Category: Economy

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report – A10-0100/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report

    (2024/2078(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

     having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

     having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

     having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[1] (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[2] (the Common Provisions Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[3] (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014[4],

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

     having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

     having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

     having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

     having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

     having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

     having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States[6];

     having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded[9],

     having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU[10],

     having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[11],

     having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[13],

     having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’[14],

     having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092[15],

     having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report[16],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[17],

     having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU[18],

     having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society[19],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas[20],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe[21],

     having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling[22],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report[23],

     having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)[24],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021[25],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded[26],

     having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia[27],

     having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia[28],

     having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU[29],

     having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP[30],

     having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union[31],

     having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe[32],

     having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’[33],

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[34],

     having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds[35],

     having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware[36] ,

     having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland[37],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists[38],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (COM(2023)0051),

     having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023[39],

     having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime[40],

     having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications[41],

     having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

     having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

     having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

     having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

     having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

     having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

     having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)[42],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

    A. whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

    B. whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected[43],[44]; whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

    C. whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

    D. whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

    E. whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

    F. whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

    Independence of the judiciary

    1. Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

    2. Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

    3. Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges   essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

    4. Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

    5. Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice;

    6. Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

    7. Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

    8. Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States[45] and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

    9. Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

    10. Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

    11. Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

    12. Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

    13. Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

    14. Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

    15. Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

    16. Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive[46] to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

    17. Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

    18. Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

    19. Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

    Anti-corruption framework

    20. Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

    21. Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

    22. Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

    23. Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

    24. Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

    25. Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation[47] and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law[48] in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

    26. Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

    27. Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

    28. Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

    29. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

    30. Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking; acknowledges the agreement on establishing the Interinstitutional Body for Ethical Standards;

    31. Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

    Media pluralism and freedom

    32. Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)[49] and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

    33. Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive[50], as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

    34. Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings[51], and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

    35. Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

    36. Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

    37. Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes; 

    38. Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act[52] (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

    39. Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

    40. Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

    41. Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343[53] on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

    42. Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

    Civil society organisations (CSOs)

    43. Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

    44. Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)[54] and civil society networks[55]; reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

    45. Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups[56];

    46. Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

    47. Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

    48. Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

    49. Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

    50. Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States[57] and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

    Equality and non-discrimination before the law

    51. Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

    52. Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC[58] on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive[59] and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

    53. Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

    54. Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    55. Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

    56. Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC[60] in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings[61] of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

    57. Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

    58. Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

    59. Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

    60. Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500[62] and Directive 2024/1499[63], which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

    61. Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

    62. Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

    63. Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)[64]; urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

    64. Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

    65. Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

    Single market and the rule of law

    66. Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

    67. Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

    68. Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

    69. Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

    70. Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

    71. Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

    72. Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

    Rule of law toolbox

    73. Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

    74. Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

    75. Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

    76. Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law[65], not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

    77. Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

    78. Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

    79. Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

    Checks and balances

    80. Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

    81. Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

    82. Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

    83. Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act[66], the AI Act[67], Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising[68] and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

    84. Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

    85. Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

    86. Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

    87. Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms[69]; recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

    88. Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

    89. Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

    90. Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

    Horizontal recommendations

    91. Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

    92. Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

    93. Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    94. Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

    95. Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

    96. Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

    97. Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

    98. Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

    99. Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; reiterates the proposal to create a permanent group of eminent personalities (‘wise persons group’) composed of independent legal, academic and human rights experts, tasked with systematically monitoring rule of law developments in Member States and providing regular assessments, recommendations and early warnings to the Commission; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

    100. Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

    101. Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

    102. Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

    103. Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

    104. Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

    105. Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

    °

    ° °

    106. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Node AI ($GPU) Launches Phase 01 of GPU Aggregator with AWS, Azure, Vast AI & More — Alongside GPU DAO & Staking 2.0

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    San Jose, CA, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Node AI, the decentralized AI compute protocol powered by the $GPU token, has officially announced Phase 01 of its groundbreaking GPU Aggregator — a one-click deployment solution integrating GPUs from AWS, Azure, Vast AI, GCP, RunPod, and 50+ global providers.

    Why it matters:

    • Developers get faster, cheaper, smarter AI compute
    • $GPU holders enjoy exclusive deployment discounts
    • Aggregator boosts network revenue and increases staking value

    With this launch, Node AI is redefining compute accessibility, positioning itself as the go-to AI infrastructure layer in the decentralized ecosystem.

    GPU Aggregator Phase 01: A Unified Compute Marketplace

    The GPU Aggregator is a one-click gateway to global compute — a single interface that connects:

    • AWSAzureVast AIGCPRunPod, and 50+ GPU providers
    • Enables real-time selection of best pricing and performance
    • Offers $GPU-holder-exclusive deployment discounts
    • Makes deploying LLMs and AI workloads frictionless and cost-efficient

    This aggregator launch is a major unlock in Node AI’s goal to democratize access to high-performance compute.

    Decentralized GPU Renting & Lending

    Node AI connects GPU owners and AI developers:

    • Lend idle GPU power and earn $GPU
    • Rent compute on-demand via smart contracts
    • Fully permissionless and automated provisioning

    Whether you’re training a model or serving live inference, Node AI’s infrastructure is enterprise-ready.

    Tokenomics & Revenue Model

    • 100M max supply
    • ~96M circulating
    • No VC or team tokens
    • Real revenue model — ETH fees from compute usage are distributed to stakers

    This sustainable design prioritizes long-term growth and fair participation.

    Real Revenue, Fair Launch, No VC Tokens

    Unlike many competitors, Node AI has:

    • No team tokens or VC allocations
    • 100% real revenue model — ETH from GPU node rentals supports staking rewards
    • A total supply of 100M $GPU, with ~96M in circulation

    This token model is designed for sustainability, favoring long-term holders and infrastructure participants.

    Roadmap Highlights: What’s Coming Next?

    • Scalable AI Endpoints for deploying inference workloads
    • AI Compute Marketplace integration with aggregator
    • Benchmarking Suite for hardware performance transparency
    • GPU Aggregator Expansion with deeper routing intelligence
    • dApp integrations for AI projects to tap into decentralized compute seamlessly

    Hardware Backbone: Built for AI Performance

    Node AI’s compute backbone is built with high-end specs:

    • NVIDIA A100 and upcoming H100 GPUs
    • Enterprise-grade cooling and power infrastructure
    • Redundant systems to guarantee uptime for AI model deployment and inference tasks

    The platform allows users to deploy AI endpoints instantly — a huge leap for accessibility in AI hosting.

    Node AI is Becoming the Backbone of Decentralized AI Compute

    With the GPU Aggregator Phase 01 liveGPU DAO active, and Staking 2.0 generating real ETH rewardsNode AI is building one of the most advanced decentralized AI infrastructures in the space.

    Whether you’re an AI dev, a GPU owner, or a crypto staker — Node AI is where utility, rewards, and decentralization converge.

    Learn more: https://nodeai.app
    Whitepaper: https://docs.nodes.ai/
    Follow: https://twitter.com/NodeAIETH

    Disclaimer: The information provided in this press release is not a solicitation for investment, nor is it intended as investment advice, financial advice, or trading advice. It is strongly recommended you practice due diligence, including consultation with a professional financial advisor, before investing in or trading cryptocurrency and securities.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes the Fifth Review under the Policy Coordination Instrument for Rwanda

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 4, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board today concluded the fifth review under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI). The PCI continues to support Rwanda’s reform agenda aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability, promoting sustainable and inclusive growth, and advancing climate-resilient development.
    • Rwanda’s economic growth remains among the strongest in sub-Saharan Africa, despite rising fiscal and external pressures linked to large investment projects and reduced concessional financing. Continued fiscal consolidation, supported by stronger domestic revenue mobilization and spending efficiency, is essential to safeguard macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability.
    • Program performance under the PCI has been strong. All quantitative targets were met, and most reform commitments were implemented, including in SOE governance, monetary statistics, and digital public financial management. The approval of the comprehensive tax policy package and the rollout of the Global Master Repurchase Agreement were implemented with a delay. Rwanda continues to demonstrate leadership in integrating climate considerations into macroeconomic policy and leveraging institutional reforms to mobilize climate finance.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the fifth review under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) for Rwanda.[1]

    Rwanda’s economy expanded by 8.9 percent in 2024, driven by a rebound in agriculture and continued strength in the services and construction sectors. Inflation remained within the National Bank of Rwanda’s 2–8 percent target band, reflecting tight monetary policy and improved domestic food supply. The current account deficit widened in 2024 due to strong consumer and capital goods imports, but reserves remained adequate at 4.7 months of imports as of end-year.

    Going forward, the fiscal position will be under pressure from the large infrastructure investment in the New Kigali International Airport and the expansion of RwandAir, as well as the recent pension reform. Public debt is expected to peak in FY2025/26, with the PCI debt anchor now projected to be reached in 2033. Accelerating domestic revenue mobilization and maintaining a credible fiscal consolidation path are crucial to restoring policy space and ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability. Continued vigilance is also needed to manage risks from SOEs, rising debt service costs, and constrained access to concessional financing.

    Monetary policy should remain data-driven to contain inflation and support external adjustment. Exchange rate flexibility will be essential to absorb shocks, while reforms to strengthen FX market functioning should continue. Close oversight of credit expansion—including in the microfinance sector—and improved monitoring of large exposures are important to safeguard financial stability.

    Program implementation under the PCI remains strong. All quantitative targets were met and most structural benchmarks for this review were completed, including those on SOE governance, PFM digitalization, and monetary statistics expansion. The remaining two structural benchmarks on the Cabinet approval of the comprehensive tax policy package and the rollout of the Global Master Repurchase Agreement were implemented with a delay. The authorities continue to build on the strong foundation established under the now-completed RSF. Progress on climate-related reforms has remained strong, including efforts to implement a climate budget tagging system, develop green taxonomies, and advance the climate finance agenda. Developing a pipeline of viable, bankable green projects will be essential to fully leverage available resources and sustain momentum.

    At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement:

    “Rwanda’s economy has demonstrated impressive resilience, recording strong growth supported by robust activity in the services, construction, and agriculture sectors. Inflation has remained within the NBR target range, aided by prudent monetary policy and improved domestic food supply. However, the macroeconomic environment has become more complex due to a need to implement difficult reforms against the background of worsening external conditions, including aid withdrawals and regional tensions.

    “Sustaining fiscal consolidation remains vital to preserving macroeconomic stability and ensuring debt sustainability. The recently adopted tax reform package is a welcome step toward broadening the tax base and enhancing equity and efficiency. Continued expenditure rationalization and close monitoring of fiscal risks, particularly from SOEs and the ambitious priority investment project, are essential. The fiscal implications of pension reform and the financing needs for the priority infrastructure project must be carefully managed to maintain fiscal discipline.

    “Monetary and financial policies remain focused on stability, but vigilance is warranted. Inflationary pressures from fiscal loosening and tax policy changes may necessitate a tightening of the policy stance. Greater exchange rate flexibility is crucial to support external adjustment and safeguard reserve adequacy. The authorities’ efforts to modernize the monetary policy framework and strengthen FX market functioning are welcome. Enhancing risk monitoring, particularly in the microfinance sector, and large exposures, along with building additional capital buffers, will be key to safeguarding financial stability.

    “Rwanda continues to advance structural reforms under the PCI, including improvements in SOE governance, public financial management digitalization, and financial sector statistics. Progress on climate-related reforms under the RSF is commendable. Looking ahead, Rwanda’s efforts to build a pipeline of bankable green projects and improve climate finance coordination will be instrumental in mobilizing additional resources. Continued commitment to reform and strong engagement with development partners will be critical to sustaining progress and supporting Rwanda’s ambitious development agenda.”

    [1] The PCI arrangement was approved on December 12, 2022.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/04/pr-25178-rwanda-imf-concludes-the-5th-review-under-the-policy-coor-instrument

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Third and Fourth Reviews under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Approves US$58 Million Disbursement for the Central African Republic

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 4, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board today completed the third and fourth reviews under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for the Central African Republic (CAR). The completion of the third and fourth reviews allows for an immediate disbursement of SDR 43.22 million (about US$58 million) to CAR to address protracted balance of payment needs and sustaining priority spending on basic public services.
    • Economic growth is expected to accelerate to 3 percent in 2025, up from 1.9 percent in 2024, while inflation is projected to decline gradually. The outlook depends on faster fuel market and governance reforms, and increased grant and concessional financing.
    • Program performance was mixed, while downside risks remain substantial.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the third and fourth reviews of the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement for the Central African Republic (CAR). The ECF arrangement, with access of SDR 147.48 million (about US$197 million), was approved by the IMF Executive Board in April 2023 (see Press Release No. 23/129). The completion of these reviews allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 43.22 million (about US$58 million) bringing total disbursements under the ECF arrangement to SDR 92.29 million (around US$124 million).

    In completing the reviews, the Executive Board also approved the authorities’ request for waivers of nonobservance of the performance criteria (PC) for the end-June 2024 and end-December 2024 domestic primary fiscal balance and net domestic financing. The Executive Board also approved the authorities’ request for a waiver of nonobservance of the continuous PC on non-accumulation of new external arrears. Further, the Executive Board completed the financing assurances review under the ECF arrangement.

    The ECF arrangement is part of coordinated efforts by international financial institutions to support the people of CAR. It will continue to help the country meet the protracted balance of payments needs and sustain spending on basic public services, including in the health and education sectors. Program implementation has helped anchor structural reforms and financing. Fuel supply and revenue have improved. Progress is being made in digitalizing the revenue administration and PFM systems, along with enhancements to the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Court of Audit. Completing the combined reviews creates new opportunities for positive outcomes.

    Economic activity is projected to expand by 3 percent in 2025, up from 1.9 percent in 2024, driven by higher energy use, mining recovery, infrastructure projects, and improved security. Inflation would ease by end-2025, in part helped by the cut in pump prices in May 2025. Still, a tighter fiscal stance is needed to arrest rising debt vulnerabilities. The domestic primary deficit would narrow to 2.1 percent of GDP in 2025 from 4.9 percent in 2024, assuming bold political backing for the agreed measures on tax administration and compliance. Reinforced spending controls are also key ahead of elections and cuts in humanitarian aid.

    The overhaul of the fuel market remains pivotal for macroeconomic stabilization and both sustained and inclusive growth in CAR. The fuel procurement audit should be accelerated to underpin price reforms and address persistent inefficiencies. Despite recent supply increases and price cuts, pump prices remain high due to costly and opaque imports. Transparent use of the recent diesel grant and a thorough audit of costs and margins could help enhance competition, improve supply efficiency, and boost fiscal revenue.

    Following the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “The Central African Republic (CAR) has shown renewed commitment to structural reforms under the ECF-arrangement despite facing deep-rooted fragility and significant uncertainty. Both financial and technical support from development partners remain vital to the program’s success, to overcome weak capacity, elevated revenue volatility, and to alleviate humanitarian needs.

    “Program performance for the combined third and fourth reviews was mixed, which is being addressed with strong corrective actions. Half of the six PCs for end-June and end-December 2024 were met. Still, the domestic primary deficit and net domestic financing targets were missed by wide margins, as was the continuous PC on non-accumulation of external arrears. The indicative targets for social spending and expenditures via extraordinary procedures were also missed.

    “Strengthening tax compliance and controls is key to boosting revenue but requires strong political support. Accelerating the fuel procurement audit is also essential to address inefficiencies and enable further reductions in pump prices. A well-functioning fuel market is vital for fiscal and macroeconomic stability.

    “Program performance depends on stronger public financial management (PFM), particularly spending controls ahead of the elections. Improved PFM is essential to prevent arrears, limit extraordinary procedures, and ensure effective social spending. It would also help mobilize grants and concessional financing, reduce costly regional borrowing, and safeguard debt sustainability.

    “Enhancing governance will reinforce PFM efforts. Progress in strengthening the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Court of Audit is welcome. Adopting the new forestry code and implementing the mining code are key to unlocking CAR’s growth potential. Prompt operationalization of the asset declaration system is also critical to maintaining donor support.

    “Policies to enhance growth potential and improve equality should be anchored on the National Development Plan (NDP) (2024-2028). A steadfast execution of the NDP is also crucial to catalyze donor support and start attracting foreign private investment flows.

    CAR’s economic program will remain supported by the implementation of policies and reforms agreed among CEMAC regional institutions, which notably aim at supporting an increase in regional net foreign assets which are ultimately critical to program’s success.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/04/pr-25179-car-imf-completes-3rd-4th-rev-under-ecf-arrang-and-approves-us-58-mil-disburse

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Mining in Motion: Ghana Targets Global Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) Integration

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    ACCRA, Ghana, June 4, 2025/APO Group/ —

    Ghana is formalizing its artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) sector to align with global standards, promote sustainability and boost economic integration. Despite ASGM contributing over 35% to the country’s total gold output, much of the country’s artisanal mining activity remains informal. Speakers during a Mining in Motion 2025 panel outlined steps to address this challenge and accelerate the global integration of Ghana’s ASGM sector 

    The session – titled Integrating ASGM into Global Supply Chains, sponsored by Emirates Gold- examined policy gaps, market barriers and innovative solutions to enhance the credibility and competitiveness of ASGM gold on the international stage. In recent months, Ghana has been making strides to foster a conducive environment for ASGM producers.  

    According to Neil Harby, Chief Technical Officer, London Bullion Market Association, “Recently introduced guidelines have improved Ghana’s capacity to produce small-scale gold, but the risk-reward ratio still lacks.”  

    As such, the Ghana Gold Board, established this year, has been created to oversee, regulate and manage all gold and precious mineral-related activities in Ghana. The Board aims to enhance regulation, maximize foreign exchange earnings, build gold reserves and promote value addition for national economic transformation.  

    “If you look at Ghana’s reserves, they’ve been very static. So, we’ve sat down and looked at how we can leverage gold resources in the country. If we can convert a domestic asset but go through the processes to convert it to a foreign asset, then we can begin to build upon our gold reserves,” stated Dr. Steve Opata, Head of Risk, Foreign Reserves Management at the Bank of Ghana. 

    Meanwhile, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has supported Ghana’s efforts to formalize its artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector by addressing illicit financial flows and promoting responsible sourcing through tools like the Due Diligence Guidance and ASM Hub. Collaborating with the Ghanian government, the OECD helps develop policies to regulate ASM, which plays a vital economic role but faces challenges including environmental harm and links to illicit activity. 

    “You have to be sure that you have some understanding of the mapping of the supply chain. You need the management systems to help you understand the circumstances of production around those mine sites. We want to allow commercial relationships between small-scale and artisanal miners and international producers,” stated Louis Maréchal, Sector Lead: Minerals and Extractives, OECD. 

    As a key player in the global precious minerals industry, Emirates Bullion Market offers significant expertise in gold refining and infrastructure development. In recent years, the UAE has become increasingly instrumental in Ghana’s gold sector. In 2024, the country emerged as one of the top export destinations for Ghana’s gold, accounting – alongside Switzerland – for 36.5% of total exports. 

    “Sustainability is conducive to operating with local miners. We want to know how their operations support the communities they come from. We only promote sustainable mining while safeguarding investor interest,” stated Sudheesh Nambiath, Manager, Dubai Multi Commodities Center, Emirates Bullion Market. 

    Meanwhile, Rand Refinery supports Ghana’s gold upstream sector by offering smelting, refining and metal recovery services. The company holds exclusive rights to refine Goldplat’s Ghana output, with a mutual agreement on processing by-products.   

    “Working as a team with in-country producers, ASM producers and large-scale miners, the intention is to unlock productivity at a commercial scale,” stated Jason McPherson, Head of Sourcing and Business Development, Rand Refinery. 

    With the launch of the Ghana Gold Board and strategic upgrades to its mining code, Ghana is aligning its ASGM sector with global standards. The country is positioning itself as a leading destination for sustainable gold sourcing, investment and innovation – proving that responsible mining can drive both local empowerment and global integration. 

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kim, Correa Request Retroactive Funding Support in Wake of Airport Fire

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Young Kim (CA-39)

    Washington, DC – Today, Representatives Young Kim (CA-40) and Lou Correa (CA-46) sent a letter to Nancy Ward, Director of the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal EOS), demanding retroactive grant support for Orange County in the wake of last year’s Airport Fire. In the immediate wake of the fire, the County’s Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) request submitted was denied—and has since had significant consequences for local residents and emergency response capabilities.

    Despite the fire’s aggressive behavior, widespread evacuations, and the threat to residential structures, the FMAG request was placed “on hold.” The rationale cited—insufficient threat level and lack of residential impact—was inconsistent with the on-the-ground conditions reported by first responders.

    “We are concerned that the denial of this FMAG request reflects a misjudgment of the situation’s urgency and impact,” Kim and Correa lambasted. “The Airport Fire posed a clear and present danger to life and property, and the County of Orange acted swiftly and in good faith to seek state support. It is important to note that Riverside County, which was also impacted by the Airport Fire, received their FMAG declaration on September 11 despite less structure loss than Orange County.”

    The Orange County Fire Authority and the Orange County Sheriff’s Department continued to engage with Cal OES through multiple revised submissions, then through additional follow up. These efforts were met with either no response or continued denial, despite mounting evidence of the fire’s severity and the financial burden placed on local agencies.

    “We respectfully request that Cal OES reconsider and approve the FMAG request retroactively,” they added, “acknowledging the critical need for federal assistance in mitigating the effects of this disaster and supporting our local emergency services.”

    You can read the full text of the letter HERE.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Scaling up European Innovation – 04-06-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Union (EU) is seeking to boost its competitiveness to help ensure the well-being of its society in the face of global challenges. Central to this objective is the EU’s innovation ecosystem, which has fallen behind the United States (US) and China. As innovative European companies grow, they struggle to attract the necessary technical and financial support within the continent. The European Commission plans to put forward a legislative proposal for a 28th regime as part of a programme of measures to boost the EU’s innovation ecosystem. The European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) is preparing a legislative-initiative report to inform the development of this proposal. This briefing, produced at the request of the committee, seeks to support its work on the file. The research identified four issues that are relevant for EU action: (1) the EU financial system has a low appetite for risk; (2) innovative companies struggle to attract workers (within the EU and beyond) with the relevant skills; (3) innovative companies face a high cost of failure and/or restructuring; and (4) there is high variation in laws affecting companies across the EU. While the proposed Savings and Investments Union could help to address the immediate and pressing demand for capital from innovative European companies, other measures such as the 28th regime could be complementary and offer European added value. Establishing one common set of EU-wide rules and introducing an EU stock option plan could boost the regime’s attractiveness for innovative European companies. Embedding links to the EU innovation ecosystem and ‘European preference’ incentives could also be beneficial. Levelling the playing field for innovative European companies, particularly by reducing the period of time to establish a company, complete funding rounds and advance through the lifecycle, could help to attract venture capital and boost the number of innovative scale-ups.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 – P-001284/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030[1] focuses on how the Union could best support Member States in filling their most urgent and critical conventional capability gaps.

    In this regard, it proposes actions and instruments to financially support Member States (in particular through the coordinated activation of the National escape clause under the Stability and Growth Pact, and the proposed new instrument Security Action for Europe — SAFE), increase the EU defence industrial readiness, including through simplification efforts, or work more closely with Ukraine and other partners.

    The Commission kindly notes that the questions submitted go beyond the scope of the White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030. They also fall outside the competences of the Commission. It is the prerogative of Member States to decide upon mobilisation of their armed forces, regardless of the framework in which to deploy them (North Atlantic Treaty Oganisation, EU, United Nations, coalition, national, etc.).

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025JC0120.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – A Europe ready for war by 2030 – P-001202/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The deterioration of the security context requires Member States to rapidly invest in defence, with a major impact on public finances. This exceptional situation, beyond Member State control, justifies Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)[1] as a legal basis, allowing the Council to adopt measures in crisis situations. Security Action for Europe (SAFE) is a new specific and temporary instrument in the form of a regulation.

    The role of the European Parliament is pivotal, and the Commissioner for Defence and Space is committed to regularly engage with the European Parliament.

    Defence is a Member States’ prerogative. The Commission has the economic and regulatory means to support them.

    SAFE loans are not expenditure arising from Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) operations with military or defence implications pursuant to Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union[2]. These loans are provided on the basis of Article 122 of the TFEU.

    The allocation of the EUR 150 billion loans to Member States for common procurements will be demand driven.

    Member States wishing to receive loans will have to submit a Defence Industry Investment Plan to the Commission. The plan will need to include the loan size and pre-financing, a description of the activities, expenditures and measures for which the loan is requested, and, where relevant, the foreseen benefits for Ukraine.

    Member States will report every six months on the progress. Where the Commission concludes that the report is unsatisfactory, the payment of all or part of the loan shall be suspended.

    The Commission will provide an annual report on the use of financial assistance to the European Parliament and the Council.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX%3A12008E122%3AEN%3AHTML.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_41/oj/eng.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Potential revision of combustion-enhancing fuel additives under Directive 98/70/EC – E-001384/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Delivering on the EU’s net greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 and the climate neutrality target by 2050, enshrined in the European Climate Law[1], call for ambitious policies and action to ensure a swift and sufficient decrease in emissions from all sectors, including transport.

    This transition will also contribute to reducing Europe’s reliance on imported fossil fuels. The transport sector needs to contribute to such objectives with a reduction of 90% of its emissions by 2050.

    Concerning certain fuel additives, which might have combustion enhancing properties, they would not be able to deliver the necessary emissions reductions.

    The Fuel Quality Directive[2] (FQD) aims to ensure a single market for fuels used in the European Union for both road vehicles and non-road mobile machinery, as well as a high level of environmental and health protection in the use of those fuels.

    The FQD regulates requirements for fuels by setting limitations in Articles 3 and 4 and corresponding Annexes I and II for certain parameters and chemical compounds, without any other restriction to the chemical composition of fuels.

    The Commission conducted a technical study[3] in 2023, which did not identify a need for regulatory changes as regards additives.

    Finally, the Commission fosters innovation through a broad range of financial and regulatory means aimed at advancing zero-emission mobility and the decarbonisation of transport fuels and energy sources, such as the Renewable Energy Directive[4].

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0080.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01998L0070-20181224&from=EN.
    • [3] https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0dd983bf-ee82-11eb-a71c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.
    • [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2413/oj/eng.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Support for the Ionian Islands in relation to landslides – E-001597/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Based on their national or subnational climate risk assessments, Member States can use Cohesion Policy to support disaster risk management, particularly by financing prevention, response and resilience measures in islands or coastal areas. This may also include measures to address soil erosion.

    Specifically for Greece, over EUR 726 million in public funding is allocated to prevent and manage climate-related flood risks, including coastal and land erosion management . Under the shared management principle governing these funds, national authorities are responsible for selecting projects for funding and overseeing their implementation.

    Furthermore, Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan[1] invests in anti-erosion and flood protection across Greece in response to the floods and wildfires in 2023 (measure 16849). The related interventions include the construction of dams, stream stabilisation structures and rainwater retention systems, with the aim to improve soil retention, biodiversity conservation and agricultural production. By end-2025, a total area of 5 000 hectares of anti-erosion works and 175 000 square meters of flood protection works is expected to be completed.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Consequences of the EU-Mercosur agreement for Polish agriculture – E-000681/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The agreement between the EU and the Mercosur represents a key geostrategic and economic interest for the EU, particularly under the current threats to the global trade order.

    The agreement creates new opportunities for EU agri-food products in the highly protected Mercosur markets, by eliminating duties on key EU products.

    It also protects EU sensitive products, such as beef, poultry and sugar, through carefully calibrated tariff rate quotas, which are limited to a very small share of EU consumption, and robust safeguards in case of adverse market effects.

    Economic studies carried out by the Commission confirm that the market impact of the Mercosur agreement for EU sensitive products would be very limited[1].

    Although these studies are carried out at EU level, it is unlikely that there would be a disproportionate impact on a particular region or Member State, such as Poland, given that potential increased import flows are expected to be absorbed by the whole EU internal market.

    Moreover, one study commissioned by a national administration broadly confirms the results of the EU-wide studies[2]. In addition, the Commission will develop a Unity Safety Net to protect Member States ‘in the unlikely event that the agricultural market situation in the EU is negatively impacted following the implementation of the Agreement’ that will include the announced EUR 1 billion reserve in the context of the proposal for the next multiannual financial framework.

    Finally, the Commission is currently analysing the economic impact of the E U-Mercosur agreement negotiated outcome, which is expected to be presented by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament simultaneously with the proposal for signature and conclusion of the agreement.

    • [1] Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of the Association Agreement negotiations between the EU and Mercosur: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/analysis-and-assessment/sustainability-impact-assessments_en; Cumulative economic impact of upcoming trade agreements on EU agriculture: https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC135540.
    • [2] https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/1c8a6-economic-and-sustainability-impact-assessment-for-ireland-of-the-eu-mercosur-trade-agreement/.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Supporting East Macedonia and Thrace in the face of the demographic crisis – E-001062/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission recognises the challenge of population decline and encourages Member States to develop integrated policies to manage demographic change.

    The Commission’s Demographic Toolbox provides a set of tools that can support Member States and regions in these efforts. As part of the Demographic Toolbox, the Talent Booster Mechanism is targeted towards EU regions that are experiencing a decline in their working-age population and that are affected by the departure of young people. The EU Long-term Vision for Rural Areas also includes strategies to address demographic decline.

    Cohesion Policy is committed to reducing disparities between regions in different Member States, including Greece, ensuring inter alia that people can effectively stay in the place they call home.

    Some EUR 639 million has been allocated to the regional programme for Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, aimed among others at fostering entrepreneurship, strengthening education and social care infrastructure, and promoting the region’s natural and cultural heritage to boost the region’s attractiveness. These investments will create jobs and upgrade public infrastructure, improving quality of life of residents.

    Additionally, the region benefits from a programme under the European Social Fund Plus aimed at boosting employment. It improves job access and activation measures for all jobseekers, focusing on youth, the long-term unemployed, disadvantaged groups in the labour market, and inactive people.

    The program also promotes self-employment and the social economy with a budget of EUR 12.75 million. Current actions include supporting enterprises in hiring highly qualified unemployed individuals and helping unemployed people start businesses.

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Supporting small and medium-sized enterprises to adapt to the Cyber Resilience Act – E-001244/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is fully committed to ensuring that the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA))[1] is tailored to the needs of companies, and in particular micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, including start-ups (henceforth, SMEs).

    Under the Digital Europe Programme, the Commission finances a range of projects aimed at actively supporting SMEs, including the ‘SECURE’ project[2], which will provide up to EUR 16.5 million of financial support to SMEs, the ‘Cyberstand.eu’ project[3] to raise awareness and fund more than 200 EU cybersecurity experts to work on harmonised standards, as well as projects focused on the development of automated tools to ease compliance.

    Additionally, the Commission intends to provide guidance to assist with the implementation of the CRA, with a specific focus on SMEs. In line with Article 33(5), the Commission will also adopt a simplified technical documentation form targeted at the needs of microenterprises and small enterprises, to alleviate the administrative compliance burden.

    The Commission has also established an informal expert group, where SMEs are represented, that will assist with the implementation of the CRA[4]. An administrative cooperation group of national market surveillance authorities will also be set up, to promote best practices and ensure the uniform application of the regulation. In accordance with Article 33, Member States should also, where appropriate, put in place support actions tailored to the needs of microenterprises and small enterprises.

    Finally, European Digital Innovation Hubs will also provide support to SMEs, offering one-stop shops that will assist companies to respond to digital challenges and to become more competitive[5].

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj/eng.
    • [2] https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projects-details/43152860/101190325 and https://secure4sme.eu/.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projects-details/43152860/101158521 and https://cyberstand.eu/.
    • [4] https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expert-groups/consult?lang=en&groupID=3967.
    • [5] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/edihs.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Russian economy enters cooling period — Russian Minister of Economic Development

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 4 (Xinhua) — Russia’s economy has entered a period of cooling after high growth rates in the previous two years, Russian Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov said. The ministry’s press service reported this on Tuesday.

    Speaking in the Federation Council of Russia, M. Reshetnikov noted that more and more industries in the real sector are demonstrating a decline in output. The growth rate of consumer demand is slowing down, and the increase in the population’s income is being sent to savings, while a slowdown in inflation is being recorded, the minister added.

    M. Reshetnikov pointed out that Russia needs to go through the cooling-off period wisely and expressed hope for a timely easing of monetary policy in order to maintain GDP growth rates of 3 percent in the long term. In addition, he also assured that the government is taking steps to optimize the investment programs of the largest companies. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Nadler and Rep. Wilson Reintroduce Bill Providing a Tax Credit to Living Organ Donors

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Jerrold Nadler (10th District of New York)

    Yesterday, Representatives Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) and Joe Wilson (R-SC) reintroduced the Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act. The bill will provide up to a $5,000 one-time refundable tax credit to living organ donors who were not reimbursed for the costs related to organ donation by the National Living Organ Donor Assistance Center (NLDAC) or any entity.  

    Our nation’s transplant shortage is dire. Seventeen people die every day waiting for a viable organ according to the Health Resources and Services Administration. Currently, there are around 93,000 Americans on the kidney transplant waitlist, with some having to wait as long as six years to receive a transplant, according to UNOS. Patients waiting for a transplant on average cost the U.S. government at least $77,000 a year on dialysis, which adds up to more than $20 billion a year according to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Removing the barriers to organ donation will not only increase the number of living donors therefore saving lives, but also will save the taxpayers money. This tax credit would apply to living kidney, liver, lung, pancreas, intestine, bone marrow donors, and any other viable living organ donation. 

    “When an organ donor decides to donate one of their organs to someone else, they aren’t just saving someone’s life—they’re making one of the most selfless, difficult decisions anyone could ever make,” said Rep. Nadler. “However, donors can face tremendous and often prohibitive costs associated with surgery, including the cost of travel, lodging, follow up care, and lost wages in connection to transplantation. That’s why I’m proud to introduce this bill with Rep. Wilson and continue my work to remove roadblocks to organ donation.” 

    “The gift of living donation is truly priceless. The donors who choose the selfless act of giving a lifesaving organ are making a major life decision, whether gifting to a stranger or a loved one. That lifechanging decision should not be burdened by the costs of donation, and this bill will remove that disincentive to ensure that everyone is able to donate an organ if they choose to, regardless of their financial situation,” said Rep. Wilson. “My predecessor House Armed Services Committee Chairman Floyd Spence miraculously received a double lung transplant as the thirtieth in the world to receive the experiment, living an additional 13 years serving America. We are always grateful for Dr. Sesshadri Raju at the University of Mississippi Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi for performing the procedure in 1988. I previously worked in the South Carolina State Senate to add a red heart for organ donors to South Carolina Driver’s Licenses at the time of registration. Today, I am grateful to expand this piece of Floyd Spence’s legacy.” 

    The bill has been endorsed by the American Association of Kidney Patients, American Kidney Fund (AKF), American Nephrology Nurses Association (ANNA), American Society of Pediatric Nephrology (ASPN), American Society of Transplant Surgeons (ASTS), American Society of Transplantation (AST), Coalition to Modify NOTA, National Kidney Donation Organization (NKDO), National Kidney Foundation (NKF), Polycystic Kidney Disease (PKD) Foundation, Renal Support Network (RSN), and Waitlist Zero. 

    “We need better public policy to increase living organ donation. The Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act of 2025 represents a positive step forward in helping people who selflessly decide to give the gift of life by donating a kidney by providing a refundable tax credit for associated costs of live organ donation such as lost wages, travel or childcare. People with limited resources should have every opportunity to help save a life,” said LaVarne A. Burton, President and CEO of the American Kidney Fund. 

     “The American Society of Pediatric Nephrology (ASPN) applauds the reintroduction of the Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act by Representatives Jerry Nadler (D-NY) and Joe Wilson (R-SC). Rates of living kidney donation are declining in the US in both the pediatric and adult populations. This decline persists despite the fact that living donor kidney transplant is well established as the optimal treatment for children and adults with end stage kidney disease due to superior graft and patient survival. This important legislation will encourage living donors and we urge its swift passage,” said President Meredith Atkinson of the American Society of Pediatric Nephrology (ASPN).

         “On behalf of the American Society of Transplantation (AST), representing a majority of the nation’s transplant professionals, our Society strongly applauds and endorses the re-introduction of the Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act. AST is grateful for the steadfast leadership of Congressmen Nadler (D-NY) and Wilson (R-SC) to protect and support living donation. The Living Donor Tax Credit Act is a patient-focused bill seeking to address financial and policy barriers that might otherwise prevent an individual from providing a lifesaving donor organ.  AST greatly appreciates this bipartisan and patient centric legislation.  We look forward to working with you to advance this key legislation in this 119th Congress,” said Dr. Jon Kobashigawa, President of the American Society of Transplantation (AST).

         “The National Kidney Foundation strongly supports the Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act as an important step toward removing financial barriers to living donation. This legislation provides tax relief solely for documented, unreimbursed expenses actually incurred by the donor—costs like child/elder care, travel, and lost income. Living donors often face unexpected costs that can reach thousands of dollars, and these expenses should never prevent someone from saving a life. By allowing tax credits for legitimate expenses while maintaining strict documentation requirements, this bill supports donors without compromising the altruistic foundation of organ donation that the National Kidney Foundation has always championed. We applaud Reps. Nadler and Wilson for their leadership and urge Congress to pass this measure that will help save lives while preserving the integrity of our transplant system,” said Kevin Longino, CEO, National Kidney Foundation and a transplant recipient.

         “There’s currently no cure for PKD, and while we await scientific breakthroughs, organ donation remains the most effective long-term treatment,” said Susan Bushnell, President and CEO of the Polycystic Kidney Disease (PKD) Foundation. “This common-sense, compassionate, and cost-effective policy to reimburse living donors for some of the costs of donation will help to remove needless financial barriers, save more lives, and reduce the burden on our federal health system by decreasing reliance on costly, time-consuming, and often unpleasant dialysis treatments. The PKD Foundation is deeply grateful for the longtime leadership of Representatives Nadler and Wilson in championing living donation,” said Susan Bushnell, PKDF’s President & CEO.

    “Living donors are true heroes who should not incur financial losses for the life-saving gift they provide. A tax credit is a straightforward method to acknowledge their generosity while simplifying the reimbursement process,” said Lori Hartwell, President & Founder of RSN and kidney transplant recipient.

         “Why should donors go into debt to give the gift of life? Representative Nadler and Representative Wilson’s Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act will ease the financial strain and empower more people to say yes to donation. For the past 25 years, the number of living kidney donors has remained stagnant. Waitlist Zero proudly supports this crucial bill,” said Elaine Perlman, Executive Director of Waitlist Zero and President of the Coalition to Modify NOTA.

    A copy of the legislation can be found here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco Releases 2024 Impact Report

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SAN FRANCISCO, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco (FHLBank San Francisco) today released its 2024 Impact Report, which shines a spotlight on the privately capitalized cooperative wholesale bank’s daily support for local financial institution members; $103.3 million in grants awarded for affordable housing, homeownership, and economic development; robust engagement with stakeholders; and a workforce empowered to meet the evolving needs of its members with agility and impact.

    “Our 2024 Impact Report demonstrates the value we deliver to our members and the communities they serve,” said Joseph Amato, interim president and CEO of FHLBank San Francisco. “Because of the financial services we provide to our members every day – including advances and letters of credit – we are able to invest directly in programs and initiatives that strengthen communities by increasing the supply of affordable housing, expanding access to homeownership, and fueling economic growth and opportunity.”

    In 2024, FHLBank San Francisco partnered with its members to award $103.3 million in grants for housing, economic development programs and other initiatives including:

    • Affordable Housing Program (AHP) General Fund and Nevada Targeted Fund: $61.3 million in grants awarded to create, preserve, or purchase nearly 3,900 affordable housing units.
    • WISH and Middle-Income Downpayment Assistance programs: $31.2 million in matching grants delivered to 791 first-time homebuyers.
    • AHEAD economic development grants: $7.3 million in grants awarded to 84 nonprofits to support innovative, community-based economic development initiatives that strengthen local communities.

    FHLBank San Francisco members also accessed $1.4 billion in the Bank’s discounted advances and letters of credit products to create nearly 1,100 owner-occupied and 2,900 rental housing units and to support other community lending and economic development activities, including funding small business loans.

    Together with its members – primarily community-based financial institutions – FHLBank San Francisco continues to make a positive impact across its three-state district of Arizona, California, Nevada, and other areas where its members do business. To learn more about how FHLBank San Francisco accomplishes its mission of providing members with reliable access to liquidity, essential financial services and expertise, and resources for housing and community and economic development, download the full 2024 Impact Report at www.fhlbsf.com.

    About Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco

    The Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco is a member-driven cooperative helping local lenders in Arizona, California, and Nevada build strong communities, create opportunity, and change lives for the better. The tools and resources we provide to our member financial institutions — commercial banks, credit unions, industrial loan companies, savings institutions, insurance companies, and community development financial institutions — propel homeownership, finance quality affordable housing, drive economic vitality, and revitalize whole neighborhoods. Together with our members and other partners, we are making the communities we serve more vibrant and resilient.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Sorensen Advocates for Peoria Ag Lab, Research Center Avoids Closure

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Eric Sorensen (IL-17)

    PEORIA, IL – Congressman Eric Sorensen (IL-17) announced a major victory for the Peoria region, as the National Center for Agricultural Utilization Research (NCAUR), also known as the Peoria Ag Lab, will remain open and is even slated for growth. The release of the administration’s Fiscal Year 2026 (FY26) Agriculture Research Service (ARS) budget proposal includes potential growth for the NCAUR with research expansion.

    “When I heard this facility might be at risk, I made it a priority to make sure the administration and USDA leadership understood the value of this world-class research center. I’m proud to say our efforts paid off,” said Congressman Sorensen. “We made our case loud and clear. I want to thank every researcher, every advocate, and every voice who spoke up. The work being done in this facility supports farmers, strengthens our food systems, and helps fight climate change. I’m proud to have stood with our community to show how important the NCAUR is—not just to Peoria, but to our entire nation.”

    “For months, we feared NCAUR would be the next target amid sudden and harmful cuts to federal agencies. The silence from USDA leadership created a culture of fear, driving away talented staff. But when we reached out to our stakeholders—especially the farming community—their support was overwhelming and helped put NCAUR and ARS back on the map,” President of AFGE Local 3247, Ethan Roberts said. “We’re grateful to everyone who stood with us to protect the vital research we do for farmers and food safety.”

    Congressman Sorensen has been a fierce advocate for the Peoria Ag Lab, leading his colleagues in a detailed letter to Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins this past March. The Congressman outlined the lab’s vital contributions to agriculture and the regional economy.

    The Peoria facility, which employs hundreds and supports both local agriculture and global research, is the largest federal employer in the region. The proposed budget not only protects those jobs but recognizes NCAUR’s cutting-edge work by highlighting its pennycress biofuel research as a leading example in the USDA’s New Products section.

    Final funding decisions will be made by Congress. Congressman Sorensen will continue to monitor the process and fight to make sure the Peoria Ag Lab remains fully protected.

    You can view the FY26 Budget for the Agricultural Research Service below.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Risch, Cotton Introduce Bill to Ban Blacklisted Firms from Sensitive DOE Contracts

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Idaho James E Risch
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Jim Risch (R-Idaho) and Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) today introduced the Securing our Energy Supply Chains Act, which would establish a Department of Energy non-procurement list for critical minerals, battery production, and other related energy needs. 
    “Organizations that threaten our national security have no business engaging in American energy production,” said Risch. “The Securing our Energy Supply Chains Act protects the energy sector, which is critical to both our economy and security, from bad actors while advancing domestic needs.”
    “Supply chains for our country’s critical minerals and battery production are a cut-and-dry national security issue. Firms that are banned from doing business with the Department of Defense and other federal agencies should face significant restrictions when working in these sensitive areas,” said Cotton.
    The Securing our Energy Supply Chains Act would:

    Establish a master energy non-procurement list for DOE projects prioritizing critical minerals and battery production

    Establish a waiver process for contracts or projects that require exceptions

    Require a federal study to pull all similar lists of entities of concern from Commerce, DOD, Energy, State, Treasury, DNI, and other agencies and make recommendations for harmonization.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Brownley, Van Duyne Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Help First-Time Homebuyers

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Julia Brownley (D-CA)

  • MIL-OSI USA: Statement on Concept Release on Foreign Private Issuer Eligibility

    Source: Securities and Exchange Commission

    Good afternoon.  This is an open meeting on June 4, 2025 of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the Government in the Sunshine Act.  Commissioners Caroline Crenshaw and Mark Uyeda are here with me in Washington, D.C., and Commissioner Hester Peirce is participating remotely.

    Today, the Commission will consider a recommendation from the Division of Corporation Finance that the Commission issue a concept release seeking comment on whether to revise the definition of foreign private issuer.

    The Commission first defined foreign private issuer in 1967.[1]  Then in 1983, it developed the foundation of the current definition through a test to determine whether a foreign issuer is “essentially [a] U.S. issuer” based on percentage of U.S. ownership, nationality of the management team, and location of business operations.[2]  The world, financial markets, and corporate legal structures have significantly changed over the past forty-plus years.

    The U.S. capital markets have been and still are the envy of the world.  Foreign companies from across the globe seek new capital from U.S. investors for their businesses and seek to have their securities listed on a U.S. exchange for a variety of potential benefits, including higher valuation, greater liquidity, and enhanced reputation.

    Foreign companies that qualify as foreign private issuers receive these potential benefits while also being offered several accommodations under the federal securities laws that are not available to U.S. companies.  These include provisions such as (1) not needing to file quarterly reports, proxy statements, or Section 16 reports, (2) not being subject to Regulation FD, and (3) furnishing current reports on Form 6-K, rather than filing the more prescriptive Form 8-K.[3]

    As early as 1935, the Commission recognized that our rules should not treat foreign companies exactly the same as domestic companies,[4] likely because many aspects of their corporate operations, business and market practices, accounting standards, tax regimes, compensation and pension benefits, and organic corporate governance laws may be quite different from those in the United States.  Yet, at the same time, the Commission has always been mindful of the paramount need for the adequacy of the disclosures provided by the foreign companies to their U.S. investors whenever it considered new accommodations under the federal securities laws for these companies.  When the Commission provided foreign companies with additional regulatory relief in 1967, it noted “the improvement in the reporting of financial information by foreign issuers, resulting from changes in foreign corporate laws, stock exchange requirements, and voluntary disclosure by the companies themselves.”[5]

    Today, maintaining reasonable accommodations in the federal securities laws to attract foreign companies to U.S. markets and to provide U.S. investors with the opportunity to trade in those companies under U.S. laws and regulations remains an objective.  That objective must be balanced with other considerations, including providing investors with material information about these foreign companies, including their unique corporate structures, and ensuring that domestic companies are not competitively disadvantaged with respect to regulatory requirements.

    The first step in striking this balance is to determine which foreign companies should qualify as foreign private issuers and be able to avail themselves to the accommodations.  It has been several decades since the Commission last examined the characteristics of the foreign private issuer community.  The global markets have changed significantly in those decades.  It is therefore only prudent for the Commission to better understand the companies that are using the foreign private issuers accommodations today and determine if changes are needed to better protect U.S. investors.  Based on the latest data from 2023, for example, almost 55% of foreign private issuers are traded exclusively, or nearly-exclusively, in the United States.[6]  Among these issuers, the most common jurisdiction of incorporation is the Cayman Islands and the most common jurisdiction of headquarters is China.[7] 

    When the United States is effectively a foreign company’s exclusive or primary trading market and the company is not subject to meaningful disclosure requirements or securities law oversight in its jurisdiction of incorporation or headquarters, careful consideration should be given to whether the foreign company is eligible for accommodations under the federal securities laws that are unavailable to U.S. companies.  This analysis begins with considering whether the current definition of a foreign private issuer is appropriately tailored.  The concept release solicits public input on this issue, and I encourage market participants to submit their views and engage with my office and the other commissioners’ offices on this topic.

    Before I turn the meeting over to Cicely LaMothe, Acting Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, to discuss the recommendation, I would like to thank the following staff members for their work on this concept release.

    From the Division of Corporation Finance: Cicely LaMothe, Sebastian Gomez Abero, Ted Yu, Michael Coco, Kelsey Glover, Kateryna Kuntsevich, Mark Green, Ryan Milne, Wei Lu, Heather Rosenberger, Kayla Roberts, Anna Abramson, and John Fieldsend.

    From the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis: Lyndon Orton, Mattias Nilsson, Evan Avila, Tara Bhandari, and Timothy Dodd.  I would especially like to recognize Mattias and Evan because the data in their white paper on trends in the foreign private issuer population[8] significantly contributed to the concept release.

    From the Office of International Affairs: Kathleen Hutchinson, Matthew Greiner, Morgan Macdonald, Michael Ferrario, Jordan Spain, and Katerina Ossenova.

    From the Office of the General Counsel: Jeffrey Finnell, Bryant Morris, Johanna Losert, Mike Killoy and Cynthia Bien.

    From the Office of the Chief Accountant:  Ryan Wolfe, Shaz Niazi, Nigel James, Chauncey Martin, Mai-Khoi Nguyen-Thanh, Jill Davis, Sarah Esquivel, and Ella Karafiat.

    Now I will turn the meeting over to Cicely for the staff’s recommendation.

     


    [1] Adoption of Rules Relating to Foreign Securities, Release No. 34-8066 (Apr. 28, 1967) [32 FR 7845 (May 30, 1967)] (the “1967 Release”).

    [2] Foreign Securities, Release No. 33-6493 (Oct. 6, 1983) [48 FR 46736 (Oct. 14, 1983)].

    [4] See Release No. 34-323, Release No. 34-324, and Release No. 34-325 (July 15, 1935) and Release 34-412 (November 6, 1935).

    [5] The 1967 Release at 7846.

    [6] The Concept Release at section III.C.1.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    The text of the following statement was released by the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union.

    Begin Text:

    1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirm the G7’s steadfast commitment to contribute towards a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.
    2. Maritime security and prosperity are fundamental to global stability, economic resilience, and the well-being of all nations, and the conservation and sustainable use of ocean ecosystems is essential to all life on Earth. Over 80% of global trade is transported by sea, and 97% of global data flows through submarine cables. Disruptions to maritime routes pose a direct threat to international food security, critical minerals, energy security, global supply chains, and economic stability. We express deep concern over the growing risks to maritime security, including strategic contestation, threats to freedom of navigation and overflight, and illicit shipping activities. State behaviour in these areas has increased the risk of conflict and environmental damage, and imperils all nations’ prosperity and living standards, especially for the world’s poorest.
    3. We recognize the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework for governing all activities in the oceans and the seas.
    4. We recall the G7 Statements on Maritime Security adopted in Lübeck (2015) and Hiroshima (2016). We welcome related work presently underway through other G7 ministerial tracks and working groups, on a range of issues including securing undersea cable networks and combating abandoned fishing gear. We welcome, as well, G7 work relating to transnational organized crime and terrorism that touches on the maritime domain, including in relation to piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking in persons, and strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of coastal states. We acknowledge the importance of regional maritime security frameworks, to support coastal states to address collectively threats to their maritime security. We welcome existing initiatives, such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FoGG, that Canada chairs this year), which has been, the primary forum for dialogue among G7 members and partners on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

    Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

    1. Enhancing Stability: We underscore the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the high seas and the exclusive economic zones as well as to the related rights and freedoms in other maritime zones, including the rights of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, as provided for under international law. We share a growing concern at recent, unjustifiable efforts to restrict such freedom and to expand jurisdiction through use of force and other forms of coercion, including across the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea. We condemn China’s illicit, provocative, coercive and dangerous actions that seek unilaterally to alter the status quo in such a way as to risk undermining the stability of regions, including through land reclamations, and building of outposts, as well as their use for military purpose. In areas pending final delimitation, we underline the importance of coastal states refraining from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment insofar as such actions jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement, as well as the importance of making every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, in those areas. We condemn, as well, dangerous vessel maneuvers, the indiscriminate attacks against commercial vessels and other maritime actions that undermine maritime order based on the rule of law and international law. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016 is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. We reaffirm that our basic policies on Taiwan remain unchanged and emphasize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to international security and prosperity. We welcome the resumption of exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Freedom of navigation for commercial shipping in the Black Sea must be upheld.
    2. Attempts to Change the Status Quo by Force: We oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas. We undertake to implement means through which to track systematically and report on attempts to change the status quo by force and by the establishment of new geographical facts, including through coercive and dangerous actions on the oceans and seas that might threaten regional and international peace and security.
    3. Protecting Critical Maritime and Undersea Infrastructure: We are seized of the fact that vital energy and telecommunications infrastructure under the oceans and seas connects our economies and is vital to our prosperity. We recall the G7 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks (2024) and the New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World (2024). We share a growing concern that undersea communications cables, subsea interconnectors and other critical undersea infrastructure have been subject to critical damage through sabotage, poor seamanship or irresponsible behaviour which have resulted in potential internet or energy disruption in affected regions, delays in global data transmission, or compromised sensitive communications. We will enhance our cooperation with industry mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks to operational tasks while strengthening repair capacities in order to improve the overall resilience of critical undersea and maritime infrastructure. In this respect, we welcome the EU Action Plan on Cable Security adopted in February 2025 by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
    4. Maritime Crime: Maritime crime, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, maritime arms trafficking and sanctions evasion, human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking and Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, continues to impede maritime security, freedom of navigation, and our economy and prosperity. We have been working together to tackle these maritime crimes, but maritime illegal activities have extended into new areas, to become an urgent issue to be addressed. We welcome the G7 Action Plan to combat migrant smuggling adopted under Italy’s 2024 G7 Presidency.
    5. Protecting Freedom of Trade: In the past year, indiscriminate Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have endangered maritime security of vessels and their crews, disturbed international trade, and exposed neighboring countries to environmental hazards. Enabled by Iran’s military, financial, and intelligence support, these illegal attacks have also contributed to increased tension in the Middle East and Yemen, with severe repercussions on the intra-Yemeni peace process. The vessel “Galaxy Leader” seized by the Houthis must be released immediately. We appreciate the efforts of all those countries that have engaged to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, protecting crucial shipping lanes and helping to restore regular flows of trade through the Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, we commend the efforts of EU’s maritime operation “Aspides” and U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian”.

    Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security

    1. Curtailing Unsafe and Illicit Shipping Practices: The rise of unsafe and illicit shipping practices, including fraudulent registration and registries, poses a significant threat to global trade and environmental sustainability. We are concerned that unsafe and illicit shipping imposes heavy costs on industry, governments and citizens. Russia’s ability to earn revenue has been sustained through its extensive effort to circumvent the G7+ oil price cap policy through its shadow fleet of often older, underinsured, and poorly maintained ships that routinely disable their automatic identification systems or engage in “spoofing” to avoid detection and circumvent international safety, environmental, and liability rules and standards. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and evade sanctions, particularly through its illicit maritime activities, including prohibited ship to-ship transfers of petroleum and other UN-banned commodities. Through G7 coordination, we have exposed North Korea uses of “dark” vessels – those that engage in illicit activity – to circumvent United Nations Security Council mandated sanctions. Russia and North Korea are strengthening their economic relations including through maritime routes, such as the reported transfer of petroleum products from Russia to North Korea Unregulated, “dark” vessels undertake IUU fishing, destroying marine habitats and depleting fish stocks, with negative impacts for biodiversity and food security. Unregulated, inadequately insured “dark” vessels also pose a high risk of maritime accidents, including in fragile ecosystems such as the Arctic and Antarctic. We commit to strengthen our coordination, amongst the G7 and with other partners, to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured and substandard vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, arms transfers, illegal fishing and illicit trade. We encourage relevant International Organizations to improve maritime domain awareness by expanding satellite-based vessel tracking and establishing comprehensive data records of the movement of individual ships and of ship-to-ship transfers, as a means of identifying and tracking illicit maritime activities. We are also committed to capacity building of the countries in the region in law enforcement and Maritime Domain Awareness.
    2. Shadow Fleet Task Force: We invite members of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden), and possibly others, to join participating G7 members in a Shadow Fleet Task Force to enhance monitoring and detection and to otherwise constrain the use of shadow fleets engaged in illegal, unsafe or environmentally perilous activities, building on the work of others active in this area. The Task Force will constitute a response by the participating States to the call by the International Maritime Organization in its Resolution A.1192(33) of 6 December 2023 for Members States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by shadow fleets and their flag states, including illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs, or engaging in other illegal activities.
    3. Enhancing Maritime Supply Chain Resilience and Energy and Food Security: Maritime supply chains will continue to underpin the global economy, but these face a variety of threats, both present and future, stemming from both geopolitical tensions and environmental factors. Maritime disruptions raise consumer costs, increase transit times, and can reduce demand in importing countries, which in turn means lower revenues and diminished competitiveness for producers in exporting countries. Such vulnerabilities in maritime transport can undermine energy and food security, particularly for developing nations reliant on stable shipping routes, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). We welcome maritime initiatives involving and supported by G7 partners intended to promote energy and food security, such as the Grain from Ukraine scheme, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We invite cooperation with the African Union (pursuant to Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050) and other relevant International Organizations to identify best practices for enhancing maritime supply chain resilience and for safeguarding energy and food security, including in times of geopolitical crisis.
    4. Promoting Safe and Resilient Ports and Strategic Waterways: Port ownership and operational control matter to national security, as foreign control or influence over critical port infrastructure can create vulnerabilities in trade, in defense and security, and in economic stability. Port resilience is also crucial to economic stability and global trade and yet ports face growing risks from environmental degradation, extreme weather events and geopolitical conflicts. Strengthening port security and modernizing infrastructure are essential to maintaining safe and efficient maritime trade. Ensuring that the ownership and management of strategic waterways and key maritime choke points are not vulnerable to undue influence by potential adversaries is also essential to national security. We underscore the importance of scrutiny of ownership structures and port management and resilience within our own national jurisdictions, including with regard to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, to ensure that adversaries do not gain leverage over supply chains, military operations, or the flow of strategic resources. We will work with partners and with relevant International Organizations to encourage robust cybersecurity standards for port ICT infrastructure, to increase resilience against malicious cyber incidents on maritime logistical networks, to reduce monopolistic power over key supply chain nodes, to promote secure and transparent port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructures and strategic waterways, and to otherwise encourage greater focus on such potential vulnerabilities.
    5. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) at sea poses a significant hazard to the marine environment, to the safety of fishermen and other users of the maritime space, and to various marine economic activities. We commit to enhancing diplomatic efforts and to exchanging best practices among national authorities, relevant international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the clean-up of UXO from the seas and ocean.

    Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources

    1. Strengthen Enforcement Against IUU Fishing: IUU fishing is a major contributor to declining fish stocks and to marine habitat destruction. It may account for a third of all fishing activity worldwide, at a cost to the global economy of more than US$23 billion per year and with negative consequences for fisheries as an enduring economic asset, including for developing countries. We welcome the Canadian-led Dark Vessel Detection System in Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and would see value in replicating the model to support other partners whose fisheries are under threat from IUU fishing. We recognize that data sharing and transparency play a key role in this fight by exposing bad actors and that technological advances can support a robust Monitoring, Control and Surveillance and enforcement landscape. We encourage further progress in addressing IUU fishing, working with and through relevant International Organizations to establish and strengthen rules to sustainably manage fish stocks on the high seas and to improve the enforcement of these measures, including through the further development of detection technologies, aircraft patrols and high seas boarding and inspection of vessels, building upon the 2022 G7 Ocean Deal.
    2. We welcome the Third UN Ocean Conference, in Nice, France, from 9 to 13 June 2025.

    PARTNERSHIPS

    1. This G7 Maritime Security and Prosperity Declaration provides a framework for cooperation with non-G7 Partners, including countries hosting major ports, large merchant fleets, or extensive flag registries as well as relevant regional and International Organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization and ASEAN. We would welcome robust cooperation with Partners to take forward the goals set out in this Declaration, consistent with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, under the efforts of the G7 countries, including a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region, to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, and of commitment to the sustainable development of the world’s maritime spaces.
    2. We welcome the cooperation on Coast Guard Functions, including the Global Coast Guard Forum hosted by Italy in 2025, as well as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which could also support the objectives of this Declaration.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Designation of Former President of Argentina and Former Minister of Planning of Argentina for Involvement in Significant Corruption

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Marco Rubio, Secretary of State

    Today, I am announcing the designation of Cristina Elisabet Fernandez de Kirchner (“CFK”), former president of Argentina, and Julio Miguel De Vido (“De Vido”), former Minister of Planning of Argentina, for their involvement in significant corruption during their time in public office.  This action renders CFK, De Vido, and their immediate family members generally ineligible for entry into the United States.

    CFK and De Vido abused their positions by orchestrating and financially benefitting from multiple bribery schemes involving public works contracts, resulting in millions of dollars stolen from the Argentine government.  Multiple courts have convicted CFK and De Vido for corruption, undermining the Argentine people’s and investors’ confidence in Argentina’s future.

    The United States will continue to promote accountability for those who abuse public power for personal gain.  These designations reaffirm our commitment to counter global corruption, including at the highest levels of government.

    These public designations are made under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024 (Div. F, P.L. 118-47), as carried forward by the Continuing Appropriations, 2025 (Div. A, H.R. 1968) (“Section 7031(c)”). Section 7031(c) requires the Secretary of State to publicly or privately designate foreign officials and their immediate family members about whom the Secretary has credible information of involvement in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Scott Jennings on SiriusXM Patriot

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Marco Rubio, Secretary of State

    Washington, D.C.

    QUESTION:  Scott Jennings sitting here on SiriusXM Patriot 125, normally the David Webb Show.  I am guest hosting for Mr. Webb today, and it is our honor to welcome to the airwaves this morning the Secretary of State of the United States Marco Rubio, former senator from Florida, and now, thanks to President Trump, the United States Secretary of State. 

    Mr. Secretary, welcome to the show. 

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Hey, thanks for having me. 

    QUESTION:  I appreciate you being on this morning.  You’re on the move.  You have just returned from your first foreign trip.  You went to Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic.  I want to jump right in this morning and just ask how was the trip, what did we accomplish, and what’s the disposition in those countries towards the United States now that we have a new administration?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  I think the disposition is very positive.  I think these are countries that want to be aligned with the United States.  That’s why we picked them.  They also happen to be countries that are on the migratory route, on the drug routes, and face tremendous challenges because of that.  These are the places people cross in order to come to the U.S., so each of them are very different. 

    Like in the case of Panama, obviously we have an issue with the canal and foreign influence over it, and so we raised that.  And I think we’re going to make a couple of announcements.  We saw the – Panama pulled out of the Belt and Road Initiative with China, which is the first country in the Western Hemisphere to actually pull out of that.  And I think we’ll hear more things.  They’ve got to work through their own processes there, but I think we’ll see even more in the days to come.  So, it’s very positive. 

    Costa Rica is an advanced economy.  They’re doing very well, of course, but they do have some challenges where drug rings are running through there, and so we partner with them to stop that.  But that’s a very pro-American government, and we wanted to interact with them.  They’re very good partners and, also, have been very strong at standing up to the Chinese Communist Party’s influence in the region, and so that’s been great. 

    And then moved on to El Salvador.  We have a great partner there in Nayib Bukele.  I’ve known him for a long time, and he made a very generous offer.  I don’t know if it can happen because of our own laws, but he offered to not only take in gang members that are illegally in the country but also any Americans who are in our jails – almost like outsourcing.  So, it was an interesting offer from him.  But he’s a great pro-American leader and, again, someone that has been very popular in his country by the way.  He’s like 90 percent approval rating. 

    Guatemala is a country that obviously is right on the border with Mexico.  They struggle with the migration.  They’re a source country, but they’re also a transit country for drugs and people.  And so, they’re trying to – they’re doing the best they can with their limited resources, and we’re helping them to stop the drugs and the migration.  But they’ve also – they’re going to almost double the number of deportation flights they’re going to take, and they’re also going to accept third-country people, people from other countries that are not from Guatemala, as part of this process, and then from there move them on to the – their nation of origin. 

    And then we finished in the Dominican Republic, which really the biggest challenge they face there are two-fold.  The one is what’s happening right across their border with Haiti, which they’re deporting people back to Haiti every day.  That – we can’t really visit Haiti right now, but that’s as close as we could get.  And so, we wanted to talk about that from there, and that’s important because that also poses a threat to the United States that there’s a mass migration event.  And it’s just a horrifying situation with these gangs taking over Port-au-Prince or large parts of it. 

    And then they’re also a great partner stopping drugs.  A lot of drug rings are – bring – try to bring drugs into the Dominican Republic because from there, over the Mona Passage, they get to Puerto Rico.  And once you get into Puerto Rico, you’re in the U.S.  There’s no more customs after that.  There’s no more border protection after that.  So, it’s something we’re going to work with them on. 

    So, it’s a good start to the trip, and then we finished off on Friday going to Southern Command, which is the Pentagon’s command for the whole region, and talked through some of these issues with them and the partnerships they have in the region.  So, it’s a good way to start my – I guess my second – end my second week as Secretary of State.

    QUESTION:  Yeah, most folks when they start a new job in the second week are still looking for the bathroom, and here you are in all these other countries.  It’s a really good way to get going.

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, well, we’re still looking for the bathrooms but – finding out where everything is at in the building, but it was important to get out there and visit these countries early. 

    QUESTION:  So, you raised an issue that I think Donald Trump, President Trump, deserves a lot of credit for tackling immediately, and that is the concept of the United States combatting Chinese influence in this region, in this hemisphere.  And obviously, this has been an issue with Panama and the Panama Canal, but it’s really an issue everywhere.  Can you talk a little bit about this?  Is this one of your principal missions to make sure that the United States, and not China, is the dominant superpower at a minimum in this region and in the world?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, look, China is a rich, powerful country and that’s what they’re going to be.  Like that’s not going to change, right?  They’ve got over a billion people.  They’ve got a big economy, second-largest economy in the world.  I mean, and we’re going to be competing with them for the rest of the century and beyond.  And I think the story of the 21st century is going to be about what happened between the U.S. and China. 

    What we can’t allow is for that to come at our expense.  What we can’t allow is an imbalance, a dangerous imbalance, to build up where they’re more powerful than we are, and then – or we become dependent on them.  And that danger is already there that we’ve become dependent on them for supply chains, for manufacturing, economically, all these sorts of things.

    So, what’s happened in part of the region is that they swoop in.  And look, they’re doing what I would do.  If I was in charge of China, I would do exactly what they’re doing.  But I have to – I I’m not in charge of China.  I run the State Department for the United States and I’m an American citizen, so I’ve got to do what’s good for America.  That’s what President Trump is for.  And that includes not getting run out of the Western Hemisphere, not waking up one day and finding out that China has more influence over our neighboring countries than we do, that China has more presence in our neighboring countries than we do.  That’s – it’s – geography is real and it’s right on top of us, and these are countries that are our neighbors, and we just – we can’t live in a world in which they have more influence and more presence than we do in the countries closest to us.

    QUESTION:  So, on the prospect of American influence in the world – and I wholeheartedly agree with you about our need to stand up to China – a lot of people are wondering about the reorientation of American soft power in the world.  Obviously, President Trump and his administration and working with you have made some dramatic shifts in the way we distribute foreign aid and the bureaucracy, the USAID bureaucracy, which you are now also simultaneously in charge of. 

    I think there’s a lot of misinformation out there and a lot of political attacks out there of people trying to score points.  I just kind of want to set the record straight here about what we’re doing.  And we’ve eliminated some bureaucracy, but you’re in charge of American soft power and you’re in charge of our influence around the world.  Can you kind of give us an idea of how this is going to work, and why the American people should be reassured that American influence is going to be top of mind for your State Department?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, first of all, we’re not walking away from foreign aid.  We will be involved in foreign aid.  I believe that foreign aid done right is good for the country, but it has to be done right.  Now, the idea that somehow we spend between $40 and $60 billion on foreign aid and all that money is well spent or on things that make sense is absurd.  There’s a lot of it that isn’t.  And so the goal is very simple:  Go through all of our foreign aid – a lot of it is through USAID, some of it is through State Department; identify the foreign aid that makes sense, the foreign aid that actually supports our country and that supports our national interests, and continue to do that; and then get rid of the ones that are a waste of money, or in some cases or run counter to our foreign – to our national interest and to our interests around the world.  And that’s what we’re going through right now. 

    The problem is that this foreign aid industrial complex has built up of NGOs and all kinds of groups that benefit from these programs, and argue that you can’t get rid of a single one of them; if you cut any of them, if you even ask questions about them, you’re undermining American soft power.  So, this is not – despite some of these reports, this is not about walking away from foreign aid.  This is about doing the aid that makes sense and getting rid of the aid that does not make sense.  That’s it.  That’s what this is about.

    So we were in Guatemala, right?  And they have a program where we help them to improve their police department so they can stop and identify fentanyl before it gets into America.  That’s foreign aid we’re going to support.  In fact, I issued a waiver so we can continue that program.  There are other things that we’re not going to do.  We shouldn’t be sponsoring LGBTQ operas.  I don’t know how that foreign – furthers the national interest. 

    And this is taxpayer money.  Look, if someone wants to pay for that stuff, you’re more than happy to go out, go ahead.  It’s legal.  Go out and raise all the money, private-sector money, and spend it on that.  But we shouldn’t be spending taxpayer money or using American Government agencies to sponsor things that make absolutely no sense.  So, we put a pause on all foreign aid, and now we’re going through it project by project.  We’re going to get rid of the ones that don’t make sense, and we’re going to keep or even build on the ones that do make sense. 

    QUESTION:  So, the things that make sense in your mind – fighting drugs, fighting illegal immigration.  What about lifesaving issues?  There’s been a lot of back and forth in the media about things that we do from a humanitarian perspective that are lifesaving medical-type programming, particularly in Africa with PEPFAR and malaria and such.  How do you view those things?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  I’m a supporter of PEPFAR.  I have been in Congress.  I am now as Secretary of State.  It’s a program we want to continue.  Obviously, we’re going to have questions about it.  Look, if PEPFAR is working well, it’s a program that should be getting smaller over time, not bigger, right?  Because you’re preventing HIV, you’re preventing the spread of HIV, and so people aren’t testing positive because their viral load gets down, they’re not passing it on to their children. 

    So ideally, it’s a program that over time shrinks, not expands, because less and less people are getting HIV or are transmitting it to their children.  That was always the goal was an AIDS-free generation, so no child was born with HIV.  And – but it’s a program I’ve supported, and we want to continue to do it.  And things like are people going to starve to death, are we going to have a famine?  Is it going to destabilize a country in a way that would be negative to our national interest and open the door for radical jihadists or others to take advantage?  We’re going to continue to do those.  But the problem is that the definition of humanitarian has expanded beyond that – to all kinds of other things that do not make sense.  That doesn’t mean they’re bad ideas.  Someone should do it.  It just shouldn’t be the American taxpayer. 

    So that’s the kind of things that we’re going through right now and identifying.  And by the way, we issued a waiver which allowed all these lifesaving programs to continue.  And obviously, there’s – any time you have a pause or some hiccups about how to restart the payment programs, but all that’s going to get taken care of here very quickly, and those programs will continue.  We’re not walking away from foreign aid.  We are walking away from foreign aid that’s dumb, that’s stupid, that wastes American taxpayer money.  We’re just not going to continue to do those.

    QUESTION:  I think that what you’re doing is long overdue.  This whole bureaucracy existed, and it really existed with very little political oversight.  And really all that the Trump Administration, at your direction, is doing is making sure that whatever money we spend somehow helps the national interest.  And I think every American taxpayer wants the money we spend to help the national interest.  And Trump and you, Mr. Secretary, on the right side of what I think is an 80-20 issue here.  And so, you see this amazing disconnect in the media, people fussing about this. 

    But some of these projects that you’ve identified are patently ridiculous.  And so, by moving this into your office and by taking personal political oversight over it, not only are you saving us money, but you’re just aligning our spending with what’s in direct interest of the United States foreign policy under the direction of the President of the United States.  I mean, that’s the point of elections.  That’s the point of having a government, not to let unelected bureaucrats determine our national direction but to let our political leadership do it.

    Mr. Secretary, in the time that we have, I want to move ahead.  You’re about to embark on your second foreign trip.  You’re going to the Munich Security Conference, and then you’re going to the Middle East.  I think you’re going to Israel, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia – obviously a hot spot or region.  What is your mission here?  What are we trying to accomplish in the Middle East?  What’s your message at the Munich Security Conference later this week?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, in Munich, I think it’s just to reaffirm to everybody – even though it’s located in Europe – obviously, that’s where the forum is – it’s not just about Europe.  People from all – leaders from all over the world go that conference.  But the top of mind for everyone is going to be war in Ukraine, and the President has been very clear.  President Trump has been clear that the war in Ukraine needs to end.  There’s a – he’s going to sort of begin to lay out a broad path forward, and he wants that war to end.  It’d be in the interest of everybody for that war to end, and so obviously we’ll be discussing that with foreign ministers and other leaders there. 

    And then in the Middle East, beyond just the – what we know has happened with – after October 7th, there’s some potentially exciting opportunities to really change the dynamic in that region, and that’s the things we want to talk about.  We’ve seen in Lebanon where a new government is now in place and Hizballah has been – I mean, imagine a region where you have a stable Lebanese government and Hizballah is no longer controlling the southern part of Lebanon and threatening Israel every day.  Imagine potentially – we’ve got to wait and see, right? – but a Syria no longer under Assad, no longer with Iranian or Russian influence, no longer with ISIS, sort of no longer a security threat to Isreal.  Imagine a region where Israel now feels secure because of what’s happened in Lebanon and in Syria that they can enter into a peace deal with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf kingdoms; a Sunni-Israeli peace deal akin to the Camp David Accords with Egypt and the peace with Jordan.  Suddenly you have a very different region where all kinds of things that were not possible before are now possible. 

    And that’s the opportunity that we hope to explore and see if it’s possible.  We have an obligation to explore, at the end.  I mean, President Trump has made very clear that part of his agenda is promoting peace in the world; and if there’s a chance to create conditions for peace, that’s certainly something we’re going to do our best to try to foster and be a part of. 

    QUESTION:  I want to ask you briefly about the hostage deal that was in place as Biden was exiting and President Trump was coming in.  Obviously, a few hostages have been released.  Some of the video of the hostages is, frankly, horrific.  What they had done to them in captivity at the hands of Hamas is nothing short of barbaric.  I saw that President Trump last night on the way to the Super Bowl made a comment about this and said he’s seen some of these abductees coming out.  He said, “They look like Holocaust survivors.  I know there’s an agreement that Hamas releases a little every week, but I don’t know how long I’ll continue to endure this.  My patience is running out.”

    Is this something you’re going to discuss when you’re in the Middle East?  Are we – is our patience running thin here, and are these hostages being more mistreated than we could have even imagined before?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, I don’t think there’s any coincidence in the schedule that they’re being released where they obviously released the ones, they thought were in the best condition first, then over time you’re starting to see the impact of this.  But I also think it’s very revealing of who Hamas is and what Hamas is. 

    You look at these images of what they – first of all, the humiliation that they have to go through.  Just put aside for a moment the horrifying conditions they were kept and the horrifying things that happened to some of those hostages, on top of the fact that these were innocent civilians.  I mean, none of these were soldiers.  These are not combatants.  These are just people that were abducted for purposes of being used as leverage.  And they’re getting, what, 200 certified killers in exchange for one innocent hostage.  But it reveals who Hamas is.

    Look at these humiliation, they put them through before they’re released, where they do these big public displays of force.  Do any of those Hamas fighters look like they’ve been skipping meals?  Do any of those Hamas fighters that you see look like they’ve been suffering over the last year and a half?  Clearly, these people are – the ones suffering are the people from Gaza, but not them.  And then the conditions they’re held in.  So, it’s incredibly revealing about what we’re dealing with.  This is an evil organization.  Hamas is evil.  It’s pure evil.  These are monsters.  These are savages.  That’s a group that needs to be eradicated. 

    And let me tell you, if they still are the dominant power in Gaza when all this is done, there is not going to peace in the Middle East, as long as a group like Hamas physically controls territory and is the most dominant power in Gaza or anywhere in the Middle East.  And I hope people can see who these people actually are, in the condition of these hostages – not just the conditions that they’re in when they’re released, but what they have to endure on the way out.

    QUESTION:  You raise the issue of Gaza, and before you go, obviously President Trump made some news on this last week.  And it strikes me that what you’re executing is a realistic foreign policy.  I mean, we’re in the common-sense doctrine era of the United States, which people are saying thank goodness, finally.

    On Gaza, on the idea of a two-state solution, is this no longer the policy of the United States?  It seems to me that you all are injecting realism into this situation and that most of the people the Israelis have had to deal with over time simply don’t want peace, and we’ve been trying to put a square peg in a round hole here.

    What is our policy?  That people that run Gaza eventually are going to have to accept peace? And that’s not what – that’s just not been the disposition of the folks we’ve been dealing with heretofore.

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, the big challenge for this whole two-state solution has not been Isreal. It’s been:  Who’s going to govern that second state?  Who’s going to be in charge of it?  If the people in charge of it are Hamas or Hizballah or anybody like that, these are groups that – whose goal is the destruction of the Jewish state.

    So, I don’t know how you’re going to have peace if you’re turning over territory to a group whose stated purpose is the destruction of the Jewish state.  Why would any country in the world agree to create a second state on their border that is governed by armed elements who kidnap babies and murder babies and rape teenage girls and abduct innocents and whose stated goal and purpose for existing is the – is your destruction?  Who would agree to that?  So that’s the fundamental challenge.

    On the broader challenge of Gaza, the President’s just pointed to the obvious.  I mean, Gaza is a place that, in addition to all the damage it suffered in the war – Hamas hides in the tunnels.  It’s the civilians who they hide behind and underneath that have suffered the consequences of this.  But that’s a place where there’s all kinds of unexploded munitions and bombs that Hamas has, that’s been used in the conflict.  Someone’s got to go in – for anybody to be able to live there, someone’s got to – you’ve got to clean it up.  You’ve got to clean all that out of there even before you begin the process of removing rubble and debris and rebuilding housing, like permanent structures.  Who’s going to do that? 

    And right now, the only one who’s stood up and said I’m willing to help do it is Donald Trump.  All these other leaders, they’re going to have to step up.  If they’ve got a better idea, then now is the time.  Now is the time for the other governments and other powers in the region, some of these very rich countries, to basically say, okay, we’ll do it.  We’re going to pay for this; we’re going to step forward; we’re going to be the ones that take charge.  None of them is offering to do it.  And I think that you can’t go around claiming that you’re a fighter for, an advocate for the Palestinian people, but you’re not willing to do anything to help rebuild Gaza.  And so far, we haven’t seen a lot of – they’ve all – they’ll all tell you what they’re not for.  But we’re still waiting for more countries to step forward and say here’s what we’re willing to do.  And right now, they’ve not been willing to do anything and – or at least anything concrete.

    So that’s a challenge that President Trump’s put out there.  And it’s outside the box, but that’s what he always is.  I mean, he is going to state the obvious.  It’s the one thing about Donald Trump – he doesn’t hide behind silly, traditional lies and things of that nature.  He’s going to put out blunt truth.  And the blunt truth is that the Middle East has, for too long, been a region of places all of whom love to talk but don’t want to do.  So, it’s time – if they don’t like Donald Trump’s plan, then it’s time for these countries in the region to step forward and offer their solution. 

    QUESTION:  Well, I think under President Trump’s leadership, under your leadership, we’re living in a common-sense era, we’re in an aspirational era, and we’re in a realistic era.  And I think the American people are grateful for it.  You have had an amazing run already, just in the first few weeks of being in office.  You had an amazing first foreign trip.  You’ve got one coming up this week.

    The foreign affairs wins of the Trump Administration are already piling up, with Mexico agreeing to send troops to their border; Canada playing ball on their border issues; Colombia accepting the repatriation flights; Panama ending its Belt and Road Initiative deal with China; the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.  We’ve taken out an ISIS leader in Somalia.  You guys are off to an amazing start.  And I think that’s why Donald Trump has a high approval rating right now, and why people are so grateful that you accepted this job as U.S. Secretary of State.

    Secretary Rubio, thanks for being with us on SiriusXM Patriot today. 

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Thanks for having me on.

    QUESTION:  All right.  Safe travels.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Sanctioning Evasion Network Supporting Hizballah Finance Operations

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Tammy Bruce, Department Spokesperson

    The United States is today designating a Lebanon-based sanctions evasion network that supports Hizballah’s finance team, which oversees commercial projects and oil smuggling networks that generate revenue for Hizballah.

    Such evasion networks bolster Iran and Hizballah, undermining Lebanon.  As part of today’s action, the United States is designating five individuals and three associated companies, including family members and close associates of prominent Hizballah officials.

    This action supports the whole-of-government policy of maximum pressure on Iran and its terrorist proxies, like Hizballah, as detailed in National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 issued on February 4. 

    The United States is committed to supporting Lebanon by exposing and disrupting funding schemes for Hizballah’s terrorist activities and Iran’s destabilizing influence in the region.  Hizballah cannot be allowed to keep Lebanon captive.  The United States will continue using tools at its disposal until this terrorist group no longer threatens the Lebanese people.

    Additionally, the Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program, which is administered by the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service, is offering a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the disruption of the financial mechanisms of Hizballah.

    Today’s action is being taken pursuant to counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended.  The Department of State previously designated Hizballah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, pursuant to E.O. 13224, which targets terrorist groups and their supporters, and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.  For more information, today’s designation can be found on the Recent Actions | Office of Foreign Assets Control website.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Up to $2 Million Reward Offers Each for Information Leading to Arrests and/or Convictions of Malicious Cyber Actors from China

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    Today, the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is announcing two reward offers under the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program (TOCRP) of up to $2 million each for information leading to the arrests and/or convictions, in any country, of malicious cyber actors Yin KeCheng and Zhou Shuai, both Chinese nationals residing in China. 

    Yin and Zhou were identified as associated with an advanced persistent threat group (APT27), who are also known to private sector security researchers as “Threat Group 3390,” “Bronze Union,” “Emissary Panda,” “Lucky Mouse,” “Iron Tiger,” “UTA0178,” “UNC 5221,” and “Silk Typhoon.”  Yin and Zhou are longtime members of the eco-system China uses to perpetuate its malicious cyber activity.  They enrich themselves financially as hackers for hire for a myriad of Chinese entities.

     An FBI investigation of APT27, which began in approximately 2014, resulted in two separate indictments, announced today by the Department of Justice.  Yin is charged individually for cybercrime activity occurring from roughly 2013 to 2015, while Yin and Zhou are charged together in a separate conspiracy related to computer network intrusion activity occurring from roughly 2018 to 2020.  Yin and Zhou are each charged with wire fraud, money laundering, aggravated identity theft, and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

    Today’s reward offers are authorized by the Secretary under the TOCRP, which supports law enforcement efforts to disrupt transnational crime globally.  The reward offers also complement the announcement today of a Treasury sanctions action by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) against Zhou and his company Shanghai Heiying Information Technology.   The combined actions represent a whole of government effort to combat malicious cyber actors.

    If you have information, please contact the FBI by email at yin_zhou_info@fbi.gov.  If you are located outside of the United States, you can also visit the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate.  If you are in the United States, you can also contact your local FBI field office.

    ALL IDENTITIES ARE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.  Government officials and employees are not eligible for rewards.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the American Compass Fifth Anniversary Gala

    Source: United States Department of State (4)

    Marco Rubio, Secretary of State

    Washington, DC

    National Building Museum

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Thank you.  Thank you.  Bernie Moreno, how’s the Senate?  (Laughter.)

    Thank you guys for having me.  It’s an honor.  I want to thank Chris for the introduction.  Did you get my office?  He just said – I just – the one I used to have, the one in Russell?  Yeah.  Did you find any cash or gold bars?  No.  (Laughter.)

    Is there media here?  There’s – (laughter) – that’s what they call – it’s a joke.  It’s a joke.  You guys know.

    Thank you, Chris, for that introduction, and actually very proud of the work you did with us on the Small Business Committee, and then Oren and everyone here at American Compass for hosting me here tonight.  A couple observations of seeing someone – we really only got to serve together for, like, 10 days, because I got confirmed pretty quickly.  And by the way, the President was so – and I got 99 out of a hundred votes because the Vice President, at the time his seat had not been filled, and the President for some period of time expressed great concern about the fact that I had 99 votes in the Senate.  He didn’t know if that was a good thing or a bad thing.  But I told him recently, sir, you don’t have to worry about that anymore.  I don’t think I’d get 99 votes now.  (Laughter.)

    And anyways, but thank you for this chance to speak to you, and by – one more thing I want to tell you about:  I spent – now that I’m in the Executive Branch, we oftentimes have to deal with the fact that we want to do something and it’s like, well, but there’s a statute or there’s a law on the books that limit our ability to do things by executive action.  It requires us to go through certain steps.  And so I increasingly find myself saying who the hell wrote these laws, and in – today I was reminded it was actually me who passed a certain law that stood as an impediment to quick action.  So anyways, yeah, I’ve grown in my appreciation for the Executive Branch more and more each day.  And – but that’s also – the media’s going to say, oh, he’s for an authoritarian form of government.  No, I just – some of these laws I passed are getting in the way of my current life, so we have to work through it.  We will.

    But thank you guys for this chance and the work that you’ve done, and I know that obviously you’re going to spend a lot of time focused on domestic decisions, but I want to hopefully pitch you a little bit tonight about what I’ve learned and what I already believed coming into this job, that so much about what happens domestically, economically is increasingly intertwined in geopolitics.  It always has been.  I think that’s one of the lessons we forgot, but I think we’ve been reminded of that here, most recently in a number of events that brought that to bear.

    The first thing I would say is I think it’s always been true – one of the amazing things, one of the reasons why history repeats itself – people like to say that – is because human nature does not change.  Technologies change, the clothes we wear change, even languages change, governments change.  A lot of things change, but the one thing that is unchanged is human nature.  It’s the same today as it was 5,000 years ago, and that’s one of the reasons why history often repeats itself.

    And one of the things about human nature – I’m not trying to sound like a psychologist here, but one of the things that I think history proves is that one of the things we are programmed as people with is the desire to belong.  In fact, if you notice, one of the – if you put humans anywhere, a handful of people anywhere, one of the first things they start doing is trying to create things that they can join or be a part of, and that’s true for nationhood and nation-states, the concept of nationhood.

    Now, it’s a new concept.  I mean, before we all – but we had something.  It was like organizations, whether it was city-states or tribal organizations, but the advent of the nation-state is a normal evolution of human behavior because people think it’s important to belong to something, and being part of a nation is important.  And I think that’s really true, obviously, increasingly in how geopolitical decisions are made.

    I think that’s obvious and people understand that, but it’s one of the things that we forgot.  And we certainly forgot it at the end of the Cold War.  If I can take you back to the end of the Cold War – and understand for me these were formative years, because I grew up in the ’80s, the greatest – probably the greatest decade ever, confirmed by the – yeah.  (Applause.) 

    You know why I know this?  Because my kids – I have young – young – I say “young” and they’re, like, 24, 22, 20 – just turned 20 – and one who’s 17.  Every – all they do is watch reruns from the ’80s and ’90s.  They don’t make good TV anymore.  Everybody wants to watch stuff from the ’80s and ’90s, so that’s just my pitch.  The ’70s were a dark period of time because of disco music, but – and the ’80s just – got a disco fan back there.  But the ’80s, we did – the hair was a little too big, but other than that.

    But going back, the ’80s, you grew up, and I remember in 1983 – now I’m aging – I just turned 54.  I feel 55, but I – and it must be 1983.  Do you guys remember a movie called the – oh, gosh, what was it?  It was about nuclear war.  Do you remember this?  It was 19 – no, War Games, that was a great movie.  I’m talking about one that was on TV that scared the hell out of me.  There was –

    AUDIENCE:  The Day After.

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  The Day After.  Do you remember that movie, The Day After?  This was traumatizing, and they had this thing on television.  But basically grew up understanding that the world at any moment could end because the United States and the Soviet Union were headed for conflict and war and that maybe we wouldn’t even make it to 25 and things of this nature.

    I forgot about War Games.  War Games was another good movie, where this guy hacks into the computer.  This was an ’80s hacker.  This was not – I can remember the phone and the modem, and it was – what was that actor?  It was the same – Matthew Broderick.  It’s a great movie.  I know I’m completely off topic – (laughter) – but let me just tell you I lived in Las Vegas at the time, and if you recall, the first city that he blows up in the war games is Las Vegas.  And I was sitting in the audience and everybody was like chuckling – nothing funny about this Las Vegas strike.  (Laughter.)

    In any event, so this is what we grew up in.  And then in 1989, in 1990 and ’91, it was my first years in college, and literally the entire world just transformed before my very eyes.  Understand you grew up your whole life, and like the whole world is about the Soviet Union, and all of a sudden the Soviet Union no longer exists.  My favorite memory of that is that I was actually taking a course that fall by a Soviet expert at – I think it was in Gainesville, Florida.  And this poor guy’s entire career came crumbling down over a three-month period as the Soviet Union collapsed.  It was like all these years of work, you have a PhD in Soviet studies, and now the Soviet doesn’t exist anymore.  So I don’t know what he did after that.  I need to check up on that guy.

    But anyways, the point is the whole world transformed and there was this effusive exuberance, the belief that the Cold War is over, we won, and now the entire world is going to become just like us – free enterprise democracies.  That was a very idealistic thing to believe.

    But here’s the other conclusion they made, and that is that everybody – that it didn’t – nationhood no longer mattered when it came to economics, that right now the world would no longer have borders.  It wouldn’t matter where things were made.  What mattered is they were made in the most efficient place.

    And it became mantra.  And look, I think it became part of Republican orthodoxy for a very long time, an orthodoxy that I came up in, which was it’s okay if productive capacity moves to another country, because what that will do is it will free up our workers to do work that’s even more productive and pays them more.  It was the famous or the infamous idea that who cares that you lost your job at a factory, you’re going to learn how to code, and then you’re going to be – you’re going to make a lot more money doing that.

    Well, it was completely unrealistic, number one, and became incredibly disruptive that that decision was made.  But here’s the other implication of it:  It robbed a nation of its industrial capacity, of its ability to make things.  And its industrial capacity and its ability to make things has two ramifications:  The first is it hurts your economy, it hurts your country, it robs people of jobs, and the transition is not nearly as easy, but it also ends up becoming corrosive and destructive to communities.  I mean, as a result we had a rust belt.  We had places that were gutted and we had families that for generations that worked in a certain field or for a certain company, and all of a sudden that company or that field vanished because it moved somewhere else where it was cheaper to do.  And those jobs were gone, and obviously it became incredibly destructive – not just for the United States, by the way, but for many nations in the industrialized West.

    But the other thing it robbed us of is the ability to make things, which is a national security impediment – impairment – and a very significant one.  If you go back to the World War – World War II, the admiral who had been tasked with planning Pearl Harbor thought it was a really bad idea.  He went through and obviously followed orders, but he thought it was a very bad idea because he had spent a substantial amount of time studying in the United States when he was younger.  And his conclusion was that attacking the United States was a bad idea because even though at the time militarily we were behind the Japanese, certainly technologically and otherwise, we had factories and we had access to raw material and resources.  And he knew that over time, once those factories and those raw materials were put to the war machine, the Japanese would not be able to keep up.

    And you could very well argue that the end of World War II, that the victory in World War II both in Europe and especially in Asia, was the result of America’s industrial capacity.  When the Japanese lost a plane, they lost a plane.  When we lost a plane – and their planes were better than ours for a long time.  When we lost a plane, we were able to produce hundreds to replace it.  Industrial capacity mattered in terms of national security, and that’s never changed.  That’s always been true. 

    And so today, what you find is because of all of those years of neglect, because of the loss of industrial capacity, we didn’t just undermine our society, we didn’t just undermine our domestic economy, we’ve undermined our position in the world.  And what you will find and what we find even now is that increasingly, on geopolitical issue after geopolitical issue, it is access to raw material and industrial capacity that is at the core both of the decisions that we’re making and the areas that we’re prioritizing. 

    It’s – now, the technologies are different, but nonetheless that is what we’re increasingly prioritizing.  And that’s become really apparent to me.  I think it was even going into this job, but in the months that I’ve been there, on place after place, every country in the world is now pitching themselves as a source of rare earth minerals.  Every country in the world – by the way, they’re not that rare, so every country has access to it, but it’s become a big – but that alone is not enough because you have to have access to rare earth minerals, but then you have to have the ability to process them and you have to have – to make them into usable material. 

    And frankly, what the Chinese have done over the last 25 or 30 years is they’ve cornered the market.  And this is one of the true challenges to sort of pure free-enterprise view of these things.  You cannot compete with a nation-state who has decided they’re not interested in making money.  They don’t – they’re not interested in making money in this field.  They are interested in the short term in dominating the market, being the sole-source provider for the world of a certain product.  Because once you establish industry dominance in any one of these fields, you can charge the world whatever you want. 

    Now, one thing is if we said:  Well, this happened because they’re just better than us.  But that’s not why it happened.  It happened because we literally gave it away.  Because we made the decision, we made the policy decision, that it was okay, we were okay with 80-something percent of the active ingredients in most of our generic pharmaceuticals coming from another country.  We were okay with giving that away.  We were okay with giving away all kinds of things like that.  And now, now we are in a crunch.  And I say “we.”  I mean the rest of the world is in a crunch, because we have realized that our industrial capability is deeply dependent on a number of potential adversary nation-states, including China, who can hold it over our head. 

    And so in many ways the nature of geopolitics is now adjusted to that and is adjusting to that.  And it’ll be one of the great challenges of the new century and one of the priorities of this administration under President Trump is to reorient our domestic and the way we pursue geopolitics to take into account for the fact that you can never be secure as a nation unless you’re able to feed your people, and unless you’re able to make the things that your economy needs in order to function and ultimately to defend yourself. 

    There is virtually none of the leading-edge industries of the 21st century in which we don’t have some level of vulnerability, and it’s become one of the highest geopolitical priorities that we now face – not simply access to raw material but figuring out how can we have more industrial capacities in these critical fields, ideally domestically, but if not here then diversify the global supply chain so that it cannot be used against us as a point of leverage at a time of potential conflict. 

    In fact, unless we fix it, some of these conflicts will never happen because we will never be able to enter – the amount of leverage they will have on us will begin to constrain our ability to make foreign policy.  Unable to get into a tremendous amount of detail, let me just say that even as I speak to you now, there are a number of foreign policy issues in which we’re having to balance what we would ideally want to do with what we may not be able to do in the short term until we fix these problems.  This is a real challenge in American geopolitics, and it’s one that’s become a priority and goes right to the heart of the decisions that were made over the last 20 or 30 years that were – that were a mistake and that we’re now trying to correct.

    The other, which is more broad but I think also ties to economic policy, is the following:  Part of the decisions that were made were, in the end, if something is good for the global economy, that’s really what matters.  Ultimately, a lot of public policy decisions were made without the nation-state in mind.  Rather, the decision was:  Is this good for the global economy?  Is this good for global economic growth?  Is this good for prosperity in other places even if it may not be in our interest? 

    And we made those decisions even during the Cold War to some extent.  We allowed nations to treat us unfairly in trade, but we allowed them to do it because we didn’t want those countries to become victim to a communist revolution that would overthrow them.  But then we kept it going.  And so today there are multiple countries around the world that are fully developed economies, but whom we have enormous trade imbalances because they want to continue that system moving along.  And that has to be corrected.

    But here’s the final point, and here’s why this is also critical.  Because not only did we take out nation-state interest and the national interest out of our economic policies; we also took it out of the way we made foreign policy decisions.  The idea that our foreign policy, depending on the place and on the issue, should be centered and focused primarily on what is good for the United States was completely lost.  Time and again, we made decisions in foreign policy because of what was good for the international order or what was good for the world.  And I’m not saying those things are irrelevant, but the number one priority of our foreign policy must – of the United States – the number one foreign policy priority of the United States needs to be the United States and what’s in the best interest of the United States.  (Applause.)

    That’s not isolationism.  That’s common sense.  On the contrary, in order to do that, we have to engage in the world.  But we need to engage in the world in a way that prioritizes our national interest above all else.  And the reason why we do that goes back to my point at the outset of this, with human nature.  And that is:  That’s what other countries do all the time.  Virtually every single nation-state we interact with prioritizes their national interest in their interactions with us.  And we need to begin to do that again, and we’re beginning to do that again – prioritizing the national interest of the United States above everything else in making these foreign policy decisions.

    And I’ll close by saying that’s where foreign policy works best.  As I’ve said to multiple foreign leaders, including some with whom we haven’t had engagements with for many years, I said the way foreign policy works best is when our national interests are aligned.  When they’re aligned, that’s where we have incredible opportunity for partnership together.  And when they’re not aligned, that’s where I expect them to pursue their national interest and us to pursue ours, and to do so peacefully if possible, and that’s the work of diplomacy. 

    And so I think the work you have done to reorient our thinking towards the national interest – both in our domestic economic policies as well as in our foreign policies – is critical work for 21st century conservatism.  And I thank you for all the work you’ve provided.  You’ve done great work.  When no one else was talking about these things, when no one else was providing the material that allowed us to build public policy and challenge thinking, you were doing it.  And I encourage you to continue to do it because this is going to be the work of a generation.  It’s – there’s still much work to be done.  We are in the midst of an important and long-overdue realignment in our thinking in American politics, and it takes organizations like American Compass to drive the innovation and the thinking.  And we appreciate everything you’ve done up to this point and encourage you to continue to do that.

    And one of the people who has really been a leader in this regard – someone who I actually got to know as part of this project and this thinking back when he was only a best-selling author and not even a political figure yet – is our current Vice President, who is doing a phenomenal job, and someone I’ve grown tremendous – my admiration for him has grown tremendously.  I admired him before.  I admired him in the Senate.  I admire him a lot more now as Vice President because I think vice presidents are just more impressive than senators, Bernie.  That’s all.  (Laughter.)  But I can say that now that I got 99 votes, see, because I don’t need their votes anymore.  (Laughter.)

    But the Vice President is going a phenomenal job, and I think is one of the most powerful and clearest voices in the world – really at the edge, at the leading edge of this new thinking in American politics.  And it’s my honor to serve with him in this administration, and it’s my honor to invite him onto the stage now to speak to all of you.

    So thank you for the opportunity to be here.  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice President of the United States, JD Vance.  (Applause.)

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: PromptQL Partners with UC Berkeley to Develop New Data Agent Benchmark for Reliability of Enterprise AI Agents

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    BERKELEY, Calif., June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — PromptQL, a platform for reliable AI, today announced a strategic research collaboration with the University of California, Berkeley to develop the first comprehensive data agent benchmark for enterprise reliability specifically designed to evaluate general-purpose AI data agents in enterprise environments.

    A recent McKinsey study revealed that 78% of organizations use AI in at least one business function, however, more than 80% say their organization hasn’t seen a tangible impact on enterprise-level Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT). The partnership – led by Aditya Parameswaran, Professor and Co-Director of UC Berkeley’s EPIC Data Lab, along with his students – addresses this fundamental challenge organizations face when deploying AI systems in business-critical environments.

    While existing agentic data benchmarks like GAIA, Spider, and FRAMES test specific AI tasks, they overlook the complexity, reliability demands, and messy, siloed data that define real business environments. The forthcoming data agent benchmark aims to offer a solution by creating a framework that reflects real-world complexities.

    “Our customer conversations reveal a clear pattern—they’re ready to move from proof-of-concepts to production AI, yet they lack the evaluation tools to make confident deployment decisions,” said Tanmai Gopal, CEO of PromptQL. “The data agent benchmark changes that by using representative datasets from our work in telecom, healthcare, finance, retail, and anti-money laundering to reflect the real complexity of enterprise AI.”

    UC Berkeley’s EPIC Data Lab brings expertise to this collaboration. Professor Parameswaran is a leading authority on the use of AI for next-gen usable data analysis tools and has received numerous prestigious awards. His research group has created widely-adopted data tools with tens of millions of downloads.

    “Current benchmarks suffer from what I call the ‘1% problem’—they’re built for tech giants and ignore the 99% of organizations grappling with real-world data complexity,” Parameswaran said. “The data agent benchmark marks a shift toward evaluating AI based on the reliability, transparency, and practical value enterprises actually need. This collaboration bridges academic rigor with the production insights PromptQL brings from real deployments.”

    The data agent benchmark beta will be revealed later this year. Organizations interested in early access or contributing use-cases or datasets can reach out to the research team at epic-support@eecs.berkeley.edu.

    PromptQL will be at AI Engineer World’s Fair, June 3-6 in San Francisco. Tanmai Gopal, PromptQL’s co-founder and CEO, will present a session, “Al Automation that Actually Works: $100M Impact on Messy Data with Zero Surprises,” on June 4 at 11:15 a.m. PT. To learn more or schedule a demo at the PromptQL booth, visit https://hasura.io/events/ai-engineer-worlds-fair-2025.

    About PromptQL
    PromptQL is a next-generation AI platform from the makers of Hasura, the company behind the pioneering GraphQL Engine. Built for enterprise-grade reliability, PromptQL enables natural language analysis and automation on internal business data — with an industry-first accuracy SLA. By learning the unique language of your business and planning tasks before executing them deterministically, PromptQL brings human-level precision to AI agents.

    About UC Berkeley EPIC Data Lab
    The EPIC Data Lab at UC Berkeley develops low-code and no-code interfaces for data work, powered by Gen AI. Co-Led by Professor Aditya Parameswaran, the lab follows Berkeley’s tradition of multidisciplinary systems research with emphasis on real-world impact and practical deployment. The lab’s tools, including DocETL and other widely-adopted systems, demonstrate Berkeley’s leadership in democratizing data science capabilities.

    Media Contact:
    Erica Anderson
    Offleash for PromptQL
    promptql@offleashpr.com

    Research Contact:
    Professor Aditya Parameswaran
    UC Berkeley EPIC Data Lab
    epic-support@eecs.berkeley.edu

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Governments of Canada and Saskatchewan announce support through the Red Cross to help those impacted by Saskatchewan wildfires

    Source: Government of Canada News (2)

    June 4, 2025 – Ottawa, Ontario

    Today, the Government of Canada announced that it will match every dollar donated to the Canadian Red Cross 2025 Saskatchewan Wildfires Appeal to support wildfire disaster relief and recovery efforts across Saskatchewan.

    The Government of Saskatchewan will be immediately providing $15 million to the Canadian Red Cross to work with the Saskatchewan Public Safety Agency to support wildfire evacuees.

    Donation matching will be open for 30 days, retroactive to when the appeal first opened on May 30th. The funds raised will be used to assist those impacted by the wildfires in Saskatchewan, including those who have evacuated their homes.

    Thousands in Saskatchewan have been displaced as wildfires continue to threaten communities across the province. In response, the Canadian Red Cross is working closely with Indigenous leadership and all levels of government to provide emergency accommodations, personal services, and critical information to people who have been forced from their homes.

    The Governments of Canada and Saskatchewan are committed to doing everything they can to support all those affected.

    Canadians wishing to make a financial donation to help those impacted by wildfires in Saskatchewan can do so online at www.redcross.ca or by calling 1-800-418-1111.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI: Mountain America Credit Union Welcomes Rob Brough as Chief Marketing Officer

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Experienced marketing leader joins credit union, bringing decades of strategic expertise and a passion for purpose-driven community impact 

    A Media Snippet accompanying this announcement is available in this link.

    SANDY, Utah, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Mountain America Credit Union has announced the appointment of Rob Brough as its new senior vice president and chief marketing officer. He succeeds Sharon Cook, who recently retired after more than 15 years of visionary leadership and impactful contributions to the organization’s growth and member experience.

    Brough brings with him nearly 30 years of experience in marketing, communications and community involvement. Most recently, he served as executive vice president of corporate marketing and communications at Zions Bank, where he led marketing, branding, digital strategy, and community outreach across a 10-state region. In 2021, he was named CXO of the Year by Utah Business Magazine.

    “Rob’s track record of purpose-driven marketing, deep roots in community involvement and strong leadership make him the ideal person to build upon a legacy defined by innovation, integrity, and lasting impact,” said Nathan Anderson, chief operating officer at Mountain America. “We’re thrilled to welcome Rob to Mountain America and confident that his vision will further elevate how we connect with members, employees, and the community.”

    Mountain America’s marketing team plays a strategic role in the organization beyond traditional campaigns to share the credit union’s story, build trust, and promote the meaningful experiences that define the brand. The marketing team at Mountain America is integral to bringing the credit union’s mission, vision and values to life.

    “I have long appreciated the commitment I see from Mountain America to make a difference for members, for the community, and for employees,” Brough said. “I also have a tremendous amount of respect for those I have come to know from Mountain America over the years and admire the quality of marketing activity I have consistently seen from the marketing team. I am truly energized by this opportunity to join the Mountain America team and look forward to partnering with my new colleagues to build on the successes of the past and grow together into the future.”

    In addition to his professional accomplishments, Brough is active in community service. He serves as the chair of the Hale Centre Theatre board of trustees, a Mountain America community partner, and holds leadership or advisory roles with the South Valley Chamber of Commerce, American Heart Association, Utah Sports Commission, Fredette Family Foundation and Ronald McDonald House Charities.

    For more information about Mountain America visit macu.com.

    About Mountain America Credit Union
    With more than 1 million members and $20 billion in assets, Mountain America Credit Union helps its members define and achieve their financial dreams. Mountain America provides consumers and businesses with a variety of convenient, flexible products and services, as well as sound, timely advice. Members enjoy access to secure, cutting-edge mobile banking technology, over 100 branches across a multi-state region, and more than 50,000 surcharge-free ATMs. Mountain America—guiding you forward. Learn more at macu.com.

    The MIL Network