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Category: Economy

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Medium and emerging private groups tax performance program

    Source: Australian Department of Revenue

    About the program

    We use a risk-based approach to:

    • identify groups with higher risk and consequence tax reporting
    • support them in meeting tax obligations.

    By doing this we strengthen community confidence that they are paying the right amount of tax.

    Information and findings we gather from working with medium and emerging private groups improves our awareness of the population and risk environment. It also complements our development of a range of differentiated response strategies.

    Through the medium and emerging private groups tax performance program, we have improved our knowledge and understanding of:

    • business operating environments
    • tax risks and issues that are present or may be emerging.

    We have learned from our work across the different industries and risks over the past few years. We are well-positioned and capable to respond to existing and emerging risks and issues with effective strategies and tailored activity.

    Who is covered by the program

    The program covers both:

    • private groups linked to Australian resident individuals who, together with their associates, control wealth between $5 million and $50 million
    • businesses with an annual turnover of more than $10 million, that are not public or foreign owned and are not linked to a high wealth private group.

    Our focus is on engaging with:

    • larger and higher risk private groups and entities
    • private groups experiencing rapid growth, increasing foreign links, looking to expand offshore or where controlling individuals are transitioning to retirement
    • foreign investment focused on acquiring high value assets in Australia and structured wealth extraction
    • private groups with higher risk issues or concerns.

    The program doesn’t cover private groups or businesses that are already part of the:

    We use data-matching and analytic models to identify wealthy individuals and link them to associated entities. We consider the group of entities together.

    The private group approach helps us understand your business better. It enables us to provide a tailored experience, including focusing on specific potential areas of risk and entities within the group.

    For more, read about the:

    How we tailor our approach to you

    We continue to improve our understanding of medium and emerging business and the environment within which you operate.

    To support our understanding, we use sophisticated data and analytics techniques. We use intelligence and insights gathered through our engagements to identify trends, priority and emerging risks specific to medium and emerging private groups.

    Through our increased understanding, we tailor our approach and develop strategies to support you to identify and mitigate tax risks within your private group.

    We’ll work with you by:

    Types of engagement you can expect

    Our engagement with you may include:

    • review of areas of correct tax reporting risk specific to your business
    • pre-lodgment compliance agreement for commercial deals and restructure events
    • leveraged engagements for areas of potential risk that are generally more easily resolved.

    We will work with you to resolve any concerns or issues that arise from our risk modelling and analysis of data from:

    Reviews

    We will streamline our engagement with you for simple issues and potential risks. We may require an extensive review for complex matters involving multiple issues and risks.

    Our reviews focus on specific risks and issues. In most cases, we aim to complete our reviews within 180 days.

    Reviews generally focus on issues that can be resolved by getting more information from you. For example, this could be completing a specific action such as lodging an outstanding return or schedule.

    We monitor many potential risks and issues. Some focus areas include:

    • where we have identified income from third-party information attributable to you but did not see this income reported on your tax returns or activity statements
    • where an entity in your group has not lodged tax returns or activity statements resulting in a shortfall of tax paid
    • late or incorrect lodgments of tax returns, schedules or activity statements
    • instances where you do not appear to have enough income to cover your expenses or to acquire the assets that you own
    • inappropriately accessing tax concessions, credits and offsets that you are not entitled to
    • large, one-off, or unusual transactions, including the transfer or shifting of wealth
    • trust structures
    • wealth extraction, including Division 7A, where we seek verification of complying loan agreements, genuine repayments and minimum yearly repayments.

    We encourage and support good tax governance as it helps taxpayers to meet their taxation obligations. However, it’s not a risk factor we consider in the program reviews.

    GST integrated reviews

    We also undertake goods and services tax (GST) integrated reviews as part of the program.

    These reviews consider potential GST risks or issues. We will request information and documentation from you in support of your GST treatment.

    Characteristics of medium and emerging groups

    Medium and emerging groups have certain characteristics and attributes. See more about the:

    Overall demographics

    There are around 273,000 private groups that are part of the program. These groups report holding approximately $3.2 trillion in net assets and contributing more than $61.3 billion in tax revenue.

    A typical medium and emerging group consists of 5 entities with a mix of:

    • companies
    • trusts
    • other entities.

    The profile of a typical medium and emerging group includes:

    • 5 entities consisting of 2 companies, 2 trusts and another entity such as a self-managed super fund
    • individuals
    • a group head aged 63 years old
    • 14 employees
    • total income of $651,000
    • net wealth of $7.9 million
    • income tax of $104,300
    • net GST of $18,200
    • pay as you go (PAYG) withholding of $92,600.

    Typical medium and emerging group

    Groups by location

    The population is mainly located on the east coast (over 84%) and distributed across Australia as follows:

    • New South Wales – 106,519
    • Victoria – 81,984
    • Queensland – 39,213
    • Western Australia – 22,206
    • South Australia – 15,393
    • Australian Capital Territory – 3,583
    • Tasmania – 3,324
    • Northern Territory – 948

    Medium and emerging groups by location

    Groups by entity type

    The program includes more than 1.4 million entities. Group structures may be complex and some groups may have many associated entities.

    There may be a combination of various entity types with companies, partnerships and trust structures operating within and outside of consolidated groups.

    The program includes:

    • 470,453 companies
    • 475,267 individuals
    • 328,870 trusts
    • 151,334 super funds
    • 61,959 partnerships.

    Medium and emerging groups by entity type

    Groups by industry

    A wide range of different industries are represented in the population. The 5 main industries represent more than half of businesses.

    The industries include:

    • financial and insurance services – 26.2%
    • other industries – 22.8%
    • professional, scientific and technical services – 9.5%
    • construction – 6.6%
    • agriculture, forestry and fishing – 6.4%
    • health care and social assistance – 6.3%
    • rental, hiring and real estate services – 5%
    • retail trade – 4.3%
    • wholesale trade – 3.7%
    • manufacturing – 3.4%
    • accommodation and food services – 1.9%
    • transport, postal and warehousing – 1.5%
    • other services – 1.2%
    • administrative and support services – 1.2%

    Medium and emerging groups by industry type

    How much tax they pay

    The population:

    • owns $3.2 trillion in net assets
    • earns $1.10 trillion in total income
    • pays over $61.3 billion income tax
    • pays over $18.9 billion in net GST
    • employs more than 7.5 million people, paying $42.4 billion in PAYG withholding.

    Tax governance and reporting

    Effective tax governance means having oversight frameworks with clear processes and procedures. This supports decision making and ensures you meet your tax and super obligations.

    When we engage with you as part of the medium and emerging program, we don’t consider or review your tax governance processes. However, good tax governance does help support taxpayers to meet their taxation obligations.

    To ensure your risks are mitigated and to improve certainty that the group is paying the right amount, you need:

    • good tax governance
    • internal controls
    • business processes and procedures.

    Clearly defining and documenting the roles and responsibilities within a group and sharing them with advisors is a key governance requirement.

    To ensure correct tax treatment and reporting, it is important to maintain:

    • oversight and independent approval of the preparation of tax returns and BAS
    • segregation of duties with review
    • checking of material transactions.

    Well-designed control systems and reporting frameworks with good governance, checking and review are key to:

    • ensuring accurate treatment
    • record keeping
    • identifying errors or mistakes and correcting them.

    In broad terms a business with a focus on ensuring risk and issue mitigation will apply:

    • well-designed and documented corporate and tax governance frameworks
    • internal controls and compliance practices appropriate to the size and complexity of the business
    • systems that respond to business growth and increasing complexity through improvement in governance focus and sophistication, internal controls, recording and reporting
    • use of automated and integrated business systems that are regularly reviewed for suitability and accurate performance
    • suitably capable and skilled personnel with regular development and ongoing responsibility to understand, manage and report tax obligations
    • segregation of duties across reporting and approval functions
    • regular review and reconciliation of business systems reporting
    • review of the tax treatment of large, unusual and irregular transactions
    • established procedures for monitoring tax reporting and correcting mistakes and errors
    • ensuring that large, unusual and irregular transactions including those between group members and associates, are properly recorded and included in tax returns
    • seeking advice as business grows and for the treatment of new, unusual, one-off and large transactions.

    For more information you can:

    For more support, see:

    MIL OSI News –

  • MIL-OSI Australia: The Tax Institute’s National GST Conference: ATO update for public and multinational businesses

    Source: Australian Department of Revenue

    Rebecca Saint, Deputy Commissioner, Public Groups and
    Virginia Gogan, Senior Director Public Groups
    Speech at The Tax Institute’s National GST Conference
    17 October 2024
    (Check against delivery)

    Introduction

    Thank you to the Tax Institute for having us at this conference. It’s a pleasure to come speak to you all today.

    It’s been 5 years since responsibility for GST compliance for large business moved to Public Groups. The move has allowed us to better combine our expertise in GST with our deep insights into large business.

    Supported by Government funding to improve assurance and compliance in the large market, we embarked on an ambitious program to generate long term change in the market. We’ve taken on a number of difficult long-term systemic issues, such as governance (including systems and controls), apportionment issues related to financial supplies and product classification.

    Whilst there is still a way to go, we are encouraged by the positive results and we are starting to envisage the future world of GST compliance for large business beyond what you see today. We will cover some of this in our presentation today.

    We will cover:

    • where we are at in our engagement with the market for GST
    • our observations on the GST risk focus area in this market, and
    • our future directions for large business compliance programs going forward.

    The importance of large business tax compliance

    Firstly, it’s useful to set the scene with some key facts and figures.

    The significant monetary contribution and position of influence of large business in the tax system shapes the way we think about compliance for this market. Understanding these drivers also helps in understanding the rationale as to why Government directs funding to specific programs in this market.

    Public and multinational businesses are the largest contributors to the GST system.

    In the 2023 financial year, GST revenue was around 14% of the ATO’s overall net tax collections. In the same year, over 60% of the $77.3 billion in net GST liabilities collected by the ATO were from public and multinational businesses.

    This is reflected in PG populations with:

    • top 100 taxpayers making up 13% of net GST liabilities or $10 billion
    • top 1000 taxpayers making up 37% or $28.6 billion, and
    • the Medium and Emerging population at 11% or $8.9 billion.

    The numbers demonstrate the important role of large business in the level of GST contribution and Government budgets. The heavy reliance on large business for revenue collection is not unique to GST and we see similar reliance for corporate tax. However, the settings of GST mean the concentration of GST collection differs to that income tax. For income tax, corporate tax is highly concentrated in large mining and resource companies, the big banks and a few retailers or telcos. In comparison we see GST as being more spread across the Top 100 and Top 1,000 populations with the bulk of collections coming from the wholesale, retail and services sectors – miners’ exports are GST-free, and banks are mostly input taxed.

    We often talk about the role that large business play beyond their significant revenue contribution. The perception of compliance by large business supports the health of the tax system as a whole. The willingness of individual and small business taxpayers to voluntarily meet their obligations is indirectly impacted by whether they consider there is fairness in the system.

    Whilst public scrutiny more commonly focusses on the income tax contribution and compliance of large business, ultimately perceptions of tax compliance generally are important. At one level GST compliance is more observable to the broader community, with many engaging directly with GST treatments through roles in different parts of the supply chain and consumers engaging with marketing of GST free supplies. This provides both positive and downside opportunities for business.

    Proving GST compliance – justified trust

    Evolution of the justified trust program

    A key platform for our engagement with public and multinational businesses is through the Justified Trust assurance programs. These programs are important in giving us high levels of confidence that we know which large businesses are meeting their Australian income tax and GST obligations. This gives Government and the community confidence that the right amount of tax is being paid by large business.

    We are specifically funded to undertake the justified programs with GST being funded by the GST Compliance Program and income tax being funded through the Tax Avoidance Taskforce.

    Under the assurance programs, the ATO provides positive assurance that taxpayers are paying the right amount of tax, rather than confirming that certain risks do not arise. Whilst the pillars of justified trust are the same for income tax and GST, our compliance stance for the taxes differs. We will explore some of these differences when discussing the programs.

    Top 100

    The Top 100 program covers the largest public and multinational businesses. Top 100 taxpayers are under continual monitoring for income tax. However, for GST, for those taxpayers that have met the governance requirements and achieved at least overall medium assurance, we will generally adopt a periodic review stance. The exception being for high-risk industries such as financial services who may have more intensive engagement.

    What this means for the vast bulk of GST remitters, is that if they meet the necessary requirements in their initial assurance review, our justified trust engagement will be more limited until a refresh year. However, we will continue to monitor their affairs at some level.

    We have now completed an initial assurance review for one or more GST reporters in around 88% of the top 100 economic groups. This means that the vast bulk of Top 100 taxpayers could already be benefiting from periodic review stances. There may be opportunity to evolve this approach further, which we will talk about later in this presentation.

    We have recently re-focussed our efforts in the Top 100 program to real time engagement. The program has always been intended to work this way – given our focus is on prevention before correction, however we have not lived up to this ideal.

    The shift to real-time is designed to provide greater tax certainty for Top 100 taxpayers and the ATO. Transactions and business changes will be considered closer to the time of event and may include both income tax and GST considerations. This may include both income tax and GST. Compliance teams will make decisions as to what if any further investigation or verification may be required. Pre-lodgment Compliance Reviews (PCRs) will be on strict time-lines, to prevent gap or open years arising. We have made changes to our internal work processes to make this happen.

    The shift to real time will come with mutual obligations for business and the ATO. Top 100 taxpayers will have agreed disclosure frameworks that set out the principles of what and the timing of disclosures throughout the year. For GST, there are also specific disclosure requirements for certain industries given the GST risks that arise – such as for large banks.

    Top 1000

    The Top 1000 program assures the largest public and multinational businesses outside of the Top 100. It is an integrated review where we assure both income tax and GST as part of a combined assurance review.

    We have completed 735 reviews for GST across the various phases of the program. 395 entities have received a GST assurance rating, with 59 of these receiving an assurance rating for a second time. The increasing number of second time reviews, particularly for income tax, is giving us insights to the ‘stickiness’ of tax assurance ratings and improvements for big business.

    Due to differences in timing as to when the programs commenced, income tax is ahead of GST. Positively, we have seen most taxpayers either maintain or improve their ratings. We have observed similar positive trends for GST although the numbers are much less. This insight is what gives us confidence that we can take a more tailored lighter approach to assurance for taxpayers that have already demonstrated high levels of compliance.

    In March this year, we announced a recalibration of the entities that would be included in the program. We originally used a $250 million total business income threshold to determine who came within the program. However, over the 8 years since commencement we have observed considerable growth in population. As a result, the Top 1000 program has been covering more than 1000 entities which was not enabling us to achieve a 4-year rolling review cycle.

    Going forward, we will be applying an assurance approach to taxpayers that are the largest 1000 outside of the Top 100 population. Based on our current analysis, for the 2025 financial year, the largest 1000 had a turnover of approximately $350 million.

    We now also differentiate between two different groups in the Top 1000. About a third of the largest 1000 taxpayers exceed $1 billion in turnover. Given the significance of that level of economic activity, these entities will be classed as our ‘significant taxpayers’, and we will apply a different approach to assure them. The remaining entities will form our ‘general taxpayer’ population.

    Differentiating within the population allows us to take different approaches in our assurance program. It also provides opportunities for us to consider opportunities for different services for ‘significant taxpayers’, given their size and contribution.

    In addition to our Justified Trust program, we have risk-based engagements on specific GST risks. These risk-based engagements are important to ensure we continue to target the highest priority GST risks for public and multinational business, including for entities outside our Top 100 and Top 1000 programs.

    Program results – Latest Top 100 and Top 1000 findings for GST

    Each year we publish a raft of information to provide insights about the tax performance and compliance of large business. This includes the findings reports for our Justified Trust programs, with the latest reports for 2024 being published in September.

    At the highest level, this is a good news story. For GST, in both programs, we have observed an increase in the number of taxpayers obtaining high assurance.

    For Top 100 taxpayers:

    • 30% attained overall high assurance, a significant increase from the figure of 23% as at the end of June 2023
    • 63% attained medium assurance, which has fallen from 70% as at the end of June 2023, and
    • overall low assurance ratings have remained stable at 2%.

    For Top 1000 taxpayers:

    • 37% of taxpayers attained an overall high assurance outcome at their most recent review, which is also a significant increase from the figure as at end of June last year of 31%. This is due to 44% of taxpayers who were reviewed in 2024 achieving an overall high assurance rating.
    • 59% of taxpayers attained medium assurance (down from 65%) and we only have 4% of the population with a low assurance rating, which remains relatively constant compared to previous years. This usually occurs where we see an absence of evidence of a governance framework, combined with a low assurance rating for the GAT, and specific issues of concern with low assurance or red flags.
    • At the conclusion of the review, if we have identified areas of concern, we will either provide recommendations for the taxpayer to undertake (including a client next action, where we typically make recommendations and require the taxpayer to advise us of what they have done to address our recommendations) or we may consider intervention through a formalised ATO next actions product. In 2024, approximately 2% of taxpayers were escalated for a further ATO action for GST via a risk review or audit.

    We are also seeing marked improvements in GST governance. We rate GST governance using stage ratings. At least a stage 2 rating, which means your documented GST control framework exists and has been designed effectively, is required to obtain overall high assurance.

    For Top 100 taxpayers:

    • 56% attained a stage 2 or stage 3 rating for GST governance – which is an increase from 45% as at 30 June 2023.
    • Stage 3 was achieved by 9% of GST reporters reviewed, meaning that the documented GST control framework is both designed and operating effectively in practice.

    For Top 1000 taxpayers:

    • 42% attained a stage 2 or 3 rating, which was an increase from 35% in 2023. This positive shift reflects that for those reviewed in 2024, 50% achieved a stage 2 or 3 rating for GST governance.
    • Governance continues to be the main reason that taxpayers are prevented from achieving an overall high assurance rating in the Top 1000 program, with 40% of those achieving medium assurance prevented from high assurance solely due to their stage 1 governance rating.

    We also continue to see improvements in GST Analytical Tool, or GAT ratings, with the majority of taxpayers being able to reconcile the accounting and GST results and explain any differences with reference to objective evidence. A stage 2 or 3 GAT rating was attained by 86% of taxpayers in the Top 100. In the Top 1000, the majority of taxpayers achieved a high assurance rating for the GAT, with 74% of taxpayers able to reconcile the accounting and GST results and able to explain any differences with reference to objective evidence.

    The GAT is a useful tool for taxpayers to check how their various streams of economic activity are treated for GST purposes and have confidence in relation to their GST outcomes. Taxpayers are encouraged to embed the GAT as part of their own governance processes.

    Errors and amendments

    Notwithstanding improvements in governance and tax control frameworks, we continue to see a significant rate of voluntary disclosures of GST errors with the root cause being deficiencies in governance controls and systems.

    In the Top 1000, about 40% of combined assurance reviews carried out in 2024 involved a voluntary disclosure for GST – either at the notification of the review, or throughout the review. For the voluntary disclosures we received in our Top 1000 reviews in the 2024 financial year, almost 30% of those taxpayers had previously made a voluntary disclosure when they had been subject to a prior review in our Top 1000 program, with some of those being disclosures for the same issue previously identified (with penalties being applied as appropriate).

    In the Top 100, about 44% of the completed reviews had issues or concerns with correct reporting of GST obligations. The amounts of these errors were commonly not material in dollar terms. However, in some cases the amounts of errors were large and, in a small number of cases, failure to take reasonable care penalties applied due to the taxpayer’s circumstances.

    Where errors are identified, we focus on understanding how the error occurred and reviewing the taxpayer’s processes and procedures to make sure they are designed effectively to prevent the error from recurring.

    We acknowledge even taxpayers that have a strong governance framework in place will have errors from time to time. Whilst a voluntary disclosure may be an indication of a good governance process to detect errors, the timing of these indicate that it is not necessarily happening as a result of the governance processes in place, but rather as a result of our review notification.  In some cases, we also see recurrent errors being made.

    We see best practice processes where businesses have a process for detecting and remediating errors on a regular basis, not just as a result of ATO contact. We encourage all businesses to embed such processes. If the ATO is to lessen the intensity through the justified trust program, we need to be confident that businesses have got appropriate processes in place to address these issues.

    As you would be aware, the Commissioner has published draft guidance on Division 93 of the GST Act earlier this year, which is about the four-year time limit on claiming input tax credits or fuel tax credits.

    You should actively consider Division 93 when periods are close to the expiry of the 4-year entitlement period, given that putting in an amendment request is not sufficient for input tax credits to be taken into account in an assessment. That is, the amendment request actually needs to be processed by the ATO within the 4-year limit.

    If you are submitting an amendment request for periods close to the expiry of the 4-year period, I encourage you to proactively consider the application of Division 93 in the circumstances. We strongly recommend that you not wait until year 4 and do sweeps much more frequently to reduce the potential impact.

    If you are making the voluntary disclosure to one of our case teams, it will take our case teams some time to consider the requests. We also may require evidence to verify the entitlement to the additional input tax credits. We also appreciate that in many cases taxpayers may wish to engage with the team prior to finalising amendments to protect against penalties, which is a practice we encourage – but you should be conscious of, and proactively raise, any periods that are close to expiry of the four-year period. Again, we encourage you not to leave this to the last year.

    In circumstances where taxpayers seek to change long standing positions to uplift GST recovery, you can expect this will attract additional scrutiny – for instance where an apportionment methodology is changed for periods to increase the rates claimed. You can expect that this will likely take us longer to review and may require further engagement and information from you. You should factor this into your timeframes.

    Just as the Division 93 Miscellaneous tax ruling raises issues for taxpayers to consider, there are also aspects that the ATO will need to consider in our compliance activities. In those cases where there may be additional liabilities and additional input tax credits may also arise, there may be a reluctance of taxpayers to provide an extension to the period of review. This is perhaps understandable if the taxpayer is at risk of the ATO making adjustments, and for those periods there is no legal basis for the Commissioner to give the taxpayer any GST credits that they would otherwise have been entitled to as a result of the audit adjustment. In these cases, both the ATO and the taxpayer will need to co-operate to ensure timely and efficient resolution of issues.

    GST risk focus areas

    Financial services and insurance

    We continue to have a focus on financial services and insurance to ensure compliance with the specific provisions that apply in this area. The types of issues we have recently seen that cause us concern are:

    • ‘Set and forget’ approaches to apportionment models without consideration of whether the method is fair and reasonable, or in relation to claiming reduced input tax credits based on general ledger codes, without conducting periodic self-review transactional analysis.
    • We’ve also observed that while financial institutions generally are within the green zone (low risk) of PCG 2019/8, we continue to have concerns with a small number who adopt high risk positions in their apportionment methodologies, including continual use of retrospective amendments for earlier periods to uplift their claims.
    • Lack of understanding and controls to identify reverse charge transactions is also a concern. In this regard we highlight our guidance on the ATO’s expectations around controls to ensure correct application of these provisions and examples of best practice that can be adopted.
    • For super funds, an example of an issue we have seen is the inappropriate allocation of administrator costs to investment activities leading to excessive input tax recovery.
    • For general insurers, we have seen issues with a lack of controls around decreasing adjustments – for instance to ensure these are only claimed on taxable policies where the insured does not have full entitlement to input tax credits.
    • We continue to see errors where large businesses fail to undertake the financial acquisitions threshold test monthly, and do not correctly recover input tax credits on costs related to significant and unusual transactions such as takeovers.

    Generally, we encourage taxpayers in the financial services and insurance industry to review the relevant practical guidance we have issued. This includes considering the use of the GST data tests for the financial services and insurance industry as part of reviewing the correctness of GST reporting – these are also the ones we incorporate into our reviews.

    Touching on one point raised earlier in the conference, we do want to urge caution around market views on the application of the appeal decision of the Full Federal Court in Commissioner of Taxation v Hannover Life Re of Australasia Ltd.

    That appeal, in relation to overheads, was decided on the particular unchallenged facts and evidence before the Court. The legal analysis adopted in respect to considering the application of Division 11 remains consistent with the ATO’s conventional understanding of relevant legal precedent on the topic. In particular:

    • it is necessary to consider the precise nature of the relationship between an acquisition and related supplies when determining creditable purpose
    • the fact that an input taxed supply is interdependent, and cannot be made without a GST-free or taxable supply also being made, or that other supplies may arise automatically as a result of the making of an input taxed supply, will not of itself determine the creditable purpose of the relevant acquisition.

    The ATO does not consider that any published guidance or advice need be changed in light of the decision. That is the ATO considers the outcome results in a ‘business as usual’ outcome. For instance, we do not agree there is any broader impact in relation to apportionment for credit cards, or for super funds. We encourage taxpayers to read our Decision Impact Statement for the decision.

    Taxpayers will continue to need to consider the extent to which particular acquisitions relate to input taxed supplies, and to the extent apportionment is required, their apportionment models should appropriately adhere to the relevant legal principles in determining any applied extent of credible purpose rate. To try and emulate the conclusions of the Hannover case in relation to ‘overheads’, without consideration of the relationship between particular acquisitions and supplies, may result in an overclaiming of GST.

    The ATO does not consider that the decision offers any judicial justification for any substantially new apportionment method for ‘overheads’. Accordingly, taxpayers should be wary of any claim that the case can permit a material uplift in GST recovery, even if their circumstances have some similarities to the Hannover case. Such an approach may risk a shortfall occurring.

    We also encourage taxpayers to take note of our recent guidance (PDF 107KB) This link will download a file around the eligibility of super funds and investor-directed portfolio services investment platforms to claim reduced input tax credits on adviser fees.

    Product classification

    As our colleague Andrea Wood discussed earlier today, the ATO has been working to provide public advice and guidance on priority food and health product classification issues, with the aim of providing certainty and stability to the industry.

    We recently published a further draft of our Determination on food of a kind marketed as a prepared meal. This incorporates a practical compliance approach to assist taxpayers in determining whether or not certain salad products are food of a kind marketed as a prepared meal. This incorporates threshold tests that refer to objective attributes involving size and composition.

    We’ve developed this approach to address industry feedback that more practical guidance is needed to provide certainty on how to correctly classify these products. We have released the guidance on prepared meals in draft because we recognise this is a new approach and we are seeking industry feedback. This forms part of a layered approach to provide certainty to the market – including principled public advice and guidance, and detailed food list updates that cover more specific categories of products.

    There has been significant work and consultation in providing ATO public advice and guidance to ensure clarity on priority issues involving food and health products – including the guidance on combination foods, and sunscreen products, and upcoming guidance on formula products.

    We have also published a webpage that we will regularly update with emerging GST issues for food and health products, to promote consistency and give the industry early insights into practical issues we are observing.

    The product classification cluster has also published a self-review guide and checklist to assist taxpayers in the industry to undertake regular self-reviews of their GST classification, which I strongly encourage all industry participants to use as part of reviewing the GST classification of their food and health products.

    We expect that in future we will undertake further compliance activity to ensure consistent adoption of the views in ATO guidance once finalised – likely in the form of targeted mailouts focusing on manufacturers and wholesalers.

    We work to ensure consistency across the market, and encourage taxpayers to review our recent guidance to ensure they have appropriate governance controls to ensure correct classification of products.

    Property, construction and retirement villages

    We have had a focus on ensuring a good understanding of what risks arise in the property, construction and retirement village segments of the public and multinational market, through both our assurance programs and risk-based engagements.

    In particular we have had a recent focus on build to rent developments – we have observed that taxpayers are treating the relevant supplies as being input taxed in line with our expectations, and the main issues arising have involved adjustments (for instance, failure to make adjustments under Division 135 when a property is acquired as a GST-free going concern).

    We will continue to engage with taxpayers across a variety of business models – including purpose built student accommodation, retirement villages, accommodation providers and hybrid property types.

    Correct reporting

    In addition to our assurance programs, we engage in a targeted way where we potential correct reporting risks may arise (for instance, in the gambling industry under Division 126 and the sharing economy), or in relation to refunds that may be high risk.

    While we have observed some improvements following the release of the relevant legislative instrument in 2023, we continue to have concerns about situations where recipient created tax invoices are issued without appropriate agreements, or issued to the incorrect supplier or to suppliers who are no longer GST-registered, or in some cases were never GST-registered. These issues can lead to GST shortfalls.

    International GST

    Another one of our risk focus areas is ensuring that Australian GST obligations are being met by offshore entities making supplies to Australian consumers.

    Since the introduction of the laws that require offshore supplies of digital products and services, and low value imported goods, to register and remit GST on these supplies, we have collected $7.8 billion in revenue. In the 2024 financial year, we collected $1.6 billion in revenue, which was a 14.7% increase from the prior year.

    We currently have 2,685 non-residents registered under these measures, which is also a 13.8% increase from the prior year.

    We are making better use of data, particularly banking data, to improve our holistic understanding of the offshore population and tailoring our risk treatment strategies to obtain greater assurance that offshore businesses who fall within the Australian GST regime are registered, are lodging, and paying the correct amount of GST.

    Our leadership in OECD Working Party 9 (WP9) on Consumption Tax allows us to play a significant role in global collaboration to better understand the impact of global digitalisation and develop administrative best practice to address fraud and non-compliance in digital trade. We will continue to leverage our strong domestic and global relationships to support multilateral arrangements that enable the exchange of crucial GST information such as payment data, enhanced intelligence sharing, and compliance insights through international administrative cooperation. This will allow us to bridge critical data gaps and more efficiently and effectively manage international GST risks.

    The role of advisors

    I want to touch on the role that advisors play in the system. The Commissioner in his keynote address earlier today recognised the important role that advisors play in supporting taxpayers to meet their tax obligations.

    The ATO has been focussed on the role of advisors in supporting large business. This includes initiatives such as the Large Market Advisor Principles, which we facilitated by working closely with the big 4 advisory firms. These principles provide an objective and transparent basis against which firms, their clients and the community, can be confident that the firms are not engaged in marketing or promotion of tax avoidance or other high-risk arrangements. All firms offering tax advisory services may choose to adopt the principles and we actively encourage firms to do so.

    The ATO’s focus is not limited to advisors in the large-market and we have dedicated programs in other business lines. We work closely with other lines and co-ordinate our actions in relation to advisors working across markets. For us this is predominantly the Private Wealth line.

    Most tax professionals act in a way that supports the integrity of the tax system. However, we’ll act quickly where we detect advisors who undermine the integrity of the system or facilitate non-compliance by large business. Whilst we are not the regulator of the tax profession, we have teams with responsibility for monitoring and addressing advisor behaviours.

    Ultimately, we’re interested in tax risk. In this respect, we are agnostic as to which advisor a business may choose. However, if an advisor is directly linked to possible facilitation and promotion of tax schemes or is influencing their clients to adopt high risk tax positions, we will take action. This may include seeking the client list of the advisor and using that as a basis for determining the targets of our compliance activity. In this way, we can shut down schemes more quickly and effectively.

    An important part of our approach to large business is to provide transparency to taxpayers on our risk parameters. This includes working with the tax profession to explain areas of concern at an early stage, to support them in providing appropriate advice to taxpayers. This enables taxpayers to make informed decisions about their levels of compliance risk. Our goal is to only have taxpayers entering into disputes with us where they know what our position is and have made a conscious decision to operate contrary to it.

    We accept that there will be differences of opinion on the operation of the law. However, we expect advisors to clearly articulate the risk of dispute with the ATO to their clients when providing advice. This is consistent with the principles in the Large Market Advisor Principles and other professional obligations such as the recent Revisions to the Code Addressing Tax Planning and Related ServicesExternal Link released by the International Ethical Standards Board for AccountantsExternal Link.

    Behaviours we have seen that cause us concern for GST include practitioners who advise clients to claim refunds without appropriate evidence to substantiate the claims or which are contrary to published ATO views without making their client fully aware of the tax technical and tax administrative risks of that course, and even in some cases, that it might not align with (or be directly contrary to) the client’s tax governance and tax risk policies. We note that commonly such arrangements are associated with retrospective input tax credit claims, with the adviser’s fees being calculated as a percentage of GST refund received. 

    Whilst not illegal, these business models bring high levels of risk for businesses. We have long been concerned with the exercise of “grave digging”. We have an even greater level of concern when there is a lack of substantiation and taxpayers seemingly are not advised of the legal and compliance risk associated with the activities.

    We have also observed issues with independence requirements of initiatives in our justified trust program. In an attempt to help businesses, we introduced an initiative that allowed businesses to engage an independent agent to conduct data testing as an alternative to the ATO doing this. Engaging an advisor on a contingency fee basis in these circumstances represents a clear conflict of interest and cannot be independent. We have since updated our guidance to reflect this.

    The solution is not to put in place arrangements that seemingly separate the ‘grave digging’ activity from the independent data testing engagement. We will not accept these engagements as being independent either.

    We want to actively support the vast bulk of advisors that are doing the right thing and prevent those operating in the grey space from gaining a commercial advantage. We recognise the important work that tax professionals do in supporting large business GST compliance, and we value the strong relationships we have with the profession. This includes your engagement with us in the development of our approaches via consultation. We will continue to invest in growing this partnership.

    Introducing the supplementary annual GST return

    As our programs gain maturity and we continue to see the embedding of positive behaviours, in particular improved governance and systems controls, being embedded in business we are able to move toward a new phase for our justified trust programs.

    A key part of our vision for future engagement with the market is the introduction of the supplementary annual GST return. We recently announced the introduction of this return following consultation with the Large Business Stewardship Group and other stakeholders.

    The return allows us to collect information from business that allows us to more readily identify changes in business and GST positions. As we have again noted today, governance and systems is the key risk for most businesses in the large market. Having observed improvements in this aspect, are considering moving to a more targeted risk-based type approach for suitable taxpayers. However, we first need to be confident that the relevant standards are maintained.

    The return will allow us to monitor this without having to conduct one on one engagements for all taxpayers. The good news for highly compliant businesses is that if you maintain your standard and lodge the return, you can reduce the likelihood of intensive justified trust reviews. For some in the Top 1000 program, you may not be selected for a justified trust review for GST.

    The return is straightforward to complete and targeted at understanding how taxpayers have actioned recommendations from our earlier review, and key updates on governance and GST compliance for the year. It will also effectively give a single view of GST risk for the entity in a similar way to how the Reportable Tax Position Schedule gives a view of key corporate tax risks to the organisation and the ATO.

    Information requested

    We have recently provided detailed guidance and a copy of the return on our website.

    The way the supplementary annual GST return is designed to work, where we obtain a baseline level of assurance over a taxpayer as part of our assurance programs, and we can maintain the level of confidence that we have in the taxpayer’s investment in correct reporting and GST governance through the supplementary annual GST return, we can use this to tailor our future engagement.

    There are five parts to the return:

    • how the entity has actioned recommendations, areas of low assurance or red flags outlined by the ATO in their most recent GST assurance review (including any subsequent interactions with us)
    • whether the entity has maintained or increased their level of GST governance, and any material business changes or material systems changes impacting their GST control framework since their last GST assurance review
    • the reconciliation between the entity’s audited financial statements and annualised business activity statements
    • whether the entity has taken any material uncertain GST positions in the period – this includes positions which are about as likely to be correct as incorrect, even if they are reasonably arguable, positions contrary to an ATO public ruling or other ATO public advice and guidance, contrary to a private ruling, or to which an ATO Taxpayer alert or moderate or high risk rating under a Practical Compliance Guideline apply
    • and finally, whether the entity has identified any material GST errors in the period and how these have been rectified, and whether the entity has claimed any material amounts of input tax credits in the period that were referable to earlier periods due to a change in GST treatment.

    How we will use the information

    For Top 100 taxpayers, we will use the information to:

    • monitor your GST disclosures and outcomes in the intervening 3 years between assurance reviews, and
    • inform the scope and intensity of our GST assurance reviews, including refresh reviews.

    As we complete some more refresh reviews for this population over the coming 12 months, we will be able to better assess whether positive behaviours, and in particular improvements to governance, remain embedded within business. Assuming this level of confidence increases, we see opportunity for an even greater role for return in determining the level of our investment in the justified trust program in this population.

    For Top 1000 taxpayers:

    • Under our differentiated approach to Combined Assurance Reviews, we’ll assess the responses to the returns to determine the level of intensity for the next GST assurance review.
    • This may result in a less intensive GST assurance review or we may decide that a GST assurance review is not required, where the following requirements are met:
      • the taxpayer has obtained an overall medium or high assurance rating for GST
      • a stage 2 or 3 GST governance rating in their most recent assurance review
      • there are no unresolved ATO or client next actions, and
      • where the information provided in the return enables us to maintain confidence that their investment in GST governance is maintained and that GST is correctly reported.
    • Taxpayers who obtained an overall low GST assurance rating or a stage 1 GST governance rating will be subject to a GST assurance review when selected under our Combined Assurance Review program.

    Timing of lodgment

    To help support full implementation of this new requirement, we will undertake a pilot of the return with a small number of Top 100 and Top 1000 taxpayers as part of their assurance reviews. This will enable us to test the usability of the questions as part of their assurance reviews prior to the broader roll-out. If you are part of this group, we will reach out to you soon.

    All taxpayers who received a GST assurance review report by 30 June 2024 will need to lodge annually from the 2025 financial year. The key due dates for the first lodgments for the 2025 financial year include 21 August 2025 for December balancers, and 21 February 2026 for June balancers.

    You’ll be required to lodge a Supplementary annual GST return for the 2024–25 financial year if you received one of the following on or before 30 June 2024:

    • Top 100 GST Assurance Report
    • Top 1,000 Combined Assurance Review report with a GST assurance rating
    • Top 1,000 GST Streamlined Assurance Review.

    We will have a direct communication campaign to notify those who need to lodge. I encourage you to read our webpage material and to raise any questions with us at SAGR@ato.gov.au.

    Moving forward, as we assure additional taxpayers under our programs, they will be required to lodge a return starting from the financial year following the financial year you received your GST assurance report. The introduction of the return emphasises the benefits of obtaining higher assurance ratings in the initial assurance review, as in combination with the information provided annually, this puts the entity in the best position for streamlined future engagement with us for GST.

    Conclusion

    Reflecting on the last five years, the ATO and large business have made substantial progress in being able to demonstrate and improve GST compliance. The ATO has invested heavily in key initiatives that provide greater and better targeted tax certainty for large businesses (including in relation to governance and tax frameworks). We are observing strong positive signs (and in some cases improvements) of compliance. As a result, we are starting to envisage the future of GST compliance for large business, one where the intensity and in some case frequency of our justified trust reviews can be lessened. However, for this to occur we need objective evidence of high levels of compliance, we need to be confident these levels can be sustained, and we need information that will allow us to monitor ongoing GST performance. We continue to encourage large business to help us achieve this.

    MIL OSI News –

  • MIL-OSI Australia: eInvoicing-enabled entities

    Source: Australian Department of Revenue

    These Australian Government entities are registered on the Peppol network. They appear on the Peppol Directory along with hundreds of state, territory and local government organisations, and thousands of other Australian businesses who can receive eInvoices.

    If you supply to any of the entities listed below and can send eInvoices you may be paid faster. For more information visit Getting PaidExternal Link on the Department of Finance’s website or talk to your contract manager in the Government entity about any specific requirements.

    Australian Government entities able to receive eInvoices

    ABN

    Entity name

    73 147 176 148

    Administrative Review Tribunal

    80 246 994 451

    Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission

    50 802 255 175

    Asbestos and Silica Safety and Eradication Agency

    92 661 124 436

    Attorney-General’s Department

    26 331 428 522

    Australian Bureau of Statistics

    34 864 955 427

    Australian Centre for International Agriculture Research

    54 488 464 865

    Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission

    97 250 687 371

    Australian Commission on Safety and Quality In Health Care

    55 386 169 386

    Australian Communications and Media Authority

    94 410 483 623

    Australian Competition & Consumer Commission

    11 259 448 410

    Australian Crime Commission

    84 425 496 912

    Australian Digital Health Agency

    21 133 285 851

    Australian Electoral Commission

    17 864 931 143

    Australian Federal Police

    19 892 732 021

    Australian Film Television & Radio School

    63 384 330 717

    Australian Financial Security Authority

    81 098 497 517

    Australian Fisheries Management Authority

    69 405 937 639

    Australian Government Solicitor

    47 996 232 602

    Australian Human Rights Commission

    31 162 998 046

    Australian Industrial Chemicals Introduction Scheme

    63 257 175 248

    Australian Institute of Criminology

    64 001 053 079

    Australian Institute of Family Studies

    65 377 938 320

    Australian Maritime Safety Authority

    33 020 645 631

    Australian National Audit Office

    13 059 525 039

    Australian Office of Financial Management

    56 253 405 315

    Australian Organ & Tissue Donation and Transplantation Authority

    79 635 582 658

    Australian Prudential Regulation Authority

    99 470 863 260

    Australian Public Service Commission

    61 321 195 155

    Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA)

    35 931 927 899

    Australian Renewable Energy Agency

    35 201 451 156

    Australian Research Council

    86 768 265 615

    Australian Securities & Investments Commission

    37 467 566 201

    Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

    22 323 254 583

    Australian Signals Directorate

    72 581 678 650

    Australian Skills Quality Authority

    67 374 695 240

    Australian Sports Commission

    67 250 046 148

    Australian Submarine Agency

    51 824 753 556

    Australian Taxation Office

    11 764 698 227

    Australian Trade and Investment Commission

    32 770 513 371

    Australian Transaction Reports & Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC)

    65 061 156 887

    Australian Transport Safety Bureau

    64 909 221 257

    Australian War Memorial

    92 637 533 532

    Bureau of Meteorology

    21 075 951 918

    Cancer Australia

    44 808 014 470

    Civil Aviation Safety Authority

    43 669 904 352

    Clean Energy Finance Corporation

    72 321 984 210

    Clean Energy Regulator

    60 585 018 782

    Climate Change Authority

    41 640 788 304

    Comcare Australia

    64 703 642 210

    Commonwealth Grants Commission

    34 190 894 983

    Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

    68 706 814 312

    Department of Defence

    69 289 134 420

    Department of Defence Army & Air Force Canteen Service

    12 862 898 150

    Department of Education

    96 584 957 427

    Department of Employment and Workplace Relations

    61 970 632 495

    Department of Finance

    47 065 634 525

    Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade

    83 605 426 759

    Department of Health and Aged Care

    33 380 054 835

    Department of Home Affairs

    74 599 608 295

    Department of Industry, Science and Resources

    86 267 354 017

    Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts

    52 997 141 147

    Department of Parliamentary Services

    36 342 015 855

    Department of Social Services

    18 526 287 740

    Department of the House of Representatives

    49 775 240 532

    Department of the Parliamentary Budget Office

    23 991 641 527

    Department of the Senate

    92 802 414 793

    Department of the Treasury

    23 964 290 824

    Department of Veterans’ Affairs & the Repatriation Commission and the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission

    96 257 979 159

    Digital Transformation Agency

    13 051 694 963

    Director of National Parks

    99 696 833 561

    Domestic, Family and Sexual Violence Commission

    12 212 931 598

    eSafety Commissioner

    93 614 579 199

    Fair Work Commission

    49 110 847 399

    Federal Court of Australia

    20 537 066 246

    Food Standards Australia New Zealand

    40 465 597 854

    Future Fund Board of Guardians

    53 156 699 293

    Future Fund Management Agency

    80 091 799 039

    Geoscience Australia

    12 949 356 885

    Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority

    27 598 959 960

    Independent Health and Aged Care Pricing Authority

    26 424 781 530

    Independent Parliamentary Expenses Authority

    59 912 679 254

    Indigenous Land and Sea Corporation

    51 248 702 319

    Inspector-General of Taxation

    38 113 072 755

    IP Australia

    13 679 821 382

    Murray-Darling Basin Authority

    47 446 409 542

    National Anti-Corruption Commission

    36 889 228 992

    National Archives of Australia

    87 361 602 478

    National Blood Authority

    75 149 374 427

    National Capital Authority

    56 552 760 098

    National Competition Council

    25 617 475 104

    National Disability Insurance Agency

    40 816 261 802

    National Emergency Management Agency

    27 855 975 449

    National Gallery of Australia

    88 601 010 284

    National Health and Medical Research Council

    15 337 761 242

    National Health Funding Body

    30 429 895 164

    National Indigenous Australians Agency

    22 385 178 289

    National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority

    67 890 861 578

    National Transport Commission

    72 581 678 650

    National Vocational Education and Training Regulator

    40 293 545 182

    NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission

    61 900 398 761

    North Queensland Water Infrastructure Authority

    87 904 367 991

    Office of National Intelligence

    41 425 630 817

    Office of Parliamentary Counsel

    80 959 780 601

    Office of the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board

    92 702 019 575

    Office of the Australian Accounting Standards Board

    85 249 230 937

    Office of the Australian Information Commissioner

    53 003 678 148

    Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman

    41 036 606 436

    Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions

    43 884 188 232

    Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman

    15 862 053 538

    Office of the Gene Technology Regulator

    27 478 662 745

    Office Of the Inspector-General of Aged Care

    67 332 668 643

    Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence & Security

    67 582 329 284

    Office of the Official Secretary to the Governor-General

    87 767 208 148

    Office of the Special Investigator

    30 620 774 963

    Old Parliament House

    78 094 372 050

    Productivity Commission

    45 307 308 260

    Professional Services Review

    99 528 049 038

    Regional Investment Corporation

    45 852 104 259

    Royal Australian Mint

    25 203 754 319

    Rural Industries Research & Development Corporation

    81 840 374 163

    Safe Work Australia

    46 741 353 180

    Screen Australia

    32 745 854 352

    Seafarers Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Authority

    90 794 605 008

    Services Australia

    17 090 574 431

    Snowy Hydro Limited

    91 314 398 574

    Special Broadcasting Service Corporation

    70 588 505 483

    Sport Integrity Australia

    50 658 250 012

    Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency

    18 108 001 191

    The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

    40 939 406 804

    Therapeutic Goods Administration

    57 155 285 807

    Torres Strait Regional Authority

    47 641 643 874

    Workplace Gender Equality Agency

    MIL OSI News –

  • MIL-OSI: Bitget lists Piggy Piggy Coin (PGC) on Pre-market for Advance Trading Orders

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VICTORIA, Seychelles, Oct. 24, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) —

    Bitget, the leading cryptocurrency exchange and Web3 company, has announced the listing of PiggyPiggy Coin (PGC) in its Pre-market allowing users to place buy and sell orders prior to its launch. The pre-market period started on October 22nd, 2024, 10:00 (UTC), with spot trading beginning shortly after. This early trading option is designed to give users an opportunity to participate in the PCG market prior to its full availability.

    Bitget’s pre-market trading platform allows users to engage in over-the-counter transactions of new tokens before their official listing. This feature offers a peer-to-peer marketplace where buyers and sellers can negotiate prices, facilitating advanced liquidity and strategic investment opportunities. Participants can secure coins at favorable prices, allowing for optimized investments without the immediate need for sellers to possess the coins.

    PiggyPiggy Coin (PGC), produced by FunKing Studio, is launching its first token, $PPT, through a highly developed TG Bot-based mini-game that offers 100% token airdrops. Players can earn a daily minimum salary of $2, with higher earnings available by inviting friends. The project has significant traffic, with over 57K Twitter followers and strong engagement across Telegram channels. FunKing Studio has reportedly secured $3 million in equity investment from prominent firms like IDG Capital, KuCoin Ventures, Opta, and Sportsbet.

    Bitget’s introduction of PGC through its pre-market mechanism shows the platform’s strategy to provide users early access to emerging blockchain projects. This early engagement benefits both the token’s market exposure and user participation, making it an integral part of Bitget’s expanding crypto ecosystem.

    Bitget has established itself as one of the leading crypto spot trading platforms, offering a diverse selection of over 800 coins and more than 900 trading pairs across various ecosystems, including Ethereum, Solana, Base, and recently, TON. The pre-market platform, launched in April 2024, has facilitated early access to over 150 high-profile projects such as EigenLayer (EIGEN), Zerolend (ZERO), Notcoin (NOT), and ZkSync (ZKSYNC), providing a unique opportunity for investors to engage with emerging tokens at an early stage. The addition of PGC to this lineup further enhances Bitget’s commitment to offering users access to promising Web3 projects.

    PGC’s introduction on Bitget’s platform signifies a growing interest in Telegram-based projects that incorporate both gaming mechanics and financial elements, creating a symbiotic relationship between entertainment and decentralized finance. This listing is expected to attract a diverse range of participants, from avid gamers to crypto enthusiasts, who are eager to explore and invest in the evolving landscape of blockchain.

    For more information on PGC, please visit here.

    About Bitget

    Established in 2018, Bitget is the world’s leading cryptocurrency exchange and Web3 company. Serving over 45 million users in 150+ countries and regions, the Bitget exchange is committed to helping users trade smarter with its pioneering copy trading, AI bot and other trading solutions. Bitget Wallet is a world-class multi-chain crypto wallet that offers an array of comprehensive Web3 solutions and features including wallet functionality, swap, NFT Marketplace, DApp browser, and more. Bitget inspires individuals to embrace crypto through collaborations with credible partners, including being the Official Crypto Partner of the World’s Top Professional Football League, LALIGA, in EASTERN, SEA and LATAM, as well as a global partner of Olympic Athletes Buse Tosun Çavuşoğlu (Wrestling world champion), Samet Gümüş (Boxing gold medalist) and İlkin Aydın (Volleyball national team).

    For more information, users can visit: Website | Twitter | Telegram | LinkedIn | Discord | Bitget Wallet

    For media inquiries, users can contact: media@bitget.com

    Risk Warning: Digital asset prices may fluctuate and experience price volatility. Only invest what you can afford to lose. The value of your investment may be impacted and it is possible that you may not achieve your financial goals or be able to recover your principal investment. You should always seek independent financial advice and consider your own financial experience and financial standing. Past performance is not a reliable measure of future performance. Bitget shall not be liable for any losses you may incur. Nothing here shall be construed as financial advice.

    Contact

    Public Relations
    Simran A
    Bitget
    media@bitget.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Financial Services Authority sets out its strategic plans

    Source: Isle of Man

    The Isle of Man Financial Services Authority has set out its intentions to drive continuous improvement in the Island’s regulatory environment.

    The Strategic Plan 2024-2027, published online today (Thursday 24 October 2024), highlights the priority initiatives that will be progressed over the next three years. Following a period of significant development, the Authority’s focus is on embedding its updated approach to supervision, maximising its use of data and developing its people.

    The theme is one of evolution, with the strategic plan identifying workstreams that support the objectives of protecting consumers, reducing financial crime and maintaining confidence in the finance sector through effective regulation. Officers will also continue to make an important contribution towards preparations for the Isle of Man’s next MONEYVAL evaluation.

    Where internal efficiencies and greater automation create additional capacity, projects will be progressed that the Authority believes will add real purpose and value for its stakeholders.

    The strategy, which has been shaped by feedback from Island firms to the 2023 industry survey, outlines high-level plans under the three strategic pillars of Infrastructure, Frameworks and People. The proposals will:

    • Strengthen organisational resilience and maximise the benefits of technology
    • Improve stakeholder engagement, and support a thriving, innovative and sustainable finance sector
    • Encourage a culture of excellence at the Authority

    Lillian Boyle, Chair of the Authority’s Board, said: ‘The Strategic Plan 2024-2027 aims to be both realistic and ambitious, setting out our immediate priorities and the matters we intend to address in the next three years. We believe that articulating our priorities serves to explain the Authority’s direction of travel, supports a collaborative approach with industry and enables Island firms to plan for the future with confidence.’

    The implementation of the strategy will be overseen at executive level by Bettina Roth whose position as Chief Executive of the Authority has been extended by the Board until the autumn of 2027. This will enhance the stability of the Authority’s leadership team to support the delivery of key initiatives.

    Mrs Roth added: ‘The world is changing at a relentless pace so it is essential to have the flexibility to deal with fresh challenges. Being nimble and having the ability to adapt our plans where necessary is critical if we are to seize opportunities for economic growth, while mitigating potential threats. We will provide periodic updates and statistics to outline the progress of our stated commitments and highlight any emerging areas of focus.’

    The Strategic Plan 2024-2027 is available to view on the publications section of the Authority’s website.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group seeks local power in DRC, not just control over mining operations

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ken Matthysen, Researcher, IPIS

    The violence wrought by the Rwandan-backed rebel group M23 Movement is often narrowly framed as intended to control eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’s resource-rich mining sites. The rebel group launched its most recent offensive in 2021 and currently controls vast territories in the south-east of North Kivu province, surrounding and cutting off the main city of Goma.

    Eastern DR Congo mines produce crucial raw materials such as tin, tantalum and tungsten, as well as abundant quantities of gold. It therefore seems logical to reduce explanations of conflict to the ambition by M23, and Rwanda behind it, to control the mines directly.

    We belong to a team of researchers who examine the various dimensions of conflict from different perspectives. Our findings, based on fieldwork and conducted in collaboration with in-country experts, show that this popular analysis does not paint the full picture.

    Conflict analysis often ignores historical and local dimensions. Our investigation with the Goma-based civil society organisation Association pour le Développement des Initiatives Paysannes therefore explored the local stakes and impacts of the M23 crisis. We interviewed more than 55 people in North Kivu (DR Congo), including members of M23, as well as soldiers and armed groups fighting them, local chiefs, state agents, teachers, taximen, traders and farmers who live on the frontline of the conflict.

    Our research reveals that M23 employs a more profound strategy to boost its position and military strength (through Rwandan support) in local struggles over land, authority and rents. M23’s disruptive strategy aims to replace Congolese authorities and overhaul local governance in areas it controls in eastern DR Congo. Key to this strategy is:

    • undermining and replacing local (customary) authorities

    • taking over strategic trade routes

    • the installation of an elaborate taxation regime.

    These strategies also allow M23 – and Rwanda – to generate revenues from the local economy, including rents from DR Congo’s mineral wealth, without necessarily directly controlling mines.

    Historical struggles over land

    Interviewees attached great importance to the historical context of the M23 conflict, explaining how struggles over land date back to independence in 1960. Going back to the 1930s and 1940s, the Belgian colonial administrators already organised large movements of migrant workers from Rwanda to work on plantations in DR Congo. The Rwandophone migrants and their descendants settled in North Kivu, becoming part of the local population.

    After independence, Hutu and Tutsi (Rwandophone) communities began to jostle for control over North Kivu’s fertile farmland with the Hunde and Nyanga communities there. As grievances over access to land and property rights increased, Rwandophone communities were stigmatised as “non-indigenous” and their land claims as illegitimate.

    As the Congo Wars broke out in the 1990s, people began seeking recourse to armed groups to settle land conflicts. Before the rise of M23 in 2012, two other groups (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie and later Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple) rose to protect the Rwandophone population in eastern DRC. They also grabbed and sold vast concessions of land – held by the state or other communities – to allied farmers and business people. These were typically from the Tutsi community.

    Given the country’s complex and under-enforced land laws, land claims became exceedingly difficult to verify or prove. This has strengthened the belief that the only way to secure access to land is by resorting to armed groups. Thus, M23 is perceived as the guardian of the Tutsi community’s access to land.

    This perception is well illustrated by a testimony of a local leader in Masisi territory:

    The wars of the last three decades have been motivated by a struggle for control over land … Indigenous people are driven out, dispossessed of their land in favour of others who are considered foreigners and refugees. … the M23 is made up of (Tutsi) pastoralists … and there are fields that their rivals had seized … it was one of their (M23) first concerns to start exploiting them.

    Most Congolese Tutsi have not asked for this “protection” by M23. But the ensuing grievances and ethnic tensions will haunt the relations between communities for years to come.

    Struggles over customary authority

    In DR Congo, customary chiefs play an important role in local land governance. They also adjudicate conflicts, bind people together through rituals, and represent the symbolic claim by a specific community to a given place.

    Many Congolese we spoke to perceive M23’s main aim to be control of power at the local level — undermining the existing authorities. The group has indeed sought to replace customary authorities with M23-appointed ones, at times assassinating Congolese chiefs. Local sources said M23 even burnt chiefdom archives, destroying evidence of claims to customary authority.

    M23’s economic grip

    Wherever M23 has a foothold, it installs an elaborate taxation regime. This involves checkpoint tolls, household taxes, dues on business, harvest taxes and forced labour. In doing so, the group generates the revenues to sustain the conflict. But this also strengthens its politico-administrative hold on the population, as taxation is a symbolic interface of public authority.

    Local armed groups that joined with the Congolese army to combat M23 deepen the problem. Called wazalendo (“patriots”), they are often unpaid and therefore rely on payments from the population to sustain their counter-offensive. As a result, taxation in eastern Congo has become heavily “militiarised”. Taxed by government forces, wazalendo and M23, civilians pay a heavy toll.

    The military nature of local governance could jeopardise future efforts to bring peace to eastern DRC.

    What about minerals?

    M23 has an impact on all aspects of local governance in eastern DR Congo. It has found ways to control and profit from the local economy in North Kivu, including mineral supply chains. It operates checkpoints along arteries and taxes minerals smuggled to Rwanda, alongside other trade flows.

    Having M23 control strategic trade routes in DR Congo, including those crossing into Uganda, is a benefit for Rwanda. From Kigali’s perspective, the resurgence of M23 in 2021 came at a perfect time to block Uganda’s efforts to improve the road network in eastern DR Congo towards its own territory. Rwanda and Uganda are locked in intense competition for Congolese informal trade, re-exporting its timber and minerals as their own, gaining taxes and foreign earnings that ought to benefit the Congolese treasury and population.

    What must be done?

    DR Congo’s resources play a large role in the M23 conflict, but our study underscores the historical roots of the conflict and its profound local impacts. These findings should inform locally meaningful and sustainable conflict resolution strategies.

    Since the M23 revival, land access, trade and security have become increasingly mediated by armed actors. Even after a possible M23 defeat, it will take years of local dialogue and mediation to undo this involvement of militia in local governance, resolve land issues, repair inter-community relations and remake customary authority. But that’s the only way to reach sustainable peace in North Kivu.

    Ken Matthysen works for the International Peace Information Service (IPIS)

    This publication has been produced with the financial assistance of the Belgian Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (DGD). The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of IPIS and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the Belgian Development Cooperation.

    – ref. Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group seeks local power in DRC, not just control over mining operations – https://theconversation.com/rwandan-backed-m23-rebel-group-seeks-local-power-in-drc-not-just-control-over-mining-operations-231318

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group seeks local power in DRC, not just control over mining operations

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ken Matthysen, Researcher, IPIS

    The violence wrought by the Rwandan-backed rebel group M23 Movement is often narrowly framed as intended to control eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’s resource-rich mining sites. The rebel group launched its most recent offensive in 2021 and currently controls vast territories in the south-east of North Kivu province, surrounding and cutting off the main city of Goma.

    Eastern DR Congo mines produce crucial raw materials such as tin, tantalum and tungsten, as well as abundant quantities of gold. It therefore seems logical to reduce explanations of conflict to the ambition by M23, and Rwanda behind it, to control the mines directly.

    We belong to a team of researchers who examine the various dimensions of conflict from different perspectives. Our findings, based on fieldwork and conducted in collaboration with in-country experts, show that this popular analysis does not paint the full picture.

    Conflict analysis often ignores historical and local dimensions. Our investigation with the Goma-based civil society organisation Association pour le Développement des Initiatives Paysannes therefore explored the local stakes and impacts of the M23 crisis. We interviewed more than 55 people in North Kivu (DR Congo), including members of M23, as well as soldiers and armed groups fighting them, local chiefs, state agents, teachers, taximen, traders and farmers who live on the frontline of the conflict.

    Our research reveals that M23 employs a more profound strategy to boost its position and military strength (through Rwandan support) in local struggles over land, authority and rents. M23’s disruptive strategy aims to replace Congolese authorities and overhaul local governance in areas it controls in eastern DR Congo. Key to this strategy is:

    • undermining and replacing local (customary) authorities

    • taking over strategic trade routes

    • the installation of an elaborate taxation regime.

    These strategies also allow M23 – and Rwanda – to generate revenues from the local economy, including rents from DR Congo’s mineral wealth, without necessarily directly controlling mines.

    Historical struggles over land

    Interviewees attached great importance to the historical context of the M23 conflict, explaining how struggles over land date back to independence in 1960. Going back to the 1930s and 1940s, the Belgian colonial administrators already organised large movements of migrant workers from Rwanda to work on plantations in DR Congo. The Rwandophone migrants and their descendants settled in North Kivu, becoming part of the local population.

    After independence, Hutu and Tutsi (Rwandophone) communities began to jostle for control over North Kivu’s fertile farmland with the Hunde and Nyanga communities there. As grievances over access to land and property rights increased, Rwandophone communities were stigmatised as “non-indigenous” and their land claims as illegitimate.

    As the Congo Wars broke out in the 1990s, people began seeking recourse to armed groups to settle land conflicts. Before the rise of M23 in 2012, two other groups (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie and later Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple) rose to protect the Rwandophone population in eastern DRC. They also grabbed and sold vast concessions of land – held by the state or other communities – to allied farmers and business people. These were typically from the Tutsi community.

    Given the country’s complex and under-enforced land laws, land claims became exceedingly difficult to verify or prove. This has strengthened the belief that the only way to secure access to land is by resorting to armed groups. Thus, M23 is perceived as the guardian of the Tutsi community’s access to land.

    This perception is well illustrated by a testimony of a local leader in Masisi territory:

    The wars of the last three decades have been motivated by a struggle for control over land … Indigenous people are driven out, dispossessed of their land in favour of others who are considered foreigners and refugees. … the M23 is made up of (Tutsi) pastoralists … and there are fields that their rivals had seized … it was one of their (M23) first concerns to start exploiting them.

    Most Congolese Tutsi have not asked for this “protection” by M23. But the ensuing grievances and ethnic tensions will haunt the relations between communities for years to come.

    Struggles over customary authority

    In DR Congo, customary chiefs play an important role in local land governance. They also adjudicate conflicts, bind people together through rituals, and represent the symbolic claim by a specific community to a given place.

    Many Congolese we spoke to perceive M23’s main aim to be control of power at the local level — undermining the existing authorities. The group has indeed sought to replace customary authorities with M23-appointed ones, at times assassinating Congolese chiefs. Local sources said M23 even burnt chiefdom archives, destroying evidence of claims to customary authority.

    M23’s economic grip

    Wherever M23 has a foothold, it installs an elaborate taxation regime. This involves checkpoint tolls, household taxes, dues on business, harvest taxes and forced labour. In doing so, the group generates the revenues to sustain the conflict. But this also strengthens its politico-administrative hold on the population, as taxation is a symbolic interface of public authority.

    Local armed groups that joined with the Congolese army to combat M23 deepen the problem. Called wazalendo (“patriots”), they are often unpaid and therefore rely on payments from the population to sustain their counter-offensive. As a result, taxation in eastern Congo has become heavily “militiarised”. Taxed by government forces, wazalendo and M23, civilians pay a heavy toll.

    The military nature of local governance could jeopardise future efforts to bring peace to eastern DRC.

    What about minerals?

    M23 has an impact on all aspects of local governance in eastern DR Congo. It has found ways to control and profit from the local economy in North Kivu, including mineral supply chains. It operates checkpoints along arteries and taxes minerals smuggled to Rwanda, alongside other trade flows.

    Having M23 control strategic trade routes in DR Congo, including those crossing into Uganda, is a benefit for Rwanda. From Kigali’s perspective, the resurgence of M23 in 2021 came at a perfect time to block Uganda’s efforts to improve the road network in eastern DR Congo towards its own territory. Rwanda and Uganda are locked in intense competition for Congolese informal trade, re-exporting its timber and minerals as their own, gaining taxes and foreign earnings that ought to benefit the Congolese treasury and population.

    What must be done?

    DR Congo’s resources play a large role in the M23 conflict, but our study underscores the historical roots of the conflict and its profound local impacts. These findings should inform locally meaningful and sustainable conflict resolution strategies.

    Since the M23 revival, land access, trade and security have become increasingly mediated by armed actors. Even after a possible M23 defeat, it will take years of local dialogue and mediation to undo this involvement of militia in local governance, resolve land issues, repair inter-community relations and remake customary authority. But that’s the only way to reach sustainable peace in North Kivu.

    – Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group seeks local power in DRC, not just control over mining operations
    – https://theconversation.com/rwandan-backed-m23-rebel-group-seeks-local-power-in-drc-not-just-control-over-mining-operations-231318

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE-supported Green Economic Forum 2024 facilitates green growth in Central Asia

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: OSCE-supported Green Economic Forum 2024 facilitates green growth in Central Asia

    Edil Baisalov, Deputy Chairperson of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic speaks in front of 500 participants of the Green Economic Forum 2024. (OSCE/Chyngyz Zhanybekov) Photo details

    Bishkek, 23 October 2024 – Over 500 participants from Central Asia gathered at the Green Economic Forum 2024 to set priorities for advancing sustainable development across the region. The event brought together government officials, international experts, and business leaders to explore strategies for green economic growth, environmental sustainability, and regional co-operation.
    Key discussions focused on renewable energy, eco-friendly construction, waste management, and green financing. The forum provided a platform for knowledge sharing and collaboration, helping governments and businesses identify joint actions for green projects, ahead of the upcoming UN Climate Change Conference (COP-29) in Baku.
    In his opening remarks, Edil Baisalov, Deputy Chairperson of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic, emphasized the forum’s importance in linking economic growth with environmental protection. “The green economy is not just a concept, it is a solution for achieving a balanced, long-term development that safeguards our natural resources,” noted Baisalov.
    Ambassador Alexey Rogov, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, underscored the significance of regional collaboration. “Promoting a green economy is essential for achieving sustainable development goals in the face of climate change. Today’s discussions fosters stronger partnerships between businesses, governments, and industry associations, paving the way for innovative solutions in Central Asia,” Ambassador Rogov stated.
    The forum also provided an opportunity for local businesses to showcase their eco-friendly products/ solutions at the exhibition held during the event. Entrepreneurs exchanged contacts and ideas, facilitating regional business connections and laying the groundwork for future contracts, which will boost cross-border collaboration on green innovations.
    The forum’s outcomes contribute to shaping national strategies and policies, driving the region’s transition towards a low-carbon and resource-efficient economy.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Derby celebrates over a decade of Purple Flag status

    Source: City of Derby

    With October marking Purple Flag Month, Derby is celebrating over 10 years of holding the Purple Flag accreditation. The city was first awarded the purple flag in July 2013 for its city centre evening and night-time economy.

    The Purple Flag recognises towns and cities that provide a safe, welcoming, and well-managed night-time economy, similar to the Blue Flag for beaches and the Green Flag for parks. The Purple Flag is only accredited to towns and cities that are welcoming to everyone, offer safe ways for visitors to travel home, provide a good mix of venues, and are appealing after dark.

    With safety being a top priority, the accreditation means that Derby has benefitted from more visitors, lower crime and anti-social behaviour, and a safer city centre. It also recognises the hard work that goes on both on the streets and the planning from local authorities to make the city centre safer at night.

    Visitors and residents who go on nights out in Derby can benefit from increased safety, such as the teams of volunteers and workers who give up their weekends to keep people safe. Street pastors, BID wardens, taxi marshals, licensing officers, Derbyshire Police, door staff, ambulance crews and CCTV operators also work together to ensure the safety of Derby’s visitors and residents.

    Councillor Ndukwe Onuoha, Cabinet Member for Streetpride, Public Safety and Leisure said:

    I am proud to be a cabinet member of a city that has repeatedly met the high standards required for the Purple Flag status. For over a decade, Derby has been recognised as a city that puts in hard work and collaboration, from local authorities to volunteers, to ensure the safety of everyone at night.

    This recognition, for over 10 years, shows that together, we gave created an evening and night-time economy that is vibrant and safe, and we are committed to going even further in the future to ensure the safety of everyone, particularly women and girls in our city.

    Councillor Nadine Peatfield, Leader of Derby City Council, said:

    I am incredibly happy to be celebrating Purple Flag Month. I am also proud that Derby has retained its status of being a Purple Flag city for over a decade now. Through a partnership effort, our teams have been working hard to ensure that Derby remains a safe city for all. This year we have also invested £147,679 of government funding in new CCTV cameras in the city centre to make everyone, particularly women and girls, feel safer at night.

    I look forward to working further on the city centre’s safety and ensuring that Derby is a safe and welcoming city for all. We have an ambition to use the next application as a launch pad to go beyond the Purple Flag standard and do even more for community safety.

    Derby City Council is currently in the process of reapplying for the Purple Flag status, and the council remains confident that the city’s vibrant and well-managed night-time economy will once again meet the high standards required. The reapplication process will be an opportunity for the Council to showcase its ongoing efforts to prioritising safety at night, particularly for women and girls.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Secretary-General’s video message to the Virtual Launch of the UNEP Emissions Gap Report

    Source: United Nations secretary general

    Download the video: https://s3.amazonaws.com/downloads2.unmultimedia.org/public/video/evergr…

    The message of today’s Emissions Gap report is clear:

    We are teetering on a planetary tight rope.

    Either leaders bridge the emissions gap, or we plunge headlong into climate disaster – with the poorest and most vulnerable suffering the most.

    This report shows annual greenhouse gas emissions at an all-time high – rising 1.3 per cent last year.  They must fall 9 per cent each year to 2030 to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius and avoid the very worst of climate change.

    Current policies are taking us towards a catastrophic 3.1 degrees Celsius temperature rise by the end of the century.

    As this report rightly puts it, people and planet cannot afford more hot air.

    The emissions gap is not an abstract notion.  There is a direct link between increasing emissions and increasingly frequent and intense climate disasters. 

    Around the world, people are paying a terrible price.

    Record emissions mean record sea temperatures supercharging monster hurricanes;

    Record heat is turning forests into tinder boxes and cities into saunas;
     
    Record rains are resulting in biblical floods.

    Today’s report shows affordable, existing technologies can achieve the emissions reductions we need to 2030 and 2035 to meet the 1.5 degree limit.

    But only with a surge in ambition and support.

    The upcoming United Nations climate conference – COP29 – must drive progress in two ways. 

    First, COP29 starts the clock for countries to deliver new national climate action plans – or NDCs – by next year. 

    Governments have agreed to align these plans with 1.5 degrees.

    That means they must drive down all greenhouse gas emissions and cover the whole economy – pushing progress in every sector.

    And they must wean us off our fossil fuel addiction: showing how governments will phase them out – fast and fairly; and contributing to global goals to accelerate renewables rollout and halt and reverse deforestation.

    The largest economies – the G20 members, responsible for around 80 per cent of all emissions – must lead. I urge first-movers to come forward.

    Second, finance will be front and centre at COP29. 

    Developing countries urgently need serious support to accelerate the transition to clean energy and deal with the violent weather they are already facing. 

    COP29 must agree a new finance goal that unlocks the trillions of dollars they need. And provides confidence it will be delivered.

    We know the price of climate inaction is far greater.

    This would require a significant increase in concessional public finance, that can be complemented by innovative sources, such as fossil fuel extraction levies.

    The COP29 outcome must also send clear signals, to drive action on debt relief and reform of the Multilateral Development Banks to make them bigger and bolder.

    Today’s Emissions Gap report is clear: we’re playing with fire; but there can be no more playing for time.

    We’re out of time.

    Closing the emissions gap means closing the ambition gap, the implementation gap, and the finance gap.

    Starting at COP29.

    Thank you.
     

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Government of Canada to Launch Call for Applications under National Crime Prevention Strategy

    Source: Government of Canada News

    Government of Canada to Launch Call for Applications under National Crime Prevention Strategy

    Gabriel Brunet
    Press Secretary
    Office of the Honourable Dominic LeBlanc
    Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs
    819-665-6527
    Gabriel.Brunet@iga-aig.gc.ca

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Government of Canada reduces immigration

    Source: Government of Canada News

    Today, the Honourable Marc Miller, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, announced the 2025–2027 Immigration Levels Plan: a plan that will pause population growth in the short term to achieve well-managed, sustainable growth in the long term. For the first time ever, the levels plan includes controlled targets for temporary residents, specifically international students and foreign workers, as well as for permanent residents.

    October 24, 2024—Ottawa—Today, the Honourable Marc Miller, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, announced the 2025–2027 Immigration Levels Plan: a plan that will pause population growth in the short term to achieve well-managed, sustainable growth in the long term. For the first time ever, the levels plan includes controlled targets for temporary residents, specifically international students and foreign workers, as well as for permanent residents.

    Immigration is essential to our country’s economic success and growth. As Canada reopened following the pandemic, the needs of businesses were greater than the supply of workers available to support their recovery. We took decisive measures to attract some of the world’s best and brightest to study and work in Canada, and to integrate them into the economy quickly. This meant a faster economic recovery. It also meant that robust immigration helped prevent a recession, while contributing to Canada’s workforce.

    In response to the evolving needs of our country, this transitional levels plan alleviates pressures on housing, infrastructure and social services so that over the long term we can grow our economic and social prosperity through immigration. This unprecedented plan offers a comprehensive approach to welcoming newcomers—one that preserves the integrity of our immigration programs and sets newcomers up for success. Canadians also expect a well-managed immigration system from the Government of Canada.

    The 2025–2027 Immigration Levels Plan is expected to result in a marginal population decline of 0.2% in both 2025 and 2026 before returning to a population growth of 0.8% in 2027. These forecasts account for today’s announcement of reduced targets across multiple immigration streams over the next two years, as well as expected temporary resident outflows resulting from the 5% target, natural population loss and other factors.

    With this year’s levels plan, we have listened to Canadians. We are reducing our permanent resident targets. Compared to last year’s plan, we are:

    • reducing from 500,000 permanent residents to 395,000 in 2025
    • reducing from 500,000 permanent residents to 380,000 in 2026
    • setting a target of 365,000 permanent residents in 2027

    The Levels Plan also supports efforts to reduce temporary resident volumes to 5% of Canada’s population by the end of 2026. Given temporary resident reduction measures announced in September and this past year, Canada’s temporary population will decrease over the next few years as significantly more temporary residents will transition to being permanent residents or leave Canada compared to new ones arriving.

    Specifically, compared to each previous year, we will see Canada’s temporary population decline by

    • 445,901 in 2025
    • 445,662 in 2026
    • a modest increase of 17,439 in 2027

    These reductions are the result of a series of changes over the past year, including a cap on international students and tightened eligibility requirements for temporary foreign workers, implemented to decrease volumes and strengthen the integrity and quality of our temporary resident programs. The changes are designed with long-term economic goals in mind to make sure that we continue to attract the best and the brightest.

    These changes will help provinces, territories and stakeholders align their capacities and allow the population to grow at a sustainable pace as we encourage institutions to do their part in better welcoming newcomers.

    Other measures from the 2025-2027 Immigration Levels Plan include the following:

    • Transitioning more temporary residents who are already in Canada as students and workers to permanent residents
      Representing more than 40% of overall permanent resident admissions in 2025, these residents are skilled, educated and integrated into Canadian society. They will continue to support the workforce and economy without placing additional demands on our social services because they are already established, with housing and employment.
    • Focusing on long-term economic growth and key labour market sectors, such as health and trades
      Permanent resident admissions in the economic class will reach 61.7% of total admissions by 2027.
    • Strengthening Francophone communities outside Quebec and supporting their economic prosperity
      Of the overall permanent resident admission targets, Francophone immigration will represent 
      • 8.5% in 2025
      • 9.5% in 2026
      • 10% in 2027

    Through this plan, we are using our existing programs so that everyone—including newcomers—has access to the well-paying jobs, affordable homes and social services they need to thrive in our beautiful country.

    Aïssa Diop
    Director of Communications
    Minister’s Office
    Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
    Aissa.Diop@cic.gc.ca

    Media Relations
    Communications Sector
    Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
    613-952-1650
    media@cic.gc.ca

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: 2025–2027 Immigration Levels Plan

    Source: Government of Canada News

    Each year, the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship tables the Immigration Levels Plan, a forward-looking snapshot of immigration targets for the next three years.

    Each year, the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship tables the Immigration Levels Plan, a forward-looking snapshot of immigration targets for the next three years.

    The plan provides permanent resident admissions targets for 2025, with notional commitments for 2026 and 2027. For the first time, we’re extending our levels plan to also include targets for temporary residents, taking into account the full scope of all newcomers and helping reduce temporary resident (TR) volumes to 5% of Canada’s population by the end of 2026.

    Development of the levels plan

    When developing the Levels Plan, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) considers

    • priorities and objectives for immigration, including those set out in the Immigration Refugee and Protection Act
    • economic and regional needs
    • international obligations and commitments
    • processing capacity
    • the capacity to settle, integrate and retain newcomers

    Throughout the year, IRCC engages with a broad range of stakeholders and partners, including provinces and territories, to help inform our plan. IRCC also conducts public opinion research through surveys and focus groups with newcomers, Canadians living in rural areas, Francophones living in communities outside of Quebec, as well as Indigenous Peoples.

    Findings from these consultations and public engagement initiatives informed the Immigration Levels Plan and are published in the Levels Consultation Report.

    Permanent resident targets

    Permanent resident (PR) programs include economic streams, family reunification, refugees and protected persons, and humanitarian and compassionate admissions.

    This year’s levels plan reduces permanent resident targets starting in 2025 and forecasts decreases for the following two years, resulting in a pause in population growth in the short term to achieve well-managed, sustainable growth and economic prosperity for the long term.

    The plan

    • represents an overall decrease of 105,000 admissions in 2025, as compared to projected 2025 levels
    • prioritizes in-Canada applicants and pathways for those already here
      • More than 40% of anticipated PR admissions in 2025 will be from those who are already in Canada as temporary residents.
      • Research has demonstrated that newcomers with in-Canada experience have positive long-term success. These skilled, educated newcomers can continue to support the workforce and economy, without placing additional demands on our social services.
      • Adjustments will be made to our economic immigration streams to prioritize transitions of workers already here to permanent residents and to be responsive to labour market needs—our in-Canada focus. We will put emphasis on our federal economic priorities in programs, including the Canadian Experience Class and regional immigration programs, to attract workers we need, such as in health care and trades occupations.
    • focuses on economic immigration, with approximately 62% of total permanent resident admissions that will be dedicated to the economic class, in key sectors such as health and trades, by 2027
    • continues to reunites families and loved ones, including spouses, children, parents and grandparents. In 2025, nearly 24% of overall permanent resident admissions will be allocated to family class immigration
    • upholds Canada’s long-standing commitment to resettle the world’s most vulnerable, including human rights defenders, LGBTQI+ refugees, religious and ethnic minorities, and women and children in precarious situations
    • strengthens Francophone communities outside Quebec and supports their economic prosperity. Of the overall permanent resident admission targets, Francophone immigration will represent
      • 5% in 2025
      • 5% in 2026
      • 10% in 2027

    These targets allow for a continued increase in volume year-over-year of Francophone admissions outside Quebec, despite decreased overall PR levels.

    Temporary resident targets

    In March 2024, Canada announced a plan to decrease the number of temporary residents to 5% of the total population over the next three years, including temporary foreign workers and international students. Starting in 2025, Canada will have targets for temporary residents as part of the levels plan.

    TR targets will capture the number of new workers and students arriving in Canada:

    • Student arrivals are aligned with the previously announced
    • Worker arrivals are those under the International Mobility Program and the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP).

    TR targets were calculated by assessing a number of factors, such as the number of individuals expected to depart Canada in each program (such as when a permit expires), individuals transitioning to permanent residents, approval rates for each program, estimated renewal rates and other factors.

    As such, categories excluded from the TR targets but included in the stock of TRs are:

    • Work or study permit extensions or change of status from within Canada (since we would be counting an individual’s status more than once). This is factored into the outflows.
    • Seasonal workers who enter and leave Canada within the same year (since they aren’t a part of our year-end population count).
    • Asylum claimants who are seeking protection in Canada (since they are entitled by law to have their claim assessed so we can’t control the volumes like we do with other programs).

    Measures designed to achieve the 5% target

    • International student cap: IRCC introduced an annual cap on international student study permits, including a further 10% reduction in 2025 relative to 2024 targets.
    • Post-Graduation Work Permit Program (PGWP) reform: IRCC tightened eligibility requirements for PGWPs to better align the program with immigration goals and labour market needs.
    • Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFW Program) reform: ESDC introduced a 10% cap on employers hiring temporary foreign workers under the low-wage stream, and announced an increase to the starting hourly wage for temporary foreign workers in the high-wage stream by 20%.
    • Limiting work permits for spouses of temporary residents: IRCC is tightening work permit eligibility for spouses of international students and temporary foreign workers.

    For more information, please consult our latest news release on strengthening temporary residence programs for sustainable volumes.

    Taken together, the targets are expected to result in a net decrease in temporary residents over the next two years. Specifically, compared to each previous year, we will see:

    • 445,901 fewer TRs in 2025
    • 445,662 fewer TRs in 2026
    • a modest increase of 17,439 TRs in 2027

    Asylum

    Like many countries, Canada is experiencing more asylum claims as the number of displaced people worldwide continues to grow, and that contributes to growing volumes. To align with our humanitarian responsibilities, the government has been working on several measures to address integrity issues and strengthen the in-Canada asylum system, including

    • implementing a partial visa requirements for Mexican nationals
    • improving claims processing while maintaining the fairness and integrity of the asylum system, as announced in 2024
    • reviewing visa decision making so that our highly trained officers have the right tools to detect fraud and reduce the number of non-genuine visitors
    • exploring more measures to further strengthen visa integrity

    Impact of the Plan

    • The 2025–2027 Immigration Levels Plan is expected to result in a marginal population decline of 0.2% in both 2025 and 2026 before returning to a population growth of 0.8% in 2027.
    • The plan will reduce the housing supply gap by approximately 670 000 units by the end of 2027.
    • Continued robust GDP growth and enable GDP per capita growth to accelerate throughout 2025 to 2027, as well as improve housing affordability and lower the unemployment rate.

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Hickenlooper, Bennet Welcome $23 Million from Bipartisan Infrastructure Law for Denver, Colorado Springs Airports

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Colorado John Hickenlooper
    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senators John Hickenlooper and Michael Bennet welcomed $23 million from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to improve airport infrastructure in Denver and Colorado Springs. This funding comes from the Airport Terminals Program, made possible by the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law.
    “Our Bipartisan Infrastructure Law keeps investing in Colorado and creating good-paying jobs. This time by improving travelers’ experiences at both Denver International Airport and the Colorado Springs Airport,” said Hickenlooper. “Giddy up!”
    “I’m grateful the FAA is supporting Colorado’s airports as they improve and modernize to meet our state’s changing needs,” said Bennet. “These dollars will help ensure our airports can continue to fuel our economy and better connect communities across our state.”
    Specifically, this funding includes:
    Airport Name
    Project Description
    Funding
    Denver International Airport
    Increase the efficiency and capacity of its baggage handling system
    $15 million
    Colorado Springs Airport
    Improve energy efficiency, ensure accessibility, and modernize gate areas
    $8 million
    Just this year, Hickenlooper and Bennet have welcomed nearly $140 million from the FAA for Colorado’s airports.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: NEWS: Sanders, Peters, Durbin, Stabenow, Duckworth, and 18 Fellow Senators Demand Stellantis Keep Its Promises to Autoworkers

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Vermont – Bernie Sanders
    WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 – In a letter sent yesterday to the automative giant that is responsible for Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, and more, Sens. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP), Gary Peters (D-Mich.), Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.), Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), and 18 of their colleagues urged Stellantis CEO Carlos Tavares to honor the collective bargaining agreement signed last year with the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the promises the company made to strengthen and expand good-paying union jobs in America.
    “We are writing to express our growing concerns about the failure of Stellantis, under your leadership, to honor the commitments it made to the United Auto Workers (UAW) in last year’s collective bargaining agreement…” wrote the senators. “We urge Stellantis not to renege on the promises it made to American autoworkers and to provide details on the timelines for these investments.”
    In the contract ratified last year, Stellantis committed to: 
    Make nearly $19 billion in new investments and product commitments in the U.S.;
    Re-open the plant in Belvidere, Illinois that was “indefinitely idled” last year;
    Establish a parts and customer care Mega Hub in Belvidere;
    Continue to manufacture the Dodge Durango in Detroit through 2025; and
    Manufacture the next generation Dodge Durango in Detroit starting in 2026.
    Instead, Stellantis has taken actions that undermine the commitments made to the UAW and leave “behind thousands of American workers who built the company into the auto giant it is today,” wrote the senators. These actions may include moving the next generation Dodge Durango out of the U.S. and into “low-cost” countries like Mexico, as well as delaying planned investments to reopen and expand the Belvidere assembly plant.
    This year, Stellantis has spent over $8 billion on stock buybacks and dividends to benefit its wealthy executives and stockholders. During the first six months of this year, Stellantis has generated over $6 billion in profits, making it one of the most profitable auto companies in the world. The company has also benefited from billions of dollars in financial assistance from American taxpayers and the federal government. In July, the Department of Energy announced Stellantis would receive nearly $335 million in federal dollars to support Belvidere Assembly Plant’s conversion to electric vehicle production.
    “Last year, while blue collar auto workers in Belvidere were being laid off indefinitely, you were able to receive a 56 percent pay raise, boosting your total compensation to $39.5 million, which made you the highest paid executive among traditional auto companies,” wrote the senators. “We believe that if Stellantis can afford to spend over $8 billion this year on stock buybacks and dividends, it can live up to the contractual commitments it made to the UAW. This is especially true given the billions of dollars in financial assistance American taxpayers have spent to support your company and the enormous sacrifices autoworkers have been forced to make over many decades.”
    Joining Sanders, Peters, Durbin, Stabenow, and Duckworth on the letter are Sens. Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Laphonza Butler (D-Calif.), Bob Casey (D-Pa.), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.), Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), Tina Smith (D-Minn.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.).
    To read the full letter, click here.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: New Report Shows NASA’s $75.6 Billion Boost to US Economy

    Source: NASA

    NASA’s work, including its Moon to Mars exploration approach, is advancing science and technology for the Artemis Generation, while also driving significant economic growth across the United States, the agency announced Thursday.
    In its third agencywide economic impact report, NASA highlighted how its Moon to Mars activities, climate change research and technology development, and other projects generated more than $75.6 billion in economic output across all 50 states and Washington, D.C., in fiscal year 2023.
    “To invest in NASA is to invest in American workers, American innovation, the American economy, and American economic competitiveness,” says NASA Administrator Bill Nelson. “Our work doesn’t just expand our understanding of the universe — it fuels economic growth, inspires future generations, and improves our quality of life. As we embark on the next great chapter of exploration, we are proud to help power economic strength, job creation, scientific progress, and American leadership on Earth, in the skies, and in the stars.”
    Combined, NASA’s missions supported 304,803 jobs nationwide, and generated an estimated $9.5 billion in federal, state, and local taxes throughout the United States.
    The study found NASA’s Moon to Mars activities generated more than $23.8 billion in total economic output and supported an estimated 96,479 jobs nationwide. For investments in climate research and technology, the agency’s activities generated more than $7.9 billion in total economic output and supported an estimated 32,900 jobs in the U.S.
    Additional key findings of the study include:

    Every state in the country benefits economically through NASA activities. Forty-five states have an economic impact of more than $10 million. Of those 45 states, eight have an economic impact of $1 billion or more.
    The agency’s Moon to Mars initiative, which includes the Artemis missions, generated nearly $2.9 billion in tax revenue. These activities provided about 32% of NASA’s economic impact.
    The agency’s investments in climate change research and technology generated more than $1 billion in tax revenue.
    Approximately 11% of NASA’s economic impacts are attributable to its investments in climate change research and technology.    
    NASA had more than 644 active international agreements for various scientific research and technology development activities in the 2023 fiscal year. The International Space Station, representing 15 countries and five space agencies, has a predominant role in the agency’s international partnerships.
    In fiscal year 2023, NASA oversaw 2,628 active domestic and international non-procurement partnership agreements, which included 629 new domestic and 109 new international agreements, active partnerships with 587 different non-federal  partners across the U.S., and partnerships in 47 of 50 states. 
    NASA Spinoffs, which are public products and processes that are developed with NASA technology, funding, or expertise, provide a benefit to American lives beyond dollars and jobs. As of result of NASA missions, our fiscal year 2023 tech transfer activities produced 1,564 new technology reports, 40 new patent applications, 69 patents issued, and established 5,277 software usage agreements. 
    Scientific research and development, which fuels advancements in science and technology that can help improve daily life on Earth and for humanity, is the largest single-sector benefitting from NASA’s work, accounting for 19% of NASA’s total economic impact.

    The study was conducted by the Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Improvement at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
    To review the full report, visit:
    https://go.nasa.gov/3NEtUIq
    -end-
    Meira Bernstein / Melissa HowellHeadquarters, Washington202-615-1747 / 202-961-6602meira.b.bernstein@nasa.gov / melissa.e.howell@nasa.gov

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Banking: quantacapital.com.co: BaFin again investigates the company Quanta Capital

    Source: Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – In English

    The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) warns consumers about the company Quanta Capital and the services it is offering. BaFin has information that the company is now also offering banking business and/or financial services on a further website – quantacapital.com.co – without the required authorisation. The company is not supervised by BaFin.

    BaFin already published a warning about the services offered by Quanta Capital on 3 June 2024.

    Financial services may only be offered in Germany if the company providing these services has the necessary authorisation from BaFin to do this. However, some companies offer these services without the required authorisation. Information on whether a particular company has been granted authorisation by BaFin can be found in BaFin’s database of companies.

    Theinformation provided by BaFin is based on section 37 (4) of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz – KWG).

    Please be aware:

    BaFin, the German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt – BKA) and the German state criminal police offices (Landeskriminalämter) recommend that consumers seeking to invest money online should exercise the utmost caution and do the necessary research beforehand in order to identify fraud attempts at an early stage.

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Coffee price volatility harms the mental health of farmers

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Saurabh Singhal, Associate professor, Lancaster University

    Oleg Brusencev/Shutterstock

    Coffee is a drink that punctuates many of our lives. Millions of us depend on this dark liquid to start the morning, or to break up the day.

    It has also become quite an expensive habit. But before we baulk at paying £5 for a flat white, it’s worth thinking about the price paid by the coffee farmers who provide its base ingredient.

    For behind every latte and espresso lies the toil and stress of coffee farmers, who face serious challenges to bring their popular product to the rest of the world. Harvests can be devastated by extreme weather events or pests and plant diseases, while volatile market prices add another layer of worry, making future income uncertain.

    This volatility exists in other crops, but especially so for coffee, the price of which is extremely unpredictable. It can rise and fall frequently because of the weather, market demand and the state of the global economy.

    Coffee trees take up to four years to grow and produce beans, and cutting them down is expensive, so farmers can’t easily change how much coffee they produce based on price changes.

    But price volatility means that farmers can’t be sure about their income at harvest time, which can be incredibly stressful. And our research shows just how much that unpredictability affects farmers’ mental health.

    Our work focused on farmers in Vietnam, a country where coffee production has soared over the last three decades. From accounting for just 1.2% of world output in 1989, Vietnam is currently the second largest producer in the world (after Brazil) producing just under 30 million 60kg bags a year. Vietnam produces mainly “robusta” coffee beans, grown by small farmers in the central highlands region of the country.

    Using data from a long-running observational survey to assess mental health, we looked at how Vietnamese coffee farmers experienced symptoms of depression including sadness, hopelessness, lack of concentration and poor sleep – and how these were linked to monthly international robusta coffee prices.

    Using a range of techniques to interpret the data, we found clear evidence that being exposed to coffee price fluctuations increased depressive symptoms among farmers of the crop. They also had lower overall wellbeing because of greater mental stress and worry over their economic future – and drank more alcohol.

    A coffee farm in Vietnam.
    Elizaveta Galitckaia/Shutterstock

    The impact of all of this uncertainty is significant. According to the World Health Organization, poor mental health is a major contributor to the global burden of disease, especially in low-income countries where mental illness and poverty are closely linked.

    Estimates suggest that as much as 80% of the world’s depressive disorder burden is borne by low and middle income countries. But these issues are often overlooked, even though they are crucial to addressing poverty.

    What can coffee drinkers do?

    There are ways to tackle the mental health effects of coffee price volatility. Initiatives to promote price stability in the global coffee markets and financial literacy among farmers, would be worth pursuing. So too would work to improve mental health support within farming communities, providing resources for coping with stress and building resilience.

    Coffee lovers around the world can also play their part by choosing the their drink carefully. Fairtrade certification for example, was set up to help reduce coffee price volatility and the resulting poverty it caused.

    It guarantees a minimum price for certified coffee, covering the average cost of sustainable production and reducing the financial risks farmers face. Fairtrade-certified farmers also receive a premium to invest in projects that improve the quality of life for their communities.

    And research suggests it is succeeding. A 2005 study of coffee farmers in Nicaragua revealed that Fairtrade farmers are less concerned about the possibility of losing their farm in the coming year compared to conventional farmers. And using data from Costa Rica, research from 2022 has found fair trade certification was effective in increasing farmers’ income.

    So the next time you savour your morning cup of coffee, take a moment to consider the people who cultivated the beans which made the drink. Coffee farmers deserve our appreciation – but also our help in establishing fairer, more stable market conditions which safeguard their livelihoods and mental health.

    Saurabh Singhal received funding from the University of Copenhagen.

    Finn Tarp has over the years received funding from a variety of donors and research funding agencies for work in Vietnam on on development issues . This is relevant only in the sense that is has helped inform about living conditions in the country.

    – ref. Coffee price volatility harms the mental health of farmers – https://theconversation.com/coffee-price-volatility-harms-the-mental-health-of-farmers-236833

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: As Colombia hosts a UN biodiversity summit, its own Amazonian rainforest is in crisis

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jesica Lopez, PhD Candidate, Centre for Environmental and Climate Research, Lund University

    Colombia hosts 18% of the world’s bird species – more than any other country. Ariboen / shutterstock

    The city of Cali, in Colombia, is hosting the UN’s 16th biodiversity summit, known as Cop16. The summit, which runs until Friday, November 1, is focused on how countries will fulfil previous pledges to protect at least 30% of the world’s land and water and restore 30% of degraded ecosystems by 2030.

    It’s a noble aim, yet Colombia itself shows just how far we have to go.

    If you travel south east from Cali, over the Andes mountains, you drop into the Amazon basin. From there, rainforest stretches for hundreds of kilometres to the border with Brazil – and far beyond. This rainforest is the main reason Colombia ranks as the fourth most biodiverse country in the world. Nowhere else has as many species of birds. Only Brazil and China have more trees.

    But the region is experiencing an environmental crisis. I recently completed a PhD on the northern Colombian Amazon, in which I tracked how the rainforest is fast being deforested and turned into pastures for cattle ranches. I particularly looked at how this affects hotspots of plant and animal life in rugged valleys on the Amazonian side of the Andes – spectacularly biodiverse places even by Colombian standards – and looked at what can be done to protect them.

    ‘Natural regions’ of Colombia. Most of Amazonia (dark green) is rainforest, along with parts of the Orinoco basin (light green) and the Pacific region (purple).
    Milenioscuro / wiki / Geographic Institute Agustín Codazzi, CC BY-SA

    This is not an easy part of the world in which to do such work – the NGO Global Witness ranks Colombia as the single most dangerous country for environmental defenders. While documenting legal and illegal cattle ranching, I was often reminded to be aware of exactly who I was contacting and to be wary of which questions I was asking.

    Activists and researchers often face violence from those who profit from deforestation, and I had to work closely with organisations and authorities that secured own safety. Very harrowing experiences are not uncommon.

    Despite these risks, many continue their efforts, driven by a deep commitment to protecting the Amazon and its biodiversity. Their bravery only underscores the urgent need for stronger protections and enforcement.

    Peace led to more deforestation

    For decades, the region was mostly controlled by the Farc guerrilla army. The Farc was largely funded by kidnappings and the drug trade, and wasn’t interested in large-scale farming.

    All this changed after the government of Colombia signed a peace agreement with the Farc in 2016. Since then, deforestation has increased, as both legal and illegal land tenants have acquired land for farming through what they call “sustainable development” practices. This mostly involves turning forest into pasture for cattle, the main driver of deforestation across Latin America.

    Cattle ranches are the main driver of deforestation.
    Jordi Romo / shutterstock

    Things peaked in 2018, when 2,470 square kilometres of forest was lost in Colombia – equivalent to a circular area more than 50 kilometres across. Rates of deforestation have reduced slightly since then (though the data isn’t very reliable), but appear to be increasing once again in 2024.

    The recent increase might be attributed to the demand to produce more coca or rear more cattle, along with pressure from extractive industries like mining. The spread of roads and other infrastructure further into the rainforest have also opened up new opportunities.

    Billions more needed to stop deforestation

    In its 2018 Living Forest Report, the WWF included Colombia’s Chocó-Darién and Amazon forests in its list of 11 “deforestation fronts” across the planet. These fronts are where it projected the largest concentrations of forest loss or severe degradation would occur in the period till 2030.

    No wonder then that Colombia’s environmental crisis has drawn international attention. Countries like Germany, Norway and the UK have supported its efforts to reduce deforestation, pledging about €22 million under the UN’s reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation scheme (known as REDD+). This is a good start, but much more is needed.

    The Amazon winds through dense forest on the border between Colombia and Peru.
    Jhampier Giron M / shutterstock

    Indeed, the Global Biodiversity Framework, the international treaty that underlies the Cop16 negotiations in Cali, estimates we’ll need an extra US$700 billion each year to protect biodiversity.

    An important issue at the summit is therefore how to mobilise sufficient financial resources, particularly for developing countries. The previous global biodiversity summit, held in Canada in 2022, established that wealthy countries should provide US$30 billion annually to low-income countries by 2030.

    Ahead of this year’s summit, countries were expected to submit new national biodiversity plans detailing how they’ll meet the 30% protection goals. Most failed to do so – including Colombia. Despite this setback, delegates in Cali will hopefully develop robust mechanisms to monitor progress and ensure countries are held accountable for meeting their targets.

    Other critical issues include reforms to benefit small-scale farmers in the Amazon. The region’s current economic model is centred on reshaping the land and extracting resources, but it has not generated prosperity for these more sustainable farmers. That same economic model has also failed to protect the forest itself.

    The summit should also work towards recognising indigenous peoples’ rights and traditional knowledge, and including their voices in policy decisions, and must address violence against environmental defenders.

    These are all huge issues in Colombia and indeed any country where cattle farmers are eyeing up pristine rainforest. The summit in Cali represents a great opportunity for the world to seriously tackle the dual biodiversity and climate crisis.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get our award-winning weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 40,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.

    Jesica Lopez works for Lund University.

    – ref. As Colombia hosts a UN biodiversity summit, its own Amazonian rainforest is in crisis – https://theconversation.com/as-colombia-hosts-a-un-biodiversity-summit-its-own-amazonian-rainforest-is-in-crisis-241776

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: How Elon Musk has become a powerful figure in US politics

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Thomas Gift, Associate Professor and Director of the Centre on US Politics, UCL

    Elon Musk, whose company SpaceX recently made history by catching a Starship rocket booster as it careened back to Earth, wants you to vote for Donald Trump for many reasons. That includes not just what Trump will do here on this planet, but also for what he’ll achieve that’s outside this world. “Vote for @real DonaldTrump,” Musk recently tweeted, “if you want humanity to be a spacefaring civilization”.

    Back inside the Earth’s orbit, the CEO of Tesla and X, and one of the richest men in the world, makes an odd foil for Democrats. In a parallel universe, his work in commercial space flights, inventing the most advanced electric cars on the planet, advocacy for sustainable energy, and long record of voting “100 percent Dem until a few years ago” would seem make him a hero of the left. Instead, Musk has taken on the role of comic book supervillain whose full-throated support for Trump has turned him into a pariah among progressives.

    Musk purports to be baffled by the backlash, since he insists that nothing that he represents is particularly controversial. He considers himself a political “moderate” who, in backing Trump, is simply standing up for common-sense, middle-of-the-road positions: belief in free speech, deference to the US Constitution, and the right of countries to control their borders. “I’ve been told at times that they are like right-wing values,” Musk said. “These are the fundamental values that made America what it is today.”

    Of course, Musk knows better. In between burning the midnight oil at his multiple corporate enterprises, Musk finds the time to tweet dozens of times a day, often trolling critics, heralding Trump, and only rarely apologising for outlandish, crass, conspiracy-laden and sometimes even false posts. Musk has acknowledged that some of his tweets are “extremely dumb”, though he refuses to apply a filter.

    In describing Musk, one journalist fretted what could happen when “the world’s richest man runs a communications platform in a truly vengeful, dictatorial way … to promote extreme right-wing agendas and to punish what he calls brain-poisoned liberals”.

    Elon Musk owns SpaceX.

    Musk’s power lies in his willingness to say just about anything — backstopped by his ownership of part of the internet’s de facto public square. In a now-deleted tweet, Musk pondered sarcastically that “no one is trying to assassinate” Kamala Harris or Joe Biden. Outside of X, Musk admits he’s been “trashing Kamala nonstop” and that, if Harris wins, he’s “fucked”.

    Throwing money and power around

    Musk is a Maga convert. In 2022, the same year that he bought Twitter and reinstated Trump’s privileges, Musk said that it was “time for Trump to hang up his hat & sail into the sunset”. Pulling no punches, Trump once called Musk “another bullshit artist”.

    Musk claims to have supported Democrats in recent elections, including Joe Biden in 2020. In July of this year, however, Musk announced that he was endorsing Trump, in large part because of how the former president’s reacted after an assassination attempt on his life. “This is a man who has courage under fire!” Musk said.

    Musk represents a new crop of politically charged billionaires who aren’t content to stay on their mega-yachts, and instead want to throw their money — and power — around in support of conservative causes.

    Yet unlike others to whom he’s often compared — such as Bill Ackman, the CEO of hedge fund Pershing Square, and Peter Thiel, co-creator of PayPal — no one has gone “all in” for Trump like Musk.

    Earlier this month, Musk invested US$75 million (£57.8 million) of his own money to create the pro-Trump America Political Action Committee (Pac). (A Pac raises money for a political candidate.) The Pac has offered registered voters in Pennsylvania US$100 (and the chance to win US$1 million) if they sign a petition “in support of free speech and the right to bear arms”.

    While critics have called the move illegal, pointing to federal election law that bars paying “or offer[ing] to pay … for registration to vote or for voting”. Musk insists there’s a loophole: he isn’t technically tying his giveaways to voting – and the US Justice Department has said this could violate federal electoral law.

    Musk has changed his short-term residency to mobilise support for Trump. As of October, Musk has hunkered down in Pennsylvania, the swing state he calls the “linchpin” in the 2024 US election, where his campaigning has included giving a surprise speech for Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania – where there was previously an assassination attempt on Trump.

    Musk has painted doomsday scenarios of what could happen if the election doesn’t turn out how he likes. In a just-released interview with former Fox News journalist Tucker Carlson, Musk surmised that “if Trump doesn’t win this election, it’s the last election we’re going to have”. The comment comes as Republicans have pilloried Democrats’ dialled-up rhetoric that democracy is “at stake” in 2024.

    Beyond the election, there’s more than speculation that Musk could be tapped for a role in a potential Trump 2.0 administration. He’s openly campaigned to serve as the new head of a department for government efficiency. Trump has already announced that, if elected, Musk will direct a task force to conduct a “complete financial and performance audit of the entire federal government” and offer “recommendations for drastic reforms”.

    True to form, Musk promises that his public service won’t stop at the edge of Earth’s outer orbit. “Washington DC has become an ever-increasing ocean of brake pedals stopping progress,” he says. “Let’s change those brake pedals to accelerators, so we can get great things done in America and become a spacefaring civilization!” One thing’s for sure: Musk’s politics are, quite literally, out of this world.

    Thomas Gift does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. How Elon Musk has become a powerful figure in US politics – https://theconversation.com/how-elon-musk-has-become-a-powerful-figure-in-us-politics-242034

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Secretary-General’s video message to the Virtual Launch of the UNEP Emissions Gap Report

    Source: United Nations – English

    ownload the video: https://s3.amazonaws.com/downloads2.unmultimedia.org/public/video/evergr…

    The message of today’s Emissions Gap report is clear:

    We are teetering on a planetary tight rope.

    Either leaders bridge the emissions gap, or we plunge headlong into climate disaster – with the poorest and most vulnerable suffering the most.

    This report shows annual greenhouse gas emissions at an all-time high – rising 1.3 per cent last year.  They must fall 9 per cent each year to 2030 to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius and avoid the very worst of climate change.

    Current policies are taking us towards a catastrophic 3.1 degrees Celsius temperature rise by the end of the century.

    As this report rightly puts it, people and planet cannot afford more hot air.

    The emissions gap is not an abstract notion.  There is a direct link between increasing emissions and increasingly frequent and intense climate disasters. 

    Around the world, people are paying a terrible price.

    Record emissions mean record sea temperatures supercharging monster hurricanes;

    Record heat is turning forests into tinder boxes and cities into saunas;
     
    Record rains are resulting in biblical floods.

    Today’s report shows affordable, existing technologies can achieve the emissions reductions we need to 2030 and 2035 to meet the 1.5 degree limit.

    But only with a surge in ambition and support.

    The upcoming United Nations climate conference – COP29 – must drive progress in two ways. 

    First, COP29 starts the clock for countries to deliver new national climate action plans – or NDCs – by next year. 

    Governments have agreed to align these plans with 1.5 degrees.

    That means they must drive down all greenhouse gas emissions and cover the whole economy – pushing progress in every sector.

    And they must wean us off our fossil fuel addiction: showing how governments will phase them out – fast and fairly; and contributing to global goals to accelerate renewables rollout and halt and reverse deforestation.

    The largest economies – the G20 members, responsible for around 80 per cent of all emissions – must lead. I urge first-movers to come forward.

    Second, finance will be front and centre at COP29. 

    Developing countries urgently need serious support to accelerate the transition to clean energy and deal with the violent weather they are already facing. 

    COP29 must agree a new finance goal that unlocks the trillions of dollars they need. And provides confidence it will be delivered.

    We know the price of climate inaction is far greater.

    This would require a significant increase in concessional public finance, that can be complemented by innovative sources, such as fossil fuel extraction levies.

    The COP29 outcome must also send clear signals, to drive action on debt relief and reform of the Multilateral Development Banks to make them bigger and bolder.

    Today’s Emissions Gap report is clear: we’re playing with fire; but there can be no more playing for time.

    We’re out of time.

    Closing the emissions gap means closing the ambition gap, the implementation gap, and the finance gap.

    Starting at COP29.

    Thank you.
     

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Biden-Harris Administration announces nearly $35 million for water infrastructure in New Hampshire through Investing in America agenda

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Maggie Hassan
    BOSTON (Oct. 23, 2024) –Today, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced $3.6 billion in new funding under the Biden-Harris Administration’s Bipartisan Infrastructure Law to upgrade water infrastructure and keep communities safe. Combined with $2.6 billion announced earlier this month, this $6.2 billion in investments for Fiscal Year 2025 will help communities across the country upgrade water infrastructure that is essential to safely managing wastewater, protecting local freshwater resources, and delivering safe drinking water to homes, schools, and businesses.
    These Bipartisan Infrastructure Law funds will flow through the Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds (CWSRF and DWSRF), a long-standing federal-state water investment partnership. This multibillion-dollar investment will fund state-run, low-interest loan programs that address key challenges in financing water infrastructure. Today’s announcement includes allotments for Bipartisan Infrastructure Law Clean Water General Supplemental funds for New Hampshire ($24,867,000), Emerging Contaminant funds ($2,146,000), and $7,640,000 under the Drinking Water Emerging Contaminant Fund.
    This funding is part of a five-year, $50 billion investment in water infrastructure through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law – the largest investment in water infrastructure in American history. To ensure investments reach communities that need them the most, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law mandates that a majority of the funding announced today must be provided to disadvantaged communities in the form of grants or loans that do not have to be repaid.
    “Water keeps us healthy, sustains vibrant communities and dynamic ecosystems, and supports economic opportunity. When our water infrastructure fails, it threatens people’s health, peace of mind, and the environment,” said EPA Administrator Michael S. Regan. “With the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law’s historic investment in water, EPA is working with states and local partners to upgrade infrastructure and address local challenges—from lead in drinking water, to PFAS, to water main breaks, to sewer overflows and climate resilience. Together, we are creating good-paying jobs while ensuring that all people can rely on clean and safe water.”
    “Clean, reliable water is at the heart of every thriving community. Yet too many communities—especially those overburdened by pollution or left behind by past investments—face challenges accessing the resources they need to upgrade water infrastructure,” said EPA Regional Administrator David W. Cash. “Thanks to the Biden-Harris Administration, we are delivering transformative funding to support local solutions to water issues, from fixing aging infrastructure to addressing emerging contaminants like PFAS. These investments don’t just protect public health and reduce pollution in waterways; they also create good-paying jobs and help communities become more resilient for the future.”
    “The health and vitality of Granite State communities depend on clean water,” said U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen. “As a lead negotiator of the water provisions of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, I’m thrilled to see this funding headed to New Hampshire to strengthen our wastewater infrastructure, address forever chemicals and keep our lakes and rivers clean.”
    “Every Granite Stater deserves safe, clean drinking water, and this new $34 million in funding for New Hampshire through the bipartisan infrastructure law will help make that possible for more families,” said U.S. Senator Maggie Hassan. “I helped negotiate and pass into law this historic infrastructure package to help deliver results for our communities, and I am pleased to see these continued investments flowing to New Hampshire to upgrade our water systems and protect public health.”
    “Safe, clean water is essential to the health and well-being of our communities, our economy, and our way of life,” said U.S. Representative Annie Kuster. “With these resources made available through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, New Hampshire will be able to make critical improvements to our state’s water infrastructure, protect our freshwater ecosystems, and ensure more families and businesses have access to clean drinking water.”
    “Our drinking water and waste water systems in New Hampshire require investment and modernization to serve the needs of Granite Staters. That is why I fought to pass the bipartisan infrastructure law to deliver these federal resources to New Hampshire,” said U.S. Representative Chris Pappas. “I’ll keep fighting to ensure this law benefits Granite Staters by delivering clean drinking water, protecting our environment, and helping our communities and economy grow for the future.”
    EPA is changing the odds for communities that have faced barriers to planning and accessing federal funding through its Water Technical Assistance program, which helps disadvantaged communities identify water challenges, develop infrastructure upgrade plans, and apply for funding. Communities seeking Water Technical Assistance can request support by completing the WaterTA request form. These efforts also advance the Biden-Harris Administration’s Justice40 Initiative, which sets the goal that 40% of the overall benefits of certain Federal investments flow to disadvantaged communities that are marginalized by underinvestment and overburdened by pollution.
    To read stories about how unprecedented investments in water from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law are transforming communities across the country, visit EPA’s Investing in America’s Water Infrastructure Storymap. To read more about additional projects, see EPA’s recently released Quarterly Report on Bipartisan Infrastructure Law Funded Clean Water and Drinking Water SRF projects.
    For more information, including the state-by-state allocation of 2025 funding and a breakdown of EPA SRF funding available under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, please visit the Clean Water State Revolving Fund website and Drinking Water State Revolving Fund website. Additionally, the SRF Public Portal allows users to access data from both the Drinking Water and Clean Water SRF programs through interactive reports, dashboards, and maps.
    The State Revolving Fund (SRF) programs have been the foundation of water infrastructure investments for more than 30 years, providing low-cost financing for local projects across America. SRF programs are critically important programs for investing in the nation’s water infrastructure. They are designed to generate significant and sustainable water quality and public health benefits across the country. Their impact is amplified by the growth inherent in a revolving loan structure, in which payments of principal and interest on loans become available to address future needs.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cassidy Releases Critical Report Outlining National Flood Insurance Program Crisis, Urges Congress to Act

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Louisiana Bill Cassidy

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, M.D. (R-LA) today released a new report detailing the current state of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the issues that led to skyrocketing premiums for millions of homeowners. The report explains the historical developments that led NFIP to this moment, key findings following a thorough examination of the crisis, and next steps Washington must take.
    “This report confirms what Louisiana homeowners already know—the National Flood Insurance Program is broken,” said Dr. Cassidy. “We must understand the problem to properly diagnose it and address it. This report clearly lays out why flood insurance premiums are out of control, but also why there is reason to hope.”
    For over 50 years, Americans have relied on the NFIP for affordable flood insurance to protect them in case of a natural disaster or major flood. NFIP is often the only flood insurance option for many communities. However, skyrocketing insurance premiums caused by FEMA’s new risk assessment program, Risk Rating 2.0, have left many Louisianans with no way to protect their families and homes. Cassidy’s report found that Risk Rating 2.0 makes flood insurance unaffordable, puts the entire program at financial risk, and runs contrary to Congressional intent. 
    Click here to read the full report and here to read the one-pager.
    Background
    In January, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee held a hearing on NFIP at the request of Cassidy. The hearing highlighted the urgent need for Congress to act and featured a Louisiana witness. Cassidy also participated in a roundtable hosted by GNO, Inc. and the Coalition for Sustainable Flood Insurance before introducing the bill to hear from community leaders and advocates on the issue.
    Cassidy traveled St. Bernard Parish last year to talk with residents about their flood insurance premiums, resulting in the second episode of his series Bill on the Hill.
    Over the last several months, Cassidy has delivered a series of speeches on the Senate floor calling for action on NFIP. Most recently, he demanded that Congress reauthorize and reform the program just before its authorization expired at the end of the fiscal year on September 30th.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: FACT SHEET: Vice President Harris Announces Record Lending to Small Businesses in 2024 and New Actions to Cut Red Tape and Expand Contracting Opportunities

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    SBA backed over 100,000 small business financings this year—the most in over 15 years
    Today, Vice President Harris announced that the Small Business Administration (SBA) provided a record $56 billion through more than 100,000 small business financings in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024—the most in more than 15 years. The Vice President also announced new actions by the Biden-Harris Administration to cut red tape and expand access to Federal contracting opportunities.
    “Small businesses are the backbone of our economy. And we know that small business owners need access to capital to hire more employees, grow their businesses, and advance innovation,” said Vice President Harris. “Today I am proud to announce that the U.S. Small Business Administration has made record lending to over 100,000 small businesses in the last year, the most by the agency in over 15 years. When small businesses thrive, our local economies thrive.”
    The Biden-Harris Administration has powered a small business boom across the country. Since President Biden and Vice President Harris took office, American entrepreneurs have filed nearly 20 million applications to start new businesses. Business ownership has doubled among Black families and hit a 30-year high for Hispanic families.
    While the Biden-Harris Administration doubles down on supporting this small business boom, Congressional Republicans have repeatedly tried to cut SBA’s funding by nearly a third and want to raise taxes and costs for small businesses by repealing Inflation Reduction Act investments.
    Building on these efforts to support small businesses, Vice President Harris is announcing:
    New Records for Lending to Small Businesses
    The SBA released its 2024 Capital Impact Report, showing that the agency increased its lending to small businesses to a record high $56 billion in FY 2024—a 50% increase over FY 2020. Further, SBA provided over 100,000 small business financings last year—the most in over 15 years. Since FY 2020, SBA has increased lending to underserved businesses including a:
    3x increase in loans to Black-owned businesses
    2.5x increase in loans to Latino-owned businesses
    2x increase in loans to women-owned businesses
    2x increase in small dollar loans (loans of less than $150,000)
    Increasing Access to Federal Contracting Opportunities
    The SBA is proposing new regulations to increase small business participation on multiple award contracts, a popular buying tool used for over 20 percent of all contracting by the Federal Government. The proposed rule will require agencies to set aside orders made under these contracts when two or more small business contract holders are expected to submit competitive offers. Multiple award contracts allow agencies to meet mission needs in a timely, cost-effective manner by awarding task and delivery orders to contract holders using streamlined competitions.
    The SBA proposed rule will require agencies to take steps that make it easier for small businesses to become contract holders on multiple-award contracts where they will then be eligible to compete for task and delivery orders through streamlined competitions. SBA projects that the new rule, if finalized as proposed, will result in up to $6 billion in additional awards to small businesses each year. This new proposed rule will further implement OMB’s January 2024 memo on “Increasing Small Business Participation on Multiple-Award Contracts.” The members of the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council will also be proposing regulatory changes in the near future to implement OMB’s guidance and align with SBA’s rulemaking.
    Direct Support to Meet Businesses’ Individual Needs
    This summer marked the first year of the Capital Readiness Program (CRP), funded by the Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA)’s State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) and announced by Vice President Harris in August 2023. The CRP is a $125 million investment to help minority and underserved entrepreneurs grow and scale their businesses, the largest-ever direct Federal investment in small business incubators and accelerators of its kind. Today’s data shows the incredible impacts the 43 program awardees have already made in their communities in the first year of the program. Through September 30, 2024, following their efforts to quickly stand-up programs, the 43 awardees have already:
    Enrolled over 6,300 small businesses
    Hosted nearly 2,500 networking events
    Supported the formation of over 2,600 new businesses
    Raised over $260 million in capital for small businesses
    Cutting Red Tape for Small Businesses Seeking Federal Contracts
    The SBA just launched MySBA Certifications to simplify and streamline certifications for small business Federal contractors. The Biden-Harris Administration committed to using every tool at its disposal to reduce administrative burden for small businesses seeking to compete for Federal contracts. Building on this goal, MySBA Certifications is a one-stop-shop that allows small business owners to apply for multiple certifications with a single application, rather than submitting separate applications for the HUBZone, 8(a), Women Owned, and Veteran Owned Small Business Certification programs. SBA also simplified and modernized its application—using plain language, eliminating redundant questions, and reducing documentation requirements—reducing the time to apply by 40% for a single certification and over 70% for multiple certifications. SBA’s new operational efficiencies will reduce processing times across the programs—meaning firms will receive their decisions more quickly and can begin competing for sole-source and set-aside contracts. In FY 2024, SBA certified more than 17,000 small businesses—a single year record and a nearly 40 percent increase over FY 2023. The agency expects to build on this success with MySBA Certifications and significantly grow the base of certified small business government contractors—helping the Federal Government meet the President’s 15 percent small disadvantaged business goal in FY 2025.
    Leveraging Public and Private Capital Through the State Small Business Credit Initiative
    The Department of the Treasury plans to release the 2022-2023 SSBCI Annual Report next week, providing additional background on data first previewed in July 2024. SSBCI is a nearly $10 billion program that is providing investment and support to small businesses across the country. Through 2023, SSBCI had already enabled access to $3.1 billion in public and private financing for thousands of small businesses. The report will show that 75% of transactions supported underserved businesses and 78% supported very small business with fewer than 10 employees through the end of 2023.
    In 2024, local jurisdictions have continued to leverage partnerships to catalyze SSBCI dollars. Efforts include:
    The Access Small Business program by Calvert Impact: This program leverages funds from SSBCI to bring access to capital and technical assistance to underserved small businesses in New York, New Jersey, Nevada, and Washington State, as well as access to capital markets for community lenders. Partners include the Community Reinvestment Fund, Grow America, and the Urban Investment Group at Goldman Sachs Alternatives.
    The Initiative for Inclusive Entrepreneurship (IIE): IIE is a public-private collaboration to ensure the equitable implementation of SSBCI. IIE’s initial 18-month pilot was incubated by Hyphen, a leading national public-private partnership accelerator. The initiative’s implementation partners include Aspen Institute’s Business Ownership Initiative, Founders First Capital Partners, JumpStart, Mission Driven Finance, Next Street, Nowak Metro Finance Lab, and Scale Link. Across IIE programs, the Initiative deployed over $10 million in direct funding and secured over $177 million in loans, loan matches, grants, and private capital. Additionally, Mission Driven Finance announced the Indigenous Futures Fund, combining a target of $25 million in credit and $2 million in grants to support Tribal SSBCI recipients. Starting in July 2024, the Milken Institute began serving as IIE’s new home.
    Tribal Consortia: In August 2024, SSBCI announced a consortium of 125 Alaska Tribes, the nation’s largest Tribal SSBCI consortium and part of the most expansive investment in small business financing for Tribal governments in history. In total, four Tribal consortium representing 170 Tribes have been awarded $124 million in SSBCI Capital Program funds to support investments in Tribal enterprises and small businesses. Partnerships among Tribal Nations are important to expanding the reach of SSBCI.
    Supportive Business Services: In September and October 2024, Treasury announced 14 awards to 12 states and two Tribal governments through the $75 million Investing in America Small Business Opportunity Program (SBOP). SBOP grantees will provide legal, accounting, and financial advisory services to small businesses in a wide range of industries and will engage at least 34 partners for program deployment.
    Developing New Tools to Help Small Businesses Access Capital, Customers, and Technical Assistance
    The Interagency Community Investment Committee (ICIC) developed fifteen state-specific small business resource guides, covering over 55 programs offered by nine federal agencies. The guides are intended to help small businesses identify federally-supported sources of capital and technical assistance available in their communities, and help direct businesses to federal contracting and tax resources. ICIC leadership has been conducting a series of virtual events in October with small business owners to talk about the Biden-Harris Administration’s small business programs and these new resource guides.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Memorandum on Advancing the United  States’ Leadership in Artificial Intelligence; Harnessing Artificial Intelligence to Fulfill National Security Objectives; and Fostering the Safety, Security, and Trustworthiness of Artificial  Intelligence

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
                   THE SECRETARY OF STATE
                   THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
                   THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                   THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
                   THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
                   THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
                   THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
                   THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
                   THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
                   THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
                   THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
                   THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
                   THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF
                   THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
                   THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC
                      POLICY AND DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
                   THE CHAIR OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
                   THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
                   THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
                   THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
                   THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                   THE NATIONAL CYBER DIRECTOR
                   THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE POLICY
                   THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
                   THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
                   THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
    SUBJECT:       Advancing the United States’ Leadership in
                   Artificial Intelligence; Harnessing Artificial
                   Intelligence to Fulfill National Security
                   Objectives; and Fostering the Safety, Security,
                   and Trustworthiness of Artificial Intelligence
         Section 1.  Policy.  (a)  This memorandum fulfills the directive set forth in subsection 4.8 of Executive Order 14110 of October 30, 2023 (Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence).  This memorandum provides further direction on appropriately harnessing artificial intelligence (AI) models and AI-enabled technologies in the United States Government, especially in the context of national security systems (NSS), while protecting human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and safety in AI-enabled national security activities.  A classified annex to this memorandum addresses additional sensitive national security issues, including countering adversary use of AI that poses risks to United States national security.
         (b)  United States national security institutions have historically triumphed during eras of technological transition.  To meet changing times, they developed new capabilities, from submarines and aircraft to space systems and cyber tools.  To gain a decisive edge and protect national security, they pioneered technologies such as radar, the Global Positioning System, and nuclear propulsion, and unleashed these hard-won breakthroughs on the battlefield.  With each paradigm shift, they also developed new systems for tracking and countering adversaries’ attempts to wield cutting-edge technology for their own advantage.
         (c)  AI has emerged as an era-defining technology and has demonstrated significant and growing relevance to national security.  The United States must lead the world in the responsible application of AI to appropriate national security functions.  AI, if used appropriately and for its intended purpose, can offer great benefits.  If misused, AI could threaten United States national security, bolster authoritarianism worldwide, undermine democratic institutions and processes, facilitate human rights abuses, and weaken the rules-based international order.  Harmful outcomes could occur even without malicious intent if AI systems and processes lack sufficient protections.
         (d)  Recent innovations have spurred not only an increase in AI use throughout society, but also a paradigm shift within the AI field — one that has occurred mostly outside of Government.  This era of AI development and deployment rests atop unprecedented aggregations of specialized computational power, as well as deep scientific and engineering expertise, much of which is concentrated in the private sector.  This trend is most evident with the rise of large language models, but it extends to a broader class of increasingly general-purpose and computationally intensive systems.  The United States Government must urgently consider how this current AI paradigm specifically could transform the national security mission.
         (e)  Predicting technological change with certainty is impossible, but the foundational drivers that have underpinned recent AI progress show little sign of abating.  These factors include compounding algorithmic improvements, increasingly efficient computational hardware, a growing willingness in industry to invest substantially in research and development, and the expansion of training data sets.  AI under the current paradigm may continue to become more powerful and general-purpose.  Developing and effectively using these systems requires an evolving array of resources, infrastructure, competencies, and workflows that in many cases differ from what was required to harness prior technologies, including previous paradigms of AI.
         (f)  If the United States Government does not act with responsible speed and in partnership with industry, civil society, and academia to make use of AI capabilities in service of the national security mission — and to ensure the safety, security, and trustworthiness of American AI innovation writ large — it risks losing ground to strategic competitors.  Ceding the United States’ technological edge would not only greatly harm American national security, but it would also undermine United States foreign policy objectives and erode safety, human rights, and democratic norms worldwide.
         (g)  Establishing national security leadership in AI will require making deliberate and meaningful changes to aspects of the United States Government’s strategies, capabilities, infrastructure, governance, and organization.  AI is likely to affect almost all domains with national security significance, and its use cannot be relegated to a single institutional silo.  The increasing generality of AI means that many functions that to date have been served by individual bespoke tools may, going forward, be better fulfilled by systems that, at least in part, rely on a shared, multi-purpose AI capability.  Such integration will only succeed if paired with appropriately redesigned United States Government organizational and informational infrastructure.
         (h)  In this effort, the United States Government must also protect human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and safety, and lay the groundwork for a stable and responsible international AI governance landscape.  Throughout its history, the United States has been a global leader in shaping the design, development, and use of new technologies not only to advance national security, but also to protect and promote democratic values.  The United States Government must develop safeguards for its use of AI tools, and take an active role in steering global AI norms and institutions.  The AI frontier is moving quickly, and the United States Government must stay attuned to ongoing technical developments without losing focus on its guiding principles.
         (i)  This memorandum aims to catalyze needed change in how the United States Government approaches AI national security policy.  In line with Executive Order 14110, it directs actions to strengthen and protect the United States AI ecosystem; improve the safety, security, and trustworthiness of AI systems developed and used in the United States; enhance the United States Government’s appropriate, responsible, and effective adoption of AI in service of the national security mission; and minimize the misuse of AI worldwide.
    Sec. 2.  Objectives.  It is the policy of the United States Government that the following three objectives will guide its activities with respect to AI and national security.
         (a)  First, the United States must lead the world’s development of safe, secure, and trustworthy AI.  To that end, the United States Government must — in partnership with industry, civil society, and academia — promote and secure the foundational capabilities across the United States that power AI development.  The United States Government cannot take the unmatched vibrancy and innovativeness of the United States AI ecosystem for granted; it must proactively strengthen it, ensuring that the United States remains the most attractive destination for global talent and home to the world’s most sophisticated computational facilities.  The United States Government must also provide appropriate safety and security guidance to AI developers and users, and rigorously assess and help mitigate the risks that AI systems could pose.
         (b)  Second, the United States Government must harness powerful AI, with appropriate safeguards, to achieve national security objectives.  Emerging AI capabilities, including increasingly general-purpose models, offer profound opportunities for enhancing national security, but employing these systems effectively will require significant technical, organizational, and policy changes.  The United States must understand AI’s limitations as it harnesses the technology’s benefits, and any use of AI must respect democratic values with regard to transparency, human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and safety.
         (c)  Third, the United States Government must continue cultivating a stable and responsible framework to advance international AI governance that fosters safe, secure, and trustworthy AI development and use; manages AI risks; realizes democratic values; respects human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy; and promotes worldwide benefits from AI.  It must do so in collaboration with a wide range of allies and partners.  Success for the United States in the age of AI will be measured not only by the preeminence of United States technology and innovation, but also by the United States’ leadership in developing effective global norms and engaging in institutions rooted in international law, human rights, civil rights, and democratic values.
    Sec. 3.  Promoting and Securing the United States’ Foundational AI Capabilities.  (a)  To preserve and expand United States advantages in AI, it is the policy of the United States Government to promote progress, innovation, and competition in domestic AI development; protect the United States AI ecosystem against foreign intelligence threats; and manage risks to AI safety, security, and trustworthiness.  Leadership in responsible AI development benefits United States national security by enabling applications directly relevant to the national security mission, unlocking economic growth, and avoiding strategic surprise.  United States technological leadership also confers global benefits by enabling like-minded entities to collectively mitigate the risks of AI misuse and accidents, prevent the unchecked spread of digital authoritarianism, and prioritize vital research.
         3.1.  Promoting Progress, Innovation, and Competition in United States AI Development.  (a)  The United States’ competitive edge in AI development will be at risk absent concerted United States Government efforts to promote and secure domestic AI progress, innovation, and competition.  Although the United States has benefited from a head start in AI, competitors are working hard to catch up, have identified AI as a top strategic priority, and may soon devote resources to research and development that United States AI developers cannot match without appropriately supportive Government policies and action.  It is therefore the policy of the United States Government to enhance innovation and competition by bolstering key drivers of AI progress, such as technical talent and computational power.
         (b)  It is the policy of the United States Government that advancing the lawful ability of noncitizens highly skilled in AI and related fields to enter and work in the United States constitutes a national security priority.  Today, the unparalleled United States AI industry rests in substantial part on the insights of brilliant scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs who moved to the United States in pursuit of academic, social, and economic opportunity.  Preserving and expanding United States talent advantages requires developing talent at home and continuing to attract and retain top international minds.
         (c)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)    On an ongoing basis, the Department of State, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) shall each use all available legal authorities to assist in attracting and rapidly bringing to the United States individuals with relevant technical expertise who would improve United States competitiveness in AI and related fields, such as semiconductor design and production.  These activities shall include all appropriate vetting of these individuals and shall be consistent with all appropriate risk mitigation measures.  This tasking is consistent with and additive to the taskings on attracting AI talent in section 5 of Executive Order 14110.
    (ii)   Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers shall prepare an analysis of the AI talent market in the United States and overseas, to the extent that reliable data is available.
    (iii)  Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and Director of the National Economic Council shall coordinate an economic assessment of the relative competitive advantage of the United States private sector AI ecosystem, the key sources of the United States private sector’s competitive advantage, and possible risks to that position, and shall recommend policies to mitigate them.  The assessment could include areas including (1) the design, manufacture, and packaging of chips critical in AI-related activities; (2) the availability of capital; (3) the availability of workers highly skilled in AI-related fields; (4) computational resources and the associated electricity requirements; and (5) technological platforms or institutions with the requisite scale of capital and data resources for frontier AI model development, as well as possible other factors.
    (iv)   Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) shall convene appropriate executive departments and agencies (agencies) to explore actions for prioritizing and streamlining administrative processing operations for all visa applicants working with sensitive technologies.  Doing so shall assist with streamlined processing of highly skilled applicants in AI and other critical and emerging technologies.  This effort shall explore options for ensuring the adequate resourcing of such operations and narrowing the criteria that trigger secure advisory opinion requests for such applicants, as consistent with national security objectives.
         (d)  The current paradigm of AI development depends heavily on computational resources.  To retain its lead in AI, the United States must continue developing the world’s most sophisticated AI semiconductors and constructing its most advanced AI-dedicated computational infrastructure.
         (e)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)    DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE) (including national laboratories), and the Intelligence Community (IC) shall, when planning for and constructing or renovating computational facilities, consider the applicability of large-scale AI to their mission.  Where appropriate, agencies shall design and build facilities capable of harnessing frontier AI for relevant scientific research domains and intelligence analysis.  Those investments shall be consistent with the Federal Mission Resilience Strategy adopted in Executive Order 13961 of December 7, 2020 (Governance and Integration of Federal Mission Resilience).
    (ii)   On an ongoing basis, the National Science Foundation (NSF) shall, consistent with its authorities, use the National AI Research Resource (NAIRR) pilot project and any future NAIRR efforts to distribute computational resources, data, and other critical assets for AI development to a diverse array of actors that otherwise would lack access to such capabilities — such as universities, nonprofits, and independent researchers (including trusted international collaborators) — to ensure that AI research in the United States remains competitive and innovative.  This tasking is consistent with the NAIRR pilot assigned in section 5 of Executive Order 14110.
    (iii)  Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, DOE shall launch a pilot project to evaluate the performance and efficiency of federated AI and data sources for frontier AI-scale training, fine-tuning, and inference.
    (iv)   The Office of the White House Chief of Staff, in coordination with DOE and other relevant agencies, shall coordinate efforts to streamline permitting, approvals, and incentives for the construction of AI-enabling infrastructure, as well as surrounding assets supporting the resilient operation of this infrastructure, such as clean energy generation, power transmission lines, and high-capacity fiber data links.  These efforts shall include coordination, collaboration, consultation, and partnership with State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, as appropriate, and shall be consistent with the United States’ goals for managing climate risks.
    (v)    The Department of State, DOD, DOE, the IC, and the Department of Commerce (Commerce) shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, use existing authorities to make public investments and encourage private investments in strategic domestic and foreign AI technologies and adjacent fields.  These agencies shall assess the need for new authorities for the purposes of facilitating public and private investment in AI and adjacent capabilities.
         3.2.  Protecting United States AI from Foreign Intelligence Threats.  (a)  In addition to pursuing industrial strategies that support their respective AI industries, foreign states almost certainly aim to obtain and repurpose the fruits of AI innovation in the United States to serve their national security goals.  Historically, such competitors have employed techniques including research collaborations, investment schemes, insider threats, and advanced cyber espionage to collect and exploit United States scientific insights.  It is the policy of the United States Government to protect United States industry, civil society, and academic AI intellectual property and related infrastructure from foreign intelligence threats to maintain a lead in foundational capabilities and, as necessary, to provide appropriate Government assistance to relevant non-government entities.
         (b)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)   Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the National Security Council (NSC) staff and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) shall review the President’s Intelligence Priorities and the National Intelligence Priorities Framework consistent with National Security Memorandum 12 of July 12, 2022 (The President’s Intelligence Priorities), and make recommendations to ensure that such priorities improve identification and assessment of foreign intelligence threats to the United States AI ecosystem and closely related enabling sectors, such as those involved in semiconductor design and production.
    (ii)  Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, and on an ongoing basis thereafter, ODNI, in coordination with DOD, the Department of Justice (DOJ), Commerce, DOE, DHS, and other IC elements as appropriate, shall identify critical nodes in the AI supply chain, and develop a list of the most plausible avenues through which these nodes could be disrupted or compromised by foreign actors.  On an ongoing basis, these agencies shall take all steps, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to reduce such risks.
         (c)  Foreign actors may also seek to obtain United States intellectual property through gray-zone methods, such as technology transfer and data localization requirements.  AI-related intellectual property often includes critical technical artifacts (CTAs) that would substantially lower the costs of recreating, attaining, or using powerful AI capabilities.  The United States Government must guard against these risks.
         (d)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)  In furtherance of Executive Order 14083 of September 15, 2022 (Ensuring Robust Consideration of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States), the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States shall, as appropriate, consider whether a covered transaction involves foreign actor access to proprietary information on AI training techniques, algorithmic improvements, hardware advances, CTAs, or other proprietary insights that shed light on how to create and effectively use powerful AI systems.
         3.3.  Managing Risks to AI Safety, Security, and Trustworthiness.  (a)  Current and near-future AI systems could pose significant safety, security, and trustworthiness risks, including those stemming from deliberate misuse and accidents.  Across many technological domains, the United States has historically led the world not only in advancing capabilities, but also in developing the tests, standards, and norms that underpin reliable and beneficial global adoption.  The United States approach to AI should be no different, and proactively constructing testing infrastructure to assess and mitigate AI risks will be essential to realizing AI’s positive potential and to preserving United States AI leadership.
         (b)  It is the policy of the United States Government to pursue new technical and policy tools that address the potential challenges posed by AI.  These tools include processes for reliably testing AI models’ applicability to harmful tasks and deeper partnerships with institutions in industry, academia, and civil society capable of advancing research related to AI safety, security, and trustworthiness.
         (c)  Commerce, acting through the AI Safety Institute (AISI) within the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), shall serve as the primary United States Government point of contact with private sector AI developers to facilitate voluntary pre- and post-public deployment testing for safety, security, and trustworthiness of frontier AI models.  In coordination with relevant agencies as appropriate, Commerce shall establish an enduring capability to lead voluntary unclassified pre-deployment safety testing of frontier AI models on behalf of the United States Government, including assessments of risks relating to cybersecurity, biosecurity, chemical weapons, system autonomy, and other risks as appropriate (not including nuclear risk, the assessment of which shall be led by DOE).  Voluntary unclassified safety testing shall also, as appropriate, address risks to human rights, civil rights, and civil liberties, such as those related to privacy, discrimination and bias, freedom of expression, and the safety of individuals and groups.  Other agencies, as identified in subsection 3.3(f) of this section, shall establish enduring capabilities to perform complementary voluntary classified testing in appropriate areas of expertise.  The directives set forth in this subsection are consistent with broader taskings on AI safety in section 4 of Executive Order 14110, and provide additional clarity on agencies’ respective roles and responsibilities.
         (d)  Nothing in this subsection shall inhibit agencies from performing their own evaluations of AI systems, including tests performed before those systems are released to the public, for the purposes of evaluating suitability for that agency’s acquisition and procurement.  AISI’s responsibilities do not extend to the evaluation of AI systems for the potential use by the United States Government for national security purposes; those responsibilities lie with agencies considering such use, as outlined in subsection 4.2(e) of this memorandum and the associated framework described in that subsection.
         (e)  Consistent with these goals, Commerce, acting through AISI within NIST, shall take the following actions to aid in the evaluation of current and near-future AI systems:
    (i)    Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum and subject to private sector cooperation, AISI shall pursue voluntary preliminary testing of at least two frontier AI models prior to their public deployment or release to evaluate capabilities that might pose a threat to national security.  This testing shall assess models’ capabilities to aid offensive cyber operations, accelerate development of biological and/or chemical weapons, autonomously carry out malicious behavior, automate development and deployment of other models with such capabilities, and give rise to other risks identified by AISI.  AISI shall share feedback with the APNSA, interagency counterparts as appropriate, and the respective model developers regarding the results of risks identified during such testing and any appropriate mitigations prior to deployment.
    (ii)   Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, AISI shall issue guidance for AI developers on how to test, evaluate, and manage risks to safety, security, and trustworthiness arising from dual-use foundation models, building on guidelines issued pursuant to subsection 4.1(a) of Executive Order 14110.  AISI shall issue guidance on topics including:
    (A)  How to measure capabilities that are relevant to the risk that AI models could enable the development of biological and chemical weapons or the automation of offensive cyber operations;
    (B)  How to address societal risks, such as the misuse of models to harass or impersonate individuals;
    (C)  How to develop mitigation measures to prevent malicious or improper use of models;
    (D)  How to test the efficacy of safety and security mitigations; and
    (E)  How to apply risk management practices throughout the development and deployment lifecycle (pre-development, development, and deployment/release).
    (iii)  Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, AISI, in consultation with other agencies as appropriate, shall develop or recommend benchmarks or other methods for assessing AI systems’ capabilities and limitations in science, mathematics, code generation, and general reasoning, as well as other categories of activity that AISI deems relevant to assessing general-purpose capabilities likely to have a bearing on national security and public safety.
    (iv)   In the event that AISI or another agency determines that a dual-use foundation model’s capabilities could be used to harm public safety significantly, AISI shall serve as the primary point of contact through which the United States Government communicates such findings and any associated recommendations regarding risk mitigation to the developer of the model.
    (v)    Within 270 days of the date of this memorandum, and at least annually thereafter, AISI shall submit to the President, through the APNSA, and provide to other interagency counterparts as appropriate, at minimum one report that shall include the following:
    (A)  A summary of findings from AI safety assessments of frontier AI models that have been conducted by or shared with AISI;
    (B)  A summary of whether AISI deemed risk mitigation necessary to resolve any issues identified in the assessments, along with conclusions regarding any mitigations’ efficacy; and
    (C)  A summary of the adequacy of the science-based tools and methods used to inform such assessments.
         (f)  Consistent with these goals, other agencies specified below shall take the following actions, in coordination with Commerce, acting through AISI within NIST, to provide classified sector-specific evaluations of current and near-future AI systems for cyber, nuclear, and radiological risks:
    (i)    All agencies that conduct or fund safety testing and evaluations of AI systems shall share the results of such evaluations with AISI within 30 days of their completion, consistent with applicable protections for classified and controlled information.
    (ii)   Within 120 days of the date of this memorandum, the National Security Agency (NSA), acting through its AI Security Center (AISC) and in coordination with AISI, shall develop the capability to perform rapid systematic classified testing of AI models’ capacity to detect, generate, and/or exacerbate offensive cyber threats.  Such tests shall assess the degree to which AI systems, if misused, could accelerate offensive cyber operations.
    (iii)  Within 120 days of the date of this memorandum, DOE, acting primarily through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and in close coordination with AISI and NSA, shall seek to develop the capability to perform rapid systematic testing of AI models’ capacity to generate or exacerbate nuclear and radiological risks.  This initiative shall involve the development and maintenance of infrastructure capable of running classified and unclassified tests, including using restricted data and relevant classified threat information.  This initiative shall also feature the creation and regular updating of automated evaluations, the development of an interface for enabling human-led red-teaming, and the establishment of technical and legal tooling necessary for facilitating the rapid and secure transfer of United States Government, open-weight, and proprietary models to these facilities.  As part of this initiative:
    (A)  Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, DOE shall use the capability described in subsection 3.3(f)(iii) of this section to complete initial evaluations of the radiological and nuclear knowledge, capabilities, and implications of a frontier AI model no more than 30 days after the model has been made available to NNSA at an appropriate classification level.  These evaluations shall involve tests of AI systems both without significant modifications and, as appropriate, with fine-tuning or other modifications that could enhance performance.
    (B)  Within 270 days of the date of this memorandum, and at least annually thereafter, DOE shall submit to the President, through the APNSA, at minimum one assessment that shall include the following:
    (1)  A concise summary of the findings of each AI model evaluation for radiological and nuclear risk, described in subsection 3.3(f)(iii)(A) of this section, that DOE has performed in the preceding 12 months;
    (2)  A recommendation as to whether corrective action is necessary to resolve any issues identified in the evaluations, including but not limited to actions necessary for attaining and sustaining compliance conditions appropriate to safeguard and prevent unauthorized disclosure of restricted data or other classified information, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; and
    (3)  A concise statement regarding the adequacy of the science-based tools and methods used to inform the evaluations.
    (iv)   On an ongoing basis, DHS, acting through the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), shall continue to fulfill its responsibilities with respect to the application of AISI guidance, as identified in National Security Memorandum 22 of April 30, 2024 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience), and section 4 of Executive Order 14110.
         (g)  Consistent with these goals, and to reduce the chemical and biological risks that could emerge from AI:
    (i)    The United States Government shall advance classified evaluations of advanced AI models’ capacity to generate or exacerbate deliberate chemical and biological threats.  As part of this initiative:
    (A)  Within 210 days of the date of this memorandum, DOE, DHS, and AISI, in consultation with DOD and other relevant agencies, shall coordinate to develop a roadmap for future classified evaluations of advanced AI models’ capacity to generate or exacerbate deliberate chemical and biological threats, to be shared with the APNSA.  This roadmap shall consider the scope, scale, and priority of classified evaluations; proper safeguards to ensure that evaluations and simulations are not misconstrued as offensive capability development; proper safeguards for testing sensitive and/or classified information; and sustainable implementation of evaluation methodologies.
    (B)  On an ongoing basis, DHS shall provide expertise, threat and risk information, and other technical support to assess the feasibility of proposed biological and chemical classified evaluations; interpret and contextualize evaluation results; and advise relevant agencies on potential risk mitigations.
    (C)  Within 270 days of the date of this memorandum, DOE shall establish a pilot project to provide expertise, infrastructure, and facilities capable of conducting classified tests in this area.
    (ii)   Within 240 days of the date of this memorandum, DOD, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), DOE (including national laboratories), DHS, NSF, and other agencies pursuing the development of AI systems substantially trained on biological and chemical data shall, as appropriate, support efforts to utilize high-performance computing resources and AI systems to enhance biosafety and biosecurity.  These efforts shall include:
    (A)  The development of tools for screening in silico chemical and biological research and technology;
    (B)  The creation of algorithms for nucleic acid synthesis screening;
    (C)  The construction of high-assurance software foundations for novel biotechnologies;
    (D)  The screening of complete orders or data streams from cloud labs and biofoundries; and
    (E)  The development of risk mitigation strategies such as medical countermeasures.
    (iii)  After the publication of biological and chemical safety guidance by AISI outlined in subsection 3.3(e) of this section, all agencies that directly develop relevant dual-use foundation AI models that are made available to the public and are substantially trained on biological or chemical data shall incorporate this guidance into their agency’s practices, as appropriate and feasible.
    (iv)   Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, NSF, in coordination with DOD, Commerce (acting through AISI within NIST), HHS, DOE, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and other relevant agencies, shall seek to convene academic research institutions and scientific publishers to develop voluntary best practices and standards for publishing computational biological and chemical models, data sets, and approaches, including those that use AI and that could contribute to the production of knowledge, information, technologies, and products that could be misused to cause harm.  This is in furtherance of the activities described in subsections 4.4 and 4.7 of Executive Order 14110.
    (v)    Within 540 days of the date of this memorandum, and informed by the United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential, OSTP, NSC staff, and the Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy, in consultation with relevant agencies and external stakeholders as appropriate, shall develop guidance promoting the benefits of and mitigating the risks associated with in silico biological and chemical research.
         (h)  Agencies shall take the following actions to improve foundational understanding of AI safety, security, and trustworthiness:
    (i)   DOD, Commerce, DOE, DHS, ODNI, NSF, NSA, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, prioritize research on AI safety and trustworthiness.  As appropriate and consistent with existing authorities, they shall pursue partnerships as appropriate with leading public sector, industry, civil society, academic, and other institutions with expertise in these domains, with the objective of accelerating technical and socio-technical progress in AI safety and trustworthiness.  This work may include research on interpretability, formal methods, privacy enhancing technologies, techniques to address risks to civil liberties and human rights, human-AI interaction, and/or the socio-technical effects of detecting and labeling synthetic and authentic content (for example, to address the malicious use of AI to generate misleading videos or images, including those of a strategically damaging or non-consensual intimate nature, of political or public figures).
    (ii)  DOD, Commerce, DOE, DHS, ODNI, NSF, NSA, and NGA shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, prioritize research to improve the security, robustness, and reliability of AI systems and controls.  These entities shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, partner with other agencies, industry, civil society, and academia.  Where appropriate, DOD, DHS (acting through CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and NSA (acting through AISC) shall publish unclassified guidance concerning known AI cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats; best practices for avoiding, detecting, and mitigating such issues during model training and deployment; and the integration of AI into other software systems.  This work shall include an examination of the role of and vulnerabilities potentially caused by AI systems used in critical infrastructure.
         (i)  Agencies shall take actions to protect classified and controlled information, given the potential risks posed by AI:
    (i)  In the course of regular updates to policies and procedures, DOD, DOE, and the IC shall consider how analysis enabled by AI tools may affect decisions related to declassification of material, standards for sufficient anonymization, and similar activities, as well as the robustness of existing operational security and equity controls to protect classified or controlled information, given that AI systems have demonstrated the capacity to extract previously inaccessible insight from redacted and anonymized data.
    Sec. 4.  Responsibly Harnessing AI to Achieve National Security Objectives.  (a)  It is the policy of the United States Government to act decisively to enable the effective and responsible use of AI in furtherance of its national security mission.  Achieving global leadership in national security applications of AI will require effective partnership with organizations outside Government, as well as significant internal transformation, including strengthening effective oversight and governance functions.
         4.1.  Enabling Effective and Responsible Use of AI.  (a)  It is the policy of the United States Government to adapt its partnerships, policies, and infrastructure to use AI capabilities appropriately, effectively, and responsibly.  These modifications must balance each agency’s unique oversight, data, and application needs with the substantial benefits associated with sharing powerful AI and computational resources across the United States Government.  Modifications must also be grounded in a clear understanding of the United States Government’s comparative advantages relative to industry, civil society, and academia, and must leverage offerings from external collaborators and contractors as appropriate.  The United States Government must make the most of the rich United States AI ecosystem by incentivizing innovation in safe, secure, and trustworthy AI and promoting industry competition when selecting contractors, grant recipients, and research collaborators.  Finally, the United States Government must address important technical and policy considerations in ways that ensure the integrity and interoperability needed to pursue its objectives while protecting human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and safety.
         (b)  The United States Government needs an updated set of Government-wide procedures for attracting, hiring, developing, and retaining AI and AI-enabling talent for national security purposes.
         (c)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)   In the course of regular legal, policy, and compliance framework reviews, the Department of State, DOD, DOJ, DOE, DHS, and IC elements shall revise, as appropriate, their hiring and retention policies and strategies to accelerate responsible AI adoption.  Agencies shall account for technical talent needs required to adopt AI and integrate it into their missions and other roles necessary to use AI effectively, such as AI-related governance, ethics, and policy positions.  These policies and strategies shall identify financial, organizational, and security hurdles, as well as potential mitigations consistent with applicable law.  Such measures shall also include consideration of programs to attract experts with relevant technical expertise from industry, academia, and civil society — including scholarship for service programs — and similar initiatives that would expose Government employees to relevant non-government entities in ways that build technical, organizational, and cultural familiarity with the AI industry.  These policies and strategies shall use all available authorities, including expedited security clearance procedures as appropriate, in order to address the shortfall of AI-relevant talent within Government.
    (ii)  Within 120 days of the date of this memorandum, the Department of State, DOD, DOJ, DOE, DHS, and IC elements shall each, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), identify education and training opportunities to increase the AI competencies of their respective workforces, via initiatives which may include training and skills-based hiring.
         (d)  To accelerate the use of AI in service of its national security mission, the United States Government needs coordinated and effective acquisition and procurement systems.  This will require an enhanced capacity to assess, define, and articulate AI-related requirements for national security purposes, as well as improved accessibility for AI companies that lack significant prior experience working with the United States Government.
         (e)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)    Within 30 days of the date of this memorandum, DOD and ODNI, in coordination with OMB and other agencies as appropriate, shall establish a working group to address issues involving procurement of AI by DOD and IC elements and for use on NSS.  As appropriate, the working group shall consult the Director of the NSA, as the National Manager for NSS, in developing recommendations for acquiring and procuring AI for use on NSS.
    (ii)   Within 210 days of the date of this memorandum, the working group described in subsection 4.1(e)(i) of this section shall provide written recommendations to the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FARC) regarding changes to existing regulations and guidance, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to promote the following objectives for AI procured by DOD and IC elements and for use on NSS:
    (A)  Ensuring objective metrics to measure and promote the safety, security, and trustworthiness of AI systems;
    (B)  Accelerating the acquisition and procurement process for AI, consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, while maintaining appropriate checks to mitigate safety risks;  
    (C)  Simplifying processes such that companies without experienced contracting teams may meaningfully compete for relevant contracts, to ensure that the United States Government has access to a wide range of AI systems and that the AI marketplace is competitive;
    (D)  Structuring competitions to encourage robust participation and achieve best value to the Government, such as by including requirements that promote interoperability and prioritizing the technical capability of vendors when evaluating offers;
    (E)  Accommodating shared use of AI to the greatest degree possible and as appropriate across relevant agencies; and
    (F)  Ensuring that agencies with specific authorities and missions may implement other policies, where appropriate and necessary.
    (iii)  The FARC shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, consider proposing amendments to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to codify recommendations provided by the working group pursuant to subsection 4.1(e)(ii) of this section that may have Government-wide application.
    (iv)   DOD and ODNI shall seek to engage on an ongoing basis with diverse United States private sector stakeholders — including AI technology and defense companies and members of the United States investor community — to identify and better understand emerging capabilities that would benefit or otherwise affect the United States national security mission.
         (f)  The United States Government needs clear, modernized, and robust policies and procedures that enable the rapid development and national security use of AI, consistent with human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, safety, and other democratic values.
         (g)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)    DOD and the IC shall, in consultation with DOJ as appropriate, review their respective legal, policy, civil liberties, privacy, and compliance frameworks, including international legal obligations, and, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, seek to develop or revise policies and procedures to enable the effective and responsible use of AI, accounting for the following:
    (A)  Issues raised by the acquisition, use, retention, dissemination, and disposal of models trained on datasets that include personal information traceable to specific United States persons, publicly available information, commercially available information, and intellectual property, consistent with section 9 of Executive Order 14110;
    (B)  Guidance that shall be developed by DOJ, in consultation with DOD and ODNI, regarding constitutional considerations raised by the IC’s acquisition and use of AI;
    (C)  Challenges associated with classification and compartmentalization;
    (D)  Algorithmic bias, inconsistent performance, inaccurate outputs, and other known AI failure modes;
    (E)  Threats to analytic integrity when employing AI tools;
    (F)  Risks posed by a lack of safeguards that protect human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and other democratic values, as addressed in further detail in subsection 4.2 of this section;
    (G)  Barriers to sharing AI models and related insights with allies and partners; and
    (H)  Potential inconsistencies between AI use and the implementation of international legal obligations and commitments.
    (ii)   As appropriate, the policies described in subsection 4.1(g) of this section shall be consistent with direction issued by the Committee on NSS and DOD governing the security of AI used on NSS, policies issued by the Director of National Intelligence governing adoption of AI by the IC, and direction issued by OMB governing the security of AI used on non-NSS.
    (iii)  On an ongoing basis, each agency that uses AI on NSS shall, in consultation with ODNI and DOD, take all steps appropriate and consistent with applicable law to accelerate responsible approval of AI systems for use on NSS and accreditation of NSS that use AI systems.
         (h)  The United States’ network of allies and partners confers significant advantages over competitors.  Consistent with the 2022 National Security Strategy or any successor strategies, the United States Government must invest in and proactively enable the co-development and co-deployment of AI capabilities with select allies and partners.
         (i)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)  Within 150 days of the date of this memorandum, DOD, in coordination with the Department of State and ODNI, shall evaluate the feasibility of advancing, increasing, and promoting co-development and shared use of AI and AI-enabled assets with select allies and partners.  This evaluation shall include:
    (A)  A potential list of foreign states with which such co-development or co-deployment may be feasible;
    (B)  A list of bilateral and multilateral fora for potential outreach;
    (C)  Potential co-development and co-deployment concepts;
    (D)  Proposed classification-appropriate testing vehicles for co-developed AI capabilities; and
    (E)  Considerations for existing programs, agreements, or arrangements to use as foundations for future co-development and co-deployment of AI capabilities.
         (j)  The United States Government needs improved internal coordination with respect to its use of and approach to AI on NSS in order to ensure interoperability and resource sharing consistent with applicable law, and to reap the generality and economies of scale offered by frontier AI models.
         (k)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)  On an ongoing basis, DOD and ODNI shall issue or revise relevant guidance to improve consolidation and interoperability across AI functions on NSS.  This guidance shall seek to ensure that the United States Government can coordinate and share AI-related resources effectively, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law.  Such work shall include:
    (A)  Recommending agency organizational practices to improve AI research and deployment activities that span multiple national security institutions.  In order to encourage AI adoption for the purpose of national security, these measures shall aim to create consistency to the greatest extent possible across the revised practices.
    (B)  Steps that enable consolidated research, development, and procurement for general-purpose AI systems and supporting infrastructure, such that multiple agencies can share access to these tools to the extent consistent with applicable law, while still allowing for appropriate controls on sensitive data.
    (C)  Aligning AI-related national security policies and procedures across agencies, as practicable and appropriate, and consistent with applicable law.
    (D)  Developing policies and procedures, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to share information across DOD and the IC when an AI system developed, deployed, or used by a contractor demonstrates risks related to safety, security, and trustworthiness, including to human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, or privacy.
         4.2.  Strengthening AI Governance and Risk Management.  (a)  As the United States Government moves swiftly to adopt AI in support of its national security mission, it must continue taking active steps to uphold human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and safety; ensure that AI is used in a manner consistent with the President’s authority as Commander in Chief to decide when to order military operations in the Nation’s defense; and ensure that military use of AI capabilities is accountable, including through such use during military operations within a responsible human chain of command and control.  Accordingly, the United States Government must develop and implement robust AI governance and risk management practices to ensure that its AI innovation aligns with democratic values, updating policy guidance where necessary.  In light of the diverse authorities and missions across covered agencies with a national security mission and the rapid rate of ongoing technological change, such AI governance and risk management frameworks shall be:
    (i)    Structured, to the extent permitted by law, such that they can adapt to future opportunities and risks posed by new technical developments;
    (ii)   As consistent across agencies as is practicable and appropriate in order to enable interoperability, while respecting unique authorities and missions;
    (iii)  Designed to enable innovation that advances United States national security objectives;
    (iv)   As transparent to the public as practicable and appropriate, while protecting classified or controlled information;
    (v)    Developed and applied in a manner and with means to integrate protections, controls, and safeguards for human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and safety where relevant; and
    (vi)   Designed to reflect United States leadership in establishing broad international support for rules and norms that reinforce the United States’ approach to AI governance and risk management.
         (b)  Covered agencies shall develop and use AI responsibly, consistent with United States law and policies, democratic values, and international law and treaty obligations, including international humanitarian and human rights law.  All agency officials retain their existing authorities and responsibilities established in other laws and policies.
         (c)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)  Heads of covered agencies shall, consistent with their authorities, monitor, assess, and mitigate risks directly tied to their agency’s development and use of AI.  Such risks may result from reliance on AI outputs to inform, influence, decide, or execute agency decisions or actions, when used in a defense, intelligence, or law enforcement context, and may impact human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, safety, national security, and democratic values.  These risks from the use of AI include the following:
    (A)  Risks to physical safety:  AI use may pose unintended risks to human life or property.
    (B)  Privacy harms:  AI design, development, and operation may result in harm, embarrassment, unfairness, and prejudice to individuals.
    (C)  Discrimination and bias:  AI use may lead to unlawful discrimination and harmful bias, resulting in, for instance, inappropriate surveillance and profiling, among other harms.
    (D)  Inappropriate use:  operators using AI systems may not fully understand the capabilities and limitations of these technologies, including systems used in conflicts.  Such unfamiliarity could impact operators’ ability to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment.
    (E)  Lack of transparency:  agencies may have gaps in documentation of AI development and use, and the public may lack access to information about how AI is used in national security contexts because of the necessity to protect classified or controlled information.
    (F)  Lack of accountability:  training programs and guidance for agency personnel on the proper use of AI systems may not be sufficient, including to mitigate the risk of overreliance on AI systems (such as “automation bias”), and accountability mechanisms may not adequately address possible intentional or negligent misuse of AI-enabled technologies.
    (G)  Data spillage:  AI systems may reveal aspects of their training data — either inadvertently or through deliberate manipulation by malicious actors — and data spillage may result from AI systems trained on classified or controlled information when used on networks where such information is not permitted.
    (H)  Poor performance:  AI systems that are inappropriately or insufficiently trained, used for purposes outside the scope of their training set, or improperly integrated into human workflows may exhibit poor performance, including in ways that result in inconsistent outcomes or unlawful discrimination and harmful bias, or that undermine the integrity of decision-making processes.
    (I)  Deliberate manipulation and misuse:  foreign state competitors and malicious actors may deliberately undermine the accuracy and efficacy of AI systems, or seek to extract sensitive information from such systems.
         (d)  The United States Government’s AI governance and risk management policies must keep pace with evolving technology.
         (e)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)   An AI framework, entitled “Framework to Advance AI Governance and Risk Management in National Security” (AI Framework), shall further implement this subsection.  The AI Framework shall be approved by the NSC Deputies Committee through the process described in National Security Memorandum 2 of February 4, 2021 (Renewing the National Security Council System), or any successor process, and shall be reviewed periodically through that process.  This process shall determine whether adjustments are needed to address risks identified in subsection 4.2(c) of this section and other topics covered in the AI Framework.  The AI Framework shall serve as a national security-focused counterpart to OMB’s Memorandum M-24-10 of March 28, 2024 (Advancing Governance, Innovation, and Risk Management for Agency Use of Artificial Intelligence), and any successor OMB policies.  To the extent feasible, appropriate, and consistent with applicable law, the AI Framework shall be as consistent as possible with these OMB policies and shall be made public.
    (ii)  The AI Framework described in subsection 4.2(e)(i) of this section and any successor document shall, at a minimum, and to the extent consistent with applicable law, specify the following:
    (A)  Each covered agency shall have a Chief AI Officer who holds primary responsibility within that agency, in coordination with other responsible officials, for managing the agency’s use of AI, promoting AI innovation within the agency, and managing risks from the agency’s use of AI consistent with subsection 3(b) of OMB Memorandum M-24-10, as practicable.
    (B)  Covered agencies shall have AI Governance Boards to coordinate and govern AI issues through relevant senior leaders from the agency.
    (C)  Guidance on AI activities that pose unacceptable levels of risk and that shall be prohibited.
    (D)  Guidance on AI activities that are “high impact” and require minimum risk management practices, including for high-impact AI use that affects United States Government personnel.  Such high-impact activities shall include AI whose output serves as a principal basis for a decision or action that could exacerbate or create significant risks to national security, international norms, human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, safety, or other democratic values.  The minimum risk management practices for high-impact AI shall include a mechanism for agencies to assess AI’s expected benefits and potential risks; a mechanism for assessing data quality; sufficient test and evaluation practices; mitigation of unlawful discrimination and harmful bias; human training, assessment, and oversight requirements; ongoing monitoring; and additional safeguards for military service members, the Federal civilian workforce, and individuals who receive an offer of employment from a covered agency.
    (E)  Covered agencies shall ensure privacy, civil liberties, and safety officials are integrated into AI governance and oversight structures.  Such officials shall report findings to the heads of agencies and oversight officials, as appropriate, using existing reporting channels when feasible.
    (F)  Covered agencies shall ensure that there are sufficient training programs, guidance, and accountability processes to enable proper use of AI systems.
    (G)  Covered agencies shall maintain an annual inventory of their high-impact AI use and AI systems and provide updates on this inventory to agency heads and the APNSA.
    (H)  Covered agencies shall ensure that whistleblower protections are sufficient to account for issues that may arise in the development and use of AI and AI systems.
    (I)  Covered agencies shall develop and implement waiver processes for high-impact AI use that balance robust implementation of risk mitigation measures in this memorandum and the AI Framework with the need to utilize AI to preserve and advance critical agency missions and operations.
    (J)  Covered agencies shall implement cybersecurity guidance or direction associated with AI systems issued by the National Manager for NSS to mitigate the risks posed by malicious actors exploiting new technologies, and to enable interoperability of AI across agencies.  Within 150 days of the date of this memorandum, and periodically thereafter, the National Manager for NSS shall issue minimum cybersecurity guidance and/or direction for AI used as a component of NSS, which shall be incorporated into AI governance guidance detailed in subsection 4.2(g)(i) of this section.
         (f)  The United States Government needs guidance specifically regarding the use of AI on NSS.
         (g)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)  Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, the heads of the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, DOD, DOJ, Commerce, DOE, DHS, ODNI (acting on behalf of the 18 IC elements), and any other covered agency that uses AI as part of a NSS (Department Heads) shall issue or update guidance to their components/sub-agencies on AI governance and risk management for NSS, aligning with the policies in this subsection, the AI Framework, and other applicable policies.  Department Heads shall review their respective guidance on an annual basis, and update such guidance as needed.  This guidance, and any updates thereto, shall be provided to the APNSA prior to issuance.  This guidance shall be unclassified and made available to the public to the extent feasible and appropriate, though it may have a classified annex.  Department Heads shall seek to harmonize their guidance, and the APNSA shall convene an interagency meeting at least annually for the purpose of harmonizing Department Heads’ guidance on AI governance and risk management to the extent practicable and appropriate while respecting the agencies’ diverse authorities and missions.  Harmonization shall be pursued in the following areas:
    (A)  Implementation of the risk management practices for high-impact AI;
    (B)  AI and AI system standards and activities, including as they relate to training, testing, accreditation, and security and cybersecurity; and
    (C)  Any other issues that affect interoperability for AI and AI systems.
    Sec. 5.  Fostering a Stable, Responsible, and Globally Beneficial International AI Governance Landscape.  (a)  Throughout its history, the United States has played an essential role in shaping the international order to enable the safe, secure, and trustworthy global adoption of new technologies while also protecting democratic values.  These contributions have ranged from establishing nonproliferation regimes for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to setting the foundations for multi-stakeholder governance of the Internet.  Like these precedents, AI will require new global norms and coordination mechanisms, which the United States Government must maintain an active role in crafting.
         (b)  It is the policy of the United States Government that United States international engagement on AI shall support and facilitate improvements to the safety, security, and trustworthiness of AI systems worldwide; promote democratic values, including respect for human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and safety; prevent the misuse of AI in national security contexts; and promote equitable access to AI’s benefits.  The United States Government shall advance international agreements, collaborations, and other substantive and norm-setting initiatives in alignment with this policy.
         (c)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)  Within 120 days of the date of this memorandum, the Department of State, in coordination with DOD, Commerce, DHS, the United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shall produce a strategy for the advancement of international AI governance norms in line with safe, secure, and trustworthy AI, and democratic values, including human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy.  This strategy shall cover bilateral and multilateral engagement and relations with allies and partners.  It shall also include guidance on engaging with competitors, and it shall outline an approach to working in international institutions such as the United Nations and the Group of 7 (G7), as well as technical organizations.  The strategy shall:
    (A)  Develop and promote internationally shared definitions, norms, expectations, and standards, consistent with United States policy and existing efforts, which will promote safe, secure, and trustworthy AI development and use around the world.  These norms shall be as consistent as possible with United States domestic AI governance (including Executive Order 14110 and OMB Memorandum M-24-10), the International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems released by the G7 in October 2023, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Principles on AI, United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/78/L.49, and other United States-supported relevant international frameworks (such as the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy) and instruments.  By discouraging misuse and encouraging appropriate safeguards, these norms and standards shall aim to reduce the likelihood of AI causing harm or having adverse impacts on human rights, democracy, or the rule of law.
    (B)  Promote the responsible and ethical use of AI in national security contexts in accordance with democratic values and in compliance with applicable international law.  The strategy shall advance the norms and practices established by this memorandum and measures endorsed in the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy.
    Sec. 6.  Ensuring Effective Coordination, Execution, and Reporting of AI Policy.  (a)  The United States Government must work in a closely coordinated manner to make progress on effective and responsible AI adoption.  Given the speed with which AI technology evolves, the United States Government must learn quickly, adapt to emerging strategic developments, adopt new capabilities, and confront novel risks.
         (b)  Consistent with these goals:
    (i)    Within 270 days of the date of this memorandum, and annually thereafter for at least the next 5 years, the heads of the Department of State, DOD, Commerce, DOE, ODNI (acting on behalf of the IC), USUN, and USAID shall each submit a report to the President, through the APNSA, that offers a detailed accounting of their activities in response to their taskings in all sections of this memorandum, including this memorandum’s classified annex, and that provides a plan for further action.  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), NSA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and NGA shall submit reports on their activities to ODNI for inclusion in full as an appendix to ODNI’s report regarding IC activities.  NGA, NSA, and DIA shall submit their reports as well to DOD for inclusion in full as an appendix to DOD’s report.
    (ii)   Within 45 days of the date of this memorandum, the Chief AI Officers of the Department of State, DOD, DOJ, DOE, DHS, OMB, ODNI, CIA, DIA, NSA, and NGA, as well as appropriate technical staff, shall form an AI National Security Coordination Group (Coordination Group).  Any Chief AI Officer of an agency that is a member of the Committee on National Security Systems may also join the Coordination Group as a full member.  The Coordination Group shall be co-chaired by the Chief AI Officers of ODNI and DOD.  The Coordination Group shall consider ways to harmonize policies relating to the development, accreditation, acquisition, use, and evaluation of AI on NSS.  This work could include development of:
    (A)  Enhanced training and awareness to ensure that agencies prioritize the most effective AI systems, responsibly develop and use AI, and effectively evaluate AI systems;
    (B)  Best practices to identify and mitigate foreign intelligence risks and human rights considerations associated with AI procurement;
    (C)  Best practices to ensure interoperability between agency deployments of AI, to include data interoperability and data sharing agreements, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law;
    (D)  A process to maintain, update, and disseminate such trainings and best practices on an ongoing basis;
    (E)  AI-related policy initiatives to address regulatory gaps implicated by executive branch-wide policy development processes; and 
    (F)  An agile process to increase the speed of acquisitions, validation, and delivery of AI capabilities, consistent with applicable law.
    (iii)  Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the Coordination Group described in subsection (b)(ii) of this section shall establish a National Security AI Executive Talent Committee (Talent Committee) composed of senior AI officials (or designees) from all agencies in the Coordination Group that wish to participate.  The Talent Committee shall work to standardize, prioritize, and address AI talent needs and develop an updated set of Government-wide procedures for attracting, hiring, developing, and retaining AI and AI-enabling talent for national security purposes.  The Talent Committee shall designate a representative to serve as a member of the AI and Technology Talent Task Force set forth in Executive Order 14110, helping to identify overlapping needs and address shared challenges in hiring.
    (iv)   Within 365 days of the date of this memorandum, and annually thereafter for at least the next 5 years, the Coordination Group described in subsection (b)(ii) of this section shall issue a joint report to the APNSA on consolidation and interoperability of AI efforts and systems for the purposes of national security.
         Sec. 7.  Definitions.  (a)  This memorandum uses definitions set forth in section 3 of Executive Order 14110.  In addition, for the purposes of this memorandum:
    (i)     The term “AI safety” means the mechanisms through which individuals and organizations minimize and mitigate the potential for harm to individuals and society that can result from the malicious use, misapplication, failures, accidents, and unintended behavior of AI models; the systems that integrate them; and the ways in which they are used.
    (ii)    The term “AI security” means a set of practices to protect AI systems — including training data, models, abilities, and lifecycles — from cyber and physical attacks, thefts, and damage.
    (iii)   The term “covered agencies” means agencies in the Intelligence Community, as well as all agencies as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(1) when they use AI as a component of a National Security System, other than the Executive Office of the President.
    (iv)    The term “Critical Technical Artifacts” (CTAs) means information, usually specific to a single model or group of related models that, if possessed by someone other than the model developer, would substantially lower the costs of recreating, attaining, or using the model’s capabilities.  Under the technical paradigm dominant in the AI industry today, the model weights of a trained AI system constitute CTAs, as do, in some cases, associated training data and code.  Future paradigms may rely on different CTAs.
    (v)     The term “frontier AI model” means a general-purpose AI system near the cutting-edge of performance, as measured by widely accepted publicly available benchmarks, or similar assessments of reasoning, science, and overall capabilities.
    (vi)    The term “Intelligence Community” (IC) has the meaning provided in 50 U.S.C. 3003.
    (vii)   The term “open-weight model” means a model that has weights that are widely available, typically through public release.
    (viii)  The term “United States Government” means all agencies as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(1).
         Sec. 8.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
    (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
    (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
         (b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
         (c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
                                  JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: ACP Statement on Treasury Issuing Final Rules for 45X Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credits

    Source: American Clean Power Association (ACP)

    Headline: ACP Statement on Treasury Issuing Final Rules for 45X Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credits

    IRS Final Regs Provide U.S. Businesses with Needed Certainty
    WASHINGTON DC, October 24, 2024 – The American Clean Power Association (ACP) released the following statement from ACP Chief Advocacy Officer JC Sandberg after the U.S. Department of Treasury issued a final rule for the Advanced Manufacturing Production Tax Credit (45X MPTC), which applies to clean energy components made in the United States:
    “ACP commends the Treasury Department and IRS for finalizing the advanced manufacturing tax credits that are driving historic levels of investment in domestic clean energy manufacturing.
    “The finalization of the 45X regulations provides American businesses with the certainty they need to continue building domestic supply chains that strengthen the country’s energy independence, create tens of thousands good paying American jobs, and boost the nation’s economy.”
    According to ACP’s Clean Energy Investing in America report, since August 2022 federal tax credits have helped drive:
    More than 160 new or expanded utility-scale clean energy manufacturing facilities announced in the U.S.
    More than one-quarter (44) of these facilities are already operational, creating 20,000 new American manufacturing jobs.
    More than $60 billion in new private sector capital investment directed toward domestic clean energy manufacturing.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Dispatch from Pennsylvania: How marketing affects swing voters as U.S. election looms

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Dave Bussiere, Associate Professor, Marketing, University of Windsor

    Americans will soon elect their next president after a race for the White House that is essentially tied. From a marketing perspective, think of Republican Donald Trump and Democrat Kamala Harris as each holding 45 per cent market share. The remaining 10 per cent includes undecided voters and people disinclined to vote.

    My political marketing class at the University of Windsor is using a marketing lens to understand the variables that will influence the outcome on Nov. 5. My recent road trip to the battleground state of Pennsylvania gave me insight into the strength of both the Democratic and Republican brands.

    I am viewing the parties as long-established brands. There is brand loyalty to both parties. Those brands’ current success, however, is influenced by the ongoing campaign.

    In terms of the Democratic Party, voters obviously aren’t being asked to buy it, but they are being asked to buy the party as augmented or diminished by Harris, its current presidential candidate. The same can be said for Trump’s Republican party.

    From a marketing perspective, we can monitor promotional efforts that include traditional media, social media, debates, interviews and rallies, and we receive updates on the parties’ fundraising efforts — essentially a promotional budget. We’ll see the results of these efforts on Nov. 5.

    Predicting results

    This is the third time I’ve offered a political marketing course based on an American presidential election. The class focuses on understanding the core party brands, and the impact of candidates, debates, media coverage and Political Action Committees. Students forecast the election results the day before the election.

    The presidency is not decided by the national popular vote. It is a state-by-state competition, with each state assigned votes in the Electoral College. There are 538 Electoral College votes, so 270 are needed to win.

    Most states are predictable. California will undoubtedly vote Democrat (54 votes); Texas will more than likely vote Republican once again (40 votes). The election therefore comes down to seven swing states: Nevada, Arizona, Georgia, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania.



    Read more:
    North Carolina is not really a red or blue state − and that makes political predictions much more difficult

    The Democrats, with 226 safe Electoral College votes, have 20 possible routes to 270 — and 19 of them require a Pennsylvania win. Republicans, with 219 safe Electoral College votes, have 21 possible routes to 270 — 19 also require a Pennsylvania win. That’s why I decided to drive through Pennsylvania and speak to voters.

    Understanding Pennsylvania

    I was in Pennsylvania during the week of Sept. 30 to Oct. 4, just after Hurricane Helene hit the southeast, when a vice-presidential debate was held in New York, as the Longshoremen started to strike and as Hurricane Milton was bearing down on Florida.

    First I went to Erie, a bellwether county with a long history of having the same voting pattern as the full state of Pennsylvania, so it’s a strong predictor of statewide results. I went to a Pittsburgh suburb, and then to the borough of State College, home of Penn State University. I periodically left the interstate to drive through other towns to see the signs, grab lunch and talk.

    Each time, my introduction was simple:

    “I’m a marketing professor from Canada running a class about the U.S. presidential election. Would you mind explaining to me how you think Pennsylvania will vote? I do not need to know how you will vote.”

    The university students I spoke to were juniors and seniors. Other than the students, the people I spoke to would be considered working class, a mix of blue collar and white collar. The non-students were 35 to retirement age. Everyone I spoke said they’d voted in the 2022 mid-term election and intended to vote this year.

    At an Erie car show, voters I interviewed were evenly split between a group of 50-plus men with vintage cars and male university students with newer vehicles. I heard from both groups that Pennsylvania was divided, but that the mood between the parties differed.

    Both argued that people voting Democrat were brand-loyal or rejecting the Trump brand. Both age groups, including Democratic voters, noted that Trump supporters were primarily focused only on him as the current Republican brand offering.

    Economic concerns

    Most said the biggest issue that will most influence undecided voters is the economy, followed closely by a more narrow economic concern — inflation.

    One Democrat conveyed a simple message that was representative. Asked who would take Erie County: “Democrats.” Asked why they would win, he replied: “I’m just hoping.”

    Contrast that with a visit to a diner in Erie. One woman explained that she supports Harris because of reproductive rights. Everyone else backed Trump because of his policies on the economy, the southern border, international wars and crime.

    One diner patron had been to a recent Trump rally in Erie. He described it as a rock concert and spoke of the excitement, and hearing Trump say the exact same lines he always says. “It was your favourite rock band playing their hits,” he said.

    I left Erie understanding that Democrats were brand loyal or voting to avoid Trump. Republicans, however, never referenced past voting or leaders. They were simply Trump supporters.

    The Pittsburgh scene

    Pittsburgh was a bust. I chose the wrong town outside Pittsburgh. While I spoke to dozens of voters in Erie, I found only two people to speak to in Smithton.

    State College was different. My hotel was close to Penn State University, and there was a restaurant/sports bar on the hotel property.

    I entered at 4 p.m. The bartender asked why I was in town. A nearby patron said that he would answer questions. Then another person volunteered. I left seven hours later. People were asking to be next.

    I spoke to people from all political spectrums. Of the 40-plus people I spoke with, one couple illustrated the mood in the state particularly well. She is a Republican. He is a Democrat. He explained: “There is too much going on — inflation, the hurricanes, the Longshoremen strike, steel and fracking, illegal immigration. Too much.”

    He shrugged his shoulders, discouraged. She smiled, eager for Election Day.

    Conclusions from talking to voters

    If the election were held today, I believe Republicans would win Pennsylvania based on my conversations with voters. But that could change if there is a change in one of the key topics: strong or unanticipated positive economic news, perhaps, or if a new issue or story develops that has not yet impacted the race.

    The road trip provided insights into voter decision-making. It highlighted the importance of brand loyalty and enthusiasm. A substantial portion of voters indicated they wished both parties had different leaders. This could impact voter turnout.

    It also illuminated a key difference between traditional consumer decision-making and voter decision-making. If, on Black Friday, I prefer Walmart’s offering over Amazon’s, I am not impacted by my neighbour’s purchase decision.

    In politics, however, how my neighbour votes will influence my life for the next four years.

    Dave Bussiere does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Dispatch from Pennsylvania: How marketing affects swing voters as U.S. election looms – https://theconversation.com/dispatch-from-pennsylvania-how-marketing-affects-swing-voters-as-u-s-election-looms-241336

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Statement from NASA’s Janet Petro on FY23 Economic Impact Report

    Source: NASA

    America is returning to the Moon with our sights set on Mars, and NASA is leading the way. Along with our industry and international partners, we’re advancing scientific research, inspiring the next generation of explorers, and ensuring reliable and continuous access to space for our nation.
    NASA’s Economic Impact Report for fiscal year (FY) 2023 highlights the nation’s strong return on its investment in NASA. Our missions help unveil the secrets of the universe and our home planet while also benefitting the taxpayers, communities, and industries across the country.
    Here at the agency’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida, we are on track for another record-setting year of launches from our Space Coast. Recent NASA missions will tell us more about Earth’s weather and climate, explore Jupiter’s moon Europa for the ingredients of life, and enable more innovative research on the International Space Station. We’re also busy building the Artemis rockets, spacecraft, and technologies that will allow our astronauts to live and work on the Moon.
    While exploring the universe for the benefit of all, NASA is also supporting the U.S. economy. During FY23, an investment of less than one-half of 1% of the federal budget, the agency generated $76 billion in total economic output nationwide.
    In Florida alone, NASA activities in FY2023 supported 35,685 jobs in the state and $8.2 billion in economic output, resulting in an additional $286.6 million in state tax revenue. NASA Kennedy’s unique facilities, proven technical capabilities, and master plan enable nearly 250 partnerships with 100 private-sector partners. And the dedication and commitment of our workforce means that our spaceport remains the world’s leader in space science, human exploration, and technology development.
    As we look toward a future of more exploration and discovery, I invite you to learn more about the impacts that NASA missions may have had in your life. The agency’s technology transfer initiatives transition NASA innovations into private hands, where real impacts are made. And NASA’s STEM engagements encourage research and the study of science, technology, engineering, and math at all ages.
    And, of course, I hope you will learn more about the exciting work we’re doing at Earth’s premier spaceport by visiting:
    www.nasa.gov/kennedy
    -end-
    Images of Janet Petro are available from NASA’s image library in vertical and horizontal  formats.
    Patti BiellingKennedy Space Center, Florida321-501-7575patricia.a.bielling@nasa.gov

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: Constellation Digital Partners and WESTconsin Credit Union Partner to Enhance Digital Services for Members through Fintech Connect

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    RALEIGH, N.C., Oct. 24, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Constellation Digital Partners is excited to announce its partnership with WESTconsin Credit Union to implement the Fintech Connect product, a strategic initiative aimed at enhancing digital services for its members.

    In an effort to provide innovative financial solutions and streamline member experiences, WESTconsin Credit Union has chosen Constellation Digital Partners for their cutting-edge technology and commitment to member satisfaction. The Fintech Connect platform will enable WESTconsin to offer a broader range of digital services, ensuring that members have access to the latest financial tools and resources.

    Kevin Hall, CIO of WESTconsin said, “WESTconsin is always looking to expand our digital offerings by partnering with emerging financial technology providers; however, finding a cost effective and timely method for integrating these platforms into our digital banking experience has been a challenge.  We couldn’t be more excited to partner with Constellation’s Fintech Connect platform to expedite our time to market and open opportunities to partner with a wider array of solutions for our members.”

    “Constellation is thrilled to work with WESTconsin Credit Union,” said Marc Miller, CRO of Constellation Digital Partners. “We believe our Fintech Connect product will significantly enhance the member experience and help WESTconsin continue to lead in financial innovation.”

    Members can look forward to new features and services that will be rolled out in the coming months as part of this exciting partnership.

    For more information about Constellation Digital Partners and its digital services, please visit https://constellation.coop/contact/.

    About WESTconsin Credit Union
    WESTconsin Credit Union is dedicated to providing members with exceptional financial services and resources tailored to their unique needs. With a focus on community engagement and member satisfaction, WESTconsin is committed to empowering individuals to achieve their financial dreams.

    About Constellation Digital Partners
    Constellation Digital Partners is a leading provider of digital banking solutions, specializing in delivering innovative digital products that enhance the member experience. Their mission is to empower credit unions and financial institutions to better serve their communities through cutting-edge technology.
    Contact:

    Constellation Digital Partners
    Amanda Reed, Enterprise Sales Executive
    areed@constellation.coop 

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Farmers & Merchants Bancorp, Inc. and F&M Bank Announces Updates to Board of Directors

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Kevin Frey Appointed to Board of Directors

    Dr. K. Brad Stamm to Retire from Board of Directors

    ARCHBOLD, Ohio, Oct. 24, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — F&M Bank (“F&M”), an Archbold, Ohio-based bank owned by Farmers & Merchants Bancorp, Inc. (Nasdaq: FMAO), announced updates to its Board of Directors. On October 22, 2024, Kevin Frey was appointed to the Board of Directors of both the Company and the Bank. In addition to this new appointment, F&M announced the retirement of Dr. K. Brad Stamm from the Board of Directors.

    “On behalf of F&M’s Board of Directors, I am thrilled to welcome Kevin to our team. With deep roots in our legacy market and a wealth of experience as Vice President of Frey & Sons, he brings invaluable insights that will strengthen our connection to the communities we serve,” said F&M’s Chairman Andrew Briggs. “We look forward to his contributions as we continue to grow while staying true to the values guiding F&M for generations.”

    Frey is the Vice President of Frey & Sons, Inc., a family-owned real estate brokerage and auction company that was incorporated in 1963 and is headquartered in Archbold, Ohio. Frey is the Principal Broker and lead Auctioneer for Frey & Sons. The company specializes in real estate auctions and sales in Northwest Ohio and heavy equipment auctions across the Midwest. Frey also manages a portfolio of multifamily, commercial, and agricultural properties and is a member of the Board of Directors for Yoder & Frey, Inc., a farm and machinery auction yard. Frey received a Bachelor of Arts in accounting from Goshen College and worked as a Certified Public Accountant from 1996-2003. He is a member of the National Association of Realtors, Ohio Association of Realtors, National Auctions Association, and Ohio Auctioneers Association.

    Dr. Stamm joined the Board in November of 2016 and served with distinction throughout his tenure. He is the President and Educational Consultant of Stamm Management Group. A celebration in honor of Dr. Stamm’s contributions was held on October 22, 2024. His final day as a Board member will be October 25, 2024.

    “Brad has been an instrumental part of our Board for nearly eight years, and his dedication and leadership will be greatly missed,” said President and CEO of F&M, Lars Eller. “We wish him all the best and express our deepest gratitude for his service to F&M.”

    About F&M Bank:
    F&M Bank is a local independent community bank that has been serving its communities since 1897. F&M Bank provides commercial banking, retail banking and other financial services. Our locations are in Butler, Champaign, Fulton, Defiance, Hancock, Henry, Lucas, Shelby, Williams, and Wood counties in Ohio. In Northeast Indiana, we have offices located in Adams, Allen, DeKalb, Jay, Steuben and Wells counties. The Michigan footprint includes Oakland County, and we have Loan Production Offices in West Bloomfield, Michigan; Muncie, Indiana; and Perrysburg and Bryan, Ohio.

    Safe harbor statement
    Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Statements by F&M, including management’s expectations and comments, may not be based on historical facts and are “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Actual results could vary materially depending on risks and uncertainties inherent in general and local banking conditions, competitive factors specific to markets in which F&M and its subsidiaries operate, future interest rate levels, legislative and regulatory decisions, capital market conditions, or the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and its impacts on our credit quality and business operations, as well as its impact on general economic and financial market conditions. F&M assumes no responsibility to update this information. For more details, please refer to F&M’s SEC filing, including its most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q. Such filings can be viewed at the SEC’s website, www.sec.gov or through F&M’s website www.fm.bank.

    Company Contact: Investor and Media Contact:
    Lars B. Eller
    President and Chief Executive Officer
    Farmers & Merchants Bancorp, Inc.
    (419) 446-2501
    leller@fm.bank    		 Andrew M. Berger
    Managing Director
    SM Berger & Company, Inc.
    (216) 464-6400
    andrew@smberger.com

     

    The MIL Network –