Category: Economy

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Morocco: African Development Bank approves over €300 million to improve competitiveness, strengthen resilience and create jobs

    Source: African Development Bank Group

    The Board of Directors of the African Development Bank Group has approved approximately €301 million to support Morocco’s economic resilience and drive job creation. The funding will back two key initiatives: the Entrepreneurship Support and Financing Programme for Job Creation (PAFE-Emplois) and the second phase of Economic Governance and Climate Resilience (PGRCC II).

    With €181.8 million in funding, PGRCC II aims to boost the Moroccan economy and strengthen its resilience to external shocks, particularly climate change. It will support competitiveness, private investment and economic resilience by modernizing the water and energy sectors. This programme will also contribute to consolidating Morocco’s new development model, in particular by promoting investment under the new Investment Charter.

    The PAFE-Emplois programme, backed by €119 million, will promote job creation by developing entrepreneurship and very small and medium-sized enterprises (VSEMEs). It will help establish a results-oriented culture, particularly in terms of employment impact. Its objectives are to support public support mechanisms for entrepreneurs, finance inclusive entrepreneurship, strengthen incentive mechanisms for VSEs and support innovative operational approaches to employment. This project will support the new roadmap for employment to promote job creation and entrepreneurship.

    ‘Together, these two new operations work in synergy and complement each other to strengthen their impact,’ said Achraf Tarsim, Country Manager for Morocco at the African Development Bank Group. They combine their objectives to consolidate the economy’s competitiveness, strengthen its resilience to shocks and boost investment and entrepreneurship. These are all levers for creating opportunities and jobs for young people and women. “

    For more than half a century, the African Development Bank Group has mobilised nearly €15 billion to finance more than 150 projects and programmes in the Kingdom. Its interventions cover strategic sectors such as transport, social protection, water and sanitation, energy, agriculture, governance and the financial sector.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Heads of Multilateral Development Banks commit to strong joint action on development priorities

    Source: African Development Bank Group

    The Heads of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) met today in Paris, hosted by the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), which currently chairs the Heads of MDBs Group. The meeting focused on advancing their joint efforts to address development priorities.

    Amid rising global uncertainty, the Heads reaffirmed their commitment to working as a system to deliver greater impact and scale, in line with their Viewpoint Note and the recommendations of the G20 Roadmap towards Better, Bigger, and More Effective MDBs. The Roadmap outlines an ambitious vision for MDB reform to better address regional and global challenges, support job creation, and help countries achieve their development aspirations.

    The Heads welcomed ongoing efforts to improve the way MDBs work with clients through operational efficiency and enhanced coordination. In 2025 alone, five mutual reliance agreements have been signed, helping streamline the preparation and implementation of co-financed projects across institutions.

    Private capital mobilization remains a system-wide priority, with the last joint report of the MDBs reflecting a positive trend in volumes mobilized. To build on this momentum, the Heads reaffirmed their commitment to developing local currency lending and foreign exchange solutions. They also reaffirmed the importance of adequate risk assessment for private sector investment in emerging markets and developing economies; in this context, the valuable contribution of disaggregated statistics on credit risk published through the Global Emerging Markets Risk Database (GEMs) was recognized.

    The Heads reiterated their continued commitment to implementing the recommendations of the G20 Independent Review of Multilateral Development Banks’ Capital Adequacy Frameworks (CAF).  Further reform efforts by MDBs since mid-2024 have increased the additional lending headroom for development projects in all countries of operation, including high-income ones, over the next decade by more than US$250 billion, thus reaching a total of over US$650 billion.

    The publication in the coming weeks of the Comparison Report by the MDBs’ Global Risk and Finance Forum (GRaFF) will provide metrics and data relating to MDBs’ financial positions, promoting a better understanding of their financial models and supporting both balance sheet optimization and private sector mobilization. 

    The Heads also agreed to continue advancing promising initiatives already underway to strengthen system-wide impact. These include: 1) Mission 300, which aims to connect 300 million people in Africa to electricity by 2030 through public and private collaboration; 2) Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Power Grid, which aims to boost energy security, strengthen resilience, and promote decarbonization for the region’s 670 million people by connecting its electricity systems; and 3) Digital Transformation in Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, which aims to connect 3.5 million students and train over 250,000 teachers. 

    In addition, MDBs are exploring joint actions to scale up investments in social infrastructure, including health, education, housing, and water and sanitation. Building on structured dialogue led by the CEB, the Heads welcomed progress made through recent cross-MDB consultations and recognized the key role these sectors play in enabling jobs, productivity, and inclusive growth, while noting persistent financing and delivery challenges that constrain impact.

    Meeting in advance of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), which will take place in Sevilla, Spain, from 30 June to 3 July, MDBs remain committed to working better as a system, in alignment with country-led development priorities and strategies to promote jobs and prosperity. In view of water’s role in human development, MDBs committed to significantly increasing collective support for global water security by 2030, and will launch the first “Joint Annual MDB Water Security Financing Report” at FfD4. Heads noted the importance of the upcoming COP30 in Belem, Brazil, in November 2025.

    Today’s meeting in Paris marks a significant step toward effective collaboration and scaled-up collective action for development priorities. MDB reforms are advancing, moving from concept to execution.

    With streamlined operations, better risk tools, and growing financial capacity, MDBs are delivering real impact – from expanding energy access and digital education to scaling investment in water security.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: African Development Bank, AIIB sign MOU renewing their collaboration on sustainable economic development for Africa

    Source: African Development Bank Group

    The African Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have signed an agreement strengthening their collaboration on sustainable economic development, designed to boost infrastructure development and economic opportunities across the African continent.

    The Memorandum of Understanding, which builds on an earlier one in 2018, was signed by African Development Bank president, Dr. Akinwumi Adesina, and AIIB President and Chair of the Board of Directors Jin Liqun on Saturday 28 June. The signing took place on the sidelines of a meeting of Heads of Multilateral Development Banks held in Paris, France, the same day.

    The agreement outlines continued collaboration from both parties in six priority areas, aligned with the Bank Group’s Ten-Year Strategy 2024–2033 as well as AIIB’s Corporate Strategy and its Strategy on Financing Operations in Non-Regional Members. The areas are:

    • (i) Green infrastructure
    • (ii) Industrialization
    • (iii) Private capital mobilization including Public – Private Partnerships
    • (iv) Cross-border-connectivity
    • (v) Digitalization; and
    • (vi) Policy-based financing

    The MOU will promote among other things, co-financing, co-guaranteeing and other forms of joint participation in financial assistance for development projects primarily in sustainable infrastructure. The African Development Bank and AIIB’s existing cooperation in this area, includes providing guarantees to support the issuance of Egypt’s first Sustainable Panda Bond in 2023, valued at RMB 3.5 billion.

    This historic issuance—backed by guarantees from both AfDB and AIIB—marked the first African sovereign bond placed in the Chinese interbank bond market. The guarantees provided by the two triple-A-rated multilateral banks were instrumental in de-risking the transaction, enabling Egypt to secure competitive terms and attract investor confidence.

    “This partnership continues to be an effective pathway to provide economic development for our member countries, especially in infrastructure. By reaffirming today, we are boosting energy access by accelerating Mission 300 which is targeting to connect 300 million people to electricity by 2030,” Dr Adesina said.

    Mr. Jin Liqun remarked: “The renewal of our partnership with the African Development Bank reflects AIIB’s commitment to supporting sustainable development beyond Asia. Through this collaboration, we can leverage our combined expertise to deliver transformative projects that will benefit millions across the continent and create prosperity through quality infrastructure investment.”

    About the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB):

    The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a multilateral development bank dedicated to financing “infrastructure for tomorrow,” with sustainability at its core. AIIB began operations in 2016, now has 110 approved members worldwide, is capitalized at USD100 billion and is AAA-rated by major international credit rating agencies. AIIB collaborates with partners to mobilize capital and invest in infrastructure and other productive sectors that foster sustainable economic development and enhance regional connectivity.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Don Davis Announces a Bill to Help Reopen Martin General Hospital

    Source: US Congressman Don Davis (NC-01)

    WILLIAMSTON, N.C.—Congressman Don Davis (NC-01) announced new legislation to support reopening facilities like Martin General Hospital as Rural Emergency Hospitals.

    The Rural Emergency Hospital Financial Stability Act, announced during a press conference outside Martin General Hospital, would provide support to healthcare facilities that are facing closure or are able to reopen by increasing Medicaid reimbursements for Rural Emergency Hospitals (REH) to the outpatient hospital, rather than the rural health clinic rate. By categorizing REHs as hospitals with respect to Medicaid, as Congress originally intended, rather than clinics, the legislation categorizes REHs in the same way as Medicare.

    [Congressman Don Davis announces the Rural Emergency Hospital Financial Stability Act in front of Martin General Hospital in Williamston, N.C.]

    Without providing this financial stability, REHs would face long-term insolvency, particularly in communities like Martin County, where Medicaid reimbursements represent the highest share of their total revenue. The legislation will also reduce Medicaid expenditures because patients will no longer have to always travel long distances to seek care at inpatient facilities like ECU Health in Greenville, and could instead receive outpatient services at a reopened Martin General.

    [Congressman Don Davis describes how the Rural Emergency Hospital Financial Stability Act would help rural hospitals like Martin General, prevent closure or reopen.]

    “Supporting the reopening of Martin General by ensuring financial stability for all Rural Emergency Hospitals is essential,” said Congressman Don Davis. “Communities with high Medicaid populations, rural hospitals are often overwhelmed, despite their best efforts to stay open. If we provide a higher Medicaid reimbursement rate for Rural Emergency Hospitals, we can help patients get the care they desperately need while creating healthcare jobs in communities that need it most.”

    [The community takes in the moment when Congressman Davis announces the Rural Emergency Hospital Financial Stability Act.]

    “This bipartisan legislation takes a commonsense step to ensure REHs are treated fairly under Medicaid—just as they are under Medicare—so they can continue providing timely, local care without being financially hamstrung by bureaucratic gaps,” said Congressman Bergman. “Rural healthcare shouldn’t be at the mercy of inconsistent reimbursement rules, and I’m proud to support a fix that brings clarity, stability, and fairness to the REH model.”

    [Congressman Davis talks to the community of Williamston, North Carolina, about the future of Martin General Hospital.]

    “The National Rural Health Association thanks Congressmen Davis and Bergman for their efforts to make a commonsense fix to rural emergency hospital payments,” said Alan Morgan, CEO, National Rural Health Association. This legislation will ensure that rural emergency hospitals are paid adequately and can maintain local access to care in rural communities. We look forward to working with Congress to strengthen and sustain this important hospital designation.”

    The press conference, with local residents in attendance, was held in front of Martin General Hospital. It highlighted the necessity of long-term solutions to improve the fiscal health of rural healthcare facilities.

    The Rural Emergency Hospital Financial Stability Act is endorsed by the National Rural Health Association and America’s Essential Hospitals, of which East Carolina University Health is a member.

    Congressman Davis’ Support for Martin General Hospital:

    • January 30, 2025: Congressman Davis meets with Martin County Commissioners and ECU Health representatives, who ask you to explore legislative pathways to increase Medicaid reimbursement rates for REHs.

    •  May 2, 2025: Congressman Davis resubmits a community project funding request for Washington Regional Medical Center (WRMC) to improve their critical infrastructure and take some of the pressure off nearby health systems.

    • May 22, 2025: Congressman Davis joins a bipartisan coalition in voting against H.R. 1, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which would dramatically cut Medicaid revenues via provider taxes that fund rural hospitals.

    • January 30 – June 30, 2025: Congressman Davis agrees to move forward with actionable legislation to address REH financial stability, working with the Town of Williamston, Martin County, and ECU Health.

    Congressman Don Davis serves as a member of the House Agriculture Committee and as Ranking Member on the Commodity Markets, Digital Assets, and Rural Development Subcommittee, which has partial jurisdiction over the U.S. Department of Agriculture, overseeing several rural development programs supporting rural communities, including rural hospitals.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: SBA Offers Relief to Kansas Small Businesses, Private Nonprofits and Residents Affected by June Storms and Flooding

    Source: United States Small Business Administration

    SACRAMENTO, Calif. – The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) announced the availability of low interest federal disaster loans to Kansas small businesses, private nonprofits and residents to offset physical and economic losses from severe storms, torrential rain and flooding occurring June 3-7. The SBA issued a disaster declaration in response to a request received from Gov. Laura Kelly on June 26.

    The declaration covers the Kansas counties of Butler, Chase, Cowley, Elk, Greenwood, Harvey, Marion, Sedgwick and Sumner.

    Businesses and nonprofits are eligible to apply for business physical disaster loans and may borrow up to $2 million to repair or replace disaster-damaged or destroyed real estate, machinery and equipment, inventory, and other business assets.

    Homeowners and renters are eligible to apply for home and personal property loans and may borrow up to $100,000 to replace or repair personal property, such as clothing, furniture, cars, and appliances. Homeowners may apply for up to $500,000 to replace or repair their primary residence.

    Applicants may be eligible for a loan increase of up to 20% of their physical damages, as verified by the SBA, for mitigation purposes. Eligible mitigation improvements include insulating pipes, walls and attics, weather stripping doors and windows, and installing storm windows to help protect property and occupants from future disasters.

    SBA’s Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program is available to eligible small businesses, small agricultural cooperatives, nurseries and private nonprofit (PNP)organizations impacted by financial losses directly related to this disaster. The SBA is unable to provide disaster loans to agricultural producers, farmers, or ranchers, except for aquaculture enterprises.

    EIDLs are for working capital needs caused by the disaster and are available even if the business or PNP did not suffer any physical damage. They may be used to pay fixed debts, payroll, accounts payable, and other bills not paid due to the disaster.

    Interest rates are as low as 4% for businesses, 3.62% for nonprofits, and 2.81% for homeowners and renters with terms up to 30 years. Interest does not begin to accrue, and payments are not due until 12 months from the date of the first loan disbursement. The SBA sets loan amounts and terms based on each applicant’s financial condition.

    “When disasters strike, SBA’s Disaster Loan Outreach Centers play a vital role in helping small businesses and their communities recover,” said Chris Stallings, associate administrator of the Office of Disaster Recovery and Resilience at the SBA. “At these centers, SBA specialists assist business owners and residents with disaster loan applications and provide information on the full range of recovery programs available.”

    Beginning Tuesday, July 1, SBA customer service representatives will be on hand at the following Disaster Loan Outreach Center (DLOC) to answer questions about SBA’s disaster loan program, explain the application process and help each individual complete their application. Walk-ins are accepted, but you can schedule an in-person appointment in advance at appointment.sba.gov.

    The DLOC hours of operation are as follows:

    BUTLER COUNTY
    Disaster Loan Outreach Center
    Butler County Historic Courthouse
    First Floor – former driver’s license room
    205 W. Central Ave.
    El Dorado, KS  67042

    Opens at 12:00 p.m., Tuesday, July 1

    Mondays – Fridays, 8:00 a.m. – 4:30 p.m.

    Closed Friday, July 4 for Independence Day

    Permanently closes at 4:30 p.m., Thursday, July 24

    To apply online, visit sba.gov/disaster. Applicants may also call SBA’s Customer Service Center at (800) 659-2955 or email disastercustomerservice@sba.gov for more information on SBA disaster assistance. For people who are deaf, hard of hearing, or have a speech disability, please dial 7-1-1 to access telecommunications relay services.

    The deadline to return physical damage applications is Aug. 26, 2025. The deadline to return economic injury applications is March 27, 2026.

    ###

    About the U.S. Small Business Administration

    The U.S. Small Business Administration helps power the American dream of business ownership. As the only go-to resource and voice for small businesses backed by the strength of the federal government, the SBA empowers entrepreneurs and small business owners with the resources and support they need to start, grow, expand their businesses, or recover from a declared disaster. It delivers services through an extensive network of SBA field offices and partnerships with public and private organizations. To learn more, visit www.sba.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Second Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for Togo

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 30, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board today completed the second review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement for Togo, allowing the authorities to draw about SDR 44.0 million (about US$ 60.5 million). The Executive Board approved the 42-month ECF arrangement in March 2024 and concluded the first review in December 2024.
    • Growth has remained robust, and inflation has continued to slow. The medium-term economic outlook is favorable, with sustained robust growth, but elevated risks remain.
    • Implementation of the IMF-supported program has been broadly satisfactory: the authorities met all quantitative targets at end-December 2024 except for the performance criterion on the fiscal balance, and they have met all but one structural benchmark due since the completion of the first ECF review.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the second review of the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement for Togo. The Board’s decision enables the immediate disbursement of about SDR 44.0 million (about US$ 60.5 million), which will be used for budget support. The ECF-arrangement provides overall financing of SDR 293.60 million (about US$ 403.4 million) on favorable terms.

    The IMF approved the ECF arrangement in March 2024 to help the authorities address the legacies of shocks experienced since 2020, notably the COVID pandemic and the increase in global food and fuel prices. The Togolese authorities were able to lessen the impacts of these shocks on the Togolese population, but this came at the price of large fiscal deficits and a rapidly rising public debt burden. The IMF-supported government program aims to (i) make growth more inclusive while strengthening debt sustainability, and (ii) implement structural reforms to support growth and limit fiscal and financial sector risks. The IMF Executive Board completed the first ECF review in December 2024.  

    The medium-term outlook is broadly favorable, with continued robust growth. Economic growth reached an estimated 5.3 percent in 2024 and is projected at 5.2 percent in 2025 and 5.5 percent per year thereafter, according to IMF staff projections, barring major adverse shocks. Headline inflation eased to 2.6 percent in April 2025 and core inflation (which excludes the prices of energy and fresh products) fell to 1.3 percent (annual averages).

    However, the outlook is subject to high risks. In particular, insecurity from the presence of terrorist groups at the country’s northern border continues, putting pressure on spending. The authorities face challenging trade-offs between the need to achieve fiscal consolidation to lower the debt burden and the need to maintain security, enhance inclusion, and support growth.

    Implementation of the IMF-supported program has been broadly satisfactory. The authorities met all quantitative targets at end-December 2024 except for the performance criterion on the fiscal balance. A notable success has been that the authorities raised tax revenue in 2024 as planned and pushed non-tax revenue beyond expectations. At the same time, higher-than-budgeted spending pushed debt higher. The authorities also met all but one structural benchmark due since the completion of the first ECF review, thanks to public financial management and banking sector reforms.

    At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement: 

    “The authorities have implemented the IMF-supported program in an overall satisfactory manner in an environment marked by continued security challenges, tight financing conditions, and elevated global uncertainty. Among other achievements, the authorities mobilized tax revenue in line with targets, while non-tax revenue exceeded projections.

    “Nonetheless, progress on fiscal consolidation has been slower than programmed due to operations the authorities recorded below the line, resulting in faster-than-expected debt accumulation. The authorities’ efforts to address this development, in particular the publication of an innovative note on budget execution and debt accumulation, are welcome.

    “Against this background, the authorities are encouraged to redouble their efforts at fiscal consolidation while preserving growth and strengthening inclusion. The IMF approves the authorities’ request for a limited relaxation of the fiscal deficit target for 2024 and for delaying the goal of lowering the present value of debt below 55 percent of GDP by one year, to 2027. These modifications appropriately balance the need to respond to security threats against the need to strengthen debt sustainability. 

    “Further, the authorities are encouraged to continue efforts to enhance revenue while making taxation more efficient, supported by a timely elaboration of a medium-term revenue mobilization strategy. Reforms to improve the efficiency of spending and strengthen the effectiveness of the social safety net, including phasing out fuel subsidies, will also be important. Further, it will be important to strengthen electricity and water provision, including raising tariffs to ensure cost recovery in combination with measures to protect the most vulnerable.

    “The IMF welcomes the authorities’ efforts to reduce financial sector and fiscal risks by recapitalizing the remaining state-owned bank, which have boosted the bank’s compliance with regulatory norms. Further efforts will be needed to address the remaining breaches of regulatory norms and to restructure the bank’s operations to ensure its stability and profitability.

    “Finally, efforts to strengthen governance will be critical for nurturing the business environment and supporting sustainable growth. The authorities’ commitment to publishing the planned Governance Diagnostic Assessment is very welcome. The authorities should also align asset and income declarations regime with international standards.”

    Togo: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2023–27

     

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

     

    Estimates

    Projections

    Real GDP

    5.6

    5.3

    5.2

    5.5

    5.5

    Real GDP per capita

    3.1

    2.8

    2.7

    3.0

    3.0

    GDP deflator

    2.9

    2.2

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    Consumer price index (annual average)

    5.3

    2.9

    2.3

    2.0

    2.0

    GDP (CFAF billions)

    5,507

    5,927

    6,360

    6,843

    7,364

    Exchange rate CFAF/US$ (annual average level)

    606

    Real effective exchange rate (appreciation = –)

    -8.2

    Terms of trade (deterioration = –)

    2.5

    -0.4

    -0.3

    0.9

    0.6

     

    Monetary survey

     

    Net foreign assets

    2.0

    1.3

    3.6

    2.4

    2.3

    Net credit to government

    1.2

    8.6

    2.6

    -1.3

    -0.1

    Credit to nongovernment sector

    2.9

    3.6

    1.4

    7.4

    7.0

    Broad money (M2)

    6.5

    8.5

    7.3

    7.6

    7.6

    Velocity (GDP/end-of-period M2)

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

     

    Investment and savings

     

    Gross domestic investment

    28.0

    26.8

    25.6

    24.4

    25.3

    Government

    11.5

    10.1

    8.5

    7.1

    7.8

    Nongovernment

    16.5

    16.7

    17.1

    17.3

    17.5

    Gross national savings

    24.0

    23.7

    23.2

    23.0

    24.3

    Government

    4.8

    2.7

    4.6

    4.1

    4.8

    Nongovernment

    19.2

    20.9

    18.7

    18.8

    19.5

     

    Government budget

             

    Total revenue and grants

    19.8

    19.0

    18.8

    18.5

    19.0

    Revenue

    16.8

    17.0

    16.6

    17.1

    17.6

    Tax revenue

    14.8

    14.9

    15.4

    15.9

    16.4

    Expenditure and net lending

    26.6

    26.4

    22.7

    21.5

    22.0

    Expenditure and net lending (excl. banking sector operations)

    26.6

    25.4

    22.3

    21.5

    22.0

    Primary balance (commitment basis, incl. grants)

    -3.9

    -4.5

    -1.2

    -0.2

    -0.4

    Overall balance (commitment basis, incl. grants, excl. banking sector operations)

    -6.7

    -6.4

    -3.5

    -3.0

    -3.0

    Overall balance (commitment basis, incl. grants)

    -6.7

    -7.4

    -3.9

    -3.0

    -3.0

    Primary balance (cash basis, incl. grants)

    -3.9

    -4.5

    -1.2

    -0.2

    -0.4

    Overall balance (cash basis, incl. grants, excl. banking sector operations)

    -6.7

    -6.4

    -3.5

    -3.0

    -3.0

    Overall balance (cash basis, incl. grants)

    -6.7

    -7.4

    -3.9

    -3.0

    -3.0

     

    External sector

             

    Current account balance

    -4.0

    -3.2

    -2.3

    -1.4

    -1.0

    Exports (goods and services)

    26.3

    25.5

    25.5

    25.5

    25.7

    Imports (goods and services)

    -37.8

    -35.9

    -34.3

    -32.8

    -32.5

    External public debt1

    26.3

    30.4

    32.8

    32.1

    32.7

    External public debt service (percent of exports)1

    7.7

    10.0

    14.8

    15.0

    8.1

    Domestic public debt2

    42.3

    41.7

    37.5

    36.6

    34.3

    Total public debt3

    68.6

    72.1

    70.2

    68.7

    66.9

    Total public debt (excluding SOEs)4

    67.3

    71.2

    69.6

    68.2

    66.6

    Present value of total public debt3

    62.3

    63.2

    60.0

    57.0

    54.0

    Sources: Togolese authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

     

    1 Includes state-owned enterprise external debt.

    2 Includes domestic arrears and state-owned enterprise domestic debt.

    3 Includes domestic arrears and state-owned enterprise debt.

    4 Includes domestic arrears.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/30/pr25229-togo-imf-completes-the-second-review-under-the-ecf-arrangement-for-togo

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Funding terror: how west Africa’s deadly jihadists get the money they need to survive

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Egodi Uchendu, Professor (of History and International Studies), University of Nigeria

    The west Africa–Sahel region has seen a proliferation of militant Islamist groups since the 1990s.

    One of the most vicious groups operating in the region is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Support Group for Islam and Muslims). The militant group emerged in 2017 in Algeria and Mali, and has targeted civilian populations.

    The UN listed the group as an al-Qaeda affiliate in 2018. Al-Qaeda is an Islamist organisation founded by Osama bin Laden in the 1980s.

    The 2024 global terrorism index listed Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin as one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organisations. Its influence has expanded in most parts of the Sahel. The group emerged to strengthen the jihadist insurgency under al-Qaeda. It combines violence with diplomacy to expand its influence and challenge state authorities.

    Despite growing pressure from counter militancy campaigns spearheaded by local, regional and international militaries, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin continues to survive and adapt by regrouping and reorganising. This was demonstrated in its latest operation in Burkina Faso in 2024. The group exerted significant control by closing schools, setting up taxation checkpoints and abducting locals.

    Its engagement in illicit economies has been key to the group’s successful expansion. This revenue is used to carry out devastating attacks.

    We research jihadi-based insurgencies, and have found that this is a common tactic among terrorist groups in the west Africa-Sahel axis, including Boko Haram militants.

    From our research, we find that Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin funds its activities by relying on

    • artisanal mining

    • kidnapping

    • livestock theft

    • money laundering.

    Dismantling the group’s illicit economies and blocking its financial flows are key to countering its activities.

    Financial resources

    The group needs money for fighting, and to sustain political and social influence in its areas of operation.

    Artisanal gold mining has proven to be a major factor in its expansion and resilience. In areas where the group exerts influence, illicit gold mining generates over US$30 billion annually. According to a report by Swissaid, a development group based in Switzerland, the main destinations for this gold are the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Switzerland.

    The jihadists gain access to gold by controlling mining sites and transport routes to and from mines. They sometimes allow trusted allies, who include local armed groups, bandits and other criminal networks, to mine in exchange for a payout. The extent of gold mining funds is not exactly known, but the artisanal sites in areas controlled by the group have the capacity to produce 725 kilograms of gold per year, valued at US$34 million.




    Read more:
    West Africa could soon have a jihadist state – here’s why


    Another source of income – and political influence – is kidnapping for ransom. Kidnap victims include cattle owners, businessmen, state officials and foreigners. The group received a ₤30 million ransom in 2020 to release one French and two Italian hostages. Between 2017 and 2023, the group and its affiliated units were responsible for 845 out of approximately 1,100 recorded kidnappings in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Burkina Faso and Mali remain the epicentre of the group’s violent activities. In the first quarter of 2023, over 180 cases of kidnapping were recorded in these countries’ war-torn areas.

    Livestock theft has also been a critical source of funds. The practice of livestock theft as economic warfare and a means to generate funds has led to livestock being forcibly taken from herders who fail to pay zakat (a religious fee among Muslims) or subscribe to the group’s ideology. The stolen livestock are sold in Mali, Mauritania or Senegal. The ability to monetise stolen livestock makes their theft a cornerstone of the Sahelian war economy and a source of cash for weapons and vehicles.

    Money laundering is another illicit economy central to the militant group’s financing. It lends money to merchants, invests with banks and funds small shops with the aim of getting profits. This helps ensure a constant flow of money and provisions to support the group’s terrorist acts. It has attached much importance to this illicit economy, to the extent of assassinating those who interfere with its investments.

    Way out

    To cut down Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s financial base – and thereby weaken its capacity for militancy – counterinsurgency efforts need to take the following actions.

    • Government security actors should collaborate with local self-defence militias to regulate artisanal mining and thwart kidnappings.

    • Financial intelligence units need to identify merchants who receive money from the militant group to block the flow of illicit funds.




    Read more:
    Jihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship


    • Specialised courts that deal with money laundering and terrorism financing cases should be established and made operational in Burkina Faso and Mali, the epicentres of the group’s activities.

    • Burkina Faso and Mali should increase security around civilians to minimise civilian casualties from terror operations.

    Since finance is the basis of the militant group’s strength, regional security co-operation should be strengthened. This would help with systematically tracking illicit flows and stopping them.

    Egodi Uchendu receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Germany. She has also received funding from TETFund, Nigeria, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Senegal, The A. G. Leventis Foundation, Greece, and the Fulbright Commission, USA.

    Muhammed Sani Dangusau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Funding terror: how west Africa’s deadly jihadists get the money they need to survive – https://theconversation.com/funding-terror-how-west-africas-deadly-jihadists-get-the-money-they-need-to-survive-242306

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Moroccan schools are fuller thanks to cash grants. The problem now is the quality of their education – study

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jules Gazeaud, Chargé de recherche CNRS, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)

    Reprinted by permission from VoxDev

    The spread of conditional cash transfer programmes in low- and middle-income countries has been described as perhaps the most remarkable innovation of recent decades in welfare programmes. These programmes provide regular cash transfers to poor families contingent on specific behaviours. These include school enrolment and regular attendance.

    The programmes started in the late 1990s in Mexico and quickly became the public policy of choice to fight poverty and low enrolment. Today, more than 60 countries operate education conditional cash transfer programmes, often at a national scale.

    There is plenty of evidence showing that conditional cash transfers boost enrolment. But evidence on their impacts on children’s learning is mixed. Explanations for the lack of learning gains relate to the short-term nature of the evaluations, which may not provide enough time for the learning effects to materialise.

    In recent research, conducted in Morocco, we show that conditional cash transfers can constrain learning when no accompanying measures are taken by governments to account for increased enrolment. We found that the introduction of a programme can deteriorate school quality and thus constrain learning for children who enrol in school.

    Conditional cash transfers in Morocco

    We looked at a programme implemented at scale in Morocco. Known as Tayssir, it began operating in 2008 and quickly became the flagship education policy of a government strongly committed to reducing school dropout rates.

    Earlier research showed that the pilot version of Tayssir had substantial positive effects on enrolment, but not on learning.

    Following this evaluation, Tayssir was quickly scaled-up to reach annually up to 800,000 children in 434 municipalities. Because the allocation of transfers remained remarkably stable over time, the scaled-up version of Tayssir offers an ideal setup to study how conditional cash transfer programmes affect learning, with enough time for the effects to materialise.

    Tayssir targeted all municipalities with a poverty rate above 30% and all households with children aged 6-15 within these municipalities.

    To study the impacts of the programme, we used data from the information system of Morocco’s ministry of education.

    In the first part of our analysis, we assessed Tayssir’s effects on dropout rates and checked for possible differences with the research done in 2015 on the pilot version of the scheme.

    We confirmed that the grade-specific dropout rate decreased by 1.3 percentage points on average (41% of the sample mean). This is equivalent to an increase in enrolment of about 9 percentage points by the end of grade 6.

    We found a greater decrease for girls: 1.8 percentage points, or 50% of the sample mean.

    Remarkably, these estimates were in line with those on the pilot, despite the nationwide expansion of the programme and the ten-fold increase in the number of beneficiaries.

    The impact on quality

    The reduction of the dropout rates induced by Tayssir may have affected both class size and class composition by retaining lower-ability students. This could potentially lead to negative effects on learning outcomes through peer effects and less effective teaching practices.

    Our estimates show that class size in targeted areas increased by 3.6 students by the end of primary school, equivalent to 12% of the sample mean.

    Variation in class composition increased by 0.30 standard deviations (SD) by the end of primary school.

    Figure 1 shows that these effects are stronger in higher grades. This suggests that the reduction in dropout rates accumulated over time and progressively overburdened school resources. Large effects in grade 1 likely reflect the fact that children in targeted municipalities started school earlier – possibly to benefit from the transfers – and repeated grade 1 more often.

    Figure 1: Effect of Tayssir on class size and heterogeneity

    Notes: Each bar reports the coefficient estimate of the local average treatment effects of Tayssir. The dependent variables are class size (number of students per class) and class heterogeneity (standard deviation of the GPAs within a class). 95% confidence intervals are reported.

    Larger class sizes and increased differences in class composition had negative impacts on children’s test scores.

    In the final part of our analysis, we looked at the effects on test scores at the end of primary school exam. We found that Tayssir had negative effects on test scores. We estimated that the programme reduced test scores by 0.12 standard deviation for the full sample.

    What needs to be done

    Our insights should not be interpreted as evidence that policymakers should not pursue conditional cash transfer programmes. Such programmes, including the one we study, have proven particularly effective at increasing access to education, which is a crucial first step to enhance learning.

    These programmes also have many other benefits. These include delayed marriage and childbearing for adolescent girls.

    However, our results, together with evidence showing alarmingly low literacy and numeracy levels among students in low- and middle-income countries, indicate that the attendance gains from the programmes alone are unlikely to equip students with the foundational skills they need to thrive.

    In fact, our results show that conditional cash transfer programmes can have adverse effects on learning when schools lack the necessary resources to accommodate the influx of new students. Such insights may be particularly relevant for other interventions aiming to increase school attendance without complementary investments in school capacity.

    Recent decades have seen a surge in evaluations focusing on the learning effects of education interventions in low- and middle-income countries. Although there is no silver bullet to raise learning, some “great buys” emerged from the 2023 report of the Global Education Evidence Advisory Panel:

    • providing information on the benefits, costs and quality of education;

    • supporting teachers with structured pedagogy;

    • pedagogical interventions that tailor teaching to student learning.

    In Morocco, where our study takes place, other scholars have demonstrated that an intervention combining two of these three “great buys” – targeted instruction based on learning level and structured pedagogy – yields large gains in learning.

    Claire Ricard received funding from Agence Nationale de la Recherche of the French government through the program “Investissements d’avenir” (ANR-10-LABX-14-01).

    Jules Gazeaud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Moroccan schools are fuller thanks to cash grants. The problem now is the quality of their education – study – https://theconversation.com/moroccan-schools-are-fuller-thanks-to-cash-grants-the-problem-now-is-the-quality-of-their-education-study-243298

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Who owns digital data about you? South African legal scholar weighs up property and privacy rights

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Donrich Thaldar, Professor, University of KwaZulu-Natal

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    In the digital economy, data is more than just information – it is an asset with immense economic and strategic value. Yet, despite its significance, a fundamental legal question remains unresolved: Can data be owned? While privacy laws worldwide focus on protecting individuals’ rights over their personal data, they often sidestep the issue of ownership. This has led to legal uncertainty, particularly in South Africa, where the Protection of Personal Information Act (Popia) grants data subjects various rights over their personal information but does not explicitly address ownership.

    This gap in legal clarity raises pressing questions: If personal data – such as private health information – exists within a vast and ever-growing digital landscape, can it be owned? And if so, who holds the rightful claim?

    Legal academic Donrich Thaldar, whose research focuses on data governance, explores these questions in a recent academic article. He unpacks his findings for The Conversation Africa.

    Why does it matter who owns data?

    In today’s digital economy, data is the most valuable asset – it’s often referred to as “the new oil”. Whether in commerce, research, or social interactions, the ability to generate, use and trade with data is central to economic competitiveness.

    If data ownership is not clearly established, it could stifle innovation and investment. Companies require legal certainty to operate effectively in a knowledge-driven economy.

    Countries have taken different legal approaches to tackling the question of who owns data. China, for instance, formally recognises the proprietary rights of data generators, meaning that businesses and individuals who generate data have legally defined rights over its use and commercialisation. This provides legal support for the country’s digital industries.

    What does South African law say?

    In the past, the South African Information Regulator has taken the position that personal information is automatically owned by the data subject – the person to whom the data relates – rather than by the entity generating the data. In this view, the rights created by Popia imply that data subjects themselves are the owners of their personal data, and nobody else.

    I suggest that this stance is legally flawed, as it conflates two different branches of the law: privacy law and property law. Moreover, it could severely disrupt the digital economy. The digital economy depends on data as a tradeable asset – it must be capable of being sold, licensed and commercialised like any other economic object. If ownership must always be with data subjects, businesses face uncertainty in using and monetising data. Uncertainty stifles innovation, discourages investment, and undermines South Africa’s digital competitiveness.

    You applied property law to the question of data ownership. Why?

    Ownership is a concept in property law, not privacy law. Therefore, to answer the data ownership question, we need to look for answers in property law.

    Property law governs the relationship between subjects (legal persons) and objects (things external to the body, whether physical or not). Ownership is about the rights that a subject has over an object. For an object to be capable of being owned, it must be valuable, useful, and – importantly – capable of human control. A bottle of water meets these criteria, but the vast oceans do not, as they are not within human control.

    Personal data in the abstract is like the water in the ocean – vast, uncontained, and beyond individual control. However, a digital instance of personal data, such as a computer file, is more like a bottled version of that water – defined and subject to human control. Just like digital money and other valuable digital assets, a specific instance of personal data meets all the requirements under South African common law for private ownership. Thus, in this sense personal data can be owned.

    Is the data owner not the data subject?

    At first glance this might seem so, but no, not necessarily. The reason that it might seem so, is because some of the privacy rights created by Popia resemble ownership rights. For example, an owner’s agreement is required before someone else can use the owned object (e.g., loan for use and rent). Similarly, a data subject’s consent is in most cases required before personal data can be processed. Furthermore, the owner of a thing has the right to destroy it; similarly, a data subject typically has the right to have personal data deleted.

    Do these privacy rights mean that data subjects actually own their personal data? I suggest not. Wearing a feather in one’s hat does not make one a bird. In the same way, privacy rights that resemble ownership rights do not mean that they constitute ownership. Ownership is acquired by following the rules of property law.

    So who owns the data?

    Because a newly created personal data instance has no antecedent legal object – in other words, it is not created out of another legal object – it initially belongs to no one. It is res nullius. Ownership of res nullius is acquired through appropriation, which requires two elements: control and the intention to own.

    This means that the entity generating the data, such as a company or university collecting and recording it, is best positioned to acquire ownership. Since it already has control over the data, the only remaining requirement is simply the intention to be the owner.

    If an entity like a university generates data and intends to own it, then – provided it is in control of that data – it will legally become the owner. This in principle allows the entity to use, license and trade the data as an economic asset. Indeed, it is prudent for data-generating entities, such as universities, to explicitly assert ownership over the data they produce. This not only establishes their legal rights with clarity but also serves as a safeguard against unauthorised access and misuse by malicious actors.

    Doesn’t this compromise data privacy?

    No, it should not. Ownership is always limited by other legal rules. For example, while I might own a car, I cannot drive it in any way I like – I must obey the rules of the road. Similarly, ownership of personal data is subject to strict limitations, particularly the privacy rights of data subjects under Popia.

    However, it is also important to understand that privacy rights apply only to personal data. If personal data is de-identified, meaning that it can no longer be linked to the data subjects, privacy rights cease to apply. What remains are the ownership rights in the data itself. It can be a fully tradeable asset.

    Recognising that a digital instance of personal data can be owned – and that the rightful owner is typically the data generator – does not undermine the privacy protections of Popia. Rather, it clarifies the legal landscape, ensuring that the rights of both data subjects and data generators are recognised and protected.

    Donrich Thaldar receives funding from the NIH.

    ref. Who owns digital data about you? South African legal scholar weighs up property and privacy rights – https://theconversation.com/who-owns-digital-data-about-you-south-african-legal-scholar-weighs-up-property-and-privacy-rights-249741

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Why your holiday flight is still not being powered by sustainable aviation fuel

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Salman Ahmad, Lecturer in Operations and Supply Chain Management, University of the West of Scotland

    Fahroni/Shutterstock

    As you wait in the departure lounge for your flight this summer, you may notice your aeroplane being pumped full of fuel ahead of takeoff. And then you may start to wonder why flying is still so dependent on fossil fuels, and whether you should have booked a holiday destination that’s accessible by a more environmentally friendly form of transport.

    So what happened to plans for so-called sustainable aviation fuel? Wasn’t it supposed to be the “game changer” that would make flying a much greener travel option than it used to be?

    Clearly, the move to adopt the technology is facing difficulties. One problem seems to be that there simply isn’t enough sustainable fuel to go around.

    But the business side of the process is also holding back sustainable fuel uptake.

    Research my colleagues and I conducted in 2021 revealed a deeply fragmented landscape at pretty much every step of sustainable fuel development. There are obstacles everywhere, blocking the paths of the producers developing these fuels, the airlines who might use them and the governmental and campaign groups pushing for change.

    Everyone seems to agree that sustainable fuel matters. They just don’t all agree about how to really get it off the ground.

    Our findings demonstrate that producers, for instance, were understandably focused on more research and development to improve efficient production. They were also worried that scaling up facilities could disrupt production that is already in place.

    Airlines meanwhile, are grappling with the economics of moving to sustainable fuel, which is around three to ten times more expensive than conventional fuel. Right now, a litre of conventional aviation fuel costs around £0.96 per litre in the UK – for sustainable aviation fuel it’s around £1.97. (Depending on the length of the journey and the size of the engine, a plane could need around 13,000 litres per hour of flying.)

    They spoke about inconsistent supply (especially at major airports), and the need for clearer regulations and incentives across the industry.

    “Cost is clearly the most important driver,” one airline executive told us, explaining that dealing with those costs would ultimately depend on passenger demand for greener travel – and how willing those passengers are to pay a premium for sustainable fuel.

    Distribution companies that take the sustainable fuel where it needs to go, have found themselves struggling to navigate the complexities of an emerging supply chain. They spoke of the logistical challenges of transporting and storing sustainable fuel, and a lack of clear communication between producers and airlines.

    They saw themselves as a crucial part of the sustainable aviation fuel puzzle, but were concerned about investing in logistics and infrastructure without guaranteed demand.

    Elsewhere, politicians and climate campaigners tend to view the adoption of sustainable fuel from a broader perspective, stressing the urgency of action on climate change. Their thinking is dominated by environmental strategy and sustainable aviation fuel regulation.

    But here, trust becomes an issue. Some of those involved with sustainable fuel development said they doubted government promises to support the sector over the long term. Others are cynical about whether airlines will really prioritise climate action over their very tight profit margins.

    Up in the air

    So sustainable fuel inspires plenty of different viewpoints and concerns. But one common thread was an overwhelming concern about cost and scale of production.

    Aside from being far more expensive than fossil-based jet fuel, building enough production facilities to make more will require billions of pounds of investment.

    The big question is who will foot the bill.

    sustainable fuel, on a wing and a prayer?
    Bulent camci/Shutterstock

    Some of this will need to be tax funded. For if the UK wants to become a leader in the use of sustainable aviation fuel, as the government says it does, it needs more than ambitious targets. It needs to start making things happen.

    And our research suggests that the industry as a whole would benefit from some certainty to encourage investment right across the supply chain. Without a clear and stable regulatory framework, everyone will remain hesitant about committing significant resources to sustainable fuel.

    Collaboration between the key players could also be improved, with a better dialogue between those in the industry and regulators, potentially leading to a shared vision for the future of sustainable aviation fuel.

    That future is by no means doomed. Major commercial airlines like Air France-KLM, IAG (British Airways) and United Airlines in the US are working with sustainable fuel producers around the world.

    But while the desire to decarbonise aviation seems clear, the path forward is not straightforward. It is a complex picture of politics, economics, trust and differing priorities.

    By navigating this turbulence wisely, the sustainable fuel sector can be part of a broader flight path to net zero. But if managed poorly, targets to dramatically increase its use will remain elusive.

    Salman Ahmad received funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council to undertake work that informs the contents of this article. He is also a professional member of the Project Management Institue and the Association for Supply Chain Management.

    ref. Why your holiday flight is still not being powered by sustainable aviation fuel – https://theconversation.com/why-your-holiday-flight-is-still-not-being-powered-by-sustainable-aviation-fuel-258958

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Why your holiday flight is still not being powered by sustainable aviation fuel

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Salman Ahmad, Lecturer in Operations and Supply Chain Management, University of the West of Scotland

    Fahroni/Shutterstock

    As you wait in the departure lounge for your flight this summer, you may notice your aeroplane being pumped full of fuel ahead of takeoff. And then you may start to wonder why flying is still so dependent on fossil fuels, and whether you should have booked a holiday destination that’s accessible by a more environmentally friendly form of transport.

    So what happened to plans for so-called sustainable aviation fuel? Wasn’t it supposed to be the “game changer” that would make flying a much greener travel option than it used to be?

    Clearly, the move to adopt the technology is facing difficulties. One problem seems to be that there simply isn’t enough sustainable fuel to go around.

    But the business side of the process is also holding back sustainable fuel uptake.

    Research my colleagues and I conducted in 2021 revealed a deeply fragmented landscape at pretty much every step of sustainable fuel development. There are obstacles everywhere, blocking the paths of the producers developing these fuels, the airlines who might use them and the governmental and campaign groups pushing for change.

    Everyone seems to agree that sustainable fuel matters. They just don’t all agree about how to really get it off the ground.

    Our findings demonstrate that producers, for instance, were understandably focused on more research and development to improve efficient production. They were also worried that scaling up facilities could disrupt production that is already in place.

    Airlines meanwhile, are grappling with the economics of moving to sustainable fuel, which is around three to ten times more expensive than conventional fuel. Right now, a litre of conventional aviation fuel costs around £0.96 per litre in the UK – for sustainable aviation fuel it’s around £1.97. (Depending on the length of the journey and the size of the engine, a plane could need around 13,000 litres per hour of flying.)

    They spoke about inconsistent supply (especially at major airports), and the need for clearer regulations and incentives across the industry.

    “Cost is clearly the most important driver,” one airline executive told us, explaining that dealing with those costs would ultimately depend on passenger demand for greener travel – and how willing those passengers are to pay a premium for sustainable fuel.

    Distribution companies that take the sustainable fuel where it needs to go, have found themselves struggling to navigate the complexities of an emerging supply chain. They spoke of the logistical challenges of transporting and storing sustainable fuel, and a lack of clear communication between producers and airlines.

    They saw themselves as a crucial part of the sustainable aviation fuel puzzle, but were concerned about investing in logistics and infrastructure without guaranteed demand.

    Elsewhere, politicians and climate campaigners tend to view the adoption of sustainable fuel from a broader perspective, stressing the urgency of action on climate change. Their thinking is dominated by environmental strategy and sustainable aviation fuel regulation.

    But here, trust becomes an issue. Some of those involved with sustainable fuel development said they doubted government promises to support the sector over the long term. Others are cynical about whether airlines will really prioritise climate action over their very tight profit margins.

    Up in the air

    So sustainable fuel inspires plenty of different viewpoints and concerns. But one common thread was an overwhelming concern about cost and scale of production.

    Aside from being far more expensive than fossil-based jet fuel, building enough production facilities to make more will require billions of pounds of investment.

    The big question is who will foot the bill.

    sustainable fuel, on a wing and a prayer?
    Bulent camci/Shutterstock

    Some of this will need to be tax funded. For if the UK wants to become a leader in the use of sustainable aviation fuel, as the government says it does, it needs more than ambitious targets. It needs to start making things happen.

    And our research suggests that the industry as a whole would benefit from some certainty to encourage investment right across the supply chain. Without a clear and stable regulatory framework, everyone will remain hesitant about committing significant resources to sustainable fuel.

    Collaboration between the key players could also be improved, with a better dialogue between those in the industry and regulators, potentially leading to a shared vision for the future of sustainable aviation fuel.

    That future is by no means doomed. Major commercial airlines like Air France-KLM, IAG (British Airways) and United Airlines in the US are working with sustainable fuel producers around the world.

    But while the desire to decarbonise aviation seems clear, the path forward is not straightforward. It is a complex picture of politics, economics, trust and differing priorities.

    By navigating this turbulence wisely, the sustainable fuel sector can be part of a broader flight path to net zero. But if managed poorly, targets to dramatically increase its use will remain elusive.

    Salman Ahmad received funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council to undertake work that informs the contents of this article. He is also a professional member of the Project Management Institue and the Association for Supply Chain Management.

    ref. Why your holiday flight is still not being powered by sustainable aviation fuel – https://theconversation.com/why-your-holiday-flight-is-still-not-being-powered-by-sustainable-aviation-fuel-258958

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Discovery of a 4,000-year-old Bronze Age settlement in Morocco rewrites history

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Hamza Benattia, Prehistory, Universitat de Barcelona

    A new archaeological discovery at Kach Kouch in Morocco challenges the long-held belief that the Maghreb (north-west Africa) was an empty land before the arrival of the Phoenicians from the Middle East in around 800 BCE. It reveals a much richer and more complex history than previously thought.

    Everything found at the site indicates that during the Bronze Age, more than 3,000 years ago, stable agricultural settlements already existed on the African coast of the Mediterranean.

    This was at the same time as societies such as the Mycenaean flourished in the eastern Mediterranean.

    Our discovery, led by a team of young researchers from Morocco’s National Institute of Archaeology, expands our knowledge of the recent prehistory of north Africa. It also redefines our understanding of the connections between the Maghreb and the rest of the Mediterranean in ancient times.

    How the discovery was made

    Kach Kouch was first identified in 1988 and first excavated in 1992. At the time, researchers believed the site had been inhabited between the 8th and 6th centuries BCE. This was based on the Phoenician pottery that was found.

    Nearly 30 years later, our team carried out two new excavation seasons in 2021 and 2022. Our investigations included cutting-edge technology such as drones, differential GPS (global positioning systems) and 3D models.

    A rigorous protocol was followed for collecting samples. This allowed us to detect fossilised remains of seeds and charcoal.

    Subsequently, a series of analyses allowed us to reconstruct the settlement’s economy and its natural environment in prehistoric times.

    What the remains revealed

    The excavations, along with radiocarbon dating, revealed that the settlement underwent three phases of occupation between 2200 and 600 BCE.

    The earliest documented remains (2200–2000 BCE) are scarce. They consist of three undecorated pottery sherds, a flint flake and a cow bone.

    The scarcity of materials and contexts could be due to erosion or a temporary occupation of the hill during this phase.

    In its second phase, after a period of abandonment, the Kach Kouch hill was permanently occupied from 1300 BCE. Its inhabitants, who probably numbered no more than a hundred, dedicated themselves to agriculture and animal husbandry.

    They lived in circular dwellings built from wattle and daub, a technique that combines wooden poles, reeds and mud. They dug silos into the rock to store agricultural products.

    Analysis shows that they cultivated wheat, barley and legumes, and raised cattle, sheep, goats and pigs.

    They also used grinding stones for cereal processing, flint tools, and decorated pottery. In addition, the oldest known bronze object in north Africa (excluding Egypt) has been documented. It is probably a scrap metal fragment removed after casting in a mould.

    Interactions with the Phoenicians

    Between the 8th and 7th centuries BCE, during the so-called Mauretanian period, the inhabitants of Kach Kouch maintained the same material culture, architecture and economy as in the previous phase. However, interactions with Phoenician communities that were starting to settle in nearby sites, such as Lixus, brought new cultural practices.

    For example, circular dwellings coexisted with square ones made of stone and wattle and daub, combining Phoenician and local construction techniques.

    Furthermore, new crops began to be cultivated, like grapes and olives. Among the new materials, wheel-made Phoenician ceramics, such as amphorae (storage jugs) and plates, and the use of iron objects stand out.

    Around 600 BCE, Kach Kouch was peacefully abandoned, perhaps due to social and economic changes. Its inhabitants likely moved to other nearby settlements.

    So who were the Bronze Age inhabitants?

    It’s unclear whether the Maghreb populations in the Bronze Age lived in tribes, as would later occur during the Mauretanian period. They were probably organised as families. Burials suggest there were no clear signs of hierarchy.

    They may have spoken a language similar to the Amazigh, the indigenous north African language, which did not become written until the introduction of the Phoenician alphabet. The cultural continuity documented at Kach Kouch suggests that these populations are the direct ancestors of the Mauretanian peoples of north-west Africa.

    Why this matters

    Kach Kouch is not only the first and oldest known Bronze Age settlement in the Maghreb but also reshapes our understanding of prehistory in this region.

    The new findings, along with other recent discoveries, demonstrate that north-west Africa has been connected to other regions of the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Sahara since prehistoric times.




    Read more:
    Discovery of 5,000-year-old farming society in Morocco fills a major gap in history – north-west Africa was a central player in trade and culture


    Our findings challenge traditional narratives, many of which were influenced by colonial views that portrayed the Maghreb as an empty and isolated land until it was “civilized” by foreign peoples.

    As a result, the Maghreb has long been absent from debates on the later prehistory of the Mediterranean. These new discoveries not only represent a breakthrough for archaeology, but also a call to reconsider dominant historical narratives. Kach Kouch offers the opportunity to rewrite north Africa’s history and give it the visibility it has always deserved.




    Read more:
    Ancient DNA reveals Maghreb communities preserved their culture and genes, even in a time of human migration


    We believe this is a decisive moment for research that could forever change the way we understand not only the history of north Africa, but also its relationship with other areas of the Mediterranean.

    Hamza Benattia, director of the Kach Kouch Archaeological Project, received funding from the National Institute of Archaeology and Heritage of Morocco (INSAP), the Prehistoric Society Research Fund, the Stevan B. Dana Grant of the American Society of Overseas Research, the Mediterranean Archaeological Trust Grant, the Barakat Trust Early Career Award, the Centre Jacques Berque Research Grant, the Institute of Ceutan Studies Research Fund and the University of Castilla La Mancha.

    ref. Discovery of a 4,000-year-old Bronze Age settlement in Morocco rewrites history – https://theconversation.com/discovery-of-a-4-000-year-old-bronze-age-settlement-in-morocco-rewrites-history-253172

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Post-flood recovery: lessons from Germany and Nigeria on how to help people cope with loss and build resilience

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola, Senior Research Associate, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), United Nations University

    Extreme climate events — floods, droughts and heatwaves — are not just becoming more frequent; they are also more severe.

    It’s important to understand how communities can recover from these events in ways that also build resilience to future events.

    In a recent study, we analysed how communities affected by the extreme flood events of 2021 in Germany’s Ahr Valley and in Lagos, Nigeria, grappled with recovery from floods.

    Our aim was to identify the factors – and combinations of factors – that served as barriers (or enablers) to recovery from disasters.

    We found that financial limitations, political interests and administrative hurdles led to prioritising immediate relief and reconstruction over long-term sustainable recovery.

    In both cases immediate and long-term recovery efforts were siloed, underfunded and focused on reconstruction to pre-disaster conditions.

    We concluded from our findings that the success of recovery efforts lies in balancing short-term relief and a long-term vision. While immediate aid is essential after a disaster, true resilience hinges on proactive measures that address systemic challenges and empower communities to build a better future.

    Recovery should not be merely action-oriented and building back infrastructure (engineering). It should also include insights in other areas, like governance and psychology, helping people to deal with losses and to heal.

    What worked

    To understand the recovery pathways of the two regions, we reviewed relevant literature, newspaper articles and government documents. We also interviewed government agencies, NGO representatives, volunteers and local residents in the communities where these floods occurred.

    We found that in the Ahr Valley, recovery wasn’t just about rebuilding structures, it was about empowering individuals.

    Through initiatives like mental health and first aid courses, residents learned to support one another. This fostered a sense of community and resilience that was essential for meeting the emotional challenges posed by the disaster.

    The focus on rebuilding with a sustainable vision also included environmental initiatives. For example, a type of heating system was put in place that didn’t rely on fossil fuels.

    Not only did this reduce carbon emissions, it also served as a symbol of hope. It showed there was an opportunity to create a more sustainable and environmentally friendly community.

    In Lagos, too, residents found strength in community and innovation. Grassroots efforts using sustainable materials like bamboo and palm wood highlighted the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the people. Faith-based organisations provided material aid as well as emotional and spiritual support. This reinforced the bonds that held the community together.

    Each community faced unique challenges. But they shared a common thread: the importance of adaptive governance – flexible decision-making and strong community ties.

    For example, established building codes in the Ahr Valley provided a framework for reconstruction, ensuring that new structures were resilient and safe.

    In Lagos, the absence of strong government support highlighted the critical role of community organisations in providing services and fostering a sense of shared responsibility.

    What needs improvment

    In both the Ahr Valley and Lagos, the journey towards recovery has been fraught with obstacles as well.

    In the Ahr Valley, bureaucratic red tape has become a formidable barrier. Residents, eager to rebuild their lives, find themselves entangled in a complex web of regulations and lengthy approval processes. This has delayed their access to insurance and recovery funds. Waiting for months or even years has eroded hope and fuelled a sense of abandonment.

    Meanwhile, in Lagos, insufficient government support has left communities to fend for themselves, creating a breeding ground for uncertainty and conflict.

    Land tenure disputes, fuelled by a lack of clear property rights, sow seeds of distrust and hinder resettlement efforts. Political disagreements complicate the picture, as competing interests divert attention and resources away from those who need them most.

    In Lagos, none of the respondents reported having insurance to help them to recover from disaster-related losses.

    While some residents in the Ahr Valley did have insurance, many were under-insured.

    The Ahr Valley’s building codes offer a framework for reconstruction. But it’s clear that processes should be streamlined so communities can take ownership of their recovery.

    In Lagos, the importance of robust social safety nets is clear. Partnerships between communities and authorities are also needed.

    A different approach

    Recovery isn’t a separate process that occurs after disasters only. It should be seen as an essential part of managing risks. It’s important to understand what recovery involves and what resources are needed.

    This will help reduce future risks and increase resilience after extreme events.

    Governments should encourage flexible governance structures that value community voices and local knowledge to enable recovery. A good example is the New Orleans Recovery Authority, established after Hurricane Katrina. It involved local residents and city officials in planning and rebuilding efforts.

    Grassroots efforts in Lagos demonstrated the power of sustainable materials and community-led initiatives. Seeing things from the community’s point of view can help tailor solutions that fit the situation and adapt to evolving challenges.

    Training and capacity-building programmes empower communities to be active in their own recovery.

    Mental health and first aid courses were successful in the Ahr Valley. Equipping individuals with skills in sustainable practices and disaster preparedness helps weave a social fabric capable of weathering future storms.

    Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola is a Visiting Scientist at, the United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS)

    Saskia E. Werners works with United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). She is grateful to have received research grants in support of her research on climate change adaptation and recovery.

    ref. Post-flood recovery: lessons from Germany and Nigeria on how to help people cope with loss and build resilience – https://theconversation.com/post-flood-recovery-lessons-from-germany-and-nigeria-on-how-to-help-people-cope-with-loss-and-build-resilience-240260

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: South Africa’s 36.1% electricity price hike for 2025: why the power utility Eskom’s request is unrealistic

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Steven Matome Mathetsa, Senior Lecturer at the African Energy Leadership Centre, Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand

    South Africa’s state-owned electricity company, Eskom, has applied to the National Energy Regulator of South Africa to approve a 36.1% electricity price hike from April 2025, a 11.8% price increase in 2026 and an 9.1% increase in 2027. Steven Mathetsa teaches and researches sustainable energy systems at the University of the Witwatersrand’s African Energy Leadership Centre. He explains some of the problems with the planned tariff increase.

    Why such a big hike?

    Eskom says the multi-year price increase is because of the need to move closer a cost-reflective tariff that reflects the actual costs of supplying electricity.

    However, Eskom’s electricity tariff increases have been exorbitant for several years – an 18% increase in 2023 and a 13% increase in 2024. This is a price increase far above inflation, which is currently at 4.4%.

    Some companies have installed their own generation capacity, and individuals have moved to rooftop solar systems. As a result electricity sales have fallen by about 2% , resulting in a drop in revenue.

    There’s a knock on effect for municipalities, the biggest distributors of electricity, which have also been forced to hike tariffs in line with Eskom’s increases.

    All these costs are passed onto the consumers.

    What will the impact be on South Africans?

    If the hike is approved it will certainly worsen the economic difficulties facing
    South Africa. One of the most unequal countries in the world, South Africa has an extremely high unemployment rate – 33.5%at the last count.

    Economic growth is also very slow, at a mere 0.6% in 2023. The cost of living is high.

    Exorbitant increases in electricity costs aggravate these problems.

    South Africans and businesses in the country have little choice about where they source their energy. Eskom is still the sole supplier for nearly all the country’s electricity needs. This means that ordinary citizens are likely to continue relying on electricity supplied by Eskom, irrespective of the costs.

    The high costs affect businesses negatively. Large industrial and small, medium, and micro enterprises have all highlighted that costs associated with utilities, mainly electricity, are affecting their sustainability.




    Read more:
    Competition in South Africa’s electricity market: new law paves the way, but it won’t be a smooth ride


    The Electricity Regulation Amendment Act implementation will make major changes to Eskom. The reforms establish an independent Transmission Systems Operator tasked with connecting renewable energy providers to the grid. This will allow the creation of a competitive market where renewable energy providers can sell power to the grid.

    But it’s not yet clear if these changes will address the issue of exorbitant electricity price rises.

    What are the problems?

    The country’s energy frameworks are drafted on the basis of the World Energy Trilemma Index. The index promotes a balanced approach between energy security, affordability, and sustainability. In other words, countries must be able to provide environmentally friendly and reliable electricity that their residents can afford.

    South Africa is currently unable to meet these goals because of different energy policies that do not align, a lack of investment in electricity and dependency on coal-fired power. Electricity is increasingly becoming unaffordable in the country. Although there’s been a recent reprieve from power cuts, security of supply is still uncertain.




    Read more:
    South Africa’s new energy plan needs a mix of nuclear, gas, renewables and coal – expert


    Furthermore, over 78% of the country’s electricity is produced by burning coal. This means South Africa is also far from attaining its 2015 Paris Agreement greenhouse gas reduction goals.

    Compounding this problem is that Eskom is financially unstable – it needed R78 billion from the government in debt relief in 2024. For years, there was a lack of effective maintenance on the aging infrastructure.

    The country has made some inroads into improving security of supply. To date, recent interventions have resulted in over 200 days without power cuts. This should be commended. The same focus must be placed on ensuring that electricity remains affordable while giving attention to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement.

    What needs to change?

    South Africa’s 1998 Energy Policy White Paper and the new Electricity Regulation Amendment Act promote access to affordable electricity. However, they’ve been implemented very slowly. Affordable electricity needs to be taken seriously.

    The question is whether the country’s electricity tariff methodology is flexible enough to accommodate poor South Africans, especially during these challenging economic times.

    In my view, it is not. In its current form, vulnerable communities continue to foot the bill for various challenges confronting Eskom, including financial mismanagement, operational inefficiencies, municipal non-payment, and corruption.

    I believe the following steps should be taken.

    Firstly, South Africa should revise its tariff application methodologies so that consumers, especially unemployed and impoverished people, are protected against exorbitant increases.

    Secondly, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa should strengthen its regulations to ensure its compliance and enforcement systems are effective. For example, Eskom should be held accountable when it does not deliver efficient services or mismanages funds, and be transparent about costs associated with its processes. Municipalities should also be held accountable for non-payment and other technical issues they regularly struggle with. Both affect the revenue of the power utility.




    Read more:
    South Africa’s economic growth affected by mismatch of electricity supply and demand


    Thirdly, the government must make sure that price increases are affordable and don’t hurt the broader economy. It can do this by adjusting its policies to make sure that increases in electricity tariffs are in line with the rate of inflation.

    Fourthly, communities can play a vital role in saving electricity at a household level. This will reduce the country’s overall energy consumption. Furthermore, both small and large businesses should continue to consider alternative energy technologies while implementing energy saving technologies.

    Lastly, the level of free-basic electricity is not sufficient for poor households. Subsidy policies should also be reviewed to allow users access to affordable electricity as their financial situation changes negatively.

    Steven Matome Mathetsa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. South Africa’s 36.1% electricity price hike for 2025: why the power utility Eskom’s request is unrealistic – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-36-1-electricity-price-hike-for-2025-why-the-power-utility-eskoms-request-is-unrealistic-240941

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Climate change is making it harder for people to get the care they need

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Maria S. Floro, Professor Emerita of Economics, American University

    The world is witnessing the consequences of climate change: long-lasting changes in temperature and rainfall, and more intense and frequent extreme weather events such as heat waves, hurricanes, typhoons, flooding and drought. All make it harder for families and communities to meet their care needs.

    Climate change affects care systems in various ways. First, sudden illnesses and unexpected disabilities heighten the need for care. Second, it reduces access to important inputs for care such as water, food and safe shelter. Third, it can damage physical and social care infrastructures.

    It can also lead to breakdowns of traditional units of caregiving such as households and communities. And it creates new situations of need with the increase in displaced person settlements and refugee camps.

    Climate change creates sudden spikes in the demand for care, and serious challenges to meeting the growing need for care. All this has immediate and long lasting effects on human well-being.

    The size of the current unmet care needs throughout the world is substantial. In childcare alone, about 23% of children worldwide – nearly 350 million – need childcare but do not have it. Families in low- and lower-middle-income countries are the most in need.

    Similarly, as the world’s population ages rapidly, only a small proportion of the elderly who need assistance are able to use formal care (in an institution or paid homecare). Most are cared for by family members or other unpaid caregivers. Much of this unpaid care and formal care work is provided by women and girls.

    Hundreds of millions of people around the world struggle to get healthcare. Expansion of access to essential health services has slowed compared to pre-2015 . And healthcare costs still create financial hardship.

    Without comprehensive public and global support for care provision and the integration of care in the climate agenda, unmet care needs will only grow and inequalities will widen.

    Impact

    Climate change interacts with human health in complex ways. Its impact is highly uneven across populations. It depends on geographical region, income, education, gender roles, social norms, level of development, and the institutional capacity and accessibility of health systems.

    In 2018-22, Africa experienced the biggest increase in the
    heat-related mortality rate since 2000-05
    . This is not surprising as the continent has more frequent health-threatening temperatures than ever before and a growing population of people older than 65.

    Africa is also the region most affected by droughts in 2013-22, with 64% of its land area affected by at least one month of extreme drought per year on average. It was followed by Oceania (55% of its land area) and South and Central America (53%).

    Scientific evidence also points to increases in health inequalities caused by climate change. The health effects of climate change are not uniformly felt by different population groups.

    Exposure, severity of impact, and ability of individuals to recover depend on a variety of factors. Physiological characteristics, income, education, type of occupation, location, social norms and health systems are some of them.

    For example, older people and young children face the greatest health risks from high temperatures.

    There is also evidence of the disproportionate effect of climate change on the health of people living in poverty and those who belong to disadvantaged groups.

    Women of lower social and economic status and with less education are more vulnerable to heat stress compared to women in wealthier households and with higher education or social status. They are exposed to pollution in the absence of clean cooking fuel, and to extreme heat as they walk to gather water and fuel, or do other work outdoors.

    Bad sanitation in poor urban areas increases the incidence of water-borne diseases after heavy rains and floods.

    Lack of access to healthcare services and the means to pay for medicines make it difficult for women and men in low-income households to recover from illness, heat strokes, and air pollution-related ailments.

    Mental health problems are being attributed to climate change as well. Studies show that the loss of family or kin member, home, livelihood and a safe environment can bring about direct emotional impacts.

    These adverse impacts increase the demand for caregiving and the care workload. Climate-induced health problems force family and community caregivers, particularly women, to spend more time looking after the sick and disabled, particularly frail elderly people and children.

    Effect on food and water

    Climate change threatens the availability of food, clean water and safe shelter. It erodes households’ and communities’ care capacity and hence societies’ ability to thrive.

    Fluctuations in food supply and rising food prices as a result of environmental disasters, along with the inadequacy of government policies, underscore the mounting challenge of meeting food needs.

    The threat of chronic shortage of safe drinking water has also risen. Water scarcity is an area where structural inequalities and gender disparities are laid bare.

    Care for the sick and disabled, the young and the elderly is compromised when water is scarce.

    Effects on providing care

    Extreme weather events disrupt physical care infrastructures. It may be hard to reach hospitals, clinics, daycare centres, nursery schools and nursing homes. Some facilities may be damaged and have to close.

    Another type of care system that can break down is family networks and support provided by friends and neighbours. These informal care sharing arrangements are illustrated in a study of the three large informal settlements in Nairobi.

    About half (50.5%) of the sampled households reported having had a sick member in the two weeks before the survey. The majority relied on close friends and family members living nearby for care and support.

    Studies have shown that climate change eventually leads to livelihood loss and resource scarcity, which can weaken social cohesion and local safety nets in affected communities.

    Heightened risks and uncertainty and imminent changes in socio-economic and political conditions can also compel individuals or entire households to migrate. Migration is caused by a host of factors, but it has increasingly been a climate-related response.

    The World Bank’s Groundswell Report released in 2018, for example, projected that climate change could force 216 million people to move within their countries by 2050 to avoid the slow-onset impacts of climate change.

    A possible consequence of migration is the withdrawal of care support provided by the migrating extended kin, neighbours or friends, increasing the caregiving load of people left behind.

    In the case of forced displacements, the traditional social networks existing in communities are disrupted entirely.

    What’s needed

    There are compelling reasons to believe that meeting care needs can also help mitigate the effects of climate change. And actions to meet carbon-zero goals, prevent biodiversity loss and regenerate ecosystems can reduce the care work burden that falls heavily on families, communities and women.

    Any effort to tackle these grave problems should be comprehensive in scope and must be based on principles of equality, universality, and responsibility shared by all.

    This article is part of a series of articles initiated through a project led by the Southern Centre for Inequality studies, in collaboration with the International Development Research Centre and a group of feminist economists and climate scientists across the world.

    Maria S. Floro does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Climate change is making it harder for people to get the care they need – https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-making-it-harder-for-people-to-get-the-care-they-need-240557

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Air quality isn’t just bad in cities – here’s why and how we’re tracking pollution from upland fires

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Rebecca Brownlow, Senior Lecturer in Environmental Science, Sheffield Hallam University

    Peatland burns over the reservoir in Langsett, a village in South Yorkshire. Wendy Birks, CC BY-NC-ND

    Early one October afternoon in 2023, thick grey smoke drifted across Sheffield’s western skyline. As much of the city became blanketed, residents turned to social media to complain about “bonfire smoke”, while others were forced to leave the city due to breathing difficulties.

    However, this smoke did not originate within the city. It was drifting in from the Peak District, more than nine miles away, where controlled heather burning was taking place on the moorlands. For around six hours, levels of fine particulate matter (known as PM2.5), tiny airborne pollutants known to harm human health, exceeded 40 micrograms per cubic metre of air (µg/m³) and peaked at 70µg/m³, well above the guidelines recommended by the World Health Organization.

    This single incident points to the wider and largely invisible problem of the routine burning of the UK’s uplands. This can be a serious source of air pollution, but because most official air pollution monitoring concentrates on urban areas, the effects are overlooked. This is why we have started monitoring upland fires and the pollution they cause.

    Prescribed burning is a longstanding land management practice often used to control vegetation for grouse shooting or livestock grazing. It happens across a range of upland landscapes. Many of the areas being burned sit on deep peat, an organic-rich soil made from layers of slowly decomposed plant material formed over thousands of years in waterlogged conditions.

    Peatlands are incredibly important. They are one of the most carbon-rich ecosystems on the planet. In the UK, they cover around 12% of the land area and store an estimated 3.2 billion tonnes of carbon. This is equivalent to all the forests of Germany, France and the UK combined. Most of the UK’s peat is found in Scotland, but notable areas in England include the Peak District and North York Moors. However, their value goes well beyond carbon.

    Around 70% of Britain’s drinking water comes from upland areas that are largely peatland, and healthy peatlands help reduce flooding by slowing the flow of water from hills to towns and cities. They also provide vital habitats for birds, insects and rare plants, forming the UK’s largest area of semi-natural habitat.




    Read more:
    Wildfire smoke can harm human health, even when the fire is burning hundreds of miles away – a toxicologist explains why


    Despite their ecological importance, more than 80% of English peatlands are classified as degraded, often through historic air pollution, draining, overgrazing and, importantly, repeated burning.

    One hidden consequence of that burning is air pollution. These burns are often viewed as isolated rural events, but their effect on regional air quality can be substantial. On that day in Sheffield, pollution levels briefly rivalled those seen across the city during bonfire night, a well-known peak in urban air pollution.

    In response to that October event, our research team launched a new pilot monitoring network across part of the Peak District national park. This FireUp project combines air quality sensors, satellite data and community observations to detect and measure pollution from upland fires.

    Planned burning event in the Peak District captured via Copernicus Sentinel-2 data (2024), retrieved from Copernicus SciHub and processed by European Space Agency.
    CC BY

    By using a mix of technologies and local reporting, we have documented spikes in PM2.5 pollution that would have otherwise been missed. Our system offers a clearer picture of when and where fires occur, and how far their smoke spreads, opening the door for better planning and stronger protections for public health. But the problem is not just a lack of data, it is also a failure of regulation. England’s current upland burning regulations are limited on four fronts.

    Heather and grass burning regulations introduced in 2021 prohibit burning only on peat deeper than 40cm inside designated sites. That means 60% of upland peat is excluded from these protections.

    With more than 95% of PM2.5 monitors located in urban areas, smoke from moorland fires in remote rural locations is rarely registered on official networks.

    The resources for organisations responsible for enforcing regulations have shrunk over the last decade. Natural England, one of the government’s statutory bodies responsible for environmental protection, has experienced a 4% decrease in funding for 2024-25 compared to the previous year.

    Prosecutions for illegal burning are exceptionally rare, with satellite analyses pointing to a higher level of unlicensed activity than official records suggest.

    In short, narrow legal scope, limited monitoring coverage and under-resourced enforcement leave many prescribed burns undetected and unaccounted for, along with the health and environmental risks they carry.

    Our FireUp system improves fire detections and helps quantify the effects of air pollution from these burns. As the UK government reviews regulations as part of the 2025 heather and grass burning consultation for England, and as upland fire risk increases, this kind of evidence is essential, not just to track what is happening, but to help shape a healthier and better future for the UK’s uplands.

    Our next step is to develop a citizen science app that makes it easier for people to report peatland fire incidents and upland burning to help improve regulation and log the effects of changes in air quality.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    James is a member of the Welsh Government Clean Air Advisory Panel, and Promoting Awareness of Air Quality Delivery Group. James also sits on the Scottish Government’s Air Quality Advisory Group.

    Maria Val Martin receives funding from UKRI and is a member of the DEFRA Air Quality Expert Group.

    Rebecca Brownlow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Air quality isn’t just bad in cities – here’s why and how we’re tracking pollution from upland fires – https://theconversation.com/air-quality-isnt-just-bad-in-cities-heres-why-and-how-were-tracking-pollution-from-upland-fires-258034

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Sugary drinks, processed foods, alcohol and tobacco are big killers: why the G20 should add its weight to health taxes

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Karen Hofman, Professor and Programme Director, SA MRC Centre for Health Economics and Decision Science – PRICELESS SA (Priority Cost Effective Lessons in Systems Strengthening South Africa), University of the Witwatersrand

    By 2030, non-communicable diseases will account for 75% of all deaths annually. Eighty percent of these will be in the global south. Most of these diseases are what we call silent killers: type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure and heart disease, as well as certain types of cancer at increasingly younger ages.

    The consumption of sugary drinks and processed foods high in sugar, salt and saturated fats is fuelling these pandemics. And increasingly advertising is being seen as the means by which the consumption of unhealthy products is promoted. This translates into the growth of non-communicable diseases in populations across the globe. This rising threat is driven largely by the way in which markets and industries are organised, which, in turn, shapes social norms towards consumption of tobacco, alcohol, food and sugary beverages.

    This process is what’s known as commercial determinants of health.

    Products that top the list in terms of their risk to health are tobacco, sugary beverages, ultra processed food and alcohol.

    These products are heavily advertised. For example, in South Africa from 2013 to 2019, sugary beverage manufacturers spent US$191 million (R3.7 billion) to advertise their products. Many of the TV advertisements for sugary drinks were placed during child and family viewing time, between 3pm and 7pm.

    Over the past decade a number of countries have introduced policies in a bid to limit the use and intake of harmful food and beverages. These have ranged from taxes on certain products, such as sugar, alcohol and tobacco, to bans on advertising. Many have proved effective. But there are still big gaps in policies to control these harmful products.

    As academics who have researched this field for three decades we believe that the G20 can play a significant role in plugging these gaps. The countries under the G20 umbrella, which represent two thirds of the world’s population, have reason to act: all are experiencing a mounting burden of obesity-related illness such as diabetes, high blood pressure and cancer at ever-younger ages.

    One of South Africa’s G20 presidency health priorities is “stemming the tide of non-communicable diseases”. In our view this is an invitation for the G20 to pledge to combat the drivers of non-communicable diseases.

    The G20 can acknowledge that these diseases are part of a pathological system in which commercial actors are causing ill health. And G20 leaders can acknowledge that progress enacting health taxes has stagnated in most countries.

    By galvanising attention in this way, the G20 can give impetus to a high level United Nations meeting in 2025 at which a new vision for the control and prevention of non-communicable diseases is due to be set. Health taxes and bans on marketing are focus areas.

    What stands in the way of progress

    Efforts by various countries to curb consumption of these harmful products have shown one thing clearly: there’s no silver bullet.

    Nevertheless, evidence shows that consumers are responsive to price. This points to the fact that taxes are a key tool for decreasing demand, especially for young consumers.




    Read more:
    Sugary drinks are a killer: a 20% tax would save lives and rands in South Africa


    There is also mounting evidence that health taxes are progressive for health at a population level – in other words they lead to better health outcomes. Research also shows that they scarcely affect overall employment, if at all.

    But advances on alcohol and tobacco taxes are slow. And there has been little progress on taxes on sugary beverages.

    These taxes remain far too low because health promotion taxes face tough resistance from industry. When any health promotion taxes are proposed, industries deny harms, promote doubt, divert attention, spread disinformation, create front organisations, and varnish their reputations through corporate social responsibility initiatives.

    When taxes do proceed through the legislative or regulatory process, industries influence proposals to make them less effective. They also offer to replace legislation with voluntary commitments. Evidence shows that voluntary commitments do not work.

    What would be gained

    In 2024, a report by a panel of experts showed that US$3.7 trillion in additional revenue could be generated over five years if all countries increased prices of tobacco, alcohol and sugary beverages by 50%.

    This money is sorely needed to boost healthcare. Non-communicable diseases disproportionately affect the most poor and vulnerable and healthcare systems are increasingly unable to cope. Screening, diagnosis, medications and treatment are very expensive for both ministries of finance and at the household level, where health needs can result in catastrophic expenditure.

    And taxes that generate a 50% increase in real prices of tobacco, alcohol and sugary beverages would save 50 million lives globally over 50 years.

    Where to begin

    We believe the G20 platform is a sound one on which to champion efforts to curb the consumption of harmful products. This is because half of the countries in the group have one or two policies for food such as taxes on sweetened beverages. Their experiences can therefore inform debates about how to protect the public from the fatal effects of diet-influenced diseases.

    But building a solid foundation won’t be easy. What’s needed is for the G20 to put its weight behind these key points:

    • Promoting good health before people get sick should be an imperative because the cost of inaction in financial and human terms is just too high.

    • Promoting the case for raising tobacco taxes, because tobacco continues to cause the most death and illness. But taxation has stalled. Approximately 90% of smokers live in countries where cigarettes were equally or more affordable in 2022 than they were five years earlier.

    • A renewed focus on alcohol taxes, which have shown little improvement in the last decade. Alcohol excise taxes are not being used effectively.

    • Fresh impetus behind increasing the level of taxes as a percentage of the cost of sugar sweetened beverages. Evidence suggests that to be effective, taxes on sugar sweetened beverages should increase product prices by at least 20%.

    • Champion nutrition regulation when navigating the trade and nutrition policy environment. Trade policies can be inconsistent with health policies.

    • Lastly, push for stronger global monitoring frameworks to track corporate accountability in health. This should include clear conflict of interest policies, information management, and exposing when corporations try to shape their own evidence-base or discredit research that would be supportive of public health policies.

    Susan Goldstein receives funding from the SAMRC, the NIHR and UNICEF. She is a Board Member of the Southern African Alcohol Policy Alliance: South Africa,

    Karen Hofman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Sugary drinks, processed foods, alcohol and tobacco are big killers: why the G20 should add its weight to health taxes – https://theconversation.com/sugary-drinks-processed-foods-alcohol-and-tobacco-are-big-killers-why-the-g20-should-add-its-weight-to-health-taxes-256024

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Most South African farmers are black: why Trump got it so wrong

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch University

    When world leaders engage, the assumption is always that they engage on issues based on verified facts, which their administrative staff are supposed to prepare. Under this assumption, we thought the meeting at the White House on 21 May between South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, and US president Donald Trump would follow this pattern.

    Disappointingly, the televised meeting was horrifying to watch as it was based on misrepresenting the reality of life in South Africa.

    Issues of agriculture, farming and land (and rural crime) were central to the discussions. What is clear to us as agricultural economists is that the skewed views expressed by Trump about these issues originate in South Africa. This includes Trump’s statement: “But Blacks are not farmers.”

    In our work as agricultural economists, we have, in many pieces and books (our latest titled The Uncomfortable Truth about South Africa’s Agriculture), tried to present South Africans with the real facts about the political economy policy reforms and structural dimensions of South African agriculture.

    Writing on these matters was necessary given that official data – agricultural census 2017, as well as the official land audit of 2017 – all provide an incomplete picture of the real state and structure of South African agriculture. The reason is that the agricultural census, which is supposed to provide a comprehensive and inclusive assessment of the size and structure of the primary agricultural sector, and the land audit, which was supposed to record the ownership of all land in South Africa, are incomplete in their coverage.

    The incomplete and inaccurate official data provides fertile ground for radical statements by the left and the right – and novices on social media. This is why South Africa has to deal with falsehoods coming from the US. These include Trump’s statement that black people are not farmers in South Africa.

    South Africa is to blame for providing inaccurate data to feed these false narratives.

    The facts presented here should allow a more nuanced interpretation of South Africa’s farm structure. Firstly, there are more black farmers in South Africa than white farmers. And not all white commercial farm operations are “large-scale”, and not all black farmers are “small-scale”, “subsistence” or “emerging”. Most farm operations can be classified as micro, or small in scale.

    This is important so that one doesn’t view South Africa’s agriculture as mainly white farmers. Indeed, we are a country of two agricultures with black farmers mainly at small scale and accounting for roughly 10% of the commercial agricultural output. Still, this doesn’t mean they are not active in the sector. They mainly still require support to expand and increase output, but they are active.

    The facts

    In the wake of the circus in the Oval Office, we were amazed by the total silence of the many farmers’ organisations in South Africa. We have not seen one coming out to reject all of Trump’s claims. The only thing we can deduce from this is that these falsehoods suit the political position of some farmer organisations. But at what cost? Will many of their members be harmed by trade sanctions or tariffs against South Africa? The US is an important market for South Africa’s agriculture, accounting for 4% of the US$13.7 billion exports in 2024.

    When Ramaphosa highlighted the fact that crime, and rural crime in particular, has an impact on all South Africans and that more black people than white people are being killed, Trump’s response was disturbing, to say the least: “But Blacks are not farmers”. This requires an immediate fact check.

    We returned to the text from our chapter in the Handbook on the South African Economy we jointly prepared in 2021. In the extract below, we discuss the real numbers of farmers in South Africa and try to provide a sensible racial classification of farmers to denounce Trump’s silly statement.

    As highlighted earlier, the two latest agricultural censuses (2007 and 2017) are incomplete as they restricted the sample frame to farm businesses registered to pay value added tax. Only firms with a turnover of one million rands (US$55,500) qualify for VAT registration.

    We were able to expand the findings from the censuses with numbers from the 2011 population census and the 2016 community survey to better understand the total number of commercial farming units in South Africa. The Community Survey 2016 is a large-scale survey that happened between Censuses 2011 and 2021. The main objective was to provide population and household statistics at municipal level to government and the private sector, to support planning and decision-making.

    Data from the 2011 population census (extracted from three agricultural questions included in the census) shows that 2,879,638 households out of South Africa’s total population, or 19.9% of all households, were active in agriculture for subsistence or commercial purposes.

    Only 2% of these active households reported an annual income derived from agriculture above R307,000 (US$17,000). This translates into 57,592 households that can be considered commercial farmers, with agriculture as the main or only source of household income. This corresponds in some way with the 40,122 farming businesses that are registered for VAT as noted in the 2017 agricultural census report.

    If we use the numbers from the agricultural census it is evident almost 90% of all VAT-registered commercial farming businesses could be classified as micro or small-scale enterprises. If the farm businesses excluded from the census are accounted for under the assumption that they are too small for VAT registration, then the fact still stands that the vast majority of all farm enterprises in South Africa are small family farms.

    There are, however, 2,610 large farms (with turnover exceeding R22.5 million (US$1.2 million per annum) which are responsible for 67% of farm income and employed more than half the agricultural labour force of 757,000 farm workers in 2017.

    Another way to get to farm numbers is to use the 2016 Community Survey. Using the shares as shown in Table 2, we estimate there are 242,221 commercial farming households in South Africa, of which only 43,891 (18%) are white commercial farmers. (This is very much in line with the VAT registered farmers but also acknowledging the fact that many white farm businesses are not necessarily registered for VAT.)

    Let’s consider only the agricultural households with agriculture as their main source of income, surveyed in the 2016 community survey. We end up with a total of 132,700 households, of whom 93,000 (70%) are black farmers. This reality is something that policy makers and farm organisations find very difficult to deal with and it seems that Trump also found this too good to be true.

    We have tried here in a long winded way to deal with farm numbers and how to get to a race classification of farmers in South Africa. In the end we trust that we have managed to show that there are more black farmers in South Africa than white farmers. Their share in total output is smaller than that of their white counterparts. The National Agricultural Marketing Council puts black farmers’ share of agricultural production as roughly 10%. But these numbers are also incomplete and largely an undercount.

    It will always be challenging to get to the real number of black farmers’ share of agricultural output as nobody would ever know whether the potato or the cabbage on the shelf came from a farm owned by a black farmer or a white person but operated by a black farmer, for example. As South Africans know, the labour on farms, in pack houses, distribution systems and retail are all black. So, the sweat and hard work of black South African workers are integral to the food supply chain in South Africa.

    Let’s get these facts straight and promote them honestly.

    Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz) and a member of the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).

    Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Most South African farmers are black: why Trump got it so wrong – https://theconversation.com/most-south-african-farmers-are-black-why-trump-got-it-so-wrong-257668

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Young men on South Africa’s urban margins: new book follows their lives over 10 years

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Hannah J. Dawson, Senior Lecturer, Anthropology and Development Studies, University of Johannesburg

    South Africa’s young people, aged 15 to 34, who make up more than 50% of the country’s working age population, bear a disproportionate burden of unemployment. They have done so for more than a decade. Of this group, those aged 15-24 face the highest barriers to the job market, according to data from Statistics South Africa. The majority of these young people live in the townships and informal settlements.

    A new book, Making a Life: Young Men on Johannesburg’s Urban Margins, examines how young people in Zandspruit, an informal settlement on the outskirts of Johannesburg, make a life. Anthropologist Hannah Dawson explains why she chose Zandspruit for her research and shares her findings about the sociopolitical landscape of urban settlements.

    Why the choice of Zandspruit for your research?

    It started with my arrival there in 2011 to study a wave of political protests during local elections. This sparked a much longer research journey spanning more than a decade, which this book traces.

    The settlement was established in the early 1990s and has grown into a densely populated area of around 50,000 people, across 14 pieces of land.

    The expansion of Zandspruit reflects broader trends in post-apartheid South Africa: rapid urbanisation, inadequate urban housing, rising unemployment and underemployment — including a shift from permanent to casual work, and from formal to informal employment.

    What sets Zandspruit apart is its location. It is near post-apartheid economic hubs such as Kya Sands, with its light industries and business parks, and Lanseria Airport, a growing freight and logistics hub earmarked for expansion under the Greater Lanseria Masterplan. It also borders affluent suburbs and golf estates. This makes it distinct from older, more isolated settlements in Johannesburg’s south. Its proximity to shopping malls, townhouse complexes, warehouses and commercial zones makes it a destination of choice for migrants. They include people seeking a foothold in the urban market from rural areas of South Africa as well as people from other parts of the African continent.

    This proximity makes Zandspruit a case study for understanding how residents access urban job markets, and the connections between wage and non-wage economic activities.

    What do your findings tell us about the lives of young people?

    The book draws on research primarily with young men, whose work and lives I followed over ten years. It shows how young men on the urban margins navigate structural unemployment and inequality by forging social ties, asserting belonging, and pursuing alternative livelihoods within what I call Zandspruit’s “redistributive economy”. I use the phrase “making a life” to move beyond survival or income generation. A life is not only about securing food and shelter. It involves the pursuit of social connection, identity, place and dignity.

    For many of the young men I came to know, this often involved turning down demeaning jobs in favour of self-initiated income strategies that offered greater autonomy. These included renting out shacks, running internet cafes or car washes, or operating as mashonisas (unregistered loan sharks). Such efforts reflect more than personal resilience – they reveal how men’s social position and connections within the settlement shape access to the more lucrative niches of the local economy.

    These dynamics point to a broader condition facing young people in South Africa: deep and persistent material insecurity. Yet, they also show the ways in which young people, especially young men, are actively building lives in the face of profound uncertainty. They are crafting meaning and striving for something more in a context marked by chronic unemployment and inequality.

    What did you learn about urban inequality and living on the urban margins?

    The residents of Zandspruit are not equally poor or marginalised. A focus of the book is the division between “insiders” – long-term residents with access to property who earn rental income – and “outsiders” – new arrivals and immigrants who, as tenants, are more dependent on low-paid jobs. These distinctions shape access to land, housing, livelihoods and local recognition.

    Most immigrants form a precarious tenant class, while landlords tend to be established residents with long-standing ties to the settlement. Zandspruit is a deeply stratified space where social connections, property access and local citizenship determine who belongs and who benefits. By tracing men’s positions as insiders or outsiders, the book shows how these inequalities shape their economic strategies and capacity to build a life on the urban margins.

    What do you recommend in terms of public policy?

    The book doesn’t make policy recommendations. However, it speaks to key public and policy debates. Media and policy narratives often portray unemployed youth as idle and disconnected from society, ignoring the complex, often invisible, economic activities and arrangements that structure their lives. While informal and unstable, these pursuits reflect resourcefulness, local knowledge, and a conscious rejection of degrading labour.

    It challenges the idea that informal entrepreneurship can solve youth unemployment. Most enterprises are too precarious to lift young people out of poverty. It also questions the notion that informal settlements are simply ghettos of exclusion and poverty. Instead, it highlights the inequalities within the settlement and calls for greater attention to be paid to the local economies and social orders being forged within these spaces. Understanding these dynamics is crucial to rethinking how we respond to unemployment, the urban housing crisis and inequality in South Africa.

    Hannah J. Dawson received funding from the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission and the National Research Foundation.

    ref. Young men on South Africa’s urban margins: new book follows their lives over 10 years – https://theconversation.com/young-men-on-south-africas-urban-margins-new-book-follows-their-lives-over-10-years-257026

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Radical listening: two big ideas and six core skills that could help you connect more deeply with others

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Christian van Nieuwerburgh, Professor of Coaching and Positive Psychology, RCSI University of Medicine and Health Sciences

    brizmaker/Shutterstock

    Even though we live in a constantly connected world, more people feel lonely than ever before. According to public polling company Gallup, nearly a quarter of the world’s population reports feeling lonely.

    At the same time, we’re overwhelmed by distractions: 80% of desk-based workers admit to losing concentration during meetings. And with just a scroll through our newsfeeds, we see growing polarisation and political division on a global scale.

    In such uncertain times, the practice of radical listening – listening with greater intention – offers a way to reconnect and to foster a deeper sense of empathy, engagement and hope.

    In our book, Radical listening: the art of true connection, which I co-authored with positive psychology expert Dr Robert Biswas-Diener, we explore how radical listening can improve motivation, wellbeing and meaningful connection. To become a radical listener, you’ll need to embrace two core ideas and develop six essential skills.

    The first idea is about clarifying your intention when listening. At the heart of radical listening is the belief that we always listen with a purpose — even if we’re not fully aware of it. For example, we might listen to a podcast with the intention of learning something, or attend a comedy show with the goal of being entertained.

    When we set a clear intention, we become more attuned to what matters. If your aim is to show appreciation during a conversation, you’ll naturally tune in to the qualities you value in the other person — a thoughtful comment, a kind gesture. If you want to elevate your listening, enter conversations with a positive, deliberate intention.

    The second idea is about matching your listening intention to what will be most helpful for your conversation partner. This is grounded in the principle of optimal matching of social support. Biswas-Diener explains it well here: meaningful conversations happen when there’s alignment between what the speaker needs and what the listener offers.

    This may sound obvious, but we often miss the mark. Say your partner has had a tough day. Should you offer advice? Reassure them with a personal story? Just listen and empathise? Change the subject to distract them? The most effective response might be asking: “What do you need from me right now?” When you get the match right, you’ll feel the connection.

    Six core skills

    We all have our own listening styles: empathetic, animated, quiet, curious. The good news is that everyone can improve their listening by practising these six core skills:

    1. Noticing: This means scanning for subtle but relevant cues: body language, facial expressions, changes in tone, or unusual word choices. Noticing shows you’re fully present. For example: “I noticed you lit up when you talked about your previous job.”

    2. Quieting: Managing distractions, both external and internal. Great listeners reduce interruptions by putting away their phones or turning off notifications – but also by calming their internal chatter. Being rested and mentally present makes quieting possible.

    3. Accepting: Respecting others’ right to their views – even when you disagree. Acceptance doesn’t mean agreement. It means acknowledging that others have a valid perspective. Try practising this by listening to someone whose views challenge your own.

    4. Acknowledging: Validating your conversation partner’s experiences and contributions. Look for opportunities to highlight their strengths, reflect their feelings and show empathy through both your words and expressions.

    5. Questioning: Curiosity is a cornerstone of radical listening. Ask questions that express genuine interest and invite deeper sharing. Try: “What was it about that moment that made it so special for you?”

    6. Interjecting: Jump in (briefly) with minimal encouragers to show you’re engaged – then jump back out. Minimal encouragers are short verbal or nonverbal cues used during a conversation to show you’re engaged without interrupting or taking over. They’re a key skill in radical listening because they let the speaker know you’re present and responsive while keeping the focus on them. Think of it as offering small bursts of energy, like “That’s amazing!” or “Wow, I didn’t know that.” It shows you’re actively listening, not passively absorbing.

    Radical listening is a hyper-intentional, purposeful and proactive approach to connection. It’s about helping others feel seen, valued and heard. The benefits for your conversation partner are clear — but there are also real advantages for you. You’ll build deeper relationships, experience more satisfying interactions, and be able to create trust quickly.

    In a world of loneliness, distraction, and division, radical listening isn’t just a nice idea – it’s a powerful tool for human connection.


    This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

    Christian van Nieuwerburgh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Radical listening: two big ideas and six core skills that could help you connect more deeply with others – https://theconversation.com/radical-listening-two-big-ideas-and-six-core-skills-that-could-help-you-connect-more-deeply-with-others-256289

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Fake online shops rely on tech skills: what drives Cameroon’s web developers to assist online fraudsters

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Suleman Lazarus, Visiting Fellow, Mannheim Centre for Criminology, London School of Economics and Political Science

    When people discuss online fraud, the focus is often on those who directly deceive victims. Little attention is given to those who enable these crimes by providing the digital infrastructure necessary for deception.

    This digital infrastructure includes reliable access to electricity and the internet, as well as digital tools such as proxy servers, spoofing software, phishing kits and virtual private networks. Those involved must possess technical competencies in areas like web development, social engineering and systems maintenance, skills that are critical for sustaining fraudulent operations behind the scenes.

    Research on cybercrime is expanding in west Africa, particularly studies of Nigeria and Ghana. But Cameroon is understudied. This gap in research has obscured a pervasive problem in Cameroon: website developers who create digital storefronts for fraudsters.

    Pet scams are a particularly common type of online fraud perpetrated by Cameroonian fraudsters. This is a form of non-delivery fraud in which victims are tricked into paying for animals that do not exist. Typically, these fake pet websites target prospective pet buyers in countries like the US, Canada and Australia by advertising nonexistent pedigree puppies and kittens as well as exotic animals such as parrots, macaws and tortoises.

    Rather than focusing on the fraudsters themselves, our study examined the infrastructure that enables this fraud to happen and the hidden networks of actors who make deception possible. Our research sheds light on a little-known group of enablers: website developers in anglophone Cameroon who knowingly build fake shopping websites.

    Through interviews with 14 website developers engaged in this illicit trade, we explored the socio-economic and political forces that drive their participation.

    Our findings showed that a mix of economic hardship, social norms and cultural beliefs drive fraud enablement in Cameroon. Our study highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of cybercrime. The website developers in Cameroon do not fit the typical profile of a fraudster. They see themselves as skilled workers navigating a complex socio-political landscape where survival often comes before morality, given that Cameroon, under Paul Biya’s presidency of more than 40 years, has experienced widespread poverty, instability and an uncertain succession struggle.

    To address fraud effectively, interventions must go beyond simply punishing offenders. Instead, efforts should focus on dismantling the structures that allow fraud to thrive, starting with those who enable it.

    Why fraudsters choose this activity

    A central theme emerging from our interviews was the impact of the Ambazonian Crisis, an ongoing separatist conflict in Cameroon’s anglophone regions. The crisis began as peaceful demonstrations in 2016 when trade unionists and lawyers protested against the mandatory use of the French language in schools and law courts. By 2017, these protests had turned violent as armed separatist groups emerged within the anglophone regions, engaging in sporadic conflict with government forces. The separatists called for the secession of the two anglophone regions, referring to them as Ambazonia. The conflict has since escalated. Reports estimate that the violence has led to approximately 6,000 civilian deaths, the displacement of 600,000 people within Cameroon, and the forced migration of over 77,000 people into Nigeria as refugees.

    The website developers we interviewed described how daily gunfire, displacement and political instability had made it difficult to secure stable employment and find clients.

    Interviewees cited frequent power outages and internet blackouts as barriers to working with legitimate clients.

    As one developer put it:

    There are times when we go without electricity or network for days. I might have a legitimate client, but if the power goes out, I lose the job. Fraudsters, on the other hand, don’t care about delays. They are always there with another request.

    Ghost-town protests, where separatists enforce economic shutdowns and force people to stay in their homes, further limit opportunities for legitimate business. In this unstable environment, undertaking website development for fraudsters became one of the few steady income streams.

    A second theme was spiritual beliefs. We found that spiritual beliefs had an impact on decision-making. Developers rationalised their work by distinguishing between fraud and fraud enablement. Directly perpetrating fraud against victims, they believed, carried spiritual consequences, while simply building websites for fraudsters did not. Some fraudsters in west Africa visit a so-called “juju priest”, who may demand animal sacrifice and even murder in return for their blessing. The website developers we spoke to did not want to get involved in this.

    One of the developers shared his fears about spiritual repercussions:

    Scammers who do rituals for money, they don’t last. Most of the time, you see them dying at the age of 20 or 30. I don’t want to be involved in that. But making websites? That’s different. I’m not the one taking the money.

    A third theme in our findings was the Big Boy culture, a subculture that glorifies online fraud as a symbol of success. In some west African communities, fraudsters who display their wealth through expensive cars, clothes and lifestyles are seen as role models rather than criminals.

    Vanesa, a developer, explained:

    Everybody wants to chill with the Big Boys. Fraudsters want to be seen as superstars, and that means spending money like celebrities.

    The normalisation of internet fraud in some circles has created a perception that financial success justifies the means by which it is achieved. While some developers disapproved of fraudsters’ extravagant lifestyles, others saw it as a model of economic survival to aspire to.

    Rethinking fraud prevention

    These findings challenge the simplistic notion that the internet inherently enables fraud. Instead, fraud thrives within a complex ecosystem that includes not just the perpetrators but also the enablers who facilitate deception for economic, political, and cultural reasons.

    A more effective fraud prevention strategy should address the enablers of cybercrime, not just the scammers.

    This means:

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Fake online shops rely on tech skills: what drives Cameroon’s web developers to assist online fraudsters – https://theconversation.com/fake-online-shops-rely-on-tech-skills-what-drives-cameroons-web-developers-to-assist-online-fraudsters-252429

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Class and masculinity are connected – when industry changes, so does what it means to ‘be a man’

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sophie Lively, PhD Candidate in Human Geography, Newcastle University

    Tero Vesalainen/Shutterstock

    On July 3, I’ll be discussing Youth, Masculinity and the Political Divide at an event with The Conversation and Cumberland Lodge at Newcastle University (get your tickets here).

    Young people involved in the panel have brought up class and the decline of industry as topics for discussion. This is particularly fitting, given my ongoing PhD research exploring masculinity and the contemporary lives of working-class men in Tyneside.

    Tyneside is an area in north-east England which was once a major centre of Britain’s Industrial Revolution. Its coal mining, shipbuilding and heavy engineering industries were seen as the backbone of the region, upheld by a large industrial skilled working class.

    As with many northern towns, widespread deindustrialisation, predominantly around the 1970s and 1980s, dramatically changed the area. At its peak, Swan Hunter – a globally recognised shipyard and significant employer in Wallsend (North Tyneside) and the surrounding area – employed up to 12,000 people. By 2005, the year before its closure, only 357 direct workers were employed.

    The process of deindustrialisation affected not just the type of work that was done, but how men in the region saw themselves. As I am currently researching, the effects of this ring true today.



    Boys and girls are together facing an uncertain world. But research shows they are diverging when it comes to attitudes about masculinity, feminism and gender equality.

    Social media, politics, and identity all play a role. But what’s really going on with boys and girls? Join The Conversation UK and Cumberland Lodge’s Youth and Democracy project at Newcastle University for a discussion of these issues with young people and academic experts. Tickets available here.


    Like other regions in Britain, Tyneside shifted from mostly masculine manual labour to a largely “feminised” service sector. Informal work, subcontracting and part-time work proliferated while rates of trade unionism declined.

    Changes in industry and understandings of social class have a surprising amount to do with how we think about masculinity. Paul Willis’ 1977 seminal study Learning to Labour explores how the links between social class and masculinity are forged early in life.

    Our ideas about masculinity are produced, reinforced and upheld through institutions such as schools, the workplace and media. There is no singular “form” of masculinity – men perform it in many different ways. There is, however, hegemonic masculinity. This is the most dominant form of masculinity in a society at any given time, valued above other forms of gender identities that do not match up to the dominant ideal.

    “Traditional” views of masculinity were particularly prevalent during the height of industry in the area. These views centred around ideas of men as providers and ideas of toughness. Value was placed on a willingness (or need) to do physical and often hazardous labour.

    The demise of “masculine” labour in areas such as Tyneside disrupted not only economic stability but also male identity and pride. As broader socioeconomic shifts unfolded across England, many working class men found themselves outside of those traditional masculine ideals around labour.

    This has been well documented, particularly in ethnographic work such as Anoop Nayak’s 2006 study Displaced Masculinities. This key text explored how working-class boys navigate “what it is to be a ‘man’ beyond the world of industrial paid employment”.

    Class and identity in a changing world

    Early findings from my research suggest that today, class (and working-class identity) is not as salient in mens’ everyday lives. Participants in my study have spoken about class, but it does not overtly feature in how they make sense of their identities. As one man put it: “Class means you have to use yourself to earn money. Your labour, that’s what I understand by it, but I’ve never thought about class much.”

    The quayside in Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
    Philip Mowbray/Shutterstock

    What happens to men when an area’s strong working-class identity declines, but there is no narrative to replace it? There is a risk that harmful ideas about masculinity step in to fill a gap left by declining industry and continued economic inequality. We have seen this in extensive research in the US about masculinity, class and the appeal of the far right.

    This is why class must be part of the discussion around the rise of the “manosphere” – online communities and influencers sharing content about masculinity that can veer into misogyny. Class politics also presents a positive and unifying alternative.

    It is imperative that working-class areas and the people within them aren’t portrayed as somehow inherently susceptible to, or represented by, the narratives of the manosphere. Indeed, the men I have spoken to have not been particularly pulled in by the manosphere. However they do recognise the feeling of being overlooked and not measuring up to idealised “standards” about masculinity.

    The “manosphere” preys on this, tapping into boys’ and young men’s fears around masculinity and their (perceived) social status. Narrow portrayals of what success looks like puts immense pressure on young people to live up to unattainable standards.

    As I have written before, mansophere content often relies on messages around hyper-individualism that ignore the broader effects of class, the economy and political views.

    Manosphere messaging that “most men are invisible” and that the system is now “rigged against men” fits neatly with young boys’ and men’s anxieties about not having the same place or opportunities in society that previous generations of men might have had.

    Without honest discussion about working-class communities and the effects of deindustrialisation on identity, this messaging may become alluring in postindustrial towns.

    Sophie Lively receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council as part of the Northern Ireland and North East Doctoral Training Partnership.

    ref. Class and masculinity are connected – when industry changes, so does what it means to ‘be a man’ – https://theconversation.com/class-and-masculinity-are-connected-when-industry-changes-so-does-what-it-means-to-be-a-man-258857

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: AI policies in Africa: lessons from Ghana and Rwanda

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Thompson Gyedu Kwarkye, Postdoctoral Researcher, University College Dublin

    Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasing productivity and pushing the boundaries of what’s possible. It powers self-driving cars, social media feeds, fraud detection and medical diagnoses. Touted as a game changer, it is projected to add nearly US$15.7 trillion to the global economy by the end of the decade.

    Africa is positioned to use this technology in several sectors. In Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, AI-led digital tools in use include drones for farm management, X-ray screening for tuberculosis diagnosis, and real-time tracking systems for packages and shipments. All these are helping to fill gaps in accessibility, efficiency and decision-making.

    However, it also introduces risks. These include biased algorithms, resource and labour exploitation, and e-waste disposal. The lack of a robust regulatory framework in many parts of the continent increases these challenges, leaving vulnerable populations exposed to exploitation. Limited public awareness and infrastructure further complicate the continent’s ability to harness AI responsibly.

    What are African countries doing about it?
    To answer this, my research mapped out what Ghana and Rwanda had in place as AI policies and investigated how these policies were developed. I looked for shared principles and differences in approach to governance and implementation.

    The research shows that AI policy development is not a neutral or technical process but a profoundly political one. Power dynamics, institutional interests and competing visions of technological futures shape AI regulation.

    I conclude from my findings that AI’s potential to bring great change in Africa is undeniable. But its benefits are not automatic. Rwanda and Ghana show that effective policy-making requires balancing innovation with equity, global standards with local needs, and state oversight with public trust.

    The question is not whether Africa can harness AI, but how and on whose terms.

    How they did it

    Rwanda’s National AI Policy emerged from consultations with local and global actors. These included the Ministry of ICT and Innovation, the Rwandan Space Agency, and NGOs like the Future Society, and the GIZ FAIR Forward. The resulting policy framework is in line with Rwanda’s goals for digital transformation, economic diversification and social development. It includes international best practices such as ethical AI, data protection, and inclusive AI adoption.

    Ghana’s Ministry of Communication, Digital Technology and Innovations conducted multi-stakeholder workshops to develop a national strategy for digital transformation and innovation. Start-ups, academics, telecom companies and public-sector institutions came together and the result is Ghana’s National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2023–2033.

    Both countries have set up or plan to set up Responsible AI offices. This aligns with global best practices for ethical AI. Rwanda focuses on local capacity building and data sovereignty. This reflects the country’s post-genocide emphasis on national control and social cohesion. Similarly, Ghana’s proposed office focuses on accountability, though its structure is still under legislative review.

    Ghana and Rwanda have adopted globally recognised ethical principles like privacy protection, bias mitigation and human rights safeguards. Rwanda’s policy reflects Unesco’s AI ethics recommendations and Ghana emphasises “trustworthy AI”.

    Both policies frame AI as a way to reach the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. Rwanda’s policy targets applications in healthcare, agriculture, poverty reduction and rural service delivery. Similarly, Ghana’s strategy highlights the potential to advance economic growth, environmental sustainability and inclusive digital transformation.

    Key policy differences

    Rwanda’s policy ties data control to national security. This is rooted in its traumatic history of identity-based violence. Ghana, by contrast, frames AI as a tool for attracting foreign investment rather than a safeguard against state fragility.

    The policies also differ in how they manage foreign influence. Rwanda has a “defensive” stance towards global tech powers; Ghana’s is “accommodative”. Rwanda works with partners that allow it to follow its own policy. Ghana, on the other hand, embraces partnerships, viewing them as the start of innovation.

    While Rwanda’s approach is targeted and problem-solving, Ghana’s strategy is expansive, aiming for large-scale modernisation and private-sector growth. Through state-led efforts, Rwanda focuses on using AI to solve immediate challenges such as rural healthcare access and food security. In contrast, Ghana looks at using AI more widely – in finance, transport, education and governance – to become a regional tech hub.

    Constraints and solutions

    The effectiveness of these AI policies is held back by broader systemic challenges. The US and China dominate in setting global standards, so local priorities get sidelined. For example, while Rwanda and Ghana advocate for ethical AI, it’s hard for them to hold multinational corporations accountable for breaches.

    Energy shortages further complicate large-scale AI adoption. Training models require reliable electricity – a scarce resource in many parts of the continent.

    To address these gaps, I propose the following:

    Investments in digital infrastructure, education and local start-ups to reduce dependency on foreign tech giants.

    African countries must shape international AI governance forums. They must ensure policies reflect continental realities, not just western or Chinese ones. This will include using collective bargaining power through the African Union to bring Africa’s development needs to the fore. It could also help with digital sovereignty issues and equitable access to AI technologies.

    Finally, AI policies must embed African ethical principles. These should include communal rights and post-colonial sensitivities.

    Thompson Gyedu Kwarkye does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. AI policies in Africa: lessons from Ghana and Rwanda – https://theconversation.com/ai-policies-in-africa-lessons-from-ghana-and-rwanda-253642

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: How the UK became dependent on asylum hotels

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jonathan Darling, Professor in Human Geography, Durham University

    Hotels housing asylum seekers have become hotspots of protest. Jory Mundy/Shutterstock

    Chancellor Rachel Reeves’s pledge to “end the costly use of asylum hotels in this parliament” is a rare thing in British politics: a policy supported by all major political parties and a range of refugee charities.

    Reeves says ending the use of asylum hotels will save the Treasury £1 billion a year. But for a government rapidly losing support, ending “hotel Britain” is also central to their popular appeal to regain control over the asylum system.

    At a time of financial instability and declining living standards, the use of hotels to house asylum seekers has increased substantially. Hotels are associated with escape, luxury or business. This explains why the use of hotels has become such a flashpoint for political controversy and fuelled resentment and tensions in some communities.

    How did we get here?

    Under the UN refugee convention, Britain has a legal obligation to house people while they are waiting for a decision on their claim to refugee status. Responsibility for housing asylum seekers lies with the Home Office, which has contracts with three private companies to offer accommodation. Hotels have historically been a small part of this housing, only used for short-term emergency cover when housing in the private rental sector is unavailable.

    Hotel use rose sharply during the COVID-19 pandemic. Private contractors responsible for housing asylum seekers were unable to find enough space in more routine “dispersal accommodation”.

    Dispersal accommodation involves housing asylum seekers in shared properties across the country. These are usually shared houses or flats that private providers procure from the private rental sector, or from subcontracted housing associations. Local authority properties are not used. Asylum seekers have no choice where they are housed.

    Once someone receives a decision on their asylum application (granted or refused refugee status), the Home Office stops providing them with housing and support. But during the pandemic, the Home Office temporarily stopped this practice, to avoid making people homeless during lockdown. But this meant more people were staying longer in asylum housing. Hotels provided emergency housing during this period.

    Following the pandemic, the number of asylum applications to the UK increased, peaking at 108,138 in 2024. Decision making on asylum claims had slowed dramatically since 2016, leaving people in the asylum process and in accommodation for longer periods of time. This increased pressure on housing and made it difficult for contractors to move people out of hotels.

    At the height of hotel use, in June 2023, 51,000 asylum seekers were housed in more than 400 hotels across the UK, costing the Home Office £8 million a day. By March 2025, this had fallen to 32,345 asylum seekers in 218 hotels.

    The use of hotels on this scale indicates that the system for housing asylum seekers in Britain is failing. While hotels can provide adaptable emergency accommodation, they are not sustainable housing solutions, nor do they offer the security of a home.

    The costs of ‘hotel Britain’

    In 2024, hotel accommodation for asylum seekers cost on average £158 per night. Dispersal accommodation, on the other hand, cost on average £20 per night. The total asylum accommodation system cost £4.7 billion, £3.1 billion of which went on hotels.

    While costly to taxpayers, this was highly profitable for those offering accommodation.

    In May 2025, the three providers contracted by the government to deliver housing were reported to have made £380 million in profit from their accommodation contracts. The Britannia Hotels chain alone reportedly made over £150 million in profit since first accommodating asylum seekers in 2014.




    Read more:
    The UK spent a third of its international aid budget on refugees in the UK – what it’s paying for, and why it’s a problem


    The costs have been more than financial. Asylum seekers have repeatedly raised the negative effects on mental and physical health associated with confinement and isolation in hotels, a lack of privacy and personal space and the limited access to support services.

    Reports of hotels infested with insects, collapsing ceilings and rude and abusive staff, reflect a model of accommodation that is ill-suited to supporting the needs of vulnerable residents. It is a far cry from the “luxury” conditions often described in media coverage.

    Hotels have also become focal points for community tensions. Local residents were rarely informed of the use of a hotel in advance, and hotels were often closed to other guests at short notice, with reports of weddings and other events being cancelled.

    These cases created a damaging sense of community powerlessness. Following a decade of austerity, the use of a town’s hotel to indefinitely accommodate asylum seekers was often described as another resource being “taken away” from communities. Far-right groups were quick to exploit these tensions, circulating details of hotels accommodating asylum seekers and organising protests.

    Communities not camps

    To end the use of hotels, government proposals have focused on expanding the use of large-scale accommodation sites. This suggests that lessons from the last government have been ignored in the rush to end hotel accommodation.

    Mass accommodation sites, such as Wethersfield camp in Essex, are not able to provide sustainable and dignified accommodation. Using former military sites has been found to be more expensive than hotels and can further isolate and stigmatise asylum seekers.

    Sustainable accommodation that meets the needs of asylum seekers and the public requires long-term strategy to replace short-term profiteering. Part of that strategy should involve using local authority expertise to provide dispersal housing in communities. Experience shows that this is the best way to reduce the costs of asylum while supporting those seeking refuge. The government’s resettlement scheme for refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria shows that engaging local authorities in housing and support is key to the success of integration.

    Any changes to asylum housing will create pressures for a UK housing sector in crisis. Yet the financial and social costs of the current system cannot be ignored. Supporting local authorities in the development and delivery of social housing must be a priority for the government, and housing asylum seekers should not be seen as an issue separate to that commitment.

    Jonathan Darling has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. He is affiliated with the No Accommodation Network as a trustee.

    ref. How the UK became dependent on asylum hotels – https://theconversation.com/how-the-uk-became-dependent-on-asylum-hotels-258767

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Urban food gardens produce more than vegetables, they create bonds for young Capetonians – study

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tinashe P. Kanosvamhira, Post-doctoral researcher, African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town

    Urban farms like this one in Nouakchott, Mauritania, have many benefits. John Wessels/AFP via Getty Images)

    Urban agriculture takes many forms, among them community, school or rooftop gardens, commercial urban farms, and hydroponic or aquaponic systems. These activities have been shown to promote sustainable cities in a number of ways. They enhance local food security and foster economic opportunities through small-scale farming initiatives. They also strengthen social cohesion by creating shared spaces for collaboration and learning.

    However, evidence from some African countries (and other parts of the world) shows that very few young people are getting involved in agriculture, whether in urban, peri-urban or rural areas. Studies from Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Nigeria show that people aged between 15 and 34 have very little interest in agriculture, whether as an educational pathway or career. They perceive farming as physically demanding, low-paying and lacking in prestige. Systemic barriers like limited access to land, capital and skills also hold young people back.

    South Africa has a higher rate of young people engaging in farming (24%) than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this number could be higher if young people better understood the benefits of a career in farming and if they had more support.

    In a recent study I explored youth-driven urban agriculture in Khayelitsha, a large urban area outside Cape Town whose residents are mostly Black, low-income earners.

    The young urban farmers I interviewed are using community gardens to grow more than vegetables. They’re also nurturing social connections, creating economic and business opportunities, and promoting environmental conservation. My findings highlight the transformative potential of youth-driven urban agriculture and how it can be a multifaceted response to urban challenges. It’s crucial that policy makers recognise the value of youth-led urban agriculture and support those doing the work.

    The research

    Khayelitsha is vibrant and bustling. But its approximately 400,000 residents have limited resources and often struggle to make a living.

    I interviewed members of two youth-led gardens. One has just two members; the other has six. All my interviewees were aged between 22 and 27. The relatively low number of interviewees is typical of qualitative research, where the emphasis is placed on depth rather than breadth. This approach allows researchers to obtain detailed, context-rich data from a small, focused group of participants.

    The first garden was founded in January 2020, just a few months before the pandemic struck. The founders wanted to tackle unemployment and food insecurity in their community. They hoped to create jobs for themselves and others, and to provide nutritional support, particularly for vulnerable groups like children with special needs.

    The second garden was established in 2014 by three childhood friends. They were inspired by one founder’s grandmother, who loved gardening. They also wanted to promote organic farming, teach people healthy eating habits, and create a self-reliant community.

    All of my interviewees were activists for food justice. This refers to efforts aimed at addressing systemic inequities in food production, distribution, and access, particularly for marginalised communities. It advocates for equitable access to nutritious, culturally appropriate food.

    One of the gardens, for instance, operates about 30 beds. It cultivates a variety of produce: beetroot, carrots, spinach, pumpkins, potatoes, radishes, peas, lettuce and herbs. 30% of its produce is donated to local community centres each month (they were unable to say how many people benefited from this arrangement). The rest is sold to support the garden financially. Its paying clients include local restaurants and chefs, and members of the community. The garden also partners with schools, hospitals and other organisations to promote healthy eating and sustainable practices.

    The second garden, which is on land belonging to a local early childhood development centre, also focuses on feeding the community, as well as engaging in food justice activism.

    Skills, resilience and connections

    The gardens also help members to develop skills. Members gain practical knowledge about sustainable agriculture, marketing and entrepreneurship, all while managing operations and planning for growth.




    Read more:
    Healthy food is hard to come by in Cape Town’s poorer areas: how community gardens can fix that


    This hands-on experience instils a sense of responsibility and gives participants valuable skills they can apply in future careers or ventures. The founder of the first garden told me his skills empowered him to seek help from his own community rather than waiting for government intervention. He approached the management of an early childhood development centre in the community to request space on their land, and this was granted.

    Social connections have been essential to the gardens’ success. Bonding capital (close ties within their networks) and bridging capital (connections beyond their immediate community) has allowed them to strengthen relationships between themselves and civil society organisations. They’ve also been able to mobilise resources, as in the case of the first garden accessing community land.

    Additionally, the gardens foster community resilience. Members host workshops and events to educate residents about healthy eating, sustainable farming and environmental stewardship.

    By donating produce to local early childhood centres, they provide direct benefits to those most in need. These efforts have transformed the gardens into safe spaces for the community.

    Broader collaboration has also been key to the gardens’ success. For instance, the second garden has worked with global organisations and networks, like the Slow Food Youth Network, to share and gain knowledge about sustainable farming practices.

    Room for growth

    My findings highlight the need for targeted support for youth-driven urban agriculture initiatives. Policy and financial backing can enable these young gardeners to expand their efforts. This in turn will allow them to provide more food to their communities, create additional jobs, and empower more young people.

    At a policy level, the government could prioritise land access for urban agriculture projects, especially in under-served communities. Cities can foster an environment for youth initiatives to thrive by allocating spaces within their planning for urban farming.




    Read more:
    Africa’s megacities threatened by heat, floods and disease – urgent action is needed to start greening and adapt to climate change


    There’s also a need for educational programmes that emphasise the value of sustainable urban agriculture, and workshops and training on entrepreneurship and sustainable farming techniques. Community organising could further empower young farmers. Finally, continued collaboration with national and international food networks would help strengthen such initiatives.

    Tinashe P. Kanosvamhira does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Urban food gardens produce more than vegetables, they create bonds for young Capetonians – study – https://theconversation.com/urban-food-gardens-produce-more-than-vegetables-they-create-bonds-for-young-capetonians-study-243500

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Education in Zimbabwe has lost its value: study asks young people how they feel about that

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kristina Pikovskaia, Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellow, University of Edinburgh

    Zimbabwean students and graduates are actively seeking change to the education system. AFP via Getty Images

    Education, especially higher education, is a step towards adulthood and a foundation for the future.

    But what happens when education loses its value as a way to climb the social ladder? What if a degree is no guarantee of getting stable work, being able to provide for one’s family, or owning a house or car?

    This devaluing of higher education as a path to social mobility is a grim reality for young Zimbabweans. Over the past two decades the southern African country has been beset by economic, financial, political and social challenges.

    These crises have severely undermined the premises and promises of education, especially at a tertiary level. A recent survey by independent research organisation Afrobarometer found that 90% of young Zimbabweans had secondary and post-secondary education compared to 83% of those aged between 36 and 55. But 41% of the youth were unemployed and looking for a job as opposed to 26% of the older generation.

    The situation is so dire that it’s become a recurring theme in Zimdancehall, a popular music genre produced and consumed by young Zimbabweans. “Hustling” (attempts to create income-generating opportunities), informal livelihoods and young people’s collapsed dreams are recurrent topics in songs like Winky D’s Twenty Five, Junior Tatenda’s Kusvikira Rinhi and She Calaz’s Kurarama.

    I study the way people experience the informal economy in Zimbabwe and Zambia. In a recent study I explored the loss of education’s value as a social mobility tool in the Zimbabwean context.

    My research revealed how recent school and university graduates think about the role of education in their lives. My respondents felt let down by the fact that education no longer provided social mobility. They were disappointed that there was no longer a direct association between education and employment.

    However, the graduates I interviewed were not giving up. Some were working towards new qualifications, hoping and preparing for economic improvements. They also thought deeply about how the educational system could be improved. Many young people got involved in protests. These included actions by the Coalition of Unemployed Graduates and the #ThisGown protests, which addressed graduate unemployment issues. Some also took part in #ThisFlag and #Tajamuka protests, which had wider socio-economic and political agendas.

    Understanding history

    To understand the current status and state of education in Zimbabwe it’s important to look to the country’s history.

    Zimbabwe was colonised by the British from the late 19th century. The colonial education system was racialised. Education for white students was academic. For Black students, it was mostly practice-oriented, to create a pool of semi-skilled workers.

    In the 1930s education was instrumental in the formation of Zimbabwe’s Black middle class. A small number of Black graduates entered white collar jobs, using education as a social mobility tool. The educational system also opened up somewhat for women.

    Despite some university reforms during the 1950s, the system remained deeply racialised until the 1980s. That’s when the post-colonial government democratised the education system. Primary school enrolment went up by 242%, and 915% more students entered secondary school. In the 1990s nine more state universities were opened.

    However, worsening economic conditions throughout the 1990s put pressure on the system. A presidential commission in 1999 noted that secondary schools were producing graduates with non-marketable skills – they were too academic and focused on examinations. Students’ experiences, including at the university level, have worsened since then.

    The decline has been driven by systemic and institutional problems in primary and secondary education, like reduced government spending, teachers’ poor working conditions, political interference and brain drain. This, coupled with the collapse of the formal economic sector and a sharp drop in formal employment opportunities, severely undermined education’s social mobility function.

    ‘A key, but no door to open’

    My recent article was based on my wider doctoral research. For this, I studied economic informalisation in Zimbabwe’s capital city, Harare. It involved more than 120 interviews during eight months of in-country research.

    This particular paper builds on seven core interviews with recent school and university graduates in the informal sector, as well as former student leaders.

    Winky D’s “Twenty Five” is about young Zimbabweans’ grievances.

    Some noted that education had lost part of its value as it related to one’s progression in society. As one of my respondents, Ashlegh Pfunye (former secretary-general of the Zimbabwe National Students Union), described it, young people were told that education was a key to success – but there was no door to open.

    Some of my respondents were working in the informal sector, as vendors and small-scale producers. Some could not use their degrees to secure jobs, while others gave up their dreams of obtaining a university degree. Lisa, for example, was very upset about giving up on her dream to pursue post-secondary education and tried to re-adjust to her current circumstances:

    I used to dream that I will have my own office, now I dream that one day I’ll have my own shop.

    Those who had university qualifications stressed that, despite being unable to apply their degrees in the current circumstances, they kept going to school and getting more certification. This prepared them for future opportunities in the event of what everyone hoped for: economic improvement.

    Historical tensions

    Some of my interviewees, especially recent university graduates and activists, were looking for possible solutions – like changing the curriculum and approach to education that trains workers rather than producers and entrepreneurs. As Makomborero Haruzivishe, former secretary-general of the Zimbabwe National Students’ Union, said: “Our educational system was created to train human robots who would follow the instructions.”

    Entrepreneurship education is a popular approach in many countries to changing the structure of classic education. In the absence of employment opportunities for skilled graduates, it is supposed to provide them with the tools to create such opportunities for themselves and others.




    Read more:
    Nigeria’s universities need to revamp their entrepreneurship courses — they’re not meeting student needs


    In 2018, the government introduced what it calls the education 5.0 framework. It has a strong entrepreneurship component. It’s too soon to say whether it will bear fruit. And it may be held back by history.

    For example, the introduction of the Education-with-Production model in the 1980s, which included practical subjects and vocational training, was met with resistance because it was seen as a return to the dual system.

    Because of Zimbabwe’s historically racialised education system, many students and parents favour the UK-designed Cambridge curriculum and traditional academic educational programmes. Zimbabwe has the highest number of entrants into the Cambridge International exam in Africa.

    Feeling let down

    The link between education and employment in Zimbabwe has many tensions: modernity and survival, academic pursuits and practicality, promises and reality. It’s clear from my study that graduates feel let down because the modernist promises of education have failed them.

    Parts of this research have been funded by the University of Oxford and the Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2022-055).

    ref. Education in Zimbabwe has lost its value: study asks young people how they feel about that – https://theconversation.com/education-in-zimbabwe-has-lost-its-value-study-asks-young-people-how-they-feel-about-that-244661

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Food security in Africa: managing water will be vital in a rapidly growing region

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christian Siderius, Senior researcher in water and food security, London School of Economics and Political Science

    Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is growing at 2.7% per year and is expected to reach two billion by the year 2050. The region’s urban population is growing even faster: it was at 533 million in 2023, a 3.85% increase from 2022.

    The need to feed this population will put pressure on land and water resources.

    I’m part of a group of researchers who have looked at whether regional food production would be sufficient to supply growing urban populations. By and large, we have found high levels of food self-sufficiency. But climate change could put a spanner in the works.

    We have also looked at the potential of local water conservation measures to help achieve food self-sufficiency in sub-Saharan Africa.

    Our study shows that measures such as better irrigation or water harvesting could boost food production while buffering the vagaries of weather.

    We found that ambitious – yet realistic – adoption of such measures increases food supply to cities and makes the region as a whole self-sufficient.

    A new model

    In large parts of eastern Africa, rainfall is relatively abundant and well distributed over the growing season, resulting in good yields. In future, however, the gap between water availability and crop water demand is expected to increase.

    We wanted to know whether sub-Saharan Africa would be able to increase its food production to meet future demand, in a changing climate. To do so, we built a novel foodshed model which simulates crop production using climate data and links urban demand to nearby food supply. Foodsheds have been defined as areas where supply matches demand. We assessed various water management measures that could buffer weather variability or increase production (or both). Understanding the potential of such measures can help mobilise and target much needed investments in Africa’s food system.

    Conserving water and growing more food

    First, we looked at whether regional food production was sufficient to supply growing urban populations.

    Combining large databases and crop simulations, we outlined the regions that food might come from for urban areas. Sub-Saharan Africa produces 85% of its overall crop food demand at present, according to our calculations, much of it in eastern Africa. Tanzania, Kenya, and even Uganda – if it were to use its food exports for domestic consumption – come close to being self-sufficient.

    Local exceptions are the large cities of Mombasa, the largest port city in Kenya, and Arusha, an important tourism and diplomatic and conference hub in Tanzania, and their immediate surroundings.

    In future, a larger population will demand more food. At the same time, the gap between how much water is available and how much crops need is expected to increase. Higher water losses due to higher temperatures will not be fully compensated for by changes in rainfall, according to climate model projections. And even where rainfall is projected to increase, more extreme events are likely to affect crop production. It might rain either too much or too little, which will lead to higher year-to-year variability.

    Our study shows that local water conservation measures could buffer some of the projected negative impacts of climate change in eastern Africa. It could also boost food production.

    Water harvesting, soil conservation and making sure water infiltrates in the soil would slow runoff and store more water in the soil.

    Irrigation systems should be gradually upgraded to drip irrigation or sprinklers. This will improve irrigation efficiency and water consumption. On rainfed areas, rainwater harvesting reservoirs should be installed. The water stored could be used for supplemental irrigation during dry periods. Soil moisture conservation measures will also be applied. These measures will prevent water from evaporating from the bare soil. Irrigation could offset occasional drought risk and so provide better financial stability or create possibilities for planting a different or a second or third crop, further increasing production and income.

    Even the foodsheds of rapidly growing cities such as Dar es Salaam in Tanzania will be able to supply enough to meet demand from relatively short distances.

    Large scale expansion of irrigation onto new lands should, however, be considered carefully. Potential trade-offs with energy and tourism incomes must equally be considered.

    In an earlier study, assessing Tanzania’s ambitious formal irrigation expansion plans, we found that expansion without water conservation measures would pose considerable risk to hydropower production in the new Julius Nyerere Hydropower Project. It would also be a risk to river-dependent ecosystems and national parks and the substantial tourism income that they generate.




    Read more:
    Kenya needs to grow more food: a focus on how to irrigate its vast dry areas is key


    Why our findings matter

    Producing more food in Africa is essential to keep pace with population growth and changing diets. The alternative is an increasing dependence on imports from outside the continent. In 2021, the total value of Africa’s food imports was roughly US$100 billion. Imports can be a useful supplement to local production, but major food exporters in Europe and America are already producing at peak productivity. They have limited scope to increase area and production.

    Security concerns around global supply chains in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and broader geo-political realignment have also made countries wary of relying too much on others.

    Our study confirms the potential of Africa to supply much of the increased demand for food within the continent. We looked at all food crops, including regionally important ones such as cassava, beans and millet. Countries in eastern Africa play a pivotal role.

    Improved productivity due to measures proposed would reduce the need for more land elsewhere to grow crops, and limit conflicts related to land use. This is equally important for biodiversity and tourism.




    Read more:
    Diet and nutrition: how well Tanzanians eat depends largely on where they live


    Looking forward

    What we propose requires large investments. Exploring these costs against benefits in a case study in the Rufiji basin in Tanzania we found that most water management measures would be cost effective, but only when considering the overall impact of water conservation on agriculture, hydropower production, and the riverine ecosystem.

    Not all farmers will be able to finance these measures themselves. The government and private sector have to provide incentives, reduce risks and increase access to affordable loans.

    Nor should these measures be taken in isolation. Other buffer mechanisms to support a stable food supply are increased storage facilities for food, diversified production, and stable and diversified trade relationships.
    With farmers innovating, the region’s infrastructure rapidly developing, and expanding urban areas becoming catalysts for growth, there is both the need and the scope to further invest in and improve the region’s food system.

    Christian Siderius received funding to conduct this research from the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) for the Future Water Challenges project (E555182DA/5200000978/9) and in preparation of the 2021 United Nations Food Systems Summit. Other cited work was carried out under the Future Climate for Africa UMFULA project with financial support from the UK Natural Environment Research Council (grants NE/M020398/1 and NE/M020258) and the UK government’s former
    Department for International Development.

    Christian is a director and founder of Uncharted Waters Ltd, a not-for-profit climate-food system analytics company, and a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Grantham Research Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom, and Visiting Senior Researcher the Water Resources Management group at Wageningen University in the Netherlands

    ref. Food security in Africa: managing water will be vital in a rapidly growing region – https://theconversation.com/food-security-in-africa-managing-water-will-be-vital-in-a-rapidly-growing-region-241281

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Africa’s worsening food crisis – it’s time for an agricultural revolution

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By William G. Moseley, DeWitt Wallace Professor of Geography, Director of Food, Agriculture & Society Program, Macalester College

    Rates of hunger in Africa are unacceptably high and getting worse.

    The UN State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 report reveals that food insecurity in Africa is the highest of any world region. The prevalence of undernourishment is 20.4% (some 298.4 million Africans) – over twice the global average. The figure has grown steadily since 2015.

    Climate change and conflict are contributing to this problem. But I suggest that something more fundamental lies at the heart of the challenge: the ideas and plans used in the postcolonial period to guide how Africa produces food and seeks to reduce malnutrition. While rates of food insecurity vary across the continent, and are worse in central and west Africa, this is a region-wide challenge.

    I’m a scholar of African food security and agriculture. In a new book, Decolonising African Agriculture: Food Security, Agroecology and the Need for Radical Transformation, I argue that to feed Africa better, decision-makers and donors ought to:

    • reduce the focus on commercial agricultural production as a way to address food insecurity

    • stop thinking that agricultural development is solely about commercialising farming and supporting other industries

    • adopt an agroecological approach that uses farmer knowledge and natural ecological processes to grow more with fewer external inputs, such as fertilisers.

    Conventional approaches have failed across various contexts and countries. I look at what’s going wrong with how governments think about agriculture – and where the focus needs to be instead to tackle Africa’s hunger crisis.

    Focus on production agriculture

    Many of the core ideas around agriculture date back to the colonial era.

    Modern crop science, or agronomy, was developed in Europe to serve colonial interests. The goal was to produce crops that would benefit European economies. Although this approach has been criticised, it still heavily influences agriculture today. The idea is that producing more food will solve food insecurity.

    Food security has six dimensions. While increased food production might address one of these dimensions – food availability – it often fails to address the other five: access, stability, utilisation, sustainability and agency.

    Food insecurity is not always about an absolute lack of food, but about people’s inability to get the food that is there.

    Unstable prices may be one reason. Or people may not have cooking fuel. Agricultural practices may be unsustainable. This often happens when farmers have limited control over how and what they farm.

    The west African nation of Mali, for example, has focused on cotton exports based on the idea that it would bolster economic growth and that cotton farmers could use their new equipment and fertiliser to grow more food. Research shows, however, that this led to the destruction of soil resources, indebtedness for farmers, and alarming rates of child malnutrition.

    Another example is South Africa’s post-apartheid land reform initiatives, which adopted a large scale commercial agricultural model. This has led to high rates of project failure and has done little to address high rates of malnutrition.

    Agriculture as a first step

    The second major challenge in addressing Africa’s high malnutrition rates is that many countries and international organisations don’t value agricultural development for itself. It’s seen as the first step towards industrialisation.

    Commercial agriculture has become paramount. It tends to focus on a single crop, with expensive inputs (like fertilisers) and with connections to far-away markets. Smaller farms, focused on production for home consumption and local markets, are less valued. These farms may not add to national economic growth in an important way, but they help the poor achieve food security.

    For example, the Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa funded a rice commercialisation project in Burkina Faso. Women farmers were encouraged to leave traditional practices behind, buy inputs, work with improved seeds, and sell to bigger urban markets. Sadly, research I worked on revealed that this didn’t provide great nutritional gains for the participants.

    In another case, as its diamond exports boomed, Botswana largely gave up on pursuing food self sufficiency in the 1980s. Crop agriculture was not seen as a significant contributor to the economy. This undermined the food security of poorer rural inhabitants and women.

    Agroecology as the way forward

    Mounting evidence of failure suggests it’s time to try a different way of addressing Africa’s food security woes.

    Agroecology – farming with nature – is a more decolonial approach. It covers formal research by scientists and informal knowledge of farmers who experiment in their fields.

    Agroecologists study the interactions between different crops, crops and insects, and crops and the soil. This can reveal ways to produce more with fewer costly external inputs. It’s a more sustainable and cheaper option.

    Common examples of agroecological practices in African farming systems are polycropping – planting different complementary crops in the same field – and agroforestry – mixing trees and crops. These diverse systems tend to have fewer pest problems and are better at maintaining soil fertility.

    No African country has fully embraced agroecology yet, but there are promising examples, many unplanned, that point to its potential.

    In Mali, for example, farmers briefly abandoned cotton in 2007-2008 due to low prices. There was then an upsurge in sorghum production. This largely saved the country from the social unrest and food price protests that happened in most neighbouring countries.

    A few land reform projects in South Africa allowed larger farms to be split into smaller plots, which had higher rates of success and more food security benefits. This suggests that a different, less commercial approach is in order.

    The beginning of a revolution

    Agroecology is a promising way forward in addressing Africa’s worsening food crisis.

    It also has the backing of many African civil society organisations, such as the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa and Network of West African Farmer Organisations and Agricultural Producers.

    African government leaders and donors have been slower to recognise the need for a different approach. We are beginning to see signs of change, though. For example, Senegal’s former agriculture minister, Papa Abdoulaye Seck, trained as a traditional agronomist. He now sees agroecology as a better way forward for his country. And the European Union has also begun funding a small number of experimental agroecology programmes.

    It’s time for a major shift in perspective. We will hopefully look back on this era as the turning point that ended intellectual colonisation in the agronomic sciences.

    William G. Moseley received funding from the US National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Fulbright-Hays Program. He is affiliated with the Mande Studies Association (MANSA) as president and American Association of Geographers (AAG) as vice president. The views expressed here are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the NSF, Fulbright-Hays, MANSA or AAG.

    ref. Africa’s worsening food crisis – it’s time for an agricultural revolution – https://theconversation.com/africas-worsening-food-crisis-its-time-for-an-agricultural-revolution-244323

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Counting Uganda’s lions: we found that wildlife rangers do a better job than machines

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alexander Richard Braczkowski, Research Fellow at the Centre for Planetary Health and Resilient Conservation Group, Griffith University

    Lions are a symbol of Africa’s last wild places. It’s a species central to many of the continent’s cultures and religions. But lion populations have reportedly declined over the past 50 years, especially in parts of west and east Africa.

    Concern over this decline has prompted large financial commitments to shore up numbers. These investments must go hand in hand with the critical work of closely monitoring lion populations. It’s important to understand how their numbers and their distribution respond to conservation actions such as anti-poaching, managing conflicts with cattle farmers, and securing protected areas.

    Many traditional methods used to count lions can produce unreliable results. And many existing estimates are based on assumptions about vast expanses which have not been surveyed.

    We are researchers with over 50 years of combined experience in conservation, big cat ecology, and the complexities of people and wildlife living together. We have long suspected wildlife tourism rangers operating within our study locations in Uganda could help us find lions in hard-to-reach places and map their distribution. After all, tourism rangers are government employees whose primary role is to guide tourists in observing and photographing wildlife daily. They have a deeper understanding of animal behaviour than most others.

    We therefore set out to study the efficacy of wildlife tourism rangers in collecting data necessary for estimating lion population numbers. We compared their performance to another commonly used field method to count big cats: remote infrared camera traps. We found that an approach led by wildlife rangers could be very useful in counting lions in many parts of their African range.

    Counting the lions of the Nile River

    As the morning sun rises on the banks of the River Nile in north-western Uganda, two wildlife rangers turn on their iPhones, preloaded with tracking software which will help them monitor where they have searched for lions. Lilian Namukose and Silva Musobozi head into the heart of Murchison Falls National Park. Here, their daily work is to locate and photograph the region’s largest predator: the African lion.

    The study area is the Nile Delta region (255km²) of the park, Uganda’s largest protected area. The region flanks the upper reaches of the Nile River, Africa’s longest waterway. It is a biodiversity hotspot but faces immense human pressures, from commercial oil extraction and wire snare poaching.




    Read more:
    The fast, furious, and brutally short life of an African male lion


    For these reasons it is critical to establish robust measures of how many lions still exist there, and develop monitoring schemes which will be long lasting.

    Over 76 sampling days we collaborated with Namukose and Musobozi, who drove 2,939km searching for lions. At the same time, we deployed infrared camera traps across 32 locations in the same study area. This allowed us to compare how these two methods performed head-to-head in exactly the same study area and time period. What we measured was the number of individually identifiable lions through their unique whisker spot patterns, suitable for advanced scientific analysis called spatial capture-recapture modelling.

    At the end of our survey period the rangers detected 30 lions 102 times, generating an estimate of 13.91 individuals per 100km² with acceptable precision. By contrast, the infrared camera traps could not reliably identify lions. There were only two usable detections because of poor image quality.

    One of the most important results of our surveys was that the ranger-led survey was 50% cheaper than running camera traps, and each detection by a camera trap was 100 times more expensive than a detection by a ranger.

    What rangers could mean for lion conservation across Africa

    Our survey of Murchison’s Nile Delta region showed us two key things. First, rangers’ intimate knowledge of lion behaviour (especially specific thickets, and regions of high lion activity) helped us achieve high lion detection rates. Second, using tourism rangers as lion monitors gives rangers an entry point into the conservation science field.

    This approach not only empowers rangers as active conservation stakeholders, but builds the local capacity that’s needed in many of the places where lions still roam. This science capacity is key if lion populations are to be monitored accurately and regularly (ideally yearly).

    This is all the more critical in key source sites of lions in Uganda which have experienced significant declines in recent years, especially Kidepo Valley and Queen Elizabeth National Park. The current lion population in Uganda is estimated at 291 individuals, far lower than many other places in east Africa (the Maasai Mara alone holds about 400 lions).

    Silva Musobozi, one of the rangers who did the fieldwork of the scientific study, adds:

    Rangers are arguably the closest group to wildlife on the ground and have good knowledge of animal behaviour. Through capacity building and training, rangers can be better incorporated into the scientific and management process.

    Nicholas Elliot of Wildlife Counts in Nairobi, Kenya, contributed to the research on which this article is based.

    Alexander Richard Braczkowski receives funding from Northern Arizona University and Griffith University.

    Duan Biggs is a member of the IUCN (World Conservation Union).

    Arjun M. Gopalaswamy and Peter Lindsey do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Counting Uganda’s lions: we found that wildlife rangers do a better job than machines – https://theconversation.com/counting-ugandas-lions-we-found-that-wildlife-rangers-do-a-better-job-than-machines-244206

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Industrial scale farming is flawed: what ecologically-friendly farming practices could look like in Africa

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rachel Wynberg, Professor and DST/NRF Bio-economy Research Chair, University of Cape Town

    African Perspectives on Agroecology is a new book with 33 contributions from academics, non-governmental organisations, farmer organisations and policy makers. It is free to download, and reviewers have described it as a “must read for all who care about the future of Africa and its people”. The book outlines how agroecology, which brings ecological principles into farming practices and food systems, can solve food shortages and environmental damage caused by mass, commercial farming. We asked the book’s editor and the South African Research Chair on Environmental and Social Dimensions of the Bio-economy, Rachel Wynberg, to set out why this book is so important.

    What’s wrong with the current system of food production?

    The dominant model of modern agriculture in the world is based on monoculture, where one crop is grown across large areas using chemical fertilisers and pesticides. It relies on seeds that are owned by big corporations and are often subsidised by governments at a high cost.

    The book outlines how this approach to growing food is flawed. Firstly, it carries major costs. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s State of Food and Agriculture 2024 report, the costs of diet-related disease, hunger and malnutrition and other costs amount to about US$8 trillion a year. Countries in the global south carry much of the burden.

    Secondly, the current approach is a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. This happens through deforestation and land degradation, livestock and fertiliser emissions, energy use, and the globalised nature of agriculture. Food is often produced far from where it is consumed.

    Huge farmlands also wipe out biodiversity and degrade one third of all soils, globally. Industrial agriculture has many negative impacts on ecosystem health, livestock and human wellbeing.

    What’s the alternative?

    Agroecology is a good alternative. It uses natural processes such as fixing nitrogen in the soil by planting legumes, and conserving natural habitat to encourage beneficial predators that keep pests in check. It includes planting a diversity of crops, rather than just one, to prevent pest outbreaks, and avoiding synthetic pesticides and herbicides.

    Agroecology places importance on building natural, local, economically viable and socially just food systems. It aims to support farmers and rural communities.




    Read more:
    Africa’s worsening food crisis – it’s time for an agricultural revolution


    As a result, it fosters more equal social relations and improves food and nutritional security.

    Agroecology also recognises local ways of knowing and doing things, and respects the rights of Indigenous people to seeds and plants that they have planted for many generations. Transforming research and education are an important part of agroecology.

    What are the advantages?

    Agroecology increases the capacity of farming systems to adapt to climate change. Studies show how agroecology increases crop yields, regulates water and nutrients, increases agricultural diversity and reduces pests.

    It gives farmers more choice about what to grow and eat. This enables them to produce a wider variety of healthy food.

    Can agroecology grow enough food for everyone?

    Agroecology can be scaled up through:

    • farmer-to-farmer knowledge exchanges

    • creating professional networks of agroecology practitioners

    • local seed-saving networks or groups that share different seeds that are adapted to local conditions




    Read more:
    Indigenous plants and food security: a South African case study


    • solidarity networks: community-based groups or movements that aim to support each other, cooperate and take collective action.

    • the revival and use of indigenous and under-utilised crops and livestock breeds such as pearl and finger millet, sorghum and Nguni cattle

    • linking producers with consumers and markets.

    What needs to be done?

    Urgent actions are needed, especially in the climate “hotspot” of sub-Saharan Africa. Agroecology needs supportive policies and funding. South Africa has had a draft agroecology strategy for more than 10 years but this has not yet been adopted.

    Development aid for farmers often undermines agroecology. It typically promotes a “new” African Green Revolution that uses hybrid seeds, agrochemicals, new technologies, and links to markets. However, hybrid seed, especially genetically modified seed, can contaminate local seed systems that are better adapted to local conditions.

    The book illustrates what can go wrong. Maize is said to have “modernised” development and promoted foreign investment in Africa. But it has displaced indigenous crops such as sorghum and millet which are more nutritious and drought-resistant.




    Read more:
    Amazing ting: South Africa must reinvigorate sorghum as a key food before it’s lost


    Subsidy programmes and state support for hybrid maize also back multinational agrochemical and seed companies.

    Governments, industry and those funding research, innovation and consumer marketing must actively move away from a maize culture and invest in a bigger range of crops.

    For millions of smallholder African farmers, there is a deep understanding of how animals, plants, soil, people and weather patterns are connected to and affect one another. Agricultural development programmes, chemical fertilisers, pesticides, and herbicides, and genetically modified seeds disrupt these relationships. They can devalue local knowledge and skills in favour of “expert”-led innovations. This means that farmers lose their capacity to understand their environment and their ability to react appropriately.




    Read more:
    Agriculture training in South Africa badly needs an overhaul. Here are some ideas


    Lastly, agriculture research and training needs to be rethought. Research and development is now mostly shaped by market-led approaches that favour crops grown by large-scale commercial farmers. A public sector research and development agenda for agroecology needs to be developed. It should be based both on scientific knowledge as well as traditional and local knowledge.

    What would help?

    Agricultural research should be co-created by everyone involved. Farmer-led research and innovation can support food system transformations.

    New ways of seeing and doing research are evolving. Western scientific and traditional knowledges are mixing in ways that can transform farming. Our book points out that social movements are emerging as a powerful force for change.

    We hope to support these efforts through a new, four year, European Union supported initiative to establish a research and training network: the Research for Agroecology Network in Southern Africa. New agroecology knowledge networks in South Africa and Zimbabwe have also been started to coordinate research and develop curricula.

    Rachel Wynberg’s research is supported by a grant from the Seed and Knowledge Initiative and South Africa’s National Research Foundation. She is a Board member of the NGO Biowatch South Africa.

    ref. Industrial scale farming is flawed: what ecologically-friendly farming practices could look like in Africa – https://theconversation.com/industrial-scale-farming-is-flawed-what-ecologically-friendly-farming-practices-could-look-like-in-africa-245579

    MIL OSI