Category: DJF

B10‑0000/2024

European Parliament resolution on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential election and a constitutional referendum on EU integration

(2024/2821(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Articles 2 and 49 of the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to the European Council decision of 23 June 2022 to grant EU candidate country status to Moldova,

– having regard to the interim opinion of the Venice Commission of 13 March 2023 on the draft law on limiting excessive economic and political influence in public life (de‑oligarchisation),

– having regard to the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’, reviewing Moldova’s implementation of reforms under the EU-Moldova Association Agreement since October 2021 (SWD(2023)0041),

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe; whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has further affected living standards;

B. whereas the Russian Federation has been using provocation, disinformation, illegal funding of political parties, cyberattacks and other hybrid means to undermine the stability, sovereignty, constitutional order and democratic institutions of the Republic of Moldova;

C. whereas Russian missiles targeting Ukraine have flown over the Republic of Moldova’s territory on several occasions, in clear violation of Moldova’s sovereignty;

D. whereas oligarchs have an excessive influence on vested interests in economic, political and public life in Moldova;

E. whereas in September, certain members of the party founded by fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor were accused by the Moldovan judiciary of having received money from accounts held by the Russian bank Promsvyazbank in order to take part in demonstrations ahead of the presidential election in October; whereas oligarch Ilan Șor fled to Russia in 2019 after being sentenced to 15 years in prison for fraud and money laundering; whereas Șor’s party was declared ‘unconstitutional’ by the Constitutional Court, accused of seeking to destabilise Moldova in collusion with Russia, and banned;

F. whereas in July 2023, the Transnistrian Communist Party leader, Oleg Khorzhan, was found stabbed to death in his home; whereas Oleg Khorzhan was a public critic of the de facto authorities and reported on human rights abuses in prison; whereas no effective investigation into his death has been carried out;

G. whereas presidential elections are scheduled to be held on 20 October 2024 in conjunction with a referendum on joining the EU; whereas Moldova was officially granted candidate status by the EU in June 2022 and negotiations were opened in December 2023;

H. whereas reducing corruption is one of the nine steps Moldova needs to address before joining the EU;

1. Notes with concern the attempts by Russia to influence the outcome of the presidential election and referendum in Moldova, notably through the actions of several members of the party funded by the convicted oligarch Ilan Șor, who is also subject to EU sanctions;

2. Notes with concern the increasing spread of pre-election propaganda and disinformation by Russian sources in Moldova on social media, with the aim of misleading voters or reducing turnout in the referendum; calls on social media platforms to adapt the design of their algorithms to mitigate the spread of illegal content, hate speech and disinformation online;

3. Recognises and encourages the efforts of the Moldovan authorities to allow all Moldovans to vote, including those living in the breakaway Republic of Transnistria or residing abroad;

4. Expresses understanding that the Moldovan authorities are intervening against social media and other actors who are clearly operating on behalf of Russia in spreading lies and seeking to sabotage a fair election process; underlines the importance of supporting the Moldovan authorities in their efforts to counter Russian influence; calls for the EU to continue helping Moldova to strengthen its capacities and resilience in the area;

5. Calls on the Moldovan authorities to protect basic democratic values, including freedom of expression, the media and organisation, and to never impose any limits on the possibility to work for a legitimate opposition or engage in critical scrutiny of the media;

6. Underlines the importance of a stable and democratic Moldova for stability, peace and cooperation throughout the region; calls for the EU to continue to support Moldova’s democratic structures;

7. Takes note of the importance of the nine conditions set by the Commission for the accession procedure; recognises Moldova’s reform efforts; underlines the importance of continued support from the EU, including strengthening the rule of law and the independence and effectiveness of the Moldovan authorities;

8. Underscores that financial support should have strong social conditionalities attached to it; recalls that such support should also encompass strengthening the capacities, independence and plurality of civil society organisations and social partner organisations; recommends establishing a sustainable social dialogue as another key area of social intervention;

9. Highlights the need to speed up the introduction of the new guaranteed minimum wage for all and to improve social protection; reiterates its criticism that the implementation of the social acquis is under-represented in the Commission’s assessments and recommendations and calls for this situation to be changed;

10. Notes with concern the strong direct and indirect dependence on Russian gas; calls for the EU to support energy conservation, domestic renewable energy production and Moldova’s continued integration into European electricity and gas grids;

11. Recognises the significant efforts made by the country in receiving Ukrainian refugees; is concerned, however, that with the newest immigration regime, refugees risk losing access to critical goods and services, including access to employment and certain other rights;

12. Notes Russia’s attempts to foment tensions between the autonomous region of Gaugazia and the Moldovan authorities; condemns Gaugazia Governor Evghenia Gutul’s meeting with Vladimir Putin; encourages the Moldovan Government’s efforts to reduce tensions with the autonomous region of Gaugazia through dialogue and reform;

13. Underlines the fact that the region of Transnistria is under Russian influence and is being used to destabilise the democratic government in Moldova; condemns President Vladimir Putin’s decision to revoke a 2012 decree committing Russia to finding a solution for Transnistria; calls on Russia to immediately dismantle its military presence in Transnistria; reiterates its support for a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova with a special status for the region of Transnistria; encourages the implementation of all confidence-building measures designed to avoid destabilisation; believes that a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict is important for Moldova’s EU accession process;

14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe.