Category: Economy

  • MIL-OSI Canada: More schools for Calgary and region | Un plus grand nombre d’écoles pour la région de Calgary

    [. Since 2020, student enrolment in Alberta has grown by almost 89,000 students, with much of this growth concentrated in the Calgary metro region. To ensure every student has the space to grow and thrive, Alberta’s government is making more investments in new and ongoing school projects across the province.

    Budget 2025, if passed, will kick-start 18 new school projects in the Calgary metro area, adding 14,400 new and updated student spaces. In total, there are now 49 school projects underway in and around Calgary.

    “Being able to meet the needs of our rapidly growing population is a top priority for Alberta’s government and that’s why we’re investing in 18 new school projects in the Calgary area. These investments will help ease the pressure on our K-12 system and ensure that every student receives the quality education they deserve, in a great school that will prepare them for success in the future.”

    Danielle Smith, Premier

    “We have heard from parents and school boards that the province needs more schools and student spaces to keep up with growing enrolment. I am proud to say that we have stepped up to the plate to meet these demands. Our plan to build schools will make sure every student has a space close to home.”

    Demetrios Nicolaides, Minister of Education

    Budget 2025, if passed, funds a total of 41 new school projects across the province, including more than 38,500 new and renovated student spaces. In total, there are now 132 active school projects across Alberta, all of which are being fast-tracked through the new and improved funding process designed and released by Alberta’s government in fall of 2024.

    “The strength of our communities comes from the strength of our people. When we ensure that students have access to well-built and well-maintained classrooms to foster positive education, we are setting up the next generation to succeed. I am proud to play a role in building the schools our province needs.”

    Martin Long, Minister of Infrastructure

    Last fall, Alberta’s government announced a generational investment of $8.6 billion to accelerate school construction and build new classroom spaces to address unprecedented enrolment growth. Over the next seven years, Alberta’s government will fund more than 100 new and renovated school projects in fast-growing communities around Alberta, adding more than 200,000 student spaces across the province.

    “We are grateful to the Government of Alberta for recognizing the urgent need for new learning spaces. Our hope is that through the School Construction Accelerator Program these schools will quickly move from design to shovels in the ground. It will be a great day when we can welcome students and staff into each of these 10 new schools.”

    Patricia Bolger, board chair, Calgary Board of Education

    “We thank the Government of Alberta for recognizing the need to invest in the Francophone education system. The modernization of École de la Rose sauvage will ensure FrancoSud can continue offering world-class education in a learning environment that meets the needs of our students, staff, and community. We’re looking forward to collaborating with Alberta Education and Alberta Infrastructure to complete this modernization project in a timely manner.”

    Hélène Emmell, chair, Conseil scolaire FrancoSud

    Budget 2025 is meeting the challenge faced by Alberta with continued investments in education and health, lower taxes for families and a focus on supporting the economy. 

    Quick facts

    • The 2025 Capital Plan allocates $75 million over the next three years for the planning and design of the 41 school capital projects approved in 2025 and $2.3 billion to building and updating previously announced school projects.
    • With Budget 2025, if passed, there are now 49 school projects underway in the metropolitan Calgary region:
      • 21 projects with construction approval
      • 15 projects with design approval
      • 11 projects with planning approval
      • 2 projects with preplanning approval

    Budget 2025 (if passed) new school projects in the Calgary region (15):

    Community

    School division

    Project type/name

    Design funding (11)

    Calgary

    Calgary Board of Education

    new 5 to 9 in Aspen Woods

    new 6 to 9 in Cityscape/Redstone

    new K to 5 in Cornerstone

    new 6 to 9 in Cornerstone

    new K to 6 in Livingston

    new 7 to 9 in Mahogany

    new K to 4 in Nolan Hill

    new K to 5 in Sage Hill

    new 6 to 9 in Sage Hill/Kincora

    new 5 to 9 in Sherwood/Nolan Hill

    Calgary Catholic School District

    new K to 9 in Cornerstone

    Planning funding (4)

    Airdrie

    Rocky View Schools

    new K to 8 in Lanark

    Calgary

    Calgary Catholic School District

    new K to 9 in Carrington

    new K to 9 in Walden

    Chestermere

    Rocky View Schools

    new 10 to 12 in Chelsea

    Budget 2025 (if passed) modernization school projects in the Calgary region (1):

    Community

    School division

    Project type/name

    Planning funding (1)

    Calgary

    Conseil scolaire FrancoSud

    modernization of École de la Rose sauvage

    Budget 2025 (if passed) public charter school projects in the Calgary region (2):

    Community

    Charter authority

    Project type/name

    Design funding (1)

    Calgary

    Foundations for the Future Charter Academy

    modernization of Quarry Park building (9 to 12) in SE Calgary

    Planning funding (1)

    Calgary

    Almadina Language Charter Academy

    new 10 to 12 in northeast Calgary

    Related information

    • Budget 2025 Capital Plan
    • Budget 2025 overview
    • School Construction Accelerator Program
    • Public charter schools

    Related news

    • Building schools in every corner of the province (March 7, 2025)

    Multimedia

    • Watch the news conference

    La région de Calgary aura bientôt dix-huit nouvelles écoles.

    De plus en plus de gens s’installent en Alberta, ce qui entraine une hausse du nombre d’élèves inscrits dans les écoles albertaines, accentuant ainsi les pressions dues aux inscriptions. Depuis 2020, le nombre d’élèves en Alberta a augmenté de près de 89 000, la majeure partie de cette croissance étant concentrée dans la région métropolitaine de Calgary. Afin que chaque élève ait l’espace nécessaire pour grandir et réussir, le gouvernement de l’Alberta investit davantage dans de nouveaux projets d’écoles et dans ceux déjà en cours dans l’ensemble de la province.

    Le budget 2025, s’il est adopté, fera démarrer 18 nouveaux projets d’écoles dans la région métropolitaine de Calgary, ce qui permettra de créer et de rénover 14 400 places pour les élèves. Au total, 49 projets d’écoles sont maintenant en cours de réalisation dans la région de Calgary.

    « La priorité absolue du gouvernement de l’Alberta est de pouvoir répondre aux besoins de notre population en croissance rapide. C’est pourquoi nous investissons dans 18 nouveaux projets d’écoles dans la région de Calgary. Ces investissements permettront d’alléger la pression qui pèse sur notre système d’éducation M à 12 et de faire en sorte que chaque élève reçoive l’éducation de qualité qu’il mérite, dans une bonne école qui le prépare à réussir dans l’avenir. »

    Danielle Smith, première ministre

    « Les parents et les autorités scolaires nous ont dit que la province avait besoin de plus d’écoles et de places pour les élèves afin de faire face à la croissance des inscriptions. Je suis fier de dire que nous avons pris les mesures nécessaires pour répondre à ces demandes. Notre plan de construction d’écoles permettra à chaque élève d’avoir une place près de chez lui. »

    Demetrios Nicolaides, ministre de l’Éducation

    Le budget 2025, s’il est adopté, finance un total de 41 nouveaux projets d’écoles dans l’ensemble de la province, ce qui permettra de créer et de rénover plus de 38 500 places pour les élèves. Au total, 132 projets d’écoles sont présentement actifs dans toute l’Alberta, tous accélérés grâce au nouveau processus de financement amélioré que le gouvernement de l’Alberta a créé et annoncé à l’automne 2024.

    « Nos collectivités puisent leur force dans notre population. Lorsque nous veillons à ce que les élèves aient accès à des salles de classe bien construites et entretenues pour favoriser une éducation positive, nous donnons à la prochaine génération les moyens de réussir. Je suis fier de jouer un rôle dans la construction des écoles dont notre province a besoin. »

    Martin Long, ministre de l’Infrastructure

    L’automne dernier, le gouvernement de l’Alberta a annoncé un investissement générationnel de 8,6 milliards de dollars pour accélérer la construction d’écoles et pour construire de nouvelles salles de classe afin de faire face aux pressions dues à la croissance sans précédent des inscriptions. Au cours des sept prochaines années, le gouvernement de l’Alberta financera plus de 100 projets de construction et de rénovation d’écoles dans des collectivités en forte croissance, un peu partout en Alberta, ce qui permettra d’ajouter plus de 200 000 places pour les élèves dans l’ensemble de la province.

    « Nous remercions sincèrement le gouvernement de l’Alberta de reconnaitre l’urgence de fournir de nouveaux espaces d’apprentissage. Nous espérons que, grâce au programme pour accélérer la construction d’écoles, ces établissements passeront rapidement de la phase de conception à la mise en chantier. Ce sera un moment mémorable lorsque nous pourrons accueillir les élèves et le personnel dans chacune de ces dix nouvelles écoles. »

    Patricia Bolger, présidente, Calgary Board of Education

    « Nous remercions le gouvernement de l’Alberta de reconnaitre la nécessité d’investir dans le système d’éducation francophone. La modernisation de l’École de la Rose sauvage garantira que FrancoSud puisse continuer à offrir une éducation de calibre mondiale dans un environnement d’apprentissage adapté aux besoins de nos élèves, de notre personnel et de notre communauté. Nous sommes impatients de collaborer avec Alberta Education et Alberta Infrastructure pour mener à bien ce projet de modernisation dans les meilleurs délais. »

    Hélène Emmell, présidente, Conseil scolaire FrancoSud

    Le budget 2025 relève les défis auxquels fait face l’Alberta en continuant d’investir dans l’éducation et la santé, en réduisant les impôts pour les familles et en soutenant l’économie. 

    En bref

    • Le plan d’immobilisations 2025 alloue 75 millions de dollars sur trois ans pour la planification et la conception des 41 projets d’immobilisations scolaires approuvés en 2025 et 2,3 milliards de dollars pour les projets de construction et de modernisation d’écoles déjà annoncés.
    • Si le budget 2025 est adopté, 49 projets d’écoles seront en cours de réalisation dans la région métropolitaine de Calgary :
      • 21 projets approuvés pour la construction;
      • 15 projets approuvés pour la conception;
      • 11 projets approuvés pour la planification;
      • 2 projets approuvés pour la planification préliminaire.

    Le budget 2025 (si adopté) financera ces projets de nouvelles écoles dans la région de Calgary (15) :

    Collectivité

    Autorité scolaire

    Type/nom de projet

    Financement pour la conception (11)

    Calgary

    Calgary Board of Education

    nouvelle école 5 à 9 dans Aspen Woods

    nouvelle école 6 à 9 dans Cityscape/Redstone

    nouvelle école M à 5 dans Cornerstone

    nouvelle école 6 à 9 dans Cornerstone

    nouvelle école M à 6 dans Livingston

    nouvelle école 7 à 9 dans Mahogany

    nouvelle école M à 4 dans Nolan Hill

    nouvelle école M à 5 dans Sage Hill

    nouvelle école 6 à 9 dans Sage Hill/Kincora

    nouvelle école 5 à 9 dans Sherwood/Nolan Hill

    Calgary Catholic School District

    nouvelle école M à 9 dans Cornerstone

    Financement pour la planification (4)

    Airdrie

    Rocky View Schools

    nouvelle école M à 8 dans Lanark

    Calgary

    Calgary Catholic School District

    nouvelle école M à 9 dans Carrington

    nouvelle école M à 9 dans Walden

    Chestermere

    Rocky View Schools

    nouvelle école 10 à 12 dans Chelsea

    Le budget 2025 (si adopté) financera ce projet de modernisation d’écoles dans la région de Calgary (1) :

    Collectivité

    Autorité scolaire

    Type/nom de projet

    Financement pour la planification (1)

    Calgary

    Conseil scolaire FrancoSud

    modernisation de l’École de la Rose sauvage

    Le budget 2025 (si adopté) financera ces projets d’écoles publiques à charte dans la région de Calgary (2) :

    Collectivité

    Autorité à charte

    Type/nom de projet

    Financement pour la conception (1)

    Calgary

    Foundations for the Future Charter Academy

    modernisation de l’édifice Quarry Park (9 à 12) dans le sud-est de Calgary

    Financement pour la planification (1)

    Calgary

    Almadina Language Charter Academy

    nouvelle école 10 à 12 dans le nord-est de Calgary

    Renseignements connexes

    • Budget 2025 : Plan d’immobilisations (en anglais seulement)
    • Aperçu du budget 2025 (en anglais seulement)
    • Programme pour accélérer la construction d’écoles
    • Écoles publiques à charte (en anglais seulement)

    Nouvelle connexe

    • Construire des écoles aux quatre coins de la province (7 mars 2025)

    Multimédia

    • Regarder la conférence de presse

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The need to improve public transport in the areas and towns of the Madonie mountains – E-000988/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000988/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Giuseppe Antoci (The Left)

    The challenges posed by geography and the lack of services in mountain areas, particularly in the union of municipalities of the Madonie mountains, make it necessary to rethink mobility in a way that ensures access to basic services and fosters social inclusion.

    Not only does the current reliance on private transport exacerbate the remoteness of mountainous areas, it also fuels major inequalities in accessing basic public services, highlighting that there is a problem with regard to guaranteeing citizenship rights for the inhabitants of these areas.

    The need to innovate the transport system through travel information services, integrating solutions such as soft mobility and dial-a-ride options, is a key step towards a more sustainable and inclusive mobility.

    In view of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.What initiatives can the EU promote to support the development of innovative public transport solutions in mountain areas, in line with the strategy of the 2021-2027 European Regional Fund Operational Programme (OP ERDF)?
    • 2.Which European funds earmarked for sustainable mobility can improve accessibility in mountain areas without perpetuating obsolete and non-inclusive transport models and how can this be done?
    • 3.Is any additional financial support envisaged in order to integrate and scale up sustainable and smart mobility projects, besides soft mobility, in Sicily’s mountain areas?

    Submitted: 6.3.2025

    Last updated: 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression – P10_TA(2025)0033 – Wednesday, 12 March 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and on Russia, in particular those adopted since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on 19 February 2014,

    –  having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of 1 August 1975, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of the OSCE of 21 November 1990 and the UN Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994 (the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances),

    –  having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part(1), and to the accompanying Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the European Union and Ukraine, signed in 2014,

    –  having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

    –  having regard to the European Council’s decision of 14 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, following the Commission’s positive recommendation of 8 November 2023 in this regard,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility(2), and to other forms of EU support for Ukraine,

    –  having regard to the joint statement by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Parliament of 24 February 2025 on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,

    –  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/7 adopted on 24 February 2025 entitled ‘Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’,

    –  having regard to the Conclusions of the extraordinary European Council of 6 March 2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas Russia has been waging an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine started in 2014 with the illegal occupation and annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the subsequent occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

    B.  whereas Russia’s actions in Ukraine over the past three years continue to threaten peace and security in Europe and worldwide; whereas the Russian war of aggression is the largest military conflict on the European continent since the end of the Second World War and reflects the growing conflict between authoritarianism and democracy;

    C.  whereas Ukraine and its citizens have shown unwavering determination in resisting Russia’s war of aggression, successfully defending their country, despite the high cost in civilian and military casualties, along with the attacks on residential areas, destruction of civilian and public infrastructure – particularly that providing water and energy – and of the natural environment and cultural heritage, forced deportations, disappearances and illegal adoptions of deported children, illegal imprisonments, mass killings, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, torture and the use of sexual violence and mass rape as weapons of war and altering the ethnic composition of the occupied territories of Ukraine, all of which constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity; whereas millions of Ukrainians remain displaced both inside and outside their country; whereas the United Nations has confirmed that more than 12 500 civilians, including hundreds of children, have been murdered since February 2022; whereas the Ukrainian authorities estimate that at least 20 000 Ukrainian children have been deported and forcibly displaced from their homes to Russia and Russian-occupied territories since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022; whereas the Russian Federation attempts to deny Ukraine and its people their ethnic, linguistic and historical identity by erasing signs of Ukrainian identity in occupied territories; whereas the brave people of Ukraine were awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize as a tribute to their courage and resilience;

    D.  whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, immediately qualified the Russian war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution of 14 November 2022, recognised the need to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its war of aggression and legally and financially responsible for its internationally wrongful acts, including by making reparation for the injury and damage caused;

    E.  whereas on 2 March 2022, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opened an investigation into the situation in Ukraine, focusing on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed on Ukrainian territory from 21 November 2013 onwards and on 17 March 2023 issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and Maria Lvova-Belova, so-called Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, for the war crime of unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children, arrest warrants for Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu and Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov for crimes against humanity including the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects and the war crime of causing excessive incidental harm to civilians or damage to civilian objects; whereas the EU supports the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression;

    F.  whereas a number of third countries, notably Iran, North Korea and Belarus, have provided Russia with substantial deliveries of weapons and ammunition, and Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory to attack Ukraine which amounts to an act of aggression under international law; whereas North Korean troops have been deployed on the battlefield and are fighting alongside the Russian army; whereas Russia and China signed a ‘no-limits partnership’ on 4 February 2022, and subsequently, China has become a key enabler of the Russian war effort through its massive support for Russia’s economy and its defence industrial base, and by supplying dual-use equipment;

    G.  whereas the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment report estimates that, as of December 2024, the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine will be at least EUR 506 billion over the next decade, which is 2.8 times the estimated nominal gross domestic product of Ukraine for 2024; whereas a total financing gap of EUR 9,62 billion for recovery and reconstruction needs remains for 2025;

    H.  whereas the EU has recently adopted its 16th sanctions package against Russia to weaken its economic base, deprive it of critical technologies and limit its ability to wage war; whereas the new sanctions target additional individuals and entities, including military firms, sanctions evaders, non-EU country supporters, Kremlin propagandists, shadow fleet networks, and individuals involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; whereas the EU sanctions now apply to over 2 400 individuals and entities, subjecting them to asset freezes, funding bans and travel restrictions;

    I.  whereas the EU and its Member States have provided the most substantial cumulative support for Ukraine in all areas since the start of the full-scale invasion, and have provided financial support amounting to close to EUR 140 billion, including over EUR 67 billion of support to Ukraine in the form of humanitarian and emergency assistance, budget support and macro-financial assistance and over EUR 48 billion of military aid; whereas approximately EUR 300 billion of Russian sovereign assets were frozen in different jurisdictions; whereas in May 2024, the EU Member States approved the use of financial proceeds generated by immobilised Russian sovereign assets held within the EU, estimated at around EUR 210 billion, to support Ukraine, with the aim of providing up to EUR 3 billion per year in support of Ukraine’s reconstruction and resilience efforts;

    J.  whereas many EU Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels from Russia, including liquefied natural gas, imports of which are rising, as well as uranium, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have exceeded EUR 200 billion;

    K.  whereas the EU has welcomed more than four million refugees from Ukraine and has expressed its support for the people of Ukraine and their leadership by launching negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU;

    L.  whereas the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine following the positive recommendation of the Commission; whereas the first intergovernmental conference took place on 25 June 2024, launching the negotiation process and adopting the negotiating framework;

    M.  whereas, under the administration of US President Donald Trump, the United States has significantly changed its stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine; whereas President Trump is making demands towards Ukraine but has not expressed any demands towards the Russian side, moreover he has downplayed Moscow’s responsibility for starting the war and possibly envisages granting Russia sanctions relief in the short term; whereas between the time of the meeting between President Trump and President Zelenskyy on 28 February 2025 and 9 March 2025 alone, Russia carried out over 2 100 aerial assaults, including 1 200 guided bomb strikes and nearly 870 drone attacks;

    N.  whereas recent US-Russia talks in Riyadh excluded Ukraine and the EU, and the United States did not consult its European allies before ending its part in the effort to isolate Russia; whereas the new US administration, alongside Russia and its allies, voted against a UN General Assembly resolution of 24 February 2025 condemning Russia’s aggression; whereas the American U-turn on the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine threatens Ukraine’s capacity to withstand Russia’s aggression, makes clear that Washington’s commitment to hold Russia accountable is no longer dependable and undermines international efforts to address the crisis;

    O.  whereas on 3 March 2025 the United States suspended its military assistance to Ukraine, including that approved by the previous US administration, as well as intelligence sharing with Ukraine; whereas it then cut off Ukraine’s access to commercial satellite imagery collected by the US government system on 7 March 2025;

    P.  whereas, according to widely recognised democratic principles and Ukraine’s constitution, elections cannot be held during wartime and under martial law, especially when millions of Ukrainians have been displaced; whereas martial law was declared and continues to be in effect in Ukraine solely because of Russia’s war of aggression; whereas the EU continues to recognise President Zelenskyy as the legitimate leader of Ukraine until democratic elections can be held;

    Q.  whereas President Donald Trump ordered a sweeping freeze on US foreign aid, halting hundreds of critical projects in Ukraine, including demining activities, military veteran rehabilitation, humanitarian aid, independent media and anti-corruption initiatives, investigations into Russian war crimes, but also those bolstering Ukraine’s telecommunications networks against Russian cyberattacks;

    R.  whereas Russia’s war of aggression shows its imperialistic attitude towards its neighbours; whereas as long as Russia remains a state pursuing revisionist policies, it remains a threat to security on the European continent; whereas the Russian war of aggression is part of a broader set of objectives against the West and its interests and values, the international rules-based order, democracy and security, as openly declared by Vladimir Putin in the weeks preceding the full-scale invasion; whereas numerous international actors have recognised Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and a state that uses means of terrorism;

    S.  whereas Ukraine’s defeat would be widely viewed as a strategic defeat for Europe, the United States and the entire NATO alliance and as a reward for Russia as the aggressor, with far-reaching security consequences, the extent of which cannot be overstated; whereas depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it will likely have a ripple effects in other parts of the world, notably the Indo-Pacific, and could encourage other revisionist powers to pursue their own hegemonic ambitions;

    T.  whereas a Special European Council took place on 6 March 2025 dedicated to the situation in Ukraine and the need to strengthen European defence; whereas the European Council endorsed the defence package put forward by the Commission on strengthening European Defence through the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, which could potentially mobilise as much as EUR 800 billion, and reiterated its support for Ukraine, highlighting in particular that there can be no negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine and that there can be no negotiations that affect European security without Europe’s involvement, and furthermore that Ukraine’s security and European, transatlantic and global security are intertwined;

    U.  whereas since the outbreak of the war, undersea cables in the Baltic Sea and key infrastructure have been targeted, presumably by Russian and Chinese-linked actors;

    1.  Pays tribute, on the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, to the thousands who have sacrificed their lives for a free and democratic Ukraine; reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine and its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders; strongly underlines Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter;

    2.  Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as of the involvement of Belarus, North Korea and Iran; demands that Russia and its proxy forces immediately completely and unconditionally cease all attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, terminate all military action in Ukraine and withdraw all military forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine; reiterates its policy of non-recognition of temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine by Russia, including but not limited to Crimea; demands that the Russian Federation permanently cease violating or threatening the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine; condemns the atrocities committed against the Ukrainian population by the Russian invading force and the indiscriminate destruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure; demands the end of forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians, and the release and return of all detained Ukrainians, especially children;

    3.  Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine as an existential threat to European security and stability; emphasises that the crime of aggression against Ukraine is a grave violation of international law and the UN Charter; underlines that the Russian war of aggression has fundamentally changed the geopolitical situation in Europe and beyond, and threatens its security architecture, and that in response this calls for bold, brave and comprehensive political, security and financial decisions by the EU; believes that a Ukraine that is capable of defending itself effectively is an integral part of a stable and predictable European security landscape;

    4.  Believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will play a crucial role in influencing future action by other authoritarian regimes, which are closely observing the course of the war and assessing how much space there is for them to exert aggressive foreign policies, including by military means;

    5.  Expresses deep concern over the apparent shift in the United States’ stance on Russia’s war of aggression, which has included openly blaming Ukraine for the ongoing war, suspending US military aid, and attempting to coerce Ukraine into relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence and into making territorial concessions; stresses that, in light of this change, the EU and its Member States are now Ukraine’s primary strategic allies and must maintain their role as the largest donor to Ukraine and significantly increase the much-needed assistance they provide to uphold Ukraine’s right to self-defence and step in, as far as possible, to replace suspended USAID funding, while ensuring long-term aid for reconstruction and recovery;

    6.  Reiterates its call on the Member States to substantially increase and accelerate their military support, in particular the provision of weapons and ammunition, as well as training, in response to pressing needs (inter alia long range weapons systems, air defence systems, artillery systems, electronic warfare systems, anti-drone capabilities and engineering equipment); urges Member States and their defence industries to invest in and partner with the Ukrainian defence industry in order to maximise the full potential of its production capabilities to produce critical equipment in the most efficient manner following the Danish and Dutch examples; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily, with no less than 0,25 % of their GDP annually; calls on the EU and its Member States to utilise their satellite imagery infrastructure for Ukraine; recalls that the military support to Ukraine must be sufficient to ultimately stop Russia’s war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people, re-establish full control over its entire territory within its internationally recognised borders and deter any further aggression by Russia; notes in this context that a number of EU Member States are non-aligned and urges them to increase their support for Ukraine in line with their constitutions;

    7.  Reaffirms its commitment to supporting Ukraine’s desire for a just and lasting peace and to the Peace Formula and the Victory Plan presented by Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy; believes that it is a comprehensive plan to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity and includes the building blocks of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law, which requires the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression, Russian reparations for the massive damage caused in Ukraine, full accountability for those responsible, and exclusion of any future aggressions by Russia; urges the EU and its Member States to work with like-minded partners to ensure that peace negotiations take place in a way that respects the above mentioned principles;

    8.  Underlines that any genuine peace negotiations must be conducted in good faith and include Ukraine; recalls that any settlement that excludes Ukraine or undermines its legitimate aspirations, such as its right to choose its own security arrangements, or which lacks credible security guarantees for Ukraine that contribute to deterring future Russian aggression, will be neither just nor viable;

    9.  Insists that the EU must contribute to robust security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression; underlines that Ukraine must be empowered to resist and prevent further Russian attacks and reject hasty deals that weaken its security in the mid to long term and risk subjecting Ukraine and other European countries to renewed Russian aggression; underlines that Russia’s war economy is not sustainable and coupling orchestrated economic pressure with accelerated military support to Ukraine would enable Ukrainian forces to improve their positions while simultaneously harming Russia’s economy to ensure Ukraine has a stronger negotiating position for Ukraine when it agrees to engage in peace talks;

    10.  Strongly deplores any attempts at blackmailing Ukraine’s leadership into surrender to the Russian aggressor for the sole purpose of announcing a so-called ‘peace deal’; considers that the current attempts by the US administration to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement with Russia over the heads of Ukraine and other European states, in which the latter are confronted with the outcome without their meaningful participation, as counterproductive and dangerous, as it leads to empowering the belligerent state, thus showing that an aggressive policy is not punished but rewarded; concludes that, taking into account the history of Russia’s violations of previous agreements and fundamental principles of international law, such a peace can only be reached through strength, including effective security guarantees;

    11.  Highlights that the financial support provided by the EU and its Member States to Ukraine exceeds that of any other country, reflecting the Union’s unparalleled commitment to Ukraine and consequently to the security of Europe; underscores that the EU’s role in any negotiations impacting the security of Europe must be commensurate with its political and economic weight; reaffirms that there can be no negotiations touching on European security without the European Union at the table; welcomes efforts by France’s President Macron and the UK’s Prime Minister Starmer to host European emergency summits in Paris and London; welcomes the launch of a ‘coalition of the willing’ to enable a European-led enforcement of an eventual peace agreement;

    12.  Expresses dismay concerning the policy of the US administration of appeasing Russia and targeting its allies; warns that this policy undermines the trust of traditional US allies around the world and can have devastating consequences for the transatlantic bond, peace and stability in Europe and beyond;

    13.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to take the latest developments in the US-Ukraine relations as the final wakeup call for them to step in as Ukraine’s leading partner and actively work towards maintaining the broadest possible international support for Ukraine, including through building a ‘coalition of the able and willing’ with like-minded partners globally to support Ukraine and increase pressure on Russia;

    14.  Welcomes the joint statement by Ukraine and the United States following their meeting in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 11 March 2025, including the resumption of US military assistance and intelligence sharing as well as a proposal for a 30-day ceasefire agreement; recalls that a ceasefire can be an effective tool for suspension of hostilities, only if the aggressor fully adheres to it; expects therefore Russia to agree to it and follow it by ceasing all attacks on Ukraine, its military positions, civilian population, infrastructure and territory;

    15.  Expresses concern about the increased tensions in the Baltic Sea with actions of hybrid warfare against critical infrastructure and considers closer cooperation between the Nordic states, Baltic states, Poland and Germany crucial;

    16.  Welcomes the conclusions of the Special European Council of 6 March 2025 and its support for a rapid strengthening of European defence through the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan and reiterating its support for Ukraine following the ‘peace through strength’ approach, highlighting in particular that Ukraine’s security and European, transatlantic and global security are intertwined;

    17.  Reiterates that Russia’s deliberate attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine, destruction of civilian infrastructure, use of sexual violence and rape as a weapon of war, deportation of thousands of Ukrainian citizens to the territory of the Russian Federation, forced transfer and adoption of Ukrainian children, and other serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law all constitute war crimes for which all perpetrators must be held accountable;

    18.  Emphasises that all those responsible for war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine must be held accountable and stresses that no peace will be sustainable without justice; reiterates its call on the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to work together with Ukraine and the international community on setting up a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by Russia and its allies and underlines the need for the jurisdiction of this tribunal to cover the entire leadership of Russia and Belarus responsible for the aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the establishment of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine in The Hague;

    19.  Emphasises its full support for the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC into the situation in Ukraine based on alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; welcomes Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which allowed it to become a state party to it as of January 2025; in this context, expresses its utmost concern about the US sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff, which constitute a serious attack on the international justice system; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the Blocking Statute and on the Member States to urgently increase their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;

    20.  Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine once the Commission’s recommendations are met; reaffirms that Ukraine’s future lies in the EU; welcomes progress on accession-related reforms despite wartime conditions; calls for the acceleration of accession talks, recognising Ukraine’s EU integration as a strategic priority; underscores the importance of continued EU financial assistance, linked to concrete reform, as a key instrument to sustain and accelerate Ukraine’s transformation in line with European standards; underlines that the Copenhagen criteria and the required reforms, in particular concerning the rule of law, democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights, are fundamental to the merit-based process of accession; believes that Ukraine’s membership of the EU represents a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe and that it equates to showing leadership, resolve and vision;

    21.  Recalls NATO’s commitments to admit Ukraine to the Alliance; notes in this regard NATO’s consistent open door policy, in accordance with which NATO remains open to all European democracies that share the values of the Alliance, and in accordance with which decisions on membership have to be taken only by NATO allies, with no third party having a say in this process;

    22.  Calls on the Ukrainian authorities to strengthen internal political unity in Ukraine, uphold parliamentary pluralism and engage in constructive cooperation with the political parties in the Verkhovna Rada; calls on Ukrainian political stakeholders to continue strengthening political unity and parliamentary pluralism and to engage in constructive cooperation within the Verkhovna Rada; calls for due regard to be given to the powers and rights of local self-governing bodies; calls for media pluralism to be guaranteed in line with the democratic principles and values that Ukrainians are so resolutely and bravely defending; suggests in light of the EU accession process to end all limitations of foreign travel of members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;

    23.  Commends Ukrainian, European and international civil society organisations for supporting families of abducted Ukrainian children, prisoners of war, and illegally detained civilians; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to assist their efforts and intensify pressure on Russia to return all abducted and detained Ukrainians;

    24.  Points to the estimate of the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment that at least EUR 506 billion will be required over the next decade for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction; welcomes the EU’s Ukraine Facility, which has a budget of almost EUR 50 billion, and the EU’s Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which, in cooperation with the G7, offers loans to Ukraine of up to EUR 45 billion; nevertheless, urges the EU to prepare for Ukraine’s reconstruction by dedicating and securing new resources; calls for the EU, the Member States and like-minded partners to provide comprehensive and coordinated political, economic, technical and humanitarian assistance to support the sustainable and inclusive post-war reconstruction and recovery of Ukraine; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to sustainable and long-term financial and economic support to Ukraine, including macro-financial assistance, support for reconstruction and economic and social recovery and measures to ensure the resilience of Ukraine’s economy and critical infrastructure; reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must pay for the massive damage caused in Ukraine and therefore calls for the Russian sovereign assets immobilised under EU sanctions to be confiscated for the purpose of supporting Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction;

    25.  Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia in order to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other European countries; calls for a ban or targeted tariffs on Russian imports to the EU with the aim of fully closing the flow of grain, potash and fertilisers as well as raw materials including steel, uranium, titanium, nickel, wood and wood products, and all types of oil and gas; calls on the Council to maintain, mirror where possible and extend its sanctions policy against Russia, and all the enabling states, such as Belarus, Iran, North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities suppling dual-use goods and military items, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing the policy’s effectiveness and impact; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the swift implementation and strict enforcement of all packages of sanctions and to strengthen cooperation among Member States; asks the Commission for an impact assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions in hindering the Russian war effort and on the effectiveness of measures to prevent the circumvention of sanctions; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU countries, and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment;

    26.  Calls for further sanctions against sectors of special importance for the Russian economy, in particular banking, the metallurgy, nuclear, chemical and agriculture sectors, raw materials such as aluminium, steel, uranium, titanium and nickel, as well as for anti-circumvention measures against all countries and entities that provide Russia with military and dual-use goods and technologies; calls for further actions against the Russian ‘shadow fleet’, in the light of sanctions circumvention, sabotage of critical infrastructure and environmental risks; calls on the Commission to jointly engage with flag and port states outside of the EU and take action against owners, operators and insurance operators in third countries that enable Russia’s shadow fleet; urges the Member States to further coordinate operational cooperation between coast guard agencies in order to increase the overall capacity for maritime surveillance; highlights that Russia is increasing its reliance on gas-derived fertilisers, which provide a growing source of revenue, while simultaneously compromising EU economies and threatening food security; expects the EU to keep its sanctions against Russia in place as long as needed to secure a just and lasting peace and until accountability is achieved;

    27.  Calls for the next EU sanctions package to sanction all known shadow fleet tankers and their owners, while also introducing sanctions on any oil tanker breaching the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and enforcing strict implementation by all Member States of the measures prohibiting vessels, irrespective of flag, from sailing in European waters or into any EU Member State port if they have not followed the international rules regarding ship-to-ship transfers (STS) at sea or have illegally turned off their automatic identification system; urges the Commission and the Member States to ban ship-to-ship transfers of Russian oil in EU waters;

    28.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop broader sanctions on Russian and Belarusian wood, including specifically prohibiting the import or purchase of wood products processed in non-EU countries that incorporate wood, particularly birch plywood, originating in Russia or Belarus, to support the enforcement of current sanctions;

    29.  Strongly condemns the Hungarian Government for threatening to block the renewal of the EU’s sanctions framework as well as to limit an appropriate EU response commensurate with the gravity of the situation; calls on the Member States to use all available tools to prevent the Hungarian Government from further blocking;

    30.  Calls for further limitations on Russian and Belarusian citizens entering the EU, especially through more stringent security screenings, including the submission of military service records during the Schengen visa application process, notwithstanding the need to issue humanitarian visas;

    31.  Strongly condemns the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russian forces; calls for the EU, its Member States and international partners to increase pressure on Russia to comply with its international obligations, particularly the Geneva Convention, and allow international organisations access to prisoners;

    32.  Condemns the devastating impact of Russia’s war on children; calls for increased EU support for children’s education, healthcare, mental health services, and for child protection, including trauma recovery and safe learning environments; urges the EU and Ukraine to prioritise children’s needs in aid and reconstruction efforts, in clearing landmines, and in integrating child welfare into the EU accession process;

    33.  Reiterates its concern about the situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is illegally controlled by Russia; supports efforts to maintain a continued International Atomic Energy Agency presence at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant; reiterates its deep concern about the broader long-term environmental impact of the war;

    34.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EU strategic communication, particularly to publicly set the record straight about the EU’s leading support to Ukraine – especially in light of claims that seek to diminish its contribution – to counter hybrid threats and grey zone activities, and to prevent Russian interference in political, electoral, and other democratic processes in Ukraine and Europe; urges proactive communication on EU enlargement benefits to enhance public understanding and support for Ukraine’s accession in both Ukraine and the Member States; underlines that Ukraine’s EU integration is an opportunity for the development of both bordering regions and the Member States; calls strongly for the EU and the Member States to combat Russian disinformation about the war, by strengthening digital literacy, promoting fact-based narratives and holding social media platforms accountable for spreading harmful content by strictly enforcing the Digital Services Act(3);

    35.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

    (1) OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/295/oj.
    (2) OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj.
    (3) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – European Semester for economic policy coordination: employment and social priorities for 2025 – P10_TA(2025)0032 – Wednesday, 12 March 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

    –  having regard to Articles 9, 121, 148 and 149 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) proclaimed and signed by the Council, Parliament and the Commission on 17 November 2017,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 entitled ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan’ (COM(2021)0102) and its proposed 2030 headline targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘2025 European Semester – Autumn package’ (COM(2024)0700),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 November 2024 entitled ‘2025 European Semester: bringing the new economic governance framework to life’ (COM(2024)0705),

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 December 2024 for a joint employment report from the Commission and the Council (COM(2024)0701),

    –  having regard to the Commission recommendation of 17 December 2024 for a Council recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area (COM(2024)0704),

    –  having regard to the Commission report of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘Alert Mechanism Report 2025’ (COM(2024)0702),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 26 November 2024 entitled ‘Fiscal statistical tables providing relevant background data for the assessment of the 2025 draft budgetary plans’ (SWD(2024)0950),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 17 December 2024 on the changes in the scoreboard the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure Scoreboard in the context of the regular review process (SWD(2024)0702),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2024 on the Council position on Draft amending budget No 4/2024 of the European Union for the financial year 2024 – update of revenue (own resources) and adjustments to some decentralised agencies(1),

    –  having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    –  having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of April 2024 on the future of the single market(2),

    –  having regard to the La Hulpe Declaration on the Future of the European Pillar of Social Rights signed by Parliament, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Council on 16 April 2024,

    –  having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2023/955 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a Social Climate Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1060(3),

    –  having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(4), and in particular to Articles 3, 4, 13 and 27 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 17 January 2023 entitled ‘Harnessing talent in Europe’s regions’ (COM(2023)0032),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2023 entitled ‘Labour and skills shortages in the EU: an action plan’ (COM(2024)0131),

    –  having regard to the 2020 European Skills Agenda,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 7 September 2022 on the European care strategy (COM(2022)0440),

    –  having regard to the Council Recommendation on access to affordable, high-quality long-term care(5),

    –  having regard to the EU Social Scoreboard and its headline and secondary indicators,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (COM(2021)0101),

    –  having regard to the Commission report of 19 September 2024 entitled ‘Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE): upward social convergence in the EU and the role of social investment’,

    –  having regard to the Council Decision on Employment Guidelines, adopted by the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council on 2 December 2024, which establishes employment and social priorities aligned with the principles of the EPSR,

    –  having regard to the Tripartite Declaration for a thriving European Social Dialogue and to the forthcoming pact on social dialogue,

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2041 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on adequate minimum wages in the European Union(6) (Minimum Wage Directive),

    –  having regard to the European Social Charter, referred to in the preamble of the EPSR,

    –  having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation for 2020-2030,

    –  having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

    –  having regard to the Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025,

    –  having regard to the EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025,

    –  having regard to the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A10-0023/2025),

    A.  whereas progress has been made towards achieving the EU’s employment targets, namely that at least 78 % of people aged 20 to 64 should be in employment by 2030, despite the uncertainty created by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the impact of high inflation; whereas, according to the Commission’s 2025 autumn economic forecast, EU employment has reached a rate of 75,3 %; whereas growth in employment in the EU remained robust in 2023; whereas in two thirds of the Member States, employment growth in 2023 was on track to reach the national 2030 target; whereas significant challenges nevertheless persist, such as high unemployment rates in some Member States, particularly among young people and persons with disabilities, as do significant inequalities between sectors and regions, which can negatively affect social cohesion and the well-being of European citizens in the long term;

    B.  whereas the European Semester combines various different instruments in an integrated framework for multilateral coordination and surveillance of economic, employment and social policies within the EU and it must become a key tool for fostering upward social convergence; whereas the Social Convergence Framework is a key tool for assessing social challenges and upward convergence within the European Semester and for monitoring social disparities across Member States, while addressing the challenges identified in the Joint Employment Report (JER);

    C.  whereas the Union has adopted the 2030 target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion by at least 15 million compared to 2019, including at least 5 million children; whereas in nearly half of the Member States the trend is heading in the opposite direction; whereas one child in four in the European Union is still at risk of poverty and social exclusion; and whereas the current trend will not make it possible to meet the 2030 target; whereas public spending on children and youth should not be seen only as social expenditure but as an investment in the future; whereas the promotion of strong, sustainable and inclusive economic growth can succeed only if the next generation can develop their full educational potential in order to be prepared for the changing labour market, whereas to meet the 2030 Barcelona targets for early childhood education and care, the EU should invest an additional EUR 11 billion per year(7);

    D.  whereas despite a minimal reduction in the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU in 2023, approximately one in five still faces this challenge, with notable disparities for children, young and older people, persons with disabilities, LGTBI, non-EU born individuals, and Roma communities;

    E.  whereas significant disparities are observed among children from ethnic or migrant backgrounds and children with disabilities; whereas 83 % of Roma children live in households at risk of poverty; whereas the EU and national resources currently deployed are in no way sufficient for addressing the challenge of child poverty in the EU and, therefore, a dedicated funding instrument for the European Child Guarantee as well as synergies with other European and national funds are of the utmost importance;

    F.  whereas the EPSR must be the compass guiding EU social and economic policies, whereas the Commission should monitor progress on the implementation of the EPSR using the Social Scoreboard and the Social Convergence Framework;

    G.  whereas poor quality jobs among the self-employed are disproportionately widespread while the rate of self-employment is declining, including among young people;

    H.  whereas there are still 1,4 million people residing in institutions in the EU; whereas residents of institutions are isolated from the broader community and do not have sufficient control over their lives and the decisions that affect them; whereas despite the fact that the European Union has long been committed to the process of deinstitutionalisation, efforts are still needed at both European and national level to enable vulnerable groups to live independently in a community environment;

    I.  whereas demographic challenges, including an ageing population, low birth rates and rural depopulation, with young people in particular moving to urban areas, profoundly affect the economic vitality and attractiveness of EU regions, the labour markets, and consequently, the sustainability of welfare systems, and further aggravate the regional disparities in the EU, and hence represent a structural challenge for the EU economy; and whereas, as underlined in the Draghi report, sustainable growth and competitiveness in Europe depend to a large extent on adapting education and training systems to evolving skills needs, prioritising adult learning and vocational education and training, and the inclusion of the active population in the labour market and on a robust welfare system;

    J.  whereas 70 % of workers in Europe are in good-quality jobs, 30 % are in high-strain jobs where demands are more numerous than resources available to balance them leading to overall poor job quality; whereas in many occupations suffering from persistent labour shortages the share of low-quality jobs is higher than 30 %;

    K.  whereas the Letta report states that there is a decline in the birth rate, noting the importance of creating a framework to support all families as part of a strategy of inclusive growth in line with the EPSR; whereas the report notes that the free movement of people remains the least developed of the four freedoms and argues for reducing barriers to intra-EU occupational mobility while addressing the social, economic and political challenges facing the sending Member States and their most disadvantaged regions, as well as safeguarding the right to stay; whereas there is a need to promote family-friendly and work-life balance policies, ensuring accessible and professional care systems as well as public quality education, family-related leave and flexible working arrangements in line with the European Care Strategy;

    L.  whereas inflation has increased the economic burden on households, having a particularly negative impact on groups in vulnerable situations, such as single parents, large families, older people or persons with disabilities, whereas housing costs and energy poverty remain major problems; whereas housing is becoming unaffordable for those who live in households where housing costs account for 40 % of total disposable income; whereas investment in social services, housing supply – including social housing – and policies that facilitate the accessibility and affordability of housing play a key role in reducing poverty among vulnerable households;

    M.  whereas the EU’s micro, small and medium-sized enterprises face particular challenges such as staying competitive against third-country players, maintaining production levels despite rising energy costs and finding the necessary skills for the green and digital transitions; whereas they need financial and technical support to comply with regulatory requirements and take advantage of the opportunities offered by the twin transitions;

    N.  whereas labour and skills shortages remain a problem at all levels, and are reported by companies of all sizes and sectors; whereas these shortages are exacerbated by a lack of candidates to fill critical positions in key sectors such as education, healthcare, transport, science, technology, engineering and construction, especially in areas affected by depopulation; whereas these shortages can result from a number of factors, such as difficult working conditions, unattractive salaries, demand for new skill sets and a shortage of relevant training, the lack of public services, barriers of access to medium and higher education and lack of recognition of skills and education;

    O.  whereas the Union has adopted the target that at least 60 % of adults should participate in training every year by 2030; whereas the Member States have committed themselves to national targets in order to achieve this headline goal and whereas the majority of Member States lost ground in the pursuit of these national targets; whereas further efforts are needed to ensure the provision of, and access to, quality training policies that promote lifelong learning; whereas upskilling, reskilling and training programmes must be available for all workers, including those with disabilities, and should also be adapted to workers’ needs and capabilities;

    P.  whereas in 2022, the average Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) score across the OECD on the measures of basic skills (reading, mathematics and science) of 15-year-olds dropped by 10 points compared to the last wave in 2018; whereas underachievement is prevalent among disadvantaged learners, demonstrating a widening of educational inequalities; whereas this worrying deterioration calls for reforms and investments in education and training;

    Q.  whereas the EU’s capacity to deal with future shocks, crises and ‘polycrises’ while navigating the demographic, digital and green transitions, will depend greatly on the conditions under which critical workers will be able to perform their work; whereas addressing the shortages and retaining all types of talent requires decent working conditions, access to social protection systems, and opportunities for skills development tailored to the needs; and whereas addressing skills shortages is crucial to achieving the digital and green transitions, ensuring inclusive and sustainable growth and boosting the EU’s competitiveness;

    R.  whereas it is essential to promote mobility within the EU and consider attracting skilled workers from third countries, while ensuring respect for and enforcement of labour and social rights and channelling third-country nationals entering the EU through legal migration pathways towards occupations experiencing shortages, supported by an effective integration policy, in full complementarity with harnessing talents from within the Union;

    S.  whereas gender pay gaps remain considerable in most EU Member States and whereas care responsibilities are an important factor that continue to constrain women into part-time employment or lead to their exclusion from the labour market, resulting in a wider gender employment gap;

    T.  whereas the JER highlights the right to disconnect, in particular in the context of telework, acknowledging the critical role of this right in ensuring a work-life balance in a context of increasing digitalisation and remote working;

    U.  whereas challenges to several sectors, such as automotive manufacturing and energy intensive industries, became evident in 2024 and a number of companies announced large-scale restructuring;

    V.  whereas there are disparities in the coverage of social services, including long-term care, child protection, domestic violence support, and homelessness aid, that need to be addressed through the European Semester;

    W.  whereas there is currently no regular EU-wide collection of data on social services investment and coverage; whereas collecting such data is key for an evidence-based analysis of national social policies in the European Semester analysis; whereas this should be addressed through jointly agreed criteria and data collection standards for social services investment and coverage in the Member States; whereas the European Social Network’s Social Services Index is an example of how such data collection can contribute to the European Semester analysis;

    X.  whereas the crisis in generational renewal, demographic changes, and lack of sufficient investment in public services have led to an increased risk of poverty and social exclusion, particularly affecting children and older people, single-parent households and large families, the working poor, persons with disabilities, and people from marginalised backgrounds; whereas an ambitious EU anti-poverty strategy will be essential to reverse this trend and provide responses to the multidimensional phenomenon of poverty;

    Y.  whereas Eurofound research shows that suicide rates have been creeping up since 2021, after decreasing for decades; whereas more needs to be done to address causes of mental health problems in working and living conditions (importantly social inclusion), and access to support for people with poor mental health remains a problem;

    Z.  whereas there were still over 3 300 fatal accidents and almost 3 million nonfatal accidents in the EU-27 in 2021; whereas over 200 000 workers die each year from work-related illnesses; whereas these data do not include all accidents caused by undeclared work, making it plausible to assume that the true numbers greatly exceed the official statistics; whereas in 2017, according to Eurofound, 20 % of jobs in Europe were of ‘poor quality’ and put workers at increased risk regarding their physical or mental health; whereas 14 % of workers have been exposed to a high level of psychosocial risks; whereas 23 % of European workers believe that their safety or their health is at risk because of their work;

    AA.  whereas the results of the April 2024 Eurobarometer survey on social Europe highlight that 88 % of European citizens consider social Europe to be important to them personally; whereas this was confirmed by the EU Post-Electoral Survey 2024, where European citizens cited rising prices and the cost of living (42 %) and the economic situation (41 %) as the main topics that motivated them to vote in the 2024 European elections;

    AB.  whereas according to Article 3 TEU, social progress in the EU is one of the aims of a highly competitive social market economy, together with full employment, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment; whereas Article 3 TEU also states that the EU ‘shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child’;

    AC.  whereas the new EU economic governance framework entered into force in April 2024 and aims to promote sustainable and inclusive growth and to give more space for social investment and achievement of the objectives of the EPSR; whereas, for the first time, the revision includes a social convergence framework as an integrated part of the European Semester;

    AD.  whereas under the new EU economic governance framework, all Member States have to include reforms and investments in their medium-term plans addressing common EU priorities and challenges identified in country-specific recommendations in the context of the European Semester; whereas the common EU priorities include social and economic resilience, including the EPSR;

    AE.  whereas public investment is expected to increase in 2025 in almost all Member States, with a significant contribution from NextGenerationEU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and EU funds and will contribute to social spending, amounting to around 25 % of the total estimated expenditure under the RRF, securing growth and economic resilience(8); whereas social investments and reforms in key areas can boost employment, social inclusion, competitiveness and economic growth(9); whereas social partners are essential for designing and implementing policies that promote sustainable and inclusive growth, decent and quality work, and fair transitions and must be involved at all levels of governance in accordance with the TFEU;

    AF.  whereas according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), on average across OECD countries, occupations at highest risk of automation account for about 28 % of employment(10); whereas social dialogue and collective bargaining are crucial in this context to ensure a participatory approach to managing change driven by technological developments, addressing potential concerns, while fostering workers’ adaptation (including via skills provision); whereas digitalisation, robotisation, automation and artificial intelligence (AI) must benefit workers and society by improving working conditions and quality of life, ensuring a good work-life balance, creating better employment opportunities, and contributing to socio-economic convergence; whereas workers and their trade unions will play a critical role in anticipating and tackling risks emerging from those challenges;

    AG.  whereas social dialogue and collective bargaining are essential for the EU’s competitiveness, labour productivity and social cohesion;

    1.  Considers that the Commission and the Council should strengthen their efforts to implement the EPSR, in line with the action plan of March 2021 and the La Hulpe Declaration, to achieve the 2030 headline targets; calls on the Commission to ensure that the JER 2026 analyses the implementation of all the principles of the EPSR in line with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 and includes an analysis of the social dimension of the national medium-term fiscal structural plans related to social resilience, including the EPSR; welcomes, in this regard, the announcement of a new Action Plan on the implementation of the EPSR(11) for 2025 to give a new impetus to social progress; welcomes the fact that almost all Member States are expected to increase public investment in 2025, which is necessary to ensure access to quality public services and achieve the aims of the EPSR; recalls that the Member States can mobilise the RRF within the scope defined by the Regulation (EU) 2021/241(12) until 31 December 2026 on policies for sustainable and inclusive growth and the next generation;

    2.  Stresses the importance of using the Social Scoreboard and the Social Convergence Framework to identify risks to, and to track progress in, reducing inequalities, strengthening social protection systems and promoting decent working conditions and supportive measures for workers to manage the transitions; stresses that in this regard, it is necessary to ensure a sustainable, fair and inclusive Europe where social rights are fully protected and safeguarded at the same level as economic freedoms; recalls that EU citizens identify social Europe as one of their priorities;

    3.  Regrets the lack of data on and analysis of wealth inequality and wealth concentration in the EU as this is one of the main determinants of poverty; points out that according to Distributional Wealth Accounts, a dataset developed by the European System of Central Banks, the share of wealth held by the top 10 % stood at 56 % in the fourth quarter of 2023, while the bottom half held just 5 %;

    4.  Welcomes the inclusion of analysis on the positive contribution of the SDGs and the European equality strategies in the JER 2025 and calls on the Commission to ensure that the JER 2026 includes both a section analysing the progress towards the SDGs related to employment and social policy, and another on progress towards eliminating social and labour discrimination in line with the Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, the EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025, the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation 2020-2030, the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025, and the Strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030;

    5.  Calls on the Member States to implement the updated employment guidelines, with an emphasis on education and training for all, new technologies such as AI, and recent policy initiatives on platform work, affordable and decent housing and tackling labour and skills shortages, with a view to strengthening democratic decision-making;

    6.  Reiterates the importance of investing in workforce skills development and occupational training and of ensuring quality employment, with an emphasis on the individual right to training and lifelong learning; urges the Member States to develop upskilling and reskilling measures in collaboration with local stakeholders, including educational and training bodies and the social partners, in order to reinforce the link between the education and training systems and the labour market and to anticipate labour market needs; welcomes the fact that employment outcomes for recent graduates from vocational education and training (VET) continue to improve across the EU; is concerned about young people’s declining educational performance, particularly in basic skills; welcomes, in this regard, the announcement of an Action Plan on Basic Skills and a STEM Education Strategic Plan; calls on the Member States to invest in programmes to equip learners with the basic, digital and transversal skills needed for the world of work and its digitisation as well as to help them to contribute meaningfully to society; recalls the important role that the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for displaced workers can play in supporting and reskilling workers who were made redundant as a result of major restructuring events;

    7.  Welcomes the announcement of a quality jobs roadmap to ensure a just transition for all; calls on the Commission to include in this roadmap considerations for measures linked to the use of AI and algorithmic management in the world of work so that new technologies are harnessed to improve working conditions and productivity while respecting workers’ rights and work-life balance as recognised in the JER(13);

    8.  Stresses that the response to labour shortages in the European Union also involves improving and facilitating labour mobility within the Union; calls on the Member States to strengthen and facilitate the recognition of skills and qualifications in the Union, including those of third-country nationals; calls on the Commission to analyse the effectiveness of the European Employment Services (EURES) platform with a view to a potential revision of its operation;

    9.  Notes that the number of early leavers from education and training, people with lower levels of education, young people not in education, employment or training (NEETs) and among them vulnerable groups, including Roma, women, older people, low- and medium-qualified people, persons with disabilities and people with a migrant or minority background, depending on the country-specific context, remains high in several Member States, despite a downward trend in the European Union; calls on the Member States to reinforce the Youth Guarantee as stated in Principle 4 of the EPSR; in order to support young people in need throughout their personal and professional development; reiterates the pivotal role that VET plays in providing the knowledge, skills and competencies necessary for young people entering the labour market; emphasises the need to invest in the quality and attractiveness of VET through the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+); recalls, therefore, the need to address this situation and develop solutions to keep young people in education, training or employment and the importance of ensuring their access to traineeships and apprenticeships, enabling them to gain their first work experience and facilitating their transition from education to employment as well as to create working conditions that enable an ageing workforce to remain in the labour market;

    10.  Considers that, although there has been an improvement, persons with disabilities, especially women with disabilities, still face significant obstacles in the labour market, and that there is therefore a need for vocational and digital training, while promoting the inclusion of persons with disabilities, targeting the inactive labour force and groups with low participation in the labour market, including women, young people, older workers and persons with chronic diseases; calls on the Commission to update the EU Disability Strategy with new flagship initiatives and actions from 2025 onwards, such as a European Disability Employment and Skills Guarantee and the sharing of best practices such as the disability card, in particular to address social inclusion and independent living for people with disabilities, also ensuring their access to quality education, training and employment through guidance on retaining disability allowances;

    11.  Expresses concern that Roma continue to face significant barriers to employment, with persistent biases limiting their prospects; notes that the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion, and participation highlights a lack of progress in employment access and a growing share of Roma youth not in employment, education, or training; emphasises the framework’s goal of halving the employment gap between Roma and the general population and ensuring that at least 60 % of Roma are in paid work by 2030; urges the Member States to adopt an integrated, equality-focused approach and to ensure that public policies and services effectively reach all Roma, including those in remote rural areas;

    12.  Stresses the need to pay attention to the social and environmental aspects of competitiveness, emphasising the need for investments in education and training for all to ensure universal access to high-quality public education and professional training programmes, as well as sustainable practices to foster inclusive growth; underlines that social partners should play a key role in identifying and addressing skills needs across the EU;

    13.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to include specific recommendations on housing affordability in the European Semester and to promote housing investment; urges the Member States to ensure that housing investments support long-term quality housing solutions that are actually affordable for low-income and middle-income households, highlighting that investments in social and affordable housing are crucial in order to ensure and improve the quality of life for all; stresses the need for a better use of EU funding, such as through European Investment Bank financial instruments, in particular to support investments to increase the energy efficiency of buildings; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take decisive action to provide an assessment of Union policies, funds and bottlenecks that should facilitate the construction, conversion and renovation of accessible, affordable and energy-efficient housing, including social housing, that meets the needs of young people, people with reduced mobility, low- and middle-income groups, families at risk and people in more vulnerable situations, while protecting homeowners and those seeking access to home ownership from a further reduction in supply;

    14.  Welcomes the announced European Affordable Housing Plan to support Member States in addressing the housing crisis and soaring rents; calls on the Commission to assess and publish which potential barriers on State aid rules affect housing accessibility; recalls that the Social Climate Fund aims to provide financial aid to Member States from 2026 to support vulnerable households, in particular with measures and investments intended to increase the energy efficiency of buildings, decarbonisation of heating and cooling of buildings and the integration in buildings of renewable energy generation and storage;

    15.  Considers that homelessness is a dramatic social problem in the EU; calls for a single definition of homelessness in the EU, which would enable the systematic comparison and assessment of the extent of homelessness across different EU Member States; calls on the Commission to develop a strategy and work towards ending homelessness in the EU by 2030 by promoting access to affordable and decent housing as well as access to quality social services; urges the Member States to better use the available EU instruments, including the ESF+, in this matter(14);

    16.  Calls on the Member States to design national homelessness strategies; welcomes the intention to deliver a Council recommendation on homelessness(15); urges the Commission to further increase the ambition of the European Platform on Combating Homelessness;

    17.  Considers that EU action is urgently needed to address the persistently high levels of poverty and social exclusion in the EU, particularly among children, young and older people, persons with disabilities, non-EU born individuals, LGTBI and Roma communities; highlights that access to quality social services should be prioritised and should ensure energy security for vulnerable households; calls on the Commission to adopt the first-ever EU Anti-Poverty Strategy;

    18.  Recalls the Union objective of transitioning from institutional to community or family-based care; calls on the Commission to put forward an action plan on deinstitutionalisation; stresses that this action plan should cover all groups still living in institutions, including children, persons with disabilities, people with mental health issues, people affected by homelessness and older people; calls on the Member States to make full use of the ESF+ funds as well as other relevant European and national funds in order to finalise the deinstitutionalisation process so as to ensure that every EU citizen can live in a family or community environment;

    19.  Calls on the Commission to deliver a European action plan for mental health, in line with its recent recommendations(16); calls on the Member States to strengthen access to mental health services and emotional support programmes for all, particularly children, young people and older people; requests a better use of the Social Scoreboard indicators to address the impact of precarious living conditions and uncertainty on mental health;

    20.  Calls on the Commission to address loneliness by promoting a holistic EU strategy on loneliness and access to professional care; calls also for this EU strategy to address the socio-economic impact of loneliness on productivity and well-being by tackling issues such as rural isolation; urges the Member States to continue implementing the Council recommendation on access to affordable, quality long-term care with a view to ensuring access to quality care while ensuring decent working conditions for workers in the care sector, as well as for informal carers;

    21.  Recognises that 44 million Europeans are frequent informal long-term caregivers, the majority of whom are women(17);

    22.  Recognises the unique role of carers in society, and while the definition of care workers is not harmonised across the EU, the long-term care sector employs 6.4 million people across the EU;

    23.  Is concerned that, in 2023, 94,6 million people in the EU were still at risk of poverty or social exclusion; stresses that without a paradigm shift in the approach to combating poverty, the European Union and its Member States will not achieve their poverty reduction objectives; believes that the announcement of the first-ever EU Anti-Poverty Strategy is a step in the right direction towards reversing the trend, but must provide a comprehensive approach to tackling the multidimensional aspects of poverty and social exclusion with concrete actions, strong implementation and monitoring; calls for this Strategy to encompass everybody experiencing poverty and social exclusion, first and foremost the most disadvantaged, but also specific measures for different groups such as persons experiencing in-work poverty, homeless people, people with disabilities, single-parent families and, above all, children in order to sustainably break the cycle of poverty; stresses that the transposition of the Minimum Wage Directive will be key to preventing and fighting poverty risks among workers, while reinforcing incentives to work, and welcomes the fact that several Member States have amended or plan to amend their minimum wage frameworks; is concerned about the rise of non-standard forms of employment where workers are more likely to face in-work poverty and find themselves without adequate legal protections;

    24.  Reiterates its call on the Commission to carefully monitor implementation of the Child Guarantee in all Member States as part of the European Semester and country-specific recommendations; reiterates its call for an increase in the funding of the European Child Guarantee with a dedicated budget of at least EUR 20 billion and for all Member States to allocate at least 5 % of their allocated ESF+ funds to fighting child poverty and promoting children’s well-being; considers that the country-specific recommendations should reflect Member States’ budgetary compliance with the minimum required allocation for tackling child poverty set out in the ESF+ Regulation(18); calls on the Commission to provide an ambitious budget for the Child Guarantee in the next MFF in order to respond to the growing challenge of child poverty and social exclusion;

    25.  Is concerned about national policies that create gaps in health coverage, increasing inequalities both within and between Member States; warns that this also undermines the implementation of principle 16 of the EPSR and of SDG 3.8 on universal health coverage, as well as the EPSR’s overall objective of promoting upward social convergence in the EU, leaving no one behind; believes that the indicators used in the Social Scoreboard do not provide a comprehensive understanding of healthcare affordability;

    26.  Underlines that employers need to foster intergenerational links within companies and intergenerational learning between younger and older workers, and vice versa; underlines that an ageing workforce can help a business develop new products and services to adapt to the needs of an ageing society in a more creative and productive way; calls, furthermore, for the creation of incentives to encourage volunteering and mentoring to induce the transfer of knowledge between generations;

    27.  Warns that, according to European Central Bank reports, real wages are still below their pre-pandemic level, while productivity was roughly the same; agrees that this creates some room for a non-inflationary recovery in real wages and warns that if real wages do not recover, this would increase the risk of protracted economic weakness, which could cause scarring effects and would further dent productivity in the euro area relative to other parts of the world; believes that better enforcement of minimum wages and strengthening collective bargaining coverage can have a beneficial effect on levels of wage inequality, especially by helping more vulnerable workers at the bottom of the wage distribution who are increasingly left out;

    28.  Calls for the Member States to ensure decent working conditions, comprising among other things decent wages, access to social protection, lifelong learning opportunities, occupational health and safety, a good work-life balance and the right to disconnect, reasonable working time, workers’ representation, democracy at work and collective agreements; urges the Member States to foster democracy at work, social dialogue and collective bargaining and to protect workers’ rights, particularly in the context of the green and digital transitions, and to ensure equal pay for equal work by men and women, enhance pay transparency and address gender-based inequality to close the gender pay gap in the EU;

    29.  Recalls the importance of improving access to social protection for the self-employed and calls on the Commission to monitor the Member States’ national plans for the implementation of the Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed(19) as part of the country-specific recommendations; recalls, in this regard, as the rate of self-employed professionals in the cultural and creative sectors is more than double that in the general population, the 13 initiatives laid down in the Commission’s 21 February 2024 response to the European Parliament resolution of 21 November 2023 on an EU framework for the social and professional situation of artists and workers in the cultural and creative sectors(20) and calls on the Commission to start implementing them in cooperation with the Member States;

    30.  Calls for the implementation of policies that promote work-life balance and the right to disconnect, with the aim of improving the quality of life for all families and workers, for ensuring the implementation of the Work-Life Balance Directive(21) and of the European Care Strategy; calls on the Commission to put forward a proposal to address teleworking and the right to disconnect; as well as a proposal for the creation of a European card for all types of large families and a European action plan for single parents, offering educational and social advantages; calls, ultimately, for initiatives to combat workforce exclusion as a consequence of longer periods of sick leave, to adapt the workplace and to promote flexible working conditions and to develop strategies to support workers’ return after longer periods of absence;

    31.  Calls for demographic challenges to be prioritised in the EU’s cohesion policy and for concrete action at EU and national levels; calls on the Commission to declare a ‘European Year of Demography’ and to prioritise the development of the Commission communication on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions and the ‘Talent Booster Mechanism’ in order to promote social cohesion and to step up funding for rural and outermost areas and regions with a high rate of depopulation, supporting quality job creation, public services, local development projects and basic infrastructure that favour the population’s ‘right to stay’, especially in the case of young people; highlights the importance of introducing specific measures to address regional inequalities in education and training, ensuring equal access to high-quality and affordable education for all;

    32.  Is concerned that, despite improvements, several population groups are still significantly under-represented in the EU labour market, including women, older people, low- and medium-qualified people, persons with disabilities and people with a migrant or minority background; warns that  educational inequalities have deepened, further exacerbating the vulnerabilities of students from disadvantaged and migrant backgrounds; points out that, according to the JER, people with migrant or minority backgrounds can significantly benefit from targeted measures in order to address skills mismatches, improve language proficiency and combat discrimination; stresses the importance of strengthening efforts in the implementation of the 2021-27 Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion, which provides a common policy framework to support the Member States in developing national migrant integration policies;

    33.  Calls on the Commission and the Council to prioritise reducing administrative burdens with the aim of simplification while respecting labour and social standards; believes that better support for SMEs and actual and potential entrepreneurs will improve the EU’s competitiveness and long-term sustainability, boost innovation and create quality jobs; notes that SMEs and self-employed professionals in all sectors are essential for the EU’s economic growth and thus the financing of social policies; urges the implementation of specific recommendations to improve the single market; takes note of the Commission’s publication of the ‘Competitiveness Compass’ on 29 January 2025(22);

    34.  Calls on the Commission to conduct competitiveness checks on every new legislative proposal, taking into account the overall impact of EU legislation on companies, as well as on other EU policies and programmes;

    35.  Considers that the social economy is an essential component of the EU’s social market economy and a driver for the implementation of the EPSR and its targets, often providing employment to vulnerable and excluded groups; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen their support for all social economy enterprises but especially non-profit ones, as highlighted in the Social Economy Action Plan 2021 and the Liège Roadmap for the Social Economy, in order to promote quality, decent, inclusive work and the circular economy, to encourage the Member States to facilitate access to funding and to enhance the visibility of social economy actors; calls for the Commission to explore innovative funding mechanisms to support the development of the social economy in Europe(23) and to foster a dynamic and inclusive business environment;

    36.  Believes that, in this year of transition, with the implementation of the revised economic governance rules, the Member States should align fiscal responsibility with sustainable and inclusive growth and employment, notes that the involvement of social partners, including in the development of medium-term fiscal structural plans, should be enhanced to contribute to the goals of the new economic governance framework;

    37.  Welcomes the fact that the national medium-term fiscal structural plans, under the new economic governance framework, have to include the reforms and investments responding to the main challenges identified in the context of the European Semester and also to ensure debt sustainability while investing strategically in the principles of the EPSR with the aim of fostering upward social convergence;

    38.  Is concerned that compliance with the country-specific recommendations (CSRs) remains low; reiterates its call, therefore, for an effective implementation of CSRs by the Member States so as to promote healthcare and sustainable pension systems, in line with principles 15 and 16 of the EPSR, and long-term prosperity for all citizens, taking into account the vulnerability of those workers whose careers are segmented, intermittent and subject to labour transitions; insists that the Commission should reinforce its dialogues with the Member States on the implementation of existing recommendations and of the Employment Guidelines as well as on current or future policy action to address identified challenges;

    39.  Welcomes the establishment of a framework to identify risks to social convergence within the European Semester, for which Parliament called strongly; recalls that under this framework, the Commission assesses risks to upward social convergence in Member States and monitors progress on the implementation of the EPSR on the basis of the Social Scoreboard and of the principles of the Social Convergence Framework; welcomes the fact that the 2025 JER delivers country-specific analysis based on the principles of the Social Convergence Framework; calls on the Commission to further develop innovative quantitative and qualitative analysis tools under this new Framework in order to make optimal use of it in the future cycles of the European Semester;

    40.  Welcomes the fact that the first analysis based on the principles of the Social Convergence Framework points to upward convergence in the labour market in 2023(24); notes with concern that employment outcomes of under-represented groups still need to improve and that risks to upward convergence persist at European level in relation to skills development, ranging from early education to lifelong learning, and the social outcomes of at-risk-of-poverty and social exclusion rates; calls on the Commission to further analyse these risks to upward social convergence in the second stage of the analysis and to discuss with the Member States concerned the measures undertaken or envisaged to address these risks;

    41.  Recognises the cost of living crisis, which has increased the burden on households, and the rising cost of housing, which, in conjunction with high energy costs, is contributing to high levels of energy poverty across the EU; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to comprehensively address the root causes of this crisis by prioritising policies that promote economic resilience, social cohesion, and sustainable development;

    42.  Warns of the social risks stemming from the crisis in the automotive sector, which is facing unprecedented pressure from both external and internal factors; calls on the Commission to pay attention to this sector and enhance social dialogue and the participation of workers in transition processes; stresses the urgent need for a coordinated EU response via an emergency task force of trade unions and employers to respond to the current crisis;

    43.  Calls on the Commission to monitor data on restructuring and its impact on employment, such as by using the European Restructuring Monitor, to facilitate measures in support of restructuring and labour market transitions, and to consider highlighting national measures supporting a socially responsible way of restructuring in the European Semester;

    44.  Is concerned about the Commission’s revision of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) Scoreboard, particularly the reduction in employment and social indicators, which are crucial for assessing the social and labour market situation in the Member States; regrets the fact that youth unemployment is no longer considered as a headline indicator, despite its relevance in identifying and addressing specific labour market challenges and in adopting adequate public policies; stresses that social standards indicators should be given greater consideration in the decision-making process; regrets the fact that the Commission did not duly consult Parliament and reminds the Commission of its obligation to closely cooperate with Parliament, the Council and social partners before drawing up the MIP scoreboard and the set of macroeconomic and macro-financial indicators for Member States; stresses that the implementation of the principles of the EPSR must be part of the MIP scoreboard;

    45.  Considers that territorial and social cohesion are essential components of the competitiveness agenda, and legislation such as the European Instrument for Temporary Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) remain a positive example to inspire future EU initiatives;

    46.  Considers that the Commission and the Member States should ensure that fiscal policies under the European Semester support investments aligned with the EPSR, particularly in areas such as decent and affordable housing, quality healthcare, education, and social protection systems, as these are critical for social cohesion and long-term economic sustainability and to address the challenges identified through social indicators;

    47.  Stresses the need to address key challenges identified in the Social Scoreboard as ‘critical’ and ‘to watch’, including children at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the gender employment gap, housing cost overburden, childcare, and long-term care the disability employment gap, the impact of social transfers on reducing poverty, and basic digital skills(25);

    48.  Stresses the negative impacts that the cost of living crisis has had on persons with disabilities;

    49.  Urges the Member States to consider robust policies that ensure fair wages and improve working conditions, particularly for low-income and precarious workers;

    50.  Stresses the need for timely and harmonised data on social policies to improve evidence-based policymaking and targeted social investments; calls for improvements to be made to the Social Scoreboard in order to cover the 20 EPSR principles with the introduction of relevant indicators reflecting trends and causes of inequality, such as quality employment, wealth distribution, access to public services, adequate pensions, the homelessness rate, mental health and unemployment; recalls that the at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion (AROPE) indicator fails to reveal the causes of complex inequality; calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a European data collection framework on social services to monitor the investment in and coverage of social services;

    51.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ C, C/2025/491, 29.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/491/oj.
    (2) Letta, E., Much more than a market – Speed, security, solidarity – Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens, April 2024.
    (3) OJ L 130, 16.5.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/955/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (5) OJ C 476, 15.12.2022, p. 1.
    (6) OJ L 275, 25.10.2022, p. 33, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2041/oj.
    (7) European Commission, ‘Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) 2024’, September 2024.
    (8) 2025 European Semester: Commission proposal of 17 December 2024 for a joint employment report from the Commission and the Council (COM(2024)0701).
    (9) European Commission, ‘Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) 2024’, September 2024.
    (10) OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 282.
    (11) von der Leyen, U., ‘Europe’s Choice, Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024-2029’, 18 July 2024.
    (12) Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).
    (13) Commission proposal of 17 December 2024 for a joint employment report from the Commission and the Council (COM(2024)0701).
    (14) Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 13 December 2023 on For an EU framework for national homeless strategies based on the principle of ‘Housing First’ (OJ C, C/2024/1567, 5.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1567/oj).
    (15) Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 13 December 2023 on For an EU framework for national homeless strategies based on the principle of ‘Housing First’.
    (16) Commission communication of 7 June 2023 on a comprehensive approach to mental health (COM(2023)0298).
    (17) European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Long-term care report – Trends, challenges and opportunities in an ageing society. Volume I, Publications Office, 2021, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/677726.
    (18) Article 7(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).
    (19) OJ C 387, 15.11.2019, p. 1.
    (20) European Parliament resolution of 21 November 2023 with recommendations to the Commission on an EU framework for the social and professional situation of artists and workers in the cultural and creative sectors (OJ C, C/2024/4208, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4208/oj).
    (21) Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU (OJ L 188, 12.7.2019, p. 79, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/1158/oj).
    (22) Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030).
    (23) Resolution of 6 July 2022 on the EU action plan for the social economy (OJ C 47, 7.2.2023, p. 171).
    (24) Commission proposal of 17 December 2024 for a joint employment report from the Commission and the Council (COM(2024)0701).
    (25) Commission proposal of 17 December 2024 for a joint employment report from the Commission and the Council (COM(2024)0701).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – European Semester for economic policy coordination 2025 – P10_TA(2025)0031 – Wednesday, 12 March 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,

    –  having regard to Protocol No 1 to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the TFEU on the role of national parliaments in the European Union,

    –  having regard to Protocol No 2 to the TEU and the TFEU on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,

    –  having regard to Protocol No 12 to the TEU and the TFEU on the excessive debt procedure,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(1),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 of 29 April 2024 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure(2),

    –  having regard to Council Directive (EU) 2024/1265 of 29 April 2024 amending Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States(3),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area(4),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area(5),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances(6),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area(8),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(9) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(10) (the RRF Regulation),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s Spring 2024 Economic Forecast of 15 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the Commission’s Autumn 2024 Economic Forecast of 15 November 2024,

    –  having regard to the Commission’s Debt Sustainability Monitor 2023 of 22 March 2024,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘Alert Mechanism Report 2025’ (COM(2024)0702) and to the Commission recommendation of 17 December 2024 for a Council recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area (COM(2024)0704),

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 December 2024 for a joint employment report from the Commission and the Council (COM(2024)0701),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 March 2023 entitled ‘Fiscal policy guidance for 2024’ (COM(2023)0141),

    –  having regard to the Commission report of 19 June 2024 prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (COM(2024)0598),

    –  having regard to the Council Recommendation of 12 April 2024 on the economic policy of the euro area(11),

    –  having regard to the European Fiscal Board assessment of 3 July 2024 on the fiscal stance appropriate for the euro area in 2025,

    –  having regard to the Eurogroup statement of 15 July 2024 on the fiscal stance for the euro area in 2025,

    –  having regard to the European Fiscal Board’s 2024 annual report, published on 2 October 2024,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 June 2024 entitled ‘2024 European Semester – Spring Package’ (COM(2024)0600),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘2025 European Semester – Autumn package’ (COM(2024)0700),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640), to the Paris Agreement adopted on 12 December 2025 in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and to the UN Sustainable Development Goals,

    –  having regard to the Eighth Environment Action Programme to 2030,

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation of 17 November 2017 on the European Pillar of Social Rights(12) and to the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 entitled ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan’ (COM(2021)0102),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on access to decent and affordable housing for all(13),

    –  having regard to the document by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the European Commission, of 18 July 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s choice – Political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029’, and to the statement made by Valdis Dombrovskis, Commissioner for Economy and Productivity, Implementation and Simplification, at his confirmation hearing on 7 November 2024,

    –  having regard to International Monetary Fund working paper 24/181 of August 2024 entitled ‘Taming Public Debt in Europe: Outlook, Challenges, and Policy Response’,

    –  having regard to the International Monetary Fund’s Fiscal Monitor entitled ‘Putting a Lid on Public Debt’ of October 2024,

    –  having regard to Special Report 13/2024 of the European Court of Auditors entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’,

    –  having regard to the in-depth analysis entitled ‘The new economic governance framework: implications for monetary policy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 20 November 2024(14),

    –  having regard to the in-depth analysis entitled ‘Economic Dialogue with the European Commission on EU Fiscal Surveillance’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 1 December 2024(15),

    –  having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European Competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0022/2025),

    A.  whereas the European Semester plays an essential role in coordinating economic and budgetary policies in the Member States, and thus preserves the macroeconomic stability of the economic and monetary union;

    B.  whereas the European Semester aims to promote sustainable, inclusive and competitive growth, employment, macroeconomic stability and sound public finances throughout the entire EU, with a view to ensuring the sustained upward convergence of the economic, social and environmental performance of the Member States;

    C.  whereas the 2024 European Semester marked the first implementation cycle of the new economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, guiding the EU and its Member States through a transitional phase;

    D.  whereas the 2024 Council Recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area calls on the Member States to take action, both individually and collectively, to strengthen competitiveness, boost economic and social resilience, preserve macro-financial stability and sustain a high level of public investment to support the green and digital transitions; whereas fiscal stability is a basis for both sustainable high social standards in the EU and the competitiveness of the EU;

    E.  whereas the main objectives of the new economic governance framework are to strengthen debt sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth in all Member States, as well as enabling all Member States to undertake the necessary reforms and investments in the EU’s common priorities, which include (i) a fair green and digital transition, (ii) social and economic resilience including the European pillar of social rights, (iii) energy security, and (iv) the build-up of defence capabilities; whereas disparities in fiscal capacity among Member States hinder equitable investment in strategic priorities and weaken cohesion within the single market;

    F.  whereas reference values of up to 3 % of government deficit to GDP and 60 % of public debt to GDP are defined by the TFEU; whereas the EU’s headline deficit and government debt-to-GDP ratio remain above the reference values; whereas both the headline deficit and government debt-to-GDP ratio vary across the EU, with significantly divergent situations in different Member States;

    G.  whereas excessive deficit procedures were opened, or kept open, for eight Member States in 2024; whereas some Member States were not subject to an excessive deficit procedure, despite having a deficit above 3 % of GDP in 2023, as decided by the Council and the Commission after a balanced assessment of all the relevant factors;

    H.  whereas no procedure concerning macroeconomic imbalances has been opened by the Council since the establishment of this procedure in 2011; whereas, in accordance with its Alert Mechanism Report, the Commission will conduct an in-depth review of 10 countries identified as experiencing macroeconomic imbalances or excessive imbalances in 2025;

    I.  whereas the success of a framework relies heavily on its proper, transparent and effective implementation from the outset, while taking into account the Member States’ starting points and the individual challenges they face;

    J.  whereas the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural and draft budgetary plans is a precondition for the effective implementation and credibility of the new rules; whereas the first national fiscal and budgetary plans have already been assessed by the Council; whereas the equal treatment of the Member States and compliance with the requirements outlined in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 as regards the fiscal plans are necessary for the effective implementation of the framework;

    K.  whereas the economic outlook for the EU remains highly uncertain and there is a growing risk of future events or situations that will negatively affect the economy; whereas Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the conflicts in the Middle East are aggravating geopolitical risks and highlighting Europe’s energy vulnerability; whereas a rise in protectionist measures by trading partners may affect world trade, with negative repercussions for the EU economy; whereas current geopolitical tensions have demonstrated the need for the EU to further strengthen its open strategic autonomy and remain competitive in the global market, while ensuring that no one is left behind;

    L.  whereas the implementation of the revised economic governance framework is expected to lead to a restrictive fiscal stance for the euro area, as a whole, of 0,5 % of GDP in 2024 and 0,25 % of GDP in 2025; whereas political discussion is needed to ensure appropriate public investment levels following the expiry of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) in 2026;

    M.  whereas the Draghi report points out that the gap between the EU and the United States in the level of GDP at 2015 prices has gradually widened, from slightly more than 15 % in 2002 to 30 % in 2023, and estimates the necessary additional annual investment by the EU at EUR 800 billion, including EUR 450 billion for the energy transition;

    N.  whereas the new Commission has set the goal of being an ‘investment Commission’; whereas discussions on addressing the significant investment gap and reducing borrowing costs are needed in the EU; whereas the framework, where appropriate, should be strengthened by EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

    O.  whereas the Member States need to have the necessary control and audit mechanisms to ensure respect for the rule of law and to protect the EU’s financial interests, in particular to prevent fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest and to ensure transparency;

    P.  whereas it is important to increase the share of ‘fully implemented’ country-specific recommendations (CSRs) and to link them more closely to the respective country reports in order to contribute to more effective economic governance;

    1.  Notes that in the last few years, the EU has demonstrated a high degree of resilience and unity in the face of major shocks, thanks, among other things, to a coordinated policy response involving all the EU institutions, including a flexible approach to the use of new and existing instruments; further recalls that promoting long-term sustainable growth means promoting a balance between responsible fiscal policies, structural reforms and investments that together increase efficiency, productivity, employment and prosperity, and also entails boosting competitiveness, fostering the single market, developing economic growth policies and revising the regulatory framework to attract investments; stresses the fundamental need for sustainable, inclusive and competitive economic growth;

    2.  Notes that economic policy coordination is fundamentally necessary for a successful economic and monetary union; recalls that the European Semester is the well-established framework for coordinating fiscal, economic, employment and social policies across the EU, in line with the Treaties, while respecting the defined national competences;

    3.  Notes the Commission’s commitment to ensure that the European Semester drives policy coordination for competitiveness, sustainability and social fairness, as well as the integration of the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the European pillar of social rights; notes that the European Green Deal remains a core deliverable for the Commission;

    4.  Highlights the fact that an integrated, coordinated, targeted and horizontal industrial policy is vital to increase investments in the EU’s innovation capacity, while bolstering competitiveness and the integrity of the single market;

    5.  Highlights that public and private investments are crucial for the EU’s ability to cope with existing challenges, including developing the EU’s innovation capacity and implementing the just green and digital transitions, and that they will increase the EU’s resilience, long-term competitiveness and open strategic autonomy; calls attention to the need for strategic investments in energy interconnections, low-carbon energies (such as renewables) and energy efficiency to, among other things, (i) make the EU independent from imported fossil fuels and prevent the possible inflationary effects of dependence on these, (ii) modernise production systems and (iii) promote social cohesion; recalls that the materialisation of climate-change-related physical risks can greatly affect public finances, as demonstrated by the floods in Valencia in October 2024 and the cyclone in Mayotte in December 2024; calls on the Member States to make the necessary investments to improve climate change mitigation and adaptation and enhance the resilience of the EU economy;

    6.  Calls on the Commission to come up with initiatives, on the basis of the Budapest Declaration; to make the EU more competitive, productive, innovative and sustainable, by building on economic, social and territorial cohesion and ensuring convergence and a level playing field both within the EU and globally; notes the development of a new competitiveness coordination tool; expects the Commission to clarify how this tool will interact with the European Semester; stresses the importance of supporting micro, small and medium-sized enterprises as key drivers of economic growth and employment within the EU;

    7.  Stresses the need to foster a dynamic entrepreneurial ecosystem that supports innovators, recognising their critical role in driving global competitiveness, economic resilience, job creation and open strategic autonomy;

    8.  Welcomes the Commission’s recommendations regarding the economic policy of the euro area, urging the Member States to enhance competitiveness and foster productivity through improved access to funding for businesses, reduced administrative burdens, and public and private investment in areas of EU common priorities, which include (i) a fair green and digital transition, (ii) social and economic resilience including the European pillar of social rights, (iii) energy security, and (iv) the build-up of defence capabilities;

    9.  Welcomes the Commission’s recommendation that, when defining fiscal strategies, euro area Member States should aim to improve the quality and efficiency of public expenditure and public revenue, which are essential for ensuring the sustainability of public finances, while minimising detrimental and distortive impacts on economic growth; stresses that this could be achieved by, among other things, increasing European coordination and reducing tax avoidance and tax evasion; welcomes the Draghi report’s conclusion that a coordinated reduction of labour income taxation for low- to middle-income workers is needed to promote EU competitiveness; recalls the Member States’ competence in tax policy; invites the Member States to redirect the tax burden from income to less distortive tax bases;

    10.  Highlights the need to create fiscal buffers to address fiscal sustainability challenges, ensuring sufficient resources for investment and for dealing with potential future shocks and crises; stresses the importance of promoting competitive, sustainable and inclusive growth in supporting long-term fiscal stability and resilience;

    Economic prospects for the EU

    11.  Expresses concern that, according to the Commission’s autumn 2024 economic forecast, EU GDP is expected to grow by 0,9 % (0,8 % in the euro area) in 2024, by 1,5 % (1,3 % in the euro area) in 2025 and by 1,8% (1,6% in the euro area) in 2026; recalls that these figures reflect a gradual recovery, but also limited economic expansion compared to previous economic cycles; notes that the economic outlook for the EU remains highly uncertain, with risks more likely to negatively affect economic growth;

    12.  Notes that the public debt ratio is projected to increase to 83,0 % in the EU and 89,6 % in the euro area in 2025 and to 83,4 % in the EU and 90 % in the euro area in 2026, when the output gap will be virtually closed both in the EU and in the euro area, and that this is higher than the levels in 2024 (82,4 % for the EU and 89,1 % for the euro area);

    13.  Recalls that developments in public debt ratios vary from country to country; points out that policy uncertainty and geopolitical risks can contribute significantly to increasing the cost of borrowing on the financial markets for the Member States; notes that unsustainable debt levels could undermine economic stability and decrease the Member States’ economic resilience and capacity to respond to crises; highlights that in 2024 and 2025, 11 euro area Member States are expected to have debt ratios above the Treaty reference value of 60 %, with 5 remaining above 100 %;

    14.  Notes that according to the Commission’s 2024 autumn economic forecast, the general government deficit in the EU and the euro area is expected to decline to 3,1 % and 3 % of GDP, respectively, in 2024, and to decrease further to 3 % and 2,9 % of GDP in 2025 and 2,9 % and 2,8 % of GDP in 2026; stresses that 10 EU Member States are expected to post a deficit above the Treaty reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2024; points out that this number will remain stable in 2025, and that in 2026, most Member States are forecast to have weaker budgetary positions than before the pandemic (2019), with 9 of them still posting deficits of above 3 %;

    15.  Notes that eight Member States have excessive deficits; recalls that the Council has taken remedial action and calls on the Member States concerned to take steps to reduce excessive deficits while minimising the socio-economic impact; recalls the importance of consistency in applying the excessive deficit procedure to the Member States;

    16.  Notes that according to the Commission’s autumn 2024 economic forecast, inflation is projected to fall from 2,6 % in 2024 to 2,4 % in 2025 and 2 % in 2026 in the EU, and from 2,4 % in 2024 to 2,1 % in 2025 and 1,9 % in 2026 in the euro area; recalls that although this reduction is a positive development, core inflation remains relatively high, which points to persistent inflationary pressures; notes that fiscal policy, while safeguarding fiscal sustainability, can support monetary policy in reducing inflation, and should provide sufficient space for additional investments and support long-term growth;

    17.  Notes that the Commission has not been able to present the Annual Sustainable Growth Survey, the Alert Mechanism Report, the draft euro area recommendation and the draft joint employment report at the same time;

    18.  Observes that according to the Commission’s 2025 Alert Mechanism Report, in-depth reviews will be prepared in 2025 for the nine countries that were identified as experiencing imbalances or excessive imbalances in 2024, while another in-depth review should be undertaken for another Member State, as it presents particular risks of newly emerging imbalances;

    19.  Underlines that housing is directly interconnected with the macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, with damaging implications for economic resilience, dynamism and social progress and for regional and intra-EU mobility; is concerned that in some Member States, house prices are likely to increase and may become hard to curb in the absence of a holistic strategy;

    Revised EU economic governance framework and its effective implementation

    20.  Recalls that the reform aims to make the framework simpler, more transparent and more effective, with greater national ownership and better enforcement, while differentiating between Member States on the basis of their individual starting points, representing a step forward in ending the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in view of the country-specific fiscal sustainability considerations embodied in the net expenditure path; recalls, furthermore, that the reform aims to strengthen fiscal sustainability through gradual and tailor-made adjustments complemented by reforms and investments and to promote countercyclical fiscal policies;

    21.  Acknowledges that the new fiscal rules provide greater flexibility and incentives linked to the investments and national reforms required to address the economic, social and geopolitical challenges facing the EU; acknowledges that financial resources and contributions from national budgets differ from one Member State to another; welcomes the fact that the net expenditure indicator excludes all national co-financing in EU-funded programmes, providing increased fiscal space for Member States to invest in the EU’s common priorities, as laid down in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, thus helping to strengthen synergies between the EU and national budgets, thereby reducing fragmentation and increasing the overall efficiency of public spending in some areas, such as defence;

    22.  Highlights that the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) plays a key role in the reformed EU fiscal rules; is of the opinion that the discretionary role of the Commission in the DSA requires the relevant assessments to be fully transparent, predictable, replicable and stable; calls on the Commission to address possible methodological improvements, such as assessing spillover effects between Member States, and to duly inform Parliament in this regard;

    23.  Notes the Commission’s inconsistent application of the fiscal rules framework in the past, and the Member States’ uneven compliance with the rules; stresses that it is essential for the new framework to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; affirms that a successful framework relies heavily on proper, transparent and effective implementation from the outset, while taking into account the Member States’ starting points and the individual challenges they face; takes note of the changes introduced in the new framework to improve the credibility of the financial sanctions regime;

    24.  Encourages the Member States to align the technical definition of their national operational indicator to the European primary net expenditure indicator;

    25.  Emphasises the role of Parliament and of independent fiscal authorities in the EU’s economic governance framework; underlines the discretionary power of the Commission in developing the medium-term fiscal-structural plans; emphasises the need for increased scrutiny of the Commission by Parliament and by the European Fiscal Board, as envisioned in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, and for an increase in the flow of information towards Parliament to enable its effective oversight;

    National medium-term fiscal-structural and budgetary plans

    26.  Notes that not all Member States were able to submit their national medium-term fiscal-structural and draft budgetary plans on time; notes that, as a result of general elections and the formation of new governments, five Member States have not yet submitted their national medium-term fiscal-structural plans and two Member States have not yet submitted their draft budgetary plans, while one Member State has not submitted its draft budgetary plan for other unspecified reasons; calls on these Member States to submit the relevant plans as soon as possible; underlines that the timely submission of these plans is a precondition for the effective implementation and credibility of the new rules; reaffirms the importance of the timely submission of draft budgetary plans to translate commitments outlined in fiscal plans into concrete policies following approval of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans;

    27.  Recalls that the reforms and investments outlined in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans should align with the EU’s common priorities as laid down in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263; emphasises that, under the new framework, the Commission should pay particular attention to these priorities when assessing the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans;

    28.  Acknowledges that 21 of the 22 national medium-term fiscal-structural plans that have been reviewed so far received a positive evaluation; notes that the new framework allows Member States to use assumptions that differ from the Commission’s DSA if these differences are explained and duly justified in a transparent manner and are based on sound economic arguments in the technical dialogue with the Member States; observes, however, that in the plans submitted by five Member States, the Commission found insufficiently justified inconsistencies and deviations from the DSA framework in macroeconomic assumptions related to potential GDP and/or the GDP deflator; stresses that such deviations and risks of backloading could potentially threaten future fiscal sustainability; notes that in the plans submitted by three Member States, the Commission acknowledges a concentration of the fiscal adjustment towards the end of the period; calls on the Commission to ensure that any such concentration of the adjustment meets the requirements set out in the regulation and calls on it to prevent procyclical policies;

    29.  Takes note of the fact that only seven Member States have sought an opinion from their relevant independent fiscal institution, which provides an important additional scrutiny dimension; notes with caution that some independent fiscal institutions gave a negative opinion on their Member State’s national fiscal plan; stresses that nine Member States did not meet their obligation to conduct political consultations with civil society, social partners, regional authorities and other relevant stakeholders prior to submitting their national plans; further regrets the fact that several Member States have not involved their national parliaments in the approval process for the plans and have not reported whether the required consultations with national parliaments took place as laid down in the new framework;

    30.  Observes that five Member States have requested an extension of the adjustment period; emphasises that any such extension should be based on a set of investment and reform commitments that, taken all together, improve the potential growth and resilience of the economy, support fiscal sustainability, address the EU’s common priorities and the relevant CSRs and have been assessed as meeting the conditions outlined in the regulation for such an extension; notes that the reforms and investments used to justify this extension rely considerably on reforms already approved under the RRF; highlights the importance of and need for reforms and investments that contribute positively to the potential GDP growth of the Member States; calls on the Commission to effectively evaluate ex post the impact of agreed investments and reforms in terms of supporting fiscal sustainability, enhancing the growth potential of the economy, addressing the EU’s common priorities and the CSRs and ensuring the required level of nationally financed public investment;

    31.  Notes the Commission’s assessment that only 8 of the 17 draft budgetary plans presented are in line with fiscal recommendations stemming from the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan; regrets the fact that 7 plans were assessed as not being fully in line with the recommendations, 1 as non-compliant and 1 as at risk of not being in line with the recommendations; is concerned that six Member States have presented draft budgetary plans with annual or cumulative expenditure growth above their prescribed ceilings;

    Fiscal stance and the role of fiscal policy in the provision of European public goods

    32.  Notes the Commission’s projection that the implementation of the revised governance framework is expected to lead to a reduction of the primary structural balance for the euro area as a whole of 0,5 % of GDP in 2024 and 0,25 % of GDP in 2025; notes the Commission’s assessment that this is in line with the process of enhancing fiscal sustainability and support the ongoing disinflationary process as economic uncertainty remains high; notes that GDP growth will continue to support fiscal consolidation throughout the EU; calls for fiscal policies that restore stability while promoting innovation, industrial competitiveness and long-term economic growth; stresses the need to create additional fiscal space to tackle future challenges and potential crises while preserving a sufficient level of investment to support and foster sustainable and inclusive growth, industrialisation and prosperity for all;

    33.  Considers that the effective implementation of the fiscal rules, although necessary, is not in itself sufficient to achieve the optimal fiscal stance at all times and ensure a high standard of living for all Europeans; notes that the fiscal stance is still projected to differ greatly from one Member State to another in 2025; calls on the Commission to explore ideas for a mechanism that helps ensure that the cyclical position of the EU as a whole is appropriate for the macroeconomic outlook at all times;

    34.  Recalls that, according to the Commission, the fiscal drag in 2025 will be partly offset by a slight expansion in investment, financed both by national budgets and by RRF grants and other EU funds; emphasises the RRF’s role in addressing EU investment needs, noting that it will expire by the end of 2026, which might lead to a decrease in public investment in common European priorities;

    35.  Calls on the Commission to initiate discussions on addressing the significant investment gap in the EU and to reduce borrowing costs, strengthen financial stability and enable strategic investments in line with the EU’s objectives and for the provision of European public goods, such as defence capabilities to match needs in a context of growing threats and security challenges; calls for full use to be made of the efficiency gains that may stem from the provision of European public goods at EU scale through the effective coordination of investment priorities among Member States; believes that this framework, where appropriate, should be strengthened by EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

    36.  Recalls that any EU funding must be accompanied by robust controls ensuring transparency, accountability and the efficient use of funds, so as to avoid unjustified increases in public spending;

    37.  Encourages the Member States to promote investment spending that produces a positive rate of return; acknowledges the Draghi report’s assessment that around four fifths of productive investments will be undertaken by the private sector in the EU, while public investment will also play a catalysing role; welcomes the Commission initiative to propose a competitiveness fund under the new multiannual financial framework and calls on it to make full use of financial guarantees to leverage private investment; stresses that the Member States must step up their efforts, in particular budgetary efforts, to accelerate innovation, digitalisation, education, training and decarbonisation, to strengthen European competitiveness and to reduce dependencies;

    Country-specific recommendations

    38.  Notes that the share of ‘fully implemented’ CSRs has dropped from 18,1 % (in the period 2011-2018) to 13,9 % (in the period 2019-2023); recalls that implementing CSRs, including with regard to the efficiency of public spending, is a key part of ensuring fiscal sustainability and addressing macroeconomic imbalances; advocates a more efficient implementation of the CSRs and the relevant reforms; calls for ways of increasing the share of ‘fully implemented’ CSRs to be explored; calls on the Commission to link the CSRs more closely to the respective country reports; calls for the impact of reforms and the progress towards reducing identified investment gaps to be evaluated; calls for greater transparency in the preparation of CSRs;

    39.  Reiterates, in this regard, that CSRs should be enhanced by focusing on a limited set of challenges, in particular specific Member States’ structural challenges and the EU’s common priorities, with a view to promoting sound and inclusive economic growth, enhancing competitiveness and macroeconomic stability, promoting the green and digital transitions and ensuring social and intergenerational fairness;

    40.  Recalls the Member States’ commitment to address, in their national fiscal plans, the relevant CSRs in both their economic and social dimensions, as expressed under the European Semester; notes that the Commission has found unaddressed CSRs in the national fiscal plans;

    41.  Highlights the importance of the CSRs in tackling the longer-term drivers of fiscal sustainability, including the sustainability and proper provision of public pension systems, the healthcare and long-term care systems in the face of demographic challenges such as ageing populations, and preparedness for adverse developments, including climate-change-related physical risks; stresses the relevance of CSRs in addressing the stability of the housing market in order to contribute to the economic resilience of the EU;

    o
    o   o

    42.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (2) OJ L, 2024/1264, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1264/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1265, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1265/oj.
    (4) OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/1173/oj.
    (5) OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 8, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/1174/oj.
    (6) OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/1176/oj.
    (7) OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/472/oj.
    (8) OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/473/oj.
    (9) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (10) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.
    (11) OJ C, C/2024/2807, 23.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2807/oj.
    (12) OJ C 428, 13.12.2017, p. 10.
    (13) OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 145.
    (14) Monetary Dialogue paper – ‘The new economic governance framework: implications for monetary policy’, Darvas, Z. et al. for the European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit, 20 November 2024.
    (15) In-depth analysis – ‘Economic Dialogue with the European Commission on EU Fiscal Surveillance’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit, 1 December 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Debates – Thursday, 13 March 2025 – Strasbourg – Revised edition

    Source: European Parliament

    Verbatim report of proceedings
     428k  792k
    Thursday, 13 March 2025 – Strasbourg
    1. Opening of the sitting
      2. A Vision for Agriculture and Food (debate)
      3. Action Plan for Affordable Energy (debate)
      4. Resumption of the sitting
      5. Announcement by the President
      6. Request for an urgent decision (Rule 170)
      7. Voting time
        7.1. European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (EDIP) (vote)
        7.2. Democracy and human rights in Thailand, notably the lese-majesty law and the deportation of Uyghur refugees (RC-B10-0174/2025, B10-0174/2025, B10-0176/2025, B10-0191/2025, B10-0192/2025, B10-0193/2025, B10-0194/2025) (vote)
        7.3. Severe political, humanitarian and human rights crisis in Sudan, in particular the sexual violence and child rape (RC-B10-0175/2025, B10-0175/2025, B10-0185/2025, B10-0186/2025, B10-0187/2025, B10-0188/2025, B10-0189/2025, B10-0190/2025) (vote)
        7.4. Unlawful detention and sham trials of Armenian hostages, including high-ranking political representatives from Nagorno-Karabakh, by Azerbaijan (RC-B10-0177/2025, B10-0177/2025, B10-0178/2025, B10-0179/2025, B10-0180/2025, B10-0181/2025, B10-0182/2025, B10-0183/2025, B10-0184/2025) (vote)
        7.5. Social and employment aspects of restructuring processes: the need to protect jobs and workers’ rights (B10-0143/2025, B10-0152/2025) (vote)
      8. Resumption of the sitting
      9. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting
      10. European Schools Alliance: potential to achieve the European education area by driving innovation, enhancing mobility and championing inclusivity (debate)
      11. Explanations of votes
        11.1. Social and employment aspects of restructuring processes: the need to protect jobs and workers’ rights (B10-0143/2025)
      12. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted
      13. Calendar of part-sessions
      14. Closure of the sitting
      15. Adjournment of the session

       

    PREDSEDÁ: MARTIN HOJSÍK
    Podpredseda

     
    1. Opening of the sitting

       

    (Rokovanie sa začalo o 9:00 h.)

     

    2. A Vision for Agriculture and Food (debate)


     

      Christophe Hansen, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, dear colleagues, the first 100 days of our mandate were dedicated to delivering on what we promised and doing this in close cooperation with those who are most concerned: the farming and the food sector.

    Since I became Commissioner, my ‘boots on the ground’ promise has taken me already to eight Member States, and when I speak to farmers, I hear a strong call for stability and predictability, and also for the recognition of the crucial role that farming and rural areas play in Europe’s economy, security and strategic autonomy. Many of you recognise those calls as well.

    In these changing and challenging times, we need a clear perspective and a coherent policy response for everyone involved in guaranteeing our food security and food sovereignty. They need to see that their future will be prosperous.

    The vision for agriculture and food recently adopted by the Commission aims to provide the direction and response to these needs. It is the Commission’s policy roadmap to engage and take action with you and all stakeholders of the agri-food system on the future of food and farming in Europe.

    Our messages, dear colleagues, are very clear: farming, fishing and food are strategic sectors and a critical asset for Europe. They must be preserved across the continent, and the vision identifies European food sovereignty as an integral part of the EU security agenda. Our policies will continue supporting farmers and the agri-food sector in producing safe foods, protecting rural landscapes, traditions and livelihoods. In Europe, farming is highly diverse and so our policies must be tailored to the local needs.

    While facing many challenges, farmers, fishers and the food industry are part of the solution for achieving a future-proof agri-food sector. We will design the solutions pragmatically and in consultation with them. Consultation and dialogue, dear colleagues, are not just words. The vision is the result of close engagement and consultation with many different stakeholders from the agri-food sector and all relevant institutions, including the European Parliament.

    The work does not stop here. The vision is only the beginning of further cooperation and dialogue to develop the initiatives together. This College is committed to overcoming the polarisation that we have lived too much in the past, and that is why I am very glad to be with you today to present the vision and hear your ideas for the way forward.

    We started from a very simple and guiding question: how to build and support and agri-food system that is attractive for current and future generations – today, tomorrow and in 2040. We want a new agriculture and food sector to be – and I quote from the vision itself – ‘attractive, competitive, future-proof and fair’ and built on dialogue and partnership between the players of the food chain and powered by innovation, knowledge and research.

    The vision contains four priority areas to provide direction and stability. For each one, it identifies specific policy responses that focus on all three dimensions of sustainability.

    First, an attractive and predictable agri-food sector that ensures a fair standard of living and leverages new income opportunities. For this, we must help the sector draw on all sources of income. We will help farmers to get a better return from the market by addressing the principle that they should not be forced to systematically sell their products below the production cost. The coming UTP review will be instrumental for achieving this.

    Secondly, public support from the Common Agricultural Policy remains essential to support farmers’ income. The Commission will make future CAP support simpler and more targeted towards those farmers who need it most, creating better incentives for ecosystem services and giving further responsibility and accountability to Member States.

    We will also help the sector to leverage new income opportunities, such as from the bio-economy or carbon-farming, agri-tourism can also provide farmers with a complementary income.

    Furthermore, in 2025, I will present a strategy for generational renewal. As you know, currently only 12 % of the EU farmers are below the age of 40. This is a huge challenge and we need to address it if we are serious about food security and food sovereignty. Therefore, we will have to bundle not only our European efforts, but as well the national efforts to get there.

    Secondly, a competitive and resilient agri-food sector in the face of global challenges. Our farmers insist on fair global competition, and the vision clearly states that we will push for a fairer, global level playing field by better aligning – and in line with international rules – our domestic production standards with those applied to imports, notably for pesticides and animal welfare.

    To advance in this area, we will start work on implementing the principle that hazardous pesticides banned in the EU should not be allowed back into the EU via imports. I always say, ‘if a product is a threat to human health or pollinators in the EU, it is as well outside’. If we still import those products, neither the consumers nor the farmers understand this. Therefore, I believe it is very important that our standards also need to be better controlled because it is good to have high standards, but without checks this is of course inefficient.

    Then, the agri-food sector is strongly affected by different crises. I think that is not a secret and we will develop a more comprehensive approach to risk and crisis management. We enforce incentives for farmers to boost farm-level adaptation and improve access to affordable insurance and de-risking tools for primary producers.

    Lastly, I want to present two simplification packages in 2025 to reduce the administrative burden for farmers and the entire agri-food value chain. The first focus will be on the CAP, while the second will look at the broader EU legislation package.

    Another important initiative will be the work that we will carry out for the livestock sector. As the vision says clearly, livestock remains an essential element of EU agriculture and we will work on making it more competitive, resilient and sustainable.

    Thirdly, we need a future-proof agri-food sector that works hand in hand with nature. To guarantee the sector’s long-term resilience and competitiveness, we need to preserve healthy soils, clean water and air, and the EU’s biodiversity. To support this, we must continue to implement and enforce the legislation that we already have.

    In the future, we must also create better incentives for farmers and agri-food actors who are delivering ecosystem services, and make sure that climate and biodiversity action go hand in hand with competitiveness. For this, there will be some key drivers, such as a more advanced toolbox under the Common Agricultural Policy, a voluntary on-farm sustainability compass, certified carbon farming, as well as measures to accelerate the access to biopesticides to the EU market.

    The fourth priority area is about strengthening the link between food and consumers and promoting fair living and working conditions in vibrant and well-connected coastal and rural areas. Addressing the gap in the availability and affordability of services for citizens in rural and coastal areas, including in the outermost regions, is key to address the need for an effective right to stay for all European citizens.

    To boost the vitality of these areas and to tackle these issues, we will strengthen synergies between EU funds and present and updated EU rural action plan and rural pact. At the same time, annual food dialogues with everyone involved in the food system will help to reconnect people with the food they eat and address many of the most pressing issues, including food reformulation and affordability.

    And finally, we will bring knowledge and innovation, research, skills and digital solutions closer to the farmers. They will play a key role in supporting the agri-food sector to carry out this initiative. And I know that many of you have as well good ideas, this is, of course, the beginning of a path towards a more sustainable agri-food system – more sustainable economically, socially and as well as environmentally – and I’m looking forward to having a good discussion with you on the different workstreams that we have identified in this vision.

     
       

     

      Herbert Dorfmann, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, sehr geschätzter Herr Kommissar, Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Bäuerinnen und Bauern sind Essensbringer, das sind die, die uns tagtäglich ernähren. Das ist eigentlich logisch – nur vergessen haben wir das vielleicht etwas in den Jahrzehnten des Überflusses. Ziel einer vernünftigen Agrarpolitik muss es doch sein, dass Bäuerinnen und Bauern tagtäglich gemeinsam mit unserer Nahrungsmittelindustrie versuchen, nachhaltig hochwertige Lebensmittel für uns, für diese 450 Millionen Europäerinnen und Europäer, zu erzeugen.

    Ich bin Ihnen, Herr Kommissar, dankbar, dass Sie dieses Thema wieder einmal ganz klar in den Mittelpunkt Ihrer Vision gestellt haben. Wir verwalten in diesem Haus jährlich rund 60 Milliarden Euro, die an die europäische Landwirtschaft gehen. Das ist viel Geld, und ich denke, wenn wir diese 60 Milliarden Euro, die an 9 Millionen Betriebe in Europa gehen, vernünftig einsetzen, dann können sie wirklich ein Treiber für eine zukunftsorientierte, produzierende, nachhaltige Landwirtschaft sein.

    Die können es sein: indem wir Betrieben – Sie haben es gesagt, Herr Kommissar – in jenen Gebieten weiterhelfen, wo es schwieriger ist zu produzieren. Wenn man die nämlich nicht berücksichtigt, dann steigen sie aus der Produktion aus, und wir verlieren diese Gebiete, wie es leider in vielen Regionen Europas, vor allem auch in den Bergen, passiert ist.

    Indem wir Bäuerinnen und Bauern weiter helfen, ihre Ideen zu verwirklichen. Wir haben viele innovative Menschen in der Landwirtschaft, aber unsere Agrarpolitik hilft manchmal nicht unbedingt weiter, diese innovativen Ideen wirklich auf den Grund zu bringen.

    Indem wir Bäuerinnen und Bauern helfen, die auf Nachhaltigkeit setzen. Auch hier haben wir viele Menschen in der Landwirtschaft, die sehr gute Ideen haben, die Nachhaltigkeit in ihrem Betrieb umsetzen. Ich glaube, wir sollten ihnen helfen, und natürlich auch jenen jungen Menschen, die in der Landwirtschaft anfangen wollen, und auch jenen Betrieben, die sich gegen den Klimawandel stemmen, indem sie aktiv oder passiv versuchen, mit dem Klimawandel umzugehen.

    Ich glaube, Herr Kommissar, das ist nun eine Vision; diese Vision müssen wir nun umsetzen. Meine Fraktion ist dazu bereit. Dazu brauchen wir Geld, und das, glaube ich, ist die größte Herausforderung, die uns in den nächsten Jahren erwartet, dass wir hier alle gemeinsam dafür einstehen, einen ordentlichen, vernünftigen Agrarhaushalt für die nächsten Jahre zu bekommen.

     
       

     

      Dario Nardella, a nome del gruppo S&D. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghe e colleghi, in questi vent’anni abbiamo perso il 37% degli agricoltori e il 12% dei profitti.

    Signor Commissario, il lavoro della visione è un ottimo punto di partenza. Ci sono, però, molti nodi che dobbiamo affrontare, a cominciare dalle risorse: senza risorse adeguate non avremo una visione e non avremo neanche una politica agricola comune. Per questo diciamo “no” a qualunque taglio alle risorse per l’agricoltura. Diciamo “no” a qualunque accentramento dei fondi o a forme di decentramento agli Stati nazionali.

    Vogliamo, invece, risorse sufficienti per aumentare produttività e reddito, senza creare disparità di trattamento, promuovendo filiere alimentari sostenibili, di qualità e innovative.

    I nostri agricoltori hanno bisogno di regole chiare e semplici. Non vogliamo deregulation, ma una buona semplificazione, perché la legge del più forte non è la legge giusta. Ma i nostri agricoltori subiscono il peso di una burocrazia spesso asfissiante.

    Per questo vogliamo un’agricoltura più sostenibile, con i giovani e le donne protagoniste e con i lavoratori che siano il vero motore, perché senza coinvolgere agricoltori e lavoratori non avremo un’agricoltura nel futuro dell’Europa forte, unita e sostenibile.

     
       


     

      Veronika Vrecionová, za skupinu ECR. – Pane předsedající, Evropa dnes čelí zásadním výzvám. Válka, hrozící celní spory a nejistá ekonomika mění pravidla hry. To všechno se promítá i do zemědělství. Je čas říci si otevřeně – našimi prioritami musí být bezpečnost a konkurenceschopnost Evropy, a to i potravinová bezpečnost a konkurenceschopnost zemědělství. V zemědělství musíme maximálně zefektivnit využití stávajících prostředků. Chci, aby společná zemědělská politika byla jednoduchá, předvídatelná a zaměřená na výsledky. Méně byrokracie, více stability. Farmáři potřebují jasná pravidla a ne další papírování. Podporu musíme směřovat tam, kde má největší smysl – k zemědělcům, kteří pečují o půdu a krajinu a především zajišťují kvalitní potraviny.

    Proto budu podporovat zastropování a degresivitu přímých plateb. Nemůžeme dále dotovat velké agroholdingy na úkor malých a středních farem, které drží venkov při životě.

     
       

     

      Valérie Hayer, au nom du groupe Renew. – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, nos agriculteurs en avaient besoin. Alors, merci, Monsieur le Commissaire, pour la vision que vous nous proposez ce matin sur l’agriculture et l’alimentation. Je vous le dis d’emblée: je vais pleinement la saluer. Les défis du monde agricole sont immenses: gestion du dérèglement climatique, instabilité géopolitique, renouvellement des générations et, ce que nous réclament nos agriculteurs depuis longtemps, des prix justes et des règles claires et faciles à appliquer.

    L’agriculture est l’un des plus grands enjeux stratégiques de notre Europe. On attendait donc de vous une ambition en matière de souveraineté alimentaire; elle y est. On attendait une volonté de développer la résilience de nos fermes; elle est là. On attendait la prise en compte du défi démographique; il y est. On attendait l’enjeu de réciprocité; c’est le cas. On attendait que la rémunération des agriculteurs figure en bonne place; je lis «attractivité», je lis «innovation», je lis «accès au foncier», et je ne peux que le saluer.

    Ce travail, nous le savons tous, n’est que le coup d’envoi d’un chantier aussi colossal qu’indispensable. Il demande maintenant qu’ensemble, en responsabilité, on se relève les manches. J’y veillerai avec mes collègues, dans mes priorités de présidente du groupe Renew. C’est un enjeu que notre groupe porte haut pour avancer concrètement, en commençant notamment par renforcer le poids des agriculteurs dans la chaîne de valeur, y compris en renforçant la directive sur les pratiques commerciales déloyales. Le plus dur reste à faire: mettre tout cela en musique, le décliner dans nos textes de loi et veiller à la cohérence de nos politiques et de nos choix, sans oublier, bien sûr, d’y consacrer les moyens de nos ambitions; le nerf de la guerre, c’est l’argent.

     
       

     

      Thomas Waitz, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Mr President, Commissioner, you expect us farmers to produce cheap for the global markets. You expect us farmers to produce affordable food for our citizens. You expect us farmers to produce extra cheap raw material for the food processing industry and for the retailers in the European Union. That’s why farmers need income support from taxpayers’ pockets.

    This income support should be based on the amount of jobs farmers are offering: you have winemakers with direct marketing who can supply two full-time jobs with five hectares, while sometimes crop farmers with 50 or 80 hectares are not even able to supply one full-time job. So I definitely welcome the slight indications in your vision that we need to allocate some of the basic income support budget based on the amount of jobs a farm is actually supplying.

    But before we can actually supply income support, we need to have a budget. And you all know here in the room that the CAP budget is not secured. It’s clearly not secured, even if farmers have the potential to help us with climate mitigation, with climate adaptation. They help us with biodiversity, with rural areas, with animal welfare – a lot of important roles in society.

    So let’s build this partnership between farming, environment, climate and rural areas. Because if you ask me, this will be the only way that we can secure a reasonable budget for our farmers.

     
       


     

      Arno Bausemer, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, meine sehr geehrten Damen und Herren! Rund 300 Milliarden Euro erhalten die Landwirte in der Europäischen Union in der laufenden Förderperiode – das klingt zunächst nach viel Geld. Allerdings kam in den vergangenen Jahren immer weniger Geld bei den Landwirten an, und gleichzeitig wird der Frust der Empfänger aufgrund neuer widersinniger Vorschriften immer größer und führt bei vielen Betrieben irgendwann zur Aufgabe. Dort, wo jahrelang Raps geblüht hat, da wächst heute noch maximal Unkraut. Dort, wo früher Gänse schnatternd über die Weide gelaufen sind, da ist jetzt kein Tier mehr zu sehen. Und dort, wo früher Milchkühe in den Ställen standen, da herrscht jetzt gespenstische Stille.

    In meinem Heimatbundesland Sachsen-Anhalt in Deutschland gab es im Jahr 2013 noch 560 Milchviehbetriebe – mittlerweile sind mehr als die Hälfte der Betriebe verschwunden. Seien Sie sich eines gewiss: Kein Landwirt trennt sich gerne von seinen Tieren, von seinem Hof und von seinem Betrieb – ganz im Gegenteil. Die Zahl der Betriebsschließungen wäre noch deutlich größer, wenn in den klein- und mittelständischen Familienbetrieben nicht bis zur Selbstausbeutung jeder Euro dreimal umgedreht werden würde, um den Betrieb am Leben zu halten. Und glauben Sie mir, ich weiß da auch gut, wovon ich spreche.

    Die harte Arbeit in der Landwirtschaft darf aber nicht dazu führen, dass es körperliche, seelische und auch finanzielle Selbstausbeutung gibt. Diese harte Arbeit muss sich für die Beteiligten endlich wieder lohnen. Und deshalb sollten wir uns auf die gemeinsamen Ziele besinnen, die 1962 die Grundlage der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik definiert haben, nämlich die Steigerung der Produktivität, die Sicherstellung eines angemessenen Lebensstandards für Landwirte und die Sicherstellung der Versorgung.

    Lassen Sie uns den Landwirten Respekt entgegenbringen, lassen Sie uns die Zukunft der Landwirtschaft sichern!

     
       


     

      Norbert Lins (PPE). – Herr Präsident, Herr Kommissar, meine lieben Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Endlich wurde begriffen, dass unsere europäischen Landwirte eine zentrale Säule in der EU darstellen und wir daher mit ihnen und nicht gegen sie arbeiten müssen. Der Vorschlag der Kommission mit dieser Vision sendet ein wichtiges Signal an die Landwirtschaft und an die ländlichen Räume in Europa, dass die Nachricht in Brüssel wirklich angekommen ist und wir nun die Möglichkeit haben, an den wichtigen akuten Aspekten zu arbeiten.

    Die Vision bekennt sich klar zur Lebensmittelproduktion und insbesondere zur Tierhaltung in Europa. Es ist gut, dass wir weggehen von der Konditionalität und dass wir zu mehr Anreizen in der Landwirtschaft kommen. Zu Recht hebt die Kommission hervor, dass die Anpassung an den Klimawandel einen hohen Stellenwert hat und Zukunftsthemen wie die Bioökonomie eine entscheidende Rolle spielen.

    Ich begrüße außerordentlich, dass es ein weiteres GAP‑Vereinfachungspaket gibt. Ich glaube aber, dass wir mehr Tempo brauchen bei den sektorübergreifenden Rechtsvorschriften – es ist gut, dass dort ein Omnibus geplant ist. Vereinfachung der Düngevorschriften und beim Pflanzenschutz ist dringend notwendig; da brauchen wir mehr Tempo, je schneller, desto besser.

    Die Landwirtschaft ist das Rückgrat unserer Gesellschaft und insbesondere der ländlichen Räume. Die offene Frage ist: Bekommen wir (Ton aus). Das ist die entscheidende Frage in den nächsten Monaten. Dafür lassen Sie uns gemeinsam kämpfen!

     
       

     

      Cristina Maestre (S&D). – Señor presidente, señor comisario, la visión que aquí presenta es buena: recoge el sentir del campo, sus necesidades y sus demandas. ¿La podríamos suscribir? Si, por supuesto. La podemos suscribir. Pero le falta lo más importante. Le falta el cómo y le falta el cuánto. Ya lo estamos diciendo aquí todos esta mañana.

    Por lo tanto, la pregunta es: ¿vamos a tener una PAC con fondos suficientes para hacer esto o va a haber recortes como ya deja intuir la Comisión Europea? Con recortes en la PAC esto sería un quiero y no puedo. Y si me dice que los Estados miembros aporten más, en este caso estaríamos hablando de un my treat, your bill: yo invito pero tú pagas.

    Y también nos tiene que aclarar si van en serio con eso de ir al modelo de sobre único para cada Estado miembro.

    Mire, señor comisario, eso de dejar al albur de cada país el uso de los fondos de la PAC es una bomba en la línea de flotación de la política agrícola y del mercado único. Por favor, quítenle de la cabeza eso a la señora Von der Leyen porque usted ha hecho un buen trabajo y corre el riesgo de quedarse en papel mojado. Que no sea esto una quimera.

     
       

     

      Mireia Borrás Pabón (PfE). – Señor presidente, señor comisario, gracias por su presentación, pero he de decirle que hoy nos presentan aquí otro informe lleno de buenas intenciones pero vacío de soluciones.

    Se cambia el envoltorio, pero el veneno sigue dentro. Permanecen las mismas políticas y objetivos del Pacto Verde y de la política agrícola común. Nos hablan en su informe de hacer el sector atractivo, pero continúan con la asfixia regulatoria. Nos hablan de una preocupación por la competencia desleal, cuando son ustedes los primeros que la promueven pretendiendo inundar Europa con importaciones del Mercosur en unas condiciones tan desiguales y tan injustas que la palabra traición se me queda corta. Nos hablan de soberanía alimentaria mientras ustedes no paran de pisotearla con acuerdos que entregan nuestro mercado a terceros países. En España, pero también en Francia, en Italia, los agricultores ven cómo los precios de sus productos caen y los supermercados se llenan de frutas y verduras marroquíes, porque ustedes nos hacen depender cada vez más de países extranjeros.

    Señor comisario, ¿quiere de verdad soluciones reales o solo otra fantasía legislativa para los agricultores? Porque si quiere soluciones reales lo que hay que hacer es derogar el Pacto Verde Europeo y su burocracia asfixiante y acabar de una vez por todas con acuerdos comerciales injustos. Mismas normas, mismas reglas, o fuera de nuestro mercado.

     
       

     

      Sergio Berlato (ECR). – Signor Presidente, signor Commissario, troppe persone, anche in questo Parlamento, ritengono che le risorse finanziarie di cui è dotata la PAC siano eccessive se rapportate al numero dei potenziali beneficiari. Probabilmente coloro che hanno questa errata opinione non sanno che ai nostri imprenditori agricoli è affidato il compito di garantire la sicurezza alimentare per tutti i consumatori ma anche la tutela e la manutenzione dei 3/4 del territorio europeo.

    La Commissione europea dichiara di voler rendere l’agricoltura più attraente, più resiliente e più sostenibile. Attualmente l’agricoltura non risulta attraente perché sempre un maggior numero di imprese agricole chiudono le loro attività.

    L’agricoltura non può risultare competitiva e resiliente se l’Unione europea e continua a sottoscrivere accordi di libero scambio che costringono i nostri imprenditori agricoli a subire la concorrenza sleale da parte di altri produttori extraeuropei che possono portare i loro prodotti sui nostri mercati senza dover rispettare le stesse costose regole imposte agli imprenditori agricoli europei.

    A forza di parlare di agricoltura sostenibile, avete costretto i nostri imprenditori agricoli ad abbandonare le loro campagne e le loro attività, esasperati dall’imposizione delle vostre ideologie animal-ambientaliste.

    Vedremo se coloro che sono pervasi di ideologia animal-ambientalista saranno in grado di sostituire i nostri imprenditori agricoli nella manutenzione del territorio.

    (L’oratore accetta di rispondere a una domanda “cartellino blu”)

     
       

     

      Christophe Clergeau (S&D), question «carton bleu». – Cher collègue, j’ai une question très simple à vous poser. Vous avez dit, à juste titre, qu’il y avait besoin d’un budget important pour la politique agricole commune. Je voulais donc vous demander si vous souhaitiez, vous et votre groupe, un budget plus important pour l’Union européenne et des ressources propres pour ce budget, qui permettraient à la fois de continuer et de renforcer la politique agricole commune, de maintenir la politique de cohésion et de financer les autres priorités. Plus d’argent pour la PAC, d’accord; moi aussi, je suis pour un budget plus important et des ressources propres; mais vous, comment faites-vous pour garder une part importante du budget pour la PAC?

     
       



     

      Cristina Guarda (Verts/ALE). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, è davvero un grande “wow”, perché torna al centro la competitività in agricoltura. Temo, però, che in questa sua visione, Commissario, la competitività dipenda, per lo più, dal peso dell’agricoltura nel commercio globale che dalla capacità di garantire cibo sano per gli europei.

    Quindi, cari colleghi, noi insieme dobbiamo guidare l’agricoltura europea a ritrovare la propria autonomia, a non essere più ostaggio degli oligopoli delle multinazionali che controllano i mercati, la genetica dei nostri semi, la chimica e ora anche la transizione verso il biologico e l’agroecologia, volendoli sempre più controllare e snaturare.

    Ad esempio, in questa sua visione, Commissario, i centrali servizi ecosistemici, generati dagli agricoltori che lavorano in simbiosi con l’agricoltura, li vuole consegnare in mano al mercato senza tutele. Così, anche questa volta, invece di essere un’opportunità di reddito per gli agricoltori, il controllo lo avrà il mercato. Lo stesso mercato che oggi lascia nelle tasche degli agricoltori solo il 7% del prezzo pagato dai consumatori.

    Commissario, lavorare per un salario giusto è un diritto anche per noi agricoltori. Ci restituisca il controllo di tutto questo.

     
       


     

      Carmen Crespo Díaz (PPE). – Señor presidente, señor comisario, señorías, es el momento de la defensa europea y, por tanto, lo primero que tenemos que hacer es reivindicar el papel de la alimentación como arma de defensa europea fundamental para los intereses de la alimentación y la soberanía alimentaria. Para ello, blindar los fondos de la PAC en el nuevo marco financiero plurianual es fundamental: sin mezcla de fondos, donde saldríamos perdiendo. Los acuerdos comerciales tienen que venir con reciprocidad y siempre respetando a nuestros agricultores y también a nuestros consumidores.

    Nos gusta la propuesta de la oficina de control de importaciones en Mercosur, es el camino de ayudar a los agricultores con esos acuerdos. Y apostar por la ciencia: las nuevas prácticas genómicas hay que desbloquearlas en el Consejo. Bajar la huella hídrica. Apostar por la economía circular, nuevo nicho de negocio en las zonas rurales. Desde luego, simplificar la vida de los agricultores —hombres y mujeres— y buscar una fórmula, además, que permita la integración de los mayores, que no los penalice y que no salgan perdiendo. Y que los jóvenes tengan una oportunidad real.

    No demonicemos la ganadería, intentemos que los aranceles en este momento, no involucren al sector agroalimentario, ni al bourbon estadounidense ni al vino europeo. Tenemos que dejarlos fuera porque es un sector muy vulnerable que durante todo este tiempo ha sufrido los altos costes y las dificultades y este es el momento de ampararlo.

    Enhorabuena por la visión, querido comisario.

     
       

     

      André Rodrigues (S&D). – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, a necessidade de garantir um rendimento justo e estável aos agricultores de hoje e construir um setor que seja suficientemente apelativo para atrair os agricultores de amanhã são prioridades com as quais, estou certo, estamos todos de acordo.

    Contudo, só serão concretizáveis com um orçamento robusto, capaz de enfrentar os complexos desafios que o setor enfrenta. Neste contexto, é fundamental manter a coerência e a interligação entre os fundos ligados à agricultura, assim como defender e reforçar o papel das parcerias com as autoridades regionais e locais na sua implementação.

    Registo, por isso, com satisfação o reconhecimento, na Visão para a Agricultura e Alimentação, das especificidades das regiões ultraperiféricas e da importância do regime POSEI. Contudo, Senhor Comissário, este programa precisa de ser atualizado — o que não acontece há mais de uma década —, para que possa ter verbas que verdadeiramente correspondam às reais necessidades do setor agrícola nestas regiões, fazendo assim justiça a quem nele trabalha.

    (O orador aceita responder a uma pergunta «cartão azul»)

     
       


     

      André Rodrigues (S&D), Resposta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Caro colega, muito obrigado pelas suas perguntas, à primeira das quais devo dizer que nós temos vindo a defender já há muito tempo a necessidade de termos um equilíbrio verdadeiro na fileira da cadeia alimentar, de forma que os produtores não sejam, de facto, o parente pobre desta mesma fileira, garantindo, assim, maior igualdade na distribuição do rendimento.

    Quanto à questão que coloca acerca das quotas (que, como sabe, já tem muitos anos), a verdade é que nós não podemos ter uma posição que vá contra aquilo que é uma inevitabilidade. E, como todos sabemos, na altura, o regime das quotas terminou. Era uma inevitabilidade. Apesar de todos os constrangimentos que possa ter criado, a verdade é que o setor soube ultrapassar de forma positiva este mesmo constrangimento.

     
       

     

      Valérie Deloge (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, une fois de plus, la Commission européenne présente une vision d’avenir pour l’agriculture qui ne répond pas aux attentes des agriculteurs européens. Les agriculteurs veulent vivre de leur travail, grâce à un revenu décent; mais l’essentiel de vos propositions se concentrent sur les aides et la diversification des activités, sans leur offrir la moindre garantie. Les agriculteurs veulent moins de bureaucratie; vous préférez multiplier les normes environnementales et les obligations administratives. Les agriculteurs veulent un secteur fort et souverain; on constate que vous restez soumis au dogme du libre-échange et de la mondialisation, pourtant néfaste à notre agriculture.

    Quant à votre réponse au besoin d’attirer les jeunes et les femmes, elle se résume à la mise en place de plans, de plateformes et d’observatoires, bref, à une usine à gaz. Ce n’est pas avec des documents de trente pages que l’on remplit les assiettes. Quand allez-vous sortir des promesses creuses et proposer du concret? Monsieur le Commissaire, l’avenir de l’agriculture dans les prochaines années me paraît bien sombre.

     
       

     

      Waldemar Buda (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie Komisarzu! Miesiąc temu przewodnicząca Ursula von der Leyen oświadczyła, że wspólna polityka rolna będzie zlikwidowana. Będzie połączona z innymi programami. Podpisała porozumienie, negocjacje z Mercosurem i mamy wyraźną tendencję do ograniczenia środków na rolnictwo. I ja bym oczekiwał, żeby komisarz, który się zajmuje rolnictwem, powinien wyjść dzisiaj i powiedzieć o tych trzech sprawach. Powiedzieć jestem przeciwko Mercosurowi, jestem za utrzymaniem wspólnej polityki rolnej i jestem za utrzymaniem albo zwiększeniem środków. Czy usłyszeliśmy jakiekolwiek słowo i zapewnienie w tych trzech podstawowych sprawach?

    Czy Pan chce być grabarzem rolnictwa? Czy Pan chce być zapamiętany jako ktoś, kto rozwijał rolnictwo? Poprzedni komisarz walczył o rolnictwo, był atakowany z każdej strony. Timmermans go atakował, Dombrowskis go atakował, a on mówił swoje: będę bronił rolnictwa. Chcielibyśmy podobnej postawy wobec Pana, żeby Pan był dobrze zapamiętany w historii polskiego, ale i europejskiego rolnictwa również. Nie ma żadnego zapewnienia w tej sprawie. Ja się obawiam, że najbliższa perspektywa finansowa to będzie degradacja europejskiego rolnictwa. Co nam się w Unii Europejskiej udało? Przemysł pogrzebany, konkurencyjność pogrzebana, tylko rolnictwo. I jesteśmy na dobrej drodze, żeby rolnictwo również zlikwidować.

     
       



     

      Arash Saeidi (The Left). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, je suis heureux d’entendre votre volonté, que je crois sincère, d’assurer des prix de vente supérieurs aux coûts de production, d’empêcher l’importation de produits élaborés avec des pesticides interdits dans l’Union européenne et, surtout, d’instaurer des contrôles effectifs pour assurer l’application de nos règles. Vous nous trouverez toujours en soutien pour aller dans cette direction.

    Cependant, est-ce bien la volonté de tout le collège des commissaires? Je vois a minima une contradiction flagrante entre vos propos et la signature d’un accord avec le Mercosur, alors que – et ce n’est malheureusement qu’un exemple – les études démontrent la très grande difficulté du Brésil à rendre effectifs les contrôles sur ses productions agricoles. Vous voulez protéger les agriculteurs contre une concurrence déloyale, mais la Commission ouvre les portes de l’Union européenne à un dumping chimique et social.

    Ma question est donc simple: comment allez-vous répondre à cette contradiction, Monsieur le Commissaire?

     
       

     

      Krzysztof Hetman (PPE). – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie Komisarzu! Szanowni Państwo! W debacie o wizji przyszłości rolnictwa powinien wybrzmieć głos rolników. Wczoraj wieczorem jednego z nich zapytałem o to, jaka ta przyszłość rolnictwa powinna być, i wymienił mi to w 5 punktach. 1. Skrócenie łańcuchów dostaw i wzmocnienie pozycji producenta. 2. Rolnicy muszą mieć łatwe i proste przepisy do przetwarzania swojej produkcji. 3. Należy obniżyć koszty produkcji, między innymi poprzez rewizję Zielonego Ładu. 4. Chronić wewnętrzny rynek rolny przed takimi umowami, jak Mercosur, i nadmierną liberalizacją handlu z Ukrainą i przed kolejnymi tego typu umowami. 5. Uprościć i doregulować przepisy w obszarze prowadzenia działalności rolniczej, bo rolnicy powinni pracować w polu, a nie siedzieć za biurkiem i wypełniać stosy dokumentów. I ode mnie, Panie Komisarzu: uważam, że w tej wizji, którą Pan przedstawił, brakuje ewentualnego rozszerzenia Unii Europejskiej o inne państwa i wpływu tego rozszerzenia na rynek rolny, europejski, a także polski. Bez tego elementu ta wizja, moim zdaniem, będzie niepełna.

     
       

     

      Maria Grapini (S&D). – Domnule președinte, stimați colegi, dezbaterea de astăzi trebuie să fie urmată imediat de măsuri, domnule comisar. Asta așteaptă fermierii. Este nevoie să avem mai multă echitate economică și socială în piața internă dacă vrem să avem o agricultură durabilă, pentru că despre asta vorbim. Trebuie să avem reglementări care să combată inflația și să se stabilizeze prețurile. Inflația mănâncă din buget. Nu putem să lăsăm fermierii să-și vândă produsele sub prețul de cost. Aici avem nevoie de măsuri. Trebuie să intensificăm eforturile pentru combaterea practicilor comerciale neloiale. Știm bine că în fiecare stat membru avem practici neloiale. De ce? Pentru că intră în piața internă produse necontrolate.

    Fermierii și muncitorii agricoli au nevoie de o viață decentă, merită condiții de viață mai bune. Trebuie să încurajăm – dacă nu vom rezolva acest lucru, generația tânără nu va merge, generația despre care dumneavoastră vorbeați că trebuie să o avem pentru înlocuire. Politica agricolă comună? Politica agricolă comună trebuie reformată, dar subvențiile directe trebuie să rămână. Domnule comisar, ați vorbit de polarizare. Cum veți face să nu mai fie polarizare? Cum veți face ca subvențiile să fie etice și echitabile pentru toți fermierii? Și da, fermierii susțin o simplificare, fără să afecteze competența și competiția loială în piața internă.

     
       

     

      Csaba Dömötör (PfE). – Elnök Úr! Érdemes őszintén beszélnünk, a Vision nevű anyagban, a hangzatos célok mögött olyan tervek vonulnak, amelyeknek az európai gazdák nem fognak örülni. Alapos a gyanúnk arra, hogy lefaragnák az agrártámogatásokat, külső körülményekre való hivatkozással, mint például Ukrajna EU-tagsága, és ezt a szándékot tompa kifejezésekbe burkolják. Így amikor célzott támogatásokról beszélnek, az valójában azt jelenti, hogy nem kapna minden gazda támogatást, nem kapnának annyian, mint most. Amikor rászorultsági elvről beszélnek, akkor az megint azt jelenti, hogy nem mindenki kapna támogatást, aki most egyébként kap.

    Ráadásul, hogyha jól értjük a terveket, akkor más forrásokkal is összevonnák az agrárpénzeket, ami elfedné azt, hogy csökkenteni akarják a támogatási összegeket. Elgondolkodtatónak tartom, hogy az előterjesztésben szereplő terveket leginkább azok a civilnek mondott szervezetek üdvözlik, amelyeket az Európai Bizottság finanszíroz. A gazdák nagyon nem. Magyarországon közel 250 ezer ember állt ki aláírásával a területalapú támogatások mellett. Kérem, hallják meg az ő hangjukat is!

     
       


     

      Barry Cowen (Renew). – Mr President, Commissioner Hansen, thank you for your presentation earlier. As I mentioned when we met yesterday morning, I welcome much of what is contained in the vision, particularly the Commission’s intention to shift the future CAP from a system of conditions to that of incentives. That, of course, is a step in the right direction.

    However, the vision falls short in addressing one critical issue: the need for a strong CAP in the next multiannual financial framework. This vision is worryingly vague, and there are persistent rumours that the CAP budget could be merged into a broader funding pot. It says nothing concrete specifically about the budgetary needs of the next CAP, failing to acknowledge the need for new funds to pay for the transition towards sustainable food systems and productions.

    So, Commissioner Hansen, I’d like to ask you at this stage, have you identified the level of funding needed to sustain the CAP in the next MFF? And crucially, what steps are you taking within the College to secure this funding?

    (The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question)

     
       


     

      Barry Cowen (Renew), blue-card answer. – Thank you, MEP Flanagan. And you’re quite correct, of course. I’m well aware of the impact, and the fears and concerns that exist in many farmers, many landowners, whose soil is designated as peaty, and the worries that they would have for the implications of what’s contained.

    However, I’m convinced that the Commission, in its efforts to have this addressed, primarily is committed to nature restoration laws and rewetting programmes, which Ireland and the region has committed strongly to. It has been funded by this Commission to the tune of EUR 100 million – to Bord na Móna, for example, a state body that has responsibility in this regard, that will meet much of the demands that are contained within that.

    I think farmers will continue to be in a position to carry out farm practices in relation to ploughing, in relation to reseeding, in relation to maintenance of drains …

    (The President interrupted the speaker)

     
       

     

      Anna Strolenberg (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, Commissioner, the Netherlands is a country of food innovation and also a country of yoghurt‑lovers for breakfast. And I want to talk about both, because I visited a farm a while ago of two young farmers coming from a long line of dairy farmers, and they saw the inefficiency of giving soy to cows, and they radically changed their business model. By now, they are producing their own soy and creating their own yoghurt. Since recently, you can find their products in one of the biggest supermarkets in the Netherlands. This is the innovation that we need in Europe. This is a success story.

    Commissioner, in your vision, you highlight our dependency on importing proteins. If you want to change this, we have to stimulate the creation of alternative proteins. And I think we can do it. It can create more options for consumers, more new opportunities for income for farmers, and more climate resilience. If your proposed plan has concrete goals and concrete policy proposals, your plan can become a success story as well.

     
       

     

      Sebastian Everding (The Left). – Herr Präsident! „Was wir heute tun, entscheidet darüber, wie die Welt morgen aussieht“, sagte schon die österreichische Schriftstellerin Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach. Herr Kommissar, ich habe eine Vision, in der Lebensmittel nicht mehr in Verbindung mit Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gebracht werden. In dieser Vision haben Landwirte ein gesichertes Einkommen, und wir erleben eine Partnerschaft auf Augenhöhe; auf der anderen Seite Verbraucher, die bereit sind, regionale und saisonale Produkte zu kaufen, frei von Pestiziden und Gentechnik.

    In meiner Vision werden diese gesunden pflanzlichen Nahrungsmittel mit nur minimalsten Steuern belegt, während tierische Produkte mit den Steuern belastet werden, die der Umweltzerstörung, der Gefährdung menschlicher Gesundheit und dem unermesslichen Tierleid gerecht werden. Massentierhaltung und Tiertransporte kommen in meiner Vision zu einem Ende. Der Bürgerinitiative „End the Cage Age“ wird Rechnung getragen, und kein Tier wird mehr in Käfige gesperrt. Sowohl Landwirtschaft als auch Industrie sind dabei, sich vollständig auf pflanzliche Fleischalternativen und lab-grown meat umzustellen. Und ja, es wird auch niemand mehr Milch als ein gesundes Getränk bezeichnen.

    (Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

     
       



     

      Daniel Buda (PPE). – Domnule președinte, domnule comisar, vă felicit pentru documentul prezentat. Stimați colegi, astăzi trebuie să hrănim 450 de milioane de europeni, în timp ce la nivel mondial peste 700 de milioane de oameni suferă de foamete. Cifrele din sector sunt însă îngrijorătoare. Veniturile din agricultură sunt cu 40 % mai mici decât în orice alt sector, în timp ce doar 12 % dintre fermieri au sub 40 de ani. Fără măsuri ferme, Europa riscă să devină dependentă de importuri, pierzând controlul asupra propriei securități alimentare, iar dependența creează vulnerabilități, așa cum spunea, de altfel, Mario Draghi.

    Timpul nu mai este de partea noastră, iar mâine este deja prea târziu pentru fermieri. Domnule comisar, azi avem nevoie de politici care să protejeze producția europeană, de reducerea birocrației, dar mai ales – și subliniez, mai ales – de o finanțare adecvată. Banii pentru agricultură nu sunt banii fermierilor, ci reprezintă investițiile indispensabile pentru ca foametea să nu fie folosită ca armă de război. Dacă vrem o Europă puternică, trebuie să ne asigurăm că este și hrănită, iar acest lucru începe cu sprijinirea fermierilor noștri.

     
       

     

      Σάκης Αρναούτογλου (S&D). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, κύριε Επίτροπε, η γεωργία δε μπορεί να είναι ένας τομέας που απλώς επιβιώνει. Πρέπει να ευημερεί, να στηρίζει τις τοπικές κοινωνίες και να εγγυάται τη διατροφική ασφάλεια της Ευρώπης. Για να πετύχει αυτό όμως, δεν αρκούν τα μεγάλα λόγια τα οποία ακούμε τα τελευταία χρόνια. Χρειάζονται δίκαιες τιμές, αξιοπρεπείς αμοιβές και ένα πλαίσιο θεμιτού ανταγωνισμού. Σήμερα οι αγρότες μας —όλοι το ξέρουμε αυτό— αναγκάζονται να πουλούν κάτω του κόστους παραγωγής, ενώ οι μεγάλες αλυσίδες λιανικής και οι μεσάζοντες αποκομίζουν τα μεγαλύτερα κέρδη. Πώς είναι δυνατό να έχουμε μια βιώσιμη γεωργία, όταν ο παραγωγός είναι ο μόνος που δεν μπορεί να ζήσει από τη δουλειά του; Πότε θα εφαρμόσει η Επιτροπή μηχανισμούς που θα διασφαλίζουν ότι κανένας αγρότης δεν θα αναγκάζεται να πουλάει κάτω από την αξία του κόπου του; Μιλάμε συνεχώς για την ανάγκη ανανέωσης των γενεών στον αγροτικό τομέα, όμως ποιος νέος θα επιλέξει να γίνει αγρότης, όταν η πρόσβαση στη γη και στη χρηματοδότηση είναι όλο και πιο δύσκολη;

    Χρειάζεται, λοιπόν, ένα φιλόδοξο πρόγραμμα για τη γενιά αγροτών με σαφή χρηματοδότηση και πραγματικά κίνητρα. Αν η Ευρώπη θέλει γεωργία με μέλλον, πρέπει να επενδύσει σε αυτήν σήμερα. Oι αγρότες δεν ζουν με ευχολόγια· υποσχέσεις δεν γεμίζουν το σιλό, δεν ποτίζουν τα χωράφια, δεν κρατούν τους νέους στη γη.

     
       

     

      Gilles Pennelle (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, en hémicycle, tout le monde s’intéresse à l’agriculture. On a même vu, tout à l’heure, la présidente du groupe Renew nous parler d’agriculture, alors qu’elle n’a jamais mis les pieds, en tant que membre titulaire, dans la commission AGRI.

    Monsieur le Commissaire, vous avez rencontré énormément d’agriculteurs et d’acteurs au Salon de l’agriculture. Ils vous ont tous dit la même chose: ils vous ont dit qu’ils ne voulaient pas du Mercosur, qu’ils ne voulaient pas de l’adhésion de l’Ukraine, qui serait une catastrophe, et qu’ils ne voulaient pas du pacte vert. D’ailleurs, ce nom de «pacte vert» a disparu de votre vocabulaire et de votre feuille de route. Pourtant, il est toujours là, puisque vous affichez pour l’agriculture la neutralité climatique en 2050 avec ses conséquences: la baisse des rendements, la décroissance, la baisse de la production, l’écologie punitive totalement incompatible avec le maintien du revenu des agriculteurs.

    Vous êtes volontairement ambigu, Monsieur le Commissaire. Moi, je vous le dis très clairement: les agriculteurs dans toute l’Union européenne, dans la quasi-unanimité, vous demandent une chose: arrêtez ce pacte vert pour sauver l’agriculture européenne.

     
       


     

      Emma Wiesner (Renew). – Herr talman! Kära jordbrukskommissionär! Var är vinsten? Visionen för Europas jordbruk pratar om inkomst, inkomst och inkomst. Men vad Europas lantbrukare behöver är vinst, vinst, vinst. Jag är besviken över att vi lägger ribban så lågt, för om lantbruket är samhällets ryggrad är maten dess hjärta. I en tid när lantbrukare runtom i Europa larmar om att ekonomin inte går ihop, samtidigt som konsumenter lägger en historiskt låg andel av sin inkomst på mat, vågar vi inte säga som det är: Lantbrukare måste kunna göra vinst!

    Utan vinst, inga investeringar i omställning eller effektiviseringar. Utan vinst, ingen konkurrenskraft eller generationsskiften. Utan vinst, ingen trygghet för våra lantbrukare. Vi har en tydlig uppgift framför oss att öka lantbrukets intäkter och sänka dess kostnader för vi behöver både ryggrad och hjärta.

    Så stirra er inte blinda på inkomsterna, våga prata om vinsten och lönsamheten! För pengar kanske inte växer på träd, men kapital ska växa på varje gård, och det är min vision för Europas lantbruk.

     
       

     

      Martin Häusling (Verts/ALE). – Herr Präsident! Herr Kommissar, ich bin ehrlich: Ich hätte mir eigentlich mehr erwartet von der Vision; die Strategie-Kommission hat ja vorgelegt. Wir haben ja Ziele in der Strategie-Kommission benannt: Klimawandel bekämpfen, biologische Vielfalt stärken und nicht schwächen, Stärkung der Landwirte in der Kette. Wo ist eigentlich die Förderung der nachhaltigen Produktion geblieben? Wo sind die 25 % Öko-Landbau, die ja mal in der Farm to Fork benannt wurden? Das alles vermisse ich. Ich glaube, wir müssen auch klar über Pestizide reden, weil es steht komischerweise in der Strategie: Pestizide werden nur vom Markt genommen, wenn andere da sind. Was heißt das konkret? Wenden wir uns jetzt von der Wissenschaft ab?

    Leider ist mir die Vision viel zu wenig konkret. Farm to Fork wird nicht benannt, der Green Deal wird nicht benannt, und stattdessen wird auf Freiwilligkeit gesetzt, statt klare Ziele zu formulieren, und natürlich wieder der Fokus auf Export. Wir müssen die Stärkung der regionalen Lebensmittelketten in den Vordergrund stellen. Wir müssen auch nicht Gentechnik jetzt als Lösung für viele Probleme im Klimawandel verstehen.

    Gute Ansätze haben Sie ja, und da finde ich die Stärkung der Rechte der Landwirte in der Kette; da sind wir uns – glaube ich – völlig einig. Aber einen Punkt muss die Kommission noch erklären: Ihr Haushalt bedeutet ja am Ende, dass auch die zweite Säule der Entwicklung gefährdet ist.

     
       

     

      Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral (PPE). – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, esta visão colocou por escrito o que nós, no PSD, e os agricultores lá fora tanto têm defendido. Finalmente fomos ouvidos, e obrigado por isto, Senhor Comissário.

    É necessário reforçar a PAC, porque a agricultura é também coesão, segurança e defesa. De que vale termos territórios se não os desenvolvermos, ou exércitos se não os conseguirmos alimentar e dependermos de países terceiros?

    Saúdo a estratégia para a renovação geracional, e os números são impressionantes: a idade média de um agricultor na União Europeia é de 57 anos e em Portugal, de 64. Daqui a cinco ou dez anos, quem irá produzir o que nós comermos?

    É crucial preservar os dois pilares da PAC, reforçar a transparência na formação dos preços e uma repartição justa do valor na cadeia de abastecimento alimentar. O preço nas prateleiras dos supermercados está demasiado distante daquilo que os agricultores recebem.

    A resiliência hídrica, e Portugal com o plano de ação «Água que une», é um excelente exemplo: a simplificação, a substituição das obrigações por incentivos, a digitalização e a inovação, a promoção e a reciprocidade, e a saúde mental, entre outros, representam uma nova esperança para os agricultores.

    E termino reconhecendo a defesa que faz da agricultura das regiões ultraperiféricas e do POSEI, que precisa de ser reforçado e atualizado. As regiões ultraperiféricas enfrentam desafios únicos e contam com o seu apoio.

     
       


     

      Eric Sargiacomo (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, la vision pour l’agriculture et l’alimentation est un panorama très complet des enjeux que nous devons affronter pour assurer la sécurité alimentaire des Européens. Pour cela, il faut refermer la parenthèse libérale ouverte en 1992. Sans régulation, pas de sécurité alimentaire ni de souveraineté. Notre monde change vite et nous devons y adapter notre politique.

    Nous devons répondre au moins à deux défis majeurs qui tiennent les deux bouts de la chaîne: assurer un revenu à nos agriculteurs et lutter contre la précarité alimentaire, qui touche 20 % des Européens et qui n’a fait qu’augmenter sous la pression de l’inflation alimentaire. Pour cela, il nous faut retrouver des instruments pour la régulation et la stabilisation des prix. Je pense en particulier aux stocks stratégiques et à la révision des prix d’intervention. L’Europe s’est créée sur une double promesse: celle de la paix et de la prospérité. Ne pas assurer la sécurité alimentaire, c’est trahir cette promesse. Monsieur le Commissaire, donnons-nous les moyens de cette vision, afin qu’elle ne soit pas un mirage, une simple illusion de plus.

     
       

     

      Gerald Hauser (PfE). – Herr Präsident! Herr Kommissar, glauben Sie wirklich, dass mit dieser Vision die Bauernproteste zurückgehen und dass Sie den Bauern mit Ihrer Vision die Zukunftsängste nehmen? Ich bin mir sicher: nicht, weil das Hauptproblem, das viele Bauern haben, ist schon einmal der Beitritt oder die Übernahme von Mercosur. Wir sollten und wir müssen Mercosur verhindern, weil Mercosur der Todesstoß für viele landwirtschaftliche Betriebe ist.

    Um Ihnen das zu beweisen, zitiere ich aus einer parlamentarischen Anfrage von mir an den ÖVP-Landwirtschaftsminister Totschnig – nicht von unserer Partei, ich bin Mitglied der Freiheitlichen Partei und der stärksten Partei in Österreich. Diese Anfragebeantwortung habe ich am 13. Februar 2024 Mercosur betreffend bekommen – ist im Netz abrufbar. Ich zitiere Ihnen daraus, was Ihr Kollege zu dem möglichen Beitritt zu Mercosur und den Auswirkungen für die Landwirte zu sagen hat: Das im Jahr 2019 ausverhandelte Mercosur-Abkommen ist jedoch kein Abkommen, das den Agrarsektor stärkt. Studien zeigen, dass es zu erheblichen Wettbewerbsnachteilen für die Agrarproduktion in sensiblen Sektoren kommt …

    (Der Präsident entzieht dem Redner das Wort.)

    (Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

     
       



     

      Francesco Ventola (ECR). – Signor Presidente, signor Commissario, onorevoli colleghi, l’agricoltura europea è di fronte ad una svolta fondamentale: è il momento di riconoscere il vero valore degli agricoltori non come inquinatori ma come custodi della terra, i difensori della natura e garanti della nostra sicurezza alimentare.

    Questa è la visione che dobbiamo abbracciare: un’agricoltura che produce cibo sano, rispettando l’ambiente. Gli agricoltori meritano una politica agricola comune che premi chi lavora la terra, garantendo un reddito giusto, scevro da forme di sfruttamento e di logiche speculative.

    I cittadini hanno diritto di alimentarsi di pietanze che fanno bene alla salute. Quindi anche i prodotti importati devono rispettare i nostri stessi standard qualitativi. Pretendiamo l’applicazione del concetto di reciprocità: in questo modo contribuiremo a determinare un mercato più equo.

    Dobbiamo incentivare tutte le forme di innovazione che la scienza ci mette a disposizione per migliorare la produttività dell’agricoltura europea. La nostra priorità deve essere l’autonomia strategica alimentare, che ne garantisce la sicurezza e l’indipendenza.

    Commissario Hansen, è questa la strada che proponiamo al fine di garantire un prospero futuro al comparto agricolo e soprattutto sana alimentazione.

     
       

     

      Céline Imart (PPE). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, merci d’avoir évité l’écueil d’un «De la ferme à la table» bis. Le ton est volontariste, vous parlez de souveraineté alimentaire et vous remettez la production au cœur de la vision et la vache au milieu du champ. Toutefois, des intentions, il faut passer aux actes.

    Sur le terrain, les agriculteurs transpirent et il est temps que les administrations fassent transpirer dans les textes ce vrai changement de cap, qu’elles comprennent que nous avons changé de mandat et qu’elles-mêmes ont changé de commissaire, et non pas qu’elles fassent semblant d’être un peu sourdes pour ne pas abolir les textes dangereux issus du mandat antérieur: le règlement sur le transport des animaux, qui ne ferait qu’imposer aux éleveurs des contraintes insurmontables, sans aucun bénéfice économique, social ni environnemental; le cadre sur l’évaluation des forêts, qui propose une usine à gaz pour accabler nos forestiers, sans aucune garantie de résultat; le programme LIFE, qui doit cesser de financer des ONG écologistes extrémistes, qui s’acharnent à fragiliser notre agriculture sous couvert d’altruisme opaque et militant. Voilà une piste d’économie à reflécher vers les budgets agricoles.

    Monsieur le Commissaire, cette vision est la première pierre pour enrayer la machine infernale. Il faut maintenant remettre du bon sens au cœur des textes européens et au cœur des administrations de la Commission.

     
       

     

      Camilla Laureti (S&D). – Signor Presidente, signor Commissario, onorevoli colleghi, bene, la visione per quello che riguarda il reddito – ce lo ha detto anche lei il salario medio degli agricoltori e del 40% più basso rispetto ad altri settori – bene, le aree interne rurali che sono l’ossatura della nostra Europa, le filiere corte e i giovani e le donne.

    Mi raccomando attenzione anche alle donne giovani: sono gestite da donne solo il 3% del 12% delle aziende under 40. Mettiamo al centro, però, una politica agricola comune nuova e che arrivi davvero ovunque – in Italia, per esempio, 3/4 dei fondi PAC vanno alle aziende agricole più grandi – e che sia una PAC attenta alla sostenibilità – ha parlato anche lei della centralità dei nostri suoli – e che aiuti tutti gli agricoltori ad innovare. Oltre alla condizionalità ambientale, non dimentichiamo la condizionalità sociale.

    Abbiamo di fronte a noi anni cruciali per il mondo agricolo, in cui sarà essenziale il dialogo e il confronto tra posizioni che spesso sono diverse. Questo è quello che dobbiamo a chi, oggi, con fatica e cura, continua a dedicarsi all’agricoltura e al nostro cibo.

     
       



     

      Ton Diepeveen (PfE). – Voorzitter, commissaris, collega’s, na jarenlang regel op regel op te leggen — de ene strenger dan de andere — na jaren waarin de landbouwsector onder druk is gezet met groene doelstellingen, vaak gepusht door groene lobbygroepen, spreekt de Europese Commissie eindelijk over vereenvoudiging.

    Het gemeenschappelijk landbouwbeleid is compleet ontspoord en staat inmiddels ver van de realiteit van onze boeren af. Hoog tijd om terug te keren naar de kern, naar boeren die voedsel produceren en niet papieren produceren. Minder regels, minder bemoeienis vanuit Brussel is wat onze boeren echt nodig hebben.

    Investeren in technologische vooruitgang en slimme innovaties, daar zit de echte duurzaamheid. Maar het duurt allemaal veel te lang. De innovatie in landbouw en visserij loopt vast in procedures, regels, vergunningen. Nieuwe technieken blijven daardoor te lang op de plank liggen. Dit moet en kan anders. Brussel moet niet op de rem staan, maar juist op het gaspedaal drukken om onze boeren en vissers snelle toegang te geven tot innovatie. Alleen dan blijft onze landbouw- en visserijsector concurrerend. Alleen dan zijn we toekomstbestendig. En alleen dan kunnen we het hebben over handelsakkoorden waarin onze boeren een gelijk speelveld hebben.

     
       

     

      Gabriel Mato (PPE). – Señor presidente, señor comisario, la agricultura es un sector fundamental, no solo por su impacto económico, sino por su peso en la forma de vida de millones de europeos. Y, si esto es importante en la Europa continental, créanme que lo es mucho más en las regiones ultraperiféricas como Canarias. Al fin y al cabo, nosotros estamos muy lejos, aunque nos sintamos muy cerca. Por eso es fundamental que la agricultura prospere en las regiones ultraperiférica, usted lo ha mencionado, y que quienes se dedican a ello puedan seguir haciéndolo. Para ello es necesaria la ayuda de la Unión Europea.

    Hemos de entender que el valor añadido de la agricultura no viene solo de su aportación al PIB, sino también de su aportación a nuestra seguridad alimentaria, de su papel para mantener nuestras comunidades tradicionales y dar oportunidades de vida a la población en áreas rurales, permitiéndoles quedarse junto a los suyos. Por ello, es fundamental que, de cara a la revisión del programa de opciones específicas por la lejanía y la insularidad (POSEI), se actualice la ficha financiera ―que, le recuerdo, lleva estancada trece años― para poder responder a la inflación y a los aumentos de costes de producción.

    Si tenemos un sistema que está dando buenos resultados, apostemos por él y démosle el respaldo económico que necesita para seguir cumpliendo con sus objetivos.

     
       

     

      France Jamet (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, nourrir l’humanité est l’enjeu majeur de ce XXIᵉ siècle. C’est pourquoi nous devons non seulement repenser, mais soutenir le modèle de production. La mer fait partie intégrante de ce défi, avec une filière pêche puissante, durable et associée à une aquaculture raisonnée. Pour cela, nous devons créer toutes les conditions pour favoriser une synergie entre les nourriciers de la mer et les nourriciers de la terre. À l’instar de l’algoculture, dont le développement offre déjà des avancées décisives dans le domaine des engrais durables et recyclés pour notre agriculture, notre indépendance vis-à-vis des intrants chimiques, dont une grande partie vient de Russie, serait ainsi assurée.

    Alors que les accords de libre-échange que vous signez et l’obsession de verdissement imposée par Bruxelles, normative et punitive, contribuent tout simplement à fragiliser notre souveraineté alimentaire, en s’acharnant sur nos agriculteurs et nos pêcheurs. Nourrir l’humanité sera l’enjeu majeur de ce XXIᵉ siècle. C’est avec eux, et non pas contre eux, que nous relèverons ce défi.

     
       

     

      Alexander Bernhuber (PPE). – Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident, lieber Herr Kommissar! Die vergangenen fünf Jahre waren für die Landwirtschaft eher fünf magere Jahre: ein Kommissar, der sich wenig für die Landwirtschaft interessiert hat, eine Gesetzgebung, die sich mehr auf Flächenstilllegung und Außernutzungstellung konzentriert hat, als auf Ernährungssicherheit zu setzen, und politische Mehrheiten im Europäischen Parlament, die absolut nicht die Interessen unserer Bäuerinnen und Bauern vertreten haben.

    Umso mehr freue ich mich jetzt auf die nächsten fünf Jahre mit Ihnen, Herr Kommissar. Ihre Vision ist ein erster wichtiger Schritt: weniger Bürokratie auf unseren Höfen, faire Wettbewerbsbedingungen dann, wenn es um Lebensmittelimporte geht, und ein klares Bekenntnis zur Versorgungssicherheit sind richtige, wichtige Schritte.

    Doch jetzt geht es darum, aus dieser Vision auch wirklich in der praktischen Umsetzung etwas zu erreichen. Wir haben noch sehr vieles auf dem Tisch liegen, das mehr Bürokratie bedeutet: Industrieemissionsrichtlinie, Entwaldungsverordnung und, und, und, wo wir hier Lösungen finden müssen und gleichzeitig auch konkrete neue Schritte setzen – da können wir auf Sie zählen, da bin ich überzeugt; Sie können auf unsere Unterstützung zählen. Lassen Sie uns gemeinsam daran arbeiten!

     
       

     

      Marta Wcisło (PPE). – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie Komisarzu! Największym wyzwaniem, przed którym stoją dziś rolnicy, jest niska opłacalność, a nawet jej brak. Rolnicy w Europie, zwłaszcza Wschodniej, borykają się z rygorystycznymi regulacjami oraz nieuczciwą konkurencją produktów spoza Unii Europejskiej. Przedstawiona przez Komisję wizja dla rolnictwa i żywności zawiera między innymi dialog z rolnikami, o czym często zapominają instytucje europejskie, jak to miało miejsce w przypadku umowy z Mercosurem.

    Dziś jednak najważniejszym problemem dla rolników jest biurokracja, nadmierna sprawozdawczość, przesadne wymogi formalne. Rolnicy oczekują uproszczenia zasad dostępu do wsparcia finansowego i grantów, zwłaszcza dla mikro-, małych i rodzinnych przedsiębiorstw rolnych, a także rewizji Zielonego Ładu i zatrzymania umowy z Mercosurem. Propozycja Komisji idzie w dobrym kierunku, ale to zaledwie mały plaster, Panie Komisarzu, na wielką ranę europejskiego rolnictwa.

     
       

     

      Maria Walsh (PPE). – Mr President, the Commissioner mentioned two words: stability and predictability. Commissioner, if you ask young men and women in Ireland right now whether they would consider going into farming, sadly most would say ‘no’. You heard this no doubt, when you visited Ireland in January, because land is expensive, credit is hard to get, succession is complex to navigate and incomes and markets are volatile. We all know this. But what is incredibly important now is what we go forth with. We cannot ignore the fact that only 7 % of our farmers are under 35, and they need that stability and predictability, now more than ever. We need to make agriculture, the whole sector, more attractive and support young people in a practical manner now. Not later on, but now. It’s a matter of food security – you mentioned that – and the survival of our sector across the EU.

    And with all eyes being on how we’re going to fund everything that’s in this vision, Commissioner, I’m asking you in your strategy that you will put forward, that you think of the young men and women, which I know you do, but it’s incredibly important that we have those practical steps in place so that they can develop a stronger food security for us all.

     
       

       

    Vystúpenia na základe prihlásenia sa o slovo zdvihnutím ruky

     
       

     

      Francisco José Millán Mon (PPE). – Señor presidente, los agricultores y los pescadores desempeñan un papel crucial en nuestra seguridad alimentaria. Sin embargo, conocemos todos el malestar imperante en el sector agrícola, también en el pesquero, que se queja de la excesiva burocracia, de muchas restricciones, de la dificultad de conseguir, comisario, el llamado level playing field. Este malestar se ha exteriorizado recientemente respecto del Acuerdo de Mercosur, pero en el fondo refleja el descontento con la política agrícola desequilibrada que la Comisión llevó a cabo especialmente en la legislatura pasada.

    Yo creo que usted, señor comisario, representa, desde luego, un cambio muy positivo. Y lo primero que debemos hacer es flexibilizar la normativa europea y también reducir la burocracia y eliminar determinadas restricciones. Pero quiero insistir en otro punto. La seguridad alimentaria no es un tema solo agrícola. Usted ha mencionado los pescadores, y lo celebro. La pesca y acuicultura son vitales: aportan una fuente de proteína muy nutritiva y con baja huella de carbono. Lamento que este sector haya ocupado un lugar un tanto marginal en la llamada «visión para la agricultura y la alimentación» y me gustaría que estuviera plenamente representado…

    (el presidente retira la palabra al orador)

     
       

     

      Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis (S&D). – Posėdžio pirmininke, gerbiamas komisare. Norėčiau atkreipti dėmesį vizijoje į tuos du sektorius: į sektorių Competitive and resilient sector ir į sektorių Future-proof sector. Jiedu abudu be galo susiję vienu ypatingai svarbiu aspektu. Tai dalykais, kurie vizijoje turi būti aptarti kompleksiškai, kai yra baisūs iššūkiai, kurie nepriklauso nuo žemės ūkio, nuo fermerių, nuo ūkininkų situacijos – karas, klimato kaitos katastrofos, baisūs sutrikimai grandinėse. Ir tada reikia ieškoti, kad vizijoje būtų kompleksinės priemonės harmonizuotos tarp abiejų šitų sektorių, kad mes galėtume užtikrinti ir kompetentingumą, ir ištvermę. Ir aš noriu pasakyti, kad kalbant apie viską, labai svarbu atkreipti dėmesį, kad tiesioginių išmokų suvienodinimas šiandien visiems ūkininkams yra tiesiog būtinybė.

     
       

     

      Anna Zalewska (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie Komisarzu! Myślę, że rolnicy zasługują na to, żeby powiedzieć im prawdę. Komisja Europejska mówi wprost. Unia Europejska jest zadłużona na ponad 500 mld euro, a jeszcze nie zaczęła spłacać odsetek od funduszu odbudowy. Komisarz von der Leyen mówi jednoznacznie i wielokrotnie: nie będzie odrębnego funduszu dla rolnictwa. Będzie jeden dla jednego państwa. Jednocześnie Komisja jest zdecydowana, zachęca. Pan komisarz też wije się, nie odpowiadając na pytania. Zapadła decyzja o podpisaniu umowy z Merkosurem. Jednocześnie odbyło się spotkanie w komisji AGRI, gdzie usłyszeliśmy, że od czerwca pełnym strumieniem, otwartą granicą będą płynąć produkty rolne z Ukrainy. Tak bardzo się boicie, że nie pokazujecie nawet rozporządzenia. Mówię to po to, żeby zderzyć Pana i Państwa z rzeczywistością. Ta wizja do niej nie przystaje.

     
       

     

      Benoit Cassart (Renew). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, la vision pour l’agriculture marque un tournant décisif pour notre agriculture. Enfin, nous mettons les agriculteurs au cœur de la transition. C’est un changement de paradigme essentiel pour garantir une agriculture durable, compétitive et résiliente. Merci.

    Permettez-moi cependant d’insister sur un point crucial, l’élevage. Nos éleveurs font face à des défis majeurs, et trop de jeunes renoncent à reprendre les exploitations. Or, sans eux, notre souveraineté alimentaire est en péril. Monsieur le Commissaire, serait-il envisageable de mettre en place un groupe de haut niveau sur l’élevage, comme c’est le cas pour le vin? Nous devons trouver des solutions d’urgence. Notre bétail disparaît chaque jour un peu plus de nos prairies.

     
       

     

      João Oliveira (The Left). – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, o que a Comissão Europeia propõe é o acentuar de um caminho errado de concentração e intensificação da produção.

    O caminho devia ser outro. Devia ser o do apoio à pequena e média produção, à agricultura familiar, promovendo um modelo de produção de qualidade — e sustentável —, que assegure a coesão social e territorial.

    O caminho devia ser o da defesa da soberania e segurança alimentar no quadro de cada país, aplicando um princípio de preferência nacional, criando e utilizando um sistema de obrigatoriedade de quotas de comercialização de produção nacional, para combater dependências externas e défices produtivos.

    Devia ser o do encurtamento das cadeias de produção, distribuição e consumo, e de uma política agrícola que intervenha nos mercados agrícolas, garantindo o escoamento das produções e preços justos aos produtores, enfrentando os interesses da grande distribuição comercial que esmagam esses rendimentos.

    O caminho devia ser o de uma política agrícola comum que vincule os apoios à produção, pondo fim ao vergonhoso princípio de pagamentos sem obrigação de produzir. Esse caminho é recusado pela União Europeia, mas vamos continuar a bater-nos por ele, que é ele que serve os agricultores e o desenvolvimento.

     
       

     

      Milan Mazurek (ESN). – Vážený pán predsedajúci, keď človek v tomto pléne počúva názory niektorých extrémnych ľavicových vegánskych aktivistov, tak musí byť skutočne zdesený o budúcnosť a slobodu ľudí v Európskej únii. Normálne tu chcete ľuďom hovoriť, aby prestali jesť mäso, že majú prestať piť mlieko, že majú jesť nejakú sóju a že majú jesť len v laboratóriu vypestované mäso? Stále chcete niekomu prikazovať, čo má či nemá robiť?

    Ja vám teraz niečo poviem, vegáni, počúvajte ma dobre: Ja som mäsožravec. Jem mäso na kilá, pijem pol litra zdravého, čerstvého nepasterizovaného mlieka každý deň a v živote som nebol zdravší, ako som teraz. Preto ma vaša propaganda nezaujíma. A keď chcete žiť podľa vlastných pravidiel, robte to, ako chcete, ale nevnucujte to všetkým ľuďom v celej Európskej únii len preto, že ste presvedčení, že vaša agenda je pravdivá. Nie mäso, nie mlieko sú nezdravé, ale vaša nebezpečná propaganda, ktorá berie ľuďom slobodu a mení Európsku úniu na progresivistický nezmysel. To je skutočná hrozba pre ľudské zdravie.

     
       

     

      Katarína Roth Neveďalová (NI). – Vážený pán predsedajúci, pán komisár, veľmi ma zaujíma, ako sa Európska komisia vysporiada s predĺžením dohody s Ukrajinou o dovoze ukrajinských produktov na naše územie, pretože vieme, že my vo východnej Európe sme mali s tým veľký problém, a už sa blíži ten čas a je okolo toho veľmi ticho. Takže bola by som veľmi rada, keby ste možno mohli odpovedať.

    Slovenskí poľnohospodári aj poľnohospodári v Európskej únii si zaslúžia, samozrejme, rešpekt a úctu. A videli sme, že sme tu mali veľmi veľa protestov a veľa tých požiadaviek bolo, samozrejme, veľmi relevantných. V poľnohospodárstve by sme sa mali snažiť o zníženie byrokracie, o zníženie kontrol pre poľnohospodárov a som rada, že aj vďaka ich tlaku sa nám to čiastočne podarilo, pre tých menších v poslednom období.

    Môžeme hovoriť o potravinárstve. Ja som si všimla, že vo vašom predstavení takisto sa zaoberáte potravinárstvom. Je to druhý najväčší sektor v európskej ekonomike a myslím si, že by sme sa mali zameriavať aj na to, ako ochrániť potravinárov, ktorí vyrábajú veľmi veľa veľmi dôležitých a zdravých potravín v Európskej únii, ale aj v súvislosti s vývozom do krajín, ako sú Spojené štáty, kde nám hrozia momentálne takisto niektoré clá alebo dane na takýto dovoz. Samozrejme, diverzifikácia poľnohospodárstva je dôležitá aj v súvislosti s klimatickými zmenami a takisto by sme ju mali podporovať, ale hlavne zachovať peniaze v poľnohospodárstve pre ďalšie obdobie.

     
       


     

      Stefan Köhler (PPE). – Herr Präsident! Sehr geehrter Herr Kommissar, vielen Dank für Ihre Vision, die sehr gute Ansätze liefert für die Zukunft und endlich die Wertschätzung, die die Landwirtschaft benötigt, entgegenbringt. Aber eine Vision, das sind nur Ideen für die Zukunft. Wenn ich mit Landwirten rede – und Sie haben gesagt, Sie haben schon viele Länder besucht –, die wollen jetzt einfach Aktion sehen, die wollen an die Umsetzung rangehen: Da möchte ich Sie ermuntern.

    Und was brauchen wir für eine starke Umsetzung? Wir brauchen ein starkes Budget, ist heute öfters gesagt worden, wir brauchen aber auch Innovation und Forschung und vor allen Dingen Erleichterung – die bringen Sie ja jetzt demnächst auf den Weg; und ich bin auch dankbar, dass wir dafür auch einen starken Kommissar haben.

    Lassen Sie uns gemeinsam die Vision schnell angehen und umsetzen! Dazu sichere ich Ihnen meine persönliche Unterstützung, aber auch die unserer Fraktion zu.

     
       

       

    (Koniec vystúpení na základe prihlásenia sa o slovo zdvihnutím ruky)

     
       

     

      Christophe Hansen, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, thank you very much for this open and frank first exchange of views on the vision on the future of agriculture and food. I have the feeling that most of you are quite positive about this new direction – a new Commission that is going and putting farmers back in the centre and is also not afraid to speak about productivity in the farming and food‑producing sector. I believe this is very important due to the geopolitical challenges that we are going through.

    You all remember one year ago that the farmers took to the streets and they had three main concerns they expressed. One was reciprocity in standards. We are addressing this reciprocity, and we are taking the first steps now, and it is clearly stated in the vision. They ask for fairer prices.

    In the first ten days of the new mandate of this Commission, we presented a targeted amendment of the Common Market Organisation Regulation and the Unfair Trading Practices Directive. And we will deliver as well on the third part, which was clearly the administrative burden that was too heavy for the agriculture and food‑producing sectors. So I’m very keen to present, already in the month of April, a first simplification package based on the common agricultural policy, but more needs to follow.

    I have travelled to several Member States, and most of the concerns I got were not related to the common agricultural policy; it was the overlap of several European laws, but as well of national laws. So we have to work and deliver by the end of the year – and I clearly stated this and it is also part of the vision – a cross-cutting simplification package that will really touch to the farms and that is well needed.

    So on the three main concerns, we are delivering concretely now as well. But, of course, you are right when you say you are lacking some details on one part or the other. And, of course, you are right that the proof of the pudding will be in the tasting afterwards. And there I believe it is very important that we take up now the workstreams that are identified in this vision together, not only with the European Parliament, but as well with the newly created European Board on Agriculture and Food, which brings together not only the farming community, but also the entire food value chain and other citizens and NGOs. This is very important to depolarise the debate and find common solutions, and I think this will deliver.

    Of course, we have to be very aware as well, as some have stated, of concerns about the ‘common’ or the ‘c’ in ‘common agricultural policy’, which will remain very important as well to have a fair level playing field between the Member States and our different farming communities.

    I believe it is also important that we speak about the next steps, and there are very many workstreams on livestock, generation renewal. Those need to be addressed together, and I think that will bring us all together forward.

    Then, of course, we have several other initiatives. I haven’t yet mentioned the wine package, although some of you have mentioned the High‑Level Group on Wine. There as well we intend to deliver the proposal already in the month of April to be able to get relief to that sector too which is very much under pressure. I am looking very much forward to doing this work together with you.

    I think it is very important that we keep up the depolarising debate and put the farmers in the centre of the discussion, not only here, but I think it’s very important that, in general, the policies are meant not in opposition here from one side to another. That is not being helpful. Let’s work in the interest of the farmers. A lot has been delivered, and I’m looking forward to future exchanges.

    For those who are members of the AGRI Committee, we will see each other on 19 March. I’m ready to discuss further in detail with a little bit more extended time, and I’m very much looking forward to that good cooperation.

     
       

       

    IN THE CHAIR: VICTOR NEGRESCU
    Vice-President

    Written Statements (Rule 178)

     
       


     

     

      Christine Schneider (PPE), schriftlich. – Die heute debattierte Vision der EU-Kommission setzt die richtigen Schwerpunkte: mehr „Farm“ statt „Fork“. Eine anreizbasierte GAP ist der richtige Weg, um die Landwirtschaft zukunftsfähig und attraktiv zu halten. Es ist alarmierend, dass nur 12 % der Landwirte unter 40 Jahren sind. Ohne gezielte Einkommensunterstützung wird der Generationswechsel nicht möglich sein.

    Bürokratieabbau ist dringend notwendig. Die angekündigte „Simplification“-Initiative im zweiten Quartal ist ein wichtiger Schritt. Sie muss aber direkt auf den Höfen ankommen wie auch in der Verwaltung. Auch beim Pflanzenschutz braucht es eine bessere Balance: Verbote dürfen erst erfolgen, wenn praxistaugliche Alternativen verfügbar sind.

    Besonders positiv ist der Ansatz der nature credits. Statt auf weitere Verbote setzt dieser Mechanismus auf Anreize für nachhaltiges Wirtschaften – ein zukunftsweisender Ansatz.

    Diese Vision bietet Landwirten Planungssicherheit, stärkt ihre Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und ermöglicht Verbrauchern eine informierte Wahl. Europa braucht eine starke Landwirtschaft – mit weniger Bürokratie, fairen Einkommen und innovativen Lösungen. Hansen setzt hier die richtigen Impulse.

     

    3. Action Plan for Affordable Energy (debate)


     

      Dan Jørgensen, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, according to Google, in my home country, the name most searched for last year was actually Taylor Swift. I don’t know what it was in Strasbourg and Brussels, but I’m pretty sure I can guess. It was probably Mario Draghi.

    Indeed, the Draghi Report is extremely important. I’m sure you’ve also all read it and will know that it mentions energy quite a lot – 700 times actually. Why? Because European industries pay two to three times more for energy than their competitors in the US and China. Because last year almost 47 million Europeans were unable to adequately heat their homes due to the high prices. Because since the war began, Europe has imported fossil fuels from Russia for an amount equal to the cost price of 2 400 F-35 fighter jets.

    For our solidarity of Ukraine and for the security of Europe, this cannot continue. And because we need to fight even harder to decarbonise our economies, when the US steps out of the Paris Agreement, it means that the EU has to step up.

    For these reasons and more, the Commission has presented the European action plan for affordable energy: an ambitious strategy to reduce energy costs for households and businesses now, while building a clean, competitive and secure energy union for future generations.

    The first pillar of our plan is focused on immediate steps to lower energy costs. We set out how Member States can tackle inefficiencies in network tariffs and taxation to achieve a more rational energy system with significantly lower prices.

    We also push for the faster deployment of clean, affordable energy. There will be no backtracking. Instead, we will fast track. We will reduce permitting times for clean energy projects significantly. For simpler projects, it should take no longer than six months to get a permit – not years, not decades as is sometimes the case today. Six months.

    We also respond to Professor Draghi’s recommendation to decouple electricity prices from gas prices by boosting longer-term contracts for renewable energy, like power purchase agreements. We will work with the EIB to create new facilities to promote and de-risk these contracts.

    Additionally, as we decarbonise our economy, demand for gas declines, but it will remain a significant part of our energy mix for some time. Our action plan therefore targets fairer gas markets. To this end, we have set up a gas market taskforce to scrutinise the operation of EU gas markets and intervene when necessary.

    So, while the first pillar sets out immediate actions to lower energy bills, the second pillar responds to structural drivers of higher costs that require long-term solutions. We accelerate our paths towards an energy union that delivers competitiveness, security, decarbonisation and a just transition, passing the benefits of clean, affordable energy on to our citizens and businesses.

    This means massive investments in grids and interconnectors. According to the Commission estimates, the EU will need investments of over EUR 570 billion annually to boost renewables, energy efficiency and grids over the course of this decade. That is why later this year, we will introduce a clean energy investment strategy to streamline the use of financial instruments such as grants, loans and blended finance to maximise impact.

    We also need to modernise our systems through electrification and digitalisation. Upcoming initiatives announced in the action plan, such as the electrification action plan, heating and cooling strategy and strategic roadmap on digitalisation in AI, can yield remarkable cost savings and benefits for Europeans. For example, increased electrification could cut energy system costs by EUR 32 billion annually by 2030. Widespread heat pump adoption could slash fossil fuel import spending by EUR 60 billion until 2030.

    The third pillar of our action plan ensures scale and certainty for investments by establishing a tripartite contract for affordable energy. This contract brings together the public sector, clean energy developers and producers, and the energy consuming industry. Our goal is to enable shared commitments and coordinated planning, providing stability in the face of market uncertainties that would otherwise hold back investments in clean transition.

    The final pillar of our plan recognises that the energy crisis exposed critical vulnerabilities in our energy system. We need to learn from this experience and be better equipped. We will therefore revise the EU energy security framework to strengthen our resilience against emerging threats and prepare for future shocks.

    At the same time, we will enhance our crisis response to better prepare for situations such as the one faced by southeast Europe last summer. We will leverage smarter demand management and better cross-border cooperation to mitigate price peaks and ensure electricity flows where it is needed the most.

    What do all of these actions mean for homes and businesses in Europe? Well, taken together, we have the potential to deliver EUR 45 billion in savings just in 2025, growing to at least EUR 130 billion in annual savings by 2030 and to EUR 260 billion annually as of 2040. Overall, between now and 2040, we can save up to EUR 2.5 trillion on fossil fuel imports. Let me just repeat that number – that is huge. EUR 2.5 trillion we can save by deploying faster our renewable energy, by becoming more energy efficient, by controlling the gas markets better, by implementing legislation that’s already been made and by interconnecting our energy systems much better than is the case today.

    If and when we do all these things, we will become much more independent of Russian fuels, our competitiveness will be much better than it is today and we will have decarbonised our economy.

     
       

     

      Peter Liese, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Die Energiekosten runterzubringen, ist eine absolute Notwendigkeit: Unsere Wirtschaft und auch die Bürgerinnen und Bürger leiden unter den hohen Energiekosten. Und für die Ziele, die wir politisch haben – Klimaschutz, Unabhängigkeit von Importen – ist es absolut notwendig, vor allen Dingen die Stromkosten runter zu bekommen. Strom ist die Energie der Transformation zur Klimaneutralität. Ob beim Heizen, bei der Mobilität oder bei industriellen Prozessen: Nicht immer, aber meistens liegt die Antwort in der Elektrifizierung, und deswegen ist es irre, dass wir so hohe Strompreise haben.

    Ich kenne Leute, die sind im Jahr 2022 jeden Morgen klimaneutral mit einem Hybrid zur Arbeit gefahren, und dann haben sie ihre Stromrechnung gesehen und haben den Hybrid verkauft, weil wir die Strompreise nicht im Griff hatten. Und es gibt Menschen, die sagen – gerade in Ihrer Fraktion, Herr Kommissar: Das ETS 1 kann gar nicht ambitioniert genug sein, aber ETS 2 wollen wir nicht. Das ist genau das Gegenteil, was wir für die Transformation brauchen – wir brauchen niedrige Strompreise. Und Strom ist eben auch die Energie, um uns unabhängig von Russland, Aserbaidschan, Katar und anderen problematischen Lieferanten zu machen; deswegen müssen die Stromkosten runter.

    Aber Kosten sind immer das Produkt von Preis und Verbrauch; das heißt, wenn wir den Verbrauch senken durch Energieeffizienz, dann gehen die Kosten eben auch runter. Und deswegen ist es so wichtig, was Sie gesagt haben, Herr Kommissar: Wir brauchen eben auch die Energieeffizienz. Und ich bitte Sie, da noch intensiver mit der Europäischen Investitionsbank zu arbeiten, um z. B. ein Frontloading der ETS 2-Einnahmen zu haben, damit wir gerade Menschen mit niedrigen und mittleren Einkommen bei der Energieeffizienz so schnell wie möglich helfen können.

     
       

     

      Dan Nica, în numele grupului S&D. – Domnule președinte, domnule comisar Jørgensen, sunteți comisarul pentru energie al Uniunii Europene și aveți în fața dumneavoastră un mandat cu extrem de multe provocări. Piața energiei electrice a Uniunii Europene este într-o situație extrem de îngrijorătoare. În țara mea, România, luna trecută, prețul energiei electrice a ajuns la 160 de euro/megawatt‑oră, de mai mult de două ori mai mare decât în aceeași lună a anului trecut și mai mare decât în Franța, Germania, unde prețurile au fost mici, mult mai mici decât în România. Această situație trebuie să fie rezolvată de urgență, pentru că ea a condus la o situație extrem de îngrijorătoare pentru economia, de exemplu, a României. 70 de mari companii sunt în pericol de delocalizare pentru că aceste costuri ale energiei electrice și ale gazelor naturale fac imposibilă desfășurarea unor activități economice.

    Peste 300 de mii de oameni pot să-și piardă locurile de muncă. Una din cinci familii din România are probleme să își plătească în același timp, în aceeași lună, factura la energie și gaze naturale și să își cumpere mâncare sau haine. Acest lucru necesită o abordare imediată și o schimbare rapidă. Pe de o parte, trebuie să știm ce s-a întâmplat și ce se întâmplă cu cei care au recurs la practici înșelătoare, care au mințit și au încălcat legea. Sunt peste 300 de cazuri în investigații și vreau ca aceste soluții să apară, domnule comisar. În plus, vrem o piață, o piață bursieră a energiei și a gazelor, să știm și noi, să avem transparență totală: cine vinde, cât vinde, cine sunt acționarii, de ce apar aceste venituri excepționale, profituri excepționale care au devenit o regulă în Uniunea Europeană. Aceste lucruri necesită o abordare și știu că puteți face acest lucru. Aveți sprijinul meu și al Parlamentului European. Luați măsuri rapide și fără niciun fel de ezitare.

     
       

     

      András Gyürk, a PfE képviselőcsoport nevében. – Elnök Úr! A magas energiaárak az uniós polgárok mindennapjainak fájdalmas részévé váltak. Európában tavaly átlagosan minden negyedik családnak okozott nehézséget, rezsiszámlájának időben történő befizetése. Ez az eredménye az elhibázott brüsszeli energiapolitikának. A valósággal szembesülve immár a Bizottság is elismeri, hogy a jelenlegi energiaárszint tarthatatlan. Azonban ez a dokumentum nem jelent valódi megoldást a problémára.

    Először is, nem vizsgálja felül az energiaárakat magasba lökő szankciós politikát. Másodszor, nem vállalkozik az árdrágító hatású klímacélok módosítására. Harmadszor, Brüsszel újfent az európai árampiaci szabályozás azonnali bevezetését követeli. Ez ellehetetlenítené a lakosságot védő hatósági árak, mint például a magyar rezsicsökkentés alkalmazását, ami elfogadhatatlan. Tisztelt Ház, az energiaárak letöréséhez nem ehhez hasonlóan sajnos hatástalan bizottsági akciótervekre, hanem bátor intézkedésekre, ha úgy tetszik, a józan ész lázadás ára van szükség, mi, patrióták ezt képviseljük.

     
       

     

      Daniel Obajtek, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Panie Przewodniczący! Szanowny Panie Komisarzu! Przedstawienie przez panią przewodniczącą Ursulę von der Leyen planu obniżenia cen energii jest niczym innym jak skandalem. Nie zawiera żadnych realnych, szybkich mechanizmów, byśmy mogli jak najszybciej obniżyć ceny energii. Zaproponowane kontrakty różnicowe i kontrakty długoterminowe już były i te kontrakty nie pozwoliły na obniżenie tak naprawdę cen energii ani w Polsce, ani gdzie indziej.

    Propozycja obniżenia podatków to jest nic innego jak generalnie coś, co mogą zrobić państwa członkowskie. Wcale nie muszą o to prosić Komisji. Rozbudowa sieci. Macie rację, rozbudowa sieci, ale to potrwa tak naprawdę dekady i pochłonie miliardy euro. Nie jesteśmy w stanie szybko tego zrobić.

    Rozwiązania są następujące, proszę Państwa, żeby tu i teraz ratować przemysł, obniżyć cenę energii. Zawiesić kwestię ETS-u. Błyskawicznie ETS zreformować z jednej prostej przyczyny: nie mogą w systemie ETS-u być instytucje finansowe, które podnoszą ceny tak naprawdę ETS-u, i zamienić ETS na inwestycje, jeżeli chodzi o emitentów.

     
       

     

      Christophe Grudler, au nom du groupe Renew. – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, le plan pour une énergie abordable doit répondre à une urgence: réduire la facture énergétique de nos industries et de nos concitoyens, car sans une énergie stable et compétitive, il n’y a ni industrie ni prospérité. Aujourd’hui, les coûts de l’énergie pèsent jusqu’à 40 % des coûts de production des industries les plus énergivores. Nos entreprises paient leur électricité deux à trois fois plus cher que leurs concurrents chinois ou américains. Comment être compétitif dans ces conditions? Il faut agir dans trois directions.

    Tout d’abord, l’électrification, vous l’avez souligné. L’objectif de 32 % d’électrification d’ici 2030 est un bon cap; mais sans réseau modernisé, procédures accélérées, stockage et flexibilité, ce chiffre ne sera pas atteignable.

    Ensuite, les financements. 584 milliards d’euros seront nécessaires d’ici 2030, rien que pour renforcer les réseaux électriques. Il faut mobiliser tous les leviers publics et privés, sans alourdir la facture des entreprises et des citoyens.

    Enfin, la stabilité. Il est clair que les contrats de long terme offriront des prix plus stables et de la visibilité aux industriels. Ils doivent concerner, Monsieur le Commissaire, toutes les énergies propres, qu’elles soient renouvelables ou nucléaires.

    Une énergie abordable est une énergie que nous n’importons plus. Je terminerai donc par une question: où est passée la feuille de route pour sortir des énergies russes?

     
       

     

      Kira Marie Peter-Hansen, for Verts/ALE-Gruppen. – Hr. formand! Kære Dan. Tillykke med planen. Den har været spændende at læse, for vi står i en afgørende tid. Vores kommissionsformand beskrev os denne uge som Europas øjeblik. Jeg er enig. Jeg tror, at borgerne mere end nogensinde før, ser mod EU for at løse de store udfordringer, og derfor skal vi minde hinanden om, at den mest effektive vej til et sikkert, et uafhængigt og et bæredygtigt Europa, det går gennem en ambitiøs grøn omstilling. Det kræver, at vi gør Europa fri for fossile brændsler. Det kræver også, at vi modstår fristelsen til at jagte kortsigtede gevinster gennem investeringer i nye gasprojekter, som der ellers lægges op til.

    Vejen til lavere energipriser går gennem massive investeringer i grøn energi, ikke gennem fossile kontrakter. Mere sol og mere vind er den billigste og hurtigste måde at reducere vores CO2-aftryk på og undgå de katastrofale konsekvenser af klimakrisen. Mere sol og vind er også den billigste og hurtigste måde at opnå uafhængighed fra gamle mænd med imperialistiske ambitioner, og det er vores stærkeste kort til at sikre en konkurrencedygtig europæisk industri. Så derfor skal vi sikre mere grøn energi. Vi skal investere massivt i vedvarende grøn energi. Det er godt for kloden, det er godt for mennesker, og det er godt for økonomien. Vi skal drastisk reducere vores udledninger, derfor skal vi vedtage et ambitiøst 2040-mål for vores CO2-reduktioner og sætte gang i handling, der sørger for, at vi når Parisaftalen. Vi kan ikke blive ved med at forurene og forvente, at fremtidige generationer rydder op efter os.

    Med grøn energi kan vi samtidig skabe konkrete forandringer for helt almindelige mennesker i hverdagen. I dag kæmper over 41 millioner europæere med at betale deres energiregning. Det er et politisk svigt, for ingen børn skal gå rundt og fryse. Derfor skal vi energirenovere vores boliger. Vi skal investere i energieffektivitet, og vi skal holde hånden under dem, der har svært ved at få enderne til at mødes. Billig, grøn energi er ikke bare godt for klimaet. Det er socialpolitik, der sikrer, at alle kan leve et værdigt liv.

    Billig og grøn energi er også den bedste hjælp, vi kan give de virksomheder, der skal ud at konkurrere med Kina og USA. Derfor skal vi fjerne de barrierer, der gør det svært at tilslutte grøn strøm til elnettet. Alt, der kan elektrificeres, skal elektrificeres. Det er vejen til et stærkt og konkurrencedygtigt europæisk erhvervsliv. Det kræver mod at træffe de beslutninger, men som Van der Leyen sagde, så er det her Europas øjeblik, og vi kan godt!

     
       

     

      Dario Tamburrano, a nome del gruppo The Left. – Signor Presidente, signor Commissario, onorevoli colleghi, venerdì un rapporto di Bloomberg – che noto non essere un collettivo di un centro sociale – stimava che con l’ETS2 i prezzi del gas per le famiglie saliranno del 20% già dal 2027 e del 43% nel 2030.

    L’ETS2 è stato proposto e negoziato per aumentare artificialmente i prezzi del gas, per orientare le scelte energetico-impiantistiche e ridurre le emissioni. Io e il mio gruppo siamo fortemente a favore della decarbonizzazione di trasporti e riscaldamento, ma essa va raggiunta senza renderla insostenibile a famiglie, imprese e pubbliche amministrazioni, già gravate dai costi energetici, dalla stagnazione economica industriale e dal ridotto gettito fiscale.

    Oggi che il gas è già molto costoso per motivi esogeni, questo meccanismo va rivisto urgentemente. Il Fondo sociale per il clima non è probabilmente sufficiente. Mi sarei aspettato delle proposte di modifica in un piano d’azione chiamato per l’energia accessibile: non c’è nulla, ma siamo ancora in tempo per correggere il tiro.

    Va disaccoppiato il costo dell’elettricità dal gas e non aumentato il prezzo del gas.

     
       

     

      Станислав Стоянов, от името на групата ESN. – Г-н Председател, достъпната енергия означава евтина енергия, а най-евтините и надеждни източници днес са ядрената и въглищна енергия. Вместо да ги отхвърляме под натиска на идеологически догми, трябва да ги разглеждаме като ключови за стабилността на нашата енергийна система.

    Ние подкрепяме напредъка и опазването на околната среда, но това не означава, че трябва с лека ръка да се откажем от работещи и достъпни технологии, особено в такива несигурни времена. Индустриите ни се нуждаят от предвидима енергия, а гражданите от сметки, които могат да си позволят. Достъпната енергия означава и сигурни доставки на ресурси. Отказът от енергийни източници заради налагане на санкции означава по-скъпа и съответно по-недостъпна енергия. За да гарантираме достъпност и икономическа стабилност, се нуждаем от всички възможни енергийни източници. Всяко необмислено ограничаване на тези възможности води до по-високи цени, по-слаба индустрия и обедняване на европейските граждани.

     
       

     

      Raúl de la Hoz Quintano (PPE). – Señor presidente, la Comisión señala en su comunicación que la energía nuclear es clave para la descarbonización, también para la seguridad del suministro y, por supuesto, para el abaratamiento del coste de la energía. En línea con esto, la mayoría de los Estados de la Unión se están planteando nuevas inversiones en el ámbito de la energía nuclear o, al menos, la prolongación de la vida útil de sus plantas. Solo hay un país cuyo Gobierno va a la contra y se está planteando el cierre de las centrales nucleares que existen en su territorio: España. Y no lo hace por cuestiones técnicas o de seguridad. Lo hace única y exclusivamente por sectarismo, por radicalismo ideológico.

    Es el legado de la señora Ribera, el legado que nos deja en España, y tiene como consecuencia inmediata el cierre, en el año 2027, de la central nuclear de Almaraz, una central nuclear que genera el 7 % de la electricidad que se consume en nuestro país. Ni que decir tiene cuál va a ser la repercusión en términos económicos, de empleo y, por supuesto, también en el precio de la factura eléctrica que pagamos en nuestro país. Así que mientras en Europa se plantea el debate en torno al abaratamiento del coste de la energía, en nuestro país seguimos anclados en el debate de «renovables sí, nucleares no». Entiendan ustedes que así es imposible avanzar.

    No es en absoluto el momento de los dogmatismos energéticos e ideológicos. Es el momento del pragmatismo económico. Si no entendemos esto, es imposible que asumamos el concepto de competitividad.

     
       

     

      Γιάννης Μανιάτης (S&D). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, αγαπητέ Επίτροπε, οι τιμές ηλεκτρισμού και φυσικού αερίου αυξήθηκαν δραστικά στην Ευρώπη, σε αντίθεση με τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, που τελικά είναι ο μόνος ωφελημένος από την εισβολή της Ρωσίας στην Ουκρανία. Ασφαλώς η φορολογία της ενέργειας, όπου η Ελλάδα είναι δυστυχώς αρνητικός πρωταθλητής, τα τέλη δικτύου, οι χρόνοι αδειοδότησης κλπ., όλα αυτά, αυξάνουν το κόστος ενέργειας, και ορθά ζητάτε να αντιμετωπιστούν. Όμως το βασικό πρόβλημα είναι ότι, ενώ οι ανανεώσιμες πηγές, που όλοι σωστά προωθούμε, έχουν μικρότερο κόστος παραγωγής σε σχέση με τα ορυκτά, αυτό δεν αντανακλάται ακόμα στις τιμές για τους καταναλωτές. Χρειαζόμαστε, λοιπόν, επενδύσεις σε δίκτυα, διασυνδέσεις, αποθήκευση, με τουλάχιστον υπερδιπλασιασμό των κονδυλίων ενέργειας του Connecting Europe Facility.

    Όμως δεν είμαστε ευχαριστημένοι ούτε με την ανύπαρκτη διαφάνεια, ούτε με την αναποτελεσματική λειτουργία, ούτε με τη μηδενική εποπτεία πολλών αγορών ενέργειας στα κράτη μέλη. Τέλος, θα ήθελα να σας ρωτήσω πώς θα αντιμετωπιστούν οι διαχρονικά αυξημένες τιμές ενέργειας σε Ελλάδα, Βουλγαρία, Ρουμανία σε σχέση με την υπόλοιπη Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση.

     
       

     

      Ondřej Knotek (PfE). – Mr President, dear colleagues, Commissioner, I naively thought that the aim of the affordable energy action plan was to provide affordable energy. But I tell you something: this plan will achieve no substantial energy cost reductions, because you, the European Commission, repeat the same failures as in the past.

    You are obsessed by an energy mix based on renewables. You blindly push forward the electricity market integration. You have disrespect for the existing reliable coal industry. You are failing to place nuclear on the forefront of the energy transition in parallel to renewables. You egotistically insist on maintaining unsustainable EU climate goals. You completely ignore what’s going on in the US and in the BRICS countries. And you naively believe that you will mobilise private capital through your bad plan.

    You will not, and your plan will fail. So if you really want to help, Commissioner, cap immediately the ETS price at EUR 30, and instead of bringing new climate targets for 2040, please cancel the existing targets for 2030 and 2050.

    (The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question)

     
       



     

      Francesco Torselli (ECR). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, è impossibile non condividere un piano d’azione che si prefigge di arginare la povertà energetica e di arginare l’aumento dei prezzi.

    I dubbi, semmai, ci arrivano sulle modalità che vogliamo mettere in campo per raggiungere questi obiettivi: nei prossimi 25 anni, ci dicono i dati, il consumo energetico in UE raddoppierà e le reti elettriche nazionali dovranno essere estese di almeno il 70%.

    E noi con quali mezzi economici ci possiamo prefissare il raggiungimento di questi obiettivi? Basterà la contrattazione a lungo termine? Basterà dire agli Stati membri: “Diminuite le tasse?”. Basterà dire: “Miglioriamo il mercato del gas?”. Ad oggi per noi la risposta è “no”.

    Servono investimenti concreti e azioni concrete; servono per mantenere, Commissario, quelle promesse che lei ha fatto per risolvere il tema della povertà energetica. Ad oggi mancano le ricette: io non ho sentito da lei una parola su biofuel e biogas, per esempio, che sono ricette assolutamente valide per conseguire i nostri obiettivi.

     
       

     

      Martin Hojsík (Renew). – Vážený pán predsedajúci, pán komisár, vysoké ceny energie škodia ľuďom aj firmám. Ohrozujú prosperitu, konkurencieschopnosť. Energetická chudoba špeciálne na Slovensku ohrozuje štvrtinu domácností. Kde je príčina? Povedzme si to rovno: z veľkej časti v našej závislosti na dovážanom fosílnom plyne. Najdrahšie plynové elektrárne určujú cenu všetkej elektriny, kolega Knotek.

    Preto vítam plán pre cenovo dostupnú energiu Európskej komisie. Obsahuje opatrenia pre zníženie platieb ako domácnostiam, tak priemyslu. Zlepšuje našu pripravenosť na krízy. Verím, že zníži účty pre domácnosti a firmy a hlavne posilní našu odolnosť voči krízam. A rieši aj hlavnú príčinu problému: závislosť od dovážaných fosílnych palív. Do roku 2030 môže pomôcť ušetriť 130 miliárd eur. Môže.

    A tu je to kľúčové. Bude závisieť od toho, či ten plán premeníme na skutky, či členské štáty vrátane Slovenska naozaj začnú robiť kroky, alebo budú niektoré ďalej hádzať polená pod nohy rozvoju zelenej energie a energetickým úsporám. Pretože bez nich budeme mať naďalej vysoké ceny a budeme závislí.

    (Rečník súhlasil, že odpovie na otázku položenú zdvihnutím modrej karty)

     
       

     

      Bogdan Rzońca (ECR), pytanie zadane przez podniesienie niebieskiej kartki. – Bardzo uważnie słuchałem Pana wystąpienia i wiem, że Pan się na tym zna. I mam prośbę, nie tylko pytanie, ale prośbę, dlatego, że poszukuję bardzo detalicznych informacji na temat kosztu budowy średniej farmy wiatrowej w Europie. Ile trzeba żwiru, cementu, wody, metalu, metali szlachetnych? Ile to wszystko kosztuje? I nigdzie nie mogę tego znaleźć. Czy Pan może mi wskazać źródło, bo chciałbym porównać. Gdyż Pan mówił o wielkich kosztach i cenach gazu, a ja nie mogę znaleźć, jak rozmawiam z wyborcami, jakie są koszty budowy farmy wiatrowej? Proszę o taką informację.

     
       


     

      Marina Mesure (The Left). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, nous le savons tous ici: le prix de l’électricité est déterminant pour notre compétitivité. Or, l’électricité est trois fois plus chère en Europe que chez nos concurrents. Malheureusement, votre plan d’action pour l’énergie abordable ne règle rien. Vous affichez une ambition de découpler le prix de l’électricité de celui du gaz. C’est un objectif louable et d’ailleurs, Ursula von der Leyen le promettait, elle aussi, dans son discours sur l’état de l’Union en 2022. Pourtant, trois ans plus tard, le prix du gaz augmente de nouveau et rien ne change.

    Par ailleurs, rien ne nous protège du président américain, qui pourrait menacer d’augmenter les prix du GNL, que nous importons massivement des États-Unis. Nous n’avons plus les moyens de payer encore une fois le prix de notre dépendance, que ce soit à la Russie ou aux États-Unis.

    De nombreux secteurs industriels stratégiques pour notre souveraineté sont aux abois. La précarité énergétique touche 10 % des foyers européens. La solution est pourtant simple, et nous le répétons en commission comme ici dans l’hémicycle: proposez une réforme du marché de l’électricité, cette fois-ci ambitieuse; ayez le courage de sortir du dogme du marché et de privilégier l’intérêt général, plutôt que ceux des énergéticiens.

     
       

     

      Milan Mazurek (ESN). – Vážený pán predsedajúci, máme trojnásobne vyššiu cenu elektriny než v Spojených štátoch amerických, päťnásobne vyššiu cenu plynu než v Spojených štátoch a to ani nehovorme o tom, ako vysoko sa líšia ceny nafty alebo benzínu. A prečo je tomu tak? No jednoducho preto, že máme Európsku komisiu, ktorá zaviedla politiky, ktoré k tomuto cieľu neskôr viedli. Je to kvôli tomu, že počúvame ľavicových marxistických extrémistov s ich zeleným podvodom, ktorý planétu nezachráni, nič nezmení, ale ľuďom predraží ich život.

    Dnes, keď sa pozrieme na to, čo sa deje v USA, ktorí odstupujú od týchto nezmyslov, alebo na Čínu, ktorá otvára skoro dve uhoľné elektrárne za týždeň, tak vidíme, že celý svet nám uniká. A kým ľudia v Európe si už ani len nemôžu zakladať rodiny, pretože nedokážu platiť svoje mesačné účty, tak príde Komisia a povie, že ona má riešenie. Tá Komisia, ktorá to spôsobila, nám povie, že musíme investovať ešte viac do zeleného podvodu, ešte viac do zelených nezmyslov a že sa to nakoniec rieši. Je šialenstvom robiť to isté stále dookola a očakávať odlišný výsledok.

    (Rečník odmietol otázku, ktorú zdvihnutím modrej karty položila Jadwiga Wiśniewska)

     
       

     

      Kateřina Konečná (NI). – Pane předsedající, říká se, že starého psa novým trikům nenaučíš. Myslím, že Komise pod vedením předsedkyně von der Leyenové tímto starým psem je. Akční plán pro dostupné ceny energií je totiž opakováním toho samého, co slyšíme od vypuknutí krize s cenami energií, i když vidíme, že dosud plány Komise na jejich zlevnění nefungovaly. Přesto je podpora obnovitelných zdrojů jediné, s čím Komise neustále přichází.

    Energie určitě nebudou dostupnější a levnější, pokud jádro zůstane opomenuto. Naopak jádro musí být podporováno alespoň tak jako obnovitelné zdroje. Nemusíte hledat nový zdroj levného plynu ze zahraničí, protože ten již existuje, jen jste na něj z politických důvodů uvalili sankce a ruský plyn teď dráže překupujete. Zrušte proto sankce! Podpořte členské státy v úplném zestátnění energetických firem, protože pokud bude s elektřinou zacházeno jako se zbožím, tak se také nikam nepohneme. Nic z toho v plánu Komise není, a pokud Komise není schopna se z minulosti poučit, pak je načase se zamyslet, zda ji není čas vyměnit.

     
       

     

      Angelika Winzig (PPE). – Herr Präsident, Herr Kommissar! Die hohen Energiepreise gefährden die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Europas. Jetzt ist schnelles Handeln gefordert, um den Kostendruck vor allem für unsere Betriebe zu reduzieren. Herr Kommissar, Sie haben gute Ansätze vorgelegt, aber eines hat mir gefehlt, und zwar, wenn ich an den Netzausbau denke. Immer mehr Bürgerinnen und Bürger verhindern wichtige Leitungsprojekte. Auch wenn ich heute heimfahre, komme ich an einem tollen Infrastrukturprojekt vorbei, das wahrscheinlich nicht umgesetzt werden kann. Vermehrt kommt es jetzt auch dazu, dass die Bürgerinnen und Bürger Erdkabel fordern, die natürlich wesentlich teurer sind; das führt natürlich dazu, dass auch Investoren häufig abspringen.

    Herr Kommissar, ich glaube, wir brauchen einen ganzheitlichen Ansatz, um Mitgliedstaaten, Gemeinden, vor allem auch die Bürgermeister, aber auch die Bürgerinnen und Bürger einzubeziehen, wie wir das schaffen, damit grenzüberschreitende Stromverbindungen wirklich möglich sind.

     
       

     

      Nicolás González Casares (S&D). – Señor presidente, señor comisario, no nos engañemos, la energía en Europa siempre ha sido más cara que en otros lugares como los Estados Unidos. ¿Por qué? Porque estaba basada en los combustibles fósiles. Está muy claro.

    Además, hemos visto cómo los amigos de Putin o los aliados de Trump, esos caballos de Troya, defienden consumir combustibles fósiles y apostar por más y más gas. Nosotros debemos ir en la dirección contraria: seguir con el Pacto Verde Europeo, confiar en fuentes de energías renovables que no emiten gases y, además, nos ayudan a luchar contra el cambio climático. Esa es nuestra garantía de éxito, esa es nuestra seguridad energética. Y es cierto que seguimos teniendo riesgos. Por lo tanto, reducir nuestro consumo de energías fósiles es el camino.

    Pero, además, siempre hemos defendido desde este grupo desacoplar los precios de la electricidad de los precios del gas. Creo que debemos avanzar en todas las oportunidades que nos permite la reforma del mercado eléctrico. Por lo tanto, señor Jørgensen, ¿por qué no adelantar la revisión de los mercados a corto plazo prevista en esta reforma? Se puede y se debe hacer, manteniendo la seguridad regulatoria.

    (El orador acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul»)

     
       




     

      Kateřina Konečná (NI), otázka položená zvednutím modré karty. – Pane kolego, já bych s vámi v podstatě, kromě té obrany, úplně souhlasila. Podepsala bych všechno, co jste řekl, ale vy jste členem vládní strany a já se vás ptám: Kdy česká vláda pod vedením vašeho premiéra Fialy přijde na Evropskou radu a navrhne tam, aby se zrušila nebo změnila taxonomie a aby se zrušil nebo změnil systém emisních povolenek tak, aby opravdu došlo ke snížení ceny elektrické energie? Já vám děkuju za to, co tady říkáte. Česká vláda zatím nemá odvahu cokoliv z toho udělat, nejen v České republice, ale ani to přenést na evropskou úroveň.

     
       

     

      Ondřej Krutílek (ECR), odpověď na otázku položenou zvednutím modré karty. – Paní kolegyně, pokud víte, tak česká vláda pracuje na jiných věcech týkajících se Green Deal, když už se bavíme o automobilovém průmyslu. Co se týče ETS, tak rozvíjíme iniciativy, které povedou minimálně k odložení ETS2 o rok až dva. A co se týče těch dalších věcí, o kterých jsem tady hovořil, tak jsem v kontaktu s lidmi, kteří k tomu mají co říct v Radě, naslouchají mi a je to běh na trošičku delší trať. Ale nebojte, pracujeme na tom.

     
       

     

      Isabel Serra Sánchez (The Left). – Señor presidente, señor comisario, cuando se inició la guerra de Ucrania ustedes dijeron que, con la escalada bélica, aumentando el gasto militar íbamos a ser más independientes y más soberanos; hoy se ve que eso es una gran mentira. Tras tres años somos más dependientes —sobre todo energéticamente— de los Estados Unidos, que desde el año 2018 ha aumentado su exportación de gas licuado un 1 749 %. Quien se ha forrado con la guerra, aparte de las grandes empresas armamentísticas, son las empresas energéticas. Y ahora, frente a su fracaso, proponen más gasto militar y recortes de los derechos sociales, lo que aumenta también la pobreza energética.

    Este Plan que proponen hoy es papel mojado, lo saben perfectamente, en una Unión Europea donde hay nada menos que 42 millones de personas que sufren pobreza energética y donde, desde sus inicios, el mercado energético es un oligopolio, un robo y una estafa a la ciudadanía. Para bajar la factura de la luz, para que seamos realmente soberanos, hacen falta más impuestos a las grandes energéticas, una intervención decidida del mercado energético, control público y paz.

     
       

     

      Siegbert Frank Droese (ESN). – Herr Präsident, verehrte Kollegen! Das einzig Richtige im Aktionsplan für erschwingliche Energie ist die Feststellung der Tatsache, dass es zu hohe Energiepreise gibt. Falsch im Plan sind dagegen die Ursachen, die genannt werden, z. B. Verbrauch der Konsumenten oder gar das Wetter – was für ein Unfug steht da drin!

    Richtig ist: Die ganze Energiepolitik der EU ist falsch. Falsch ist besonders die Abkopplung von günstigen Gas- und Ölimporten aus Russland. Daher sagen wir: Wettbewerbskompass – weg damit! Aktionspläne – weg damit! Flaggschiffprojekte oder Pilotprogramme – weg damit!

    Die EU muss einfach ökonomisch denken, profitorientiert und nicht grün-ideologisch. Wir brauchen Marktwirtschaft statt Planwirtschaft, weg mit dem grünen Energiesozialismus. Die Lösung in der Energiefrage ist nicht clean energy, sondern cheap energy. Solange das die Kommission nicht begreift, wäre es bei den Aktivitäten der Kommission für die Menschen besser, Sie würden gar nichts tun. Die fossilen Brennstoffe sind nicht das Problem, sondern die Fossile in der Kommission sind das Problem – da darf sich der Herr Kommissar ruhig angesprochen fühlen. Und man kann daher nur hoffen, dass die aussterben wie die Dinosaurier.

    (Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

     
       


     

      Siegbert Frank Droese (ESN), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Herr Kollege, ich weiß nicht, wie alt Sie sind, aber es ist Ihnen sicherlich entgangen, dass wir in Zeiten des Kalten Krieges mit der früheren Sowjetunion – die ja durchaus deutlich aggressiver gegenüber dem Westen auftrat als das heutige Russland das eigentlich tut – sehr, sehr gute Verträge gehabt haben. Ich weiß nicht, wo hier das Problem ist.

    Also, für uns ist wichtig, dass wir unseren Verbrauchern günstige Energie zur Verfügung stellen. Die Administration in den USA hat das erkannt. Wir hoffen sehr als deutsche Volksvertreter, dass Nordstream 2 repariert wird und dass wir dann dort gemeinsam als amerikanisch‑russisches Projekt Nordstream 2 wieder günstige Energie beziehen können. Das ist eine absolute Frage der Souveränität; günstige Energie ist auch eine Form von Souveränität.

     
       


     

      Katarína Roth Neveďalová (NI). – Vážený pán predsedajúci, kolegovia, dostupná energia je právo, nie privilégium pre ľudí a mali by sme sa snažiť, aby ceny energií boli celkovo dostupné pre občanov, nielen pre firmy, ale aj pre občanov. Viacerí kolegovia tu hovorili o tom, že ako môžeme porovnávať ceny v Spojených štátoch amerických a Európskej únii, koľkonásobne vyššie sú ceny v Európskej únii oproti Spojeným štátom, čo znižuje našu konkurencieschopnosť a zvyšuje cenu našich produktov. Toto je jedna z vecí, na ktoré by sme sa mali viacej pozrieť.

    Takisto si myslím, že odstrihávanie sa od lacných zdrojov a fosílnych palív je nesprávnym krokom, ktorý Európska únia robí, a mali by sme ho prehodnotiť. Takisto si myslím, že keď hovoríme o kúrení a teple, zákaz kotlov na fosílne palivá bolo zlé riešenie. A keď budeme všetko iba elektrifikovať, tej elektriny nemáme momentálne dostatok a musíme tým pádom viac budovať aj siete. A oceňujem, že Komisia to takisto chce robiť.

    Takisto by som chcela povedať, pán komisár Jørgensen, že veľmi oceňujem váš príspevok do debaty, ktorú má Slovenská republika s Ukrajinou, kde sa snažíme obnoviť tranzit plynu cez ukrajinské územie pre Slovenskú republiku, aby sme mali lepšiu bezpečnosť energetickú aj pre Slovákov, ale aj pre celú východnú a strednú Európu.

     
       

     

      Aura Salla (PPE). – Mr President, the affordable energy action plan has a market-based approach, but execution is the key. We must accelerate investment, cut red tape and ensure that competition – not subsidies – drives our transition. Europe cannot afford to slip into state-driven energy markets. Overreliance on government planning will drive investment elsewhere and hidden subsidies would distort price signals.

    As the Nordic model shows, a market-based, diverse and clean energy mix lowers energy costs. And yes, nuclear power is one of the key elements in this mix. Europe can do the same: scale renewables, strengthen our grids and develop long-term contract models.

    We must invest in grids. But this is not a cost; it is a down payment on lower energy bills, cheaper transport and industrial competitiveness.

    So, let’s be clear: free markets, competition and private investments must lead our energy transition.

     
       

     

      Bruno Gonçalves (S&D). – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, colegas, investir na produção de energia renovável não é uma questão ideológica: é a aposta certa para uma Europa que quer mais autonomia estratégica, uma trajetória favorável de preços e menos emissões poluentes.

    Sabemos que, no curto prazo, será muito difícil competir com os preços de energia, seja dos competidores americanos, seja dos competidores chineses. Temos falta de recursos naturais endógenos e a dependência do gás barato da Rússia, que agora se extingue, inibiu durante muito tempo o investimento em alternativas. Mas o caminho é este — e o caminho é certo.

    Comissário Jørgensen, terá todo o meu apoio para o seu plano para a energia acessível. Mas, como diz o relatório Draghi, há uma forma de a Europa aliviar já, hoje, os preços da eletricidade. E isso é caminhar para acabar com a indexação do preço do gás. Contamos consigo para essa batalha.

    A política energética e a transição climática precisam de entregar resultados para as pessoas e para as pequenas e médias empresas, não para grandes empresas do setor energético, nem para especuladores do sistema financeiro, cujos interesses não são os interesses europeus.

    (O orador aceita responder a uma pergunta «cartão azul»)

     
       

     

      João Oliveira (The Left), Pergunta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Senhor Deputado Bruno Gonçalves, este plano de ação para preços de energia acessíveis anuncia a intenção de desacoplar o preço da energia do preço do gás, como, de resto, referiu na sua intervenção, mas faz esse anúncio de forma muito tímida e não introduz nenhuma alteração de fundo ao mecanismo de formação de preços.

    E, portanto, o que isso significa é que a energia produzida a partir de fontes renováveis — e mais barata — continua a ser paga aos preços, mais altos e voláteis, do gás.

    E a pergunta que lhe faço, por isso, é se é possível, nestas condições, esperar mesmo que os preços da energia baixem para as famílias e para as empresas ou se, pelo contrário, vão continuar elevados, a alimentar os lucros dos grupos económicos do setor energético.

     
       

     

      Bruno Gonçalves (S&D), Resposta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Caro Deputado, como mencionei na minha intervenção — e menciona também bem —, o mais importante neste momento é reduzir o preço para as famílias, para as pequenas e médias empresas, para quem precisa.

    Isso significa, obviamente, olhar para o mecanismo de formação de preços, entendê-lo e reformulá-lo. E é por isso que eu vejo com muito agrado que esta Comissão, pela primeira vez, encara este desafio e diz, desde logo, não só para o futuro, como para o presente, que os Estados‑Membros têm também a responsabilidade de desenhar mecanismos que possam prever já isso.

    Olhe o nosso caso em Portugal: é responsabilidade do Governo português começar já a desenhar esses mecanismos, esse mecanismo de desacoplamento. Não é aceitável que, num país onde a produção renovável é tão alta, os preços continuem como estão.

    E, portanto, essa é uma boa medida, essa é uma boa proposta.

     
       

     

      Kris Van Dijck (ECR). – Voorzitter, commissaris, de energiekosten in de EU zijn te hoog en daar lijden dus de burgers en onze ondernemingen onder. De vraag is dus: “hoe maken we die energie goedkoper, terwijl we ook steeds meer elektriciteit nodig hebben?” Ik volg de Commissie als het gaat om de realisatie van de energie-unie en onder andere het beter connecteren van het Europese net.

    Maar wat mis ik toch wel in deze nota? Dat is de plaats van, ook op korte termijn, kernenergie, die zeker betaalbaar, efficiënt en schoon is. De elektriciteitsprijs wordt bepaald door de duurste productie. Die moet vervangen worden en dat doe je dus niet door het sluiten van kerncentrales. Ik geef een voorbeeld: in februari betaalden een Belgisch gezin en een Belgische kmo 50 % meer voor elektriciteit dan een Frans gezin of een Franse kmo. En ja, waar zit het verschil, denk je? Ik vraag dus, mijnheer de commissaris, met aandrang om de ideologische vooringenomenheid die de Europeanen veel geld kost, te stoppen en naar de volledige systeemkosten van elke technologie te kijken.

     
       

     

      Gabriella Gerzsenyi (PPE). – Elnök úr! Magyar családok százezrei fáznak a saját otthonukban, és vannak, akik télen megfagynak. Orbán Viktor a versenyképesség élharcosának mutatja magát, miközben elhanyagolják az infrastruktúra fejlesztését. Magyarország több áramot importál, mint Németország. Az ipari fogyasztók pedig az Európai Unió ötödik legmagasabb áramszámláját fizetik. Hatalmas energiaigényű kínai akkumulátorgyárakat építenek az országban, és nem csökkentik az orosz fosszilis forrásoktól való függőséget.

    Megjegyzem, lehet, hogy ezentúl az amerikai forrásokra fognak áttérni, hiszen tudjuk, hogy Orbánnak nem csak Putyin, hanem Trump is a barátja. Mi a Tisza Pártnál azon dolgozunk, hogy a diverzifikálás, az energiahatékonyság és a megújulók, például a geotermikus energia jobb kihasználása révén minden magyar számára biztosítsuk az otthon melegét.

     
       


     

      Massimiliano Salini (PPE). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, il piano proposto dalla Commissione europea va nella direzione corretta per molti motivi, individuando strumenti di carattere finanziario o interventi di carattere infrastrutturale che certamente aiuteranno a ridurre l’impatto del costo dell’energia.

    Il problema è che la gran parte dei provvedimenti individuati all’interno di questo piano sono lenti, cioè genereranno nel lungo termine gli effetti auspicati. Noi abbiamo bisogno di interventi anche, che, però, consentano oggi a chi consuma energia, in particolare la nostra industria energivora, di avere effetti positivi.

    Il Commissario ha fatto correttamente riferimento alla necessità di disaccoppiare in forme particolari il calcolo del prezzo dell’energia, distinguendo l’energia prodotta da fonti fossili da quella da fonti rinnovabili.

    Ma non viene messo in discussione la possibilità, almeno, della revisione del disegno del mercato elettrico. Valutiamo di fare una vera valutazione dell’impatto di questo disegno, perché è stato costruito in tempi troppo diversi da quelli attuali.

     
       

     

      Thomas Pellerin-Carlin (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, pour rester maîtres de notre destin, maîtrisons nos prix de l’électricité. Mon pays, la France, produit déjà de l’électricité décarbonée en abondance, grâce au nucléaire et aux renouvelables. Pour rester maîtres de notre destin, nous devons investir massivement dans toutes les énergies renouvelables, y compris l’éolien terrestre, les énergies marines et le solaire sur toiture. Cela nous permettra de continuer à produire de l’électricité à un prix abordable, tout en respectant les objectifs européens fixés dans les plans nationaux en matière d’énergie et de climat. Pour rester maître de notre destin, le gouvernement français doit écouter la Commission européenne et arrêter d’augmenter les taxes sur l’électricité.

    Chers collègues, nous disposons aujourd’hui de tous les outils pour mieux maîtriser les prix de l’électricité. À nous d’en faire bon usage. C’est ainsi que nous restaurerons la confiance dans les prix de l’électricité pour aider nos industriels, nos collectivités locales et nos citoyens à pouvoir faire sereinement le choix de l’électrique.

     
       

     

      Bruno Tobback (S&D). – Voorzitter, commissaris, collega’s, nog erger dan een half miljard Europeanen te laten gijzelen door Vladimir Poetin is om een half miljard Europeanen laten gijzelen door Donald Trump én Vladimir Poetin. De beste manier om daaraan te ontkomen, is aan onze welvaart te bouwen met de energie die we zelf produceren en controleren. Dat is ook de basis van uw actieplan. Laat ons nu zorgen voor actie.

    De Europese energie-unie moet meer zijn dan een verzameling van 27 aparte energiemarkten met te hoge prijzen, waar burgers niet alleen moeten betalen voor dure stroom omdat we die met gas moeten produceren, maar zelfs moeten betalen wanneer ze zelf groene stroom produceren en gratis leveren, omdat onze netten niet in staat zijn om die te brengen naar de bedrijven die erom smeken. In een markt die schreeuwt om goedkope energie is het absurd dat honderden projecten waarmee goedkope stroom kan worden geproduceerd, vandaag wachten op een aansluiting.

    Commissaris, iedere politicus droomt ervan om te verbinden. Enfin, misschien niet iedereen in dit halfrond, maar toch velen. Verbindingen vermenigvuldigen is vandaag de beste garantie voor lagere energieprijzen voor onze gezinnen en voor onze bedrijven. Laat die kans niet liggen.

     
       

     

      Elena Sancho Murillo (S&D). – Señor presidente, señor comisario Jørgensen, con la publicación del Plan de Acción para una Energía Asequible, la Comisión reconoce que los obstáculos fundamentales para la competitividad europea siguen siendo los precios de la energía y la dependencia de la energía fósil externa. Este es un gran paso en la dirección correcta.

    Sí, tenemos que reducir las tarifas de red y tenemos que aportar más oferta y flexibilidad al sistema acortando los plazos de autorización, aumentando la velocidad a la que incorporamos las energías renovables y desacoplando los precios de las renovables de los precios de los combustibles fósiles. La Comisión también señala de manera correcta en este Plan algunos de los principales cuellos de botella que siguen obstaculizando nuestros objetivos, como la capacidad de red y, especialmente, las interconexiones.

    Además, este Plan debe ir más allá y poner el foco en un aspecto realmente decisivo: el de la inversión pública. Debemos ser capaces de reducir los precios de las tarifas e invertir para mejorar y ampliar nuestras redes e interconexiones. Debemos tomar ejemplo del trabajo que lleva haciendo el Gobierno de España estos últimos años, optando por las energías renovables y consiguiendo una bajada histórica de los precios.

    Trabajemos por una Unión Europea limpia, conectada y competitiva que no deje a nadie atrás.

     
       

     

      Michael McNamara (Renew). – Mr President, I’m not here very long, but already I have the impression that this place operates like a bubble. I’ve listened to numerous speeches this week saying that the only thing that our citizens care about is defence. Colleagues, I do not believe for a moment that this Parliament will be judged on whether or not there are soldiers wearing the European Union insignia on their shoulder in five years’ time. The success or failure of this Parliament will be judged on whether or not we bring down energy prices in Europe, and whether or not we provide energy stability and security across Europe. And the same is true, Commissioner, of your Commission, in my view.

    I do very much welcome the action plan that has been announced, though. Clearly, we need a huge investment in our infrastructure. Clearly, we need to break the link between gas‑pricing and energy‑pricing, because that has resulted in energy prices remaining artificially high across Europe. But we can’t wait for grid infrastructure. We do need to look at innovative solutions.

    Everybody across Europe is talking about the benefits of AI. At the same time, the same people are saying that we can’t have data centres. Well, we can’t have it both ways. We do need to look at whether data centres can be used to stabilise our grid in the short term, while we wait for our grid to be enhanced.

     
       

       

    Catch-the-eye procedure

     
       

     

      Elena Nevado del Campo (PPE). – Señor presidente, señor comisario de Energía, en su propósito tiene usted al enemigo en casa: la señora Ribera. Nos enfrentamos en Europa a un reto crucial: garantizar a las familias, y a las empresas que dan trabajo, una energía asequible sostenible y segura. La ciencia es clara: la combinación de las energías renovables y la energía nuclear es clave para reducir las emisiones y proteger nuestro planeta.

    Mientras los Estados Unidos prolongan hasta ochenta años la vida útil de las centrales nucleares, Sánchez las cierra en España sin importarle las familias ni de Extremadura ni de Cataluña. Por lo tanto, el desmantelamiento de la central nuclear de Almaraz, en mi tierra, que abastece a más de 4 millones de hogares en España y evita la emisión de 7,2 millones de toneladas de CO2 al año, es un sacrificio que no podemos permitir.

    Por eso les pido a todos ustedes que apoyen el no al cierre de la central nuclear de Almaraz.

     
       

     

      Maria Grapini (S&D). – Domnule președinte, domnule comisar, discutăm despre prețuri accesibile, însă mi-aș fi dorit să dați o definiție: ce înțelegeți dumneavoastră prin prețuri accesibile la energie? Pentru că alt preț este accesibil pentru cetățenii din Luxemburg, alt preț este accesibil pentru cei din România sau din țările din est. Ați fost foarte sigur pe dumneavoastră, ca și cum aveți asul în buzunar. Puteți să rezolvați făcând o uniune a energiei, reducând prețurile, energie curată – toate acestea înseamnă investiție și mai ales timp. Cetățeanul are nevoie astăzi, pentru că de trei ani Europa este mereu în criză.

    Unde se duce criza? La buzunarul cetățeanului. Aș vrea să ne spuneți în răspunsurile pe care le dați acum, când? Un termen, un timp. Eu așa am înțeles, ca om de afaceri: să spun măsura și timpul. Când avem prețuri accesibile pentru toți cetățenii, în funcție de veniturile pe care le au? În plus, mai cred ceva, domnule comisar. E o speculă în prețul energiei, necercetată, necăutată și lăsată așa, să trăiască bine producătorii de energie necontrolați și furnizorii de energie, iar costurile din nou să meargă la buzunarul cetățeanului.

     
       

     

      Anna Zalewska (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie Komisarzu! Pan zdaje sobie sprawę, że Pana plan to wzrost cen energii. Czas uwolnić się od algorytmów, szantażystów, zielonych, którym płacicie, lobbystów. Czas usiąść z inżynierami, energetykami, chemikami i fizykami. Czas wrócić do ETS-u sprzed 2014 roku, bo w tej chwili stał się bańką, piramidą finansową, która spekuluje i manipuluje. Jednocześnie czas wyrzucić ETS 2 do kosza. Obywatele nie mogą ponosić odpowiedzialności za Wasze beztroskie pomysły, za Waszą ideologię i za to, że jesteście zakładnikami wielkich biznesów.

    ECR w ciągu najbliższych tygodni przygotuje projekt rezolucji i debatę na temat wyrzucenia ETS 2 do kosza.

     
       

     

      Billy Kelleher (Renew). – Mr President, I welcome the publication of the Action Plan for Affordable Energy. Of course, affordable energy and energy in the context of security is vital for the development of the European economy, to give certainty in terms of investment, but equally – and importantly – we have to address a very fundamental issue around our competitiveness, the cost to businesses and the cost to families and households right across Europe.

    Reference has been made to affordability and, of course, affordability varies greatly across the European Union itself. I would like to see greater investment in generation capacities and in harnessing capacities, particularly in the area of solar and wind, and we do need a Eurogrid, Commissioner, whereby we can transport electricity from where it is produced to where it is needed, and there will be significant challenges.

    From an Irish perspective, of course, we are an island nation. We have great potential in terms of wind energy, but we need to have the capacity to export it through interconnectors, via France directly, and also via the UK as well. There would be significant costs and challenges, but this needs to be done to advance our wind energy capacity.

     
       

     

      Ana Miranda Paz (Verts/ALE). – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, como eurodeputada galega, quero advertir que, para ter energia acessível, há que travar os benefícios escandalosos do lobby elétrico.

    No meu país, somos produtores de energia elétrica e estamos penalizados por produzir sem que se favoreça o nosso povo. O preço da energia disparou nos últimos anos em 300 %. Os benefícios das empresas elétricas também.

    O lobby elétrico é apoiado no meu país pelo Governo do Partido Popular, que permite que se espolie energia, com benefícios que emigram. Por isso, defendemos uma tarifa elétrica pública.

    Advirto também, Senhor Comissário, que, perante esse espólio, há muitos lares afetados pela pobreza energética e pelo preço iníquo, sem poderem aquecer mais a casa e passando frio. A pobreza energética na Galiza é o dobro da média europeia — 20 % dos nossos habitantes não podem pagar a conta da luz.

    Advirto também, Senhor Comissário, que acelerar o licenciamento nos projetos eólicos tem um perigo: o PP no Governo galego acelera projetos, violando normativas ambientais. Energia acessível…

    (o Presidente retira a palavra à oradora)

     
       


     

      Lukas Sieper (NI). – Herr Präsident, liebe Menschen Europas, liebe Schülerinnen und Schüler des DBG, Felix! Bezahlbare Energie ist nicht nur eine wirtschaftliche Frage; es ist die große politische Frontlinie unserer Zeit. Denn Energie bedeutet nicht nur, die urmenschlichen Bedürfnisse wie Wärme im Winter zu erfüllen, sondern auch Arbeit und industrielle Zukunft.

    Nach wie vor beziehen wir unsere Energie maßgeblich von Autokraten; es sind nun andere, aber immer noch Autokraten. Und das müssen wir ändern: Wir brauchen echte europäische Energieunabhängigkeit. Wir brauchen ein massives Solarprogramm, mit dem wir bis 2035 auf jedem öffentlichen Gebäude in Europa Solarzellen haben. Wir brauchen ein 100 Milliarden Euro‑Sondervermögen für den Ausbau der Infrastruktur, insbesondere der Ladeinfrastruktur. Wir brauchen einen europaweiten Windkraftausbau mit weniger Bürokratie, schnelleren Genehmigungen und Mindestkapazitäten für jeden Mitgliedstaat.

    Bezahlbare Energie ist kein Luxus, sie ist Grundlage sozialen Friedens, wirtschaftlicher Stärke und geopolitischer Unabhängigkeit.

     
       

       

    (End of catch-the-eye procedure)

     
       

     

      Dan Jørgensen, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, we are now in a situation where we are still, in Europe, dependent on Russian gas. Every day we use gas bought in Russia and thereby indirectly help fill up Putin’s war chest. This is, of course, unacceptable.

    At the same time, last year was the year with the highest temperatures ever measured. So, climate change is not going away. Actually, it’s probably even more serious than we thought.

    These two huge fundamental problems need to be solved. But the good news is that the tools that we need to solve these problems, to make us independent of fossil fuels, to decarbonise our economies, are also the tools that will make us more competitive. If we look at the deployment of renewable energy from 2021 to 2023, it saved us more than EUR 100 billion – more than EUR 100 billion!

    If we then also look at how connected we are, how connected our grids are, that rationality saves us more than EUR 30 billion a year on top of that.

    So yes, our energy prices are too high, but they would have been even higher had we not had the green transition that we are in the middle of going through in Europe. And we can do even better: we will deploy renewable energy faster, we will become much more energy efficient, and we will connect our energy systems in Europe much better. Thank you so much for a very good debate today.

     
       


       

    (The sitting was suspended at 11:58)

     
       

       

    IN THE CHAIR: MARTIN HOJSÍK
    Vice-President

     

    4. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (The sitting resumed at 12:03)

     

    5. Announcement by the President

     

      President. – Yesterday, the President made an announcement about the name of Péter Magyar having been added to the names of the signatories of the joint motion for a resolution on the future of European defence due to a clerical error. After a thorough investigation into the matter was launched, it can be confirmed, as already said yesterday, that the name should not have been on the list of signatories since it was not in the names transmitted by the EPP Group to the services.

    The President has asked the services to put measures in place to prevent similar errors in the future. However, I would also like to invite the Members of this House not to escalate such a regrettable situation and to stick to the facts.

     

    6. Request for an urgent decision (Rule 170)



     

      President. – As important as this situation is, this is not a point of order. Thank you for understanding.

     

    7. Voting time

     

      President. – The next item is the vote.

     

    7.1. European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (EDIP) (vote)


     

      François-Xavier Bellamy, rapporteur. – Mr President, the time for having the floor will be longer than the time for taking the floor.

    I just wanted to say that with our EPP Group, we are asking our Parliament to go for an urgent procedure on the European Defence Industry Programme.

    This will allow us to work, of course, in a very inclusive manner. With the rapporteur of the SEDE Committee, we are very much looking forward to working with all of you on the proposals you will make, but it will allow us to deliver fast. In this very important geopolitical moment, our Parliament has to show that we are ready to be efficient, precise and to work fast on this absolutely decisive programme for the defence of our Europe.

     

     

      President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution on democracy and human rights in Thailand, notably the lese-majesty law and the deportation of Uyghur refugees (see minutes, item 7.2).

     

     

      President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution on the severe political, humanitarian and human rights crisis in Sudan, in particular the sexual violence and child rape (see minutes, item 7.3).

     

    7.4. Unlawful detention and sham trials of Armenian hostages, including high-ranking political representatives from Nagorno-Karabakh, by Azerbaijan (RC-B10-0177/2025, B10-0177/2025, B10-0178/2025, B10-0179/2025, B10-0180/2025, B10-0181/2025, B10-0182/2025, B10-0183/2025, B10-0184/2025) (vote)


       

    – After the vote on paragraph 7:

     
       


       

    (Parliament did not agree to put the oral amendment to the vote)

     

    8. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (Rokovanie pokračovalo od 15.02 h.)

     

    9. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

     

      Predsedajúci . – Zápisnica zo včerajšieho rokovania a prijaté texty sú k dispozícii. Má niekto pripomienky? Nie. Ďakujem. Zápisnica je týmto schválená.

     

    10. European Schools Alliance: potential to achieve the European education area by driving innovation, enhancing mobility and championing inclusivity (debate)


     

      Christophe Hansen, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, last week, Executive Vice-President Roxana Mînzatu delivered the Union of Skills package, and she presented it to you yesterday.

    The Union of Skills is a bold and ambitious package which strives to equip people with the right skills, starting with basic skills, and to support balanced cross-border mobility and free movement of knowledge and skills. The Union of Skills, with the European Education Area as a key enabler, will help to lay strong foundations for learning.

    A key objective of these efforts is ensuring that everyone has the basic skills they need to thrive in life. Currently, one third of 15-year-olds struggle with real life mathematics, one quarter fail to understand basic texts, and 43 % of eighth-graders lack basic digital skills. Most countries have either declined or shown no improvement. This concerning trend demands immediate action.

    One of the first deliverables of the Union of Skills is the action plan on basic skills. The first objective of this action plan is to set an ambitious target by complementing the existing target on basic skills as follows. By 2030, the share of underachievement in literacy, mathematics, science and digital skills should be less than 15 %, whereas the share of top performance in literacy, mathematics and science should be at least 15 %. For this, we will pilot a basic skills support scheme as from next year.

    In addition, we will pilot in 2026 the first European school alliances with the support of the Erasmus+ programme. The European school alliances aim to foster better cooperation and mobility among schools across Europe, acting as a catalyst to enhance the learning and teaching of basic skills. These alliances will test innovative teaching methods, curricula and competence frameworks, including in collaboration with local authorities.

    To support this, we will work to make mobility a standard in schools. Indeed, what better way to learn citizenship than by exchanging with learners from another country and culture. This is what opens the mind. The alliances will lead the way towards structural, strategic and sustainable cooperation between schools across Europe. They will provide a new format of cooperation both for schools and for school authorities, and they will serve as a springboard, enabling the transfer of knowledge and of innovative best practices at all levels.

    Erasmus+ has highlighted the benefits of learning, mobility and cross-border cooperation. However, national school systems often face obstacles that prevent them from fully reaping these benefits, lacking the legal autonomy needed. Schools rely heavily on local, regional and national authorities. The European school alliances will help address these barriers, ensuring all schools have equal access to opportunities. They will support teachers’ professional development and contribute to the future EU teachers and trainers agenda.

    To conclude, let me say that we are glad to see your interest in this initiative and we look forward to hearing your views and ideas on how together we can shape the European school alliances to offer Europe’s children the best possible start in life.

     
       

     

      Tomislav Sokol, u ime kluba PPE. – Poštovani predsjedavajući, povjereniče, kolegice i kolege, obrazovni sustav je institucionalni stup društva, temelj društvenog poretka i ključni instrument nacionalne suverenosti i identiteta.

    Dok promišljamo o jačanju obrazovne suradnje unutar Europske unije moramo osigurati da se svaka inicijativa odvija u okviru načela supsidijarnosti i proporcionalnosti kako bi nacionalne vlade zadržale primarnu regulatornu nadležnost nad svojim obrazovnim politikama. Europska unija je ovlaštena podupirati, koordinirati i dopunjavati djelovanja država članica u području obrazovanja. U tom kontekstu Europski savez škola može poslužiti kao mehanizam za unapređenje obrazovne mobilnosti, znanstvene izvrsnosti, institucionalne kohezije i općenito za unaprjeđenje vještina, kao što rekao i povjerenik, ali ne može dovesti do harmonizacije nacionalnih obrazovnih sustava. To se posebno odnosi na obrazovne programe, odnosno kurikulume, gdje države članice zadržavaju punu autonomiju njihovog definiranja, a Europska unija im, naravno, pri tome može pomoći.

    Drugim riječima, pravo na obrazovanje mora se prvenstveno ostvarivati u nacionalnim okvirima koji najbolje reflektiraju kulturne, gospodarske i društvene prioritete svake države članice. Mobilnost unutar europskog obrazovnog prostora može biti koristan instrument akademskog razvoja, no moramo osigurati da se ona ne koristi kao instrument društvenog inženjeringa ili prisilne homogenizacije obrazovnih standarda. Inkluzivnost obrazovnog sustava važan je društveni cilj, no treba biti oprezan da nas ovaj put ne vodi k normativnim rješenjima koja favoriziraju političku korektnost na štetu meritokracije.

    Europska unija može djelovati u onim područjima gdje dodana vrijednost nadilazi ono što se može postići na nacionalnoj razini. Bilo kakva tendencija prema unifikaciji obrazovnih sustava putem sekundarnog zakonodavstva ili financijskih uvjetovanja predstavljalo bi korak u krivom smjeru koji bi ugrozio stabilnost europske integracije i dao argumente onima koji žele njenu propast.

    No, svakako, na kraju bih istaknuo da ovakvi programi jesu dobri, da suradnja i razmjena su ono što jača europsku integraciju, što stvara nove generacije koje su odgojene na europskim vrijednostima, ali isto tako moramo biti oprezni da, dok to radimo, postupamo isključivo u okviru nadležnosti koje Europska unija ima.

     
       

     

      Sabrina Repp, im Namen der S&D-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, Herr Kommissar! Stellen Sie sich vor: eine junge Schülerin aus einer Kleinstadt in einer ländlichen Region. Ihre Eltern haben nie die Möglichkeit gehabt, im Ausland Urlaub zu machen, und finanzielle Sorgen stehen an der Tagesordnung. Für diese junge Frau scheint Europa weit weg – eine Idee auf dem Papier, aber nicht Teil ihres Alltags. Doch sie ist nicht alleine. Viele junge Menschen haben nicht die Chance, mit Gleichaltrigen aus anderen Ländern in Kontakt zu kommen. Ihnen fehlt die Möglichkeit, Europa wirklich zu erleben, weil es zu teuer ist, weil die Schule es nicht anbietet oder weil sich niemand um sie kümmert. Genau hier setzt die Europäische Schulallianz an.

    Sie bietet jungen Menschen die Chance, über Grenzen hinweg zusammenzuarbeiten, neue Perspektiven zu entdecken und Freundschaften zu schließen. Programme wie Erasmus+ und eTraining ermöglichen es Schülerinnen und Schülern, andere Kulturen kennenzulernen, Sprachen zu üben und zu verstehen, was europäische Zusammenarbeit bedeutet.

    Aber diese Chancen müssen für alle gelten. Der europäische Austausch darf nicht nur für junge Menschen da sein, deren Eltern es sich leisten können. Er muss auch diejenigen erreichen, die es schwerer haben – junge Menschen aus Familien mit wenig Geld, aus kleinen Dörfern, aus schwierigen Lebensverhältnissen.

    Schule ist dabei der Schlüssel. Sie können dafür sorgen, dass alle jungen Menschen an Austauschprogrammen teilnehmen können, unabhängig vom Einkommen oder Bildungsstand der Eltern. Doch das funktioniert nur, wenn wir Hürden abbauen und mehr Möglichkeiten schaffen. Daher brauchen wir mehr finanzielle Unterstützung für benachteiligte Schülerinnen und Schüler, digitale und lokale Austauschformate, mehr Informationen in Schulen, damit alle erfahren, welche Chancen es gibt, und mehr Geld für Programme wie Erasmus+ und eTraining.

    Der europäische Austausch ist mehr als nur ein Vorteil für den Arbeitsmarkt. Er verändert Menschen; er macht sie offener, neugieriger und selbstbewusster. Und vor allem zeigt er, dass Europa für alle da ist, nicht nur für einige. Er ist das Versprechen, dass nicht Herkunft über Zukunft entscheidet, sondern Bildung.

    Ich wünsche mir, dass die Schülerin vom Anfang meiner Rede diese Chance bekommt. Und wer weiß, vielleicht steht sie irgendwann hier vor Ihnen im Europäischen Parlament und ist eine der jüngsten Abgeordneten und setzt sich dafür ein, dass noch mehr junge Menschen Europa entdecken möchten.

     
       

     

      Annamária Vicsek, a PfE képviselőcsoport nevében. – Elnök Úr! Az európai oktatási térség megteremtése egy ambiciózus célkitűzés, ugyanakkor egy kiváló lehetőség, amely hosszú távon meghatározza Európa versenyképességét, társadalmi kohézióját és kulturális sokszínűségét. Az Európai Iskolák Szövetsége kezdeményezés tényleges megoldásokat kínál ehhez, hiszen az innováció, a mobilitás és az inkluzivitás hármas pillérére épít. Támogatnunk kell az ilyen projekteket, de egyúttal biztosítanunk kell azt is, hogy az európai oktatási térség építése tiszteletben tartsa a nemzeti identitásokat, a tagállamok oktatási hagyományait és szuverenitását.

    Az egységes Európa nem az uniformizálásról kell, hogy szóljon, hanem a sokszínűség és az együttműködés erejéről. A tagállamok jó gyakorlatainak és esettanulmányainak egymás közötti megosztása hozzájárulhat ahhoz, hogy uniós szinten még jobb eredményeket érjünk el e téren. Az európai oktatási térség megvalósítását jelentősen segíti az Erasmus+ program, a diákok és pedagógusok mobilitásának lehetővé tételével. Örömmel vehetjük tudomásul, hogy az EU-n kívüli, csatlakozni kívánó országok is részt vehetnek az Erasmus+ programokban, de követeljük, hogy az EU-s tagállamok minden diákja és oktatója megkülönböztetés nélkül férjen hozzá a mobilitási programokhoz. Nem engedhet meg magának az EU olyan negatív példákat, mint egyes magyar és osztrák egyetemisták kizárása az Erasmus+ programokból. Ugyanis ez teljesen összeegyeztethetetlen a sokszor emlegetett európai értékekkel és az európai oktatási térség vállalt céljaival.

    Végezetül szeretném hangsúlyozni, mennyire fontos az EU-s tagjelölt államok minél szorosabb bekapcsolása a térség kínálta programokba és lehetőségekbe. Különösen fontos az ott élő fiatalok számára, hiszen ők azok, akik egy nap remélhetőleg uniós állampolgárok lehetnek. A tagjelöltek bekapcsolásával elérhetjük azt, hogy a csatlakozás pillanatában az oktatási rendszereik jobban össze legyenek hangolva az uniós elvárásokkal.

     
       

     

      Христо Петров, от името на групата Renew. – Г-н Председател, знаете ли кое е най-важното нещо, което научих през последните години, докато помагах на деца и младежи, много от които в неравностойно положение. Те могат, те имат талантите и желанието. Това, което им липсва, е възможност. Просто трябва да им се даде шанс. Те имат всички качества, за да успеят, и потенциалът и желанието им надминават нашия ритъм. За да отговорим на техния потенциал, ние трябва да осигурим не само повече, но и по-разнообразни и качествени възможности за развитие.

    “European Schools Alliance” е точно този шанс, който те заслужават. За да бъде успешен този Съюз на училищата, той не трябва просто да повтаря стари практики в нов формат. Аз призовавам Европейската комисия да отвори Съюза на училищата към широк спектър от дейности по мобилността, включително неформални форми на образование като летни лагери с фокус върху изкуство, спорт и езикови умения. Една от причините да имам възможността да бъда днес тук сред вас е, че аз съм обещал на хората в моята страна да се боря за тази идея, защото тя е онова, което може да накара децата и младежите в България, Румъния, Гърция, но също и във Франция, Германия и Испания, да могат да приемат дълбоко в себе си истината, че Европа, това сме всички ние. Има нужда да заложим гражданското образование като приоритет на Съюза на училищата, за да бъде този съюз успешен, той трябва да достигне до най уязвимите деца и младежи. От личен опит знам, че успехът зависи от способността на училищата да участват в подобни проекти. Ето защо трябва да направим всичко, за да бъдат подготвени учителите и да гарантираме, че процедурите за кандидатстване и участие са опростени и насочени към децата с най-малко възможности. Колкото повече подкрепяме учителите, толкова по-добре ще се развиват учениците.

    Що се отнася до структурата на Съюза, нека се поучим от опита на европейските университети, които от самосебеси се организират тематично. Мисля, че ще е подходящо да окуражим училищата също да сформират съюзи тематично на тема спорт, изкуство, а също и по професионални сектори. Така ще може от самото начало да стимулираме задълбочаване на техните учебни методи и по-дълбокото профилиране на учителите като специалисти. “European Schools Alliance”, Съюза на училищата една уникална възможност за нашите деца в цяла Европа. Аз призовавам както Комисията, така и всички мои колеги тук, които се вълнуват от съдбата и бъдещето на децата, да работим заедно, за да направим така, че този съюз да бъде успешен и за да могат и нашите деца един ден да покажат на техните деца, че най-хубавото място на света е Европа.

     
       

     

      Marc Jongen, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Überall, wo die EU ihre Hände im Spiel hat, folgen Bürokratie, Zentralisierung, Gleichmacherei und regelmäßige Berichtspflichten für die Betroffenen sowie eine schleichende Infiltrierung mit den EU-Ideologien wie Klimarettung, Genderismus, diversity usw. Die unter den EU-Auflagen ächzende Wirtschaft kann ein Lied davon singen, und in der Bildungspolitik ist es nicht anders. Wir trauen daher den schönen Worten nicht, mit denen jetzt eine europäische Schulallianz etabliert werden soll.

    Mobilität von Schülern – ähnlich wie bereits von Studenten durch Erasmus+ – Fortbildung und Karrieremöglichkeiten von Lehrkräften, lebenslanges Lernen: klingt alles wunderbar, wird aber teuer erkauft, nämlich durch den Abbau der nationalen Bildungstraditionen, auch den Abbau der Qualität und den schleichenden Verlust nationaler Souveränität im Sinne der ever closer union.

    Dabei zeigt sich besonders deutlich der Grundwiderspruch dieses Ansatzes: Man feiert einerseits die europäische Vielfalt und tut zugleich alles dafür, diese zu eliminieren und überall gleiche Standards, gleiches Denken, gleiche Ergebnisse einzuführen. Und sobald die EU hier durch Subventionen einen Fuß in der Tür hat, wird sie auch jeden bestrafen, der ihre Vorgaben nicht erfüllt – davon ist mit Sicherheit auszugehen.

    Dabei sind die schulischen Ergebnisse zunehmend katastrophal. In Deutschland können nach der Grundschule ein Viertel der Kinder nicht richtig lesen und schreiben. Trotzdem dürfen immer mehr aufs Gymnasium, und 30 % erhalten dann ein Einserabitur – nicht nur der Euro inflationiert, sondern auch die Schulnoten. Die Rezepte der EU wie mehr Inklusion und sogenannte Geschlechtergerechtigkeit werden diese Misere nicht beheben. Sie verstärken nur nationale Fehlentwicklungen, die etwa das deutsche Schulsystem zu einer leistungsfeindlichen Komfortzone und einer Spielwiese für Bildungsideologen gemacht haben.

    Was wir brauchen, ist eine Rückkehr zum Leistungsprinzip und zu einer differenzierten Schulbildung, je nach den Talenten der Kinder, die ja auch sehr unterschiedlich sind. Dann wird es auch etwas mit der vielbeschworenen europäischen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, und zwar ganz ohne EU-Zentralismus.

     
       

     

      Giusi Princi (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signor Commissario, onorevoli colleghi, l’Europa deve costruire con determinazione un sistema educativo interconnesso e globale, un sistema in cui l’innovazione, la mobilità e l’inclusività siano i pilastri fondamentali.

    In questo contesto, il modello di riconoscimento automatico dei titoli sta trovando efficace applicazione nell’istruzione accademica attraverso il diploma europeo. Ma sorge spontanea una domanda: perché fermarsi all’università e non estendere l’iniziativa anche ai licei? Se l’obiettivo è realizzare lo spazio europeo dell’istruzione, è necessario partire dalle fondamenta, ovvero dalla scuola secondaria.

    Da donna di scuola, lo so bene perché conosco a perfezione queste dinamiche. Immaginiamo l’impatto trasformativo che un’iniziativa del genere potrebbe avere nelle aree periferiche delle nostre regioni.

    Penso alla mia Calabria: un’integrazione effettiva delle scuole in un sistema educativo europeo interconnesso porterebbe non solo al riconoscimento universale dei titoli ma anche alla creazione di uno standard educativo europeo, non solo una garanzia di qualità per i nostri studenti, ma un’opportunità concreta di accesso a percorsi formativi e professionali in tutti gli Stati membri.

    Semplificherebbe maggiormente la mobilità studentesca eliminando barriere burocratiche e linguistiche, rafforzando un’identità europea condivisa. L’Alleanza delle scuole europee, dunque, non deve essere solo una proposta ma un imperativo categorico per realizzare pienamente lo spazio europeo dell’istruzione.

    Attraverso la promozione di una mobilità attiva e strutturale, l’innovazione dei metodi didattici e la garanzia di un’istruzione inclusiva creerebbe una comunità educativa che non solo forma, ma prepara i giovani a essere cittadini europei consapevoli e pronti a rispondere alle sfide globali di oggi.

     
       

     

      Victor Negrescu (S&D). – Mr President, Commissioner, education is a foundation of a united, competitive and inclusive Europe. To shape the future, we must invest in education, skills, knowledge, values and mobility. The European Schools Alliance has the potential to become a game changer in achieving the European Education Area, bringing together innovation, mobility and inclusivity to create a truly borderless learning experience.

    As Vice-President of the European Parliament and a strong advocate for education, I work alongside colleagues in the EPP Intergroup on the Future of Education and Skills to push for ambitious and transformative policies supported by adequate funding. One of our key demands is to allocate at least 20 % of the next multiannual financial framework to education and skills. If we want Europe to remain a global leader, we must treat education as a strategic investment, not just another policy or a cost.

    We need a new European framework for education and skills – a comprehensive plan that ensures every child and young person, regardless of their background, has access to quality education, modern learning environments and future-proof skills. This can and must be Europe’s vision of the future.

    This means also fostering greater synergies between them and avoiding fragmentation. At the heart of this vision is a need for a real Erasmus 2.0. It should be not just a mobility programme, but a pillar for quality education and training across Europe. We must move towards a common curriculum, share learning objectives and truly European diplomas that are recognised across borders. Our students should not only gain knowledge in different European countries, but also learn about what it means to be together in Europe, strengthening their sense of belonging and shared responsibility.

    The European Schools Alliance can be a driving force behind these ambitions. By fostering collaboration between schools, educators and policymakers, we can create a system that transcends national borders, ensures fair access to opportunities and equips the next generation with the skills they need to thrive in an increasingly complex world.

    The time to act is now. The European Education Area must be more than just a concept; it must become a reality. If we speak more and more about defence, we should also speak more and more about education and working together. Investing in education means investing in a better future for our citizens.

     
       

     

      Virginie Joron (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, parler de stratégie et d’alliances, c’est aussi parler de bilan. L’éducation en Europe s’effondre. C’est le crash des écoles en France: les examens PISA de 2022 le prouvent. Les résultats s’écroulent, alors que les pays d’Asie progressent. Singapour culmine à 575 points, tandis que la France traîne à 474; c’est un écart gigantesque. L’OCDE nous dit que les enfants issus de l’immigration ont encore plus de difficultés. Cela, on s’en doutait un peu; mais, même parmi les enfants les plus favorisés, nous sommes désormais très loin des pays asiatiques en maths. Dans les écoles américaines, les plus pauvres ont de meilleurs scores en maths qu’en France.

    Voici les pays devant la France en mathématiques: Singapour, Macao, Taïwan, Hong Kong, Japon, Corée du Sud, Estonie, Suisse, Canada, Pays-Bas, Irlande, Belgique, Danemark, Pologne, Royaume-Uni, Australie, Autriche, Tchéquie, Slovénie, Finlande, Lettonie, Suède, Nouvelle-Zélande, Lituanie et Allemagne. En lecture, nous sommes très loin derrière les États-Unis.

    Un autre chiffre est effrayant: 13 % des enfants ont peur pour leur sécurité en allant à l’école, soit plus d’un million d’enfants et d’adolescents qui ont peur. Moi, j’ai envie de vous dire d’arrêter avec ces slogans creux. Votre inclusion ne s’adresse pas aux enfants handicapés, autistes ou hospitalisés; c’est pour les toilettes neutres sans urinoir et les livres LGBT obligatoires à la bibliothèque; ne pas dire «père» ou «mère», mais «parent 1» et «parent 2». Voilà les priorités de la caste de Bruxelles.

    L’exemple à suivre est pourtant simple. Regardez Singapour; c’est notre programme: rigueur académique, autorité des enseignants, priorité aux matières essentielles, fin des dérives idéologiques et soutien aux élèves en difficulté. Finalement, et c’est tragique, nous avons le résultat de cette idéologie mortifère, qui tire les écoles vers le bas.

    (L’oratrice refuse de répondre aux questions carton bleu de Sieper et Repp.)

     
       

     

      Seán Kelly (PPE). – As a former teacher, I am particularly pleased to see the European Schools Alliance being proposed by President von der Leyen. Education is the foundation of our future, and this initiative represents a crucial step in ensuring that young people across Europe have access to high-quality, innovative and inclusive learning opportunities.

    The success of the European University Alliance has demonstrated the power of cross-border collaboration in higher education. The European Schools Alliance should take inspiration from this model. The University Alliance has proven that overcoming fragmentation and enhancing cooperation leads to real benefits, such as joint degrees in research, collaboration and mobility programmes.

    At the school level, we must aim for similarly tangible outcomes, ensuring that students and teachers alike can benefit from a truly European approach to education. To be effective, the European Schools Alliance must focus on delivering measurable outcomes, much like the University Alliance has done with research, innovation and joint degree programmes.

    This is particularly important from my own country, Ireland, an island nation. Strengthening ties between our schools will help bridge the physical gap, ensuring Irish students and teachers have the same opportunities for collaboration and exchange as their counterparts across the continent. By building these connections, the European Schools Alliance will not only benefit students and teachers, but also contribute to a more unified and competitive Europe.

    Now to conclude, next Monday is our national holiday, Saint Patrick’s Day. Isn’t that right, Billy?

    Lá Fhéile Pádraig sona daoibh uilig agus caith an tseamróg.

     
       

       

    Vystúpenia na základe prihlásenia sa o slovo zdvihnutím ruky

     
       

     

      Bogdan Rzońca (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Mamy fatalne wyniki szkolnictwa podstawowego. Mamy fatalne wyniki działalności uniwersytetów. W pierwszych 30 uniwersytetach świata jest tylko jeden uniwersytet, jedna politechnika, monachijska, z Europy, z Unii Europejskiej. Przegrywamy. Ale tak jest dlatego, że lewicowo-liberalne trendy powodują, że w przedszkolach i w szkołach przebiera się chłopców za dziewczynki i dziewczynki za chłopców. To jest pierwsze zadanie niektórych nauczycieli. Dalej przekazuje się dzieciom książki z gołymi kobietami i mężczyznami. Uczy się je po prostu hedonistycznych zachowań, do których dzieci nie dorosły, burzy się ich intelekt. Trzeba więc po prostu wrócić do normalnej psychologii rozwojowej. Wielu psychologów doskonale wie, jak uczyć dzieci. I wielu doskonałych nauczycieli wie, jak uczyć dzieci. Trzeba im tylko dać szansę, dać lepsze płace. I wara, i z daleka odsuńmy eksperymentatorów i eksperymenty od natury dziecięcej.

     
       

     

      Billy Kelleher (Renew). – Mr President, I am very excited about this European Schools Alliance, and I really do welcome it, and I hope that it is supported across the entirety of the European Union. This is not about integration. It’s about a celebration of diversity, broadening horizons and deepening understanding, learning about each other and learning from each other. And if we can get to that principle in terms of education, I think we will have done an awful lot for the generations of children to come.

    If you look at the Erasmus+ programme, it has has been really beneficial to third‑level students right across the European Union. To learn to live, to love in another country and another culture is a beautiful experience and something that stays with people for evermore.

    So I hope that this particular programme will be supported and encouraged at Member State level, facilitated by local authorities. But we need to ensure that in areas of deprivation, they are not forgotten, and that they’re as entitled to access this programme as any other child across the continent. There must be no barriers to children being able to access this programme and facilitated by the educators that support them. I commend it and support it.

     
       

     

      Lukas Sieper (NI). – Mr President, all students in Europe will hate this idea, but we need new school subjects in all of the European schools. Before I elaborate, let me educate some colleagues like Mr Jongen, who struggles to read Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union or, for example, Article 23 of the German Constitution, which in fact set the aim of ‘ever closer union’.

    But a Europe-wide school policy makes sense. What difference is there in teaching English, art, music or maths. And in the same way, all our European children need to understand these topics.

    All of our European children today need to be educated in two new subjects. The first one is digitalisation. All the possibilities and dangers of the digital realm need to be taught to them. And the second thing – and this is ever more important – is democracy. How does this Parliament work? How does the European Union work? Those are things that children need to learn all over Europe. So let’s go forward and enact these ideas.

     
       

       

    (Koniec vystúpení na základe prihlásenia sa o slovo zdvihnutím ruky)

     
       

     

      Christophe Hansen, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, the design and development of the European Schools Alliance is still in its very early days. That is why a debate like the one today is so useful, and the outcomes will feed into the design of the pilot.

    After the pilot, the success of the European Schools Alliance will depend on the next Erasmus+ programme and, of course, the future multiannual financial framework. This is why we believe we must give priority to investment in people, in pupils and their skills. We have to invest where it matters the most.

    You will be part of the debates, and we hope that the budget for the next Erasmus+ programme will match the expectations that some of you – like Mr Negrescu and Mr Petrov have mentioned – including for future European school alliances. To build a true Union of Skills, to make the European Schools Alliance a success, we need your support and we know we can count on you to make a difference.

     
       

     

      Predsedajúci . – Rozprava k tomuto bodu sa týmto skončila.

     

    11. Explanations of votes

     

      Predsedajúci . – Ďalším bodom programu sú vysvetlenia hlasovania.

     

    11.1. Social and employment aspects of restructuring processes: the need to protect jobs and workers’ rights (B10-0143/2025)



     

      Predsedajúci . – Tento bod programu je ukončený.

     

    12. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted

     

      Predsedajúci . – Zápisnica z tohto rokovania bude predložená na schválenie na začiatku nasledujúceho rokovania. Pokiaľ nie sú žiadne námietky, uznesenia prijaté na dnešnom rokovaní budú ihneď postúpené osobám a orgánom, ktoré sú v nich uvedené.

     

    13. Calendar of part-sessions

     

      Predsedajúci . – Nasledujúca schôdza sa uskutoční od 31. marca do 3. apríla 2025 v Štrasburgu.

     

    14. Closure of the sitting

       

    (Rokovanie sa skončilo o 15.37 h.)

     

    15. Adjournment of the session

     

      Predsedajúci . – Schôdza Európskeho parlamentu je týmto prerušená. Rokovanie sa skončilo.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria – P10_TA(2025)0035 – Wednesday, 12 March 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) of 18 December 2015,

    –  having regard to the establishment of the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic, under UN General Assembly Resolution 77/301 of 29 June 2023,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 28 February 2024 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in Syria(1),

    –  having regard to the statement by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the orders of the Paris Judicial Court of 14 November 2023 and 21 January 2025 issuing international arrest warrants for Bashar al-Assad and members of his family, and to universal jurisdiction cases in European courts,

    –  having regard to the joint statement by the Governments of France, Syria, Bahrain, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, the Secretary General of the League of Arab States and the Secretary General of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf of 13 February 2025,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/406 of 24 February 2025 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria(2),

    –  having regard to the statement issued following Syria’s National Dialogue Conference, held in Damascus on 25 February 2025,

    –  having regard to the statement of 8 March 2025 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service on the latest developments in Syria,

    –  having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas in December 2024 Syria witnessed momentous change, as a rebel coalition spearheaded by the armed group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA), the Southern Operations Room (formerly Southern Front) and several other opposition forces toppled Bashar al-Assad’s murderous regime; whereas the historic collapse of the Assad dynasty marked the end of half of a century of suffering for the Syrian people, with unprecedented tyranny and chaos unfolding after Bashar al-Assad brutally repressed the 2011 uprising and led the country into civil war, as well as the beginning of a new chapter for the Syrian people and the broader Middle East;

    B.  whereas the fallen Assad regime engaged in systematic repression, mass arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and other grave human rights violations, and is responsible for documented war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the deliberate targeting of civilians, siege warfare leading to mass starvation, the use of barrel bombs and the deployment of chemical weapons, in violation of international law; whereas since 2011, at least half a million Syrians have died and 14 million have been forced to flee their homes, of which roughly 7 million have been internally displaced, as a result of the fierce repression and demographic engineering by the Assad regime and his allies, as well as at the hands of terrorist groups; whereas the fates and whereabouts of tens of thousands of people remain unknown;

    C.  whereas Russia and Iran, under the guise of strategic alliances, were both enablers and active players in the war waged by the bloody Assad regime against its own people and used Syria as a geopolitical battleground for destabilising the region, as a hub for arms and drug trafficking, as well as a testing ground for military capabilities and tactics, systematically targeting civilian infrastructure and humanitarian aid convoys in clear violation of international law; whereas Assad’s power relied on Russia and Iran’s continued support and their supply of manpower and weapons, as well as that of their proxies, including the Wagner Group, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and Afghan mercenaries; whereas his sudden fall is a clear geostrategic defeat for both countries;

    D.  whereas after assuming a leading role in overthrowing the regime, former HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa was designated caretaker President and launched a political transition process, entailing plans for a new constitution and the holding of elections in four to five years from now; whereas the caretaker president was tasked with forming a temporary legislative council, appointed a caretaker government and pledged to establish, by early March 2025, a new non-sectarian, comprehensive, credible and inclusive government reflecting Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity; whereas on 24 and 25 February 2025, the Syrian interim government held the announced National Dialogue Conference; whereas the Syrian constitution of 2012 was nullified and the People’s Assembly and the Baath Party dissolved; whereas many armed groups also formally agreed to dissolve and be integrated into the Syrian army;

    E.  whereas the EU rightly refused to normalise its ties with the Assad regime right through to its demise and played a significant role as a major humanitarian donor to Syrian civilians and as host to 1,3 million refugees fleeing the conflicts; whereas since 2011, the EU and its Member States have mobilised more than EUR 33,3 billion in humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance focusing on life-saving aid, resilience programmes and the political implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015); whereas in December 2024 the EU launched a humanitarian air bridge to deliver emergency healthcare and other essential supplies; whereas in the aftermath of the fall of the Assad regime, some Member States announced a suspension of pending asylum applications by Syrians; whereas the EU has suspended sanctions on key economic sectors to facilitate engagement with Syria and its reconstruction;

    F.  whereas the caretaker government authorities control most but not all of Syrian territory, with the overall security situation in Syria remaining fragmented and volatile; whereas violent events, including revenge killings, sectarian violence and criminal activities, are seen to be increasing, particularly in the coastal and rural areas; whereas pro-Assad armed groups and, allegedly, others have conducted coordinated attacks starting on 6 March 2025 in the Latakia, Tartus and Homs governorates, leading to deadly clashes with Syrian security forces; whereas in return, members of the Syrian security forces and the SNA, foreign fighters and jihadists reportedly participated in unjustifiable retaliations and executions targeting Alawite civilians on the basis of their ethno-religious affiliation; deplores also the confirmed killings of at least 10 Christians; whereas, despite the statement delivered by de facto President al-Sharaa, the fighting lasted several days and has so far caused over 1 000 casualties; whereas de facto President al-Shaara has announced the creation of a ‘fact-finding committee’ and of a ‘higher committee’;

    G.  whereas north-eastern Syria is still currently administered by the self-proclaimed Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and controlled militarily by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); whereas on 10 March 2025 an agreement towards their integration within all institutions of the Syrian state was jointly signed by de facto President al-Sharaa and Commander in Chief of the SDF Mazloum Abdi; whereas since December 2024, the Turkish-backed SNA militias, some of which have not been included in the transitional government, and Türkiye itself, have intensified attacks and incursions within northern Syrian territory, including attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in the Manbij and Kobani areas, which may amount to war crimes;

    H.  whereas Israel has occupied a part of the Syrian territory in the Golan Heights since 1967; whereas following the overthrow of the Assad regime, Israel has further seized the UN-patrolled demilitarised zone beyond the Golan Heights and repeatedly carried out strikes on military targets in Syria; whereas the Israeli Minister of Defence has declared that ‘the IDF will remain at the summit of Mount Hermon and the security zone indefinitely’;

    I.  whereas Russia seeks to retain its military bases in Syria, particularly the Tartus naval base and the Hmeimim military airfield; whereas Bashar al-Assad and his family fled the country and have been granted political asylum in Russia; whereas diplomatic contact has been made between Russia and the new Syrian authorities;

    J.  whereas the Assad regime supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recognised the occupied Luhansk and Donetsk regions in Ukraine, as well as the Abkhazia region in Georgia; whereas Ukraine’s military intelligence service systematically reported that Russia was training mercenaries recruited in Syria to support Russia’s war against Ukraine; whereas the ‘Grain from Ukraine’ initiative was deployed in Syria after the suspension of Russian food exports;

    K.  whereas Daesh has caused tremendous suffering in Syria, triggered numerous terrorist attacks worldwide and continues to operate within and from Syria, relying on its centre for external operational planning in the Badia region; whereas approximately 10 000 Daesh fighters and 40 000 Daesh family members are currently being detained in the Al-Hol and Roj detention facilities, primarily guarded by the Kurdish-led SDF; whereas Syrian security forces may reportedly take over the management of the detention facilities following the agreement of 10 March 2025 made between de facto President al-Sharaa and SDF Commander in Chief Mazloum Abdi;

    L.  whereas Syria’s Christian population has steeply declined since 2011 due to its targeting by both the Assad regime, as well as by Daesh and other terrorist groups;

    M.  whereas the situation in Syria remains one of the world’s most acute humanitarian crises, with nine out of ten Syrians below the poverty line and almost 17 million people – 70 % of the population – requiring humanitarian assistance because of widespread food insecurity and a lack of basic infrastructure and public services;

    N.  whereas, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the humanitarian response for Syria is significantly underfunded, having secured less than 10 % of the USD 1.2 billion needed until March 2025; whereas the executive order issued by US President Donald Trump’s administration, enacting a 90-day suspension of all foreign assistance programmes, including those administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has and will have an impact on the humanitarian programmes and non-governmental organisations that operate on the ground in Syria; whereas the UK and several EU Member States have also announced significant decreases in their global aid budgets;

    O.  whereas Syria finds itself in a tremendously dire economic situation, with soaring inflation in the country reaching a record high level of 40,2 % in 2024, electricity shortages and rising commodity prices; whereas the collapse of the Syrian economy was exacerbated by regime corruption, predatory economic policies and reliance on illicit activities, including the production and trafficking of Captagon; whereas a colossal reconstruction effort must be undertaken while navigating the shift to an open market economy, with exports having dramatically decreased compared to pre-war levels;

    P.  whereas 5,5 million Syrian refugees live in the five countries neighbouring Syria, namely Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, with the EU providing financial assistance to help shoulder the associated costs; whereas approximately 500 000 internally displaced persons and 300 000 external refugees have returned to their areas of origin since the collapse of the Assad regime, with inadequate services, limited livelihoods and damaged infrastructure hindering their sustainable reintegration;

    1.  Praises the bravery, dignity and resilience of the Syrian people, who finally succeeded in overthrowing the cruel Assad dictatorship; pays tribute to the countless victims of the regime; calls for the EU to seize this historic opportunity to support a Syrian-led political transition in order to unite and rebuild the country, and to assist Syria in implementing its reconstruction and achieving a just and inclusive political transition; remains concerned, however, by the high degree of instability, both in Syria and in the region; underlines that a stable and peaceful Syria is in the interests of the Middle East, the EU’s southern neighbourhood and the EU itself;

    2.  Welcomes the fresh start in EU-Syria relations, manifested by the appointment of an EU Chargé d’affaires in Damascus, diplomatic engagement and high-level meetings undertaken by Member States and EU leaders, as well as the anticipated organisation of the Ninth Brussels Conference set to take place on 17 March 2025; encourages the EU and all its Member States to cooperate with Syria’s interim authorities in a transparent, coordinated and responsible manner, and to convey readiness to provide state-building assistance if and as needed; welcomes dialogue held alongside regional partners in the so-called ‘Aqaba’ format;

    3.  Strongly believes that stability in Syria will come from a pluralistic political transition that includes credible representatives of all components of Syrian society and of all geographical areas, that is to say all religious and ethnic communities, women, civil society and peaceful opposition forces; welcomes the caretaker president’s acknowledgement of Syria’s diversity while taking note that the composition of the current interim government is lacking in this regard; underlines the importance of the future government reflecting this plurality and for a future constitutional framework guaranteeing equal rights and access to opportunities for all Syrians, in line with democratic principles, the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms, including religious freedom, as upheld by international law, as well as clear and concrete evidence that these rights are respected in national and local decisions;

    4.  Acknowledges in this regard, the National Dialogue Conference that took place on 25 February 2025 as a starting point for establishing a culture of dialogue for all Syrians; expresses its concern about the exclusion of Kurdish political representatives, as well as the failure to ensure the participation of all segments of Syrian civil society, particularly women; recalls, further, that this dialogue ought to be upheld in order to prevent deepening societal divisions and discord within key segments of Syrian society and further destabilising an already fragile security situation; calls on the interim government to craft a roadmap setting out its plan for carrying out the political transition process and improve transparency in respect of Syrian citizens;

    5.  Notes with concern the violent past of factions that toppled the Assad regime and are now participating in government; takes good note of the caretaker President’s declarations of intent, while pledging to monitor the actions of national and local authorities when evaluating further engagement; expresses cautious optimism regarding the behaviour of the caretaker authorities regarding freedom of religion and encourages them to implement further confidence-building measures; calls on the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consistently speak out against any possible violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights in Syria by the interim government or other groups;

    6.  Is deeply worried by the fragile security situation across Syria, particularly the coastal area, and firmly condemns the retaliatory targeting of the Alawite community based on its perceived association with the Assad regime; calls on the caretaker authorities to rein in all violent factions, including those set to be incorporated within the Syrian army and security forces, protect all civilian citizens from violence and ensure their right to live in safety; calls for prompt, transparent and impartial investigations into all killings and other violations and for those responsible to be held to account, in line with international legal norms and standards; urges the caretaker government to ensure that all military and security appointments are based strictly on professional qualifications, respect for international human rights and humanitarian law, and a commitment to combating terrorism; expresses concern regarding the presence of foreign extremist fighters, including European citizens, among the forces that overthrew the Assad regime, and cautions against integrating them permanently into the Syrian security apparatus; recognises the challenge for orderly state-building linked to the risk of insurgency by armed groups loyal to the former regime; encourages caretaker authorities to organise paramilitary and civilian disarmament;

    7.  Praises the invaluable contribution of civil society, in Syria and abroad, as the legitimate repository and defender of the aspirations of the Syrian people during years of brutal oppression; pays particular tribute to the White Helmets, target of a regime-orchestrated and Russia-backed smear campaign; calls for the EU to increase financial support, especially for Syrian civil society organisations as they adapt to shifting operating conditions, with a focus on promoting civic dialogue, notably between ethnic, cultural and religious communities, to foster pluralism, peaceful coexistence and trust within Syrian society;

    8.  Stresses the importance of recognising the role of sexualised and gender-based violence in justice and accountability processes, as well as of policies to ensure women’s full participation and representation in political life, as well as their economic empowerment; calls, further, to address specifically the suffering inflicted on children;

    9.  Is concerned by the exponential rise of disinformation originating both within Syria and from abroad; warns of the risk of instrumentalisation of communities also by foreign actors; stresses the need for a pluralistic media landscape to flourish and operate free of censorship and under a legally protected freedom of the press; calls for the EU and its Member States to provide funding and capacity-building in this regard;

    10.  Strongly believes that the success of the Syrian political transition, notably the safeguarding of civil peace and the building of trust in state institutions, hinges on transitional justice and reconciliation as a path to fighting the impunity of all parties responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses; calls for judicial reform to be made an urgent political priority; encourages the caretaker Syrian Government to establish an independent transitional justice committee to ensure accountability for past human rights violations committed by all factions, emphasising that military unification cannot be achieved without a credible justice mechanism to build trust among armed groups, including representatives from the southern factions, the SDF and former regime officers;

    11.  Calls on caretaker authorities to fully cooperate with competent international instances, including UN mechanisms established specifically for investigating serious crimes in Syria, such as the UN International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and facilitate their on-site operations; encourages Syria to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and align national legislation accordingly, as well as give the ICC retroactive jurisdiction through a declaration; recognises the irreplaceable contribution of Fareed al-Madhhan (‘Caesar’) to documenting regime crimes, as well as the Syrian Network of Human Rights’ work in tracking disappearances; stresses the importance of these processes now being completed; calls for the EU to support the renewal of the mandate of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria and increase funding for all relevant mechanisms, notably in light of US disinvestment;

    12.  Commends the steps taken to fight impunity through universal jurisdiction cases in Germany, France and other Member States, of individuals linked to the Assad regime and Daesh; encourages courts to continue such prosecutions and expects newfound evidence and fruitful cooperation with Syrian authorities to lead to leaps in investigations and convictions;

    13.  Stresses the need for Syria’s transitional authorities to urgently take all steps to secure and preserve physical evidence of serious international crimes across the country, including through cooperation and engagement with international experts and current international mechanisms, and to grant all competent organisations access to archival documents; encourages the EU to provide support for timely evidence collection on the ground, including forensic equipment and expertise to identify and analyse mass graves, as well as the collection of survivors’ testimonies;

    14.  Highlights that Syria is among the most heavily mine-contaminated countries; is alarmed by the rising number of victims, including children, who have been killed or injured by mines and other explosives, a problem that is further increasing as people start to return; commends efforts by international and local organisations in identifying, marking and clearing explosive ordnance, and calls for the EU to urgently support demining efforts jointly with specialised actors and Syrian authorities;

    15.  Reiterates its strongest condemnation of the appalling use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians by the Assad regime; welcomes the announcement by Syria’s interim government to destroy any remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons in Syria and its openness to cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

    16.  Appreciates the determination demonstrated by caretaker authorities in discontinuing the production and trafficking of drugs, in particular Captagon, which have negatively affected the whole region for years; encourages international cooperation against the trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings;

    17.  Highlights the importance of protecting Syria’s cultural heritage and calls for international collaboration to restore historical sites and religious landmarks and to prevent the illicit trade in looted artefacts; urges the EU to support Syria in efforts to restore areas and places of cultural significance to the Syrian public and the world, including the UNESCO site of Palmyra after its revolting partial destruction by Daesh in 2015;

    18.  Acknowledges that the Syrian economy is shattered, with considerable investment gaps towards achieving price stability and sustained job creation; calls for all necessary steps to be taken in order to incentivise and facilitate foreign direct investment in accordance with international standards, as well as for reforms addressing housing, land and property rights and policies balancing development across urban and rural areas to reduce regional disparities; encourages economic disentanglement from Russia and Iran after both countries have profited from Syria’s economic collapse to extract resources and control strategic industries;

    19.  Welcomes the gradual and conditional suspension of sanctions on a range of economic sectors and the indefinite extension of humanitarian exemptions; underlines that despite recent adjustments, the EU, US and UK sanctions policies towards Syria are an obstacle to reconstruction efforts; calls on the Commission and the Council to reach out to other countries imposing sanctions on Syria, notably the US and the UK; supports a full yet reversible lifting of all sectoral sanctions, with a focus on the financial sector, so as to provide the Syrian economy a much-needed lifeline, while closely monitoring the political transition process; expects over-compliance to remain an issue as long as extensive US and UK sanctions remain in place, notably due to the former’s extraterritorial dimension; calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide European businesses and banks with legal assurances to counteract over-compliance; calls, nevertheless, for individual sanctions against military personnel, officials, business entities and individuals associated with the Assad family to be maintained; expects the yearly update of the EU sanction regime ahead of its expiration on 1 June 2025 to adequately assess the relevance of all renewed sanctions, allowing for much-needed clarity, and asks the European Council to define and clearly communicate clear steps that Syria’s authorities must carry out, to secure further sanctions easing or prevent the activation of a snapback;

    20.  Welcomes the announcement by the Commission to allocate EUR 235 million in new humanitarian support to Syrians and calls for the EU and its Member States to sustain humanitarian and development aid efforts and to maintain financial support for neighbouring countries hosting Syrian refugees; invites the EU to explore pathways to use frozen assets of the Assad regime for a trust fund for Syrian reconstruction, rehabilitation and compensation of victims; is extremely concerned by the suspension of all USAID funding related to Syria or Syrian refugees and by the foreseen non-participation of the US in the next Brussels conference;

    21.  Calls for the EU to strategically extend its focus from humanitarian aid to accelerated and early economic recovery and reconstruction in key sectors such as energy, water supply, healthcare and education, in order to reach tangible results while ensuring that programming is accompanied by due diligence and independent monitoring; urges the European Union and its Members States to agree on the joint provision of sustainable funding at the forthcoming Ninth Brussels Conference;

    22.  Welcomes the decision taken, for example, by France to allow refugees to return to Syria and participate in its reconstruction without jeopardising their status, including for ‘go-and-see’ visits to Syria; calls on the Member States and third countries to urgently replicate this initiative; calls on the Commission to encourage and provide the Member States with guidance and best practice on the implementation of EU law on this issue, including as regards the difference between ‘travel’ and ‘re-establishment’; insists that all asylum status claims and renewals must be assessed individually and thoroughly; stresses the importance of balanced participation in the political transition process of the Syrian diaspora as a key asset for the country’s transition and reconstruction; recognises the importance of remittances alongside official development assistance and urges the Member States to lift any restrictions placed on sending remittances to Syria; recalls, moreover, that according to the UN Refugee Convention, conditions for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees can only be met following fundamental and durable changes in Syria;

    23.  Recalls the presence of over 400 000 Palestinian refugees residing in Syria, some of them displaced multiple times, and the role of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in assisting its needs; remembers the siege of the Yarmouk camp by Assadist factions between 2013 and 2015;

    24.  Calls on Syria to break free from its notorious long-standing alliances with Tehran and Moscow, which have brought suffering to the Syrian people and destabilisation to the Middle East and beyond; calls, further, on the caretaker Syrian authorities to bring the Russian military presence in Syria to an end; condemns Russia for hosting Bashar al-Assad and his family and shielding them from justice, after having obstructed justice by actively interfering in international investigations and vetoing UN Security Council resolutions aimed at addressing the regime’s war crimes and their own;

    25.  Calls on neighbouring countries to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and to immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law;

    26.  Firmly believes that the unification of all segments of Syria, including the integration of all armed factions within a national army, require a Syrian-led political solution; calls for the EU and the Member States to use all diplomatic channels to advocate the stabilisation of Syria, which is in the interest of most countries in the region, and support discussions towards a peaceful and stable solution and ensure that the well-being and preservation of fundamental freedoms, economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the gender equality of all Syrians, notably those living in north-eastern Syria, remain at the centre of decisions; welcomes, in this regard, the agreement of 10 March 2025 between de facto President al-Sharaa and SDF Commander in Chief Mazloum Abdi and hopes for its smooth implementation; takes note of the positive result of recent negotiations between Kurdish armed groups in Türkiye and the Turkish Government towards disarmament;

    27.  Insists that different ethnic and religious groups must be protected in order to create a peaceful Syria; therefore calls for the European Union and the Member States to support the implementation process of the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF, in order to guarantee the Kurdish community full recognition and political participation in Syria;

    28.  Stresses the importance of the fight led by the international coalition against Daesh, with the invaluable support of Kurdish fighters, and calls for it to cooperate with the Syrian interim government to prevent Daesh and other jihadist groups from reorganising; expresses deep concerns as attacks led or supported by Türkiye in north-eastern Syria not only cause civilian casualties and increase the number of internally displaced persons, but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; urges the caretaker authorities to demonstrate clear commitment to the fight against terrorism and to cooperate with international partners both to fight remaining active cells in Syria and to investigate past crimes, notably against the Yazidi community;

    29.  Urgently calls for a lasting solution to be found among all the parties concerned as these camps continue to be breeding grounds for radicalisation and constitute a dormant threat to both Syrian and European security; warns against the serious international security risk a sudden disengagement of the United States in the region would cause in this uncertain context; reiterates its call on the Member States to repatriate all their nationals, especially children, from Al-Hol and Roj and to bring adults to justice in fair trials;

    30.  Calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cease all activities aimed at torpedoing the Syrian caretaker government’s political and economic efforts and forcedly altering the status quo; commends the interim authorities for intercepting Iranian weapon shipments destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon and welcomes the complete collapse of Iran’s extensive infrastructure and networks in Syria;

    31.  Welcomes de facto President al-Sharaa’s pledge to seek peaceful relations with all of Syria’s neighbours; calls on the caretaker Syrian authorities to ensure this commitment is turned into concrete action to prevent and refrain from taking any security-threatening measures against neighbouring countries and beyond;

    32.  Condemns those European politicians, including current and former MEPs, who have repeatedly spread pro-Assad narratives and actively engaged in whitewashing the bloody dictatorship; expresses deep concern regarding the recent invitation by Parliament’s Intergroup on Christians in the Middle East of organisations closely linked to EU-sanctioned Assadists;

    33.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the caretaker Syrian government, and to have it translated and published in Arabic.

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6749, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6749/oj.
    (2) OJ L, 2025/406, 25.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/406/oj.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – White paper on the future of European defence – P10_TA(2025)0034 – Wednesday, 12 March 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas over the last decade, major geopolitical shifts, amplified by the return of large-scale war to our neighbourhood, have been threatening the security of the EU, its Member States, the candidate countries and their respective citizens; whereas the EU is currently under attack, with hybrid incidents inside its borders, a large-scale war in its neighbourhood and a realignment of global powers, all presenting real risks to the security of the EU and its citizens and requiring immediate, ambitious and decisive action; whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a watershed moment in European history; whereas Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine is widely recognised as an attack on the European peace order established after the Second World War and the global order as a whole;

    B.  whereas the global order is fragmenting and increasingly characterised by complex and entrenched instabilities;

    C.  whereas there cannot be any European security without security in its immediate neighbourhood, starting with Ukraine’s capacity to resist Russia’s war of aggression;

    D.  whereas recent statements by members of the US administration, accompanied by the heavy pressure exerted on Ukraine by the US leadership, reflect a shift in US foreign policy as the Trump administration is proposing the normalisation of ties with Russia and it is becoming increasingly clear that Europe needs to strengthen its security and defence to be able to help Ukraine to defend itself;

    E.  whereas the quickest and most extensive expansion of Russia’s capabilities is taking place near its borders with the West, while the EU is taking its time to enhance its defence capacity;

    F.  whereas China, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods deployed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European security and interests; whereas China is also investing tremendously in its armed forces, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security as well as to the EU’s economic interests;

    G.  whereas the impact of wars, terrorism, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, north-eastern Africa and Libya poses serious risks to EU security; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with, and remain an ongoing challenge for, the EU’s management of its external borders;

    H.  whereas European security is linked to stability on the African continent, and the growing presence of non-European actors is testament to the lack of sufficient security and diplomatic engagement in the region to effectively counter these challenges and protect the EU’s strategic interests;

    I.  whereas, in the light of the worsening external environment and despite the efforts made in recent years to enhance the EU’s crisis preparedness through new legislation, mechanisms and tools across various policy areas, the EU and its Member States remain vulnerable to multiple crisis scenarios;

    J.  whereas there is an urgent need to further reform and strengthen the EU’s defence policy in the light of Ukraine’s recent war experience and the use of new war technologies;

    K.  whereas the Member States have different military and security policies, including policies of neutrality, and such policies should be respected;

    L.  whereas it is in the EU’s interest to see Ukraine as an integral part of a genuine European security system;

    M.  whereas the Black Sea has shifted from a secondary to a primary military theatre for the EU and NATO, and alongside the Baltic Sea, it has become a pivotal strategic region for European security in countering the Russian threat;

    N.  whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important in terms of economic development and transport, while, at the same time, facing challenges linked to climate change and militarisation, as well as those resulting from increasing geopolitical competition and migration;

    O.  whereas as a result of investment in military equipment and ammunition, numerous reports, notably the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis(1) of May 2022, have analysed a worrying capability gap in European defence;

    P.  whereas the Strategic Compass(2) was mainly drafted and negotiated before 24 February 2022; whereas the Strategic Compass is a very broad strategy that provides little guidance with regards to the urgent need to accomplish defence readiness and provide deterrence and defence capabilities to prepare for the most urgent military contingencies;

    Q.  whereas the 2024 Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness(3) highlighted a funding need of EUR 500 billion in European defence for the next decade, and underlines a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence investment and limited access to financing as obstacles to a capable EDTIB;

    R.  whereas the Niinistö report(4) underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios;

    S.  whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture and shared threat perception and assessment, as well as the development of solutions to be combined in doctrine and concepts;

    T.  whereas the EU’s ability to take decisive action in response to external threats has been repeatedly hampered by the requirement for unanimity, with certain Member States and candidate countries blocking or delaying critical military aid to Ukraine and hence undermining European security;

    U.  whereas, in the light of the above challenges and analyses, the President of the European Commission tasked the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with presenting a white paper on the future of European defence within the first 100 days of their term of office;

    V.  whereas Parliament and experts have been calling for a white paper on defence for more than a decade;

    A historic time for European defence: ‘become a genuine security provider’

    1.  Considers that the EU must act urgently to ensure its own autonomous security, strengthening its partnerships with like-minded partners and significantly reducing its dependencies on non-EU countries; stresses, therefore, that the EU is now at a turning point in its history and construction; insists that a ‘business as usual’ approach is no longer an option as it would lead to the end of a safe and secure Europe; considers that the EU and its Member States must choose between joining forces and working in unison to overcome the threats and attacks on EU security, and standing alone at the mercy of aggressive adversaries and unpredictable partners;

    2.  Recalls that the EU is a peace project and should strive towards peace and stability, while condemning aggression; underlines that in order to achieve peace and stability, we must support Ukraine and become more resilient ourselves;

    3.  Stresses that Europe continues to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine as it courageously fights for our European values, and recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided; strongly believes that Europe is today facing the most profound military threat to its territorial integrity since the end of the Cold War;

    4.  Strongly believes that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not just a simple increase in ambition and action, but a complete overhaul of the way we act and invest in our security and defence, such that from now on we plan, innovate, develop, purchase, maintain and deploy capabilities together, in a coordinated and integrated fashion, and making full use of the complementary competences of all actors in Europe, including NATO, to achieve a common European defence;

    5.  Believes that Russia, supported by its allies including Belarus, China, North Korea and Iran, is the most significant direct and indirect threat to the EU and its security, as well as that of EU candidate countries and partners; reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, however, the need to consider fully the instability in our southern neighbourhood, the rise in Chinese military power and the increased aggressiveness of the middle powers, which appear ready to jeopardise transatlantic cooperation on common security and make a deal with the Russian aggressor at the expense of Ukrainian and European security, which are one and the same; notes that the recent actions and statements of the US administration have further increased concerns about the future stance of the US vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the security of Europe; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; strongly condemns US threats against Greenland;

    6.  Insists that Europe must take on greater responsibilities within NATO, especially when it comes to ensuring security on the European continent;

    7.  Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;

    8.  Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member state and EU candidate country, to abide by international law, recognise the Republic of Cyprus and immediately end the occupation and withdraw its troops from the island;

    9.  Underlines that the EU must now adopt a holistic and horizontal approach that integrates a defence and security dimension into most EU policies, supported by both regulatory and financial instruments and identified capability needs and gaps;

    10.  Believes, therefore, that the time has come for a renewed political ambition to act and turn the EU into a genuine security provider, increase the EU’s defence readiness and build a true European Defence Union; recalls that the adoption of the Strategic Compass was a good starting point, but notes that its timely implementation remains necessary; welcomes the recently introduced EU defence instruments and insists on the urgent need to scale up as EU defence efforts cannot remain limited in size, fragmented in scope and lengthy in delivery; calls for a quantum leap and a new approach to defence, including strong decisions, an action plan and both short- to long-term defence investment plans; underlines that this requires vision, concreteness and shared commitments, both in the strictly military field and in the industrial, technological and intelligence sectors;

    11.  Deplores the reluctance of the Council and the EU Member States when it comes to addressing deep structural challenges of the European defence industrial landscape and the lack of ambition as regards cooperation at EU level between the Member States’ armed forces; calls on the Member States to join forces and support a major step towards a very ambitious and comprehensive framework on defence;

    12.  Urges the EU to adopt a coherent and robust comprehensive framework to strengthen its security and that of its partners, better identify potential future breaking points and prevent further crises, and coordinate joint responses with its Member States similar to those used in wartime;

    13.  Believes that the white paper on the future of European defence should put forward concrete measures and options to the European Council so that truly groundbreaking and necessary efforts can be undertaken, differentiating between short- and long-term plans and objectives, addressing defence sector capability issues, industrial competitiveness and investment needs, and framing the overall approach to EU defence integration; urges both the Council and the Commission to identify clear and concrete priorities for the short, medium and long term, with a corresponding timeline of actions;

    14.  Considers that common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations need to be reassessed and reviewed from this perspective; insists that the CSDP must be strengthened and made more agile, including by becoming the EU’s main instrument to fight hybrid warfare, in order to fulfil its role as an insurance policy for Europe’s security, as well as a power and security provider;

    15.  Expects the white paper on the future of European defence to identify the most pressing threats, structural risks and competitors, and define the extent to which the EU can develop contingency plans to ensure mutual support in the event of large-scale security crises, and help Europe anticipate, prepare for and deter potential aggressors and defend itself in the short and long term, in order to become a credible power and European pillar within NATO; underlines that the protection of EU land, air and maritime borders contributes to the security of the entire EU, in particular the EU’s eastern border, and thus stresses that the East Shield and Baltic Defence Line should be the flagship EU projects for fostering deterrence and overcoming potential threats from the East;

    16.  Calls for immediate measures to enhance the security and defence of the EU’s north-eastern border with Russia and Belarus by establishing a comprehensive and resilient defence line across land, air and maritime domains to counter military and hybrid threats including energy weaponisation, infrastructure sabotage and the instrumentalisation of migration; emphasises the need to coordinate and integrate national efforts through EU regulatory and financial instruments to accelerate implementation;

    17.  Stresses the need to enhance capabilities and resources, while overcoming the fragmentation of the defence market; fully agrees with the Draghi report’s view that the EU and its Member States must urgently decide on incentives for the EU defence industry and find creative solutions for large-scale public and private investments in security and defence;

    Short-term: defending Ukraine against an existential threat to Europe’s security

    18.  Urges the EU and its Member States to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine; recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided and that the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine will be decisively shifted; underlines that such a shift now depends almost entirely on Europe; urges the Member States, therefore, to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine before negotiations are concluded; warns that, if the EU were to fail in its support and Ukraine were forced to surrender, Russia would then turn against other countries, including possibly the EU Member States; calls on the EU Member States, international partners and NATO allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets in Russian territory; calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war that must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression, and Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

    19.  Strongly believes that the EU must further expand and improve its tailor-made training operations to respond to the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and, in return, create conditions for European armed forces to learn lessons and strategic practices from them; calls on the Member States to further expand training operations for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including in Ukrainian territory;

    20.  Emphasises the importance of ensuring a geographically balanced distribution of defence financing in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    21.  Urges the EU to develop a ‘Ukraine strategy’, outlining clear objectives for supporting Ukraine’s defence capabilities and the integration of the Ukrainian DTIB into the EDTIB, and to find the necessary resources to implement such a strategy, while supporting European defence industry activities in Ukraine; proposes the allocation of a specific multi-billion euro budget to the European Defence Industry Programme’s (EDIP) Ukraine Support Instrument reserved exactly for this purpose; underscores that such a Ukraine strategy must be an integral part of a ‘European defence’ strategy;

    22.  Calls for urgent financial support to ensure the timely supply of defence products through joint procurement, industrial coordination, stockpiling, access to finance for manufacturers and the expansion and modernisation of production capacities;

    23.  Praises the ‘Danish model’ for support for Ukraine, which consists of procuring defence capabilities produced directly in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to strongly support this model and to make full use of its potential, as there is an underutilisation of Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, estimated at around 50 %, and it brings many advantages to both sides, such as cheaper equipment, speedier and safer logistics, and greater ease of training and maintenance;

    24.  Calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support for Ukraine; calls, in this regard, for the swift adoption of the next military aid package, which should be the largest to date and reflect the level of ambition this juncture calls for; calls on the EU Member States to commit at least 0,25 % of their GDP to military aid for Ukraine; condemns the veto imposed by one Member State on the functioning of the European Peace Facility; calls on the EU Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately seize all frozen Russian assets to serve as a foundation for a substantial grant and loan to Ukraine, as a legally sound and financially significant way to maintain and increase our support for Ukraine’s military needs;

    25.  Urges the Council and the Member States to review and strengthen the enforcement of existing sanctions and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities and non-EU states facilitating the circumvention of sanctions, providing Russia’s military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment; urges the Member States to pay special attention to the Russian shadow fleet and the security and environmental risks this poses;

    26.  Insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with, and the integration of, the Ukrainian defence industry into the EDTIB, which offers clear advantages for both sides, and calls for its speedier integration; highlights the urgency of properly financing EDIP’s Ukraine Support Instrument, which is currently not budgeted; further proposes the provision of war insurance for critical EDTIB projects inside Ukraine; proposes the regular inclusion of Ukrainian Defence Ministry officials with observer status at meetings of relevant Council configurations;

    27.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to make full use of the lessons learnt from Ukraine’s advanced modern warfare capabilities, including drones and electronic warfare;

    28.  Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drones package, focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, containing plans and funds to stimulate research and development, which should draw on lessons learnt from the Ukrainian experience and be open to the participation of Ukraine’s highly innovative companies, as well as an industrial programme dedicated to the joint development, production and procurement of drone and anti-drone systems, and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts;

    ‘Ready for the most extreme military contingencies’– a new long-term approach

    Preparedness

    29.  Stresses that preparedness for hybrid and grey zone attacks must become part of the EU’s strategic culture, with permanent exercises, joint threat assessments and pre-planned, coordinated responses among Member States, particularly in regions bordering hostile powers;

    30.  Calls for the EU to develop a comprehensive EU risk assessment to help identify the major cross-sectoral threats and hazards, as well as the concrete risks facing the EU as a whole, building on current sector-specific risk assessment procedures;

    31.  Insists on the importance of using the upcoming ‘Preparedness Union Strategy’ to put the EU on track for comprehensive preparedness;

    32.  Supports a ‘Preparedness by Design’ principle being embedded horizontally and consistently across the EU institutions, bodies and agencies; insists on the need to develop a mandatory ‘security and preparedness check’ for future impact assessments and ‘stress-tests’ for existing legislation; stresses the need to reduce the obstacles in current national and EU legislation that undermine the efficiency of European defence and security;

    33.  Recommends, in particular, the Niinistö report recommendations aimed at empowering citizens to make societal resilience work, inspired by the Finnish concept of total defence;

    34.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to explore the feasibility of an EU preparedness act, setting joint standards and long-term guidelines to align EU and national efforts when possible;

    35.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to establish and regularly conduct an EU comprehensive preparedness exercise to horizontally test both high-level decision-making and operational coordination in order to build strong links between actors and across sectors;

    36.  Calls for the EU and its Members States to facilitate the use of CSDP instruments in complementarity with internal security tools in the immediate vicinity of the EU’s territory and territorial waters, and to strengthen dual-use and civil-military cooperation at EU level, based on a whole-of-government approach; reiterates its call for the protection of critical underwater infrastructure via the establishment of EU-specific rapid response strategies for underwater infrastructure protection, operating in alignment with NATO; encourages investment in advanced detection and surveillance systems for underwater infrastructure monitoring;

    Readiness: the Strategic Compass and the European Defence Industrial Strategy as the right tools

    37.  Calls for the EU to urgently adapt its tools to new realities by designing an administrative capacity to move much faster through the procedures when faced with wars or other large-scale crises, and to adopt the appropriate tools;

    38.  Considers regular threat analyses, such as the one first conducted in the Strategic Compass, as an absolute necessity; recommends, therefore, updating the EU’s Strategic Compass and adapting the measures within it accordingly in order to reflect the magnitude of our threat environment, and conducting more frequent threat assessments, as they are a precondition for realistically and successfully planning our capabilities and operations; considers that the Strategic Compass, the CSDP, the white paper and the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) should form the basis for a comprehensive vision of European defence;

    39.  Insists that the Rapid Deployment Capacity must achieve full operational capability in 2025 and should be upgraded to be able to face the most extreme military contingencies; reiterates its call to strengthen the EU’s Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), establishing it as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations and providing it with adequate premises, staff and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations, including those of the Rapid Deployment Capacity;

    40.  Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member, to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, an EU Member State, and work constructively to find a viable and peaceful solution based on the relevant UN resolutions;

    41.  Strongly believes that, in the current geopolitical context, the operationalisation of Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on mutual assistance is of utmost importance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, regardless of whether they are NATO members;

    42.  Reiterates the importance of EU-NATO cooperation, as NATO remains, for those states that are members of it, an important pillar of their collective defence; stresses that EU-NATO cooperation should continue, in particular, in areas such as information exchange, planning, military mobility and the exchange of best practice, and to reinforce deterrence, collective defence and interoperability; calls, nonetheless, for the development of a fully capable European pillar of NATO able to act autonomously whenever necessary; reiterates its call to strengthen cooperation – through action, not only words – on military mobility, information exchange, coordination of planning, improved cooperation on their respective military operations and enhanced response to hybrid warfare aimed at destabilising the whole EU continent;

    43.  Invites the Member States to actively participate in a priority-ordering mechanism for defence production to help prioritise orders, contracts and the recruitment of employees in emergency situations; underlines that the Member States should go beyond their current defence applications to encompass other essential resilience-building infrastructure such as energy, transport and telecommunications;

    44.  Recognises that the starting point must be a realistic assessment of critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in order to ramp up defence industry production; underlines the need to ensure the coherence of output between the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP) and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and NATO’s capability targets in order to identify and address the critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in the EU and focus efforts on European strategic enablers to provide genuine EU added value in order to address most extreme military contingencies; calls on the Commission to act on the recommendations of the European Court of Auditor’s Special Report 04/2025 on military mobility and to give greater importance to the military assessment during the selection process for dual-use projects;

    45.  Urges the EU and its Member States, with regard to armed forces, to move from the ‘flow’ approach that prevailed during peaceful times to a ‘stock’ approach, with a stockpile of defence equipment ready for a sustained increase in demand; notes, in this regard, the advantages offered by mechanisms such as advance purchase agreements, the establishment of ‘ever-warm’ facilities and the creation of defence readiness pools; believes that the Commission should take any actions necessary to encourage the Member States to increase exchanges and build trust among them regarding long-term, transparent planning, more proactive measures aimed at securing raw materials, and policies to close gaps in production processes and on the labour market;

    46.  Calls for the EU to adopt a global and coherent approach to external aid in all of its dimensions, with much stronger alignment between common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and CSDP objectives and instruments; considers that the strategic environments in which many EU CSDP missions are present are radically deteriorating, which demonstrates the need for the white paper to ensure flexibility in a 360 degree approach to European security that strives towards building a credible and capable deterrence capacity for the Member States, and ensures that Member State civilian and military personnel can deter and respond rapidly to the growing threat environment;

    47.  Considers that the CSDP must strongly participate in the fight against hybrid warfare against partner countries, particularly candidate countries; is deeply worried by the sharp increase in hybrid attacks, including sabotage, cyberattacks, information manipulation and election interference, with the objective of weakening the EU and its candidate countries; calls on the EU Member States to consider appropriate deterrence and countermeasures, including through the use of Article 42(7) TEU; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to pool resources and expertise in the field of cybersecurity; strongly advocates the development of a unified European approach to cyber forces; further insists on the swift creation of joint European cyber capabilities; recalls the increasing threats of cyber warfare and underlines the need for the EU to establish an EU cyber defence coordination centre to monitor, detect and respond to cyber threats in real time;

    48.  Insists on the need to improve the CSDP’s ability to identify, prevent and counter information manipulation aimed at hindering the EU’s external action; reiterates its calls to establish an effective horizontal strategic communications strategy adapted to all EU channels;

    49.  Calls for the creation of an ‘EU crisis response air fleet’ under the CSDP, comprising military transport aircraft held at EU level and made available to Member States for EU deployments, the transport of equipment or troops (military mobility), or in the event of emergency evacuations – as shown by the capability gap during the withdrawal from Afghanistan – as well as for civil security missions, based on a model similar to the European Air Transport Command;

    Coherence and sovereignty

    Coherence

    50.  Expects the European External Action Service (EEAS) to carry out comprehensive and uncompromising reviews of CSDP missions and operations, taking into account, in particular, the feasibility of their respective mandates in relation to the resources allocated, the staff recruitment method for missions and operations, especially on the link between the skills required and the different profiles, as well as the rationalisation of resources and the management of missions and operations, transparency in calls for tender, activities and results obtained, lessons learnt from best practice and difficulties encountered; asks the Council, on the basis of these reviews, to take decisions aimed at adapting or abandoning ineffective missions and strengthening the most useful missions; believes that the governance of evaluation and the control of CSDP missions and operations must be improved;

    51.  Believes that the EU should develop wartime economic cooperation contingency plans with close partners to ensure mutual support in the case of large-scale security crises involving them directly, and should deepen wartime economic dialogues with European and global partners to provide early warning of hard, hybrid and cyber threats, and foster mutual support planning, the protection of critical infrastructure and maritime safety;

    52.  Calls for the EU to further accelerate the implementation of military mobility; believes that the EU has to move from ‘mobility’ to ‘military logistics’; stresses the need for significant investment in military mobility infrastructure to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, camps, fuel infrastructure through depots, ports, air, sea and rail transport platforms, railway lines, waterways, roads, bridges and logistic hubs; stresses that this must be done in cooperation with NATO by drafting a strategic plan for developing mobility; calls for the rapid implementation of the technical arrangement signed under the aegis of the European Defence Agency Cross-Border Movement Permission, the harmonisation of customs formalities and the preparation of a centralised and justified lifting of road and rail traffic standards in the event of a crisis situation;

    53.  Believes that, in order to create a favourable ecosystem for the European defence industry, the EU must decide on a united and clear long-term vision for the European defence industry in order to provide visibility to the industry and ensure that priority needs are addressed;

    54.  Stresses that EDIP must actively facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and new market entrants through simplified access to funding; emphasises that EDIP should be designed as a stepping stone towards greater European sovereignty in defence production; suggests that successful Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF) projects be prioritised along the line of known capability gaps and that sufficient funding be ensured for projects that have proven to deliver; reiterates its call on the Member States to provide an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year; calls for a more geographically balanced development of the EDTIB, ensuring that critical capabilities, such as ammunition production, air defence systems and drone technologies, are also developed in frontline states, which have a direct understanding of operational needs;

    55.  Is deeply convinced that the EU-level instruments should prioritise and massively increase support for SMEs and start-ups in the dual-use and defence sector; stresses the need to support SMEs and start-ups in bringing successfully tested prototypes to the market, including the scaling up of production; underlines the need to bridge the current funding gap as regards these important steps that would strengthen the EDTIB, including in close cooperation with the Ukrainian technological and defence industrial base;

    56.  Urges the EU to increase coherence between existing and future EU instruments, in particular between PESCO, on demand consolidation, and the EDF, on programmatic roadmaps; between the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), on joint procurement, and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), on industrial ramp-up; between EDIP, on the identification of dependencies, and the EDF, on the resolution of identified dependencies; or within EDIP itself, on coherence within the instrument of the implementation of actions related to the consolidation of demand and supply;

    57.  Calls for a significant increase in common procurement by the Member States of required European defence equipment and capabilities; calls on the Member States to aggregate demand by procuring defence equipment jointly, with the possibility of granting the Commission a mandate to procure on their behalf, ideally ensuring a long-term planning horizon for the EDTIB, thus improving the EDTIB’s production capacities and the interoperability of the European armed forces, and making efficient use of taxpayers’ money through economies of scale;

    58.  Welcomes the proposal for European Defence Projects of Common Interest on the development of common capabilities that go beyond the financial means of a single Member State; believes that these projects should be used to support the industrial and technological capacities that underpin the major common priorities of several Member States and in fields such as external border protection and defence, in particular in the land domain, as well as strategic enablers, particularly in space and European air defence, to act on the whole spectrum of threats, military mobility, in particular strategic and tactical air transport, deep strikes, drone and anti-drone technologies, missiles and munitions, and artificial intelligence, in order to develop sovereign infrastructure and critical enablers; emphasises that pragmatism must prevail due to the sheer number of priorities and the need to mobilise new resources; considers, in that regard, that the EU should focus, where possible, on rapidly available and proven European technologies that gradually reduce our dependencies and improve our security; highlights the need to support the development of pan-European value chains in EU defence cooperation by incorporating companies throughout the Union and to boost competitiveness in the sector by various means, such as mergers and champions; considers, furthermore, that instead of focusing on fair return, our defence policies should encourage the growth of EU centres of excellence;

    59.  Calls for the further development of an EU defence industrial policy to improve existing and develop defence-specific instruments where necessary, and to optimise the use of non-defence-specific instruments for the purposes of the EDTIB;

    60.  Recalls the need to ensure coherence in EU public policies, which must not generate obligations contradictory to the overall defence objectives, especially during a security crisis, where the concept of ‘strategic exception’ should be introduced; calls for the creation of a genuine defence environment in favour of defence that could support industrial ramp-up efforts by taking better advantage of the multi-sectoral Commission instruments by screening, reviewing and, where needed, revising existing ones to ensure that they do not undermine EU defence policy objectives;

    61.  Recommends the establishment of a security of supply regime, including joint strategic stocks of raw materials and critical parts, to ensure the availability of raw materials and components needed for the production of defence products, and to allow production cycles to be ramped up faster and shortened; calls for the Commission and the Member States to be jointly tasked with the mapping and monitoring of the EDTIB, with the aims of protecting its strengths, reducing its vulnerabilities, avoiding crises and providing it with an effective and efficient industrial policy;

    62.  Proposes that relevant defence-related entities/activities be allowed access to InvestEU and other EU funds, taking advantage of EU defence as a job creator; insists that defence-related entities/activities be prioritised as appropriate, with the support of the Chips Act(5) and the Critical Raw Materials Act(6); believes that the simplification efforts announced by the Commission must fully encompass the defence sector; calls on the Commission to leverage the full dual-use potential of space technologies, considering space as both a new operating domain and a critical enabler of multi-domain operations; underlines that the EU currently has a substantial gap in space capabilities compared to its main competitors and stresses that, in order to address this gap in space technologies, already existing flagship projects (i.e. Copernicus and Galileo) should be enhanced for defence applications; suggests, furthermore, that the EU should urgently pursue the development of its IRIS2 constellation, together with the development of further EU common projects, for example, for space domain awareness and space-based missile early-warning applications;

    63.  Insists on the need to ensure geographical coherence by taking stock of the will of the EU and the UK, first and foremost to build security guarantees for Ukraine and become closer security partners, and to sign a joint declaration with concrete engagements and structured dialogue in order to strengthen EU-UK cooperation on the full range of foreign and security challenges facing the continent, the budgetary and regulatory conditions of which remain to be negotiated, and keeping in mind the importance of the decision-making autonomy of the EU; underlines, in this regard, the importance of closer cooperation on information and intelligence sharing, military mobility, security and defence initiatives, crisis management, cyber defence, hybrid threats, foreign information manipulation and interference and in jointly addressing shared threats;

    64.  Calls for more coherence in support of companies by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and cutting red tape, and ensuring much easier access for small- and mid-cap companies within the defence sector; underlines the need to review, simplify and harmonise the current framework for export licences and intra-EU transfer licences, as well as for cross-certification of equipment, as one of the priorities to foster better cooperation within the market and among Member States;

    65.  Encourages a common European certification scheme for weapons systems and a move beyond the current system of national certification in order to speed up the introduction of weapons systems into the armed forces of Member States;

    66.  Calls for greater coherence in governance as CSDP must become the key instrument of a powerful Europe; considers that this requires a real link in governance between the Member States, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Commissioners; urges the Member States to overcome the complexity of decision-making processes in the governance of European defence; calls for the creation of a council of defence ministers and for the move from unanimity to qualified majority voting for decisions in the European Council, the Council of Ministers and EU agencies such as the EDA, excluding military operations with an executive mandate; calls, in the meantime, for the use of Article 44 TEU in the creation of a horizontal task force on defence in the Commission; calls for increased democratic accountability through enhanced oversight by Parliament;

    67.  Proposes the strengthening of Parliament’s oversight and scrutiny role, in line with the expansion of the EU’s role in defence; calls for the appointment of a Parliament representative to the new Defence Industrial Readiness Board proposed in EDIP, as there is currently none provided for;

    Sovereignty

    68.  Stresses that the creation of a single European defence market is a priority, as the fragmentation and lack of competitiveness of the European industry have so far hampered the capacity of the EU to assume more responsibility as a security provider; recalls that the concept of a ‘defence market’ implies a full recognition of its specificity and an appropriate and coherent application of EU public policies; recalls that European preference should be the aim of achieving this single ‘market’ by strictly linking territoriality and the added value generated in this territory;

    69.  Considers that European preference must be the guiding principle and long-term ambition of EU policies related to the European defence market, in order to develop and protect European technological excellence; stresses, however, that such preference must not be pursued at the expense of the defence readiness of the Union, given the extent of international supply and value chains in the defence sector;

    70.  Rejects a scenario in which EU funds contribute to perpetuating or deepening dependences on non-European actors, both for production of capabilities or their deployment;

    71.  Urges the Member States to stop invoking Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as a means of avoiding the application of the Procurement Directive(7) (2009/81/EC), thus undermining the common market for defence; calls on the Commission to review the Directive on the transfer of defence-related products(8) and the Directive on defence procurement as well as the inter-community transfer directive (2009/43/EC) with a view to strengthening the common market for defence and introducing flexibility with regard to crisis situations like the one we are currently facing;

    72.  Calls on the Commission to design a better-resourced, more strategic and more efficient successor to the European Defence Fund that supports common research and innovation in defence all along the supply chain and to lay the conditions to address technological challenges: advanced persistent threats, artificial intelligence and machine learning, quantum computing, the internet of military things, security, supply chain attacks, zero-day exploits and cloud security; calls for the establishment of an EU agency, inspired by the US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, as part of the European Defence Agency, which should be solely responsible for supporting research in emerging and disruptive technologies, equipped with an adequate amount of venture capital;

    Finance and investments

    73.  Is concerned that, without a substantial increase in defence investment, the EU’s security and defence objectives will not be reached, both in terms of military support for Ukraine and the improvement of our common security; highlights the fact that the cost of non-preparedness for the most extreme military contingencies would be much higher than the cost of decisive EU preparedness; calls for the EU and its Member States to work and agree on concrete ways and means to achieve a short- to long-term substantial increase in public and private investment in defence and security;

    74.  Considers that, in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework (MFF), defence spending lines will have to reflect the new ‘ready for the most extreme military contingencies’ priority;

    75.  Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next MFF; insists that innovative solutions for finding additional funding must be explored without delay, such as investing in the defence sector, making it easier and faster to repurpose funds from one project to another, and exploring the possibility of adjusting EU funding criteria to give new prominence to security criteria in allocating spending;

    76.  Welcomes the five-point ‘ReArm Europe’ plan proposed by the Commission President on 4 March 2025;

    77.  Strongly supports the idea that EU Member States must increase their defence and security financing to new levels; notes that some Member States have already increased their defence spending to 5 % of GDP;

    78.  Welcomes the proposals made in the recent Niinistö report as regards the financing of European defence; supports the establishment of a defending Europe facility and a securing Europe facility; equally welcomes and supports the proposal to establish an investment guarantee programme based on the model of InvestEU with open architecture to trigger private sector investment and to issue a ‘European preparedness bond standard’;

    79.  Is of the opinion that national recovery and resilience plans should be amended to allow for new defence funding; calls for these investments to also address vulnerabilities in both military capabilities and the social fabric, empowering us to fight all threats to our values, social model, security and defence;

    80.  Urges the Member States to support the establishment of a defence, security and resilience bank to serve as a multilateral lending institution designed to provide low-interest, long-term loans that can support key national security priorities such as rearmament, defence modernisation, rebuilding efforts in Ukraine and the buying back of critical infrastructure currently owned by hostile non-EU countries;

    81.  Calls for a system of European defence bonds to be explored for financing large-scale military investments up front; calls, similarly, for the use of unused ‘coronabonds’ for defence instruments to be explored, to complement the Commission’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, as the EU is now experiencing a pressing need to boost security and defence to protect its citizens, restore deterrence and support its allies, first and foremost Ukraine;

    82.  Reiterates, in line with the Commission’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, its call for the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other international financial institutions and private banks in Europe to invest more actively in the European defence industry; calls, in particular, for an urgent revision of the EIB’s lending policy and immediate flexibility to remove current restrictions on financing defence, and for the possibility of issuing earmarked debt for funding security and defence projects to be investigated;

    83.  Calls on European Council President António Costa to immediately convene the European Council, based on the conclusions of the white paper, so that EU leaders can agree on immediate and far-reaching decisions to implement the European Defence Union as laid out in Article 42(2) TEU and elaborate on the measures identified in the white paper;

    84.  Welcomes the outcomes of the special European Council of 6 March 2025 and asks the Member States to act decisively during the upcoming March Council meeting;

    85.  Underlines the need to enhance our partnerships with like-minded countries, particularly those in Europe, such as the UK and Norway; calls for a broad EU-UK security pact, also covering key subjects such as energy, migration and critical minerals; points to the added value of fostering our relationships with global partners such as the US, Japan and Australia;

    86.  Calls for enhanced cooperation with Western Balkan countries in the area of defence industries; emphasises that Western Balkan countries have significant expertise in defence industries and that the EU should consider procuring military equipment from Western Balkan countries; emphasises that this approach would help make Western Balkan countries stronger allies of the EU;

    87.  Believes that every effort must be made to maintain and, if possible, foster transatlantic cooperation in every field of the military and defence sector, while recalling the need to foster European defence and develop greater sovereignty;

    88.  Notes that the above is without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States;

    o
    o   o

    89.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024).
    (2) Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022.
    (3) Report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and in particular Chapter Four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies.
    (4) Report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’.
    (5) Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Chips Act) (OJ L 229, 18.9.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1781/oj).
    (6) Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj).
    (7) Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (OJ L 216, 20.8.2009, p. 76, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/81/oj).
    (8) Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/43/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Romanian industrial hub of Ploiesti to get EIB advisory support on green transport projects

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • EIB Advisory to offer municipality of Ploiesti project management support for transport upgrades
    • EIB advisory to support the just transition territories in their journey towards climate neutrality
    • Ploiesti plans to upgrade existing urban transport infrastructure

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) will advise the Romanian municipality of Ploiești on green transport projects as part of a Europe-wide push to make urban life healthier for people and the environment. EIB Vice-President Ioannis Tsakiris and Ploiești Mayor Mihai Poliţeanu signed an agreement on advisory support today in the city, which is a major industrial hub 56 kilometres north of Bucharest.

    The Ploiesti administration, which serves a metropolitan population of more than 266,000, is seeking to upgrade local transport infrastructure to keep pace with the area’s economic growth and cut emissions that cause global warming.

    Under the accord with Ploiesti, EIB Advisory will deploy its own experts as well as external consultants to provide guidance on financial and project management of transport projects. Assistance in preparing the grant application under the European Union’s “Just Transition” Pillar 3 programme – Public Sector Loan Facility is also possible. The support is offered through the InvestEU Advisory Hub. Further support may be available at a later stage.

    “We are very pleased to support Ploiesti in this transition toward climate neutrality,” said EIB Vice-President Ioannis Tsakiris. “This partnership underscores our commitment to climate action andsustainable urban development.”

    Ploiești, the capital of Prahova County, has historically been a centre for the petroleum industry and serves as a hub for oil refining and petrochemicals. It is Romania’s ninth-largest municipality and its proximity to other industrial centres as well as to tourist destinations increases its potential to become part of a major transport and economic corridor.

    “Our partnership with the EIB is important and promotes the development of our city.,” said Mihai Poliţeanu, mayor of Ploiesti. “We are considering investments that closely align with the EU’s social and environmental objectives, contribute to reducing carbon emissions and strengthen Romania’s commitments to sustainable urban development.”

    The EIB provides technical and financial expertise to support the development of sustainable and bankable projects in various sectors. In Romania, EIB Advisory is assisting authorities and businesses in preparing infrastructure investments, improving project planning and enhancing access to funding through tailored services and capacity building.

    Background information  

    EIB

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, the EIB finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, high-impact investments outside the European Union and the capital markets union.

    The EIB Group, which includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed almost €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60 % of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers. Around half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average.

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here.

    About the InvestEU Advisory Hub

    The InvestEU programme provides the European Union with crucial long-term funding by leveraging substantial private and public funds in support of a sustainable recovery and growth. It helps mobilise private investments for the European Union’s policy priorities, such as the European Green Deal and the digital transition. InvestEU brings together under one roof the multitude of EU financial instruments, making funding for investment projects in Europe simpler, more efficient and more flexible. The InvestEU Fund is implemented through financial partners that invest against an EU budget guarantee worth €26.2 billion. That guarantee will back investment projects of the implementing partners, increase their risk-bearing capacity and thus mobilise at least €372 billion in additional investment. The InvestEU Advisory Hub is the central entry point for project promoters and intermediaries seeking advisory support and technical assistance related to centrally managed EU investment funds. Managed by the European Commission and financed by the EU budget, the InvestEU Advisory Hub connects project promoters and intermediaries with advisory partners, who work directly together to help projects reach the financing stage. The InvestEU Advisory Hub complements the InvestEU Fund by supporting the identification, preparation and development of investment projects across the European Union. Together with the InvestEU Portal – the EU’s online matchmaking tool – we aim to strengthen Europe’s investment and business environment.

    In Romania, EIB Advisory supports public and private clients in developing and implementing projects. EIB Advisory provides financial and technical advice, market development and capacity building support in a wide range of sectors and in line with the EIB Group’s eight strategic priorities.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Almost €80 million in EU investment to modernise Cambodia’s agricultural sector and to boost farmers’ access to domestic and global markets

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • The comprehensive EU investment package – which blends an EIB Global loan, an EU grant, and technical assistance – will strengthen Cambodia’s agricultural sector, improve food security, make selected value chains more competitive and boost exports.
    • This investment will benefit 100 000 smallholder farmers, 25 000 land-poor households and 500 agricultural enterprises, enhancing productivity and competitiveness.
    • It will upgrade the National Agricultural Laboratory, expand key agricultural facilities to enhance the country’s sanitary and phytosanitary capacities, and support the construction of the Kaoh Khsach Tonlea bridge to improve transport and market access.
    • This initiative is in line with the European Union’s Global Gateway strategy, promoting sustainable growth, climate resilience and inclusive economic development.

    EIB Global – the European Investment Bank’s global arm – and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) of the Kingdom of Cambodia have signed an agreement today for a €15 million EU grant to support the Agriculture Services Programme for an Inclusive Rural Economy and Agricultural Trade (ASPIRE-AT). A key priority for the Cambodian government, ASPIRE-AT aims to modernise the agricultural sector, enhance food security and strengthen export potential. This grant supplements a €60 million loan from EIB Global and €4.5 million of support from the European Union for technical assistance, which will be implemented by the European Investment Bank (EIB). This brings the total of EU-backed investment in the programme to nearly €80 million. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the UN’s rural development agency, is co-financing the programme with $49 million.

    The agreement was signed in Phnom Penh by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Aun Pornmoniroth and EIB Vice-President Nicola Beer during her first visit to Cambodia as the EIB Vice-President responsible for Southeast Asia. The signing took place in the presence of EU Ambassador to Cambodia Igor Driesmans and Country Director for Cambodia at the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Frew Behabtu.

    The EU financing will help modernise Cambodia’s agricultural sector, equipping smallholder farmers, agribusinesses and producer organisations with tools and infrastructure to boost production, provide access to new markets, and improve food safety. The project will directly benefit 100 000 smallholder farmers and 25 000 land-poor households, creating new income opportunities – particularly in rural areas – with a strong focus on empowering women, engaging young people and supporting indigenous communities.

    EIB Vice-President Nicola Beer said: “The European Investment Bank is proud to support ASPIRE-AT and Cambodia’s agricultural sector, which plays a vital role in the country’s economy and food security. With this financing, we are helping the government to strengthen food security, increase farmers’ incomes, and open up new market opportunities for Cambodian products. It is a great example of how Team Europe delivers real impact, creating jobs, driving trade, and strengthening Cambodia’s economy.”

    Ambassador of the European Union to the Kingdom of Cambodia Igor Driesmans said: “I am proud to be part of this important agricultural investment project by partnering with our European Investment Bank and IFAD under the European Union Global Gateway and our Team Europe initiatives. Our support of €19.5 million ($21.06 million) in grants will help farmers and their communities improve primary production, processing capabilities and market access through capacity building and access to financing, agricultural laboratory support, and better rural and urban connectivity. Together, we are helping the sector to become more inclusive and resilient, benefiting all Cambodians, and especially those in rural communities.”

    Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance (MEF) Aun Pornmoniroth expressed his deep appreciation to the EIB, the European Union and to IFAD for their support and cooperation in successfully designing and preparing the ASPIRE-AT programme. He reiterated that the agreement signed today for the ASPIRE-AT programme is a testament to the increased and closer cooperation between the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the EIB, the European Union and IFAD, as well as to the unwavering support of key development partners in the reform agenda of the government’s Pentagonal Strategy (Phase I), as Cambodia aims to achieve its goal of becoming an upper-middle-income country in 2030 and a high-income country in 2050. In this spirit, the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia reaffirmed its commitment to fostering and strengthening future partnerships with the EIB, the European Union and IFAD across multifaceted sectors.

    International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Country Director for Cambodia Frew Behabtu said: “This significant EU grant, alongside the EIB loan and IFAD’s co-financing, marks a powerful step towards transforming Cambodia’s agricultural sector. IFAD is proud to be part of this collaborative effort to empower rural communities, enhance food security, and unlock the export potential that drives sustainable economic growth.”

    This investment will strengthen Cambodia’s agricultural infrastructure and market connectivity, supporting collection and handling facilities, warehouses, drying pads, and access roads to improve bulk produce transport. It will also fund the Kaoh Khsach Tonlea bridge, linking the island to the mainland to enhance market access and pilot a new agricultural cooperative model. Additionally, the financing will improve food safety and quality control by supporting laboratories, research and quarantine stations and the expansion of the National Agricultural Laboratory. These investments are strategically distributed across a range of locations in Cambodia, ensuring that they have a broad geographic impact and enable greater integration into regional and global markets.

    Background information

    About EIB Global

    EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm dedicated to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance. EIB Global is designed to foster strong, focused partnership within Team Europe, alongside fellow development finance institutions and civil society. EIB Global brings the Group closer to local people, companies and institutions through our offices around the world.

    About the EIB in Cambodia

    Since 2018, EIB Global has been a key partner in Cambodia’s sustainable development, investing €310 million across various sectors, including in water and agriculture, as well as to rehabilitate rural roads. In close collaboration with the Delegation of the European Union to the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Royal Government of Cambodia, and other development partners, the EIB supports projects that foster economic growth, enhance environmental sustainability, and improve living standards. The Bank’s investments focus on clean water access, rural infrastructure, climate-resilient agriculture and food security. These initiatives have expanded irrigation systems, upgraded rural roads, and strengthened agricultural value chains, directly benefiting millions of Cambodians by creating new economic opportunities and building resilience in local communities.

    The Agriculture Services Programme for an Inclusive Rural Economy and Agricultural Trade (ASPIRE-AT) is an initiative of the Cambodian government – implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) – that is aimed at reducing rural poverty and enhancing climate resilience in Cambodian households. Building on the success of the previous ASPIRE programme (2015-2022), ASPIRE-AT focuses on sustainable agricultural growth by providing small-scale producers with productive assets, fostering business partnerships, and improving market access. The programme targets 125 000 rural households, emphasising inclusivity with at least 50% of beneficiaries being women, 20% young people and 1.5% indigenous people.

    The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is an international financial institution and a United Nations specialized agency. Based in Rome – the United Nations food and agriculture hub – IFAD invests in rural people, empowering them to reduce poverty, increase food security, improve nutrition and strengthen resilience. Since 1978, we have provided more than US$25 billion in grants and low-interest loans to fund projects in developing countries.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB provides €160 million to support micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Tuscany

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • Tuscany Region President Eugenio Giani and EIB Vice-President Gelsomina Vigliotti launched the operational phase of the initiative at an event in Florence today.
    • Subsidies will be applied to loans granted to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises by banks selected by the Tuscany region.
    • The funds will be channelled through Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Cambiano, Cambiano Leasing and BCC Banca Iccrea to 12 cooperative banks in Tuscany that are members of BCC Iccrea Group and Federazione Toscana delle BCC.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) has approved a €160 million financing package for the Tuscany region, aiming to back the investments and the working capital needs of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Tuscany. Tuscany Region President Eugenio Giani and EIB Vice-President Gelsomina Vigliotti launched the operational phase of the initiative at the Palazzo Strozzi Sacrati in Florence today.

    In addition to the €160 million already planned, the region will provide a further €10 million to cut the interest paid by micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Tuscany. The 321 companies selected in the 2023 research and development calls will be able to access the EIB credit line from 17 March by confirming the option exercised in the application to finance their investments in productive activities, research, innovation and working capital.

    Subsidies will be applied to loans granted to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises by banks selected by the Tuscany region in a recently issued public call. It will also be possible to obtain a refund of any guarantees. The banks involved are Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Cambiano, Cambiano Leasing and BCC Banca Iccrea, benefiting 12 cooperative banks in Tuscany that are members of BCC Iccrea Group and Federazione Toscana delle BCC.

    “This agreement confirms the EIB’s support for Italian business, helping to promote the sustainable development and long-term competitiveness of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Tuscany,” said EIB Vice-President Gelsomina Vigliotti.

    Tuscany Region President Eugenio Giani and Regional Councillor for Economy and Tourism Leonardo Marras explained: “We want to improve the competitiveness of our micro, small and medium-sized enterprises by backing their productive investment in expansion, diversification, system consolidation and the green, technological and digital transition. Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises are the backbone of the regional productive system in Tuscany. The calls we have just published will enable them to reduce the interest rates and guarantee premiums on bank loans granted from the EIB’s Regione Toscana EU Blending 2023-0118 credit line. We will provide them with an additional €30 million from the European Regional Development Fund, €3 million of which will be reserved for companies based in inner areas.”

     

     

     

    Technical details

    The beneficiaries of this operation are micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in several sectors including manufacturing, tourism and research and development. See here for specific limitations. Subsidy applications must be submitted online via the Sistema Fondi Toscana IT system here and will be assessed by Sviluppo Toscana. Applications can be submitted until the available funds are exhausted. The total cost of the projects presented must not be less than €70 000 (€90 000 for research and development calls) or more than €5 million. Interest rate reduction subsidies are provided in a single instalment covering up to 80% of the amount for financing investment projects and up to 90% for financing projects contributing to climate action.

    The maximum interest rate subsidy for new calls for productive investments may not exceed €300 000 per project. Within five months of submitting the subsidy application, the company must provide documentation certifying the granting of the bank loan and the related guarantee to receive the financing. Guarantees costs can be reimbursed by the Tuscany region up to a maximum of €12 000.

    Once financing is secured, they will have 15 months to complete their investment project.

    Background information

    EIB

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union, and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world. The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security. The EIB Group signed 99 operations totalling €10.98 billion in Italy in 2024, unlocking almost €37 billion of investment in the real economy. All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment. Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average.

    • Tuscany Region President Eugenio Giani and EIB Vice-President Gelsomina Vigliotti launched the operational phase of the initiative at an event in Florence today.
    • Subsidies will be applied to loans granted to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises by banks selected by the Tuscany region.
    • The funds will be channelled through Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Cambiano, Cambiano Leasing and BCC Banca Iccrea to 12 cooperative banks in Tuscany that are members of BCC Iccrea Group and Federazione Toscana delle BCC.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) has approved a €160 million financing package for the Tuscany region, aiming to back the investments and the working capital needs of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Tuscany. Tuscany Region President Eugenio Giani and EIB Vice-President Gelsomina Vigliotti launched the operational phase of the initiative at the Palazzo Strozzi Sacrati in Florence today.

    In addition to the €160 million already planned, the region will provide a further €10 million to cut the interest paid by micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Tuscany. The 321 companies selected in the 2023 research and development calls will be able to access the EIB credit line from 17 March by confirming the option exercised in the application to finance their investments in productive activities, research, innovation and working capital.

    Subsidies will be applied to loans granted to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises by banks selected by the Tuscany region in a recently issued public call. It will also be possible to obtain a refund of any guarantees. The banks involved are Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Cambiano, Cambiano Leasing and BCC Banca Iccrea, benefiting 12 cooperative banks in Tuscany that are members of BCC Iccrea Group and Federazione Toscana delle BCC.

    “This agreement confirms the EIB’s support for Italian business, helping to promote the sustainable development and long-term competitiveness of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Tuscany,” said EIB Vice-President Gelsomina Vigliotti.

    Tuscany Region President Eugenio Giani and Regional Councillor for Economy and Tourism Leonardo Marras explained: “We want to improve the competitiveness of our micro, small and medium-sized enterprises by backing their productive investment in expansion, diversification, system consolidation and the green, technological and digital transition. Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises are the backbone of the regional productive system in Tuscany. The calls we have just published will enable them to reduce the interest rates and guarantee premiums on bank loans granted from the EIB’s Regione Toscana EU Blending 2023-0118 credit line. We will provide them with an additional €30 million from the European Regional Development Fund, €3 million of which will be reserved for companies based in inner areas.”

     Technical details

    The beneficiaries of this operation are micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in several sectors including manufacturing, tourism and research and development. See here for specific limitations. Subsidy applications must be submitted online via the Sistema Fondi Toscana IT system here and will be assessed by Sviluppo Toscana. Applications can be submitted until the available funds are exhausted. The total cost of the projects presented must not be less than €70 000 (€90 000 for research and development calls) or more than €5 million. Interest rate reduction subsidies are provided in a single instalment covering up to 80% of the amount for financing investment projects and up to 90% for financing projects contributing to climate action.

    The maximum interest rate subsidy for new calls for productive investments may not exceed €300 000 per project. Within five months of submitting the subsidy application, the company must provide documentation certifying the granting of the bank loan and the related guarantee to receive the financing. Guarantees costs can be reimbursed by the Tuscany region up to a maximum of €12 000.

    Once financing is secured, they will have 15 months to complete their investment project.

    Background information

    EIB

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union, and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world. The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security. The EIB Group signed 99 operations totalling €10.98 billion in Italy in 2024, unlocking almost €37 billion of investment in the real economy. All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment. Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Thales Delivers the World’s First Autonomous Mine Hunting System to the Royal Navy

    Source: Thales Group

    Headline: Thales Delivers the World’s First Autonomous Mine Hunting System to the Royal Navy

    • Thales has reached a historic milestone by delivering the first end-to-end autonomous maritime mine hunting system to the Royal Navy. This achievement comes under the aegis of the Joint Armament Cooperation Organization (OCCAr) and within the framework of the Franco-British MMCM (Maritime Mine Counter Measures) project.
    • This cutting-edge system places the UK and France at the forefront of naval innovation. Utilising cyber-secured autonomous drones equipped with Artificial Intelligence (AI), Thales is revolutionising mine countermeasures operations with unprecedented precision and safety.
    • Thales relies on 200 skilled jobs, thereby contributing to the dynamism of the British defence industry.
    ©Thales/Shaun Roster” id=”image-5327e472-2cc6-4f7d-ac56-e0a4d5fad37f” data-id=”5327e472-2cc6-4f7d-ac56-e0a4d5fad37f” data-original=”https://cdn.uc.assets.prezly.com/5327e472-2cc6-4f7d-ac56-e0a4d5fad37f/-/inline/no/image.png” data-mfp-src=”https://cdn.uc.assets.prezly.com/5327e472-2cc6-4f7d-ac56-e0a4d5fad37f/-/format/auto/” alt=”©Thales/Shaun Roster”/>
    ©Thales/Shaun Roster

    Marking a technological breakthrough in the conduct of mine countermeasure missions, this system drastically reduces the exposure risk for personnel on board ships while contributing to the safety of maritime routes, the backbone of the global economy.

    The Royal Navy will receive its first four systems over the course of the year. Each system includes several integrated pieces of equipment and subsystems, enabling the accomplishment of highly complex missions: an Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV)[1], an advanced towed sonar (TSAM) with a cutting-edge multivision sonar (SAMDIS), a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV), and a lightweight operations centre (e-POC), all supported by a secure command and control system.

    Thanks to its expertise in sensors, data analysis, and machine learning, Thales has developed a sonar analysis application, Mi-Map, which processes sonar data up to four times faster, allowing even more precise detection and classification of sea floor mines.

    Deployed and operated from a mother ship and coastal bases, the platforms can handle vast volumes of data, enabling operators to expedite the process of identifying and neutralising mines. This innovative system aligns with the British government’s ambitious policy to position the UK as a global leader in autonomous maritime technologies.

    Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry, Rt Hon Maria Eagle MP, said: “This delivery marks a significant milestone in our mine-hunting capabilities and the autonomous technology will keep Britain and our Royal Navy sailors safer by identifiying & removing them from mines. It has also supported hundreds of skilled jobs across UK industry – a clear demonstration that defence is an engine for economic growth.”

    Rebecca Smith, Member of Parliament for South West Devon, attended the ceremony at the Thales Maritime Autonomy Centre in Plymouth, officially marking the delivery of this cutting-edge technology capable of detecting and neutralising the growing threat of naval mines.

    “I welcome today’s announcement by Thales regarding the delivery to the Royal Navy of the world’s first end-to-end autonomous mine hunting system. I am pleased to see that a city with such a prestigious naval history as Plymouth now finds itself at the heart of a future rich in innovations for the Royal Navy. I hope we continue to see new activities develop, resulting in new local jobs in high-tech maritime areas. In the current climate, it is important to ensure strong military and industrial cooperation across Europe, and I am proud to see Plymouth playing a key role in effectively supporting the relationship between the UK and France”, declared Rebecca Smith, MP South West Devon

    Phil Siveter, CEO of Thales in the UK, stated, “We are extremely proud to deliver the world’s first end-to-end autonomous mine hunting system to the Royal Navy. With the introduction of AI and advanced sensor technology, this innovation marks a new era in naval defence and underlines our unwavering commitment to providing cutting-edge solutions that enhance the capabilities of our armed forces. The Royal Navy will now have a powerful tool to protect its national interests and maintain safety at sea.”

    A historic partner of the Royal Navy for over a century, Thales has long contributed to the advanced technologies that equip its sonar and mine hunting systems. The Franco-British MMCM program highlights Thales’s determination to provide world-class capabilities in these areas. Significant investments made by the UK have maintained over 200 skilled jobs, particularly at Thales sites in Somerset and Plymouth, strengthening the entire ecosystem of suppliers and partners.

    About OCCAR

    OCCAR is an International Organisation for the management of complex, cooperative defence equipment programmes. France, Germany, Italy and the UK created the OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement / Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation) on the basis of a ratified treaty known as the OCAR Convention, with the intent to increase their armaments cooperation in order to improve efficiency and reduce costs.

    www.occar.int

    About Thales

    Thales (Euronext Paris: HO) is a global leader in advanced technologies for the Defence, Aerospace, and Cyber & Digital sectors. Its portfolio of innovative products and services addresses several major challenges: sovereignty, security, sustainability and inclusion.

    The Group invests more than €4 billion per year in Research & Development in key areas, particularly for critical environments, such as Artificial Intelligence, cybersecurity, quantum and cloud technologies.

    Thales has more than 83,000 employees in 68 countries. In 2024, the Group generated sales of €20.6 billion.

    1Royal Navy Motor Boat (RNMB) ARIADNE

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Global: What food did the real St Patrick eat? Less corned beef and cabbage, more oats and stinky cheese

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Regina Sexton, Food and culinary historian, University College Cork

    Every St Patrick’s day, thousands of Americans eat corned beef and cabbage as a way of connecting to Ireland. But this association sits uncomfortably with many Irish people.

    That’s because the dish, while popular in the past, has nothing to do with St Patrick himself. St Patrick (also known as Patricius or Pádraig) was born in Roman Britain in the 5th century. He is the patron saint of Ireland and in later biographies, legend and folklore, he is depicted as almost single-handedly converting the Irish to Christianity, and breaking the power of the druids.

    The entangled mix of history, myth and folklore that has been attached to the saint makes it difficult to isolate historical fact from hagiographical and folklore embellishments. So what, if anything, do the celebratory foods of today have to do with the real St Patrick? And would he have eaten any of those same foods himself?


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    The real St Patrick

    The little we know about the real Patrick comes from two, probably 5th-century, short Latin texts written by the saint himself. Those are the Confessio, which is believed to be Patrick’s autobiography, and the Epistola, a letter of excommunication to the soldiers of a British king Coroticus, after they killed and enslaved some of his converts.

    A St Patrick’s Day greeting card from 1909.
    Missouri History Museum

    In these texts, food is only mentioned in the context of hunger and the miraculous appearance of pigs that are slaughtered to sustain starving travellers.

    Other important biographies of St Patrick were written in the 7th and somewhere between the 9th and 12th century. The two 7th-century Latin texts were written by churchmen, Muirchú and Tírechán. The author of the later biography, The Tripartite Life of Saint Patrick, is not known, but it was written partly in Latin and partly in Irish. These hagiographies (writing on the lives of saints) were works in legend-building with little connection to the real Patrick.

    They do, however, give us a glimpse of the food culture of early medieval Ireland, when Patrick lived. They make references to dairy produce, salmon, bread, honey and meats, including beef, goat and a “ram for a king’s feast”.

    Herb gardens are discussed alongside details of the cooking culture with mention of copper cauldrons, kitchens and cooking women. Grain and dairy foods would have most common, with white meats abundant in summer, and grain – especially oats – associated with the winter and early spring.

    It is these foods, along with cultivated cabbage and onion-type vegetables and wild greens and fruit, that most likely would have sustained Patrick.

    Delicious miracles

    Food is frequently the subject of Saint Patrick’s miracles. As a child, he is said to have turned snow into butter and curds. On his missionary work, he was said to have changed water to honey, and cheese into stone and back to cheese again. In another miracle, he turned rushes into chives to satisfy a pregnant woman’s craving.

    The bountiful fish stocks of certain rivers are also attributed to the saint’s blessing. One such example is the River Bann in Northern Ireland which was known for its salmon.

    The food in Patrick’s world had a defined Irish signature. There is an emphasis in the hagiographies on a range of fresh, cultured and preserved dairy produce and the use of byproducts such as whey-water.

    Corned beef and cabbage has become a popular St Patrick’s Day meal, but bears little connection to the real Patrick.
    Brent Hofacker/Shutterstock

    The extensive and later abandoned Irish cheese-making tradition is referenced in mention of curds and fáiscre grotha (pressed curds). The differentiation between new milk and milk may indicate a skills-based culture of working with dairy in the preparation of a family of thickened, soured and fermented milks. The associated communities, of which Patrick would have been part, probably had a taste for highly flavoured and cultured milk and cheese products.

    These foods are typical of a self-sufficient agrarian economy, producing food that was suited to Irish soil and climatic conditions including wild and managed woodland, coastline and farmland. It is this vision of an untouched Ireland that continues to inspire Irish food culture today.

    Regina Sexton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. What food did the real St Patrick eat? Less corned beef and cabbage, more oats and stinky cheese – https://theconversation.com/what-food-did-the-real-st-patrick-eat-less-corned-beef-and-cabbage-more-oats-and-stinky-cheese-251746

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Putin mulls over US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal – but the initial signs aren’t positive

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate Editor

    While Donald Trump’s special envoy was en route to Moscow to talk about a possible ceasefire deal with his opposite numbers in the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin enjoyed a meet-up with his old friend Alexander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus, and the atmosphere was reportedly congenial.

    According to the Guardian’s contemporaneous report, the pair even shared a macabre joke at a press conference after their meeting about Europe being “done for”. Putin hastened to clarify that when Lukashenko said if the US and Russia came to an agreement, Europe would be “done for” he had of course been enjoying a pun. Apparently, said Putin, “pipeline in Russian means also being done for, so this will be to Europe’s benefit, because they will get cheap Russian gas. So they will have a pipeline.”

    “That’s what I meant,” said Lukashenko. “Yes, that’s what I thought you did,” Putin replied. Smiles all round from the Russian media audience.

    Putin explained that while he’s technically in favour of a ceasefire, there were a few things that needed to be cleared up and that he and Donald Trump would have a phone call to do just that. Top of the list was “removing the root causes of this crisis”, which most observers are translating as Putin maintaining his demand for all four provinces Ukraine that Russian troops currently occupy and an undertaking by Kyiv never to join Nato.

    It’s unlikely to meet with the approval of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. Zelensky has said he thinks that Putin will do “everything he can to drag out the war” – and Putin’s approach appears to bear this out. This accords with what Stefan Wolff and Tetyana Malyarenko wrote in reaction to the news that the US and Ukraine were at last seeing eye to eye, at least on the need for a halt to the killing.


    Sign up to receive our weekly World Affairs Briefing newsletter from The Conversation UK. Every Thursday we’ll bring you expert analysis of the big stories in international relations.


    Wolff and Malyarenko, professors of international security at the University of Birmingham and National University Odesa Law Academy respectively, believe Putin will want to keep hostilities going as long as he can while still keeping in with the US president. They see Russia following a “two-pronged approach” – engaging with the White House over the ceasefire proposal while also pushing for further battlefield gains. They write:

    The peculiar set-up of the negotiations also plays into the Kremlin’s hands here. Short of direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow, Washington has to shuttle between them, trying to close gaps between their positions with a mixture of diplomacy and pressure. This has worked reasonably well with Ukraine so far, but it is far less certain that this approach will bear similar fruit with Russia.




    Read more:
    US and Ukraine sign 30-day ceasefire proposal – now the ball is in Putin’s court


    In all this shuttle diplomacy, one question that you hear more rarely is what the Ukrainian public will be prepared to accept. Over the past three years Gerard Toal of Virginia Tech University, John O’Loughlin of the University of Colorado and Kristin M. Bakke of UCL have provided us with some valuable insights based on polling of the Ukrainian public. They believe that while the majority of Ukrainians are war-weary and willing to make concessions, even ceding territory in return for peace, they are not willing to compromise their country’s political independence. They also don’t trust Putin and see the war in existential terms.

    And, contrary to what Trump might have the world believe, Zelensky remains a popular leader. In fact the latest poll finds his support up ten points on the previous survey at 67%. (Incidentally, Trump posted on his TruthSocial website recently that Zelensky’s approval rating was 4%.) They conclude:

    It will be in large part down to ordinary Ukrainians to shape what happens afterwards. An ugly peace may be accepted by a war-weary population. But if it has little local legitimacy and acceptance, peace is likely to be unsustainable in the long run.




    Read more:
    Are Ukrainians ready for ceasefire and concessions? Here’s what the polls say


    Russia, meanwhile, has weathered the conflict remarkably well, certainly better than the analysts who forecast in the summer of 2022. It that stage, when Ukraine’s counter-offensive was pushing the invaders out of occupied territory, inflicting major casualties and destroying huge amounts of equipment, some observers thought that Russia’s economy would collapse under the weight of defeat and western sanctions.

    Not so, writes Alexander Hill of the University of Calgary. Hill, a military historian, observes the ways in which the Russian war machine has adapted to conditions over the past two years, ditching the recklessness which saw it suffer such grievous losses in 2022 and using more conservative tactics coupled with smart adoption of new technology to give it an edge on the battlefield. He concludes: “While the Russian army remains a relatively blunt instrument, it is not as blunt as it was in late 2022 and early 2023.”




    Read more:
    Why Russia’s armed forces have proven resilient in the war in Ukraine


    Turning off US aid

    Of course, when the US suspended its intelligence-sharing for a few days last week it was a major boost for the Russians. Without data from US satellite coverage and other intelligence traffic, Ukraine’s defenders were left virtually deaf and blind at a crucial time. It gave Russia the space to push its advantage even further as it races to take more territory ahead of a possible peace deal.

    The state of the conflict in Ukraine, March 10 2025.
    Institute for the Study of War

    It’s a bitter lesson for Ukraine to have to learn at this stage in the conflict, write Dafydd Townley and Matthew Powell, experts in international security and strategy at the University of Portsmouth. They believe relying too heavily on one ally for so much was never going to be a good idea and has been exposed as risky since Donald Trump returned to the White House. Perhaps even more risky, given the personality involved, is Ukraine’s dependence on data from ELon Musk’s Starlink satellite system. Musk himself has boasted that: “My Starlink system is the backbone of the Ukrainian army. Their entire front line would collapse if I turned it off.”

    Egotistical self-promotion aside, Musk is probably right about this, but less so when he says there’s no alternative. Townley and Powell believe that it’s in Ukraine’s best interests to look into other satellite systems available to them and note that shares in French-owned satellite company Eutelsat, a European rival to Starlink have recently climbed by almost 400%.




    Read more:
    The US has lifted its intelligence sharing pause with Ukraine. But the damage may already be done


    Many of us who are watching this conflict closely cringed when Trump announced he would cut off military assistance to Ukraine after his (one-sided, it has to be said) shouting match with Volodymyr Zelensky at the end of February. And the announcement that the Pentagon was halting intelligence-sharing as noted above simply made matters worse.

    It felt like a spiteful move. Psychologist Simon McCarthy-Jones of Trinity College, Dublin, has written a book about spite which delves into, among other things, exhibitions of spitefulness in the public arena. It’s a fascinating read. A spiteful approach to foreign policy, he writes, is when we abandon what he calls “humanity’s superpower” – cooperation.

    Trump’s approach, as exemplified by his treatment of Zelensky and also by his baffling decision to impose tariffs even on his friends and allies, “embraces selfishness, treating international relations as a zero-sum game where there can only be one winner”.




    Read more:
    Donald Trump’s foreign policy might be driven by simple spite – here’s what to do about it


    One of the sticking points between the US and Ukraine has been the question of security guarantees in case of a ceasefire or even a longer-term peace deal. It seems increasingly far-fetched that Ukraine will be allowed to join Nato any time soon, so Nato article 5 protections, which would mean that all other member states would be obliged to come to its defence, will not be an issue.

    Trump’s vice-president, J.D. Vance, has suggested that if Ukraine allows US companies access to its mineral resources this would in itself be a security guarantee feels equally improbable. And, in any case, how valuable have US security guarantees been in the past, asks historian Ian Horwood, of York St John University. Horwood pints to the Paris Peace accords of 1973 in which the Nixon administration promised to underwrite South Vietnam’s continued security, while withdrawing US combat troops. Within two years, North Vietnamese tanks were rolling into Saigon.

    More recently the Doha agreement between the first Trump administration and the Taliban was made without involving the Afghan government and didn’t even last long enough for US and Nato troops to get out of Kabul. This sorry history will no doubt have given Zelensky food for thought.




    Read more:
    What is the value of US security guarantees? Here’s what history shows


    Ukraine’s mineral wealth

    All the while many of us have been asking what’s so special about Ukraine’s minerals. We’ve long known about the country as the “bread basket of Europe”, but what is not as widely understood is Ukraine’s mineral wealth. Geologist Munira Raji of the University of Plymouth, says Ukraine has deposits containing 22 of 34 critical minerals identified by the European Union as essential for energy security. This, she says, positions Ukraine among the world’s most resource-rich nations.

    Much of this cornucopia of geological booty is contained in what is known as the “Ukrainian shield” which sits underneath much of the country, writes Raji. Here she walks us through the riches beneath Ukraine’s soil and why America is so keen to get its hands on them.




    Read more:
    What’s so special about Ukraine’s minerals? A geologist explains



    World Affairs Briefing from The Conversation UK is available as a weekly email newsletter. Click here to get updates directly in your inbox.


    ref. Putin mulls over US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal – but the initial signs aren’t positive – https://theconversation.com/putin-mulls-over-us-ukrainian-ceasefire-proposal-but-the-initial-signs-arent-positive-252225

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Video: Seizing Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals | CBP

    Source: United States of America – Federal Government Departments (video statements)

    The trade of counterfeit and pirated goods threatens America’s innovation economy, the competitiveness of our businesses, the livelihoods of U.S. workers, and, in some cases, national security and the health and safety of consumers. Protect yourself and your family by avoiding potentially dangerous counterfeit items.

    Trade of illegitimate goods is associated with smuggling and other criminal activities, and often funds criminal enterprises. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and partner government agencies work side-by-side to protect the intellectual property rights of American businesses. Safeguarding them from unfair competition, and loss of consumer trust, while upholding American innovation and ingenuity.

    Instagram ➤ https://instagram.com/CBPgov
    Facebook ➤ https://facebook.com/CBPgov
    Twitter ➤ https://twitter.com/CBP
    Official Website ➤ https://www.cbp.gov

    #cbp
    #pharmacy
    #medicine
    #trade
    #lawenforcement

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ya35MJniKSE

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Education Secretary’s speech at the ASCL conference

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Education Secretary’s speech at the ASCL conference

    The Education Secretary, Bridget Phillipson, speech at the Association of School and College Leaders.

    Good morning, everyone. Thank you so much for inviting me to speak.

    It’s good to be here. To talk to ASCL members once again.

    Continuing a conversation that has stretched over many years, during my time in opposition, and now as Secretary of State for Education,

    I value your voice and your views. When we agree, of course…

    But even when we don’t. I welcome those robust conversations.

    And Manny, that was certainly robust.

    And I welcome that challenge because I know you and your members want what I want, what parents want, what this government wants, what the Prime Minister wants, what the people of this country want:

    Better life chances for all of our children and young people.

    And through the headwinds and turbulence, the disruption and distraction, this is a government that will face down challenges and focus on outcomes for children.

    And I know that’s what you want too, Pepe.

    It’s been a year of change for both of us since we met at this conference last March.

    Because, just as this is your first ASCL Conference as General Secretary, it’s my first as Secretary of State.

    I did warn you last year that might happen.

    And when I spoke here last year, I told you what I’d do.

    I made promises to deliver change for children, and [political content removed] that’s exactly what I’ve done.

    That’s where my focus lies, delivering change for them – not playing politics or jumping on passing bandwagons or indulging the commentariat.

    I promised to move quickly on an expert-led Curriculum and Assessment Review – and it’s already in full swing.

    I promised a register of children not in school – we’re already legislating for that.

    I promised a single unique identifier for our children – we’re already legislating for that too.

    I promised a free breakfast club in every primary school – we’re already starting to roll them out.

    Promises made, promises kept. With funding. Tripling investment in breakfast clubs.

    On average a school switching to our early adopter breakfast club programme would get £21,400 more funding than under the last scheme.

    And much of our vital action is delivered by the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill.

    That bill belongs to children. To keep them safe, to raise standards in their schools, and to save their parents money.

    And a lot of the change we are delivering, doesn’t need legislation:

    the biggest ever boost to Early Years Pupil Premium,

    new flexibility for teachers to take planning time remotely,

    new T-level qualifications.

    We are getting on and delivering. That’s what families expect of a responsible government, not more words, action that makes a genuine difference in their lives, right now.

    And Education is a driving force for change.

    That’s why, despite the toughest financial inheritance in a generation, the Chancellor protected key education priorities at the Budget.

    £8 billion for early years.

    A 5.5% pay award for schoolteachers.

    But I know we’ve had to make some incredibly difficult decisions already, and I’m afraid to say more are coming.

    I have to be blunt about our inheritance as a government, not just fiscally, but on the fabric of education too.

    You know this all too well, you see it every day.

    Children turning up still in nappies, not able to speak, absences stubbornly high, vacancies up, the SEND system creaking after years of neglect.

    The destruction in the social fabric that wraps around our children cannot be fixed overnight.

    [Political content removed]

    But together we’re making progress. Building long-term solutions to generational challenges. Rejecting the shiny appeal of quick fixes. Promoting the life chances of this country’s children.

    And I know that you’re all doing the same. Your leadership has never mattered more – with all of the challenges we face.

    You’ve risen to the occasion before. And Monday will mark the 5-year anniversary of the disruption to schools by Covid.

    You stepped up then. You did incredible things for our children. and I need you to step up again – but this time, government will be right at your side.

    Despite the challenges, I am hopeful. I believe this country’s best days lie ahead of us.

    There are so many examples of excellence in countless colleges and schools. But together we need to go further, so that every child gets the best education.

    That’s at the centre of my vision.

    To break down barriers to opportunity for every child.

    And it has to be for every child.

    It’s never enough for a just lucky few bright children from deprived backgrounds to succeed.

    I went to fantastic schools; I had teachers who believed in me, a family who prized learning.

    I was given the opportunities to achieve. For me, background wasn’t destiny, but for too many of the kids on my street, it was. I saw the bad luck of a tough start weigh down their life chances.

    And now I want opportunity for every child, and for that we need high and rising standards in every school.

    I know that’s a phrase you’ve heard a few times from me before.

    And I say it because it matters. Because standards drive life chances.

    And it means four things. And it starts with you. Teachers, leaders.

    You make such a difference in the lives of children.

    We’re working to get 6,500 more teachers across schools and colleges, to keep the great ones we’ve already got, and for all teachers to at least be progressing towards qualified teacher status.

    That’s the first step. The next is what you teach. The curriculum.

    And we need a core curriculum in all schools, one that builds on the past, but is fit for the future, rich in knowledge, broad and deep, cutting-edge, guided by the curriculum and assessment review, chaired by Professor Becky Francis – and she’ll be here tomorrow to tell you more about it.

    But to benefit, children need to be in the classroom and ready to learn. So high and rising standards means breaking down the barriers to learning too.

    Tackling our absence crisis, supporting our children with special educational needs.

    The final piece of the standards puzzle is structures and accountability.

    How we drive improvement, how we as government and you as leaders work together to deliver better life chances for children.

    So let’s talk about improvement, about accountability.

    Because I know the proposed changes are challenging. I know they’ve sparked debate. But that’s right where education should be, at the heart of our national conversation.

    That’s why we are consulting on this, why Ofsted are consulting on their proposals to improve inspection.

    They are genuine consultations. We need to hear from young people and parents, teachers and leaders. Because you understand our shared responsibility. The leaders in my schools did too.

    I remember one day I was passed a note during a lesson,

    And it called me to the Deputy Head’s office. Now Mr Hurst could be fierce, believe you me.  And getting summoned out of the blue put the fear of God into me. And when I got there, he told me to sit down.

    He told me he’d seen the list of pupils applying to visit Oxford and Cambridge that year – and that my name was nowhere to be seen.

    He told me to get that right by the end of the day. And then he sent me on my way.

    As teachers and leaders, you play those pivotal moments, when futures tip one way or the other. I only had one childhood, one chance to succeed.

    Where would I be now without those 2 minutes in Mr Hurst’s office?

    No child gets a second chance at childhood.

    We owe them that relentless pursuit of better. From stuck to good, good to great, great schools sharing their excellence.

    And strong and effective accountability will be at the heart of how we drive change for children.

    And the way we deliver improvement is changing too.

    Smarter, more diagnostic, more targeted. A system that challenges but provides support too.  So that when we identify problems, schools aren’t left out in the cold to solve them alone.

    Backed by swift action. Action in the 600 schools that are stuck – receiving consecutive poor Ofsted judgements.

    For the 300,000 children who go to those schools. That’s who these changes are for. Those children.

    And the spark of improvement in their schools and in their lives – that comes from leadership.

    I’ve seen it in my own constituency, especially during the pandemic. Strong groups of schools where leaders could share evidence, generate ideas, improve life chances by working together.

    And our new RISE teams share that spirit. Taking what’s best in schools and trusts and spreading it, so that all children can benefit.

    Improvement of schools, by schools, for children– with government there to challenge and support you.

    Where performance in schools isn’t good enough, RISE teams will be there with targeted interventions. Intensive, mandatory support, backed by investment, guided by top leaders, from top schools and top trusts.

    Added to that, our universal RISE service, a new offer of support for continuous improvement in all our schools, spreading best practice.

    Following four national priorities.

    One is attainment, with a focus on English and Maths.

    It’s not a nice-to-have. Good for some children but fine for others to miss out.

    No. All children need that firm foundation of attainment.

    That’s why the Prime Minister’s Plan for Change sets attainment as a key milestone.

    We’re investing in reading at key stages 2 and 3, building up phonics to fluency and we’ll be publishing our new Writing Framework for schools later this year.

    We’ll drive progress across the board, but especially for kids from tough backgrounds.

    And that progress must start early in life – when the possibilities still stretch out ahead.

    That’s why the Plan for Change also sets the milestone of a record number of children starting school ready to learn.

    So the next priority for RISE teams is reception year quality. Joining those two priorities are two more: attendance and inclusion – two urgent barriers to learning our children face.

    Unlocking learning for all children is so important.

    And as leaders you know it’s your responsibility to set the ethos of your school. To enforce good behaviour and to break down barriers.

    And phones are a big one.

    As school leaders you all know that so much of the damage caused by smartphones and social media takes place outside the school gates.

    The Technology Secretary has commissioned a study led by the University of Cambridge to assess the impact of social media and smartphones, strengthening the evidence base on their impact on children’s well-being

    But you know, we all do, that phones are disruptive, distracting, bad for behaviour.

    They have no place in our schools. And the government’s position is clear: you have our full backing in ridding our classrooms of the disruption of phones.

    And I know that will be the case in the overwhelming majority of your classrooms. But I expect it to be true in all classrooms.

    So I have tasked my officials to look at how we can more effectively monitor what’s happening on the ground

    Because this is not a government of gimmicks and rhetoric – [political content removed] but a government that will ensure that where words flow, action follows.

    Because if we don’t, it’s children who suffer.

    And it’s the same for absence. [political content removed]

    That challenge was turbocharged, not just by Covid but by no plan for our children’s return.

    It wreaked havoc with children’s life chances. You see it in your schools every day. [political content removed]

    And our new analysis shows the cost to future life chances. Take teenagers who attend nearly every day of year 11, they are almost twice as likely to get a Grade 5 or above in their English and Maths GCSEs than similar students who miss just 10 more days than them.

    The evidence is clear: absence scars life chances.

    Every day out of the classroom will cost a child hundreds of pounds in future wages over their lifetime.

    No parent wants that for their child.

    No school wants that for their pupils.

    No government wants that for their country.

    One in five children persistently absent from school. 1.6 million missing a day every other week.

    That’s the national picture. But it varies – from school to school.

    Our data shows that there are schools, facing similar challenges, but with significantly different performance on attendance.

    Some doing really well. But others not making enough progress. Not yet learning from the best. And I won’t accept the damage that does to those children.

    I expect schools to catch up – fast.

    And I know that’s what schools want to do, what you’re all working so hard to do,

    The way we turn this around is through collaboration, partnership and, if we’re honest, old-fashioned graft.  Shared responsibility too – parents, schools and government.

    We’re delivering daily attendance data, so we can identify, interrogate and tackle patterns of absence.

    The green shoots are appearing. Especially in our secondary schools. If we keep this up, we’ll achieve one of the biggest annual increases in recent memory.

    On attendance and the challenge of behaviour – continuing to work with you to spread best practice.

    And the way we drive improvement in schools will focus on attendance too. That’s why one of those four national priorities for our brand-new RISE teams is attendance. And we’re proposing that new school report cards include a focus on attendance too.

    We’re hosting 9 major conferences to reach every secondary school in the country – focusing on leadership.

    Building networks of schools. Bringing leaders together – to lead the solutions. And I want to thank everyone in this room who has helped and I’m so glad to hear from so many of you that they are working well for you.

    We will continue to support and challenge schools on this.

    But another barrier to learning that we all know is the failure of the system supporting children with special educational needs and disabilities.

    It’s not working how any of us would like. And children aren’t getting the support they need. Children and young people with SEND – along with disadvantaged children – have the most to gain from high and rising standards.

    And a classroom that caters to all is a strength. Children thinking in different ways is a gift. It’s time we recognised that. I’ve been told this is too hard, that it can’t be done.

    Of course it’s not easy, but it is possible. There are schools and trusts doing it already. I’ve talked to parents, and they tell me how important this is too.

    One father told me about his daughter at Becontree Primary School in Dagenham, which has a SEND unit for children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder.

    His daughter moving into a mainstream school gave him faith that she will be able to achieve as an adult, get a job, be an active citizen.

    It can be done.

    King Ecgbert School in Sheffield, part of Mercia Learning Trust.

    The school has a 30-place integrated resource unit for autism. Pupils spend most of their time in mainstream lessons, supported by specialist learning assistants.

    Inclusion spreads beyond the classroom. Pupils with SEND get the support they need to play sports, to join art clubs, to feature in school plays. 

    The school focuses not just on support, but on outcomes too.

    Attainment is above the local and national average.

    All pupils, including those with SEND achieve exceptionally well.

    They is proof that the inclusion vs standards compromise is no such thing, they go together. As the schools says, ‘if we get it right for our most vulnerable, then we’ll be getting it right for everyone’. 

    Their Ofsted report sums it up – ‘these impressive outcomes open doors to opportunity for all children leaving the school’.

    And that’s what it’s all about. Opportunity. We need to spread that excellence.

    And so I’m glad their headteacher, Paul Haigh, is now one of our new RISE advisers.

    This excellence exists and it must become the norm for all of our children.

    Action is underway: through our RISE teams, through the Curriculum and Assessment Review, through the £740m of capital investment I announced in December.

    But this is a complex and difficult challenge. It will take time. We need to get this right. We’re working with parents, teachers, experts, those with lived experience.

    Our Strategic Advisor on SEND, Dame Christine Lenehan is drawing on the wisdom of parents, professionals and leaders.

    Tom Rees, who is leading my Expert Advisory Group on Inclusion, is working with ImpactED, and will launch a survey on best practice tomorrow.

    Our conversations leave us in no doubt of the scale of the challenge that we face. But I am hopeful. The change we need already exists.

    Back in October last year I visited Chantry Academy on the outskirts of Ipswich.

    I met a young boy there with special educational needs. He told me that he had always felt too special for a normal school, but not special enough for a special school.

    He worried he just didn’t fit in anywhere. Until he joined Chantry Academy.

    And thanks to Chantry’s focus on inclusion, that little boy finally feels that he belongs. And speaking to the head teacher, I could see why.

    Community is the key – creating a community within the school where everyone is welcome – and connected to the community around them.

    Chantry is on an improvement journey. After an inadequate judgement from Ofsted in 2014, they joined Active Learning Trust and changed leadership.

    There is still more to do, but the school is seeing tangible progress.

    Just two years ago one in three students at Chantry were persistently absent.  Now it’s fewer than one in five, back below the national average.

    And the share of pupils getting good grades in English and maths at GCSE has nearly doubled since 2019.

    I love visiting schools and colleges.

    Because it reminds me what’s truly important. What really matters.

    It’s the children. Their life chances, their hopes, their futures.

    That’s what we’re here to do. That’s who we’re here to serve.

    That’s the responsibility of your jobs and of mine.

    That hopeful little boy in Ipswich,

    those quiet little girls growing up on streets like mine.

    But that’s the real privilege too.

    Why mine is the best job in government,

    Why yours are the source of so much about what’s good in our country.

    Because despite the big challenges, the early mornings, the late nights, the tough times, what we do matters.

    And I want to thank you, from the bottom of my heart, for all you do.

    For the difference you make. I know how hard you work, I know it’s not easy, the work of turning around children’s life chances never will be.

    But I want you to know that if we come together now,

    to spread what works, to end what doesn’t, to share the spirit of restless improvement.

    If we do that, together we have the chance to usher in not just a new era of education, but a brighter future too.

    For our children, for our communities, and for our country.

    Updates to this page

    Published 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Sustainability support for universities

    Source: Scottish Government

    Further £10 million for Scottish Funding Council to support the sector.

    Additional support will be made available through the Scottish Funding Council (SFC) to support universities facing financial challenges.

    Education Secretary Jenny Gilruth said an additional £10 million will be provided to the SFC to support higher education institutions such as the University of Dundee as they navigate current financial challenges.

    It brings total additional support for the sector from the Scottish Government to £25 million, on top of the £1.1 billion in the 2025-26 budget for university teaching and research.

    The Scottish Government will convene a range of expertise from across the higher education sector, government, and Dundee City Region to support the University of Dundee while it develops its Financial Recovery Plan. This is in addition to work already underway by the SFC, which engages closely with universities on financial sustainability.

    Ms Gilruth said:

    “The Scottish Government is providing an additional £10 million support package to assist universities such as Dundee with navigating immediate financial challenges. This is on top of the £15 million of extra support previously announced for the sector in February.

    “Ministers have held further meetings with the University of Dundee, unions and the Scottish Funding Council this week, building on the extensive engagement that has already taken place with the institution since financial issues came to light.

    “Both the Higher Education Minister and I have conveyed our deep concern at the level of job losses currently being discussed at the University. While the University is an autonomous institution, it is our clear expectation that the University’s leadership works with us, and engages fully with staff and trade unions, to explore all options to protect jobs.

    “Work will continue in the coming days to convene the right range of expertise from across government, the sector, and the wider city region to support the institution as it continues to develop its Financial Recovery Plan.

    “Scotland’s universities play a pivotal role in the economy and wider society, and they must be supported to thrive into the future. This support package is another clear sign of the Scottish Government’s commitment to support the sector with financial challenges – challenges which have been compounded by UK Government policies on migration and employer National Insurance contributions.” 

    Chief Executive of Scottish Funding Council Francesca Osowska said:

    “We welcome Scottish Ministers’ continued commitment to the tertiary sector and confirmation of this additional funding. Recognising the particular challenges facing the University of Dundee, we look forward to engaging with a wide range of partners to secure its continued success as a world-renowned University delivering excellent outcomes for learners and researchers and contributing to economic growth and social wellbeing.”

    Background

    The additional £10 million capital funding has been identified from within the education portfolio.

    The Scottish Government has put forward proposals for a Scottish Graduate Visa and the First Minister wrote to the UK Government in January seeking clarity on changes to employers National Insurance contributions.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK and China restart meaningful climate change dialogue

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Press release

    UK and China restart meaningful climate change dialogue

    Energy Secretary calls for action and cooperation from China to tackle the climate emergency.

    • Energy Secretary visits Beijing to urge continued action from China – the world’s biggest emitter – to tackle the climate emergency   
    • Miliband expected to say there is no route to keeping future generations safe from climate threat without engaging China in responsible climate leadership
    • UK and China agree to secure and pragmatic cooperation and lesson sharing on climate and clean energy – delivering on government’s Plan for Change to re-engage with China on issues that matter to the British people

    Pragmatic cooperation with China will help keep British people safe from the climate crisis, as UK and Chinese ministers are set to meet in Beijing for the first formal talks to accelerate climate action in nearly 8 years.  

    As the government pursues its mission to become a clean energy superpower under the Plan for Change, The Energy Secretary will meet with China’s National Energy Administrator Minister Wang Hongzhi and China’s Ecology and Environment Minister Huang Runqiu in Beijing to commit to pragmatic engagement on the climate crisis, cooperating with China to reduce global emissions. 

    The UK is expected to launch a formal Climate Dialogue with Chinese counterparts, inviting Chinese ministers to London later this year, and for the first time institutionalising climate change talks between both countries moving forward. 

    China is the world’s largest investor and supplier of renewable energy but it remains the world’s largest emitter responsible for more emissions than the US, EU, India, and UK combined. China’s contribution to climate action is therefore crucial to tackling one of the biggest global challenges the world faces.   

    The Energy Secretary will also use the visit to engage frankly with China on UK concerns on issues like forced labour in supply chains, human rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, and China’s ongoing support for Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.  

    The climate crisis is an existential threat to our way of life in Britain. Extreme weather is changing the lives of people and communities across country; from thousands of acres of farmland being submerged due to storms like Bert and Daragh, to record numbers of heat-related deaths in recent summers. In turn, China are feeling the effects with temperatures in Beijing remaining above 35°C for a record breaking 28 days last year.  

    The government’s Plan for Change is restoring the UK’s role as a responsible climate leader, and re-engaging with the world’s second largest economy will remain critical in delivering both climate and energy security for Britain and across the world.   

    Energy Secretary Ed Miliband said:  

    We can only keep future generations safe from climate change if all major emitters act. It is simply an act of negligence to today’s and future generations not to engage China on how it can play its part in taking action on climate. 

    That is why I will be meeting Chinese ministers for frank conversations about how both countries can fulfil the aims of the Paris Climate Agreement, to which both countries are signed up.  

    Our Plan for Change and clean energy superpower mission is about energy security, lower bills, good jobs and growth for the British people. It is with this mission that we can also influence climate action on a global stage, fight for our way of life and keep our planet safe for our children and grandchildren.

    The Energy Secretary will refresh an outdated 10-year-old UK Clean Energy Partnership with China – which will now provide clarity on areas where the UK government can securely collaborate with China on areas of mutual benefit – such as new emerging technologies, including hydrogen and carbon capture and storage. The UK will also share expertise on phasing out coal, having closed its last coal-fired power station last year.

    This will establish a formal agreed platform with China to engage with them on potential UK and global energy security concerns, and creating a channel to challenge them on areas where we disagree, such as forced labour in supply chains.

    This further boosts already robust national security controls in our critical infrastructure such as the National Security and Investment Act – providing a strengthened mechanism to protect the UK’s national security, which is the first duty of government.

    This is part of the government’s commitment to a long-term, strategic and pragmatic relationship with China, rooted in UK and global interests – cooperating where we can, competing where we need to, and challenging where we must. 

    As an open economy, the UK welcomes investment from a wide range of countries and investors on the basis is supports the UK’s mission for growth securely and pragmatically. The government will not hesitate to use established powers to protect national security in energy infrastructure whenever concerns are identified. These discussions complement the government’s mission to make Britain a clean energy superpower, delivering energy security and bringing down bills for good. The expected rise in the price cap shows once again the cost of remaining reliant on the unstable global fossil fuel markets that are driving price increases. 

    Three years on from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, wholesale gas prices have now risen by 15% compared to the previous price cap period, which is directly affecting the cost of generating power and heating of homes. Moving to a power system based on homegrown, clean energy will reduce the UK’s reliance on volatile markets and protect billpayers.  

    To achieve this, government has set out the most ambitious reforms of the UK’s energy system in a generation. Within its first eight months in office, the government has lifted the onshore wind ban, established Great British Energy, approved nearly 3GW of solar, delivered a record-breaking renewables auction and kickstarted the carbon capture and hydrogen industries in the UK – helping to deliver energy security, grow the economy and deliver clean, cheap energy.    

    Notes to editors

    The last time an Energy Secretary visited Beijing for a formal climate and energy dialogue was in 2017. COP26 President Alok Sharma visited Tianjin in 2021 ahead of the COP26 summit in Glasgow.

    However, both our formal partnerships with China on climate and clean energy both date back to 2015. And this visit signals a shift in the dial in re-engaging with China and updating relationships in line with the current global landscape.

    Updates to this page

    Published 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Council leaders unite to raise awareness of social care careers

    Source: City of Portsmouth

    Council leaders from children and adult social care have joined forces during Social Work Week to highlight the rewarding careers in the sector.

    This initiative is part of a national campaign led by Social Work England, taking place from 17 – 21 March, aimed at raising awareness of the wide-ranging opportunities within the social care sector.

    Councillor Nick Dorrington, Cabinet Member for Children, Families and Education at Portsmouth City Council, said:

    “Social care practitioners support families across the city on a daily basis in a range of different roles. This makes for a dynamic and interesting career that will see you work with some of the more vulnerable people in society to enable change and improve outcomes.

    “We need more professionals who can step up and make a difference in Portsmouth. Social Work Week provides an opportunity to showcase the full range of jobs and the significant impact made by those who work within them.”

    Portsmouth City Council provides a range of opportunities for those wishing to take a step into the profession with extensive training and development pathways.

    This includes apprenticeships to upskill existing staff members as well as employment programmes such as the Assessed and Supported Year in Employment (ASYE) programme and the Step Up to Social Work scheme.

    Councillor Matthew Winnington, Cabinet Member for Community Wellbeing, Health and Care at Portsmouth City Council, added:

    “Through this national awareness campaign, we want to showcase the rewards and challenges of working in this sector.

    “Our hopes for the future in Portsmouth are centred on building a robust and resilient social care workforce. By attracting passionate and dedicated individuals to the profession, we can ensure that our community continues to flourish.”

    As part of the week, Foster Portsmouth, a council service that supports foster families in the city, will be celebrating their community and foster carers.

    The service will be encouraging people to start their fostering journey, providing information on the extensive local support networks provided by social workers and the other professionals who make up their ‘team around the child’, the application process and the financial assistance that is available.

    Careers in adult social care

    Adult social care is about supporting people to live their best lives possible, whether it’s providing a bit of help to get back on their feet after a fall or supporting them to keep their independence and stay in their home.

    Debbie Lucas, a social work apprentice at Portsmouth City Council said: “I feel lucky to be working in adult social care as a social work apprentice. It’s a brilliant job, working with people in a wide range of situations and settings within the community. Learning the skills to make a difference to people’s lives, there’s no better feeling.”

    If you want to make a difference, you can find out more about careers in social care on the Portsmouth City Council website at portsmouth.gov.uk/workincare.

    Careers in children’s social care 

    Social workers who support children, young people and their families provide a restorative approach using Portsmouth’s unique model of family practice.

    Liam Mills, an advanced social worker at Portsmouth City Council said: “We pride ourselves on being creative and relationship focused. I am enjoying my new role as an advanced social worker. It’s incredibly rewarding to be part of the conversation on improving our practice and fostering a culture of learning.”

    If you are an experienced social worker looking at your next steps, you can search for children social care jobs on the Stronger Futures website.

    Learn more about Foster Portsmouth

    Discover the team who support foster carers and the extensive range of services available.

    Claire Young, an experienced social worker in children’s social care at Portsmouth City Council said:

    “It is really rewarding to help people prepare to offer safe, happy, loving homes for the children we care for.”

    If you are interested in becoming a foster carer, visit the Foster Portsmouth website today.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Walking, wheeling and cycling plan set for approval

    Source: City of Wolverhampton

    The council’s cabinet will be asked to support the Black Country Walking, Wheeling and Cycling Plan at its meeting on 19 March.

    The collaborative blueprint involves all 4 Black Country councils and is for an interconnected network of active travel routes across the region.

    It will make walking, cycling and wheeling – such as using a wheelchair, or electric mobility scooter – a more attractive option, particularly for short journeys.

    Projects include safe segregated cycle lanes, better footpaths, intelligent lighting, more cycle parking, conveniently located pedestrian crossings and more accessible routes for users of wheelchairs and specially adapted cycles.

    In a consultation on the plan 86% of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that it would be valuable to have a walking, wheeling and cycling network in the Black Country.

    Councillor Qaiser Azeem, Cabinet Member for Transport and Green City at City of Wolverhampton Council, said: “The travel options we provide for people have an impact on everything from traffic congestion and air pollution to the local economy and our health.

    “Establishing a network of walking, wheeling and cycling routes aligns with the priorities we have set out in Wolverhampton to create well-connected neighbourhoods with healthy inclusive communities, while helping towards the city wide goal of becoming net zero by 2041.”

    In Wolverhampton active travel schemes in the plan include:

    • Bentley Bridge to Darlaston
    • Fordhouses to Heath Town
    • City Centre to Lower Penn
    • City Centre to Perton
    • Smestow Valley Leisure Route
    • Ring Road
    • West Park to Whitmore Reans
    • Park Village
    • i54

    It is anticipated most of the funding to develop and deliver projects will come from external grants.

    City of Wolverhampton Council and Walsall Council are currently working together to create a new cycle route from Noose Lane to Pinson Road, along the A454 Willenhall Road and Somerford Place. This £2.5m project is funded through the Active Travel Fund, provided by the Department for Transport and the Further City Region Sustainable Transport Settlements (CRSTS) – specifically outlined for transport schemes such as this.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Trader who defrauded customers handed suspended jail term 14 March 2025 Isle of Wight trader who defrauded customers handed suspended jail term

    Source: Aisle of Wight

    An Island trader has been handed a suspended two-year jail term following an Isle of Wight Council investigation that uncovered fraudulent activities amounting to more than £162,000.

    Scott Richard Carpenter appeared before the Isle of Wight Crown Court yesterday (Thursday) for sentencing after pleading guilty to two counts of participating in fraudulent trading at an earlier hearing.

    The offences took place between May 2021 and October 2022 when Carpenter was trading under the unregistered business name Bespoke Carpentry and Building Services IOW.

    Operating as a sole trader, the 41-year-old defrauded six customers, resulting in an estimated financial loss of £162,686, though Carpenter disputes the full figure.

    An investigation by Trading Standards revealed consumers paid Carpenter for work and materials that were either not provided, not provided on time, or not provided to a satisfactory standard.

    The victims, who suffered significant financial and emotional distress, provided statements that were crucial to building the case against the defendant.

    The court heard Carpenter attributed some of his failure to fulfil contracts to extensive medical issues, though investigators found some of his claims were not substantiated by his medical records. This included claims he was suffering from bowel cancer.

    Carpenter accepted he overstated his health concerns and told many lies to placate his consumers.

    Sentencing Carpenter to two years’ imprisonment suspended for two years, Mr Recorder Dow noted the profound impact on the victims, stating that “who could fail to be moved by the accounts of the victims.”

    He emphasised that “this is a small island” and Carpenter’s crimes had affected the entire community. The judge concluded that, “on the narrowest of balances,” he could suspend the sentence but stressed that “it is not a let off.”

    Carpenter was also given a 182-day curfew (from 7pm to 7am), coupled with a 30-day rehabilitation activity requirement.

    It was made clear to Carpenter that if he breached any of the requirements, or committed any further offence during the next two years, the court could activate the suspended sentence.

    Speaking after the hearing, James Potter, the council’s Trading Standards and community safety manager, said: “This prosecution underscores our commitment to protecting consumers from fraudulent practices.

    “We will continue to pursue justice for those affected and ensure that traders who engage in deceitful activities are held accountable.

    “The financial and emotional distress caused to the victims in this case is significant, and we hope this outcome serves as a deterrent to others who might consider similar actions.”

    Councillor Karen Lucioni, Cabinet member for community safety, added: “This case highlights the importance of vigilance and the need for consumers to be aware of their rights. We are committed to supporting victims and ensuring that justice is served.”

    The council is now seeking a confiscation order under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to claw back the losses for Carpenter’s victims.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Factory Girls unwrap special tribute artwork today

    Source: Northern Ireland – City of Derry

    Factory Girls unwrap special tribute artwork today

    13 March 2025

    Representatives of Derry’s Factory Girls had the honour today of unwrapping the new sculpture for the first time which will be the centrepiece of the public realm works currently underway at Harbour Square in the city.

    They joined the Mayor of Derry and Strabane, Councillor Lilian Seenoi Barr, and artist Chris Wilson who created the sculpture ‘Memory Lines’, a piece dedicated to the many generations of shirt factory workers who powered the city’s economy for over a century. The design is based on the shapes of spools of thread used in the shirt factories and the piece will be the focal point of the reimagined public realm area beside the Guildhall.

    The sculpture is supported by the Department for Communities and Derry City and Strabane District Council, as a key element of an exciting wider project that will transform Harbour Square, Custom House Street, Guildhall Street, Whittaker Street, and the Foyle Embankment and other parts of Derry’s city centre and riverfront area.

    An official opening event is planned in the coming weeks, with project partners, political representatives and the local community all invited to mark the completion of the Harbour Square works, and the long-awaited tribute to the factory workers.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Council secures more than £3.4m funding for warmer homes

    Source: City of York

    Published Friday, 14 March 2025

    Council leaders have confirmed that City of York Council will receive more than £3.4m of funding thanks to two separate grants.

    The funding, announced this week by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, will be used to upgrade around 280 homes over the next three years, to reduce carbon emissions and fuel poverty and improve the comfort and health of Council homes.

    The first grant of around £1.4m will be used to improve the energy efficiency of around 140 Council homes via the Warm Homes: Social Housing Fund.

    The second grant of around £2m will be used to improve the energy efficiency of around 140 homes for lower-income home owners through the Warm Homes: Local Grant Scheme.

    These works build on improving 73 Council homes to which 141 energy-efficiency measures have been installed. And they add to the 211 homes of lower-income owners to which have been added 241 new energy efficiency measures. The measures include loft, flat roof, external wall and cavity wall insulation, air source heat pumps, smart heating controls and solar photovoltaic panels to generate electricity.

    To support eligible owners and landlords of draughty, listed buildings or of homes in conservation areas, the council’s Local Energy Advice Demonstrator (LEAD) Project has given 452 pieces of advice since November 2023. This project’s funding ends on 31 March 2025, so find out more here or call 01904 555520 or email here

    Cllr Michael Pavlovic, Executive Member for Housing at City of York Council, said:

    “We know that making York’s homes warmer and better-insulated is a huge benefit to residents; financially and in terms of the positive impact on their wellbeing.

    “With rising energy costs and continued concerns around climate change, it’s essential that these improvements are made as soon as possible so that residents will see the benefits for years to come.

    “For free advice, assessment and coordination of energy saving measures, York residents who aren’t eligible for the LEAD scheme, should contact YorEnergy by calling 01904 211221 or emailing: hello@yorenergy.co.uk.”

    Further details about how to apply for the next phase of retrofit works will be announced as soon as possible. Meanwhile, more information can be found here

    An update on the Council’s retrofit programme was discussed at Executive on Tuesday, 11 March 2025.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Green, growing and successful: latest numbers add up for Edinburgh

    Source: Scotland – City of Edinburgh

    Edinburgh remains one of the most prosperous and green places to live in the UK, according to findings collated by the City of Edinburgh Council. 

    The 18th annual Edinburgh by Numbers is based on data from a variety of sources including the ONS, National Records of Scotland and the Scottish Household Survey.

    Looked at together, the figures reveal that residents in the Scottish capital are 1.5 times more likely to take up cycling and running – with most (74%) able to enjoy local green spaces within a five minute walk from home.

    With 144 parks making up almost half of the city (49%), 92% of people surveyed are satisfied with local green spaces and Edinburgh has almost halved greenhouse gas emissions over the last decade (by 40.9% since 2012).

    Highlighting the city’s economic resilience, Edinburgh has retained its position as the UK’s most economically productive city outside of London with some of the highest wages, skilled workers and employment.

    Tourism continues to recover from the pandemic, with hotel occupancy rates at their highest in 6 years (81.4%) and 5 million visitors staying overnight in Edinburgh, and air and travel also rebounding.

    The city is growing almost three times faster than the rest of Scotland and house prices are valued at the highest in the country. In 10 years, our population has grown by 8.4% to 523,250 people but for the first time, fewer babies are being born.

    Further statistics reveal:  

    • Edinburgh’s weather is changing, with April to June now the wettest months
    • Finance leads Edinburgh’s local economy, generating £7.2 billion – that’s as much as the next three largest sectors combined
    • Satisfaction with public transport is very high at 86% of those surveyed, well above Scotland’s 64% average
    • There are more university students in Edinburgh than school pupils (together, they make up 161,000 of the population)
    • 75.8% of workers have a degree, which is far higher than other UK cities
    • Audiences are eager to return to top rated visitor attractions and events with visitors flocking to Edinburgh Castle (1.9m visitors) the National Museum of Scotland (2.19 million visitors) and the festivals (4.59 million in person and online attendees).

    Council Leader Jane Meagher said

    This edition of Edinburgh by Numbers reminds us of the strength and success of our capital city, which continues to punch far above its weight as a place to live, work, invest in and visit.

    Thanks to our fantastic parks and air quality, ‘Auld Reekie’ is no more. We’re leading the way in climate consciousness and outdoor living – with the data pointing to more of us cycling and running, high satisfaction rates with public transport and positive scores for wellbeing.

    We know that the results of Edinburgh by Numbers are hotly anticipated by professionals from across the tourism sector at home and abroad, and the outlook for hospitality is healthy – people are flocking back to the city’s main attractions and festivals and 5 million visitors are staying overnight. That’s 40% of Scotland’s total overnight tourism with hotel occupancy rates their highest in six years (81.4%).

    So, we’re getting outdoors and we’re enjoying our city and, in this report, there is much to celebrate. That said, these numbers also speak to the challenges Edinburgh faces. Drawn by good jobs and a good quality of life, migration means our population is growing three times faster than other Scottish cities. We’re living longer, but the birth rate has dropped. Many residents are struggling with the cost of living – meaning poverty and homelessness remain two of the biggest challenges of our time.

    All of this leads to unprecedented demand for homes and public services. Initiatives such as our affordable housebuilding programme, Visitor Levy, climate adaptation and better connectivity around the city will give us more resources and solutions for sustainably managing Edinburgh’s continued economic success and growth.

    Denise Hamilton, Head of Communications at Cycling Scotland, commented:

    “It’s really encouraging to see 68% of short trips now being made on foot or by bike in Edinburgh. New dedicated cycle routes, like the City Centre West to East Link and Leith Walk, are showing big increases in the proportion of journeys being cycled, compared with other transport. 

    “As Edinburgh continues to build its planned citywide network of safe, on-street cycle lanes, it’s likely more and more people will choose to get around by bike and benefit from being active, saving money and getting to their destination quickly. And everyone living in or visiting Edinburgh can enjoy cleaner air and less congestion.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: ILO Governing Body: UK Statement on the occupied Arab territories

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Speech

    ILO Governing Body: UK Statement on the occupied Arab territories

    POL/5: UK Statement for the Enhanced programme of development cooperation for the occupied Arab territories. Delivered at the 353th ILO Governing Body in Geneva.

    Thank you Chair

    1. At each Governing Body meeting since the 7th of October, the UK has spoken of the horrors experienced by Palestinians and Israelis. The hostages have endured unimaginable suffering at the hands of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. For the people of Gaza who have lost lives, homes or loved ones, this conflict has been a living nightmare. We need all parties to uphold the ceasefire and ensure it leads to a sustainable peace and the reconstruction of Gaza.

    2. We thank the Office for your update to the POL5 document and, as ever, I’d like to commend the ongoing actions of the ILO staff in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the continued roll out and expansion of the ILO’s emergency response programme.

    3. We remain deeply concerned about the continued, profound impact on the economy across the Occupied Palestinian Territories with GDP decreased by 26% in the OPTs and 82% in Gaza. There are significant job losses, but for those in work, conditions have significantly worsened with low wages, poor safety standards, and lack of social protection.

    4. Since 7 October 2023, 200,000 permits for Palestinian workers in Israel have been revoked, further impacting the economy and contributing to rising poverty. We urge the government of Israel to reinstate these permits without delay.

    5. Economic stability is squarely in the interest of both parties. The UK also calls on Israel to fully implement the 1994 Paris Protocol and to reduce barriers to trade, helping the Palestinian private sector to recover.

    6. We also note with concern that the implementation of the Knesset legislation on UNRWA not only risks upending the humanitarian response, but threatens thousands of jobs across the OPT. We urge the government of Israel to work with international partners, including the UN, to ensure continuity of UNRWA’s operations; no other entity or UN Agency currently has the capacity or infrastructure to replace their mandate and experience.

    7. Chair, the UK believes that economic development programmes are the key to enabling Palestinians to preserve their economy, encourage private investment and restart economic growth. So, we encourage the international community to continue to provide this. UK support to date includes agricultural productivity, private sector investment and facilitation between Palestinians and Israelis in water, energy, trade. It included £10m in financial aid and Technical Assistance to strengthen the PA’s ability to deliver services, maintain stability, and deliver reform.

    To conclude, Chair, the UK supports the decision as amended by Oman on behalf of the Arab Group.  

    Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Kent taxi driver jailed after inflating turnover to secure three Covid loans

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Kent taxi driver jailed after inflating turnover to secure three Covid loans

    Jail for taxi driver who abused Covid Bounce Back Loan Scheme

    • Taxi driver Nelson Clark dishonestly secured three Covid Bounce Back Loans worth a combined £130,000 

    • Clark fraudulently overstated his turnover on the applications and failed to use the money for his businesses as he was required to do 

    • The 34-year-old has been jailed following investigations into his applications by the Insolvency Service 

    A Kent taxi driver has been jailed after exploiting a government-backed Covid loan scheme on three separate occasions during the pandemic. 

    Nelson Clark fraudulently applied for three Bounce Back Loans in 2020 by significantly exaggerating his turnover. 

    He then used the funds for personal use, breaking the rules of the scheme again. 

    Clark, 34, of Silver Birch Close, Dartford, was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison when he appeared at Croydon Crown Court on Thursday 13 March. 

    David Snasdell, Chief Investigator at the Insolvency Service, said: 

    Nelson Clark deliberately targeted a scheme which was set up to support genuine small businesses through Covid. 

    Clark made false representations on not just one occasion, but three times within a two-month period. His actions were clearly dishonest and he made matters worse by spending the money he received for his own personal benefit. 

    Five years on from the start of the pandemic, the Insolvency Service remains committed to taking action against the fraudsters who cynically applied for money they were not entitled to during a national emergency.

    Clark first applied to the bank for a £30,000 Bounce Back Loan in May 2020 on behalf of his N Clark Taxis business. 

    In the application, Clark claimed his annual turnover was £120,000. But Insolvency Service analysis revealed this was an over-estimate of around £70,000. 

    Two months later, Clark dishonestly secured a further £100,000 in Bounce Back Loan funds from different banks under the names of Nelson Clark Management and Rosewood Motors. 

    In both applications, Clark obtained £50,000 by falsely claiming his turnover for both businesses was £200,000 each. 

    Significant amounts of the £130,000 Clark fraudulently secured were used for personal purposes, including transfers of £80,000 to a third party. 

    Clark was declared bankrupt in August 2021 and signed a 10-year Bankruptcy Restrictions Undertaking in March 2022, restricting him from being able to borrow more than £500 without disclosing his bankrupt status. 

    The Insolvency Service is seeking to recover the fraudulently obtained funds under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 

    Further information 

    Updates to this page

    Published 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Registration for the XV Grushinskaya Sociological Conference is open

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    On March 27-28, 2025, the XV International Grushin Sociological Conference will be held in Moscow at the State University of Management (SUM).

    The theme of this year’s event is: “Human-centredness vs. socio-centredness: individualization and interaction in the modern world.”

    The program included reports, sections and round tables in various areas: technology, public administration, economics, business, personnel, urban space, social connections and cultural changes, new contours of migration processes, modern methods and challenges in sociology, individualization and interaction in the modern world of media, the social effect of public and youth organizations, trends, ethical dilemmas and regulation of the influence of AI on consumer behavior.

    Registration is available until March 21 inclusive. Participation is free.

    Every year the conference brings together not only representatives of the research industry, but also specialists from science, business, government and the media.

    “The Grushinskaya Conference is a traditional platform for discussing the challenges facing the research world and society as a whole. Every year, about 1,500 experts from various fields participate in it. This year, we will discuss human-centrism. What risks and opportunities are opening up thanks to this trend, what problems will we face in the near future? The conference program will be rich, we will discuss the paths to helping sociology, the role of artificial intelligence and media in modern trends, what changes are taking place in cities in the conditions of the new reality and the methodological challenges of the research industry. I am confident that together with the professional community, we will be able to form directions in building a new human-centrism, where everyone will not be an isolated individual, but a full-fledged member of society,” said Valery Fedorov, General Director of VTsIOM.

    The full conference program is available on the event website.

    The general information partner of the conference is the Russian news agency TASS.

    Let us recall that VTsIOM has been holding the Grushin Conference since 2010 with the support of leading scientific, research organizations and universities. The conference is dedicated to the memory of the outstanding Russian sociologist, creator of the first all-Russian network for collecting sociological information Boris Andreevich Grushin (1929-2007).

    Subscribe to the tg channel “Our State University” Announcement date: 03/27/2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Polytechnic University held the first conference on systems engineering

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    The 1st All-Russian scientific and practical conference “Modern approaches in system engineering and digital modeling of complex production systems” (SEDM-2025) was held in the Research Building of the Polytechnic University. The event was organized by the laboratories “Industrial systems of streaming data processing” and “Digital modeling of industrial systems” of the Advanced Engineering School of SPbPU “Digital Engineering” together with the industrial partner of the SPbPU PISh, the company “Tetracube”.

    The conference was dedicated to systems engineering as a methodological approach to the implementation of complex projects in various industries.

    Systems engineering is a highly relevant methodological direction in the technological landscape of Russia and the world. It allows implementing complex multi-component projects both for solving frontier engineering problems in the high-tech industry and in other industries – economics, medicine or education. The methodology of systems engineering is universal: it is based on the assessment of all factors, requirements and restrictions that affect the development of the project, and is also a field for the application and development of advanced digital technologies, such as artificial intelligence or mathematical modeling, – noted the chairperson of the conference program committee, head of the Laboratory of PSPOD PISh SPbPU Marina Bolsunovskaya.

    The scientific partners of the conference were the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Kazan Federal University, Ivanovo State Polytechnic University and others. The event was supported as industrial partners by the Engineering Center for Textile and Light Industry, the North-West Scientific Center for Hygiene and Public Health of Rospotrebnadzor, Kola MMC, Viziumtex, Olvia and Amdor companies.

    SEDM-2025 participants presented scientific research and practical solutions in the field of design, analysis, forecasting and optimization of complex systems in the economy, industry, transport, medicine, social sphere and education. The event attracted more than 200 speakers and listeners – research scientists and representatives of commercial companies and government organizations.

    The conference consisted of scientific and practical parts. It was addressed both to “theorists” – specialists who study and develop the methodology of systems engineering, and to practitioners – project managers who use the method of systems engineering to solve specific applied problems at their enterprises.

    The presentations were made by recognized experts in the field of studying and implementing approaches to system engineering and digital modeling, theorists and practitioners, as well as students and postgraduates who have chosen system engineering as the direction of their scientific and professional development. For young researchers, the conference became an excellent opportunity to present their research projects to experts, learn their opinions and discuss the practical application of the results.

    The plenary session reports presented the main areas of research and development, which were then discussed in more detail in separate sections.

    The plenary session was opened by Marina Bolsunovskaya. After welcoming remarks, she spoke about the development of the system engineering methodology using practical examples of the PSPOD Laboratory projects. The speaker noted possible directions for the development of the method and the specifics of its use in implementing complex projects at the enterprises of the laboratory’s industrial partners.

    Marina Vladimirovna noted that the requests of enterprises now concern the development of optimization models to identify hidden patterns and develop specific methods for eliminating anomalies. For many customer enterprises, there are no ready-made solutions, so the development of libraries of standard solutions that will allow companies to immediately offer possible solutions for data analysis seems promising.

    Elena Tishchenko, Advisor on Digital Economy to the Dean of the Faculty of Economics at Lomonosov Moscow State University, presented a theoretical report on the method of model-based system engineering (Model Based System Engineering) for synthesizing multi-level economic models. The method involves the widespread use of engineering descriptions of objects in the form of models and their platforms in the economy for analyzing complex economic systems.

    Alexey Gintsyak, Head of the Laboratory of Digital Modeling of Industrial Systems at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, spoke about the development of a set of tools for generating schedules in production systems using a multi-agent approach. The work is being carried out with the support of the Russian Science Foundation in 2025-2026. The speaker defined multi-agent systems, highlighted the capabilities and features of the multi-agent approach to the applied task of generating production schedules, and revealed the complexity of generating schedules in a multi-agent environment. In conclusion, Alexey Gintsyak noted that taking multi-agency into account allows for obtaining modeling results that are much more adequate to reality.

    The report by the head of the laboratory “System Dynamics” Angi Skhvediani was devoted to the application of methods of systems engineering in agriculture. He spoke about the current work on the platform for automatic prediction of the sorption properties of biochar obtained as a result of processing plant waste of the agro-industrial complex. The project includes the development of a database and a program for the analysis and prediction of the sorption properties of waste using machine learning methods, the development of a recommendation system for enterprises and scientists in terms of selecting optimal technological modes of waste processing to obtain functional materials with the best properties.

    Associate Professor of the Higher School of Transport of the Institute of Metallurgical Engineering and Technology Dmitry Plotnikov touched upon the topic of digital modeling in the transport industry. The speaker listed interdisciplinary tasks in the development of unmanned ground transport and noted that digital models in the creation of transport systems and processes can be used as a means of supporting decision-making in the design of the life cycle of a vehicle and transport systems in general, as well as an element of the finished product that determines its operational properties. The speaker shared the experience of creating an unmanned car at the Polytechnic University and the complex tasks that the development team faces.

    The conference became a platform for exchanging experience in the field of systems engineering in the transport industry, where there was a place for both experienced professionals and young scientists. Interesting works on the use of simulation modeling for effective traffic management were presented. The reports on the creation of intelligent transport systems deserved special attention, – the speaker noted.

    The head of the control and audit department of the enterprise “Gorelektrotrans” Elena Ezhelina made a report on the development of a new model for managing the enterprise of ground urban electric transport for the automation and optimization of its work. One of the first steps in this direction, Elena Aleksandrovna believes, could be the automation of the management of the daily cycle of the enterprise’s work, which will require the creation of a single dispatch service.

    Deputy Head of the Traffic Safety Service of Gorelektrotrans Alexey Vishensky spoke about his model for distributing tram and trolleybus drivers on city passenger transportation routes. The model is aimed at ensuring the required volume of transport services while complying with legal requirements. The number of drivers is calculated taking into account the design capacity of the fleet, working time fund, work schedules, vacations, knowledge of routes and other factors.

    Anastasia Gorbach, an engineer at Radioavionika JSC, presented an analysis of technologies for implementing artificial intelligence in the process of spelling and punctuation checking using a systems approach. Traditional verification methods based on dictionaries and grammar rules are not effective enough for complex language structures. Using AI to check spelling and punctuation is part of a wider range of technologies that can be applied in the development and optimization of complex technical systems to automate and optimize documentation and communication within the system.

    The most popular sections among the participants were on systems engineering in the field of economics and on digital modeling in industry and related industries. More than 40 reports were submitted for some sessions.

    Teachers and students from various departments of Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, such as the Higher School of Computer Technologies and Information Systems of the IKNK, the Higher School of Project Activity and Innovations in Industry and the Higher School of Transport of the IMMIT SPbPU, the Higher School of Engineering and Economics, the Higher School of Business Engineering and the Laboratory of System Dynamics of the IPMET SPbPU, took an active part in organizing and holding the conference.

    Students of the master’s program of the St. Petersburg Polytechnical University “Systems Engineering and Digital Modeling in High-Tech Industries” presented their developments in the field of systems engineering at the conference.

    The conference was organized for the first time and, it must be said, exceeded our expectations. We saw great interest in the methodology of systems engineering from industrial partners and university researchers – teachers, researchers, students and postgraduates. Next year, we plan to expand the conference topics. In particular, there will be a hybrid modeling section, entirely dedicated to this promising approach within the framework of systems engineering, which allows combining classical analytics and artificial intelligence technologies, – noted Marina Bolsunovskaya.

    Based on the results of the conference, a collection of papers will be published with a DOI and ISBN assigned, and full-text article-by-article placement in the Russian Science Citation Index.

    Photo archive

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for Nepal

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    March 14, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board completed the fifth review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangement for Nepal, providing the country with access to SDR 31.4 million (about US$ 41.8 million).
    • Nepal has made tangible progress in implementing economic reforms under the program, despite a challenging political environment and disruptions caused by the September 2024 floods.
    • The growth recovery is expected to continue in FY2024/25, supported by increased capital spending including on reconstruction, an accommodative monetary policy stance, and additional hydropower generation.

    Washington, DC: On March 12, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the fifth review under the four‑year Extended Credit Facility (ECF) for Nepal, allowing the authorities to withdraw the equivalent of SDR 31.4 million (about US$ 41.8 million) under the ECF. This brings total disbursements under the ECF for budget support thus far to SDR 219.7 million (about US$ 289.1 million).

    The ECF arrangement for Nepal was approved by the Executive Board on January 12, 2022 (see Press Release No. 22/6) for SDR 282.4 million (180 percent of quota). Nepal has made tangible progress in implementing reforms under the program, which has supported early signs of economic recovery while preserving macroeconomic and financial stability and protecting the vulnerable.

    The economy continues to face challenges with subdued domestic demand. Economic activity is expected to pick up moderately in FY2024/25 on account of disruptions caused by the September 2024 floods. Growth is expected to reach 4.2 percent in FY2024/25, supported by a planned increase in capital spending including on reconstruction, an accommodative monetary policy stance, and additional hydropower generation. Post-flood supply-side pressures are expected to be short-lived, and average inflation is projected to remain close to the Nepal Rastra Bank’s target of about 5 percent. Efforts to mobilize revenues will support development spending and fiscal sustainability. The outlook is subject to important downside risks including those related to possible under-execution of capital spending, financial-sector vulnerabilities, and political fragility.

    Following the Executive Board discussion, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director, made the following statement:

    “Executive Directors welcomed the continued recovery and the broadly adequate performance under the program, acknowledging the challenges posed by political uncertainty and recent flood-related disruptions. They noted that while the outlook remains broadly favorable, it is subject to downside risks. Accordingly, Directors encouraged continued prudent policies to safeguard macroeconomic stability and steadfast implementation of structural reforms to foster sustainable and inclusive growth. Fund capacity development will also be important to achieve program objectives.

    “Directors recommended continued gradual, growth-friendly fiscal consolidation to stabilize debt. Noting the need to mobilize revenue to support higher capital spending and protect the vulnerable, Directors welcomed the newly adopted Domestic Revenue Mobilization Strategy. They also underscored the need to strengthen public investment management to enhance capital spending execution. Further advancing fiscal transparency would help to contain fiscal risks and strengthen fiscal sustainability. Directors emphasized the importance of supporting the most vulnerable including through expanding child grants.

    “Directors agreed that monetary policy should remain cautious and data-driven to preserve price and external stability. They highlighted the importance of amending the Nepal Rastra Bank Act to strengthen its governance, independence and accountability.

    “Directors underscored that increasing financial sector vulnerabilities warrant a proactive approach. They encouraged steps to further align financial sector regulations with international standards, conduct the planned Loan Portfolio Review, and develop a comprehensive strategy to address problematic savings and credit cooperatives. Noting Nepal’s recent FATF grey listing, Directors stressed the urgency of strengthening the AML/CFT framework through reforms to enhance legal, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks.

    “Directors called for ambitious structural reforms to support more sustainable and inclusive growth. They recommended efforts to reduce the high cost of doing business, enhance the investment climate, improve governance, and strengthen anticorruption institutions. Nepal’s high vulnerability to natural disasters underscores the importance of enhancing resilience to climate shocks.”

                                                                                               Nepal: Selected Economic Indicators 2021/22-2029/30 1/

     

     

    2021/22

     

    2022/23

    2023/24

       

    2024/25

    2025/26

    2026/27

    2027/28

    2028/29

    2029/30

    Est.

       

    Projections

                             

    Output and Prices (annual percent change)

                       

    Real GDP

    5.6

     

    2.0

     

    3.1

     

    4.2

    5.4

    5.0

    5.0

    5.0

    5.0

    Headline CPI (period average)

    6.4

     

    7.7

     

    5.4

     

    5.2

    5.4

    5.4

    5.4

    5.4

    5.4

    Headline CPI (end of period)

    8.1

     

    7.4

     

    3.6

     

    5.5

    5.4

    5.4

    5.4

    5.4

    5.4

    Fiscal Indicators: Central Government (in percent of GDP)

                 

    Total revenue and grants

    22.9

    19.3

    19.2

    19.8

    20.9

    21.5

    22.1

    22.6

    22.6

      of which: Tax revenue

    19.8

    16.2

    16.4

    17.0

    17.8

    18.4

    19.1

    19.6

    19.6

    Expenditure

    26.1

    25.2

    21.9

    24.3

    25.0

    25.4

    25.8

    26.2

    26.2

    Expenses

    21.7

    20.8

    18.6

    19.3

    19.4

    19.5

    19.6

    19.8

    19.8

    Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets

    4.3

    4.4

    3.3

    5.0

    5.6

    5.9

    6.2

    6.4

    6.4

    Operating balance

    1.2

    -1.4

    0.6

    0.5

    1.5

    2.1

    2.5

    2.8

    2.8

    Net lending/borrowing

    -3.1

    -5.8

    -2.7

    -4.5

    -4.1

    -3.8

    -3.7

    -3.6

    -3.6

    Statistical discrepancy

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Net financial transactions

    3.1

    5.8

    2.7

    4.5

    4.1

    3.8

    3.7

    3.6

    3.6

    Net acquisition of financial assets

    2.6

    -0.9

    0.5

    1.3

    1.3

    1.3

    1.3

    1.3

    1.3

    Net incurrence of liabilities

    5.8

    4.9

    3.2

    5.8

    5.4

    5.1

    5.0

    4.9

    4.9

    Foreign

    2.0

    1.7

    1.6

    1.7

    1.5

    1.4

    1.3

    1.3

    1.4

    Domestic

    3.7

    3.3

    1.6

    4.1

    3.9

    3.7

    3.7

    3.5

    3.5

               

    Money and Credit (annual percent change)

                 

    Broad money

    6.8

    11.4

    13.6

    10.1

    10.1

    10.3

    10.5

    10.7

    10.7

    Domestic credit

    17.9

    8.8

    6.2

    8.2

    9.6

    10.3

    10.5

    10.7

    10.7

    Private sector credit

    13.3

    4.6

    6.1

    7.2

    8.1

    9.1

    10.0

    10.7

    10.7

                           

    Saving and Investment (in percent of nominal GDP)

                       

    Gross investment

    37.6

    31.7

    32.9

    37.5

    39.4

    38.3

    37.0

    35.8

    34.7

    Gross fixed investment

    29.0

    25.1

    26.1

    29.7

    31.2

    30.4

    29.3

    28.3

    27.5

    Private

    23.6

    21.7

    22.7

    24.7

    25.6

    24.5

    23.1

    21.9

    21.1

    Central government

    5.3

    3.4

    3.3

    5.0

    5.6

    5.9

    6.2

    6.4

    6.4

    Change in Stock

    8.7

    6.6

    6.8

    7.8

    8.2

    8.0

    7.7

    7.4

    7.2

    Gross national saving

    25.1

    30.8

    36.7

    36.2

    35.5

    34.5

    33.2

    32.2

    31.0

    Private

    24.4

    32.7

    36.5

    36.3

    34.9

    33.3

    31.6

    30.1

    29.1

    Central government

    0.7

    -1.9

    0.2

    -0.1

    0.6

    1.2

    1.7

    2.0

    2.0

                 

    Balance of Payments

     

                 

    Current account (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    -5,174

    -361

    1,663

    -630

    -1,969

    -2,166

    -2,321

    -2,479

    -2,760

    In percent of GDP

    -12.6

    -0.9

    3.8

    -1.3

    -3.8

    -3.8

    -3.7

    -3.6

    -3.7

    Trade balance (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    -13,759

    -10,699

    -10,431

    -12,481

    -15,053

    -15,957

    -16,797

    -17,678

    -18,664

    In percent of GDP

    -33.4

    -26.2

    -24.0

    -26.7

    -29.2

    -28.2

    -27.0

    -25.8

    -24.8

    Exports of goods (y/y percent change)

    43.9

    -19.9

    -2.5

    8.9

    9.6

    9.1

    9.7

    9.4

    9.4

    Imports of goods (y/y percent change)

    21.9

    -22.0

    -2.5

    18.4

    19.4

    6.3

    5.7

    5.7

    6.0

    Workers’ remittances (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    8,326

    9,485

    10,864

    11,151

    11,680

    12,258

    12,766

    13,283

    13,767

    In percent of GDP

    20.2

    23.2

    25.0

    23.8

    22.7

    21.6

    20.5

    19.4

    18.3

    Gross official reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    8,956

    10,954

    14,547

    15,301

    15,004

    14,821

    14,876

    14,897

    15,289

    In months of prospective imports

    7.6

    9.3

    10.5

    9.4

    8.7

    8.1

    7.7

    7.2

    7.0

    Memorandum Items

                     

    Public debt (in percent of GDP)

    42.7

    47.1

    48.2

    50.0

    50.4

    50.6

    50.6

    50.5

    50.5

    Nominal GDP (in billions of U.S. dollars)

    41.2

    40.9

    43.4

    46.8

    51.5

    56.6

    62.3

    68.5

    75.3

    Nominal GDP (in billions of Nepalese Rupees)

    4,977

    5,349

    5,776

    6,333

    7,040

    7,792

    8,623

    9,543

    10,562

    Net International Reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    8,821

    10,507

    14,064

    14,744

    14,451

    14,321

    14,440

    14,541

    15,027

    Primary Deficit (in billions of Nepali Rupees)

    110

    239

    76

    183

    179

    175

    180

    182

    204

    Primary Deficit (in percent of GDP)

    2.2

    4.5

    1.3

    2.9

    2.5

    2.2

    2.1

    1.9

    1.9

    Tax Revenue (in billions of Nepalese Rupees)

    984

    866

    945

    1,074

    1,250

    1,436

    1,648

    1,868

    2,065

    Tax Revenue (In percent of GDP)

    19.8

    16.2

    16.4

    17.0

    17.8

    18.4

    19.1

    19.6

    19.6

    Private sector credit (in percent of GDP)

    94.2

    91.7

    90.1

    88.0

    85.6

    84.3

    83.8

    83.8

    83.9

    Exchange rate (NPR/US$; period average)

    120.8

    130.8

    133.0

    Real effective exchange rate (average, y/y percent change)

    1.6

    1.2

    1.4

                                                                                                                           
             

    1/ Fiscal year ends in mid-July.

                         
                                                         

    Note: The NSO adopts a 3 year cycle in its national accounts producing preliminary, revised and final estimates for real GDP growth. In May 2023 growth was revised up in FY2020/21 from 4.2 percent to 4.8 percent and from 5.3 percent to 5.6 percent in FY2021/22 in light of new data.

    Note: Current baseline forecast is as of January 29, 2025.

       

    ·      

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/03/14/pr25063-nepal-imf-completes-the-fifth-review-under-the-extended-credit-facility-arrangement

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: The EBA consults on draft technical standards setting out the threshold for prudential risk management requirements of central securities depositories providing banking-type ancillary services

    Source: European Banking Authority

    The European Banking Authority (EBA) today launched a public consultation on draft Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) on the threshold of activity at which Central Securities Depositories (CSDs) providing ‘banking-type ancillary services’, need to meet certain prudential risk management requirements set out in the Central Securities Depositories Regulation (CSDR). The aim of this work is to allow CSDs to do more settlement of foreign currency in commercial bank money without increasing the risk in CSDs or the overall financial system. This consultation runs until 16 June 2025. A public hearing will be held on 13 May.

    The EBA is proposing a threshold with staggered requirements dependent on a CSD’s level and type of activity in banking-type ancillary services. This is to ensure that the threshold is risk sensitive and proportionate, without impacting market stability.

    The EBA’s analysis included in this consultation paper shows that the maximum level of activity a CSD can provide before having to meet the requirements set out in CSDR is 2.5% of the total value of all securities transactions against cash settled in the books of the CSD over one year. This accounts for up to EUR 6.25 billion per year. Below 1.5% and up to 3.25bn, CSDs would only have to meet basic prudential requirements on credit worthiness, liquidity risk management policy and procedures, and a recovery plan.

    Consultation process

    Responses to the consultations can be sent to the EBA by clicking on the “send your comments” button on the consultation page.

    All contributions received will be published after the consultation closes, unless requested otherwise. The deadline for the submission of comments is 16 June 2025.

    public hearing on this consultation will take place on 13 May 2025 from 10:00 to 12:00 CEST. Deadline for registration is 9 May 2025 at 16:00 CEST.

    Legal basis and background

    The EBA has developed these draft RTS under Article 59(9 of CSDR, which mandates the Authority to help support further settlement in foreign currencies by CSDs while still ensuring a level playing field in the industry. In particular, the EBA is mandated to set out a threshold at which CSDs providing ‘banking-type ancillary services’ need to meet certain prudential risk management requirements.

    Banking-type ancillary services include activities such as providing cash accounts to, and accepting deposits from, participants in a securities settlement system, and payment services involving processing of cash and foreign exchange transactions. 

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