Category: European Union

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Fairness and Child Poverty Update

    Source: Scotland – City of Dundee

    Grassroots examples of how Dundee City Council and partners are tackling fairness and child poverty issues are to be showcased to councillors.

    The frontline actions are contained in a new report which highlights the scale of the task faced by local agencies during the continuing cost of living crisis.

    While Dundee is setting itself the ambitious goal of matching the Scottish Government’s overall national target of reducing child poverty to less than 10% of children living in relative poverty, latest figures show a rate of 26.1 % for the city.

    A combined Fairness and Local Child Poverty Action Plan Report for 2024/25 is to go before the City Governance committee at its next meeting on Monday June 23. The document sets out how the council and partners will continue to work together to improve the situation for families and communities across Dundee.

    It also takes on board the latest recommendations of the Dundee Fairness Leadership Panel, which is looking to prioritise efforts around mental health and isolation, fair housing and support to third sector projects offering crisis assistance to tackle poverty.

    In the report, areas of improvement over the last year are highlighted.

    These include:  

    • The number of council and registered social landlord housing completions (increased by 29.2%).
    • percentage point gap in literacy in p1-p7 between pupils living in SIMD 1 areas and SIMD 5 areas (decreased by 16.6%)
    • number of children living in temporary accommodation (decreased by 13.4%) 

    Within the report, a number of case studies are used to illustrate the efforts that are ongoing throughout the city. These are grouped under themes and some of the projects listed include:

    Social Inclusion and Stigma

    Strengthening family support through volunteering – DVVA Programme

    Promoting community-led suicide prevention – Dundee Creating Hope Awards Pilot

    Work and Wages  

    Supporting young people into employment – Employability Pathfinder (LFI Linlathen)

    Safe Housing Enabling Employment – Housing & Communities Team

    Benefits and Advice

    Preventing housing insecurity through school-based advice

    Securing backdated benefits for an older resident

    Attainment and Child Poverty

    Tackling poverty and increasing attainment in Longhaugh and St Francis’ Primary Schools

    Closing the attainment gap through the Strategic Equity Fund

    Health Inequalities

    Promoting wellbeing and resilience in schools – S2 Health & Wellbeing Group

    Supporting mental health through community-led events – Hilltown Community

    Housing and Communities

    Adapting homes for children with disabilities

    Providing coordinated housing and community support

    Committee depute convener Councillor Willie Sawers said: “The voices of communities with experience continue to be listened to as they are a vital help to us to develop responses to inequalities and poverty.

    “Statistics concerning child poverty in Dundee are stark, that is why we committed to doing as much as we can to turn this around.

    “I am heartened by the strong partnerships that exist between Dundee organisations and agencies across the public, private and third sectors and the ongoing desire to work together to transform life for people in the city.” 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Algernon Yau begins visit to France

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    In an effort to promote Hong Kong’s unique advantages and vast opportunities for businesses in France, Secretary for Commerce & Economic Development Algernon began his visit to the country yesterday by touring a global aeronautic services company in Toulouse.

     

    Mr Yau met Elior Group SA Group Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Daniel Derichebourg to learn about the company’s latest developments.

     

    They also exchanged views on promoting closer business collaboration between Hong Kong and France.

     

    With the assistance of Invest Hong Kong, Elior Group SA has recently set up an Asian headquarters and expanded its presence in Hong Kong.

     

    Earlier this year, the company signed a memorandum of understanding with the Airport Authority to explore the possibility of providing professional services such as aircraft dismantling, parts recycling and related training in Hong Kong, thereby helping Hong Kong develop into the first aircraft parts processing and trading centre in Asia.

     

    Mr Yau pointed out that Hong Kong and France have long-standing business relations and many companies in Hong Kong with parent companies located in France are internationally renowned enterprises.

     

    He added that with the distinct advantages under “one country, two systems”, Hong Kong is the premier destination for enterprises around the globe to set up or expand their businesses.

     

    The commerce chief also highlighted that he believes the co-operation between the company and various stakeholders in Hong Kong will help unleash market potential and create new opportunities, leveraging Hong Kong’s advantages as a business and investment hub, and its role as a springboard to the Mainland, markets in Asia and beyond.

     

    Furthermore, Mr Yau toured the Derichebourg Aeronautics Training Center and the Airbus assembly lines respectively to learn about the latest advancements in related aeronautic training, aircraft manufacturing and sustainable aviation development.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • Indian animated film Desi Oon wins Jury Prize at Annecy, shines on global stage

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Indian animated film Desi Oon has won the prestigious Jury Award for Best Commissioned Film at the Annecy International Animation Festival 2025 in France. The festival is widely considered the world’s foremost event for animation.

    Directed by celebrated animator Suresh Eriyat, Desi Oon has garnered multiple accolades across both national and international platforms. It recently bagged the Best Film award at the WAVES Awards of Excellence 2025 and was one of the top entries in the Create in India Challenge, an initiative by the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting (I&B) under the WAVES 2025 summit.

    The Create in India Challenge attracted entries from more than 60 countries across 32 themed challenges, showcasing stories deeply rooted in Indian culture while leveraging cutting-edge animation technology. Over 750 finalists were featured at Creatosphere, a curated platform during WAVES 2025 held at the Jio World Convention Centre in Mumbai from May 1–4.

    Desi Oon has also been shortlisted in the Film Craft Lions category at Cannes Lions 2025, further cementing its global acclaim. Among its growing list of recognitions are wins at the AICP Show 2025, with the film now archived at New York’s Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), as well as two Golds at Good Ads Matter 2025, multiple trophies at the Kyoorius Creative Awards, and a coveted D&AD Wooden Pencil for design excellence.

    Calling Desi Oon a “cultural milestone,” Anubhav Singh, the Ministry official overseeing the Create in India Challenge, said: “The Government of India remains committed to nurturing the AVGC-XR sector and positioning India as a global content creation powerhouse.”

    Sanjay Khimesara, President of ASIFA India, a non-profit promoting the art of animation, VFX, and gaming, added:

    “This win is not just Suresh Eriyat’s; it is India’s. Desi Oon reflects the soul of India in a frame-by-frame journey that blends humour, emotion, and artistry. It inspires a new generation of Indian creators to think big, stay rooted, and aim global.”

    Organised by the Ministry of I&B in collaboration with ASIFA India, the WAVES Awards celebrate excellence in animation, VFX, and emerging media.

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Change of His Majesty’s Ambassador to Hungary: Justin McKenzie Smith

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Change of His Majesty’s Ambassador to Hungary: Justin McKenzie Smith

    Mr Justin McKenzie Smith has been appointed His Majesty’s Ambassador to Hungary in succession to Mr Paul Fox, who will be retiring from the Diplomatic Service. Mr McKenzie Smith will take up his appointment during October 2025.

    Justin McKenzie Smith

    Curriculum vitae           

    Full name: Justin James McKenzie Smith

    Date Role
    2024 to present Language training (Hungarian)
    2021 to 2024 FCDO, Head, Central Asia & Eastern Neighbourhood Department
    2020 to 2021 Scottish Government (on secondment)
    2016 to 2020 Tbilisi, Her Majesty’s Ambassador
    2015 to 2016 Language training (Georgian)
    2011 to 2015 Mexico City, Director, Trade & Investment and Deputy Head of Mission
    2011 Language training (Spanish)
    2008 to 2011 FCO, Deputy Director/Director (acting), Eastern Europe & Central Asia Directorate
    2004 to 2008 New York, First Secretary, UK Mission to the United Nations
    2002 to 2004 FCO, Ministerial Press Officer
    1999 to 2002 FCO, Head, Europe Section, Human Rights Policy Department
    1996 to 1999 Moscow, Second Secretary
    1995 to 1996 Language training (Russian)
    1994 to 1995 FCO, European Union Department
    1994 Joined FCO

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Email the FCDO Newsdesk (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Coventry celebrates Armed Forces Day 2025

    Source: City of Coventry

    All are invited to the Service of Thanksgiving in Holy Trinity Church at 10.30am which is then followed by a parade leading into Broadgate where the city says thank you to those who serve and their families, veterans and cadets.

    Following the church service the parade will be led by the 13th Coventry Scout Band and commences from the side of Holy Trinity Church at 11.30am, goes into Cuckoo Lane, Pepper Lane, High Street and then into Broadgate where there will be a civic salute from the presentation stage.

    Broadgate will also play host to a number of organisations showcasing their support and raising awareness of their services in support of the city’s armed forces.

    People are invited to come along and show the armed forces the city’s support and pay tribute to all the brave service personnel and their families.

    The Lord Mayor of the City of Coventry, Cllr Rachel Lancaster said, “I am very proud to be part of Armed Forces Day and to be able to join with the residents of the city to say thank you to our service women and men.”  

    “In these times of conflict, it’s a chance to show how grateful we are to all those who have served, are serving and the families that support them, and the support we receive from the armed services in the city’s work for peace.”

    On the day, the Armed Forces Day flag will be raised on buildings and famous landmarks around the country, including Coventry’s Council House.

    David Fellows, Chair of the Coventry branch of the Royal Naval Association said, “Armed Forces Day is not only an opportunity to show support for our Forces but also show we have respect for those who are charged with the protection of our beliefs and values.” 

    “The Armed Services are on call 24/7, 365 days a year, they respond to natural disasters, take part in Air/Sea rescues, work in the NHS alongside doctors and nurses and are always there to step up when needed. “

    “Armed Forces Reserves, who work in all walks of life, are also ready to act when needed.”

    Coventry is a member of the Armed Forces Covenant which is a promise to look after current and former service personnel and their families.

    Find out more about the national day, events and how to get involved.

    Details of Coventry’s Armed Forces Day.

    Visit the RNA website.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Open letters between HM Treasury and Bank of England, June 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Correspondence

    Open letters between HM Treasury and Bank of England, June 2025

    CPI inflation was 3.5% in April 2025, prompting an open letter from the Governor of the Bank of England to the Chancellor on 19 June 2025. The Chancellor replied to the Governor on 19 June 2025.

    Documents

    Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Governor of the Bank of England (19/06/2025)

    Request an accessible format.
    If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need a version of this document in a more accessible format, please email digital.communications@hmtreasury.gov.uk. Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use.

    Letter from the Governor of the Bank of England to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (19/06/2025)

    Request an accessible format.
    If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need a version of this document in a more accessible format, please email digital.communications@hmtreasury.gov.uk. Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use.

    Details

    The remit for the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) requires an exchange of open letters between the Governor of the Bank of England and the Chancellor of the Exchequer if inflation moves away from the target by more than 1 percentage point in either direction.

    Updates to this page

    Published 19 June 2025

    Sign up for emails or print this page

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-Evening Report: A war on diplomacy itself – Israel’s unprovoked attack on Iran

    ANALYSIS: By Joe Hendren

    Had Israel not launched its unprovoked attack on Iran on Friday night, in direct violation of the UN Charter, Iran would now be taking part in the sixth round of negotiations concerning the future of its nuclear programme, meeting with representatives from the United States in Muscat, the capital of Oman.

    Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu claimed he acted to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb, saying Iran had the capacity to build nine nuclear weapons. Israel provided no evidence to back up its claims.

    On 25 March 2025, Trump’s own National Director of Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard said: 

    “The IC [Intelligence Community] continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorised the nuclear weapons programme he suspended in 2003. The IC is monitoring if Tehran decides to reauthorise its nuclear weapons programme”

    Even if Iran had the capability to build a bomb, it is quite another thing to have the will to do so.

    Any such bomb would need to be tested first, and any such test would be quickly detected by a series of satellites on the lookout for nuclear detonations anywhere on the planet.

    It is more likely that Israel launched its attack to stop US and Iranian negotiators from meeting on Sunday.

    Only a month ago, Iran’s lead negotiator in the nuclear talks, Ali Shamkhani, told US television that Iran was ready to do a deal. NBC journalist Richard Engel reports:

    “Shamkhani said Iran is willing to commit to never having a nuclear weapon, to get rid of its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, to only enrich to a level needed for civilian use and to allow inspectors in to oversee it all, in exchange for lifting all sanctions immediately. He said Iran would accept that deal tonight.”

    Inside Iran as Trump presses for nuclear deal.   Video: NBC News

    Shamkhani died on Saturday, following injuries he suffered during Israel’s attack on Friday night. It appears that Israel not only opposed a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear impasse: Israel killed it directly.

    A spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Esmaeil Baghaei, told a news conference in Tehran the talks would be suspended until Israel halts its attacks:

    “It is obvious that in such circumstances and until the Zionist regime’s aggression against the Iranian nation stops, it would be meaningless to participate with the party that is the biggest supporter and accomplice of the aggressor.”

    On 1 April 2024, Israel launched an airstrike on Iran’s embassy in Syria, killing 16 people, including a woman and her son. The attack violated international norms regarding the protection of diplomatic premises under the Vienna Convention.

    Yet the UK, USA and France blocked a United Nations Security Council statement condemning Israel’s actions.

    It is worth noting how the The New York Times described the occupation of the US Embassy in November 1979:

    “But it is the Ayatollah himself who is doing the devil’s work by inciting and condoning the student invasion of the American and British Embassies in Tehran. This is not just a diplomatic affront; it is a declaration of war on diplomacy itself, on usages and traditions honoured by all nations, however old and new, whatever belief.

    “The immunities given a ruler’s emissaries were respected by the kings of Persia during wars with Greece and by the Ayatollah’s spiritual ancestors during the Crusades.”

    Now it is Israel conducting a “war on diplomacy itself”, first with the attack on the embassy, followed by Friday’s surprise attack on Iran. Scuppering a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue appears to be the aim. To make matters worse, Israel’s recklessness could yet cause a major war.

    Trump: Inconsistent and ineffective
    In an interview with Time magazine on 22 April 2025, Trump denied he had stopped Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear sites.

    “No, it’s not right. I didn’t stop them. But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, because I think we can make a deal without the attack. I hope we can. It’s possible we’ll have to attack because Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.

    “But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, but I didn’t say no. Ultimately I was going to leave that choice to them, but I said I would much prefer a deal than bombs being dropped.”

    — US President Donald Trump

    In the same interview Trump boasted “I think we’re going to make a deal with Iran. Nobody else could do that.” Except, someone else had already done that — only for Trump to abandon the deal in his first term as president.

    In July 2015 Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) alongside the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union. Iran pledged to curb its nuclear programme for 10-15 years in exchange for the removal of some economic sanctions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also gained access and verification powers.

    Iran also agreed to limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent U-235, allowing it to maintain its nuclear power reactors.

    Despite clear signs the nuclear deal was working, Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and reinstated sanctions on Iran in November 2018. Despite the unilateral American action, Iran kept to the deal for a time, but in January 2020 Iran declared it would no longer abide by the limitations included in JCPOA but would continue to work with the IAEA.

    By pulling out of the deal and reinstating sanctions, the US and Israel effectively created a strong incentive for Iran to resume enriching uranium to higher levels, not for the sake of making a bomb, but as the most obvious means of creating leverage to remove the sanctions.

    As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Iran is allowed to enrich uranium for civilian fuel programmes.

    Iran’s nuclear programme began in the 1960s with US assistance. Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran was ruled by the brutal dictatorship of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahavi.

    American corporations saw Iran as a potential market for expansion. During the 1970s the US suggested to the Shah he needed not one but several nuclear reactors to meet Iran’s future electricity needs. In June 1974, the Shah declared that Iran would have nuclear weapons, “without a doubt and sooner than one would think”.

    In 2007, I wrote an article for Peace Researcher where I examined US claims that Iran does not need nuclear power because it is sitting on one of the largest gas supplies in the world. One of the most interesting things I discovered while researching the article was the relevance of air pollution, a critical public health concern in Iran.

    In 2024, health officials estimated that air pollution is responsible for 40,000 deaths a year in Iran. Deputy Health Minister Alireza Raisi said the “majority of these deaths were due to cardiovascular diseases, strokes, respiratory issues, and cancers”.

    Sahimi describes levels of air pollution in Tehran and other major Iranian cities as “catastrophic”, with elementary schools having to close on some days as a result. There was little media coverage of the air pollution issue in relation to Iran’s energy mix then, and I have seen hardly any since.

    An energy research project, Advanced Energy Technologies provides a useful summary of electricity production in Iran as it stood in 2023.

    Iranian electricity production in 2023. Source: Advanced Energy Technologies

    With around 94.6 percent of electricity generation dependent on fossil fuels, there are serious environmental reasons why Iran should not be encouraged to depend on oil and gas for its electricity needs — not to mention the prospect of climate change.

    One could also question the safety of nuclear power in one of the most seismically active countries in the world, however it would be fair to ask the same question of countries like Japan, which aims to increase its use of nuclear power to about 20 percent of the country’s total electricity generation by 2040, despite the 2011 Fukushima disaster.

    Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran’s uranium enrichment programme “must continue”, but the “scope and level may change”. Prior to the talks in Oman, Araghchi highlighted the “constant change” in US positions as a problem.

    Trump’s rhetoric on uranium enrichment has shifted repeatedly.

    He told Meet the Press on May 4 that “total dismantlement” of the nuclear program is “all I would accept.” He suggested that Iran does not need nuclear energy because of its oil reserves. But on May 7, when asked specifically about allowing Iran to retain a limited enrichment program, Trump said “we haven’t made that decision yet.”

    Ali Shamkhani, an adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in a May 14 interview with NBC that Iran is ready to sign a deal with the United States and reiterated that Iran is willing to limit uranium enrichment to low levels. He previously suggested in a May 7 post on X that any deal should include a “recognition of Iran’s right to industrial enrichment.”

    That recognition, plus the removal of U.S. and international sanctions, “can guarantee a deal,” Shamkhani said.

    So with Iran seemingly willing to accept reasonable conditions, why was a deal not reached last month? It appears the US changed its position, and demanded Iran cease all enrichment of uranium, including what Iran needs for its power stations.

    One wonders if Zionist lobby groups like AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) influenced this decision. One could recall what happened during Benjamin Netanyahu’s first stint as Israel’s Prime Minister (1996-1999) to illustrate the point.

    In April 1995 AIPAC published a report titled ‘Comprehensive US Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action’. In 1997 Mohammad Khatami was elected as President of Iran. The following year Khatami expressed regret for the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 and denounced terrorism against Israelis, while noting that “supporting peoples who fight for their liberation of their land is not, in my opinion, supporting terrorism”.

    The threat of improved relations between Iran and the US sent the Israeli government led by Netanyahu into a panic. The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reported that “Israel has expressed concern to Washington of an impending change of policy by the United States towards Iran” adding that Netanyahu “asked AIPAC . . . to act vigorously in Congress to prevent such a policy shift.”

    20 years ago the Israeli lobby were claiming an Iranian nuclear bomb was imminent. It didn’t happen.

    Netanyahu’s Iran nuclear warnings.   Video: Al Jazeera

    The misguided efforts of Israel and the United States to contain Iran’s use of nuclear technology are not only counterproductive — they risk being a catastrophic failure. If one was going to design a policy to convince Iran nuclear weapons may be needed for its own defence, it is hard to imagine a policy more effective than the one Israel has pursued for the past 30 years.My 2007 Peace Researcher article asked a simple question: ‘Why does Iran want nuclear weapons?’ My introduction could have been written yesterday.


    “With all the talk about Iran and the intentions of its nuclear programme it is a shame the West continues to undermine its own position with selective morality and obvious hypocrisy. It seems amazing there can be so much written about this issue, yet so little addresses the obvious question – ‘for what reasons could Iran want nuclear weapons?’.

    “As Simon Jenkins (2006) points out, the answer is as simple as looking at a map. ‘I would sleep happier if there were no Iranian bomb but a swamp of hypocrisy separates me from overly protesting it. Iran is a proud country that sits between nuclear Pakistan and India to its east, a nuclear Russia to its north and a nuclear Israel to its west. Adjacent Afghanistan and Iraq are occupied at will by a nuclear America, which backed Saddam Hussein in his 1980 invasion of Iran. How can we say such a country has no right’ to nuclear defence?’”

    This week the German Foreign Office reached new heights in hypocrisy with this absurd tweet.

    Iran has no nuclear weapons. Israel does. Iran is a signatory to the NPT. Israel is not. Iran allows IAEA inspections. Israel does not.

    Starting another war will not make us forget, nor forgive what Israel is doing in Gaza.

    From the river to the sea, credibility requires consistency.

    I write about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. I don’t like war very much.

    Joe Hendren writes about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. Republished with his permission. Read this original article on his Substack account with full references.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: A war on diplomacy itself – Israel’s unprovoked attack on Iran

    ANALYSIS: By Joe Hendren

    Had Israel not launched its unprovoked attack on Iran on Friday night, in direct violation of the UN Charter, Iran would now be taking part in the sixth round of negotiations concerning the future of its nuclear programme, meeting with representatives from the United States in Muscat, the capital of Oman.

    Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu claimed he acted to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb, saying Iran had the capacity to build nine nuclear weapons. Israel provided no evidence to back up its claims.

    On 25 March 2025, Trump’s own National Director of Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard said: 

    “The IC [Intelligence Community] continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorised the nuclear weapons programme he suspended in 2003. The IC is monitoring if Tehran decides to reauthorise its nuclear weapons programme”

    Even if Iran had the capability to build a bomb, it is quite another thing to have the will to do so.

    Any such bomb would need to be tested first, and any such test would be quickly detected by a series of satellites on the lookout for nuclear detonations anywhere on the planet.

    It is more likely that Israel launched its attack to stop US and Iranian negotiators from meeting on Sunday.

    Only a month ago, Iran’s lead negotiator in the nuclear talks, Ali Shamkhani, told US television that Iran was ready to do a deal. NBC journalist Richard Engel reports:

    “Shamkhani said Iran is willing to commit to never having a nuclear weapon, to get rid of its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, to only enrich to a level needed for civilian use and to allow inspectors in to oversee it all, in exchange for lifting all sanctions immediately. He said Iran would accept that deal tonight.”

    Inside Iran as Trump presses for nuclear deal.   Video: NBC News

    Shamkhani died on Saturday, following injuries he suffered during Israel’s attack on Friday night. It appears that Israel not only opposed a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear impasse: Israel killed it directly.

    A spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Esmaeil Baghaei, told a news conference in Tehran the talks would be suspended until Israel halts its attacks:

    “It is obvious that in such circumstances and until the Zionist regime’s aggression against the Iranian nation stops, it would be meaningless to participate with the party that is the biggest supporter and accomplice of the aggressor.”

    On 1 April 2024, Israel launched an airstrike on Iran’s embassy in Syria, killing 16 people, including a woman and her son. The attack violated international norms regarding the protection of diplomatic premises under the Vienna Convention.

    Yet the UK, USA and France blocked a United Nations Security Council statement condemning Israel’s actions.

    It is worth noting how the The New York Times described the occupation of the US Embassy in November 1979:

    “But it is the Ayatollah himself who is doing the devil’s work by inciting and condoning the student invasion of the American and British Embassies in Tehran. This is not just a diplomatic affront; it is a declaration of war on diplomacy itself, on usages and traditions honoured by all nations, however old and new, whatever belief.

    “The immunities given a ruler’s emissaries were respected by the kings of Persia during wars with Greece and by the Ayatollah’s spiritual ancestors during the Crusades.”

    Now it is Israel conducting a “war on diplomacy itself”, first with the attack on the embassy, followed by Friday’s surprise attack on Iran. Scuppering a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue appears to be the aim. To make matters worse, Israel’s recklessness could yet cause a major war.

    Trump: Inconsistent and ineffective
    In an interview with Time magazine on 22 April 2025, Trump denied he had stopped Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear sites.

    “No, it’s not right. I didn’t stop them. But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, because I think we can make a deal without the attack. I hope we can. It’s possible we’ll have to attack because Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.

    “But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, but I didn’t say no. Ultimately I was going to leave that choice to them, but I said I would much prefer a deal than bombs being dropped.”

    — US President Donald Trump

    In the same interview Trump boasted “I think we’re going to make a deal with Iran. Nobody else could do that.” Except, someone else had already done that — only for Trump to abandon the deal in his first term as president.

    In July 2015 Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) alongside the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union. Iran pledged to curb its nuclear programme for 10-15 years in exchange for the removal of some economic sanctions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also gained access and verification powers.

    Iran also agreed to limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent U-235, allowing it to maintain its nuclear power reactors.

    Despite clear signs the nuclear deal was working, Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and reinstated sanctions on Iran in November 2018. Despite the unilateral American action, Iran kept to the deal for a time, but in January 2020 Iran declared it would no longer abide by the limitations included in JCPOA but would continue to work with the IAEA.

    By pulling out of the deal and reinstating sanctions, the US and Israel effectively created a strong incentive for Iran to resume enriching uranium to higher levels, not for the sake of making a bomb, but as the most obvious means of creating leverage to remove the sanctions.

    As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Iran is allowed to enrich uranium for civilian fuel programmes.

    Iran’s nuclear programme began in the 1960s with US assistance. Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran was ruled by the brutal dictatorship of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahavi.

    American corporations saw Iran as a potential market for expansion. During the 1970s the US suggested to the Shah he needed not one but several nuclear reactors to meet Iran’s future electricity needs. In June 1974, the Shah declared that Iran would have nuclear weapons, “without a doubt and sooner than one would think”.

    In 2007, I wrote an article for Peace Researcher where I examined US claims that Iran does not need nuclear power because it is sitting on one of the largest gas supplies in the world. One of the most interesting things I discovered while researching the article was the relevance of air pollution, a critical public health concern in Iran.

    In 2024, health officials estimated that air pollution is responsible for 40,000 deaths a year in Iran. Deputy Health Minister Alireza Raisi said the “majority of these deaths were due to cardiovascular diseases, strokes, respiratory issues, and cancers”.

    Sahimi describes levels of air pollution in Tehran and other major Iranian cities as “catastrophic”, with elementary schools having to close on some days as a result. There was little media coverage of the air pollution issue in relation to Iran’s energy mix then, and I have seen hardly any since.

    An energy research project, Advanced Energy Technologies provides a useful summary of electricity production in Iran as it stood in 2023.

    Iranian electricity production in 2023. Source: Advanced Energy Technologies

    With around 94.6 percent of electricity generation dependent on fossil fuels, there are serious environmental reasons why Iran should not be encouraged to depend on oil and gas for its electricity needs — not to mention the prospect of climate change.

    One could also question the safety of nuclear power in one of the most seismically active countries in the world, however it would be fair to ask the same question of countries like Japan, which aims to increase its use of nuclear power to about 20 percent of the country’s total electricity generation by 2040, despite the 2011 Fukushima disaster.

    Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran’s uranium enrichment programme “must continue”, but the “scope and level may change”. Prior to the talks in Oman, Araghchi highlighted the “constant change” in US positions as a problem.

    Trump’s rhetoric on uranium enrichment has shifted repeatedly.

    He told Meet the Press on May 4 that “total dismantlement” of the nuclear program is “all I would accept.” He suggested that Iran does not need nuclear energy because of its oil reserves. But on May 7, when asked specifically about allowing Iran to retain a limited enrichment program, Trump said “we haven’t made that decision yet.”

    Ali Shamkhani, an adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in a May 14 interview with NBC that Iran is ready to sign a deal with the United States and reiterated that Iran is willing to limit uranium enrichment to low levels. He previously suggested in a May 7 post on X that any deal should include a “recognition of Iran’s right to industrial enrichment.”

    That recognition, plus the removal of U.S. and international sanctions, “can guarantee a deal,” Shamkhani said.

    So with Iran seemingly willing to accept reasonable conditions, why was a deal not reached last month? It appears the US changed its position, and demanded Iran cease all enrichment of uranium, including what Iran needs for its power stations.

    One wonders if Zionist lobby groups like AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) influenced this decision. One could recall what happened during Benjamin Netanyahu’s first stint as Israel’s Prime Minister (1996-1999) to illustrate the point.

    In April 1995 AIPAC published a report titled ‘Comprehensive US Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action’. In 1997 Mohammad Khatami was elected as President of Iran. The following year Khatami expressed regret for the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 and denounced terrorism against Israelis, while noting that “supporting peoples who fight for their liberation of their land is not, in my opinion, supporting terrorism”.

    The threat of improved relations between Iran and the US sent the Israeli government led by Netanyahu into a panic. The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reported that “Israel has expressed concern to Washington of an impending change of policy by the United States towards Iran” adding that Netanyahu “asked AIPAC . . . to act vigorously in Congress to prevent such a policy shift.”

    20 years ago the Israeli lobby were claiming an Iranian nuclear bomb was imminent. It didn’t happen.

    Netanyahu’s Iran nuclear warnings.   Video: Al Jazeera

    The misguided efforts of Israel and the United States to contain Iran’s use of nuclear technology are not only counterproductive — they risk being a catastrophic failure. If one was going to design a policy to convince Iran nuclear weapons may be needed for its own defence, it is hard to imagine a policy more effective than the one Israel has pursued for the past 30 years.My 2007 Peace Researcher article asked a simple question: ‘Why does Iran want nuclear weapons?’ My introduction could have been written yesterday.


    “With all the talk about Iran and the intentions of its nuclear programme it is a shame the West continues to undermine its own position with selective morality and obvious hypocrisy. It seems amazing there can be so much written about this issue, yet so little addresses the obvious question – ‘for what reasons could Iran want nuclear weapons?’.

    “As Simon Jenkins (2006) points out, the answer is as simple as looking at a map. ‘I would sleep happier if there were no Iranian bomb but a swamp of hypocrisy separates me from overly protesting it. Iran is a proud country that sits between nuclear Pakistan and India to its east, a nuclear Russia to its north and a nuclear Israel to its west. Adjacent Afghanistan and Iraq are occupied at will by a nuclear America, which backed Saddam Hussein in his 1980 invasion of Iran. How can we say such a country has no right’ to nuclear defence?’”

    This week the German Foreign Office reached new heights in hypocrisy with this absurd tweet.

    Iran has no nuclear weapons. Israel does. Iran is a signatory to the NPT. Israel is not. Iran allows IAEA inspections. Israel does not.

    Starting another war will not make us forget, nor forgive what Israel is doing in Gaza.

    From the river to the sea, credibility requires consistency.

    I write about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. I don’t like war very much.

    Joe Hendren writes about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. Republished with his permission. Read this original article on his Substack account with full references.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Africa: SA sends 10 critically endangered Black rhinos to Mozambique

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Ten additional black rhinos have been successfully translocated from South Africa to Zinave National Park in Mozambique to help secure the first founder population of black rhinos since becoming locally extinct 50 years ago.

    The rhinos, including five males and five females, were donated by South Africa’s provincial conservation entity, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, in collaboration with Mozambique’s National Administration for Conservation Areas (ANAC) and Peace Parks Foundation. 

    The translocation was made possible through funding from the United Kingdom’s People’s Postcode Lottery.

    By reintroducing wildlife to areas where the species once thrived, biodiversity is restored. The preservation of natural ecosystems is one of the most effective tools in mitigating climate change. Through the creation of ecosystem ‘carbon sinks’, these ecosystems can increase global carbon uptake by up to 12 times.

    With 37 rhinos already introduced and thriving, this initiative aims to enhance biodiversity and reinforce the park as Mozambique’s only ‘big five’ national park, setting a new standard for wildlife conservation and ecological restoration.

    Peace Parks Foundation approached Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife for a donation of black rhinos to boost the numbers to form a viable breeding population of black rhinos in Mozambique. 

    An agreement was reached on the ten rhinos sourced from Ithala Game Reserve and Ezemvelo’s three Black Rhino Range Expansion Project. The rhinos were initially relocated to Hluhluwe iMfolozi Park, where they were housed in specially prepared holding facilities in preparation for the 48-hour journey to Zinave.

    Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, Dr Dion George, described this as a significant conservation success.

    Goerge commended the Government of Mozambique and its co-management partner, Peace Parks Foundation, on achieving this important milestone, noting that establishing new founder populations is one of many critical interventions to secure the future of these species.

    “South Africa’s successes in rhino conservation and the implementation of anti-poaching and anti-trafficking efforts have stabilised its rhino populations, thereby placing the country in a position as a source of rhino for range States in Africa which have either lost many or all of their rhino and wish to re-establish populations or augment current populations, as is the case with this translocation. 

    “The export and import of these valuable black rhinos have been done in compliance with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora’s legislation of both countries,” the Minister said on Wednesday.

    To ensure successful translocation and compliance with all the required permits, the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment Management Inspectors (EMIs), together with officials from Border Management Authority (BMA), played a crucial role during the loading and endorsement of Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) permits at the ports of exit. 

    During the loading this week, the departmental EMIs ensured that all the allocated microchip numbers, as prescribed in the CITES permits, correspond with those inserted in the live rhino.

    The first rhinos were successfully translocated from South Africa to Zinave National Park in 2022, in the longest road transfer of rhinos ever undertaken. 

    This initiative, the result of a partnership between Mozambique’s National Administration for Conservation Areas (ANAC) and Peace Parks Foundation, marked the beginning of Mozambique’s efforts to rebuild founder white and black rhino populations as part of a national conservation initiative to reintroduce rhinos in the country. 

    In 2023, Peace Parks received a funding award of £800,000, raised by players of the UK People’s Postcode Lottery towards the translocation of ten more black rhinos to Zinave, which enabled this critical next phase in rhino rewilding.

    “Supporting the rewilding of critically endangered species like the black rhino is at the heart of what we believe in — creating lasting impact for people and planet. I am delighted that players of People’s Postcode Lottery have been able to support Peace Parks Foundation. 

    “This historic translocation to Zinave National Park simply wouldn’t have happened without player-raised funding. It’s a powerful example of what we can achieve when we come together across borders to restore nature and protect our shared future,” Managing Director of UK People’s Postcode Lottery Clara Govier said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Supply of Veterinary Medicines to Northern Ireland from 1 January 2026

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Supply of Veterinary Medicines to Northern Ireland from 1 January 2026

    New rules governing the distribution of veterinary medicines in Northern Ireland will apply from 1 January 2026.

    On 19 June 2025, the Government published its paper ‘Protecting Animal Health: The Government’s Approach to Veterinary Medicines in Northern Ireland’.

    This paper sets out important information for Marketing Authorisation Holders, Wholesale Dealers and Retailers and reports on the progress in safeguarding the ongoing supply of veterinary medicines in Northern Ireland, and the steps that the Government will take to support this.

    The following guidance accompanies the Paper and provides further technical guidance which can be found on the VMD Information Hub – GOV.UK:

    • Supplying veterinary medicines to Northern Ireland from 2026 – Guidance for Marketing Authorisation holders
    • Supplying veterinary medicines to Northern Ireland from 2026 – Guidance for Wholesalers / Retailers
    • Supplying veterinary medicines to Northern Ireland from 2026 –  Veterinary Medicine Health Situation Scheme – Guidance
    • Supplying veterinary medicines to Northern Ireland from 2026 – Veterinary Medicines Internal Market Scheme guidance

    Please direct any queries to windsorframework@vmd.gov.uk

    Updates to this page

    Published 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: SCED begins visit to France to promote Hong Kong’s unique advantages as business and investment hub (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         The Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development, Mr Algernon Yau, began his visit to France on June 18 (France time) to promote Hong Kong’s unique advantages and vast opportunities for businesses.
     
         Mr Yau first visited Toulouse and met with the Group Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Elior Group SA, Mr Daniel Derichebourg, to learn about the company’s latest developments and exchange views on promoting closer business collaboration between Hong Kong and France. Elior Group SA is a global aeronautic services company, which is part of Derichebourg SA, a leading business in Europe.
     
         With the assistance of Invest Hong Kong, Elior Group SA has recently set up an Asian headquarters and expanded its presence in Hong Kong. The company early this year signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Airport Authority Hong Kong to explore the possibility of providing professional services such as aircraft dismantling, parts recycling and related training in Hong Kong, thereby helping Hong Kong develop into the first aircraft parts processing and trading centre in Asia.
      
         Mr Yau said that Hong Kong and France have long-standing business relations and many companies in Hong Kong with parent companies located in France are internationally renowned enterprises. With the distinct advantages under “one country, two systems”, Hong Kong is the premier destination for enterprises around the globe to set up or expand their businesses. He believes that the co-operation between the company and various stakeholders in Hong Kong will help unleash market potential and create new opportunities, leveraging Hong Kong’s advantages as a business and investment hub, and its role as a springboard to the Mainland, markets in Asia and beyond.
      
         Meanwhile, Mr Yau took the opportunity to visit the Derichebourg Aeronautics Training Center and the Airbus assembly lines respectively to learn about the latest advancements in related aeronautic training, aircraft manufacturing and sustainable aviation development.
      
         Mr Yau will proceed to Bordeaux on June 19 (France time).

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI: JLT Mobile Computers announces a generational change in marketing leadership

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Växjö, Sweden, June 24, 2025 * * * JLT Mobile Computers, a leading developer and supplier of reliable computers for demanding environments, today announced the planned generational change in its marketing leadership. This leadership transition reflects JLT’s strategic initiative to centralize and mobilize its marketing resources, reinforcing its commitment to global growth and market expansion.

    Christian Meincke, who has served as Chief Marketing Officer at JLT since 2023, is retiring. Tejal Ranjan, Vice President of Marketing, will take on global responsibility for the company’s marketing strategy, planning, and operations.

    Tejal joined JLT as VP of Marketing, USA in October 2024 and brings over 20 years of international experience in B2B technology marketing. Throughout her career, Tejal has held executive marketing positions at global technology firms, leading digital transformation efforts, building high-performing teams, and launching integrated campaigns that accelerated revenue growth and brand recognition. She is recognized for her customer-centric approach, data-driven decision-making, and her ability to closely align marketing with sales for measurable business impact.

    To learn more about JLT Mobile Computers, and the company’s products, services and solutions, visit jltmobile.com. Financial information is available on JLT’s investor page.

    About JLT Mobile Computers

    JLT Mobile Computers is a leading developer and supplier of rugged mobile computing devices and solutions for demanding environments. 30 years of development and manufacturing experience have enabled JLT to set the standard in rugged computing, combining outstanding product quality with expert service, support and solutions to ensure trouble-free business operations for customers in warehousing, transportation, manufacturing, mining, ports and agriculture. JLT operates globally from offices in Sweden, France, and the US, complemented by an extensive network of sales partners in local markets. The company was founded in 1994, and the share has been listed on the Nasdaq First North Growth Market stock exchange since 2002 under the symbol JLT. Eminova Fondkommission AB acts as Certified Adviser. Learn more at jltmobile.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: JLT Mobile Computers announces a generational change in marketing leadership

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Växjö, Sweden, June 24, 2025 * * * JLT Mobile Computers, a leading developer and supplier of reliable computers for demanding environments, today announced the planned generational change in its marketing leadership. This leadership transition reflects JLT’s strategic initiative to centralize and mobilize its marketing resources, reinforcing its commitment to global growth and market expansion.

    Christian Meincke, who has served as Chief Marketing Officer at JLT since 2023, is retiring. Tejal Ranjan, Vice President of Marketing, will take on global responsibility for the company’s marketing strategy, planning, and operations.

    Tejal joined JLT as VP of Marketing, USA in October 2024 and brings over 20 years of international experience in B2B technology marketing. Throughout her career, Tejal has held executive marketing positions at global technology firms, leading digital transformation efforts, building high-performing teams, and launching integrated campaigns that accelerated revenue growth and brand recognition. She is recognized for her customer-centric approach, data-driven decision-making, and her ability to closely align marketing with sales for measurable business impact.

    To learn more about JLT Mobile Computers, and the company’s products, services and solutions, visit jltmobile.com. Financial information is available on JLT’s investor page.

    About JLT Mobile Computers

    JLT Mobile Computers is a leading developer and supplier of rugged mobile computing devices and solutions for demanding environments. 30 years of development and manufacturing experience have enabled JLT to set the standard in rugged computing, combining outstanding product quality with expert service, support and solutions to ensure trouble-free business operations for customers in warehousing, transportation, manufacturing, mining, ports and agriculture. JLT operates globally from offices in Sweden, France, and the US, complemented by an extensive network of sales partners in local markets. The company was founded in 1994, and the share has been listed on the Nasdaq First North Growth Market stock exchange since 2002 under the symbol JLT. Eminova Fondkommission AB acts as Certified Adviser. Learn more at jltmobile.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Verizon announces pricing terms of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and related tender offers open to certain investors

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Verizon announces pricing terms of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and related tender offers open to certain investors

    NEW YORK, N.Y. –  Verizon Communications Inc. (“Verizon”) (NYSE, Nasdaq: VZ) today announced the pricing terms of its two previously announced related transactions to repurchase 10 series of its outstanding notes listed in the tables below.

    Exchange Offers

    The first transaction consists of 10 separate private offers to exchange (the “Exchange Offers”) any and all of the outstanding series of notes listed in the table below (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers (as defined below), collectively the “Old Notes”) in exchange for newly issued debt securities of Verizon (the “New Notes”), on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offering Memorandum dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offering Memorandum”), the eligibility letter (the “Eligibility Letter”) and the accompanying exchange offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Exchange Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offering Memorandum and the Eligibility Letter, constitute the “Exchange Offer Documents”). Only a holder who has duly completed and returned an Eligibility Letter certifying that it is either (1) a “qualified institutional buyer” (as defined in Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”)); or (2) a person located outside the United States who is (i) not a “U.S. person” (as defined in Rule 902 under the Securities Act), (ii) not acting for the account or benefit of a U.S. person and (iii) a “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” (as defined below), are authorized to receive the Offering Memorandum and to participate in the Exchange Offers (such holders, “Exchange Offer Eligible Holders”).

    The Exchange Offers will each expire at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (such date and time with respect to an Exchange Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Exchange Offer, the “Exchange Offer Expiration Date”). Old Notes tendered for exchange may be validly withdrawn at any time at or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (such date and time with respect to an Exchange Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Exchange Offer, the “Exchange Offer Withdrawal Date”), but not thereafter, unless extended by Verizon. The “Exchange Offer Settlement Date” with respect to an Exchange Offer will be promptly following the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025.

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Exchange Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Exchange Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the applicable Exchange Offer Yield and Total Exchange Price (each as defined in the Offering Memorandum) for each series of Old Notes, as calculated at 11:00 a.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers (as defined below), the “Price Determination Date”).

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Yield of Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Fixed Spread
    (basis points) (2)

    Floating Rate Note Total Exchange Price(3)

    Fixed Rate Note Exchange Offer Yield

    Fixed Rate Note Total Exchange Price

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    4.625% due March 15, 2026

    4.225%

    +0

    N/A

    4.225%

    $980.07

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    $1,006.00

    N/A

    N/A

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    3.875% due May 31, 2027

    3.929%

    +15

    N/A

    4.079%

    $1,000.71

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    3.875% due May 31, 2027

    3.929%

    +15

    N/A

    4.079%

    $982.00

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    3.875% due June 15, 2028

    3.869%

    +20

    N/A

    4.069%

    $1,007.76

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    3.875% due June 15, 2028

    3.869%

    +15

    N/A

    4.019%

    $950.62

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +30

    N/A

    4.252%

    $990.52

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +35

    N/A

    4.302%

    $951.02

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +55

    N/A

    4.502%

    $867.19

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +60

    N/A

    4.552%

    $1,152.36

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Exchange Offers described in the Offering Memorandum, if the New Notes Capacity Condition (as defined below) and/or the corresponding Cash Offer Completion Condition (as defined below) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Old Notes for exchange in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, each an “Acceptance Priority Level,” with 1 being the highest Acceptance Priority Level and 10 being the lowest Acceptance Priority Level). It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for exchange even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The Total Exchange Price payable per each $1,000 principal amount of a series of Old Notes validly tendered for exchange other than the Floating Rate Notes (as defined below) (the “Fixed Rate Notes”) will be payable in a specified principal amount of New Notes and will be based on the fixed spread specified in the table above (the “Fixed Spread”) for the applicable series of Fixed Rate Notes, plus the yield of the specified Reference U.S. Treasury Security for that series as of the Price Determination Date. The Total Exchange Price does not include the applicable Accrued Coupon Payment (as defined below), which will be payable in cash in addition to the applicable Total Exchange Price.

    (3) The Total Exchange Price payable per each $1,000 principal amount of floating rate notes due 2026 (the “Floating Rate Notes”) validly tendered for exchange and not validly withdrawn will be payable in a specified principal amount of New Notes. Any Floating Rate Notes validly tendered and accepted by us, will receive the Total Exchange Price listed above for the Floating Rate Notes.

    Upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Exchange Offer Documents, Exchange Offer Eligible Holders who (i) validly tender, and who do not validly withdraw, Old Notes at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date or (ii) deliver a properly completed and duly executed Exchange Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery and all other required documents at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and validly tender their Old Notes at or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on the second business day after the applicable Exchange Offer Expiration Date pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures, and whose Old Notes are accepted for exchange by us, will receive the applicable Total Exchange Price for each $1,000 principal amount of such Old Notes, which will be payable in principal amount of New Notes.

    Verizon is offering to accept for exchange validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to a $2.5 billion cap on the maximum aggregate principal amount of New Notes that Verizon will issue in all of the Exchange Offers (the “New Notes Maximum Amount”). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the New Notes Maximum Amount at any time.

    Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Exchange Offers described in the Offering Memorandum, Verizon will, in accordance with the Acceptance Priority Levels, accept for exchange all Old Notes of each series validly tendered and not validly withdrawn, so long as (1) the Total Exchange Price for all validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Old Notes of such series, plus (2) the Total Exchange Price for all validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Old Notes of all series having a higher Acceptance Priority Level than such series of Old Notes is equal to, or less than, the New Notes Maximum Amount; provided, however, Verizon may: (x) waive the New Notes Capacity Condition with respect to one or more Exchange Offers and accept all Old Notes of the series sought in such Exchange Offer, and of any series of Old Notes sought in Exchange Offers with a higher Acceptance Priority Level, validly tendered and not validly withdrawn; or (y) skip any Exchange Offer for Old Notes that would have caused the New Notes Maximum Amount to be exceeded and exchange all Old Notes of a given series in an Exchange Offer having a lower Acceptance Priority Level so long as Verizon is able to exchange the full amount of validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes in such Exchange Offer without exceeding the New Notes Maximum Amount. Subject to applicable law, Verizon may waive or increase the New Notes Maximum Amount at any time.

    In addition to the applicable Total Exchange Price, Exchange Offer Eligible Holders whose Old Notes are accepted for exchange will receive a cash payment equal to the accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Exchange Offer Settlement Date (the “Accrued Coupon Payment”). Interest will cease to accrue on the Exchange Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted in the Exchange Offers, including those Old Notes tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures.

    The New Notes will mature on July 2, 2037. The table below indicates the interest rate (the “New Notes Coupon”) for the series of New Notes to be issued by Verizon pursuant to the Exchange Offers (as calculated at the Price Determination Date in accordance with the Offering Memorandum).

    New Notes

    Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Reference Yield of Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Fixed Spread
    (basis points)

    New Notes Coupon

    New Notes due 2037

    4.250% due May 15, 2035

    4.351%

    +105

    5.401%

    Pursuant to the Minimum Issue Requirement, Verizon will not complete the Exchange Offers if the aggregate principal amount of New Notes to be issued would be less than $750 million. Verizon may not waive the Minimum Issue Requirement.

    In addition to the Minimum Issue Requirement, Verizon’s obligation to accept any series of Old Notes tendered in the Exchange Offers is subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions applicable to the Exchange Offer for such series as described in the Offering Memorandum, including, among others, the New Notes Capacity Condition and the Cash Offer Completion Condition. Verizon expressly reserves the right, subject to applicable law, to waive any and all conditions to any Exchange Offer, other than conditions described by Verizon as non-waivable.

    Notwithstanding any other provision in the Offering Memorandum to the contrary, if at the Exchange Offer Expiration Date, for a particular Exchange Offer, the Total Exchange Price payable for all validly tendered Old Notes of a particular series is greater than the New Notes Maximum Amount (after exchanging all validly tendered Old Notes of each series with a higher Acceptance Priority Level), then Verizon will not be obligated to accept for exchange, or issue any New Notes in exchange for, such series of Old Notes and may terminate the Exchange Offer with respect to such series of Old Notes (the “New Notes Capacity Condition”) in accordance with the Acceptance Priority Procedures described in the Offering Memorandum.

    Each series of Old Notes that is subject to an Exchange Offer pursuant to the Exchange Offer Documents is also subject to a corresponding Cash Offer pursuant to the Offer to Purchase (as defined below), which Cash Offer is only available to holders of the Old Notes that are not Exchange Offer Eligible Holders. The Acceptance Priority Levels set forth in the Offer to Purchase correspond to the Acceptance Priority Levels set forth in the Offering Memorandum. Verizon’s obligation to complete an Exchange Offer with respect to a particular series of Old Notes is conditioned on the timely satisfaction or waiver of all conditions precedent to the completion of the corresponding Cash Offer for such series of Old Notes (with respect to each Exchange Offer, the “Cash Offer Completion Condition”), and Verizon’s obligation to complete a Cash Offer with respect to a particular series of Old Notes is subject to various conditions, as set forth in the Offer to Purchase, including (i) that all of the conditions precedent to the completion of the corresponding Exchange Offer are timely satisfied or waived and (ii) that the aggregate amount of cash (excluding the Accrued Coupon Payment) that would have to be paid to purchase any and all of the validly tendered Old Notes of such series in such Cash Offer does not exceed the applicable maximum cash amount specified in the Offer to Purchase. Verizon will terminate an Exchange Offer for a given series of Old Notes if it terminates the Cash Offer for such series of Old Notes, and Verizon will terminate the Cash Offer for a given series of Old Notes if it terminates the Exchange Offer for such series of Old Notes. The termination of a Cash Offer for a series of Old Notes will not impact the Exchange Offers for any other series of Old Notes. The Cash Offer Completion Condition cannot be waived by Verizon. If Verizon extends any Cash Offer for a series of Old Notes for any reason, Verizon will extend the corresponding Exchange Offer for such series Old Notes.

    If and when issued, the New Notes will not be registered under the Securities Act or any state securities laws. Therefore, the New Notes may not be offered or sold in the United States absent registration or an applicable exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act and any applicable state securities laws. Verizon will enter into a registration rights agreement with respect to the New Notes.

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Exchange Agent for the Exchange Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Exchange Offers or for additional copies of the Exchange Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774.You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Exchange Offers. The Exchange Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://gbsc-usa.com/eligibility/verizon.

    Cash Offers

    The second transaction consists of 10 separate offers to purchase for cash (the “Cash Offers”) any and all of each series of Old Notes, on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offer to Purchase dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offer to Purchase”), the certification instructions letter (the “Certification Instructions Letter”) and the accompanying cash offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Cash Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offer to Purchase and the Certification Instructions Letter, constitute the “Tender Offer Documents”). Only holders who are not Exchange Offer Eligible Holders (“Cash Offer Eligible Holders”) are eligible to participate in the Cash Offers. Holders of Old Notes participating in the Cash Offers will be required to complete the Certification Instructions Letter and certify that they are Cash Offer Eligible Holders.

    The Cash Offers will each expire at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (such date and time with respect to a Cash Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Cash Offer, the “Cash Offer Expiration Date”). Old Notes tendered for purchase may be validly withdrawn at any time at or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (such date and time with respect to a Cash Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Cash Offer, the “Cash Offer Withdrawal Date”), but not thereafter, unless extended by Verizon. The “Cash Offer Settlement Date” with respect to a Cash Offer will be promptly following the Cash Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025.

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Cash Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Tender Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the applicable Cash Offer Yield and Total Consideration (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) for each series of Old Notes, as calculated at the Price Determination Date in accordance with the Offer to Purchase.

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Yield of Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Fixed Spread
    (basis points) (2)

    Floating Rate Note Total Consideration(3)

    Cash Offer Yield

    Fixed Rate Note Total Consideration

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    4.625% due March 15, 2026

    4.225%

    +0

    N/A

    4.225%

    $980.07

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    $1,006.00

    N/A

    N/A

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    3.875% due May 31, 2027

    3.929%

    +15

    N/A

    4.079%

    $1,000.71

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    3.875% due May 31, 2027

    3.929%

    +15

    N/A

    4.079%

    $982.00

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    3.875% due June 15, 2028

    3.869%

    +20

    N/A

    4.069%

    $1,007.76

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    3.875% due June 15, 2028

    3.869%

    +15

    N/A

    4.019%

    $950.62

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +30

    N/A

    4.252%

    $990.52

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +35

    N/A

    4.302%

    $951.02

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +55

    N/A

    4.502%

    $867.19

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +60

    N/A

    4.552%

    $1,152.36

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Cash Offers described in the Offer to Purchase, including if the Maximum Total Consideration Condition (as defined below) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Notes for purchase in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above. It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for purchase even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The Total Consideration for each series of Fixed Rate Notes (such consideration, the “Fixed Rate Note Total Consideration”) validly tendered will be determined in accordance with standard market practice, as described in the Offer to Purchase, to result in a Total Consideration payable per each $1,000 principal amount of each series of Fixed Rate Notes that equates to a yield to the maturity date (or Par Call Date, if applicable) in accordance with the formula set forth in Annex A to the Offer to Purchase, for the applicable series of Fixed Rate Notes, equal to the sum of (i) the yield corresponding to the bid side price of the applicable Reference U.S. Treasury Security specified in the table above for such series of Fixed Rate Notes at the Price Determination Date plus (ii) the applicable Fixed Spread specified in the table above for such series of Fixed Rate Notes. The Total Consideration does not include the applicable Accrued Coupon Payment (as defined below), which will be payable in cash in addition to the applicable Total Consideration.

    (3) Payable per each $1,000 principal amount of Floating Rate Notes validly tendered and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date or the Cash Offer Guaranteed Delivery Date (as defined below) pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and accepted for purchase (such amount, the “Floating Rate Note Total Consideration”).

    Upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Tender Offer Documents, Cash Offer Eligible Holders who (i) validly tender, and who do not validly withdraw, Old Notes at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date or (ii) deliver a properly completed and duly executed Cash Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date and validly tender their Old Notes at or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on the second business day after the applicable Cash Offer Expiration Date (such date and time with respect to a Cash Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Cash Offer, the “Cash Offer Guaranteed Delivery Date”) pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures, and whose Old Notes are accepted for purchase by Verizon, will receive the applicable Total Consideration for each $1,000 principal amount of Old Notes, which will be payable in cash.

    Verizon is offering to purchase validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to the Maximum Total Consideration Condition (as defined below) and the Exchange Offer Completion Condition (as defined below). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the Maximum Total Consideration Condition at any time.

    Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Cash Offers described in the Offer to Purchase, Verizon will, in accordance with the Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, accept for purchase all Old Notes of each series validly tendered and not validly withdrawn, so long as the Total Consideration, excluding the Accrued Coupon Payment, for all validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes of all series having a higher Acceptance Priority Level than such series of Old Notes is equal to, or less than, the Maximum Total Consideration Amount; provided, however, Verizon may: (x) waive the Maximum Total Consideration Condition with respect to one or more Cash Offers and accept all Old Notes of the series sought in such Cash Offer, and of any series of Old Notes sought in Cash Offers with a higher Acceptance Priority Level, validly tendered and not validly withdrawn; or (y) skip any Cash Offer for Old Notes that would have caused the Maximum Total Consideration Amount to be exceeded and purchase all Old Notes of a given series in an Cash Offer having a lower Acceptance Priority Level so long as Verizon is able to purchase the full amount of validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes in such Cash Offer without exceeding the Maximum Total Consideration Amount. 

    In addition to the applicable Total Consideration, Cash Offer Eligible Holders whose Old Notes are accepted for purchase will be paid accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Cash Offer Settlement Date (the “Accrued Coupon Payment”). Interest will cease to accrue on the Cash Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted in the Cash Offers, including those Old Notes tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures.

    Verizon’s obligation to accept any series of Old Notes tendered in the Cash Offers is subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions applicable to the Cash Offer for such series as described in the Offer to Purchase, including the Maximum Total Consideration Condition and the Exchange Offer Completion Condition. Verizon expressly reserves the right, subject to applicable law, to waive any and all conditions to any Cash Offer, other than conditions described by Verizon as non-waivable.

    Verizon’s obligation to complete a Cash Offer with respect to a particular series of Old Notes validly tendered is conditioned (the “Maximum Total Consideration Condition”) on aggregate Total Consideration, excluding the Accrued Coupon Payment, payable for Old Notes purchased in the Cash Offers (the “Aggregate Purchase Consideration”) not to exceed $300 million (the “Maximum Total Consideration Amount”). Verizon’s obligation to complete a Cash Offer with respect to a particular series of Old Notes validly tendered is conditioned on the Maximum Total Consideration Amount being sufficient to pay the Total Consideration, excluding the Accrued Coupon Payment, for all validly tendered Notes of such series (after accounting for all validly tendered Notes that have a higher Acceptance Priority Level).  

    Verizon reserves the right, but are under no obligation, to increase or waive the Maximum Total Consideration Amount, in our sole discretion subject to applicable law, with or without extending the Cash Offer Withdrawal Date. No assurance can be given that Verizon will increase or waive the Maximum Total Consideration Amount. If Cash Offer Eligible Holders tender more Old Notes in the Cash Offers than they expect to be accepted for purchase based on the Maximum Total Consideration Amount and Verizon subsequently accepts more than such Cash Offer Eligible Holders expected of such Old Notes tendered as a result of an increase of the Maximum Total Consideration Amount, such Cash Offer Eligible Holders may not be able to withdraw any of their previously tendered Notes. Accordingly, Cash Offer Eligible Holders should not tender any Old Notes that they do not wish to be accepted for purchase.

    If the Maximum Total Consideration Condition is not satisfied with respect to each series of Old Notes, for (i) a series of Old Notes (the “First Non-Covered Notes”) for which the Maximum Total Consideration Amount is less than the sum of (x) the Aggregate Purchase Consideration for all validly tendered First Non-Covered Notes and (y) the Aggregate Purchase Consideration for all validly tendered Notes of all series, having a higher Acceptance Priority Level as set forth on the cover of the Offer to Purchase (with 1 being the highest Acceptance Priority Level and 10 being the lowest Acceptance Priority Level) than the First Non-Covered Notes, and (ii) all series of Old Notes with an Acceptance Priority Level lower than the First Non-Covered Notes (together with the First Non-Covered Notes, the “Non-Covered Notes”), then Verizon may, at any time on or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date: (x) waive the Maximum Total Consideration Condition with respect to one or more Cash Offers and accept all Old Notes of the series sought in such Cash Offer, and of any series of Old Notes sought in Cash Offers with a higher Acceptance Priority Level, validly tendered and not validly withdrawn; or (y) skip any Cash Offer for Old Notes that would have caused the Maximum Total Consideration Amount to be exceeded and purchase all Old Notes of a given series in an Cash Offer having a lower Acceptance Priority Level so long as Verizon is able to purchase the full amount of validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes in such Cash Offer without exceeding the Maximum Total Consideration Amount.

    Verizon’s obligation to complete any Cash Offer with respect to a given series of Old Notes is conditioned on the completion of the corresponding Exchange Offer for such series of Old Notes (with respect to each Cash Offer, the “Exchange Offer Completion Condition”). Verizon will terminate the Cash Offer for a given series of Old Notes if it terminates the Exchange Offer for such series of Old Notes, and it will terminate the Exchange Offer for a given series of Old Notes if it terminates the Cash Offer for such series of Old Notes. The termination of an Exchange Offer for a series of Old Notes will not impact the Cash Offer for any other series of Old Notes. If Verizon extends the Exchange Offer for a series of Old Notes for any reason, Verizon will extend the corresponding Cash Offer for such series of Old Notes. The Exchange Offer Completion Condition cannot be waived by Verizon.

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Tender Agent for the Cash Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Cash Offers or for additional copies of the Tender Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774. You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Cash Offers. The Tender Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://www.gbsc-usa.com/verizon.

    Verizon refers to the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, collectively, as the “Offers.”

    If Verizon terminates any Offer with respect to one or more series of Old Notes, it will give prompt notice to the Tender Agent or Exchange Agent, as applicable, and all Old Notes tendered pursuant to such terminated Offer will be returned promptly to the tendering holders thereof. With effect from such termination, any Old Notes blocked in DTC will be released.

    Holders are advised to check with any bank, securities broker or other intermediary through which they hold Old Notes as to when such intermediary needs to receive instructions from a holder in order for that holder to be able to participate in, or (in the circumstances in which revocation is permitted) revoke their instruction to participate in, the Exchange Offers or Cash Offers, as applicable, before the deadlines specified herein and in the Exchange Offer Documents or the Tender Offer Documents, as applicable. The deadlines set by any such intermediary and each clearing system for the submission and withdrawal of exchange instructions will also be earlier than the relevant deadlines specified herein and in the Exchange Offer Documents or the Tender Offer Documents, as applicable.

    This announcement is for informational purposes only. This announcement is not an offer to purchase or a solicitation of an offer to purchase any Old Notes. The Exchange Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offering Memorandum and related documents and the Cash Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offer to Purchase and related documents. The Offers are not being made to holders of Old Notes in any jurisdiction in which the making or acceptance thereof would not be in compliance with the securities, blue sky or other laws of such jurisdiction. In any jurisdiction in which the securities laws or blue sky laws require the Offers to be made by a licensed broker or dealer, the Offers will be deemed to be made on behalf of Verizon by the dealer managers or one or more registered brokers or dealers that are licensed under the laws of such jurisdiction.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offers have not been approved by an authorized person for the purposes of Section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”). Accordingly, this announcement is not being distributed to, and must not be passed on to, persons within the United Kingdom save in circumstances where section 21(1) of the FSMA does not apply. Accordingly, this communication is only addressed to and directed at persons who are outside the United Kingdom and (i) persons falling within the definition of investment professionals (as defined in Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “Financial Promotion Order”)), or (ii) within Article 43 of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iii) high net worth companies and other persons to whom it may lawfully be communicated falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iv) to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of Section 21 of the FSMA) in connection with the issue or sale of any securities may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (such persons together being “relevant persons”). The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes will be engaged in only with, relevant persons. Any person who is not a relevant person should not act or rely on any document relating to the Exchange Offers or any of their contents.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offer are only addressed to and directed at persons in member states of the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), who are “Qualified Investors” within the meaning of Article 2(e) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129. The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes, will be engaged in only with, Qualified Investors. The Exchange Offer is only available to Qualified Investors. None of the information in the Offering Memorandum and any other documents and materials relating to the Exchange Offer should be acted upon or relied upon in any member state of the EEA by persons who are not Qualified Investors.

    “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” means:

    (i)       in relation to any investor in the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), a qualified investor as defined in Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 (as amended or superseded) that is not a retail investor. For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (a) a retail client as defined in point (11) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU (as amended, “MiFID II”); or (b) a customer within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client as defined in point (10) of Article 4(1) of MiFID II;

    (ii)      in relation to any investor in the United Kingdom, a qualified investor as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that is not a retail investor and that (a) has professional experience in matters relating to investments and qualifies as an investment professional within the meaning of Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (as amended, the “Financial Promotion Order”), (b) is a person falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) (“high net worth companies, unincorporated associations etc.”) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (c) is a person to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”)) in connection with the issue or sale of any notes may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (all such persons together being referred to as “relevant persons”). For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (x) a retail client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 2017/565 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (“EUWA”); or (y) a customer within the meaning of the provisions of the FSMA and any rules or regulations made under the FSMA to implement Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the EUWA; or

    (iii)      any entity outside the U.S., the EEA and the United Kingdom to whom the Exchange Offer may be made in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations of any applicable jurisdiction without registration of the Exchange Offer or any related filing or approval.

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    In this communication Verizon has made forward-looking statements, including regarding the conduct and completion of the Offers. These forward-looking statements are not historical facts, but only predictions and generally can be identified by use of statements that include phrases such as “will,” “may,” “should,” “continue,” “anticipate,” “assume,” “believe,” “expect,” “plan,” “appear,” “project,” “estimate,” “hope,” “intend,” “target,” “forecast,” or other words or phrases of similar import. Similarly, statements that describe our objectives, plans or goals also are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those currently anticipated, including those discussed in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase under the heading “Risk Factors” and under similar headings in other documents that are incorporated by reference in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase. Holders are urged to consider these risks and uncertainties carefully in evaluating the forward-looking statements and are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements included in this press release are made only as of the date of this press release, and Verizon undertakes no obligation to update publicly these forward-looking statements to reflect new information, future events or otherwise. In light of these risks, uncertainties and assumptions, the forward-looking events might or might not occur. Verizon cannot assure you that projected results or events will be achieved.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Christine Lagarde: Strengthening economies in a stormy and fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the ninth Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial integration in a stormy and fragmenting world” organised by the National Bank of Ukraine and Narodowy Bank Polski in Kyiv, Ukraine

    Kyiv, 19 June 2025

    It is an honour to be here in Kyiv – a city that has come to symbolise resilience, dignity and the enduring spirit of freedom. Kyiv stands not only as the heart of Ukraine, but as a beacon of what it means to hold fast to democratic values in the face of immense challenge.

    As the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko once wrote, “In your own house – your own truth. Your own strength and freedom.” Ukraine’s fight today reminds all of Europe of this powerful truth: our security and prosperity rely on unity, on integration with our neighbours.

    In the face of Russia’s unjustified war of aggression, Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience in defence of their country.

    In my remarks today, and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I would like to reflect on the historical lessons we have learned about strengthening and integrating economies in an increasingly stormy and fragmented world.

    Experience shows that closer ties with the European neighbourhood can provide a strong foundation for Ukraine to rebuild and emerge stronger. And as geopolitical tensions rise and global supply chains fragment, the case for deeper regional cooperation has never been clearer.

    Europe’s own long history of integration offers valuable insights that can help guide Ukraine’s path forwards. Two key lessons stand out.

    First, while deeper integration increases the potential rewards, it also raises the risks if not managed wisely. Sound domestic policy frameworks are essential to maximise growth and safeguard stability.

    Second, the benefits of integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Maintaining them depends on continuous reform – but reforms must also deliver tangible improvements for people’s lives, and do so relatively quickly.

    The benefits of integration in a fragmenting world

    During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain fractured the European economy. Trade between East and West fell by half. This division was like imposing a 48% tariff – leading to immense welfare losses and isolating the Eastern bloc from global markets.[1]

    But the transformation since Europe’s eastern enlargement has been nothing short of remarkable. On average, countries that joined the EU in 2004 have nearly doubled their GDP per capita over the past two decades.

    Critically, this was not just about catching up from a low base. Between 2004 and 2019, the EU’s new Member States saw their GDP per capita grow 32% more than comparable non-EU countries.[2] The difference was deeper economic integration – and those that were already highly embedded in the regional economy gained the most.

    While all new members experienced gains, countries with stronger integration into regional value chains recorded nearly 10 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth compared with less integrated peers – regardless of geographic proximity.[3]

    This difference was driven mainly by technology and productivity spillovers. ECB research shows that a 10% increase in productivity among western EU firms translated into a 5% productivity gain for central and eastern European firms linked to their supply chains.[4]

    The case for regional integration is therefore clear – and in today’s increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, it has become even more compelling.

    First, regional integration underpins growth.

    European economies are highly open, which means a world splintering into rival trading blocs poses clear risks to prosperity. Yet Europe’s most important trading partner is Europe itself: around 65% of euro area exports go to other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. For Ukraine too, Europe is the principal trading partner, accounting for over 50% of its goods trade in 2024.

    By deepening economic ties – more closely linking neighbouring economies – we can reduce our exposure to external shocks. Rising trade within our region can help offset losses in global markets.

    Second, regional integration strengthens resilience.

    One consequence of geopolitical fragmentation is the realignment of supply chains toward trusted partners. Nearly half of firms involved in external trade have already revised their strategies – or intend to do so – including relocating parts of their operations closer to home.[5] While this trend reduces strategic dependencies, it can also raise costs.

    Yet large integrated regions can mitigate these costs by replicating many of the benefits of globalisation at the regional level. Supply chains can be reorganised regionally, allowing each country to specialise based on its comparative advantage within regional value chains.

    Ukraine stands to benefit significantly from expanding these networks across the region – and the EU stands to benefit, too, from having Ukraine as a partner.[6]

    In the automotive sector, for example, Ukrainian firms already produce around 7% of all wire harnesses used in EU vehicles.[7] As the industry shifts towards electric vehicles, which require more complex wiring systems, Ukraine’s manufacturing base is well positioned to scale up and play a larger role in the EU value chain.

    Equally transformative is Ukraine’s drone industry, which has become one of the most advanced in the region. Drones are not only a critical component of modern warfare, but also a technology with substantial spillover effects and far-reaching dual-use applications.

    Indeed, the country’s ambitious goal of producing 4.5 million drones by 2025 has accelerated innovation in materials science, battery technology and 3D printing. These advances are already finding civilian applications in sectors such as logistics, agriculture and emergency response.

    In short, for both existing EU members and neighbouring countries like Ukraine, regional integration is both a path to prosperity and a strategic anchor in an increasingly fragmented world.

    Managing the risks of integration

    But examining the experience of countries that have used regional integration as a platform for growth and reform reveals two important lessons.

    The first is that if integration is not accompanied by appropriate reforms, it can create new vulnerabilities – especially in the financial sphere.

    Financial integration often brings volatile capital inflows, which can make it difficult to distinguish sustainable growth from unsustainable excesses in real time.

    One way this can happen is when productivity gains in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, drive up wages in those sectors, which then spill over into higher wages in non-tradable sectors and push up overall inflation.[8]

    While this effect is a normal feature of catching-up, it can make it easy to mistake genuine convergence for economic overheating. If foreign capital is in fact driving financial imbalances – such as unsustainable real estate booms – countries may exhibit the same patterns of rising wages and inflation, masking underlying vulnerabilities.

    Another potential distortion is that capital inflows can significantly affect government fiscal positions by boosting tax revenues and creating the illusion of permanently greater fiscal space. This often leads to procyclical fiscal policies, with governments increasing spending or cutting taxes during boom periods – only to face fiscal stress when inflows reverse or growth slows.

    Both dynamics have been visible during Europe’s recent experience with regional integration.

    After the eastern enlargement, financial integration accelerated rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008, the new Member States experienced an extraordinary surge in capital inflows, averaging over 12% of GDP annually – twice the typical level for emerging markets globally.[9]

    Initially, this rapid financial integration brought clear benefits: it expanded access to credit, fuelled growth and enabled much-needed development. However, in many countries, foreign capital was disproportionately channelled into consumption and construction booms, while tax revenues rose sharply on the back of property transactions and buoyant domestic demand.[10] This led to widespread misallocation of private capital and inefficient public spending.

    Capital flows then reversed sharply when the global financial crisis struck, exposing these imbalances. Between December 2008 and May 2013, external bank liabilities in non-euro area central and eastern European countries declined by an average of 27% – with some countries experiencing drops of more than 50%.[11]

    Yet the risks associated with financial integration can be avoided. Not all countries in the region were affected equally. Those that performed better typically shared two key features.

    First, they had clear policies to channel foreign investment into productive sectors. Strong industrial strategies, a skilled workforce and integration into global supply chains helped direct capital towards manufacturing and tradable services – sectors that drive export growth and are less prone to unsustainable booms and asset bubbles.[12]

    Second, they maintained robust financial policy frameworks. Tighter capital requirements, active macroprudential measures and countercyclical buffers strengthened domestic banking sectors and curbed excessive mortgage lending. These tools enabled those countries to absorb large capital inflows without creating destabilising imbalances.[13]

    The lesson is clear: as countries integrate into the region, strong domestic policy frameworks are critical to ensuring that capital inflows support long-term growth rather than generating financial instability or inefficient allocation.

    This insight is especially relevant for Ukraine today as it charts its path towards recovery. If reconstruction proceeds as planned, the country could attract significant capital inflows over the next decade. But without the right safeguards, that capital risks being misallocated – undermining long-term productivity instead of strengthening it.

    There are encouraging signs. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area have already driven significant reforms in the financial sector. Ukraine’s banking regulation now aligns with more than 75% of EU standards, covering critical areas such as capital adequacy, governance and auditing.[14]

    The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a risk-based supervisory model inspired by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – the system of banking supervision in Europe – markedly improving oversight. Despite extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine is also modernising its capital markets – consolidating exchanges, upgrading settlement systems and strengthening regulatory enforcement to attract long-term investors.

    These reforms are already delivering results: in 2023, Ukraine’s banking sector remained profitable and well capitalised despite the ongoing war – an outcome that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

    Still, further progress is essential, especially in fiscal governance. Strengthening public investment management will be critical to ensure that reconstruction funds are allocated transparently and efficiently.

    This is not just about meeting external standards. It is about ensuring that every euro, and every hryvnia, delivers real returns for the Ukrainian people.[15]

    Making integration sustainable

    However, reforms cannot be treated as a one-time effort.

    So, the second key lesson is that the benefits of regional integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Sustaining them requires continuous reform – and, just as importantly, it requires citizens to see visible, tangible improvements in their daily lives.

    In this context, there are two risks to watch out for.

    The first is that institutional reform momentum can fade if economic benefits do not follow quickly.

    Deeper regional integration typically begins with aligning framework conditions, such as legal systems, regulation and public administration. These areas often improve rapidly. But for the economic gains to materialise, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors must respond to the new incentives created – and this takes time.

    In the long run, evidence shows that countries with initially weaker institutions benefit the most from adopting higher standards.[16] But in the short run, if people only see the effort and not the payoff, public support for further reforms can weaken, putting long-term convergence at risk.

    The second risk is that structural shifts in the economy may weaken the link between integration and economic convergence over time.

    The integration of goods markets has traditionally driven convergence almost automatically, as foreign direct investment flows to countries with lower land and labour costs, supply chains relocate and lower-income countries benefit from technology transfers.

    As I mentioned earlier, this will remain an important mechanism even in an era of supply chain reshoring. But countries cannot rely on it as heavily as in the past. Future growth in intra-EU trade is expected to depend increasingly on services – particularly digital services.

    However, research shows that services sector activity tends to concentrate in larger, more affluent urban areas that exhibit the hallmarks of a knowledge economy: high tertiary education rates, strong technology and science sectors and robust digital infrastructure.[17]

    This means that deeper integration alone will not guarantee broad-based convergence across all regions. Over time, countries will need to invest more in education, skills and digitalisation to ensure they can build high levels of human capital.

    Maintaining the path of convergence is therefore not easy. But slowing down reform efforts is not the answer – especially in the shock-prone world we face today.

    There is a clear link between strong institutions and economic resilience. ECB research indicates that, during the pandemic, regions with lower institutional quality experienced – all else equal – an additional decline of around 4 percentage points in GDP per capita compared with the ten regions with the highest quality of government.[18]

    As our economies are increasingly buffeted by global turbulence, institutional backsliding therefore risks creating a vicious circle: repeated shocks can undermine economic convergence and further erode public confidence in the reform process.

    The best way for countries to sustain reform momentum is to recognise the importance of maintaining public support and, as far as possible, pair governance improvements with a focus on sectors where they have a clear competitive edge – and where deeper integration with the region can unlock significant and rapid growth opportunities.

    This way, the benefits of reforms will be felt more quickly and more widely.

    Ukraine is well positioned to put this into practice. Its IT sector is already relatively strong: IT services exports reached nearly USD 7 billion in 2023, making it one of the country’s leading export sectors despite the war.[19]

    Ukraine also produces around 130,000 STEM graduates each year – exceeding Germany and France[20] – and it ranks among the top five countries globally for certified IT professionals.[21] Successful IT clusters are active in several cities, and major foreign firms – including Apple, Microsoft, Boeing and Siemens – have established R&D operations in the country.

    A dynamic defence tech ecosystem is also taking shape[22], with Ukrainian start-ups attracting almost half a billion US dollars in funding in 2024 – surpassing many of their peers across central and eastern Europe.[23] Experience from countries like Israel suggests that such a foundation can enable the country to emerge as a broader technology hub in the years ahead.

    If Ukraine stays the course on institutional reform and continues to adapt its economy to new opportunities, despite the stormy environment, it can emerge as a vital engine of growth and a key contributor to the region’s future.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment – facing the hardships of war, the challenge of reconstruction and the opportunity of deeper regional integration.

    In a world marked by shifting geopolitical realities, such integration offers a clear path to recovery and lasting prosperity.

    The recent history of regional integration shows not only its immense benefits, but also the importance of managing transitional risks through robust policy frameworks. It also underlines the need to sustain reform over time by ensuring that people feel its benefits.

    I am confident that Ukraine will be able to fully realise its economic potential, turning the upheaval of today into the foundation for a dynamic future.

    As Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine’s greatest poets, once wrote: “even though life is but a moment and made up of moments, we carry eternity in our souls.”

    This enduring spirit captures the resilience and potential of Ukraine’s people and its economy – a spirit that will continue to drive advancement and renewal in the years ahead.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – State of play of the EU accession negotiations with Ukraine versus the Western Balkans – E-002321/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002321/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Friedrich Pürner (NI)

    Ukraine was granted EU candidate country status in 2022 and is among the ten countries hoping to accede to the Union. The Western Balkans embarked upon their journey to EU membership in 2003. Since then, only Croatia has joined the Union (in 2013), while the other countries are still working towards the Copenhagen criteria. By contrast, although Ukraine is at war, its accession process is advancing at a much faster pace.

    • 1.What progress has Ukraine made in ticking off the Copenhagen criteria and the individual chapters of the EU acquis since being conferred candidate status in June 2022, and what specific challenges remain, particularly in the areas of the rule of law, fighting corruption, and judicial reform?
    • 2.Are there discussions within the Commission about adapting or loosening the accession requirements for Ukraine in certain areas – for example, as regards the full implementation of the EU acquis or economic convergence – in order to speed up the accession process, and if so, how is a balance being struck between expedition and compliance with the accession criteria?
    • 3.To what extent is the Commission taking the current geopolitical situation and the ongoing war in Ukraine into account when setting timelines and priorities for the accession negotiations, and are there any plans to introduce transitional arrangements or special agreements in order to facilitate the accession process in these extraordinary circumstances?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – State of play of the EU accession negotiations with Ukraine versus the Western Balkans – E-002321/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002321/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Friedrich Pürner (NI)

    Ukraine was granted EU candidate country status in 2022 and is among the ten countries hoping to accede to the Union. The Western Balkans embarked upon their journey to EU membership in 2003. Since then, only Croatia has joined the Union (in 2013), while the other countries are still working towards the Copenhagen criteria. By contrast, although Ukraine is at war, its accession process is advancing at a much faster pace.

    • 1.What progress has Ukraine made in ticking off the Copenhagen criteria and the individual chapters of the EU acquis since being conferred candidate status in June 2022, and what specific challenges remain, particularly in the areas of the rule of law, fighting corruption, and judicial reform?
    • 2.Are there discussions within the Commission about adapting or loosening the accession requirements for Ukraine in certain areas – for example, as regards the full implementation of the EU acquis or economic convergence – in order to speed up the accession process, and if so, how is a balance being struck between expedition and compliance with the accession criteria?
    • 3.To what extent is the Commission taking the current geopolitical situation and the ongoing war in Ukraine into account when setting timelines and priorities for the accession negotiations, and are there any plans to introduce transitional arrangements or special agreements in order to facilitate the accession process in these extraordinary circumstances?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – State of play of the EU accession negotiations with Ukraine versus the Western Balkans – E-002321/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002321/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Friedrich Pürner (NI)

    Ukraine was granted EU candidate country status in 2022 and is among the ten countries hoping to accede to the Union. The Western Balkans embarked upon their journey to EU membership in 2003. Since then, only Croatia has joined the Union (in 2013), while the other countries are still working towards the Copenhagen criteria. By contrast, although Ukraine is at war, its accession process is advancing at a much faster pace.

    • 1.What progress has Ukraine made in ticking off the Copenhagen criteria and the individual chapters of the EU acquis since being conferred candidate status in June 2022, and what specific challenges remain, particularly in the areas of the rule of law, fighting corruption, and judicial reform?
    • 2.Are there discussions within the Commission about adapting or loosening the accession requirements for Ukraine in certain areas – for example, as regards the full implementation of the EU acquis or economic convergence – in order to speed up the accession process, and if so, how is a balance being struck between expedition and compliance with the accession criteria?
    • 3.To what extent is the Commission taking the current geopolitical situation and the ongoing war in Ukraine into account when setting timelines and priorities for the accession negotiations, and are there any plans to introduce transitional arrangements or special agreements in order to facilitate the accession process in these extraordinary circumstances?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – European rules on nitrous oxide for recreational use – E-002334/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002334/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nadine Morano (PPE)

    Several Member States have reported an increase in cases of severe poisoning and deaths related to recreational use of nitrous oxide (‘laughing gas’), especially among young people. In 2023, some 472 incidents were reported to the French CEIP-A, an organisation which assesses and monitors drug addiction, an increase of 30% compared to 2022.

    In 92% of the cases, the doses consumed were high, often from large-volume canisters, and 50% of users reported daily consumption. More than 80% of cases presented serious neurological complications, including spinal cord damage. According to Santé publique France, in 2022 some 14% of 18-24 year-olds had experimented with nitrous oxide. The rules vary greatly from one Member State to another.

    • 1.Does the Commission intend to harmonise the rules on the sale and use of nitrous oxide at European level?
    • 2.Are there plans to include nitrous oxide in the scope of the European Union Drugs Agency and in the Early Warning System?
    • 3.What information campaigns are being supported at European level to raise awareness of the neurological and respiratory risks associated with using nitrous oxide?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Aid for investment in new nuclear power in Sweden – E-002358/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002358/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Hanna Gedin (The Left), Jonas Sjöstedt (The Left)

    In May 2025, the Swedish Parliament adopted a decision allowing state aid for firms investing in new nuclear reactors in Sweden. The aid takes the form of both government loans and two-way contracts for difference. The cost is put at SEK 400 billion, of which the Government will provide SEK 300 billion in loan capital. A price hedging agreement will also guarantee the nuclear power companies at least 80 öre/kWh from the Government for 40 years.

    EU state aid rules, in principle, prohibit state aid that distorts competition in the internal market, but allow derogations if the aid is deemed necessary, proportionate and compatible with the common interest as referred to in Article 107(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

    In the light of this:

    • 1.Has the Commission received a notification from Sweden on the proposed aid scheme for new nuclear power and, if so, does it regard the scheme as compatible with EU state aid rules?
    • 2.Does the Commission regard the aid as proportionate and necessary, especially in view of the fact that there is already an electricity surplus in many parts of Sweden?
    • 3.How is it to be ensured that the proposed aid scheme does not lead to distortions of competition vis-à-vis other non-fossil power sources, such as wind or solar?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Nea Dimokratia Government’s announced abolishment of OPEKEPE – E-002310/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002310/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos (NI)

    The revelations at the centre of the publicity surrounding OPEKEPE, Greece’s Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid, are hardly a ‘bolt from the blue’. They are the result of the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) – which all the bourgeois parties voted for, co-shaped and implemented from government positions – and, indeed, the scandalous way in which agricultural subsidies are granted.

    The Nea Dimokratia Government bears full responsibility for the latest developments, because for at least six years it has continued to implement the ‘technical solution’ introduced by the previous Syriza Government from 2015 to 2017.

    National governments and the Commission have been – and still are – turning a deaf ear to farmers’ and livestock breeders’ demands for subsidies to be based on actual agricultural production and actual livestock count, as well as to complaints that ‘decoupled’ payments ultimately end up in the hands of non-farmers.

    In view of this, can the Commission say:

    • 1.What view does it take of the Nea Dimokratia Government’s announcement that it will abolish OPEKEPE, which comes just as it has declared that it has submitted a plan to turn the organisation around to the EU?
    • 2.How does it view the demands of the agricultural trade union movement for subsidies to be granted on the basis of actual agricultural production and actual livestock count?
    • 3.What view does it take of the need to take all the necessary measures to ensure that struggling farmers are not subject to cuts, that outstanding payments be made immediately and that the system be opened so that they can submit their declarations in good time?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Regulation on the taxation of tobacco products – E-002377/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002377/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anna Bryłka (PfE)

    At a meeting of the Sub-Committee on Taxation (FISC) on 6 February 2025, the Commission’s main priorities for 2025 in the area of taxation were presented, including the objectives of the new excise directive, as its priorities in the area of tobacco taxation regulation.

    Poland is one of the largest manufacturers and exporters of tobacco products in the European Union. At the same time, the tobacco sector provides more than 30% of excise revenues for the state budget, while the shadow economy is at a historically low level of less than 5%. This is a huge achievement by the Polish authorities in the fight against the shadow economy, given that one in every five cigarettes smoked in Poland came from illegal sources in 2015, and is also the result of a sensible and balanced tax policy, including the introduction of a multi-year plan for excise duty increases.

    The approximation of the level of taxation and prices in the EU that underpins the excise directive has already failed and will only increase illegal trade and smuggling.

    • 1.Could the Commission please set out the economic and social impact of the revision of Directive 2011/64/EU on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco?
    • 2.Could the Commission please provide a timetable for the work on the proposed changes?
    • 3.Could the Commission state which Member States support the proposed changes?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Sanctioning of sham charities supporting Hamas – E-002378/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002378/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Pina Picierno (S&D)

    In October 2024, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three individuals and one sham charity that are prominent financial supporters of Hamas but also active in Italy, Germany and Austria[1].

    On 10 June 2025, OFAC sanctioned another five people and five sham charities outside the US that stand accused of financing Hamas’s military wing under the guise of conducting humanitarian work both internationally and in Gaza. Some of them operate in the EU, specifically, in Italy and the Netherlands, and are run by people already subject to sanctions[2].

    Despite those measures, the charities continue to operate undisturbed in Europe, carrying out activities for a movement that the EU has designated a terrorist organisation.

    Taking into account that the US, an important Atlantic Alliance partner in efforts to tackle international terrorism and bring stability to the Middle East, has already sanctioned those charities, will the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy apply similar sanctions at EU level with a view to curbing terrorist activities in the Member States?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    • [1] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2632.
    • [2] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0162.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Brussels endorses the CGT as a ‘trusted flagger’ on the Internet – E-002315/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002315/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Virginie Joron (PfE)

    The new EU Digital Services Act (DSA) now governs the moderation and removal of ‘illegal’ content online. Article 22 of the DSA requires online platforms to take the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers are given priority. The Commission has recently confirmed that the CGT has been granted ‘trusted flagger’ status in France (5 March 2025)[1].

    However, the CGT is not recognised for its commitment to freedom of expression or to combating fraud, nor for its political neutrality.

    • 1.Can the Commission confirm that the biggest platforms (X, Meta, Youtube, etc.)[2] must address reports and requests for removal issued by the CGT as a priority, including in times of crisis?
    • 2.Is the fact of a country granting trusted flagger status to a political entity or trade union compatible with the spirit of the DSA?
    • 3.Has the CGT indeed received nearly EUR 10 million from the European Union since 2014[3]?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    • [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/trusted-flaggers-under-dsa
    • [2] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/analysis.html A search of the Commission’s financial transparency register using the keyword ‘CGT’ reveals approximately EUR 10 million in European funding, of which EUR 9.14 million was reportedly paid to three organisations: 1) The CGT’s National Federation of Construction Workers (approximately half of the amount) 2) The CGT’s Confederation of Retired Workers and Trade Unionists 3) The CGT’s Federation of Metalworkers
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Brussels endorses the CGT as a ‘trusted flagger’ on the Internet – E-002315/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002315/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Virginie Joron (PfE)

    The new EU Digital Services Act (DSA) now governs the moderation and removal of ‘illegal’ content online. Article 22 of the DSA requires online platforms to take the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers are given priority. The Commission has recently confirmed that the CGT has been granted ‘trusted flagger’ status in France (5 March 2025)[1].

    However, the CGT is not recognised for its commitment to freedom of expression or to combating fraud, nor for its political neutrality.

    • 1.Can the Commission confirm that the biggest platforms (X, Meta, Youtube, etc.)[2] must address reports and requests for removal issued by the CGT as a priority, including in times of crisis?
    • 2.Is the fact of a country granting trusted flagger status to a political entity or trade union compatible with the spirit of the DSA?
    • 3.Has the CGT indeed received nearly EUR 10 million from the European Union since 2014[3]?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    • [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/trusted-flaggers-under-dsa
    • [2] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/analysis.html A search of the Commission’s financial transparency register using the keyword ‘CGT’ reveals approximately EUR 10 million in European funding, of which EUR 9.14 million was reportedly paid to three organisations: 1) The CGT’s National Federation of Construction Workers (approximately half of the amount) 2) The CGT’s Confederation of Retired Workers and Trade Unionists 3) The CGT’s Federation of Metalworkers
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Ireland’s schools and UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – E-002363/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002363/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kathleen Funchion (The Left)

    In the recent Commission staff working document, entitled ‘2025 Country Report – Ireland’, which accompanies the Commission communication entitled ‘Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Ireland’ (COM(2025)0207), there is an acknowledgement that the segregated ‘special schools’ are not in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

    • 1.Could the Commission outline what supports, including financial supports, are available to Ireland to increase special classes within mainstream schools to cater for children with additional needs?
    • 2.What funding opportunities are there for targeted treatments within the school environment to assist with diagnoses, development and ongoing learning, such as speech and language therapy and additional resources teachers?
    • 3.What funding opportunities are there for other therapeutic treatments, play therapy counselling, nurture programme teachers and other related techniques?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Ireland’s schools and UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – E-002363/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002363/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kathleen Funchion (The Left)

    In the recent Commission staff working document, entitled ‘2025 Country Report – Ireland’, which accompanies the Commission communication entitled ‘Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Ireland’ (COM(2025)0207), there is an acknowledgement that the segregated ‘special schools’ are not in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

    • 1.Could the Commission outline what supports, including financial supports, are available to Ireland to increase special classes within mainstream schools to cater for children with additional needs?
    • 2.What funding opportunities are there for targeted treatments within the school environment to assist with diagnoses, development and ongoing learning, such as speech and language therapy and additional resources teachers?
    • 3.What funding opportunities are there for other therapeutic treatments, play therapy counselling, nurture programme teachers and other related techniques?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Statement on cyber security incident

    Source: City of Oxford

    Published: Thursday, 19 June 2025

    Oxford City Council was subject to a cyber security incident over the weekend of 7/8 June.

    An unauthorised presence was detected within our network. Our automated security systems kicked in, removed the presence and minimised the access the attackers had to our systems and databases.

    We then rapidly deployed external cyber security specialists to support us and proactively took down each of the Council’s main systems to carry out full security checks and investigate the incident.

    These precautionary measures resulted in disruption to some of our services over the last week, our staff have been working hard to minimise impact on our residents but we would like to sincerely apologise for any inconvenience this has caused to people wanting to access our services.

    We’re pleased to say that most of our systems are now safely up and running again, and the remaining systems should be back online this week. Thank you for your patience and understanding while we’ve worked through this.

    As a result of these precautionary checks, we can confirm that the Council’s email systems and wider digital services remain secure and safe to use.

    Unfortunately, the attackers were able to access some historic data on legacy systems. We have now identified that people who worked on Oxford City Council-administered elections between 2001 and 2022, including poll station workers and ballot counters, may have had some personal details accessed. The majority of these people will be current or former Council officers. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the accessed information has been shared with third parties.

    Investigations continue to identify as precisely as we can what was accessed and what, if anything, might have been taken out of our systems. There is no evidence of a mass download or extraction of data.

    We understand that people will be concerned and today we have individually contacted people potentially affected to explain what happened, what support is available, and the steps we’re taking to ensure something like this doesn’t happen again.

    We know how important it is to protect the information we hold. We take that responsibility extremely seriously, and this unlawful breach of Council systems is deeply regrettable for all impacted. We have already taken action to prevent any further unauthorised access to our systems, and we have reported the incident to the relevant government authorities and law enforcement agencies. A full investigation into the incident is ongoing.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Implementing the EPBD to ensure genuine energy savings by levering measured performance – E-002357/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002357/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Niels Flemming Hansen (PPE)

    The recast Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) introduces a pivotal shift towards measured energy performance (Annex I), which assesses a building’s actual energy consumption. This data-driven approach is a significant improvement over the theoretical models used for traditional Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs), which often fail to reflect real-world energy use.

    Adopting measured performance is critical for ensuring that building renovations deliver verifiable energy savings, thereby enhancing accountability, de-risking investments and building public trust. However, the successful EU-wide implementation of this principle depends entirely on clear guidance from the Commission and robust support for Member States.

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.What specific actions will the Commission take to develop and disseminate clear guidance for Member States on the effective implementation of measured energy performance, as introduced in the recast EPBD?
    • 2.How does the Commission intend to support the development of a harmonised, pan-European certification scheme for measured performance systems to ensure their reliability and comparability across the EU?
    • 3.Given that other international partners, such as the United Kingdom, have already begun to shift renovation policies towards a measured performance framework, what steps will the Commission take to analyse the lessons learned from these experiences to inform best practice within the EU?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Implementing the EPBD to ensure genuine energy savings by levering measured performance – E-002357/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002357/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Niels Flemming Hansen (PPE)

    The recast Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) introduces a pivotal shift towards measured energy performance (Annex I), which assesses a building’s actual energy consumption. This data-driven approach is a significant improvement over the theoretical models used for traditional Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs), which often fail to reflect real-world energy use.

    Adopting measured performance is critical for ensuring that building renovations deliver verifiable energy savings, thereby enhancing accountability, de-risking investments and building public trust. However, the successful EU-wide implementation of this principle depends entirely on clear guidance from the Commission and robust support for Member States.

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.What specific actions will the Commission take to develop and disseminate clear guidance for Member States on the effective implementation of measured energy performance, as introduced in the recast EPBD?
    • 2.How does the Commission intend to support the development of a harmonised, pan-European certification scheme for measured performance systems to ensure their reliability and comparability across the EU?
    • 3.Given that other international partners, such as the United Kingdom, have already begun to shift renovation policies towards a measured performance framework, what steps will the Commission take to analyse the lessons learned from these experiences to inform best practice within the EU?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News