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Category: European Union

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Israel’s new aid system is inhumane. Israel needs to end its restrictions on aid now: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Israel’s new aid system is inhumane. Israel needs to end its restrictions on aid now: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Explanation of vote by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, following the vote on the E10 draft UN Security Council resolution on Gaza.

    The United Kingdom voted in favour of this resolution today because the intolerable situation in Gaza needs to end.

    We are determined to see an end to this war, secure the release of the hostages held by Hamas and alleviate the catastrophic humanitarian situation for Palestinians in Gaza. 

    This Israeli Government’s decisions to expand its military operations in Gaza and severely restrict aid are unjustifiable, disproportionate and counterproductive, and the UK completely opposes them.

    The Israeli Government says it has opened up aid access with its new system.

    But Palestinians, desperate to feed their families, have been killed as they try to reach the very few aid sites that have been permitted by Israel. 

    This is inhumane.

    We support the UN’s call for an immediate and independent investigation into these events and for perpetrators to be held accountable.

    Israel needs to end its restrictions on aid now: let the UN and humanitarians do their job to save lives, reduce suffering and maintain dignity.

    President, we regret that the Council was unable to reach consensus today, but we remain committed to the vision of this text.

    We will continue to strongly support the efforts led by the United States, Qatar and Egypt to secure an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. 

    A ceasefire is the best way to secure the release of all remaining hostages and achieve a long-term political solution.

    And we repeat our condemnation of the heinous attack by Hamas on 7th October and demand that it release all the hostages immediately and unconditionally. Hamas can have no role in the future governance of Gaza.

    A two-state solution is the only way to bring the long-lasting peace, stability and security that both Israelis and Palestinians deserve. 

    We welcome France and Saudi Arabia’s leadership in chairing an international conference later this month.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Washington State Man Arrested on Federal Charges Alleging He Provided Material Support to Palm Springs Fertility Clinic Bomber

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    A Washington state man was arrested on a federal criminal complaint alleging he provided material support to the Palm Springs fertility clinic bomber by shipping and paying for significant quantities of ammonium nitrate – an explosive precursor – prior to the suicidal terror attack last month.

    Daniel Jongyon Park, 32, of Kent, was arrested last night shortly after his flight from Poland arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Park is charged with providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists and made his initial court appearance today in the Eastern District of New York.

    “This defendant is charged with facilitating the horrific attack on a fertility center in California. Bringing chaos and violence to a facility that exists to help women and mothers is a particularly cruel, disgusting crime that strikes at the very heart of our shared humanity,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “We are grateful to our partners in Poland who helped get this man back to America and we will prosecute him to the fullest extent of the law.”

    “Park allegedly sent large amounts of explosive precursors to the man who drove a car bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs, an attack that potentially could have killed innocent people,”  said FBI Director Kash Patel. “The FBI and our partners work together to find and hold accountable those who engage in domestic terrorism and other illegal activity. I also want to express my thanks to authorities in Poland for their vital assistance in this case.”

    “This defendant is charged with shipping large quantities of explosive precursors to the man whose suicide bombing last month destroyed a fertility clinic in Palm Springs,” said U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California. “Domestic terrorism is evil and unacceptable. Those who aid terrorists can expect to feel the cold wrath of justice.”

    According to an affidavit filed with the complaint, Guy Edward Bartkus, 25, of Twentynine Palms, California, drove a car containing a bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs on May 17. Bartkus detonated the bomb, killing himself, injuring numerous victims, destroying the fertility clinic’s building, and damaging surrounding buildings and areas. Bartkus’s attack was motivated by his pro-mortalism, anti-natalism, and anti-pro-life ideology, which is the belief that individuals should not be born without their consent and that non-existence is best.

    Park – who shares Bartkus’s extremist views – shipped large quantities of explosive precursor materials to Bartkus, including approximately 180 pounds of ammonium nitrate. Days before the Palm Springs bombing, Park paid for an additional 90 pounds (40.8 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate that was shipped to Bartkus.

    Park sent the first shipments of approximately 180 pounds (81.7 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate to Bartkus shortly before traveling to Bartkus’s residence, where he stayed with Bartkus from Jan. 25 to Feb. 8. Three days before Park arrived at Bartkus’s house, records from an AI chat application show that Bartkus researched how to make powerful explosions using ammonium nitrate and fuel.

    During his stay at Bartkus’s residence, Park and Bartkus spent time in Bartkus’s room as well as in a detached garage “running experiments,” according to the affidavit. This was the same garage where law enforcement, during a search after the May 17 bombing, located significant amounts of chemicals commonly used in the construction of homemade bombs.

    Four days after Bartkus conducted the suicide bombing, Park flew to Europe. On May 30, Park was detained in Poland and later was ordered deported to the United States. 

    If convicted, Park would face a statutory maximum penalty of 15 years in federal prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    The FBI’s Inland Empire Joint Terrorism Task Force is investigating this matter. Considerable assistance was provided by the Palm Springs Police Department, the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department; the FBI’s legal attaché in Warsaw, Polish authorities, and FBI field offices in Seattle, New York, San Diego, Las Vegas, and Portland.  

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sarah E. Gerdes and Anna P. Boylan for the Central District of California, and Trial Attorney Patrick J. Cashman of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: US Department of Labor and Adidas America reach settlement for $235K in penalties resolving fall hazard and unsafe ladder violations

    Source: US Department of Labor

    ALBANY, NY – The U.S. Department of Labor has entered into a settlement agreement with Adidas America Inc. that requires the company to pay $235,000 in fines and implement enhanced safety measures at multiple facilities.

    The agreement comes after the department’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration conducted a 2024 follow-up inspection at an Adidas warehouse in upstate New York. OSHA initially cited for hazards in 2021 during an inspection that found missing guardrails and an unsafe ladder.

    Inspectors returned in 2024 to find that Adidas had not corrected the hazards cited in 2021 and found an additional unsafe ladder violation. 

    The May 30, 2025, settlement requires Adidas to implement enhanced abatement measures at its facilities in New York, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico, including adopting a comprehensive Safety and Health Management program, retraining employees on fall hazards, assessing and auditing potential fall hazards at each facility, and discontinuing use of overhead storage in the facilities. 

    Adidas also agreed to pay $235,000 in penalties. 

    Adidas America Inc. is a subsidiary of Adidas AG, an athletic apparel and footwear corporation headquartered in Herzogenaurach, Bavaria, Germany.

    OSHA’s Warehousing page provides solutions to prevent injuries from hazards including forklifts, slips, trips and falls and materials handling. The agency’s stop falls website offers safety information and video presentations in English and Spanish to teach workers about fall hazards and proper safety procedures.

    Learn more about OSHA.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Washington State Man Arrested on Federal Charges Alleging He Provided Material Support to Palm Springs Fertility Clinic Bomber

    Source: US State of California

    A Washington state man was arrested on a federal criminal complaint alleging he provided material support to the Palm Springs fertility clinic bomber by shipping and paying for significant quantities of ammonium nitrate – an explosive precursor – prior to the suicidal terror attack last month.

    Daniel Jongyon Park, 32, of Kent, was arrested last night shortly after his flight from Poland arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Park is charged with providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists and made his initial court appearance today in the Eastern District of New York.

    “This defendant is charged with facilitating the horrific attack on a fertility center in California. Bringing chaos and violence to a facility that exists to help women and mothers is a particularly cruel, disgusting crime that strikes at the very heart of our shared humanity,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “We are grateful to our partners in Poland who helped get this man back to America and we will prosecute him to the fullest extent of the law.”

    “Park allegedly sent large amounts of explosive precursors to the man who drove a car bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs, an attack that potentially could have killed innocent people,”  said FBI Director Kash Patel. “The FBI and our partners work together to find and hold accountable those who engage in domestic terrorism and other illegal activity. I also want to express my thanks to authorities in Poland for their vital assistance in this case.”

    “This defendant is charged with shipping large quantities of explosive precursors to the man whose suicide bombing last month destroyed a fertility clinic in Palm Springs,” said U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California. “Domestic terrorism is evil and unacceptable. Those who aid terrorists can expect to feel the cold wrath of justice.”

    According to an affidavit filed with the complaint, Guy Edward Bartkus, 25, of Twentynine Palms, California, drove a car containing a bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs on May 17. Bartkus detonated the bomb, killing himself, injuring numerous victims, destroying the fertility clinic’s building, and damaging surrounding buildings and areas. Bartkus’s attack was motivated by his pro-mortalism, anti-natalism, and anti-pro-life ideology, which is the belief that individuals should not be born without their consent and that non-existence is best.

    Park – who shares Bartkus’s extremist views – shipped large quantities of explosive precursor materials to Bartkus, including approximately 180 pounds of ammonium nitrate. Days before the Palm Springs bombing, Park paid for an additional 90 pounds (40.8 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate that was shipped to Bartkus.

    Park sent the first shipments of approximately 180 pounds (81.7 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate to Bartkus shortly before traveling to Bartkus’s residence, where he stayed with Bartkus from Jan. 25 to Feb. 8. Three days before Park arrived at Bartkus’s house, records from an AI chat application show that Bartkus researched how to make powerful explosions using ammonium nitrate and fuel.

    During his stay at Bartkus’s residence, Park and Bartkus spent time in Bartkus’s room as well as in a detached garage “running experiments,” according to the affidavit. This was the same garage where law enforcement, during a search after the May 17 bombing, located significant amounts of chemicals commonly used in the construction of homemade bombs.

    Four days after Bartkus conducted the suicide bombing, Park flew to Europe. On May 30, Park was detained in Poland and later was ordered deported to the United States. 

    If convicted, Park would face a statutory maximum penalty of 15 years in federal prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    The FBI’s Inland Empire Joint Terrorism Task Force is investigating this matter. Considerable assistance was provided by the Palm Springs Police Department, the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department; the FBI’s legal attaché in Warsaw, Polish authorities, and FBI field offices in Seattle, New York, San Diego, Las Vegas, and Portland.  

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sarah E. Gerdes and Anna P. Boylan for the Central District of California, and Trial Attorney Patrick J. Cashman of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility – A10-0098/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility

    (2024/2085(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     

    – having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[1] (RRF Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC[2] (REPowerEU Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[3] (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[4] (MFF Regulation),

    – having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[5] (the IIA),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[6] (Financial Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241[7],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97[8],

    – having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility[9],

    – having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’[10],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    – having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    – having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    – having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    – having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    – having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’[11],

    – having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    – having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    – having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF[12],

    – having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds[13],

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    – having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

     

    A. whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B. whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C. whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D. whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E. whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F. whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G. whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H. whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I. whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J. whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K. whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197.46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108.68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L. whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M. whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    N. whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    O. whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    P. whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    Q. whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

     

    1. Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2. Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3. Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4. Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5. Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1.4 % compared with 2.3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0.8 %; notes that the  long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6. Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7. Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8. Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation[14]; observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9. Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10. Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11. Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12. Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7.5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13. Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14. Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15. Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16. Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

     

    17. Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18. Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385.8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19. Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20. Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21. Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

     

    22. Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23. Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24. Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25. Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26. Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27. Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28. Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29. Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30. Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31. Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32. Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33. Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34. Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35. Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36. Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37. Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38. Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39. Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40. Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41. Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42. Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43. Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44. Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

     

    45. Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(3) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46. Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47. Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48. Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    49. Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    50. Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    51. Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    52. Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    53. Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    54. Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    55. Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2.8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

     

    56. Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    57. Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    58. Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    59. Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    60. Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    61. Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    62. Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    63. Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    64. Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    65. Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    66. Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    67. Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    68. Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    69. Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    70. Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    71. Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    72. Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    73. Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    74. Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    75. Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    76. Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    77. Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    78. Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    79. Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    80. Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    81. Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    82. Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    83. Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    84. Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    85. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Bulgaria meets criteria to join the euro area on 1 January 2026

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Brussels, 04 Jun 2025 Today, the European Commission concluded that Bulgaria is ready to adopt the euro as of 1 January 2026 – a key milestone that would make it the twenty-first Member State to join the euro area.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report – A10-0100/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report

    (2024/2078(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

    – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

    – having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

    – having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[1] (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[2] (the Common Provisions Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[3] (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014[4],

    – having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

    – having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

    – having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

    – having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

    – having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

    – having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

    – having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

    – having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[5],

    – having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States[6];

    – having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland[7],

    – having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level[8],

    – having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded[9],

    – having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU[10],

    – having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[11],

    – having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights[12],

    – having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[13],

    – having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’[14],

    – having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092[15],

    – having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report[16],

    – having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[17],

    – having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU[18],

    – having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society[19],

    – having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas[20],

    – having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe[21],

    – having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling[22],

    – having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report[23],

    – having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)[24],

    – having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021[25],

    – having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded[26],

    – having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia[27],

    – having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia[28],

    – having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU[29],

    – having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP[30],

    – having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union[31],

    – having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe[32],

    – having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’[33],

    – having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[34],

    – having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds[35],

    – having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware[36] ,

    – having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland[37],

    – having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists[38],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (COM(2023)0051),

    – having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023[39],

    – having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime[40],

    – having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications[41],

    – having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

    – having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

    – having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

    – having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

    – having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

    – having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

    – having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)[42],

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

    A. whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

    B. whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected[43],[44]; whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

    C. whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

    D. whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

    E. whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

    F. whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

    Independence of the judiciary

    1. Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

    2. Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

    3. Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges   essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

    4. Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

    5. Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice;

    6. Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

    7. Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

    8. Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States[45] and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

    9. Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

    10. Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

    11. Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

    12. Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

    13. Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

    14. Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

    15. Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

    16. Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive[46] to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

    17. Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

    18. Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

    19. Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

    Anti-corruption framework

    20. Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

    21. Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

    22. Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

    23. Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

    24. Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

    25. Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation[47] and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law[48] in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

    26. Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

    27. Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

    28. Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

    29. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

    30. Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking; acknowledges the agreement on establishing the Interinstitutional Body for Ethical Standards;

    31. Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

    Media pluralism and freedom

    32. Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)[49] and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

    33. Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive[50], as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

    34. Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings[51], and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

    35. Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

    36. Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

    37. Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes; 

    38. Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act[52] (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

    39. Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

    40. Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

    41. Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343[53] on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

    42. Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

    Civil society organisations (CSOs)

    43. Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

    44. Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)[54] and civil society networks[55]; reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

    45. Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups[56];

    46. Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

    47. Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

    48. Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

    49. Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

    50. Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States[57] and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

    Equality and non-discrimination before the law

    51. Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

    52. Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC[58] on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive[59] and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

    53. Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

    54. Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    55. Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

    56. Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC[60] in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings[61] of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

    57. Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

    58. Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

    59. Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

    60. Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500[62] and Directive 2024/1499[63], which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

    61. Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

    62. Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

    63. Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)[64]; urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

    64. Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

    65. Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

    Single market and the rule of law

    66. Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

    67. Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

    68. Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

    69. Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

    70. Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

    71. Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

    72. Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

    Rule of law toolbox

    73. Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

    74. Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

    75. Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

    76. Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law[65], not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

    77. Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

    78. Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

    79. Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

    Checks and balances

    80. Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

    81. Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

    82. Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

    83. Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act[66], the AI Act[67], Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising[68] and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

    84. Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

    85. Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

    86. Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

    87. Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms[69]; recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

    88. Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

    89. Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

    90. Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

    Horizontal recommendations

    91. Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

    92. Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

    93. Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    94. Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

    95. Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

    96. Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

    97. Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

    98. Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

    99. Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; reiterates the proposal to create a permanent group of eminent personalities (‘wise persons group’) composed of independent legal, academic and human rights experts, tasked with systematically monitoring rule of law developments in Member States and providing regular assessments, recommendations and early warnings to the Commission; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

    100. Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

    101. Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

    102. Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

    103. Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

    104. Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

    105. Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

    °

    ° °

    106. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: Palestine, Sudan, South Sudan & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (4 June 2025) | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Senior Personnel Appointment    
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Sudan
    South Sudan
    Libya
    Bangladesh
    Yemen
    Human Rights/Climate
    International Day
    Programming Note

    SENIOR PERSONNEL APPOINTMENT    
    The Secretary-General is appointing Major General Diodato Abagnara of Italy as Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, known as UNIFIL. We expect him to take up his position on the 24th of June.
    Major General Abagnara succeeds Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz of Spain.  The Secretary-General extends his sincere gratitude to Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz for his dedication, for his leadership of UNIFIL during one of the mission’s most challenging periods.
    Major General Abagnara brings to the position over 36 years of military service, including extensive leadership roles within the Italian Armed Forces.  
    Most recently, he served as Commander and Chair of the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon, where he oversaw multinational coordination efforts in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. 

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
    Tom Fletcher, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, today urged Israel to open all of the crossings into Gaza, let in lifesaving aid at scale from all directions, and lift the restrictions on what and how much aid we can bring in. 
    He noted that dozens of Gazans were declared dead at hospitals yesterday after Israeli forces said they had opened fire. Mr. Fletcher said this is the outcome of a series of deliberate choices that have systematically deprived two million people of the essentials they need to survive.  
    Meanwhile, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs tell us the latest figures indicate that in the past three weeks, more than 100,000 people were forced to flee in the governorates of North Gaza and Gaza. 
    UN partners working in health say that more medical facilities are suspending their operations.
    On Monday, the remaining staff and patients at the Indonesian Hospital, in North Gaza, were evacuated.
    As a result, not a single hospital remains functional in North Gaza.  
    Today in Gaza City, Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator Suzanna Tkalec visited Al Ahli hospital, which has sustained multiple attacks since the beginning of the war. Ms. Tkalec heard from staff about the challenges they are facing every day. They stressed that preventable deaths are occurring due to shortages of critical supplies, including antibiotics. The Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator called for the protection of health facilities, the unrestricted flow of assistance into Gaza, and support for our work and our partners’ work to deliver at scale to alleviate the suffering of people.
    Meanwhile, we and our partners continue to send supplies to Kerem Shalom crossing, where the Israeli authorities scan them before they can enter Gaza.
    For today, we submitted over 130 pre-cleared truckloads for a second and final Israeli clearance, but only 50 of them – which were carrying flour – were approved to enter the Israeli side of the Kerem Shalom crossing. 
    UN teams on the ground are also working hard to collect supplies from Kerem Shalom and bring them closer to the people who need them inside Gaza. But these attempts are facing major hurdles. Just yesterday, one attempt was denied access altogether and another one did manage to retrieve just over a dozen truckloads carrying flour. Overall, since the crossing reopened, we’ve been able to collect fewer than 400 truckloads, even though every day we have tried to coordinate access and secure safe routes through the Israeli-militarized zone in the south. 
    And that denied attempt to access Kerem Shalom was one of the six access denials our teams faced just yesterday across the Gaza Strip, out of a total of 13 attempts. These denials prevented our teams from carrying out interventions as critical as trucking water to those who need it. 
    Another of yesterday’s six denied access attempts was to retrieve fuel, which is so urgently needed. OCHA warns that without immediate access to fuel that is already inside Gaza but located in hard-to-reach areas that are either militarized or subject to displacement orders, more critical services will have to suspend operations soon.  
    And as you know, this afternoon at 4 p.m., the members of the Security Council of the United Nations will meet not far from here to discuss the situation in Gaza.

    Full highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=04%20June%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w7x3xY06V9s

    MIL OSI Video –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Aircraft noise around Schiphol – P-002158/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-002158/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Dirk Gotink (PPE)

    With a view to reducing aircraft noise around Schiphol, the Netherlands has followed the ‘balanced approach’ procedure. In view of this:

    • 1.Does the Commission agree that setting spatial, environmental and noise limits on the operation of national airports is a responsibility of the Member States, one which requires them to carefully balance economic and environmental interests?
    • 2.Does the Commission agree that the sole purpose of the mandatory European ‘balanced approach’ procedure when it comes to noise-related operating restrictions is to ensure that national assessments are carried out with the requisite due diligence, in particular to properly substantiate the inevitability or added value of a proposed operating restriction in the light of a noise-related target determined at national level?
    • 3.Does the Commission consider that the Dutch Government has carefully followed the ‘balanced approach’ procedure with regard to Schiphol Airport, and does it also take the view that the Dutch Government has therefore adopted a balanced package of measures to reduce noise levels for people and homes by 20 %?

    Submitted: 28.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Need for fair trials in Baku – E-002048/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002048/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nicolas Bay (ECR)

    Since the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh, which saw more than 130 000 Armenians forced to flee their ancestral land, several citizens of Armenian origin have been arrested by the Azerbaijani authorities and are currently being tried in Baku. The Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Belgium stated that the trials were public and that diplomats and politicians could attend[1][2].

    With tensions high between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the peace treaty, the EU must remain vigilant as regards respect for fundamental rights, including the right to a fair trial.

    As it is engaged in strategic partnerships with these two Caucasus countries, including a controversial gas agreement with Baku, the EU has a responsibility to ensure its relations are founded on democratic principles. The European Parliament’s support for closer ties with Armenia sends a strong signal for a more balanced commitment[3].

    Is the Commission going to ask the EU Delegation in Azerbaijan to mandate an observer to attend the hearings of these trials on a daily basis to ensure that the international standards of justice and a fair procedure are being upheld?

    Submitted: 21.5.2025

    • [1] ‘The court proceedings are open, any person be it any citizen of any country, foreigner or foreign diplomat or journalist can attend this proceedings. You have your embassy in Baku, they are free to go and to provide directly to you all the information’, reply to Belgian politician Pierre Kompany, on 8 April 2025, at the hearing of Vagif Sadikov, Ambassador of Azerbaijan to the Committee on External Affairs of the Belgian Federal Parliament, on a resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh.
    • [2] ‘Political access to the political prisoners, well I already mentioned well you have excellent ambassador of Belgium in Baku Mr. Ambassador Julien De Fraipont, he is welcomed to attend the court proceedings anytime when he wants’, reply to Belgian politician Els Van Hoof in the same interview.
    • [3] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-2024-0166_EN.html
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Impact of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive on the availability and affordability of essential medicines – E-002108/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002108/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Christine Anderson (ESN)

    The revised[1] Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive[2] (UWWTD) may significantly increase production costs for essential, low-cost medicines such as Metformin, a key treatment for type two diabetes used by nearly three million patients in Germany[3].

    Estimates suggest that pharmaceutical and cosmetic companies are required to cover at least 80 % of the costs (Article 9) of additional treatment to remove micropollutants in order to comply with the directive. This could lead to a cost increase of up to 445 % for Metformin production. Manufacturers warn that this would make the continued EU-based production of such medicines unviable, risking market withdrawals, medicine shortages and greater dependence on non-EU imports.

    • 1.Can the Commission confirm whether the estimate of up to a 445 % cost increase for Metformin is accurate, and whether it anticipates similar effects across other Member States and medicines, particularly for low-margin generics?
    • 2.How does the Commission reconcile the provisions of the UWWTD, specifically the mandatory cost allocation under Article 9(4), with the objectives of the proposed Critical Medicines Act, which aims to strengthen EU production and supply security for essential pharmaceuticals?
    • 3.Given the risk to medicine affordability and availability, does the Commission consider a targeted revision or exemption within the UWWTD necessary in order to safeguard public health and pharmaceutical resilience?

    Submitted: 26.5.2025

    • [1] COM(2022)0541.
    • [2] Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment, OJ L, 2024/3019, 12.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/3019/oj.
    • [3] Der Spiegel, https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/diabetes-medikament-metformin-droht-das-aus-hohe-kosten-durch-eu-abwasserrichtlinie-a-25ab387e-8ef2-43c7-a9e0-7714d850aeb3.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Independence and impartiality of the UNAR (Italian equality body) – E-002106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002106/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Pina Picierno (S&D), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Marc Angel (S&D), Lucia Yar (Renew), Irene Tinagli (S&D), Krzysztof Śmiszek (S&D), Alessandra Moretti (S&D)

    The Ufficio Nazionale Antidiscriminazioni Razziali (UNAR) is a public equality body established by the Italian Government, responsible for promoting equal treatment and eliminating discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender identity and sexual orientation.

    The UNAR falls under Directive 2000/43/EC[1] and, after its transposition into national law, Directive (EU) 2024/1500[2].

    Independence and impartiality should underpin its actions. Nevertheless, the UNAR reports to the Office of the Prime Minister and its director is appointed by the Prime Minister. Therefore, the principles of independence and impartiality are compromised and the office is subject to political influence by the government. The UNAR has been accused of delaying the financing of anti-discrimination projects and breaking off formal relations with civil society organisations and human rights defenders, specifically LGBTQIA+ related associations.

    In view of the implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1500, in particular Articles 3 on independence and impartiality, 4 on resources, and 5 and 6 that set out the objectives, can the Commission clarify:

    • 1.if the UNAR and the Italian Government are already complying with the provisions applying to equality bodies in the context of the Directive (EU) 2024/1500;
    • 2.if it is already in contact with national authorities regarding the implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1500;
    • 3.what would the possible actions be if Italy does not comply with the provisions of EU law?

    Submitted: 26.5.2025

    • [1] Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22., ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/43/oj.
    • [2] Directive (EU) 2024/1500 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, OJ L, 2024/1500, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1500/oj.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Widespread phenomenon of fir and plane trees drying out in the mountainous areas of Greece – risk to biodiversity and forest ecosystems – E-002094/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002094/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Sakis Arnaoutoglou (S&D)

    In recent years, according to the Institute of Mediterranean Forest Ecosystems, a large number of fir and plane trees have been drying out in many mountainous areas of mainland Greece, with Tzoumerka, the Acheloos valley and Agrafa being typical examples. This phenomenon is a major concern for local communities and scientists, as it affects forest ecosystems, threatens biodiversity and increases the risk of fires and desertification.

    The fact that fir and plane trees are drying out appears to be related both to the effects of climate change (prolonged droughts, extreme temperatures) and to biotic factors, such as attacks by bark-eating insects and fungi. However, to date, neither a single monitoring mechanism nor a coordinated response has been implemented at European level.

    In the light of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.Does it monitor the widespread phenomenon of fir and plane trees drying out in EU Member States, in particular in mountainous areas such as Tzoumerka, the Acheloos valley and Agrafa?
    • 2.Are there any European funding tools that can be used to research, prevent and tackle this phenomenon in these regions?
    • 3.Does it intend to strengthen cooperation with the Member States to set up early warning and intervention mechanisms to protect forest ecosystems from the consequences of the climate crisis?

    Submitted: 26.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Use of NextGenerationEU funds in the bullfighting lobby – E-002066/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002066/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Estrella Galán (The Left)

    The website[1] of an association of breeders of bulls for bullfighting mentions that it is receiving funding from NextGenerationEU without clarifying what it is for. This organisation is part of the so-called ‘bullfighting lobby’, whose activities involve lobbying and influencing public authorities in order to promote or strengthen bullfighting in Spain and also in the European Union[2].

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.What funds has the Commission allocated to this group?
    • 2.Is the Commission aware that EU funds are being used for bullfighting?

    Submitted: 22.5.2025

    • [1] https://ganaderosdebravo.es/en/
    • [2] https://ganaderosdebravo.es/en/defense-and-representation-in-european-institutions-central-and-regional-administrations/
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Investments in defence and Romania’s budget deficit – P-002191/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-002191/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza (ECR)

    The European Union has approved the creation of the SAFE instrument, the EUR 150 billion European arms fund that will support those Member States that wish to invest in defence industrial production through common procurement. This initiative is welcome in the current geopolitical context.

    However, since Romania has been in the excessive debt procedure (over 3 % of GDP) for four years and Romania had an ESA (standard used in the European Union) budget deficit of 9.2 % of GDP in 2024:

    • 1.How does the European Commission intend to harmonise the implementation of the SAFE programme with the situation of Member States with a major budget deficit, such as Romania, so that access to financing to strengthen defence capacities does not deepen national fiscal imbalances?
    • 2.In view of the high level of the budget deficit estimated for Romania (8.6 % of GDP in 2025), what concrete instruments is the European Commission making available to support Romania in its efforts to strengthen national defence, without compromising macroeconomic stability?
    • 3.What opportunities for financing or participation in European defence programmes are available to Romania in the context of other security initiatives, which do not entail new sovereign loans and can contribute to the development of defence industrial capacities?

    Submitted: 2.6.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Increase in number of attacks with explosives in the Netherlands – Need for European action – E-002111/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002111/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tom Berendsen (PPE), Jeroen Lenaers (PPE)

    Nowhere in Europe are there as many attacks with powerful fireworks and explosives as in the Netherlands. In 2024, there were as many as 1543. In addition, we see this trend spreading further in Europe to Germany, Belgium, France and Sweden. At issue, in particular, are flash bangers (as sold under the brand name Cobra) – fireworks belonging to category F4, intended for professional use only. Flash bangers indeed fall under this category but are rarely, if ever, used professionally and mainly end up in the hands of criminals.

    Legal production and storage take place largely outside the Netherlands. Flash bangers from abroad then enter the black market through criminal networks and are then resold cheaply and easily, for example on online platforms.

    To counter the worrying developments, European action is necessary. Both trade in and production of powerful fireworks such as flash bangers need to be more strictly regulated and controlled.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.Is the Commission prepared to introduce a ban on the production of powerful, loud-bang fireworks such as flash bangers, as they are not being used for professional purposes?
    • 2.In the meantime, what action will the Commission take to prevent this type of explosive from entering the black market?

    Submitted: 27.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Missions – Mission report following the ECON mission to Paris, France, from 14 to 16 April 2025 – 14-04-2025 – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    During its mission to Paris, the ECON delegation met the French Finance Minister, the Governor of the Banque de France and the Premier Président of the Cour des comptes, as well as other French government officials, regulatory agencies, businesses, economists and trade unions’ representatives.

    The ECON delegation also met with the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

    Location : Paris, France
    Mission report following the ECON mission to Paris, France, from 14 to 16 April 2025

    Source : © European Union, 2025 – EP

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Concerns regarding integrity mechanisms for EPPO national representatives – E-001356/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is independent from the Commission. The Commission is not involved in the administrative inquiry concerning the European Prosecutor from Bulgaria, nor in the vetting or the assessment of the asset disclosure requirements of the members of the EPPO, for which the EPPO is responsible in accordance with the relevant rules and procedures.

    The Commission is evaluating the implementation and impact of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 (‘EPPO Regulation’)[1], as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of the EPPO and its working practices. The evaluation report is due in 2026.

    In this context, the Commission will also assess whether the existing measures to strengthen integrity checks, transparency and asset verification for EPPO staff are sufficient.

    The cooperation between the EPPO and national authorities will be covered by the same evaluation. In addition, the Commission has been receiving from the EPPO, since 2023 and on an annual basis, a contribution on the cooperation between the national authorities and the EPPO in the context of the annual Rule of Law Cycle.

    This information will feed into the evaluation of the EPPO Regulation and the EPPO’s effectiveness, efficiency and working practices.

    • [1] Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1-71.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Support for the Ionian Islands in relation to landslides – E-001597/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Based on their national or subnational climate risk assessments, Member States can use Cohesion Policy to support disaster risk management, particularly by financing prevention, response and resilience measures in islands or coastal areas. This may also include measures to address soil erosion.

    Specifically for Greece, over EUR 726 million in public funding is allocated to prevent and manage climate-related flood risks, including coastal and land erosion management . Under the shared management principle governing these funds, national authorities are responsible for selecting projects for funding and overseeing their implementation.

    Furthermore, Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan[1] invests in anti-erosion and flood protection across Greece in response to the floods and wildfires in 2023 (measure 16849). The related interventions include the construction of dams, stream stabilisation structures and rainwater retention systems, with the aim to improve soil retention, biodiversity conservation and agricultural production. By end-2025, a total area of 5 000 hectares of anti-erosion works and 175 000 square meters of flood protection works is expected to be completed.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Consequences of the EU-Mercosur agreement for Polish agriculture – E-000681/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The agreement between the EU and the Mercosur represents a key geostrategic and economic interest for the EU, particularly under the current threats to the global trade order.

    The agreement creates new opportunities for EU agri-food products in the highly protected Mercosur markets, by eliminating duties on key EU products.

    It also protects EU sensitive products, such as beef, poultry and sugar, through carefully calibrated tariff rate quotas, which are limited to a very small share of EU consumption, and robust safeguards in case of adverse market effects.

    Economic studies carried out by the Commission confirm that the market impact of the Mercosur agreement for EU sensitive products would be very limited[1].

    Although these studies are carried out at EU level, it is unlikely that there would be a disproportionate impact on a particular region or Member State, such as Poland, given that potential increased import flows are expected to be absorbed by the whole EU internal market.

    Moreover, one study commissioned by a national administration broadly confirms the results of the EU-wide studies[2]. In addition, the Commission will develop a Unity Safety Net to protect Member States ‘in the unlikely event that the agricultural market situation in the EU is negatively impacted following the implementation of the Agreement’ that will include the announced EUR 1 billion reserve in the context of the proposal for the next multiannual financial framework.

    Finally, the Commission is currently analysing the economic impact of the E U-Mercosur agreement negotiated outcome, which is expected to be presented by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament simultaneously with the proposal for signature and conclusion of the agreement.

    • [1] Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of the Association Agreement negotiations between the EU and Mercosur: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/analysis-and-assessment/sustainability-impact-assessments_en; Cumulative economic impact of upcoming trade agreements on EU agriculture: https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC135540.
    • [2] https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/1c8a6-economic-and-sustainability-impact-assessment-for-ireland-of-the-eu-mercosur-trade-agreement/.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Supporting East Macedonia and Thrace in the face of the demographic crisis – E-001062/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission recognises the challenge of population decline and encourages Member States to develop integrated policies to manage demographic change.

    The Commission’s Demographic Toolbox provides a set of tools that can support Member States and regions in these efforts. As part of the Demographic Toolbox, the Talent Booster Mechanism is targeted towards EU regions that are experiencing a decline in their working-age population and that are affected by the departure of young people. The EU Long-term Vision for Rural Areas also includes strategies to address demographic decline.

    Cohesion Policy is committed to reducing disparities between regions in different Member States, including Greece, ensuring inter alia that people can effectively stay in the place they call home.

    Some EUR 639 million has been allocated to the regional programme for Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, aimed among others at fostering entrepreneurship, strengthening education and social care infrastructure, and promoting the region’s natural and cultural heritage to boost the region’s attractiveness. These investments will create jobs and upgrade public infrastructure, improving quality of life of residents.

    Additionally, the region benefits from a programme under the European Social Fund Plus aimed at boosting employment. It improves job access and activation measures for all jobseekers, focusing on youth, the long-term unemployed, disadvantaged groups in the labour market, and inactive people.

    The program also promotes self-employment and the social economy with a budget of EUR 12.75 million. Current actions include supporting enterprises in hiring highly qualified unemployed individuals and helping unemployed people start businesses.

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New St Clements School co-location statutory consultation

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    Members of the Education Committee met today (Wednesday 4 June) and agreed the recommendation to proceed with the statutory public consultation for the co-location of the new St Clement’s School alongside a new Dingwall Primary School on a shared site with enhanced community facilities.

    A public meeting will be held on Wednesday 2 July to discuss the Council’s proposal. There will also be the opportunity for stakeholders to submit views to the Council ahead of the meeting and subsequently prior to any final recommendation and decision being made.

    At a meeting of The Highland Council on Thursday 27 March 2024, elected members unanimously agreed investment priorities for the first phase of The Highland Investment Plan (HIP), including a recommendation to co-locate St Clement’s and Dingwall Primary schools at a new Dingwall Community Point of Delivery (POD) site, on the basis that this provides the greatest educational benefits for pupils of both schools, and the maximum economic benefit for the wider community.  The proposal to relocate St Clement’s School alongside a new Dingwall Primary School on a shared site will require to undergo a statutory consultation.

    Education Committee Chair, Cllr John Finlayson said: “The commitment to build a new school that retains the school’s unique identity has been endorsed by Committee today.  The Highland Investment Plan offers an exciting co-location option that has even greater benefits for our young learners than any other previously proposed.   

    “The strong collaborative working between St Clement’s School, Dingwall Primary and the wider Dingwall community has always played an integral part in our young people’s learning journey.  Co-locating will enhance inclusion and equitable opportunities for success, providing the best learning environments for all our children.

    “It will increase opportunities for pupils with a disability to participate in wider curriculum and social opportunities, whilst ensuring specialist support and facilities are tailored to individual needs in their own individually designed standalone school and associated outdoor spaces.

    “A statutory consultation will now be undertaken for the proposed new site for St Clement’s School.”

    The consultation will begin on 9 June 2025 and will end on 3 October 2025. This period allows for the statutory minimum of six weeks, including at least thirty school days.

    A public meeting will be held at 6:30pm on Wednesday 2 July at St Clement’s School with an opportunity to attend virtually for those unable to be there in person.

    A consultant architect with extensive experience of designing special schools and additional support needs facilities has been engaged to assist with the development of the new St Clement’s School project brief and initial floor plans and external layouts have been prepared. A series of design workshops will be held with stakeholder groups in the coming weeks to establish a clear vision for the new school. This will ensure that it provides first-rate facilities to meet the needs of every child that will attend St Clement’s in the future and maximise the benefits to be realised.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Education update and positive destinations for our school leavers

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    The Highland Council, Education Committee met today (Wednesday 4 June 2025) and received a comprehensive overview of recent developments in the Education and Learning Service, including positive school leaver destinations and an update on the refreshed attainment strategy and the Education and Learning management restructure.

    Education Committee Chair, Cllr John Finlayson said: “The set of reports presented to us today, show positive steps in the educational journey of all our learners across Highland and the positive contribution they will bring as part of our ‘Workforce for the Future’ ambitions.

    “The last few months, has been as is always expected at this time of year, challenging for our senior phase learners as they have prepared for and taken their SQA exams, finalised apprenticeships and completed portfolios and module-based learning. I commend the pupils and staff for all their efforts and hope that as we draw near to the school summer holidays, pupils take some down time to reflect on what they do next in terms of learning, life and work.

    “It is encouraging to see the positive destination statistics for our school leavers be that in employment, education, or training, which have produced the most positive figures we have seen in the last 5 years with 96.5% of 2,692 pupils achieving sustained destinations on leaving school.” 

    Cllr Finlayson added: “A refreshed attainment strategy with input from central officers, headteachers, and unions has positively progressed since our February Education Committee, and its strategic focus and workstreams will be discussed at our head teachers conference.

    “At Committee today, we also received an update on the Education and Learning management restructure, a new area-based model with 8 operational areas. The changes deliver a simplified and streamlined structure, providing clear lines of responsibility and accountability.

    “Improving outcomes for all our Highland learners remains a key priority and all of today’s reports outline the continued vision and commitment of The Highland Council’s Education and Learning Service and that of our partner services to move positively forward on our journey to excellence.”

    The report can be accessed here (Item 11)

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Integrated Children Services Planning Board – Annual Update

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    At the Education Committee on Wednesday 4 June, Members were presented with the Integrated Children Services Plan Annual Report 2024/25.

    The Integrated Children’s Service’s work continues as it enters the 3rd year of the delivery of the Integrated Children’s Service Plan. The report highlights the continued progress that has been made in 2024/25. The work of the Integrated Children Services Board has continued to be strengthened through the delivery groups and strong partnership across services and in all sectors.

    The plan has been developed in collaboration with public sector bodies and third sector organisations and is informed by both the voice and testimony of children, young people and families and the needs of our communities as articulated through our Joint Strategic Needs Assessment (2023). The annual report details the significant work that has been undertaken by the delivery groups in progressing the priorities and change ideas.

    Education Committee Chair, Cllr John Finlayson said: “Listening and learning from the views and experience of children, young people and their families is key to continuing to deliver an effective and relevant Integrated Children’s Services.

    “We all have a duty and responsibility to support our communities in Highland, I along with my fellow Members recognise the importance of engaging with all partners, third sector, public and community groups to continue to improve the future prosperity and safety of the children living in Highland. 

    “This well supported plan demonstrates the exemplary wealth of professionals we have across Highland who are committed to integrating skills, experience and expertise to improve outcomes for children, young people and their families. The plan articulates how partners work together to provide services which are organised, equipped to deliver high-quality, joined-up, trauma-informed, responsive and preventative support to children and families.”

    The programme supports a whole family approach that is family and person centred, with a strong emphasis on reducing inequalities and improving outcomes for children, young people and their families, by strengthening supports for families, to reduce crisis and family breakdown and to meet ‘The Promise’ in Highland. It also sets clear indicators for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of children’s services in terms of their success in responding to and addressing children’s wellbeing needs.

    The full report is available here (Item 12).

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Dedicated road marking team mobilised throughout the Highlands

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    Highland Council’s dedicated road marking team has been fully mobilised to carry out road marking across the Highland region.

    Chair of Highland Council’s Economy and Infrastructure Committee, Councillor Ken Gowans, said: “The Council has invested significantly in road maintenance as part of a broader program to improve Highland roads and the dedicated road marking team will help us to improve road safety for our communities. I’m delighted to see that the newly established team has made the most of the recent good weather to cover a lot of ground in the north-west and Skye, despite the challenging geography. Our new vehicles are also ensuring that the work is carried out quickly and effectively with minimal disruption for local people.”

    Since April, the team has completed approx. 150km of white lines across Sutherland, Caithness and the Isle of Skye, with a further 190km of white lining works planned for over the summer months across the other areas of the Highlands, including Lochaber, Ross and Cromarty, Badenoch and Inverness. Exact timings will be weather-dependent, but we aim to give communities advance notice on social media wherever possible.

    The operation requires a team of four operatives using two lorries. A feeder lorry is used to preheat and deliver the thermoplastic lining material to the lining lorry which then applies the hot material to the road surface as either an edge or centre line. Immediately after the line is applied, another nozzle adds reflective glass beads, followed by a final nozzle spraying clean water onto the line to cool the material, allowing traffic to flow immediately.

    The road marking programme forms part of The Council’s £2.1 billion Highland Investment Plan which will provide 20 years of funding for roads and transport, schools, offices and community facilities throughout the Highlands.


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    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Supporting behaviour in Schools

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    At today’s Education Committee (Wednesday 4 June), Members noted the evidence base that supports the approach taken in Highland to address relationship and behaviour issues in our schools and agreed the actions being taken to ensure practice across Highland is in line with national recommendations.

    The 2023/4 national Behaviour in Scottish Schools survey and subsequent report (BISSR) indicated a difference to behaviour in schools from the previous report (2016) and cited the significant impact of COVID-19 on overall attendance and behaviour in schools and communities across Scotland.

    The BISSR findings identify that most children can manage school well most or all of the time, however the evidence identifies an increase in classroom disruption and in physical and verbal aggression.

    Education Committee Chair, Cllr John Finlayson said: “To better reflect the relationships and behaviours across our Highland schools, we recently conducted an extensive school staff survey which gathered in-depth information about the behavioural barriers, indicating that low-level disruptive behaviour remains the thing that causes most impact in pre-school and infant classrooms.

    “Last school session less than 2% of children were involved in reported staff/pupil incidents. In many cases their language, communication and cognitive skills were poorly developed. The age where there is the highest level of pupil-staff incidents in Highland is Primary One (28% of incidents are recorded in relation to 3-5 year olds). Our understanding of this is that very young children haven’t yet developed their language skills or understanding of social situations to enable them to communicate their needs well. After Primary One the number of reported incidents significantly reduce, indicating the developmental nature of this issue in primary schools.

    “Ongoing training and staff support is regularly offered by the Council’s Psychological Service to help support the wellbeing of teaching and support staff at all levels and to aid them in understanding and intervening in relation to dysregulated and distressed behaviour.

    “In the recent staff survey, staff were asked what successes they had in supporting dysregulated and distressed children. The greatest number of responses related to providing safe, quiet spaces where children regulate and find calm, often helped by a knowledgeable member of staff with whom they already have a relationship.

    “Work continues to improve pre-school and infant school pupils’ development skills, to enable young children to effectively communicate with peers and staff and over time reduce dysregulation and low level disruptive behavioural patterns forming in school settings.”

    To support staff, Highland Council has a Positive Relationships Framework and Guidance  that is in line with the requirements of the Scottish Government policy landscape. Our Framework has drawn together relevant research and educational thinking. It promotes a more relationship-based approach, with a focus on self-regulation and co-regulation, which we know is effective in creating calm and respectful early years settings, classrooms and schools.

    To read the report, click the link here (Item 10).

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Statement on Concept Release on Foreign Private Issuer Eligibility

    Source: Securities and Exchange Commission

    Good afternoon.  This is an open meeting on June 4, 2025 of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the Government in the Sunshine Act.  Commissioners Caroline Crenshaw and Mark Uyeda are here with me in Washington, D.C., and Commissioner Hester Peirce is participating remotely.

    Today, the Commission will consider a recommendation from the Division of Corporation Finance that the Commission issue a concept release seeking comment on whether to revise the definition of foreign private issuer.

    The Commission first defined foreign private issuer in 1967.[1]  Then in 1983, it developed the foundation of the current definition through a test to determine whether a foreign issuer is “essentially [a] U.S. issuer” based on percentage of U.S. ownership, nationality of the management team, and location of business operations.[2]  The world, financial markets, and corporate legal structures have significantly changed over the past forty-plus years.

    The U.S. capital markets have been and still are the envy of the world.  Foreign companies from across the globe seek new capital from U.S. investors for their businesses and seek to have their securities listed on a U.S. exchange for a variety of potential benefits, including higher valuation, greater liquidity, and enhanced reputation.

    Foreign companies that qualify as foreign private issuers receive these potential benefits while also being offered several accommodations under the federal securities laws that are not available to U.S. companies.  These include provisions such as (1) not needing to file quarterly reports, proxy statements, or Section 16 reports, (2) not being subject to Regulation FD, and (3) furnishing current reports on Form 6-K, rather than filing the more prescriptive Form 8-K.[3]

    As early as 1935, the Commission recognized that our rules should not treat foreign companies exactly the same as domestic companies,[4] likely because many aspects of their corporate operations, business and market practices, accounting standards, tax regimes, compensation and pension benefits, and organic corporate governance laws may be quite different from those in the United States.  Yet, at the same time, the Commission has always been mindful of the paramount need for the adequacy of the disclosures provided by the foreign companies to their U.S. investors whenever it considered new accommodations under the federal securities laws for these companies.  When the Commission provided foreign companies with additional regulatory relief in 1967, it noted “the improvement in the reporting of financial information by foreign issuers, resulting from changes in foreign corporate laws, stock exchange requirements, and voluntary disclosure by the companies themselves.”[5]

    Today, maintaining reasonable accommodations in the federal securities laws to attract foreign companies to U.S. markets and to provide U.S. investors with the opportunity to trade in those companies under U.S. laws and regulations remains an objective.  That objective must be balanced with other considerations, including providing investors with material information about these foreign companies, including their unique corporate structures, and ensuring that domestic companies are not competitively disadvantaged with respect to regulatory requirements.

    The first step in striking this balance is to determine which foreign companies should qualify as foreign private issuers and be able to avail themselves to the accommodations.  It has been several decades since the Commission last examined the characteristics of the foreign private issuer community.  The global markets have changed significantly in those decades.  It is therefore only prudent for the Commission to better understand the companies that are using the foreign private issuers accommodations today and determine if changes are needed to better protect U.S. investors.  Based on the latest data from 2023, for example, almost 55% of foreign private issuers are traded exclusively, or nearly-exclusively, in the United States.[6]  Among these issuers, the most common jurisdiction of incorporation is the Cayman Islands and the most common jurisdiction of headquarters is China.[7] 

    When the United States is effectively a foreign company’s exclusive or primary trading market and the company is not subject to meaningful disclosure requirements or securities law oversight in its jurisdiction of incorporation or headquarters, careful consideration should be given to whether the foreign company is eligible for accommodations under the federal securities laws that are unavailable to U.S. companies.  This analysis begins with considering whether the current definition of a foreign private issuer is appropriately tailored.  The concept release solicits public input on this issue, and I encourage market participants to submit their views and engage with my office and the other commissioners’ offices on this topic.

    Before I turn the meeting over to Cicely LaMothe, Acting Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, to discuss the recommendation, I would like to thank the following staff members for their work on this concept release.

    From the Division of Corporation Finance: Cicely LaMothe, Sebastian Gomez Abero, Ted Yu, Michael Coco, Kelsey Glover, Kateryna Kuntsevich, Mark Green, Ryan Milne, Wei Lu, Heather Rosenberger, Kayla Roberts, Anna Abramson, and John Fieldsend.

    From the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis: Lyndon Orton, Mattias Nilsson, Evan Avila, Tara Bhandari, and Timothy Dodd.  I would especially like to recognize Mattias and Evan because the data in their white paper on trends in the foreign private issuer population[8] significantly contributed to the concept release.

    From the Office of International Affairs: Kathleen Hutchinson, Matthew Greiner, Morgan Macdonald, Michael Ferrario, Jordan Spain, and Katerina Ossenova.

    From the Office of the General Counsel: Jeffrey Finnell, Bryant Morris, Johanna Losert, Mike Killoy and Cynthia Bien.

    From the Office of the Chief Accountant:  Ryan Wolfe, Shaz Niazi, Nigel James, Chauncey Martin, Mai-Khoi Nguyen-Thanh, Jill Davis, Sarah Esquivel, and Ella Karafiat.

    Now I will turn the meeting over to Cicely for the staff’s recommendation.

     


    [1] Adoption of Rules Relating to Foreign Securities, Release No. 34-8066 (Apr. 28, 1967) [32 FR 7845 (May 30, 1967)] (the “1967 Release”).

    [2] Foreign Securities, Release No. 33-6493 (Oct. 6, 1983) [48 FR 46736 (Oct. 14, 1983)].

    [4] See Release No. 34-323, Release No. 34-324, and Release No. 34-325 (July 15, 1935) and Release 34-412 (November 6, 1935).

    [5] The 1967 Release at 7846.

    [6] The Concept Release at section III.C.1.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

    Media Note

    March 14, 2025

    The text of the following statement was released by the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union.

    Begin Text:

    1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirm the G7’s steadfast commitment to contribute towards a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.
    2. Maritime security and prosperity are fundamental to global stability, economic resilience, and the well-being of all nations, and the conservation and sustainable use of ocean ecosystems is essential to all life on Earth. Over 80% of global trade is transported by sea, and 97% of global data flows through submarine cables. Disruptions to maritime routes pose a direct threat to international food security, critical minerals, energy security, global supply chains, and economic stability. We express deep concern over the growing risks to maritime security, including strategic contestation, threats to freedom of navigation and overflight, and illicit shipping activities. State behaviour in these areas has increased the risk of conflict and environmental damage, and imperils all nations’ prosperity and living standards, especially for the world’s poorest.
    3. We recognize the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework for governing all activities in the oceans and the seas.
    4. We recall the G7 Statements on Maritime Security adopted in Lübeck (2015) and Hiroshima (2016). We welcome related work presently underway through other G7 ministerial tracks and working groups, on a range of issues including securing undersea cable networks and combating abandoned fishing gear. We welcome, as well, G7 work relating to transnational organized crime and terrorism that touches on the maritime domain, including in relation to piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking in persons, and strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of coastal states. We acknowledge the importance of regional maritime security frameworks, to support coastal states to address collectively threats to their maritime security. We welcome existing initiatives, such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FoGG, that Canada chairs this year), which has been, the primary forum for dialogue among G7 members and partners on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

    Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

    1. Enhancing Stability: We underscore the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the high seas and the exclusive economic zones as well as to the related rights and freedoms in other maritime zones, including the rights of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, as provided for under international law. We share a growing concern at recent, unjustifiable efforts to restrict such freedom and to expand jurisdiction through use of force and other forms of coercion, including across the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea. We condemn China’s illicit, provocative, coercive and dangerous actions that seek unilaterally to alter the status quo in such a way as to risk undermining the stability of regions, including through land reclamations, and building of outposts, as well as their use for military purpose. In areas pending final delimitation, we underline the importance of coastal states refraining from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment insofar as such actions jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement, as well as the importance of making every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, in those areas. We condemn, as well, dangerous vessel maneuvers, the indiscriminate attacks against commercial vessels and other maritime actions that undermine maritime order based on the rule of law and international law. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016 is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. We reaffirm that our basic policies on Taiwan remain unchanged and emphasize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to international security and prosperity. We welcome the resumption of exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Freedom of navigation for commercial shipping in the Black Sea must be upheld.
    2. Attempts to Change the Status Quo by Force: We oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas. We undertake to implement means through which to track systematically and report on attempts to change the status quo by force and by the establishment of new geographical facts, including through coercive and dangerous actions on the oceans and seas that might threaten regional and international peace and security.
    3. Protecting Critical Maritime and Undersea Infrastructure: We are seized of the fact that vital energy and telecommunications infrastructure under the oceans and seas connects our economies and is vital to our prosperity. We recall the G7 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks (2024) and the New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World (2024). We share a growing concern that undersea communications cables, subsea interconnectors and other critical undersea infrastructure have been subject to critical damage through sabotage, poor seamanship or irresponsible behaviour which have resulted in potential internet or energy disruption in affected regions, delays in global data transmission, or compromised sensitive communications. We will enhance our cooperation with industry mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks to operational tasks while strengthening repair capacities in order to improve the overall resilience of critical undersea and maritime infrastructure. In this respect, we welcome the EU Action Plan on Cable Security adopted in February 2025 by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
    4. Maritime Crime: Maritime crime, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, maritime arms trafficking and sanctions evasion, human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking and Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, continues to impede maritime security, freedom of navigation, and our economy and prosperity. We have been working together to tackle these maritime crimes, but maritime illegal activities have extended into new areas, to become an urgent issue to be addressed. We welcome the G7 Action Plan to combat migrant smuggling adopted under Italy’s 2024 G7 Presidency.
    5. Protecting Freedom of Trade: In the past year, indiscriminate Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have endangered maritime security of vessels and their crews, disturbed international trade, and exposed neighboring countries to environmental hazards. Enabled by Iran’s military, financial, and intelligence support, these illegal attacks have also contributed to increased tension in the Middle East and Yemen, with severe repercussions on the intra-Yemeni peace process. The vessel “Galaxy Leader” seized by the Houthis must be released immediately. We appreciate the efforts of all those countries that have engaged to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, protecting crucial shipping lanes and helping to restore regular flows of trade through the Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, we commend the efforts of EU’s maritime operation “Aspides” and U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian”.

    Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security

    1. Curtailing Unsafe and Illicit Shipping Practices: The rise of unsafe and illicit shipping practices, including fraudulent registration and registries, poses a significant threat to global trade and environmental sustainability. We are concerned that unsafe and illicit shipping imposes heavy costs on industry, governments and citizens. Russia’s ability to earn revenue has been sustained through its extensive effort to circumvent the G7+ oil price cap policy through its shadow fleet of often older, underinsured, and poorly maintained ships that routinely disable their automatic identification systems or engage in “spoofing” to avoid detection and circumvent international safety, environmental, and liability rules and standards. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and evade sanctions, particularly through its illicit maritime activities, including prohibited ship to-ship transfers of petroleum and other UN-banned commodities. Through G7 coordination, we have exposed North Korea uses of “dark” vessels – those that engage in illicit activity – to circumvent United Nations Security Council mandated sanctions. Russia and North Korea are strengthening their economic relations including through maritime routes, such as the reported transfer of petroleum products from Russia to North Korea Unregulated, “dark” vessels undertake IUU fishing, destroying marine habitats and depleting fish stocks, with negative impacts for biodiversity and food security. Unregulated, inadequately insured “dark” vessels also pose a high risk of maritime accidents, including in fragile ecosystems such as the Arctic and Antarctic. We commit to strengthen our coordination, amongst the G7 and with other partners, to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured and substandard vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, arms transfers, illegal fishing and illicit trade. We encourage relevant International Organizations to improve maritime domain awareness by expanding satellite-based vessel tracking and establishing comprehensive data records of the movement of individual ships and of ship-to-ship transfers, as a means of identifying and tracking illicit maritime activities. We are also committed to capacity building of the countries in the region in law enforcement and Maritime Domain Awareness.
    2. Shadow Fleet Task Force: We invite members of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden), and possibly others, to join participating G7 members in a Shadow Fleet Task Force to enhance monitoring and detection and to otherwise constrain the use of shadow fleets engaged in illegal, unsafe or environmentally perilous activities, building on the work of others active in this area. The Task Force will constitute a response by the participating States to the call by the International Maritime Organization in its Resolution A.1192(33) of 6 December 2023 for Members States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by shadow fleets and their flag states, including illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs, or engaging in other illegal activities.
    3. Enhancing Maritime Supply Chain Resilience and Energy and Food Security: Maritime supply chains will continue to underpin the global economy, but these face a variety of threats, both present and future, stemming from both geopolitical tensions and environmental factors. Maritime disruptions raise consumer costs, increase transit times, and can reduce demand in importing countries, which in turn means lower revenues and diminished competitiveness for producers in exporting countries. Such vulnerabilities in maritime transport can undermine energy and food security, particularly for developing nations reliant on stable shipping routes, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). We welcome maritime initiatives involving and supported by G7 partners intended to promote energy and food security, such as the Grain from Ukraine scheme, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We invite cooperation with the African Union (pursuant to Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050) and other relevant International Organizations to identify best practices for enhancing maritime supply chain resilience and for safeguarding energy and food security, including in times of geopolitical crisis.
    4. Promoting Safe and Resilient Ports and Strategic Waterways: Port ownership and operational control matter to national security, as foreign control or influence over critical port infrastructure can create vulnerabilities in trade, in defense and security, and in economic stability. Port resilience is also crucial to economic stability and global trade and yet ports face growing risks from environmental degradation, extreme weather events and geopolitical conflicts. Strengthening port security and modernizing infrastructure are essential to maintaining safe and efficient maritime trade. Ensuring that the ownership and management of strategic waterways and key maritime choke points are not vulnerable to undue influence by potential adversaries is also essential to national security. We underscore the importance of scrutiny of ownership structures and port management and resilience within our own national jurisdictions, including with regard to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, to ensure that adversaries do not gain leverage over supply chains, military operations, or the flow of strategic resources. We will work with partners and with relevant International Organizations to encourage robust cybersecurity standards for port ICT infrastructure, to increase resilience against malicious cyber incidents on maritime logistical networks, to reduce monopolistic power over key supply chain nodes, to promote secure and transparent port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructures and strategic waterways, and to otherwise encourage greater focus on such potential vulnerabilities.
    5. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) at sea poses a significant hazard to the marine environment, to the safety of fishermen and other users of the maritime space, and to various marine economic activities. We commit to enhancing diplomatic efforts and to exchanging best practices among national authorities, relevant international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the clean-up of UXO from the seas and ocean.

    Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources

    1. Strengthen Enforcement Against IUU Fishing: IUU fishing is a major contributor to declining fish stocks and to marine habitat destruction. It may account for a third of all fishing activity worldwide, at a cost to the global economy of more than US$23 billion per year and with negative consequences for fisheries as an enduring economic asset, including for developing countries. We welcome the Canadian-led Dark Vessel Detection System in Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and would see value in replicating the model to support other partners whose fisheries are under threat from IUU fishing. We recognize that data sharing and transparency play a key role in this fight by exposing bad actors and that technological advances can support a robust Monitoring, Control and Surveillance and enforcement landscape. We encourage further progress in addressing IUU fishing, working with and through relevant International Organizations to establish and strengthen rules to sustainably manage fish stocks on the high seas and to improve the enforcement of these measures, including through the further development of detection technologies, aircraft patrols and high seas boarding and inspection of vessels, building upon the 2022 G7 Ocean Deal.
    2. We welcome the Third UN Ocean Conference, in Nice, France, from 9 to 13 June 2025.

    PARTNERSHIPS

    1. This G7 Maritime Security and Prosperity Declaration provides a framework for cooperation with non-G7 Partners, including countries hosting major ports, large merchant fleets, or extensive flag registries as well as relevant regional and International Organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization and ASEAN. We would welcome robust cooperation with Partners to take forward the goals set out in this Declaration, consistent with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, under the efforts of the G7 countries, including a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region, to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, and of commitment to the sustainable development of the world’s maritime spaces.
    2. We welcome the cooperation on Coast Guard Functions, including the Global Coast Guard Forum hosted by Italy in 2025, as well as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which could also support the objectives of this Declaration.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary Rubio’s Meeting with Danish Foreign Minister Rasmussen

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    Secretary Rubio’s Meeting with Danish Foreign Minister Rasmussen

    Readout

    April 3, 2025

    The below is attributable to Spokesperson Tammy Bruce:

    Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen today in Brussels. Secretary Rubio reaffirmed the strong relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark. They discussed shared priorities including increasing NATO defense spending and burden sharing, and addressing the threats to the Alliance, including those posed by Russia and China. They also reviewed ongoing coordination to enhance stability and security in Europe and to secure an enduring peace in Ukraine.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Senior Bureau Official for International Organization Affairs Pitt’s Travel to Switzerland, Italy, and the Holy See

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs McCoy Pitt is currently in Geneva, Switzerland, where he is traveling from April 7-11 to meet with counterparts and participate in the consultative-level meeting of the Geneva Group on UN governance and management. While in Geneva, he will hold additional meetings with leadership of several UN agencies.

    From April 14-15, Senior Bureau Official Pitt will travel to Rome, Italy, to meet with officials from the Rome-based UN agencies and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He will also engage in discussions with officials from the Holy See to discuss a number of shared priorities.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
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