Category: Economy

MIL-OSI Russia: Mongolia: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 27, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff mission, led by Mr. Tahsin Saadi Sedik, conducted discussions as part of the 2025 Article IV consultation with the Mongolian authorities in Ulaanbaatar during June 4–18, 2025. At the end of the visit, the mission issued the following statement, summarizing its key findings and recommendations.

During 2023‒24, record-high coal exports and increased government spending led to buoyant economic activity, which, along with fiscal surpluses and successful debt rollovers, also helped reduce vulnerabilities.
The resource boom is weakening amid rising risks. With coal exports declining in recent months, mainly due to falling prices, and increased global uncertainty, the near-term outlook has become less favorable, and downside risks have increased amid limited policy buffers.
The policy priority is to increase resilience of the Mongolian economy to downside risks by restoring both internal and external balances, and by preserving buffers. This requires greater fiscal prudence and adherence to fiscal rules, tight monetary and macroprudential policies, and increased exchange rate flexibility.
Should downside risks materialize, significant and timely policy adjustments—particularly fiscal tightening—will be required to safeguard macroeconomic and financial stability.

Recent economic developments, outlook, and risks

Since the 2023 Article IV consultation, Mongolia’s macroeconomic conditions have improved. A resource-driven boom during 2023‒24 led to buoyant economic activity, despite a sharp contraction in the agriculture sector. Budget revenues from the mining sector more than doubled, enabling fiscal surpluses and contributing to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and savings in the sovereign wealth fund despite a significant increase in public spending, which together with debt repayments helped reduce debt-to-GDP ratio from 64.5 percent in 2022 to 44.5 percent in 2024 (IMF staff definition). Rating agencies have upgraded Mongolia’s sovereign credit rating to B+/B2, and its sovereign spread narrowed to historically low levels before the volatility spiked amid global trade tensions. The IMF staff’s Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework (SRDSF) indicates a moderate risk rating compared to the high-risk rating in the 2023 SRDSF. However, the sharp increase in public spending in 2023-24, including wages and capital expenditures, resulted in a highly expansionary fiscal policy stance, which together with the policy rate cuts, despite the tightening of reserve requirements, fueled rapid credit growth and inflation pressures, and led to a surge in imports and a shift in the current account from surplus to deficit in 2024.

In early 2025, the commodity boom began to lose momentum, and the outlook has weakened amid rising downside risks. Mongolia’s coal export receipts declined sharply, mainly due to falling prices, resulting in a sizeable shortfall in budget revenues and a further widening of the current account deficit, which led to a reduction in foreign exchange reserves and increased depreciation. Credit growth and inflation remain high despite some recent moderation, with inflation standing above the Bank of Mongolia (BOM)’s target band.

Policies to Navigate a Weaker Outlook and Increased Risks

Fiscal policy

Greater fiscal prudence and adherence to the fiscal rules are critical to restoring external and internal balances and preserving fiscal buffers. Despite the decline in revenues, the authorities plan to meet the structural fiscal balance target envisaged in the 2025 Budget and the recently approved medium-term fiscal framework through expenditure restraint. To achieve this objective, the government needs to articulate detailed and credible measures. It is critical that these measures safeguard social spending to protect the most vulnerable. Should downside risks materialize, an ambitious consolidation strategy would be needed to preserve macroeconomic stability. To ensure the credibility of fiscal rules as a policy anchor, compliance with the rules will be critical. In particular, large investment projects should be implemented within the fiscal deficit and debt rules, as defined in the Fiscal Stability Law.

As a priority, the tax package currently under discussion should be reconsidered. While the package includes several positive elements, such as modernizing the tax administration, broadening VAT base, introducing digital service tax and strengthening progressive tax structure, it would result in a substantial and permanent reduction in non-mining tax revenues. This would increase the overall deficit, reduce the government’s fiscal space to implement critically needed development projects, and hinder compliance with fiscal rules, while also increasing the budget’s vulnerability to volatile mining revenues. In addition, some elements of the tax package need to be further refined to align with international best practices. The package also includes some measures, such as a progressive VAT, for which Mongolia’s tax administration is not yet prepared. Instead, reform efforts should focus on strengthening non-mining revenue mobilization by streamlining tax incentives, collecting tax arrears, and implementing tax and customs administration reforms.

Further reforms are needed to mitigate fiscal risks. Efforts should focus on improving the targeting of social assistance, which would help address the perceived inequitable distribution of mining wealth. Implementation of mega projects should be prioritized according to the availability of external financing and the economy’s absorptive capacity. Coordination with subnational entities needs to be strengthened to ensure fiscal discipline of the general government. Legal frameworks governing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public-private partnerships should be enhanced. Building on recent efforts, the Ministry of Finance’s capacity to monitor and mitigate related fiscal risks should be further strengthened. The Development Bank of Mongolia’s long-standing balance-sheet and governance issues need to be addressed promptly. Expanding domestic debt issuance is critical to establishing a benchmark yield curve to help develop domestic markets and to reduce Mongolia’s reliance on external borrowing.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies

Domestic financial conditions should remain tight to contain credit growth and inflation. Despite the policy rate hike in early 2025 and some moderation in recent months, inflation is expected to stay above the BOM’s target band over 2025–26. A further rate increase may be warranted if the recent decline in inflation reverses, including through exchange rate depreciation. At the same time, there is scope to recalibrate reserve requirements. Excessive reliance on reserve requirements may incentivize banks to seek external funds with more than one year maturity, which are excluded from these requirements, thus increasing the BOM’s exposure to exchange rate risks through its foreign exchange swaps with banks.

Greater exchange rate flexibility would strengthen Mongolia’s resilience to external shocks. The BOM should pursue opportunistic accumulation of reserves when market conditions allow. The BOM should support a more effective exchange rate price-discovery mechanism by gradually reducing its role as an intermediary and structural provider of FX to the market. In addition, the BOM should support the development of domestic FX derivatives markets and phase out its role as the dominant provider of FX hedging instruments to banks.

Reforms to strengthen the BOM’s effectiveness should be accelerated. As a priority, the BOM should fully withdraw from subsidized mortgage program, which undermines the transmission of monetary policy and jeopardizes the independence of the central bank. The government should expedite the transfer of the BOM’s subsidized mortgage program and relieve the BOM of its obligation to channel the newly established Savings Fund toward the expansion of the mortgage program. Moreover, the proposed amendments to the central bank law, aimed at strengthening the BOM’s mandate, as well as the operational autonomy, and governance, should be finalized and submitted to Parliament. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance and the BOM need to agree on a memorandum of understanding that outlines a gradual recapitalization strategy for the BOM that is consistent with fiscal sustainability.

Macroprudential and Financial Sector Policies

Macroprudential frameworks and financial oversight should be strengthened to mitigate financial stability risks, including rapid credit growth. The recent tightening of macroprudential measures, including the reduction of Debt-Service-To-Income (DSTI) limits, for banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) is a welcome development. Further efforts are needed, including aligning the DSTI limit for NBFIs with that of banks and expanding the BOM’s macroprudential toolkit to include countercyclical capital buffers, liquidity coverage ratios, and net stable funding ratios. Macroprudential and monetary policies should be separated in terms of formulation and implementation. The ongoing transition toward a risk-based, forward‑looking supervisory approach is welcome. The interconnections between banks and NBFIs should be closely monitored. Amendments to the BOM and Banking Laws are critical to ensure greater legal protection for supervisors and more effective inter-agency information sharing and coordination. The strengthening of crisis management arrangements and clarifying the resources available for resolutions would also help reduce financial stability risks.

Reforms are also needed to enhance the financial sector’s ability to lend to creditworthy entities. The objective is to reduce the cost of lending, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises. This could be done by amending the Credit Information and Insolvency Laws to enable more effective and timely credit assessment and collateral evaluation, and to streamline foreclosure and insolvency processes. In addition, efforts to diversify bank ownership structures should continue, which may require increasing ownership limits, and allowing investment in multiple banks. This should be complemented with effective supervision of complex ownership structures to mitigate the risks associated with connected and related-party lending.

Structural Policies

Further improvements to the business climate and governance that build on recent progress would boost Mongolia’s long-term growth prospects. The substantial state footprint in the economy and frequent regulatory changes dampen private sector initiatives and discourage FDI. Reform efforts should focus on reducing red tape, streamlining licensing procedures, improving tax compliance and land use processes, and ensuring consistent and transparent judicial and regulatory enforcement. Governance in the public sector also requires strengthening. This includes addressing corruption vulnerabilities in revenue institutions, strengthening the transparency and accountability of public procurement and SOEs, and implementing legislative reforms, including the SOE Law and Whistleblower Protection Law. Mongolia has made satisfactory progress in strengthening its anti‑money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism legal framework, though challenges related to effective implementation remain.

Climate adaptation, mitigation, and green transition will require significant investments and policy reforms. Adaptation actions are needed given increase in the frequency and intensity of natural hazards, such as harsh winters and floods, while mitigation actions are needed to address Mongolia’s high carbon intensity and to reduce air pollution. In addition, preparations are needed to address the expected decline in China’s coal demand as it advances its energy transition and decarbonization agenda. So far, implementation of Mongolia’s climate agenda remains limited. Climate adaptation measures have yet to be fully integrated into sectoral policies and budget processes. Moreover, there is no dedicated climate change law to mandate cross-sectoral coordination. Advancing Mongolia’s climate objectives will require significant financial contributions from both the public and private sectors, underscoring the importance of creating fiscal space.

The staff team expresses its sincere gratitude to the authorities and to a broad range of public and private sector counterparts for their warm hospitality and for the candid, constructive discussions.

Table 1. Mongolia: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2022-30

	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
		Actual			Projections
			(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
*National Accounts*
Real GDP growth (percent change)	5.0	7.4	4.9	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.3	5.0	5.0
Nominal GDP (in USD million)	17,146	20,315	23,586	…	…	…	…	…	…
Contributions to Real GDP (ppts)
Domestic Demand	11.4	5.6	21.2	6.6	4.4	7.1	7.2	6.5	6.2
Exports of G&S	13.9	17.9	0.5	4.2	5.4	2.8	2.3	1.7	1.8
Imports of G&S	-20.3	-16.2	-16.8	-5.3	-4.2	-4.4	-4.2	-3.3	-3.0
Consumption	65.8	57.5	66.1	72.1	72.0	72.5	72.5	73.0	73.0
Private	51.9	44.5	49.8	55.6	55.9	56.6	56.6	57.2	57.3
Public	13.9	13.0	16.3	16.5	16.1	16.0	15.9	15.8	15.7
Gross Capital Formation	42.3	33.9	34.6	32.3	30.7	30.7	30.9	30.7	30.4
Gross Fixed Capital Formation	29.8	25.3	26.8	24.3	23.7	23.7	23.9	23.7	23.4
Public	7.1	7.4	9.9	8.3	8.0	7.9	7.8	7.8	7.9
FDI	14.2	10.7	11.6	9.5	9.0	8.8	8.6	7.8	7.7
Domestic Private (including SOEs)	8.6	7.3	5.3	6.5	6.7	7.0	7.5	8.0	7.8
Gross national saving	28.9	34.5	24.1	17.5	17.6	17.4	17.9	17.8	17.7

*Prices*
Consumer Prices (Avg; percent change)	15.1	10.4	6.2	8.7	8.6	7.9	7.2	6.7	6.4
Consumer Prices (EoP; percent change)	13.3	7.7	8.3	9.0	8.2	7.5	6.8	6.5	6.2
Copper prices (US$ per ton)	8,829	8,491	9,142	8,981	8,897	8,983	9,056	9,122	9,167
Coal prices (US$ per ton)	123	131	107	68	73	72	72	72	72
GDP deflator (percent change)	17.7	21.8	8.2	6.1	8.0	7.5	7.3	6.5	6.5

*General government accounts 1/*
Primary balance (IMF definition)	2.2	4.3	2.8	1.0	0.5	-1.0	-0.8	-0.8	-0.7
Total revenue and grants	34.4	34.6	39.2	35.1	33.6	31.5	31.2	31.1	30.9
Primary expenditure and net lending	32.2	30.3	36.5	34.1	33.0	32.5	32.1	31.8	31.6
Interest	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.5
Overall balance (IMF definition)	0.7	2.7	1.3	-0.7	-1.4	-3.1	-3.1	-3.1	-3.2
Non-mineral primary balance (in percent of GDP)	-6.3	-5.7	-8.9	-7.4	-8.3	-9.4	-9.0	-8.6	-8.2
Gross financing needs	3.8	9.0	4.7	5.4	5.6	7.5	7.8	8.6	11.9
General government debt 2/	64.5	45.9	44.5	44.7	46.8	49.5	51.5	53.0	53.7
Domestic	4.4	2.6	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.6
External	60.1	43.3	41.3	41.7	43.8	46.4	48.3	49.6	50.1

*Monetary sector*
Broad money growth (percent change)	6.5	26.8	15.2	13.4	12.7	11.7	11.8	14.1	11.8
Reserve money growth (percent change)	39.9	7.4	51.9	0.7	12.7	11.7	11.8	14.1	12.7
Credit growth (percent change)	8.6	22.0	30.9	25.0	21.2	19.5	17.5	15.5	15.5

*Balance of payments*
Current account balance	-13.4	0.6	-10.5	-14.8	-13.1	-13.3	-13.0	-12.9	-12.7
Exports of goods	57.5	68.5	62.5	53.6	53.5	51.4	49.8	47.9	46.1
Imports of goods	50.3	46.1	49.5	46.2	45.1	44.2	43.7	42.9	41.5
Gross official reserves (in USD million)	3,400	4,922	5,510	4,566	4,627	4,669	4,864	5,045	5,212
(In months of imports)	3.0	3.6	4.0	3.2	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
(net of bank’s FX deposits held at the BOM)	1,949	3,491	4,233	…	…	…	…	…	…
Net international reserves (NIR) 3/	-788	1,152	1,768	…	…	…	…	…	…

*Exchange rate*
Togrog per U.S. dollar (eop)	3,445	3,411	3,420	…	…	…	…	…	…
Sources: Mongolian authorities; and IMF staff projections.
1/ These projections were prepared ahead of the supplementary budget for 2025 currently under discussion. They include the tax package approved by the previous Cabinet.

2/ Includes DBM’s total debt, explicit government’s guarantees to SOE as well as government’s liabilities to BOM related to the TDB settlement regarding Erdenet. Excludes BOM liabilities to PBOC.

3/ NIR is defined as GIR excl. commercial banks’ and government’s US$ deposits held at the BOM, the PBOC swap line, and liabilities to the IMF.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/27/mongolia-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

June 28, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: Ranking Member Mfume’s Opening Remarks at Subcommittee Hearing on the Trump Administration’s Politicization of the U.S. Postal Service

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Kweisi Mfume (MD-07)

WASHINGTON, D.C. —Below is Rep. Kweisi Mfume’s opening statement, as prepared for delivery, at today’s Subcommittee on Government Operations hearing on President Trump’s efforts to undermine the independence of the Postal Service and the failure of Trump-appointed Former Postmaster General’s “Delivering for America Plan.”

Click here to watch the video.

Opening Statement
Ranking Member Kweisi Mfume
Subcommittee on Government Operations
“The Route Forward for the U.S. Postal Service: A View from Stakeholders”

June 24, 2025

Thank you, Chairman Sessions, for calling a hearing on this important topic. I appreciate your interest in bringing us together for a thoughtful conversation about how the Postal Service can chart a better path forward under new leadership.

The Postal Service has an immense duty dating back to its creation—it powers communities and businesses, it keeps Americans healthy, it reinforces democracy, and it bridges geographical, economic, and cultural divides. Importantly, its universal service obligation ensures equitable access to prompt, reliable and efficient mail services—whether you live in a rural Maryland county or my constituents in the City of Baltimore and Baltimore County.

With Mr. David Steiner starting his tenure next month as the 76th Postmaster General, this is our first hearing on the Postal Service since the departure of former Postmaster General Louis DeJoy. I hope Mr. Steiner heeds our calls to protect the service that millions of Americans rely on to send and receive critical items—from financial statements and mail-in ballots to life-saving medicines and personal letters.

In doing so, he must defend against any threats to the Service’s independence and ensure the Postal Service remains a public good—which will not be easy under this Administration. Donald Trump has repeatedly questioned its independence and wrongly suggested privatization or merging it with the Commerce Department, despite the Postal Service being a self-supporting, independent agency.

To be clear: unilateral restructuring efforts would not only be illegal, but could jeopardize the delivery of critical items, especially in rural communities and hard-to-reach areas where the Postal Service serves as a lifeline.

Let us be reminded that our nation’s first Postmaster General, Benjamin Franklin, advocated for the security and privacy of the mail—not privatization. A commitment to security and privacy that our former Postmaster General upheld after refusing to allow DOGE officials, that have no experience with the Postal Service, broad access to the Postal Service’s data systems.

I urge the incoming Postmaster General to continue blocking any efforts to compromise the Postal Service’s data in order to maintain the historical status as one of the most trusted American institutions. Because for American families and businesses to continue to trust the USPS with their precious mail, they require certain assurances.

Americans deserve a true universal service—with reliable and efficient delivery times, affordable pricing, and low risk of theft.

Sadly, letter carriers are being robbed at gunpoint or chased by criminals with bats and no concern for the life or safety of these patriotic men and women. These criminals are desperately trying to obtain arrow keys, which are master keys, to steal mail in bulk—from low- and high-income communities alike.

The former Postmaster General, Louis DeJoy, proposed a seven rate hikes of postage that would mark a 41.8percent increase in the price of First-Class Mail Forever stamps since 2021—all while the Postal Service continues to serve the American public well below its 95% on time delivery standard.

That’s asking Americans to pay higher prices for worse service. Slower delivery times and concerning rates of mail theft and fraud do nothing to attract and retain the Postal Service’s customer base.

The Postal Service must be efficient, reliable, and stable to ensure its long-term survival. Now that we’re more than four years into the Delivering for America plan, it’s clear that the incoming Postmaster General, the Board of Governors, and Congress must be brave enough to protect this vital institution without compromising good service.

In the past, I supported the Inflation Reduction Act’s $3 billion in funds to replenish and modernize its vehicle fleet and invest in electric infrastructure.

Yet, instead of building on this progress to deploy safer and current vehicles, Senate Republicans are supporting a $1 billion rescission in these funds, costing the Postal Service a total of $1.5 billion—despite the American people already paying for a modern fleet replacement.

The rescission would not only be environmentally irresponsible, but also immensely wasteful.

Let us also recognize the incredible work the postal workforce continues to do for the American people.

The Postal Service’s workforce delivered ballots during the last election cycle reliably and efficiently, and employees weathered the storm of high volume during the holiday season.

The positive relationship between the Postal Service and Inspector General, Tammy Hull, has been crucial in identifying and resolving areas of waste and improving efficiency and identifying cost savings for the Postal Service.

There have also been notable efforts to renovate facilities in dire need of repair, expansion, and relocation.

Collectively, I think we can all agree that there must be a better way to address the frustrations of our constituents, of fellow Members, and of critical partners, and to build back Americans’ trust in the Postal Service.

As we partner to remedy those frustrations, let’s also make clear that the Postal Service is not for sale, not to be sidelined, and not be weakened.

It is a pillar of American life, and we owe it to the American people to protect and improve it.

I look forward to this discussion on how we can all work together to put this essential institution on firmer ground.

I yield back.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Ranking Member Mfume’s Opening Remarks at Subcommittee Hearing on the Trump Administration’s Politicization of the U.S. Postal Service

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Kweisi Mfume (MD-07)

WASHINGTON, D.C. —Below is Rep. Kweisi Mfume’s opening statement, as prepared for delivery, at today’s Subcommittee on Government Operations hearing on President Trump’s efforts to undermine the independence of the Postal Service and the failure of Trump-appointed Former Postmaster General’s “Delivering for America Plan.”

Click here to watch the video.

Opening Statement
Ranking Member Kweisi Mfume
Subcommittee on Government Operations
“The Route Forward for the U.S. Postal Service: A View from Stakeholders”

June 24, 2025

Thank you, Chairman Sessions, for calling a hearing on this important topic. I appreciate your interest in bringing us together for a thoughtful conversation about how the Postal Service can chart a better path forward under new leadership.

The Postal Service has an immense duty dating back to its creation—it powers communities and businesses, it keeps Americans healthy, it reinforces democracy, and it bridges geographical, economic, and cultural divides. Importantly, its universal service obligation ensures equitable access to prompt, reliable and efficient mail services—whether you live in a rural Maryland county or my constituents in the City of Baltimore and Baltimore County.

With Mr. David Steiner starting his tenure next month as the 76th Postmaster General, this is our first hearing on the Postal Service since the departure of former Postmaster General Louis DeJoy. I hope Mr. Steiner heeds our calls to protect the service that millions of Americans rely on to send and receive critical items—from financial statements and mail-in ballots to life-saving medicines and personal letters.

In doing so, he must defend against any threats to the Service’s independence and ensure the Postal Service remains a public good—which will not be easy under this Administration. Donald Trump has repeatedly questioned its independence and wrongly suggested privatization or merging it with the Commerce Department, despite the Postal Service being a self-supporting, independent agency.

To be clear: unilateral restructuring efforts would not only be illegal, but could jeopardize the delivery of critical items, especially in rural communities and hard-to-reach areas where the Postal Service serves as a lifeline.

Let us be reminded that our nation’s first Postmaster General, Benjamin Franklin, advocated for the security and privacy of the mail—not privatization. A commitment to security and privacy that our former Postmaster General upheld after refusing to allow DOGE officials, that have no experience with the Postal Service, broad access to the Postal Service’s data systems.

I urge the incoming Postmaster General to continue blocking any efforts to compromise the Postal Service’s data in order to maintain the historical status as one of the most trusted American institutions. Because for American families and businesses to continue to trust the USPS with their precious mail, they require certain assurances.

Americans deserve a true universal service—with reliable and efficient delivery times, affordable pricing, and low risk of theft.

Sadly, letter carriers are being robbed at gunpoint or chased by criminals with bats and no concern for the life or safety of these patriotic men and women. These criminals are desperately trying to obtain arrow keys, which are master keys, to steal mail in bulk—from low- and high-income communities alike.

The former Postmaster General, Louis DeJoy, proposed a seven rate hikes of postage that would mark a 41.8percent increase in the price of First-Class Mail Forever stamps since 2021—all while the Postal Service continues to serve the American public well below its 95% on time delivery standard.

That’s asking Americans to pay higher prices for worse service. Slower delivery times and concerning rates of mail theft and fraud do nothing to attract and retain the Postal Service’s customer base.

The Postal Service must be efficient, reliable, and stable to ensure its long-term survival. Now that we’re more than four years into the Delivering for America plan, it’s clear that the incoming Postmaster General, the Board of Governors, and Congress must be brave enough to protect this vital institution without compromising good service.

In the past, I supported the Inflation Reduction Act’s $3 billion in funds to replenish and modernize its vehicle fleet and invest in electric infrastructure.

Yet, instead of building on this progress to deploy safer and current vehicles, Senate Republicans are supporting a $1 billion rescission in these funds, costing the Postal Service a total of $1.5 billion—despite the American people already paying for a modern fleet replacement.

The rescission would not only be environmentally irresponsible, but also immensely wasteful.

Let us also recognize the incredible work the postal workforce continues to do for the American people.

The Postal Service’s workforce delivered ballots during the last election cycle reliably and efficiently, and employees weathered the storm of high volume during the holiday season.

The positive relationship between the Postal Service and Inspector General, Tammy Hull, has been crucial in identifying and resolving areas of waste and improving efficiency and identifying cost savings for the Postal Service.

There have also been notable efforts to renovate facilities in dire need of repair, expansion, and relocation.

Collectively, I think we can all agree that there must be a better way to address the frustrations of our constituents, of fellow Members, and of critical partners, and to build back Americans’ trust in the Postal Service.

As we partner to remedy those frustrations, let’s also make clear that the Postal Service is not for sale, not to be sidelined, and not be weakened.

It is a pillar of American life, and we owe it to the American people to protect and improve it.

I look forward to this discussion on how we can all work together to put this essential institution on firmer ground.

I yield back.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI: Ninepoint Partners Announces Final June 2025 Cash Distribution for Ninepoint Cash Management Fund – ETF Series

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

TORONTO, June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ninepoint Partners LP (“Ninepoint Partners”) today announced the final June 2025 cash distribution for the Ninepoint Cash Management Fund – ETF Series. The record date for the distribution is June 30, 2025. This distribution is payable on July 8, 2025.

The per-unit final June 2025 distribution is detailed below:

Ninepoint ETF Series Ticker Cash Distribution per
unit Notional Distribution
per unit CUSIP

Ninepoint Cash
Management Fund NSAV $0.12456 $0.00000 65443X105

About Ninepoint Partners

Based in Toronto, Ninepoint Partners LP is one of Canada’s leading alternative investment management firms overseeing approximately $7 billion in assets under management and institutional contracts. Committed to helping investors explore innovative investment solutions that have the potential to enhance returns and manage portfolio risk, Ninepoint offers a diverse set of alternative strategies spanning Equities, Fixed Income, Alternative Income, Real Assets, F/X and Digital Assets.

For more information on Ninepoint Partners LP, please visit www.ninepoint.com or for inquiries regarding the offering, please contact us at (416) 943-6707 or (866) 299-9906 or invest@ninepoint.com.

Ninepoint Partners LP is the investment manager to the Ninepoint Funds (collectively, the “Funds”). Commissions, trailing commissions, management fees, performance fees (if any), and other expenses all may be associated with investing in the Funds. Please read the prospectus carefully before investing. The information contained herein does not constitute an offer or solicitation by anyone in the United States or in any other jurisdiction in which such an offer or solicitation is not authorized or to any person to whom it is unlawful to make such an offer or solicitation. Prospective investors who are not resident in Canada should contact their financial advisor to determine whether securities of the Fund may be lawfully sold in their jurisdiction.

Please note that distribution factors (breakdown between income, capital gains and return of capital) can only be calculated when a fund has reached its year-end. Distribution information should not be relied upon for income tax reporting purposes as this is only a component of total distributions for the year. For accurate distribution amounts for the purpose of filing an income tax return, please refer to the appropriate T3/T5 slips for that particular taxation year. Please refer to the prospectus or offering memorandum of each Fund for details of the Fund’s distribution policy.

The payment of distributions and distribution breakdown, if applicable, is not guaranteed and may fluctuate. The payment of distributions should not be confused with a Fund’s performance, rate of return, or yield. If distributions paid by the Fund are greater than the performance of the Fund, then an investor’s original investment will shrink. Distributions paid as a result of capital gains realized by a Fund and income and dividends earned by a Fund are taxable in the year they are paid. An investor’s adjusted cost base will be reduced by the amount of any returns of capital. If an investor’s adjusted cost base goes below zero, then capital gains tax will have to be paid on the amount below zero.

Sales Inquiries:

Ninepoint Partners LP
Neil Ross
416-945-6227
nross@ninepoint.com

The MIL Network –

June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI: United Community Banks, Inc. Announces Date for Second Quarter 2025 Earnings Release and Conference Call

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

GREENVILLE, S.C., June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — United Community Banks, Inc. (NYSE: UCB) announces it will release its second quarter 2025 financial results on Wednesday, July 23, 2025, before the stock market opens. The company also will hold a conference call at 9:00 a.m. EST on Wednesday, July 23, 2025, to discuss its financial results, business highlights, and outlook.

Participants can pre-register for the conference call by navigating to https://dpregister.com/sreg/10200766/ff6c2759d0. Those without internet access or unable to pre-register may dial in by calling 1-844-676-1337. Participants are encouraged to dial in 15 minutes prior to the call start time. The conference call also will be webcast and can be accessed by selecting “Events and Presentations” under “News and Events” within the Investor Relations section of the company’s website, ucbi.com.

About United Community Banks, Inc.

United Community Banks, Inc. (NYSE: UCB) is the financial holding company for United Community, a top 100 U.S. financial institution committed to building stronger communities and improving the financial health and well-being of its customers. United Community offers a full range of banking, mortgage and wealth management services. As of March 31, 2025, United Community Banks, Inc. had $27.9 billion in assets and operated 200 offices across Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee. The company also manages a nationally recognized SBA lending franchise and a national equipment finance subsidiary, extending its reach to businesses across the country. United is an 11-time winner of J.D. Power’s award for highest customer satisfaction among consumer banks in the Southeast and was named the most trusted bank in the region in 2025. The company has also been recognized eight consecutive years by American Banker as one of the “Best Banks to Work For.” In commercial banking, United earned five 2025 Greenwich Best Brand awards, including national honors for middle market satisfaction. Forbes has consistently named United among the World’s Best and America’s Best Banks. Learn more at ucbi.com.

For more information:

Elizabeth Boggess
Head of Investor Relations
(864) 241-8705
Investor_Relations@ucbi.com

The MIL Network –

June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI: E-L Financial Corporation Limited Enters Into Automatic Share Purchase Plan

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

TORONTO, June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — E-L Financial Corporation Limited (TSX:ELF) (TSX:ELF.PR.F) (TSX:ELF.PR.G) (TSX:ELF.PR.H) (the “Company”) announced today that, as part of its previously announced normal course issuer bid (the “Bid”), it has entered into a pre-defined automatic share purchase plan (“ASPP”) with its designated broker in order to facilitate repurchases of the Company’s common shares (the “Shares”). The ASPP has received clearance from the Toronto Stock Exchange (the “Exchange”) and is scheduled to take effect on June 30, 2025.

The ASPP is designed to allow for the repurchase of the Shares in connection with the Bid at times when the Company ordinarily would not be active in the market due to its own internal trading blackout periods, insider trading rules or otherwise. Outside of the restricted periods, the timing of purchases will be determined by management of the Company. Decisions regarding purchases will be based on market conditions, share price, best use of available cash, and other factors. The funding for any purchase pursuant to the Bid will be financed out of the working capital of the Company.

The ASPP will terminate on the earliest of the following dates: (a) upon the expiration of the Bid; (b) when the maximum annual purchase limit under the Bid is reached; or (c) the ASPP otherwise terminates in accordance with its terms.

All purchases of Shares made under the ASPP will be included in determining the number of Shares purchased under the Bid. Any Shares purchased by the Company pursuant to the ASPP will be cancelled. The Company is not currently in possession of any material undisclosed information in relation to the Company, the Shares or any of the Company’s other securities.

The Company previously announced that it had received approval from the Exchange to purchase up to 173,086 Shares for cancellation through the facilities of the Exchange or through alternative Canadian trading systems during the 12-month period commencing March 12, 2025 and ending March 11, 2026. The Bid has been subsequently adjusted to reflect the a hundred-for-one share split of the Shares approved by the shareholders of the Company on May 7, 2025. Since the initiation of the Bid, the Company has not bought back any Shares.

About E-L Financial Corporation Limited

The Company operates as an investment and insurance holding company. In managing its operations, the Company distinguishes between two operating segments, E-L Corporate and Empire Life.

E-L Corporate represents investments in stocks and fixed income securities held directly and indirectly through pooled funds, closed-end investment companies and other investment companies. The investment strategy is to accumulate shareholder value through long-term capital appreciation and dividend and interest income from its investments.

Empire Life is a subsidiary of the Company. Since 1923, Empire Life has provided individual and group life and health insurance, investment and retirement products to Canadians. Empire Life’s mission is to make it simple, fast and easy for Canadians to get the products and services they need to build wealth, generate income, and achieve financial security.

Forward-Looking Statements

This press release may contain forward-looking information within the meaning of applicable securities regulation. The words “may”, “will”, “would”, “should”, “could”, “expects”, “plans”, “intends”, “trends”, “indications”, “anticipates”, “believes”, “estimates”, “predicts”, “likely” or “potential” or the negative or other variations of these words or other comparable words or phrases, are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These statements include, without limitation, statements regarding the Company’s intentions and expectations with respect to the Bid and purchases thereunder, the Company’s ASPP with its broker, and the effects of purchases under the Bid. Purchases made under the Bid are not guaranteed and may be suspended at the discretion of the Board of Directors of the Company. Forward-looking information is based on a number of assumptions and is subject to a number of risks and uncertainties that may cause the results or events mentioned in this press release to differ materially from those that are discussed in or implied by such forward-looking information. These risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to, general, local economic, and business conditions. All forward-looking information in this press release speaks as of the date hereof. The Company does not undertake to update any such forward-looking information whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. Additional information about these assumptions and risks and uncertainties is disclosed in filings with securities regulators filed on SEDAR+ (www.sedarplus.com).

For more information, please contact:

Richard B. Carty
Vice-President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary
E-L Financial Corporation Limited
Telephone: (416) 947-2578
Fax: (416) 362-2592

Scott Ewert
Vice-President, Chief Financial Officer
E-L Financial Corporation Limited
Telephone: (416) 947-2578
Fax: (416) 362-2592

The MIL Network –

June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Implementation of the Migration Pact in the context of the Polish Government’s position – temporary protection and financial contributions – P-001105/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Council Implementing Decision 2022 /382[1], establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine and having the effect of introducing temporary protection, specifies in Article 2(1) and (2) the categories of persons who receive temporary protection and their rights.

Member States must ensure that beneficiaries of temporary protection on their territory enjoy these rights. For further information on the obligations of Member States, the Commission refers the Honourable Member to the guidance documents and operational guidelines[2].

According to Article 64(1) of the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR)[3], financial contributions consist of transfers from the contributing Member States to the EU budget.

Pursuant to Article 64(2) of the AMMR, the benefitting Member States shall identify actions eligible for funding, and the Commission shall collaborate closely with them to ensure that those actions correspond to the objectives of the Annual Solidarity Pool (Articles 56(2)(b) and 56(3)) of the AMMR.

The Commission is working on the assessment of migratory pressure, risk of migratory pressure and significant migratory situation. The assessments of these situations will be based on both quantitative and qualitative data, in accordance with Articles 9 and 10 of the AMMR.

[1] Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection, OJ L 71, 4.3.2022, p. 1-6 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2022/382/oj/eng).

[2] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/asylum-eu/temporary-protection-0_en?prefLang=da#obligations-of-eu-countries-towards-persons-enjoying-temporary-protection .

[3] Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024 (http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj).
Last updated: 27 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Authoritarian restructuring of the Turkish state without consequences for EU candidate status – E-001451/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The April 2024 European Council conclusions[1] highlighted the EU’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. This aligns with the November 2023 Joint Communication[2], advocating for a progressive, proportionate, and reversible approach.

As an EU candidate country and long-standing member of the Council of Europe, Türkiye is expected to apply the highest democratic standards and practices.

Full respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law will continue to be an integral part of EU-Türkiye relations. The Commission’s position on the arrest of the Mayor of Istanbul on 19 March 2025 was spelled out in the joint statement[3] of the High Representative/Vice-President and Commissioner for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, issued on the day of the mayor’s detention.

The statement stressed that the events gave rise to questions regarding Türkiye’s adherence to its long-established democratic tradition. The EU urged the Turkish authorities to provide full transparency and follow due process.

Accession negotiations with Türkiye remain at a standstill since June 2018, following the decisions of the Council[4]. This position was re-confirmed by the Council in December 2024[5].

Consequently, the Commission has reduced financial support to Türkiye, with funding reoriented towards support for civil society organisations and EU key priorities.

[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf.

[2] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-political-economic-and-trade-relations-0_en.

[3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_836.

[4] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf.

[5] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf.
Last updated: 27 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission’s assesment of EIOPA findings regarding NOVIS case – E-001855/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
Under Article 30 of the Solvency II Directive[1], the financial supervision of insurance undertakings with their head office located in the territory of a Member State is the sole responsibility of the supervisory authority of that Member State.

The Commission’s opinion issued according to Article 17(4) of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) Regulation[2] concerns the way and the extent to which the national supervisor exercised its supervisory powers under the Solvency II Directive following the detection of non-compliance by a Slovakian insurance undertaking with Solvency II requirements.

Article 17(4) of the EIOPA Regulation does not confer on the Commission any powers to open an autonomous investigation upon any individual undertaking that is the object of the national competent authority’s supervision. This provision provides that the Commission’s formal opinion shall take into account the EIOPA’s recommendation.

The factual background and assessment of the situation of the Slovak insurance undertaking referred to in the Commission’s opinion are based on the evidence and assessment provided by the national supervisory authority, which is the sole authority empowered to exercise direct supervisory competence towards insurance undertakings under its jurisdiction, and by EIOPA, including in the context of inspections of a collaboration platform.

The Commission and EIOPA discussed the findings referred to in the EIOPA Recommendation and concurred that supervisory action was necessary.

[1] OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, p. 1-155.

[2] OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48-83.
Last updated: 27 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Transparency in the allocation of European funds intended for persons with disabilities in France – E-001925/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) is implemented under shared management. It is up to Member States to decide which measures they want to invest in, in line with the specific objectives of the ESF+ Regulation[1].

All Managing Authorities (MA) must have a website with information on programmes under its responsibility, covering the programme’s objectives, activities, available funding opportunities, achievements, and a list of operations selected for support (Article 49 of the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR)[2]).

For the selection of operations, the MA shall establish and apply criteria and procedures which are non-discriminatory, transparent, ensure accessibility to persons with disabilities, ensure gender equality, and take account of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), the principle of sustainable development and the EU policy on environment (Article 73(1) of the CPR).

Article 69(7) of the CPR stipulates that it is the Member States’ responsibility to ensure the effective examination of complaints concerning the Funds.

The scope, rules and procedures concerning those arrangements are the responsibility of Member States in accordance with their institutional and legal framework. This is without prejudice to the general possibility of citizens and stakeholders to address complaints to the Commission.

The Horizontal Enabling Conditions on the effective application and implementation of the Charter and on the implementation and application of the United Nations Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (UNCRPD) reiterate that Member States need to have reporting arrangements to the monitoring committee regarding cases of non-compliance of operations in place.

[1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R1057 .

[2] Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy.
Last updated: 27 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Belgium’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of play – 27-06-2025

Source: European Parliament

The EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the core component of Next Generation EU (NGEU). By promoting the sustainable and inclusive recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic that ensures the green and digital transitions make progress, the RRF is consistent with the European Commission’s priorities. Belgium’s initial maximum contribution to finance its national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) was set to €5 924 million in grants. The amount was updated in June 2022 and reduced to €4 523 million. In addition, the non-repayable allocation for the REPowerEU chapter to reinforce the NRRP’s energy dimension is set at €281 million. Belgium also submitted a reasoned request to transfer part of its allocation from the resources of the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to the RRF (€228 million). Finally, Belgium requested a loan support of €264 million. The overall EU financial contribution to the amended Belgian NRRP stands thus at €5 298 million; it represents 0.7 % of the entire RRF, and 1.1 % of Belgium’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019. The Council approved Belgium’s amended NRRP in December 2023. Other targeted revisions took place in 2024 and 2025. In total, Belgium has received €2.46 billion so far: €915.1 million in pre-financing – 13 % of the initial NRRP (€770 million, all grants) in 2021, and 20 % of the REPowerEU chapter (€102.1 million in grants, €43 million in loans) in 2024; and two result-based instalments – one of €631.6 million (all grants) in September 2024, and another of €909 million (of which €40 million in loans) in May 2025. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate of creating a common EU recovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on RRF implementation and scrutinises the European Commission’s work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Third edition. The ‘NGEU delivery’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Global Gateway initiative – E-002457/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002457/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Engin Eroglu (Renew), Joachim Streit (Renew)

The Global Gateway initiative aims to offer a strategic alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Funded by European taxpayers, it seeks to promote European values and interests worldwide.

However, media reports indicate that Chinese state-owned enterprises have won major contracts under EU-funded projects abroad. In some years, they reportedly secured more contract value financed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) than European firms.

This raises serious concerns about the responsible use of EU funds, the competitiveness of European industry, and the EU’s strategic autonomy.

1.Can the Commission confirm the accuracy of recent media reports regarding Chinese companies being awarded contracts under Global Gateway and in EIB-funded projects, and clarify the extent of their involvement?

2.What measures is the Commission taking – both independently and in cooperation with the EIB – to ensure that EU-funded infrastructure projects do not benefit strategic competitors or undermine Europe’s geopolitical and economic interests, and that European companies and workers benefit fairly from these initiatives?

3.What reforms to the EIB’s procurement rules for non-EU projects could help block tenders based on unfair competition, such as incorporating principles from the Foreign Subsidies Regulation[1]?

Submitted: 18.6.2025

[1] Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj.
Last updated: 27 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Skin sensitisation tests involving the use of guinea pigs – E-001720/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
In 2022, 33 029 skin sensitisation tests were conducted on animals constituting a reduction of 12.2% compared to 2018 and 12.5% compared to 2021.

Based on ALURES[1] data, most guinea pig sensitisation assays occur in the medical devices (MD) sector. Testing requirements for these are governed by the International Organisation for Standardisation standards, and the relevant standard 10993-10:2021[2] still lists guinea pig assays next to the local lymph node assay (LLNA) and non-animal methods.

Member States are expected to urge manufacturers to validate the LLNA or other alternatives for specific needs such as MD. Manufacturers should prioritise application of Defined Approaches for skin sensitisation.

These consist of a combination of non-animal methods and a defined algorithm to interpret results and are described in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Guideline 497[3]. These approaches have superior performance compared to the LLNA in predicting human responses.

Member States require regular reporting on progress made with alternatives, or to limit the project authorisation period for animal tests.

If validation of the alternative fails, use of animals should continue to be allowed. The Commission collaborates closely with Member States to remind them of the obligations[4] under Directive 2010/63[5] to ask product-specific qualification of recognised alternatives.

The European Partnership for Alternative Approaches to Animal Testing[6] has invited the MD industry to join initiatives such as the skin sensitisation project to share knowledge and accelerate qualification of non-animal methods also by MD manufacturers.

The Commission will publish a Roadmap on phasing out animal testing which covers MD legislation.

[1] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/chemicals/animals-science/statistics-and-non-technical-project-summaries_en.

[2] Biological evaluation of medical devices — Part 10: Tests for skin sensitisation.

[3] https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/guideline-no-497-defined-approaches-on-skin-sensitisation_b92879a4-en.html.

[4] E.g., during bi-annual meetings.

[5] Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes, OJ L 276, 20.10.2010, p. 33-79.

[6] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/chemicals/european-partnership-alternative-approaches-animal-testing_en.
Last updated: 27 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Further sanctions against Nord Stream – P-002107/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The EU has imposed unprecedented restrictive measures (sanctions) in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including far-reaching trade restrictions in several economic sectors, and specific financial measures against Russian individuals and entities.

As the Honourable Member is aware, these sanctions are adopted under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and are aimed to maximise their impact on Russia’s ability to conduct and finance its war of aggression.

On 10 June 2025, the Commission President and the High Representative/Vice-President[1] stated that the joint proposal for the 18^th sanctions package includes, among other measures, sanctions on the Nord Stream pipelines.

This measure should prevent Russia from generating any revenue in the future by using those pipelines to transport natural gas. Those future measures are currently discussed in the Council and require a unanimous adoption.

The proposals and the negotiations in the Council are not public. Hence, the Commission is not able to comment further on measures prior to their adoption in the Council.

The Commission will continue to cooperate and coordinate closely with Member States and operators on the implementation and enforcement of sanctions once they are adopted.

[1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ukrainerussia-press-remarks-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-joint-press-conference_en.
Last updated: 27 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Further sanctions against Nord Stream – P-002107/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The EU has imposed unprecedented restrictive measures (sanctions) in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including far-reaching trade restrictions in several economic sectors, and specific financial measures against Russian individuals and entities.

As the Honourable Member is aware, these sanctions are adopted under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and are aimed to maximise their impact on Russia’s ability to conduct and finance its war of aggression.

On 10 June 2025, the Commission President and the High Representative/Vice-President[1] stated that the joint proposal for the 18^th sanctions package includes, among other measures, sanctions on the Nord Stream pipelines.

This measure should prevent Russia from generating any revenue in the future by using those pipelines to transport natural gas. Those future measures are currently discussed in the Council and require a unanimous adoption.

The proposals and the negotiations in the Council are not public. Hence, the Commission is not able to comment further on measures prior to their adoption in the Council.

The Commission will continue to cooperate and coordinate closely with Member States and operators on the implementation and enforcement of sanctions once they are adopted.

[1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ukrainerussia-press-remarks-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-joint-press-conference_en.
Last updated: 27 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Access to school canteens in Sicily and the use of ESF+ and NRRP funds – E-001981/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament

The Commission acknowledges the situation regarding school canteens in Sicily and is working closely with Italy to ensure the effective implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan[1]. Investment 1.2[2] supports the construction or renovation of canteen spaces for at least 1 000 structures[3].

This would allow schools to extend school time, increase the educational offer and keep schools open beyond school hours. The Commission will assess its implementation via the target for ‘Structures to host students beyond school time’[4], whose completion is expected by Q2 2026.

The European Social Fund + (ESF+) regional programme (RP) in Sicily contributes to combat education poverty and improve access to essential services.

Under its specific objective 4.5[5], the RP launched in 2023 the call ‘Open schools for the territory’[6], making available EUR 27 million[7] to enhance training provision, supporting students at risk of failure and dropout, and promoting schools as cultural hubs. The call also supports access to school canteens, covering the costs of meals for students participating to afternoon activities.

The ESF+ contributes to the implementation of the Child Guarantee through targeted actions and structural reforms to tackle child poverty.

To this end, Italy has earmarked EUR 1.1 billion of ESF+ resources, with roughly EUR 25 million[8] to be invested in Sicily. The Commission regularly monitors these funds to ensure goals are met.

Member States have developed national plans for the Child Guarantee, also overseen by the Commission. Through these efforts, the ESF+ strives to break the cycle of poverty and provide every child with equal opportunities, a crucial aspect for the effective implementation of the Child Guarantee, particularly in regions like Sicily.
- [1] https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages/italys-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en.
- [2] Plan for the extension of full-time under Mission 4, Component 1.
- [3] The Council Implementing Decision (CID) does not envisage a specific distribution of such structures across Italian regions. It is therefore within the Member State’s remit to decide the allocation of such structures over the national territory.
- [4] M4C1-21, part of the 10th payment request: ‘At least 1 000 structures are built or upgraded to facilitate the extension of school time and the opening of schools to the territory beyond school hours’.
- [5] ESO 4.5 ‘Improving the quality, inclusiveness, effectiveness and labour market relevance of education and training systems, including through the validation of non-formal and informal learning, to support the acquisition of key competences, including entrepreneurial and digital skills, and promoting the introduction of dual training systems and apprenticeships (ESF+)’.
- [6] Avviso 10/2023: https://www.sicilia-fse.it/avvisi-e-bandi/pr-fse-2021-2027/avviso-10-2023.
- [7] EUR 9 million annually for three consecutive school years 2023-24, 2024-25 and 2025-26.
- [8] On top of this specific allocation for Sicily, the ESF+ national programmes ‘Social inclusion’ and ‘School and skills’ also contribute to the Child Guarantee across Italy, including in Sicily.
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Addressing medicine shortages by reassessing the revised Urban Wastewater Directive – E-001335/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD)[1] requires the removal of micropollutants from urban wastewaters with quaternary treatment.

The Polluter-Pays Principle[2] is enshrined in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The European Court of Auditors[3] recommended strengthening the integration of this principle into environmental legislation.

The UWWTD refers to it[4] and provides for an extended producer responsibility system (EPR) whereby the pharmaceutical and cosmetics sectors, which represent the main source of micropollutants in urban wastewater[5], finance at least 80% of the quaternary treatment costs.

The impact assessment accompanying the Commission’s proposal assessed the cost of such extended producer responsibility system and its impact[6] on the pharmaceutical sector at EU level.

In addition, as announced in the Water Resilience Strategy[7] of 4 June 2025, in the context of the implementation of the extended producer responsibility, the Commission will conduct an updated study of costs and its potential impacts on concerned sectors.

In addition, the Commission will continue to support Member States in the pragmatic design of national systems with a view to avoiding unexpected or unintended consequences, in particular for the availability and affordability of medicines.

[1] Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment (recast), OJ L, 2024/3019, 12.12.2024.

[2] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/economy-and-finance/ensuring-polluters-pay_en.

[3] https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR21_12.

[4] Article 1 of Directive (EU) 2024/3019.

[5] Impact assessment accompanying the proposal for a directive concerning urban wastewater treatment (recast): https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-revised-urban-wastewater-treatment-directive_en.

[6] Ibid.

[7] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en.
Last updated: 27 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Addressing medicine shortages by reassessing the revised Urban Wastewater Directive – E-001335/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD)[1] requires the removal of micropollutants from urban wastewaters with quaternary treatment.

The Polluter-Pays Principle[2] is enshrined in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The European Court of Auditors[3] recommended strengthening the integration of this principle into environmental legislation.

The UWWTD refers to it[4] and provides for an extended producer responsibility system (EPR) whereby the pharmaceutical and cosmetics sectors, which represent the main source of micropollutants in urban wastewater[5], finance at least 80% of the quaternary treatment costs.

The impact assessment accompanying the Commission’s proposal assessed the cost of such extended producer responsibility system and its impact[6] on the pharmaceutical sector at EU level.

In addition, as announced in the Water Resilience Strategy[7] of 4 June 2025, in the context of the implementation of the extended producer responsibility, the Commission will conduct an updated study of costs and its potential impacts on concerned sectors.

In addition, the Commission will continue to support Member States in the pragmatic design of national systems with a view to avoiding unexpected or unintended consequences, in particular for the availability and affordability of medicines.

[1] Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment (recast), OJ L, 2024/3019, 12.12.2024.

[2] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/economy-and-finance/ensuring-polluters-pay_en.

[3] https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR21_12.

[4] Article 1 of Directive (EU) 2024/3019.

[5] Impact assessment accompanying the proposal for a directive concerning urban wastewater treatment (recast): https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-revised-urban-wastewater-treatment-directive_en.

[6] Ibid.

[7] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en.
Last updated: 27 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Former Santa Cruz County Treasurer Sentenced to 10 Years in Prison for Stealing Over $38 Million in County Funds

Source: US FBI

TUCSON, Ariz. – Elizabeth Gutfahr, 63 of Rio Rico, Arizona, was sentenced on June 23, 2025, by United States District Judge Rosemary C. Márquez to 120 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. Gutfahr previously pleaded guilty to Embezzlement by a Public Official, Money Laundering, and Tax Evasion. Gutfahr was also ordered to pay approximately $51.8 million in restitution to Santa Cruz County and the United States Treasury.

“The people of Santa Cruz County and all Arizonans have a right to expect their elected leaders to serve with integrity and in the best interest of their constituents,” said U.S. Attorney Timothy Courchaine. “Ms. Gutfahr stole more than money from the people of her county, she betrayed the confidence of the voters who elected her. This sentence shows that abuse of public trust will be punished.”

“Ms. Gutfahr will now be held accountable for using her official position for huge financial gain at the expense of the residents of Santa Cruz County,” said FBI Phoenix Special Agent in Charge Heith Janke. “Each act of greed and dishonor negatively affected fundamental aspects of the county’s operations. The FBI continues to investigate public corruption cases, and we remain committed to identifying and pursuing those who violate the public’s trust.”

“Ms. Gutfahr violated her sworn duty by enriching herself with the public money she was entrusted to protect,” said Special Agent in Charge Carissa Messick of the IRS Criminal Investigation Phoenix Field Office. “Taxpayers deserve to know that their elected leaders are working in the community’s best interest — not just their own. IRS-CI remains committed to rooting out corruption at every level.”

According to court documents, Gutfahr, who served as Santa Cruz County Treasurer from 2012 through 2024, embezzled and laundered approximately $38.7 million by wiring public funds from Santa Cruz County’s account to accounts in the names of fake companies she had created that performed no legitimate business. Gutfahr then used the money to purchase real estate, to renovate her family ranch, to pay expenses for her cattle business, and to buy at least 20 vehicles.

Gutfahr’s 10-year scheme involved approximately 187 wire transfers, which she was able to complete by undermining the two-step approval process required for transfers. Gutfahr used the token of a subordinate Santa Cruz County employee so that she could both initiate and approve the wire transfers. To cover up the scheme, Gutfahr falsified accounting records, cash reconciliation records, and reports of the County’s investment accounts, thereby hiding the millions of dollars that she had stolen from Santa Cruz County. Gutfahr also failed to report any of the stolen funds as income for tax purposes.

The FBI and IRS-CI conducted the investigation in this case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Jane L. Westby for the District of Arizona and Senior Litigation Counsel Nicholas W. Cannon of the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section handled the prosecution.

CASE NUMBER: 24-CR-08132-TUC-RM
RELEASE NUMBER: 2025-098_Gutfahr

# # #

For more information on the U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Arizona, visit http://www.justice.gov/usao/az/
Follow the U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Arizona, on Twitter @USAO_AZ for the latest news.

MIL Security OSI –

June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Continuity planning empowers businesses to adapt, recover, and thrive

Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

Businesses often struggle to recover from extreme weather events and natural hazards because they are not ready.

It has been estimated that 40% of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) do not reopen after a disaster and many of those that do, fail within a year. Businesses need to rethink their operating models before disruptions happen. Yet building disaster resilience does not always have to require a resource intensive process or lead to something new. It does not mean changing what a business does, but how it does it. This is where business continuity planning comes in.

A business continuity plan (BCP) outlines what is needed for a business to continue operating or resume operations after a disruption. It serves as a guide for pivoting operations if and as needed. Yet according to some estimates, only 20-30% of SMEs have written BCPs in place.

In partnership with local governments, chambers of commerce and ARISE networks, UNDRR is implementing a project in Barcelona (Spain), Bridgetown (Barbados) and Sendai (Japan) to support SMEs in developing and testing business continuity plans to strengthen their disaster resilience. Early lessons are already emerging.

Here are five noteworthy things about business continuity planning that further highlight its importance:

Business continuity plans can separate those that recover from those that do not

With the increasing frequency and intensity of disasters, preparation is no longer optional. It makes all the difference. In many parts of the world, the question is not whether but when the next extreme weather event or natural hazard will strike. What businesses do today will determine how they fare in the face of a disaster tomorrow. A systemic approach to developing a BCP – conducting even quick multi-hazard risk assessments, identifying critical functions, outlining response and communications protocols, assigning roles, and stress-testing the plan – outline a clear roadmap that enables faster, risk informed decision-making and more effective resource allocation. Those without BCPs will inevitably face more chaos, operational delays, and significant losses – many times leading to business closure. Businesses that are risk-aware, with tested and up-to-date BCPs, however, are able to absorb shocks better, pivot operations, recover faster and become more resilient.

Business continuity plans are cost-effective mitigation measures

Business continuity plans are a quick, low-cost way to mitigate potentially high-impact disaster risks. They typically require low financial investment especially when compared against the potentially significant losses of being unprepared for disasters. This is particularly true for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that often do not have the resources – human or financial – for developing more holistic disaster risk reduction approaches or undertaking disaster recovery efforts.

Business continuity plans are a mechanism to operationalize resilience

While resilience encompasses more than just business continuity, a well prepared BCP provides the foundation for reducing organizational vulnerabilities, pivoting operations and building resilient recovery capabilities. They clarify roles and actions that are needed to continue operations or resume quickly after a disruption. While resilience may be the ultimate goal, business continuity planning represents the practical steps to achieve it.

Business continuity plans can offer a strategic advantage during uncertainty

Business continuity plans can significantly enhance a company’s competitiveness and safeguard long-term success during disruptions. Those that have BCPs – and have tested and updated them regularly – are in a better position to minimize downtime and continue or quickly resume their operations. They are better equipped to protect their physical assets and data, while also retaining customers as well as contributing to the resilience of the communities where they operate. The operational flexibility – agility and ability to adapt to changing circumstances – can even help in capturing more market share.

Business continuity plans can improve financial reserves

Limited access to finance and no or inadequate insurance coverage are often cited among the key reasons why SMEs do not recover from disasters. Partners want to ensure that their supply chains and services are not disrupted, investors and lenders are keen to protect their capital, and insurers want to minimize payouts. A robust BCP can help improve financial cushioning by providing a form of assurance that operations will continue. As operational and financial risks are lowered, the business becomes a more stable, and thus attractive investment. Business continuity planning can also improve insurability: turning the business into a lower-risk policyholder, potentially leading to better policy terms and/or lower insurance premiums. In general, BCPs signal commitment to proactivity, stability and sustainability – making the business more credible and trustworthy in the eyes of all key stakeholders.

To support businesses in understanding their resilience capacities, UNDRR has also developed the Resilience Maturity Assessment Tool (ReMA). ReMA helps businesses – particularly SMEs – identify gaps in their disaster preparedness and assess the maturity of their resilience strategies, offering a structured path toward stronger continuity planning and risk governance.

Business continuity planning is more than a safeguard – it’s a strategic choice that empowers businesses to adapt, recover, and thrive amid disruption.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI: PIMCO Closed-End Funds Announce Shareholder Approval of Issuance of Common Shares in Proposed Reorganizations
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

NEW YORK, June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — At a joint special meeting earlier today, common shareholders of each of PIMCO Municipal Income Fund II (NYSE: PML), PIMCO New York Municipal Income Fund II (NYSE: PNI) and PIMCO California Municipal Income Fund (NYSE: PCQ) (each, an “Acquiring Fund”) approved the issuance of additional common shares in connection with each of the below reorganizations, as applicable (each, a “Merger” and collectively, the “Mergers”):
- National Mergers: PIMCO Municipal Income Fund (NYSE: PMF) and PIMCO Municipal Income Fund III (NYSE: PMX) with and into PML;
- New York Mergers: PIMCO New York Municipal Income Fund (NYSE: PNF) and PIMCO New York Municipal Income Fund III (NYSE: PYN) with and into PNI; and
- California Mergers: PIMCO California Municipal Income Fund II (NYSE: PCK) and PIMCO California Municipal Income Fund III (NYSE: PZC) with and into PCQ.
Once the Mergers are consummated, each of the Acquiring Funds will acquire all of the assets and liabilities of, as applicable, PMF, PMX, PNF, PYN, PCK, and PZC (each, an “Acquired Fund” and together with the Acquiring Funds, the “Funds”), and the common shares of each Acquired Fund will, in effect, be exchanged for new common shares of the corresponding Acquiring Fund with an equal aggregate net asset value. In addition, each Fund has one or more series of Remarketable Variable Rate MuniFund Term Preferred Shares (“RVMTP Shares”) outstanding. As part of each Merger, the outstanding RVMTP Shares of each Acquired Fund will, in effect, be exchanged for RVMTP Shares of the corresponding Acquiring Fund with an aggregate liquidation preference equal to, and other terms that are substantially identical to, the corresponding series of RVMTP Shares of each such Acquired Fund.

The Mergers are currently expected to be completed on or about August 1, 2025, subject to PIMCO’s market outlook and operational considerations and the satisfaction of applicable regulatory requirements and customary closing conditions. In the event the completion of the Mergers is delayed, PIMCO will issue a press release notifying Fund shareholders of the new expected completion date.

The holders of the RVMTP Shares of each Acquired Fund have been asked to consent to the applicable Merger, and the consummation of a Merger with respect to each such Acquired Fund is contingent upon the consent of the holders of its RVMTP Shares, as applicable. No further action is needed from common or preferred shareholders of any Fund.

In light of the existing similarities in the Funds’ investment strategies and holdings, PIMCO does not currently expect to materially restructure any Acquired Fund’s portfolio or reposition its holdings prior to the Mergers in order to align with the applicable Acquiring Fund’s investment strategies. However, as of the close of business today through the closing of the Mergers, each Acquired Fund will be in a “transition period” during which PIMCO may reposition the Acquired Fund’s assets to prepare to transfer such assets to the corresponding Acquiring Fund, as needed, depending on market conditions and each Acquiring Fund’s portfolio holdings prior to the Mergers. During this time, an Acquired Fund may not be pursuing its investment objective and strategies, and limitations on permissible investments and investment restrictions will not apply.

About PIMCO

PIMCO was founded in 1971 in Newport Beach, California and is one of the world’s premier fixed income investment managers. Today we have offices across the globe and 3,000+ professionals united by a single purpose: creating opportunities for investors in every environment. PIMCO is owned by Allianz S.E., a leading global diversified financial services provider.

Registration statements relating to each Acquiring Fund’s Common Merger Shares (as defined in the corresponding registration statement) have been filed with, and declared effective by, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). This press release is not intended to, and does not, constitute an offer to purchase or sell shares of the Funds; nor is this press release intended to solicit a proxy from any shareholder of the Funds.

Except for the historical information and discussions contained herein, statements contained in this press release constitute forward-looking statements. These statements may involve a number of risks, uncertainties and other factors that could cause actual results to differ materially, including the performance of financial markets, the investment performance of PIMCO’s sponsored investment products and separately managed accounts, general economic conditions, future acquisitions, competitive conditions and government regulations, including changes in tax laws. Readers should carefully consider such factors. Further, such forward-looking statements speak only on the date at which such statements are made. PIMCO undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances after the date of such statement.

This material has been distributed for informational purposes only and should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission. PIMCO is a trademark of Allianz Asset Management of America LLC in the United States and throughout the world. PIMCO Investments LLC, 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019, is a company of PIMCO. ©2025, PIMCO.

For information on PIMCO Closed-End Funds:
Financial Advisors: (800) 628-1237
Shareholders: (844) 337-4626 or (844) 33-PIMCO
PIMCO Media Relations: (212) 597-1054

The MIL Network –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI: Array Technologies Closes Upsized Offering of Its 2.875% Convertible Senior Notes
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
- $345 million raised; approximately $334 million of net proceeds
- $233 million of term loan outstanding balance to be repaid with proceeds
- $78 million of proceeds used to repurchase $100 million principal of 1.00% Convertible Senior Notes due 2028
- $35 million of proceeds used to acquire Capped Calls elevating conversion price to $12.74 per share
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — ARRAY Technologies, Inc. (NASDAQ: ARRY) (the “Company” or “ARRAY”) today announced the closing of its previously announced private offering of $345 million aggregate principal amount of its 2.875% convertible senior notes due July 2031 (the “Notes”). The Notes were sold in a private offering only to persons reasonably believed to be qualified institutional buyers pursuant to Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended. The offering represents the aggregate of both the previously announced, upsized offering of $300 million, as well as the full exercise of the $45 million option to purchase additional Notes granted by ARRAY to the initial purchasers of the Notes.

Kevin G. Hostetler, Chief Executive Officer of ARRAY, said, “This successful offering marks a significant milestone in our ongoing efforts to strengthen ARRAY’s capital structure and position the company for long-term growth. By refinancing higher-cost debt and proactively managing our debt maturity profile, we are enhancing our financial flexibility while minimizing potential dilution for shareholders. These actions reflect our continued commitment to disciplined capital allocation and delivering sustainable value.”

H. Keith Jennings, Chief Financial Officer of ARRAY, added, “We are pleased with the strong demand for our convertible notes offering, which allowed us to upsize the transaction and optimize our balance sheet. The repayment of our term loan affords us the full maturity extension of our revolving credit facility, and the repurchase of a portion of our 2028 convertible notes at a discount generates meaningful shareholder value. Additionally, the capped call transactions provide important protection against dilution, aligning with our focus on prudent financial management.”

The net proceeds from the offering were approximately $334.1 million, after deducting the initial purchasers’ discounts and estimated expenses payable by ARRAY. ARRAY intends to use (i) a portion of the net proceeds, together with approximately $12.1 million cash on hand, to fully repay the approximately $232.8 million of outstanding indebtedness under its term loan facility, (ii) approximately $35.1 million of the net proceeds to fund the cost of entering into the capped call transactions and (iii) a portion of the net proceeds to fund repurchases of approximately $100 million in aggregate principal amount of its outstanding 1.00% Convertible Senior Notes due 2028 for approximately $78.3 million in cash, plus accrued and unpaid interest.

The capped call transactions entered into in connection with the offering are expected to generally reduce potential dilution to the common stock upon conversion of the Notes or to offset any cash payments the Company is required to make in excess of the principal amount of converted Notes, as the case may be, with the reduction or offset subject to a cap initially equal to $12.74 per share. The capped calls have an initial strike price of $8.12 per share, subject to adjustments, which corresponds to the initial conversion price of the Notes.

Total annual net interest expense savings resulting from these transactions is expected to be approximately $9 million and will enhance free cash flow generation.

About Array Technologies, Inc.

ARRAY Technologies, Inc. (NASDAQ: ARRY) is a leading global provider of solar tracking technology to utility-scale and distributed generation customers, who construct, develop, and operate solar PV sites. With solutions engineered to withstand the harshest weather conditions, ARRAY’s high-quality solar trackers, software platforms and field services combine to maximize energy production and deliver value to ARRAY’s customers for the entire lifecycle of a project. Founded and headquartered in the United States, ARRAY is rooted in manufacturing and driven by technology – relying on its domestic manufacturing, diversified global supply chain, and customer-centric approach to design, deliver, commission, train, and support solar energy deployment around the world. For more news and information on ARRAY, please visit arraytechinc.com.

Media Contact:
Nicole Stewart
505-589-8257
nicole.stewart@arraytechinc.com

Investor Relations Contact:
ARRAY Technologies, Inc.
Investor Relations
investors@arraytechinc.com

Forward-Looking Statements

This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements may be identified by the use of words such as “estimate,” “plan,” “project,” “forecast,” “intend,” “will,” “shall,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “seek,” “target,” “continue,” “could,” “may,” “might,” “possible,” “potential,” “predict” or other similar expressions that predict or indicate future events or trends or that are not statements of historical matters. These forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to the intended use of the net proceeds and the expected savings from the offering. Forward-looking statements involve inherent risks and uncertainties, and important factors (many of which are beyond the Company’s control) that could cause actual results to differ materially from those set forth in the forward looking statements, including risks and uncertainties associated with market conditions, including market interest rates, the trading price and volatility of ARRAY’s common stock, the Company’s business and operations and results of financing efforts, including those described in more detail in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2025 and subsequent reports and other documents on file with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The forward-looking statements included in this press release speak only as of the date of this press release. Except as required by law, the Company does not undertake, and specifically disclaims, any obligation to update any forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances occurring after the date of such statements.

The MIL Network –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI: Portman Ridge Finance Corporation Announces Shareholder Approval of Merger with Logan Ridge Finance Corporation
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

NEW YORK, June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Portman Ridge Finance Corporation (NASDAQ: PTMN) (“Portman Ridge” or “PTMN”) announced today that it obtained shareholder approval for the issuance of PTMN common stock in connection with the proposed merger of Logan Ridge Finance Corporation (NASDAQ: LRFC) (“Logan Ridge” or “LRFC”) with and into PTMN (the “Share Issuance Proposal”) following the adjourned special meeting of shareholders held on June 27, 2025.

PTMN shareholders voted overwhelmingly in favor of the proposed transaction, with approximately 88% of voting shareholders supporting the proposal. Of note, on June 20, 2025, LRFC stockholders approved the merger with PTMN. Thus, subject to the satisfaction of customary closing conditions, the merger is expected to close on or about July 15, 2025.

Ted Goldthorpe, President and Chief Executive Officer of PTMN and LRFC and Head of the BC Partners Credit Platform, stated, “We would like to thank our shareholders for their strong support of the merger with LRFC. Their vote affirms the strategic vision behind this combination and supports our efforts to create a larger, more efficient platform that is better positioned for long-term growth.

Upon closing, we look forward to rebranding the combined company as BCP Investment Corporation to reflect the Company’s affiliation with the broader BC Partners Credit Platform. Additionally, we are proud to introduce a monthly distribution framework, and implement a robust share repurchase initiative, all designed to enhance shareholder value and align interests across the platform.

We are excited about the opportunities ahead and remain committed to delivering compelling risk-adjusted returns for our shareholders.”

Merger Related Terms
- Pre-closing: Shareholders of LRFC will receive 1.50 newly issued shares of PTMN common stock in exchange for each share of common stock of LRFC.
- Upon the closing of the merger: Portman Ridge will rebrand and begin operating under the name BCP Investment Corporation (the “Company” or “BCIC”). In connection with the rebranding, the Company will continue to trade on the Nasdaq under the new ticker symbol “BCIC”.
- Beginning in 2026: The Company will transition to paying its currently quarterly base distribution on a monthly basis, while retaining the potential for quarterly supplemental distributions. The quarterly supplemental distributions will continue to approximate 50% of the incremental net investment income earned in excess of the base monthly distributions.
- Over the next 24 months: To further align our interests with shareholders and drive additional value creation, the Company, along with its management, its adviser and their affiliates intend to acquire up to 20% of the Company’s outstanding common stock to the extent the Company’s shares continue to trade below 80% of net asset value (“NAV”), which implies a share price of $15.08 based Portman Ridge’s March 31, 2025 NAV per share, or approximately a 20% premium to PTMN’s June 26, 2025 closing market price. These purchases will begin no earlier than 60 calendar days following the date of the closing of the LRFC merger and may occur through various methods, including open market purchases and privately negotiated transactions, and may be conducted pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 and Rule 10b-18 trading plans. In this regard and as previously announced, PTMN’s Board of Directors has authorized an open market stock repurchase program of up to $10 million for the period from March 12, 2025 to March 31, 2026. The Company, its management and its adviser also reserve the right to conduct tender offers as part of the Company’s broader value creation initiatives.
About Portman Ridge Finance Corporation

PTMN is a publicly traded, externally managed closed-end investment company that has elected to be regulated as a business development company under the Investment Company Act of 1940. PTMN’s middle market investment business originates, structures, finances and manages a portfolio of term loans, mezzanine investments and selected equity securities in middle market companies. PTMN’s investment activities are managed by its investment adviser, Sierra Crest Investment Management LLC, an affiliate of BC Partners Advisors L.P. PTMN’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), earnings releases, press releases and other financial, operational and governance information are available on Portman Ridge’s website at www.portmanridge.com.

About Logan Ridge Finance Corporation

LRFC is a business development company (a “BDC”) that invests primarily in first lien loans and, to a lesser extent, second lien loans and equity securities issued by lower middle-market companies. LRFC invests in performing, well-established middle-market businesses that operate across a wide range of industries. It employs fundamental credit analysis, targeting investments in businesses with relatively low levels of cyclicality and operating risk. For more information, visit www.loganridgefinance.com.

About BC Partners Advisors L.P. and BC Partners Credit
BC Partners Advisors L.P. (“BC Partners”) is a leading international investment firm in private equity, private credit and real estate strategies. Established in 1986, BC Partners has played an active role in developing the European buyout market for three decades.

Today, BC Partners executives operate across markets as an integrated team through the firm’s offices in North America and Europe. For more information, please visit https://www.bcpartners.com/.

BC Partners Credit was launched in February 2017 and has pursued a strategy focused on identifying attractive credit opportunities in any market environment and across sectors, leveraging the deal sourcing and infrastructure made available from BC Partners.

Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

Some of the statements in this communication constitute forward-looking statements because they relate to future events, future performance or financial condition. The forward-looking statements may include statements as to future operating results and distribution projections of the Company; business prospects of the Company, and future share repurchase/purchase activity. In addition, words such as “anticipate,” “believe,” “expect,” “seek,” “plan,” “should,” “estimate,” “project” and “intend” indicate forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements include these words. The forward-looking statements contained in this communication involve risks and uncertainties. More information on the risks and other potential factors that could affect these forward-looking statements is included in Registration Statement and Joint Proxy Statement (in each case, as defined below). Although PTMN and LRFC undertake no obligation to revise or update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, you are advised to consult any additional disclosures that they may make directly to you or through reports that PTMN and LRFC in the future may file with the SEC, including the Registration Statement and Joint Proxy Statement, annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and current reports on Form 8-K.

Contacts:
Portman Ridge Finance Corporation
650 Madison Avenue, 3rd floor
New York, NY 10022

Brandon Satoren
Chief Financial Officer
Brandon.Satoren@bcpartners.com
(212) 891-2880

The Equity Group Inc.
Lena Cati
lcati@equityny.com
(212) 836-9611

Val Ferraro
vferraro@equityny.com
(212) 836-9633

The MIL Network –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI: Portman Ridge Finance Corporation Announces Shareholder Approval of Merger with Logan Ridge Finance Corporation
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

NEW YORK, June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Portman Ridge Finance Corporation (NASDAQ: PTMN) (“Portman Ridge” or “PTMN”) announced today that it obtained shareholder approval for the issuance of PTMN common stock in connection with the proposed merger of Logan Ridge Finance Corporation (NASDAQ: LRFC) (“Logan Ridge” or “LRFC”) with and into PTMN (the “Share Issuance Proposal”) following the adjourned special meeting of shareholders held on June 27, 2025.

PTMN shareholders voted overwhelmingly in favor of the proposed transaction, with approximately 88% of voting shareholders supporting the proposal. Of note, on June 20, 2025, LRFC stockholders approved the merger with PTMN. Thus, subject to the satisfaction of customary closing conditions, the merger is expected to close on or about July 15, 2025.

Ted Goldthorpe, President and Chief Executive Officer of PTMN and LRFC and Head of the BC Partners Credit Platform, stated, “We would like to thank our shareholders for their strong support of the merger with LRFC. Their vote affirms the strategic vision behind this combination and supports our efforts to create a larger, more efficient platform that is better positioned for long-term growth.

Upon closing, we look forward to rebranding the combined company as BCP Investment Corporation to reflect the Company’s affiliation with the broader BC Partners Credit Platform. Additionally, we are proud to introduce a monthly distribution framework, and implement a robust share repurchase initiative, all designed to enhance shareholder value and align interests across the platform.

We are excited about the opportunities ahead and remain committed to delivering compelling risk-adjusted returns for our shareholders.”

Merger Related Terms
- Pre-closing: Shareholders of LRFC will receive 1.50 newly issued shares of PTMN common stock in exchange for each share of common stock of LRFC.
- Upon the closing of the merger: Portman Ridge will rebrand and begin operating under the name BCP Investment Corporation (the “Company” or “BCIC”). In connection with the rebranding, the Company will continue to trade on the Nasdaq under the new ticker symbol “BCIC”.
- Beginning in 2026: The Company will transition to paying its currently quarterly base distribution on a monthly basis, while retaining the potential for quarterly supplemental distributions. The quarterly supplemental distributions will continue to approximate 50% of the incremental net investment income earned in excess of the base monthly distributions.
- Over the next 24 months: To further align our interests with shareholders and drive additional value creation, the Company, along with its management, its adviser and their affiliates intend to acquire up to 20% of the Company’s outstanding common stock to the extent the Company’s shares continue to trade below 80% of net asset value (“NAV”), which implies a share price of $15.08 based Portman Ridge’s March 31, 2025 NAV per share, or approximately a 20% premium to PTMN’s June 26, 2025 closing market price. These purchases will begin no earlier than 60 calendar days following the date of the closing of the LRFC merger and may occur through various methods, including open market purchases and privately negotiated transactions, and may be conducted pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 and Rule 10b-18 trading plans. In this regard and as previously announced, PTMN’s Board of Directors has authorized an open market stock repurchase program of up to $10 million for the period from March 12, 2025 to March 31, 2026. The Company, its management and its adviser also reserve the right to conduct tender offers as part of the Company’s broader value creation initiatives.
About Portman Ridge Finance Corporation

PTMN is a publicly traded, externally managed closed-end investment company that has elected to be regulated as a business development company under the Investment Company Act of 1940. PTMN’s middle market investment business originates, structures, finances and manages a portfolio of term loans, mezzanine investments and selected equity securities in middle market companies. PTMN’s investment activities are managed by its investment adviser, Sierra Crest Investment Management LLC, an affiliate of BC Partners Advisors L.P. PTMN’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), earnings releases, press releases and other financial, operational and governance information are available on Portman Ridge’s website at www.portmanridge.com.

About Logan Ridge Finance Corporation

LRFC is a business development company (a “BDC”) that invests primarily in first lien loans and, to a lesser extent, second lien loans and equity securities issued by lower middle-market companies. LRFC invests in performing, well-established middle-market businesses that operate across a wide range of industries. It employs fundamental credit analysis, targeting investments in businesses with relatively low levels of cyclicality and operating risk. For more information, visit www.loganridgefinance.com.

About BC Partners Advisors L.P. and BC Partners Credit
BC Partners Advisors L.P. (“BC Partners”) is a leading international investment firm in private equity, private credit and real estate strategies. Established in 1986, BC Partners has played an active role in developing the European buyout market for three decades.

Today, BC Partners executives operate across markets as an integrated team through the firm’s offices in North America and Europe. For more information, please visit https://www.bcpartners.com/.

BC Partners Credit was launched in February 2017 and has pursued a strategy focused on identifying attractive credit opportunities in any market environment and across sectors, leveraging the deal sourcing and infrastructure made available from BC Partners.

Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

Some of the statements in this communication constitute forward-looking statements because they relate to future events, future performance or financial condition. The forward-looking statements may include statements as to future operating results and distribution projections of the Company; business prospects of the Company, and future share repurchase/purchase activity. In addition, words such as “anticipate,” “believe,” “expect,” “seek,” “plan,” “should,” “estimate,” “project” and “intend” indicate forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements include these words. The forward-looking statements contained in this communication involve risks and uncertainties. More information on the risks and other potential factors that could affect these forward-looking statements is included in Registration Statement and Joint Proxy Statement (in each case, as defined below). Although PTMN and LRFC undertake no obligation to revise or update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, you are advised to consult any additional disclosures that they may make directly to you or through reports that PTMN and LRFC in the future may file with the SEC, including the Registration Statement and Joint Proxy Statement, annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and current reports on Form 8-K.

Contacts:
Portman Ridge Finance Corporation
650 Madison Avenue, 3rd floor
New York, NY 10022

Brandon Satoren
Chief Financial Officer
Brandon.Satoren@bcpartners.com
(212) 891-2880

The Equity Group Inc.
Lena Cati
lcati@equityny.com
(212) 836-9611

Val Ferraro
vferraro@equityny.com
(212) 836-9633

The MIL Network –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI: Portman Ridge Finance Corporation Announces Shareholder Approval of Merger with Logan Ridge Finance Corporation
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

NEW YORK, June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Portman Ridge Finance Corporation (NASDAQ: PTMN) (“Portman Ridge” or “PTMN”) announced today that it obtained shareholder approval for the issuance of PTMN common stock in connection with the proposed merger of Logan Ridge Finance Corporation (NASDAQ: LRFC) (“Logan Ridge” or “LRFC”) with and into PTMN (the “Share Issuance Proposal”) following the adjourned special meeting of shareholders held on June 27, 2025.

PTMN shareholders voted overwhelmingly in favor of the proposed transaction, with approximately 88% of voting shareholders supporting the proposal. Of note, on June 20, 2025, LRFC stockholders approved the merger with PTMN. Thus, subject to the satisfaction of customary closing conditions, the merger is expected to close on or about July 15, 2025.

Ted Goldthorpe, President and Chief Executive Officer of PTMN and LRFC and Head of the BC Partners Credit Platform, stated, “We would like to thank our shareholders for their strong support of the merger with LRFC. Their vote affirms the strategic vision behind this combination and supports our efforts to create a larger, more efficient platform that is better positioned for long-term growth.

Upon closing, we look forward to rebranding the combined company as BCP Investment Corporation to reflect the Company’s affiliation with the broader BC Partners Credit Platform. Additionally, we are proud to introduce a monthly distribution framework, and implement a robust share repurchase initiative, all designed to enhance shareholder value and align interests across the platform.

We are excited about the opportunities ahead and remain committed to delivering compelling risk-adjusted returns for our shareholders.”

Merger Related Terms
- Pre-closing: Shareholders of LRFC will receive 1.50 newly issued shares of PTMN common stock in exchange for each share of common stock of LRFC.
- Upon the closing of the merger: Portman Ridge will rebrand and begin operating under the name BCP Investment Corporation (the “Company” or “BCIC”). In connection with the rebranding, the Company will continue to trade on the Nasdaq under the new ticker symbol “BCIC”.
- Beginning in 2026: The Company will transition to paying its currently quarterly base distribution on a monthly basis, while retaining the potential for quarterly supplemental distributions. The quarterly supplemental distributions will continue to approximate 50% of the incremental net investment income earned in excess of the base monthly distributions.
- Over the next 24 months: To further align our interests with shareholders and drive additional value creation, the Company, along with its management, its adviser and their affiliates intend to acquire up to 20% of the Company’s outstanding common stock to the extent the Company’s shares continue to trade below 80% of net asset value (“NAV”), which implies a share price of $15.08 based Portman Ridge’s March 31, 2025 NAV per share, or approximately a 20% premium to PTMN’s June 26, 2025 closing market price. These purchases will begin no earlier than 60 calendar days following the date of the closing of the LRFC merger and may occur through various methods, including open market purchases and privately negotiated transactions, and may be conducted pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 and Rule 10b-18 trading plans. In this regard and as previously announced, PTMN’s Board of Directors has authorized an open market stock repurchase program of up to $10 million for the period from March 12, 2025 to March 31, 2026. The Company, its management and its adviser also reserve the right to conduct tender offers as part of the Company’s broader value creation initiatives.
About Portman Ridge Finance Corporation

PTMN is a publicly traded, externally managed closed-end investment company that has elected to be regulated as a business development company under the Investment Company Act of 1940. PTMN’s middle market investment business originates, structures, finances and manages a portfolio of term loans, mezzanine investments and selected equity securities in middle market companies. PTMN’s investment activities are managed by its investment adviser, Sierra Crest Investment Management LLC, an affiliate of BC Partners Advisors L.P. PTMN’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), earnings releases, press releases and other financial, operational and governance information are available on Portman Ridge’s website at www.portmanridge.com.

About Logan Ridge Finance Corporation

LRFC is a business development company (a “BDC”) that invests primarily in first lien loans and, to a lesser extent, second lien loans and equity securities issued by lower middle-market companies. LRFC invests in performing, well-established middle-market businesses that operate across a wide range of industries. It employs fundamental credit analysis, targeting investments in businesses with relatively low levels of cyclicality and operating risk. For more information, visit www.loganridgefinance.com.

About BC Partners Advisors L.P. and BC Partners Credit
BC Partners Advisors L.P. (“BC Partners”) is a leading international investment firm in private equity, private credit and real estate strategies. Established in 1986, BC Partners has played an active role in developing the European buyout market for three decades.

Today, BC Partners executives operate across markets as an integrated team through the firm’s offices in North America and Europe. For more information, please visit https://www.bcpartners.com/.

BC Partners Credit was launched in February 2017 and has pursued a strategy focused on identifying attractive credit opportunities in any market environment and across sectors, leveraging the deal sourcing and infrastructure made available from BC Partners.

Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

Some of the statements in this communication constitute forward-looking statements because they relate to future events, future performance or financial condition. The forward-looking statements may include statements as to future operating results and distribution projections of the Company; business prospects of the Company, and future share repurchase/purchase activity. In addition, words such as “anticipate,” “believe,” “expect,” “seek,” “plan,” “should,” “estimate,” “project” and “intend” indicate forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements include these words. The forward-looking statements contained in this communication involve risks and uncertainties. More information on the risks and other potential factors that could affect these forward-looking statements is included in Registration Statement and Joint Proxy Statement (in each case, as defined below). Although PTMN and LRFC undertake no obligation to revise or update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, you are advised to consult any additional disclosures that they may make directly to you or through reports that PTMN and LRFC in the future may file with the SEC, including the Registration Statement and Joint Proxy Statement, annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and current reports on Form 8-K.

Contacts:
Portman Ridge Finance Corporation
650 Madison Avenue, 3rd floor
New York, NY 10022

Brandon Satoren
Chief Financial Officer
Brandon.Satoren@bcpartners.com
(212) 891-2880

The Equity Group Inc.
Lena Cati
lcati@equityny.com
(212) 836-9611

Val Ferraro
vferraro@equityny.com
(212) 836-9633

The MIL Network –
June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

Source: European Central Bank

Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

Basel, 27 June 2025

Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.^[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.^[2]

Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.^[3]

Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.^[4]

Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

This raises three pressing issues.

First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.^[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.^[6]

Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.^[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.^[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.^[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.^[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.^[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.^[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.^[13]

Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.^[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.^[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.^[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.^[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.^[18]

We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.^[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.^[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.^[21]

We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface^[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world^[23].

Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.^[24]

Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

Conclusion

Let me conclude.

We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

Thank you for your attention.

MIL OSI Economics –

June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

Source: European Central Bank

Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

Basel, 27 June 2025

Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.^[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.^[2]

Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.^[3]

Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.^[4]

Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

This raises three pressing issues.

First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.^[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.^[6]

Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.^[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.^[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.^[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.^[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.^[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.^[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.^[13]

Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.^[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.^[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.^[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.^[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.^[18]

We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.^[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.^[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.^[21]

We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface^[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world^[23].

Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.^[24]

Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

Conclusion

Let me conclude.

We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

Thank you for your attention.

MIL OSI Economics –

June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

Source: European Central Bank

Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

Basel, 27 June 2025

Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.^[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.^[2]

Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.^[3]

Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.^[4]

Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

This raises three pressing issues.

First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.^[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.^[6]

Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.^[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.^[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.^[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.^[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.^[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.^[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.^[13]

Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.^[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.^[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.^[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.^[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.^[18]

We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.^[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.^[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.^[21]

We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface^[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world^[23].

Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.^[24]

Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

Conclusion

Let me conclude.

We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

Thank you for your attention.

MIL OSI Economics –

June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

Source: European Central Bank

Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

Basel, 27 June 2025

Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.^[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.^[2]

Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.^[3]

Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.^[4]

Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

This raises three pressing issues.

First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.^[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.^[6]

Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.^[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.^[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.^[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.^[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.^[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.^[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.^[13]

Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.^[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.^[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.^[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.^[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.^[18]

We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.^[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.^[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.^[21]

We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface^[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world^[23].

Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.^[24]

Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

Conclusion

Let me conclude.

We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

Thank you for your attention.

MIL OSI Economics –

June 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Working Group announces Small Business Champions, discusses digitalization and MC14 plan

Source: World Trade Organization

Small Business Champions

The winners of the 2025 Small Business Champions Competition are Silaiwali (India), a company which empowers women artisans by upcycling waste fabric from garment factories into handcrafted products, and NetZero Pallets (Viet Nam), which specializes in converting biomass into carbon-neutral shipping pallet materials.

The fifth edition of the competition was held under the theme “Completing the Loop: Helping Small Businesses Contribute to the Circular Economy.” It was jointly organized by the Informal Working Group on MSMEs, the International Trade Centre (ITC), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and in partnership with UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for the first time.

At the award ceremony, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala congratulated the winners and reiterated the vital role of MSMEs in global value chains and supply chains. She emphasized that small businesses are a bedrock of innovation and agility, and that the Small Business Champions Award reflects their invaluable contributions to sustainable development. She also stressed the importance of supporting MSMEs in times of uncertainty, as they often face significant trade barriers, particularly in accessing knowledge and finance. “They’re the ones that need the stability and predictability of the world trading system the most. We cannot do without their voice,” she said.

ITC Executive Director Pamela Coke-Hamilton and ICC Secretary General John Denton also delivered opening remarks. Deputy Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Pedro Manuel Moreno, addressed the ceremony via video message. All three speakers reaffirmed their organizations’ commitment to fostering a supportive business ecosystem where MSMEs can thrive and actively contribute to the circular economy.

The award ceremony can be watched here.

Digitalization, other thematic issues

Lively discussions focused on capacity building for MSMEs through digital transformation, with members and international organizations sharing experiences in helping small businesses reduce costs and improve efficiency.

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) introduced its Cross-Border Paperless Trade Database, developed with the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), as a hub offering innovative resources and legal support. China presented its single-window customs platform designed to simplify cross-border procedures for MSMEs. The International Trade Centre (ITC) provided an update on its digital trade policy and regulatory work. It also outlined its work on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) through the “One Trade Africa” project, which supports African MSMEs in participating in trade. Georgia proposed a peer-learning session to explore how to scale up digital solutions and streamline regulations.

Building on previous thematic sessions, members also discussed good regulatory practices (GRPs) and the informal sector. They emphasized the importance of ensuring interoperability between regulatory frameworks to facilitate MSME trade. Participants expressed support for continued dialogue on informal MSMEs and recommended monitoring relevant developments in other international forums.

MC14 strategies, implementation of 2020 MSME Package

Following discussions at the March meeting, the Coordinator, Ambassador Matthew Wilson of Barbados, proposed tentative outcomes and issues to be developed in the lead-up to MC14. Group members agreed to focus on a primary deliverable: a joint study report by the World Customs Organization, ICC and the WTO on the integration of MSMEs into Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programmes (INF/MSME/W/62/Rev.2), as adopted by the Group in March.

Additional outcomes will include the Coordinator’s reports summarizing the Group’s work between MC13 and MC14, a summary of exemplary small enterprises and a review of key findings from the thematic discussions.

The MSME Group Coordinator announced new funding from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) and the Organization for Trade Development and Standards Cooperation (ODCCN) for the Trade4MSMEs website to ensure its operation for the next six years. This contribution has already enabled the translation of the website into Mandarin, thereby enhancing its accessibility to a broader international audience.

In addition, members agreed to continue deliberating on a possible policy guidance document (a compendium) for good regulatory practices (GRPs). Further discussion is also planned on how to advance joint work with the Trade and Gender Initiative, particularly in improving access to finance for women-led MSMEs.

The Group also reviewed progress in implementing its December 2020 MSME Package — a set of policy recommendations aimed at supporting MSMEs. Several members, along with the WTO Secretariat, provided updates on their respective actions in support of the package’s implementation.

Strengthening engagement with private sector

A special session open to the business community took place on 25 June. Small traders were invited to share their views on the impact of recent trade tensions on their businesses, their engagement in good regulatory practices, and other challenges they face.

The Coordinator reflected on key takeaways from the constructive discussion. Businesses described a challenging landscape created by economic uncertainty and ongoing trade tensions, including regarding tariffs. They also noted benefits from newly implemented efficiencies and other significant challenges, especially in relation to planning and day-to-day operations.

While good regulatory practice (GRP) initiatives exist, MSMEs reported that they are often not adequately informed or consulted. They also noted that GRPs tend to be fragmented and country-specific, lacking global harmonization. Small businesses further highlighted limited access to tariff and trade regulation information, lack of clarity regarding customs regulations, and high shipping costs as major trade obstacles. They called for easier access to tariff information and greater support from national authorities.

Members welcomed the discussion and proposed further discussions on how to incorporate feedback from the business community into the Group’s future agenda.

Next

The next meeting of the Informal Working Group on MSMEs is scheduled for 3 October 2025.

Share

MIL OSI Economics –

June 28, 2025

Ninepoint ETF Series	Ticker	Cash Distribution per unit		Notional Distribution per unit		CUSIP
Ninepoint Cash Management Fund	NSAV	$0.12456		$0.00000		65443X105

Category: Economy

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

Business continuity plans can separate those that recover from those that do not

Business continuity plans are cost-effective mitigation measures

Business continuity plans are a mechanism to operationalize resilience

Business continuity plans can offer a strategic advantage during uncertainty

Business continuity plans can improve financial reserves

Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

Conclusion

Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

Conclusion

Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

Conclusion

Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

Conclusion

Small Business Champions

Digitalization, other thematic issues

MC14 strategies, implementation of 2020 MSME Package

Strengthening engagement with private sector

Next

Share