Source: European Parliament
Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
Jackson, Miss. – A Jackson man pled guilty to illegal possession of a machinegun.
Johnny Ragsdale, 20, pled guilty on October 24, 2024 in U.S. District Court in Jackson.
According to court documents, Ragsdale was found in possession of an illegal machinegun after an attempted traffic stop on a vehicle in Jackson. Ragsdale, the driver, failed to yield to law enforcement and led Capitol Police on a high-speed chase. The chase ended after Ragsdale collided with a train car on Mill Street. A Glock pistol was recovered from the vehicle, and a machinegun conversion device, also known as a switch, was attached to the pistol.
The U.S. Attorney’s Office has seen an increase in cases involving illegal firearm conversion devices, commonly known as “switches” or “auto sears,” which convert semi-automatic handguns into fully automatic weapons (i.e., machineguns) in a matter of seconds. The rapid fire of firearms converted to machineguns presents a significant danger in our community to both the public and law enforcement. According to a 2023 report by the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), there was a 570% increase in the number of machinegun conversion devices taken into ATF custody between 2017 and 2021.
Ragsdale is scheduled to be sentenced on February 25, 2025, and a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. A federal district judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.
U.S. Attorney Todd W. Gee and Special Agent in Charge Joshua Jackson of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) made the announcement.
The ATF and the Capitol Police Department are investigating the case.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Amber S. Jones is prosecuting the case.
This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.
Source: European Parliament
This briefing presents a summary of 3 studies prepared by academic expert panel for the Banking Union on the occasion of 10 years of parliamentary scrutiny over key authorities within the Banking Union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Board (SRB). It also presents proposals for enhancing the accountability framework governing these authorities. These studies were requested by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament.
Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
United States Attorney Clint Johnson today announced the results of the October Federal Grand Jury 2024-B Indictments.
The following individuals have been charged with violations of United States law in indictments returned by the Grand Jury. The return of an indictment is a method of informing a defendant of alleged violations of federal law, which must be proven in a court of law beyond a reasonable doubt to overcome a defendant’s presumption of innocence.
Lawrence Francis Michael Bady. Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition. Bady, 33, transient, is charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition, knowing he was previously convicted of felonies. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and the Tulsa Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Niko Boulieris is prosecuting the case. 24-CR-340
Paul Jimenez Diaz; Saul Peña Becerra. Drug Conspiracy; Possession of Fentanyl with Intent to Distribute; Possession of Heroin with Intent to Distribute; Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute; Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Distribute; Maintaining a Drug-Involved Premises (superseding). Diaz, 37, and Becerra, 20, Mexican Nationals, are charged with conspiring to distribute fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine. Diaz knowingly possessed more than 500 grams of fentanyl, 100 grams of heroin, and more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. They also are charged with maintaining a residence for the distribution of drugs. Becerra is charged with knowingly possessing cocaine to distribute it and possessing more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. The Drug Enforcement Administration, Homeland Security Investigation, and the Tulsa Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Mandy M. Mackenzie is prosecuting the case. 24-CR-323
Kourtney Dawn Haley. Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute; Maintaining a Drug-Involved Premises. Haley, 44, of Tulsa and a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, is charged with knowingly possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and maintaining a residence to distribute methamphetamine. The Drug Enforcement Administration and the Tulsa Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney David A. Nasar is prosecuting the case. 24-CR-330
Joseph Matthew Hough. Domestic Assault in Indian Country by a Habitual Offender. Hough, 48, of Tulsa and a member of the Cherokee Nation, is charged with domestic assault after receiving felony convictions for domestic assault in Tulsa County District Court. The FBI and the Tulsa Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Melissa Weems and Stacey P. Todd are prosecuting the case. 24-CR-331
Hilario Lucas Mendoza. Unlawful Reentry of a Removed Alien. Mendoza, 42, a Mexican national, is charged with unlawfully reentering the United States after having been removed in Dec. 2009. U.S. Immigration and Custom’s Enforcement and Removal Operations is the investigative agency. Assistant U.S. Attorney Niko Boulieris is prosecuting the case. 24-CR-332
James Dernest Mims, Jr. Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition; Possession of a Stolen Firearm. Mims, 26, of Virginia, is charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition, knowing he was previously convicted of felonies. Additionally, Mims possessed a stolen firearm. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and the Tulsa Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Scott Dunn is prosecuting the case. 24-CR-334
Jesse Lane Mitchell; Jacklyn Paige Roberts. Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under 12 Years of Age in Indian Country; Coercion and Enticement of a Minor; Child Neglect in Indian Country. Mitchell, 35, and Roberts, 32, a member of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, both of Collinsville, are charged with knowingly engaging in a sexual act with a minor child under 12 years old between Jan. 2023 and Apr. 2024. Mitchell is further charged with coercing and enticing a minor child under 18 years old to engage in sexual activity. From Jan. 2023 through Aug. 2024, Roberts willfully failed to protect and adequately supervise a child. Homeland Security Investigations and the Collinsville Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Stephanie Ihler and Stephen Scaife are prosecuting the case. 24-CR-342
Brian Scott Perry. Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition. Perry, 46, of Tulsa, is charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition, knowing he was previously convicted of felonies. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and the Tulsa Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Valeria Luster and Matthew Cyran are prosecuting the case. 24-CR-339
Arlando Maurice Williams. Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition. Williams, 25, of Sapulpa, is charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition, knowing he was previously convicted of felonies. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and the Oklahoma Highway Patrol are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Niko Boulieris is prosecuting the case. 24-CR-333
Michael Brandon Williams. Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition; False Impersonation of an Officer or Employee of the United States. Williams, 43, of Bixby, is charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition, knowing he was previously convicted of felonies. Additionally, Williams was charged with pretending to be an FBI agent. The FBI and Bixby Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Adam C. Bailey is prosecuting the case. 24-CR-336
Source: European Parliament
The Commission acknowledges the importance of an inclusive education, according to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) Regulation.
The contribution to the objective of territorial cohesion is among the assessment criteria of national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) based on the RRF Regulation.
The ‘mezzogiorno quota’ of 40% of NRRP investment is a national commitment, as the RRF Regulation does not require a quantification.
The Commission has been working closely with the Italian authorities to ensure that funds are used effectively, including through the use of the audit and control system required by the plan.
The RRF Regulation also provides for an ex-post independent evaluation report on the implementation of the Facility, including its long-term impact.
Source: United States Navy Pacific Fleet 1
25 October 2024
SAN DIEGO (October 25, 2024) – The 41st Surface Line Week (SLW) Pacific 2024 came to an end with an award ceremony where USS Jack H. Lucas (DDG 125) was announced as the overall winner, Oct. 25.The week-long competition highlighted the professional and athletic skills of members of the Surface Warfare community in San Diego while enhancing camaraderie and team building.
“It’s a huge win for the team,” said Capt. Andrew Bucher, DDG 125’s commanding officer. “We’ve done a lot this year, and this was a great opportunity to come together as shipmates and friends.”
As part of the honor, DDG 125 can proudly display the 2024 SLW banner on the ships brow until the 2025 winner is selected.
“Our Navy needs an esprit-de-corps to win and that starts on the deckplates and the athletic fields,” said Vice Adm. Brendan McLane, commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. “We never fight alone. Incredible acts of courage require incredible teams, whether on the soccer field or beyond the horizon. Steel and brass are great, but without combat ready crews to man the ships rails and bring her to life, everything is superfluous. In war and peace, strong teams are what our nation, and what our Navy needs.”
HMAS Brisbane (DDG 41) from the Royal Australian Navy won the 2024 SLW spirit award for small unit commands.
“We were really excited to get the invitation to participate this year,” said Cmdr. Bernard Dobson, DDG 41’s commanding officer. “We threw everything we had at it and it really solidified the interchangeability mission that we have between the Australian Navy and the U.S. Navy, [Surface line week] was like the cream on the cake.”
The mission of CNSP is to man, train, and equip the Surface Force to provide fleet commanders with credible naval power to control the sea and project power ashore.
For more information from CNSP, visit https://www.surfpac.navy.mil/.
Source: European Parliament
1. Under EU law, if a third-country national makes an application for international protection at the internal border of a Member State, that Member State is required to apply the provisions of the Dublin Regulation to determine which Member State is responsible for the examination of the asylum application[1]. The new transfer procedure of Article 23a of the revised Schengen Borders Code[2] does not apply to applicants for international protection.
2. In accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the derogation of Article 72 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU must be interpreted strictly. This Article cannot be read in such a way as to confer on Member States the power to depart from the provisions of EU law based on no more than reliance on the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security. A Member State has to prove that it is necessary to have recourse to that provision which will be subject to control by the Court of Justice of the European Union[3]. In doing so, the Court examines to what extent the EU legislator has already taken account of the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon the Member States in relation to public policy and internal security[4].
Source: European Parliament
While primary responsibility for civil protection and for providing national disaster-management systems with sufficient capabilities lies with Member States, the Commission has a supporting competence in this area.
Given the growing concern of wildfires in Europe and to better support Member States, the EU has taken steps to improve preparedness and to bolster firefighting capacities.
Since 2023, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism[1] (UCPM) has doubled its rescEU transitional fleet of firefighting aircraft during the summer season.
In 2024, the transitional fleet is composed of a total of 28 assets, available for deployment if there is a request for assistance. This comes in addition to the capacities available in the European Civil Protection Pool[2] as well as to the teams pre-positioned in 2024 in four Member States[3] for a total of almost 600 firefighters.
For the long term, as part of the rescEU permanent fleet, the Commission has invested significant financial resources for the acquisition of 12 new medium amphibious planes.
The planes will be hosted by six Member States and are expected to arrive gradually as of 2027. In addition, UCPM grants are currently supporting five wildfire prevention projects of EUR 2.8 million[4], which help enhance national capabilities for wildfire resilience.
The deployment procedures, agreed with the Member States, are foreseen in Article 12(6) of Decision no 1313/2013/EU[5] and relevant implementing rules[6].
While there are no comparable European alternatives available on the market at the moment, the Commission is in contact with relevant stakeholders to continue enhancing firefighting capacities in a Team Europe approach.
Source: European Parliament
All contracting authorities and contracting entities in the EU must respect the national rules transposing the EU Public Procurement directives[1].
These directives ensure that public procurement is opened up to competition and public funds are used efficiently. Member States are obliged to ensure application of the provisions transposing t hese directives to all public contracts and concessions the value of which is estimated to be not less than certain thresholds[2].
As specified in Directive 2014/24/EU[3], the procurement shall not be subdivided with the effect of preventing it from falling within the scope of this directive, unless justified by objective reasons.
National courts are usually in the best position to assess whether contracting authorities and contracting entities respect their obligations under EU law.
The transposition of the directives on remedies in public procurement[4] provides economic operators with rapid review procedures to challenge award procedures that they deem to be in breach of EU law, in the case at stake, before the Administrative Tribunal on Public Procurement of the Autonomous Community of Galicia[5].
Based on the information provided by the Honourable Member, the Commission cannot determine if these public procurement activities received EU funds.
For EU funds under shared management , the Member States shall ensure that expenditure submitted to the Commission is legal and regular and prevent, detect, correct and report on possible irregularities.
The Commission will raise the issue with the Spanish authorities and, should it identify a breach of EU law or a serious deficiency in a programme’s management and control system, it may interrupt or suspend the payment deadlines, and cancel the EU contribution.
Source: European Parliament
The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)[1] works on a 24 hours/7 days basis to carry out its mandate that includes, among other tasks, monitoring of unfolding or potential disasters and their impact.
In this context, the ERCC daily monitors the forecast estimates for potential flooding across Europe, through the dedicated European Flood Awareness System (EFAS)[2] of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service.
The EFAS complements national systems, contributing to monitoring and raising awareness about floods and related events, while retaining the supporting role that the Commission has in this field.
As of 13 September 2024, due to the heavy rains and strong winds which affected large parts of Central and Eastern Europe, Member States such as Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania pro-actively activated the Rapid Mapping of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service[3] for floods. Poland activated the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM)[4] on 18 September 2024.
From the onset, the ERCC was in contact with the national civil protection authorities of Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and Slovakia to raise awareness about possible upcoming floods and offered support through the UCPM.
Source: European Parliament
The EU provides significant financial support for water related investments: In 2021-2027, EUR 13.2 billion of Cohesion Policy funds[1] is earmarked for water management in the EU, including in drinking water supply with a preference for demand side options before investing in additional supply.
This includes efficiency measures such as leakage reduction of water networks to reduce water losses. Investment in desalination infrastructure must comply with the Do No Significant Harm Principle and could be considered for regions (e.g. islands) in the framework of integrated water management after demand side options have been exploited and if there is no alternative for drinking water supply.
EU Cohesion Policy in Greece already supports desalination plants to address water scarcity and the need for increased quality standards. In 2014-2020, EUR 49 million for more than 25 desalination projects in insular Greece were funded[2].
In 2021-2027, EUR 20 million have been earmarked[3] for investments in sustainable water desalination through an integrated implementation model from the source to citizen’s tap.
Within Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP)[4], a water regulatory authority has been established with the aim to strengthen the institutional framework, supervise the water sector and ensure the sustainability of water services, while Greece benefits from RRP funding for water supply and water saving infrastructure[5].
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)[6], the EU programme for the environment and climate action[7] and s everal European Missions and Partnerships under Horizon Europe[8] also support water resilience, including EU funded research,[9] to minimise negative environmental effects of the current generation of desalination plants.
Source: European Parliament
18.10.2024
Question for written answer E-002161/2024
to the Commission
Rule 144
Fernando Navarrete Rojas (PPE), Dolors Montserrat (PPE)
Taking into account that Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 provides that each national medium-term fiscal-structural plan should mention its status in the context of national procedures (recital 23) and that expenditure paths should be consistent with draft budgetary plans (recital 39):
Submitted: 18.10.2024
Source: European Parliament
The designated candidates of the von der Leyen Commission will be heard by the European Parliament in committees dealing with their respective portfolios. The confirmation hearings take place from 4 until 12 November 2024. MEPs assess if the candidates are suitable for the posts they have been assigned to. The confirmation hearings are streamed live. The commissioner-designate will give an opening speech and then answer questions by committee members. CULT will be responsible for:
More information, including the candidates’ portfolios & written answers, the schedule, the procedure, the live web streaming and a record after the hearing, can be found on the dedicated webpage linked below.
Source: European Parliament
The Great Sea Interconnector (formally known as ‘EuroAsia Interconnector’) consists of an offshore electricity cable and related infrastructure to interconnect the national grids of Cyprus, Greece and at a later stage Israel, and connect them to the single energy market of the EU.
This project is recognised as a project of common interest (PCI) of the EU in the field of energy, notably under the first EU list of projects of common interest and mutual interest adopted in 2023 in line with the Trans-European Networks for Energy Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure[1].
PCIs are closely monitored by the Commission. The Commission is working together with the project promoter and relevant national authorities of the Member States involved to advance this project aiming at improving the interconnection of Cyprus, bringing the potential to lower energy prices for consumers, allowing for a higher share of renewables in its energy mix and increasing the security of energy supply of two Member States and the EU system altogether.
The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye.
In this context, the EU continues to expect Türkiye to unequivocally commit to and promote good neighbourly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice, and to respect the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of all EU Member States, in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos).
Source: European Parliament
SANT subcommittee will travel to Stockholm from 28 to 29 October to visit the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). The delegation will be composed of three Members: Elena NEVADO DEL CAMPO (EPP, Spain), András Tivadar KULJA (EPP, Hungary), Marta TEMIDO (S&D, Portugal).
The aim of this mission is to gather information about the current and planned activities of the Agency. In addition, participating SANT Members would like to obtain first-hand insight on measures to prevent and control communicable diseases, in particular what concerns the MPox crisis. Members would also have the opportunity to discuss best practices for managing health crises, and understand how epidemiological data is collected and used to influence public health policies in the EU.
Source: European Parliament
Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale aggression of Ukraine, the EU and its Member States have delivered unprecedented levels of military support for the Ukrainian armed forces.
Between 2022 and 2024, the EU mobilised EUR 6.1 billion to incentivise Member States’ deliveries of military equipment in view of addressing Ukraine’s pressing military and defence needs.
In addition, in March 2024, the EU increased the financial ceiling of the European Peace Facility by EUR 5 billion, by establishing a dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund. This brings the total financial support allocated via the Facility to EUR 11.1 billion[1].
Beyond these aggregated numbers of military support to Ukraine provided at the EU level, the EU is not in a position to disclose any information on military support provided by individual Member States.
The Commission does not coordinate arms deliveries at the EU level. It remains the prerogative of each Member State to communicate on its national military support to Ukraine.
Source: European Parliament
16.10.2024
Question for written answer E-002096/2024
to the Commission
Rule 144
Daniel Buda (PPE)
The EU is the biggest wine producer in the world, accounting for 62 % of global wine production. In 2020 there were 2.2 million wine holdings in the EU and vineyards covered around 2 % of the Union’s utilised agricultural area.
The wine sector is the EU’s biggest agri-food sector in terms of exports; in 2022 the sector contributed EUR 130 billion to the EU’s GDP, equivalent to 0.8 % of the total.
Romania, the EU’s sixth biggest wine producer, saw a drop in grape production in 2024, and oenologists are worried by these changes. The drought and low yield meant that grapes ripened much faster and needed to be harvested earlier.
According to experts, on top of these major production losses, over-ripening will make it very difficult for wineries to obtain quality wines.
What measures does the Commission plan to take to protect the wine sector, which is a key contributor to the EU’s GDP?
Submitted: 16.10.2024
Source: European Parliament
BUDG members will exchange with Nadia Calviño, President of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and Tony Murphy, President of the European Court of Auditors (ECA), on the lessons learnt from the current EU long-term budget, on the 6th November.
The debate will feed into the BUDG own-initiative report “A revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world”, in which Parliament will set out its priorities and expectations for the next EU long-term budget (post-2027) before the European Commission proposal in 2025.
Source: European Parliament
While there is no specific EU legislation on cormorants, they are protected[1] under the Birds Directive[2]. The Commission is aware that a recent expansion of the cormorant population can make the balancing of conflicts between human interests and cormorants challenging.
The Commission has published advice on managing such conflicts[3], and points to the possibility to use derogations under Article 9 of the Birds Directive. Guidance on applying such derogations is under development.
The current eel fishing closure established by the EU applies only to inland waters in the Mediterranean region[4]. This six-month ban stems from Recommendation GFCM/42/2018/1[5] of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean[6], extended by Recommendations GFCM/45/2022/1[7] and GFCM/46/2023/1[8], and most recently implemented into EU law through Regulation (EU) 2024/259[9].
The Water Framework Directive (WFD)[10] provides for the management of surface and groundwaters to ensure the good status of all waters.
Article 14 requires Member States to ensure that all interested parties are actively involved in the implementation of the directive, and that all draft planning documents are consulted publicly.
This allows anglers and stakeholders[11] to contribute, e.g. on characterising and classifying water bodies, identifying pressures, and setting mitigation and restoration measures.
The European Anglers Alliance is an active stakeholder in the Common Implementation Strategy for the WFD. Additionally, under the Common Fisheries Policy[12], fisheries associations are members in Advisory Councils, which advice on conservation and socioeconomic aspects of management, as well as on simplification of rules.
Source: European Parliament
Under EU law[1], EU citizens have the right to reside in the territory of other Member States for up to three months with the only requirement of holding a valid identity card or passport.
Checks on compliance with that provision cannot be carried out systematically. The person concerned may only be asked to provide evidence in case of substantiated doubts (which may be the case where the person comes into contact with the national authorities over a period of more than three consecutive months).
Assessing the duration of a stay requires an individual examination, based on objective factors and taking into account the person’s intention and relevant evidence.
During the first three months of residence, in accordance with Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC, EU citizens who are not engaged in economic activity may be refused social assistance benefits by the host Member State.
After three months, pursuant to Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC, economically non-active EU citizens must have sufficient resources not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State.
EU citizens who do not comply with those residence conditions can be expelled and can only claim a new right of residence there under Article 6 after having genuinely and effectively terminated their residence under Article 7.
In December 2023, the Commission issued guidance on the directive[2], including on the above matters.
It is within the competence of the Member States to develop policies to tackle begging, which is a phenomenon that can also concern own nationals.
Source: European Parliament
There are currently two infringement cases in relation to Ireland on compliance with the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive[1] (UWWTD).
On 7 February 2024 the Commission issued a letter of formal notice to Ireland for failing to fully comply with the directive in agglomerations Kilmore Quay, Kilrush, Kilkee, Whitegate-Aghada, Moville, Mitchelstown, Clareabbey and Lahinch as urban waste waters are not properly treated before being discharged.
A further three agglomerations with a population of more than 10 000 — Ringaskiddy, Malahide and Cobh[2] — were considered to be discharging wastewater in sensitive areas without the more stringent treatment as required by the directive[3].
In another case[4], on 28 March 2019 the Court of Justice of the EU gave its judgment in Case C-427/17[5] and found that Ireland breached various obligations of the UWWTD in relation to the following agglomerations: Arklow, Athlone, Cork City, Enniscorthy, Ballybofey/Stranorlar, Cobh, Enfield, Fermoy, Killybegs, Mallow, Midleton, Passage/Monkstown, Rathcormac, Ringaskiddy, Ringsend, Roscommon Town, Shannon Town, Tubbercurry, Youghal, Dundalk and Castlebridge.
As the cases are still ongoing, at this stage, the Commission is not in a position to confirm the compliance of any of the above listed agglomerations with the requirements of the directive. However, the most recent report on the implementation of the directive in Ireland is public[6].
Source: European Parliament
1. EUR 150 million have been allocated from the 2014-2020 Cohesion Policy programme ‘Transport Infrastructure, Environment and Sustainable Development’ to support the disaster management system of the affected Greek regions to address the consequences of the floods. Additionally, around EUR 13 million have been allocated from the ‘Competitiveness, Entrepreneurship and Innovation’ programme to support the adaptability of enterprises and workers affected by the floods. Under shared management Greece is responsible for the selection and implementation of projects in line with programme objectives and priorities.
2. The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) provides financial assistance to EU countries facing severe natural disasters according to the specific rules set out in Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002[1]. EUSF financial assistance is intended to supplement the countries’ own public expenditure to finance essential emergency and recovery operations. Following Greece’s application, the Budget authority approved mobilisation of EUR 101.5 million of EUSF assistance for Greece following the floods in September 2023. The EUSF aid calculation methodology has been established in 2023 and accepted by the European Parliament and the Council.
Under the Greek Rural Development Programme 2014-2022, support is foreseen from the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development for investments to restore agricultural and forestry potential following natural disasters, adverse climatic or catastrophic events amounting to EUR 45 million[2].
At the end of 2023, the Commission provided an additional exceptional funding of EUR 43 million through the agricultural crisis reserve[3]. These funds were paid to farmers around lake Karla by the end of May 2024.
Source: European Parliament
The Commission notes that regulation (EC) No 883/2004[1], lays down rules to determine the legislation applicable to a person in a cross-border situation, such as students studying abroad .
According to Article 11(3)(a) and (e), an employed person is subject to the legislation of the Member State in which they pursue their activity, while inactive persons, such as students, are subject to the legislation of the place of residence.
When studying abroad in the EU, students generally remain covered by the legislation of the country of origin and access necessary health treatments in the country where they study with the European Health Insurance Card.
However, when a student takes up work abroad, the social security legislation applicable to them changes as well. The Commission is thus aware of the possible changes in their social security coverage.
Since the EU law in this field does not harmonise, but only coordinates national social security legislation, moving from one Member State to another can have consequences for an insured person in terms of entitlements and contributions.
The Commission does not consider this to be an obstacle to the mobility of students as one of the main principles is the mandatory application of a single national legislation.
This is to avoid that a person exercising their right to free movement would be left with no coverage or would have to pay contributions in more than one Member State .
As for traineeships, the Council Recommendation on a Quality Framework for Traineeships[2] encourages traineeship providers to clarify if they provide health and accident insurance. This has been further strengthened in the Commission’s proposal reinforcing the Quality Framework for Traineeships[3].
Source: European Parliament
1. In the Commission proposal for a Traineeships Directive[1], it is proposed that Member States be required to provide for effective controls and inspections conducted by competent authorities to detect and take enforcement measures against practices where a regular employment relationship is disguised as a traineeship. To this end Member States can make use of EU funds[2], for example to support training of and guidance to labour inspectorates.
2. Though incentives for offering paid traineeships are not part of the proposed Council Recommendation on a reinforced Quality Framework for Traineeships[3], the proposed recommendation does encourage Member States to provide financial and/or non-financial support such as practical guidance to traineeship providers in applying this recommendation.
3. According to the proposed Council Recommendation, Member States are to ensure that traineeship providers designate a supervisor. The proposed Council Recommendation does not specify further details, such as the status of supervisors or the recruitment practises .
Source: European Parliament
1. Sphera Network gathers ten partners across Europe. It has been selected for funding under the European Parliament pilot project and preparatory action ‘A European public sphere: a new online media offer for young Europeans’ that aims to bring the EU closer to young people by increasing the availability of online information that affects young people[1]. Under the current grant, Sphera Network receives EUR 1.94 million. Since the project’s inception in 2021, the total EU co-financing amounts to EUR 3.9 million. The coordinator of Sphera Network, Cafébabel , received a yearly grant of EUR 200 000 between 2014 and 2021 under the Europe for Citizens programme[2].
2. EU grants are subject to the principles of transparency and equal treatment as set out in the Financial Regulation[3]. Calls for proposals are open to all eligible entities. All proposals are evaluated against the same criteria listed in the calls, which include the relevance of the project to the objectives of the call, the effectiveness and rationale of the methodology and organisation, the experience of the team, the outreach plan and expected audience figures, as well as cost-effectiveness of the action.
Calls require applicants to abide by professional journalistic standards by signing a Declaration on standards and independence, guaranteeing that all beneficiaries act in full editorial independence. Moreover, projects are monitored during implementation to make sure that the commitments are respected.
3. The Commission supports a diverse public debate. All beneficiaries must commit to journalistic standards and to respect general principles such as transparency, non-discrimination, accuracy, pluralism and independence.
Source: European Parliament
The Commission deeply supports the autonomy of sport and hence respects the decision of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to use the flag, the emblem and the anthem adopted by the National Olympic Committees and approved by the IOC Executive Board. It therefore acknowledges that no exceptions to this rule are currently allowed.
Notwithstanding, the Commission welcomes the strong European dimension of the Paris 2024 Olympic Games and the fact that for the first time the EU flag was prominently displayed in venues alongside the Olympic flag.
It considers that its partnership with the Paris 2024 Olympic Games provided a unique opportunity for the EU to promote its core values such as unity and diversity, including through the medal counter. The Commission will continue to support EU visibility at such significant sporting events in the future.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Louise Deacon, PhD Graduand, Te Kunenga ki Pūrehuroa – Massey University
Current thinking about workplace problems, mental health and the law is hindering New Zealand’s ability to prevent job-related mental harm.
The inclusion of mental health in New Zealand’s Health and Safety at Work Act (HSWA) is meant to protect workers from the risk of harm arising from exposure to workplace psychosocial hazards.
These arise from the way work is designed, managed and led, and the context in which work is carried out. They can cause psychological, social or physical harm. Common examples include long work hours, role ambiguity, emotional demands, job insecurity and bullying.
Our research examined how the most senior company decision-makers understood their legal duties as they relate to mental health.
Under the HSWA, these officers – including company directors and chief executives – must exercise due diligence to ensure their company is compliant with the law.
But most of the 24 research participants, who were officers of large companies, expressed uncertainty and ambiguity about the meaning of “mental health” within the HSWA.
Exposure to psychosocial hazards is commonly reported by New Zealand workers.
Those working in jobs such as policing, nursing and teaching, for example, report high levels of emotional demands.
Māori and Pacific workers, workers in retail, and workers in their 30s report higher than average levels of job insecurity.
The harm caused by exposure to these these hazards typically presents as psychological. But it has also been strongly linked to cardiovascular disease and musculoskeletal disorders.
Managerial decisions relating to how work is designed, organised and managed influence how people experience work and the psychosocial hazards they may face.
Psychosocial risk often stems from operational and performance decisions relating to things like intensification, staffing, production and market demands.
In many organisations, these decisions are made in the boardroom – far removed from where the core work of the business is carried out.
Many of the research participants felt the uncertainty about the meaning of mental health within the HSWA arose from a lack of expertise in New Zealand’s health and safety workforce, a lack of clear regulatory guidance, and the complexity of psychosocial risk.
As one participant said:
There’s no boundaries, there’s no playbook, there’s no formula they can follow, it’s hard and it’s complex and it’s different for each person, and there’s nobody who you can point to and go, “They’ve absolutely nailed it”.
But our analysis also found that uncertainty and ambiguity arose from other factors.
These included a belief that the risk of exposure was often rooted in the personal characteristics and behaviours of workers rather than in their work. There was also a focus on fixing harm rather than preventing it and the conflation of psychosocial risks with other risks.
Unfortunately, these beliefs also limited the application of the HSWA.
Instead of addressing work-related risk, senior managers became distracted by workers’ personal lives and focused on reactive management strategies rather than preventative ones. They adopted an approach to risk management that emphasised “risks to the organisation” rather than “risks to workers”.
These limits were most clearly evident when participants described their oversight of organisational responses to bullying and harassment.
Many of the causes of bullying and harassment lie in the way work is organised, managed and led.
However, in detailing their performance of due diligence, participants described ensuring such risks were managed by recounting conflict reporting and resolution systems, support for victims, and organisational policy stressing “zero tolerance” for poor workplace behaviour.
While these responses might form part of a comprehensive approach to bullying and harassment (although in practice these could be unjust, ineffective or even counterproductive), on their own they may also be inadequate when the problem is considered under work health and safety law.
The risk-based, preventative nature of the HSWA requires that harm is prevented through understanding, anticipating and intervening in the contributing factors within the work environment.
Research has firmly established that bullying is more likely in organisations where there are unreasonable workloads, high job demands and job insecurity, along with laissez-faire or “hands off” management, or management strategies that relentlessly require workers do more with less.
Consideration of these risks may be relevant in the current context of job insecurity and job cuts across the public sector which could result in increased demands on remaining workers.
Risk assessment must focus on what can, and ought to be, known about the relationship between these psychosocial hazards and potential harm. Risk management must aim to eliminate or minimise risks as far as reasonably practicable.
Importantly, acting on risk does not require evidence of harm. Responding to harm once it has happened is contrary to the overall purpose of the HSWA.
But addressing deeper organisational factors is much more difficult and uncomfortable for those in charge.
Preventing bullying and harassment requires considering how decisions about the design, organisation and management of work may contribute to the risk of harm.
Prevention can therefore explicitly question the decisions and practices of company directors, executives and managers – not traditionally considered within the remit of work health and safety.
As a result, bullying and harassment tend to be framed as an interpersonal problem between workers and their managers. This is less challenging than bringing the decisions relating to the management and governance of a company into question.
The preventative focus is then placed on correcting and improving behaviour rather than managing or changing the conditions of work which give rise to bullying and harassment.
Louise Deacon received a grant from Health and Safety Association of New Zealand and a Massey University Doctoral Scholarship for this research.
Bevan Catley has recieved funding in the past from The Health Research Council of New Zealand and WorkSafe New Zealand concerning work-related psychosocial risks.
David Tappin has received research funding in the past from The Health Research Council of New Zealand and WorkSafe New Zealand concerning work-related psychosocial risks.
– ref. Where’s the harm in that? How we think about workplace hazards hampers the application of health and safety law – https://theconversation.com/wheres-the-harm-in-that-how-we-think-about-workplace-hazards-hampers-the-application-of-health-and-safety-law-240794
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Anna Boucher, Associate Professor in Public Policy and Political Science, University of Sydney
Some of the ways migrants are exploited in the workforce get a lot of public attention. We hear tragic stories about wage theft, forced unpaid overtime, unsafe work conditions or discrimination. And we are likely to hear more such grim stories revealed at a NSW parliamentary inquiry that will examine modern slavery in Australia.
These vulnerabilities all relate to what researchers call workplace precarity – insecurity or uncertainty at work. But too often, a major piece of this picture gets overlooked.
My recent analysis of more than 900 court cases brought by migrant workers shines a light on migrants being sexually harassed, sexually assaulted or trafficked for sexual reasons in their workplaces.
Yet, with the exception of a recent landmark research report on sexual harassment experienced by migrant women, this issue has not received the attention it deserves.
The taboo nature of sexual crimes likely plays a role in this neglect. When it is covered, there is often a somewhat sensationalist focus by the media on the sex work industry.
In the process, we may overfocus on sex work and neglect many other workplaces in which migrant workers can face forms of sexual violence. Any reckoning with workplace precarity more broadly cannot afford to ignore the risk of sexual exploitation.
Workplace “precarity” – insecurity or uncertainty at work – can affect us all.
It can encompass a wide range of aspects, including a lack of workplace protections, job insecurity and social or economic instability at work.
Visa status, a lack of knowledge of local laws and language barriers can all make migrants more vulnerable to workplace precarity.
Unscrupulous employers may exploit these known vulnerabilities to extract favours and take advantage.
Many theories of economic precarity do not consider sexual risk at all.
My research, drawn from more than 900 court cases brought by migrant workers, uncovered some harrowing examples.
In one case in Canada, an employer sexually harassed and in one case raped two migrant women who worked in his business as fish filleters. One of the women felt she had to comply with demands for fellatio to avoid deportation back to Mexico.
Following a ruling, the women were awarded damages under Ontario human rights law.
In another highly publicised case in Australia, a farmer was found guilty of raping a young British backpacker, threatening refusal to sign off on her farm work if she did not comply.
Such a “sign off” is required for a working holiday maker to be able to extend their visa for an additional year.
A further case concerned sex slavery. Two Thai women entered Australia fraudulently on tourist visas with the intention of undertaking sex work. The sex work began, with their consent.
However, they came to be subjected to work that went beyond what had been contracted in terms of the number of clients, the nature of sexual services provided, frequency and rest periods.
One woman suffered damage to her sexual organs. They also had their mobile phones removed. After several legal appeals, this behaviour was found to amount to sex trafficking and the defendant employer was imprisoned.
An attempt to overturn the conviction was refused.
Recent research by the NSW Anti Slavery Commissioner’s Office with migrant workers on NSW farms also suggests allegations of sexual violence could be unreported due to a perceived risk of retaliation.
These cases, and many others, all demonstrate that economic and sexual exploitation can commingle for migrant workers.
In such cases, employers may use economic and visa vulnerability to extract sexual favours. At times in these cases, there are also egregious examples of underpayment or even non-payment.
To capture this relationship in migration systems, I developed the term sexual precarity. This has five core components:
First, as with broader migrant worker rights, education campaigns for migrants are required.
These would extend beyond making them better informed about their rights on economic exploitation to issues of discrimination and protection from sexual exploitation.
Second, practical safeguards can be put in place to protect migrant women in isolated workplaces.
This might include female-only sleeping dorms, female-only agriculture workforces, support person rules for meetings with male employers and general advice on sexual consent laws for both employers and employees.
Third, policymakers could consider whether sexual offences that are accompanied by a visa threat should suffer additional penalties under criminal or immigration law.
This has already been made the case with recent changes to visa sponsorship where employers who coerce migrants into breaching their visa conditions are subjected to certain penalties.
Anna Boucher received funding from the Australian Research Council and the University of Sydney that funded this prior research. She is Vice President (Independent) on the Australian Institute of Employment Rights. 2023-4 she was on the NSW Anti-Slavery Commissioner’s Advisory Panel.
– ref. ‘Sexual precarity’: how insecure work puts migrants at risk of being sexually harassed, assaulted or trafficked – https://theconversation.com/sexual-precarity-how-insecure-work-puts-migrants-at-risk-of-being-sexually-harassed-assaulted-or-trafficked-238880
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Geoff M Boucher, Associate Professor in Literary Studies, Deakin University
Is Donald Trump a fascist? General Mark Milley, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Trump, thinks so. Trump is “fascist to the core,” he warns.
John Kelly, Trump’s former chief of staff, agrees. So does Vice President Kamala Harris, his opponent in this year’s presidential election.
But political commentators who have a grounding in history are not so sure. Writing in The Guardian, Sidney Blumenthal calls Trump “Hitlerian” and his rallies “Naziesque”, but stops short of calling him a fascist.
Michael Tomasky of The New Republic understands the reservations, but he is tired spending time debating the difference between “fascistic” and just plain “fascist”. “He’s damn close enough,” Tomasky writes, “and we’d better fight”.
I understand this logic. It’s the reason Harris uses the term “fascist” to describe Trump – to send “a 911 call to the American people”. But there’s a problem.
I have spent the past six years researching right-wing, authoritarian political communication in America. I can say with confidence how these kinds of labels can misfire. They can very easily be made to look like liberal hysteria, playing straight into the hands of the far right.
Here are the two reasons why it is crucial to call Trump exactly what he is.
Calling Trump a fascist, and then instantly adding, “or close enough,” plays directly into the hands of the far right. “See?” they might say. “Anytime anyone steps outside the liberal consensus, they get labelled a fascist. This is how political correctness silences dissent.”
Trump’s kind of authoritarianism thrives on ambiguity about what sort of right-wing populist figure he is. Its success depends on the fact that “fascist” is the only name we have right now for authoritarian politics.
In my view, Trump is not a fascist. Rather, he is part of a “new authoritarianism” that subverts democracy from within and solidifies power through administrative, rather than paramilitary, means.
This brand of new authoritarianism hides in plain sight because there is no name for it yet. It looks like something else – for example, right-wing populism that is anti-liberal, but not yet anti-democratic. And then suddenly, it shows itself as anti-democratic extremism, as Trump did in refusing to accept the 2020 election result and encouraging the storming of the Capitol.
This moment starkly revealed Trump as a new authoritarian. Supplementary debate about whether Trump is like Adolf Hitler risks being pointless. But the problem is that fascism is the only name we have now for anti-democratic extremism.
All fascists are authoritarians. But not all authoritarians are fascists. It’s crucial to understand there are other types of authoritarianism – and how they differ.
This is not just important for preventing Trump from seeking to subvert American democracy. It is also vital for stopping Trump imitators, who will now spring forth in other democracies. If there is still no name for what they are other than “fascist,” then they, too, will thrive on ambiguity.
I suggest we focus on what Trump actually is – an anti-democratic, “new authoritarian” – and understand what this means and how he is gaining wider support using right-wing populism.
The new authoritarians don’t necessarily take a sledgehammer to a nation’s institutions, for example, by doing away with elections. Rather, they hollow out democracy from within, so it becomes a façade draped over a one-party state.
We have many examples of this kind of ruler today: Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Hungary’s Viktor Orban, Belarus’ Alexander Lukashenko, Tunisia’s Kais Saied and, of course, the poster-figure for the new authoritarians, Russia’s Vladimir Putin.
Trump’s admiration for Putin is a matter of public record. For alt-right thinkers who are influential with Trump, such as Steve Bannon, Putin provides a blueprint for how new authoritarianism works.
Authoritarians like Putin must govern through the state, not the people, because, as social psychologist Bob Altemeyer explains, they ultimately represent a tiny minority of the population.
Military dictatorships rule through the armed forces. The fascist regimes of 20th century Europe were ultimately police states. They relied on converting paramilitary death squads into secret police (like the Gestapo) and state security (the SS in Nazi Germany).
The new authoritarians, however, govern through the transformation of the civil service into their own personal political machines.
That is why Trump is obsessed with the “deep state”, by which he means the way in which democratic institutions have built-in legal safeguards defended by civil servants, who can potentially frustrate executive orders. The new authoritarian strategy is to appoint a stratum of political loyalists to key positions in their administrations, who can circumvent institutional checks. But that is no easy matter.
If Trump is elected, he has vowed to “crush the deep state”, for example, by purging thousands of nonpolitical civil service employees. As part of this, he has pledged to establish a “truth and reconciliation commission” oriented to punishing those he thinks opposed him the past.
Trump has been following this new authoritarian playbook for nearly his entire political career. These are the three steps he is taking to lay the groundwork for authoritarian rule:
The first key to new authoritarianism: subvert democracy by undermining electoral integrity. The acid test here? Authoritarians do not accept election results when the opposition has won. As Trump has very bluntly put it, “I am a very proud election denier”.
Trump’s opening move in this regard was to take over the Republican Party. He used election denialism to do this, while also marginalising any moderates who opposed him.
The Trump Republican Party is now a minority party, oriented to white grievance, resentment of immigrants and the anti-democratic idea that a country should be run like a company.
Its only hope for winning government as a minority party is by trying to suppress the vote of its opponents. To do this, pro-Trump Republican states have passed a number of laws since 2020 to make voting more difficult.
These states have also aggressively removed people from the voting rolls. Texas alone has stricken one million voters off its rolls since 2021, only 6,500 of whom were deemed non-citizens.
If Trump wins, he will likely make it even harder for people to vote. Civil rights groups fear he may introduce a citizenship question to the census, use the Department of Justice to conduct a massive purge of voter rolls, and launch criminal investigations of electoral officials.
As a backup, Trump will likely resurrect the “election integrity commission” he established in 2017 to justify his claims of alleged voter fraud in the 2016 election and support his election denialism narrative.
The second key to new authoritarianism: circumventing the checks-and-balances function of the legislative branch of government. The goal here is to rule by executive fiat or govern through a stacked legislative majority.
The new authoritarians often govern through executive orders, including the use of emergency powers. For instance, Trump has envisaged a scenario in which a Republican Congress could enact emergency powers to empower the president to overturn the authority of state governors to fire their prosecutors and use the National Guard for law enforcement.
Such a development would depend on a number of factors, including the complicity of the judiciary. This is why new authoritarians also attempt to stack the judiciary with loyalists.
In his first term, Trump not only appointed three Supreme Court justices, he also placed judges to the federal appeals courts, district courts and circuit courts.
This leads to the third pillar of new authoritarianism: decapitating the political opposition and suppressing dissent.
Trump’s threats to investigate and prosecute his enemies, including leading figures in the Democratic Party, should be taken very seriously. His calls to target the “enemy from within” were pointedly directed at what he deemed “radical left lunatics”.
Journalists and the news media would also likely be targeted. Trump’s statement that the broadcast licenses of national networks should be revoked, for example, needs to be understood in the context of his pledges to dismantle federal regulatory agencies if elected.
That matters, because the next step for new authoritarians to solidify their power is through suppressing dissent. Trump has proposed using the military in civil contexts to target criminals and prevent illegal immigration. He has reportedly even questioned why the military couldn’t “just shoot” protesters.
It is important to understand how this differs from fascism, because it is central to Trump’s ability to retain electoral support.
Classical fascism under dictators like Hitler and Italy’s Benito Mussolini was based on street-fighting, paramilitary movements, which used violence to intimidate and crush the opposition. The equivalents of this today are right-wing militias such as the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers.
Trump keeps one foot on the edge of this camp. But alt-right figures like Bannon understand that swastika flags and paramilitary uniforms are a political liability. Their preference is for new authoritarianism, which is able to push
a right-wing extremist agenda by reducing democracy to sham elections, rather than openly setting up a totalitarian regime.
As such, Trump can dodge accusations of being a “fascist” by telling the Proud Boys to “stand by”, while throwing up a smokescreen of equivocations about the January 6 Capitol insurrection. He can distance himself from kind of paramilitary violence that is reminiscent of classical fascism.
It is about time to call things by their true names. Trump has the anti-democratic tendencies of a new authoritarian – and, as his opponents point out, he seems likely to put his words into actions if elected a second time.
Geoff M Boucher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
– ref. Is Donald Trump a fascist? No – he’s a new brand of authoritarian – https://theconversation.com/is-donald-trump-a-fascist-no-hes-a-new-brand-of-authoritarian-241586
Source: The Conversation – USA – By Karen Figueroa-Clewett, Lecturer, Agents of Change program, Department of Political Science and International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
With the general election drawing close, it’s important to know your rights in case your vote is challenged.
The best way to ensure that your vote is counted is to advocate for yourself. I’m a civil rights attorney and lecturer for the University of Southern California’s undergraduate civil rights advocacy initiative, Agents of Change. Here are several straightforward ways to ensure your vote is counted and two practical remedies for you to consider if your vote remains challenged.
A major part of ensuring that you are able to vote is doing the necessary preparation before you even get to the polling place. Read on to find out how and where to register, where and when you can cast your ballot, and what numbers to call for any information you can’t find online.
Before you vote, you need to ensure that you’re registered to vote. You can verify your registration status using this tool. If you can’t use an online tool, then call your local election office or a voter help line like the ones listed in the hotline section below.
If you find you’re not registered, you can use this tool from the National Conference of State Legislatures to find your state’s online registration application. If you need to do this in person, then call your local election office for instructions.
At this point, you may have missed your state’s deadline for voter registration. But it may not be too late to register.
Many states allow same-day registration at the polling site. You can find your state’s same-day voter laws detailed here. Ask the poll worker, at the correct polling location, for a same-day registration form; complete the form and then ask for a “conditional ballot.” A conditional ballot allows election officials to count your vote after verifying your voter eligibility. If you can’t research online, you can call your local election office to find out if you can register on Election Day.
If you live in a state that requires identity verification to vote in person, gather the required documents – which may range from a driver’s license to bank statements with identifying information – before traveling to the correct polling place. You can find your county election office’s contact information here. This webpage includes a table listing each state’s acceptable ID documents and possible exceptions for some people. You may also call your local election office to find out what’s required.
Absentee voters: Locate your state’s identity verification rules here.
You can ensure that you’re headed to the right polling place with this tool. Or call your county election office to find your polling place and its hours of operation; you can look up your county’s election office contact information here.
Once you know your polling place and its hours, you can go there and check in. In most cases, you’ll be handed a ballot, shown where to vote and asked to put your ballot in a machine or a box, and then you can go merrily along your way.
But the moment of check-in is where things might go wrong.
Here are potential vote challenges and ways to overcome them.
Possibility No. 1: Out-of-order polling machines.
If you’re asked to leave because of malfunctioning machines, don’t. Instead, ask for a paper ballot.
Possibility No. 2: You’re in line and officials announce the polls have closed.
If you’re in line at the polling location before it closes, don’t let them turn you away at closing time if you haven’t voted. You have the legal right to vote under those circumstances, so stay in line and wait to cast your ballot.
Possibility No. 3: You’re not on the registered voters list.
If you’re told you can’t vote because your name is not on the voter roster, ask the poll site worker to check again and to check what’s called the list of supplemental voters. If they still can’t find your name, ask the poll worker to verify that you’re at the right location.
Possibility No. 4: Someone claims you shouldn’t be allowed to vote.
If your voting eligibility remains challenged after ensuring you’re at the right polling location, ask to cast a provisional ballot, which is available in every state except Idaho and Minnesota. You can find details about your particular state’s provisional ballot rules here.
Track your provisional ballot here.
If you are not given a provisional ballot, call an election hotline for help. Here are four hotlines, run by members of the nonpartisan Election Protection coalition, that can help you:
English: 866-OUR-VOTE/866-687-8683, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
Spanish: 888-VE-Y-VOTA/888-839-8682, the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund
Asian Languages: 888-API-VOTE/888-274-8683, Asian and Pacific Islander American Vote
Arabic: 844-YALLA-US/844-925-5287, Arab American Institute
If someone tries to scare you into voting or not voting for a candidate, stand your ground and demand a ballot from the poll site, call one of the hotlines above to report the intimidation, and file a claim with the FBI later by phone at 800-CALL-FBI – 800-225-5324 – or online at tips.fbi.gov.
If you are still blocked from voting, consider legal action – but get advice on your exact situation from one of the hotlines, which have free lawyers on hand. It’s a good idea to write down the names of people who prevented you from voting and to ask people who witnessed the incident for their contact information.
This is an updated version of a story that was originally published on Nov. 2, 2022.
Karen Figueroa-Clewett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
– ref. What to do if your vote is challenged: Practical advice from a civil rights attorney for Election Day – https://theconversation.com/what-to-do-if-your-vote-is-challenged-practical-advice-from-a-civil-rights-attorney-for-election-day-239066
