their populations subsisting on less than US$2.15 per day fell from 40% to under 11%. Over 1.5 billion people were lifted out of extreme poverty.
    Since 1995, per capita incomes in low- and middle-income countries have nearly tripled, and global per capita income increased by approximately 65 percent.
    For the first time since the industrial revolution two centuries earlier, per capita incomes in rich and poor countries began to converge.
    Gains for poor countries did not come at the expense of rich ones. Examining the United States since 1950, researchers at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) have shown that international trade boosted the economy by the equivalent of $2.6 trillion in 2022, or about 10% of GDP. The gains from trade would be even larger for small, open advanced economies.
    In a Foreign Affairs piece this year, Dev Patel, Justin Sandefur, and Arvind Subramanian called the years between 1990 and the start of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, I quote, “history’s most golden period of economic development”.   They argue that the rapid increase in trading opportunities was “perhaps the most important enabler” of convergence.
    Research from our new World Trade Report backs them up: the pace of income convergence of low- and middle-income economies is strikingly correlated with their participation in global trade, as measured by a size-adjusted ratio of trade to GDP. Our simulations suggest falling trade costs account for as much as one-third of the convergence.
    To be clear, the period was not golden for everyone. Developing countries with lower trade participation or greater commodity-dependence – mostly in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East – lagged on convergence. And in some rich countries, many people felt left behind, and their frustration started to fuel a political backlash against trade.
    Multilateral rule-making on trade began to falter, with the failure of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations.
    Nevertheless, in 2008 and 2009, when the world economy faced its worst financial crisis since the 1930s, the system worked.
    International markets stayed broadly open. The rules and norms of the multilateral trading system helped governments contain protectionist pressures.
    Alongside fiscal and monetary support, trade was a powerful shock absorber. Crisis-hit countries could rely on predictable market access elsewhere to absorb their excess supply, preventing growth and development from getting derailed.
    The WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF also worked together productively on the macro-micro policy nexus.
    For instance, when trade finance dried up during the credit crunch, despite being extremely low-risk, the three institutions joined hands to encourage G20 members and international financial institutions to step in with a $250 billion support package.
    Since the financial crisis, the multilateral trading system, with the WTO at its core, has continued to deliver economic benefits, despite rising geopolitical tensions and tariffs between the US and China, the disabling of the Appellate Body, and the failure to reach agreements in long-running negotiations such as those on agriculture. Global trade kept reaching new highs through the 2010s, and over 75% of global goods trade continued – and continues today – to operate on core WTO tariff terms.
    When COVID-19 hit in 2020, the norms and rules of the multilateral trading system mostly did their job again. Trust in trade was damaged by initial missteps, as governments enacted export restrictions on medical supplies and vaccines. But governments generally refrained from widespread protectionism, allowing food and other essentials to flow across borders to where they were needed. Goods trade rebounded strongly from the lockdowns and was soon setting new records. Cross-border supply chains churned out products needed to fight the pandemic, from face masks to vaccines. Trade in digitally-delivered services boomed, propelled by the same technologies that allowed so many of us to work from home.
    Goods and especially services trade are now well above pre-COVID levels.  Last year, global trade was worth a near-record $30.5 trillion, in a $105-trillion world economy.
    Re-imagining the Multilateral Trading System with coherence
    As we saw at the outset, however, these successes did not forestall the challenges we now face in global trade. While trade has been largely resilient, signs of fragmentation are now visible.
    So it’s not difficult to imagine a return of vicious circles – trade restrictions, efficiency losses, slower growth, higher prices, costs imposed by extreme weather and food insecurity, and public frustration and anger.
    Allowing the vicious circles to take hold and the world to fragment into isolated trading blocs would be costly. The WTO has estimated longer term global GDP losses in the order of 5% were the world to fragment into two like-minded trading blocs. IMF estimates are in the order 7%. We cannot afford this!
    And that is why we need to re-imagine the multilateral trading system to solve modern challenges and address modern vulnerabilities.
    This means re-imagining coherence as well. Trade alone was insufficient in 1944, and trade alone is insufficient to build the more secure, sustainable, and inclusive world we want today.  The way forward for trade will increasingly be about “WTO and” – trade in tandem with other issues, and policies that support the original vision of coherence and do not misuse trade tools, for coercion, as a weapon, or to undermine competition.
    Our unfinished business from 1944 was elegantly illustrated by a recent blog post from IMF chief economist Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and his team.
    They showed that China’s growing and contentious trade surplus, and the US’s widening trade deficit, are the result of domestic macro-economic forces, rather than the product of trade and industrial policies.
    “Homegrown surpluses and deficits call for homegrown solutions,” they argued, suggesting demand-boosting measures in China and fiscal consolidation in the US.
    As for concerns over industrial policy, they said the right response was to strengthen WTO rules, not to restrict trade.
    They cited the WTO’s recent China Trade Policy Review which showed new data of billions of dollars in subsidies going to manufacturing. Urging China to be more transparent about its subsidies.
    The blog shows the coherence mandate in action but it also illustrates how even today, the global trading system is paying a price for shortcomings of macro-economic policy.
    As Sylvia Ostry, one of my predecessors at this podium, said in 1987, “Trade policy is no substitute for macro policy.”
    Let’s now turn to the new trade agenda, and look at three areas where future prospects for people and the planet require trade to be re-imagined, and complemented by other policy levers pulling in the same direction.
    First, the environmental agenda, above all climate change and getting to net zero by mid-century.
    Trade is indispensable to deploy low-carbon technologies globally. Trade lets countries share the burden of developing new green tech. Scale economies and competitive pressures associated with trade help drive down unit costs, making it possible for renewables to undercut fossil fuel energy.
    Trade also allows us to leverage ‘green comparative advantage’, a concept that our chief economist, Ralph Ossa, has done much to advance. The idea is straightforward: just as individuals and countries can reap economic gains by specializing in what they are relatively good at, the world can reap environmental gains if countries specialize in what they are relatively green at.
    If countries with abundant clean energy can produce more energy-intensive goods and services, while importing energy-light products from places where clean energy is scarce, and vice versa, global emissions fall much more than they would have absent that trade. And in fact research from the University of Zurich  suggests that as much as one-third of global emissions reductions could come from this kind of specialization linked to green comparative advantage.
    As Ricardo Hausmann at Harvard has observed, fossil fuels are cheap to transport, but wind and solar energy are not. This makes parts of Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America with high green energy potential attractive destinations for investment in energy-intensive industries, including the production of green hydrogen.
    Global cooperation on internalizing carbon costs would incentivize greener sourcing everywhere. Nevertheless, we are already seeing moves in the right direction as in Kenya, which has attracted a billion-dollar investment to build a geothermal-powered low-carbon data center.
    Parenthetically, a similar dynamic exists for water, provided it is valued correctly. A recent report of the Global Commission on the Economics of Water, which I co-chair, shows that with trade one can also promote the notion of a hydrological comparative advantage. Trade can help mitigate water scarcity by allowing countries with abundant hydrological resources to specialize in producing water-intensive products for export to water-scarce nations.  Such virtual water trade offers agricultural export opportunities, for example, to those regions including countries in Africa with under-utilized ground water resources and land.
    But just as environmental policy coordination could accelerate climate action, policy fragmentation could weaken it.  There is a genuine risk that trade frictions associated with carbon pricing, green subsidies, and other climate policies will escalate into trade restrictions and retaliation, harming emissions reduction as well as trade.
    We should seek to pre-empt such frictions and disputes by establishing shared frameworks for trade and climate policy. The goal would be to maximize emissions reduction and green innovation, while minimizing negative spillovers, trade tensions, and wasted public resources on subsidy races that most countries may not even afford to participate in.
    To this end, the WTO Secretariat is coordinating a carbon pricing task force comprised of the IMF, World Bank, OECD, UNCTAD, and UNFCCC, where we are working to develop shared carbon metrics and ultimately a global carbon pricing framework against which we can benchmark national policies to aid interoperability of approaches. We have also joined hands with the IMF, the OECD, and the World Bank to explore approaches to enhance greater transparency with respect to subsidies. And we are working with the steel industry to help them promote interoperability in decarbonization standards, reducing transaction costs and facilitating trade and investment in green steel.
    Reforming the over $1.2 trillion in direct global annual fossil fuel subsidies, the $630 billion in trade-distorting agricultural support, and the $22 billion in harmful fisheries subsidies (which the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Agreement is delivering) should be a no-brainer. Some of the resources freed up could be repurposed to support green innovation and a just transition for poor countries.
    The second set of opportunities for the Multilateral Trading System deals with diversifying and decentralizing supply chains – and doing so in a manner that brings in countries and communities that remain on the margins of the global division of labor.
    More diversified global production networks would enhance supply security in an increasingly shock-prone world, while extending the benefits of trade to places and people that have not shared adequately in them. Greater diversification would also help lower the geopolitical temperature around supply chain relationships, by making them harder for any single country to weaponize.
    As the pandemic and the war in Ukraine made abundantly clear, overconcentration makes supply chains vulnerable in a crisis.
    The advent of COVID-19, concentrated minds on the fact that 80% of world vaccine exports came from only ten countries. This meant export restrictions in a few of them severely disrupted global access to vaccines – especially to Africa, which relied on imports for 99% of its jabs.
    Decentralizing value chains and building up pharmaceutical production capacity in Africa and other developing country regions for instance would make the global supply base more resilient in the event of future pandemics, whilst more closely integrating these regions in to world trade, and making them part of a more prosperous and healthy world.
    Critical minerals is another sector where there are major opportunities to mitigate concerns about overconcentration in mining and especially processing, while stimulating growth in developing countries. 
    Exports of minerals critical for the low-carbon transition, like lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths, have grown rapidly to reach USD 320 billion in value in 2022, and are set to increase much more in the years ahead. Africa, for example, represents 40% of estimated global reserves of cobalt, manganese, and platinum; and 12% of world exports of critical minerals, but only 3.8% of exports of processed minerals.
    By investing in processing these minerals within the regions including in Central Asia and Latin America where they are found, we can promote value addition and job creation while removing supply bottlenecks that currently threaten to hold back the low-carbon transition.
    Furthermore, to the extent that this process is powered by green hydrogen and other kinds of clean energy, it would harness the green comparative advantage I mentioned earlier and thereby help the developing regions increase their share in world trade.
    It would be green growth and green trade – the ‘re-globalization’ we want.
    Finally, there are areas where cross-border commerce is flourishing, but where new rules are necessary to foster predictability and lower barriers to entry for smaller businesses and developing economies.
    The fastest growing segment of international trade is in services delivered across borders via computer networks. Trade in digitally-delivered services – everything from streaming video to remote consulting – has quadrupled since 2005, reaching $4.25 trillion in value last year. These services have become an increasingly important driver of growth and job creation.
    The commercialization of artificial intelligence promises to further accelerate digital trade. A forthcoming WTO report describes how AI could reduce trade and transaction costs, improve supply chain logistics, and shift countries’ comparative advantages.
    I always say the future of trade is digital, but the future of protectionism could be as well. Imports of digital services could become as contentious as manufactured imports have, or more so – inviting digital barriers that are even simpler to put in place than their counterparts for trade in physical goods.
    Putting in place some basic rules for digital trade would reduce the risks of such reversals. The 90-odd members participating in plurilateral e-commerce negotiations at the WTO are now looking to conclude a first phase agreement on a series of practical measures to facilitate digital trade, from common rules for e-signatures and payments, to paperless trading, and consumer protection. Tougher issues like cross-border data flows – a critical element in AI – will be dealt with in a second phase of negotiations.
    Delivering on this agenda for the future will involve strengthening all of the WTO’s functions: monitoring and transparency, negotiations, and dispute settlement.
    With respect to our dispute settlement system, we are working to reform it. The reform process has wide buy-in, and talks are advancing, including on issues like appeal review and accessibility to ensure that developing countries can use the system. There are delicate issues here around how national security exceptions will be handled – it is going to take work!
    We will need to negotiate and implement new rules in important areas like the environment. Some members are showing the way: New Zealand, Costa Rica, Switzerland, and Iceland recently agreed to liberalize trade in a list of hundreds of environmental goods, and they are trying to get others to join.
    We are working on getting an Agreement on Investment Facilitation for Development, negotiated by three-quarters of our membership, into the WTO rulebook. This agreement will help developing economies attract FDI by simplifying investment-related procedures and sweeping away red tape.
    We will also need to review existing rules to make them fit for purpose. Instead of members doing an end run around our Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to introduce industrial policies, it would be better to update that agreement. It actually dates back to 1994 – seven years before China joined the WTO,  [a time when climate concerns were barely on the radar screen, and the conventional wisdom was that state-owned enterprises were a fading relic of a bygone era]. Members could decide to create space for subsidizing the green transition. Shared ground rules would help minimize negative spillovers and related trade tensions, while maximizing efficiency in the use of public resources. 
    Excellencies, ladies, and gentlemen. Let me now conclude.
    As I said at the start, these are tense times for trade. There are political dynamics outside our control. But we can treat the challenges we face as opportunities to re-imagine the global trading system.
    We can build global resilience whilst making the system more supportive of inclusive growth and environmental sustainability.
    We can make existing trade rules more fit for purpose rather than go around or against them and we can make new rules fit for the time.
    We can help developing countries left behind by the recent wave of global economic integration.
    We can have interdependence without overdependence.
    While nothing is ever easy at the WTO, we are moving in the right direction. We will manage what we can manage. Control what we can control. But we will need your help.
    Over the past eight decades, the multilateral economic architecture, including the trading system, has delivered a great deal for the world. We have reinvented it before. We can do so again, for people and planet.
    Nelson Mandela once wrote that “after climbing a great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb.” I ask you, let’s climb these hills together.
    Thank you.

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    MIL OSI Economics