NewzIntel.com

Category: European Union

  • MIL-OSI USA: British national indicted in organized multi-state fraud and money laundering scheme

    Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

    PROVIDENCE, R.I. – A British national from Northern Ireland residing illegally in the United States has been indicted by a Rhode Island federal grand jury in for participating in a multi-state construction and money laundering fraud scheme uncovered by a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement investigation. The scheme is alleged to have defrauded residents of several states of over $1 million.

    The indictment charges Elijah Gavin aka Timothy O’Reilly aka Elijah Thomas, 29, with wire fraud conspiracy, wire fraud, and money laundering.

    According to court documents, Gavin and other co-conspirators are purported to be associated with the so-called Traveling Conmen Fraud Group (Conmen Travelers), a group recognized by the FBI’s Terrorist Screen Center as a transnational organized crime group.

    Gavin and his co-conspirators allegedly defrauded property owners in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York of more than over $1 million by misrepresenting to property owners who they were, the qualifications of their construction businesses, and construction needs or repairs required on properties. Co-conspirators billed property owners and collected funds for equipment that was not needed or used.

    The victims of this scheme included a 78-year-old Rhode Island woman who was fraudulently induced to pay over $850,000 for unnecessary foundation and basement repairs, including in checks written to Gavin and others.    

    Money collected through this conspiracy was deposited into bank accounts controlled by co-conspirators or transferred to other individuals who laundered the fraudulently obtained funds.

    Gavin last entered the United States lawfully in 2022 but did not comply with the terms of his admission. He is currently wanted on local charges in the U.K. Gavin has been detained in criminal federal custody since his arrest in New Jersey on January 29. Arraignment is scheduled for March 10, 2025, at the U.S. District Court in Providence.

    A federal indictment is merely an accusation. A defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.          

    The matter is being investigated by ICE, the Rhode Island State Police, and U.S Diplomatic Security Service.

    Members of the public can report crimes and suspicious activity by dialing 866-DHS-2-ICE (866-347-2423) or completing the online tip form.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Greets the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defence John Healey and Takes Questions From the Press

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PETE HEGSETH: Well, Mr. Secretary, your entire delegation, welcome to the Pentagon. It’s great to see you. It was wonderful to meet you the first time in Brussels, and have some great interactions about our mutual interest, no doubt. And your prime minister, it was a privilege to meet him as well. He was here last week. Our nations, as you know, share a long and special relationship. Stronger today than ever before. I experienced that firsthand myself, as many of our generation has, on the battlefield, shoulder-to-shoulder with British troops in Afghanistan. I know how capable they are, how tough they are, and how close our bond is as brothers across the Atlantic, full stop.

    And so we are grateful for oh the many years that we have stood by each other’s side. And at the same, we are in the middle of a dynamic security environment, where on that continent, President Trump is calling on our European allies to take the lead, and you have done just that, sir. In fact, you chaired the first meeting of the Ukraine defense contact group that I had a pleasure to speak to. That was your first time as chair, and you’ll continue to it. And that’s, again, the United Kingdom stepping up.

    And then, once again, when your prime minister was here, you called me, we had a chance to speak briefly about the increase in defense spending that the U.K. is undertaking. So U.K. leadership is absolutely critical, and we very much appreciate it. We want to work together to achieve peace and security in Europe by working to bring an end to the war in Ukraine, building sustainable deterrence on the continent, and then increasing our allied capabilities and interoperability.

    And European leadership of NATO, led by the U.K., led by others, is, we believe, the future of defense on the continent, ensuring we provide a peaceful future for your kids and my kids and your grandkids and my grandkids. That’s ultimately what it’s about. I also want to thank the British people for the warm support they give to US forces stationed in the U.K. as well. It’s a long-standing relationship that we are very grateful for. So, you’re true allies, longtime friends. We’re new friends, but we’re getting there, and fellow warriors, so thank you very much for being here, Mr. Secretary.

    SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE JOHN HEALEY: Mr. Secretary, thank you for such a warm welcome and such warm words. It’s great to be back in Washington, and it’s good to see you again. We last met last month in NATO, and then you challenged Europe to step up. You challenged us to step up on Ukraine, on defense spending, on European security. And I say to you that we have, we are, and we will further. And last week, the British prime minister announced the biggest increase in defense spending since the end of the Cold War, and we will go further.

    You also asked the U.K. to step up on leadership on Ukraine alongside the U.S., and indeed, you were with me when we had the 46 nations round the table at a week’s notice at the Ukraine Contact Group. Our meeting today follows very good discussions between President Trump and Prime Minister Starmer a week ago today, in which they both pledged to work together, our nations would work together to secure lasting peace in Ukraine. And we have a chance today to discuss the progress on that path to peace, with the opportunity that President Trump has created now since the 20th of January.

    When your president and my prime minister met last week, your president also said that the U.K. and the U.S. have a relationship like no other, and I think for me, that was exemplified last night at the British Embassy, when we were able to lay on a party to celebrate the 250th birthday of the U.S. Marine Corps. And for more than a century, your U.S. Marines and our Royal Marines have trained together. They fought together, and too often they’ve died together, defending the values that our two free nations share.

    And Pete, as you say, you know that from your own experience and your own service. And in many ways, for me, they embody the sort of warrior force that both you and I as defense secretaries are dedicated in our roles to strengthen because we know that we have to strengthen together with allies, deterrence in the face of rising threats.

    And finally, if I may, you’ve spoken about the deep bond between our two nations, and I’d say to you, I’m here today to strengthen that defense and security bond between our two nations. It’s needed now more than ever in this new era that we must face together. So thank you for receiving us and thank you for welcoming our delegation and I look forward to the discussions ahead.

    SECRETARY HEGSETH: And to that, I say, amen. Thank you. Appreciate you being here. If it’s OK, we’ll take a few questions for either myself or the secretary.

    Pentagon Press Secretary John Ullyot : We’ll take two from the U.S. press, and we’ll take two from the British press. Go with the U.S.

    Q: Mr. Secretary, you have said that Europe needs to do more to contribute to defense. Is a security guarantee of troops from France and the U.K. enough for Ukraine?

    SECRETARY HEGSETH: I think it’s been very encouraging to watch our friends in the U.K. and in France step up to say they are prepared to take the lead to ensure an enduring peace in Ukraine. What the president has also said time and time again is, let’s not get ahead of ourselves. Let’s get both sides to the table. Let’s get a commitment to peace, and that is what President Trump is actively doing, both with the Russians and Vladimir Putin and also the Ukrainians and Zelenskyy. So, there will be…in order to maintain enduring peace, there’s a security aspect to it. The U.K. and France have pledged, along with others, to be the core part of that, there will be other aspects that are part of further terms of the negotiation.

    Mr. Ullyot: British press. Go ahead.

    Q: Mr. Secretary, there are reports that a negotiating team will be going to Saudi Arabia next week. Given a renewed push for peace, will you reconsider resupplying Ukraine with weapons, or have the taps been turned off permanently?

    SECRETARY HEGSETH: As the president has pointed out, it is a pause. Exactly what he said from the beginning, pause pending a true commitment to a path to peace. The president is paying a very keen eye to precisely what the Ukrainians are saying and doing about committing to that peace process, and we’re very encouraged by the signs we’re seeing. Ultimately, he will make the determination, but it is a pause for now.

    Q: Thank you.

    Mr. Ullyot: U.S. press.

    Q: Missy Ryan, Washington Post. Secretary Healey, a question for you. Obviously, you both have referenced this strong, historic relationship. At the same time, what does it mean for the U.K. that its closest ally is now voicing the same narrative that Russia is voicing, vis a vis the war in Ukraine and seeming to align itself more closely with Russia versus what it has done in the past?

    SECRETARY HEALEY: Look, first of all, I don’t believe as members of government and decision takers, we’re the people to comment on every twist and turn in this process. I’m fixed on the historic opportunity the president has created to bring a lasting and secure peace to Ukraine. That’s what he and my prime minister dedicated themselves to do last week. And you’ve seen since then, the British prime minister pulled together in London, leaders of 18 nations to discuss the detail of a path to peace. And the president also has asked Europe to step up, and we are.

    The U.K. is ready to take on a leadership in that task. You saw that from Keir Starmer at the weekend, in the way that he is pulling the parties together, ensuring that we take Ukraine with us and that we work closely alongside the United States. And it’s the detail of those discussions which are rightly behind the scenes that the defense secretary and I will now pursue this afternoon.

    Mr. Ullyot: Last question from Danielle with the U.K. press.

    Q: Yeah. Thank you so much. Danielle [inaudible] Daily Telegraph. This is for both secretaries. What’s the plan if the Ukrainian Front line falls apart in the next couple of days? Does Britain, Europe have permission to intervene and help? And secondly, if I may, does Britain have the ability to use its nuclear deterrent by itself?

    SECRETARY HEALEY: Nobody who has been to Ukraine, who has talked with Ukraine, who has worked with the Ukrainian leaders, or met the Ukrainian servicemen and women, or the civilians, believe that they will not fight, nor do I or the prime minister doubt that as President Zelenskyy has said, they are ready to sign the important economic deal with the U.S. They are ready for a ceasefire. They want the guarantees and the security that must follow to ensure that they will not again face Russian invasion and Russian aggression. But they, like we, are willing to work to make the most of this unique opportunity that we now have, and that’s a responsibility on all of us. And that is very clear from our prime minister. It’s clear from the president. It’s also clear from President Zelenskyy, too.

    And as far as your question about nuclear, it is a question that it will be unthinkable and unprecedented for any defense secretary or any government to start commenting on or speculating on.

    SECRETARY HEGSETH: We are watching, obviously very closely, the front line of troops. I mean, our chairman our defense department, of course, we monitor that very closely. But ultimately, we’re interested in creating the conditions for peace. I mean, to the previous question from the Washington Post, the press is interested in narratives. Our president is interested in peace. So, we will get characterized one way or another, oh, your stance is pro Russia or pro…it’s all garbage. The president got elected to bring peace in this conflict, and he is working with both sides in a way that only President Trump can. Let’s be clear, only President Trump can, to bring them to the table to end the killing. And I can tell you from being behind the scenes, he is laser-focused on making that happen, and we’re closer today than we’ve ever been because of his leadership. Thank you very much.

    Mr. Ullyot: Thank you very much, press.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Bridget Jones’s husband must die – how the women of our rom coms must lose love to find it again

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Charlotte Ireland, Associate Researcher, Department of English, University of Birmingham

    In the first three Bridget Jones films, the eponymous chaotic heroine has been on a seemingly endless quest to not be single. We have watched her secure, lose and secure again the heart of buttoned-up human rights lawyer Mark Darcy. Sadly, the cycle must continue and in the newest and last instalment, Mad About the Boy, she loses him all over again.

    The brand of romantic comedy Bridget Jones belongs to, which came about in the late 90s and early 2000s, thrives on the chaos of single life, not “smug married” life. Bridget works best when she is self-deprecating, single and searching.

    Helen Fielding’s Bridget Jones’s Diary (1996) has been, and continues to be, described as the “urtext” of chick lit — a defining novel from which others in the genre descend.

    In chick lit, characters are often navigating the ebbs and flows of contemporary female experience, negotiating the challenges of juggling personal autonomy, career, family, friendship and love.

    The new film cleaves closely to these tried and tested tropes of the genre. And, in a twist, the film’s writers have killed off Mark Darcy. Fielding’s novel Mad About the Boy (2013) is set several years after Darcy’s death, which occurs when he’s on a humanitarian mission in Sudan.

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    Bridget isn’t the first 2000s romantic lead to lose her great love. Fans of Sex and the City watched Carrie Bradshaw lose Big, the man she had pursued with equally wavering success across the show’s six seasons, in its reboot And Just Like That.

    While it may be frustrating that the writers felt that they couldn’t tell a story about Bridget or Carrie without making them single, the exploration of dating, friendships and careers has matured in these new instalments. Age, widowhood and a changing dating landscape have introduced alternative narratives – grief, dating with children, across ages and online.

    Totally new romantic prospects

    Divorce is a familiar theme in chick lit. It can be seen in Jojo Moyes’ Someone Else’s Shoes (2023), Marian Keyes’ Again, Rachel (2022) and even Candace Bushnell’s Is There Still Sex in the City? (2019). Given how frequently divorce appears in chick lit, it’s worth asking: why did Darcy and Big have to die?

    Studies show that 60% of people going through a divorce may be open to reconciliation. For Bridget and Carrie, divorce would have left the romantic door open.

    Also, as the path of reconciliation has been tread so many times with these men, there are only so many stories left to tell. New romantic interests would bring new dynamics, new issues to explore and more uncertainty for fans.

    Bridget Jones and Sex in the City were pioneering. They featured honest and open discussion of being single in your 30s. They depicted candid portrayals of female sexuality, including discussions about self-pleasure. They showed Bridget and Carrie navigating complex relationships, difficult careers and friendships in a way many hadn’t seen at the time.

    Stories of divorce and marriage are common in chick lit. So death, widowhood and middle-age allow the writers of Bridget Jones and And Just Like That to tread new ground for the same audiences in a way they did when they first came out.

    Dating through grief and at an older age

    Widowed dating brings avoidance, awkwardness and guilt. Bridget and Carrie initially claim they will never have sex again, feeling out of place in the dating world. Yet, there is a palpable sense of interest that makes them go back on this pronouncement quickly.

    Guilt follows their first post-widowhood dates, as they sense their late husbands watching: Carrie through flickering lights, Bridget through an owl.

    Carrie is told she must date again to give her readers a “glimmer of hope” (and sell more books). Similarly, Mad About the Boy critiques the stigma surrounding older single women.

    Both have been praised for their portrayal of widowed dating realities (And Just Like That) and as a moving study of grief (Mad About the Boy).

    Chapter 2, the UK’s only dating app for widowers and widows, found a lack of resources on widowed dating so surveyed over 500 people across the UK who had lost a partner. They found, on average, widows and widowers started dating two years and seven months after their loss. Nearly 50% felt some form of guilt (or as though they were “replacing” or “cheating” on their deceased partner), while only 7% didn’t find it difficult.

    Bridget Jones, once a relatable 30-something dater, now reflects the realities of such widowed dating in midlife. Bringing these experiences to a popular, entertaining format sparks conversations about grief, love, and second chances – challenging stigmas while acknowledging the complexities of moving forward.

    The consistency of friendships

    What remains constant in both Bridget and Carrie’s lives is friendship, which studies have found becomes even more vital after loss.

    In Mad About the Boy, Bridget’s friends “surrounded [her] like a womb” after Darcy’s death. In And Just Like That, Miranda comforts Carrie in bed, rubbing her back just as Big once did.

    “Friends are the family we choose for ourselves”, a phrase often attributed to writer Edna Buchanan, is a common saying that encapsulates the close friendships in chick lit. This is reflected in the “urban family of single friends”, a stock feature of the genre.

    These friendships aren’t just supportive — they’re essential to the heroines’ survival and happiness. The message is clear: romantic love may fade, but true friendships endure.

    Charlotte Ireland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Bridget Jones’s husband must die – how the women of our rom coms must lose love to find it again – https://theconversation.com/bridget-joness-husband-must-die-how-the-women-of-our-rom-coms-must-lose-love-to-find-it-again-249914

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Employee at Multinational DVD Company Charged with Stealing, Selling Pre-Release Commercial DVDs for Blockbuster Films

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    A worker at a DVD and Blu-ray manufacturing and distribution company used by major movie studios was arrested today in Memphis, Tennessee, for allegedly stealing DVDs and Blu-rays of blockbuster movies from the company and selling them before their official scheduled release dates. A digital copy of at least one of the stolen Blu-rays was illegally distributed tens of millions of times over the internet, causing the copyright owner tens of millions of dollars in losses.

    According to court documents, Steven R. Hale, 37, of Memphis, worked for a multinational company that, among other things, manufactured and distributed DVDs and Blu-rays of movies. From approximately February 2021 to March 2022, Hale allegedly stole numerous “pre-release” DVDs and Blu-rays, that is, discs being prepared for commercial distribution in the United States and not available for sale to the public. These included DVDs and Blu-rays for such popular films as “F9: The Fast Saga,” “Venom: Let There Be Carnage,” “Godzilla v. Kong,” “Shang-Chi and the Legend of the Ten Rings,” “Dune,” and “Black Widow.” Hale allegedly sold the DVDs and Blu-rays through e-commerce sites. At least one pre-release Blu-ray that Hale allegedly stole and sold, “Spider-Man: No Way Home,” was “ripped” — that is, extracted from the Blu-ray by bypassing the encryption that prevents unauthorized copying — and copied. That digital copy was then illegally made available over the internet more than a month before the Blu-ray’s official scheduled release date. Copies of “Spider-Man: No Way Home” were downloaded tens of millions of times, with an estimated loss to the copyright owner of tens of millions of dollars.

    The indictment, unsealed today, charges Hale with two counts of criminal copyright infringement and one count of interstate transportation of stolen goods. If convicted, he faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison on each criminal copyright infringement count and 10 years in prison on the interstate transportation of stolen goods count. A federal district judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Supervisory Official Antoinette T. Bacon of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Acting U.S. Attorney Reagan Fondren for the Western District of Tennessee, and Special Agent in Charge Joseph E. Carrico of the FBI Nashville Field Office made the announcement.

    The FBI is investigating the case.

    Senior Counsel Matthew A. Lamberti and Trial Attorney Debra Ireland of the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Raney Irwin for the Western District of Tennessee are prosecuting the case.

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Banking: CSO-3 optical Earth-observation satellite successfully launched

    Source: Thales Group

    Headline: CSO-3 optical Earth-observation satellite successfully launched

    • The CSO system comprises three defense and security satellites
    • This trio has two distinct missions: reconnaissance for CSO-1 and CSO-3, and identification for CSO-2, affording higher resolution and refined analysis
    • The very-high-resolution optical instrument flying on each satellite is a marvel of technology built by prime contractor Thales Alenia Space

    Cannes, March  6th, 2025 – The CSO-3 military observation satellite has been successfully launched by Arianespace atop an Ariane 6 from Europe’s spaceport in French Guiana. Carrying a very-high-resolution optical instrument built by Thales Alenia Space, the joint venture between Thales (67%) and Leonardo (33%), the satellite was developed by prime contractor Airbus Defence & Space for the French defense procurement agency DGA on behalf of the French Air and Space Force’s Space Command, with delegated oversight from the French space agency CNES.

    CSO © CNES

    The third and last component in the CSO system for France’s MUSIS* military program, CSO-3 will provide increased coverage and revisit capabilities to enable more effective conduct of military operations and faster crisis response.

    Designed to the most stringent intelligence and defense requirements, CSO-3 is equipped with a cutting-edge instrument developed by Thales Alenia Space. This instrument is the core of the mission, affording exceptional resolution and detail of Earth’s surface. Its unrivaled performance enables it to acquire imagery at extremely high resolution, even in low-light conditions and at night thanks to its infrared capabilities. Its advanced technologies include latest-generation optical systems and ultra-sensitive sensors. 

    CSO © CNES

    Like for the previous Helios 1, Helios 2 and Pleiades satellites, Thales Alenia Space designed strategic equipment for the CSO system, including the solar arrays, very-high-throughput image telemetry systems, and encryption/decryption modules to ensure data security and confidentiality. The company also supplied the system’s telemetry, tracking and control transponders.

    “The launch of CSO-3 is a major milestone for French sovereignty in space, both in terms of launch capabilities and satellite technology,” said Hervé Derrey, Thales Alenia Space CEO. “With the completion of this system, France is leading the way in optical space reconnaissance. The CSO system’s exceptional performance is based in particular on the optical instrument built by the teams at Thales Alenia Space and our industry partners. These unique skills in Europe are strategically important and demonstrate our ability to meet the new challenges facing French and European sovereignty.”

    *Multinational Space-based Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Observation

    About THALES ALENIA SPACE

    Drawing on over 40 years of experience and a unique combination of skills, expertise and cultures, Thales Alenia Space delivers innovative solutions for telecommunications, navigation, Earth observation, environmental management, exploration, science and orbital infrastructures. Governments and private industry alike count on Thales Alenia Space to design and build satellite-based systems that provide anytime, anywhere connections and positioning, monitor our planet, enhance management of its resources and explore our Solar System and beyond. Thales Alenia Space sees space as a new horizon, helping to build a better, more sustainable life on Earth. A joint venture between Thales (67%) and Leonardo (33%), Thales Alenia Space also teams up with Telespazio to form the parent companies’ Space Alliance, which offers a complete range of services. Thales Alenia Space posted consolidated revenues of approximately €2.2 billion in 2023 and has around 8,600 employees in 8 countries, with 16 sites in Europe.
     

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Members share experiences on going beyond tariff codes to implement environmental measures

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Members share experiences on going beyond tariff codes to implement environmental measures

    Organized and moderated by Luis Oña-Garcés of Ecuador, the session featured experience-sharing by members implementing environmental measures which are controlled at the border based on tariff classification categories beyond the Harmonized System codes.
    A series of key questions guided delegations in addressing environmental measures implemented through tariff classification, exploring the use of specific codes and additional categories designed for this purpose. Other mechanisms used at the border, such as certifications or licences, were also analysed. Good practices identified in the implementation and monitoring of these measures were shared. The objective was to understand the challenges and results of these strategies.
    The European Union shared its process used to track trade in products covered by regulations of fluorinated greenhouse gases, ozone-depleting substances, and deforestation. This included the EU TARIC databases which identify specific products beyond 6-digit HS codes. This more exact definition helped customs operations by enhancing traceability and smoothing the cross-border process.
    The EU suggested that the World Customs Organization (WCO) put in place a project aimed at improving the classification of green technology and environmentally friendly products by refining definitions and collaborating with international organizations. The EU noted that updating the current HS system to recognize products under green initiatives and the circular economy will streamline processes, enhance policy enforcement, and improve trade efficiency and traceability.
    The United Kingdom indicated that collaboration between trade and customs is essential to understand limitations posed by the HS and to apply solutions that can be implemented at the border. The UK emphasized that differentiation of production processes or end-use, especially for environmental products, is challenging. It noted that national tariff lines and harmonized definitions/standards are alternatives to HS amendments.
    The UK presented a case study showing that HS codes have no precise categories for recycling, reuse and waste of textiles, which hamper monitoring trade. Discrepancies in customs classification and contamination cause trade barriers due to HS code definitions not conforming with industry procedures. To avoid this, the UK said greater WTO member cooperation can enhance knowledge of trade restrictions due to unclear HS nomenclature.
    The Dominican Republic reported on the successful implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and their integration into the country’s customs tariff system. It has introduced further subdivisions in its tariff structure, beyond the HS standard codes, to monitor environmentally sensitive products and institutionalised interagency planning and coordination through the creation of a Green Customs Department.
    Addressing challenges and opportunities, the Dominican Republic noted the obstacles encountered, particularly on outdated law frameworks, and emphasized the significance of effective technology-driven customs regulation and staff training to improve understanding and implementation of environmental policies while maintaining trade efficiency.
    Jamaica also highlighted its efforts in enforcing environmental policies on plastics pollution, hazardous waste treatment and disposal, and the development of renewable energy through customs policy. However, Jamaica noted the numerous challenges that hinder effective enforcement both at the national level and regionally within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). These include insufficient stakeholder knowledge of MEAs and lack of coordination among regulatory and customs institutions. Jamaica said that enforcement continues to be difficult despite advancement because of a shortage of resources and the need for additional interagency coordination. The country continues to modernize customs practices and simplify policies according to international environmental commitments, with the aim of striking a balance between trade facilitation and sustainability goals.
    The HS is a multipurpose international product nomenclature developed by the WCO. It comprises more than 5,000 commodity groups or categories, each of them identified by a six-digit code. See here for the current HS 2022 nomenclature.
    The system is used by 212 economies as a basis for their customs tariffs and for the collection of international trade statistics. Over 98% of the merchandise in international trade is classified in terms of the HS.
    A first thematic session on Greening the HS was held in June 2024. It provided a detailed presentation of the HS role and structure, including its potential and limitations in identifying goods of policy interest. The challenge of defining environmental goods and making them visible in the HS were discussed, as were proposed HS amendments by the Food and Agriculture Organization and the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions.
    The Chair of the Committee on Market Access, Nicola Waterfield of Canada, said that the presentations gave members an opportunity to learn about a very wide range of challenges and solutions beyond the HS to implement their environmental policies. They also highlighted the crossovers between greening efforts and the work of the Committee on transparency in import and export restrictions and prohibitions which would be notified as quantitative restrictions.
    As with past thematic sessions in the Committee, and to respond to a demand by members, the WTO Secretariat will prepare a factual summary report based on information shared.

    Share

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Global Bodies – IPU report: Parliamentary gender gap narrowed over the past 30 years but progress stalled in 2024

    Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union

    Geneva, Switzerland, Thursday 6 March 2025 – A new IPU report analysing three decades of women in national parliaments reveals that the percentage of seats held by women has risen from 11.3% in 1995 to 27.2% in 2025.

    The IPU report Women in parliament 1995-2025 commemorates 30 years since the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the landmark UN framework which set out a roadmap for gender equality and women’s rights. (ref. https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2025-03/women-in-parliament-1995-2025 )

    The report shows that, from 2000 to 2015, the proportion of women in parliament rose steadily. However, in recent years, this progress has slowed.

    And in 2024, despite a high number of elections with 73 chamber renewals globally, women’s parliamentary representation increased by only 0.3 percentage points, marking the slowest rate of progress since 2017.

    Parity achieved in six countries

    In 1995, no parliament had achieved gender parity.

    In 2025, six parliaments have parity or more women than men in their single or lower chambers (Rwanda, Cuba, Nicaragua, Mexico, Andorra and the United Arab Emirates).

    Regional differences

    The Americas have seen the most significant increase in women’s parliamentary participation, with a 22.7 percentage point gain across all chambers combined over 30 years. The region now has the highest average, with 35.4% of seats held by women.

    From leading the world 30 years ago for gender equality in parliament, Asia now lags behind; the region recorded the slowest growth with a gain of just 8.9 points since 1995.

    2024 elections: More diversity and prominence for gender issues

    Despite the current pushback against diversity in the United States, the November 2024 elections saw two Black women elected to the Senate for the first time and the first openly transgender person to be elected to Congress.

    The United Kingdom Parliament elected in 2024 is also the most ethnically diverse in the country’s history with Black, Asian and ethnic minorities, both men and women, comprising around 13% of the House of Commons.

    The report notes that gender issues, particularly abortion rights and issues of gender identity, had a polarizing effect on many of the elections last year, in some cases spurring an anti-feminist backlash and in others serving to mobilize female voters.

    Violence against women in politics

    The report also points to political violence against women in 2024 elections:

    Mexico’s 2024 election was one of its most violent, with an estimated 130 candidates, including 30 women, allegedly attacked, according to Data Cívica.

    In the Republic of Korea, a woman MP was physically attacked during the election campaign.

    In the United Kingdom, the 2024 election saw an “alarming rise” in candidate abuse according to a report by the country’s Electoral Commission, disproportionately affecting women.

    However, some countries, with IPU support, have taken noteworthy steps to address gender-based violence in elections and parliaments, including Australia and the United Republic of Tanzania.

    Proactive steps towards gender parity

    Countries which have taken steps towards ensuring greater gender balance have seen the most laudable progress.

    These steps include implementing well-designed quotas, making parliaments more gender-sensitive and addressing violence against women.

    The report underlines that two factors have made a significant difference in the share of women elected to parliaments: electoral systems – especially proportional representation or mixed systems – and gender quotas in any form.

    In countries with gender quotas in place, the proportion of women elected or appointed was 31.2% in 2024 compared to 16.8% in countries without.

    Quotes

    IPU President, Tulia Ackson: “True progress in women’s political representation requires political will, intentional steps and a long-term commitment. At a time when women’s rights are on the backfoot in some regions of the world, women’s leadership is more important than ever.”

    President of the IPU Forum of Women Parliamentarians, Cynthia López Castro: “The journey from 11% to 27% women in parliaments over 30 years shows us that change is possible, but also that our work is far from done as we aim for gender parity. We need to encourage the next generation to come forward and continue the fight.”

    IPU Secretary General, Martin Chungong: “IPU analysis shows that the gender glass ceiling in parliaments has cracked but is far from shattered. There has been progress but the backlash against women’s rights in some countries is extremely worrying. It will take both women and men to overcome these challenges and accelerate progress towards gender parity.”

    The IPU is the global organization of national parliaments. It was founded in 1889 as the first multilateral political organization in the world, encouraging cooperation and dialogue between all nations. Today, the IPU comprises 181 national Member Parliaments and 15 regional parliamentary bodies. It promotes peace, democracy and sustainable development. It helps parliaments become stronger, younger, greener, more innovative and gender-balanced. It also defends the human rights of parliamentarians through a dedicated committee made up of MPs from around the world.

    MIL OSI – Submitted News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction in Kenya’s Dadaab Refugee Complex

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    In May 2024, heavy rains in Kenya triggered severe flooding, affecting the communities in Dadaab refugee complex and displacing over 20,000 people, according to UNHCR. The floods disrupted schooling, destroyed latrines and homes, blocked roads, and heightened the risk of disease outbreaks. The high population density, combined with limited infrastructure and resources make the complex and its inhabitants highly vulnerable to climate-related disasters.

    The Dadaab refugee complex, situated in Garissa County, has been continuously expanding since its creation in 1991. Home to more than 400,000 people, the three camps that make up the complex welcome victims of conflict and persecution but also climate shocks.

    Despite disasters and displacement being deeply interconnected, and refugees facing recurring disasters, DRR has often been an afterthought in humanitarian responses.

    “Historically, our focus has been on immediate humanitarian response-providing shelter, food, and protection for displaced populations. DRR was often seen as a secondary priority in the urgency of crisis response. However, with the increasing frequency and intensity of climate-related disasters, we can no longer afford to address displacement and disasters separately. We now recognize that resilience must be built from the outset. Integrating DRR into our work is critical to ensure that communities we serve are not perpetually vulnerable to the next disaster.” Mr William Ejalu, Head of UNHCR Dadaab sub-office.

    As these displacements become more protracted, the Government of Kenya, supported by humanitarian and development partners, launched the Shirika plan. It aims to transition refugee camps into integrated municipalities, promoting durable solutions to displacement that strengthen resilience and promote inclusion. This municipalization process constitutes a critical opportunity to embed disaster risk reduction (DRR) into broader humanitarian and development strategies.

    Recognizing this window of opportunity, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and the United Nations University (UNU) conducted a scoping mission to Dadaab in January 2025, as part of project accelerating disaster risk reduction in humanitarian action supported by the Government of Germany. The mission assessed disaster risks and identified the best ways to leverage the Early Warnings for All (EW4All) and Making Cities Resilient 2030 initiatives to support the integration of DRR in the refugee complex and in the establishment of the new municipalities.

    “The future of disaster risk reduction in refugee settings hinges on strong partnerships, and innovative solutions. As displacement becomes increasingly protracted and climate risks intensify, we must act now to integrate refugees into national resilience strategies. This is not just about reducing risks-it’s about safeguarding lives, protecting livelihoods, and ensuring that no one, regardless of their status, is left behind.” Mr. Huw Beynon, Deputy Chief, UNDRR Regional Office for Africa

    In this context, there is an opportunity to reduce disaster risk and build resilience in Dadaab. To support this, UNDRR and UNU proposed four areas of collaboration including improving disaster risk governance; strengthening early warning and early action; enhancing data and knowledge management and promoting community-led resilience.

    “Refugees should not be the last to know when disaster strikes. They need to be integrated into national early warning systems just as any other resident. Integrating refugees into national disaster preparedness systems is not just a matter of equity but also of efficiency. When everyone receives early warnings, response times improve, and lives are saved.” Mr Vitalis Ogur, Assistant County Commissioner, Dadaab Subcounty

    This initiative will serve as a model for DRR in refugee-hosting municipalities worldwide, demonstrating that even in displacement settings, resilience is possible.

    “Dadaab is no longer just a refugee camp-it is evolving into a municipality. This means we must work with all stakeholders and integrate disaster risk in everything we do, to ensure that we develop a resilient sustainable municipality.” Mr Emma Mohammed, Municipal Manager, Dadaab Municipality,

    By leveraging the strengths of EW4All, MCR2030, and the municipalization process, stakeholders can move beyond short-term humanitarian responses to build long-term resilience for both refugees and host communities.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0149/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Reinis Pozņaks, Adam Bielan, Rihards Kols, Cristian Terheş, Alberico Gambino, Alexandr Vondra, Aurelijus Veryga, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Michał Dworczyk, Roberts Zīle, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Bogdan Rzońca, Carlo Fidanza, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Geadis Geadi
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0149/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

    – having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

    – having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States[1],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092[2],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[3],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[4],

    – having regard to European Court of Auditors (ECA) special report 04/2025 of 6 February 2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility – Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’[5],

    – having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 18 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’, and in particular the section ‘Promoting peace and enhancing security: towards a Common Market for the defence industry’,

    – having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, and in particular chapter four thereof, ‘Increasing security and reducing dependencies’,

    – having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

    – having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

    – having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration issued by NATO heads of state or government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

    – having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept of 29 June 2022 and the Vilnius Summit Communiqué issued by NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius on 11 July 2023,

    – having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

    – having regard to the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO heads of state or government participating in the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 10 July 2024,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas, following the deteriorating geopolitical context and security environment in recent years, the strengthening of European defence, the bolstering of Europe’s operational capabilities and the ramping up of defence production are key initiatives that must be undertaken for ensuring peace, fostering development and strengthening unity between citizens and the Member States, and will contribute decisively to peace on our continent and towards ensuring the long-term security of Ukraine;

    B. whereas the recognition that Russia is the most significant threat to Europe’s security for the foreseeable future is paramount, and all Member States must therefore ensure a widespread increase in defence production and operational capabilities in order to ensure that credible deterrence is restored on the European continent, while simultaneously recognising that the instability in the southern neighbourhood must be fully taken into consideration;

    C. whereas, in light of the worsening external environment and despite the efforts made in recent years to enhance the EU’s crisis preparedness through new legislation, mechanisms and tools across various policy areas, the EU and its Member States remain vulnerable to multiple crisis scenarios;

    D. whereas the Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, have been jointly tasked with producing a white paper on the future of European defence within the first 100 days of the mandate of the new Commission; whereas this paper aims to move from political objectives expressed in general terms to specific and quantifiable objectives, and to constitute an element of defence planning;

    E. whereas the timing of the white paper may coincide with a review of the Strategic Compass threat analysis, as well as with possible proposals for a revision of the Strategic Compass, as the majority of its commitments are due for completion by 2025;

    F. whereas the white paper’s principal focus must be to outline a clear plan for how the Member States can address and overcome their growing need for greater financial, operational and logistical resources for their national armed forces and intelligence services;

    G. whereas the white paper must ensure that an effective and financeable strategy that counters hybrid warfare can be realised, particularly one that counters the ongoing attacks on subsea infrastructure that are essential for global energy transport and digital communications, as approximately 99 % of global data traffic is reliant on undersea fibre-optic cables;

    H. whereas the undersea network of the Member States consists of 39 such cables, ensuring connectivity across the Mediterranean, North Sea and Baltic Sea; whereas recent undersea cable disruptions are often dismissed as maritime accidents; whereas emerging technologies and rapid advancements in autonomous underwater drones and deep-sea espionage capabilities create key vulnerabilities that are being exploited by hostile state and non-state actors;

    I. whereas the white paper must ensure complementarity with NATO’s Strategic Concept as NATO is and must remain the principal security guarantor for the Euro-Atlantic area;

    1. Reiterates its firm support for initiatives aimed at strengthening the European defence and deterrence capacity, addressing hybrid and cyber threats, promoting industrial cooperation in the defence sector, and providing the Member States and their allies with high-quality defence products in the required quantities and at short notice; underlines that these objectives require vision, concreteness and shared commitments, both in the strictly military field and in the industrial, technological and intelligence sectors;

    2. Emphasises that the EU must adopt a comprehensive, all-encompassing approach to civilian and military preparedness and readiness, involving both government and society as a whole, as European defence is confronted with increasingly complex challenges that demand a shift in approach, in particular regarding artificial intelligence (AI), cybersecurity and multi-domain operational strategies; considers the importance of strengthening cooperation with NATO and like-minded countries and engaging with the United States to increase the resilience of the transatlantic relationship;

    3. Expects the white paper on the future of European defence to differentiate between short-term and long-term plans and objectives, to predominantly address defence sector capability issues, industrial competitiveness and investment needs, as well as to frame the overall approach to EU defence integration, with the aim of strengthening the Member States’ abilities to respond to threats – particularly in the context of Russia’s continuing war of aggression in Ukraine, combined with evolving geopolitical challenges to Europe’s southern flank, and increased military capabilities of hostile state and non-state actors – reinforce EU-NATO cooperation, ensure more efficient Member State defence spending, improve coordination between the Member States, and strengthen strategic partnerships while prioritising the transatlantic relationship;

    4. Underlines that Europe must take on greater responsibility and welcomes the fact that higher Member State investment in defence is already accelerating the consolidation of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), which includes a number of large multinational companies, mid-caps and over 2 000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); stresses that the different EU initiatives and regulations should work together to incentivise this process, rather than presenting obstacles; underlines the importance of improving coherence and coordination between EU instruments and programmes of common European interest for defence;

    5. Reiterates, in this regard, that it will also be important to promptly adopt the European defence industry programme (EDIP), in order to support the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS), adopted in March 2024, which aims to enhance the EU’s defence readiness and specifically its industrial capacity;

    6. Encourages the expansion of financial support to future European defence spending initiatives that promote the mass development of operational capabilities and strategic enablers, along with a robust enhancement of civil defence infrastructure to ensure the national resilience of the Member States;

    7. Welcomes the announcement of the proposal for the exemption of defence spending from EU limitations on public spending – a first, fundamental step in the right direction;

    8. Recalls that on 31 January 2025, 19 of the Member States sent a letter urging the European Investment Bank (EIB) to take a stronger role in financing security and defence, in particular re-evaluating the EIB’s list of excluded activities, increasing funding for defence-related investments and exploring the issuance of ‘defence bonds’;

    9. Calls on the EIB to further review its policy on defence investment; welcomes the EIB’s decision to update the definition of eligible dual-use projects, but notes that its lending policy still excludes the financing of ammunition and weapons, as well as equipment or infrastructure exclusively dedicated to military use; underlines that more should be done to enable access to financing and facilitate the de-risking of defence projects across the financial institutions;

    10. Urges the Member States to support the establishment of a defence, security and resilience bank to serve as a multilateral lending institution designed to provide low-interest, long-term loans that can support key national security priorities such as rearmament, defence modernisation, rebuilding efforts in Ukraine and the buying back of critical infrastructure currently owned by hostile non-EU countries;

    11. Encourages EU defence actions aimed at supporting, initiating and incentivising better Member State coordination as Member States are the principal customers of defence equipment, and stresses that any EU initiative for defence must aim to reach a critical mass of capability development, support an appreciable share of Europe’s overall defence investments and support its defence industrial tools with financial means that have a structural effect, without coming at the expense of national defence spending;

    12. Encourages the Member States to promote cooperation between different European defence firms to encourage the combining of resources and competencies, in order to spur innovation and the development of modern military equipment;

    13. Considers that the strategic environments in which many EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions are present are radically deteriorating, with an ongoing war of aggression by Russia in Ukraine and its spillover effect into Moldova and the South Caucasus, a wave of coup d’états in the Sahel region and renewed terrorist campaigns in Somalia and Mozambique, all of which demonstrate the need for the white paper to ensure flexibility in a 360 degree approach to European security that strives towards building a credible and capable deterrence capacity for the Member States, and ensures that Member State civilian and military personnel can deter and respond rapidly to the growing threat environment;

    14. Recognises that the current geopolitical paradigm is the result of decades of underinvestment in European security and over-reliance on allies and partners; considers it a key priority of the white paper to outline an actionable plan to revitalise and advance deterrence along the periphery of Europe with a combination of joint civilian and military training missions that specialise in combined arms training, counter-unmanned aerial vehicle (C-UAV) and counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) capabilities, and enhance interoperability and interchangeability among the Member States and non-EU countries;

    15. Calls for the white paper to ensure that the CSDP’s access to planning, resources and logistics is utilised in a manner that permits the CSDP to become the primary enabler of civilian crisis management during emergencies, and can be used as a practice hub for societal resilience and recovery in the face of both human-induced and natural disasters;

    16. Stresses that the white paper should promote close coordination between the EU and NATO to aid our collective defence and deterrence efforts, as well as the alliance’s effort to promote cooperative security through defence capacity-building and its open door policy;

    17. Calls for the white paper to outline how the EU and NATO should collaborate on building an integrated approach to the Black Sea, with a view to strengthening partnership in the areas of security, energy and connectivity; calls for the EU to redouble joint efforts by the EU and NATO to strengthen the deterrence and resilience of the Eastern Partnership countries by developing maritime defence capabilities, enhancing maritime interoperability, providing capabilities to deter and defend against cyber intrusions and attacks, expanding intelligence-sharing and maintaining modern outfitting of national armed forces;

    18. Highlights that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Iran’s aggression against Israel have demonstrated the use of drones at an unprecedented scale in modern warfare, urges the Member States to utilise the European Peace Facility, Permanent Structured Cooperation, the European Defence Agency and other available and future instruments to ensure that investment, development and joint procurement of counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) and airborne electronic attack (AEA) equipment are prioritised, and to integrate C-UAS and AEA into the strategic doctrine of CSDP military training missions;

    19. Concurs with the ambition of enhancing the European pillar within NATO, with a view to augmenting strategic complementarity, by increasing the amount and range of NATO advanced training courses between European allies and partners to ensure that the Member States close the gap with the United States in operational capabilities and effectiveness; stresses that the development of EU operational capabilities can go hand in hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation;

    20. Emphasises that the rise of asymmetric transnational threats has increasingly blurred the distinction between external and internal security, as well as between military and non-military security, and that this shifting landscape necessitates a comprehensive and adaptive approach to security at EU level; underlines that the Member States’ increases in defence spending should be complementary to the EU’s overall security strategy, which must evolve in response to changes in the strategic environment;

    21. Recognises that NATO and leading allies such as the United States and the United Kingdom are playing a crucial role in coordinating and leading the efforts to support Ukraine militarily not only with weapons, ammunition and equipment, but also intelligence and data; considers Russia’s ongoing war of aggression as further evidence that the most important countries for European security remain the United States and United Kingdom, as the war continues to reveal profound structural faults in EU security and defence architecture and unacceptable shortfalls in its capabilities;

    22. Highlights the need to ensure the security of the Black Sea region by assisting in the demining of Ukraine’s seawaters and to encourage the Member States to offer joint training exercises in this regard, with an emphasis on the development of maritime mine counter measure capabilities and critical seabed infrastructure protection;

    23. Underlines the importance of undersea cables and in this regard expresses worry about the recent series of cable disruptions in the Baltic Sea, which raise concerns about hybrid warfare tactics, particularly plausible deniability in state-sponsored sabotage; recalls that Russia’s increased naval presence, also through its shadow fleet, in European waters, highlights the vulnerabilities of seabed infrastructure; stresses the need to expand NATO and EU naval coordination for Baltic Sea patrols, enhance surveillance and defensive capabilities, increase investment in undersea surveillance technologies and strengthen partnerships with private telecom and energy companies for real-time monitoring of undersea threats;

    24. Encourages the Member States to provide specialised opportunities for SMEs in the European defence sector so they have the capacity to participate in the bidding process via measures such as creating a pre-approved list of companies to facilitate a speedier engagement process, introducing private equity firms that invest in SMEs into the procurement process, assisting SME growth through incubation and capital investment, reducing the complexities of bidding for contracts, and devising an internal effort to reform the amount of time taken to address contract details;

    25. Encourages the Member States to support binding commitments in their defence budgets that ensure a minimum expenditure in the field of research and development spending, in order to ensure that SME engagement and a spillover effect into the civilian marketplace can be tangibly supported;

    26. Emphasises that the Member States’ ambitions to achieve defence readiness should also be advanced through partnerships and prioritise, where possible, the integration of the Ukrainian Defence Technological and Industrial Base into the wider European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and transatlantic defence technological and industrial cooperation, with a particular emphasis on joint drone and munitions development;

    27. Encourages initiatives such as the EU’s Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) to serve as a standard for advancing the much-needed increase in munitions and capabilities required for our armed forces, using ASAP as a basis for combining credible and effective multi-domain conventional force capabilities, missile defences, space support, drone development and various other key capabilities as outlined in the EDA’s Capability Development Plan;

    28. Stresses that the white paper must include an outline of institutional reforms that reinforce changes in procurement regulations and intellectual property frameworks, as well as leveraging tax incentives to promote defence-related innovation; emphasises that any such changes must be designed to ensure speed and efficiency within the procurement process and management life cycle of Member State weapons systems;

    29. Encourages speedy financing for enhancing military mobility in a manner that guarantees the upgrading of infrastructure for dual-use military and civilian purposes, contributes to the EU’s defence capabilities and realises a fully operational military Schengen area; underlines that such investments offer significant economic and security benefits; calls on the Commission to act on the recommendations of the 2025 ECA special report on military mobility and to give greater importance to the military assessment during the selection process for dual-use projects;

    30. Stresses that military mobility requires the elimination of regulatory bottlenecks that hinder the delivery of capabilities and limit the investment required to modernise defence capabilities and improve military mobility; emphasises, therefore, that the removal of obstacles, implementation of flow-monitoring and optimisation of systems for addressing cross-border threats are crucial and must be reflected in the white paper;

    31. Urges the Commission to consider financing that ensures that anti-access/area denial capabilities and civil-military fusion are prioritised within any infrastructure development objectives, particularly along the eastern flank;

    32. Supports initiatives for industrial reinforcement actions that benefit SMEs or mid-caps, demonstrate a contribution to the creation of new forms of cross-border cooperation or involve the creation of new infrastructure, facilities or production lines, or the establishment of new or the ramping-up of existing manufacturing capacities of crisis-relevant products;

    33. Encourages the Member States to prioritise the pre-deployment of personnel and capabilities in support of the eastern flank, combined with a follow-on forces and rapid deployment capability that ensures effective border security and deterrence against both hybrid warfare and Russian military manoeuvres;

    34. Underlines the Arctic’s strategic importance within the EU’s defence framework, underscoring the need for strengthened deterrence and defence capabilities in close coordination with NATO; emphasises that this cooperation is essential to address the intensifying militarisation and resource competition operated by Russian and Chinese activities in the region, and to counterbalance their expanding influence and military presence;

    35. Encourages the Member States to ensure closer synergies with national joint training and evaluation centres in Eastern Partnership countries, while also ensuring that there is widespread Member State representation in CSDP missions throughout the Eastern Partnership region, and to encourage greater participation of non-EU countries in these missions, particularly non-EU countries that have hosted successfully completed CSDP missions;

    36. Considers outer space to be an increasingly contested area, with the weaponisation of space on the rise, space security becoming an ever more critical and contested issue, and a growing rush to militarise space infrastructure; highlights the need to prioritise the defence and security of space as a critical part of Europe’s defence, and underscores the importance of securing Europe’s space capabilities and infrastructure, both on land and in orbit, to ensure continuous, secure access to data and communications;

    37. Recognises the important role that emerging disruptive technologies such as quantum computing and AI will play in our future relations with Russia and China, and calls for increasing Europe’s resilience to emerging disruptive technologies in all CSDP missions and operations;

    38. Considers that hybrid threats in the years to come will see the systematic combination of information warfare, agile combat manoeuvres, mass cyber warfare and emerging and disruptive technologies from seabed to space, with both advanced air-breathing and space-based surveillance and strike systems deployed, all of which will be enabled by advanced AI, quantum computing, increasingly ‘intelligent’ drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems, and nanotech and bio-warfare;

    39. Underlines the importance of civil defence and preparedness in the medium and long term, including the need to establish adequate civil protection infrastructure and planning for emergency situations; calls for the EU, its Member States and local governments to ensure the necessary investments for those purposes and a dedicated investment guarantee programme within the EIB for crisis-proofing and civil defence infrastructure;

    40. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, in particular the President of the Commission, the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the other competent Commissioners, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the UN Secretary-General, the NATO Secretary General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and partner countries.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0150/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0150/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the EU is currently under attack, with hybrid incidents inside its borders, a large-scale war in its neighbourhood, and a realignment of global powers, all presenting real risks to the security of the EU and its citizens and requiring immediate, ambitious and decisive action;

    B. whereas the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy are expected to present a white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025, which should serve as a roadmap for such action;

    1. Urges the EU to act immediately to ensure its ability to protect its citizens, deter its enemies, support its allies and become a powerful defender of the rules-based international order and the principles of the European security architecture; urges the EU and its Member States to define a coherent, comprehensive and actionable strategy to achieve this; expects the Commission to present a proposal for such a strategy in its white paper on the future of European defence;

    2. Is firmly convinced that a united EU can overcome all the challenges it faces and become a global power for peace, security, human rights and sustainable development, but that this requires a strong EU budget or additional European financial instruments, a reliable and sovereign industrial basis, a full spectrum of European military capabilities, including strategic enablers, and an integrated command allowing all national forces to act under a unified structure at the service of the EU, alone or in complementarity with other allied forces;

    3. Believes that the strategy must include a renewed threat assessment, reflecting the recent unprecedented changes in the EU’s geopolitical context, a plan for supporting Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression, as a key action to defend the EU’s values and protect its citizens and territory, a roadmap to close the capability gap, restore deterrence and enable autonomous EU action, and a plan to finance such vital transformations in the EU’s capacity to act;

    4. Stresses its firm commitment to continued close cooperation with NATO to reinforce deterrence, collective defence and interoperability; calls nonetheless for the development of a fully-capable European Pillar of NATO able to act autonomously whenever necessary;

    Assessing our threats and challenges

    5. Is convinced that the EU needs to define its foreign policy goals and strategic defence doctrine, identifying the most pressing challenges, systemic threats and rival actors, and to shape its defence strategy accordingly;

    6. Strongly believes that Europe is today facing the most profound military threat to its territorial integrity since the Second World War; believes that Russia and its allies are currently the most significant threat to our security and that of EU candidate countries and partners, and reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, however, that the instability in our southern neighbourhood, the rise in Chinese military power, the increased aggressiveness of some middle powers and the behaviour of the Trump administration, which appears ready to jeopardise transatlantic cooperation on common security and make a deal with the Russian aggressor at the expense of Ukrainian and European security, which are one and the same, must also be fully taken into consideration;

    7. Highlights the fact that on assessments by several European intelligence services, Russia will be ready to attack EU territory within 3 to 10 years, particularly if there is a ceasefire in its aggression against Ukraine that does not lead to a just and lasting peace; notes with deep concern that the Russian armed forces have grown in size and gained valuable battlefield experience, unlike any European forces with the exception of those of Ukraine, aims to have a 1.5 million-strong military by 2026 and has significantly ramped up its armaments production, making it an extremely worrisome threat for the EU’s security and for peace in Europe and globally;

    8. Strongly condemns Russia’s escalating hybrid warfare tactics within the EU and its neighbourhood, which encompass both non-physical and physical actions, including attacks on critical infrastructure and disruption of elections; highlights that Russia’s strategic doctrine includes significant conventional conflict in its conception and execution of hybrid war and conceives hybrid wars as the main line of future military development, rather than a temporary phenomenon; calls for the EU to immediately and significantly step up its ability to defend, attribute and punish hybrid warfare waged within its territory and that of candidate countries;

    9. Condemns all countries that are providing military equipment, financial support or any other form of assistance to Russia, thereby enabling and intensifying its ongoing aggression; warns of the very serious risks resulting from a widening of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; is deeply concerned that the involvement of Iran and North Korea will provide them with important lessons to modernise their military capabilities, and may accelerate their paths towards nuclearisation;

    10. Reaffirms its grave concerns about China’s increasing military investments and capabilities; expresses serious concerns about the renewed Chinese and Russian commitment to further strengthen their military ties and condemns China’s supplying of components and equipment to Moscow’s military industry;

    11. Notes with concern the increase in both intra and inter-state conflicts in the EU’s wider neighbourhood, in part driven by the hegemonic ambitions of several middle powers, the presence of aggressive non-state actors and by the fragility of several states; also notes that this leads to clear threats to the EU’s security, namely by fostering terrorism and increasing the destabilisation of populations, often forcing their displacement;

    12. Is deeply concerned by the recent actions of the Trump administration, which distance it from the values that have been at the core of its relationship with the EU, namely democracy, the rule of law, freedom of speech and support for the rules-based international order; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression, as well as the unilateral decision to end Russia’s international isolation and to propose a normalisation of relations between them; strongly condemns any attempt to blame Ukraine, the victim, for the actions of the aggressor, Russia; urges the US Government to maintain maximum pressure on Russia until the latter agrees to a just and lasting peace for Ukraine; rejects any attempt by the US Government to impose a new security architecture on the EU and its Member States, and reiterates that any negotiation of such a security architecture must take place with the EU at the table; is deeply concerned by the actions of the US Government towards NATO and the doubts raised regarding the United States’ commitment to the security of the European continent; supports the peace process for Ukraine launched by European leaders, together with Ukraine, on 2 March 2025 in London, which seeks a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, and must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for Russia’s war crimes and crime of aggression, Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine and credible security guarantees for Ukraine;

    13. Concurs with the assessment of the Strategic Compass that the EU is surrounded by instability and conflicts, but notes that in the meantime the situation has changed dramatically; believes that, altogether, these developments produce an encirclement of Europe that reduces its scope for the pursuit of democratically defined and autonomous interests and values, and that this requires an immediate response; recognises the evolving nature of global security threats and therefore calls for the EU to conduct more frequent threat assessments, as they are the precondition for a realistic and successful planning of capabilities and operations;

    Supporting Ukraine

    14. Urges the EU and its Member States, together with international partners and NATO allies, to immediately increase their military support to Ukraine in order to assist it in exercising its legitimate right to self-defence against the Russian war of aggression according to Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls, in this regard, for the swift adoption of the next military aid package, which should be the largest to date and reflect the level of ambition this juncture calls for; calls on the Member States, international partners and NATO allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets in Russian territory; calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support to Ukraine; calls on the Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately seize all frozen Russian assets in order to maintain and step up the EU’s response to Ukraine’s military needs;

    15. Urges the Member States to immediately engage in joint procurement of additional capabilities, in particular ammunition for air defence and artillery, as well as any capabilities in which US assistance has played a key role thus far; further urges them to plan in advance for a possible sudden stop in US military assistance;

    16. Welcomes the continued support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, which has already trained more than 60 000 Ukrainian troops, and calls on the mission to continue training as many troops as possible; stresses the importance of specific training modules aimed at developing the capacities of existing and future officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces across all levels and in accordance with their needs; emphasises that the mission should also act as a platform for the exchange of best practices that would ensure that European forces also benefit from the lessons learnt on the battlefield by the Ukrainian Armed Forces; calls on the Member States to further expand training operations for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including training operations in Ukrainian territory;

    17. Insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with, and the integration of, the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), which offers clear advantages for both sides, and calls for speedier integration of the Ukrainian defence industry; recalls the importance of the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) to that effect, and highlights the urgency of properly financing EDIP’s Ukraine Support Instrument, which is currently not budgeted; calls on the Commission to include Ukraine and its defence industry in all its defence industrial programmes;

    18. Praises the ‘Danish Model’ for support to Ukraine, which consists of procuring defence capabilities produced directly in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to strongly support this model and to make full use of its potential, as there is an underutilisation of Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, estimated at around 50 %, and it brings many advantages to both sides, such as cheaper equipment, speedier and safer logistics as well as greater ease of training and maintenance;

    19. Calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war that must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for Russia’s war crimes and the crime of aggression, and Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

    Closing the capabilities gap and restoring deterrence

    20. Strongly believes that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not just a simple increase in ambition and action, but a complete overhaul of the way we act and invest in our security and defence, such that from now on we plan, innovate, develop, purchase, maintain and deploy capabilities together, in a coordinated and integrated fashion, while making full use of the complementary competences of all actors in Europe, including NATO;

    21. Calls on the Commission to come up with a complete programme for defence, including against hybrid attacks, ensuring that planning, research, development, procurement and management of capabilities are all done through a European lens, and that all EU funds are used as a stimulus to joint EU action, instead of perpetuating the present state of market fragmentation, divergent and incompatible capabilities, and superfluous and wasteful investments; considers EDIP to be a good step forward and as such calls for its swift adoption;

    22. Recognises that the starting point must be a realistic assessment of the current capabilities and capability gap; calls on the Commission, with the support of the European Defence Agency and in cooperation with NATO, to identify critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in the EU, in particular for strategic enablers, where the Member States have fallen behind and become dependent on non-European allies; furthermore, calls on the Commission to transform the capability gaps into clear industrial targets that can be the object of planning and programming and benefit from an industrial policy;

    23. Declares the EDTIB to be a strategic asset of the EU, and as such considers that the Commission should be tasked with its mapping and monitoring, so as to safeguard the EU’s strengths, reduce its vulnerabilities, avoid crises, and provide it with an effective and efficient industrial policy; calls on the Commission to draw on the EU Military Committee’s expertise in the definition of defence industries’ priorities and the formulation of defence initiatives in order to ensure alignment between industrial capabilities and military needs; recalls the importance of ensuring that the EDTIB is present in all Member States, distributing the burden and the benefits equitably, and preventing its disruption by a targeted attack on a particular area;

    24. Strongly believes that EU support for the production and procurement of defence products should focus on stimulating the EDTIB, increasing production volumes and ensuring the development of native European solutions for key capabilities, in particular for domains of action where we have so far relied on support from allies, and thus be oriented towards EU-based companies; rejects a scenario in which EU funds contribute to perpetuating or deepening dependences on non-European actors, whether for production of capabilities or their deployment; notes with concern that the vast majority of EU defence investment is diverted to defence industry players outside the EU; highlights that our investments should also contribute to bringing our European allies closer together, first and foremost Ukraine, but also Norway and the UK, finding synergies between complementary industrial strengths and bolstering the interoperability of our fighting forces; states, however, that joining common projects in defence and security requires a steadfast commitment to the EU’s values and norms and demands that any industrial partnerships with non-EU allies include strong safeguards on technology transfer and design authority, ensuring that we do not face restrictions on the use of the capabilities acquired; highlights that EU funds will provide opportunities for the defence industry, but also require a commitment to give priority to orders linked to ensuring European security and defence, in particular in times of crisis;

    25. Urges the Member States to radically change the way they procure defence products, choosing common procurement by default, and to consider tasking the Commission with undertaking joint procurement on their behalf; considers that all products procured in the EU, particularly those supported by EU funds, must respect strong safeguards on technology transfer and design authority;

    26. Welcomes all measures that allow a faster and more effective ramp-up of production of defence products in Europe, in particular those that are most needed for a land war; calls for a change in paradigm from a ‘flow’ approach to a ‘stock’ approach, with stock piles of materiel ready for a sustained increase in demand; notes, in this regard, the advantages offered by mechanisms such as advance purchase agreements, the establishment of ‘ever-warm’ facilities and the creation of defence readiness pools; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in developing wartime economic cooperation contingency plans with close partners to prepare for mutual support in the case of large-scale security crises involving them directly, and to deepen wartime economic dialogues with European and global partners;

    27. Highlights that the EDTIB cannot thrive without a true single market for defence; emphasises, in this regard, the need for an effective regulatory framework aimed at encouraging innovation and cross-border cooperation in production, procurement and investment; insists on the need to remove barriers to market entry for defence products across the EU and calls on the Commission to act upon the results of the reviews of the Directives on the transfer of defence-related products[1] and defence procurement[2], considering the obstacles and costs imposed by the current fragmented framework for certification of defence products; calls on the Commission to propose a regulation for common rules on the certification of defence products and the creation of a European defence certification authority; underlines at the same time the importance of maintaining fruitful competition between different undertakings in the single market for defence; calls on the Commission to propose a regulation on the standardisation of defence products with binding industrial standards, taking advantage of the lessons learnt from the implementation of NATO defence standards;

    28. Stresses the need for greater transparency and convergence at the national and European levels on arms exports; points out the need for the Member States to respect the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, while acknowledging their competences in their defence acquisition policies;

    29. Underlines the importance of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in improving and harmonising the EU’s defence capabilities; reiterates its regret that Member States continue to not make full use of the PESCO framework; reiterates its call on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States, and with the involvement of the Commission, to assess projects and their potential regularly and comprehensively with a view to streamlining the current set of projects to a small set of priority projects; believes that priority projects must focus on reducing our dependencies regarding strategic enablers, such as battlefield command and control (C2), aerial and satellite intelligence, surveillance and recognition, satellite communication, air defence and suppression of enemy air defences, military mobility, strategic and tactical air transport and aerial refuelling, missile and deep strike capabilities, drone and anti-drone technologies, combat engineering and wet-gap crossing, and airborne electronic attack; believes that these could be European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI); regrets that Parliament is not in a position to properly scrutinise PESCO projects and calls for a change of paradigm for the governance of EDPCIs, such that Parliament is adequately involved; reiterates its call on the Member States to provide an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year;

    30. Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drones package, focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, containing plans and funds to stimulate research and development, which should learn from the Ukrainian experience and be open to the participation of Ukraine’s highly innovative companies, as well as an industrial programme dedicated to the joint development, production and procurement of drones and anti-drone systems, and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts;

    31. Calls on the Commission to step up the ambition of the European Defence Fund, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and to better align its work programme with the capability planning exercises; recalls that the EU’s investment in defence research and innovation is much lower than that of its industrial competitors; considers that part of the investment from the European Defence Fund (EDF) should be designed to foster partnerships between academia, ministries of defence and the defence industry, and to the creation of dedicated research centres for defence; highlights the importance of promoting the participation of the most innovative high-tech companies from the civilian sector in the EDF;

    32. Recalls that the EDTIB is currently facing a shortage of skilled workers, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a strategy to train, upskill and reskill workers; considers that funding from defence programmes must be paired with requirements regarding benefits for workers and communities where the investments are located, making the European defence industry a source of high-quality jobs and earning the EDTIB broad support from the population;

    33. Calls for the EU and its Member States to quickly improve the state of military mobility and logistics, removing all unnecessary obstacles that slow down the speed at which the EU can react to threats and deploy its forces;

    34. Calls for the EU to develop a comprehensive set of instruments to detect, prevent and react to hybrid attacks and threats and protect the Union’s citizens and assets, including critical infrastructure, but also democratic institutions and processes; reiterates its call on the Member States, the European External Action Service and the Commission to consider the creation of a well-resourced and independent structure tasked with identifying, analysing and documenting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threats against the EU as a whole to increase situational awareness and threat intelligence sharing, and develop attribution capabilities and countermeasures in relation to FIMI;

    35. Stresses the importance of enhanced intelligence sharing and information exchange among the Member States and EU institutions, including Parliament, to improve situational awareness and to be able to better anticipate and counter threats to collective security and define common lines of action under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), particularly in the area of crisis management; calls on the Member States to use the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) as an effective intelligence-sharing body to share intelligence securely, formulate a common strategic culture and provide strategic information to better anticipate and respond to crises within and outside the EU; reiterates its call for the deployment of intelligence-gathering capacities in all CSDP missions and operations, which would provide information to the EU INTCEN, EU military staff, the EU’s Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability;

    36. Welcomes the Niinistö report and its recommendations for strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and resilience; supports the adoption of a whole-of-society approach to resilience, involving the active engagement of the EU institutions, the Member States, civil society and individual citizens in strengthening the Union’s security framework; urges the EU to increase the alignment of existing EU instruments and policies, as well as that between EU and national policies, pioneering a ‘preparedness in all policies’ approach to security and defence, ensuring they do not generate contradictory obligations or jeopardise overall defence objectives, especially during a security crisis; expects the upcoming EU strategy on preparedness to offer details of the implementation of the report;

    Enabling autonomous EU action

    37. Recalls that the Strategic Compass provides the EU and its Member States with a framework for strengthening the EU’s security and defence and for advancing towards a common forward-looking strategic culture; reiterates that the Strategic Compass’s ambitious aims and milestones can only be achieved with the corresponding political will, adequate financial contributions and openness to cooperation where necessary; calls for the Member States to take all the necessary steps and decisions and fully implement the Strategic Compass; reiterates its call to strengthen the EU-s MPCC, establishing it as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations and providing it with adequate premises, staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations, including those of the Rapid Deployment Capacity; insists that the Rapid Deployment Capacity must achieve full operational capability in the first half of 2025 at the latest, with at least 5 000 troops; calls on the Member States to urgently pursue a more ambitious pace and scale of command integration and joint operational capability, with the goal of enabling the EU to conduct large-scale operations independently, without reliance on non-EU countries for any capability, including strategic enablers; stresses that the EU and its Member States cannot develop consistent foreign and defence policies without strong support for democratic and agile structures and decision-making processes; underlines that further institutional discussions on removing the unanimity requirement to enhance cooperation should be explored;

    38. Underlines that in the current geopolitical context, the need for continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on mutual assistance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, regardless of whether or not they are NATO members, is of utmost importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to present concrete steps towards developing a true EU solidarity policy, including by clarifying the practical arrangements in the event of a Member State triggering Article 42(7) TEU;

    39. Notes that EU candidate countries are frequently the target of destabilisation campaigns, and thus calls for the EU to ensure them greater support, in order to preserve stability and security and increase defence cooperation, especially in the fight against disinformation and hybrid warfare; is concerned that otherwise it will act as an invitation to Russia to invade them before they finally join the EU;

    40. Reiterates the importance of EU-NATO cooperation, as NATO remains, for those states that are members of it, an important pillar of their collective defence, such that EU-NATO cooperation should continue, in particular in areas such as information exchange, planning, military mobility and exchange of best practices; highlights that all EU-NATO cooperation must be mutually beneficial and inclusive and respect the EU’s capacity to act autonomously; remains concerned, in this respect, that Türkiye, a NATO member and EU candidate country, excludes Cyprus from cooperation with NATO, hampering an enhanced relationship between the EU and NATO;

    41. Underlines the need for a strong EU defence pillar within NATO, able to act autonomously from, and in complementarity with, NATO, turning the transatlantic alliance into a more equal partnership, and granting the necessary security guarantees to the EU, its Member States and whoever else they deem it necessary to extend them to;

    42. Considers it essential to formalise a security and defence partnership with the United Kingdom as a means of strengthening European security and the European pillar of NATO, in particular in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines, in this regard, the importance of closer cooperation on information and intelligence sharing, military mobility, security and defence initiatives, crisis management, cyber defence, hybrid threats, FIMI and in jointly addressing shared threats;

    43. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that all instruments of external action, including development aid and cooperation, are aligned with the EU’s security objectives, fostering resilient societies by promoting inclusive economic growth, good governance and human rights; emphasises the crucial role that diplomacy and development cooperation play alongside military efforts in ensuring long-term international security; underscores that sustainable peace cannot be achieved through military measures alone, but requires comprehensive strategies that address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, governance failures and climate change;

    Financing our security and defence

    44. Considers that, in order to be able to protect its citizens, deter its enemies, support its allies and become a powerful actor in the defence of a rules-based international order, the EU requires an immediate, substantial and sustained investment in security and defence, in particular at EU level, using a mix of public and private funds and incentivising better spending and better collective action; calls for the EU and the Member States to urgently agree on concrete financial solutions to finance security and defence-related investments; welcomes the ReArmEU initiative by the Commission as an important first step towards swift action;

    45. Recalls that the Commission has estimated the funding needed at EUR 500 billion over the next 10 years (2025-2034), including EUR 400 billion to strengthen Member States’ defence capabilities and EUR 100 billion to support Ukraine; notes higher estimates, such as a Bruegel study referring to EUR 250 billion annually in the event that the United States withdraws its military presence from Europe; highlights that the cost of isolated action is much higher than the cost of joint action, and that the EU and its Member states can also increase their preparedness by making current investment more efficient and coordinated; highlights that the cost of non-preparedness and the consequent loss of autonomy and potential military defeat is much higher than the cost of acting decisively now;

    46. Strongly supports increased investments in our security and defence to ensure that the EU and its Member States are able to face all types of threats, from hybrid to conventional, and establish strong deterrence, while reducing dependences; notes that insecurity, social exclusion and poverty are persistently weaponised by our enemies, as they make large swaths of people more vulnerable to hostile propaganda and anti-democratic narratives; demands therefore that the increased investments in our security and defence come on top of the important investments in social cohesion and welfare, and not instead of them; calls instead for a comprehensive EU investment strategy, based on a permanent fiscal capacity that addresses both vulnerabilities in military capabilities and in the social fabric, empowering us to fight all threats to our values, social model, security and defence; underlines that this pressing investment requires raising public financial resources quickly and in substantial volumes and that this should be based on the principle of social solidarity and a fair redistribution of wealth within our European societies; calls therefore on the Commission to propose new own resources and taxes on the stakeholders benefiting from the current economic and security situation, notably through windfall profits, in order to ensure a fair and sustainable contribution to our collective resilience; recalls that investing in security and defence brings many additional benefits for European society besides greater security and autonomy, and contributes to the desire to make the EU’s economy more competitive;

    47. Warns that simply increasing national defence spending without addressing coordination issues, redundant efforts, and misaligned strategies could be counterproductive as it may exacerbate force integration challenges and drive up procurement costs for all Member States by intensifying competition between them; is therefore concerned by the Commission’s proposals in ReArmEU to activate the escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence investments, which would change the fiscal rules without creating more fiscal space and without accompanying it with proposals for increased coordinated or joint spending; recalls that any exemption should take into account the need to avoid moral hazard and avoid rewarding countries with long-standing inadequacies in their security and defence spending; demands that the Commission and the Member States design any exemptions for defence spending ramp-up in a way that incentivises coordinated spending and ensures the definition of such investments takes into account all threats, including hybrid, and the need to improve military mobility, resilience and security of communications and the availability of skilled workers;

    48. Calls therefore for the bulk of the effort to serve EU-level action; regrets that the Commission’s ReArmEU initiative is mostly based on national expenditure; furthermore calls for the EU and its Member States to give prominent coordination roles to the Commission and the European Defence Agency in new financing instruments, which should be coupled with a complete programme for defence, including against hybrid attacks, ensuring that planning, development, procurement and management of capabilities is done together, in groupings of significant numbers of Member States, and often with the Commission and the European Defence Agency acting on their behalf;

    49. Recognises that the present multiannual financial framework (MFF) is unable to provide sufficient resources for security and defence, and rejects any increases in security and defence spending in the present and future MFFs at the expense of cohesion policy funds, as proposed by the Commission in its ReArmEU initiative; calls on the Commission and the Member States to adapt the cohesion policy funds to a new geopolitical reality, shifting from a reactive, crisis-response stance to a more proactive policy focused on resilience; underlines that the EU budget alone cannot fill the defence spending gap, but has an important role to play; calls for additional EU-wide and European solutions to bridge the gap until the next MFF; highlights the importance of future MFFs in transforming the current immediate increases in security and defence into structural and sustainable EU-level efforts to ensure the EU’s security and defence;

    50. Notes the proposals to make use of readily available sources of capital to finance security and defence, namely the unspent funds of NextGenerationEU and potential financial lines from the European Stability Mechanism, similar to the programme put together during the response to the COVID-19 pandemic; believes that these options could be explored, but would fall short of the needs estimated by the Commission;

    51. Calls therefore on the Commission to raise common debt to provide the Union with the fiscal capacity to borrow in exceptional and crises situations, present and future, taking into account the experience and lessons learnt from NextGenerationEU, as we are now experiencing a pressing need to boost security and defence to protect the EU’s citizens, restore deterrence and support our allies, first and foremost Ukraine; notes additional ideas to create a rearmament bank or a special purpose vehicle with pooled national guarantees to ensure Member States have easier access to markets; underlines that the meaningful involvement of Parliament as one arm of the budgetary authority in the governance of future EU defence spending is a sine qua non; reiterates that the governance of whatever instrument is used should be such that it gives rise to a European defence programme that uses the funds to solve coordination problems in planning, developing, procuring, maintaining and deploying capabilities, reduces dependencies from non-European countries, supports the EDTIB and ultimately enables the EU and its close allies to act autonomously and in a coordinated manner;

    52. Recognises the importance of mobilising private capital into security and defence; recalls, however, that, as governments remain the sole procurers of military capabilities, private capital will not replace public capital in the security and defence sector; calls on the Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to consider an investment guarantee programme, similar to InvestEU, to assist in this effort; calls on the EIB to re-evaluate the list of excluded activities, to adjust its lending policy to increase the volume of available funding in the field of security and defence, and to investigate earmarked debt issuance for funding security and defence projects; calls for more consistent support for companies by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and simplifying procedures, in particular by increasing information-sharing between public authorities, upholding the once-only principle and making full use of digital technologies; calls for the EU to start preparing emergency procedures for projects established in response to major crises or wars;

     

    °

    ° °

    53. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the EU security and defence agencies, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Greece’s potential contribution to the EU green hydrogen strategy – E-000870/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000870/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Sakis Arnaoutoglou (S&D)

    Green hydrogen is a key pillar of Europe’s strategy for achieving climate neutrality by 2050. The target is for the EU to produce 10 million tonnes a year by 2030.

    With its strong potential in the renewable energy sector Greece is well placed to play a central role in Europe’s green hydrogen market. However, there have been delays in the development of a comprehensive national hydrogen strategy. Although a committee tasked with drawing up a national strategy was set up in 2019, the regulatory framework is still lacking and this is holding up critical investments. By actively participating in the green transition with hydrogen, Greece can become more self-sufficient in terms of energy, create new jobs and play a part in achieving climate targets.

    Although ambitious projects, such as the production of hydrogen for export to Germany, have been announced, the absence of a clear legislative framework and funding mechanisms is preventing them from materialising.

    In view of these delays, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.In its opinion, what progress has Greece made in developing green hydrogen compared to other European countries?
    • 2.What specific measures is it planning in order to expedite the adoption of green hydrogen in Greece, particularly given the delays in the regulatory framework?
    • 3.Are there any European funding instruments available that could help Greece develop the necessary infrastructure and strengthen the hydrogen supply chain, turning the country into an energy hub between Europe and the Middle East?

    Submitted: 27.2.2025

    Last updated: 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Measures to limit the effects of the recent ecological disaster in the Black Sea – E-000084/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission acknowledges the increased difficulties for Romania and Bulgaria to protect their marine environment, exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the absence of well-functioning regional cooperation.

    Under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive[1] (MSFD), Romania and Bulgaria have been assisted in developing their marine strategies to protect their marine waters.

    The EU Research and Innovation Framework Programme Horizon Europe[2] supports environmental protection in the Black Sea[3]. The Interreg Black Sea programme[4] provides EUR 95 million of EU funds[5].

    The Cohesion Policy[6] provides support for a total estimated value of EUR 70 million, focused on the Natura 2000 sites in the Black Sea and Danube Delta.

    A project[7] promoted monitoring and assessment activities, in line with MSFD requirements. Under the Common Maritime Agenda[8] for the Black Sea, projects against marine pollution due to the ongoing conflict started[9].

    The Commission alerts the authorities in Bulgaria and Romania daily on possible pollution incidents, including from oil spills, detected by satellite surveillance[10]. National authorities can request assistance from the Union Civil Protection Mechanism[11].

    Furthermore, the Ukraine Investment Framework[12] could support investments related to climate change, environmental and biodiversity protection.

    The Commission also works towards the EU goal[13] of acceding the Bucharest Convention, improving environmental protection of the Black Sea and strengthening the EU technical and financial contribution.

    • [1] Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy, OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19-40.
    • [2] https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en
    • [3] Notably through the EU Mission Restore our Ocean and Waters: https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe/eu-missions-horizon-europe/restore-our-ocean-and-waters_en and more particularly its Danube and Black Sea Lighthouse: https://restore4life.eu/eu-missions-restore-our-ocean-waters/ or through specific projects such as https://www.doorsblacksea.eu, https://bridgeblacksea.org/
    • [4] Involving eight countries https://blacksea-cbc.net/
    • [5] Much of it for risk prevention and biodiversity.
    • [6] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/what/investment-policy_en
    • [7] https://emblasproject.org/
    • [8] The EU sea basin strategy promoting maritime regional cooperation among the coastal countries in the Black Sea region, except for Russia.
    • [9] Building Response Frameworks under existing and new Marine Pollution Challenges in the Black Sea (RESPONSE): https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/how-to-participate/org-details/999999999/project/101124661/program/43392145/details and Harnessing complementary curricular preparedness via sustainable management in response to civil and military pollution on the coastline, tributaries and lagoons in Black Sea’s North, West, South zone (Black Sea SIERRA): https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/how-to-participate/org-details/999999999/project/101124670/program/43392145/details
    • [10] CleanSeaNet hosted by the European Maritime Safety Agency: https://www.emsa.europa.eu/csn-menu.html
    • [11] https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en via the Emergency Response Coordination Centre.
    • [12] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/ukraine/ukraine-investment-framework_en
    • [13] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39779/st10219-en19.pdf — The tenth paragraph refers to the EU’s accession to the Black Sea Commission, as follows: ‘(…) The Council reaffirms the EU’s aim to become a full member of the Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution. The Council particularly takes into account the need for enhanced international cooperation for addressing the environmental and climate challenges in the Black Sea. (…)’.
    Last updated: 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Lack of transparency in the Ministry of Education and Merit’s decision not to publish the reserve lists of NRRP competitions for teaching posts – E-003076/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission does not generally oversee internal competition mechanisms, which fall within the scope of competences of the Member State, without prejudice to its role as guardian of the Treaties.

    Regarding the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the Commission is working closely with the Italian authorities to ensure the effective implementation of Italy’s national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP), including the reform of the teacher recruitment system in Italy ( Reform 2.1, Component 1, Mission 4 of the NRRP).

    In addition, the Council Implementing Decision (CID) approving the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Italy[1] only determines the requirements for eligibility under the reformed system and the number of teachers to be recruited, and does not concern a recruitment approach across competitions, nor a single ranking system.

    Specifically, the CID does not contain specific conditions regarding the recruitment of eligible candidates from previous NRRP competitions.

    Overall, the recruitment procedures organised by Italy are competitive processes and qualifying examinations. They are designed to select candidates with the highest qualifying scores, in line with the number of available positions.

    While candidates who exceed the minimum threshold but do not rank among the top scorers are considered successful in meeting the eligibility criteria, they are not guaranteed immediate employment and may need to participate in future competitions.

    • [1] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15114-2024-ADD-1-REV-1/en/pdf
    Last updated: 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0145/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0145/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to Articles 24(1), 42, 43 and 45 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

    – having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[1],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[2],

    – having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence,

    – having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States[3],

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 entitled ‘European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’ (JOIN(2023)0009),

    – having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

    – having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    – having regard to Special Report 04/2025 of the European Court of Auditors of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility: Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’,

    – having regard to the three Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

    – having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by the NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

    – having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius,

    – having regard to the opening remarks made by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in Brussels at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting of 12 February 2025,

    – having regard to the talks held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 18 February 2025 between US and Russian negotiators,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the Commission announced the release of a white paper on the future of European defence, co-authored by Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius and Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, by 19 March 2025; whereas this document will be the first of its kind produced by the EU and emulates similar documents published by Member States;

    B. whereas the white paper must respect the limits set by the TEU in terms of foreign policy and defence and it must take note of the international context and the strategic environment in order to provide a perspective and proposals that will enable the strengthening of Europe’s security;

    C. whereas the white paper on the future of European defence will provide the framework for future defence projects and regulations and will be a key point of reference for incoming negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework;

    D. whereas the international order is profoundly destabilised and is restructuring; whereas the international rules and organisations that emerged from the Second World War and then from the end of the Cold War are in crisis; whereas international relations are increasingly characterised by uncertainty, and the tendency to resort to armed force to resolve international disagreements is growing;

    E. whereas Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has profoundly destabilised the security order in Europe; whereas this unilateral aggression has accelerated the integration of Sweden and Finland into NATO; whereas this war has considerably deteriorated relations and exchanges between Russia and the countries of Europe;

    F. whereas the war in Ukraine has highlighted the chronic underinvestment by Member States in their armed forces; whereas the stocks of arms and ammunition in Europe are largely insufficient; whereas certain critical military capabilities are not possessed by any European military; whereas the infrastructure that is essential for the security and proper functioning of European societies and economies is vulnerable; whereas some Member States have encountered significant difficulties in deploying and transporting military resources within the EU itself;

    G. whereas the relations between the United States and China will structure, to a large extent, the future of international relations in the 21st century; whereas the United States no longer has the will to maintain the same level of military involvement in Europe; whereas the US Secretary of Defence has expressly spoken of a ‘division of labour’ between allies, with the Americans prioritising the Pacific region, while emphasising that Europeans must be responsible for the defence of Europe and must increase their capabilities accordingly;

    H. whereas the European Union is composed of 27 sovereign states, with each having the sovereign right to determine its own foreign and defence policy;

    I. whereas it is in the interest of the Member States to adopt a common policy on matters of common interest to them; whereas enhanced cooperation on defence matters is mutually beneficial if it improves the security of the Member States against any direct aggression or if it increases their capacity to respond to any threat to their territorial integrity, sovereignty or prosperity;

    J. whereas the European defence market is too fragmented; whereas for a single armament type, there can be several or even dozens of different varieties of equipment in the EU, representing a collective loss of resources because of duplication, and preventing economies of scale;

    K. whereas Article 24(1) TEU stipulates that decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy are taken unanimously by the Council; whereas Article 24(1) TEU also stipulates that the EU cannot adopt legislative acts on foreign affairs and defence; whereas Article 36 TEU stipulates that Parliament has a consultative role;

    L. whereas, on 30 January 2025, 19 EU countries sent a letter to the European Investment Bank calling for it ‘to play an even stronger role in providing investment funding and leveraging private funding for the security and defence sector’;

    1. Stresses that diplomatic and defence policy issues are primarily the prerogative of the Member States, which remain the most relevant and the only legitimate political units in the international order; respects the right of every Member State to determine its own foreign and security policy; insists on the importance of maintaining the principle of unanimity in the Council for all decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy;

    2. Underlines that strengthening the Member States’ militaries, based on threats, is necessary to compensate for the security deficit caused by decades of underinvestment and the gradual disengagement of the United States; emphasises that this rearmament policy led by the Member States must not aim to escalate tensions in Europe, but rather aim to reach a level that will deter any hostile actions, establish a continental balance and maintain peace;

    3. Notes that the United States remains the EU’s main military ally and is an essential member of NATO; insists that, irrespective of the political orientation of the White House, US foreign policy will continue to make the Asia-Pacific region a geostrategic priority and to perceive Europe as a secondary theatre; stresses that Member States must no longer subcontract their security and defence to other powers;

    4. Underlines that NATO is a crucial partner in the collective defence architecture in Europe; takes note of the ambition of building a European pillar within NATO; considers that a greater contribution from European states within the alliance must, for the sake of consistency, result in a more balanced distribution of command posts in favour of European military personnel; stresses that stepping up the defence capabilities of European states can go hand in hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation with due respect for the neutrality of the EU Member States that are not part of the NATO alliance;

    5. Highlights the need to overcome the fragmentation of the EU’s internal market for defence products through greater cooperation between Member States and to collectively work on the interoperability of military capabilities; calls on the Member States to encourage cross-border defence procurement in order to strengthen intra-European industrial cooperation and achieve the objective of European strategic autonomy;

    6. Stresses that greater cooperation in the defence sector must actively involve defence SMEs, not only large defence actors, and serve as a platform for SME development, providing greater opportunities for them to contribute to the EU’s technological base and enhance European strategic autonomy;

    7. Notes, however, that the strengthening of the European defence industry must not result in the attribution of new competences to the Commission, which would be in breach of the Treaties and would undermine the sovereignty of Member States without increasing efficacy; reiterates, therefore, that decision-making regarding military requirements, the prioritisation of capability development and the purchase of defence products should remain within the remit of Member States; underlines that, despite the need for increased cooperation in the field of defence, such as on joint procurement and joint production, the Member States must retain full sovereignty over their arms export policies;

    8. Calls for the co-legislators to establish the principle of a European preference in future European defence regulations, including in the European defence industrial plan, so that European funds benefit European companies on European soil, which will enhance our industrial defence capabilities and will reduce our dependences on non-EU countries; recalls that this regulation must in no way restrict the freedom of the Member States to determine their own arms procurement and import/export policy;

    9. Calls on the NATO-affiliated Member States to cooperate in order to identify and fill critical capability gaps by building on and complementing NATO’s Defence Planning Process targets, which are required for sustained full-spectrum operations, including space systems and launchers, long-range missiles, integrated air and missile defence systems, ammunition production, artificial intelligence (AI), maritime drone capability, command and control capability, electronic warfare systems and air-to-air refuelling capacity;

    10. Calls on non-neutral Member States to adequately invest in their infrastructure to guarantee optimal military mobility across Europe in line with their respective military agreements and alliances;

    11. Emphasises the importance for European states to have the capacity and a framework to act independently within the NATO framework where possible and outside of the NATO framework if necessary; points out that the Rapid Deployment Capacity, an inter-state initiative under the control of the Member States, only comprised of 5 000 troops, does not allow for the possibility of engagement in a context of intense combat; reaffirms that it is in the Member States’ interest to strengthen their ability to fight together by conducting joint training and exercises that enhance the interoperability of the various national instruments;

    12. Expresses the need to consider European defence in all its dimensions, including land, air, naval, space and cybernetic; notes that contemporary strategic issues have a growing naval dimension and that the powers challenging the international order are deploying naval capabilities at regional level; stresses the importance of European cooperation at sea and welcomes the current progress of Operation Aspides, the lessons from which must be put to good use; stresses that European strategic autonomy has a maritime and naval dimension, and that European navies should cooperate more closely to ensure the protection of their maritime areas, as well as their underwater or surface infrastructure; stresses that the principle of freedom of navigation must be protected and calls, therefore, for an increase in surveillance and the ability to react quickly in the event of threats arising in European seas;

    13. Notes that space will increasingly become a key aspect of power and sovereignty; underlines that the Member States must maintain and guarantee their independent access to space; welcomes the launch of Ariane 6, but is concerned by the accumulated delays; draws attention to the need for the space sector to be industrialised to increase the number of rockets launched to put European satellites into orbit; welcomes the launch of the European satellite constellation IRIS², which should enable secure communications solutions for sovereign and military issues by 2030; emphasises the need for the future EU space law not to hamper the competitiveness of European companies and to apply constraints on non-EU players; notes the importance of Galileo, Europe’s global navigation satellite system;

    14. Underlines that, unlike the United States (Buy America Act) and China (Government Procurement Law), the European space industry is not shielded from international competition and does not benefit from a European preference; calls on the Member States and the Commission to implement a European preference in space industry procurement and promote innovation, research and development; stresses that the European Space Agency’s principle of geographical return hampers innovative European SMEs and start-ups from receiving adequate funding and contributes to the fragmentation of the European space industry; calls on the European Space Agency to abolish the principle of geographical return and adopt an innovative and efficiency-based approach to space procurement rather than a geographically driven one;

    15. Underlines that the strengthening of European defence capabilities will require significant financing; calls on banks, pension funds, insurance companies and other actors in the Member States to simplify and significantly increase the financing of projects and companies operating in the field of defence; insists that in the context of the urgent need to increase defence spending, financial institutions should not consider investments in the field of defence to be damaging for their reputation; rejects, however, the idea of issuing joint debt, such as defence Eurobonds, to support defence spending;

    16. Notes the growing importance of AI in warfare, particularly in the development of drones and autonomous weapons; recognises the indigenous AI advances in warfare made by Ukraine and Israel, demonstrating that the Member States are equally capable of developing similar capabilities; highlights that recent breakthroughs, such as the one made by the Chinese AI computing start-up DeepSeek, demonstrate the feasibility of cost-competitive AI systems; calls on the Member States to accelerate the development of AI capabilities; underlines that the AI Act[4], set to be implemented in 2025, creates uncertainty regarding the production and development of dual-use AI systems, an ambiguity that could hinder the development of essential defence industry products; calls for this issue to be clarified to ensure that the European defence industry is not disadvantaged compared to its American and Chinese counterparts;

    17. Stresses that a strong civilian manufacturing industry, particularly in the steelmaking, automotive, aerospace and shipbuilding sectors, is essential for deterrence and for maintaining long-term military and industrial capabilities in the event of conflict; notes the decline of these industries since the 1990s, especially in western Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to safeguard the manufacturing industries that are vital to national security, including through the use of tariffs; urges the Commission to revise the Green Deal and revoke the net-neutrality goal, since it destroys manufacturing competitiveness and is responsible for the deindustrialisation of key industries in the Member States; stresses that the relocation of essential manufacturing industries to non-EU countries is counterproductive both in terms of global environmental impact and national security;

    18. Expresses concern over the growing dependence of the European defence industry on foreign components, particularly rare earths and semiconductors, which are essential for advanced military technologies; calls on the Member States to intensify efforts to develop domestic rare earth mining and semiconductor manufacturing capabilities to safeguard the autonomy of the European defence industry in the event of conflicts or severe supply chain disruptions;

    19. Welcomes the Dutch Government’s decision to tighten export control rules on advanced lithography systems, which are essential for semiconductor production; stresses that EU technological transfers to non-EU countries have significantly contributed to the rise of foreign competition and the deindustrialisation of Europe; encourages the Member States to impose stricter export controls on critical dual-use technologies and manufacturing products;

    20. Notes that 80 % of EU data is stored and managed in the United States and other non-EU countries, where it may be subject to extraterritorial intervention under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the CLOUD Act, or China’s Data Security Law; stresses that protecting critical industrial and government data is essential to ensuring national security; welcomes the Swiss Government Cloud programme as a step toward cloud sovereignty and encourages the Member States to implement similar initiatives; encourages the Member States to strengthen regulations on telecommunications service providers, which are predominantly based outside Europe, creating a significant dependence on external actors;

    21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, the Commission, the European Council and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0144/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0144/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the EU,

    – having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42 thereof,

    – having regard to Title III, Article 3 of the Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon,

    – having regard to the announced publication of the white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025,

    – having regard to the Helsinki Accords,

    – having regard to the various European defence projects of recent years,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas, in line with the Treaties, the CSDP is part of the CFSP and is considered a policy framework through which Member States can develop a European strategic culture of security and defence, address conflicts and crises together, protect the Union and its citizens and strengthen international peace and security;

    B. whereas Article 42(2) TEU states that the Union’s CSDP must be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty;

    C. whereas NATO is largely dominated by the United States, and NATO membership entails a mandatory complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems, hence impeding the strategic and operational autonomy of Member States and other European countries;

    D. whereas at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, the US Government pushed for Ukrainian NATO membership against the opinion of several Member States; whereas following the Russian invasion, the United States pushed EU Member States to systematically increase the quantity and quality of arms deliveries to Ukraine;

    E. whereas different Member States have different military and security policies, including policies of military neutrality;

    F. whereas the United States saw windfall benefits from the Ukraine war through an increase of US shale gas exports to the European Union; whereas the US Government now unjustly wishes to control Ukrainian mineral resources and negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine with Putin, without involving Ukraine and the European Union;

    G. whereas unlike nuclear weapon states such as India and the People’s Republic of China, NATO and Russia refuse to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy, whereby they would formally refrain from using nuclear weapons, except in retaliation to an attack by an enemy power using weapons of mass destruction;

    H. whereas the US Government has launched a high number of wars and military operations that violated international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; whereas, in light of 2024 advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the United States’ ongoing military support for Israel might make it complicit in genocide and illegal occupation; whereas the participation of EU Member States in violations of international law, including in wars of aggression and military invasions contrary to international law against countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, have undermined global adherence to the principles of international law;

    I. whereas the United States has forwardly deployed new B61-12 gravity bombs on the territory of EU Member States, increasing the risk that these Member States will fall victim to preventive or retaliatory strikes related to US foreign policy;

    J. whereas Russia’s repeated acts of war and aggression, starting with the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as an increasing number of acts of sabotage on critical infrastructure, have been factors in creating and exacerbating tensions;

    K. whereas Article 41(2) TEU prohibits charging expenditure arising from operations with military or defence implications to the Union budget;

    L. whereas the Commission has nevertheless launched several European defence projects over the last few years, including the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and, most recently, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP);

    M. whereas according to 2023 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute figures, EU Member States, together with the United Kingdom, already spend more nominally on defence than all other countries in the world combined, with the exception of the United States;

    N. whereas in April 2021, the Commission estimated that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion every year;

    O. whereas the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) is planning to shut down more than four out of five of its hubs worldwide, reducing its diplomatic presence from around 100 delegations to 18 hubs;

    P. whereas in 2024, EU leaders agreed to cut EUR 2 billion from the EU’s external action budget in the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027; whereas several Member States, such as France and Belgium, have also made cuts and reforms to their diplomacy services;

    Q. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed a new common instrument to boost military spending across the EU to unlock up to EUR 800 billion of additional defence spending over the coming years;

    R. whereas even the military spending of the United States, which maintains over 700 military installations in over 70 countries, does not exceed 3.46 % of its GDP;

    S. whereas, nevertheless, the US Government, certain Member States and NATO and Commission officials are pushing for a further massive increase in defence expenditure, from an average of 1.9 % of GDP to 5 %;

    T. whereas even the military-oriented Niinisto Report, entitled ‘Safer Together –Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ highlights the fact that threats to the security of European citizens, including increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events, such as megadroughts, floods and heatwaves, and the risk of new pandemics, would require massive investment in public services;

    U. whereas while the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness highlights the need for massive investment in a variety of sectors, including energy, pharmaceuticals and transport, the Commission has placed seven Member States under an excessive deficit procedure, pushing for harsh austerity and structural reforms in social and public expenses;

    V. whereas a further massive increase in military expenditure will instead lead to cuts in public services, and in social, climate and environmental spending throughout Europe, endangering the social and human security of European citizens;

    W. whereas the Commission is nonetheless considering the suspension of economic governance rules for military expenses;

    X. whereas the Commission has failed to present a fully autonomous assessment of European defence needs and priorities, relying instead on NATO assessments of critical gaps in defence capability;

    Y. whereas Türkiye, a NATO member, illegally occupies 37 % of Cyprus, an EU Member State;

    Z. whereas in international relations theory the ‘security dilemma’ refers to a phenomenon whereby actions, such as arms procurement, taken by a state actor to increase its own security provokes reactions from other states, such as increased arms procurement or preventive attacks, that ultimately lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security;

    AA. whereas the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, concluded in Helsinki between the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and all of the countries of Europe, except Albania, played an important role in easing tensions between East and West during the Cold War;

    AB. whereas the Cold War collective security acquis has been systematically undermined by the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Open Skies Treaty, systematically followed by Russian withdrawals, and by the Russian withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

    AC. whereas a new European security architecture will have to apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems and offer security guarantees to all parties in order to avoid Europe being divided once again into two diametrically opposed blocs;

    Towards a European collective security architecture

    1. Recalls that the Treaties consider the CSDP part of the CFSP; asks, therefore, that any defence initiative at EU level be subordinated to a clear foreign and security policy and strategy for peace on the European continent;

    2. Rejects the militarisation of the EU and any belligerent objectives of the CSDP;

    3. Notes with great concern the diminishing respect for international and humanitarian law by parties all around the world, with Israel, Russia and the United States being flagrant examples; reiterates the need for European independence in shaping foreign and defence policy;

    4. Considers that in light of the United States’ past and ongoing violations of international law and the negative impact of US military interventions on neighbouring regions, the foreign, security and defence policy of the Union and Member States can no longer be aligned with the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); calls, therefore, on the European Council to start the process of revising the EU Treaties to remove this requirement from the TEU;

    5. Recalls that NATO and the EU are distinct organisations which serve very different purposes and whose membership is not even identical; regrets the conflation of NATO, a military alliance, with the EU;

    6. Is extremely worried by the fact that there are still more than 13 000 nuclear weapons scattered around the world, many of which can be deployed within minutes and could cause the end of humankind; notes with concern that despite a stated commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NATO’s nuclear member states invested USD 271 billion in nuclear weapons modernisation and maintenance between 2019 and 2023, while in 2023 China and Russia were the second and third largest spenders, with budgets of USD 11.9 billion and USD 8.3 billion respectively;

    7. Believes that NATO’s refusal to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy on nuclear weapons and the forward deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe increases the risk of Europe becoming a target of nuclear strikes; demands, therefore, the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the territory of Member States; is deeply concerned about nuclear threats to European security, including veiled warnings about the use of tactical nuclear weapons and Russia’s lowering of its threshold for using nuclear weapons;

    8. Urges the Member States to work on a new long-term collective security architecture for Europe inspired by the principles of the Helsinki process and including the concept of mutual security guarantees; notes that a fundamental aspect of such an approach is respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and a commitment to international law;

    9. Insists that a new European security architecture apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems, and offer security guarantees to all parties;

    10. Calls on the Commission, in light of multiple threats ranging from climate-related catastrophes to pandemics, to abandon a narrow focus on military security and develop a policy centred on human security as defined in United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/290, which states that ‘human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people’ and calls for ‘people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people’;

    11. Calls on the Commission and Member States to seek inspiration from Austria, which has enshrined neutrality in its constitution, committing not to join military alliances and not to permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on its territory;

    12. Calls on the Commission and Member States to also look to the example set by Ireland, with its tradition of military neutrality; recalls that this tradition includes an active approach towards peace support operations and crisis management, contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, work for human rights and development, and efforts to promote disarmament and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction;

    13. Regrets the attacks on Irish neutrality and recalls that the people of Ireland were guaranteed continued military neutrality, underpinned by a commitment to only undertake operations with a United Nations mandate, ahead of their ratification of the Lisbon Treaty;

    14. Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member, to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, an EU Member State, and to work constructively towards finding a viable and peaceful solution based on the relevant UN resolutions;

    15. Calls for unanimity voting on defence issues to be maintained within the Council to promote consensus-based solutions that foster much-needed unity;

    Diplomacy as the cornerstone of European security

    16. Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;

    17. Recalls that conflict prevention is paramount to any security and defence strategy; underlines the fact that diplomacy prevents and ends wars, and that every euro invested in conflict prevention saves around EUR 16 later on;

    18. Believes that, given the deteriorating security situation on several fronts and increasing geopolitical tensions, preventive diplomacy requires sustained and enhanced attention; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to immediately reverse the cutbacks made to diplomatic representations;

    19. Believes that its systematic alignment with US foreign policy, most recently with regard to Israeli war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices against Palestinians, has dramatically reduced the EU’s global diplomatic credibility and therefore worsened its security situation;

    20. Recalls that the participation of EU Member States in illegal military operations and the support for violations of international law abroad gravely endangers the security of EU citizens; urges the Commission and Member States to explore a non-aligned foreign and security policy stance based on the principles of the UN Charter, including peaceful conflict resolution, diplomacy and multilateralism;

    21. Believes that Europe has much to gain from diversifying its relations and maintaining diplomatic connections with as many countries as possible around the world;

    Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

    22. Is deeply concerned that world military expenditure continues to rise to new record levels; highlights the fact that an arms race will not create security for European citizens, but instead, in line with the security dilemma, heighten the risk of violent conflict; calls on the Commission to actively promote new arms control treaties;

    23. Recalls that the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction made non-proliferation a central goal of the EU’s CFSP, stating that ‘our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation of concern worldwide’; calls, therefore, on Member States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

    24. Notes that arms exports, also of small and light weapons, can fuel conflict and global terrorism and destabilise entire regions, states and societies, thereby thwarting sustainable development and crisis management efforts; calls on the Commission and Member States to strictly apply Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment in order to avoid a worsening of the security situation in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood;

    25. Calls for the creation of a Directorate-General for Disarmament and Arms Control at the Commission;

    26. Demands an immediate arms embargo against Israel and any other country directly or indirectly involved in armed conflict, except in the case of those that are the victim of invasion by others, in order to stop EU complicity in war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices, whether perpetrated by Israel or any other country; calls on the Commission and Member States to base their foreign and security policy on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

    Defence expenditure

    27. Urges the Commission and Member States to offer full transparency and a critical audit of the current defence expenditure within the Union, detailing why it estimates that European countries would be unable to defend themselves with budgets already vastly superior to those of most of the world’s countries;

    28. Notes with concern that the Commission has presented a new EUR 150 billion common defence fund; believes that an increase in defence spending is not the solution to finding a lasting peace and that cuts in the EU structural funds should not be used for this purpose, given how vital these funds are to the development of local communities across the EU;

    29. Notes that the share of GDP is not an adequate measure for the efficiency and impact of defence expenditure; calls on the Commission and Member States not to enter an arms race through a massive increase in defence budgets at the expense of both human and social security;

    30. Regards the NATO demand for complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems as incompatible with European strategic autonomy; regrets that the Commission and the Council have failed to present a detailed assessment of European critical defence capability gaps; calls on both institutions to present such an assessment, including specific priorities, before considering increased defence expenditure; recalls that these should focus on defensive tasks, not on building capacities for military intervention all over the world;

    31. Recalls Commission estimates that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save up to EUR 100 billion every year; calls, in this regard, for inspiration to be drawn from existing intra-European cooperation structures, such as BACA, the Belgian-Dutch Naval cooperation BeNeSam and the Nordic Defence Cooperation, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, which have increased the efficiency of the participating nations’ national defence, and to explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions;

    32. Considers that the military cooperation commitments that may be assumed in collective security organisations should be considered in light of strict respect for the UN Charter;

    33. Rejects the allocation of appropriations on the EU budget to the EU’s militarisation; calls for the reallocation of EU budget funds earmarked for the ongoing militarisation of the EU and its programmes to respond to the social and economic needs of citizens and promote cohesion between Member States;

    34. Highlights the fact that there can be neither autonomy nor security without digital sovereignty; calls on the Commission to prioritise the development of a democratic, public-led digital stack that includes digital infrastructure as a service, and universal platforms, such as search engines and foundation AI models, governed by new public institutions with public and civil society representation;

    35. Calls for heightened cooperation between Member States on sectoral issues of critical infrastructure protection, such as submarine cables;

    Defence industry

    36. Recalls that over the past three years, the EU has adopted a number of new initiatives on defence, and that the new Commissioner for Defence and Space believes that an additional investment of EUR 500 billion is needed in the coming decade, though other sources speak of EUR 700 billion;

    37. Recalls that the previous EU programmes have been implemented with a lack of transparency with regard to the application of EU ethical guidelines, and that decision-making is extremely opaque and heavily influenced by arms industry lobbyists;

    38. States that without ethics in investment choices, the EU will contribute to the creation of a more dangerous and lawless world order, where imperialist powers can disregard international law without facing consequences, while countries of the global south are exploited for their resources;

    39. Calls, in addition, for the EU to adopt a policy of transparent, mission-oriented military spending, with more conscious spending at the service of a defined foreign policy to ensure greater efficiency;

    40. Recalls that under Article 41(2) TEU expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications may not be charged to the EU budget; calls for a strict application of this article; demands a retroactive review of corresponding defence funds and budget lines and for their termination where needed;

    41. Expresses deep concern about the increased subsidies and public support for the military-industrial complex amid record total global military expenditure of USD 2 443 billion in 2023, making 2023 the ninth consecutive year in which military expenditure increased;

    42. Demands that European public money go to European companies and emphasises that public European companies should, by definition, remain in Europe, while private companies can relocate their activities if they so wish;

    43. Observes that leading arms companies have benefited shamelessly from the war in Ukraine; notes that Lockheed Martin alone distributed USD 6.8 billion of cash to shareholders in dividends and share repurchases in 2024; demands that windfall profits be taxed to finance climate adaptation, public health and housing, which are also components of a broader understanding of security;

    44. Considers that the use of public money should systematically correspond to a proportional public return on investment and not finance corporate profit;

    45. Stresses that focusing our resources, notably research and development spending, on the military sector will also slow down the development of other strategic industries with civilian purposes, such as renewable energy or pharmaceuticals;

    46. Adds that military spending does not address any of the major social or environmental challenges, and that, worse still, it reinforces polluting and energy-consuming industrial models, thus increasing pressure on resources and the climate, particularly critical materials;

    47. Believes that a massive increase in purchases of US-made goods would not only be detrimental to the European economy but would equally prolong Europe’s military dependence on the United States, while creating new industrial and technological constraints;

    48. Demands that the defence industry continue to be excluded from qualifying for the sustainability criteria with regard to investment;

    49. Calls for EIB financing to be strictly limited to civilian projects, excluding dual-use items;

    Reprioritising public services and social spending

    50. Is deeply concerned that militarisation, and specifically the ReArm Europe plan, is being used to further attack public services across the EU, which are already facing the suffocating effects of austerity measures imposed by the Commission;

    51. Is appalled by the fact that the Commission is willing to bend fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact to finance military spending, but considers it impossible to raise spending to fund crumbling public services and support social and economic upward convergence in Member States;

    52. Firmly insists that health, education, green mobility, climate adaptation, climate mitigation, biodiversity, food security and digital transition are elements of human security and should be considered priorities that require investments rather than budgetary cuts;

    53. Calls, in line with the concept of human security, for a reprioritisation of public services and social welfare spending, as well as for investments in fighting climate change, as imperative prerequisites for guaranteeing that people live in a safe and secure environment;

    °

    ° °

    54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: European Commission and EIB group lay foundations for a new pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • Commissioner for Energy and Housing Dan Jørgensen joins EIB Group President Nadia Calviño to start laying the foundations of a pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing. This initiative underlines the importance of ensuring more affordable and sustainable housing in a productive economy.
    • At EIB Forum, EIB Group announced upcoming launch of the EIB Action Plan to support housing, which includes a new housing one-stop-shop portal to provide advice and finance to support innovation in the construction sector, build affordable homes and invest in energy efficiency and the renovation of housing stock across Europe. EIB plans investments of around €10 billion over next two years. 
    • EIB Action Plan and one-stop shop portal are key building blocks of the pan-European investment platform that the European Commission and the EIB are working on and that are open to other players such as national promotional banks and international financial institutions.

    The European Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group are partnering with Europe’s national promotional banks (NPBs) and international financial institutions (IFIs) to develop new financing opportunities for affordable and sustainable housing across Europe. At the EIB Group Forum in Luxembourg today, EIB Group President Nadia Calviño and European Commissioner for Energy and Housing Dan Jørgensen underlined the importance of tackling one of the most pressing concerns of citizens and governments in the European Union. They advocated a pan-European push that brings together local and national, public and private actors to catalyse finance and urgent action under the Commission’s upcoming European Affordable Housing Plan.

    Their call comes as the EIB Group completes work on an Action Plan for Affordable and Sustainable Housing with planned investments of around €10 billion over the next two years. The EIB Plan will support local and national efforts to build more affordable homes, renovate existing housing stock to be more energy efficient and encourage more sustainable and innovative building materials and equipment. The EIB also launched a housing portal, a one-stop shop to support final beneficiaries to access advice and finance. The EIB Group’s investment aims to deliver 1.5 million new or renovated housing units across Europe. The EIB Action Plan and the portal are key building blocks for the pan-European investment platform, which will be open to other players such as NPBs and IFIs. The Council of European Development Bank has also signalled its interest in participating.

    Speaking at a special event on housing at the EIB Group’s annual Forum titled “Investing in a more Sustainable and Secure Europe”, President Nadia Calviño said: “Being able to afford a comfortable and warm home is a wish that unites every family and every community in Europe. Helping to make that possible for our citizens is a social responsibility and a fiscal challenge. It is also the foundation of any productive economy. That’s why we at the EIB Group and the European Commission are working full speed on a pan-European initiative that will be open for others to join.” 

    In his opening remarks at the EIB Group Forum, Commissioner for Energy and Housing Dan Jørgensen said: “Ensuring more affordable and sustainable housing is a pressing issue. The Commission will enable Member States to increase cohesion funds for affordable housing and ensure our state-aid rules better support our goal of achieving more affordable housing. The EU is already mobilising substantial funding, for example via the Recovery and Resilience Facility But we will not stop there. Today we are kicking off the work with the EIB, national promotional banks and international financial institutions towards a pan-European investment platform to attract more public and private funding for housing.  And, together with the European Parliament, we will consult intensively with Member States, cities, regions and all stakeholders to deliver the European Affordable Housing Plan.”

    The lack of affordable housing in Europe, particularly in larger cities, is highlighted as an increasing concern in relation to Europe’s economic growth and productivity in the EIB Group’s investment survey based on feedback from around 13,000 European small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  The report, presented this week at the Forum, also notes low productivity and insufficient innovation in the European construction sector, adding to the cost and time of delivering housing projects. At the same time, the cost of energy and the impact of carbon-dioxide emissions are also a concern.  Two-thirds of household energy consumption are used for heating homes and, with 46 million Europeans living in energy poverty, the energy efficiency of Europe’s housing stock is a key focus.

    Working closely with the Commission and its new Task Force for Housing in the context of the European Affordable Housing Plan, as well as Member States, regions, cities and NPBs and IFIs, the EIB Group aims to raise the supply of affordable and sustainable housing in the EU. The approach rests on four pillars, which provide the general framework for the measures described further below:

    • Partnerships with the European Commission and NPBIs/IFIs for easier access to finance and advice, based on complementarity with existing structures and products.
    • EU-wide rollout: widening the regional scope of EIB Group support with an emphasis on EU countries with less mature housing systems and large unmet needs, where an enhanced advisory component will complement financing.
    • Value-chain approach: opening up to new types of housing projects – from innovation in construction to real-estate development to ownership, with policy safeguards.
    • Mobilisation of private sector: expansion of the client base to include private, for-profit promoters

    In July 2024, the EIB Group’s  newly established Housing Task Force organised a kick-off event featuring around 300 public and private stakeholders to discuss scaling up financial support for affordable and sustainable housing throughout the EU. The event was followed by technical meetings in the autumn with stakeholders to help shape a pan-European investment platform alongside the Commission.

    Background information

    The European Commission is already active on housing, with support through the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Policy Funds, InvestEU, LIFE and Horizon Europe, among others.

    As outlined in the mission letter of Commissioner Jørgensen, the Commission will publish its first-ever European Affordable Housing Plan. The plan will offer technical assistance to cities and Member States and focus on investment and skills needed. The Commission will in particular develop a European Strategy for Housing Construction to support housing supply, establish a pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing, conduct an analysis of the impact of housing speculation, support Member States to double the planned cohesion policy investments in affordable housing, tackle systemic issues with short-term accommodation rentals and make proposals to tackle the inefficient use of the current housing stock and revise state-aid rules to enable housing support measures, notably for energy efficiency and social housing.

    Background information

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union, and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.    

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.    

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average.  

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here. 

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Proposals by former Commissioner for Economy Paolo Gentiloni on a debt-financed EU Defence Fund and ending the veto on new Eurobonds – E-000874/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000874/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Petra Steger (PfE)

    Former Commissioner for Economy Paolo Gentiloni has publicly called for the creation of a debt-financed EU Defence Fund. This would constitute a second step after Commission President von der Leyen already announced that Member States would be allowed greater flexibility in debt reduction to increase military spending. Consequently, according to Gentiloni, the existing veto against new Eurobonds should also be reconsidered. However, this mutualisation of debt rewards poorly performing countries at the expense of the few remaining net contributor countries. This creates a completely wrong incentive for the future – ‘bad economic management pays and is rewarded’. Making this madness permanent would mean the economic deathblow for the net contributor states and would be nothing other than a centralist wealth redistribution programme that would undermine national sovereignty and make the debt and transfer union a reality once and for all.

    • 1.What is the Commission’s assessment of Gentiloni’s proposals, in particular with regard to a debt-financed EU Defence Fund and an end to the veto on new Eurobonds?
    • 2.Can the Commission exclude the use of new debt-financed financial instruments, such as a new debt fund, during the current legislative term?
    • 3.What measures does the Commission intend to take to safeguard the national budgetary autonomy of the Member States and to prevent net contributors, such as Austria, from having to pay for the mistakes of states with irresponsible budgetary policies?

    Submitted: 27.2.2025

    Last updated: 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI: Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 06.03.2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nokia Corporation
    Stock Exchange Release
    6 March 2025 at 22:30 EET

    Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 06.03.2025

    Espoo, Finland – On 6 March 2025 Nokia Corporation (LEI: 549300A0JPRWG1KI7U06) has acquired its own shares (ISIN FI0009000681) as follows:

    Trading venue (MIC Code) Number of shares Weighted average price / share, EUR*
    XHEL 2,755,402 4.84
    CEUX 826,754 4.84
    BATE – –
    AQEU 142,080 4.84
    TQEX 129,929 4.83
    Total 3,854,165 4.84

    * Rounded to two decimals

    On 22 November 2024, Nokia announced that its Board of Directors is initiating a share buyback program to offset the dilutive effect of new Nokia shares issued to the shareholders of Infinera Corporation and certain Infinera Corporation share-based incentives. The repurchases in compliance with the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (MAR), the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 and under the authorization granted by Nokia’s Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024 started on 25 November 2024 and end by 31 December 2025 and target to repurchase 150 million shares for a maximum aggregate purchase price of EUR 900 million.

    Total cost of transactions executed on 6 March 2025 was EUR 18,653,002. After the disclosed transactions, Nokia Corporation holds 149,315,265 treasury shares.

    Details of transactions are included as an appendix to this announcement.

    On behalf of Nokia Corporation

    BofA Securities Europe SA

    About Nokia
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    Inquiries:

    Nokia Communications
    Phone: +358 10 448 4900
    Email: press.services@nokia.com
    Maria Vaismaa, Global Head of External Communications

    Nokia Investor Relations
    Phone: +358 931 580 507
    Email: investor.relations@nokia.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India’s AI Revolution

    Source: Government of India (2)

    India’s AI Revolution

    A Roadmap to Viksit Bharat

    Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 4:09PM by PIB Delhi

    Introduction

    India is undergoing a remarkable transformation in Artificial Intelligence, driven by the visionary leadership of PM Modi. For the first time in India’s history, the government is actively shaping an AI ecosystem where computing power, GPUs, and research opportunities are accessible at an affordable cost.

    Unlike in the past, AI in India is no longer confined to a privileged few or dominated by global tech giants. Through forward-looking policies, the Modi government is empowering students, startups, and innovators with world-class AI infrastructure, fostering a truly level playing field. Initiatives such as the IndiaAI Mission and the establishment of Centres of Excellence for AI are strengthening the country’s AI ecosystem, paving the way for innovation and self-reliance in this critical sector.

    These efforts align with the vision of Viksit Bharat by 2047, where India aspires to become a global AI powerhouse, leveraging cutting-edge technology for economic growth, governance, and societal progress.

    AI Compute and Semiconductor Infrastructure

    India is rapidly building a strong AI computing and semiconductor infrastructure to support its growing digital economy. With the approval of the IndiaAI Mission in 2024, the government allocated ₹10,300 crore over five years to strengthen AI capabilities. A key focus of this mission is the development of a high-end common computing facility equipped with 18,693 Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), making it one of the most extensive AI compute infrastructures globally. This capacity is nearly nine times that of the open-source AI model DeepSeek and about two-thirds of what ChatGPT operates on.

    Here are the key developments:

    • Scaling AI Compute Infrastructure: The initial phase of the mission has already made 10,000 GPUs available, with the remaining units to be added soon. This will enable the creation of indigenous AI solutions tailored to Indian languages and contexts.
    • Opening Access to High-Performance Computing: India has also pioneered the launch of an open GPU marketplace, making high-performance computing accessible to startups, researchers, and students. Unlike many countries where AI infrastructure is controlled by large corporations, this initiative ensures that small players have an opportunity to innovate.
    • Robust GPU Supply Chain: The government has selected 10 companies to supply the GPUs, ensuring a robust and diversified supply chain.
    • Indigenous GPU Capabilities: To further strengthen domestic capabilities, India aims to develop its own GPU within the next three to five years, reducing reliance on imported technology.
    • Affordable Compute Access: A new common compute facility will soon be launched, allowing researchers and startups to access GPU power at a highly subsidised rate of ₹100 per hour, compared to the global cost of $2.5 to $3 per hour.
    • Strengthening Semiconductor Manufacturing: In parallel, India is advancing semiconductor manufacturing, with five semiconductor plants under construction. These developments will not only support AI innovation but also reinforce India’s position in the global electronics sector.

     

    Advancing AI with Open Data and Centres of Excellence (CoE)

    Recognising the importance of data in AI development, the Modi government has launched the IndiaAI Dataset Platform to provide seamless access to high-quality, non-personal datasets. This platform will house the largest collection of anonymised data, empowering Indian startups and researchers to develop advanced AI applications. By ensuring diverse and abundant datasets, this initiative will drive AI-driven solutions across key sectors, enhancing innovation and accuracy.

    • IndiaAI Dataset Platform for Open Data Access: The platform will enable Indian startups and researchers to access a unified repository of high-quality, anonymised datasets, reducing barriers to AI innovation.
    • Boosting AI Model Accuracy with Diverse Data: By providing large-scale, non-personal datasets, the initiative will help reduce biases and improve the reliability of AI applications across domains such as agriculture, weather forecasting, and traffic management.
    • Centres of Excellence: The government has established three AI Centres of Excellence (CoE) in Healthcare, Agriculture, and Sustainable Cities in New Delhi. The Budget 2025 further announced a new CoE for AI in education with an outlay of ₹500 crore, making it the fourth such centre.
    • Skilling for AI-Driven Industries: Plans are in place for five National Centres of Excellence for Skilling, which will equip youth with industry-relevant expertise. These centres will be set up in collaboration with global partners to support the ‘Make for India, Make for the World’ vision in manufacturing and AI innovation.

     

    India’s AI Models & Language Technologies

    The government is facilitating the development of India’s own foundational models, including Large Language Models (LLMs) and problem-specific AI solutions tailored to Indian needs. To foster AI research, multiple Centres of Excellence have also been set up.

    • India’s Foundational Large Language Models: IndiaAI has launched an initiative to develop indigenous foundational AI models, including LLMs and Small Language Models (SLMs), through a call for proposals.
    • Digital India BHASHINI: An AI-led language translation platform designed to enable easy access to the internet and digital services in Indian languages, including voice-based access, and support content creation in Indian languages.
    • BharatGen: The world’s first government-funded multimodal LLM initiative, BharatGen was launched in 2024 in Delhi. It aims to enhance public service delivery and citizen engagement through foundational models in language, speech, and computer vision. BharatGen involves a consortium of AI researchers from premier academic institutions in India.
    • Sarvam-1 AI Model: A large language model optimised for Indian languages, Sarvam-1 has 2 billion parameters and supports ten major Indian languages. It is designed for applications such as language translation, text summarisation, and content generation.
    • Chitralekha: An open-source video transcreation platform developed by AI4Bhārat, Chitralekha enables users to generate and edit audio transcripts in various Indic languages.
    • Hanooman’s Everest 1.0: A multilingual AI system developed by SML, Everest 1.0 supports 35 Indian languages, with plans to expand to 90.

     

    AI Integration with Digital Public Infrastructure

    India’s Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) has redefined digital innovation by combining public funding with private sector-led innovation. Platforms like Aadhaar, UPI, and DigiLocker serve as the foundation, while private entities build application-specific solutions on top of them. This model is now being enhanced with AI, integrating intelligent solutions into financial and governance platforms. The global appeal of India’s DPI was evident at the G20 Summit, where several countries expressed interest in adopting similar frameworks. Japan’s patent grant to India’s UPI payment system further underscores its scalability.

    For Mahakumbh 2025, AI-driven DPI solutions played a crucial role in managing the world’s largest human gathering. AI-powered tools monitored real-time railway passenger movement to optimise crowd dispersal in Prayagraj. The Bhashini-powered Kumbh Sah’AI’yak Chatbot enabled voice-based lost-and-found services, real-time translation, and multilingual assistance. Its integration with Indian Railways and UP Police streamlined communication, ensuring swift issue resolution. By leveraging AI with DPI, Mahakumbh 2025 set a global benchmark for tech-enabled, inclusive, and efficient event management.

    AI Talent & Workforce Development

    India’s workforce is at the heart of its digital revolution. The country is adding one Global Capability Center (GCC) every week, reinforcing its status as a preferred destination for global R&D and technological development. However, sustaining this growth will require continuous investment in education and skill development. The government is addressing this challenge by revamping university curricula to include AI, 5G, and semiconductor design, aligning with the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020. This ensures that graduates acquire job-ready skills, reducing the transition time between education and employment.

    • AI Talent Pipeline & AI Education: Under the IndiaAI Future Skills initiative, AI education is being expanded across undergraduate, postgraduate, and Ph.D. programs. Fellowships are being provided to full-time Ph.D. scholars researching AI in the top 50 NIRF-ranked institutes. To enhance accessibility, Data and AI Labs are being established in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, with a model IndiaAI Data Lab already set up at NIELIT Delhi.
    • India Ranks 1st in Global AI Skill Penetration: According to the Stanford AI Index 2024, India ranks first globally in AI skill penetration with a score of 2.8, ahead of the US (2.2) and Germany (1.9). AI talent concentration in India has grown by 263% since 2016, positioning the country as a major AI hub. India also leads in AI Skill Penetration for Women, with a score of 1.7, surpassing the US (1.2) and Israel (0.9).
    • AI Innovation: India has emerged as the fastest-growing developer population globally and ranks second in public generative AI projects on GitHub. The country is home to 16% of the world’s AI talent, showcasing its growing influence in AI innovation and adoption.
    • AI Talent Hubs: The India Skills Report 2024 by Wheebox forecasts that India’s AI industry will reach USD 28.8 billion by 2025, with a CAGR of 45%. The AI-skilled workforce has seen a 14-fold increase from 2016 to 2023, making India one of the top five fastest-growing AI talent hubs, alongside Singapore, Finland, Ireland, and Canada. The demand for AI professionals in India is projected to reach 1 million by 2026.

    AI Adoption & Industry Growth

    India’s Generative AI (GenAI) ecosystem has seen remarkable growth, even amid a global downturn. The country’s AI landscape is evolving from experimental use cases to scalable, production-ready solutions, reflecting its growing maturity.

    • Businesses Prioritising AI Investments: According to BCG, 80% of Indian companies consider AI a core strategic priority, surpassing the global average of 75%. Additionally, 69% plan to increase their tech investments in 2025, with one-third allocating over USD 25 million to AI initiatives.
    • GenAI Startup Funding: According to a November 2024 report by National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), Indian GenAI startup funding surged over six times quarter-on-quarter, reaching USD 51 million in Q2FY2025, driven by B2B and agentic AI startups.
    • AI Transforming Workplaces: The Randstad AI & Equity Report 2024 states that seven in 10 Indian employees used AI at work in 2024, up from five in 10 a year earlier, showcasing AI’s rapid integration into workplaces.
    • AI Empowering Small & Medium Businesses (SMBs): AI-driven technologies, such as autonomous agents, are helping SMBs scale efficiently, personalise customer experiences, and optimise operations. According to Salesforce, 78% of Indian SMBs using AI reported revenue growth, while 93% stated AI has contributed to increased revenues.
    • Rapid Expansion of India’s AI Economy: As per the BCG-NASSCOM Report 2024, India’s AI market is projected to grow at a CAGR of 25-35%, reinforcing its potential for innovation and job creation. While AI automates routine tasks, it is simultaneously generating new opportunities in data science, machine learning, and AI-driven applications.
    • AI Startup Support Ecosystem: India hosts 520+ tech incubators and accelerators, ranking third globally in active programs. 42% of these were established in the past five years, catering to the evolving needs of Indian startups. AI-focused accelerators like T-Hub MATH provide crucial mentorship in product development, business strategy, and scaling. In early 2024, MATH supported over 60 startups, with five actively discussing funding, highlighting India’s growing AI startup landscape.

     

    A Pragmatic AI Regulation Approach

    India’s pragmatic AI regulation balances innovation and accountability, steering clear of overregulation that could stifle growth and unchecked market-driven governance that may create monopolies. Instead of relying solely on legislation, India is investing in AI-driven safeguards, funding top universities and IITs to develop solutions for deep fakes, privacy risks, and cybersecurity threats. This techno-legal approach ensures AI remains a force for inclusive growth, fostering an ecosystem where innovation thrives while ethical concerns are proactively addressed.

    Conclusion

    India’s rapid advancements in artificial intelligence, underpinned by strategic government initiatives, have positioned the country as a global AI powerhouse. By expanding AI compute infrastructure, fostering indigenous AI models, enhancing digital public infrastructure, and investing in talent development, India is creating an inclusive and innovation-driven ecosystem. The emphasis on open data, affordable access to high-performance computing, and AI-driven solutions tailored to local needs ensures that the benefits of AI reach businesses, researchers, and citizens alike. As AI adoption accelerates across industries, India’s proactive approach is not only strengthening its digital economy but also paving the way for self-reliance in critical technologies. With a clear vision for the future, India is set to become a leader in AI innovation, shaping the global AI landscape in the years to come.

    Source: Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology

    Click to see in PDF

    ***

    Santosh Kumar/ Ritu Kataria/ Saurabh Kalia

    (Release ID: 2108810) Visitor Counter : 108

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: HKETO, Brussels celebrates Chinese New Year in Madrid and Barcelona (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    HKETO, Brussels celebrates Chinese New Year in Madrid and Barcelona (with photos)
    *********************************************************************************

    The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Brussels (HKETO, Brussels) hosted Chinese New Year receptions in Madrid and Barcelona, Spain, on March 3 and 4 (Spanish time) respectively, concluding the series of celebration for the Year of the Snake.     The reception in Barcelona was officiated by the Secretary for Innovation, Technology and Industry, Professor Sun Dong, who led a delegation of representatives from Hong Kong’s innovation and technology (I&T) sector to attend the Mobile World Congress (MWC) 2025 in Barcelona. The visit aimsto strengthen ties and co-operation between Hong Kong and Spain in the field of I&T, promote Hong Kong’s I&T advantages, and explore overseas business opportunities for Hong Kong’s I&T sector.     At the reception, the Special Representative for Hong Kong Economic and Trade Affairs to the European Union, Ms Shirley Yung, highlighted in her welcoming remarks that under “one country”, Hong Kong has convenient and often priority access to the huge Mainland market, while maintaining the qualities of an international city under “two systems”.      “These distinct advantages are recognised in the latest international ranking, in which Hong Kong is ranked among the world’s top three international financial centres,” Ms Yung added.     At the reception in Madrid, HKETO, Brussels took the opportunity to showcase Hong Kong’s unique East-meets-West culture by staging a music performance featuring two Hong Kong flutists and one German cellist, who performed both classical Chinese and Spanish music, as well as contemporary Hong Kong pop.     The two receptions in Madrid and Barcelona attracted over 200 guests from the sectors of government, business, culture, academia and media in Spain. They were co-organised with Invest Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC) and with the support of the Spain Hong Kong Business Association.     The MWC is one of the world’s leading technology fairs where tens of thousands of technology experts and companies gather. This year, the Hong Kong delegation include heads of the Hong Kong Science and Technology Parks Corporation (HKSTPC), Cyberport, the Hong Kong Applied Science and Technology Research Institute, and the Hong Kong Microelectronics Research and Development Institute, as well as representatives of 24 Hong Kong I&T enterprises and institutions. The HKSTPC and the HKTDC co-ordinate the participation of the I&T representatives in the Hong Kong Tech Pavilion at the MWC.

    Ends/Thursday, March 6, 2025Issued at HKT 20:47

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Pledge to Climate, Peace and Security on Yemen – Security Council Media Stakeout | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Joint statement of the Security Council members signatories of the Joint Pledges related to Climate, Peace and Security on Yemen read by Ambassador Christina Markus Lassen, PR of Denmark. Other participants – Slovenia, Guyana, Republic of Korea, Panama, Greece, United Kingdom, Sierra Leone, France.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mt_A-7c0wnM

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: €10 million EIB Global and WHO initiative to strengthen public health across Lebanon

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • The European Investment Bank and the World Health Organization signed the agreement today at the EIB Group Forum in Luxembourg
    • Lebanon’s health system is under significant economic and financial strain.
    • The donor-funded initiative will re-establish Lebanon’s Central Public Health Laboratory and prioritise medication provision and healthcare support to over 50,000 people with chronic diseases like diabetes, cardiovascular issues, and cancer.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB Global) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have formally launched a €10 million grant support to boost health resilience across Lebanon, including combating medicine scarcity and fragmented laboratory services.

    The cooperation was signed at the EIB Forum in Luxembourg by WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus and EIB Vice President Thomas Östros and will support the re-establishment of the Central Public Health Laboratory in Lebanon crucial for enhancing the detection capacity for emerging infectious diseases. It will test for emergency infectious diseases, promptly confirming potential pathogens to prevent outbreaks, which will be especially relevant among vulnerable displaced populations and refugees. The CPHL will also test all blood donations to ensure safe transfusions.

    Today’s agreement will also unlock provision of essential medicines and expert support to primary healthcare centres across Lebanon. This will enable public healthcare centres to restore services, including reproductive health and prevention of gender-based violence, addressing specific gender gaps in services.

    EIB Group President Nadia Calviño said, “Strategic partnerships and win-win solutions are more important than ever in these challenging times. This important European Union financing for Lebanon’s public health system is also the fruit of our good cooperation with our fellow multilateral institutions and the excellent partnership with the World Health Organisation whose expertise on the ground is vital to deliver projects like this one.”

    WHO Director-General, Dr Tedros said: “This initiative comes at a critical time for Lebanon and will make a real difference in strengthening Lebanon’s capacity to detect and respond rapidly to health emergencies, and in expanding access to lifesaving medicines. It’s a perfect example of the impact that WHO, EIB and other multilateral development banks aim to have around the world through the Health Impact Investment Platform.”

    “We are grateful for the EIB and WHO’s support for Lebanon’s health sector. This initiative will help us address critical needs, improve the quality of care, and build a more resilient health system for people living across Lebanon,” said Ambassador of Lebanon to Belgium and Luxembourg Fadi Hajali.

    “This joint initiative by the European Investment Bank and implemented by WHO is a crucial step towards strengthening Lebanon’s health system and ensuring that vital services reach the most vulnerable. By supporting the re-establishment of the central public health laboratory and bolstering primary healthcare centres, we are addressing immediate needs and building long-term resilience. This initiative is a prime example of the Team Europe approach, aligning with the European Union’s priorities in Lebanon and complementing our existing support for the health sector, particularly in ensuring access to essential medicines,” said Sandra De Waele, Ambassador of the European Union to Lebanon.

    The grant is provided by the donor-financed EIB’s Economic Resilience Initiative (ERI) Fund, supported by EU member states

    This project in Lebanon builds on previous projects co-managed by WHO and the EIB in Palestine, Rwanda and Angola.  It paves the way for the operational launch of the Health Investment Platform- a unique financing approach that has seen several multilateral development banks, including the Islamic Development Bank and African Development Bank join the EIB and WHO to provide a targeted and strategic approach to primary health care financing. 

    Lebanon’s health system is under significant strain due to a severe economic and financial collapse, compounded by multiple crises, including conflict in southern Lebanon, the Beirut port explosion, the Syrian conflict and a cholera epidemic. Humanitarian challenges continue to escalate, making the population increasingly vulnerable.

    The initiative will prioritise medication provision and healthcare support, including supporting over 50,000 people with chronic diseases like diabetes, cardiovascular issues, and cancer. Vulnerable populations, including those affected by the current conflict, Syrian refugees, and others will benefit from this initiative. Lebanon hosts approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees and around 200,000 Palestinian refugees, constituting about one-third of the total Lebanese population. In addition, in 2025, the number of displaced people within Lebanon has risen to over 950,000.

    The initiative will be implemented by the World Health Organization and is fully endorsed by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health. The initiative will contribute to the Ministry of Public Health’s strategy to strengthen the health services among vulnerable populations, including those affected by the current conflict.

    Background information

    About EIB Global

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives.  

    EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm devoted to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance, and a key partner of Global Gateway. We aim to support €100 billion of investment by the end of 2027 — around one-third of the overall target of this EU initiative. Within Team Europe, EIB Global fosters strong, focused partnerships alongside fellow development finance institutions and civil society. EIB Global brings the EIB Group closer to people, companies and institutions through our offices across the world. 

    About the Economic Resilience Initiative (ERI) Fund

    The Economic Resilience Initiative (ERI) Fund, which backs this grant, was established by the EIB in 2017 to channel donors resources to impactful projects in the Southern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans to address the challenges posed by forced displacement and migration. The ERI Fund donors are Bulgaria, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, and the United Kingdom.

    Lebanon WHO Health Resilience Initiative
    €10 million EIB Global and WHO initiative to strengthen public health across Lebanon
    ©EIB
    Download original
    Lebanon WHO Health Resilience Initiative
    €10 million EIB Global and WHO initiative to strengthen public health across Lebanon
    ©EIB
    Download original

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Non-compliance with the European Social Charter in the overseas territories – E-000881/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000881/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Rody Tolassy (PfE), Séverine Werbrouck (PfE), France Jamet (PfE)

    In a Republic that claims to be united and indivisible, it is unacceptable for our overseas compatriots to be treated as second-class citizens. The exclusion of the overseas territories from the European Social Charter constitutes a profound injustice and a flagrant breach of the principle of equal rights.

    This situation reflects a persistent contempt on the part of the elites towards these territories, which are already facing serious economic, social and environmental inequalities: wages are much lower than in mainland France, access to drinking water is still precarious and the issue of chlordecone poisoning has not been properly addressed.

    Against this backdrop, the inaction of the European and national authorities is unacceptable. It is time to mobilise all parliamentary bodies to demand justice and compensation. The ratification of the European Social Charter for Overseas France would be a major step forward in guaranteeing these citizens the same rights and protections as those in mainland France.

    • 1.In light of the foregoing, how can the Commission justify this discriminatory exclusion?
    • 2.What concrete commitments will it make to guarantee the genuine equality of social rights for overseas citizens?
    • 3.Will it finally recognise that this situation violates the fundamental principles of justice and human dignity?

    Submitted: 28.2.2025

    Last updated: 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Nitin Gadkari highlights on immediate need for improved road safety measures

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 7:41PM by PIB Delhi

    Union Minister for Road Transport and Highways Shri Nitin Gadkari highlighted the immediate need for improved road safety measures to put in place and called upon the road construction industry to develop strategies to enhance road safety by adopting newer technologies and sustainable recyclable construction materials.

    Speaking after inaugurating two-day Global Road Infratech Summit & Expo (GRIS) with the theme “Vision Zero: Sustainable Infratech and Policy for Safer Roads,” in New Delhi today, Shri Gadkari observed that most of the road accidents that happen in the country are due to poor civil engineering practices in road design, construction, and management and improper road signages and marking systems.  He suggested that they can be rectified by emulating from what is being practiced in countries like Spain, Austria and Switzerland.

    India witnessed 4,80,000 road accidents, 1,80,000 deaths, and about 4,00,000 serious injuries. Out of these 1,40,000 accident deaths are in the age of 18-45 years and affecting mostly two-wheeler riders and pedestrians.  These accidents contribute to an economic loss of 3 % to GDP, Shri Gadkari noted.

    Holding engineers largely responsible for the rise in road accidents due to poor planning and design of roads, the Union Minister also pointed to substandard detailed project reports (DPRs).  With road safety a top priority, the government aims to reduce accident rates by 50% by 2030, he added.

    Shri Gadkari urged the industry and government to collaborate in finding solutions to prevent road accidents, emphasising the importance of education in building safer infrastructure and promoting awareness on safer driving habits. He also highlighted the need for stronger law enforcement and responsive emergency medical services.

    The summit being organised by the International Road Federation-India Chapter (IRF-IC) is crafted to inspire innovation, showcase cutting-edge solutions from industry providers, foster knowledge exchange, and open valuable networking opportunities for experts and decision-makers from government bodies and private organisations.

    The summit through the conference-cum-expo mode, aims to deliver a holistic experience that educates, inspires, and drives progress in the industry by seamlessly blending the formats”, said Mr K K Kapila, President Emeritus, International Road Federation (IRF) a global road safety body working for better and safer roads worldwide.

    Ms Susanna Zammataro, Director General, IRF, Geneva, Lt. Gen. Harpal Singh, President, IRF -India Chapter and Akhilesh Srivastva, Vice President, IRF, also spoke on the occasion.

    ***

    GDH/HR

    (Release ID: 2108902) Visitor Counter : 71

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘Orgasms are a marvellous happiness’. Shere Hite gave voice to female sexuality in a landmark book – but the backlash was fierce

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Camilla Nelson, Associate Professor in Media and Journalism, University of Notre Dame Australia

    Owen Franken/Corbis via Getty Images

    In our feminist classics series we revisit influential works.

    Shere Hite’s The Hite Report was quickly dubbed a “sexual revolution in 600 pages”. It did something nobody had considered worth doing: investigating women’s sexuality by asking them to share their thoughts and feelings, then relaying those reflections to readers in women’s own words.

    This might not sound unusual today. But in 1976, it was incendiary.

    Based on a survey of 3,000 women distributed by the New York Chapter of the National Organisation for Women (the feminist group co-founded by Betty Friedan), more than 75% of the book comprises narrative responses to open ended survey questions.

    It includes a plethora of startlingly frank – for its time – and explicitly detailed opinions, anecdotes, complaints and criticisms about sex, masturbation and orgasm. The book is an extraordinarily rich cultural artefact in the archive of human intimacy.

    Unsurprisingly, the women who responded to Hite’s survey thoroughly enjoyed sex. “Orgasm is the ultimate pleasure – which women often deny themselves, but men never do,” claimed one. “Orgasms are a marvellous happiness”, added another. “Orgasm cancels out rage and longing for at least 48 hours,” said yet another.

    But it was the manner in which Hite’s respondents got their orgasms that made the book a scandal. “I think masturbation is essential to one’s health,” said one respondent. “[A]s I learned in my marriage – a partner is not always good sexually, though he may be wonderful in other ways.”

    Masturbation is better than “bad sex with an incompatible partner”, explained another respondent. “The only way I can have an orgasm is by masturbating,” said another.

    ‘A complex nature’

    The Hite Report did not attempt to define a sexual norm, or produce a representative survey sample, or pretend its data could be generalised to an entire population. But it did contain some statistical findings.

    The most significant of these – the source of the book’s notoriety – was that only 30% of women surveyed reported being able to regularly or reliably reach orgasm through heterosexual intercourse. And yet, 80% reported they could easily and regularly reach orgasm through clitoral stimulation, which was frequently obtained through masturbation, either alone, or with their partner.

    In her preface Hite argued that the canonical sexological works of the past 100 years – including the works of Sigmund Freud, Alfred Kinsey, and William Masters and Virginia Johnson – had constructed female sexuality “as essentially a response to male sexuality and intercourse”. She set out to demonstrate that “female sexuality might have a complex nature of its own”.

    Hite argued sex was a cultural institution, not a biological one. Historically, men had defined sex in terms of their own needs and preferences, then mandated their preferences as biological.

    Freud, for example, knew female orgasm could be reliably obtained through clitoral stimulation, but defined clitoral orgasm as an “immature orgasm” and orgasm arising from heterosexual intercourse as a “mature orgasm”. He then labelled women who could not achieve orgasm in the required way “frigid” and “hysterical”.

    The Hite Report is organised into eight chapters or themes, starting with “Masturbation”, followed by “Orgasm”, “Intercourse”, “Clitoral Stimulation”, “Lesbianism”, “Sexual Slavery”, “The Sexual Revolution” and “Older Women”. In a concluding chapter, Hite reflects on the issues raised by survey participants.

    In the chapter “Lesbianism”, a significant number of heterosexual-identified women confess same sex attraction, or else identify as bisexual. They also describe lesbian sexuality as “more variable”, and the “physical actions more mutual”.

    “The basic difference with a woman is that there’s no end,” claimed one respondent, “[…] it’s like a circle, it goes on and on.”

    “Lesbianism” sits in stark contrast to the chapter on “Sexual Slavery”, where Hite seeks to investigate why women pursue unequal sexual relationships, especially where respondents claim to receive little or no sexual pleasure.

    “Having a man love me and want to have sex with me is necessary to my happiness,” claimed one respondent. “Sex makes me feel I am a woman to my husband instead of just a live-in maid,” added another.

    “I’ve never heard a word of praise from my husband in 21 years except while having intercourse,” claimed yet another. “While I resent this, I still love him […] ”

    Wildly successful

    Many women applauded the book. Author Erica Jong, writing in The New York Times, called it a “revelation”. Others warned of a possible male backlash. “It seems that women are finally reporting the facts of their own sex,” wrote journalist Ellen Willis in the Washington Post, “and men are putting on the earmuffs of fear and retreating to deeper fantasies.”

    This backlash was not long in coming. Playboy apocryphally dubbed it “The Hate Report”, a label regularly recycled in media outlets around the world, including by female journalists. One male journalist, writing in the Miami Herald, argued women could not be regarded as truthful or reliable witnesses to their own lives. “What annoys me about The Hite Report,” he wrote, “is its smug assumption that just because women made these comments, they’re true”.

    Despite – or perhaps because of – this controversy, the book was wildly successful. It was translated into ten different languages – including French, Spanish, German, Italian, Hebrew and Japanese – and sold over 2 million copies within the first 12 months.

    It remains the 30th bestselling book of all time, with 50 million copies sold in 45 countries, including two recently translated editions in China, where it sparked conversations among intellectuals interested in formerly taboo western culture.

    Faking orgasms

    Born in smalltown Missouri, Hite gained a masters degree in social history and in 1967 moved to New York to enrol in a PhD program at Columbia University. She left when conservative faculty members refused to allow her to complete her dissertation on female sexuality. Hite worked as a model to pay her tuition fees. She joined the National Organisation for Women when they protested the sexism of the Olivetti advertising campaigns, after Hite was cast as an “Olivetti girl” for the typewriter company.

    Increasingly tagged as a “man-basher” after the publication of her book, Hite’s public persona was conventionally, almost theatrically feminine. She revelled in a contemporary Baroque aesthetic; a mirage of red lipstick, froufrou dresses, pancake-style makeup and tousled orange or platinum curls. And she spoke about sex in explicit detail, in a voice that was earnest, articulate and unembarrassed.

    Hite did not “discover” the clitoral orgasm. Instead, by centring women’s experiences, and taking their reflections seriously, her work threw into question centuries of sexological studies. These studies had either pathologised normal female sexual functioning or else insisted any pleasure women derived from sex had to be a by-product of conventional heterosexual intercourse.

    Even Masters and Johnson, who, in their reports from 1966 onwards, clinically proved all female orgasms were the result of clitoral stimulation, had insisted on the centrality of coitus.

    As Hite told television show host Geraldo in 1977,

    Masters and Johnson made a tremendous step forward in that they studied, and showed clinically, for the first time, that all orgasms are caused by clitoral stimulation, and we really have them to thank for that. However, when they described how it’s done – the thrusting of the penis causes the vaginal lips to move, which causes the skin that’s connected to the clitoris to move, which causes the glands to move over the clitoris, which supposedly gives you orgasm. But that doesn’t work for most women.

    And yet, although the participants in Hite’s study were overwhelmingly educated and politically progressive, many confessed they felt compelled to fake an orgasm during intercourse to please a man.

    “I ‘perform’ and boost his ego and confidence,” claimed one. “I do not like to think of myself as a performer but I feel judged and also judge myself when I don’t have an orgasm.” “[M]en do expect it, so I often force myself […],” said another.

    Participants also claimed how a woman was seen to orgasm mattered. “I don’t show the signs you’re supposed to,” worried one. “They think because I don’t pant, scream and claw I haven’t had one,” said another. “I used to go out of my way to offer all the mythical Hollywood signs,” revealed another.

    One participant even suggested the whole issue of sex was so politically fraught that, “Maybe sex would be better if we’d never heard of orgasm”.

    Respondents also told Hite the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s had intensified, rather than reduced, gender prejudices and double standards.

    Sexual violence

    Another breathtaking aspect of the book is the way participants’ answers are shot through with sexual violence. On the issue of sexual coercion, for example, one participant replied, “I’m not supposed to say ‘no’ since I’m legally married”.

    On a question about the use of force in sex, another replied, “Only with my husband.” (In 1976, marital rape was legal and “acceptable” in most western nations.)

    Rape myths are also common. “I define as rape someone you don’t know who attacks you,” said one respondent. “I never defined it as […] someone you know. If you define rape that way, every woman has been raped over and over.”

    Another suggested rape wasn’t rape if a victim gave up fighting. “He really raped me, but not in the legal way. I couldn’t prevent him, in other words.”

    Hite identified toxic gender stereotypes as the major driver of sexual violence, especially the belief that “a man’s need for ‘sex’ is a strong and urgent ‘drive’” which women were obligated to satisfy. “Women aren’t always free to not have sex,” explained one respondent.

    Archival insights

    The Hite archive is housed in the Schlesinger Library of the Radcliffe Institute at Harvard University. It comprises over 250 filing boxes and folios, occupying more than 30 metres of shelf space. Most of the material relates to Hite’s public career as a sex researcher, with a small scattering of personal papers.

    I was at Harvard doing research for a book on Hite’s contemporary Andrea Dworkin. Although the two feminists exist as polar opposites in the public imagination, they thoroughly agreed with one another, and enjoyed a supportive working relationship. And so I wanted to take a look.

    Among the publishing agreements, speaking invitations, publicity material and the copies of the edited and revised questionnaires that formed the basis of the 1976 report – which are printed in vermillion – an occasional note flips out.

    One, a seemingly unpublished open letter titled “Dear Women”, bears the traces of the intense, frequently misogynistic and overtly hostile media scrutiny that marked Hite’s wild catapult to fame.

    “Sometimes I feel I am dying here in the midst of all this,” she writes, “without the support of anyone”.

    Another, scrawled in a flamboyant purple felt tip pen in the midst of her 1977 book tour of France, reads, “I know that I have done something good – but somehow I feel evil […] When did that start?”

    There are also letters from readers. One, sent from Milan in the wake of the controversy that accompanied the Italian edition of the book, bears the typewritten subject line “Personal”. It reads:

    Dear Ms Hite,
    I am 43 years old and have never written a fan letter in my life until today. But I feel a moral obligation to tell you that your ‘Report’ has rehabilitated me in my own eyes. After years of thinking there was something wrong with me, your book has shown me I’m normal.

    Hite’s “Dear Women” letter describes the extraordinary challenges, including the financial challenges, she faced both before and after the book was published.

    Macmillan, after purchasing the rights to the book, went cold on the project when the commissioning editor resigned or, as Hite phrases it, “quit/was fired depending on your point of view”. The publisher made no plan to promote the book and assigned a 22-year-old man to answer any media queries.

    Hite decided to step in, when, working in the publisher’s offices late one evening, she found a letter from her male publicist declining an invitation to discuss The Hite Report on TV as “he thought my book/subject might be too ‘ticklish’ for television”.

    Hite’s contract with Macmillan gave her little or no control over international editions of the book (and severely limited the income she could take from royalties, before it was ruled unconscionable by a court). In 1978, she “flew around the world twice” attempting to stop the book from being sensationalised.

    In France, the publisher had promised Hite a plain print cover, but was overruled by an all-male advertising department who “printed a cover with a nude woman”. In the second printing, the publisher agreed to revert to plain text.

    In Israel, entire sections of the first edition text were censored. Protests by local journalists led to the publisher engaging an Israeli feminist to re-translate the work.

    In Japan, the male translator produced a translation that was “so embarrassed and vague that it made absolutely no sense”. But on this occasion, a sympathetic female editor stepped in to rewrite entire sections of the manuscript.

    Hite’s Australian reception ranked among the most hostile. Her research assistant described the trip as “hideous”, alleging Hite had “never before encountered” such “vicious attitudes” as those exhibited by male journalists.

    Hite’s research assistant revealed in a separate letter that Hite’s doctors had “absolutely forbid her to do anything but rest for the next few months” after the Australian trip.

    Later life

    In her preface, Hite writes that she hoped to start a conversation through which men and women might “begin to devise more kind, generous, and personal ways of relating”.

    Sadly, this was not what happened. Hite went on to release four major reports on human sexuality, including a report on male sexuality, one on women and love, and one on the family. Then in 1996, she revoked her US citizenship and moved to Germany, saying the media’s hostility towards her made it impossible to continue working.

    Living in Germany, and later in Paris and London, she published her autobiography, The Hite Report on Shere Hite, and The Hite Reader, containing a selection of her published work. She died in 2020, aged 77.

    What marks the Hite Report as an artefact from another era is less the peculiar patois of the “Age of Aquarius”, than the way in which Hite’s respondents so often defined their identities through their husband’s, whether as a wife, former wife, or woman destined to be a wife. “Wifedom” is the default state.

    Equally, what makes the book disturbing, is the reality of sexual violence and coercion that lurks in so many answers, even when respondents are not being questioned about violence or coercion directly.

    With shocked recognition, the reader realises society has not changed nearly as much as some would like to think. The fact it has changed at all is partly due to the second sexual revolution ignited by Hite’s work.

    Camilla Nelson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. ‘Orgasms are a marvellous happiness’. Shere Hite gave voice to female sexuality in a landmark book – but the backlash was fierce – https://theconversation.com/orgasms-are-a-marvellous-happiness-shere-hite-gave-voice-to-female-sexuality-in-a-landmark-book-but-the-backlash-was-fierce-246150

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Highland Council road order outlines 2025 closure dates for Infirmary Bridge, Inverness

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    A new road order, which covers the entire year, has been created to detail the dates on which Inverness’s Infirmary Bridge will be closed to the public in 2025.

    lnfirmary Bridge, Inverness, will be closed between its junction with the Ness Bank and CavelI Gardens Road and its junction with the Ness Walk Upper as follows:

    • Inverness Half Marathon and Inverness 5K Events – 10:30 to 15:30 on Sunday 9 March 2025
    • Etape Loch Ness – 05:00 to 15:00 on Sunday 27 April 2025
    • The Gathering Event – 10:00 on Saturday 24 May 2025 to 08:00 on Sunday 25 May 2025
    • Cancer Research UK, Race for Life 5K & 10K Events – 08:00 to 14:00 on Sunday 1 June 2025
    • Scottish Fiddle Orchestra (Inverness Leisure concert) 16:00 to midnight on Saturday 14 June 2025
    • Concert (provisional) at Inverness Leisure – 18:00 to midnight on Wednesday 18 June 2025
    • Concert (provisional) at Inverness Leisure – 18:00 to midnight on Thursday 19 June 2025
    • Concert (provisional) at Inverness Leisure – 18:00 to midnight on Friday 20 June 2025
    • Inverness Highland Games – 09:00 to midnight on Saturday 12 July 2025
    • Inverness Comic Con (Inverness Leisure) – 09:00 to 17:00 on Saturday 2 August 2025
    • Loch Ness Marathon, River Ness 10K And River Ness 5K Events – 08:30 to 17:00 on
    • Sunday 28 September 2025
    • Inverness Bonfire and Fireworks Display – 16:00 to 20:00 on Wednesday 5 November 2025
    • Concert (provisional) at Inverness Leisure – 18:00 to midnight on Friday 7 November 2025
    • Concert (provisional) at Inverness Leisure – 18:00 to midnight on Saturday 8 November 2025
    • Concert (provisional) at Inverness Leisure – 18:00 to midnight on Sunday 9 November 2025
    • Remembrance Day Parade – 13:00 to 18:00 on Sunday 9 November 2025
    • LCC Live (Inverness Leisure concert) – 16:30 to midnight on Friday 5 December 2025.
    • LCC Live (Inverness Leisure concert) – 16:30 to midnight on Saturday 6 December 2025
    • LCCLive (Inverness Leisure concert) – 16:30 to midnight on Sunday 7 December 2025
    • Concert (provisional) at Inverness Leisure – 18:00 to midnight on Friday 19 December 2025
    • Concert (provisional) at Inverness Leisure – 18:00 to midnight on Saturday 20 December 2025

    6 Mar 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Whin Parks toilets temporary closure to enable Whin Park works

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    To enable the installation of an interactive play feature at Whin Park in Inverness, the public toilets at Whin Park are currently closed and will remain closed for next week.

    The toilet closure is required to facilitate an electrical connection to the new piece of play equipment – called a “Sona” – which is currently being installed. 

    The Lappset Sona interactive play arch is an audio-based piece of interactive play equipment made for the outdoors. 

    Highland Council apologises for any inconvenience for the short term closure of the toilets which is part of the works which are progressing well on the exciting changes taking place at Whin Park in Inverness. 

    Weather dependent, the target is to have the works completed for Easter 2025. The remainder of the park remains open during the works, but the main play area and a section of the car park in front of the shop are closed to allow the works to continue. This also includes the main entrance ramped area to the park. The path network from the Ness Islands and the path at the side of the public toilets also remain open enabling the public to view the works’ progress during this exciting period for this landmark location. 

    Funding for the contract has been awarded by the Scottish Government Play Area Fund (£234,988) which was allocated to the redevelopment of the park by Members of the Inverness, Central, Ness-side, Millburn, and Inverness West Wards.  In 2023, Inverness City Committee Members agreed £150,000 Inverness Common Good Funding; and in 2024 a further £100,000 from the Community Regeneration Fund towards the park development costs. 

    Watch the video of the latest works. On YouTube: https://youtu.be/nZswm-1T0vo (external link)  and look out for our next video update later in March.

    6 Mar 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Highland Council agrees a budget for investment and growth

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    The Highland Council has agreed a budget which will see over £4.5 million of revenue investments for 2025 – 2026, over £17 million additional reserves investment for major developments and the creation of over 100 jobs across the Highlands.

    Members agreed a 7% increase in Council Tax, one of the lowest increases in Scotland, with 2% of this allocated to create capital investment fund for schools and roads as part of the Highland Investment Plan.

    A package of an additional £14 million savings, efficiencies and income generation was agreed, without the need for use of Reserves to balance the budget. This will add to existing saving plans, resulting in a total of £36.7m to be delivered over 3 years.  These new savings are described under the themes of improvements to our operating model, efficiencies and mechanisms to generate additional income for the council.

    Leader of the Council Raymond Bremner said: “I am delighted that Members have today supported the creation of a Poverty and Equality Commission for the Highland area, underpinned by £870k, to focus on tackling poverty and inequality across Highland communities. This in addition to our planned investment programme will help to sustain our Highland communities, with affordable homes, better access to renewable energy, job opportunities and economic prosperity.”

    Convener of the Council Bill Lobban said: “Long term financial planning has enabled us to be in the position today of being able to invest rather than cut. Our savings and income generation plans will mean we can focus a large proportion of our Reserves on investing in huge projects such as an £8m energy investment fund and a £6m transport expansion fund, which will benefit Highland people for many years to come.”

    The full budget report can be found on the Council’s website.

    6 Mar 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI USA: New York Woman Pleads Guilty for Role in Deadly Alien Smuggling Conspiracy on the Northern Border

    Source: US State of California

    A New York woman pleaded guilty today for her role in a deadly human smuggling conspiracy that left a family of four, including two children under the age of three, dead in the St. Lawrence River.

    According to court documents, Janet Terrance, 45, of Hogansburg, conspired with five others to bring Indian and Romanian nationals into the United States for private financial gain. Co-conspirators Dakota Montour, 31, and Kawisiiostha Celecia Sharrow, 43, both of Akwesasne-Mohawk, New York, entered guilty pleas on Jan. 23, 2025, and Oct. 8, 2024, respectively.

    “The defendant and her coconspirators — fueled by greed, indifference, and recklessness — smuggled aliens via vehicle and boat across the U.S.-Canada border in dangerous weather conditions,” said Supervisory Official Antoinette T. Bacon of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “They endangered the lives of two small children and their parents for profit, resulting in the family’s tragic deaths. Dismantling transnational criminal organizations that smuggle people into and throughout the United States is a top priority for the Department of Justice.”

    “A family of four died because a smuggling organization put them in harm’s way for profit,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Daniel Hanlon for the Northern District of New York. “Our top priority is the prosecution and dismantling of smuggling organizations. By securing our northern border, we aim to avoid more tragedies like this one.”

    According to court documents, Terrance, Montour, and Sharrow worked with a human smuggling organization (HSO) on the Akwesasne Mohawk Indian Reservation (AMIR) and in Cornwall, Ontario, Canada, that smuggled aliens from mainland Cornwall to Cornwall Island, and then into northern New York. The HSO routinely smuggled aliens from various countries into the United States. The HSO arranged for aliens to stay in local motels in Cornwall before transporting the aliens to the AMIR to stage the aliens on the banks of the St. Lawrence River. Members of the HSO would then transport the aliens by boat across the St. Lawrence River to later be driven into New York.

    Terrance, Montour, and Sharrow admitted in their plea agreements that in late March 2023, the co-conspirators were employed to illegally transport a Romanian family of four — mother, father, one-year-old boy, and two-year-old girl — from Cornwall into New York. The children were Canadian citizens. Both Montour and Terrance admitted that they were hired to transport the Romanian family to the AMIR from mainland Cornwall.

    Montour admitted that he was aware of the dangerous weather conditions on March 29, 2023 — high winds, freezing temperatures, and limited visibility — yet the family of four was loaded into a small boat by another co-conspirator to cross the St. Lawrence River. The boat capsized, and the family died as a result.

    “The tragic deaths of two innocent, unknowing toddlers and their parents underscores the devastating impacts of alien smuggling,” said Special Agent in Charge Erin Keegan of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (ICE HSI) Buffalo. “Janet Terrance and her co-conspirators moved forward with this smuggling attempt despite the dangerous conditions and sheer illegality of the act, placing these victims in the situation that ultimately killed them. ICE HSI Massena is committed to enforcing U.S. laws at our border to protect the safety and the security of our communities.”

    “The Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service is dedicated to keeping our community safe,” said Acting AMPS Chief Ranatiiostha Swamp. “By working closely with Homeland Security on this investigation, we are enhancing efforts to combat human smuggling and cross-border illegal activity, ensuring the safety and security of our territory.”

    Montour pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit alien smuggling, four counts of alien smuggling for financial gain, and three counts of alien smuggling resulting in death. Montour faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison on each of the conspiracy and alien smuggling for financial gain counts and a mandatory penalty of life in prison on the alien smuggling resulting in death counts.

    Sharrow and Terrance pleaded guilty to two counts and one count of conspiracy to commit alien smuggling, respectively, and each to four counts of alien smuggling for financial gain. They each face a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison on the conspiracy counts and two of the alien smuggling for financial gain counts and a mandatory minimum of five years and maximum penalty of 15 years in prison on two of the alien smuggling for financial gain counts.

    A federal district court judge will determine the defendants’ sentences after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    HSI Massena engaged in an extensive years-long investigation of the case, with assistance from the U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), HSI’s Human Smuggling Unit in Washington, D.C., CBP’s National Targeting Center, New York State Police, Canada Border Services Agency, AMPS, St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police Department, Ontario Provincial Police, Sûreté du Québec, St. Lawrence County Sheriff’s Department, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Cornwall Police Service. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided significant support with foreign legal assistance requests.

    Trial Attorney Jenna E. Reed of the Criminal Division’s Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Stitt for the Northern District of New York are prosecuting the case.

    The investigation is being conducted under the Extraterritorial Criminal Travel Strike Force (ECT) program, a joint partnership between the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and HSI. The ECT program focuses on human smuggling networks that may present particular national security or public safety risks, or present grave humanitarian concerns. ECT has dedicated investigative, intelligence and prosecutorial resources. ECT coordinates and receives assistance from other U.S. government agencies and foreign law enforcement authorities.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: New York Woman Pleads Guilty for Role in Deadly Alien Smuggling Conspiracy on the Northern Border

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    A New York woman pleaded guilty today for her role in a deadly human smuggling conspiracy that left a family of four, including two children under the age of three, dead in the St. Lawrence River.

    According to court documents, Janet Terrance, 45, of Hogansburg, conspired with five others to bring Indian and Romanian nationals into the United States for private financial gain. Co-conspirators Dakota Montour, 31, and Kawisiiostha Celecia Sharrow, 43, both of Akwesasne-Mohawk, New York, entered guilty pleas on Jan. 23, 2025, and Oct. 8, 2024, respectively.

    “The defendant and her coconspirators — fueled by greed, indifference, and recklessness — smuggled aliens via vehicle and boat across the U.S.-Canada border in dangerous weather conditions,” said Supervisory Official Antoinette T. Bacon of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “They endangered the lives of two small children and their parents for profit, resulting in the family’s tragic deaths. Dismantling transnational criminal organizations that smuggle people into and throughout the United States is a top priority for the Department of Justice.”

    “A family of four died because a smuggling organization put them in harm’s way for profit,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Daniel Hanlon for the Northern District of New York. “Our top priority is the prosecution and dismantling of smuggling organizations. By securing our northern border, we aim to avoid more tragedies like this one.”

    According to court documents, Terrance, Montour, and Sharrow worked with a human smuggling organization (HSO) on the Akwesasne Mohawk Indian Reservation (AMIR) and in Cornwall, Ontario, Canada, that smuggled aliens from mainland Cornwall to Cornwall Island, and then into northern New York. The HSO routinely smuggled aliens from various countries into the United States. The HSO arranged for aliens to stay in local motels in Cornwall before transporting the aliens to the AMIR to stage the aliens on the banks of the St. Lawrence River. Members of the HSO would then transport the aliens by boat across the St. Lawrence River to later be driven into New York.

    Terrance, Montour, and Sharrow admitted in their plea agreements that in late March 2023, the co-conspirators were employed to illegally transport a Romanian family of four — mother, father, one-year-old boy, and two-year-old girl — from Cornwall into New York. The children were Canadian citizens. Both Montour and Terrance admitted that they were hired to transport the Romanian family to the AMIR from mainland Cornwall.

    Montour admitted that he was aware of the dangerous weather conditions on March 29, 2023 — high winds, freezing temperatures, and limited visibility — yet the family of four was loaded into a small boat by another co-conspirator to cross the St. Lawrence River. The boat capsized, and the family died as a result.

    “The tragic deaths of two innocent, unknowing toddlers and their parents underscores the devastating impacts of alien smuggling,” said Special Agent in Charge Erin Keegan of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (ICE HSI) Buffalo. “Janet Terrance and her co-conspirators moved forward with this smuggling attempt despite the dangerous conditions and sheer illegality of the act, placing these victims in the situation that ultimately killed them. ICE HSI Massena is committed to enforcing U.S. laws at our border to protect the safety and the security of our communities.”

    “The Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service is dedicated to keeping our community safe,” said Acting AMPS Chief Ranatiiostha Swamp. “By working closely with Homeland Security on this investigation, we are enhancing efforts to combat human smuggling and cross-border illegal activity, ensuring the safety and security of our territory.”

    Montour pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit alien smuggling, four counts of alien smuggling for financial gain, and three counts of alien smuggling resulting in death. Montour faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison on each of the conspiracy and alien smuggling for financial gain counts and a mandatory penalty of life in prison on the alien smuggling resulting in death counts.

    Sharrow and Terrance pleaded guilty to two counts and one count of conspiracy to commit alien smuggling, respectively, and each to four counts of alien smuggling for financial gain. They each face a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison on the conspiracy counts and two of the alien smuggling for financial gain counts and a mandatory minimum of five years and maximum penalty of 15 years in prison on two of the alien smuggling for financial gain counts.

    A federal district court judge will determine the defendants’ sentences after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    HSI Massena engaged in an extensive years-long investigation of the case, with assistance from the U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), HSI’s Human Smuggling Unit in Washington, D.C., CBP’s National Targeting Center, New York State Police, Canada Border Services Agency, AMPS, St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police Department, Ontario Provincial Police, Sûreté du Québec, St. Lawrence County Sheriff’s Department, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Cornwall Police Service. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided significant support with foreign legal assistance requests.

    Trial Attorney Jenna E. Reed of the Criminal Division’s Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Stitt for the Northern District of New York are prosecuting the case.

    The investigation is being conducted under the Extraterritorial Criminal Travel Strike Force (ECT) program, a joint partnership between the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and HSI. The ECT program focuses on human smuggling networks that may present particular national security or public safety risks, or present grave humanitarian concerns. ECT has dedicated investigative, intelligence and prosecutorial resources. ECT coordinates and receives assistance from other U.S. government agencies and foreign law enforcement authorities.

    MIL Security OSI –