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Category: European Union

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Members review farm policies, food security, technology transfer and transparency issues

    Source: World Trade Organization

    Updates on agricultural market developments and food security

    Members heard updates from observer international organizations, including the International Grains Council (IGC), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Their contributions encompassed the overarching theme of global food security and related challenges, with a particular focus on the unique difficulties faced by least developed countries (LDCs) and net food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs), along with their continuous efforts to mitigate these challenges.

    The IGC reported that the prospects for the next grain harvest remain broadly favourable, although an unusually dry winter and early spring has reduced yield potential in parts of East Asia. Including upgrades for the Americas, the global crop projection is boosted by 2 million tonnes, to a record 2,375 million. Due to a slightly lower estimate for feed use, the forecast for total grain consumption has been revised down slightly month-on-month, now standing at 2,372 million tonnes.

    With grains and oilseeds markets expected to be comfortably supplied, the IGC emphasized the importance of open trade, noting that global price developments may be strongly influenced by demand-side measures, including trade policies. It also underscored the value of market transparency and drew members’ attention to the Wheat Maritime Trade and Food Security Dashboard, developed jointly with the WTO. This tool supports the monitoring of short-term trends in international wheat maritime trade flows in response to changing market conditions and enables analysis of longer-term developments.

    FAO shared with members the main information contained in The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) 2024. The publication confirmed that global progress towards the goal of ending hunger is not on track, with chronic hunger and food insecurity persisting at elevated levels. After a sharp increase between 2019 and 2021, the prevalence of undernourishment remained well above pre COVID-19 figures, reaching 9.1% in 2023. This means an estimated 713 to 757 million people facing hunger, with a mid-range estimate of 733 million – approximately 152 million more than in 2019.  

    FAO reminded members that the vast majority of people and countries facing acute food insecurity have remained in that situation for several years, underscoring the protracted nature of the crisis and the importance of resilience-building efforts. FAO also noted that it has been closely monitoring the global food security situation and has developed a dedicated web page – FAO Response to Global Food Security Challenges – which provides detailed information on various aspects of food security.

    The WFP stressed that global food insecurity remains alarmingly high, with 295 million people acutely affected. Catastrophic hunger, the most severe form, has surged – rising from 80,000 people in 2018 to 1.9 million in 2024. Conflict remains the primary driver, with 70% of the acutely food insecure living in fragile, violent contexts. Extreme weather, such as droughts and floods, also threatens food security, as do economic factors like inflation, debt and high food prices. Humanitarian operations are further strained by severe funding shortfalls, said the WFP, which in 2025 expects to assist 24 million fewer people than in 2024.

    To address this crisis, increased funding, humanitarian access and robust data systems are urgently needed. The WFP thanked WTO members for the Decision adopted at the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) to exempt humanitarian food purchases from export restrictions. The decision has improved access to local and regional production, facilitating international and regional movement of commodities and positively impacting the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of WFP operations

    Nairobi and Bali decisions – transparency

    Regarding the implementation of the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, the Chair called on members concerned to make all possible efforts to fully conclude this exercise of aligning export subsidy schedules with the obligations under the Nairobi Decision. The next export competition dedicated discussion is scheduled for the Committee meeting in September. Referring to the Committee’s Decision in G/AG/2/Add.2 of December 2024, the Chair reminded members that 2024 is the last implementation year for which the information required under the export competition questionnaire (ECQ) needs to be provided via a response to the questionnaire.

    Starting from the implementation year 2025, members will be required to submit a new annual export competition notification, which consolidates and streamlines existing export competition related notification requirements and formats, including the ECQ. Members were urged to redouble efforts to submit outstanding responses to the ECQ, and to use the ECQ Agriculture Information Management System (AG IMS) on-line facility for this purpose.

    The Chair noted that the second triennial review of the operation of  the Bali Decision on Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) administration is due in 2025. This topic will remain on the Committee’s agenda all this year. Members shared thoughts on the possible contents and outcomes of this review. The Chair also reminded members of the specific issues raised at the March 2025 Committee meeting and invited them to build on those discussions.

    Issues addressed included the need for better follow-up on the first review’s conclusions , improved transparency and completeness of market access notifications, particularly for TRQs with country-specific allocations in the schedule of commitments, as well as the inclusion of tariff data in TRQ notifications. Members also called for action on TRQ underutilization by addressing barriers, such as unrelated licensing requirements, enhancing notification practices, compiling current challenges and exploring ways to reallocate underused quotas to improve TRQ effectiveness and transparency.

    Technology transfer

    Members expressed interest in advancing discussions on the transfer of technology to developing economies in the food and agricultural sector. Delegations expressed support for continuing discussions on the topic, with calls to shift from educational exchanges to examining how WTO rules could bolster technological development.

    To capitalize on this momentum, the Chair encouraged delegations to turn this interest into concrete, substantive ideas for collective exploration, utilizing the Committee’s nearly three decades of experience with the implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture. Despite encouragement from the previous Chair, Anna Leung of Hong Kong, China, at the March 2025 meeting, no written proposals have been submitted.

    The Chair suggested convening informal discussions and continuing to include this topic on formal agendas to support ongoing reflection and shape collective guidance.

    Agricultural policies review

    A total of 180 questions were raised by members concerning individual notifications and specific implementation matters during the meeting. This peer review process allows members to address issues related to the implementation of commitments outlined in the Agreement on Agriculture. Of these, 14 issues were raised for the first time, while 23 were recurring matters from previous Committee meetings.

    The 14 new items covered a range of topics, including Australia’s livestock industry funds, Brazil’s rural development efforts, Canada’s involvement in farm and dairy support, and the European Union’s emergency agricultural measures and tariff actions on Russian products.

    Other discussions focused on India’s domestic support programmes, sugar policy, and export duties, as well as Indonesia’s agricultural support. Japan’s initiatives to lower carbon emissions and secure fertilizers were also reviewed, along with Paraguay’s rural assistance project, Switzerland’s payments to farmers, Thailand’s debt relief and rice support policies, Türkiye’s tax and pricing systems, the United Kingdom’s schemes to enhance farm productivity, and the United States’ trade programmes, avian flu response, and broad agricultural support measures.

    Since the previous meeting in March 2025, a total of 53 individual notifications have been submitted to the Committee: 24 related to market access, 14 concerning domestic support, 11 regarding export competition, and four related to the implementation of the Marrakesh Decision on LDCs and NFIDCs.

    The Chair urged members to submit timely and complete notifications and to respond to overdue questions, stressing the critical importance of enhanced transparency.

    All questions submitted for the meeting are available in G/AG/W/255. All questions and replies received are available in the WTO’s Agriculture Information Management System.

    Next meeting

    The next meeting of the Committee on Agriculture is scheduled for 25-26 September 2025.

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    MIL OSI Economics –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Whose story is being told — and why? 4 questions museum visitors should ask themselves this school holidays

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Olli Hellmann, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Waikato

    The winter school holidays will mean families across Aotearoa New Zealand will be looking for indoor activities to entertain children. With millions of visitors each year, museums focused on the country’s history will inevitably play host to local and international visitors.

    Museums tend to enjoy a high level of trust among the public. They’re widely seen as neutral, factual sources of historical knowledge.

    But like all forms of storytelling, museums present the past in particular ways. They narrate events from a certain group’s or individual’s perspective and explain why events unfolded in the way they did.

    In this respect, museums are not so different from historical films. Consider the different ways two recent movies – 1917 and the remake of All Quiet on the Western Front – narrate the first world war.

    In 1917, the storyteller takes the British side, encouraging viewers to invest in the bravery and endurance of British soldiers. But All Quiet on the Western Front is narrated from a German perspective, inviting viewers to grieve for German soldiers as victims of a political system that glorified war.

    Museum exhibitions tell stories in a similar way. Visitors should be asking not just what story is told, but why.

    Spoiler alert: it often has to do with national identity. Museums tell particular stories of the past because these stories support a particular image of New Zealand as a nation.

    Four questions for your next museum visit

    At its core, every story has two basic ingredients: actors and events. To turn these into a compelling narrative, the storyteller connects the events into a plot, so they build on each other. The storyteller also transforms actors into characters by giving them particular traits — brave, selfish, wise, cruel and the like. Museums do this, too.

    As you move through a museum exhibition, try asking yourself the following questions:

    1. Which historical events are included — and which are left out?

    Every story begins somewhere. Museums choose which events to include and which to leave out, shaping how visitors understand what happened and why.

    Take Te Papa’s Gallipoli: The Scale of Our War exhibition. It opens with the landing at ANZAC Cove but skips over events in the lead-up to WWI — such as Britain’s earlier moves to seize Ottoman territories like Cyprus and Egypt.

    Leaving these out helps frame Gallipoli as a noble – albeit tragic – “coming of age” for New Zealand. But in reality, ANZAC soldiers were fighting to support Britain’s imperial ambitions in the Middle East.

    2. How are events organised into a plot?

    Museums don’t just say “this happened, then that happened”. They link events into a larger plot — a chain of cause and effect that explains how one thing led to another. This can happen through text, but also through spatial layout, lighting, sound and other techniques that guide visitors through rising and falling moments of narrative tension.

    Often, museums use familiar plot types to connect events. One common example is the quest narrative — a story in which heroes must navigate unknown terrain, and where mistakes are part of the journey and threaten to derail the mission. It’s a bit like The Lord of the Rings: a journey full of challenges, wrong turns and personal growth.

    At Te Kōngahu Museum of Waitangi, Aotearoa New Zealand’s Treaty story is told using this quest structure. The Treaty is presented as something unique and unfamiliar and the British, confronted with this unknown, fall back on familiar colonial practices — the “mistake” that led to the New Zealand wars.

    Because this misstep is treated as part of the learning curve typical of any quest, the exhibition avoids harder questions about this violent part of history, and instead preserves the image of Aotearoa New Zealand as fundamentally tolerant and respectful.

    3. Who are the main actors in the story — and who is missing?

    Every story needs protagonists, and whose perspective frames the story matters. In many smaller regional museums, history is still told almost entirely from the viewpoint of European settlers. But what about Māori experiences of colonisation? Or the histories of Chinese communities and other migrants who arrived in the 1800s?

    By focusing narrowly on European settlers as the main actors, these museums present a one-sided view of the past and construct an image of New Zealand as a European nation — one that expects others to assimilate.

    4. How are the main actors characterised — and how are we meant to feel about them?

    It’s not surprising that museums portray some actors positively and others less so. What’s more revealing is how certain individuals are elevated as symbols of the nation and how museums invite us to form personal connections with them.

    In Te Papa’s Gallipoli exhibition, visitors can open drawers and boxes containing soldiers’ personal belongings. This intimate activity encourages us to feel close to these figures — not just learning about them, but identifying with them as embodying national qualities: bravery, resilience and a commitment to peace.

    Why does this matter?

    Historical museum narratives aren’t necessarily inaccurate — but, much like historical movies, they are selective. They highlight certain events, actors and cause-and-effect chains to tell a particular kind of story. Often, that story supports a specific idea of what it means to be an Aotearoa New Zealander.

    By reading museum exhibitions with a critical eye, visitors can better understand not just the past, but how storytelling shapes national identity in the present — and imagine how it might be shaped differently.

    Olli Hellmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Whose story is being told — and why? 4 questions museum visitors should ask themselves this school holidays – https://theconversation.com/whose-story-is-being-told-and-why-4-questions-museum-visitors-should-ask-themselves-this-school-holidays-259538

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4) – Curtain-raiser Press Briefing

    Source: United Nations (video statements)

    The Deputy Secretary-General, Amina J. Mohammed, accompanied by Ambassador Héctor Gómez Hernández, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, and Ambassador Chola Milambo, the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations, briefed reporters today to preview the upcoming Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, which will be taking place in Sevilla, Spain.

    Ahead of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), UN deputy chief Amina J. Mohammed said that the Conference offers a chance to “change course, to catalyze investment, to address debt and sustainable development, to reform the rules of the system and to put people’s needs at the center.”
    —

    The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), to take place in Sevilla, Spain, from 30 June to 3 July 2025, will bring together world leaders to advance solutions to financing challenges threatening the achievement of sustainable development. Governments, international organizations, financial institutions, businesses and civil society will come together to commit to financing our future through a renewed global framework for financing for development.

    Rising debt burdens, falling investment, and shrinking aid are among the financing challenges confronting the world today. With progress on the Sustainable Development Goals off track and rising systemic risks, including due to climate change and conflicts, the Conference provides a once-in-a-decade opportunity to mobilize finance at scale and reform the rules of the system to put people’s needs at the center.

    The Conference is expected to adopt the Compromiso de Sevilla, an intergovernmentally negotiated outcome, which was approved for adoption by consensus at the Fourth Preparatory Committee Meeting for FFD4 on 17 June.

    The Conference will mark the beginning of implementation of the outcome document, signaling a new phase of collective action on financing for development. Coalitions of countries and diverse stakeholders will announce ambitious commitments and concrete solutions under the Sevilla Platform for Action that will boost the renewed financing framework and setting out a turning point from dialogue to delivery.

    Related Link:
    4th International Conference on Financing for Development (30 June – 3 July 2025) – Website
    https://financing.desa.un.org/ffd4

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ATlnayBgbE

    MIL OSI Video –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024 – A10-0114/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024

    (COM(2025)0250 – C10‑0102/2025 – 2025/0138(BUD))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0250 – C10‑0102/2025),

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund[1],

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[2], and in particular Article 9 thereof,

    – having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[3], and in particular point 10 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund[4],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)[5],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[6],

    – having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[7],

    – having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2024 on RESTORE – Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 and Regulation (EU) 2021/1057[8], and in particular the budgetary assessment attached to it,

    – having regard to the EEA Report No 1/2024 – European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA)[9],

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0114/2025),

    A. whereas in September 2024, exceptionally high levels of rainfall occurred in Austria causing severe flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Austrian authorities at EUR 1 711,6 million;

    B. whereas in September 2024, heavy rain occurred in south-western Poland which led to the flooding of several rivers resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Polish authorities at EUR 3,04 billion;

    C. whereas in September 2024, very strong winds and heavy rain struck entire Czechia which led to flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Czech authorities at EUR 2,82 billion;

    D. whereas as of 15 September 2024, Slovakia experienced substantial flooding, particularly in Bratislava and the surrounding regions which led to the levels of the Danube and Morava rivers significantly rising resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Slovakian authorities at EUR 84,3 million;

    E. whereas in September 2024, torrential rain and the resulting floods hit several districts of Moldova resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Moldovan authorities at EUR 7,8 million;

    F. whereas in October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by heavy rainfall which caused catastrophic flash floods, landslides and flooding in several parts of the country resulting in total direct damages estimated by the authorities at EUR 841,85 million;

    G. whereas above mentioned occurrences caused by severe natural disasters are a result of global climate change; whereas the European State of the Climate 2024 confirms that 2024 was the warmest year ever recorded in Europe and that 30 % of the continent’s river network exceeded the “high” flood threshold while 12 % exceeded the “severe” threshold, resulting in the most widespread flooding since 2013;

    1. Expresses its deepest solidarity with all the victims, their families and all the individuals affected by the destructive floods in Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as with the national, regional and local authorities involved in the relief efforts;

    2. Welcomes the decision as a tangible and visible form of the Union’s solidarity with its citizens and the regions in the affected areas, including with those in partner countries;

    3. Reiterates the importance of communicating to the public the tangible benefits brought about by the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), also to further increase citizens’ awareness of Union tools and programmes in the Member States and countries involved in accession negotiations with the Union;

    4. Highlights the increasing number of severe, destructive and deadly natural disasters in Europe and calls on Member States and the Commission to invest in climate mitigation and adaptation measures to avoid human and economic losses; underlines that in 2024 storms and flooding affected an estimated 413 000 people, resulting in the loss of at least 335 lives and that the damage from storms and flooding across Europe during the year is estimated to have cost at least EUR 18 billion[10]; considers that the budget of the EUSF or its equivalent should be substantially expanded in view of the upcoming Commission proposal on the new Multiannual Financial Framework and subsequent inter-institutional negotiations and that the EUSF or its equivalent must provide assistance commensurate to the magnitude of such disasters to citizens; notes that substantially increasing the EUSF would allow Member States to respond more effectively and quickly to disasters while other instruments, particularly cohesion funds whose primary purpose is not disaster response, could be preserved; urges also the Commission to explore all possible avenues for accelerating the mobilisation of the EUSF, in particular by amending current rules and granting higher advance payments to applicant countries;

    5. Calls on the Commission to develop dedicated crisis-response instruments for the post-2027 period, recognising that the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters, health emergencies, geopolitical instability, and economic shocks require more agile and tailored financial mechanisms at the Union level; underlines the need for enhanced coordination with national civil protection systems and early-warning mechanisms, ensuring a more integrated and data-driven Union-wide disaster response; emphasises the importance of dedicated support for cross-border and regional cooperation in preparedness, mitigation, and recovery efforts, particularly in vulnerable or high-risk areas;

    6. Stresses that the EUSF is only a curative instrument and that the Union should also continue to address climate change adaptation and mitigation by supporting European and national policies to prevent natural disasters; underlines that EEA Report No 1/2024 ‘European Climate Risk Assessment’ warned that the Union is unprepared for the effects of climate change even if the world manages to keep global temperature rise to 1,5 degrees Celsius, as set out in the Paris Agreement, and stresses the need for action to avoid the climate risks identified reaching critical levels; recalls the need for effective synergies with other Union policies and programmes and underlines that Member States should make best use of funding opportunities in particular, of the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund+ and the rural development programmes; calls on the Commission to assess with due urgency any reasoned requests by Member States to reallocate funds within the National Recovery and Resilience plans to natural disaster assistance, in accordance with the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council[11]; stresses also the need for preventive measures, not only to mitigate future damage but also to prevent the exacerbation of risk conditions following catastrophic events, such as floods, wildfires, landslides or the drying up of lakes and rivers; emphasises that all reconstruction financed by the EUSF must be climate-resilient; underlines the importance of adequate flexibility between the different programmes; underscores that assistance provided under the EUSF should not be to the detriment of Union funding received by Member States under other Union policies or programmes; recalls that Member States can grant State aid, in accordance with the applicable Union rules, notably for agricultural businesses that have suffered damages due to natural disasters;

    7. Recalls that RESTORE[12] and the specific measures under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)[13] provide additional assistance to Member States affected by natural disasters through further flexibilities in the use of the funds; stresses that Member States should make use of the new opportunities; underlines also that RESTORE provided limited flexibility for some Member States as the implementation of the current Multiannual Financial Framework is very advanced;

    8. Recalls the importance of rapid and solid damage assessment that takes due account of the economic repercussions and calls for increased operational efforts to be made in order to reduce the average time for the release of advanced payments to offer timely assistance to regions affected by natural disasters and extreme weather events, while ensuring the Union budget is protected; stresses that Member States should, in the context of disaster response and recovery measures, give due priority to the needs of the affected population, with particular attention to vulnerable groups;

    9. Stresses the urgent need to release immediate financial assistance through the EUSF to ensure that support can reach the affected regions in a timely manner;

    10. Approves the decision annexed to this resolution;

    11. Instructs its President to sign the decision with the President of the Council and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

    12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission.

     

     

    ANNEX: DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

    on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund[14], and in particular Article 4(3) thereof,

    Having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[15], and in particular Article 9 thereof,

    Having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[16], and in particular point 10 thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    Whereas:

    (1) The European Union Solidarity Fund (‘the Fund’) aims to enable the Union to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner to emergency situations in order to show solidarity with the population of regions struck by major or regional natural disasters or major public health emergency.

    (2) The Fund is not to exceed the ceilings laid down in Article 9 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2020/2093, as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765[17].

    (3) On 29 November 2024, Austria submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (4) On 29 November 2024, Poland submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (5) On 4 December 2024, Czechia submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (6) On 7 December 2024, Slovakia submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (7) On 5 December 2024, Moldova submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (8) On 27 December 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in October 2024.

    (9) Those applications meet the conditions for providing a financial contribution from the Fund, as laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002.

    (10) The Fund should therefore be mobilised to provide a financial contribution to Austria, Poland,  Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    (11) In order to minimise the time taken to mobilise the Fund, this Decision should apply from the date of its adoption,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    For the general budget of the Union for the financial year 2025, the European Union Solidarity Fund shall be mobilised as follows in commitment and payment appropriations in relation to natural disasters:

    (a) the amount of EUR  42 789 075 shall be provided to Austria in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (b) the amount of EUR 75 998 939 shall be provided to Poland in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (c) the amount of EUR 113 979 781 shall be provided to Czechia in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (d) the amount of EUR 2 108 187 shall be provided to  Slovakia in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (e) the amount of EUR 195 196 shall be provided to Moldova in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (f) the amount of EUR 45 669 725 shall be provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to floods in October 2024.

    Article 2

    This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    It shall apply from [the date of its adoption][*].

     

    Done at Brussels,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President  The President

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    The Commission proposes to mobilise the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 (EUSF regulation) for an amount of EUR 280 740 903 to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to the natural disaster (floods) that took place in 2024.

     

    Austria – neighbouring country natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 12 and 16 September 2024, exceptionally high levels of rainfall occurred in Austria causing severe flooding. Lower Austria, Upper Austria and Vienna were particularly affected. In some parts of Lower Austria, 300-420 mm of rain fell in five days. The entire province of Lower Austria was declared a disaster area. Protective measures had to be put in place along the Danube River. In Lower Austria, nearly 2 000 houses had to be evacuated, thousands of households were without electricity, drinking water and sewerage for days. The floods led to five fatalities and 24 people were injured in Lower Austria.

     

    Austria estimates the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 1 711.6 million. This amount represents 0.38% of Austria’s Gross National Income (GNI) in 2022. As the same natural disaster qualifies a “major natural disaster” in Czechia, the application from Austria is eligible for a contribution from the EUSF without a specific threshold under the neighbouring country natural disaster criterion as laid down in Article 2(4) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Poland – regional natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 11 and 16 September 2024, heavy rain occurred in south-western Poland which led to the flooding of several rivers. The most impacted provinces were the Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces. Subsequently, nearly 10 600 residential and more than 2 000 farm buildings were flooded. Over 200 000 people were directly affected by the disaster. Numerous businesses were forced to temporarily suspend or significantly reduce their operations which led to significant financial losses.

     

    The Polish authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 3.04 billion. According the EUSF regulation, where the natural disaster concerns several regions at NUTS level 2, the threshold shall be applied to the average GDP of those regions weighted according to the share of total damage in each region. The direct damage expressed as a percentage of total weighted regional GDP of Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces is 8.46%. This amount exceeds 1.5% of the weighted average regional GDP of Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces.

     

    Czechia – major natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 12 and 17 September 2024, very strong winds and heavy rain struck the entire country which led to flooding. The most affected regions were the Moravian-Silesian and the Olomouc Region. Dozens of houses and approximately 1 000 road and railway bridges and 2 000 km of roads and railway lines were destroyed, or damaged. More than 350 schools were flooded. Over 250 000 households were left without electricity, heat and drinking water. As a result, over 13 000 people, as well as several hospitals had to be evacuated. The floods also led to eight fatalities.

     

    The Czech authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 2.82 billion. This amount exceeds the ‘major natural disaster’ threshold for Czechia of 0.6% of its Gross National Income, which was EUR 1.58 billion in 2024. Therefore, the disaster qualifies as a ‘major natural disaster’ according to Article 2(2) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Slovakia – neighbouring country natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    As of 15 September 2024, Slovakia experienced substantial flooding, particularly in Bratislava and the surrounding regions. Both the Danube and Morava rivers saw significant water level rises, with return periods exceeding 100 years in some locations. Cumulative rainfall reached up to 400 mm in the Záhorie region, exacerbating the impact. The most significant damage was attributed to smaller rivers, where levee breaches were reported, amplifying the flooding and leading to destruction in both rural and urban areas. Roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure were severely affected, straining emergency response efforts.

     

    Slovakia estimates the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 84.3 million. This amount represents 0.07% of Slovakia’s Gross National Income (GNI) in 2022. As the same natural disaster qualifies a “major natural disaster” in Czechia, the application from Slovakia is eligible for a contribution from the EUSF without a specific threshold under the neighbouring country natural disaster criterion as laid down in Article 2(4) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Moldova – regional natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 14 and 16 September 2024, torrential rain and the resulting floods hit the Cantemir, Hincesti, Leova, Straseni, Floresti and Telenesti districts of Moldova. Over 200 000 people were affected by the disaster. The floods destroyed or damaged 20 bridges, 8 educational institutions and several public buildings. Dozens of houses and cellars were flooded and over 60 people needed to be rescued.

     

    The Moldovan authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 7.8 million. The Moldovan authorities submitted the application under the “regional natural disaster” criterion as laid down in Article 2(3) of the EUSF Regulation, which is any natural disaster in a region at NUTS level 2 of an eligible State resulting in direct damage exceeding 1.5% of that region’s gross domestic product (GDP).

     

    Bosnia and Herzegovina – major natural disaster: floods in October 2024

     

    Between 3 and 17 October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by heavy rainfall, which caused catastrophic flash floods, landslides and flooding in the central, southern and western parts of the country. Herzegovina-Neretva, Central Bosnia, Zenica-Doboj and Canton 10 were the most affected cantons. In addition to power outages lasting several days and disruptions to landline and mobile phone services, there was also a complete disruption to road and rail transport. This caused severe physical and financial damage to residential and commercial buildings, as well as to the transport, water and sewage system. The floods led to 27 fatalities and 22 people were injured. Many families were forced to leave their homes and were accommodated in temporary shelters.

     

    The authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 841.85 million. This amount exceeds the ‘major natural disaster’ threshold for Bosnia and Herzegovina of 0.6% of its Gross National Income, which was EUR 138.33 million in 2024. Therefore, the disaster qualifies as a ‘major natural disaster’ according to Article 2(2) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Conclusion

     

    The methodology for calculating the aid was set out in the 2002-2003 Annual Report on the EUSF and accepted by the Council and the European Parliament. The Commision therefore proposes to the budget authority to mobilise the following amounts for the applications submitted by Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina:

     

    Disaster

    Total direct damage (EUR)

    Applied disaster threshold

    (EUR)

    2,5% of total direct damage (up to the threshold for major diasters) (EUR)

    6% of direct damage above the major disaster threshold (EUR)

    2.5% of total direct damage

    Total amount of aid proposed (EUR)

    Advance paid

    (EUR)

    Balance to be paid

    (EUR)

    Austria-floods

    (neighbouring disaster)

    1 711 563 002

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    42 789 075

    42 789 075

    10 663 587

     

    32 125 488

    Poland-floods

    (regional disaster)

    3 039 957 574

    538 909 893

    N/A

    N/A

    75 998 939

    75 998 939

    N/A

     

    75 998 939

    Czechia

    (major disaster)

    2 821 143 019

    1 579 680 000

    39 492 000

    74 487 781

    N/A

    113 979 781

    N/A

     

    113 979 781

    Slovakia-floods

    (neighbouring disaster)

    84 327 482

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    2 108 187

    2 108 187

    N/A

     

    2 108 187

    Moldova-floods

    (regional disaster)

    7 807 840

    226 331

    N/A

    N/A

    195 196

    195 196

    N/A

     

    195 196

    Bosnia and Herzegovia-floods

    (major disaster)

    841 851 670

    138 325 000

    3 458 125

    42 211 600

    N/A

    45 669 725

    N/A

     

    45 669 725

    TOTAL

    280 740 903

    10 663 587

    270 077 316

     

     

    Council Regulation 2024/765[18] of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 split the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) in two separate instruments: the European Solidarity Reserve and the Emergency Aid Reserve. The European Solidarity Reserve with an annual amount of EUR 1 016 million (in 2018 prices, corresponding to EUR 1 167.1 million in 2025 prices) will be used for assistance to respond to emergency situations covered by the EUSF.

    In order to avoid an early depletion of the annual allocation, Article 3(7) of the EUSF Regulation and Article 9(2), second subparagraph, of the amended MFF Regulation stipulate  that 25% of the annual EUSF allocation (i.e. EUR 291.8 million for 2025) shall remain available on 1 October of each year.

    Finally, according to the Article 4a(4) of the EUSF Regulation, the amount of EUR 50 000 000 has been already inscribed in the EU general budget 2025 (in commitments and payments appropriations) for the payment of possible advances.

    Therefore, the maximum amount that can be used by the EUSF at this stage is EUR 908,95 million (excluding the reserve for advances and the amound that will become available on 1 October). After this mobilisation EUR 980,64 million will remain available for upcoing mobilisastions.

     

    Amount available under the EUSF in 2025 (EUR):

     

    Total annual 2025 EUSF allocation (incl. 1 October tranche)

    1 167 064 638

    Amount carried over from 2024 (incl. unused advances) (+)

    194 316 161

    Credits reserved for advance payments (-)

    50 000 000

    Amount already used for advances to Spain and Austria (-)

    110 663 587

    Amount available only after 1 October (-)

    291 766 160

    Total amount currenty available (excl. reserve for advances and 1 October tranche)

    908 951 052

    Amount proposed for mobilisation under current  Mobilisation Decision (only balance to be paid)

    270 077 316

    Remaining amount for future applications (inc. for advances and 1 October tranche)

    980 639 896

     

     

    The Rapporteur recommends the swift approval of the Commission proposal for a decision annexed to this report, leading to the rapid mobilisation of the aforementioned amounts, as a sign of European solidarity with Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rapporteur calls on the Commission that this financial contribution should be delivered with particular urgency.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: US to hold talks with Iran next week – D. Trump

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    THE HAGUE, June 25 (Xinhua) — U.S. President Donald Trump announced in The Hague, the Netherlands, on Wednesday that the United States will hold talks with Iran next week.

    “We are going to talk to them – to Iran – next week. We can sign an agreement,” D. Trump said at a press conference following the NATO summit.

    Earlier on Wednesday, Trump noted that the ceasefire between Iran and Israel was being observed “very well.” –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran – RC-B10-0284/2025/REV1

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0284/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0285/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0296/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0299/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0300/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Michał Wawrykiewicz, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Loucas Fourlas, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Daniel Attard, Chloé Ridel
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Aurelijus Veryga, Diego Solier, Nora Junco García, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Charlie Weimers, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alexandr Vondra, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Marion Maréchal, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Kris Van Dijck
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Abir Al‑Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Bart Groothuis, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Alice Kuhnke
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Jonas Sjöstedt

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran

    (2025/2753(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran,

    – having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Swedish-Iranian national Dr Ahmad Reza Djalali, a specialist in emergency medicine and a scholar at Belgium’s Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Italy’s Università del Piemonte Orientale, was arrested on 24 April 2016 by the Iranian security forces;

    B. whereas Djalali was sentenced to death on spurious espionage charges in October 2017 following a grossly unfair trial based on a confession extracted under torture; whereas the sentence was upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court on 17 June 2018;

    C. whereas Djalali has been denied adequate medical care despite the severe deterioration in his physical health and the risk to his life, including a recent heart attack at Evin prison; whereas Iran has continued to threaten to implement his death sentence;

    D. whereas hundreds of individuals have already been executed in 2025 and at least 972 were executed in 2024, a 14 % increase on 2023;

    E. whereas the Iranian Government refuses to recognise Djalali’s Swedish citizenship;

    F. whereas this case is part of a systematic pattern of unlawful detentions and hostage diplomacy by the Iranian regime;

    1. Calls on Iran to immediately release Dr Djalali along with all political prisoners currently being detained; calls on Iran to put a moratorium on executions and to abolish the death penalty;

    2. Strongly condemns Djalali’s sham trial and the Iranian authorities’ brutal treatment of him, amounting to torture and ill treatment, as he was subjected to months of interrogation in solitary confinement, and then sentenced to death;

    3. Urges Iran to provide Djalali, whose health is deteriorating, with immediate and unrestricted access to necessary specialised medical care at an external hospital; urges Iran, furthermore, to provide Djalali with legal representation and legal defence, and allow him regular contact with his family;

    4. Calls on the relevant Member States and the European External Action Service to intensify diplomatic efforts and adopt targeted measures in response to Iran’s continued detention of EU nationals, including Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and others, as part of its hostage diplomacy and in violation of international law;

    5. Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for taking EU nationals hostage and for mass executions of opposition voices and other human rights violations;

    6. Demands that Iran grant full access to UN human rights mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur, and the EU’s full support and increase support for civil society organisations;

    7. Emphasises that EU-Iran engagements must be founded on tangible progress on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the release of all political prisoners;

    8. Asks the VP/HR to raise Djalali’s case publicly and in all engagements with her Iranian counterparts;

    9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government of Iran, the VP/HR, the Commission, the Member States and the United Nations.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – European main battle tank – E-001662/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Defence Fund (EDF) aims to support collaborative research and development (R&D) projects based on common priorities agreed by the Member States.

    The development of a next-generation main battle tank (MBT) is one of these priorities, as set out in the EU Capability Development Plan[1] and the Strategic Compass[2].

    In line with this, the EDF launched a call for proposals in 2023 to initiate such development, complementing the multinational Main Ground Combat System programme led by France and Germany.

    Through this call, Member States agreed on the requirements for key technologies necessary for the next-generation European MBT, and industry was invited to establish a consortium to conduct the necessary R&D.

    As a result, two projects (i.e. Main ARmoured Tank of Europe[3] and Technologies for existing and Future MBTs[4]) were selected for funding to conduct the initial R&D stages.

    A follow-up R&D action for these projects is high on the agenda for discussions with Member States, thus demonstrating a convergence of national plans.

    While Member States are free to decide which defence capabilities to develop and procure, the EU could further incentivise Member States to engage in joint procurement, which would reduce the number of systems used in the different defence capability areas.

    The Security Action for Europe Regulation[5] is a case in point, as it encourages Member States to buy together by offering them access to loans and simplified procurement rules, including in land combat capabilities.

    • [1] https://eda.europa.eu/publications-and-data/thematic-policy-reports/the-2023-eu-capability-development-priorities.
    • [2] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en.
    • [3] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/b816bef0-0a9f-439d-9f30-2dfc97373b55_en?filename=EDF-2023-DA-GROUND-MBT%20MARTE.pdf.
    • [4] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/37439eaf-8092-4e5b-ba7d-216ec4fa891b_en?filename=EDF-2023-DA-GROUND-MBT%20FMBTech.pdf.
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Funding for trauma-informed support structures – E-002384/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002384/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kathleen Funchion (The Left)

    Are there any EU-funded or -supported programmes operating in Ireland or elsewhere that fund trauma-informed support structures for students in schools? If operating in Ireland, what is their managing authority? If there are no such programmes in Ireland or elsewhere, will the Commission, in the context of future cohesion policy, look at funding such support structures?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli – RC-B10-0282/2025/REV1

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0282/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0287/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0289/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0290/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0295/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Rasa Juknevičienė, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere, Loucas Fourlas, Krzysztof Brejza
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Waldemar Tomaszewski
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Lena Schilling, Markéta Gregorová
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt, Per Clausen

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0282/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0282/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    (2025/2752(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

    – having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Mzia Amaglobeli, a journalist and co-founder of Batumelebi and Netgazeti outlets, was arrested during pro-European protests on 12 January 2025 and faces four to seven years in prison for a provoked incident involving a police officer;

    B. whereas the adoption of draconian legislation – such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, Code of Administrative Offences and Law on Grants – constitutes a dangerous acceleration of democratic backsliding and deliberate authoritarian strategy by Georgian Dream to silence critical voices in civil society and independent media and persecute the political opposition;

    C. whereas the authorities have virtually annihilated remaining independent media outlets in the country; whereas the public information space is fully dominated by pro-government media, spreading Russian-style propaganda and anti-European disinformation;

    D. whereas in Mzia Amaglobeli’s case, the authorities ignored procedural safeguards, imposed pre-trial detention without a clear legal basis, contested by the Public Defender, and assigned a presiding judge lacking qualifications in criminal law; whereas she is being punished for exposing corruption and reporting on election fraud during the 2024 elections;

    E. whereas she reportedly suffered inhumane treatment and undertook a 38-day hunger strike;

    F. whereas Estonia and Lithuania have imposed personal sanctions on Georgian judges and police officers linked to Mzia Amaglobeli’s case;

    1. Demands Mzia Amaglobeli’s immediate and unconditional release and the withdrawal of all charges against her, and denounces her politically motivated arrest and prosecution;

    2. Strongly condemns the Georgian Dream regime’s systemic assault on democratic institutions, political opposition, independent media, civil society and judicial independence;

    3. Expresses deep concern over arbitrary detentions and the harassment of, and violence against, journalists in Georgia, including smear campaigns, legal persecution, abuse and gender-based violence in detention; calls for independent investigations and urges the authorities to immediately end intimidation and ensure journalists’ safety and freedom;

    4. Urges the Georgian authorities to release all political prisoners and other illegally detained persons without delay, including activist Mate Devidze, opposition leaders Zurab Japaridze, Nika Melia and Nika Gvaramia, and former President Mikheil Saakashvili, and denounces the violent abduction of UNM Chair Tina Bokuchava’s husband and the reported threats to her children’s safety;

    5. Calls for the immediate repeal of all repressive legislation, the restoration of democracy, and full protection of media freedom and civil liberties;

    6. Calls for the EU to step up support for Georgia’s independent media and civil society following the entry into force of the FARA, and monitor ongoing trials;

    7. Regrets the persistent inaction of the Council, Member States and Commission and reiterates its repeated call on Member States to impose bilateral sanctions against Georgian Dream leaders and officials responsible for democratic backsliding;

    8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, President Zourabichvili, and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Protection of Hungarian citizens’ fundamental rights in the context of biometric identification and surveillance at public gatherings – E-002415/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002415/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kim Van Sparrentak (Verts/ALE), Brando Benifei (S&D), Svenja Hahn (Renew), Birgit Sippel (S&D), Leila Chaibi (The Left), Maria Walsh (PPE), Markéta Gregorová (Verts/ALE), Pernando Barrena Arza (The Left), Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE), Sophie Wilmès (Renew), Sebastian Everding (The Left), Jan-Christoph Oetjen (Renew), Klára Dobrev (S&D), Kai Tegethoff (Verts/ALE), Fabienne Keller (Renew), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Nela Riehl (Verts/ALE), Saskia Bricmont (Verts/ALE), Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle (Renew), Damian Boeselager (Verts/ALE), Evin Incir (S&D), Anna Strolenberg (Verts/ALE), Olivier Chastel (Renew), Reinier Van Lanschot (Verts/ALE), Dainius Žalimas (Renew), Thomas Waitz (Verts/ALE), Daniel Freund (Verts/ALE), Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Verts/ALE), Marc Angel (S&D), Rasmus Nordqvist (Verts/ALE), Villy Søvndal (Verts/ALE), Hanna Gedin (The Left), Rasmus Andresen (Verts/ALE), Özlem Demirel (The Left), Jaume Asens Llodrà (Verts/ALE), Catarina Vieira (Verts/ALE), Alexandra Geese (Verts/ALE), Maria Ohisalo (Verts/ALE), Rudi Kennes (The Left), Lena Schilling (Verts/ALE), Mounir Satouri (Verts/ALE), Benoit Cassart (Renew), Mélissa Camara (Verts/ALE), Alice Kuhnke (Verts/ALE), Elio Di Rupo (S&D), Sara Matthieu (Verts/ALE), Joanna Scheuring-Wielgus (S&D), Gordan Bosanac (Verts/ALE), Petras Auštrevičius (Renew), Katrin Langensiepen (Verts/ALE), Anja Hazekamp (The Left), David Cormand (Verts/ALE), Per Clausen (The Left), Murielle Laurent (S&D), Benedetta Scuderi (Verts/ALE), Lucia Yar (Renew), Marco Tarquinio (S&D), Majdouline Sbai (Verts/ALE), Diana Riba i Giner (Verts/ALE), Elisabeth Grossmann (S&D)

    Recent reports suggest that a new Hungarian law may allow the use of facial recognition technology to identify individuals participating in public demonstrations banned by the government[1].

    • 1.Can the Commission assess whether such use complies with the Artificial Intelligence Act’s prohibition on real-time biometric identification[2], applying all legal safeguards and criteria, and confirm that post-remote identification cannot be used to bypass Article 5, which has already entered into force[3]?
    • 2.Does the use of remote biometric identification in this situation bring additional risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, such as freedom of assembly and association, as enshrined in Article 12 of the Charter?
    • 3.If the national authorities responsible for oversight are unable or unwilling to act ‘independently, impartially and without bias’, as required by the Artificial Intelligence Act[4], will the Commission commit to taking action – including infringement proceedings if needed – to ensure that Hungarian citizens are effectively protected under the Artificial Intelligence Act and the Charter of Fundamental Rights?

    Submitted: 16.6.2025

    • [1] Spike, J., ‘Hungary’s new anti-LGBTQ+ law bans Pride events and sparks protests’, Associated Press, 19 March 2025, https://apnews.com/article/hungary-pride-ban-orban-lgbtq-rights-e7a0318b09b902abfc306e3e975b52df.
    • [2] Article 5(1), point (c) and Article 5(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    • [3] Article 26(10) of the Artificial Intelligence Act.
    • [4] As required by Article 70 of the Artificial Intelligence Act.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Stress tests potentially run on the Spanish grid with no prior notification during the blackout of 28 April 2025 – E-002456/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002456/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Pilar del Castillo Vera (PPE)

    In the light of the blackout that affected the Iberian Peninsula and parts of France on 28 April 2025, a number of technical sources have suggested that one of the scenarios is that the incident could have been linked to deliberate tests on the Spanish electricity system to assess its resilience when faced with unmanageable peaks in renewable energy generation.

    With this in mind:

    • 1.Was the Commission made formally aware of, or did it receive any official communication from the Spanish Government about, the possibility of the incident being linked to a stress test on the national grid?
    • 2.If so, does the Commission consider Spain to have complied with the obligation of prior notification and cooperation laid down in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2019/941 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector?

    Submitted: 18.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026 – A10-0113/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026

    (COM(2025)0304 – C10‑0110/2025 – 2025/0158(NLE))

    (Consultation)

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2025)0304),

    – having regard to Article 140(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C10‑0110/2025),

    –  having regard to the Commission Convergence Report 2025 and the European Central Bank Convergence Report of June 2025,

    – having regard to Rule 108 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0113/2025),

    1. Approves the Commission proposal;

    2. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

    3. Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

    4. Instructs its President to forward Parliament’s position to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Eurogroup and the governments of the Member States.

     

     

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Bulgaria joining the euro area sends a strong political and economic signal of confidence in the enduring viability and appeal of the European Union’s single currency. More than two decades after the euro’s introduction, Bulgaria’s readiness to adopt the euro on 1 January 2026 reaffirms the Union’s cohesion and the euro’s role as a global symbol of stability and unity. Bulgaria has achieved substantial progress towards full economic convergence, making it well-positioned to become the twenty-first member of the euro area.

    Bulgaria introduced its currency board framework on 1 July 1997, pegging the Bulgarian lev to the German mark and subsequently to the euro. Since its EU accession in 2007, Bulgaria has held the status of a “Member State with a derogation,” subject to regular convergence assessments by the European Commission and the European Central Bank.

    At the European Parliament level, the Euro Accession Countries Working Group was established by a decision of the ECON Coordinators on 18 November 2019. It remained active throughout the entire 9th legislative term, scrutinising Bulgaria’s readiness to join the euro area and holding four dedicated sessions with experts, as well as Bulgarian Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers of Finance. 

    On 25 February 2025, Bulgaria submitted a request for a convergence assessment. The ECB and Commission reports of 4 June 2025 include an examination of the compatibility between Bulgaria’s national legislation, notably the statute of its national central bank, with Articles 130 and 131 of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB. The reports also examine whether a high degree of sustainable convergence has been achieved, by reference to the fulfilment of the convergence criteria, and take account of several other factors required under the final sub-paragraph of Article 140(1) of the Treaty.

    Based on its own convergence report and that of the ECB, the Commission proposed that Bulgaria adopt the euro as of 1 January 2026. In accordance with Article 140(2) TFEU, the Council shall decide, by qualified majority and on a proposal from the Commission, which Member States with a derogation meet the necessary conditions for adopting the euro, as defined in Article 140(1) TFEU. This decision is to be made following consultation with the European Parliament and on the basis of the Commission and ECB reports. The Parliament is thus consulted on the legislative proposal for a Council decision to allow Bulgaria to adopt the euro on 1 January 2026.

    On the Convergence Criteria under Article 140(1) of the TFEU, the Rapporteur observes:

    1. Compatibility of National Legislation with Articles 130 and 131 TFEU and the Statutes of the ECB

    Bulgaria’s national legislation, including the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank, is fully aligned with EU requirements. The law guarantees the independence of the national central bank and of the members of its decision-making bodies, the prohibition of monetary financing and privileged access, and ensures compliance with the objectives of the ESCB as formulated in Article 127 of the Treaty.

    2. Achievement of a High Degree of Price Stability

    Over the 12 months to April 2025, Bulgaria recorded an average inflation rate of 2.7%, below the reference value of 2.8%. An analysis of a broad set of indicators reveals no concerns regarding the sustainability of price stability. The reference value is calculated as the average inflation rate of the three best-performing EU Member States in terms of price stability, plus 1.5 percentage points. For the period from May 2024 to April 2025, the reference value of 2.8% is based on the inflation rates of Ireland (1.2%), Finland (1.3%), and Italy (1.4%). No Member States were considered statistical outliers in this calculation, as none showed inflation deviations significantly above the euro area average due to country-specific factors.

    3. Sustainability of the Government Financial Position

    Bulgaria is currently not subject to a Council Decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Its general government budget deficit stood at 3.0% of GDP in 2024, i.e. at the level of the 3% reference value, and its general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 24.1%, i.e. well below the 60% reference value since 2007. 

    4. Compliance with the Normal Fluctuation Margins of the EMS’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) for at least the past 2 years

    The Bulgarian lev participated in ERM II in the two-year reference period from 20 May 2023 to 19 May 2025. Over the reference period, the lev did not exhibit any deviation from the central rate. Bulgaria has fulfilled nearly all of its post-entry commitments under ERM II. Further efforts are needed related to anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures.

    5. Durability of Convergence, as Reflected in Long-Term Interest Rate Levels

    In the twelve months ending April 2025, Bulgaria’s average long-term interest rate was 3.9%, well below the reference value of 5.1%. The reference value for April 2025 is calculated as the simple average of the average long-term interest rates in Ireland (2.8%), Finland (2.9%) and Italy (3.7%) plus 2 percentage points, yielding a reference value of 5.1%.

    6. Economic Integration and Convergence (Article 140(1), Second Subparagraph TFEU) 

    In accordance with Article 140 TFEU, the Commission’s assessment must also consider additional factors relevant to economic integration and convergence, as these provide insight into a Member State’s capacity to join the euro area without significant difficulties. These include developments in the balance of payments and product, labour, and financial market integration.

    In this context, Bulgaria’s external position has improved, with its combined current and capital account close to balance in 2024. The country is well integrated with the euro area through trade and investment, benefiting from increased banking and financial integration and access to the broader euro area market. Bulgaria continues to make progress but further actions are needed to address the rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and regulatory quality. 

    While the financial sector is small and bank-dominated, it is well embedded in the euro area, supported by Bulgaria’s participation in the banking union since 2020. Market-based financing remains underdeveloped, but potential financial stability risks are being mitigated by the Bulgarian National Bank’s conservative macroprudential policy and the robustness of the banking system. The Commission’s 2025 Alert Mechanism Report found no need for an in-depth imbalance review, but emphasized the importance of closely monitoring developments in competitiveness, the housing market, and credit growth.

    Bulgaria’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP), supported by €5.7 billion in EU grants (2021–2026), targets structural reforms, competitiveness, and reducing regional disparities. A revised RRP was submitted in April 2025 to accelerate implementation, especially in decarbonisation, governance, and business environment. Cohesion policy funds (€10.7 billion for 2021–2027) further support competitiveness, the green transition, social inclusion, and education, with implementation progressing overall, despite some remaining challenges.

    7. Note regarding Consultation of the European Parliament

    In accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Procedure, when Parliament is consulted pursuant to Article 140(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the committee responsible shall submit a report to Parliament advocating approval or rejection of the proposed act on the basis of which Parliament shall deliberate. Parliament shall take a single vote on the proposed act, to which no amendments may be tabled, which shall apply also to the vote in committee. On 19 March 2025, ECON Coordinators agreed the file to be treated swiftly with plenary vote in July and to allocate the rapporteurship on this file as soon as possible.

    Based on the above, the Rapporteur recommends that the derogation be lifted and Bulgaria adopts the euro on 1 January 2026.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

     

    Entity and/or person

    Commissioner for Economy and Productivity; Implementation and Simplification

    Minister of Finance of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Permanent Representation of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European Union

    Chair of the Committee on Budget and Finance in the National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Association of Banks in Bulgaria

    Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank

    Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Bulgarian Commission for Consumer Protection

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

     

     

    MINORITY POSITION

    MEP Rada Laykova

    Minority position under Rule 56(4) of the Rules of Procedure

    Proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026

    The supposed job of the EP is to scrutinize the Commission´s assessment on behalf of the people, as they will pay the price of the ignored Maastricht criteria – mathematical rules to ensure no Ponzi scheme happens to the Euro.

    However, what did it do?

    • Ignore incoherence between findings within the Commission report and its final assessment, which strongly suggests a political decision that ignores Maastricht criteria and math to the detriment of the people;

    • ignore the suspicious Bulgarian budget data sent to the Commission with absurd income projections and concealed expenses;

    • ignore the suppressed referendum in Bulgaria;

    • replace the scrutiny by a gleeful statement cheerleading Bulgaria´s boarding of the “Eurotanic”, ignoring the obvious state of the Euro, which shows several classic terminal signs of a flat currency. A short statement like “shared sorrow is half sorrow” would have been more honest.

    The lack of diligence might have serious and far-reaching consequences for the people in the Eurozone or Bulgaria as it recreates certain aspects of Greece´s accession into the Euro.

    Here, the EU´s “democracy in action” was “democracy in name only” and the people will pay the price, as evidenced in the past.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024 – A10-0112/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024

    (2024/2053(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

    – having regard to Articles 15, 126, 174, 175, 177, 208, 209, 271, 308 and 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and to Protocol (No 5) on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB),

    – having regard to Articles 41 to 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Activity Report 2024 of 30 January 2025 entitled ‘Priorities for prosperity’,

    – having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2024/2025 of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe’,

    – having regard to the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap of 21 June 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026 of 9 February 2024 and to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2025-2027 of 30 January 2025,

    – having regard to the G20 commissioned review of Multilateral Development Banks’ capital adequacy frameworks (the CAF Review),

    – having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2025/504 of 11 March 2025 amending Protocol No 5 on the Statute of the European Investment Bank[1],

    – having regard to the EIB Board’s decision of 21 March 2025,

    – having regard to the EIB Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027 of 13 October 2021,

    – having regard to the launch of the EIB’s European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) on 13 February 2023,

    – having regard to the EIB Group’s third annual report on EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions of 15 July 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB Environmental and Social Standards of 2 February 2022,

    – having regard to the EIB Group 2023 Climate Bank Roadmap Progress Report of 25 July 2024,

    – having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

    – having regard to the ‘Main outcomes from EIB Group analysis and stakeholder consultation’, presented at the EIB seminar on housing on 18 July 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB press release of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘European Commission and EIB group lay foundations for a new pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing’,

    – having regard to the letter by EIB President Nadia Calviño to the EU leaders of 4 March 2025,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan presented at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 12 April 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB’s updated list of eligibility, excluded activities and excluded sectors of 14 July 2022,

    – having regard to the EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024 of 13 June 2024,

    – having regard to the Tripartite Agreement between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank, signed on 11 November 2021,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Procedures of 13 November 2018,

    – having regard to the document entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’ of 14 October 2024,

    – having regard to the study of the European Parliamentary Research Service entitled ‘Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe (2022-2032)’, published in February 2023,

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

    – having regard to the study by the European Commission published on 11 January 2024 entitled ‘Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs’[2] ,

    – having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    – having regard to the report of 25 April 2024 by Christian Noyer entitled ‘Developing European capital markets to finance the future’,

    – having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    – having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025’ (COM(2025)0045),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy: Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

    – having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on the defence package (Rearm Europe plan) of 4 March 2025,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Savings and Investments Union – A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth and Economic Competitiveness in the EU’ (COM(2025)0124),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[3],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017[4],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009[5],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund[6],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1229 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on the public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism[7],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform[8],

    – having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

    – having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence[9],

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0112/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB, entirely owned by the Member States, is the largest multilateral financial institution in the world, operating in international capital markets and offering competitive terms to clients on favourable conditions in order to contribute to the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU  policies and projects both within and outside the EU, in accordance with Article 309 TFEU; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (59.8 %), by the EU (29.7 %) and by financial institutions (10.5 %) from the Member States, the United Kingdom and Türkiye;

    B. whereas the EIB Group has a balance sheet of close to EUR 600 billion; whereas the EIB Group states that its total investment reached a record level of EUR 88.8 billion in 2024, of which EUR 50.7 billion related to climate and the environment, EUR 16.2 billion to SMEs and mid-caps, EUR 14.4 billion to digitalisation and technological innovation and EUR 1 billion to enhancing Europe’s security and defence; whereas the EIB’s gearing ratio has been increased to 290 %, providing additional room for the EIB to invest and support the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU policies; whereas the EIB Group’s total investment is expected to increase to EUR 95 billion in 2025;

    C. whereas the EIB maintains solid financial fundamentals and has a ‘triple A’ rating, a cornerstone of its financial credibility and lending capacity, which is essential to preserve investor confidence and ensure low borrowing costs;

    D. whereas the EIB supports EU policies and projects and is the main implementing partner to leverage the mandates and guarantees of the EU’s budget and thus to mobilise large-scale public and private investment; whereas the EIB states that approximately 90 % of its annual investment is committed to projects within the EU and 10 % deployed in investments outside the EU;

    E. whereas the EIF, as part of the EIB Group, is an entity specialised in supporting the EU’s policy objectives, including in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion, and plays a key role in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by enhancing their access to financial markets, from venture capital to micro-finance; highlights the fact that the EIB Group supports companies at all stages of development;

    F. whereas as of June 2024, InvestEU is estimated to have mobilised around EUR 280 billion in additional investments, of which EUR 201 billion originated from the private sector; whereas the InvestEU envelope is almost depleted;

    G. whereas the latest reports on the future of the EU call for the EU’s competitiveness and productivity to be strengthened, emphasise the vital role of market integration and underscore the need to accelerate both public and private investment to build a stronger, more secure, autonomous and fair Europe;

    H. whereas the Draghi report on European competitiveness assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030; whereas the EIB Group plays a crucial role in helping bridge the gap both through its own lending capacity and by ‘crowding in’ private capital to finance these investment needs;

    I. whereas according to the Draghi report, EU companies spend less on research and innovation (R&I) than their US counterparts and Europe persistently fails to translate R&I into commercialisation, particularly in sectors like biotech, artificial intelligence and renewable energy, in the context of the EU’s lack of scale and incomplete single market, banking union and capital markets union; whereas the Draghi report highlights a 30 % EU-US productivity gap in 2023 and points to Europe’s missing out on the digital revolution – driven by the internet and the associated productivity gains – as a key factor, noting that only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European;

    J. whereas the Letta report estimates that EUR 300 billion of European savings are not invested in Europe, but mainly in the United States, due to the lack of an integrated capital markets union (CMU); whereas the President of the European Central Bank estimates that companies in the EU could raise approximately an additional EUR 470 billion a year in funding from the capital markets if the CMU were completed[10]; whereas the European Parliamentary Research Service estimates the potential benefits of a more fully integrated and more effectively regulated EU financial market of up to EUR 159 billion per year in the long run as well as the benefit of further progress in the integration of the EU banking sector of up to EUR 114 billion per year;

    K. whereas the EIB’s operations should contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest, in line with the Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and support the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; whereas the EIB has branded itself the EU’s climate bank in view of the investments needed to deliver the fair green transition; whereas the Commission estimates that the EU needs to increase its annual investments in energy, industrial innovation and scale-up, and transport systems by around EUR 480 billion compared to the previous decade[11];

    L. whereas in the light of the current geopolitical context, the development of the European defence technological and industrial base plays an increasingly important role within the internal market; whereas the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence identifies that an additional EUR 800 billion investment is needed in the defence sector over a four-year period; whereas the EIB announced that it would double its funding for security and defence from EUR 1 billion in 2024 to EUR 2 billion in 2025, while safeguarding its ‘triple A’ credit rating status;

    M. whereas housing prices in the EU rose by an average of 48 % between 2015 and 2023, and the housing crisis affects nearly all of Europe, increasingly impacting the middle class and not just the most vulnerable; whereas EIB data indicates a yearly need to build 1.5 million new homes and renovate five million more, requiring EUR 300-400 billion in annual investment; whereas the housing sector is of general interest but faces reduced public investment, which makes continued EIB investment crucial for this sector; whereas the EIB’s new action plan envisages investment of EUR 10 billion over the next two years;

    N. whereas the EIB Global lending arm, which was launched in 2022, is of key importance in terms of Europe’s position in the world; whereas EIB Global is expected to facilitate at least one third of the EUR 300 billion in investment that the Global Gateway sets out to generate by the end of 2027;

    O. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB; whereas Parliament has signed agreements with various EU bodies; whereas Parliament and the EIB share a long history of intensive cooperation, including (non-)legislative interactions and dialogue;

    General remarks

    1. Appreciates the EIB’s readiness to adapt to changing EU policy requirements, while respecting its long-term objectives; welcomes the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap, which reflects the EU’s political priorities; points out that the eight priority areas set out in the strategic roadmap are: the EIB’s role as the climate bank, digitalisation and deployment of new technologies, security and defence industry, modern cohesion policy, agriculture and the bioeconomy, Europe’s social infrastructure, high impact investments outside the EU, and the capital markets union;

    2. Highlights the strong call for the EIB to play an even greater role in closing Europe’s investment gap, which Mario Draghi estimated at EUR 800 billion, of which EUR 450 billion is needed for the energy transition alone; calls on the Commission and the EIB to fully leverage the EIB’s potential to provide financial support for the EU’s common priorities and to fulfil its crucial role in driving the necessary investment for fair and inclusive sustainable growth, while maximising innovation gains in key EU policy areas; calls for the EIB Group’s contribution to be further strengthened in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), particularly through financial instruments and budgetary guarantees that have proven highly effective in advancing key EU policy objectives; urges the Member States to provide sufficient funding for this purpose by assigning mandates to the EIB and through a possible capital increase, thus enabling the EIB to mobilise investments that truly meet pan-European needs and strengthen the EU’s relevance as a global player; recalls that the new Commission has set itself the goal of being an ‘investment Commission’;

    3. Stresses that the EIB’s ‘triple A’ rating is essential and a key asset that must be maintained; urges all relevant actors to protect and guarantee this rating when adapting the EIB’s lending policy and mandate; underlines that the rating is based, among other factors, on its solid capital position, excellent asset quality and performance, the creditworthiness of the Member States as its ultimate guarantors, and the fact that the EIB has been responsive to EU policy objectives; notes that, with a solid ‘triple A’ rating and a strong risk management framework, the EIB Group has the financial strength required to steadily increase its annual investments; highlights the fact that the EIB’s rating and financial position also allow it to ensure favourable financing conditions in funding public interest projects compared to private commercial banks, ensuring certainty and cost effectiveness, and allow it to absorb potential fluctuations in returns, retain investor confidence and contain borrowing costs; underlines that the EIB should further leverage its privileged status to take greater risks in funding European public goods and strategic investments; takes note of the decision of the EIB Board of Governors to increase the EIB’s gearing ratio limit from 250 % to 290 %; stresses that the EIB should adequately calibrate its intervention to ensure that it does not crowd out private investment;

    4. Notes that the EIB investment volume relative to GDP among European countries ranges from 0.1 %[12] to 1.4 % for 2024; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments aiming to maximise its impact across all EU regions to promote cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the EU, with particular attention on under-represented and less developed areas; calls on the EIB to keep focusing on investment plans aimed at closing the gap between the more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, the outermost regions, economically depressed areas and all areas of the EU at a disadvantage owing to natural factors;

    5. Stresses the need to simplify, streamline, optimise and consolidate current and future EIB processes and mandates to enhance synergies, effectiveness and efficiency; suggests the development and introduction of a single rule book, with a uniform set of financial rules, to function as a unified framework across multiple EU programmes and simplify implementation for partners, which will contribute to enhancing the EIB’s operations;

    6. Stresses the importance of reducing the administrative burden and reporting costs as well as simplifying procedures for EIB-financed projects, in particular for SMEs and smaller-scale innovation-driven initiatives; underlines that a more streamlined process could increase the EIB’s impact and responsiveness; welcomes, in this regard, the establishment of one-stop shops to offer coordinated financial support and technical guidance;

    7. Acknowledges the EIB’s commitment to reforms to shorten time-to-market, with a target of a 30 % reduction by the end of 2024 and a 50 % reduction over the 2024-2026 period; notes that the implementation of these reforms is being accelerated to reduce bureaucracy, enhance synergies within the Group, to automate and streamline internal procedures and improve cost efficiency; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further assess how to speed up the EIB’s time-to-market as well as to simplify financing mandates without compromising auditing standards or transparency; calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    Closing the investment gap and fostering competitiveness

    8. Emphasises the important role of the EIB Group as a pan-European and international investment body in mobilising both public and private financing for EU priorities and supporting Member States in financing essential and strategic investments and EU policy goals;

    9. Recalls, however, that the EIB’s operations are by nature limited and can only play a supporting role in addressing the significant investment gap; reiterates that a more integrated economic and monetary union and strengthened economic architecture and effective coordination would support the EIB’s operations; calls, therefore, for swift and substantial progress regarding the capital markets union, particularly through concrete steps on the recently launched savings and investments union, the completion of the banking union, as well as, where appropriate, the establishment of EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

    10. Affirms that more integrated capital markets and a deeper single market are also essential foundations for the EIB’s operations; welcomes the EIB’s strategic roadmap, which places the capital markets union high on its agenda; considers that a adequately completed savings and investments union will bring benefits to consumers and SMEs alike by providing high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy, and will ultimately strengthen the venture capital market, which is considered riskier than other forms of investment, by facilitating access to more diversified funding sources; emphasises that relevant European public actors should contribute to the savings and investments union and welcomes the EIB’s willingness to launch pilot projects and other concrete initiatives in this area;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to enhance efforts to deliver on the agenda for the Competitiveness Compass and the savings and investments union by mobilising private capital for productive investments, supporting innovation throughout companies’ life cycles, venture capital financing and more high-risk equity financing for start-ups and scale-ups; underlines that higher-risk instruments such as equity and venture debt must be used with clear risk frameworks and measurable performance indicators; encourages the EIB to expand financing for women-owned businesses;

    12. Recognises the central role of SMEs, as the backbone of the European economy, in driving economic growth, fostering innovation, creating employment and promoting territorial cohesion; recalls, in this regard, that the EU’s 24 million SMEs account for 99 % of all businesses, provide around two-thirds of all jobs and generate over 50 % of the total value added that is produced by EU businesses; underlines that supporting SMEs is a key objective for the EIB Group and that greater access to credit, the creation of tailored financial instruments, and targeted investments in SMEs can have a widespread positive impact by contributing to the Union’s economic resilience, the competitiveness of local production chains, and the digital and sustainable transitions in regional economies;

    13. Encourages the EIB to maintain and strengthen its role in facilitating access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, which frequently encounter obstacles when seeking funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and prosper; points out that SMEs continue to face challenges owing to high interest rates and raw materials and energy costs;

    14. Welcomes the EIF’s role in financing start-ups and scale-ups in Europe, including through its activities in the European venture capital market; stresses that EIF instruments must remain easily accessible for smaller applicants, and calls on the EIF to streamline its application procedures accordingly; calls for an increase in the budget of the EIF dedicated to the EU venture capital ecosystem, in line with the Draghi report recommendation; calls also for the introduction of first-loss guarantees and convertible instruments targeted at start-ups and scale-ups;

    15. Highlights the role of the EIB Group as a major contributor to developing the European venture capital and private equity ecosystem, but notes that further work is needed to support European innovation to provide start-ups with more opportunities to scale up and access funding throughout their life cycle; notes that, although a share of private investment already flows through venture capital funds, it remains insufficient and is unevenly distributed across Member States; underlines that a capital markets union could help address this imbalance and improve access to finance across Member States;

    16. Stresses that de-risking instruments and budgetary guarantees provided by the EU have proven to be powerful tools; considers that de-risking should continue effectively, particularly for investments in innovative and strategic sectors; is concerned that, according to the interim evaluation of the InvestEU programme, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s proposal of 26 February 2025 to provide additional funding to InvestEU; calls for a balanced geographical distribution of financing under InvestEU, particularly with respect to smaller Member States;

    17. Recalls that EU budgetary guarantees are underpinned by taxpayer funds and that defaults on EIB-backed projects could directly impact the EU budget;

    18. Welcomes the continued expansion of the EIB’s network of European promotional banks and other international financial institutions to help to further leverage public and private investment, and to ensure broad geographical and sectoral coverage; recalls that InvestEU is 75 % implemented by the EIB; calls for the financial instrument component of the Competitiveness Fund to make use of the expertise of national promotional banks and institutions (NPBIs), particularly their knowledge of local and regional actors; in that context, calls for the blending of instruments between the EIB and NPBIs to be explored further, ensuring that such instruments do not compromise the funds already dedicated to NPBIs;

    19. Asks the EIB to increase its concessional loans to local and national financial intermediaries, including to credit guarantee consortia, microfinance institutions, ethical banks and collective guarantee structures working to facilitate access to credit for SMEs, with a particular focus on rural areas, inland and island areas, the outermost regions, and areas undergoing economic and environmental transitions;

    Consolidating the EIB’s role as the EU’s climate bank

    20. Acknowledges the EIB’s role as a climate bank and its alignment with the EU sustainable finance framework, including the integration, where applicable, of taxonomy criteria[13], supporting the transition by providing financing in sustainable and clean technologies and backing the Union’s efforts to decarbonise the EU economy; recalls that the EIB’s financial flows must be consistent with the EU’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 and climate objectives for 2030; notes that all corporate clients of EIB financing are contractually required to publish a credible Paris alignment strategy (‘decarbonisation plans’)[14];

    21. Welcomes the EIB’s climate and environmental investments, which totalled EUR 50.7 billion in 2024, exceeding the target of channelling at least 50 % of total financing into climate action and environmental sustainability; calls on the EIB to uphold its high level of ambition, while emphasising that this commitment enhances the Union’s competitiveness, energy security and industrial resilience;

    22. Recalls that the green transition must be inclusive, fair and competitive, and that green investments must be viable; expects the EIB, therefore, to leverage its lending, financial instruments, technical assistance and advisory services to support citizens and businesses that face socio-economic challenges deriving from their efforts to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the need to support industrial restructuring, workforce reskilling, and the creation of new employment opportunities in affected regions; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty as a priority;

    23. Welcomes the EIB’s investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, interconnectors, and electricity grids and storage, including its support for REPowerEU; underlines the importance of focusing on projects with high economic impact and measurable climate benefits; calls on the EIB to play a role in mobilising private capital for grid investments in support of lower energy prices; acknowledges, in particular, the increased investment in emerging technologies for industrial electrification and decarbonisation, recognising their role in supporting the transition to climate neutrality by reducing emissions from hard-to-abate industrial sectors, while expressing concern about their potential impact on the water supply in certain regions;

    24. Stresses the importance of addressing high energy costs in the EU to enhance the competitiveness of European companies; points out that a stable energy supply at competitive prices is one of the foundations of a successful industrial policy; calls on the EIB Group to especially support SMEs facing energy-related cost pressures, including through targeted financing and advisory services to improve energy efficiency and resilience; calls on the EIB to continue to support energy-intensive industries, in order to ensure that this highly strategic sector is in a position to successfully manage the energy transition;

    25. Notes that, in a world full of uncertainty, investments should be focused on the EU’s preparedness to face shocks; stresses the need for increased investment in climate adaptation and resilience; encourages further research and development, including of innovative technologies, for climate preparedness; calls for access to finance for SMEs in innovative green technologies to be enhanced; recalls that clean technology strengthens EU sovereignty and is essential for competitiveness, yet faces even greater funding challenges due to the green premium compared to incumbent technologies; highlights the Draghi report’s call for more public guarantee and counter-guarantee schemes to cover the investment risks of clean technology manufacturing projects;

    26. Recalls that the EIB was the first issuer of green bonds and is now the largest multi-currency issuer of green bonds; welcomes the fact that on 2 April 2025 the EIB issued its first Climate Awareness Bond aligned with the EU Green Bond Standard Regulation[15]; highlights the key role of the EIB in developing the green-bond market, providing financing solutions to sustainable companies; calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to maintain the EU’s leadership in green and digital bonds;

    27. Recalls the EIB’s commitment to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and supports the EIB’s investments in biodiversity protection and the preservation of natural resources; welcomes the EIB and European Environment Agency agreement to deepen their collaboration on biodiversity and climate actions; emphasises that, in order to achieve the long-term benefits of restoration, conservation and protection of biodiversity and nature, attractive financing schemes should be made available to potential beneficiaries to engage in such practices on a voluntary basis;

    Financing peace, security and defence

    28. Welcomes the EIB’s proactive approach in the area of security and defence; highlights the fact that investment in this sector doubled in 2024 to EUR 1 billion, with the EIB’s 2025 plan set to double it again to a record EUR 2 billion; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage commercial banks’ investment in the sector; notes, however, that these amounts represent less than 1.1 % of EIB investments for  2024 (EUR 88.8 billion), and 2.2 % of its financing objectives for 2025 (EUR 95 billion) and emphasises that they can only play a complementary role in addressing the estimated EUR 33.6 billion to EUR 48 billion in new financing required by 2030 for defence companies to meet the increase in orders expected under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan; stresses that European-level funding is essential to meet the significant funding needs of Member States; underlines that any future structural European defence funding must be designed with clear conditions set and strong oversight, drawing on lessons learned from existing instruments;

    29. Supports the EIB’s continued and strengthened role in bolstering Europe’s security through targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure, and stresses the need to concentrate strategic investments in projects delivering European added value and in dual-use technologies that contribute to both civilian and defence objectives, in line with the EU’s overarching goals of fostering innovation and enhancing the Union’s security and resilience; stresses that effective defence innovation depends on close collaboration between academia, research institutions and private industry, and encourages the EIB to act as a catalyst in structuring long-term public-private partnerships through targeted financial instruments;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s plan to revise its operational framework, establishing a dedicated transversal public policy goal to enhance Europe’s peace and security, backed by ambitious financial and capital allocation[16]; supports, therefore, the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to integrate the EIB’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) into a permanent, cross-cutting public policy objective, complementing the existing public policy goals; underlines, however, that any activities in the field of defence must be subject to appropriate financial parameters, regular risk assessment and transparent oversight and must be accompanied by strong risk management procedures;

    31. Welcomes the joint initiative of the Commission and the EIB Group to set up, via its subsidiary EIF, a fund of funds called the Defence Equity Facility, with a budget of EUR 175 million between 2024 and 2027, to support private investment in European SMEs developing innovative dual-use defence technologies, and to help address the equity financing needs of companies in the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, estimated at between EUR 6.8 billion and EUR 20 billion by 2030, to meet the increase in orders anticipated under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan;

    32. Acknowledges the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to broaden the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria for security and defence investments, limiting excluded activities, in accordance with the proposals approved by EU leaders at the European Council on 6 March 2025, as well as the approval of the EIB Group Security and Defence Action Plan in May 2024, aimed at enhancing support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes that, under that plan, the EIB Group provides financing to SMEs and innovative start-ups operating in the security and defence sector in line with the dual-use principle, maintaining the requirement of ‘credible civil use’ while discontinuing the revenue test;

    33. Takes note of the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 that there will be no fixed ceiling for security and defence investments, with funding amounts to be determined annually in the EIB Group Operational Plan; asks the EIB to clarify the potential implications of that decision for other policy areas and the overall operations of the EIB;

    34. Suggests that the EIB should continuously reflect on and evaluate its role, as well as the scope of eligible investments, in contributing to Europe’s peace and security as outlined in the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence, particularly in the light of the pressing need to scale up the European defence sector and ensure long-term security and strategic autonomy; warns that any adjustment to the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria or funding to align with new priorities must safeguard the Group’s financial position and ensure effective financing of other strategic EU priorities;

    Addressing challenges in social infrastructure, cohesion policy and housing

    35. Welcomes the EIB’s core strategic priorities to reinforce Europe’s social infrastructure and a modern cohesion policy for inclusive and sustainable growth across Europe; appreciates that in its Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions, and that in 2024, such financing accounted for 48 % of total EU lending; calls on the EIB to continue to support infrastructure development, including investments in railways, healthcare and social infrastructure, which are crucial for social and economic cohesion, resilience and inclusive growth; underlines that, amid the geopolitical and economic uncertainties, the EIB can provide long-term solutions to address the cost of living crisis;

    36. Highlights the crucial role of skills development in driving long-term sustainable growth, employment and competitiveness in the EU; underlines that financing initiatives aimed at boosting human capital not only foster innovation and productivity and address labour market needs, but also strengthen social cohesion and economic resilience; calls on the EIB to step up investments in education, training, upskilling and reskilling, and health, in close coordination and cooperation with Member State initiatives in those areas, aiming to complement and enhance their impact;

    37. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to addressing the challenge of the double market failure in the housing sector, including the insufficient provision of affordable and energy-efficient housing, as well as the market failure to increase the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock; notes the differences between Member States in both policies and the magnitude of the aforementioned market failures;

    38. Welcomes the EIB’s ‘Action Plan for Affordable and Sustainable Housing’ with planned investments of EUR 10 billion over the next two years; draws attention to the outcome of the EIB Group analysis and stakeholder meeting, which highlighted an estimated annual public and private investment gap of EUR 300 billion to 400 billion needed to build 1.5 million new housing units and to renovate 5 million additional units annually; encourages the EIB to mobilise even more funding for affordable housing projects throughout the Member States; invites the EIB to focus on sustainable urban development by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, sustainable, more cohesive and prosperous Europe, including investments in recovering existing infrastructure, with a focus on supporting urban regeneration projects and projects converting old or abandoned buildings into modern social housing;

    39. Calls on the EIB to take into account the differentiated burden of housing costs on different income groups and family structures, especially as some low-income groups are at risk of marginalisation; encourages the EIB to collaborate with other European public investment banks, local public financial institutions, local governments, and cooperative and social housing companies to finance housing solutions for vulnerable and low-income groups; welcomes the EIB’s intention to increase its focus on R&I in the area of housing;

    40. Calls on the EIB to scale up financial support through the deployment of standardised off-the-shelf financial products in energy and building renovation; highlights the fact that the EIB’s ‘originate-to-distribute’ model, channelling the savings of institutional investors, is an innovative model that could contribute to the integration of EU capital markets;

    41. Welcomes the EIB’s intention to expand financial and advisory support for affordable housing, especially for younger generations; encourages close synergy and exchange with the Commission, municipalities and local authorities, cooperative housing providers, housing associations and the construction sector, exchanging best practice and promoting pan-European cooperation; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty;

    42. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities; underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas and that enhancing support and fostering innovation for this vital sector play a significant role in ensuring food security; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young farmers, noting that farmers and enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing; calls on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    43. Calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts to promote youth employment, particularly by supporting projects and programmes that foster youth entrepreneurship, access to employment, vocational training and innovation, in order to contribute to fairer and more inclusive territorial development and to help curb brain drain, especially in the EU’s island regions and economically disadvantaged areas;

    Promoting the digital transformation and new technologies

    44. Calls on the EIB to strengthen financing for the EU’s open strategic autonomy in the digital field and to promote research, support the development of European digital infrastructure, foster new and disruptive technologies such as AI and quantum computing, and enable the growth of digital start-ups; underlines the importance of bridging digital divides, both within the EU and globally, to ensure inclusive access to digital infrastructure and services; highlights the importance of aligning EIB digital investments with EU strategic priorities such as the Digital Decade targets, including connectivity, digital skills and the digital transformation of businesses;

    45. Supports the EIF’s expansion of the European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) to attract private capital to scale up innovative start-ups into successful global leaders, ensuring that European-founded companies and technologies remain in the EU through the late growth stage; highlights the need for the deployment of the current ETCI to be accelerated in order to keep up with the pace of innovation and start-ups; calls, furthermore, for the successful experience of the ETCI to be built on to develop other similar initiatives to continue supporting the digital transition and other strategic sectors, and encourages the EIF to explore setting up a second generation of this initiative as well as to explore the possibility of investing in funds of funds;

    46. Underlines that institutional investors in Europe could play a bigger role in supporting venture capital, especially for scale-ups; urges the EIB Group therefore to create an European Tech Forum, bringing together the venture capital ecosystem, to engage institutional investors following the model of the Tibi initiative[17]; calls on the EIB to offer opportunities for such investors to build their expertise and opt in to co-investment schemes between the EIF and institutional investors, on transparent and pre-agreed terms;

    47. Highlights the fact that the Clean Industrial Deal aims to develop a TechEU programme with the EIB; stresses the importance of ensuring that this fund has a specific allocation target for start-ups and scale-ups;

    48. Calls on the EIB to support the strengthening of cybersecurity capabilities in the EU, in order to make Europe more resilient while enhancing existing cooperation between the Member States and in order to protect critical entities and essential services;

    49. Highlights the fact that the security of supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) is crucial for the green and digital transitions, the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; recalls the role played by the EIB in the EU Raw Materials Alliance and the Union’s aim of becoming more autonomous as regards the CRM supply; emphasises the importance of a circular economy approach to CRMs, in order to reduce the EU’s dependence on non-EU countries and boost its strategic autonomy; calls, therefore, on the EIB to invest more in the CRM sector to enhance resilience in raw materials with a particular focus on the recycling of secondary raw materials;

    50. Calls on the EIB to support the technological transformation of European companies, as well as the development of digital skills among employees and entrepreneurs;

    EIB neighbourhood and Global Gateway

    51. Welcomes the EIB’s vital support for Ukraine in the light of Russia’s full-scale, unjustified and illegal war of aggression; calls for an increase in EU budget guarantees to allow the EIB to continue to deliver and strengthen public and private sector operations in Ukraine, supporting Ukraine’s immediate economic challenges, but also envisaging the reconstruction of the country over the medium to long term;

    52. Emphasises that, to decrease dependence on non-EU countries, the deployment of resilient European-controlled infrastructure, among others in the domains of satellite communications, energy and logistics, is essential;

    53. Stresses the important role that the EIB plays in supporting Members States and countries outside the EU, particularly candidate countries, in obtaining access to risk capital markets, thus expanding investment opportunities;

    54. Stresses that, as part of the EU’s external action toolbox, the Global Gateway is crucial for Europe’s global position and aims to promote the rules-based multilateral system, sustainable development, democracy, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law; welcomes the EIB’s role, as the EU’s leading development bank, in this regard; recalls the importance of predictable guarantees from the EU budget to enable the EIB to continue delivering operations outside the EU;

    55. Calls for enhanced transparency and disclosure practices in line with other multinational development banks, along with the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism that can effectively address and remedy grievances; underlines the need for effective mechanisms to ensure the participation of, and accountability to, communities affected by EIB-financed projects to ensure that Global Gateway projects are responsive to local needs, are gender-sensitive and deliver meaningful developmental results; emphasises the importance of public participation, in particular in the EIB’s planning, appraisal and monitoring processes for CRMs, including the Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous communities, as provided for in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

    56. Reiterates its call for EIB Global to focus blending operations on areas where they can add value to the local economy while avoiding the crowding out of private capital and to ensure that blended finance is not used for essential public services, particularly health, education and social protection; recalls that EU development policy goals, and in particular the goal of enhancing affordable access to healthcare, should guide EIB investments in the field, to ensure better health outcomes for all, and in particular for women;

    57. Expects the EIB’s global activities to also respond swiftly to evolving realities and urgent needs; highlights the gap in development aid financing resulting from the US aid freeze and the reduction of funding towards the Global South; calls for concrete initiatives to prevent humanitarian or health crises, to support pan-African trade, infrastructure and regional integration, and strengthen ties with Europe; welcomes EIB Global’s intention to scale up higher-risk operations, enabled by the mandate of the Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe);

    58. Expresses concern over reports that some EU-funded projects outside the EU, including under the Global Gateway, are being built by Chinese companies, with Chinese firms at times winning more EIB-funded contracts than EU firms; urges the Commission to ensure a level playing field by working with the EIB to boost European company participation; recommends procurement practices that prioritise best price/quality ratio over lowest price to promote fair competition and align with EU values;

    59. Welcomes the efforts of the EIB, together with nine other multilateral development banks, to strengthen their collaboration in advancing progress towards the SDGs; calls on the EIB to continue cooperating with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring long-term positive impacts and added value;

    60. Welcomes the EIB’s announcement to step up support for sectors such as water supplies, small businesses, renewable energy and energy efficiency, as well as to further reinforce partnerships within Europe and globally, including with private actors, to deliver maximum impact on the ground;

    Governance: accountability and transparency

    61. Stresses that the EIB’s growing role should be accompanied by greater democratic accountability and transparency; including more timely publication of project-related documents; reiterates its call for an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB to formalise and enhance their existing cooperation, including through regular structured dialogue, improved Parliament access to EIB documents and data, and the possibility for Parliament to submit questions for written answers to the EIB, as already provided for the European Central Bank; in this context, asks the EIB to provide Parliament with a clear, simplified overview of EU budget contributions to its balance sheet, off-balance sheet, and profit and loss account;

    62. Highlights the importance of the EIB ensuring full transparency and traceability of projects funded, including more detailed information, to enable proper oversight by all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, rather than solely by the ministries responsible; recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that the final recipients comply with the visibility conditions of the EU’s financial support;

    63. Invites the EIB to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the EIB to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility of European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    64. Underlines the importance of the EIB Group’s upholding the highest standards in preventing all forms of fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and the financing of terrorism; notes that safeguarding the integrity of the EIB Group’s financing is essential to ensure public trust and the effective use of resources; takes note of the inquiries completed by the European Ombudsman and ongoing investigations by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office, and expects full clarity and appropriate follow-up, including any necessary consequences;

    65. Reiterates its call for the EIB to consider aligning the division of labour within the Management Committee with recommendations from EU institutions, to help mitigate potential conflicts of interest;

    66. Welcomes the 2024 framework for the recognition of trade unions at the European Investment Bank;

    67. Welcomes the EIB’s principles of diversity, equity and inclusion, including the target of at least 40 % of management positions being held by women by the end of 2026; calls for a geographically balanced representation of EU nationalities among staff;

    68. Highlights the need to strengthen the EIB’s human rights policies, including the establishment of a clear and effective human rights due diligence framework and strategy; stresses that environmental and social impact assessments should be carried out by independent experts, and that independent verification mechanisms should be introduced to oversee the self-monitoring and self-reporting conducted by EIB clients;

    °

    ° °

    69. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European Investment Bank.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia – A10-0110/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia

     

    (2025/2024(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0697),

    – having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

    – having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

    – having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 on Georgia and of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0110/2025),

    A. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 and primarily relating to reforms in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be taken;

    B. whereas the situation in Georgia has deteriorated significantly since the publication of the 2024 Commission report on the country on 30 October 2024, particularly as a result of the actions of the Georgian Government;

    C. whereas Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding in recent years and in particular since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which failed to meet international democratic standards and comply with Georgia’s OSCE commitments, and resulted in an illegitimate parliament composed of only one political party, Georgian Dream; whereas Russia has systematically interfered in democratic processes in Georgia; whereas the fraudulent elections included voter intimidation, vote buying and harassment of election observers;

    D. whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which have the strong support of the Georgian people;

    E. whereas concerns over the direction in which the country is heading and the decision to pause the efforts to start accession negotiations sparked large-scale protests across the country, with protesters demanding new, free and fair elections, the return of the country to its European path, an end to political violence and repression, investigations into and accountability for the serious human rights violations committed against protesters by law enforcement agencies, and the release of political prisoners; whereas protests have been taking place every day without interruption since 28 November 2024; whereas pro-EU protests have significantly increased across Georgia in 2025, with tens of thousands of citizens demonstrating against the government’s perceived shift away from EU integration; whereas these self-organised and spontaneous protests involving all segments of Georgian society underscore the Georgian people’s strong commitment to European values and democratic governance;

    F. whereas in response to the peaceful protests, the Georgian authorities began an unprecedented violent crackdown on demonstrations, accompanied by the unlawful use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by the de facto authorities; whereas since November 2024, at least 62 people have been criminally charged in connection with their participation in pro-European protests and 54 remain in pre-trial detention; whereas more than 500 people have been detained under administrative procedures, some 300 of whom have reportedly been subjected to torture or other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and at least 157 of whom have suffered visible signs of serious physical injury;

     

    G. whereas the de facto Georgian Dream authorities systematically subject civil society and independent media to pressure, legal restrictions and physical violence; whereas at least 138 incidents of media freedom violations have been documented in the context of pro-European protests or related events since November 2024, and a total of 174 media professionals have been the target of state repression; whereas at least 30 reporters have suffered repeated violations, including physical assaults, damage to professional equipment, administrative fines, criminal charges and judicial harassment; whereas journalist Mzia Amaglobeli is currently in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges;

     

    H. whereas the Georgian authorities have been restructuring or eliminating structures within the Georgian civil service responsible for pro-European reforms and dismissing professionals and civil servants en masse, in particular those who have criticised government policies, expressed pro-European views and condemned violence against peaceful demonstrators;

     

    I. whereas the illegitimate Georgian parliament has established the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Regime and Political Figures of 2003-2012, which was the period when President Mikheil Saakashvili was at the helm and paving the way for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions; whereas this commission is a tool for the further persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements; whereas on 22 May 2025, Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze, the leader of the Girchi – More Freedom party and one of the leaders of the Coalition for Change, was arrested for refusing to appear before this politically motivated commission created and controlled by Georgian Dream, whose long-term ambition is to eradicate political opposition in Georgia; whereas on 29 May 2025, Nika Melia, another leader of the Coalition for Change, was arrested one day before he was due to appear in court for refusing to appear before the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission;

     

    J. whereas, in order to maintain and further increase its grip on power, the ruling Georgian Dream party has unilaterally and without consultation adopted changes to the municipal electoral system for the elections to the city councils in October 2025; whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended repealing these changes and the leaders of the main opposition parties have announced that their parties will not participate in those elections; whereas reforms to the formation process of the Central Election Commission further compromise election integrity, limit citizen participation and restrict the ability of observers and media to effectively monitor the electoral process;

     

    K. whereas despite progress towards a more equal and inclusive society, deep-rooted inequalities and stereotypes persist, resulting in high levels of gender-based violence, severe restrictions for persons with disabilities and violence and harassment against the LGBTI community; whereas due to insecurity at home, many LGBTI people choose to flee the country; whereas Georgia’s legal definition of rape does not comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention;

    Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

    1. Reiterates its solidarity with the Georgian people and its unwavering support for their legitimate European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, as expressed in mass protests that continue despite brutal crackdowns by the authorities; remains ready to assist the Georgian people in achieving these goals; strongly condemns the violent repression, arbitrary and politically motivated detention without sufficient legal grounds and the reported systemic torture of peaceful protesters, civil society actors, political opponents and media representatives; demands that the Georgian authorities refrain from using force, respect the freedoms of assembly and of expression and annul the recently adopted draconian legislation aimed at stifling popular protests, notably through extortionate fines; expresses its particular concern regarding the growing number of political prisoners and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all of them; calls for all acts of violence to be effectively and credibly investigated and for those responsible to be held accountable; expresses concern about the lack of independence within the judiciary, with high-placed judges with links to the Georgian Dream overseeing politically motivated court proceedings against peaceful protesters and government critics;

    2. Expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party failed to use the historic opportunity granted to Georgia, as a candidate country, to progress on its European integration path, noting that European integration continues to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the population; recalls that candidate status was granted to Georgia with the benefit of the doubt, despite the already concerning trajectory of the Georgian Dream government’s actions, which were increasingly at odds with European values and democratic principles; underlines that Georgia under Georgian Dream’s rule has not moved forward, and has in fact even regressed, on the key provisions of the nine steps indicated by the Commission, despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary; stresses that Georgia’s EU integration process has effectively been suspended as a result of the continued democratic backsliding in the country and the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections amounting to a clear turning point towards an authoritarian regime, the ensuing illicit capture of the state institutions and democratic safeguards, and the adoption of a series of anti-democratic legislative acts that run counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action jeopardises Georgia’s EU path and urges the Georgian Dream to return to the course of democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration;

    3. Deplores the dismissal of approximately 700 civil servants since December 2024 due to their participation in or support for pro-European protests; stresses that such retaliation erodes public trust in democratic institutions, violates freedom of expression and association, and contributes to the deepening authoritarian tendencies of the current regime; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and to allow civil servants to register a trade union in order to protect them from the unjustified restriction of their labour rights; expresses its concern about the growing politicisation of civil service appointments, and calls for a repeal of the amendments to the Law on Public Service adopted in December 2024 that remove the competition rule for the appointment of civil servants and instead grant direct appointment powers to the heads of public institutions; reiterates that these amendments constitute worrying backsliding from the successful public service reform that was implemented by Georgia under the EU-Georgian Association Agreement and calls for their repeal; 4.  Stresses the need for an immediate and comprehensive audit of the EU’s policy towards Georgia given the ongoing democratic backsliding and the increasingly repressive political and legislative environment that constitutes a regression for many of Georgia’s democratic achievements and successful EU reforms, fundamentally weakens democratic institutions and further consolidates power in the hands of the ruling party; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the blatant breach of Georgia’s obligations regarding the general principles laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates that non-fulfilment of these obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and the privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    5. Deplores the fact that high-level ruling party officials, members of parliament and government-affiliated media regularly spread manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories about the EU, its Member States, leaders and politicians, as well as European integration; stresses that the ruling party’s regime continues its purposefully deceitful and ambiguous discourse, fuelling the false belief among parts of the Georgian public that it remains in favour of European integration; regrets the fact that the media and information environment is being suppressed and dominated by TV and media outlets supported by Georgian Dream, which spread false narratives about EU integration, thereby emulating and playing into Russian-inspired propaganda and facilitating polarisation in society;

     

    6. Underlines the responsibility of Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials and political leaders, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze, and the former Georgian Dream chair Irakli Garibashvili, for the deterioration of the political process in Georgia by enabling democratic backsliding resulting in the autocratic consolidation of power and by acting against the country’s constitutional objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls, therefore, for immediate and targeted personal sanctions to be imposed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze his financial assets; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; condemns the unilateral actions by the Hungarian Government seeking to legitimise Georgian Dream;

     

    Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

     

    7. Reiterates its position that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections, which should be held in the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international and independent domestic observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process that would reflect the true will of the people;

    8. Stresses that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities established by the Georgian Dream party following the rigged parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 and that it considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; consequentially rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a one-party parliament formed on the basis of fraudulent elections, which is incompatible with a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and the standards expected from an EU candidate country; welcomes the rejection of Georgian Dream’s credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Georgian delegation;

    9. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through their illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; reiterates its calls for an end to politically motivated hostilities, an improvement to the political environment and the building of trust and cross-party dialogue;

     

    10. Condemns the unlawful prosecution of political opponents by the investigative committee of the de facto Georgian parliament under the leadership of the Georgian Dream party, which disproportionately targets the actions of the government that ended its mandate more than twelve years ago; highlights the political nature of the ‘investigation’, noting that the Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 but launched the investigative committee in parallel with its attempts to ban genuine opposition parties; notes with concern the statements by the chair of the investigative committee, Tea Tsulukiani, spreading Russian narratives; strongly condemns the arrest of Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze and Nika Melia, and the threats to arrest  other politicians, and considers these individuals to be political prisoners;

     

    11. Expresses deep concern over recent declarations by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party indicating their intention to declare opposition parties – primarily the United National Movement – unconstitutional; recalls that the United National Movement played a pivotal role in initiating and advancing Georgia’s European integration process; notes the parallels between the conduct of the Georgian Dream de facto authorities and the current Kremlin regime, which cemented its rule by outlawing opposition parties; condemns the draft amendment to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens and to the Law on the Constitutional Court adopted on 13 May 2025, which would empower the Constitutional Court to effectively and arbitrarily ban all opposition parties;

     

    12. Strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the Georgian authorities bear full responsibility for his health and well-being and must be held accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

     

    13. Underlines that the policy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the one-party parliament and the president appointed by it should continue until there is a tangible change in the political course of Georgia and new free and fair parliamentary elections are held; calls for the EU’s and the Member States’ representatives and members of parliament to refrain from meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

     

    14. Points out that the upcoming municipal elections in autumn 2025 present yet another test for the resilience of Georgia’s democracy and political pluralism; calls on the opposition to seize the opportunity presented by these elections to reflect the unity of the Georgian people in favour of democracy and the rule of law, as already demonstrated in the peaceful protests against the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and repression; calls for the municipal elections to be held in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process;

     

    15. Is deeply concerned, in this context, by the further deterioration of the electoral system and the overall democratic environment ahead of the municipal elections, in particular the fast-tracked adoption of new amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law and to the Election Code in December 2024 that undermine the principle of equal suffrage and aim to solidify the ruling party’s dominance at all levels of governance; recalls that these amendments have been criticised by the Venice Commission and calls for them to be repealed; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consider imposing additional individual sanctions against Georgian officials if the upcoming municipal elections fail to meet the criteria for fair and free elections;

     

    16. Strongly condemns the continuing and deliberate destruction of the environment for Georgia’s vibrant civil society, with the adoption of several pieces of restrictive Russian-style legislation, including on the transparency of foreign influence, threats, and stigmatisation by the authorities; strongly denounces the new legislative initiative that requires the registration of all civil society organisation grants with the government and that obliges foreign donors to obtain executive approval to disburse grants to local organisations; regrets the recent decision by the authorities to freeze the bank accounts of crowdfunding initiatives and campaigns in support of political prisoners and their families; calls on the authorities to immediately cease the intimidation, threats, politically motivated prosecutions and physical assaults against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists, journalists and media workers in Georgia; condemns the arbitrary and unjustified refusal of several European journalists’ entry to Georgia;

    17. Condemns the recent adoption, without due public consultation, of legislation that enables further political persecution, limits the right of assembly, and further shrinks the space for civil society, independent media and the opposition to operate freely, including the Russian-style foreign agent law, the amendments to the Law on Public Service, the amendments to the Law on Grants, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as new restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law; calls for the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative changes; stresses that Georgian Dream’s political conduct, including its strategic alignment with the Russian Federation and the accelerated adoption of tools characteristic of authoritarian regimes, mirrors such developments within Russia itself;

     

    18. Commends the work of Georgia’s civil society in the past months, providing free legal aid, documenting serious human rights violations and taking the lead on domestic and international litigation to seek justice and accountability against a background of continued attacks, the criminalisation of civic space, and disinformation campaigns against the work of civil society;

     

    19. Stresses the urgent need to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media in the light of the growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore asks the Commission to increase financial support and disburse it without any further delay; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment and for funds to be reallocated to directly support civil society organisations, independent media and human rights defenders; stresses further, in this regard, that the Member States should be ready to receive and support Georgian civil society organisations and independent media outlets so that they can continue their work in exile;

     

    20. Stresses that beyond Georgian Dream’s rejection of Georgia’s EU integration, it rejects more generally international human rights law and democratic standards, while speedily moving along the negative trajectory previously witnessed in Russia; is deeply concerned, specifically, that this will have further trickle-down effects on the rights and well-being of women, minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities, LGBTI people, people living below the poverty line, and other vulnerable or at-risk groups; strongly condemns the adoption of anti-LGBTI legislation by the Georgian parliament in October 2024, which mirrors authoritarian, Russian-style policies and violates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and calls for it to be repealed; calls for the reinstatement of gender quotas that were abolished by the parliament of Georgia in April 2024; calls on the EU Member States, when assessing asylum applications, to adequately take into account the fact that Georgia now has one of the most repressive anti-LGBTI laws in Europe; is concerned about the lack of protection of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia;

     

    21. Reiterates that the measures taken by the EU so far in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and its consequences across the region; regrets the lack of proactive measures taken and the generally limited and delayed reaction by the Council and the Commission; stresses that the absence of unanimity among the Member States should not prevent those willing to take appropriate and effective measures from doing so; calls on the EU’s leadership to urgently rally like-minded Member States to take coordinated action and thereby surmount the political obstacles to adopting EU-wide sanctions;

    22. Calls for the EU and its Member States to introduce, on a bilateral and coordinated basis, personal sanctions against key Georgian Dream political leaders, officials and the regime’s enablers in the administration, business, media, justice system, law enforcement agencies and the electoral commission who are responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists; further calls for sanctions to extend to mid- and lower-level public officials responsible for implementing repressive measures against the regime’s opponents and to maintain them until Georgian democracy is adequately restored; welcomes the imposition of bilateral sanctions by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Czechia, Germany and Poland, as well as by like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ukraine, and invites other EU Member States to follow suit; calls for the consideration of further restrictive measures, such as SWIFT cut-off or sectoral sanctions, aimed at cutting off the financial flows and sources of income of the Georgian Dream regime;

     

    23. Welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials as a first step in response to the persistent negative developments in Georgia; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspending it if the relevant benchmarks and standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not met because of the ruling party’s actions; stresses that Georgian Dream is fully responsible for any consequences stemming from the possible suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens; stresses the importance of visa-free travel for Georgian civil society actors, human rights activists and journalists, among others, both for travelling to the EU to inform European actors of developments in Georgia, but also for enabling them to quickly leave the country, as many face political persecution by the authorities;

    Alignment on foreign policy matters

    24. Deplores the fact that Georgian Dream is undoing decades of progress towards democracy, the rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration and is alienating its allies, which had supported it throughout the process; regrets that Georgia has made no progress on implementing the EU’s recommendations on foreign, security and defence policy and that the level of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains remarkably low, at 49 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; emphasises that progress in the EU accession process requires full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in line with the expectations for all candidate countries; regrets the fact that Georgia does not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; regrets the fact that misalignment of Georgia’s foreign policy is leading to self-isolation and that Georgian Dream’s repressive regime is worsening the instability in the South Caucasus region and the Black Sea;

    25. Notes that Georgia, under the current government, is moving in a direction that puts it at risk of becoming a Russian vassal state like Belarus; regrets the fact that, at a time when the democratic world is standing in strong support of Ukraine against the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression, the current Georgian authorities are increasingly aligning themselves with Kremlin policies and rhetoric, thereby contributing to historical revisionism; notes that Georgia has not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, but has claimed that it has cooperated with the EU to prevent sanctions circumvention; expresses its concern, however, over reports alleging Georgia’s role in facilitating the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia; calls, therefore, on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation into such allegations;

     

    26. Notes also with concern the recent strategic turn by the Georgian Dream government towards China and its increasing cooperation with Iran; notes the Georgian Dream’s public support for Chinese geostrategic initiatives and strengthened bilateral economic relations, including the award of the Anaklia deep-sea port construction project to a Chinese-led consortium; emphasises that such a move contradicts Georgia’s stated commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration; underscores that the Anaklia project now risks becoming a vehicle for increasing Chinese political, financial and economic leverage in the region, thereby further distancing Georgia from its strategic partners in the West; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to review and, if necessary, suspend or redirect funding for regional connectivity projects; expresses serious concern about Georgia’s increased multifaceted cooperation with Teheran, which can lead to Georgia’s further isolation;

     

    27. Warns that Georgia’s ongoing turn towards authoritarianism and increasing alignment with Russia constitutes a growing threat to European security, particularly in view of Georgia’s strategic location and access to the Black Sea, which is critical to Russia projecting power in the region; underlines that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s strategy may be replicated elsewhere as a playbook for hybrid state capture; is concerned about regional repercussions and warns that the credibility of European action in the wider South Caucasus is at stake, especially in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Black Sea strategy;

     

    28. Is deeply concerned about Georgian Dream’s collaboration, rapprochement and ideological convergence with Russia and other authoritarian regimes, despite Russia’s creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory; denounces Georgian Dream’s promotion of and participation in Russian disinformation and manipulation, including the weaponisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as a propaganda tool, which are at odds with the undiminished and extraordinarily high public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; regrets the lack of cooperation with the EU in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

    29. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression and calls for the EU to remain actively engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities;

    30. Recommends the reinforcement of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) with increased resources and a broader mandate to monitor foreign interference and border destabilisation; urges the Member States to ensure adequate funding and personnel for the EUMM to respond to the current political and security crisis;

    31. Notes that support from the European Peace Facility, worth EUR 30 million, was rightfully suspended in 2024 in response to the democratic backsliding in Georgia and that no support is planned for 2025; highlights that this suspension will have detrimental consequences on the national stability and security of Georgia; reiterates that any future financial support can only be authorised with the stipulation that the self-declared Georgian regime step down and fair and impartial elections be held;

     

    °

    ° °

    32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: RECOMMENDATION on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark – A10-0099/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

    (COM(2024)0479 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE))

    (Consent)

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the draft Council decision (14652/2024),

    – having regard to the Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, of the other part (2025-2030) (14781/24),

    – having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 43(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0227/2024),

    – having regard to its non-legislative resolution of …[1] on the draft decision,

    – having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

    – having regard to Rule 107(1) and (4) and Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Fisheries (A10-0099/2025),

    1. Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

    2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States, of the one part, and of Greenland and Denmark, of the other part.

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

     

    At the end of 2024, Greenland and the European Union signed a new Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) (2025-2030). This is a mixed agreement that allows the European Union’s vessels to fish species such as cod, Greenland halibut, redfish and Northern prawn. In return, the European Union pays a financial contribution of EUR 17 296 857 per annum, comprising EUR 14 096 857 for access rights and EUR 3 200 000 for support and implementation of Greenland’s fisheries policy, plus the fees paid by vessel owners. In recent years, the fisheries agreement has allowed around 10 of the European Union’s vessels to operate in the autonomous territory’s waters. The new Protocol provides details of the rules and provisions governing this access.

     

    Fisheries in Greenland

     

    The fisheries sector is of central importance for Greenland in socio-economic and cultural terms. It accounts for 15% of the territory’s jobs and over 90% of its exports. Inshore fishing mainly involves small boats (dinghies), and sustains a local economy and jobs. Many remote Inuit communities rely on subsistence fishing. The territory also has a developed offshore fishing fleet and has fisheries agreements in force that allow foreign vessels to fish in the offshore area. Greenland’s fisheries are suffering the effects of climate change on a vulnerable Arctic marine environment, with particular impacts on the species caught. Greenland has put measures in place to limit the impact of fisheries on the marine environment; these include a ban on discards, a plan for the management of bycatch, etc.

     

    New Protocol implementing the SFPA

     

    The new Protocol that has been signed has a term of six years, providing stability and visibility for stakeholders. It contains provisions aimed at providing a framework for access to waters by European vessels and cooperation with Greenland: fishing opportunities, bycatch, scientific cooperation, monitoring, controls, surveillance, fishing areas, observers etc.

     

    A specific characteristic of the agreement is that catches are regulated on the basis of fishing opportunities that are set annually. Your rapporteur is concerned about the fact that, according to the ex-post evaluation, the TACs for several of the targeted species exceed the limits set on the basis of scientific advice. These proven cases of overfishing, or of uncertainty owing to a lack of data, pose a threat to fish populations and the sustainability of fisheries, as in the case of the Northern prawn. Several indicative fishing opportunities have been reduced. The second noteworthy point is linked to the need for additional data regarding the targeted species and marine ecosystems.

     

    The programming of sectoral support will be adopted in the three months following the application of the Protocol. The sectoral support allocated in recent years has made it possible to support research and scientific assessments, the administration of Greenland’s fisheries, controls and also small-scale coastal fisheries. This is assessed positively in the evaluation of the last Protocol.

     

    Conclusions and recommendations 

     

    In the context of current diplomatic tensions with the United States and the climate crisis in the Arctic, your rapporteur recalls the importance of the SFPA and relations between Greenland and the European Union in the area of fisheries. Through its sectoral support, the fisheries agreement offers assistance that is welcomed by the authorities and a number of civil society actors in Greenland. Positive developments include the increase in the financial contribution paid by the European Union, in the amount of sectoral support and in the fees paid by vessel owners.

     

    Your rapporteur invites the European Union to provide increased support to coastal fishing communities, with respect for the rights of the indigenous peoples and the FAO’s Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries. It is advisable to ensure that these peoples, as well as NGOs, are involved in the agreement. Another positive development is the European Union’s support in areas such as controls, the fight against IUU fishing, the collection of data and scientific research.

    Your rapporteur underlines the environmental challenges associated with the agreement. As already requested by Parliament in 2021, it is essential to continue efforts in relation to data collection and the fight against overfishing, by following the scientific advice for setting TACs in Greenland and allocating annual fishing opportunities to the European Union. Even though it fishes smaller quantities, the European Union must follow the precautionary principle. The definition of the surplus is controversial in certain cases. The fishing carried out by the European Union’s vessels furthermore has an impact on seabed ecosystems and the emphasis must be on identifying and protecting vulnerable marine ecosystems, with the sector’s help.

     

    Finally, your rapporteur asks for this fisheries agreement to be repositioned in the context of regional fisheries governance. Quota exchanges mean that post-Brexit relations with coastal countries, including Norway, are closely linked to the agreement. The European Union and Greenland must strengthen cooperation and transparency within the RFMOs and the agreements between coastal states. More broadly, the European Union must do more to protect species and the marine environment in the Arctic.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report:

    Entity and/or person

    Delegation of France to the European Union

    Delegation of Germany to the European Union

    Delegation of Denmark to the European Union

    Greenland Ministry of Fisheries

    Oceana

    Europêche

    DG MARE (Commission)

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Fisheries

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Protocol implementing the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand

    (COM(2024)0479 – C10‑0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE))

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

    The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

    A. whereas the previous 4-year Implementing Protocol to the Agreement will expire on 21 April 2025;

    B. whereas the financial contribution for the entire duration of the new Implementing Protocol is EUR 103 781 000, based on:

    (a) an annual amount for access to fishery resources for the categories provided for in the Protocol, set at EUR 14 096 857 for the duration of the Protocol;

    (b) support for the development of Greenland’s sectoral fisheries policy amounting to EUR 3 200 000 per year for the duration of the Protocol;

    C. whereas the implementation of the Protocol requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below:

    DG MARE

     

    Year
    N

    Year
    N+1

    Year
    N+2

    Year
    N+3

    Year
    N+4

    Year
    N+5

    TOTAL

    □ Operational appropriations

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Budget line 08 05 01

    Commitments

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    103.781

    Payments

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    103.781

    EUR million (to three decimal places)

    D. whereas on 21 November 2024, Parliament approved DEC 15/2024 submitted by the Commission on 25 October 2024, which makes available the necessary appropriations on operational line 08 05 01 to honour the 2024 financial obligations resulting from the new Implementing Protocol;

    E. whereas the Protocol with Greenland and Denmark was signed and entered into provisional application on 12 December 2024;

    1. Notes that the support allocated to the Protocol should meet the objectives of enabling Union vessels to fish in Greenland’s fishing zone, enabling the Union and Greenland to work closely together to further promote the development of a sustainable fisheries policy and the responsible exploitation of fishery resources in Greenland’s fishing zone, and ensuring that the Union and Greenland cooperate to contribute to decent working conditions in the fisheries sector; considers that there should be thorough scrutiny to ensure that the support meets those objectives effectively during the implementation of the Protocol;

    2. Recommends that, for future agreements, an impact assessment of the added value and socio-economic benefits derived from the previous agreement be taken into account; considers that this assessment should guide the negotiation and renewal of subsequent agreements to ensure that they align with the objectives of sustainable development and efficient use of the Union’s financial resources;

    3. Notes that the transfer of appropriations for an amount of EUR 16 992 434 in commitment appropriations, as submitted by the Commission in DEC 15/2024, was approved by the budgetary authority in the time limit provided for in the Financial Regulation; regrets that the decision on this budgetary matter is disconnected from, and had to be taken prior to, the decision on the consent to be given by Parliament to the new Implementing Protocol; underlines that decisions on the agreement itself and related budgetary matters are inextricably linked, and fears, therefore, that the disconnect risks de facto pre-empting the decision on consent and creating a fait accompli;

    4. Calls on the Commission to explain the need for the provisional application of the Implementing Protocol in question, since the existing Implementing Protocol remains in force until April 2025, thus allowing time for the agreement to be finalised without any risk of a gap; calls on the Commission to provide further information about the budgetary implications of the provisional application of the new Implementing Protocol as of 12 December 2024, given the fact that the current Implementing Protocol is still in force;

    5. Takes note that DEC 15/2024 does not include any transfer of payment appropriations to the operational line for 2024 on the basis that, according to the Commission, the first access payment linked to this Implementing Protocol will be due by 30 June 2025; asks the Commission to clarify the lack of synchronisation between commitment and payment appropriations;

    6. Notes that the 2025 budget as voted on in plenary on 27 November 2024 includes amounts of EUR 150 560 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 135 300 000 in payment appropriations on line 08 05 01, as well as amounts of EUR 59 970 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 41 620 000 in payment appropriations for fishing activities on reserve line 30 02 02; regrets that the amounts are cumulative and not broken down by fisheries agreements, thus making it difficult for Parliament to scrutinise budget implementation in this field;

    7. Stresses that the financial programming of line 08 05 01 needs to be sufficient to cater for the financial obligations in the years 2026-2027 subject to the decision of the budgetary authority in the annual budgetary procedures; calls for scrutiny regarding the financial programming of line 08 05 01 in the annual budgets of 2026 and 2027;

    8. Concludes that the Committee on Budgets is in a position to advise the Committee on Fisheries, as the committee responsible, to recommend approval of the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Protocol implementing the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    Title

    Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

    References

    14652/2024 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE)

    Committee(s) responsible

    PECH

     

     

     

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    10.2.2025

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment

     Date appointed

    Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

    12.12.2024

    Discussed in committee

    16.1.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    23

    0

    5

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Tobiasz Bocheński, Tomasz Buczek, Angéline Furet, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Andrzej Halicki, Alexander Jungbluth, Fabienne Keller, Janusz Lewandowski, Giuseppe Lupo, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Victor Negrescu, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Lucia Yar

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Moritz Körner, Tiago Moreira de Sá

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Hildegard Bentele

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    23

    +

    ECR

    Tobiasz Bocheński, Bogdan Rzońca

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Hildegard Bentele, Andrzej Halicki, Janusz Lewandowski, Danuše Nerudová, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    Renew

    Fabienne Keller, Moritz Körner, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Giuseppe Lupo, Victor Negrescu, Matjaž Nemec, Carla Tavares

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Ignazio Roberto Marino

     

     

    5

    0

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

    PfE

    Tomasz Buczek, Angéline Furet, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Julien Sanchez

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

    References

    14652/2024 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE)

    Date of consultation or request for consent

    18.12.2024

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    PECH

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    10.2.2025

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Emma Fourreau

    18.12.2024

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    27.1.2025

    18.3.2025

     

     

    Date adopted

    20.5.2025

     

     

     

    Budgetary assessment

     Date of budgetary assessment

    BUDG

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    24

    1

    2

    Members present for the final vote

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Thomas Bajada, Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Ton Diepeveen, Siegbert Frank Droese, Emma Fourreau, Nicolás González Casares, France Jamet, Nora Junco García, Isabelle Le Callennec, Isabella Lövin, Giuseppe Lupo, Giuseppe Milazzo, Francisco José Millán Mon, Jessica Polfjärd, André Rodrigues, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Sander Smit, António Tânger Corrêa, Emma Wiesner, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Sebastian Everding, Marco Falcone, Karin Karlsbro, Rasmus Nordqvist

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Hélder Sousa Silva

    Date tabled

    28.5.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    24

    +

    ECR

    Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Nora Junco García, Giuseppe Milazzo, Bert-Jan Ruissen

    PPE

    Carmen Crespo Díaz, Marco Falcone, Isabelle Le Callennec, Francisco José Millán Mon, Jessica Polfjärd, Sander Smit, Hélder Sousa Silva

    PfE

    Ton Diepeveen, António Tânger Corrêa

    Renew

    Karin Karlsbro, Emma Wiesner, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

    S&D

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Thomas Bajada, Nicolás González Casares, Giuseppe Lupo, André Rodrigues

    The Left

    Emma Fourreau

    Verts/ALE

    Isabella Lövin, Rasmus Nordqvist

     

    1

    –

    ESN

    Siegbert Frank Droese

     

    2

    0

    PfE

    France Jamet

    The Left

    Sebastian Everding

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania – A10-0106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania

    (2025/2017(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part[1],

    – having regard to Albania’s application for EU membership, submitted on 24 April 2009,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0690),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania’ (SWD(2024)0828),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0690),

    – having regard to the Reform Agenda of Albania submitted under the EU’s Reform and Growth Facility, as approved by the Commission on 23 October 2024,

    – having regard to the final report of 29 September 2023 by the Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Albania’s local elections of 14 May 2023,

    – having regard to the final report of 26 July 2021 by the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE/ODIHR on Albania’s parliamentary elections of 25 April 2021,

    – having regard to the Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR of 11 December 2020 on the amendments to the Albanian constitution of 30 July 2020 and the amendments to Albania’s electoral code of 5 October 2020,

    – having regard to the Sofia Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018, and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    – having regard to the Zagreb Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 May 2020,

    – having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Brussels on 13 December 2023 and 18 December 2024,

    – having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    – having regard to Reporters Without Borders’ 2024 World Press Freedom Index,

    – having regard to Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index,

    – having regard to the 2024 Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Albania,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0106/2025),

     

    A. whereas enlargement is the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be by far Albania’s biggest trade and investment partner and its largest provider of financial assistance;

    C. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process based on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas Albania’s EU accession depends on lasting, in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas, starting with the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions;

    D. whereas Albania has been an EU candidate country since 2014, began accession negotiations in July 2022 and successfully completed the screening process in November 2023;

    E. whereas Albania opened negotiations on ‘Cluster 1: Fundamentals’ on 15 October 2024 and on ‘Cluster 6: External Relations’ on 17 December 2024;

    F. whereas Albania is a reliable foreign policy partner and is fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

    G. whereas Albania has been a target of foreign malign influence campaigns aiming to sow discord, provoke tensions and violence and destabilise the whole region, including Russian disinformation and election meddling, as well as questionable investments from non-EU actors such as China; whereas Russian and Iranian cyber attacks against Albania in 2022 and 2023 disrupted critical government functions, illustrating the hybrid threat environment Albania faces as it progresses toward EU integration;

    H. whereas electoral shortcomings and serious vulnerabilities persist in Albania’s electoral system; whereas the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to further improve the conduct of elections in Albania have not yet been fully addressed;

    I. whereas Albania participates in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, including in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

    J. whereas protection of national and ethnic minorities is crucial for aspiring EU Member States; whereas the implementing legislation on free self-identification and the use of minority languages has been adopted in Albania;

    K. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the critical importance of EU enlargement for ensuring security and stability on our continent;

    1. Welcomes Albania’s unwavering commitment to EU integration, reflecting consensus among all political parties, both governmental and opposition, and overwhelming support among citizens, and commends its consistent full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and promotion of the rules-based international order, including its categorical response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through its alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus; acknowledges the country’s active role in the region and in regional initiatives;

    2. Welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations by the end of 2027 and the swift progress made in recent years, notably the opening of two clusters of negotiating chapters in 2024; recalls that candidate countries undergo in-depth transformations to fulfil membership criteria during accession negotiations, which last as long as it takes to implement the necessary reforms; stresses the need to strengthen the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of the accession process, including its parliamentary dimension; cautions against any actions that could undermine the system of checks and balances;

    3. Notes that the pace of EU accession is determined by the candidate country’s progress on aligning with the EU acquis, its track record on implementing it and the due functioning of all the country’s institutions, and is grounded in the rule of law, good governance and fundamental rights; urges Albania to accelerate reforms to strengthen the rule of law and economic growth, counter corruption and organised crime, prevent human trafficking, ensure the protection of fundamental rights and make progress in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of information and media pluralism and independence;

    4. Welcomes the EU’s new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, which will provide EUR 922 million in grants and loans to Albania when it meets the conditions set out in its ambitious Reform Agenda;

    5. Takes note of Albania’s adoption of the National Plan for European Integration 2024-2026; welcomes the fact that Albania has established the bodies in charge of the integration process; calls for greater efforts to increase transparency and engage in public communication on EU integration;

    6. Welcomes the decision to open the European Parliament’s antenna office for the Western Balkans in Tirana; notes that the office will serve as a key contact point between the European Parliament and national parliaments, civil society and local partners from across the Western Balkans region; 

    7. Welcomes the involvement of 18 Albanian participants in the Enlargement Candidate Members initiative launched by the European Economic and Social Committee, which aims to foster closer ties with candidate countries and facilitate their gradual integration into the EU;

    Democratic institutions, media and civil society

    8. Insists on the importance of constructive political debate and orderly parliamentary conduct as key aspects of democratic governance; reaffirms the joint responsibility of Albania’s political forces to strengthen constructive and inclusive political dialogue and overcome ongoing high political polarisation in the country; deplores the continued confrontations and inflammatory rhetoric by politicians from all parties and the clashes between the ruling majority and the opposition; underlines the need to foster a political culture based on mutual respect and adherence to democratic norms, ensuring that political competition does not undermine institutional stability, and to demonstrate full respect for the role of parliamentarism, by putting an end to political attacks; calls for genuine dialogue to promote political stability and progress, emphasising the need for cross-party consensus on the EU integration agenda and the meaningful involvement of civil society; emphasises the need for more effective parliamentary oversight and improved functioning of institutions;

    9. Recognises the growing threat of foreign malign influence and hybrid interference in Albania’s democratic institutions; highlights that Kremlin-aligned narratives have sought to erode public confidence in democratic institutions and promote anti-Western sentiment; calls on Albania to enhance institutional resilience against covert political funding, media manipulation and cyber threats that directly impact its EU accession process; calls for the EU institutions to closely monitor Albania’s exposure to foreign malign influence;

    10. Welcomes Albania’s blocking of  Russian disinformation domains but stresses the need for a coordinated EU-Albania disinformation response mechanism, modelled on the EUvsDisinfo platform, to rapidly debunk and counteract Kremlin narratives; advocates for increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; warns of the increasing footprint of Chinese state-backed media in Albania;

    11. Emphasises the Albanian Parliament’s duty to respect the rulings of the Constitutional Court without delay; stresses the fundamental and irreplaceable role of parliament in safeguarding checks and balances; calls on Albania to ensure genuine democratic accountability and stronger, more transparent governance;

    12. Takes note of the July 2024 amendments to Albania’s electoral code, which enable out-of-country voting by the Albanian diaspora and introduce partially open candidate lists; takes note of the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025 and underlines that, based on the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR, the elections were competitive and professionally conducted but took place in a highly polarised environment and contestants did not enjoy a level playing field; expresses concern that the ruling party benefited from the widespread use of administrative resources; calls on all parties to demonstrate political will for a comprehensive and inclusive electoral reform to implement all recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission fully and in a timely manner, including those on the electoral and party financing framework;

    13. Regrets that the environment for free media and independent journalists has been declining in recent years; notes with concern that media independence and pluralism in Albania continue to be affected by high market concentration, the overlap of business and political interests, lack of transparency of funding and ownership, intimidation and precarious working conditions for journalists; notes that, according to the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, Albania ranks 99th, reflecting ongoing issues related to media ownership concentration, political interference and threats against journalists; highlights that the lack of transparency in media financing and ownership structures increases the risk of editorial bias and foreign propaganda penetration and undermines public trust in journalism; calls on the Albanian authorities to ensure media ownership transparency and enforce a policy of zero tolerance for the intimidation of journalists; calls on the Albanian Government to support independent fact-checking platforms as a means to ensure public access to accurate information and to uphold the integrity of the information space;

    14. Recalls that any revision of media laws should be in line with the Venice Commission recommendations and should take place in a transparent and inclusive manner in consultation with media organisations, with the aim of improving media freedom and self-regulation; welcomes the Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists launched by the Council of Europe, together with the EU and a network of prominent press freedom organisations; regrets  that there has been no progress in aligning the legislative framework with the EU acquis and EU standards, including the European Media Freedom Act[4]; recalls the need to strengthen investigative journalism, fact-checking and media literacy and to tackle hate speech, disinformation and fake news; expresses concern over enduring inflammatory anti-media rhetoric, including by high-level politicians, public officials and other public figures, which fuels the culture of intimidation; strongly condemns the increasing verbal attacks against journalists reporting on rule of law and corruption matters, as well as misogynistic online harassment targeting women journalists, smear campaigns, violence and rioting, and calls for the final convictions of the attackers to be ensured; regrets that the criminal code does not provide protection to journalists against threats and violence, calls on the authorities to adopt a legal framework that efficiently protects journalists, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against the concerning increase of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), to decriminalise defamation and to respect the role of independent journalism as a crucial check on power and to engage with the media in a manner that upholds democratic principles;

    15. Recalls the responsibility of national and local authorities to improve transparency, accountability and inclusiveness by conducting meaningful and regular public stakeholder consultations; notes with concern that the Albanian Parliament’s implementation of the legal framework for public consultations remains predominantly formal; stresses the need for greater transparency regarding public data and key legislative projects; insists that the financial resources, administrative capacity and fiscal autonomy of local authorities should be improved;

    16. Welcomes Albania’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a crucial and positive role in the reform process; welcomes the improvement of electoral monitoring and the increasing participation of civil society in overseeing the democratic process; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress; encourages the Albanian Government to bolster the role of civil society, including women’s rights organisations, in the EU accession process, from an early stage and in a transparent legislative process; regrets that civil society organisations operate in a challenging environment and receive limited public funding; insists that the groundwork for an effective VAT exemption system be laid in compliance with the commitments taken by Albania under the EU-Albania Cooperation Agreement and the IPA III; urges the authorities to speed up the drafting of the 2024-2027 roadmap for the government policy towards a more enabling environment for civil society development and to closely monitor the implementation of this roadmap;

    17. Welcomes the establishment of the new position of Minister of State for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption and underlines the importance of its effectiveness and of delivering public administration and anti-corruption reforms; remains concerned, however, that there has been limited progress in public administration reform; insists that the Albanian authorities effectively implement provisions on merit-based recruitment and review the effectiveness of the current monitoring structures for the new public administration and anti-corruption reforms; underlines the need to foster a culture of accountability, non-partisan access to public information and scrutiny of public institutions, including with regard to the implementation of the Reform Agenda; notes that public entities need to improve their compliance with transparency requirements and their responsiveness to information requests;

    18. Regrets that limited progress has been made in aligning the legal framework for procurement with the EU acquis; expresses concern over the newly introduced temporary exemptions in public procurement law; calls on the Albanian authorities to improve competitive procurement procedures in line with the EU acquis;

    19. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in improving data transmission to Eurostat;

    Fundamental rights

    20. Notes that Albania’s legal framework for gender-based violence is not yet fully aligned with the Istanbul Convention; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; welcomes the establishment of a femicide watch by the Ombudsperson; urges the enhancement of support services for victims, particularly healthcare, shelter funding, free legal aid, and victim reintegration and rehabilitation; stresses the need for increased financial and institutional support to be given to prevention programmes, public awareness campaigns, and specialised training for law enforcement and judicial authorities to ensure a victim-centred approach;

    21. Expresses concern about persistent shortcomings, such as non-alignment or partial alignment with the EU acquis, regarding persons with disabilities and gender equality; recognises the need for Albania to fully align its legal framework on gender-based violence with the Istanbul Convention; notes that, according to the World Economic Forum’s 2024 Global Gender Gap Report, Albania has fallen six places to rank 23rd globally, indicating a widening gender gap; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; calls for the full and effective implementation of existing legislation, including stricter enforcement of protective measures and enhanced judicial responsiveness to gender-based violence cases, as highlighted in the European Commission’s 2024 report on Albania;

    22. Welcomes the adoption of a new and better-financed national action plan for LGBTI+ persons; regrets, however, that there has been no progress in initiating the necessary legislation in this field and calls on the authorities to adopt the necessary legislation on the recognition of gender identity and sex characteristics, as well as on same-sex partnerships/marriages; deplores the fact that LGBTI+ persons continue to face threats and derogatory media campaigns, with public institutions failing to provide adequate protection; notes that women living in rural and remote areas, Roma and Egyptian women and LGBTI+ individuals continue to face limited access to primary healthcare; urges public institutions to demonstrate strong commitment to protecting LGBTI+ rights and to act decisively against discriminatory and hateful language towards the LGBTI+ community;

    23. Welcomes the adoption of the pending implementing legislation on the rights of persons belonging to minorities, specifically on self-identification and the use of minority languages, and underscores that these by-laws have to be fully and effectively implemented in order to render the exercise of minority and education rights feasible in practice; calls on the authorities to increase the capacity of the State Committee on National Minorities; expresses concern over persistent issues of discrimination and social exclusion affecting minority groups in Albania; calls on the Albanian Government to fully respect and protect human rights, including the rights of minorities, and to ensure that all allegations of human rights abuses, including hate speech, are promptly and thoroughly investigated; urges the Albanian authorities to enhance institutional mechanisms to prevent discrimination and ensure the meaningful political participation of all communities, in line with the recommendations of the Commission’s 2024 report on Albania; calls on Albania to protect and promote the cultural heritage, languages and traditions of its national minorities; calls on Albania to provide education for national minorities in minority languages and to ensure adequate access to state primary, secondary and higher education for all of its citizens; 

     

    24. Recalls that Albania should safeguard the right to property, in particular, by making decisive progress on first registration and compensation, improving the transparency of the state cadastre and the quality of the property register cadastral data, and ensuring that the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy are respected in cases of expropriation and removal of properties;

    25. Calls for increased investment in the modernisation of the education system, ensuring its quality and inclusiveness; calls on Albania to implement measures to foster opportunities in employment and education for persons with disabilities;

    26. Commends the successful 2024 census held in an atmosphere of trust and transparency and its results; believes that Albania should serve as a positive model for conducting a population census in the region;

    27. Welcomes the adoption of the law on personal data protection, aimed at full alignment with the EU acquis; commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of the implementing legislation on the procedure and fair compensation for the use of orphan works and the database of copyright works, but expresses serious concern about the handling of personal data and weaknesses in IT systems; calls on the Albanian authorities to strengthen safeguards against data breaches, enhance prevention and public awareness, and improve institutional capacity in order to effectively implement the new Law on Personal Data Protection; calls on Albania to further collaborate with the EU Intellectual Property Office;

    28. Recognises the closer cooperation between Albania and the EU in managing migration flows and border control processes, in particular through the new national strategy on migration for 2024‑2026 and cooperation with Frontex; takes note of the Italy-Albania Memorandum of Understanding;

    Rule of law

    29. Commends the progress Albania has achieved in the implementation of the justice reforms aimed at strengthening the independence, transparency and accountability of the judiciary, including on the vetting process, completed at first instance; welcomes the new reform process ‘Good governance, rule of law and anti-corruption for Albania 2030’ launched by the Albanian Parliament; stresses that any initiative to strengthen governance, rule of law and anti-corruption efforts must be built on inclusivity, transparency and collaboration;

    30. Expresses concern about continued political interference with and pressure on the judicial system; notes with concern  shortcomings in the merit-based appointments of non-magistrate members of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecution Council and their integrity;

    31. Calls for urgent steps to ensure judicial independence and institutional integrity;

    32. Highlights that Albania ranked 80th in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating the need for substantial progress in combating high-level corruption and ensuring judicial independence; underscores the key work of Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK) in building up a track record of investigating, prosecuting and convicting in high-level corruption cases as well as cases involving the protection of the EU’s financial interests; stresses the importance of ensuring the full independence of anti-corruption institutions and encourages the strengthening of their operational and investigative capacity; welcomes high-level corruption investigations and proceedings; stresses that increasing the number of final convictions of high-level officials remains an important priority;  urges all actors to refrain from any actions that undermine the work of independent institutions such as SPAK; expresses its regret at the environment of intimidation that the judiciary operates in, and at instances of undue pressure that it endures, which pose a serious threat to judicial independence; expresses concern that the lack of institutional support for magistrates facing threats weakens public trust and seriously jeopardises the rule of law and Albania’s EU integration process;

    33. Notes the challenges concerning the quality and efficiency of the justice system, including the high number of judicial vacancies, insufficient court staff, the quality of initial and continuous judicial training, the consistency of case-law and the lack of a modern integrated case management system; notes that budget allocations are insufficient, particularly for the court component; underlines that reducing the backlog of unprocessed files in the judicial system should remain a priority; welcomes, however, the fact that the Constitutional Court of Albania has improved its efficiency by reducing its backlog and continues to uphold institutional checks and balances;

    34. Welcomes the adoption of national legislation to align with the EU acquis on anti-money laundering; notes the need to establish a strong asset recovery office and to improve vetting procedures and the processes for investigating, prosecuting and obtaining convictions in high-level corruption cases, including through the seizure and final confiscation of criminal assets;

    35. Calls on Albania to continue aligning its legal framework, and notably the criminal code, with the EU acquis on the fight against organised crime and the trade in drugs and firearms, as well as combating cybercrime, extremism and terrorist threats; notes the appointment of additional prosecutors to the Special Prosecution Office as well as the establishment of a financial investigation unit; commends Albania’s participation in joint operations and cooperation under the European multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats (EMPACT) on drug trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime; further acknowledges the intensified cooperation with EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, INTERPOL and the CARIN Network in fighting organised crime and dismantling transnational crime networks; encourages Albania to strengthen its mechanisms for sharing intelligence with EU agencies to enhance regional stability; calls for sustained efforts to align Albania’s security policies with EU strategies, fostering a more integrated and resilient regional security framework; calls on Albania to strengthen the fight against human trafficking in cooperation with the Member States and EU agencies; stresses the need to counter the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as Albania remains both a destination and a transit country; welcomes the adoption of a new strategy for the protection of victims of crime; emphasises the importance of continuous training for migration control personnel to ensure the effective implementation of European regulations and a stronger response to human trafficking networks;

    36. Encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to further help boost Albania’s resilience against hybrid threats in the area of cyber security, information manipulation and protection of critical infrastructure; calls on Albania to assess the risks associated with foreign direct investment and to screen such investment, particularly in strategic sectors such as energy, mining and telecommunications, in order to avoid economic dependencies and debt traps and protect national interests, enhance security and ensure consistency with EU standards;

    37. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries with a view to facilitating close cooperation and the prosecution of misuse of EU funds; welcomes the fact that Albania has concluded a bilateral working arrangement with the EPPO;

    Socio-economic reforms

    38. Welcomes Albania’s engagement in implementing the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, encompassing EU single market integration, regional economic integration, fundamental reforms and increased financial support;

    39. Reiterates the importance of improving the public infrastructure within the Western Balkan countries and developing connections with EU Member States; recalls the potential of the economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans to enhance regional connectivity through rail and road infrastructure; in that respect, urges the authorities in all countries to complete Corridor VIII connecting Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria; recalls the importance of improving flight connections between the Western Balkan countries and with the EU Member States;

    40. Welcomes Albania’s Reform Agenda addressing the business environment, human capital, digitalisation, energy and the green transition, fundamental rights and the rule of law; welcomes, furthermore, Albania’s participation in the EU’s Digital Europe programme; welcomes the fact that Albania has been ranked as a regional leader in public administration and digital public procurement by the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management programme, run by the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;

    41. Encourages the Albanian authorities to reduce the risk of poverty and social exclusion by further improving access to education and housing, as well as social and healthcare services, especially for disadvantaged populations and minority groups, including Roma and Egyptians; calls for the implementation of Albania’s National Social Protection Strategy 2024-2030 and National Employment and Skills Strategy 2023-2030; calls on Albania to adopt further measures to fight against youth unemployment and calls on the Albanian authorities to effectively implement the National Agenda for the Rights of the Child by providing assistance to children facing exclusion and poverty;

    42. Commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of legislative acts to reform higher education and for the implementation of the National Strategy for Education 2021-2026; calls on Albania to expand media literacy as a core subject in school curricula while ensuring that teachers receive dedicated training and modern resources to deliver high-quality programmes; encourages collaboration with EU educational initiatives and regional networks such as the Western Balkans Media Literacy Observatory to implement best practices in critical thinking and digital literacy education;

    43. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in concluding bilateral agreements with EU Member States on social security and in its preparations to enable the connection of its employment services system to EURES, the European network of employment services;

    44. Welcomes the fact that Albania joined the Single Euro Payments Area in November 2024, which reduces costs for citizens and businesses and will contribute to Albania’s further integration into the single market; commends the Albanian authorities on the alignment with the EU acquis on payments (Payment Accounts Directive[5]) and on their actions that have resulted in Albania’s removal from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force; recognises Albania’s efforts to improve economic competitiveness and calls on the government to continue with structural reforms to foster a more attractive business environment in line with EU standards; regrets that the inefficiency in public administration, an excessive regulatory framework, corruption and large informal economy undermines the business environment and impedes competition;

    45. Commends the improvement of Albania’s fiscal performance; calls on the Albanian authorities to further enhance fiscal risk analysis by strengthening the relevant Ministry of Finance department; calls for greater transparency and accountability of state-owned enterprises through annual financial reports; calls on Albania to strengthen its public internal financial control and to ensure that the recommendations of the Supreme Audit Institution (ALSAI) are implemented;

    46. Welcomes the further alignment of legislation with the EU acquis on private pension funds, bank recovery and the resolution framework; calls on Albania to complete its alignment with the EU acquis on insurance, capital markets, securities markets, investment funds and financial market infrastructures;

    47. Welcomes the agreement reached at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; in this respect, calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to work towards achieving the agreed targets of substantially reducing roaming charges for data and further reducing prices for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU to levels close to domestic prices by 2027; welcomes the implementation of the first phase of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    48. Is concerned about the lack of progress in company law legislation in Albania; calls on the Albanian authorities to complete the alignment of company law legislation with the EU acquis;

    Environment, biodiversity, energy and transport, sustainable tourism

    49. Stresses that more efforts are needed for Albania to align with the EU acquis on the environment; calls for its alignment with the EU’s Environmental Impact Assessment[6] and Strategic Environmental Assessment[7] directives; underlines the need to strengthen the fight against environmental crime;

    50. Highlights the need for transparent and inclusive public consultations in line with the Aarhus Convention, ensuring the active involvement of local communities, NGOs and scientific institutions in environmental decision-making processes, especially on projects with large environmental and socio-economic repercussions; warns that the lack of proper stakeholder engagement undermines governance standards and Albania’s compliance with its obligations under the EU acquis; expresses concern about the economic and environmental impact of non-competitive foreign-funded development projects;

    51. Recalls that substantial efforts are needed for Albania to achieve the goals relating to climate protection, energy efficiency, diversification and greening of energy supply and transport; notes that air and water quality and waste management remain particularly challenging issues for the country; urges the central government and local authorities to step up their efforts to improve air quality and reduce potentially lethal pollution; urges the Albanian Government to prioritise the implementation of climate adaptation strategies, the development of renewable energy sources and the modernisation of the country’s waste management system to meet EU standards and support sustainable economic growth; encourages the Albanian authorities to strengthen measures and investments to expand the public transport and railway systems;

    52. Firmly believes that environmental protection and sustainable tourism development must go hand in hand; welcomes the establishment of the first wild river national park in Europe, the Vjosa Wild River National Park, and calls for sufficient resources to be allocated to its protection; calls on the authorities to fully respect the national park’s ecological integrity and to reconsider infrastructure projects, notably the water abstraction project on the Shushica river, in line with international biodiversity conservation standards and best practice to ensure that the park’s biodiversity, habitats and ecological functions remain intact; reiterates its concern over the construction of the Vlora airport in the Vjosa-Narta Protected Area, in violation of national and international biodiversity protection norms, and calls on the Commission to address the issue in chapter 27 of the accession negotiations; calls on the Albanian authorities to adopt the implementing legislation for the Law on Cultural Heritage and Museums;

    53. Expresses serious concern regarding recent amendments to Albania’s Law on Protected Areas that allow large infrastructure and tourism projects in ecologically sensitive zones; calls for these legislative amendments to be reversed with a view to ensuring full and strict compliance with national and international legal frameworks and conservation standards and addressing marine waste pollution affecting neighbouring countries;

    54. Calls on the Albanian authorities to designate and effectively manage key protected areas for the survival of critically endangered species, in particular the Balkan lynx, including through comprehensive biodiversity monitoring programmes, and to implement and strictly enforce anti-poaching legislation; urges Albania to abandon the plans for the Skavica hydropower plant on the Black Drin river, given its severe ecological, social and cultural impacts, including the displacement of local communities;

    Regional cooperation and foreign policy

    55. Welcomes the Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and Albania, adopted on 19 November 2024, which establishes a platform for enhanced dialogue and cooperation on security and defence issues and represents a significant step forward; stresses the importance of ensuring that this partnership translates into concrete actions, including joint training initiatives, shared intelligence capabilities and enhanced border security measures to address regional and global security challenges; underlines the need for deeper security cooperation within the Western Balkans, fostering closer coordination among regional partners to combat organised crime, cyber threats, and hybrid challenges; calls for strengthened EU support for regional security initiatives that enhance stability and resilience across the Western Balkans; acknowledges that this partnership represents a significant step forward in strengthening Albania’s role as a reliable security partner of the EU; further emphasises that the partnership will, among other things, facilitate joint initiatives and capacity-building efforts, thereby contributing to a more resilient and integrated security architecture in the Western Balkans;

    56. Welcomes the adoption of the national security strategy in 2024 to further fight hybrid threats and the new law on cybersecurity; welcomes the joint declaration signed by Albania, Kosovo and Croatia, which aims to improve cooperation and strengthen defence potential, while providing full support for Euro-Atlantic and regional defence integration;

    57. Commends Albania’s full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including its support for EU sanctions against third countries, and its positive contribution to common security and defence policy missions, particularly EUFOR Althea, which underlines the country’s commitment to contributing to regional and international security and stability, and welcomes Albania’s participation in operations led by the EU and by NATO, and its collaboration with Europol and Interpol; calls for its further participation in EU-led crisis management operations and common security and defence policy missions such as the maritime security operation EUNAVFOR Aspides; recognises the strategic importance of the Adriatic-Ionian region for European security and economic stability; calls on Albania to enhance its maritime security capabilities in coordination with the EU and NATO;

    58. Welcomes the Albanian Government’s continued efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations; recalls, in this respect, the importance of Albania’s undertaking to resolve any border disputes in conformity with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including, if necessary, by following the judgments of the International Court of Justice; welcomes Albania’s active contribution to the Berlin Process; further encourages sustained and constructive engagement in regional cooperation initiatives, in line with EU values and enlargement objectives, as it contributes to peace, security and stability in the Western Balkans; cautions against any actions, such as the Open Balkans initiative, that could undermine the common regional market or deviate from the Berlin Process, to the extent that they create obstacles to EU integration and cohesion, potentially jeopardising Albania’s progress toward deeper regional and European integration;

    59. Welcomes the ratification by Albania of bilateral agreements on the coordination of social security systems with Croatia, Montenegro and Bulgaria;

    60. Emphasises Albania’s constructive role in promoting stability and cooperation in the Western Balkans, particularly through bilateral dialogue with neighbouring countries and its engagement in regional organisations;

    °

    ° °

    61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, to the Council, to the Commission, to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Albania.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Plaid’s direct child payment best way to tackle child poverty – experts

    Source: Party of Wales

    A direct child payment is the most powerful and effective intervention to reduce poverty a leading report has found.

    A recent report by Policy in Practice has identified that the most powerful and effective intervention designed to reduce poverty is a direct child payment.

    Today (Tuesday, June 24th), Rhun ap Iorwerth, Plaid Cymru leader, challenged the Labour First Minister, Eluned Morgan, on her refusal to implement such a policy.

    Plaid Cymru has called on the Labour Government in Wales to implement a Child Payment immediately to “reach nearly one-third of households that are in poverty”, and “reduce child poverty by nearly a quarter”.

    Plaid Cymru announced their intention to create a direct child payment, Cynnal, in their Spring Conference in March of 2025. The policy took inspiration from the Scottish Child Payment, which has aided Scotland in becoming the only nation where child poverty is projected to fall.

    By 2029, child poverty is set to rise to 34.4% in Wales, which would be the highest rate of all UK nations.

    The Plaid Cymru leader judged the Labour First Minister for her inaction on this ‘national stain’,  accusing her of ‘continued objection’ towards the policy, which has been backed by experts in the sector.

    The Plaid Cymru leader also challenged the First Minister over the Labour UK Government’s proposed changes to welfare, changes which see the Government in Westminster facing a rebellion from the Labour backbenchers. Mr ap Iorwerth asked the Welsh Labour leader she would urge her Welsh Labour MP colleagues to vote on the changes, with only 3/27 Welsh Labour MPs having declared their objection.

    Rhun ap Iorwerth MS went on to state that only a Plaid Cymru Government has ‘real ambition’ to tackle child poverty, that will provide a ‘brighter future’ for future generations.

    Plaid Cymru leader, Rhun ap Iorwerth MS, said:

    “The introduction of a Welsh Child Payment has emerged as the most powerful and effective of all interventions designed to reduce child poverty. Such a payment would reach nearly one-third of households that are in poverty, particularly benefiting larger families and households with young children.

    “The policy has proved transformational in Scotland with it set to be the only nation, based on current trends, that will succeed in reducing child poverty by 2029. In stark contrast, child poverty in Wales is set to rise to a scandalous 34.4% in the same timeframe – the highest in the UK. So, with such unequivocal evidence, what is the First Minister waiting for?

    “The answer to that question is clear – tackling poverty is not a priority for Labour. While Labour keep the cruel two child cap, and push more people into poverty through cuts to disability benefits, Plaid Cymru are pledging to take positive action on reducing poverty – showing that we are the only Party willing to tackle this national stain.

    “This is made even clearer by the list of Labour MPs ready to vote against Labour’s cruel cuts to disability welfare, because despite Wales being hit disproportionately by the cuts, it appears that only a handful of Labour MPs from Wales are on the list of rebelling Labour MPs.

    “Plaid Cymru know that this is not as good as it gets for Wales, we know that 1/3 of our children should not be living in poverty, that poverty is not inevitable in our communities. That is why we are the only party willing to tackle this issue head on.

    “A vote for Plaid Cymru in 2026 is a vote for a party with real ambition and credible plans to tackle child poverty, backed by the experts, for a brighter future for our future generations.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: United Nations (UN) Women Executive Board lauds progressive gender equality and women’s empowerment work in Zimbabwe

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    Download logo

    UN Women Executive Board’s visit to Zimbabwe from 4-10 May 2025 marked a pivotal moment in the country’s ongoing efforts to advance gender equality and women’s empowerment. The visit, led by H.E. Ms. Nicola Clase, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations and President of the UN Women Executive Board, provided an opportunity to showcase the impact of UN Women’s programming in the country while strengthening strategic partnerships with key stakeholders.

    “I note the strong legal frameworks for gender equality and women’s empowerment,”acknowledged Ambassador Nicola Clase, President of the UN Women Executive Board.  “We encourage the government and partners to focus on the effective implementation of these laws.”

    High-Level Engagements

    Throughout the week, the delegation engaged with government officials, development partners, civil society organizations, traditional leaders, the private sector, and women’s rights organizations to deepen collaboration and assess progress on gender-responsive policies and initiatives.

    In a productive meeting with the country’s president , H.E  Emmerson Mnangagwa, there was reaffirmation of Zimbabwe’s commitment to gender equality. “We believe gender equality is not only a fundamental right, but also a necessity for national growth. Zimbabwe remains steadfast in its commitment to empowering women and girls,” assured President Mnangagwa.

    The delegation also met  Senator Monica Mutsvangwa, Minister of Women Affairs, Community, and Small and Medium Enterprises Development. She highlighted the government’s ongoing initiatives saying,”Zimbabwe has made significant strides in advancing women’s rights, and will continue to strengthen policies that ensure women’s full participation in economic and social development.”

    Jacob Francis Mudenda, Speaker of Parliament, emphasized the importance of inclusive governance. “Ensuring women’s full participation in governance and business will drive Zimbabwe forward into a more inclusive future,” he said.

    Field Visits Showcasing Impact

    The Executive Board members visited Umzingwane Safe Market, Epworth Safe Market, Maker Space Innovation Hub, and the Knowledge Hub at Rosaria Memorial Trust where the team saw the impact of innovative approaches to supporting women’s economic empowerment and safety in informal marketplaces. These engagements demonstrated UN Women’s commitment to creating sustainable opportunities for women, improving livelihoods, and fostering gender-responsive practices.

    Speaking about her transformation as a clothing trader in the market, Sarah Muchengeti had this to say, “The biggest challenge before the Epworth Safe Market was finding a secure and reliable place to work. This initiative gave me a proper workspace, where I can now take larger orders and grow my operation. My vision  has changed—I am no longer just working to survive; I am building a legacy. My family now sees me as a successful businesswoman, and my children are inspired by what I have accomplished.”

    Reflections from the Region and Country 

    The visit by the board was a proud moment for the UN Women Zimbabwe team, whose extensive preparations ensured a seamless and impactful experience.

    Anna Mutavati, Regional Director for East and Southern Africa, emphasized the significance of the engagement, “This visit reinforced the importance of partnerships in driving change. It is inspiring to see the Executive Board acknowledge the progress we’ve made in Zimbabwe.”

    Fatou Lo, UN Women Zimbabwe Country Representative, who spearheaded  the visit, highlighted the collaborative effort involved, “This was a collective achievement, the dedication of our teams and partners made it possible to showcase our work and deepen strategic discussions on gender equality.”

    Lovenes Makonense, Deputy Country Representative, reflecting on the experience, said, “Being able to present the tangible impact of our work was incredibly rewarding. The enthusiasm from stakeholders reaffirmed our mission to empower women across all sectors.”

    Looking Ahead

    As the Executive Board concluded its visit, the momentum gained from these discussions will continue to shape UN Women’s programming in Zimbabwe. The visit amplified the power of collaboration and the need for sustained investment in gender equality initiatives.

    UN Women Zimbabwe remains deeply appreciative of all partners, stakeholders, and government officials who contributed to the success of this visit. As the team reflects on the week-long engagements, one message remains clear: the commitment to empowering women in Zimbabwe is stronger than ever.

    – on behalf of UN Women – Africa.

    MIL OSI Africa –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: ‘Upcycled’ food is on the rise – here’s what you need to know

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Simona Grasso, Assistant Professor & Ad Astra Fellow in Food Science and Nutrition, University College Dublin

    Wonky veg are ‘upcycled’ from the dustbin. Civil/Shutterstock

    Whether customers are pleased to hear it or not, firms are selling “upcycled” food to tackle food waste internationally.

    Food with ingredients that were saved from the waste heap via verifiable supply chains is said to be “upcycled”. The term originated in the US, though it’s also been adopted on this side of the Atlantic.

    This rather broad definition includes byproducts from the food industry, such as spent grains left over from beer manufacturing, or apple pulp that doesn’t make it into juice.

    If you’re not familiar with the idea, perhaps you have already bought upcycled produce in the form of wonky carrots and potatoes. This is food that does not meet the visual standards of most supermarkets but is nevertheless still tasty to eat. Elsewhere, food manufacturers are making products that include upcycled ingredients.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    Why upcycle food in the first place? The US Environmental Protection Agency rates it as just as effective as donating or redistributing food to restaurants and shelters for reducing the environmental impact of the food system. Wasted food, after all, can generate potent greenhouse gases such as methane if left to rot in landfills.

    So it’s good for the planet if ingredients that would not have gone to human consumption are transformed into new food-grade products. But just how good exactly?

    How much of a product contains upcycled ingredients will influence its sustainability credentials. If they are listed at the beginning of the ingredients on the packaging then that indicates a large percentage of inclusion. Far down at the bottom suggests a smaller percentage.

    How much of a food has to be upcycled to count?
    Dean Drobot/Shutterstock

    Of course, there is only so much of an upcycled ingredient that can be added to food before it affects the colour, taste or flavour of the final product. It is important to keep a balance.

    According to the US upcycled food certification standard, a product only needs to contain a minimum of 10% upcycled inputs by weight in order to be certified as upcycled. This may only make a slight difference to a single product’s overall sustainability.

    Compare it with organic food. Both in the US and in the EU, a product must contain a minimum of 95% of certified organic ingredients to be labelled organic. The EU loosely defines “organic” as food that “respects the environment and animal welfare”.

    This is very far from the 10% required by the certified standard for upcycling used in the US. Of course, it would be quite hard to make an upcycled product with at least 95% upcycled ingredients. Think about a biscuit. Most of the major ingredients – flour, butter, sugar – would need to be upcycled. On the other hand, would 10% be enough to encourage you to buy food certified as upcycled?

    Before you spend on spent grain …

    While I believe that attempts to include upcycled ingredients in food formulations should be encouraged, however big or small, it is important to have rules in place.

    In the EU, upcycled foods are not regulated and there are no certification standards, though some product packaging may claim it contains upcycled ingredients. Consumers might buy a product with a sprinkling of upcycled ingredients thinking that it is a more sustainable choice.

    For example, a loaf of bread recently sold in Tesco was reported to contain 2.5% spent grain by weight. In other cases, the level of inclusion appears to be quite substantial. Granola sold in Ireland claims 30% spent grain from brewers, but it is not clearly stated in the ingredient list.

    Put to good use: spent grains from beermaking.
    BearFotos/Shutterstock

    Often, consumers are asked to pay more for upcycled food, even though it contains ingredients that would have otherwise gone to waste. This is because the producers are often small start-ups with high production costs that they must recoup with high prices.

    If sustainability claims are at stake, and if consumers are asked to pay more for upcycled foods, it is important to prevent deceptive marketing that could present products as more sustainable than they actually are. One way to do so is by carrying out a life-cycle assessment, a measurement of a product’s environmental impact from its production to its disposal. The manufacturer could do this as a way of reassuring the consumer and backing up any claims with evidence.

    If we want upcycled foods to become more common, and so reduce waste, we have to make sure consumers aren’t being misled. If consumers trust, value and understand these products, they are more likely to succeed in the market.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    Simona Grasso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. ‘Upcycled’ food is on the rise – here’s what you need to know – https://theconversation.com/upcycled-food-is-on-the-rise-heres-what-you-need-to-know-253306

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: ‘Upcycled’ food is on the rise – here’s what you need to know

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Simona Grasso, Assistant Professor & Ad Astra Fellow in Food Science and Nutrition, University College Dublin

    Wonky veg are ‘upcycled’ from the dustbin. Civil/Shutterstock

    Whether customers are pleased to hear it or not, firms are selling “upcycled” food to tackle food waste internationally.

    Food with ingredients that were saved from the waste heap via verifiable supply chains is said to be “upcycled”. The term originated in the US, though it’s also been adopted on this side of the Atlantic.

    This rather broad definition includes byproducts from the food industry, such as spent grains left over from beer manufacturing, or apple pulp that doesn’t make it into juice.

    If you’re not familiar with the idea, perhaps you have already bought upcycled produce in the form of wonky carrots and potatoes. This is food that does not meet the visual standards of most supermarkets but is nevertheless still tasty to eat. Elsewhere, food manufacturers are making products that include upcycled ingredients.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    Why upcycle food in the first place? The US Environmental Protection Agency rates it as just as effective as donating or redistributing food to restaurants and shelters for reducing the environmental impact of the food system. Wasted food, after all, can generate potent greenhouse gases such as methane if left to rot in landfills.

    So it’s good for the planet if ingredients that would not have gone to human consumption are transformed into new food-grade products. But just how good exactly?

    How much of a product contains upcycled ingredients will influence its sustainability credentials. If they are listed at the beginning of the ingredients on the packaging then that indicates a large percentage of inclusion. Far down at the bottom suggests a smaller percentage.

    How much of a food has to be upcycled to count?
    Dean Drobot/Shutterstock

    Of course, there is only so much of an upcycled ingredient that can be added to food before it affects the colour, taste or flavour of the final product. It is important to keep a balance.

    According to the US upcycled food certification standard, a product only needs to contain a minimum of 10% upcycled inputs by weight in order to be certified as upcycled. This may only make a slight difference to a single product’s overall sustainability.

    Compare it with organic food. Both in the US and in the EU, a product must contain a minimum of 95% of certified organic ingredients to be labelled organic. The EU loosely defines “organic” as food that “respects the environment and animal welfare”.

    This is very far from the 10% required by the certified standard for upcycling used in the US. Of course, it would be quite hard to make an upcycled product with at least 95% upcycled ingredients. Think about a biscuit. Most of the major ingredients – flour, butter, sugar – would need to be upcycled. On the other hand, would 10% be enough to encourage you to buy food certified as upcycled?

    Before you spend on spent grain …

    While I believe that attempts to include upcycled ingredients in food formulations should be encouraged, however big or small, it is important to have rules in place.

    In the EU, upcycled foods are not regulated and there are no certification standards, though some product packaging may claim it contains upcycled ingredients. Consumers might buy a product with a sprinkling of upcycled ingredients thinking that it is a more sustainable choice.

    For example, a loaf of bread recently sold in Tesco was reported to contain 2.5% spent grain by weight. In other cases, the level of inclusion appears to be quite substantial. Granola sold in Ireland claims 30% spent grain from brewers, but it is not clearly stated in the ingredient list.

    Put to good use: spent grains from beermaking.
    BearFotos/Shutterstock

    Often, consumers are asked to pay more for upcycled food, even though it contains ingredients that would have otherwise gone to waste. This is because the producers are often small start-ups with high production costs that they must recoup with high prices.

    If sustainability claims are at stake, and if consumers are asked to pay more for upcycled foods, it is important to prevent deceptive marketing that could present products as more sustainable than they actually are. One way to do so is by carrying out a life-cycle assessment, a measurement of a product’s environmental impact from its production to its disposal. The manufacturer could do this as a way of reassuring the consumer and backing up any claims with evidence.

    If we want upcycled foods to become more common, and so reduce waste, we have to make sure consumers aren’t being misled. If consumers trust, value and understand these products, they are more likely to succeed in the market.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    Simona Grasso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. ‘Upcycled’ food is on the rise – here’s what you need to know – https://theconversation.com/upcycled-food-is-on-the-rise-heres-what-you-need-to-know-253306

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Caleb H. Wheeler, Senior Lecturer in Law, Cardiff University

    The recent US attack on Iran’s nuclear sites has prompted renewed questions about whether the UN charter’s prohibition on the use of force is meaningful.

    Considered one of the keystones of international law, article 2(4) of the charter specifically forbids member states from using force – or threatening to do so – against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or “in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.

    A significant amount of commentary exists about what the prohibition entails. This tries to clarify ambiguities around the terms “force”, “threats of force”, “territorial integrity” and “political independence”. Although no absolute consensus has been reached, it is commonly thought that member states are prohibited from launching armed attacks against other states, or threatening to do so, unless acting in self-defence or with the authorisation of the UN security council.

    Other exceptions have been suggested. These include use of force as part of a larger humanitarian intervention operation. There’s also a question of whether it’s permissible when a state is rescuing its nationals abroad. But the legality of either of these situations is contentious and remains unsettled.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    Early in its existence, the UN made concerted efforts to protect and respect article 2(4) and to comply with its provisions. In 1950, the security council authorised UN member states to provide South Korea with the assistance necessary to repel the armed attack launched by North Korea, triggering the increased internationalisation of the Korean war.

    While article 2(4) was not explicitly mentioned in resolution 83, it was alluded to through repeated references to North Korea’s “armed attack” against South Korea. As such, it can be interpreted as an effort by the security council to use its authority to address a violation of article 2(4), even if it did not clearly frame it in those terms.

    The security council also authorised member states in 2011 to take all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya. Unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that the member states may have exceeded their authority in Libya and carried out acts that could themselves be construed as violations of the UN charter.

    Rather than just protecting civilians, as the security council resolution instructed, legal experts were concerned they had effectively intervened in a civil war. Any possible violations went unpunished by the security council.

    Security council actions taken with regard to Korea were, in many ways, the high watermark for the prohibition of the use of force, given the scale of the conflict. There are two reasons for that. First, a significant proportion of the wars taking place after 1945 have been domestic and not subject to the provisions of article 2(4). The prohibition specifically applies to a member state’s international relations so is not inapplicable when a member state attacks a group within its own borders.

    Second, the UN has failed to address many of the acts occurring after 1945 that might fall under the provisions of article 2(4). The reason for this inaction lies primarily in the flawed structure on which the UN is built.

    Chapter VII of the charter makes the security council responsible for addressing acts of aggression that would constitute uses of force under article 2(4). But it has repeatedly failed to fill that role, allowing states to commit these acts without meaningful response.

    The UN veto problem

    UN security council decisions can only be enacted when at least nine members vote in favour. This must also include the affirmative vote or abstention of all five of the permanent members: the US, Russia, China, the UK and France. This essentially gives each of the permanent members the right to veto security council resolutions.

    Permanent members have commonly used the threat of their veto in their own political interests. This can be seen in a variety of instances, most notably the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Both situations clearly involved uses of force prohibited by article 2(4), and in both situations the security council was prevented from acting by some of its permanent members.

    This inaction is consistent with the UN’s failure to address many other acts that might fall under the provisions of article 2(4), including US involvement in south-east Asia in the 1960s and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s.

    The security council’s failure to adequately perform its role has caused some to try and find a workaround. The Council of Europe, disappointed at the lack of accountability for Russia’s acts of aggression against Ukraine, has entered into an agreement with Ukraine to establish a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.

    In the special tribunal’s draft statute, an act of aggression is defined to almost exactly mirror the type of conduct that would constitute a use of force under the UN charter.

    Bombing Iran

    Which brings us to the current situation in Iran. There is little question that the US violated article 2(4) when it bombed Iranian nuclear sites in Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan on the evening of Saturday June 21. This is a clear use of force against the territory of another state.

    But even if the attacks themselves were not enough to establish a violation, they were also accompanied by US president Donald Trump’s suggestion that a regime change in Iran might be appropriate. These comments, coming immediately after the initial attack, could be construed as a threat of further force against Iran’s political independence should such a change not occur.

    Under the UN charter, such threats and uses of force should elicit a response from the security council. But just as with Iraq in 2003 and Ukraine in 2022, none will probably be forthcoming as the US will block any efforts to hold it to account.

    But equally chilling is the lack of condemnation of the US actions by its allies. German chancellor Friedrich Merz saw “no reason to criticise” the bombings, and Nato secretary general Mark Rutte insisted that the bombings did not violate international law.

    As the respected Dutch scholar of international law André Nollkaemper suggests, this refusal to condemn a clear violation of the prohibition of the use of force creates a real danger that the bar for when a state can legally use force will be lowered.

    Should that be allowed to happen it could further hollow out the prohibition, effectively making it less likely that states will be held to account for violating international law. Further, it could also lead to the return of a world where “might makes right”. This would undo more than a century of legal evolution.

    Caleb H. Wheeler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed? – https://theconversation.com/bombing-iran-has-the-un-charter-failed-259751

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: expert reaction to observational study linking nitrate in drinking water to pre-term birth rates

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    June 25, 2025

    A observational study published in PLOS Water looks at the link between nitrate in drinking water and premature births.

    Prof Oliver Jones, Professor of Chemistry, RMIT University, said:

    “The headline on this research may sound scary; however, to my mind, there are several issues with this paper. 

    “Firstly, the data are from 1970-1988 and so are not current. Secondly, the author did not perform any measurements themselves but instead used public health data and water quality data. The water quality data was self-reported and so may not be accurate, and it only comes from one place in the USA, so it does not reflect conditions elsewhere. 

    “This data was used to show a very weak possible association between estimated early prenatal nitrate exposure and birth outcomes. An association between two factors does not mean one causes the other. The apparent relationship can be due to a range of different factors that have nothing to do with the two variables being considered. I am inclined to think that this is the case here because there is a large overlap in the data and because the effect disappears above 10 mg/L, which does not make sense from a toxicological point of view. Other factors that may affect health, such as the mother’s health or diet, were not available, so could not be taken into account. This is quite important in this case since at concentrations of less than 10 mg/L, the main source of nitrate is actually food, not water. It is thus possible that the results reflect diet, not nitrate.

    “Arguing that a policy change is needed on a very well-studied compound based on a single paper that at best only found a weak statistical association from 40-year old data from one part of the USA and which shows no increased risk at the higher exposure concentrations, is, in my view, possibly a little overzealous.” 

    ‘Early prenatal nitrate exposure and birth outcomes: A study of Iowa’s public drinking water (1970-1988) by Semprini was published in PLOS Water at 19:00 UK time on Wednesday 25th June. 

    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pwat.0000329

    Declared Interests

    Prof Oliver Jones “I am a Professor of Chemistry at RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia. I have no direct conflicts of interest to declare; however, I have received research funding from the Water Industry and EPA Victoria for research on environmental pollution in the past.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: V. Zelensky met with D. Trump on the sidelines of the NATO summit

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    KYIV, June 25 /Xinhua/ — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the NATO summit in The Hague /Netherlands/ on Wednesday, the Ukrainian leader’s Telegram channel reported.

    V. Zelensky noted that “all truly significant issues” were raised at the meeting. In particular, according to him, the parties discussed ways to establish peace in Ukraine and protect Ukrainian citizens from Russian attacks.

    V. Zelensky stressed that Ukraine appreciates the attention of the United States and its readiness to help end the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK partners with Gavi to help save up to eight million lives by 2030

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Press release

    UK partners with Gavi to help save up to eight million lives by 2030

    New UK support will see millions of children vaccinated against some of the world’s deadliest diseases, Foreign Secretary David Lammy announced today at Gavi’s global summit in Brussels.

    • The UK will support Gavi as a leading investor in the Vaccine Alliance, committing £1.25 billion to vaccinate millions of children between 2026-2030.
    • The commitment will help Gavi protect up to 500 million children from some of the world’s deadliest diseases like meningitis, cholera and measles.
    • Gavi’s global vaccination work prevents the spread of dangerous infectious diseases while boosting investment and jobs in UK science as part of the Government’s Plan for Change.

    New UK support will see millions of children vaccinated against some of the world’s deadliest diseases, Foreign Secretary David Lammy announced today at Gavi’s global summit in Brussels.

    The UK’s new £1.25 billion pledge to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, extends a close 25-year partnership which has helped to vaccinate over one billion children globally against diseases like meningitis, to prevent more than 18 million lives being lost, and to improve countries economic prospects. Since 2000, when the UK was a founding member, Gavi has generated $250 billion in economic benefits through reduced death and disability. Gavi now receives investment from 56 countries and over 60 organisations. 19 countries have graduated from Gavi support, including India and Indonesia who have now become donors to Gavi.

    Today’s pledge will help Gavi in their mission to protect up to 500 million children between 2026-2030 and save up to eight million more lives.

    It will also have a positive impact at home, creating British jobs and growth, through partnerships with health companies like GSK, which employs about 14,000 people in the UK, as the government delivers on its Plan for Change to boost economic growth.

    Gavi helps strengthen the UK’s health security by preventing the spread of dangerous infectious diseases before they reach our borders. This reduces pressures on our hospitals and health workers, enabling an NHS fit for the future.

    UK Foreign Secretary, David Lammy said:

    Gavi’s global impact is undeniable. Over 1 billion children vaccinated, over 18 million lives saved, over $250 billion injected into the global economy.

    I’m immensely proud of the role the UK has played in reaching these milestones. Our ongoing partnership with Gavi will give millions of children a better start, save lives and protect us all from the spread of deadly diseases.

    GSK is a leading supplier to Gavi, providing vaccines for diseases like malaria and human papillomavirus (HPV). Their partnership supports UK research, science and innovation.

    Earlier this week, Minister for Development Baroness Chapman visited GSK’s research campus in Stevenage, alongside the Gavi CEO, Dr Sania Nishtar and and GSK’s President of Global Health, Deborah Waterhouse. Together they discussed some of the world-leading research being conducted by British scientists, including on new malaria and TB vaccines.

    UK Minister for Development, Jenny Chapman said:

    Our modern approach to development means focussing on where we can have the biggest impact, and on areas the UK can lead. We must ensure every pound delivers for the UK taxpayer and the people we support.

    Our partnership with Gavi does just that. It will save the lives of millions of children around the world, to grow up safe from deadly diseases like cholera and measles. And it will make the world and the UK healthier and safer, helping prevent future pandemics.

    It is partnership based on the UK’s world-leading expertise, not just money. By rolling out vaccines developed by British scientists, Gavi puts our best brains and their innovations on the world stage, and supports UK jobs and growth.

    CEO of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Dr Sania Nishtar said:

    The United Kingdom is one of Gavi’s longest and most committed partners. This pledge for our next strategic period reaffirms its status as a leader in global health and I am delighted that we will be able to count on its support in our next strategic period, working together and leveraging some of the best in British science and innovation as we save lives and fight outbreaks around the world.

    President Global Health at GSK, Deborah Waterhouse said:

    The UK’s world-class infectious disease research continues to inform our work at GSK and combined with our scientific expertise, is enabling GSK to advance malaria prevention and control, directly impacting global health agendas and access strategies.

    As a longstanding partner of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance – an organisation that plays a vital role in delivering vaccines to children in lower-income countries – we welcome the UK Government’s new pledge to Gavi, to help save up to eight million lives by 2030 and get ahead of disease together.

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Email the FCDO Newsdesk (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

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    Published 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Man convicted of manslaughter in Charlton

    Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police

    A man has been convicted of the manslaughter of another man in Charlton, following an investigation by the Metropolitan Police Service.

    On Wednesday, 25 June 2025 a jury at Isleworth Crown Court convicted Radoslaw Brzezicki, 42 (28.06.1982), of Erwood Road, Charlton, of the manslaughter of Robert Dlugosz, 60, on Wednesday, 22 November, 2023.

    The victim was attacked at his own home in Erwood Road, Charlton, following an argument. A woman was also physically assaulted, with Brzezicki convicted of causing actual bodily harm to her.

    The first responding officer on the scene was one of the last people to speak to Robert while he was still alive. Using a translation app, he was able to obtain an account which proved crucial in this case.

    Detective Chief Inspector Samantha Townsend, from Specialist Crime South, and who led the investigation said: “Robert died in appalling circumstances, having been brutally assaulted by someone who claimed to be his friend.

    “Due to the first-hand account Robert was able to give officers – while critically injured – justice has been done.

    “I would also like to pay tribute to the surviving victim in this case. Her assistance to the police from day one was vital.

    “She showed great courage and determination throughout what has no doubt been a very traumatic time.

    “My thoughts and that of my officers, remain with all Robert’s friends and loved ones.”

    On Wednesday, 22 November, 2023, a woman in her 40s called police, saying she had escaped from a house in Erwood Road, Charlton, after being assaulted there alongside her friend, Robert Dlugosz. Officers attended and went to Robert’s aid, who was still alive but severely injured.

    Using a translation app, an officer was able to obtain a brief account from the victim, a Polish speaker. He said he had been beaten, and identified Radoslaw Brzezicki as the assailant.

    Shortly after giving this account, he collapsed. Paramedics attended, and he was taken to hospital. Despite undergoing emergency surgery, Robert sadly died on Saturday, 25 November. A post-mortem examination found cause of death was due to a traumatic brain injury.

    The account provided by Robert before he died was corroborated by the female victim at the scene. The woman managed to escape the property and told a neighbour about the attack.

    Brzezicki was arrested shortly after Robert collapsed.

    He will be sentenced on Thursday, 24 July.

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Learning German has many benefits for young people – and it’s not as hard as its reputation suggests

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sascha Stollhans, Professor of Language Education and Linguistics, University of Leeds

    Marienplatz, Munich. frantic00/Shutterstock

    As the government is exploring a new EU youth mobility scheme and working towards a renewed association with the Erasmus+ programme, a world of opportunity may be opening up once again for young people in the UK. Studying or working abroad is not just an enriching experience – it’s a powerful step towards building intercultural competence and a successful career in today’s globalised world.

    The German-speaking countries are among Europe’s most influential cultural and political forces and have therefore been an attractive destination for young Brits. And learning German could be the gateway to a period of cultural immersion.

    Learning a language has many professional, cultural and intellectual benefits. With almost 100 million first-language speakers across several countries, German is one of the most widely spoken languages in Europe. Germany is not just Europe’s largest economy but also the third largest economy in the world. Knowing German can give you a competitive edge with employers and even boost your salary prospects.

    More than that, learning a language gives you unique insights into different cultures, societies and perspectives, as new research on learning German that I have carried out with colleagues shows. It helps you look beneath the surface and connect with people on a deeper level.


    No one’s 20s and 30s look the same. You might be saving for a mortgage or just struggling to pay rent. You could be swiping dating apps, or trying to understand childcare. No matter your current challenges, our Quarter Life series has articles to share in the group chat, or just to remind you that you’re not alone.

    Read more from Quarter Life:

    • How to motivate yourself to learn a language

    • Dating someone with a different mother tongue? Learning each other’s language will enrich your relationship

    • Sex Education: a sex therapist’s advice on having a successful long-distance relationship


    Understanding German also enriches your cultural experiences, as you will be able to enjoy German-language literature, philosophy, music, film and TV – all in their original form. Of course it will also be useful if you are planning to travel, study or work in a German-speaking country.

    While there are all these benefits, German is sometimes thought of as a difficult language to learn. However, there are many reasons why it’s not actually as hard as some may think.

    Shared roots with English

    German and English both belong to the Germanic language family and have a shared history. This means that there are many “cognates” (words that are historically related and therefore similar). These are often easy to guess for English speakers, particularly once you are familiar with some of the patterns.

    Can you read it?
    travelview/Shutterstock

    You can probably work out what the German words “Apfel” and “Pfeffer” mean (apple and pepper). In cognates, German pf and ff often correspond to a p sound in English. Some knowledge of the history of languages can help learners spot (and explain) these patterns and identify cognates more easily. This is one of the many reasons why my colleagues and I have been arguing that all language learners should be introduced to some basics of linguistics, the scientific study of language.

    It gets easier

    German grammar sometimes has the reputation to be particularly complicated. It can’t be denied that it can be challenging at times, and unfamiliar grammatical concepts in any language can take a while to get your head around.

    The interesting thing about German grammar is that it is quite “frontloaded”. This means that learners will encounter many of those challenging new concepts – such as grammatical gender, cases and some specific word order rules – right at the beginning. You need to understand these basics to a certain extent to be able to produce even quite simple sentences.

    It is worth persevering, though, as German grammar gets easier further down the line. German tenses, for example, are quite straightforward. Whereas in English we differentiate between “she read”, “she has read”, and “she was reading”. There is only one form to learn in German: “sie hat gelesen”.

    Similarly, when it comes to pronunciation, there are some sounds in German that will be unfamiliar to English speakers to start with, such as the “umlaute” ä, ö and ü, and the ways in which ch and r are pronounced. It takes some practice to master these. However, the correspondence between spelling and pronunciation is much more predictable and consistent in German than it is in English.

    Take, for example, the different ways to pronounce -ough in the words “through”, “thorough” and “tough”. Such examples can be really challenging for learners of English. You won’t find such tricky differences in German.

    German has a word for it

    German is famous for its long words. These often consist of two or more words joined together to create a new compound word. While compounds are fascinating in themselves, they also tend to be very descriptive, which can be helpful for language learners.

    For example, if you know the words for “sick” (“krank”) and “house” (“Haus”), you basically know the word for “hospital” too (and you can definitely guess its meaning when you encounter it): “Krankenhaus”. And could you work out that “Spielzeug” (literally “play stuff”) means “toy”?

    Learning a language is never without its difficulties, and German is no exception. However, my experience of teaching German at British universities has shown me that German is much more accessible to English speakers than some might think.

    Many people enjoy the intellectual challenge of learning a new language and find it a highly rewarding experience, and it may be a gateway to some time spent in a German-speaking country. So give it a go, and don’t let the thought of learning German cause you any angst!

    Sascha Stollhans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Learning German has many benefits for young people – and it’s not as hard as its reputation suggests – https://theconversation.com/learning-german-has-many-benefits-for-young-people-and-its-not-as-hard-as-its-reputation-suggests-253263

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: Our Common Future: Worth the Investment | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (video statements)

    What are the best investments humanity can make? As delegates prepare to gather for the Fourth World Conference on Financing for Development in Sevilla, Spain, Mariangela Parra-Lancourt explains that what’s good for the individual can advance society as a whole. Drawing on her expertise as Chief of the UN’s Strategic Engagement and Policy Integration Branch in the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, she shows how this works.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZGPM0qJ6l0

    MIL OSI Video –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Strengthening Communication for Better Food Safety in Senegal

    The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in collaboration with the Association of Journalists in Health, Population and Development (AJSPD), organized a five‑day capacity‑building workshop in Thiès (June 16–20, 2025) to train Senegalese media professionals on food safety issues. The training aimed to deepen their understanding of the key challenges, legal frameworks, technical tools, and best practices related to food safety.

    In her opening remarks, Mrs Bintia Stephen‑Tchicaya, FAO’s Acting Sub‑Regional Coordinator for West Africa, complimented AJSPD for its outstanding work in health and development journalism. “You are essential actors in building a culture of prevention and responsibility around food safety. Through your investigations, reports, and columns, you can shift mindsets, influence behaviors, and hold decision makers to account. We count on your renewed commitment to consistently include food safety in your reporting,” she said.

    Food safety remains a major challenge across Africa. According to a 2015 WHO estimation, more than 91 million people in Africa fall ill annually from foodborne illnesses, resulting in around 137 000 deaths. These alarming figures highlight the urgent need to raise public awareness and influence policymakers, professionals, and consumers alike.

    Professor Amadou Diop, Chair of the National Codex Committee in Senegal, reminded participants that the Codex Alimentarius – fully endorsed by Senegal – sets rigorous, science‑based international food safety standards. “These standards only have impact,” he said, “if they are understood, communicated, and applied – especially by media professionals. Journalists are not only messengers but educators, preventers, and mobilizers who can translate complex scientific data into accessible, actionable messages.”

    The workshop featured theoretical lectures, panel discussions, case studies, and practical field work. Journalists visited Thiès’s main transport hub to assess street food safety issues firsthand. Captain Armand Seck of the Thiès hygiene brigade reported numerous violations: cramped stalls, poor ventilation, inadequate lighting, and makeshift food stands under tarpaulins.

    Recognizing the lack of formal training among journalists on food safety, the program covered legal frameworks, international standards like Codex, microbiological, physical, and chemical hazards, surveillance systems, and safe handling practices for food preparation and sale.

    Participants proposed several recommendations to improve communication, awareness, and advocacy: fostering stronger collaboration between media, health authorities, and partners; organizing regular specialized training; publicizing safe food-handling practices; educating policymakers including parliamentarians; and creating regional professional networks.

    This workshop marks an important milestone in promoting quality information on food safety to benefit consumers in Senegal and across West Africa. It is part of the project “Strengthening capacity to respond to food safety emergencies and improving street food quality in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal,” funded by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, with the goal of enhancing emergency response to food safety threats and improving street food hygiene standards in West Africa.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO): Regional Office for Africa.

    MIL OSI Africa –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: MOFA response to UK naval vessel transiting Taiwan Strait

    Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    MOFA response to UK naval vessel transiting Taiwan Strait

    • Date:2025-06-19
    • Data Source:Department of European Affairs

    June 19, 2025  

    On June 18, the UK Royal Navy patrol vessel HMS Spey transited the Taiwan Strait. Through this concrete action, the United Kingdom further defended freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait and demonstrated its firm position that the strait constitutes international waters. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomes and affirms the transit.

     

    MOFA continues to encourage the United Kingdom and other like-minded countries to jointly safeguard cross-strait peace and stability, promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and maintain the rules-based international order. 

    MIL OSI China News –

    June 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Global Nuclear Emergency Exercise Concludes, Testing International Response in Simulated Reactor Accident

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    During the ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise, one of the response measures includes aerial monitoring of the environment. (Photo: J. Jin)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in collaboration with over 75 countries and 10 international organizations, successfully concluded a 36-hour simulation that tested global readiness and response mechanisms to a severe nuclear emergency scenario at Romania’s Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant. The ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise began on 24 June and concluded today, 25 June, at about 17:45 CEST.

    Such exercises are held every three to five years and are based on simulated events hosted by IAEA Member States.

    The exercise simulated a significant release of radioactive material, prompting participating nations and organizations to engage in real-time decision-making, information exchange, public communication and coordination of protective actions, including medical response and cross-border logistics.

    “The ConvEx-3 (2025) demonstrated the strength of international cooperation in nuclear emergency preparedness,” said Carlos Torres Vidal, Director of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre. “By working together in realistic scenarios, we enhance our collective ability to protect people and the environment.”

    Key innovations in this year’s exercise included:

    • Enhanced regional collaboration: Recognizing the transboundary impact of severe nuclear accidents, neighbouring countries Bulgaria and the Republic of Moldova coordinated protective measures to ensure harmonized responses across borders.
    • Integration of nuclear security scenarios: The simulation incorporated physical protection challenges and cyber security threats, reflecting evolving risks.
    • Advanced crisis communication testing: An expanded social media simulator was utilized to assess and improve public information strategies.
    • Deployment of international assistance missions: Expert teams from Bulgaria, Canada, France, Lithuania, Moldova, Sweden and the United States of America conducted joint operations, including aerial and land-based radiation monitoring, under the IAEA’s Response and Assistance Network (RANET).

    The exercise emphasized the importance of timely information sharing, accurate assessment and prognosis, and effective public communication during nuclear emergencies.

    ConvEx-3 exercises are conducted every three to five years to evaluate and strengthen the emergency response frameworks established under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

    In the coming weeks, the IAEA will compile feedback from all participants to identify best practices and areas for improvement, contributing to the continuous enhancement of global nuclear emergency preparedness. The final report will guide preparations for the upcoming International Conference on Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies (EPR 2025) to be held this December in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

    Photos from ConvEx-3 are available here.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    June 26, 2025
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