NewzIntel.com

Category: DJF

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Provocations and incitement of war by armed groups advocating for “Taiwan independence” will only lead to their self-destruction – PRC Ministry of Defense

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 14 (Xinhua) — Provocations and warmongering by armed groups advocating “Taiwan independence” are useless and will only lead to their self-destruction, Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Jiang Bin said Monday.

    Jiang Bin made the statement in response to a journalist’s question about the creation of Taiwan’s first HIMARS multiple launch rocket system battery.

    In order to secure American support for “Taiwan independence,” the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration is selling out Taiwan’s interests to the United States by squandering the Taiwanese people’s hard-earned money to pay for “defense costs,” the official said.

    “Buying American weapons to give oneself courage is absolutely useless and self-deceiving, and resisting reunification by force is a dead end,” Jiang Bin said.

    The official was also asked about the launch of the W121 air route by the Civil Aviation Administration of China, which is a connecting route with the M503 route. The establishment and launch of the relevant air route is a routine action carried out by relevant departments in accordance with the needs of managing the development of civil aviation, and will benefit compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, Jiang Bin noted.

    However, as the official pointed out, the DPP authorities used the event to fan the so-called “military threat from the mainland” in a reckless attempt to raise security concerns, escalate confrontation and hinder cross-coast exchanges, which runs counter to public sentiment and is doomed to fail.

    According to Jiang Bin, the root cause of the current cross-Strait tensions is that the DPP administration, in collusion with external forces, has been continuously carrying out provocations aimed at achieving “independence.”

    “We hope that Taiwanese compatriots will see through the ‘true face’ of the DPP administration advocating ‘Taiwan independence’, recognize the grave danger of separatism, resolutely oppose separatist actions, and jointly safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” the Chinese defense ministry spokesman concluded. -0-

    Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    .

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Timberbiz

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    Mission

    Timberbiz is Australasia’s home for timber news and information.

    Timberbiz’s aim is to produce complete, informative and quality industry publications, which focus on industry news, views, research and development and solution outcomes; offer a quality medium through exceptional service; and provide an effective advertising service.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: More services coming to Chinook Regional Hospital

    Source: Government of Canada regional news (2)

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The digital euro: legal tender in the digital age

    Source: European Central Bank

    Introductory statement by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament

    Brussels, 14 July 2025

    Thank you for inviting me to take part in this exchange of views. I would like to talk about why we need the digital euro – and the cost of not pursuing it.

    My message is simple. The main reason for issuing a digital euro is to preserve the benefits of cash in the digital era. To do so, we need to complement physical cash with a digital form of cash.

    The inability to use physical cash in online transactions or for digital payments at the point of sale deprives us of a key payment option, reducing resilience, competition, sovereignty and, ultimately, consumers’ freedom to choose how to pay.

    This increases the risks that European consumers, merchants and policymakers face. For a growing number of their transactions, Europeans lack access to central bank money – the money that is backed by the sovereign and has legal tender status, underpinning our monetary union because it is accepted everywhere in the euro area.

    Monetary sovereignty and people’s freedom to pay with legal tender: two sides of the same coin

    The Eurosystem is committed to cash and will continue to issue it.[1] But people’s habits are shifting towards digital payments.

    As the role of online payments has grown, the role of cash in day-to-day transactions has been declining at pace: between 2019 and 2024 its share fell from 68% to 40% in volume terms and from 40% to 24% in value terms.[2]

    This has two important implications.

    First, the role of cash will be significantly reduced if we do not provide a digital equivalent. If we fail to act, we will fail to fulfil our responsibility as a central bank towards the people we serve.

    Second, our monetary sovereignty is eroding. People’s ability to pay across the euro area with sovereign money – cash – and frequently choosing to do so, is a key pillar of monetary sovereignty. A digital form of cash would protect our sovereignty and ensure our monetary union is also a digital monetary union.

    What’s particularly concerning in Europe is that the gap left by declining cash use is being filled by non-European payment solutions. For card payments, only seven out of the 20 euro area countries have a national card scheme. These card schemes cannot be used in other euro area countries and are also losing market share domestically. For e-commerce, European-owned solutions are prevalent in only three euro area countries.[3]

    Strengthening our legal tender to stop the erosion of our monetary sovereignty

    To address this situation, the Single Currency Package protects the rights of those who want to continue to pay with cash, while complementing physical cash with a digital form of the legal tender: the digital euro.

    I believe we are being presented with a false choice: a private pan-euro area payment solution or a public one. First, it is not just about payments; it is about the evolution of the money. And second, it is a historical fact that state-issued money and money issued by private parties have typically coexisted, reinforcing each other.[4]

    The cost of inaction

    Since the start of the euro, we have recognised the need for an integrated retail payments market. This prompted the development of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) to harmonise bank transfers. However, SEPA does not cover key use cases such as payments at the point of sale.

    Over the years, private firms have made several attempts to create a pan-European payment solution, but difficulties in coordinating among market participants prevented those firms from delivering a scalable and unified system.[5] Some 25 years after the launch of the euro, we still have no European payment solution that allows people to pay digitally throughout the euro area in stores, for e‑commerce goods and services and from person to person.

    Let us take a leap of faith. Imagine things would be different this time and that banks would manage to work together to rapidly provide a pan-European private payment solution. Would it still make sense to have the digital euro? The answer is yes.

    First, the digital euro would help preserve money as a public good that is easily accessible to everyone and universally accepted across the euro area. By contrast, private money belongs to the competitive space, so we cannot guarantee its acceptance by all merchants.

    Second, the digital euro would enhance resilience. We would have a reliable fallback in times of crisis, complementing cash. An especially important feature is that the digital euro would also function offline, providing a secure payment method even without an internet connection.[6] Moreover, as is the case with cash, we would be sure that all components of the digital euro remain in European hands.

    Third, the digital euro would prevent market concentration. The availability of legal tender and its wide adoption would put merchants in a stronger position to negotiate fees. In addition, the digital euro would create open standards with a wide acceptance network, making it easier for payment service providers to scale up their solutions. This would result in greater competition and innovation at European level.[7]

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union entrusts you, the co-legislators, to “lay down the measures necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency.”

    We can together ensure that our currency is fit for the digital age by complementing physical cash and private payment initiatives with digital cash. Indeed, the digital euro is key to preserving the benefits of cash in the digital era.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Sudan: Life-saving aid must reach the people caught between the rains and conflict

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Following the start of the rainy season in Sudan’s North Darfur region, Amnesty International’s Director for East and Southern Africa, Tigere Chagutah said:

    To stop this humanitarian emergency from spiraling further, parties to the armed conflict must facilitate rapid, unconditional and safe access to humanitarian aid, and end all attacks on humanitarian objects and personnel.

    Tigere Chagutah, Amnesty International’s Director for East and Southern Africa,

    “The rainy season is a terrifying prospect for many Sudanese who have fled fighting in North Darfur between armed groups. Internally displaced persons and refugees have told Amnesty International that they fear the coming rains will heighten the risk of diseases and make already dire conditions in their areas even worse. They are desperate for food, including seeds to plant ahead of the rains, water and medical services. Adequate shelter also remains a major concern. One 90-year-old woman told us that she didn’t have any proper shelter and was living under the trees. Others are in similar situations.

    “Sudan is the world’s largest displacement and humanitarian crisis, yet the humanitarian response for 2025 is grossly underfunded. This will go down in history as an abject failure unless Sudan’s international partners rise to the occasion and increase emergency funding for the humanitarian response in Sudan, as well as for Sudanese refugees.

    “To stop this humanitarian emergency from spiraling further, parties to the armed conflict must facilitate rapid, unconditional and safe access to humanitarian aid, and end all attacks on humanitarian objects and personnel.

    “Sudan is the world’s largest displacement and humanitarian crisis, yet the humanitarian response for 2025 is grossly underfunded. This will go down in history as an abject failure unless Sudan’s international partners rise to the occasion and increase emergency funding for the humanitarian response in Sudan, as well as for Sudanese refugees. More must be done to save lives. The international community cannot afford to look away.”

    Background

    Since the latest armed conflict broke out in Sudan in April 2023, over 11 million people have fled their homes. Displaced persons live in dire conditions in Sudan, including in Darfur, one of the regions most severely affected by fighting, as well as other countries. Cases of cholera outbreak are already being reported in North Darfur.

    Parties to the conflict continue to impede humanitarian access and attack humanitarian objects and personnel.Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to ensure sufficient humanitarian aid to a suffering population.

    The rainy season in Darfur typically lasts from June to September. In April, MSF already warned that the rainy season threatened to worsen the ongoing malnutrition crisis. In August 2024, the UN confirmed famine conditions in Zamzam camp and identified 13 other areas at risk of famine.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: GG Mothai: Aid cuts are putting LGBTIQ+ lives at risk in rural Botswana

    Source: Amnesty International –

    The Trump administration’s abrupt and sweeping suspension of US foreign aid is placing the lives and human rights of millions at risk. The cuts have ended critical programmes across the globe, including vital grassroots LGBTIQ+ organizations in Botswana which challenge entrenched homophobia and provide safety and support for LGBTIQ+ people.

    Gagotheko (GG/Gybian) Mothai is a non-binary human rights advocate based in Maun, Botswana, and director of the Pink Triangle LGBTQ Support Group.

    Below, GG shares the profound impact of grassroots organizations on LGBTIQ+ people’s lives and raises serious concerns about the welfare and safety of LGBTIQ+ people due to funding cuts.

    Maun is a deeply traditional and conservative place, more so than Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, where people are more aware. Maun is smaller and harmful cultural values still dominate.

    People here see LGBTIQ+ people as “un-African” or “possessed”. Homophobia is normalized, and being open about our identities puts us at constant risk of violence. We are rejected by our families, forced into unwanted marriages (especially LBQ women) and are cast out by our religious leaders. It feels harsher and more personal because it comes from people who are close to us: our families, chiefs and neighbours.

    I was disowned by my family in 2020, amid the pandemic.

    Activism here is survival work. It can feel powerful, we’ve seen real shifts: families starting to understand their queer children, churches slowly opening to dialogues on spirituality and sexuality, and queer people beginning to heal. But it’s also painful and emotionally draining. You may see progress on one side of town whilst violent incidents are increasing on the other.

    This is my hometown. I keep doing this work here because I hope one day to have a hometown that is kind, understanding and accepting.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Eswatini: Authorities must ensure access to justice for opposition MP Bacede Mabuza

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Reacting to the continued delay in the hearing of the appeal by the detained opposition Member of Parliament, Mduduzi Bacede Mabuza, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for East and Southern Africa, Vongai Chikwanda, said:

    “Eswatini’s authorities are failing to safeguard the independence and integrity of the country’s courts – a failure illustrated by the persistent delay to hear Bacede Mabuza’s appeal.  This undermines Mabuza’s right to access to justice and effective remedies including to an appeal to a higher tribunal.

    Authorities must end any interferences in judicial independence – whether direct or indirect, ensure respect for the human rights of everyone in the country and uphold the rule of law.

    Vongai Chikwanda, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for East and Southern Africa

    “In recent years, the Eswatini courts have been unable to protect human rights, and advance access to justice in cases of persecution of opposition leaders, human rights defenders, activists, and journalists. Authorities must end any interferences in judicial independence – whether direct or indirect, ensure respect for the human rights of everyone in the country and uphold the rule of law.”  

    Background

    On 15 July 2024, MPs Mduduzi Bacede Mabuza and Mthandeni Dube were sentenced to 85 years and 58 years respectively, after being convicted under the Suppression of Terrorism Act of 2008 and the Sedition and Subversive Activities Act of 1938. They were found guilty of allegedly inciting unrest during pro-democracy protests in June 2021. On 1 June 2023, after almost two years of arbitrary detention, they were convicted of terrorism, sedition, and murder. Mabuza’s case has been omitted from the court roll on three consecutive occasions by the Registrar of the Supreme Court, despite all required documents, including the Notice of Appeal, Record of Proceedings, and supporting pleadings, being properly filed.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Risk management tools under the CAP – E-002797/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002797/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Maria Grapini (S&D)

    The risk management tools under the CAP should offer an effective response to crises in order to protect European farmers, without discriminating or differentiating among them.

    Does the Commission not consider that the provisions of Recital 21 and Article 41a(5) of the proposal for a regulation (COM (2025) 236 final) allowing Member States the possibility of national co-financing of up to 200 % (in the form of state aid) in the event of climate disasters could lead to disparities between regions? This could happen owing to the differing potentials of the Member States, which are at different stages of development, and the provision risks undermining the level playing field in the single market.

    Rather than making provision for national co-financing, the financing of the crisis reserve at EU-level could be bolstered, and this used equitably for farmers wherever they are farming.

    Submitted: 9.7.2025

    Last updated: 14 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Risk management tools under the CAP – E-002797/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002797/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Maria Grapini (S&D)

    The risk management tools under the CAP should offer an effective response to crises in order to protect European farmers, without discriminating or differentiating among them.

    Does the Commission not consider that the provisions of Recital 21 and Article 41a(5) of the proposal for a regulation (COM (2025) 236 final) allowing Member States the possibility of national co-financing of up to 200 % (in the form of state aid) in the event of climate disasters could lead to disparities between regions? This could happen owing to the differing potentials of the Member States, which are at different stages of development, and the provision risks undermining the level playing field in the single market.

    Rather than making provision for national co-financing, the financing of the crisis reserve at EU-level could be bolstered, and this used equitably for farmers wherever they are farming.

    Submitted: 9.7.2025

    Last updated: 14 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Risk management tools under the CAP – E-002797/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002797/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Maria Grapini (S&D)

    The risk management tools under the CAP should offer an effective response to crises in order to protect European farmers, without discriminating or differentiating among them.

    Does the Commission not consider that the provisions of Recital 21 and Article 41a(5) of the proposal for a regulation (COM (2025) 236 final) allowing Member States the possibility of national co-financing of up to 200 % (in the form of state aid) in the event of climate disasters could lead to disparities between regions? This could happen owing to the differing potentials of the Member States, which are at different stages of development, and the provision risks undermining the level playing field in the single market.

    Rather than making provision for national co-financing, the financing of the crisis reserve at EU-level could be bolstered, and this used equitably for farmers wherever they are farming.

    Submitted: 9.7.2025

    Last updated: 14 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Risk management tools under the CAP – E-002797/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002797/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Maria Grapini (S&D)

    The risk management tools under the CAP should offer an effective response to crises in order to protect European farmers, without discriminating or differentiating among them.

    Does the Commission not consider that the provisions of Recital 21 and Article 41a(5) of the proposal for a regulation (COM (2025) 236 final) allowing Member States the possibility of national co-financing of up to 200 % (in the form of state aid) in the event of climate disasters could lead to disparities between regions? This could happen owing to the differing potentials of the Member States, which are at different stages of development, and the provision risks undermining the level playing field in the single market.

    Rather than making provision for national co-financing, the financing of the crisis reserve at EU-level could be bolstered, and this used equitably for farmers wherever they are farming.

    Submitted: 9.7.2025

    Last updated: 14 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Risk management tools under the CAP – E-002797/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002797/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Maria Grapini (S&D)

    The risk management tools under the CAP should offer an effective response to crises in order to protect European farmers, without discriminating or differentiating among them.

    Does the Commission not consider that the provisions of Recital 21 and Article 41a(5) of the proposal for a regulation (COM (2025) 236 final) allowing Member States the possibility of national co-financing of up to 200 % (in the form of state aid) in the event of climate disasters could lead to disparities between regions? This could happen owing to the differing potentials of the Member States, which are at different stages of development, and the provision risks undermining the level playing field in the single market.

    Rather than making provision for national co-financing, the financing of the crisis reserve at EU-level could be bolstered, and this used equitably for farmers wherever they are farming.

    Submitted: 9.7.2025

    Last updated: 14 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Presentation of the CAP after 2027 by Commissioner Hansen – Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development

    Source: European Parliament

    Christophe Hansen, European Commissioner for Agriculture © European Union, 2024

    At its meeting on 16 July, the College of Commissioners is likely to adopt the post-2027 multiannual financial framework package, including the first set of sectoral proposals. Commissioner Hansen will present the proposal on the common agricultural policy after 2027 which is supposed to be part of the package in the afternoon of the same day in ComAGRI and answer questions from MEPs.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Presentation of the CAP after 2027 by Commissioner Hansen – Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development

    Source: European Parliament

    Christophe Hansen, European Commissioner for Agriculture © European Union, 2024

    At its meeting on 16 July, the College of Commissioners is likely to adopt the post-2027 multiannual financial framework package, including the first set of sectoral proposals. Commissioner Hansen will present the proposal on the common agricultural policy after 2027 which is supposed to be part of the package in the afternoon of the same day in ComAGRI and answer questions from MEPs.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Definition and declaration of an international health emergency – E-001491/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. A ‘health emergency’ definition is not included in EU legislation. However, Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371[1] defines a serious cross-border threat to health. Internationally, a public health emergency of international concern is set in the International Health Regulations[2].

    2. The EU can recognise a public health emergency on its own. The procedure for the recognition is set in Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371[3], which foresees a consultation with relevant agencies and bodies[4]. The recognition has a form of an implementing act, requiring a favourable opinion of the Member States. The Commission does not have to consult the World Health Organisation (WHO) before the recognition, but should nonetheless inform the WHO about its intention to adopt such decision.

    3. The substantial conditions for the recognition stem from Articles 2(1) and 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371. In particular, the cross-border nature of a health threat and the need for EU-level coordination must be identified.

    • [1] Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371: ‘serious cross-border threat to health’ means a life-threatening or otherwise serious hazard to health of biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin, as referred to in Article 2(1), which spreads or entails a significant risk of spreading across the national borders of Member States, and which may necessitate coordination at Union level in order to ensure a high level of human health protection (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:314:FULL&from=EN).
    • [2] https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/246107/9789241580496-eng.pdf (Article 6 and Annex II of the International Health Regulations).
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2371&qid=1673887469777.
    • [4] The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, or the Advisory Committee on public health emergencies (referred to in Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371) or any other relevant Union agency or body.
    Last updated: 14 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Definition and declaration of an international health emergency – E-001491/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. A ‘health emergency’ definition is not included in EU legislation. However, Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371[1] defines a serious cross-border threat to health. Internationally, a public health emergency of international concern is set in the International Health Regulations[2].

    2. The EU can recognise a public health emergency on its own. The procedure for the recognition is set in Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371[3], which foresees a consultation with relevant agencies and bodies[4]. The recognition has a form of an implementing act, requiring a favourable opinion of the Member States. The Commission does not have to consult the World Health Organisation (WHO) before the recognition, but should nonetheless inform the WHO about its intention to adopt such decision.

    3. The substantial conditions for the recognition stem from Articles 2(1) and 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371. In particular, the cross-border nature of a health threat and the need for EU-level coordination must be identified.

    • [1] Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371: ‘serious cross-border threat to health’ means a life-threatening or otherwise serious hazard to health of biological, chemical, environmental or unknown origin, as referred to in Article 2(1), which spreads or entails a significant risk of spreading across the national borders of Member States, and which may necessitate coordination at Union level in order to ensure a high level of human health protection (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:314:FULL&from=EN).
    • [2] https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/246107/9789241580496-eng.pdf (Article 6 and Annex II of the International Health Regulations).
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2371&qid=1673887469777.
    • [4] The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, or the Advisory Committee on public health emergencies (referred to in Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371) or any other relevant Union agency or body.
    Last updated: 14 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Revision of Directive 2011/64/EU and growth of the shadow economy – E-002810/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002810/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Marlena Maląg (ECR)

    Directive 2011/64/EU established minimum excise duties on manufactured tobacco in the European Union, giving Member States the freedom to set higher rates based on their own circumstances. The Law and Justice Party Government of 2015-2023 made use of this freedom to pursue a policy of moderate excise duty increases, which led to a reduction in the shadow economy and growth in budgetary revenue in Poland. In 2024, Donald Tusk’s new governing coalition decided to significantly increase these rates, which has already led to a growth in the shadow economy, according to market analyses. Similar observations have been made in the Netherlands, which has seen an increase in the consumption of cigarettes without excise duty having been paid.

    In relation to the above:

    • 1.Has the Commission assessed the risk of the shadow economy growing as a result of the possible revision of Directive 2011/64/EU and the increase in minimum rates?
    • 2.Does the Commission have data available on the impact of increases in excise duties on the rate of illegal trade of processed tobacco in Member States?
    • 3.Has the Commission taken into account differences in purchasing power and geographic location of Member States when developing new legislative proposals on tobacco taxation?

    Submitted: 9.7.2025

    Last updated: 14 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Establishing a housing fund and doubling funds – E-001262/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission agrees with the Honourable Member that the housing crisis impacts a large number of European citizens. In response to the housing crisis, the Commission will put forward a European Affordable Housing Plan (‘the EHAP’) in 2026.

    The Commission notes, that in respect of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, primary responsibility for affordable and social housing is within the remit of Member States, regional and local authorities and the EAHP will respect these principles.

    In addition, the Commission put forward a — mid-term review — legislative proposal to modernise cohesion policy[1] including incentives to encourage Member States and regions to double their investments in affordable housing under the Cohesion policy.

    The relevant legislation on European funds and programmes[2] available for Member States, regions and local authorities for housing contain rules on governance, including allocation mechanism[3], and follow the said principles, in line with the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

    Any future budgetary provisions, including the allocation methodology, will be decided by co-legislators at the next MFF negotiations. In addition, the recent communication on NextGenerationEU[4] explicitly recognises the possibility to inject equity to national promotional banks, also for affordable housing.

    The Commission will continue to strengthen its contribution to mitigating the housing crisis, including for youth in its future actions.

    The Commission aims to cut unnecessary red tape and simplify processes[5] in order that available funding can be disbursed as quick as possible. On this matter the Commission works in close cooperation with the managing authorities and other relevant bodies.

    • [1] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review, COM(2025) 123.
    • [2] Most importantly the Recovery and Resilience Plans, the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund, the European Social Fund+ and the InvestEU programme.
    • [3] For Cohesion policy Funds, the methodology on allocation of global resources per Member State is defined by Annex XXVI of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy.
    • [4] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council NextGenerationEU — The road to 2026, COM/2025/310 final (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0310).
    • [5] In general, simplification is a key objective of the Commission, as evidenced also by the simplification omnibuses and the mentioned NextGenerationEU communication.
      Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions A Competitiveness Compass for the EU COM/2025/30 final (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0030&qid=1750151442346).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Establishing a housing fund and doubling funds – E-001262/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission agrees with the Honourable Member that the housing crisis impacts a large number of European citizens. In response to the housing crisis, the Commission will put forward a European Affordable Housing Plan (‘the EHAP’) in 2026.

    The Commission notes, that in respect of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, primary responsibility for affordable and social housing is within the remit of Member States, regional and local authorities and the EAHP will respect these principles.

    In addition, the Commission put forward a — mid-term review — legislative proposal to modernise cohesion policy[1] including incentives to encourage Member States and regions to double their investments in affordable housing under the Cohesion policy.

    The relevant legislation on European funds and programmes[2] available for Member States, regions and local authorities for housing contain rules on governance, including allocation mechanism[3], and follow the said principles, in line with the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

    Any future budgetary provisions, including the allocation methodology, will be decided by co-legislators at the next MFF negotiations. In addition, the recent communication on NextGenerationEU[4] explicitly recognises the possibility to inject equity to national promotional banks, also for affordable housing.

    The Commission will continue to strengthen its contribution to mitigating the housing crisis, including for youth in its future actions.

    The Commission aims to cut unnecessary red tape and simplify processes[5] in order that available funding can be disbursed as quick as possible. On this matter the Commission works in close cooperation with the managing authorities and other relevant bodies.

    • [1] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review, COM(2025) 123.
    • [2] Most importantly the Recovery and Resilience Plans, the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund, the European Social Fund+ and the InvestEU programme.
    • [3] For Cohesion policy Funds, the methodology on allocation of global resources per Member State is defined by Annex XXVI of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy.
    • [4] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council NextGenerationEU — The road to 2026, COM/2025/310 final (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0310).
    • [5] In general, simplification is a key objective of the Commission, as evidenced also by the simplification omnibuses and the mentioned NextGenerationEU communication.
      Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions A Competitiveness Compass for the EU COM/2025/30 final (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0030&qid=1750151442346).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Imports of sheep and goats from countries with active foot-and-mouth disease – E-001823/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission has adopted emergency measures[1] pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/429[2] and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/687[3].

    These measures include restrictions on the movement of susceptible animals and products from the affected areas. The definition of such restricted areas ensures safe trade from non-restricted areas of the EU, including affected Member States.

    Consignments of live animals from different restricted areas are only authorised if all conditions laid down in Union law are met, including pre-export quarantine and veterinary certification.

    Compliance with these requirements falls under the responsibility of the competent authorities of the Member States concerned. Member States must record the results of checks performed on animals involved in intra-EU trade in TRACES and their performance can be monitored during Commission audits.

    • [1] Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 of 31 March 2025 concerning certain emergency measures relating to outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in Hungary and Slovakia and repealing Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/613 (OJ L, 2025/672, 2.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/672/oj).
    • [2] Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’) (OJ L 84, 31.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj).
    • [3] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 of 17 December 2019 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and the Council, as regards rules for the prevention and control of certain listed diseases (OJ L 174, 3.6.2020, p. 64, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/687/oj).
    Last updated: 14 July 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Imports of sheep and goats from countries with active foot-and-mouth disease – E-001823/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission has adopted emergency measures[1] pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/429[2] and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/687[3].

    These measures include restrictions on the movement of susceptible animals and products from the affected areas. The definition of such restricted areas ensures safe trade from non-restricted areas of the EU, including affected Member States.

    Consignments of live animals from different restricted areas are only authorised if all conditions laid down in Union law are met, including pre-export quarantine and veterinary certification.

    Compliance with these requirements falls under the responsibility of the competent authorities of the Member States concerned. Member States must record the results of checks performed on animals involved in intra-EU trade in TRACES and their performance can be monitored during Commission audits.

    • [1] Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 of 31 March 2025 concerning certain emergency measures relating to outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in Hungary and Slovakia and repealing Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/613 (OJ L, 2025/672, 2.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/672/oj).
    • [2] Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’) (OJ L 84, 31.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj).
    • [3] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 of 17 December 2019 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and the Council, as regards rules for the prevention and control of certain listed diseases (OJ L 174, 3.6.2020, p. 64, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/687/oj).
    Last updated: 14 July 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Information on the first-ever European-wide enquiry on the impact of social media on the well-being of young people – E-001411/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. As outlined in the mission letter to the Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare, the Commission will carry out an EU-wide inquiry on the broader impacts of social media and related excessive screentime on wellbeing and mental health, especially of children and young people. This initiative may include the collection of relevant data and consultations with key stakeholders. The scope, methodology and timeline of the inquiry are being developed.

    This inquiry will build on enforcement actions currently under way in the context of the Digital Services Act[1], where the Commission is investigating mental health risks on social media platforms including TikTok[2] and Meta[3].

    2. The Commission is also preparing an action plan to tackle cyberbullying. It would aim to develop a shared definition of cyberbullying; map national best practices to scale them up at EU level; foster cooperation with industry and civil society; and encourage a culture of seeking support and reporting cyberbullying.

    The Commission services responsible for the inquiry and the action plan are working closely to ensure that the inquiry builds on and reinforces the existing work on mental health and social media, and that it aligns with the upcoming Digital Fairness Act.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng.
    • [2] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_926.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2664.
    Last updated: 14 July 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Consequences of the war in Sudan in North Africa – E-001636/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    As a key humanitarian and development aid donor, the Commission is acutely aware that conflicts — particularly the war in Sudan — have generated significant protection needs for displaced populations, many of whom have fled to neighbouring countries, notably Egypt and Libya.

    The North Africa region remains a destination and transit point for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, including unaccompanied children.

    As a result of their fragile legal status, displaced people are exposed to insecurity, threats, harassment, sexual and gender-based violence, and forced recruitment.

    The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) receives EU funding across the whole North Africa region, with a primary focus on protection and refugee status determination.

    However, the agency faces alarming levels of underfunding in the region. In 2024, the United States alone accounted for approximately 38% of its funding in the region, with contributions reaching as high as 47% in the case of Egypt.

    The Commission remains strongly committed to supporting UNHCR in North Africa to ensure the continued delivery of critical life-saving assistance, such as food and water, sanitation and hygiene, as well as to strengthen the protection and resilience of vulnerable people.

    This includes efforts to enhance access to basic education and health services. The Commission will continue to support people in need in Egypt and Libya, working through UNHCR and other mandated United Nations agencies.

    In parallel, the Commission will also support the reinforcement of national asylum systems by providing technical assistance, capacity-building, and targeted training to local stakeholders.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Consequences of the war in Sudan in North Africa – E-001636/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    As a key humanitarian and development aid donor, the Commission is acutely aware that conflicts — particularly the war in Sudan — have generated significant protection needs for displaced populations, many of whom have fled to neighbouring countries, notably Egypt and Libya.

    The North Africa region remains a destination and transit point for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, including unaccompanied children.

    As a result of their fragile legal status, displaced people are exposed to insecurity, threats, harassment, sexual and gender-based violence, and forced recruitment.

    The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) receives EU funding across the whole North Africa region, with a primary focus on protection and refugee status determination.

    However, the agency faces alarming levels of underfunding in the region. In 2024, the United States alone accounted for approximately 38% of its funding in the region, with contributions reaching as high as 47% in the case of Egypt.

    The Commission remains strongly committed to supporting UNHCR in North Africa to ensure the continued delivery of critical life-saving assistance, such as food and water, sanitation and hygiene, as well as to strengthen the protection and resilience of vulnerable people.

    This includes efforts to enhance access to basic education and health services. The Commission will continue to support people in need in Egypt and Libya, working through UNHCR and other mandated United Nations agencies.

    In parallel, the Commission will also support the reinforcement of national asylum systems by providing technical assistance, capacity-building, and targeted training to local stakeholders.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Lack of transparency on allegedly manipulated EMA vaccine documents and implications for public trust and foreign interference – E-001401/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission would like to stress that the European Medicines Agency (EMA) cyberattack in 2020 was successfully contained without affecting the evaluation and approval of COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics.

    The EMA swiftly launched a full investigation, in close cooperation with the Dutch police, the Cybersecurity Service for the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (CERT-EU) and Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation. The law enforcement investigation did not confirm the identities of the suspects involved in this criminal attack.

    The EMA remains vigilant and has subsequently further strengthened its defensive cybersecurity capabilities to be better prepared for cyberattacks.

    The EMA has also published a wealth of information about the evaluation of COVID-19 vaccines, including the clinical data submitted for assessment and the detailed assessment reports. The cyberattack did not impact the integrity of the data that were assessed by the EMA.

    The Commission and the EMA would like to stress the importance of consulting reliable information sources and refer the public to the documents published on the EMA website.

    The EMA will continue releasing documents to the public in line with its legal obligations and its transparency policy.

    Last updated: 14 July 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Foreign investment in private education and its impact on public education in the European Union – E-002794/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002794/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nikos Pappas (The Left)

    Education is a fundamental public good, with the EU committed – through Regulation (EU) 2021/817 – to promoting quality and equality. It is crucial that recent developments in private education do not undermine these objectives.

    In recent years, there has been an increasing infiltration of foreign investment capital into private education in Member States such as Greece, Italy, Cyprus and the Netherlands. International investment groups are acquiring educational institutions, which raises questions about the impact on public education, equal access and social cohesion. In some cases, inequalities are increasing and there is a risk of ‘two-tier education’.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.How does the Commission assess the increasing presence of foreign investment capital in private education in the Member States and the possible impact on public education?
    • 2.What measures does the Commission intend to put in place to ensure that the infiltration of foreign capital does not lead to inequalities in access to and quality of education provided?
    • 3.How does the Commission intend to support Member States in strengthening and upgrading public education so that it remains competitive and attractive for students and their families?

    Submitted: 9.7.2025

    Last updated: 14 July 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Are EU funds being used to promote a progressive ideological agenda? – E-002791/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002791/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Markus Buchheit (ESN)

    Numerous EU funding programmes, including Erasmus+, Horizon Europe, and the Cohesion Fund, now systematically include ideological criteria related to ‘diversity,’ ‘gender equality,’ ‘LGBTIQ+ inclusion’, or ‘climate justice.’

    These conditions often appear in grant application guidelines, project evaluations, and reporting obligations. While the stated aim is to promote equality and sustainability, in practice they risk discriminating against institutions and applicants who do not adhere to a specific ideological worldview.

    Public funds should serve the general interest of all EU citizens, not act as instruments for social re-engineering.

    • 1.Can the Commission explain why political and ideological concepts such as ‘gender mainstreaming,’ ‘intersectionality,’ or ‘climate justice’ are increasingly used as evaluation criteria in EU-funded programmes?
    • 2.What safeguards exist to ensure that EU citizens, institutions, or associations that do not endorse progressive ideologies are not excluded from funding opportunities?
    • 3.How does the Commission justify the use of taxpayers’ money to promote specific ideological agendas instead of maintaining strict political and ideological neutrality in public funding?

    Submitted: 9.7.2025

    Last updated: 14 July 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Illegal trafficking of pesticides – E-001736/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU Agri-Food Fraud Network (FFN)[1] works with law enforcement through the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), guided by the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment Report.

    EMPACT connects Member States, EU bodies, and international partners to combat serious organised crime. For illegal pesticides, the FFN co-leads with Europol the Operational Action Plan ‘Environmental Crime’ and supports Europol’s Operation SILVER AXE, targeting intellectual property rights protected non-compliant products.

    Participants share related information via the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA), for secure exchange. The FFN contributes by data sharing, statistical analysis, and trend evaluation.

    The Commission audits Member States to assess controls on marketing and use of plant protection products, including detecting fraud.

    The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) actively detects dangerous goods, as pesticides, and works closely with customs authorities to support cross- border investigations. OLAF has coordinated a joint customs operation on dangerous substances, including pesticides, in the context of the Asia-Europe Meeting[2].

    Moreover, OLAF provided support and specialised intelligence for operations leading to the interception of a significant consignments of illegal pesticides in Bulgaria and Romania[3][4].

    The Commission works with partner countries at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development fighting illegal trade in pesticides and remains committed mitigating negative impacts of illegal pesticides on environment, thus ensuring the protection of European consumers .

    • [1] https://food.ec.europa.eu/safety/agri-food-fraud/eu-food-fraud-network_en.
    • [2] https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/media-corner/news/operation-noxia-olaf-leads-operation-against-dangerous-substances-2023-10-16_en.
    • [3] https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/media-corner/news/11-tonnes-pesticides-seized-thanks-olaf-and-bulgarian-authorities-2023-03-31_en.
    • [4] https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/media-corner/news/romanian-authorities-seize-1000-litres-counterfeit-pesticides-valued-over-eu600-000-thanks-olafs-2024-10-03_en.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Resumption of Frontex–Europol data-sharing in the interests of security and combating crime and irregular immigration – P-001768/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Under Article 68(5) of Regulation 2019/1896[1], the transfer of personal data between the two EU Agencies requires a working arrangement.

    The negotiations of the working arrangement are ongoing and taking place directly between the two Agencies. The Commission has no competence established in the legislation to take any steps to resume data transfers.

    The Commission does not take part in the negotiation of the working arrangement. However, under Art. 68(2) of Regulation 2019/1896, Frontex is required to submit the agreed text to the Commission to receive a prior approval decision, once the negotiations have been finalised between the two Agencies.

    The Commission regularly encourages the Agencies to swiftly conclude the negotiations.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, OJ L 295, 14/11/2019, p. 1.
    Last updated: 14 July 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Need for immediate EU response to the humiliating end of the diplomatic mission to Libya on 8 July 2025 – E-002804/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002804/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Konstantinos Arvanitis (The Left), Nikolas Farantouris (The Left), Elena Kountoura (The Left), Nikos Pappas (The Left)

    Yesterday’s humiliating end to the diplomatic mission to Libya led by Commissioner Brunner and involving ministers from three EU Member States constitutes diplomatic humiliation and an international downgrading of the EU’s prestige, with potentially serious implications for EU foreign policy. The focus is on the extremely sensitive area of ​​refugees/migration, in which EU-Libya relations remain tense and troubled due to the operations of actors such as the so-called ‘Libyan Coast Guard’. In addition, the European mission was characterised by Benghazi as ‘unwanted’, while its presence was considered a ‘blatant violation’,[1] in an extremely provocative move to instrumentalise the refugee/migration issue.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.To what does the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy attribute the disastrous failure of the mission?
    • 2.Is the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy considering readjusting the EU’s stance and the subsequent measures it will put in place, such as changing the funding and aid regime for Libya?
    • 3.What specific actions has the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy taken to protect against the possibility that first country Member States will be further burdened by the refugee/migration issue, as a result of the diplomatic actions of the EU leadership, as well as the humanitarian crisis that may arise from the entrapment of refugees and migrants in these Member States as a result of the new Migration Pact?

    Submitted: 9.7.2025

    • [1] https://www.ertnews.gr/eidiseis/ellada/politiki/emploki-me-xaftar-sti-veggazi-anepithymiti-i-eyropaiki-antiprosopeia/
    Last updated: 14 July 2025

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