Category: Economy

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Ensuring impartiality and conflict of interest prevention in Commission-hired consultancies – E-000695/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000695/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE)

    The Commission and its agencies increasingly award public tenders to consultancies tasked with providing independent assessments of policy areas. While participants must sign general and specific declarations of honour and submit staff CVs, this does not prevent cases where a consultancy holds a clear position on a certain policy option but leaves out counter-evidence, thus undermining the neutrality of the outcome.

    Several such instances have arisen in recent years, for example in relation to a study on EU merger decisions[1], to a study on environmental, social and governance (ESG) objectives[2] and to services to support the implementation and further development of a tobacco control policy[3].

    Given these concerns:

    • 1.How does the Commission ensure that consultants hired for external support are free from conflicts of interest and provide unbiased analysis?
    • 2.Beyond the declarations of honour and the assessment of CVs of staff members, what measures does the Commission implement to exclude consultants with vested interests at an early stage?
    • 3.Does the Commission plan to introduce additional safeguards to prevent such situations and conflicts in the future?

    Submitted: 14.2.2025

    • [1] https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/rbb-economics-loses-eu-merger-review-contract-over-perceived-biases.
    • [2] https://reclaimfinance.org/site/en/2021/06/30/blackrocks-lobbying-machine-vs-eu-green-finance-rules/.
    • [3] https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/stakeholders-bicker-over-eu-tender-on-tobacco-control-policy/.
    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Denmark: Norlase secures €20 million EIB venture debt to advance ophthalmic laser technology.

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • Denmark’s med-tech sector receives a boost as Norlase strengthens its position in the global ophthalmic laser market with EIB venture debt financing.
    • Norlase will employ the funding for the further development and market access of its innovative portable ophthalmic laser technology.
    • The EIB’s financing is backed under the European Commission’s InvestEU initiative.

    Med-tech company Norlase, a spin-out of the Technical University of Denmark (DTU), has signed a €20 million venture debt financing with the European Investment Bank (EIB). The funding will support the expansion of Norlase’s innovative ophthalmic laser technology, reinforcing Denmark’s position as a hub for world-class med-tech innovation. Ensuring that European companies developing critical technology have the possibility and funding to grow in the EU, is an important building block in European strategic autonomy. The EIB financing is supported by the European Commission’s InvestEU programme.

    “Denmark’s efforts in building up its bio- and med-tech ecosystem are definitely paying dividends today. Like other Danish companies we recently financed, Norlase’s technology is top of its class and a real example of excellence in European innovation.” said EIB Vice-President Ioannis Tsakiris. “With the support of InvestEU, the EIB finances projects that advance state-of-the-art medical treatment, and this funding aims to enhance the position of Norlase as a European med-tech champion.”

    “As the patient burden continues to grow, the need to accelerate technological innovation in eye care has never been greater. With four product launches in just five years and rapid adoption by the ophthalmic community, Norlase is leading this transformation,” said Norlase CEO and Co-founder Oliver Hvidt. “This funding from the EIB allows us to scale our global presence and push even further beyond the limits of existing technology, solidifying Norlase’s role as a leader in the future of eye care. We’re just getting started.”

    The Head of the European Commission Representation to Denmark, Per Haugaard, added: “It’s crucial that European companies develop critical technology and that we secure investments in med-tech companies like Norlase across the continent.”

    On a technical level, the financing will support the development and market access of Norlase’s innovative portable ophthalmic lasers, designed to diagnose and treat causes of vision loss and blindness. The project focuses on advancing novel ophthalmic laser technologies and expanding production facilities to support increased demand. The company recently launched its fourth and most innovative device, LYNX, which can reduce treatment time by more than 50%, setting new standards for efficiency, accessibility, and precision in ophthalmic laser treatments.

    Background information

    The European Investment Bank is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives. EIB projects bolster competitiveness, drive innovation, promote sustainable development, enhance social and territorial cohesion, contribute to peace and security, and support a just and swift transition to climate neutrality. The Group’s AAA rating allows it to borrow at favourable conditions on the global markets, benefiting its clients within the European Union and beyond. The Group has the highest ESG standards and a tier one capital ratio of 32%.

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here.

    The InvestEU programme provides the European Union with crucial long-term funding by leveraging substantial private and public funds in support of a sustainable economy. It helps generate additional investments in line with EU policy priorities, such as the European Green Deal, the digital transition and support for small and medium-sized enterprises. InvestEU brings all EU financial instruments together under one roof, making funding for investment projects in Europe simpler, more efficient, and more flexible. The programme consists of three components: the InvestEU Fund, the InvestEU Advisory Hub, and the InvestEU Portal. The InvestEU Fund is implemented through financial partners who invest in projects using the EU budget guarantee of €26.2 billion. This guarantee increases their risk-bearing capacity, thus mobilising at least €372 billion in additional investment.

    Norlase was founded in Denmark to commercialize patented laser technology developed at the Technical University of Denmark (DTU) and its products are now in use in the top ophthalmic hospitals globally.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Multiannual financial framework and Common Agricultural Policy – E-000680/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000680/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Christine Singer (Renew), Engin Eroglu (Renew), Joachim Streit (Renew)

    The Commission is expected to present its draft multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2028-2034 in July 2025. This budget will have to address new defence and security challenges while maintaining intensive efforts to combat climate change. It must also become ‘more focused, simpler and more impactful’. At the same time, the mission letter from Commissioner Hansen stressed the need for the existing legal framework to be much simplified. Given all of these lines of thought on legislative reform, one wonders how the Commission will ensure that all relevant stakeholders – in particular regional governments, agricultural associations, industry representatives and actors from rural areas – will remain actively involved in the design and implementation of EU funding. These groups have in-depth knowledge of regional and sectoral conditions and make a significant contribution to the successful implementation of the relevant programmes. It is of utmost importance that they are involved at an early stage and throughout the process if we wish to ensure that funding is used in a targeted, practical and needs-based manner.

    • 1.How does the Commission intend to ensure that EU funding is provided in a simpler and more targeted and effective manner without neglecting the specific needs of EU agriculture, rural areas and the food production sector?
    • 2.How does it intend to maintain a uniform legal framework for a unified and adequately funded common agricultural policy?

    Submitted: 13.2.2025

    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Overhauling the multiannual financial framework for 2028-2034: can the Commission guarantee that common agricultural policy funding won’t be cut to finance other priorities? – E-000692/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000692/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mathilde Androuët (PfE)

    An overhaul of the multiannual financial framework for 2028-2034 was announced several months ago, and a copy has already been published[1]. Given the costly priorities set out in the document, which will eat up a lot of the budget, questions arise as to the introduction of new revenue and the uncertainty surrounding financing via new own resources. No clear political and legal agreement has yet been reached to make up for the fact that there has been no increase in Member States’ national contributions.

    The Commission is considering new taxes, such as the extension of the EU’s Emissions Trading System, the introduction of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and the establishment of a minimum tax on multinationals. Even if an agreement is reached, however, these would not be enough to cover the shortfall.

    With no new revenue, the EU will have no choice but to cut existing budgets, and this could undermine a key sector like agriculture. The common agricultural policy (CAP) is vital for France and its farming industry, which is already reeling, in particular owing to the proliferation of free trade agreements.

    With NextGenerationEU[2] debt – estimated at between EUR 25 billion and EUR 30 billion per year as of 2028 – likely to result in budget cuts, can the Commission guarantee that CAP funding will not be cut to finance other priorities?

    Submitted: 13.2.2025

    • [1] https://www.contexte.com/actualite/pouvoirs/budget-post-2027-la-commission-pose-les-premieres-pierres-dun-chantier-titanesque_218085.html
    • [2] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/recovery-plan-europe_en
    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Addressing the impact of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on the wind energy sector – E-000774/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000774/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (PPE)

    The implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in 2026 raises serious concerns for the wind energy sector in the EU. According to a study commissioned by WindEurope, the cost of CBAM certificates for steel used in wind turbines, combined with the administrative burden of calculating embedded emissions, will significantly impact the industry’s competitiveness.

    The study, conducted by EY, estimates that each wind turbine produced in the EU could face an additional cost of EUR 910 000 associated with CBAM certificates. These rising costs are challenging to pass on to consumers, potentially undermining the expansion of wind energy at a time when the EU is striving to accelerate its clean energy transition.

    As wind energy is a cornerstone of the European Green Deal and the EU’s energy security strategy, what measures does the Commission plan to take to mitigate the financial and administrative burden of the CBAM on the wind industry, while ensuring the policy achieves its climate objectives?

    Submitted: 19.2.2025

    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – What commitments will the Commission make with regard to the democratic control and legitimacy of the fiscal reforms planned in the 2028-2034 Multiannual Financial Framework? – E-000693/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000693/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mathilde Androuët (PfE)

    The framework and components of the redesigned Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the years 2028-2034 have already been circulated[1]. The EU’s unprecedented debt, on top of the growing needs and the Member States’ reluctance to increase their contributions, is causing a budgetary deadlock, ‘trilemma’ even.

    As we know, any major fiscal reform – made necessary by this critical situation – will be subject to unanimity among the Member States and often national ratification. With European populations becoming increasingly distrustful of supranational entities, this not only makes for a drawn-out process but one in which it is difficult to get decisions adopted. There are concerns that the Commission will try to use interinstitutional or administrative mechanisms to get around this issue.

    To dispel these fears and doubts as to whether the democratic wishes in the Member States will be taken into account, will the Commission make a commitment to respecting these principles and not circumventing national sovereignty by using interinstitutional mechanisms or delegated regulations?

    Submitted: 13.2.2025

    • [1] https://www.contexte.com/actualite/pouvoirs/budget-post-2027-la-commission-pose-les-premieres-pierres-dun-chantier-titanesque_218085.html?go-back-to-briefitem=218085
    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: employment and social priorities for 2025 – A10-0023/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: employment and social priorities for 2025

    (2024/2084(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

      having regard to Articles 9, 121, 148 and 149 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) proclaimed and signed by the Council, Parliament and the Commission on 17 November 2017,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 entitled ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan’ (COM(2021)0102) and its proposed 2030 headline targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘2025 European Semester – Autumn package’ (COM(2024)0700),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 November 2024 entitled ‘2025 European Semester: bringing the new economic governance framework to life’ (COM(2024)0705),

      having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 December 2024 for a joint employment report from the Commission and the Council (COM(2024)0701),

     having regard to the Commission recommendation of 17 December 2024 for a Council recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area (COM(2024)0704),

      having regard to the Commission report of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘Alert Mechanism Report 2025’ (COM(2024)0702),

      having regard to the Commission staff working document of 26 November 2024 entitled ‘Fiscal statistical tables providing relevant background data for the assessment of the 2025 draft budgetary plans’ (SWD(2024)0950),

     having regard to the Commission staff working document of 17 December 2024 on the changes in the scoreboard the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure Scoreboard in the context of the regular review process (SWD(2024)0702),

     having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2024 on the Council position on Draft amending budget No 4/2024 of the European Union for the financial year 2024 – update of revenue (own resources) and adjustments to some decentralised agencies[1],

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of April 2024 on the future of the single market[2],

     having regard to the La Hulpe Declaration on the Future of the European Pillar of Social Rights signed by Parliament, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Council on 16 April 2024,

     having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2023/955 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a Social Climate Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1060[3],

     having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97[4], and in particular to Articles 3, 4, 13 and 27 thereof,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 17 January 2023 entitled ‘Harnessing talent in Europe’s regions’ (COM(2023)0032),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2023 entitled ‘Labour and skills shortages in the EU: an action plan’ (COM(2024)0131),

     having regard to the 2020 European Skills Agenda,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 7 September 2022 on the European care strategy (COM(2022)0440),

     having regard to the Council Recommendation on access to affordable, high-quality long-term care[5],

     having regard to the EU Social Scoreboard and its headline and secondary indicators,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (COM(2021)0101),

     having regard to the Commission report of 19 September 2024 entitled ‘Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE): upward social convergence in the EU and the role of social investment’,

     having regard to the Council Decision on Employment Guidelines, adopted by the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council on 2 December 2024, which establishes employment and social priorities aligned with the principles of the EPSR,

     having regard to the Tripartite Declaration for a thriving European Social Dialogue and to the forthcoming pact on social dialogue,

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2041 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on adequate minimum wages in the European Union[6] (Minimum Wage Directive),

     having regard to the European Social Charter, referred to in the preamble of the EPSR,

     having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation for 2020-2030,

     having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

     having regard to the Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025,

     having regard to the EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025,

     having regard to the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A10-0023/2025),

    A. whereas progress has been made towards achieving the EU’s employment targets, namely that at least 78 % of people aged 20 to 64 should be in employment by 2030, despite the uncertainty created by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the impact of high inflation; whereas, according to the Commission’s 2025 autumn economic forecast, EU employment has reached a rate of 75.3 %; whereas growth in employment in the EU remained robust in 2023; whereas in two thirds of the Member States, employment growth in 2023 was on track to reach the national 2030 target; whereas significant challenges nevertheless persist, such as high unemployment rates in some Member States, particularly among young people and persons with disabilities, as do significant inequalities between sectors and regions, which can negatively affect social cohesion and the well-being of European citizens in the long term;

    B. whereas the European Semester combines various different instruments in an integrated framework for multilateral coordination and surveillance of economic, employment and social policies within the EU and it must become a key tool for fostering upward social convergence; whereas the Social Convergence Framework is a key tool for assessing social challenges and upward convergence within the European Semester and for monitoring social disparities across Member States, while addressing the challenges identified in the Joint Employment Report (JER);

    C. whereas the Union has adopted the 2030 target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion by at least 15 million compared to 2019, including at least 5 million children; whereas in nearly half of the Member States the trend is heading in the opposite direction; whereas one child in four in the European Union is still at risk of poverty and social exclusion; and whereas the current trend will not make it possible to meet the 2030 target; whereas public spending on children and youth should not be seen only as social expenditure but as an investment in the future; whereas the promotion of strong, sustainable and inclusive economic growth can succeed only if the next generation can develop their full educational potential in order to be prepared for the changing labour market, whereas to meet the 2030 Barcelona targets for early childhood education and care, the EU should invest an additional EUR 11 billion per year[7];

    D. whereas despite a minimal reduction in the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU in 2023, approximately one in five still faces this challenge, with notable disparities for children, young and older people, persons with disabilities, LGTBI, non-EU born individuals, and Roma communities;

    E. whereas significant disparities are observed among children from ethnic or migrant backgrounds and children with disabilities; whereas 83 % of Roma children live in households at risk of poverty; whereas the EU and national resources currently deployed are in no way sufficient for addressing the challenge of child poverty in the EU and, therefore, a dedicated funding instrument for the European Child Guarantee as well as synergies with other European and national funds are of the utmost importance in both the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the next one;

    F. whereas the EPSR must be the compass guiding EU social and economic policies, whereas the Commission should monitor progress on the implementation of the EPSR using the Social Scoreboard and the Social Convergence Framework;

    G. whereas poor quality jobs among the self-employed are disproportionately widespread while the rate of self-employment is declining, including among young people;

    H. whereas there are still 1.4 million people residing in institutions in the EU; whereas residents of institutions are isolated from the broader community and do not have sufficient control over their lives and the decisions that affect them; whereas despite the fact that the European Union has long been committed to the process of deinstitutionalisation, efforts are still needed at both European and national level to enable vulnerable groups to live independently in a community environment;

    I. whereas demographic challenges, including an ageing population, low birth rates and rural depopulation, with young people in particular moving to urban areas, profoundly affect the economic vitality and attractiveness of EU regions, the labour markets, and consequently, the sustainability of welfare systems, and further aggravate the regional disparities in the EU, and hence represent a structural challenge for the EU economy; and whereas, as underlined in the Draghi report, sustainable growth and competitiveness in Europe depend to a large extent on adapting education and training systems to evolving skills needs, prioritising adult learning and vocational education and training, and the inclusion of the active population in the labour market and on a robust welfare system;

    J. whereas, as highlighted in the Draghi report, migrant workers have been an important factor in reducing labour shortages and are more likely to work in occupations with persistent shortages than workers born in the EU;

    K. whereas 70 % of workers in Europe are in good-quality jobs, 30 % are in high-strain jobs where demands are more numerous than resources available to balance them leading to overall poor job quality; whereas in many occupations suffering from persistent labour shortages the share of low-quality jobs is higher than 30 %;

    L. whereas the Letta report states that there is a decline in the birth rate, noting the importance of creating a framework to support all families as part of a strategy of inclusive growth in line with the EPSR; whereas the report notes that the free movement of people remains the least developed of the four freedoms and argues for reducing barriers to intra-EU occupational mobility while addressing the social, economic and political challenges facing the sending Member States and their most disadvantaged regions, as well as safeguarding the right to stay; whereas there is a need to promote family-friendly and work-life balance policies, ensuring accessible and professional care systems as well as public quality education, family-related leave and flexible working arrangements in line with the European Care Strategy;

    M. whereas inflation has increased the economic burden on households, having a particularly negative impact on groups in vulnerable situations, such as single parents, large families, older people or persons with disabilities, whereas housing costs and energy poverty remain major problems; whereas housing is becoming unaffordable for those who live in households where housing costs account for 40 % of total disposable income; whereas investment in social services, housing supply – including social housing – and policies that facilitate the accessibility and affordability of housing play a key role in reducing poverty among vulnerable households;

    N. whereas the EU’s micro, small and medium-sized enterprises face particular challenges such as staying competitive against third-country players, maintaining production levels despite rising energy costs and finding the necessary skills for the green and digital transitions; whereas they need financial and technical support to comply with regulatory requirements and take advantage of the opportunities offered by the twin transitions;

    O. whereas labour and skills shortages remain a problem at all levels, and are reported by companies of all sizes and sectors; whereas these shortages are exacerbated by a lack of candidates to fill critical positions in key sectors such as education, healthcare, transport, science, technology, engineering and construction, especially in areas affected by depopulation; whereas these shortages can result from a number of factors, such as difficult working conditions, unattractive salaries, demand for new skill sets and a shortage of relevant training, the lack of public services, barriers of access to medium and higher education and lack of recognition of skills and education;

    P. whereas the Union has adopted the target that at least 60 % of adults should participate in training every year by 2030; whereas the Member States have committed themselves to national targets in order to achieve this headline goal and whereas the majority of Member States lost ground in the pursuit of these national targets; whereas further efforts are needed to ensure the provision of, and access to, quality training policies that promote lifelong learning; whereas upskilling, reskilling and training programmes must be available for all workers, including those with disabilities, and should also be adapted to workers’ needs and capabilities;

    Q. whereas in 2022, the average Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) score across the OECD on the measures of basic skills (reading, mathematics and science) of 15-year-olds dropped by 10 points compared to the last wave in 2018; whereas underachievement is prevalent among disadvantaged learners, demonstrating a widening of educational inequalities; whereas this worrying deterioration calls for reforms and investments in education and training;

    R. whereas the EU’s capacity to deal with future shocks, crises and ‘polycrises’ while navigating the demographic, digital and green transitions, will depend greatly on the conditions under which critical workers will be able to perform their work; whereas addressing the shortages and retaining all types of talent requires decent working conditions, access to social protection systems, and opportunities for skills development tailored to the needs; and whereas addressing skills shortages is crucial to achieving the digital and green transitions, ensuring inclusive and sustainable growth and boosting the EU’s competitiveness;

    S. whereas it is essential to promote mobility within the EU and consider attracting skilled workers from third countries, while ensuring respect for and enforcement of labour and social rights and channelling third-country nationals entering the EU through legal migration pathways towards occupations experiencing shortages, supported by an effective integration policy, in full complementarity with harnessing talents from within the Union;

    T. whereas gender pay gaps remain considerable in most EU Member States and whereas care responsibilities are an important factor that continue to constrain women into part-time employment or lead to their exclusion from the labour market, resulting in a wider gender employment gap;

    U. whereas the JER highlights the right to disconnect, in particular in the context of telework, acknowledging the critical role of this right in ensuring a work-life balance in a context of increasing digitalisation and remote working;

    V. whereas challenges to several sectors, such as automotive manufacturing and energy intensive industries, became evident in 2024 and a number of companies announced large-scale restructuring;

    W. whereas there are disparities in the coverage of social services, including long-term care, child protection, domestic violence support, and homelessness aid, that need to be addressed through the European Semester;

    X. whereas there is currently no regular EU-wide collection of data on social services investment and coverage; whereas collecting such data is key for an evidence-based analysis of national social policies in the European Semester analysis; whereas this should be addressed through jointly agreed criteria and data collection standards for social services investment and coverage in the Member States; whereas the European Social Network’s Social Services Index is an example of how such data collection can contribute to the European Semester analysis;

    Y. whereas the crisis in generational renewal, demographic changes, and lack of sufficient investment in public services have led to an increased risk of poverty and social exclusion, particularly affecting children and older people, single-parent households and large families, the working poor, persons with disabilities, and people from marginalised backgrounds; whereas an ambitious EU anti-poverty strategy will be essential to reverse this trend and provide responses to the multidimensional phenomenon of poverty;

    Z. whereas Eurofound research shows that suicide rates have been creeping up since 2021, after decreasing for decades; whereas more needs to be done to address causes of mental health problems in working and living conditions (importantly social inclusion), and access to support for people with poor mental health remains a problem;

    AA. whereas there were still over 3 300 fatal accidents and almost 3 million nonfatal accidents in the EU-27 in 2021; whereas over 200 000 workers die each year from work-related illnesses; whereas these data do not include all accidents caused by undeclared work, making it plausible to assume that the true numbers greatly exceed the official statistics; whereas in 2017, according to Eurofound, 20 % of jobs in Europe were of ‘poor quality’ and put workers at increased risk regarding their physical or mental health; whereas 14 % of workers have been exposed to a high level of psychosocial risks; whereas 23 % of European workers believe that their safety or their health is at risk because of their work;

    AB. whereas the results of the April 2024 Eurobarometer survey on social Europe highlight that 88 % of European citizens consider social Europe to be important to them personally; whereas this was confirmed by the EU Post-Electoral Survey 2024, where European citizens cited rising prices and the cost of living (42 %) and the economic situation (41 %) as the main topics that motivated them to vote in the 2024 European elections;

    AC. whereas according to Article 3 TEU, social progress in the EU is one of the aims of a highly competitive social market economy, together with full employment, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment; whereas Article 3 TEU also states that the EU ‘shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child’;

    AD. whereas the new EU economic governance framework entered into force in April 2024 and aims to promote sustainable and inclusive growth and to give more space for social investment and achievement of the objectives of the EPSR; whereas, for the first time, the revision includes a social convergence framework as an integrated part of the European Semester;

    AE. whereas under the new EU economic governance framework, all Member States have to include reforms and investments in their medium-term plans addressing common EU priorities and challenges identified in country-specific recommendations in the context of the European Semester; whereas the common EU priorities include social and economic resilience, including the EPSR;

    AF. whereas European social partners, during Macroeconomic Dialogue, have denounced the lack of involvement of social partners in the drafting of the medium-term fiscal structural plans and ETUC, SMEUnited and SGIEurope have signed a joint statement for a material and factual involvement of social partners in the economic governance and the European Semester;

    AG. whereas public investment is expected to increase in 2025 in almost all Member States, with a significant contribution from NextGenerationEU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and EU funds and will contribute to social spending, amounting to around 25 % of the total estimated expenditure under the RRF, securing growth and economic resilience[8]; whereas social investments and reforms in key areas can boost employment, social inclusion, competitiveness and economic growth[9]; whereas social partners are essential for designing and implementing policies that promote sustainable and inclusive growth, decent and quality work, and fair transitions and must be involved at all levels of governance in accordance with the TFEU;

    AH. whereas the Member States should implement the Minimum Wage Directive without delay and prepare action plans that increase collective bargaining coverage in line with the directive, where applicable;

    AI. whereas according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), on average across OECD countries, occupations at highest risk of automation account for about 28 % of employment[10]; whereas social dialogue and collective bargaining are crucial in this context to ensure a participatory approach to managing change driven by technological developments, addressing potential concerns, while fostering workers’ adaptation (including via skills provision); whereas digitalisation, robotisation, automation and artificial intelligence (AI) must benefit workers and society by improving working conditions and quality of life, ensuring a good work-life balance, creating better employment opportunities, and contributing to socio-economic convergence; whereas workers and their trade unions will play a critical role in anticipating and tackling risks emerging from those challenges;

     

    AJ. whereas social dialogue and collective bargaining are essential for the EU’s competitiveness, labour productivity and social cohesion;

    1. Considers that the Commission and the Council should strengthen their efforts to implement the EPSR, in line with the action plan of March 2021 and the La Hulpe Declaration, to achieve the 2030 headline targets; calls on the Commission to ensure that the JER 2026 analyses the implementation of all the principles of the EPSR in line with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 and includes an analysis of the social dimension of the national medium-term fiscal structural plans related to social resilience, including the EPSR; welcomes, in this regard, the announcement of a new Action Plan on the implementation of the EPSR[11] for 2025 to give a new impetus to social progress; welcomes the fact that almost all Member States are expected to increase public investment in 2025, which is necessary to ensure access to quality public services and achieve the aims of the EPSR; recalls that the Member States can mobilise the RRF within the scope defined by the Regulation (EU) 2021/241[12] until 31 December 2026 on policies for sustainable and inclusive growth and the young;

    2. Stresses the importance of using the Social Scoreboard and the Social Convergence Framework to identify risks to, and to track progress in, reducing inequalities, strengthening social protection systems and promoting decent working conditions and supportive measures for workers to manage the transitions; stresses that in this regard, it is necessary to ensure a sustainable, fair and inclusive Europe where social rights are fully protected and safeguarded at the same level as economic freedoms; recalls that EU citizens identify social Europe as one of their priorities;

    3. Regrets the lack of data on and analysis of wealth inequality and wealth concentration in the EU as this is one of the main determinants of poverty; points out that according to Distributional Wealth Accounts, a dataset developed by the European System of Central Banks, the share of wealth held by the top 10 % stood at 56 % in the fourth quarter of 2023, while the bottom half held just 5 %;

    4. Welcomes the inclusion of analysis on the positive contribution of the SDGs and the European equality strategies in the JER 2025 and calls on the Commission to ensure that the JER 2026 includes both a section analysing the progress towards the SDGs related to employment and social policy, and another on progress towards eliminating social and labour discrimination in line with the Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, the EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025, the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation 2020-2030, the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025, and the Strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030;

    5. Calls on the Member States to implement the updated employment guidelines, with an emphasis on education and training for all, new technologies such as AI, and recent policy initiatives on platform work, affordable and decent housing and tackling labour and skills shortages, with a view to strengthening democratic decision-making;

    6. Reiterates the importance of investing in workforce skills development and occupational training and of ensuring quality employment, with an emphasis on the individual right to training and lifelong learning; urges the Member States to develop upskilling and reskilling measures in collaboration with local stakeholders, including educational and training bodies and the social partners, in order to reinforce the link between the education and training systems and the labour market and to anticipate labour market needs; welcomes the fact that employment outcomes for recent graduates from vocational education and training (VET) continue to improve across the EU; is concerned about young people’s declining educational performance, particularly in basic skills; welcomes, in this regard, the announcement of an Action Plan on Basic Skills and a STEM Education Strategic Plan; calls on the Member States to invest in programmes to equip learners with the basic, digital and transversal skills needed for the world of work and its digitisation as well as to help them to contribute meaningfully to society; recalls the important role that the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for displaced workers can play in supporting and reskilling workers who were made redundant as a result of major restructuring events;

    7. Welcomes the announcement of a quality jobs roadmap to ensure a just transition for all; calls on the Commission to include in this roadmap considerations for measures linked to the use of AI and algorithmic management in the world of work so that new technologies are harnessed to improve working conditions and productivity while respecting workers’ rights and work-life balance as recognised in the JER[13]; calls on the Commission to propose a directive on the use of AI in the workplace that ensures that workers’ rights are protected and respected;

    8. Stresses that the response to labour shortages in the European Union also involves improving and facilitating labour mobility within the Union; calls on the Member States to strengthen and facilitate the recognition of skills and qualifications in the Union, including those of third-country nationals; calls on the Commission to analyse the effectiveness of the European Employment Services (EURES) platform with a view to a potential revision of its operation;

    9. Notes that the number of early leavers from education and training, people with lower levels of education, young people not in education, employment or training (NEETs) and among them vulnerable groups, including Roma, women, older people, low- and medium-qualified people, persons with disabilities and people with a migrant or minority background, depending on the country-specific context, remains high in several Member States, despite a downward trend in the European Union; calls on the Member States to reinforce the Youth Guarantee as stated in Principle 4 of the EPSR; in order to support young people in need throughout their personal and professional development; reiterates the pivotal role that VET plays in providing the knowledge, skills and competencies necessary for young people entering the labour market; emphasises the need to invest in the quality and attractiveness of VET through the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+); recalls, therefore, the need to address this situation and develop solutions to keep young people in education, training or employment and the importance of ensuring their access to traineeships and apprenticeships, enabling them to gain their first work experience and facilitating their transition from education to employment as well as to create working conditions that enable an ageing workforce to remain in the labour market;

    10. Considers that, although there has been an improvement, persons with disabilities, especially women with disabilities, still face significant obstacles in the labour market, and that there is therefore a need for vocational and digital training, while promoting the inclusion of persons with disabilities, targeting the inactive labour force and groups with low participation in the labour market, including women, young people, older workers and persons with chronic diseases; calls on the Commission to update the EU Disability Strategy with new flagship initiatives and actions from 2025 onwards, such as a European Disability Employment and Skills Guarantee and the sharing of best practices such as the disability card, in particular to address social inclusion and independent living for people with disabilities, also ensuring their access to quality education, training and employment through guidance on retaining disability allowances;

    11. Expresses concern that Roma continue to face significant barriers to employment, with persistent biases limiting their prospects; notes that the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion, and participation highlights a lack of progress in employment access and a growing share of Roma youth not in employment, education, or training; emphasises the framework’s goal of halving the employment gap between Roma and the general population and ensuring that at least 60 % of Roma are in paid work by 2030; urges the Member States to adopt an integrated, equality-focused approach and to ensure that public policies and services effectively reach all Roma, including those in remote rural areas;

    12. Stresses the need to pay attention to the social and environmental aspects of competitiveness, emphasising the need for investments in education and training for all to ensure universal access to high-quality public education and professional training programmes, as well as sustainable practices to foster inclusive growth; underlines that social partners should play a key role in identifying and addressing skills needs across the EU;

    13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to include specific recommendations on housing affordability in the European Semester and to promote housing investment; urges the Member States to ensure that housing investments support long-term quality housing solutions that are actually affordable for low-income and middle-income households, highlighting that investments in social and affordable housing are crucial in order to ensure and improve the quality of life for all; stresses the need for a better use of EU funding, such as through European Investment Bank financial instruments, in particular to support investments to increase the energy efficiency of buildings; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take decisive action to provide an EU regulatory framework for the housing sector, together with an assessment of Union policies, funds and bottlenecks that should facilitate the construction, conversion and renovation of accessible, affordable and energy-efficient housing, including social housing, that meets the needs of young people, people with reduced mobility, low- and middle-income groups, families at risk and people in more vulnerable situations, while protecting homeowners and those seeking access to home ownership from a further reduction in supply;

    14. Welcomes the announced European Affordable Housing Plan to support Member States in addressing the housing crisis and soaring rents; calls on the Commission to assess and publish which potential barriers on State aid rules affect housing accessibility; recalls that the Social Climate Fund aims to provide financial aid to Member States from 2026 to support vulnerable households, in particular with measures and investments intended to increase the energy efficiency of buildings, decarbonisation of heating and cooling of buildings and the integration in buildings of renewable energy generation and storage;

    15. Considers that homelessness is a dramatic social problem in the EU; calls for a single definition of homelessness in the EU, which would enable the systematic comparison and assessment of the extent of homelessness across different EU Member States; calls on the Commission to develop a strategy and work towards ending homelessness in the EU by 2030 by promoting access to affordable and decent housing as well as access to quality social services; urges the Member States to better use the available EU instruments, including the ESF+, in this matter[14];

    16. Calls on the Member States to design national homelessness strategies centred around housing-based solutions; welcomes the intention to deliver a Council recommendation on homelessness[15]; urges the Commission to further increase the ambition of the European Platform on Combating Homelessness, in particular by providing it with a dedicated budget;

    17. Considers that EU action is urgently needed to address the persistently high levels of poverty and social exclusion in the EU, particularly among children, young and older people, persons with disabilities, non-EU born individuals, LGTBI and Roma communities; highlights that access to quality social services should be prioritised, with binding targets to reduce homelessness and ensure energy security for vulnerable households; calls on the Commission to adopt the first-ever EU Anti-Poverty Strategy;

    18. Recalls the Union objective of transitioning from institutional to community or family-based care; calls on the Commission to put forward an action plan on deinstitutionalisation; stresses that this action plan should cover all groups still living in institutions, including children, persons with disabilities, people with mental health issues, people affected by homelessness and older people; calls on the Member States to make full use of the ESF+ funds as well as other relevant European and national funds in order to finalise the deinstitutionalisation process so as to ensure that every EU citizen can live in a family or community environment;

    19. Calls on the Commission to deliver a European action plan for mental health, in line with its recent recommendations[16], and to complement it with a directive on psychosocial risks in the workplace; calls on the Member States to strengthen access to mental health services and emotional support programmes for all, particularly children, young people and older people; requests a better use of the Social Scoreboard indicators to address the impact of precarious living conditions and uncertainty on mental health;

    20. Calls on the Commission to address loneliness by promoting a holistic EU strategy on loneliness and access to professional care; calls also for this EU strategy to address the socio-economic impact of loneliness on productivity and well-being by tackling issues such as rural isolation; urges the Member States to continue implementing the Council recommendation on access to affordable, quality long-term care with a view to ensuring access to quality care while ensuring decent working conditions for workers in the care sector, as well as for informal carers;

    21. Recognises that 44 million Europeans are frequent informal long-term caregivers, the majority of whom are women[17];

    22. Recognises the unique role of carers in society, and while the definition of care workers is not harmonised across the EU, the long-term care sector employs 6.4 million people across the EU;

    23. Is concerned that, in 2023, 94.6 million people in the EU were still at risk of poverty or social exclusion; stresses that without a paradigm shift in the approach to combating poverty, the European Union and its Member States will not achieve their poverty reduction objectives; believes that the announcement of the first-ever EU Anti-Poverty Strategy is a step in the right direction towards reversing the trend, but must provide a comprehensive approach to tackling the multidimensional aspects of poverty and social exclusion with concrete actions, strong implementation and monitoring; calls for this Strategy to encompass everybody experiencing poverty and social exclusion, first and foremost the most disadvantaged, but also specific measures for different groups such as persons experiencing in-work poverty, homeless people, people with disabilities, single-parent families and, above all, children in order to sustainably break the cycle of poverty; stresses that the transposition of the Minimum Wage Directive will be key to preventing and fighting poverty risks among workers, while reinforcing incentives to work, and welcomes the fact that several Member States have amended or plan to amend their minimum wage frameworks; is concerned about the rise of non-standard forms of employment where workers are more likely to face in-work poverty and find themselves without adequate legal protections; stresses that an EU framework directive on adequate minimum income and active inclusion, in compliance with the subsidiarity principle, would contribute to the goals of reducing poverty and fostering the integration of people absent from the labour market;

    24. Reiterates its call on the Commission to carefully monitor implementation of the Child Guarantee in all Member States as part of the European Semester and country-specific recommendations; reiterates its call for an increase in the funding of the European Child Guarantee with a dedicated budget of at least EUR 20 billion and for all Member States to allocate at least 5 % of their allocated ESF+ funds to fighting child poverty and promoting children’s well-being; considers that the country-specific recommendations should reflect Member States’ budgetary compliance with the minimum required allocation for tackling child poverty set out in the ESF+ Regulation[18]; calls on the Commission to provide an ambitious budget for the Child Guarantee in the next MFF in order to respond to the growing challenge of child poverty and social exclusion;

    25. Is concerned about national policies that create gaps in health coverage, increasing inequalities both within and between Member States, such as privatisation of public healthcare systems, co-payments and lack of coverage; highlights that these deepen poverty, erode health and well-being, and increase social inequalities within and across EU countries; warns that this also undermines the implementation of principle 16 of the EPSR and of SDG 3.8 on universal health coverage, as well as the EPSR’s overall objective of promoting upward social convergence in the EU, leaving no one behind; believes that the indicators used in the Social Scoreboard do not provide a comprehensive understanding of healthcare affordability;

    26. Underlines that employers need to foster intergenerational links within companies and intergenerational learning between younger and older workers, and vice versa; underlines that an ageing workforce can help a business develop new products and services to adapt to the needs of an ageing society in a more creative and productive way; calls, furthermore, for the creation of incentives to encourage volunteering and mentoring to induce the transfer of knowledge between generations;

    27. Warns that, according to European Central Bank reports, real wages are still below their pre-pandemic level, while productivity was roughly the same; agrees that this creates some room for a non-inflationary recovery in real wages and warns that if real wages do not recover, this would increase the risk of protracted economic weakness, which could cause scarring effects and would further dent productivity in the euro area relative to other parts of the world; believes that better enforcement of minimum wages and strengthening collective bargaining coverage can have a beneficial effect on levels of wage inequality, especially by helping more vulnerable workers at the bottom of the wage distribution who are increasingly left out;

    28. Calls for the Member States to ensure decent working conditions, comprising among other things decent wages, access to social protection, lifelong learning opportunities, occupational health and safety, a good work-life balance and the right to disconnect, reasonable working time, workers’ representation, democracy at work and collective agreements; urges the Member States to foster democracy at work, social dialogue and collective bargaining and to protect workers’ rights, particularly in the context of the green and digital transitions, and to ensure equal pay for equal work by men and women, enhance pay transparency and address gender-based inequality to close the gender pay gap in the EU;

    29. Recalls the importance of improving access to social protection for the self-employed and calls on the Commission to monitor the Member States’ national plans for the implementation of the Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed[19] as part of the country-specific recommendations; recalls, in this regard, as the rate of self-employed professionals in the cultural and creative sectors is more than double that in the general population, the 13 initiatives laid down in the Commission’s 21 February 2024 response to the European Parliament resolution of 21 November 2023 on an EU framework for the social and professional situation of artists and workers in the cultural and creative sectors[20] and calls on the Commission to start implementing them in cooperation with the Member States;

    30. Stresses that the role of social dialogue and social partners should be systematically integrated into the design and implementation of employment and social policies, ensuring the involvement of social partners at all levels;

    31. Calls for the implementation of policies that promote work-life balance and the right to disconnect, with the aim of improving the quality of life for all families and workers, for ensuring the implementation of the Work-Life Balance Directive[21] and of the European Care Strategy; calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to address teleworking and the right to disconnect; as well as a proposal for the creation of a European card for all types of large families and a European action plan for single parents, offering educational and social advantages; calls, ultimately, for initiatives to combat workforce exclusion as a consequence of longer periods of sick leave, to adapt the workplace and to promote flexible working conditions and to develop strategies to support workers’ return after longer periods of absence;

    32. Calls for demographic challenges to be prioritised in the EU’s cohesion policy and for concrete action at EU and national levels; calls on the Commission to prioritise the development of the Commission communication on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions and the ‘Talent Booster Mechanism’ in order to promote social cohesion and to step up funding for rural and outermost areas and regions with a high rate of depopulation, supporting quality job creation, public services, local development projects and basic infrastructure that favour the population’s ‘right to stay’, especially in the case of young people; highlights the importance of introducing specific measures to address regional inequalities in education and training, ensuring equal access to high-quality and affordable education for all;

    33. Is concerned that, despite improvements, several population groups are still significantly under-represented in the EU labour market, including women, older people, low- and medium-qualified people, persons with disabilities and people with a migrant or minority background; warns that  educational inequalities have deepened, further exacerbating the vulnerabilities of students from disadvantaged and migrant backgrounds; points out that, according to the JER, people with migrant or minority backgrounds can significantly benefit from targeted measures in order to address skills mismatches, improve language proficiency, combat discrimination and receive tailored and integrated support services; stresses the importance of strengthening efforts in the implementation of the 2021-27 Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion, which provides a common policy framework to support the Member States in developing national migrant integration policies;

    34. Calls on the Commission and the Council to prioritise reducing administrative burdens with the aim of simplification while respecting labour and social standards; believes that better support for SMEs and actual and potential entrepreneurs will improve the EU’s competitiveness and long-term sustainability, boost innovation and create quality jobs; notes that SMEs and self-employed professionals in all sectors are essential for the EU’s economic growth and thus the financing of social policies; urges the implementation of specific recommendations to improve the single market; takes note of the Commission’s publication of the ‘Competitiveness Compass’ on 29 January 2025[22];

    35. Calls on the Commission to conduct competitiveness checks on every new legislative proposal, taking into account the overall impact of EU legislation on companies, as well as on other EU policies and programmes;

    36. Considers that the social economy is an essential component of the EU’s social market economy and a driver for the implementation of the EPSR and its targets, often providing employment to vulnerable and excluded groups; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen their support for all social economy enterprises but especially non-profit ones, as highlighted in the Social Economy Action Plan 2021 and the Liège Roadmap for the Social Economy, in order to promote quality, decent, inclusive work and the circular economy, to encourage the Member States to facilitate access to funding and to enhance the visibility of social economy actors; calls for the Commission to explore innovative funding mechanisms to support the development of the social economy in Europe[23] and to foster a dynamic and inclusive business environment;

    37. Believes that, in this year of transition, with the implementation of the revised economic governance rules, the Member States should align fiscal responsibility with sustainable and inclusive growth and employment, notes that the involvement of social partners, including in the development of medium-term fiscal structural plans, should be enhanced to contribute to the goals of the new economic governance framework;

    38. Welcomes the fact that the national medium-term fiscal structural plans, under the new economic governance framework, have to include the reforms and investments responding to the main challenges identified in the context of the European Semester and also to ensure debt sustainability while investing strategically in the principles of the EPSR with the aim of fostering upward social convergence;

    39. Is concerned that compliance with the country-specific recommendations (CSRs) remains low; reiterates its call, therefore, for an effective implementation of CSRs by the Member States so as to promote healthcare and sustainable pension systems, in line with principles 15 and 16 of the EPSR, and long-term prosperity for all citizens, taking into account the vulnerability of those workers whose careers are segmented, intermittent and subject to labour transitions; insists that the Commission should reinforce its dialogues with the Member States on the implementation of existing recommendations and of the Employment Guidelines as well as on current or future policy action to address identified challenges;

    40. Welcomes the establishment of a framework to identify risks to social convergence within the European Semester, for which Parliament called strongly; recalls that under this framework, the Commission assesses risks to upward social convergence in Member States and monitors progress on the implementation of the EPSR on the basis of the Social Scoreboard and of the principles of the Social Convergence Framework; welcomes the fact that the 2025 JER delivers country-specific analysis based on the principles of the Social Convergence Framework; calls on the Commission to further develop innovative quantitative and qualitative analysis tools under this new Framework in order to make optimal use of it in the future cycles of the European Semester;

    41. Welcomes the fact that the first analysis based on the principles of the Social Convergence Framework points to upward convergence in the labour market in 2023[24]; notes with concern that employment outcomes of under-represented groups still need to improve and that risks to upward convergence persist at European level in relation to skills development, ranging from early education to lifelong learning, and the social outcomes of at-risk-of-poverty and social exclusion rates; calls on the Commission to further analyse these risks to upward social convergence in the second stage of the analysis and to discuss with the Member States concerned the measures undertaken or envisaged to address these risks;

    42. Recognises the cost of living crisis, which has increased the burden on households, and the rising cost of housing, which, in conjunction with high energy costs, is contributing to high levels of energy poverty across the EU; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to comprehensively address the root causes of this crisis by prioritising policies that promote economic resilience, social cohesion, and sustainable development;

    43. Warns of the social risks stemming from the crisis in the automotive sector, which is facing unprecedented pressure from both external and internal factors; calls on the Commission to pay attention to this sector and enhance social dialogue and the participation of workers in transition processes; stresses the urgent need for a coordinated EU response via an emergency task force of trade unions and employers to respond to the current crisis;

    44. Calls on the Commission to monitor data on restructuring and its impact on employment, such as by using the European Restructuring Monitor, to facilitate measures in support of restructuring and labour market transitions, and to consider highlighting national measures supporting a socially responsible way of restructuring in the European Semester;

    45. Calls on the Commission to monitor the development of minimum wages in the Member States following the transposition of the Minimum Wage Directive to determine whether the goal of ‘adequacy’ of minimum wages is being achieved;

    46. Is concerned about the Commission’s revision of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) Scoreboard, particularly the reduction in employment and social indicators, which are crucial for assessing the social and labour market situation in the Member States; regrets the fact that youth unemployment is no longer considered as a headline indicator, despite its relevance in identifying and addressing specific labour market challenges and in adopting adequate public policies; stresses that social standards indicators should be given greater consideration in the decision-making process; regrets the fact that the Commission did not duly consult Parliament and reminds the Commission of its obligation to closely cooperate with Parliament, the Council and social partners before drawing up the MIP scoreboard and the set of macroeconomic and macro-financial indicators for Member States; stresses that the implementation of the principles of the EPSR must be part of the MIP scoreboard;

    47. Considers that territorial and social cohesion are essential components of the competitiveness agenda, and legislation such as the European Instrument for Temporary Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) remain a positive example to inspire future EU initiatives;

    48. Considers that the Commission and the Member States should ensure that fiscal policies under the European Semester support investments aligned with the EPSR, particularly in areas such as decent and affordable housing, quality healthcare, education, and social protection systems, as these are critical for social cohesion and long-term economic sustainability and to address the challenges identified through social indicators;

    49. Stresses the need to address key challenges identified in the Social Scoreboard as ‘critical’ and ‘to watch’, including children at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the gender employment gap, housing cost overburden, childcare, and long-term care the disability employment gap, the impact of social transfers on reducing poverty, and basic digital skills[25];

    50. Stresses the negative impacts that the cost of living crisis has had on persons with disabilities;

    51. Urges the Member States to consider robust policies that ensure fair wages and improve working conditions, particularly for low-income and precarious workers;

    52. Calls on the Member States to strengthen social safety nets to provide adequate support to those whose income from employment is insufficient to meet basic living costs;

    53. Stresses the need for timely and harmonised data on social policies to improve evidence-based policymaking and targeted social investments; calls for improvements to be made to the Social Scoreboard in order to cover the 20 EPSR principles with the introduction of relevant indicators reflecting trends and causes of inequality, such as quality employment, wealth distribution, access to public services, adequate pensions, the homelessness rate, mental health and unemployment; recalls that the at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion (AROPE) indicator fails to reveal the causes of complex inequality; calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a European data collection framework on social services to monitor the investment in and coverage of social services;

    54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The impact of climate change on deaths from heat and cold in European cities – E-000645/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000645/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    César Luena (S&D)

    A new article published in Nature Medicine magazine[1], based on an in-depth study of 854 European cities, provides clear evidence that net mortality in Europe will increase even in the most benign climate change scenario. The assessments show that the net burden on health will increase substantially in scenarios involving extreme warming, and that this trend can only be reversed by bringing in adaptation measures on a massive scale in urban communities.

    Bearing in mind that the study emphasises the importance of adaptation to heat:

    • 1.How is the Commission intending to incorporate more robust adaptation measures into the EU’s strategy on adaptation to climate change, in particular with regard to urban communities and the most vulnerable age groups?
    • 2.Will the Commission be addressing this increasing risk to public health specifically in EU climate legislation?
    • 3.Given the regional disparities where the projected impact of climate change is concerned, with the most serious net effects in southern Europe, is the Commission planning to address this inequality as regards vulnerability to climate change in its next proposal for a multiannual financial framework?

    Submitted: 12.2.2025

    • [1] https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-024-03452-2.
    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Impact of the first Omnibus package on the European Green Deal – E-000720/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000720/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    César Luena (S&D)

    In its presentation of the Competitiveness Compass, the Commission asks for all EU, national and local institutions to develop simple rules to speed up administrative procedures. That process will begin with the first in a series of Omnibus simplification packages. Focusing exclusively on investors, the first Omnibus will cover simplification relating to sustainable finance reporting, sustainability due diligence and taxonomy. What is missing, however, is an assessment of the environmental impact of the simplified regulations, which could be used by businesses to shirk their environmental obligations.

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.What impact does the Commission expect the Omnibus packages and wider simplification strategy to have on the Green Deal?
    • 2.How does the Commission believe the introduction of a small-mid cap will affect implementation of the European Green Deal, particularly in view of the proposed simplification of the carbon border adjustment mechanism?
    • 3.What measures is the Commission considering for businesses that fail to meet the new simplified and sustainable laws?

    Submitted: 17.2.2025

    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Environmental issues in the next multiannual financial framework and the future European Competitiveness Fund – E-000719/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000719/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    César Luena (S&D)

    Within the context of revising the EU budget and tailoring it to the new competitiveness priorities, the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass proposes that the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) include a European Competitiveness Fund. According to the Commission itself, EU budget spending is currently fragmented over too many programmes that often have limited coordinated strategic direction and tend to be incredibly complicated for the beneficiaries.

    In light of the above:

    • 1.What priority will the Commission give to environmental issues in the MFF and the European Competitiveness Fund?
    • 2.How does the Commission plan to balance the desire for competitiveness with the rules and regulations needed to ensure sustainable and environmentally friendly growth?
    • 3.According to the Commission, which programmes should be ‘revised’ to make the EU budget fit for purpose?

    Submitted: 17.2.2025

    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Portugal: EIB finances Galp’s Renewable Hydrogen and Biofuels projects in Sines with €430 million

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • The two projects, already in construction at the Sines Refinery, represent a total investment of €650 million.
    • The Biofuels unit, financed with €250 million, will produce low-carbon fuels essential for the decarbonization of transport.
    • The Green Hydrogen production unit, financed with €180 million, will be one of the largest in Europe.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) has granted a €430 million loan for the construction of two key projects aimed at transforming Galp’s Sines Refinery, making a crucial contribution for the decarbonization of heavy-duty road transport and aviation.

    Galp is developing the Biofuels unit, already at a construction stage, in partnership with Japan’s Mitsui, as part of a total €400 million investment, of which €250 million is provided by the EIB. This unit will convert vegetable oils and residual fats into sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) and renewable diesel of biological origin (HVO) with identical characteristics to the fossil-based fuels used in regular combustion engines.

    This unit, set to begin production in 2026, will have the capacity to produce up to 270,000 tons of renewable fuels, enough for Portugal to comply with the European Union mandate for this type of fuels in aviation. SAF is essential for air transportation – responsible for about 3% of global greenhouse gas emissions – to begin its decarbonization journey.

    In parallel, Galp is building in the same site a 100MW electrolyser, a €250 million investment of which the EIB will finance €180 million. It is set to produce up to 15,000 tons of green hydrogen per year when it goes online next year, becoming one of the first operational units of its size in Europe.

    “These pioneering projects are a clear example of how we can combine financing, innovation, and our environmental commitment to promote a fair and sustainable energy transition,” said Jean-Christophe Laloux, Director General, Head of EU Lending and Advisory at the EIB. “By supporting the production of advanced biofuels and green hydrogen, we are contributing to a more energy-independent Europe that aligns with global climate goals.”

    “We have mobilized partners, private investment, and European financing to drive a transformative project that brings European and national energy and industrial policies to life,” said Ronald Doesburg, Galp’s Executive Board Member responsible for the Industrial area. “More is needed from energy companies, public funding and government support if we want to maintain Portugal’s relevance in an increasingly unstable world,” he concluded.

    The two projects support the goal of climate neutrality by 2050, in line with the European Green Deal, and strengthen the EU’s energy independence as outlined in the REPowerEU plan. The projects benefit from €22,5 in Recovery and Resilience Plan incentives.

    Background information   

    About the EIB  

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union, and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world. 

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.   

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.   

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average. 

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here.

    About Galp

    Galp is an energy company committed to developing efficient and sustainable solutions in its operations and the integrated offerings it provides to its customers. We create simple, flexible, and competitive solutions for energy or mobility needs, catering to large industries, small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as individual consumers.

    Our portfolio includes various forms of energy – from electricity generated from renewable sources to natural gas and liquid fuels, including low-carbon options. As a producer, we engage in the extraction of oil and natural gas from reservoirs located kilometers below the ocean surface, and we are also one of the leading solar-based electricity producers in the Iberian region.

    We contribute to the economic development of the 10 countries where we operate and to the social progress of the communities that welcome us. Galp employs more than 7,000 people from 52 nationalities.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Cyprus gets €72 million EIB loan for new national archaeological museum as EU bank publishes 2024 financing results in country

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • EIB provides €72 million loan to Cypriot government to build state-of-the-art archaeological museum in capital Nicosia
    • Credit for landmark Cypriot cultural project follows 2024 EIB Group financing in Cyprus totalling €225 million mainly for university-campus and road-network upgrades.
    • Latest annual results bring EIB Group support in Cyprus to €1.3 billion over past five years.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) is providing the Cypriot government with a €72 million loan for a new national archaeological museum in the capital Nicosia. The EIB credit will be used to build the planned state-of-the-art Cyprus Archaeological Museum, which will serve as a cultural landmark while contributing to urban regeneration.

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), today also announced that new financing in Cyprus in 2024 totalled €225 million. Top projects last year included EIB loans of €125 million for the Cyprus University of Technology (CUT) to build affordable student housing and upgrade campus facilities in Paphos and Limassol and €100 million for the Cypriot government to improve and expand road networks.

    “Our work in Cyprus is a testament to the transformative power of the EIB’s strategic financing,” said EIB Vice-President Kyriakos Kakouris. “In 2024, we reaffirmed our commitment to the country by supporting major projects in sustainable and affordable student housing as well as critical transport- infrastructure improvements, reinforcing social cohesion in the process.”

    Cultural landmark

    The planned Cyprus Archaeological Museum, whose construction is due to be completed in 2029 .will be located in the centre of Nicosia  and transform the area into a vibrant cultural hub. The museum will feature spacious exhibition halls equipped with cutting-edge technologies to enhance the presentation of Cyprus’s rich archaeological heritage, which dates to the Neolithic  period  and  extends to the Christian era.

    “The new museum will offer dedicated spaces for research, education and engagement with the scientific and cultural community, further strengthening Cyprus’s role in the global archaeological and cultural dialogue,” said EIB Vice-President Kyriacos Kakouris.

    It will house an extensive collection from Department of Antiquities of the Cypriot Culture Ministry’s

    “The Cyprus Archaeological Museum will stand as the country’s most significant cultural initiative,” said Cypriot Minister of Finance Makis Keravnos. “This is a crucial project for the Cypriot government and the people as it will revitalise and showcase – in the most fitting way – our country’s rich and diverse history. It will also create a dynamic cultural, recreational, and social hub in the heart of the city.”

    The new project includes a state-of-the-art 30,000 sqm museum and a 20,000 sqm landscaped public square, transforming the Nicosia area into a vibrant cultural hub.

    “For many years, it has been the state’s vision to establish a museum capable of housing, with the dignity they deserve, the memories of our archaeological past,” said Cypriot Minister of Transport, Communications and Works Alexis Vafeades. “This museum will become a place of attraction for people of all ages and nationalities, fostering inclusivity and sharing Cyprus’s rich archaeological history with the world.”

    2024 results

    The latest annual results from the EIB Group bring its total financing in Cyprus over the past five years to €1.3 billion. The annual average in the country since 2000 is €256 million.

    The EIB’s support for CUT last year included two financing agreements with the university totalling €108 million and one accord with the Municipality of Paphos amounting to €17 million. The project features the construction and renovation of academic and administrative spaces, along with the addition of 703 student accommodation units.

    In Limassol, the planned upgrades include the creation of a solar energy park to power the campus, making it energy self-sufficient.

    Part of the financing is supported by the InvestEU programme, marking its first initiative in Cyprus.

    The EIB’s support for Cypriot road development in 2024 was part of a €200 million package for such infrastructure in the country, with a second €100 million tranche expected to be signed in 2025. The projects, which involve road upgrades in various Cypriot regions, are expected to be completed by 2029.

    Background information  

    EIB 

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, high-impact investments outside the European Union, and the capital markets union.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.  

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.  

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average.

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Meeting of 29-30 January 2025

    Source: European Central Bank

    Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on Wednesday and Thursday, 29-30 January 2025

    27 February 2025

    1. Review of financial, economic and monetary developments and policy options

    Financial market developments

    Ms Schnabel noted that the financial market developments observed in the euro area after October 2024 had reversed since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting on 11-12 December 2024. The US presidential election in November had initially led to lower euro area bond yields and equity prices. Since the December monetary policy meeting, however, both risk-free yields and risk asset prices had moved substantially higher and had more than made up their previous declines. A less gloomy domestic macroeconomic outlook and an increase in the market’s outlook for inflation in the euro area on the back of higher energy prices had led investors to expect the ECB to proceed with a more gradual rate easing path.

    A bounce-back of euro area risk appetite had supported equity and corporate bond prices and had contained sovereign bond spreads. While the euro had also rebounded recently against the US dollar, it remained significantly weaker than before the US election.

    In euro money markets the year-end had been smooth. Money market conditions at the turn of the year had turned out to be more benign than anticipated, with a decline in repo rates and counterparties taking only limited recourse to the ECB’s standard refinancing operations.

    In the run-up to the US election and in its immediate aftermath, ten-year overnight index swap (OIS) rates in the euro area and the United States had decoupled, reflecting expectations of increasing macroeconomic divergence. However, since the Governing Council’s December monetary policy meeting, long-term interest rates had increased markedly in both the euro area and the United States. An assessment of the drivers of euro area long-term rates showed that both domestic and US factors had pushed yields up. But domestic factors – expected tighter ECB policy and a less gloomy euro area macroeconomic outlook – had mattered even more than US spillovers. These factors included a reduction in perceived downside risks to economic growth from tariffs and a stronger than anticipated January flash euro area Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI).

    Taking a longer-term perspective on ten-year rates, since October 2022, when inflation had peaked at 10.6% and policy rates had just returned to positive territory, nominal OIS rates and their real counterparts had been broadly trending sideways. From that perspective, the recent uptick was modest and could be seen as a mean reversion to the new normal.

    A decomposition of the change in ten-year OIS rates since the start of 2022 showed that the dominant driver of persistently higher long-term yields compared with the “low-for-long” interest rate and inflation period had been the sharp rise in real rate expectations. A second major driver had been an increase in real term premia in the context of quantitative tightening. This increase had occurred mainly in 2022. Since 2023, real term premia had broadly trended sideways albeit with some volatility. Hence, the actual reduction of the ECB’s balance sheet had elicited only mild upward pressure on term premia. From a historical perspective, despite their recent increase, term premia in the euro area remained compressed compared with the pre-quantitative easing period.

    Since the December meeting, investors had revised up their expectations for HICP inflation (excluding tobacco) for 2025. Current inflation fixings (swap contracts linked to specific monthly releases in year-on-year euro area HICP inflation excluding tobacco) for this year stood above the 2% target. Higher energy prices had been a key driver of the reassessment of near-term inflation expectations. Evidence from option prices, calculated under the assumption of risk neutrality, suggested that the risk to inflation in financial markets had become broadly balanced, with the indicators across maturities having shifted discernibly upwards. Recent survey evidence suggested that risks of inflation overshooting the ECB’s target of 2% had resurfaced. Respondents generally saw a bigger risk of an inflation overshoot than of an inflation undershoot.

    The combination of a less gloomy macroeconomic outlook and stronger price pressures had led markets to reassess the ECB’s expected monetary policy path. Market pricing suggested expectations of a more gradual easing cycle with a higher terminal rate, pricing out the probability of a cut larger than 25 basis points at any of the next meetings. Overall, the size of expected cuts to the deposit facility rate in 2025 had dropped by around 40 basis points, with the end-year rate currently seen at 2.08%. Market expectations for 2025 stood above median expectations in the Survey of Monetary Analysts. Survey participants continued to expect a faster easing cycle, with cuts of 25 basis points at each of the Governing Council’s next four monetary policy meetings.

    The Federal Funds futures curve had continued to shift upwards, with markets currently expecting between one and two 25 basis point cuts by the end of 2025. The repricing of front-end yields since the Governing Council’s December meeting had been stronger in the euro area than in the United States. This would typically also be reflected in foreign exchange markets. However, the EUR/USD exchange rate had recently decoupled from interest rates, as the euro had initially continued to depreciate despite a narrowing interest rate differential, before recovering more recently. US dollar currency pairs had been affected by the US Administration’s comments, which had put upward pressure on the US dollar relative to trading partners’ currencies.

    Euro area equity markets had outperformed their US counterparts in recent weeks. A model decomposition using a standard dividend discount model for the euro area showed that rising risk-free yields had weighed significantly on euro area equity prices. However, this had been more than offset by higher dividends, and especially a compression of the risk premium, indicating improved investor risk sentiment towards the euro area, as also reflected in other risk asset prices. Corporate bond spreads had fallen across market segments, including high-yield bonds. Sovereign spreads relative to the ten-year German Bund had remained broadly stable or had even declined slightly. Relative to OIS rates, the spreads had also remained broadly stable. The Bund-OIS spread had returned to levels observed before the Eurosystem had started large-scale asset purchases in 2015, suggesting that the scarcity premium in the German government bond market had, by and large, normalised.

    Standard financial condition indices for the euro area had remained broadly stable since the December meeting. The easing impulse from higher equity prices had counterbalanced the tightening impulse stemming from higher short and long-term rates. In spite of the bounce-back in euro area real risk-free interest rates, the yield curve remained broadly within neutral territory.

    The global environment and economic and monetary developments in the euro area

    Starting with inflation in the euro area, Mr Lane noted that headline inflation, as expected, had increased to 2.4% in December, up from 2.2% in November. The increase primarily reflected a rise in energy inflation from -2.0% in November to 0.1% in December, due mainly to upward base effects. Food inflation had edged down to 2.6%. Core inflation was unchanged at 2.7% in December, with a slight decline in goods inflation, which had eased to 0.5%, offset by services inflation rising marginally to 4.0%.

    Developments in most indicators of underlying inflation had been consistent with a sustained return of inflation to the medium-term inflation target. The Persistent and Common Component of Inflation (PCCI), which had the best predictive power of any underlying inflation indicator for future headline inflation, had continued to hover around 2% in December, indicating that headline inflation was set to stabilise around the ECB’s inflation target. Domestic inflation, which closely tracked services inflation, stood at 4.2%, staying well above all the other indicators in December. However, the PCCI for services, which should act as an attractor for services and domestic inflation, had fallen to 2.3%.

    The anticipation of a downward shift in services inflation in the coming months also related to an expected deceleration in wage growth this year. Wages had been adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay, but the ECB wage tracker and the latest surveys pointed to moderation in wage pressures. According to the latest results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, firms expected wages to grow by 3.3% on average over the next 12 months, down from 3.5% in the previous survey round and 4.5% in the equivalent survey this time last year. This assessment was shared broadly across the forecasting community. Consensus Economics, for example, foresaw a decline in wage growth of about 1 percentage point between 2024 and 2025.

    Most measures of longer-term inflation expectations continued to stand at around 2%, despite an uptick over shorter horizons. Although, according to the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, the inflation expectations of firms had stabilised at 3% across horizons, the expectations of larger firms that were aware of the ECB’s inflation target showed convergence towards 2%. Consumer inflation expectations had edged up recently, especially for the near term. This could be explained at least partly by their higher sensitivity to actual inflation. There had also been an uptick in the near-term inflation expectations of professionals – as captured by the latest vintages of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Survey of Monetary Analysts, as well as market-based measures of inflation compensation. Over longer horizons, though, the inflation expectations of professional forecasters remained stable at levels consistent with the medium-term target of 2%.

    Headline inflation should fluctuate around its current level in the near term and then settle sustainably around the target. Easing labour cost pressures and the continuing impact of past monetary policy tightening should support the convergence to the inflation target.

    Turning to the international environment, global economic activity had remained robust around the turn of the year. The global composite PMI had held steady at 53.0 in the fourth quarter of 2024, owing mainly to the continued strength in the services sector that had counterbalanced weak manufacturing activity.

    Since the Governing Council’s previous meeting, the euro had remained broadly stable in nominal effective terms (+0.5%) and against the US dollar (+0.2%). Oil prices had seen a lot of volatility, but the latest price, at USD 78 per barrel, was only around 3½% above the spot oil price at the cut-off date for the December Eurosystem staff projections and 2.6% above the spot price at the time of the last meeting. With respect to gas prices, the spot price stood at €48 per MWh, 2.7% above the level at the cut-off date for the December projections and 6.8% higher than at the time of the last meeting.

    Following a comparatively robust third quarter, euro area GDP growth had likely moderated again in the last quarter of 2024 – confirmed by Eurostat’s preliminary flash estimate released on 30 January at 11:00 CET, with a growth rate of 0% for that quarter, later revised to 0.1%. Based on currently available information, private consumption growth had probably slowed in the fourth quarter amid subdued consumer confidence and heightened uncertainty. Housing investment had not yet picked up and there were no signs of an imminent expansion in business investment. Across sectors, industrial activity had been weak in the summer and had softened further in the last few months of 2024, with average industrial production excluding construction in October and November standing 0.4% below its third quarter level. The persistent weakness in manufacturing partly reflected structural factors, such as sectoral trends, losses in competitiveness and relatively high energy prices. However, manufacturing firms were also especially exposed to heightened uncertainty about global trade policies, regulatory costs and tight financing conditions. Service production had grown in the third quarter, but the expansion had likely moderated in the fourth quarter.

    The labour market was robust, with the unemployment rate falling to a historical low of 6.3% in November – with the figure for December (6.3%) and a revised figure for November (6.2%) released later on the morning of 30 January. However, survey evidence and model estimates suggested that euro area employment growth had probably softened in the fourth quarter.

    The fiscal stance for the euro area was now expected to be balanced in 2025, as opposed to the slight tightening foreseen in the December projections. Nevertheless, the current outlook for the fiscal stance was subject to considerable uncertainty.

    The euro area economy was set to remain subdued in the near term. The flash composite output PMI for January had ticked up to 50.2 driven by an improvement in manufacturing output, as the rate of contraction had eased compared with December. The January release had been 1.7 points above the average for the fourth quarter, but it still meant that the manufacturing sector had been in contractionary territory for nearly two years. The services business activity index had decelerated slightly to 51.4 in January, staying above the average of 50.9 in the fourth quarter of 2024 but still below the figure of 52.1 for the third quarter.

    Even with a subdued near-term outlook, the conditions for a recovery remained in place. Higher incomes should allow spending to rise. More affordable credit should also boost consumption and investment over time. And if trade tensions did not escalate, exports should also support the recovery as global demand rose.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, bond yields, in both the euro area and globally, had increased significantly since the last meeting. At the same time, the ECB’s past interest rate cuts were gradually making it less expensive for firms and households to borrow. Lending rates on bank loans to firms and households for new business had continued to decline in November. In the same period, the cost of borrowing for firms had decreased by 15 basis points to 4.52% and stood 76 basis points below the cyclical peak observed in October 2023. The cost of issuing market-based debt had remained at 3.6% in November 2024. Mortgage rates had fallen by 8 basis points to 3.47% since October, 56 basis points lower than their peak in November 2023. However, the interest rates on existing corporate and household loan books remained high.

    Financing conditions remained tight. Although credit was expanding, lending to firms and households was subdued relative to historical averages. Annual growth in bank lending to firms had risen to 1.5% in December, up from 1% in November, as a result of strong monthly flows. But it remained well below the 4.3% historical average since January 1999. By contrast, growth in corporate debt securities issuance had moderated to 3.2% in annual terms, from 3.6% in November. This suggested that firms had substituted market-based long-term financing for bank-based borrowing amid tightening market conditions and in advance of increasing redemptions of long-term corporate bonds. Mortgage lending had continued to rise gradually but remained muted overall, with an annual growth rate of 1.1% in December after 0.9% in November. This was markedly below the long-term average of 5.1%.

    According to the latest euro area bank lending survey, the demand for loans by firms had increased slightly in the last quarter. At the same time, credit standards for loans to firms had tightened again, having broadly stabilised over the previous four quarters. This renewed tightening of credit standards for firms had been motivated by banks seeing higher risks to the economic outlook and their lower tolerance for taking on credit risk. This finding was consistent with the results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, in which firms had reported a small decline in the availability of bank loans and tougher non-rate lending conditions. Turning to households, the demand for mortgages had increased strongly as interest rates became more attractive and prospects for the property market improved. Credit standards for housing loans remained unchanged overall.

    Monetary policy considerations and policy options

    In summary, the disinflation process remained well on track. Inflation had continued to develop broadly in line with the staff projections and was set to return to the 2% medium-term target in the course of 2025. Most measures of underlying inflation suggested that inflation would settle around the target on a sustained basis. Domestic inflation remained high, mostly because wages and prices in certain sectors were still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. However, wage growth was expected to moderate and lower profit margins were partially buffering the impact of higher wage costs on inflation. The ECB’s recent interest rate cuts were gradually making new borrowing less expensive for firms and households. At the same time, financing conditions continued to be tight, also because monetary policy remained restrictive and past interest rate hikes were still being transmitted to the stock of credit, with some maturing loans being rolled over at higher rates. The economy was still facing headwinds, but rising real incomes and the gradually fading effects of restrictive monetary policy should support a pick-up in demand over time.

    Concerning the monetary policy decision at this meeting, it was proposed to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the ECB steered the monetary policy stance – was justified by the updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. The alternative – maintaining the deposit facility rate at the current level of 3.00% – would excessively dampen demand and therefore be inconsistent with the set of rate paths that best ensured inflation stabilised sustainably at the 2% medium-term target.

    Looking to the future, it was prudent to maintain agility, so as to be able to adjust the stance as appropriate on a meeting-by-meeting basis, and not to pre-commit to any particular rate path. In particular, monetary easing might proceed more slowly in the event of upside shocks to the inflation outlook and/or to economic momentum. Equally, in the event of downside shocks to the inflation outlook and/or to economic momentum, monetary easing might proceed more quickly.

    2. Governing Council’s discussion and monetary policy decisions

    Economic, monetary and financial analyses

    As regards the external environment, incoming data since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting had signalled robust global activity in the fourth quarter of 2024, with divergent paths across economies and an uncertain outlook for global trade. The euro had been broadly stable and energy commodity prices had increased. It was underlined that gas prices were currently over 60% higher than in 2024 because the average temperature during the previous winter had been very mild, whereas this winter was turning out to be considerably colder. This suggested that demand for gas would remain strong, as reserves needed to be replenished ahead of the next heating season, keeping gas prices high for the remainder of the year. In other commodity markets, metal prices were stable – subdued by weak activity in China and the potential negative impact of US tariffs – while food prices had increased.

    Members concurred that the outlook for the international economy remained highly uncertain. The United States was the only advanced economy that was showing sustained growth dynamics. Global trade might be hit hard if the new US Administration were to implement the measures it had announced. The challenges faced by the Chinese economy also remained visible in prices. Chinese inflation had declined further on the back of weak domestic demand. In this context, it was pointed out that, no matter how severe the new US trade measures turned out to be, the euro area would be affected either indirectly by disinflationary pressures or directly, in the event of retaliation, by higher inflation. In particular, if China were to redirect trade away from the United States and towards the euro area, this would make it easier to achieve lower inflation in the euro area but would have a negative impact on domestic activity, owing to greater international competition.

    With regard to economic activity in the euro area, it was widely recognised that incoming data since the last Governing Council meeting had been limited and, ahead of Eurostat’s indicator of GDP for the fourth quarter of 2024, had not brought any major surprises. Accordingly, it was argued that the December staff projections remained the most likely scenario, with the downside risks to growth that had been identified not yet materialising. The euro area economy had seen some encouraging signs in the January flash PMIs, although it had to be recognised that, in these uncertain times, hard data seemed more important than survey results. The outcome for the third quarter had surprised on the upside, showing tentative signs of a pick-up in consumption. Indications from the few national data already available for the fourth quarter pointed to a positive contribution from consumption. Despite all the prevailing uncertainties, it was still seen as plausible that, within a few quarters, there would be a consumption-driven recovery, with inflation back at target, policy rates broadly at neutral levels and continued full employment. Moreover, the latest information on credit flows and lending rates suggested that the gradual removal of monetary restrictiveness was already being transmitted to the economy, although the past tightening measures were still exerting lagged effects.

    The view was also expressed that the economic outlook in the December staff projections had likely been too optimistic and that there were signs of downside risks materialising. The ECB’s mechanical estimates pointed to very weak growth around the turn of the year and, compared with other institutions, the Eurosystem’s December staff projections had been among the most optimistic. Attention was drawn to the dichotomy between the performance of the two largest euro area economies and that of the rest of the euro area, which was largely due to country-specific factors.

    Recent forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, the Survey of Monetary Analysts and the International Monetary Fund once again suggested a downward revision of euro area economic growth for 2025 and 2026. Given this trend of downward revisions, doubts were expressed about the narrative of a consumption-driven economic recovery in 2025. Moreover, the December staff projections had not directly included the economic impact of possible US tariffs in the baseline, so it was hard to be optimistic about the economic outlook. The outlook for domestic demand had deteriorated, as consumer confidence remained weak and investment was not showing any convincing signs of a pick-up. The contribution from foreign demand, which had been the main driver of growth over the past two years, had also been declining since last spring. Moreover, uncertainty about potential tariffs to be imposed by the new US Administration was weighing further on the outlook. In the meantime, labour demand was losing momentum. The slowdown in economic activity had started to affect temporary employment: these jobs were always the first to disappear as the labour market weakened. At the same time, while the labour market had softened over recent months, it continued to be robust, with the unemployment rate staying low, at 6.3% in December. A solid job market and higher incomes should strengthen consumer confidence and allow spending to rise.

    There continued to be a strong dichotomy between a more dynamic services sector and a weak manufacturing sector. The services sector had remained robust thus far, with the PMI in expansionary territory and firms reporting solid demand. The extent to which the weakness in manufacturing was structural or cyclical was still open to debate, but there was a growing consensus that there was a large structural element, as high energy costs and strict regulation weighed on firms’ competitiveness. This was also reflected in weak export demand, despite the robust growth in global trade. All these factors also had an adverse impact on business investment in the industrial sector. This was seen as important to monitor, as a sustainable economic recovery also depended on a recovery in investment, especially in light of the vast longer-term investment needs of the euro area. Labour markets showed a dichotomy similar to the one observed in the economy more generally. While companies in the manufacturing sector were starting to lay off workers, employment in the services sector was growing. At the same time, concerns were expressed about the number of new vacancies, which had continued to fall. This two-speed economy, with manufacturing struggling and services resilient, was seen as indicating only weak growth ahead, especially in conjunction with the impending geopolitical tensions.

    Against this background, geopolitical and trade policy uncertainty was likely to continue to weigh on the euro area economy and was not expected to recede anytime soon. The point was made that if uncertainty were to remain high for a prolonged period, this would be very different from a shorter spell of uncertainty – and even more detrimental to investment. Therefore the economic recovery was unlikely to receive much support from investment for some time. Indeed, excluding Ireland, euro area business investment had been contracting recently and there were no signs of a turnaround. This would limit investment in physical and human capital further, dragging down potential output in the medium term. However, reference was also made to evidence from psychological studies, which suggested that the impact of higher uncertainty might diminish over time as agents’ perceptions and behaviour adapted.

    In this context, a remark was made on the importance of monetary and fiscal policies for enabling the economy to return to its previous growth path. Economic policies were meant to stabilise the economy and this stabilisation sometimes required a long time. After the pandemic, many economic indicators had returned to their pre-crisis levels, but this had not yet implied a return to pre-crisis growth paths, even though the output gap had closed in the meantime. A question was raised on bankruptcies, which were increasing in the euro area. To the extent that production capacity was being destroyed, the output gap might be closing because potential output growth was declining, and not because actual growth was increasing. However, it was also noted that bankruptcies were rising from an exceptionally low level and developments remained in line with historical regularities.

    Members reiterated that fiscal and structural policies should make the economy more productive, competitive and resilient. They welcomed the European Commission’s Competitiveness Compass, which provided a concrete roadmap for action. It was seen as crucial to follow up, with further concrete and ambitious structural policies, on Mario Draghi’s proposals for enhancing European competitiveness and on Enrico Letta’s proposals for empowering the Single Market. Governments should implement their commitments under the EU’s economic governance framework fully and without delay. This would help bring down budget deficits and debt ratios on a sustained basis, while prioritising growth-enhancing reforms and investment.

    Against this background, members assessed that the risks to economic growth remained tilted to the downside. Greater friction in global trade could weigh on euro area growth by dampening exports and weakening the global economy. Lower confidence could prevent consumption and investment from recovering as fast as expected. This could be amplified by geopolitical risks, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, which could disrupt energy supplies and further weigh on global trade. Growth could also be lower if the lagged effects of monetary policy tightening lasted longer than expected. It could be higher if easier financing conditions and falling inflation allowed domestic consumption and investment to rebound faster.

    On price developments, members concurred with Mr Lane’s assessment that the incoming data confirmed disinflation was on track and that a return to the target in the course of 2025 was within reach. On the nominal side, there had been no major data surprises since the December Governing Council meeting and inflation expectations remained well anchored. Recent inflation data had been slightly below the December staff projections, but energy prices were on the rise. These two elements by and large offset one another. The inflation baseline from the December staff projections was therefore still a realistic scenario, indicating that inflation was on track to converge towards target in the course of 2025. Nevertheless, it was recalled that, for 2027, the contribution from the new Emissions Trading System (ETS2) assumptions was mechanically pushing the Eurosystem staff inflation projections above 2%. Furthermore, the market fixings for longer horizons suggested that there was a risk of undershooting the inflation target in 2026 and 2027. It was remarked that further downside revisions to the economic outlook would tend to imply a negative impact on the inflation outlook and an undershooting of inflation could not be ruled out.

    At the same time, the view was expressed that the risks to the December inflation projections were now tilted to the upside, so that the return to the 2% inflation target might take longer than previously expected. Although it was acknowledged that the momentum in services inflation had eased in recent months, the outlook for inflation remained heavily dependent on the evolution of services inflation, which accounted for around 75% of headline inflation. Services inflation was therefore widely seen as the key inflation component to monitor during the coming months. Services inflation had been stuck at roughly 4% for more than a year, while core inflation had also proven sluggish after an initial decline, remaining at around 2.7% for nearly a year. This raised the question as to where core inflation would eventually settle: in the past, services inflation and core inflation had typically been closely connected. It was also highlighted that, somewhat worryingly, the inflation rate for “early movers” in services had been trending up since its trough in April 2024 and was now standing well above the “followers” and the “late movers” at around 4.6%. This partly called into question the narrative behind the expected deceleration in services inflation. Moreover, the January flash PMI suggested that non-labour input costs, including energy and shipping costs, had increased significantly. The increase in the services sector had been particularly sharp, which was reflected in rising PMI selling prices for services – probably also fuelled by the tight labour market. As labour hoarding was a more widespread phenomenon in manufacturing, this implied that a potential pick-up in demand and the associated cyclical recovery in labour productivity would not necessarily dampen unit labour costs in the services sector to the same extent as in manufacturing.

    One main driver of the stickiness in services inflation was wage growth. Although wage growth was expected to decelerate in 2025, it would still stand at 4.5% in the second quarter of 2025 according to the ECB wage tracker. The pass-through of wages tended to be particularly strong in the services sector and occurred over an extended period of time, suggesting that the deceleration in wages might take some time to be reflected in lower services inflation. The forward-looking wage tracker was seen as fairly reliable, as it was based on existing contracts, whereas focusing too much on lagging wage data posed the risk of monetary policy falling behind the curve. This was particularly likely if negative growth risks eventually affected the labour market. Furthermore, a question was raised as to the potential implications for wage pressures of more restrictive labour migration policies.

    Overall, looking ahead there seemed reasons to believe that both services inflation and wage growth would slow down in line with the baseline scenario in the December staff projections. From the current quarter onwards, services inflation was expected to decline. However, in the early months of the year a number of services were set to be repriced, for instance in the insurance and tourism sectors, and there were many uncertainties surrounding this repricing. It was therefore seen as important to wait until March, when two more inflation releases and the new projections would be available, to reassess the inflation baseline as contained in the December staff projections.

    As regards longer-term inflation expectations, members took note of the latest developments in market-based measures of inflation compensation and survey-based indicators. The December Consumer Expectations Survey showed another increase in near-term inflation expectations, with inflation expectations 12 months ahead having already gradually picked up from 2.4% in September to 2.8% in December. Density-based expectations were even higher at 3%, with risks tilted to the upside. According to the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, firms’ median inflation expectations had also risen to 3%. However it was regarded as important to focus more on the change in inflation expectations than on the level of expectations when interpreting these surveys.

    As regards risks to the inflation outlook, with respect to the market-based measures, the view was expressed that there had been a shift in the balance of risks, pointing to upside risks to the December inflation outlook. In financial markets, inflation fixings for 2025 had shifted above the December short-term projections and inflation expectations had picked up across all tenors. In market surveys, risks of overshooting had resurfaced, with a larger share of respondents in the surveys seeing risks of an overshooting in 2025. Moreover, it was argued that tariffs, their implications for the exchange rate, and energy and food prices posed upside risks to inflation.

    Against this background, members considered that inflation could turn out higher if wages or profits increased by more than expected. Upside risks to inflation also stemmed from the heightened geopolitical tensions, which could push energy prices and freight costs higher in the near term and disrupt global trade. Moreover, extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected. By contrast, inflation might surprise on the downside if low confidence and concerns about geopolitical events prevented consumption and investment from recovering as fast as expected, if monetary policy dampened demand by more than expected, or if the economic environment in the rest of the world worsened unexpectedly. Greater friction in global trade would make the euro area inflation outlook more uncertain.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, members broadly agreed with the assessment presented by Ms Schnabel and Mr Lane. It was noted that market interest rates in the euro area had risen since the Governing Council’s December monetary policy meeting, partly mirroring higher rates in global financial markets. Overall, financial conditions had been broadly stable, with higher short and long-term interest rates being counterbalanced by strong risk asset markets and a somewhat weaker exchange rate.

    Long-term interest rates had been rising more substantially than short-term ones, resulting in a steepening of the yield curve globally since last autumn. At the same time, it was underlined that the recent rise in long-term bond yields did not appear to be particularly striking when looking at developments over a longer time period. Over the past two years long-term rates had remained remarkably stable, especially when taking into account the pronounced variation in policy rates.

    The dynamics of market rates since the December Governing Council meeting had been similar on both sides of the Atlantic. This reflected higher term premia as well as a repricing of rate expectations. However, the relative contributions of the underlying drivers differed. In the United States, one factor driving up market interest rates had been an increase in inflation expectations, combined with the persistent strength of the US economy as well as concerns over prospects of higher budget deficits. This had led markets to price out some of the rate cuts that had been factored into the rate expectations prevailing before the Federal Open Market Committee meeting in December 2024. Uncertainty regarding the policies implemented by the new US Administration had also contributed to the sell-off in US government bonds. In Europe, term premia accounted for a significant part of the increase in long-term rates, which could be explained by a combination of factors. These included spillovers from the United States, concerns over the outlook for fiscal policy, and domestic and global policy uncertainty more broadly. Attention was also drawn to the potential impact of tighter monetary policy in Japan, the world’s largest creditor nation, with Japanese investors likely to start shifting their funds away from overseas investments towards domestic bond markets in response to rising yields.

    The passive reduction in the Eurosystem’s balance sheet, as maturing bonds were no longer reinvested, was also seen as exerting gradual upward pressure on term premia over longer horizons, although this had not been playing a significant role – especially not in developments since the last meeting. The reduction had been indicated well in advance and had already been priced in, to a significant extent, at the time the phasing out of reinvestment had been announced. The residual Eurosystem portfolios were still seen to be exerting substantial downside pressure on longer-term sovereign yields as compared with a situation in which asset holdings were absent. It was underlined that, while declining central bank holdings did affect financial conditions, quantitative tightening was operating gradually and smoothly in the background.

    In the context of the discussion on long-term yields, attention was drawn to the possibility that rising yields might also lead to financial stability risks, especially in view of the high level of valuations and leverage in the world economy. A further financial stability risk related to the prospect of a more deregulated financial system in the United States, including in the realm of crypto-assets. This could allow risks to build up in the years to come and sow the seeds of a future financial crisis.

    Turning to financing conditions, past interest rate cuts were gradually making it less expensive for firms and households to borrow. For new business, rates on bank loans to firms and households had continued to decline in November. However, the interest rates on existing loans remained high, and financing conditions remained tight.

    Although credit was expanding, lending to firms and households was subdued relative to historical averages. Growth in bank lending to firms had risen to 1.5% in December in annual terms, up from 1.0% in November. Mortgage lending had continued to rise gradually but remained muted overall, with an annual growth rate of 1.1% in December following 0.9% in November. Nevertheless, the increasing pace of loan growth was encouraging and suggested monetary easing was starting to be transmitted through the bank lending channel. Some comfort could also be taken from the lack of evidence of any negative impact on bank lending conditions from the decline in excess liquidity in the banking system.

    The bank lending survey was providing mixed signals, however. Credit standards for mortgages had been broadly unchanged in the fourth quarter, after easing for a while, and banks expected to tighten them in the next quarter. Banks had reported the third strongest increase in demand for mortgages since the start of the survey in 2003, driven primarily by more attractive interest rates. This indicated a turnaround in the housing market as property prices picked up. At the same time, credit standards for consumer credit had tightened in the fourth quarter, with standards for firms also tightening unexpectedly. The tightening had largely been driven by heightened perceptions of economic risk and reduced risk tolerance among banks.

    Caution was advised on overinterpreting the tightening in credit standards for firms reported in the latest bank lending survey. The vast majority of banks had reported unchanged credit standards, with only a small share tightening standards somewhat and an even smaller share easing them slightly. However, it was recalled that the survey methodology for calculating net percentages, which typically involved subtracting a small percentage of easing banks from a small percentage of tightening banks, was an established feature of the survey. Also, that methodology had not detracted from the good predictive power of the net percentage statistic for future lending developments. Moreover, the information from the bank lending survey had also been corroborated by the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, which had pointed to a slight decrease in the availability of funds to firms. The latter survey was now carried out at a quarterly frequency and provided an important cross-check, based on the perspective of firms, of the information received from banks.

    Turning to the demand for loans by firms, although the bank lending survey had shown a slight increase in the fourth quarter it had remained weak overall, in line with subdued investment. It was remarked that the limited increase in firms’ demand for loans might mean they were expecting rates to be cut further and were waiting to borrow at lower rates. This suggested that the transmission of policy rate cuts was likely to be stronger as the end of the rate-cutting cycle approached. At the same time, it was argued that demand for loans to euro area firms was mainly being held back by economic and geopolitical uncertainty rather than the level of interest rates.

    Monetary policy stance and policy considerations

    Turning to the monetary policy stance, members assessed the data that had become available since the last monetary policy meeting in accordance with the three main elements the Governing Council had communicated in 2023 as shaping its reaction function. These comprised (i) the implications of the incoming economic and financial data for the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation, and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    Starting with the inflation outlook, members widely agreed that the incoming data were broadly in line with the medium-term inflation trajectory embedded in the December staff projections. Inflation had been slightly lower than expected in both November and December. The outlook remained heavily dependent on the evolution of services inflation, which had remained close to 4% for more than a year. However, the momentum of services inflation had eased in recent months and a further decrease in wage pressures was anticipated, especially in the second half of 2025. Oil and gas prices had been higher than embodied in the December projections and needed to be closely monitored, but up to now they did not suggest a major change to the baseline in the staff projections.

    Risks to the inflation outlook were seen as two-sided: upside risks were posed by the outlook for energy and food prices, a stronger US dollar and the still sticky services inflation, while a downside risk related to the possibility of growth being lower than expected. There was considerable uncertainty about the effect of possible US tariffs, but the estimated impact on euro area inflation was small and its sign was ambiguous, whereas the implications for economic growth were clearly negative. Further uncertainty stemmed from the possible downside pressures emanating from falling Chinese export prices.

    There was some evidence suggesting a shift in the balance of risks to the upside since December, as reflected, for example, in market surveys showing that the risk of inflation overshooting the target outweighed the risk of an undershooting. Although some of the survey-based inflation expectations as well as market-derived inflation compensation had been revised up slightly, members took comfort from the fact that longer-term measures of inflation expectations remained well anchored at 2%.

    Turning to underlying inflation, members concurred that developments in most measures of underlying inflation suggested that inflation would settle at around the target on a sustained basis. Core inflation had been sticky at around 2.7% for nearly a year but had also turned out lower than projected. A number of measures continued to show a certain degree of persistence, with domestic inflation remaining high and exclusion-based measures proving sticky at levels above 2%. In addition, the translation of wage moderation into a slower rise in domestic prices and unit labour costs was subject to lags and predicated on profit margins continuing their buffering role as well as a cyclical rebound in labour productivity. However, a main cause of stickiness in domestic inflation was services inflation, which was strongly influenced by wage growth, and this was expected to decelerate in the course of 2025.

    As regards the transmission of monetary policy, recent credit dynamics showed that monetary policy transmission was working. Both the past tightening and the subsequent gradual removal of restriction were feeding through to financing conditions, including lending rates and credit flows. It was highlighted that not all demand components had been equally responsive, with, in particular, business investment held back by high uncertainty and structural weaknesses. Companies widely cited having their own funds as a reason for not making loan applications, and the reason for not investing these funds was likely linked to the high levels of uncertainty, rather than to the level of interest rates. Hence low investment was not necessarily a sign of a restrictive monetary policy. At the same time, it was unclear how much of the past tightening was still in the pipeline. Similarly, it would take time for the full effect of recent monetary policy easing to reach the economy, with even variable rate loans typically adjusting with a lag, and the same being true for deposits.

    Monetary policy decisions and communication

    Against this background, all members agreed with the proposal by Mr Lane to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. Lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the monetary policy stance was steered – was justified by the updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    There was a clear case for a further 25 basis point rate cut at the current meeting, and such a step was supported by the incoming data. Members concurred that the disinflationary process was well on track, while the growth outlook continued to be weak. Although the goal had not yet been achieved and inflation was still expected to remain above target in the near term, confidence in a timely and sustained convergence had increased, as both headline and core inflation had recently come in below the ECB projections. In particular, a return of inflation to the 2% target in the course of 2025 was in line with the December staff baseline projections, which were constructed on the basis of an interest rate path that stood significantly below the present level of the forward curve.

    At the same time, it was underlined that high levels of uncertainty, lingering upside risks to energy and food prices, a strong labour market and high negotiated wage increases, as well as sticky services inflation, called for caution. Upside risks could delay a sustainable return to target, while inflation expectations might be more fragile after a long period of high inflation. Firms had also learned to raise their prices more quickly in response to new inflationary shocks. Moreover, the financial market reactions to heightened geopolitical uncertainty or risk aversion often led to an appreciation of the US dollar and might involve spikes in energy prices, which could be detrimental to the inflation outlook.

    Risks to the growth outlook remained tilted to the downside, which typically also implied downside risks to inflation over longer horizons. The outlook for economic activity was clouded by elevated uncertainty stemming from geopolitical tensions, fiscal policy concerns in the euro area and recent global trade frictions associated with potential future actions by the US Administration that might lead to a global economic slowdown. As long as the disinflation process remained on track, policy rates could be brought further towards a neutral level to avoid unnecessarily holding back the economy. Nevertheless, growth risks had not shifted to a degree that would call for an acceleration in the move towards a neutral stance. Moreover, it was argued that greater caution was needed on the size and pace of further rate cuts when policy rates were approaching neutral territory, in view of prevailing uncertainties.

    Lowering the deposit facility rate to 2.75% at the current meeting was also seen as appropriate from a risk-management perspective. On the one hand, it left sufficient optionality to react to the possible emergence of new price pressures. On the other hand, it addressed the risk of falling behind the curve in dialling back restriction and guarded against inflation falling below target.

    Looking ahead, it was regarded as premature for the Governing Council to discuss a possible landing zone for the key ECB interest rates as inflation converged sustainably to target. It was widely felt that even with the current deposit facility rate, it was relatively safe to make the assessment that monetary policy was still restrictive. This was also consistent with the fact that the economy was relatively weak. At the same time, the view was expressed that the natural or neutral rate was likely to be higher than before the pandemic, as the balance between the global demand for and supply of savings had changed over recent years. The main reasons for this were the high and rising global need for investment to deal with the green and digital transitions, the surge in public debt and increasing geopolitical fragmentation, which was reversing the global savings glut and reducing the supply of savings. A higher neutral rate implied that, with a further reduction in policy rates at the present meeting, rates would plausibly be getting close to neutral rate territory. This meant that the point was approaching where monetary policy might no longer be characterised as restrictive.

    In this context, the remark was made that the public debate about the natural or neutral rate among market analysts and observers was becoming more intense, with markets trying to gauge the Governing Council’s assessment of it as a proxy for the terminal rate in the current rate cycle. This debate was seen as misleading, however. The considerable uncertainty as to the level of the natural or neutral interest rate was recalled. While the natural rate could in theory be a longer-term reference point for assessing the monetary policy stance, it was an unobservable variable. Its practical usefulness in steering policy on a meeting-by-meeting basis was questionable, as estimates were subject to significant model and parameter uncertainty, so confidence bands were too large to give any clear guidance. Moreover, the natural rate was a steady state concept, which was hardly applicable in a rapidly changing environment – as at present – with continuous new shocks.

    Moreover, it was mentioned that a box describing the latest Eurosystem staff estimates of the natural rate would be published in the Economic Bulletin and pre-released on 7 February 2025. The box would emphasise the wide range of point estimates, the properties of the underlying models and the considerable statistical uncertainty surrounding each single point estimate. The view was expressed that there was no alternative to the Governing Council identifying, meeting by meeting, an appropriate policy rate path which was consistent with reaching the target over the medium term. Such an appropriate path could only be identified in real time, taking into account a sufficiently broad set of information.

    Turning to communication aspects, it was widely stressed that maintaining a data-dependent approach with full optionality at every meeting was prudent and continued to be warranted. The present environment of elevated uncertainty further strengthened the case for taking decisions meeting by meeting, with no room for forward guidance. The meeting-by-meeting approach, guided by the three-criteria framework, was serving the Governing Council well and members were comfortable with the way markets were interpreting the ECB’s reaction function. It was also remarked that data-dependence did not imply being backward-looking in calibrating policy. Monetary policy was, by definition, forward-looking, as it affected inflation in the future and the primary objective was defined over the medium term. Data took many forms, and all relevant information had to be considered in a timely manner.

    Taking into account the foregoing discussion among the members, upon a proposal by the President, the Governing Council took the monetary policy decisions as set out in the monetary policy press release. The members of the Governing Council subsequently finalised the monetary policy statement, which the President and the Vice-President would, as usual, deliver at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting.

    Monetary policy statement

    Monetary policy statement for the press conference of 30 January 2025

    Press release

    Monetary policy decisions

    Meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council, 29-30 January 2025

    Members

    • Ms Lagarde, President
    • Mr de Guindos, Vice-President
    • Mr Centeno
    • Mr Cipollone
    • Mr Demarco, temporarily replacing Mr Scicluna
    • Mr Dolenc, Deputy Governor of Banka Slovenije
    • Mr Elderson
    • Mr Escrivá*
    • Mr Holzmann
    • Mr Kālis, Acting Governor of Latvijas Banka
    • Mr Kažimír
    • Mr Knot
    • Mr Lane
    • Mr Makhlouf*
    • Mr Müller
    • Mr Nagel
    • Mr Panetta
    • Mr Patsalides*
    • Mr Rehn
    • Mr Reinesch
    • Ms Schnabel
    • Mr Šimkus
    • Mr Stournaras*
    • Mr Villeroy de Galhau
    • Mr Vujčić*
    • Mr Wunsch

    * Members not holding a voting right in January 2025 under Article 10.2 of the ESCB Statute.

    Other attendees

    • Mr Dombrovskis, Commissioner**
    • Ms Senkovic, Secretary, Director General Secretariat
    • Mr Rostagno, Secretary for monetary policy, Director General Monetary Policy
    • Mr Winkler, Deputy Secretary for monetary policy, Senior Adviser, DG Monetary Policy

    ** In accordance with Article 284 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

    Accompanying persons

    • Mr Arpa
    • Ms Bénassy-Quéré
    • Mr Debrun
    • Mr Gavilán
    • Mr Gilbert
    • Mr Kaasik
    • Mr Koukoularides
    • Mr Lünnemann
    • Mr Madouros
    • Mr Martin
    • Mr Nicoletti Altimari
    • Mr Novo
    • Mr Rutkaste
    • Ms Schembri
    • Mr Šiaudinis
    • Mr Šošić
    • Mr Tavlas
    • Mr Ulbrich
    • Mr Välimäki
    • Ms Žumer Šujica

    Other ECB staff

    • Mr Proissl, Director General Communications
    • Mr Straub, Counsellor to the President
    • Ms Rahmouni-Rousseau, Director General Market Operations
    • Mr Arce, Director General Economics
    • Mr Sousa, Deputy Director General Economics

    Release of the next monetary policy account foreseen on 3 April 2025.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: HKSAR Government strongly condemned and opposed the slanders and smears on Hong Kong by the so-called resolution introduced by US politicians

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    HKSAR Government strongly condemned and opposed the slanders and smears on Hong Kong by the so-called resolution introduced by US politicians
    HKSAR Government strongly condemned and opposed the slanders and smears on Hong Kong by the so-called resolution introduced by US politicians
    ******************************************************************************************

         ​The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government today (February 27) strongly condemned individual members of the United States (US) House Committee on Foreign Affairs, through introducing a so-called resolution against Hong Kong, for making baseless allegations against Hong Kong and smearing the Hong Kong National Security Law (HKNSL) and the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO). The HKSAR Government strongly condemned and opposed such despicable political maneuvering and reckless clamoring, and urged the US to stop undermining Hong Kong’s international reputation, and immediately stop interfering in Hong Kong matters, which are purely China’s internal affairs.           A spokesman for the HKSAR Government said, “The US politicians have repeated their tactics and breached the international law and the basic norms underpinning international relations, and wantonly interfering with Hong Kong matters by passing the so-called resolution, which is a despicable political manipulation. The US politicians have time and again made skewed remarks about Hong Kong’s situation and advocated to impose the so-called ‘sanctions’ on Hong Kong pursuant to its domestic law, attempting to interfere with Hong Kong’s law-based governance and undermine the city’s rule of law as well as its prosperity and stability. The HKSAR Government strongly condemned its political grandstanding rife with ill intentions, which have been seen through by all.”           The spokesman said, “National security is the foundation for prosperity and stability in society, as well as the well-being of the people. Only with security could there be development. While the ‘black-clad violence’ and the Hong Kong version of ‘colour revolution’ back in 2019 have severely damaged the social stability of Hong Kong. With the promulgation and implementation of the HKNSL, its effect in stopping violence and curbing disorder as well as quickly restoring social stability in the Hong Kong community was immediate. With the concerted efforts of the HKSAR Government, the Legislative Council and all sectors of the community, the HKSAR fulfilled its constitutional duty by enacting the SNSO last year to improve the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for safeguarding national security, enabling Hong Kong’s transition from chaos to order and its advancement from stability to prosperity.”           “In fact, the implementation of the HKNSL in the past four years or so has enabled the livelihood and economic activities of the Hong Kong community at large to swiftly resume to normal and the business environment to be restored and improved continuously. In the Economic Freedom of the World 2024 Annual Report, Hong Kong ranks as the world’s freest economies among 165 economies. In the World Competitiveness Yearbook 2024, Hong Kong’s ranking improved by two places to fifth globally. Last year, Hong Kong ranked among the top three international financial centres and the top four initial public offering markets in the world. It is evident that international funds and investments are confident in Hong Kong’s development.”           The spokesman pointed out, “In accordance with international law and international practice based on the Charter of the United Nations, it is each and every sovereign state’s inherent right to enact laws safeguarding national security, and it is also an international practice. With at least 21 pieces of laws safeguarding national security, the US politicians have displayed hypocrisy and exposed their double standards by pointing fingers at the HKSAR’s legal system and enforcement mechanism to safeguard national security.”           The spokesman emphasised, “The legal framework for safeguarding national security in the HKSAR is fully in compliance with the international standard for the protection of human rights. The HKNSL and the SNSO clearly stipulate that human rights shall be respected and protected in safeguarding national security. The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong people under the Basic Law and the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applicable to the HKSAR are protected in accordance with the law. By wantonly neglecting the relevant provisions and lashing out, the US politicians have fully exposing its malicious intentions.”           “The offences endangering national security stipulated by HKNSL and SNSO target acts endangering national security with precision, and define the elements and penalties of the offences with clarity. The HKSAR law enforcement agencies have been taking law enforcement actions based on evidence and strictly in accordance with the law in respect of the acts of the persons or entities concerned, which have nothing to do with their political stance, background or occupation. Any suggestion that certain individuals or organisations should be immune from legal consequences for their illegal acts is no different from advocating a special privilege to break the law, and this totally runs contrary to the spirit of the rule of law.”           The spokesman also reiterated, “All cases are handled strictly on the basis of evidence and in accordance with the law. All defendants will receive fair trial strictly in accordance with laws applicable to Hong Kong (including the HKNSL) and as protected by the Basic Law and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. As the legal proceedings involving Lai Chee-ying are still ongoing, it is inappropriate for any person to comment on the details of the case.”           “The HKSAR Government will, as always, resolutely, fully and faithfully implement the HKNSL, the SNSO and other relevant laws safeguarding national security in the HKSAR, to effectively prevent, suppress and impose punishment for acts and activities endangering national security in accordance with the law. At the same time, it protects the rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents in accordance with the law, ensuring the steadfast and successful implementation of ‘one country, two systems’.”

     
    Ends/Thursday, February 27, 2025Issued at HKT 23:40

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Government launches Aadhaar Good Governance portal to streamline approval process for Aadhaar authentication requests

    Source: Government of India

    Government launches Aadhaar Good Governance portal to streamline approval process for Aadhaar authentication requests

    New Aadhaar Governance Portal to Enhance Ease of Living, Make Services More People-Friendly, and Improve Citizen-Centric Access to Services

    New Rule Enables Seamless Aadhaar Authentication for Public Interest Services by Both Government and Private Entities

    Posted On: 27 FEB 2025 8:33PM by PIB Delhi

    The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) today launched Aadhaar Good Governance portal to streamline approval process for Aadhaar authentication requests. This is in sync with an effort to make Aadhaar more people-friendly, enable ease of living, and enable better access to services for people.

    The Aadhaar Good Governance portal was launched by Shri S. Krishnan, Secretary, MeitY in the presence of Shri Bhuvnesh Kumar, CEO UIDAI, Shri Inder Pal Singh Sethi Director General of NIC, Shri Manish Bhardwaj, DDG UIDAI,  Shri Amod Kumar, DDG UIDAI and other senior officials from MeitY, UIDAI and NIC.

    Enhance Ease of Living and Service Accessibility

    The online platform (http://swik.meity.gov.in) comes into effect, after Aadhaar Authentication for Good Governance (Social Welfare, Innovation, Knowledge) Amendment Rules, 2025 under the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 was notified in late January 2025. This amendment has been done to help improve transparency and inclusivity in the decision-making process.

    Aadhaar is considered as the most trusted digital ID in the world. In the past decade, more than a billion Indians have expressed their trust in Aadhaar by using it to authenticate themselves over 100 billion times. Expansion of the scope of Aadhaar authentication, as envisaged in the amendment, will further improve ease of living and facilitate hassle-free access to newer services of their choice.

    Shri Krishnan, Secretary, MeitY  highlighted that with the launch of this platform and continuous improvement of other processes and systems around it, we hope to expedite the process of adding more use cases in the domain of good governance and ease of living.

    Shri Bhuvnesh Kumar, CEO UIDAI underlined how Aadhaar is facilitating the growth of India’s digital economy. He said Aadhaar is an enabler of good governance, and resident centricity is the focus of UIDAI. The Aadhaar good governance portal has been developed to facilitate ease of submission and approval proposals by entities in accordance with the prescribed rules.

    Seamless Authentication for Public Interest Services

    The amendment enables both government and non-government entities to avail Aadhaar authentication service for providing various services in the public interest for related specific purposes like enablement of innovation, spread of knowledge, promoting ease of living of residents and enabling better access to services for them. This will help both the service providers as well as the service seekers to have trusted transactions.

    The fresh amendment enables Aadhaar number holders to avail hassle free services from several sectors including hospitality, healthcare, credit rating bureau, e-commerce players, educational institutions and aggregator service providers. Service providers too will find it helpful for a range of things including staff attendance, customer onboarding, e-KYC verification, exam registrations etc.

     

    Portal to Offer Step-by-Step Guide for Authentication Requests

    The portal shall work as a resource rich guide, and offer detailed SOP for authentication seeking entities on how to apply and how to onboard for Aadhaar authentication.

    Face Authentication may also be integrated in the customer facing apps of private entities, which will enable anytime anywhere, authentication.

    As part of its commitment to make Aadhaar people-friendly and enable ease of living and better access to services for citizens, the Ministry had proposed rules to enable Aadhaar authentication by entities other than Government Ministries and Departments. The proposed amendments were posted on the Ministry website and comments were invited from the stakeholders and the general public during April and May 2023.

    ****

    Dharmendra Tewari/Shatrunjay Kumar

    (Release ID: 2106755) Visitor Counter : 15

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: A high-level European Union delegation, led by Ms Ekaterina Zaharieva, currently on India visit, today called on Union Minister for Science and Technology, Dr. Jitendra Singh and discussed primarily the StartUp and innovation collaborations

    Source: Government of India

    A high-level European Union delegation, led by Ms Ekaterina Zaharieva, currently on India visit, today called on Union Minister for Science and Technology, Dr. Jitendra Singh and discussed primarily the StartUp and innovation collaborations

    The meeting between Ekaterina, who is the European Union Commissioner for Startups, Research and Innovation and the Indian Minister marks a significant milestone in India-EU cooperation in the field of science and technology

    Recalls the long-standing and growing cooperation between India and the European Union (EU) in the field of science and technology

    “Prime Minister Narendra Modi Instrumental in Making India a hub of hub of cutting-edge research, fostering innovation, and driving transformative initiatives across various scientific domains” says Dr. Singh

    Highlights AI, Quantum Mission, healthcare, Ocean Polar along with other areas with potential of India -EU collaboration

    Posted On: 27 FEB 2025 8:27PM by PIB Delhi

    A high-level European Union delegation, led by Ms Ekaterina Zaharieva, currently on India visit, today called on Union Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Science and Technology, Dr. Jitendra Singh and discussed primarily the StartUp and innovation collaborations.

    The meeting between Ekaterina, who is the European Union Commissioner for Startups, Research and Innovation and the Indian Minister marks a significant milestone in India-EU cooperation in the field of science and technology.

    The Science and Technology Minister emphasized the longstanding partnership between India and the European Union, which dates back to the signing of the India-EU Science and Technology Agreement in 2001, renewed in 2015 and 2020, and set to be renewed once again for the period 2025-2030.

    Dr. Jitendra Singh credited Prime Minister Narendra Modi for his visionary leadership and unwavering support, which has played a pivotal role in India’s remarkable leap in science and technology. He noted that PM Modi has been instrumental in steering the country towards becoming a hub of cutting-edge research, fostering innovation, and driving transformative initiatives across various scientific domains.

    During the discussions, Dr. Jitendra Singh highlighted several key areas where India and the EU can collaborate further to drive innovation and sustainable development.

    These areas include:

    Water Resource Management

    Clean Energy & Smart Grids

    Artificial Intelligence (AI), Data & Robotics

    Healthcare (including Vaccine Development and Pandemic Preparedness)

    Climate Change & Polar Research

    The Minister stressed that collaboration in these areas would harness the strengths of both India and Europe, with an emphasis on increasing synergy and sharing knowledge and resources.

    Dr. Singh underscored India’s commitment to advancing joint research initiatives with the EU, particularly during the period from 2020 to 2024. He referred to ongoing projects such as:

    Department of Science and Technology (DST): Projects on Water, Energy, AI, Data, and Robotics

    Department of Biotechnology (DBT): Collaborative work on Water Resources and Vaccine Development

    Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES): Joint research on Climate Change and Polar Research

    The Minister emphasized India’s substantial contribution to these projects, amounting to €20.92 million. He also named several noteworthy achievements and projects, including:

    Geospatial Mapping of Point/Non-Point Pollution Sources (SPRING)

    PAVITRA GANGA: Demonstration of novel wastewater treatment technologies at Kanpur and Barapullah, New Delhi

    ENDFLU: Development of an improved influenza vaccine (Myn002) for better protection against drifted influenza strains

    BRIC-THSTI: Development of domestic influenza vaccine testing capacity through the ENDFLU and INCENTIVE projects

    PRESCRIP-TEC: HPV awareness and screening initiatives

    RUTI®: Phase 1 trials of Anti-TB vaccine

    The Minister of Earth Sciences, Dr. Singh, further emphasized the importance of international collaboration in addressing oceanic and climatic challenges. Key areas of research include:Ocean warming, deoxygenation, and acidification;Polar climate studies;Ocean forecasting.

    Dr. Jitendra Singh stressed the need for global cooperation to address these threats and ensure the health of the planet’s ecosystems.

    Looking ahead, Dr. Singh outlined several promising areas for future India-EU collaboration:

    Quantum Research: India’s emerging Quantum R&D capabilities combined with the EU’s advanced quantum hardware can lead to breakthroughs in secure communication and computing.

    Bioeconomy: India’s first-of-its-kind Bioeconomy (BioE3) policy, along with the EU’s expertise, can foster growth in the sector.

    Green Hydrogen: India’s scaling renewable hydrogen projects, paired with the EU’s leadership in electrolysis technology, can drive transformational change in energy.

    Battery Technology & Blue Economy: Exploring innovations in energy storage and sustainable use of ocean resources.

    High-Performance Computing: Enhancing computational capabilities for scientific and industrial applications.

    Dr. Singh also highlighted India’s commitment to tackling climate change through clean energy collaboration, particularly in offshore wind and solar projects. This, he said, would help meet the ambitious climate targets set by both India and the EU.

    The S&T Minister pointed out that India’s National AI Mission, backed by substantial funding, will be a key area for collaboration between India and the EU. He emphasized the potential for both regions to lead in AI safety and security, ensuring the development of AI in a sustainable, equitable, and inclusive manner.

    In the health sector, Dr. Singh identified several key areas where India and the EU can collaborate:Infectious and Non-Infectious Diseases; Novel Therapeutics, Biologicals, and Early Diagnostics; Drug Repurposing; AI in Healthcare Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR); One Health Approach.

    He stressed that the partnership between India and Europe could extend to these critical health challenges, which have global implications.

    From the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Mr. Marc Lemaître, Director-General; Ms. Nienke Buisman, Head of Unit, Innovation, Prosperity, and International Cooperation; and from the Cabinet of the Commissioner, Ms. Sophie Alexandrova, Deputy Head of Cabinet, along with Mr. Ivan Dimov, Member of Cabinet; Mr. Pierrick Fillon-Ashida, First Counsellor & Head of the Research & Innovation Section; Dr. Vivek Dham, Policy Officer, Research & Innovation Section, EU Delegation to India, were part of the delegation.

    Dr. Jitendra Singh concluded the discussions by reiterating India’s deep commitment to strengthening its partnership with the European Union in science and technology. He expressed confidence that the shared vision for collaboration in key sectors will create a pathway to solving global challenges and advancing mutual interests.

    ********

    NKR/PSM

    (Release ID: 2106749) Visitor Counter : 41

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Dubai ETO greets Year of Snake with gala dinners in Riyadh and Dubai (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Dubai (Dubai ETO), in collaboration with the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC), hosted gala dinners in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 24 (Riyadh time) and in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on February 25 (Dubai time) to celebrate the Year of Snake with Saudi and UAE communities, and promote Hong Kong as well as its unique advantages and culture to locals from various sectors.
          
         A total of over 450 guests from the government, business and cultural sectors as well as the local Hong Kong community attended the two gala dinners. Among them were the Minister of State for Foreign Trade of the UAE, Dr Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi, the Consul-General of the People’s Republic of China in Dubai, Ms Ou Boqian, and the Chairman of the Saudi Chinese Business Council, Mr Mohammed Al Ajlan.
          
         In his welcoming remarks to the guests, the Director-General of the Dubai ETO, Mr Damian Lee, highlighted the closer-than-ever relations and booming exchanges between Hong Kong and the Middle East region, marked by robust and active trade and economic co-operation as well as deepening collaboration in tourism, culture, education and many areas, since the establishment of the Dubai ETO more than three years ago and successive visits to Gulf countries by the Chief Executive and various Principal Officials.
          
         Mr Lee also shared with guests how Hong Kong’s distinctive advantages of having strong support of the country while maintaining unparalleled connectivity with the world render the city her role as a bridge linking the Mainland China and the rest of the world. He encouraged local business operators to make good use of Hong Kong’s measures dovetailing with national development strategies to expand their business in Hong Kong.
          
         “Like the virtuous snake in the Chinese zodiac, Hong Kong demonstrated her wisdom, flexibility and resilience amidst global uncertainties: in 2024, Hong Kong remained the world’s freest economy and the third-largest global financial centre with a record number of 10 000 non-local firms, a 10 per cent increase on the previous year and a testament to the abundant confidence of people from around the world. Hong Kong also launched the New Capital Investment Entrant Scheme last year, further enhancing our attractiveness to foreign capital and talents. In the Year of Snake ahead, Hong Kong and the Middle East will definitely build upon the strong foundation of our relationship for further collaborations.”
          
         The Dubai ETO also invited Legislative Council Member and Associate Vice-President of Lingnan University, Professor Lau Chi-pang, to deliver a keynote presentation, on Hong Kong’s rich intangible cultural heritage, as guests marvelled at the diversity, openness and the unique mix of Eastern and Western cultures of Hong Kong. During the dinners, representatives from Invest Hong Kong and HKTDC also shared respectively Hong Kong’s promising investment opportunities and the upcoming trade fairs and activities in Hong Kong, and encouraged local businesses to invest and join fairs in Hong Kong.
          
         The events also featured cultural performances, including the ancient Chinese theatrical art form from Sichuan opera – face-changing, as well as fascinating and interactive magic shows with Hong Kong elements by Louis Yan, an internationally renowned champion magician from Hong Kong who has won the Merlin Award, also known as the “Oscars” among professional magicians. The performances received enthusiastic applause from the audience who were deeply impressed by the beauty of the traditional Chinese culture and the authentic local culture of Hong Kong.                                       

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Chief Minister of Maharashtra and Union Minister of State for Power and New & Renewable Energy addressed the 2nd meeting of Group of Ministers on viability of distribution utilities.

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Chief Minister of Maharashtra and Union Minister of State for Power and New & Renewable Energy addressed the 2nd meeting of Group of Ministers on viability of distribution utilities.

    Renewable Energy as panacea for increasing supply and reducing cost of power

    Inflation-indexed and cost-reflective power tariffs need of the hour.

    Need for Regulatory Reforms for Power Distribution.

    Posted On: 27 FEB 2025 7:57PM by PIB Delhi

    The 2nd meeting of Group of Ministers (GoM), constituted for addressing issues related to viability of electricity distribution utilities, was held in Mumbai today in the presence of Shri Devendra Fadnavis, Hon’ble Chief Minister of Maharashtra, also holding the portfolio of Energy Ministry in the State, and Shri Shripad Yesso Naik, Hon’ble Union Minister of State for Power and New & Renewable Energy as Chairman of the GoM.

    Thiru V Senthil Balaji, Hon’ble Minister of Electricity, Tamil Nadu, Dr. Somendra Tomar, Hon’ble Minister of State for Energy, Uttar Pradesh, and Smt. Meghana Sakore Bordikar, Hon’ble Minister of State for Energy, Maharashtra attended the meeting. Shri Gottipati Ravikumar, Hon’ble Minister of Energy, Andhra Pradesh and Shri Heeralal Nagar, Hon’ble Minister of State for Energy, Rajasthan attended the meeting through video-conference. The meeting was also attended by officials from Central Government, State Governments and Power Utilities of member States, Power Finance Corporation (PFC) Ltd and REC Ltd.

    In his opening remarks, Union Minister of State welcomed Energy Ministers from the member States and thanked Chief Minister, Maharashtra, for hosting the meeting. He highlighted the discussions held in the first meeting of the GoM and the collective efforts required from the members for improvement in power Distribution sector. He highlighted about 4 key parameters and their relevance to improving viability of distribution utilities viz. Aggregate Technical and Commercial (AT&C) Loss, Gap between Average Cost of Supply and Average Revenue Realised (ACS-ARR Gap), Accumulated Losses and Outstanding debts.

    Union Minister expressed that every 1% increase of AT&C loss results in monetary losses for utilities in upwards of Rs. 10,000 Cr. He stressed upon the need for leveraging renewable energy (RE) for reducing cost of power in line with the initiatives taken by Maharashtra and Rajasthan. He highlighted about various short, medium and long term strategies to supplement the efforts towards viability of power distribution sector. He mentioned about the use of advanced technologies such as Artificial Intelligence for demand forecasting and power purchase optimisation, establishing mechanism for timely payment of Government dues, sharing best practices amongst DISCOMs, development of renewable energy, energy storage and expediting works under Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme (RDSS), as the key interventions.

    In his address Chief Minister of Maharashtra thanked Union Minister of State for having the 2nd meeting of the Group of Ministers in Mumbai. He commended that the measures taken by the Government of India will have far reaching impact on making country’s distribution sector stronger and healthier. He highlighted about the energy distribution across different consumer categories in the State. He emphasised on the need for expeditious growth of renewable sources of energy couple with energy storage solutions so as to meet the future challenges of energy transition and growing power demand.

    He further highlighted the efforts made by the State towards RE deployment under Mukhyamantri Saur Krishi Vahini Yojana facilitating day time power supply to farmers thereby reducing cost of power and reducing subsidy burden of the State. He mentioned that the State is expeditiously working towards solarization of all the Agricultural load feeders.

    He assured for improvement in AT&C loss figures of the State in the coming years. He mentioned about progress made by the State under the RDSS. He highlighted the importance of Resource Adequacy plan, use of AI tools etc. He requested support of Government of India (GoI) for early release of Gross Budgetary Support (GBS) under RDSS, reintroduction of schemes like UDAY (Ujjwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana), lowering interest rates on loans charged by REC Ltd. and Power Finance Corporation (PFC) Ltd., and waiver or reduction in their prepayment charges. He urged for having regulatory relaxations for allowing surplus of DISCOMs towards infrastructure development and reducing debt burden before passing it on further.

    Joint Secretary (Distribution), Ministry of Power made a presentation highlighting status of key financial and operational parameters of member States.

    The contours of the Action plan identifying the ways to reduce the outstanding debts and losses of the Distribution Utilities and the means to bring them into profits, were discussed in detail.

    State of Gujarat, as a special invitee, shared the best practices adopted and their journey toward making their DISCOMs profitable.

    The member States actively participated in the meeting and presented the overview of State DISCOMs. They gave valuable suggestions for improving the financial condition of DISCOMs. State of Maharashtra, Tamilnadu, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and Rajasthan, made presentations covering status, reforms undertaken, best practices and way forward for the GoM.

    PRAYAS group made a presentation highlighting reforms that may be undertaken for having a financially viable distribution sector.

    The Group of Ministers reiterated its commitment and expressed resolve to take necessary measures for improving the financial viability of DISCOMs.

    In his closing remarks, Hon’ble Union Minister of State mentioned that the inputs/ suggestions provided by the States would be helpful in shaping the policies and further course of action and urged the member States to work upon the action points that have emerged during the meeting.

    It was also unanimously decided to have 3rd meeting of GoM in Uttar Pradesh in the month of March.

    *****

    JN / SK 

    (Release ID: 2106731) Visitor Counter : 55

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Shri Amit Shah addresses the Remembrance Day ceremony on 15th death anniversary of Bharat Ratna Nanaji Deshmukh in Chitrakoot, Madhya Pradesh

    Source: Government of India

    Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Shri Amit Shah addresses the Remembrance Day ceremony on 15th death anniversary of Bharat Ratna Nanaji Deshmukh in Chitrakoot, Madhya Pradesh

    Nanaji, through his hard work, has established principles in politics that will remain role models for generations to come

    Through rural development, Nanaji Deshmukh implemented Pandit Deendayal’s principle of ‘Antyodaya’ on the ground

    Nanaji’s efforts were instrumental in changing the socio-economic landscape of the country’s villages

    Prime Minister Modi, who considers the “Antyodaya politics” of Nanaji and Pandit Deendayal as an ideal, is today bringing about a change in the lives of millions of poor people

    The unique combination of Sangh’s sanskars, Bal Gangadhar’s nationalism and Gandhiji’s Gram Swaraj is seen in Nanaji Deshmukh’s personality

    Nanaji established the Saraswati Shishu Mandir, today thousands of these schools across the country are imparting education and values to children

    Posted On: 27 FEB 2025 7:45PM by PIB Delhi

    The Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Shri Amit Shah addressed the Remembrance Day ceremony on 15th death anniversary of Bharat Ratna, Nanaji Deshmukh in Chitrakoot Madhya Pradesh today. On this occasion, several dignitaries, including the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, Dr. Mohan Yadav, and the Deputy Chief Minister, Shri Rajendra Shukla, were present.

    In his address, Shri Amit Shah said that on the occasion of Nanaji Deshmukh’s death anniversary, a tribute program was organized along with the inauguration of the statue of Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya and the presentation based on the life of Lord Ram, “Ram Darshan.” He said that Nanaji Deshmukh is among those individuals whose life leaves an impact not for just a few years, but for centuries, and such people work towards making the era transformative.

    Shri Shah said that Nanaji, who was born in Maharashtra, was associated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) from his childhood. He became a pracharak of the RSS, made Uttar Pradesh his area of work, became the General Secretary of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, and, along with Pandit Deendayal, traveled to every block and region in Uttar Pradesh to lay the foundation of the Jana Sangh. Nanaji got the privilege of being a centenarian by dedicating every moment of his life and every particle of his body to Mother India. He said that it is very difficult to go from the world as Ajatashatru while being in politics, but till today neither the ruling party nor any leader of the opposition heard anything wrong about Nanaji.

    The Union Home Minister said that it is very difficult to gain universal acceptance while being in politics, as one often has to face opposition for political purposes. However, in his long life, no one had the courage to oppose Nanaji, nor did anyone consider it appropriate to oppose him. He said that Nanaji made connections in almost every field, including art, literature, industry, service, and politics, and earned acceptance and respect in each of those fields. Achieving so much in one lifetime is quite difficult. He said that through rural development, Nanaji Deshmukh implemented Pandit Deendayal’s principle of ‘Antyodaya’ on the ground.

    Shri Amit Shah said that when Nanaji was just 60 years old, he decided to leave politics and pursue Ekatm Manavvaad (‘Integral Humanism’) for the rest of his life. He was also like a lotus in politics, kept himself aloof from every evil and spent his entire life removing evils. Nanaji, through his hard work, has established principles in politics that will remain role models for generations to come. He said Nanaji’s efforts were instrumental in changing the socio-economic landscape of the country’s villages.

    The Union Home Minister said that the Bharatiya Jana Sangh gave two great men to the country’s politics in the same period in the form of Nanaji Deshmukh and Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyaya. Both were born in 1916. He said that after the country’s independence, when policies were being made, people were watching the country’s policies with concern. In policies related to foreign affairs, economy, agriculture, and education, there was no fragrance of our ancient nation’s soil. At that time, the government was satisfied with creating policies by merely translating principles borrowed from the West. During that time, Pandit Deendayal established the principle of ‘Integral Humanism,’ showing how our economic philosophy should be, what our foreign policy should look like, and how our perspective on the world should be based on global brotherhood. He said that this very principle is now leading us toward becoming the best in the world.

    Shri Amit Shah said that Pandit Deendayal named India’s development model as ‘Antyodaya,’ meaning that until the last person in the line is developed, it holds no meaning. He said that the development of the last person should be a reflection of the nation’s development. He said that Prime Minister Modi, who considers the “Antyodaya politics” of Nanaji and Pandit Deendayal as an ideal, is today bringing about a change in the lives of millions of poor people. Shri Shah further said that development should take place while preserving our heritage.

    Union Home Minister Shri Amit Shah stated that under the leadership of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi, the government has significantly improved the lives of 60 crore poor citizens over the past decade. He highlighted key welfare initiatives, including housing, sanitation, clean drinking water, gas connections, free grain distribution, electricity access, and health coverage of up to ₹5 lakh. He emphasized that these efforts align with Nanaji Deshmukh’s vision for rural development, working towards transforming villages into self-sustaining Gokul Grams.

    Reflecting on Nanaji Deshmukh’s contributions, Shri Amit Shah described him as an exceptional organizer who played a crucial role in resisting the Emergency, when democracy and personal freedoms were under threat. He noted that despite a scattered opposition, public awareness was awakened, leading to a 19-month-long struggle that resulted in the defeat of the ruling government and the triumph of democracy. Nanaji was instrumental in the formation of the Janata Party and laid the foundation of the current ruling party by championing the principle of Nation First.

    Shri Amit Shah further stated that Nanaji’s life was deeply rooted in the ideals of the Sangh. He said that the unique combination of Sangh’s sanskars, Bal Gangadhar’s nationalism and Gandhiji’s Gram Swaraj is seen in Nanaji Deshmukh’s personality.

    Recognizing his lifelong service, he was awarded with the Padma Vibhushan. Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi later honored him with the Bharat Ratna, acknowledging his transformative contributions to society. Shri Shah remarked that Nanaji was among those rare individuals whose legacy elevates the honors bestowed upon them.

    He also highlighted Nanaji’s role in education, particularly in establishing the first Saraswati Shishu Mandir in Gorakhpur, today thousand of these schools across the country are imparting education and values to children. Nanaji remained committed to cultural nationalism throughout his life.

    Speaking about Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya, Shri Amit Shah noted his pivotal role in foundation of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. He credited Pandit Deendayal with shaping the ideological foundation of the party and developing Ekatm Manavvaad (Integral Humanism), a philosophy that encompasses the holistic development of individuals, society, and the nation.

    Shri Amit Shah highlighted Chitrakoot’s spiritual significance, recalling that it was where Lord Shri Ram spent a significant portion of his exile. He reiterated Chitrakoot’s deep connection to devotion and Indian cultural heritage.

    *****

    RK/VV/ASH/PR/PS

    (Release ID: 2106726) Visitor Counter : 27

    Read this release in: Hindi

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Mineral and non-ferrous metal production on growth track in FY 2024-25 (April-January)

    Source: Government of India

    Mineral and non-ferrous metal production on growth track in FY 2024-25 (April-January)

    Robust Growth in Production of Key Minerals and non-ferrous Metals

    Posted On: 27 FEB 2025 6:26PM by PIB Delhi

    Production of some key minerals in the country has continued to witness strong growth during FY 2024-25 (April- January), after reaching record production levels in FY 2023-24. Iron ore accounts for 70% of the total MCDR mineral production by value. Production of iron ore was 274 million metric tonne (MMT) in FY 2023-24.

    As per provisional data, production of iron ore has increased from 228 MMT in FY 2023-24 (April-January) to 236 MMT in FY 2024-25 (April-January), showing a healthy 3.5% growth. Production of manganese ore has risen by 11.1% to 3.0 MMT in FY 2024-25 (April-January) from 2.7 MMT during the corresponding period of previous year. Production of Chromite has risen by 8.7% to 2.5 MMT in FY 2024-25 (April- January) from 2.3 MMT during the corresponding period of previous year. Additionally, production of bauxite has also risen by 5.6% to 20.6 MMT in FY 2024-25 (April- January) from 19.5 MMT in FY 2023-24 (April- January).

    In the non-ferrous metal sector, primary aluminium production in FY 2024-25 (April-January) posted a growth of 1.2% over the corresponding period last year, increasing to 35.10 lakh ton (LT) in FY 2024-25 (April-January) from 34.67 LT in FY 2023-24 (April-January). During the same comparative period, refined copper production has grown by 7.4% from 4.19 LT to 4.50 LT.

    India is the 2ndlargest Aluminium producer, among top-10 producer in refined copper and 4thlargest iron ore producer in the world. Continued growth in production of iron ore in the current financial year reflects the robust demand conditions in the user industry viz. steel. Coupled with growth in aluminium and copper, these growth trends point towards continued strong economic activity in user sectors such as energy, infrastructure, construction, automotive and machinery.

    ****

    Shuhaib T

    (Release ID: 2106688) Visitor Counter : 68

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI: Westamerica Bancorporation Announces Stock Repurchase Plan

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SAN RAFAEL, Calif., Feb. 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Board of Directors of Westamerica Bancorporation (NASDAQ: WABC) today approved a plan to repurchase, as conditions warrant, up to 2,000,000 shares of the Company’s common stock on the open market or in privately negotiated transactions prior to March 31, 2026. The repurchase plan represents approximately 7.5 percent of the Company’s common stock outstanding as of December 31, 2024.

    Chairman, President and CEO David Payne stated, “This stock repurchase plan recognizes Westamerica’s financial strength, conservative risk profile and reliable earnings stream.”

    Westamerica Bancorporation, through its wholly owned subsidiary, Westamerica Bank, operates banking and trust offices throughout Northern and Central California.

    Westamerica Bancorporation Web Address: www.westamerica.com

    For additional information contact:
    Westamerica Bancorporation
    1108 Fifth Avenue, San Rafael, CA 94901
    Robert A. Thorson – Investment Relations Contact, 707-863-6090
    investments@westamerica.com

    FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION:

    The following appears in accordance with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:

    This press release may contain forward-looking statements about the Company, including descriptions of plans or objectives of its management for future operations, products or services, and forecasts of its revenues, earnings or other measures of economic performance. Forward-looking statements can be identified by the fact that they do not relate strictly to historical or current facts. They often include the words “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “plan,” “estimate,” or words of similar meaning, or future or conditional verbs such as “will,” “would,” “should,” “could,” or “may.”

    Forward-looking statements, by their nature, are subject to risks and uncertainties. A number of factors — many of which are beyond the Company’s control — could cause actual conditions, events or results to differ significantly from those described in the forward-looking statements. The Company’s most recent reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including the annual report for the year ended December 31, 2023 filed on Form 10-K and quarterly report for the quarter ended September 30, 2024 filed on Form 10-Q, describe some of these factors, including certain credit, interest rate, operational, liquidity and market risks associated with the Company’s business and operations. Other factors described in these reports include changes in business and economic conditions, competition, fiscal and monetary policies, disintermediation, cyber security risks, legislation including the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2011, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, and mergers and acquisitions.

    Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. The Company does not undertake to update forward-looking statements to reflect circumstances or events that occur after the date forward looking statements are made.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Does the Commission intend to give priority to the EU’s external commitments in the next multiannual financial framework? – E-000691/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000691/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mathilde Androuët (PfE)

    Some months ago, the Commission announced an overhaul of the multiannual financial framework 2028-2034, a copy of which has already been published[1]. It appears that the document contains an unsolvable ‘budgetary trilemma’. The EU is expected to provide considerable financing to cover the increase in strategic spending – the green transition, digital challenge and defence of and support for Ukraine, but also ensure that NextGenerationEU debt is being paid off from 2028 onwards, at an estimated EUR 25 and 30 billion per year, and come to terms with the absence of a rise in national contributions. Those three simultaneous constraints clearly cannot be resolved without new financial resources, which have yet to be found.

    Against that backdrop, does the Commission plan to give priority to its external commitments that will have to be extended or to redirect EU funds towards Member States’ own needs?

    Submitted: 13.2.2025

    • [1] https://www.contexte.com/actualite/pouvoirs/budget-post-2027-la-commission-pose-les-premieres-pierres-dun-chantier-titanesque_218085.html
    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Discrimination against Baha’is in Egypt – E-000676/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000676/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Per Clausen (The Left)

    The Egyptian Government institutionalised its state-sponsored discrimination against the Baha’is by way of a decree issued in 1960 by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, which banned Baha’i activities, dissolved Baha’i institutions and confiscated Baha’i properties (Law 263/1960).

    This pervasive discrimination has intensified, with the Egyptian authorities denying Baha’is national identity cards, their burial rights and access to cemeteries, as well as carrying out family separations.

    Baha’is in Egypt are currently denied their ability to enjoy basic civil liberties and fundamental rights, including freedom of religion[1].

    In the light of Egypt’s undertaking to guarantee respect for human rights as a precondition for receiving macro-financial assistance from the Commission, what EU strategy is in place to urge the Egyptian authorities to repeal the 1960 decree, upon which their entire mechanism of discrimination rests?

    Submitted: 13.2.2025

    • [1] https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/egypt1107/4.htm.
    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Tackling drug trafficking in America – E-000632/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000632/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Jorge Martín Frías (PfE)

    In late January 2025, President Trump designated Mexican cartels as ‘foreign terrorist organisations’ so that he could allocate the requisite resources to tackling drugs.

    To put a stop to drug trafficking, strong policies must be taken to combat traffickers, who are usually linked to other crimes such as human trafficking and financial crimes. Attacking cartel finances is a good strategy.

    In Mexico, however, as this Member has warned, President Sheinbaum is complicit with drug traffickers, for example, her government has adopted a chapucera judicial reform that enables cartels to finance campaigns for the election and an unambitious security strategy intended to limit police capacities, which promotes illegal activities and impunity for drug trafficking in Mexico.

    Between 2015 and 2023, the Commission spent EUR 140 million on aid and grants for Mexico.

    • 1.Can the Commission confirm that not a single euro ends up in the hands of cartels?
    • 2.I insist: will the Commission suspend all further financial transfers to Mexico until it ensures that the Mexican Government commits properly to fully tackling drug trafficking?
    • 3.Will it provide the US administration with the mechanisms and tools at its disposal to combat drugs?

    Submitted: 11.2.2025

    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: European Investment Bank (EIB) backs Africa Finance Corporation $750 Million Climate Resilient Infrastructure Fund

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    CAPE TOWN, South Africa, February 27, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) has committed to join Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) (www.AfricaFC.org) in financing a $750 million Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund (ICRF). This landmark initiative will accelerate climate adaptation and sustainable infrastructure across Africa.

    As part of this commitment, the EIB today confirmed it will invest $52.48 million in the Fund, which is managed by AFC Capital Partners (ACP), the asset management arm of AFC. ACP has already secured a $253 million commitment from the Green Climate Fund (GCF), marking GCF’s largest-ever equity investment in Africa. In addition, the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) and two private African pension funds have also committed to the Fund, demonstrating robust institutional backing on the continent and internationally.

    The Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund aims to accelerate climate adaptation in Africa by embedding resilience measures at every stage of infrastructure development—from design and construction to operation. Using blended finance to de-risk private investment, the Fund also integrates innovative tools such as climate risk parametric insurance to enhance protection against climate-related risks and losses. In addition, the Fund will provide technical assistance to enhance the capacity of countries seeking climate risk assessment and adaptation, aligning with the European Union’s Global Gateway initiative and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

    The EIB formally signed the agreement at the Finance in Common Summit (FICS) in Cape Town today, demonstrating the close collaboration between the EIB, AFC, and other strategic partners.

    “The EIB is committed to supporting private sector investment in climate-resilient infrastructure, especially in regions most vulnerable to climate change,” EIB Vice-President Ambroise Fayolle stated at the ceremony today. “This partnership with the Africa Finance Corporation and the launch of ACP’s Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund are a significant step towards accelerating Africa’s green and digital transition and ensuring a sustainable future for all. The EIB’s investment is not just about the initial capital injection; it is also intended to have a multiplier effect by attracting more investors, reducing risk, showcasing successful projects, and promoting best practices in climate finance.”

    ACP’s fund aims to demonstrate that Africa can pursue a climate-resilient and sustainable development path by addressing market failures, mitigating environmental risks, strengthening logistics, trade, and industrialization, and accelerating the continent’s digital and energy transition.

    “This Fund is crucial for bridging the funding gap for climate adaptation in Africa,” Samaila Zubairu, AFC’s President & CEO, said at the launch event today. “By focusing on climate-resilient infrastructure, we are not only securing our economic future but also creating opportunities for sustainable growth, and supporting job creation across the continent. We are glad to partner with the EIB and other investors who are committed to increasing the impact of climate finance.”

    Developing Climate-Resilient Infrastructure

    The ICRF focuses on Africa, the world’s most climate-vulnerable continent, by investing in infrastructure that can withstand the impacts of climate change while reducing carbon emissions. The Fund prioritizes resilient, low-carbon solutions across transport and logistics, clean energy, digital infrastructure, and industrial development, ensuring sustainable growth.

    ACP’s investment strategy evaluates climate risk across both physical and transition dimensions, including emissions and climate governance. The Fund is committed to ensuring that infrastructure assets are designed, built, and operated to withstand and adapt to evolving climate conditions. To achieve this, ACP will conduct rigorous climate risk screenings and assessments for every investment, establishing a new benchmark for selecting and implementing the most effective adaptation solutions.

    The Fund leverages a powerful partnership between three major institutions—EIB, AFC, and GCF—uniting their expertise, capital, and commitment to climate resilience. Aligned with the EIB’s Climate Bank Roadmap, ACP will draw on the proven track records and deep technical expertise of both EIB and AFC in infrastructure investment, creating a compelling platform to attract additional investors. Through this strategic collaboration, the $750 million fund is poised to unlock up to $3.7 billion in financing, accelerating the deployment of climate-resilient infrastructure across Africa.

    The GCF will play a critical role by providing technical assistance for due diligence and climate resilience monitoring while also covering the first-loss tranches on new investments, effectively de-risking projects and attracting private capital.

    Once operational, the Fund aims to invest in a diversified portfolio of 10 to 12 projects across Africa. It will also assist countries and entities in capacity building and deployment of climate risk assessment and adaptation solutions.

    Further Information

    Leveraging Partnerships

    The Fund is built on a powerful partnership between three major institutions: the European Investment Bank (EIB), Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Through its asset management arm, AFC Capital Partners (ACP), AFC is collaborating with the EIB to deploy the Fund, leveraging both institutions’ proven track records and technical expertise in infrastructure investment to attract additional investors. The partnership is further strengthened by the GCF’s critical role in providing first-loss protection and technical assistance, ensuring a robust framework for scaling climate-resilient infrastructure across Africa.

    Mobilizing Climate Finance

    The EIB’s $52.48 million commitment is a strategic step toward the Fund’s $750 million target, aimed at catalysing additional investments from both private and public sector partners into climate-resilient infrastructure. This commitment is expected to help mobilize approximately $3.7 billion in total financing, driving tangible, on-the-ground impact across Africa.

    Focusing on EIB’s core priorities agreed by ECOFIN

    The EIB investment will support the climate bank ambition to accelerate international action on adaptation and resilience. With an expected climate action and environmental sustainability contribution of about 80%, the operation will contribute to EIB’s objectives to dedicate (i) 50% of its financing toward climate action and environmental sustainability and (ii) 15% of its financing toward to climate adaptation by 2025. The Fund supports three of the five EU Global Gateway thematic priorities: i) climate and energy, ii) transport and iii) digital.

    Addressing Market Failures

    The EIB investment in ACP’s Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund is intended to address the scarcity of equity capital for greenfield infrastructure projects, and to help overcome other market failures such as the lack of incentives for green energy solutions or market failures related to transport accessibility and digital connectivity. The Fund also aims to improve the efficiency of logistics and trade corridors and contribute to the digital and energy transition.

    Supporting the Green and Digital Transition

    By investing in clean energy and digital infrastructure, the Fund aims to support the broader green and digital transition in Africa and contribute to diversification and security of energy supply, as well as improved access to digital connectivity.

    Enhancing Capacity for Climate Risk Management

    ACP’s Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund will provide technical assistance to build capacity for climate risk assessment and adaptation, with a focus on integrating climate risk considerations into project design and construction.

    Creating Jobs and Economic Opportunities

    Projects backed by ACP’s Infrastructure Climate Resilient Fund will contribute to job creation, economic growth, and improved quality of life in the target regions. These projects are expected to generate significant temporary employment during construction as well as permanent jobs during operation.

    Key projects in the ICRF pipeline, such as the Lobito Corridor, underscore AFC’s pivotal role in driving transformational and climate-resilient infrastructure investments across Africa. As the lead developer of the project, AFC is spearheading efforts to enhance regional connectivity and economic integration through the corridor, which is set to become a critical trade and logistics route linking Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Zambia.

    The Lobito Corridor is expected to unlock vast economic opportunities by facilitating efficient transportation of critical minerals, agricultural goods, and other commodities, reducing dependency on other congested export routes and fostering industrial development along the wider corridor. Alongside partners including the European Union, the United States Government, the African Development Bank and the governments of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, AFC is working to ensure the corridor is developed with climate resilience in mind, integrating sustainable infrastructure solutions that can withstand environmental challenges while promoting long-term economic growth.

    Beyond Lobito, the ICRF pipeline includes other strategic projects across transport, clean energy, and digital infrastructure, all designed to attract institutional investment and address Africa’s pressing infrastructure gap. Through these initiatives, ACP continues to highlight its commitment to mobilizing capital for projects that deliver both financial returns and lasting developmental impact.

    The investments backed by the Fund will actively promote the adoption of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) best practices, including gender equality, protection, and anti-discrimination policies.

    De-risking Investments

    The Fund’s structure, with support from the EIB and other institutions like the Green Climate Fund (GCF), aims to de-risk climate investments.

    The GCF is providing grant funding to help with due diligence and monitoring of climate resilience, which can make the investments more attractive to other investors. Additionally, the Fund will integrate innovative climate risk insurance to complement traditional indemnity programs.

    Aligning with Global and Regional Objectives

    The EIB investment aligns with EU strategies, the African Union’s Agenda 2063, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and aims to support the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Alexander Novak awarded the winners of the educational prize “Knowledge.Award” in the field of economics, business and law

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Previous news Next news

    Alexander Novak awarded the winners of the educational prize “Knowledge.Award” in the field of economics, business and law

    Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak took part in the award ceremony for the winners of the educational prize “Knowledge.Award”. At the site of the National Center “Russia”, he presented awards to the winners in the nomination “For Contribution to Education in the Sphere of “Economics, Business and Law”.

    “Education is the key to the future. Today, in the era of rapid development of science and technology, the value of education and knowledge is only growing. Those who become leaders in education become leaders in the economy. Russia is one of the leading countries in the provision of educational services and ranks fourth among the largest economies in the world,” said Alexander Novak, emphasizing the importance of educational work in the field of economics, entrepreneurship and law.

    The winner in the “Educator” nomination was the Governor of the Lipetsk Region Igor Artamonov for master classes and lectures on working with financial instruments, as well as the implementation of the “I Want to Live Here” project. This is an educational platform for more than 20 thousand participants, where through strategic games and political and economic sessions, residents of the region learned how public policy functions, the budget is formed, and how new technologies are changing the future.

    The winner in the Project nomination was the multi-format Lenta.ru project “You Have the Right” – a guide to state benefits and social payments, which explains what kind of assistance from the state a citizen can count on and how to receive it.

    The educational award was established by the Russian Society “Knowledge” in 2021 to recognize the achievements of teachers, lecturers, authors, bloggers, popularizers of science, as well as educational projects. A total of 19,523 applicants from 89 regions of the country applied for the award in 21 nominations. In all nominations, 31 winners were selected by the decision of the honorary jury and the results of the public vote.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: New administration can create a stronger AI tech export rule

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: New administration can create a stronger AI tech export rule

    A high-stakes race is underway that will determine which country will supply the technology that powers the world’s emerging AI economy. Vice President Vance got it right at the recent AI Summit in Paris, emphasizing the need to focus on AI opportunities, pursue lighter regulations, and prioritize bringing American AI to the world. However, a last-minute Biden administration regulation, if left unchanged, risks undermining America’s ability to succeed.  

    The Biden administration’s interim final AI Diffusion Rule caps the export of essential American AI components to many fast-growing and strategically vital markets. As drafted, the rule undermines two Trump administration priorities: strengthening U.S. AI leadership and reducing the nation’s near trillion-dollar trade deficit. Left unchanged, the Biden rule will give China a strategic advantage in spreading over time its own AI technology, echoing its rapid ascent in 5G telecommunications a decade ago.    

    As a company, we support the need to protect national security by preventing adversaries from acquiring advanced AI technology. And there are important elements in the rule that should be retained. For example, the rule’s qualitative provisions would ensure that AI technology components are deployed in certified, secure, and trusted datacenters. This avoids shipments of advanced chips to entities that do not meet these standards and thereby helps reduce the risk of chip diversion to China. Similarly, the rule rightly imposes strict requirements on these trusted datacenter operators to protect against chip diversion and to ensure that advanced AI services cannot be used by adversaries.  

    There is an important opportunity to further strengthen these provisions, including by ensuring the Commerce Department has the resources it will need to put the Rule into effect. This can help both expedite approval processes for companies and strengthen enforcement, including against unlawful chip diversion. 

    But a significant problem remains. Namely, the Biden rule goes beyond what’s needed. It puts many important U.S. allies and partners in a Tier Two category and imposes quantitative limits on the ability of American tech companies to build and expand AI datacenters in their countries. This includes many American friends, such as Switzerland, Poland, Greece, Singapore, India, Indonesia, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. These are countries where we and many other American companies have significant datacenter operations.  

    This Tier Two status is undermining one of the essential requirements needed for a business to succeed—namely, confidence by our customers that they will be able to buy from us the AI computing capacity that they will need in the future. Customers in Tier Two countries now worry that an insufficient supply of critical American AI technology will restrict their opportunities for economic growth.  

    The unintended consequence of this approach is to encourage Tier Two countries to look elsewhere for AI infrastructure and services. And it’s obvious where they will be forced to turn. If left unchanged, the Diffusion Rule will become a gift to China’s rapidly expanding AI sector.  

    All this comes at precisely the time when the American tech sector wants to invest in AI computing capacity at an unprecedented level. Our own company’s plans are illustrative. This year alone, Microsoft will spend $80 billion to build AI infrastructure around the world, with more than half of this total on U.S. soil. As this reflects, the solid majority of our computing power will remain in the United States.   

    But our ability to continue growing and investing at this level, including in the United States, depends in important part on exporting our technology services. This requires building AI infrastructure in other countries, so AI services can be accessed and used with low latency by local enterprises and consumers. Ironically, the Diffusion Rule discourages what should be regarded as an American economic opportunity—the export of world-leading chips and technology services. 

    The potentially negative impact on American economic growth doesn’t stop there. As the tech sector invests billions of dollars to build datacenters around the world, we are developing global supply chains that combine international and American suppliers of more traditional manufactured goods. I saw this first-hand when I was in Warsaw last week to announce with Prime Minister Donald Tusk a $700 million expansion of Microsoft’s datacenter infrastructure in Poland. Among the beneficiaries are American workers manufacturing advanced electrical generators in Lafayette, Indiana, so they can be shipped to Poland. 

    The irony could not be clearer. At the very moment when the Trump administration is pressing Europe to buy more American goods, the Biden Diffusion Rule leaves the leaders of partners like Poland asking why they have been relegated to Tier Two status and an uncertain ability to buy more American AI chips in the future. 

    This puts the opportunity for the Trump administration in bold relief. It can take an overly complex rule that requires 41 pages in the Federal Register and right-size it. Make it simpler. Stop relegating American friends and allies into a second tier that undermines their confidence in ongoing access to American products. Eliminate the quantitative caps that would interfere with a well-functioning economic market. And keep what matters most, such as the qualitative security standards and AI use restrictions that protect national security. 

    We need to recognize the obvious. America’s AI race with China begins at home. It’s founded on the ability of innovative American firms to bring manufactured goods and technology services to like-minded countries around the world. We’re prepared to invest. What we need now is an AI diffusion rule that gives us the ability to do so. 

    Tags: AI diffusion rule, AI economy, supply chains

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI USA: February 27th, 2025 Heinrich, Luján, Leger Fernández, Curtis Reintroduce Bipartisan Legislation to Fund and Complete the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Mexico Martin Heinrich
    Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senators Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) and Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), and U.S. Representatives Teresa Leger Fernández (D-N.M.) and John Curtis (R-Utah) introduced the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project Amendments Act of 2025. The legislation amends the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project to ensure it has the resources and time needed to reach completion to deliver drinking water to northwestern New Mexico communities. 
    The Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project was first authorized as part of the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, which settled the Navajo Nation’s water rights in the San Juan Basin of New Mexico and funded the design and construction of the waterline to reach an estimated 250,000 people by the year 2040. Upon completion, the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project will provide a long-term, sustainable water supply from the San Juan River to roughly 43 Chapters on the eastern Navajo Nation, the southwestern portion of the Jicarilla Apache Nation, and the City of Gallup, which currently rely on a rapidly depleting groundwater supply of poor quality. Full project completion is planned for 2029. When complete, it will include approximately 300 miles of pipeline, two water treatment plants, 19 pumping plants and multiple water storage tanks.
    “Communities in northwest New Mexico, the Navajo Nation, and the Jicarilla Apache Nation deserve water security and clean drinking water. Our legislation achieves this by funding the completion of the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project to deliver clean, reliable water to 43 Tribal communities and the City of Gallup. I call on the Senate to quickly take up this legislation and ensure the project can be completed,” said Heinrich.
    “Ensuring that the Navajo Nation, City of Gallup, and Jicarilla Apache Nation have access to safe, clean, and reliable drinking water is vital for the health and well-being of rural and Tribal communities,” said Luján, a member of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.“The Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project will help provide a reliable, sustainable surface water supply to improve the public health and economic opportunities for the region. I’m proud to lead this bipartisan legislation to move this critical project forward and reduce the financial burden on Tribal and local governments. I look forward to working with my colleagues to pass this much-needed legislation to help meet the water needs in the San Juan Basin for years to come.”
    “Since I was elected to Congress, I have prioritized funding for the Navajo Gallup Water Supply Project so we can provide clean, reliable, and affordable water to the Navajo people and surrounding communities in New Mexico. We secured $615 million in funding to move the project forward,” said Leger Fernández. “The Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project Amendments Act builds upon this work.  We won’t stop until this project is completed because in New Mexico, we know that water sustains us. Sabemos que Agua Es Vida.”
    “Water is the lifeblood of the West, and Utahns know that securing a reliable water supply is essential for our communities, our economy, and our way of life,” said Curtis. “I’m proud to join my colleagues on this bipartisan legislation to help ensure the Navajo Nation in Utah have the water they need to thrive.”
    The amending legislation makes several important changes:
    Increases the project funding authorization to match updated construction costs;
    Extends the project timeline beyond 2025 to 2029 to provide additional time for completion;
    Establishes trust funds for operations and maintenance costs for the Navajo Nation and the Jicarilla Apache Nation once construction is complete; and
    Allows the project to expand its service area to reach Navajo communities without running water.
    The Navajo Nation, Jicarilla Apache Nation, State of New Mexico, and the City of Gallup support the legislation.
    Heinrich, Luján and Leger Fernández have long supported efforts to fund and complete the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project.
    Heinrich, Luján and Leger Fernández secured $137 million in 2023 and $164 million in 2024 for the project through the  Infrastructure Law toward the total authorized project cost. In August 2024, the N.M. Delegation welcomed a $267 million Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project contract to design and build the San Juan Lateral Water Treatment Plant in northwest New Mexico. The plant is the largest and most important feature of the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project.
    In January 2025, Heinrich, Luján and Leger Fernández announced $120 million for Fiscal Year 2025 for the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project using funding from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s Reclamation Water Settlements Fund. The original version of the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project Amendments Act was passed out of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee in November 2023. However, new legislation is required to authorize additional time and resources to complete the project and for its long-term, sustainable operations and maintenance.
    Additionally, the N.M. Delegation recently reintroduced a slate of Tribal water rights settlement bills they are pushing to pass in this Congress.
    For more information about the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project, click here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: News 02/27/2025 Blackburn, Rosen Introduce “No Immigration Benefits for Hamas Terrorists Act”

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn)
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) and Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.) introduced the No Immigration Benefits for Hamas Terrorists Act to prevent any migrant tied to Hamas from entering the country. This follows Hamas’ savage murder and release of four innocent hostages, including a young mother, her two toddlers, and a journalist, last week. 
    “The Biden-Harris administration released nearly 100 individuals on the terrorist watchlist into our country over the last four years, and we need to make certain anyone tied to Hamas is not allowed to enter or remain in the U.S.,” said Senator Blackburn. “This common-sense, bipartisan bill would ensure that no migrant tied to Hamas and its savage terrorist attack on October 7 can enter our nation or receive immigration benefits on the taxpayer dime.”
    “No one who participated in Hamas’s brutal October 7 terrorist attack should be allowed to enter the United States,” said Senator Rosen. “That’s why I’m helping introduce bipartisan legislation to prohibit Hamas terrorists from being eligible to receive immigration benefits. I’ll always work across the aisle to keep our nation safe.”
    NO IMMIGRATION BENEFITS FOR HAMAS TERRORISTS ACT
    The No Immigration Benefits for Hamas Terrorists Act would:
    Prohibit any migrant who carried out, participated in, planned, financed, afforded material support to, or otherwise facilitated in any way the attacks perpetrated by Hamas against Israel on October 7, 2023, from being admitted to the United States; and
    Prohibit any such individual from being eligible for any immigration benefits.
    RELATED
    Click here for bill text.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: NZ’s barriers to economic growth: short-term thinking, political concentration and policy flip-flops

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kate Nicholls, Senior Lecturer, School of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Auckland University of Technology

    Hagen Hopkins/Getty Images

    Economic growth took centre stage during Prime Minister Christopher Luxon’s recent State of the Nation speech.

    Yet in amongst the discussion and criticism of the government’s plans, many have got locked into a one-dimensional debate centred on reducing regulation to encourage economic growth.

    This ignores a deeper discussion on the actual sources of New Zealand’s economic growth in the 21st century and, potentially, what we need to do to shift from one model of growth to another.

    What drives growth?

    Emerging partly out of the 2007–09 global financial crisis, thinking about economic growth has become dominated by something known as the growth model framework.

    The framework contrasts countries such as Germany that base their growth on exports – partly through wage restraint – with those in which growth is led by consumption. This group includes the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand.

    New Zealand’s growth model

    How can this framework be used to understand economic growth in our local context?

    New Zealand’s economy is dominated by domestic demand – with the service industry making up around two-thirds of the gross domestic product, putting us squarely in the consumption-led camp.

    Local analysts have often reflected on the drivers and pitfalls of this growth model, revolving as it does around property investment and related industries such as banking and insurance.

    And yet, this is not how we tend to think of ourselves at all.

    Whether aspirational or wishful thinking, countless political speeches and policy documents refer to New Zealand as something of an export platform, a trading nation, or a (potential) knowledge-based innovator on the world stage.

    New Zealand has long viewed itself as an export economy. But economic indicators tell a different story.
    Kritsana Laroque/Shutterstock

    The politics of New Zealand’s growth model

    It is also difficult to imagine a New Zealand political leader standing up to announce how proud they are to be overseeing a service and consumption-driven economy.

    In fact, it could be argued the past couple of decades have represented a series of failures to shift the growth model from where we are to where we want to be.

    What is more, many of the barriers to doing so are political rather than strictly economic.

    The growth model perspective identifies not only the varied national growth strategies but also the coalition of political and business groups that support each model.

    Possible – but difficult – change

    Shifts in national growth models can occur. But doing so requires forging a consensus around a new or evolving growth model through political institutions or through the expansion of the growth coalition’s base to include new economic players including, in some cases, trade unions.

    Ireland, for example, underwent a major shift from the late 1980s toward a growth model infused with foreign direct investment. This happened, in part, through social partnership, where most aspects of public policy were negotiated between state, business and organised labour, along with some input from the community and voluntary sector. It was also due to an overwhelmingly centrist political culture and it’s structure of government.

    Sweden’s gradual shift toward more information-technology intensive manufacturing and the Netherlands’ to business services and finance, representing more balanced or mixed growth models, can also be traced to consensus-driven politics.

    Barriers to change

    Back in Aotearoa New Zealand, we face a series of political barriers to similar change.

    Above all, politics in New Zealand is notably short-term in nature, driven by a host of factors including the three-year electoral term. There is also an absence of an Irish or Swedish-style social partnership-type tradition in which key societal groups are included in policy negotiations that survive changes of government.

    Compounding this, power in New Zealand politics is still concentrated in the hands of the incumbent government despite the adoption of the mixed member proportional (MMP) system. This means a considerable degree of ideological yo-yoing and policy flip-flops.

    Most difficult perhaps is finding a way to override entrenched economic interests with a vested interest in the status quo.

    For example, while there is widespread support for a capital gains tax in New Zealand, implementing one has proven out of political reach.

    This is likely due, in part, to the oversized role that property plays in our economy, but also because we lack consensus-forging institutions through which to channel a will to change.

    Somehow broadening the base of support may help to address this issue, as will ensuring that the government is able to exercise its own autonomy – connected to economic interests yet able to rise above rather than relying on them to make change happen.

    Kate Nicholls does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. NZ’s barriers to economic growth: short-term thinking, political concentration and policy flip-flops – https://theconversation.com/nzs-barriers-to-economic-growth-short-term-thinking-political-concentration-and-policy-flip-flops-249007

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz