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Category: European Union

  • MIL-OSI: Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 12.02.2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nokia Corporation
    Stock Exchange Release
    12 February 2025 at 22:30 EET

    Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 12.02.2025

    Espoo, Finland – On 12 February 2025 Nokia Corporation (LEI: 549300A0JPRWG1KI7U06) has acquired its own shares (ISIN FI0009000681) as follows:

    Trading venue (MIC Code) Number of shares Weighted average price / share, EUR*
    XHEL 1,334,463 4.74
    CEUX – –
    BATE – –
    AQEU – –
    TQEX – –
    Total 1,334,463 4.74

    * Rounded to two decimals

    On 22 November 2024, Nokia announced that its Board of Directors is initiating a share buyback program to offset the dilutive effect of new Nokia shares issued to the shareholders of Infinera Corporation and certain Infinera Corporation share-based incentives. The repurchases in compliance with the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (MAR), the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 and under the authorization granted by Nokia’s Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024 started on 25 November 2024 and end by 31 December 2025 and target to repurchase 150 million shares for a maximum aggregate purchase price of EUR 900 million.

    Total cost of transactions executed on 12 February 2025 was EUR 6,328,290. After the disclosed transactions, Nokia Corporation holds 246,429,217 treasury shares.

    Details of transactions are included as an appendix to this announcement.

    On behalf of Nokia Corporation

    BofA Securities Europe SA

    About Nokia
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    Inquiries:

    Nokia Communications
    Phone: +358 10 448 4900
    Email: press.services@nokia.com
    Maria Vaismaa, Global Head of External Communications

    Nokia Investor Relations
    Phone: +358 931 580 507
    Email: investor.relations@nokia.com

    Attachment

    • Daily Report 2025-02-12

    The MIL Network –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Keynote Speech by Commissioner Kubilius at the Perspectives Spatiales

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Speech Paris, 12 Feb 2025 I am very glad to be here in France, a country that has been a such a powerful engine for European cooperation in space since the very beginning. Thanks to France, Europe is a leading space power. For now. If we want to maintain our lead in space, we need to take bold and decisive steps.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Unfair commissions on transactions for ordinary people while banks profit – E-000485/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000485/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos (NI)

    The New Democracy Government recently put in place certain measures to reduce specific categories of fees and commissions that financial groups earn from banking transactions. These are mock interventions, since official government data reveals that the cost of reducing bank commissions amounts to only EUR 150 million per year, when, for 2023 and the 9 months from January to September 2024, these are estimated at EUR 1.8 billion. The selective zero charges for some services apply to payments made digitally, while charges for payments made at bank counters or ATMs remain in force as usual.

    In light of the above:

    • 1.What is the Commission’s position on the fact that banking groups manage to achieve high profitability, the source of which is largely fees and commissions, precisely by relying on EU directives (see Directive 2014/92/EU, etc.) that define a “reasonable fee” that institutionalises lawful speculation at the expense of ordinary families?
    • 2.What is the Commission’s position on the fact that, despite the continuous record profitability of the four systemic banking groups in Greece, they do not pay taxes, and will continue not to pay until 2041, while the four systemic banks already owe the State EUR 12.5 billion in deferred tax (paid by the people) and their shareholders received a dividend of EUR 848 million in 2023, at a tax rate of just 5%?
    • 3.What is the Commission’s position on the request to abolish all these unfair commissions on ordinary people’s transactions?

    Submitted: 4.2.2025

    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU-Algeria partnership called into question, and making aid conditional on effective migration cooperation – E-000521/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000521/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nadine Morano (PPE)

    On 23 January 2025, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for the release of the Franco-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal. In response, on 27 January, the Algerian Parliament strongly condemned this resolution, calling the concerns it expressed ‘false allegations’[1]. In addition, the day before, President Tebboune had called for a revision of the Association Agreement between Algeria and the EU[2].

    In light of that, it is perfectly reasonable for the EU to reconsider how appropriate it is to send financial aid to Algeria. Another factor is Algeria’s failure to both comply with its international commitments and cooperate effectively with Member States, particularly France, including as regards the readmission of irregular Algerian migrants subject to an ‘obligation to leave French territory’ (OQTF). In 2023, of the 25 120 Algerian nationals[3] under such an obligation, only 2 562 were deported, which is less than 10%.

    • 1.How does the Commission view Algeria not cooperating on migration even though it is granted financial support by the EU?
    • 2.Is the Commission prepared to make all EU funding conditional on Algeria making commitments regarding the readmission of irregular migrants?
    • 3.What concrete measures does the Commission plan on introducing to ensure that Algeria assumes its responsibilities with regard to the migratory pressure faced by the EU?

    Submitted: 5.2.2025

    • [1] ‘Communiqué rendu public par les deux Chambres du Parlement algérien concernant la résolution du Parlement européen’, published on 27 January 2025, https://www.apn.dz/lire-article/6939
    • [2] Le Monde, ‘L’Algérie veut revoir l’accord avec l’Union européenne sur un principe “gagnant-gagnant”’, published on 27 January 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/01/27/l-algerie-veut-revoir-l-accord-avec-l-union-europeenne-sur-un-principe-gagnant-gagnant_6518752_3212.html
    • [3] Eurostat, ‘First permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship’, accessed 4 February 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_resfirst/default/table?category=migr.migr_man.migr_res.migr_resval
    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia – RC-B10-0106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Wouter Beke, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Reinhold Lopatka, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Inese Vaidere, Michał Wawrykiewicz
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Rihards Kols, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Michał Dworczyk, Roberts Zīle, Marlena Maląg, Ivaylo Valchev, Alexandr Vondra, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Assita Kanko
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Bernard Guetta, Karin Karlsbro, Michał Kobosko, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Reinier Van Lanschot
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    European Parliament resolution on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia

    (2025/2522(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular that of 28 November 2024 on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud[1],

    – having regard to Georgia’s status as an EU candidate country, granted by the European Council at its summit of 14 and 15 December 2023,

    – having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which demands the implementation of all possible measures to guarantee Georgia’s complete integration into the EU and NATO,

    – having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,

    – having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the democratic backsliding in Georgia has dramatically accelerated since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which were deeply flawed and marked by grave irregularities, and failed to meet international democratic standards and Georgia’s OSCE commitments; whereas these elections violated the democratic norms and standards set for free and fair elections, failing to reflect the will of the people and rendering the resulting ‘parliament’, and subsequently the ‘president’, devoid of any democratic legitimacy; whereas from the very beginning of its activity, the current Georgian parliament has operated as a one-party (Georgian Dream) organ, which is incompatible with the essence of pluralistic parliamentary democracy;

    B. whereas Article 2 of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement[2] concerns the general principles of the agreement, which include democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms;

    C. whereas Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution states that the constitutional bodies must take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union;

    D. whereas the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, publicly condemned the parliamentary elections as rigged, declared that she would not recognise them and called for an international investigation; whereas the current Georgian regime, led by the Georgian Dream party and its founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has orchestrated an unconstitutional usurpation of power, systematically dismantling democratic institutions, undermining judicial independence and eroding fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, thereby deepening Georgia’s political and constitutional crisis;

    E. whereas Georgia has officially held the status of EU candidate country since December 2023; whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations;

    F. whereas on 28 November 2024, peaceful mass anti-government protests began across the country, demanding new, free and fair elections, an end to political violence and repression, and the return of the country to its European path; whereas the protests have been taking place without interruption for over 75 days;

    G. whereas on 14 December 2024, the de facto parliament held a ‘presidential election’ with a single candidate from the Georgian Dream party, former footballer Mikheil Kavelashvili, elected with 224 out of 225 votes cast;

    H. whereas Georgia’s self-appointed authorities have plunged the country into a fully fledged constitutional and political crisis, as well as a human rights and democracy crisis; whereas this has been marked by the brutal repression of peaceful protesters, political opponents and media representatives, with judges, prosecutors and police officers actively fabricating politically motivated administrative and criminal charges against protesters, journalists and opposition figures detained during peaceful anti-government demonstrations; whereas, as of December 2024, more than 460 people have been arrested or punished since the protests began, with this number growing by the day;

    I. whereas riot police deliberately lacking force identification numbers have forcefully dispersed protesters with tear gas and water cannons; whereas numerous journalists have reported being targeted and beaten, and having their equipment destroyed and personal items stolen; whereas dozens of protesters have been brutally assaulted, and several hundred people have been arrested; whereas Georgia’s Public Defender has revealed that 80 % of those detained reported experiencing violence and inhumane treatment at the hands of law enforcement officers; whereas despite international condemnation, the illegitimate Georgian Government has awarded medals to officials involved in the crackdown;

    J. whereas independent media outlets, including TV Formula, TV Mtavari and TV Pirveli, face severe operational and financial constraints due to the regime’s interference, while dozens of media representatives are being subjected to various forms of intense physical and psychological pressure; whereas numerous violent attacks on journalists have been documented, including the severe beatings of Aleksandre Keshelashvili, Maka Chikhladze and Giorgi Shetsiruli, and the harassment of detained journalist Saba Kevkhishvili; whereas on 12 January 2025, the Georgian authorities arrested journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, who has been in pre-trial detention since then and is on hunger strike in solidarity with all political prisoners in Georgia; whereas she faces between four and seven years in prison;

    K. whereas, on the night of 14 January 2025, Giorgi Gakharia, opposition leader of the For Georgia party and former Prime Minister, and Zviad Koridze, journalist and Transparency International activist, were physically assaulted by Georgian Dream officials in separate incidents at the same venue in Batumi;

    L. whereas on 2 February 2025, Nika Melia, a leader of the pro-European Akhali party, and Gigi Ugulava, the former mayor of Tbilisi, were arrested during the anti-government protests and subjected to physical violence in detention; whereas on 12 January 2025, Elene Khoshtaria, leader of the Droa political movement, was detained in Batumi;

    M. whereas the de facto Georgian authorities have used disproportionate force and excessive violence against peaceful protesters and resorted to arbitrary mass arrests to thwart dissent; whereas independent human rights organisations have reported the systemic mistreatment of detainees, including torture; whereas to date, not a single law enforcement official involved in the brutal crackdowns, arbitrary arrests and mistreatment has been brought to justice;

    N. whereas the self-appointed authorities introduced new draconian legislation that came into force on 30 December 2024 and amended the Criminal Code, the Code of Administrative Offences and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations, imposing further arbitrary restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, introducing, among other things, hefty fines for putting up protest slogans and posters, and granting police the power to detain individuals ‘preventively’ for 48 hours on suspicion of planning to violate the rules governing public assembly; whereas on 3 February 2025, the Georgian Dream party unveiled further draft legislation designed to tighten control, ramping up penalties for a variety of offences directly targeting protestors, critics and political dissent, such as harsher punishments for ‘insulting officials’, the criminalisation of road blocks and an increase in the duration of administrative detention from 15 to 60 days;

    O. whereas on 27 January 2025, the Council decided to suspend parts of the EU-Georgia visa facilitation agreement for Georgian diplomats and officials, but failed to impose individual sanctions in response to the continued crackdown; whereas the Hungarian and Slovak Governments have been consistently blocking impactful EU-wide sanctions, preventing the remaining 25 Member States (EU-25) from effectively introducing sanctions against the self-appointed Georgian authorities;

    P. whereas several Member States, including Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Czechia, have imposed bilateral sanctions on some Georgian politicians, judges and other officials responsible for the brutal crackdown on protesters, violations of human rights and abuse of the rule of law; whereas in December 2024, the United States sanctioned Bidzina Ivanishvili, alongside Georgia’s ‘Minister of Internal Affairs’ Vakhtang Gomelauri and Deputy Head of the Special Tasks Department Mirza Kezevadze, for their involvement in brutal crackdowns on media representatives, opposition figures and protesters; whereas the UK and Ukraine have imposed similar sanctions on high-level Georgian officials; whereas Ivanishvili, through hastily adopted laws tailored to his personal situation, is moving his offshore assets to Georgia in anticipation of further sanctions;

    Q. whereas on 29 January 2025, Georgian Dream announced that it would withdraw its delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) after it demanded new, genuinely democratic parliamentary elections, the release of political prisoners and accountability for perpetrators of violence; whereas UN experts have condemned the pattern of repression and human rights violations in Georgia, while the OSCE has called this suppression a serious breach of the right to freedom of assembly;

    R. whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party convened the new parliament in violation of the country’s constitution, resulting in a boycott of parliament by the opposition; whereas on 5 February 2025, the self-appointed ‘parliament’ voted to approve the early termination of the mandates of 49 out of 61 members of parliament, representing the Coalition for Change, Strong Georgia and the United National Movement, in order to strip them of their immunity and facilitate their arrest and prosecution; whereas the same ‘parliament’ established a commission to punish former ruling party United National Movement;

    S. whereas a growing number of civil servants have been dismissed after speaking out against the halting of Georgia’s EU accession process; whereas Georgian Dream has amended laws on public service, simplifying procedures to dismiss public servants, several of whom have been dismissed for participating in protests, in a clear attempt to silence critical voices;

    1. Condemns the Georgian Dream ‘authorities’ and urges them to immediately cease the violent repression of peaceful protesters, political opponents and media representatives; underlines that Georgia’s self-appointed authorities are currently violating fundamental freedoms, basic human rights and the core international obligations of the country, thereby undermining decades of democratic reforms driven by the country’s political class and civil society; considers Georgia as a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party has abandoned its path towards European integration and NATO membership; recalls that the ongoing democratic backsliding and adoption of anti-democratic laws has effectively suspended Georgia’s EU integration process; reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country;

    2. Does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities of the Georgian Dream party established following the rigged election of 26 October 2024, which was neither free nor fair, was held in violation of democratic norms and standards, and did not reflect the will of the people of Georgia; underlines that the extensive electoral fraud has undermined the integrity of the election process, cast doubt on the legitimacy of the result and eroded public trust, both domestically and internationally, in any new government;

    3. Calls for the EU and its Member States, as well as national parliaments and interparliamentary institutions, not to recognise the legitimacy of the Georgian Dream one-party parliament and their appointed president; calls, therefore, on the international community to join the boycott of the self-proclaimed Georgian authorities;

    4. Continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development; calls on the President of the European Council to invite President Zourabichvili to represent Georgia at an upcoming European Council meeting and at the next European Political Community summit;

    5. Underlines that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections; demands that new elections take place in Georgia within the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process; encourages the Member States and EU officials to firmly demand new elections and to make any future engagement explicitly conditional on setting a new date for parliamentary elections and establishing a mechanism to ensure they are free and fair;

    6. Calls on the Council and the Member States, particularly the EU-25 on a bilateral and coordinated basis, to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family and his companies, and to freeze all his assets within the EU for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia, enabling democratic backsliding and acting against the country’s constitutionally declared interests of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls on the French Government to strip Bidzina Ivanishvili of the Legion of Honour and impose individual sanctions on him; welcomes, in this regard, the sanctions imposed bilaterally by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Czechia, as well as those already imposed by the US and the UK;

    7. Calls for the EU and its Member States, in particular the EU-25 on a bilateral and coordinated basis, to impose personal sanctions on the officials and political leaders in Georgia responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary General of the ruling Georgian Dream party Kakha Kaladze, and Chair of the Georgian Dream party Irakli Garibashvili; calls for them to extend these sanctions to judges, including those of the Constitutional Court of Georgia who are passing politically motivated sentences, and representatives of the law enforcement services, as well as to financial enablers tacitly or openly supporting the regime and the owners of regime-aligned media outlets, including TV Imedi, Pos TV and Rustavi 2 TV, for their role in spreading disinformation and seeking to manipulate public discourse in order to sustain the current ruling party’s authoritarian rule;

    8. Calls on the Council and the Member States to impose sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili’s network of enablers, elite entourage, corrupt financial operatives, propagandists and those facilitating the repressive state apparatus, including, among others, Ekaterine Khvedelidze, Uta Ivanishvili, Tsotne Ivanishvili, Bera Ivanishvili, Gvantsa Ivanishvili, Alexander Ivanishvili, Shmagi Kobakhidze, Ucha Mamatsashvili, Natia Turnava, Ivane Chkhartishvili, Sulkhan Papashvili, Giorgi Kapanadze, Tornike Rizhvadze, Ilia Tsulaia, Kakha Bekauri, Lasha Natsvlishvili, Vasil Maglaperidze, Grigol Liluashvili, Mikheil Chinchaladze, Levan Murusidze, Irakli Rukhadze, Tinatin Berdzenishvili, Tamaz Gaiashvili, Anton Obolashvili and Gocha Enukidze;

    9. Maintains the view that the measures taken so far by the EU in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments does not yet fully reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and the latest developments; welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials, but considers it as only a first step, which must be followed by tougher measures; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on introducing sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia;

    10. Emphasises that respect for fundamental rights is vital to the EU’s visa liberalisation benchmarks; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspension if it is considered that EU standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not being upheld;

    11. Strongly condemns the brutal violence and repression used by Georgia’s ruling regime against peaceful protesters since 28 November 2024; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and those detained during the anti-government protests; demands the release of journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, who has been on hunger strike for over four weeks now because of her unjust detention and risks facing critical, irreversible and life-threatening consequences; denounces the assault and beating of former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, resulting in his hospitalisation, followed by the arrest on 2 February 2025 of political leaders including Nika Melia and Gigi Ugulava, as a shocking escalation of state-orchestrated violence by Georgian Dream and its allies against peaceful demonstrators and political opponents; reminds of the detention of Elene Khoshtaria on 12 January 2025 in Batumi; 

    12. Reiterates its solidarity with the people of Georgia and its vibrant civil society in fighting for their legitimate democratic rights and for a European future for their country; urges the Georgian Government to reverse its current political course and return to implementing the will of the Georgian people for continued democratic reforms that would reopen the prospect of future EU membership;

    13. Strongly condemns the enactment of draconian legislation that imposes unjustified restrictions on freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and demands the annulment of such recently adopted repressive legislation; urges the Georgian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all individuals detained for peacefully exercising their fundamental rights to freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and to ensure prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into all allegations of unlawful and disproportionate use of force by the law enforcement agencies; considers that the Georgian justice system has been weaponised to stifle dissent, instil fear and silence free speech;

    14. Calls for the ‘Georgian authorities’ to take immediate action to ensure the safety and freedom of journalists and to investigate all instances of violence and misconduct by law enforcement agencies; emphasises the importance of fostering a democratic environment where media, civil society and the opposition can operate freely without fear of retaliation or censorship;

    15. Demands an independent, transparent and impartial investigation into police brutality and the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators; calls for those responsible for human rights violations, including law enforcement and government officials ordering acts of repression, to be held fully accountable before the law;

    16. Denounces the launch of an investigation by the Prosecutor’s Office on 8 February 2025 into non-governmental organisations accused of aggravated sabotage, attempted sabotage and assisting foreign and foreign-controlled organisations in hostile activities aimed at undermining the state interests of Georgia, for which they could receive multiple-year sentences; views this action as further escalation of repression by the regime, misuse of the judicial system and accelerated democratic backsliding;

    17. Condemns the broader campaign of attacks by the Georgian authorities vilifying civil society organisations and reputable international donors that support democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in Georgia;

    18. Denounces the termination by Georgian Dream of the mandates of 49 opposition members of parliament as a sign of further democratic backsliding, and considers this the latest move in Georgian Dream’s attack on political pluralism in the country;

    19. Welcomes PACE’s decision to challenge the credentials of Georgia’s parliamentary delegation due to democratic backsliding and human rights abuses; supports PACE’s call for Georgia to immediately initiate an inclusive process involving all political and social actors, including the ruling party, the opposition and civil society, to urgently address the deficiencies and shortcomings noted during the recent parliamentary elections and to create an electoral environment conducive to new, genuinely democratic elections to be announced in the coming months;

    20. Notes that Georgia, once a front runner for Euro-Atlantic integration, is undergoing an accelerated process of democratic backsliding, in a seemingly deliberate attempt to demonstrate that the will of the Georgian people no longer determines the country’s future, which could result in the country taking the Belarussian path of political development, transitioning from the current authoritarian state to a dictatorial regime;

    21. Deplores the decision of Irakli Kobakhidze to suspend accession talks and reject EU funding until the end of 2028; recalls that all polls consistently show the overwhelming support of the Georgian population for a Euro-Atlantic future; expresses strong support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Georgian people;

    22. Calls for an immediate and comprehensive audit of EU policy towards Georgia due to the democratic backsliding; calls on the Commission to review the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the self-declared Georgian authorities’ breach of the general principles, as laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms; points out that non-fulfilment of obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    23. Welcomes the Commission’s decision to cease all budgetary support to the Georgian authorities and to suspend the initiation of any future investment projects; encourages the Commission to terminate all financial support for ongoing projects; calls for a moratorium on all investment projects in the field of connectivity; calls on the Commission to start identifying economic sectors of relevance to the oligarchic interests that support and sustain the current authoritarian rule, with a view to a potential future decision about restrictive measures or economic sanctions; calls on the Commission to start identifying connectivity projects that support and sustain the current authoritarian rule and to consider their suspension until a rerun of the parliamentary elections;

    24. Condemns the climate of intimidation and polarisation fuelled by statements by Georgian Government representatives and political leaders, as well as by attacks against political pluralism, including through disturbing cases of intimidation and violence against the Georgian democratic political forces and repeated threats to ban opposition parties, to arrest their leaders and even ordinary supporters, and to silence dissent; underlines that anything but the full restoration of Georgia’s democratic standards will entail a further deterioration of EU-Georgia relations, make any move towards EU accession impossible and result in additional sanctions;

    25. Calls on the Commission to swiftly redirect the frozen EUR 120 million originally intended as support for the Georgian authorities to enhance the EU’s support for Georgia’s civil society, in particular the non-governmental sector and independent media, which are increasingly coming under undue pressure from the ruling political party and the authorities, as well as to support programmes supporting democratic resilience and electoral integrity; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment; highlights the urgency of the need to support civil society in the light of growing repression and the suspension of activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore urges the Commission to ramp up support without delay;

    26. Expresses deep concern about the increasing Russian influence in the country and about the Georgian Dream government’s actions in pursuing a policy of rapprochement and collaboration with Russia, in spite of its creeping occupation of Georgian territory; deplores, in this regard, the growing anti-Western and hostile rhetoric of the Georgian Dream party’s representatives towards Georgia’s strategic Western partners, including the EU, and its MEPs and officials, and Georgian Dream’s promotion of Russian disinformation and manipulation;

    27. Strongly reiterates its urgent demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds, specifically for the purpose of seeking medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the self-appointed authorities bear full and undeniable responsibility for the life, health, safety and well-being of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and must be held fully accountable for any harm that befalls him;

    28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Support for mastic producers – E-000481/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000481/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Georgios Aftias (PPE)

    Mastic is a special product produced on the island of Chios, in Greece. The cultivation of this product is difficult and takes place from July to October. The total quantity produced extends to 200 tonnes, most of which is exported to 55 countries. Mastic producers are facing huge losses in their economic activity due to weather phenomena. It is noted that this sector is crucial for the island, since it employs more than 2 500 people, thus constituting the main economic pillar of the island.

    On the basis of this data:

    • 1.With what financial instruments can the Commission financially support mastic producers?
    • 2.Can the damage be repaired through the European Solidarity Fund?
    • 3.How can production of the product, which is declining due to climate change, be boosted?

    Submitted: 4.2.2025

    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India’s Cultural Influence Across the Indian Ocean Region Stems from its rich Cultural, Intellectual and Knowledge Traditions: Union Minister Shri Gajendra Singh Shekhawat

    Source: Government of India

    India’s Cultural Influence Across the Indian Ocean Region Stems from its rich Cultural, Intellectual and Knowledge Traditions: Union Minister Shri Gajendra Singh Shekhawat

    From Ancient Trade Winds to Modern Maritime Security:  ‘Monsoon’ Conference Explores India’s Expanding Indian Ocean Role

    Posted On: 12 FEB 2025 9:42PM by PIB Delhi

    In the backdrop of India’s growing maritime partnerships and security initiatives, the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts (IGNCA) is organizing a two-day international conference in collaboration with the Advanced Study Institute of Asia ( ASIA) at SGT University titled ‘Monsoon: The Sphere of Cultural and Trade Influence’. ‘Project Mausam’, is an Indian transnational initiative under the Ministry of Culture. This conference, exploring historical and cultural connections among Indian Ocean nations through maritime interactions, will highlight India’s central role in shaping trade, traditions, and connectivity across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The inaugural session of the conference began today at IGNCA, New Delhi, and will continue until 13th February 2025. Shri Gajendra Singh Shekhawat, Union Minister Minister of Culture and Tourism, graced the occasion as the Chief Guest, with a keynote address by Dr. Vinay Sahasrabuddhe and a welcome address by Dr. Sachchidanand Joshi, Member Secretary, IGNCA. Prof. Amogh Rai, Research Director, ASIA, SGT University, and Dr. Ajith Kumar, Director of Project Mausam, were also present during the inaugural session.

    Union Minister of Culture and Tourism, Shri Gajendra Singh Shekhawat, while speaking at the inaugural session, highlighted the deep interlinkages between India and the region, emphasising that India’s cultural influence across the Indian Ocean Region stems from its rich cultural, intellectual, and knowledge traditions. He noted that this influence stemmed not only from commerce and trade but also from India’s intellectual prowess and golden prosperity. He remarked that the footprints of India’s cultural impact are visible among those who came as students, monks, or even as aggressors, carrying with them the essence of India’s cultural progress, fostering diversity and unity over thousands of years. He also spoke about the unique vision of ‘Project Mausam’ to showcase a Transnational Mixed Route of Natural and Cultural Heritage, stating, “The world realises that culture is the factor that unites us all.”

    The initiative is particularly timely, as India and France recently concluded their Maritime Cooperation Dialogue in New Delhi, agreeing on joint measures to assess and counter threats to maritime security in the IOR. These threats include piracy, maritime terrorism, smuggling, illegal fishing, hybrid and cyber threats, and marine pollution. Oman will also be hosting the 8th edition of the Indian Ocean Conference from February 16-17, focusing on ‘Voyages to New Horizons of Maritime Partnership’. Simultaneously, the Indian Navy’s 2025 capstone Theatre Level Operational Exercise (TROPEX) is underway, showcasing India’s preparedness in the Indian Ocean.

    ‘Project Mausam’ not only emphasizes India’s historical maritime influence but also resonates with the nation’s evolving geopolitical strategy in the region. The conference will focus on key themes such as ancient navigational routes, port city networks, and coastal settlements. By integrating tangible and intangible cultural heritage, the project highlights India’s continued leadership in fostering connectivity and maritime partnerships, contributing to UNESCO’s maritime heritage studies.

    Dr. Vinay Sahasrabuddhe in his address emphasised the cultural foundations of India-Southeast Asia relations, calling for intellectual and emotional investment to integrate Southeast Asia into India’s popular consciousness. Noting that cultural bonds need revitalisation, he highlighted the monsoon as a symbol of enduring connections and urged moving beyond Eurocentric perspectives. He advocated deepening cultural engagement through the Act East policy to ‘Attract East’ by strengthening cultural, strategic, and economic ties. He also called for reinforcing Dharma-Dhamma relations, reviving shared epics, promoting collaborative art and craft, advancing educational and technological exchanges, addressing climate change, and building linguistic bridges.

    Dr. Sachchidanand Joshi said that IGNCA’s area studies in South and Central Asia led to the development of Vrihattar Bharat to explore cultural routes and linkages, expanding beyond the initially identified 39 countries. He noted that over 70 countries share cultural heritage with India. Emphasising international cooperation, as reflected in the G20 summit’s motto, ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’, he highlighted that IGNCA’s efforts were ongoing, with the conference serving as a catalyst to expand these studies.

    Prof. Amogh Rai expressed his views on the monsoon as both a physical and cultural force, highlighting its role as a cultural multiplier and the conference’s potential for further research. Dr. Ajith Kumar concluded the inaugural session by extending a formal vote of thanks and emphasising the cultural unity between India and Southeast Asian countries.

    IGNCA’s international conference aims to foster deeper cultural diplomacy, with academic collaborations and heritage conservation paving the way for future policy dialogues. This dialogue aligns seamlessly with India’s evolving maritime strategies and international partnerships.

    ***

    Sunil Kumar Tiwari

    pibculture[at]gmail[dot]com

    (Release ID: 2102534) Visitor Counter : 16

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: WAVES offers a golden opportunity for Reel Makers and Professional Ad Filmmakers to shine as celebrites

    Source: Government of India

    WAVES offers a golden opportunity for Reel Makers and Professional Ad Filmmakers to shine as celebrites

    Hurry up! Only two days left, don’t miss this chance to have your work recognized on a global stage, Submit your entry by February 15th

    WAVES Awards of Excellence as part of the Create in India Challenge, attracts global submissions, uniting creators from over dozen countries & more than 52 Indian institutes like NIDs, IITs & SRFTI

    Posted On: 12 FEB 2025 6:46PM by PIB Delhi

    Do you have a vision that speaks through the lens and a story that unfolds in every frame? If creativity runs through your veins the WAVES Awards of Excellence presents a golden opportunity

    The much-anticipated Student Showreels & Professional Ad Film Competition is officially open for submissions! Submit your entry by February 15th.

    Ministry of Information & Broadcasting in collaboration with ASIFA India, a UNESCO-recognized global NGO promoting animation, is hosting WAVES Awards of Excellence as part of the Create in India Challenge. These awards celebrate exceptional achievements in Animation, Visual Effects, and Extended Reality (XR), reinforcing India’s creative leadership on the global stage.

    About the awards

    There are two competition categories:  Student Showreels (No time restriction) and Professional Ad Films (limit 60 seconds). The submissions reflect themes of India’s socio-cultural landscape, and modern technology like:

    • Wellness & Yoga

    • Gaming for Social Impact

    ASIFA India has witnessed an exceptional response with enthusiastic participation

     

    ASIFA India has received an overwhelming response with 1238 submissions of finished works from various demographics: Students (75%), Professionals (25%), Women (35%) and Emerging Creators (50%). The participation of women and young creators underscores the challenge’s role in promoting diversity, inclusivity, and fresh perspectives in India’s AVGC sector.

                                       

    Submissions have been promoted across various continents, resulting in over 60 global entries from 13 countries, such as Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States, Greece, Cyprus, Iran, Finland, the Philippines, Germany, Sri Lanka, Puerto Rico, China, and Mexico. Global Animated Film association Asifa (Association Internationale du Film d’Animation) is promoting the competition globally via its 40 Chapters in various counties.

    ASIFA also received submissions from more than 52 institutions in India and abroad. Leading global educational institutions like BAU Centro Universitario de Artes y Diseño de Barcelona, Bass School of Arts, Humanities, and Technology at UTD, Tehran University of Art, Filmakademie Baden-Württemberg, Academy Of Art University, Academy of Design, Colombo, Kennesaw State University student have submitted their top entries to this prestigious festival.
    Students from Prestigious Indian Institutions including all NID, IITs (IDC School of Design and DOD at various IIT’s), SRFTI, Symbiosis, Sir JJ Institute of Applied Art, Banasthali Vidyapith, Ajeenkya D Y Patil University, BIT Mesra, UID, Srishti Manipal have also submitted their best work.

    Glimpses of Submissions of Waves Awards of Excellence

    WAVES Winners Gain Global Opportunities

     

    Winners will receive in-person support for portfolio review by experts, opportunity to interact with global jury from US, Greece & India. They will also receive networking opportunities by direct engagement with key stakeholders, including international studios, producers, and government officials for potential career opportunities. Animation studios and independent developers will receive guidance on funding, IP development, and business scalability.

    ASIFA India organized series Meet ups across 15 Indian sub-chapters to inspire creators from various cities for their participation in the upcoming WAVES Awards of Excellence. In the session ‘Deep Dive into Excellence from Mentors’ eminent global Jury like Briana Yarhouse from USA & Dr. Anastasia Dimitra from Athens, Greece gave tips to participants.

    Global Jury Members Briana Yarhouse, Dr.Anastasia Dimitra sharing their expertise during a Virtual Meet recently, joined by Deanna Morse(Member of Oscars), Celebrity Artist Dhimant Vyas, BN Vichar& Others..Session Moderated by Sanjay Khimesara, President, Asifa India & Vinita Bachani, Core Committee Member

     

    For more information and to submit your work, visit the submission portal here:

    https://www.asifaindia.com/waoe/

     

    About ASIFA INDIA

    ASIFA India is a non-profit organization established in 2000 with the goal of promoting the art, craft, and profession of VFX, Animation & Gaming in India. ASIFA India has been working tirelessly to create a platform for creators including- Animators, Vfx & Gaming artists, students, and professionals to network, learn, and showcase their work.

    ******

    Dharmendra Tewari/Kshitij Singha/Shatrunjay kumar

    (Release ID: 2102429) Visitor Counter : 28

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular – RC-B10-0126/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0126/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0128/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0131/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0134/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0135/2024 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Željana Zovko, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Gabriel Mato, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Wouter Beke, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Tomáš Zdechovský, Mirosława Nykiel, Jessica Polfjärd, Luděk Niedermayer, Jan Farský, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Leire Pajín
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Carlo Fidanza, Alberico Gambino, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Assita Kanko, Mariusz Kamiński, Marlena Maląg, Bogdan Rzońca, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ivaylo Valchev, Jadwiga Wiśniewska
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Bernard Guetta, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Catarina Vieira
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0126/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0126/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular

    (2025/2547(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Nicaragua,

    – having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas since 2018, the Nicaraguan regime has systematically, repeatedly and arbitrarily persecuted human rights defenders (HRDs), opposition and religious representatives, among others; whereas over 5 600 NGOs have been dissolved, including religious groups – mainly Catholic – and their assets confiscated;

    B. whereas imprisoned political opponents, along with HRDs, have been expelled from the country, stripped of their nationality and deprived of their political rights; whereas since 2018, 245 members of the clergy have been arbitrarily arrested or expelled, including Bishop Rolando Álvarez, Sakharov Prize finalist;

    C. whereas in January 2025, the regime passed a constitutional reform that eliminates the separation of powers and political pluralism, establishing an Ortega-Murillo co-presidency that controls all branches of government, independent institutions and the media, and ignores adherence to international human rights conventions and treaties;

    1. Strongly condemns the Ortega-Murillo regime’s widespread, systemic human rights violations against its population, democratic opposition, students, civil society organisations (CSOs) and its persecution of religious leaders, primarily Catholic; urges the immediate release of all those arbitrarily detained, and the restoration of the rule of law and the legal status of all organisations, freedoms and the rights of exiled individuals, including their safe return; insists that these are essential conditions for any prospect of meaningful dialogue;

    2. Denounces the use of statelessness and exile as a weapon against dissenting voices; reiterates the need to end restrictions on civic space and to respect the right to dissent;

    3. Calls on the Ortega-Murillo regime to reverse its constitutional reform and all repressive laws institutionalising totalitarianism, to fully respect its international human rights obligations, and to implement the recommendations made by the UN Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua; calls for its mandate to be extended;

    4. Calls for the EU to include specific guarantees of human rights compliance when allocating EU funds, including through multilateral and financial institutions, and to ensure that the funds do not contribute to strengthening the Ortega-Murillo regime;

    5. Highlights the key role played by CSOs, HRDs, the Catholic Church and journalists in Nicaragua; calls for the EU to reinforce its regular dialogue with them, including those in exile, to support their vital work, as well as countries receiving migrants fleeing Nicaragua, such as Costa Rica;

    6. Calls on the Member States, in accordance with the Rome Statute, to open investigations through the International Criminal Court into the Ortega-Murillo regime for crimes against humanity;

    7. Reiterates its demand that the democratic clause of the EU Association Agreement be triggered; rejects any prospect of holding any parliamentary dialogue with members of Nicaragua’s regime-controlled National Assembly;

    8. Reiterates its call to expand the list of sanctioned individuals to include Ortega, Rosario Murillo and their inner circle;

    9. Calls for the immediate extradition of Alessio Casimirri to Italy;

    10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, Commission, the VP/HR, the Member States and the Nicaraguan authorities.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Follow-up question due to lack of answer to Question E-002172/2024 – E-002922/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The measure referred to by the Honourable Member has been announced as part of the Spanish action plan but has not been adopted yet and, therefore, the Commission is not in a position to assess it. Also, the Commission would not assess individual political statements.

    Member States have a primary responsibility to monitor the application of the European Media Freedom Act[1] and to take the necessary steps for enforcement.

    In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the situation on the independence of media and journalists and may decide to take appropriate action including, where appropriate, infringement proceedings.

    It will continue assessing all relevant developments related to media freedom and pluralism in all Member States, including Spain, under the annual Rule of Law Report[2].

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401083
    • [2] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en
    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission measures to uphold journalists’ rights and protect journalists and publications threatened by the Russian Federation – E-002264/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    As stated in its reply to Written Question P-001987/2024, the EU firmly condemns Russia’s ongoing intimidation, harassment and killing of European journalists and other media workers who report from its war of aggression against Ukraine.

    This also includes the use of politically motivated arrest warrants issued by Russia against international journalists reporting from war zones and frontlines[1].

    The EU has consistently condemned Russia’s attempts to obstruct the work of European and other journalists and has regularly addressed these issues in multilateral fora like the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe where Russia is present.

    The EU will remain steadfast in its commitment to protect media freedom and the safety of journalists around the world and in war zones.

    The Commission will ensure the effective application of the European Media Freedom Act[2] and the anti-SLAPP Directive[3]. It will also monitor Member States’ actions to put in practice the recommendation[4] on the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and the recommendation[5] on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings to safeguard the independence of media and journalists and will continue assessing all relevant developments related to media freedom and pluralism in all Member States, including Romania, under the annual Rule of Law Report[6].

    • [1] Further detailed guidance on extradition to third states and a summary of the relevant case law of the Court of Justice in this respect can be found in the Guidelines on Extradition to Third States of June 2022, see Commission Notice — Guidelines on Extradition to Third States, Official Journal of the European Union, (2022/C 223/01).
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401083
    • [3] Directive — EU — 2024/1069 — EN — EUR-Lex.
    • [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendation-protection-safety-and-empowerment-journalists
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A138%3ATOC
    • [6] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en
    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Presentation of the Polish Presidency priorities in DEVE – Committee on Development

    Source: European Parliament

    On 18 February from 9:15 to 10:30, the DEVE Committee will hold an exchange of views with Jakub Wiśniewski, Poland’s Undersecretary of State responsible for international development cooperation. Mr Wiśniewski will present to the DEVE Committee the main priorities of the Polish Presidency in the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid

    The Polish Presidency is expected to brief Members on its main priorities, including development cooperation, humanitarian aid, and Agenda 2030. In the current competitive and multipolar geopolitical environment, this exchange of views will provide an opportunity for Members to engage with the rotating Presidency of the Council on issues of common concern and foster close cooperation in support of the Team Europe approach.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Loans of repatriated ethnic Greeks from former USSR countries – E-000486/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000486/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos (NI)

    The Pan-Pontian Federation of Greece expresses the anguish of thousands of families repatriated from former USSR countries, who are facing the threat of their homes being auctioned or seized for loans they had taken out using a rehabilitation programme under the Law of 2000. After the onset the economic crisis in 2009, many families found themselves unable to make their loan repayments.

    The large increases in repayment instalments and interest are due to the fact that the loans were linked to Greek State bonds, the prices of which sky-rocketed during the period of the memoranda signed by the Greek governments of ND, SYRIZA and PASOK with the EU, the European Central Bank and the IMF. The funding for the repatriation programme was provided by the Public Investment Programme, which also included funds from the Third and Fourth Community Support Frameworks.

    Given the EU’s shared responsibility for leading thousands of families of repatriated people down a dead end,

    • 1.What is the Commission’s position on the urgent request to write off the amounts that have amassed from increases, recapitalisations and compound interest?
    • 2.What is the Commission’s position on the urgent request for the annual service cost, after the above write-offs, not to exceed 10% of the annual taxable amount, in order for such people to be able to save their only home, which for them was a lifelong dream?
    • 3.What is the Commission’s position on the urgent request to cease any enforcement actions or other coercive measure on the part of credit institutions and the State, so that they do not lose their homes?

    Submitted: 4.2.2025

    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Paragon spyware scandal and the surveillance of European journalists and civil society organisations – P-000589/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-000589/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Sandro Gozi (Renew)

    Last week, Euractiv published an article entitled ‘EXCLUSIVE: Spyware firm behind new surveillance of journalists, civil society operates from the EU’[1] on the Paragon scandal involving the systematic surveillance of over a hundred European citizens’ mobile phones and WhatsApp accounts. The article reveals that individuals in various EU Member States, such as Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, including journalists and civil society organisations critical of national governments, are being spied on by unidentified actors.

    • 1.Is the Commission aware of this breach of fundamental rights and digital privacy of European citizens and has it started to conduct an analysis of who was targeted, why and by whom?
    • 2.What measures will the Commission take in order to respond to and address this breach of European citizens’ rights?
    • 3.Will the Commission follow up on the recommendations of the former European Parliament PEGA Committee[2], take immediate action to ensure full transparency and accountability, and address these spyware threats?

    Submitted: 10.2.2025

    • [1] https://www.euractiv.com/section/tech/news/exclusive-spyware-firm-behind-new-surveillance-of-journalists-civil-society-operates-from-the-eu/.
    • [2] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2023-0189_EN.html.
    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Andalusian government blocking construction of provincial centres for victims of sexual violence. – E-001877/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The availability of appropriately equipped and easily accessible rape crisis or sexual violence referral centres is a key element of the specialist support that victims of sexual violence will be entitled to under the recently adopted Directive (EU) 2024/1385[1].

    In line with the standards of the Istanbul Convention[2], the directive requires that these centres exist in sufficient number and be adequately spread over the territory of each Member State.

    The Commission will closely monitor compliance with these requirements in the context of the transposition of the Istanbul Convention and of the directive, for which implementation workshops will start in 2025.

    Spain has allocated Next Generation EU funds for the construction of these centres. In particular, the Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) for Spain[3], under Component 22, Investment 4, includes a target with number 327 related to the creation of 52 24-hour comprehensive care services for victims of sexual violence. The satisfactory fulfilment of this target of the plan will be assessed in the context of the 7th payment claim of the RRP.

    The Commission remains committed to monitoring the effective use of EU funds allocated under the RRP and to ensuring full compliance with the newly adopted EU legislation on combating violence against women and domestic violence.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1385/oj/eng
    • [2] Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence Istanbul, 11.V.2011.
    • [3] https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages/spains-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en
    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Irregularities in the use of national RRP funds in Campania: new hospital in Battipaglia – E-002827/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission assesses the compliance of Italy’s Recovery and Resilience plan (RRP) measures against the ‘Do No Significant Harm’ (DNSH) principle based on analysis of documentation provided by the Italian authorities.

    The assessment is done at the measure level. As a rule and without prejudice to its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission does not assess the environmental impact of specific projects within overall investment measures.

    This is a primary responsibility of the Member States, which are requested to ensure compliance of specific projects with EU and national law, including the environmental acquis.

    Given that the specific project mentioned above has been implemented exclusively through the National Complementary Fund (and not with Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) budget), no DNSH assessment has been undertaken by the Commission.

    According to Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU[1], Member States are responsible for the management of health services.

    Principle 16 of the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan[2] underscores the right to affordable, good-quality healthcare. The Commission supports Member States in upholding this principle through funding projects .

    The works for this hospital, in the amount of EUR 23.5 million, are financed with national funds under the Piano Nazionale Complementare.

    Based on the information at the disposal of the Commission, for the investment at stake, the RRF (EU) funds are being used for an amount of EUR 4 million exclusively for the purchase of equipment and digitalisation of hospitals for the Eboli-Battipaglia-Roccadaspida hospitals (as part of the investments M6C2 1.1.1. and M6C2 1.1.2 of the RRP of Italy).

    For that reason, the Commission is not launching RRP-related checks on the construction project for a new hospital in Battipaglia.

    • [1] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=en
    • [2] https://op.europa.eu/webpub/empl/european-pillar-of-social-rights/en

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Clarification on the alignment of regulatory restructuring with EU legislation – E-003023/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission remains vigilant to any legislative developments that may negatively impact the legal standards of independence of national regulatory authorities set out in EU law, in its role as guardian of the Treaties.

    The European Media Freedom Act[1] (EMFA) foresees that national regulatory authorities must be subject to the requirements set out in Article 30 of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive[2] (AVMSD).

    This Article requires Member States to ensure the independence of such national authorities, firstly by ensuring that they are legally distinct and functionally independent of their respective governments, or any other public or private entity, and secondly ensuring that they exercise their powers impartially and transparently.

    Pursuant to the Digital Services Act[3] (DSA), Member States shall ensure that their Digital Services Coordinators perform their tasks under the DSA in an impartial, transparent and timely manner.

    The 2024 country chapter for Slovakia states that ‘a legal framework and autonomous budget permit the Council for Media Services to operate autonomously’[4].

    Any changes to the current framework should aim to strengthen the independence of the national regulatory authorities, in line with the requirements set out in AVMSD and referred to in EMFA.

    In particular, the potential changes to the structure of the Council, aimed at transforming it from a collegiate body to a single-person body, should not affect the possibility for the Council to exercise its powers impartially and transparently and not to seek or take instructions from any other body in relation to the exercise of its tasks, while ensuring that the appointment and dismissal procedures guarantee the requisite degree of independence of the Council.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act), OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083
    • [2] Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, p. 69-92, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1808/oj/eng
    • [3] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1-102, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng
    • [4] 2024 Rule of law report, https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2024-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en
    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Removing babies is still harming First Nations families, almost two decades after the apology to Stolen Generations

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Sam Burrow, PhD candidate, School of Population and Global Health, The University of Western Australia

    Belinda Howell/Getty Images

    Today marks 17 years since the apology to Australia’s Indigenous peoples for the forced removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families between the mid-1800s and 1970s.

    Yet, communities and researchers are concerned that child protection systems are creating “another stolen generation” and a “crisis in infant removals”.

    Statistics tell us Indigenous children are 11 times more likely to be removed by child protection systems than non-Indigenous children. Indigenous babies aged under one are at greatest risk.

    But beyond the data, what do parents tell us about this experience?

    Our recent study reviewed all the studies available about child protection processes in the perinatal period (during pregnancy and the year following birth) in Australia and across the world.

    We looked at parents’ experiences across the board, with a special interest in whether First Nations families had been included in existing research.

    What we already knew

    Whistleblowers, including a former Aboriginal family support officer, have reported distressing child protection processes, including the removal of babies immediately following delivery.

    Families that interact with child protection systems often already face multiple and complex forms of adversity. This can include poverty, homelessness, racism, intergenerational trauma, family violence, disability, mental illness, substance use and incarceration.

    The perinatal period offers a unique window for early intervention and family support to reduce the risk of removal.

    This could involve greater help accessing suitable housing and addressing family violence, and enhancing access to health care that is culturally safe and trauma-informed, before and after birth.

    What we found

    Our systematic review examined 24 studies about child protection services becoming involved with families during pregnancy and the first year after birth. This included research from Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, New Zealand and Sweden.

    We looked at what parents told researchers about their experiences and found striking similarities, regardless of where they lived.

    Globally, there were comparatively few studies including First Nations families. But both Indigenous and non-Indigenous parents reported punitive processes that had an enduring impact on the health and wellbeing of the parent and family.

    They also agreed that early, transparent, compassionate and culturally appropriate support was required to address their needs. These included legal support to understand court processes, as well as being able to access health care without fear it could lead to removal.

    Four themes emerged from these lived experiences. Here, we’ve included the voices of Aboriginal mothers who participated in a 2023 Australian study to illustrate the importance of these issues to Indigenous families.

    1. A lack of support before and after removal

    Parents often found the birth of their babies life-changing. However many believed child protection services didn’t adequately understand their experience or inform and support them at this time.

    Mothers felt confused and overwhelmed, experiencing symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and enduring grief following the removal of their babies.

    Bridget*, an Aboriginal mother, told researchers:

    There is no support… I think they should help towards improving family and helping family before taking a child away. It should be the absolute last option.

    Mothers were left confused and grieving after removals.
    Solstock/Getty Images

    2. Devastating impact on relationships and wellbeing

    Mothers often felt isolated and described negative interactions not only with child protection workers but also partners and families.

    Fear of removal also prevented mothers from seeking antenatal care or professional support services, further compromising health and wellbeing.

    Stacey said:

    You have to do what they want; they control everything… who you hang out with, what you do […] There is no fixing the family… What they say goes or they take your kids.

    3. Feeling powerless in the system

    Many mothers had been in care themselves. They felt unfairly punished, because it was assumed they would not be capable parents due to past and present trauma.

    First-time parents felt especially powerless to prove their parenting capacity.

    Stacey said removing a baby from a first-time mum causes

    a lot of stress and impact on everyone involved… It’s causing a lot of pain… give us the chance to be with our child to build that bond first.

    Parents described surveillance framed as support, a lack of professional transparency, and often unexpected and acutely painful removals.

    4. Harmful judgements and stereotypes

    Insufficient support for poverty and homelessness before removal made it impossible to meet child protection requirements.

    A mother who was homeless at the time her baby was removed said:

    We had got secure accommodation with family. […] We weren’t doing any drugs; we were on the methadone… we had a caseworker…

    They led us to believe we’re keeping her… [then] they handed me a piece of paper and said, “We’re taking your baby”. I was in shock… I felt like I was ambushed.

    Parents with complex health issues also felt judged according to negative stereotypes and traditional, white, middle-class standards.

    Some parents lost welfare entitlements and housing because babies had been removed, compounding their difficulties.

    Some mothers felt ambushed by the process.
    New Africa/Shutterstock

    Where to from here?

    In Australia, current Indigenous-led research and the work of Aboriginal state, territory, and national children’s commissioners is critical to guiding the development of support for families to stay together and thrive.

    Parents and researchers are united about the immediate need for child protection systems to:

    • provide early and sustained family-centred support during pregnancy and beyond
    • address families’ practical and material needs, including poverty and homelessness
    • train professionals to reduce power imbalances and build trusted relationships
    • offer trauma-informed and culturally matched support services
    • provide immediate and ongoing mental health support if babies are removed.

    Renna (a co-author on this article and also a proud Walbunja woman from the Yuin Nation, academic and social worker) reflects on the removal of her baby not long before the apology.

    Eighteen years later, I know we will never feel whole, left with empty arms, a life stolen, the shadow festers and grows.

    Special thanks to our review co-authors Melissa O’Donnell, Lisa Wood, Colleen Fisher and Renée Usher, our expert advisory group, the Stan Perron Charitable Foundation and the original participants and researchers whose primary studies made our review and this article possible.

    *Names have been changed for privacy.


    If this article has raised issues for you, or if you’re concerned about someone you know, call Lifeline on 13 11 14. 13YARN is a free and confidential 24/7 national crisis support line for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who are feeling overwhelmed or having difficulty coping. Call 13 92 76.

    Sam Burrow receives a PhD scholarship from the Stan Perron Charitable Foundation.

    Renna Gayde is affiliated with SAFeST start coalition, a stream of the Replanting the Birthing Trees Project.

    – ref. Removing babies is still harming First Nations families, almost two decades after the apology to Stolen Generations – https://theconversation.com/removing-babies-is-still-harming-first-nations-families-almost-two-decades-after-the-apology-to-stolen-generations-249353

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Do parties win elections because of their leaders, or in spite of them? History shows it’s a bit of both

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Pandanus Petter, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University

    The upcoming federal election will see the incumbent Labor prime minister, Anthony Albanese, face off against Liberal opposition leader, Peter Dutton. We’ll likely see a strong focus on the personal qualities and performance of the two leaders.

    We tend to think a popular leader can win an election for their party while an unpopular one can lose it. Much of the commentary on the Coalition’s 2022 election loss, for example, centred on the widespread dislike of Scott Morrison.

    But how much do party leaders actually affect their party’s vote share, and ultimately, the outcome of an election? We looked at 40 years of opinion polling to find out.

    Our research

    Opinion polls in Australia have been conducted since the 1940s, but it was not until the 1980s that they began to regularly ask questions about leader satisfaction and voting intention. In recent decades, the proliferation of polls has seen a greater consistency in question wording and protocols.

    We have been analysing the polling data on government popularity and responsiveness in Australia. This enables us to track and compare leaders over an extended period.

    We’ve crunched the numbers on voter intention and leader satisfaction from September 1985 until December 2024.

    We can cross-reference these statistics to show which prime ministers and opposition leaders were a net benefit to their party (more popular than their party overall) and which were a net drag (less popular than their party).

    Prime ministers: who helped and who hindered?

    By this measure, the prime minister who provided the most electoral benefit to their party was Kevin Rudd between 2007 and 2010.

    Rudd achieved some of the highest levels of voter satisfaction recorded since the early Bob Hawke years, averaging 60% satisfaction, a 14-point net benefit for his party.



    His popularity declined considerably just before his replacement by Julia Gillard in 2010, and never fully recovered when he became prime minister again in 2013.

    John Howard ranks second, with Morrison and Albanese (so far) sharing third place in terms of satisfaction. However, there’s a larger difference between Albanese’s personal popularity and his party’s vote intention.

    Morrison’s tenure in office was skewed by the COVID pandemic, which saw a “rally around the flag” effect, seeing a spike in voters’ trust in government.

    Paul Keating comes at the bottom of the list. His personal popularity trailed his party’s by eight percentage points on average, with an upset victory in 1993 not enough to win over the public to defeat a resurgent Howard in 1996.

    Similiarly, Tony Abbott, although party leader when the Coalition returned to power after the Rudd-Gillard-Rudd years, was consistently less popular than his party – by seven points in opposition and four as prime minister.

    What about opposition leaders?

    Among opposition leaders, Rudd again tops the list. He was more popular than Labor overall in the year prior to winning the election in December 2007, peaking at 65.5% satisfaction.

    Mark Latham comes in second, perhaps surprisingly. This is due, at least in part, to the unpopularity of the Coalition government at the time.

    The opposition leader who represents the greatest drag on their party was Andrew Peacock in the late 1980s, in what was his second incarnation as Liberal leader.



    Overall, prime ministers have a greater impact on their party’s fortunes than opposition leaders. This is expected as incumbency has advantages, with prime ministers usually given more opportunity for media attention, greater recognition with the public, and hopefully a record of achievements in government to point to.

    Prime ministers register a net gain to their party of about four percentage points, compared with minus three points for opposition leaders.

    Labor leaders show a net gain to their party of two points, compared to minus four points for their Liberal counterparts.

    The personalisation of politics

    Since at least the 1970s, political leaders have attracted increasing attention in democratic elections around the world.

    This trend has not been restricted to countries with presidential systems, such as the United States. It’s also playing out in parliamentary systems such as Australia’s and the United Kingdom’s. This is despite the fact voters elect local members to parliament, rather than voting for the prime minister directly.




    Read more:
    Strong political leaders are electoral gold – but the trick is in them knowing when to stand down


    This profound shift in democratic politics has been based on several social changes.

    First, the rise of television, and more recently social media, has provided the visual images that direct voters’ attention towards the leader.

    While television’s heyday has passed – in both the 2019 and 2022 elections, the Australian Election Study surveys show more people followed the election on the internet than on television – visual images of the leaders dominate the media, both traditional and social.

    Second, party de-alignment has seen voters moving away from their traditional party loyalties, with the personalities of the leaders filling this gap.

    In the 1960s, around one in ten voters said they did not identify with a party, compared with one in four in the 2022 election.

    Third, the unprecedented expansion in university education has produced critical voters who are more volatile in their voting than any groups in the past.

    One factor that can sway their vote is policies, but another is the leader they find most competent.

    What does this mean for the next election?

    For Australian voters, leaders matter, rightly or wrongly, for evaluating the performance of a government and choosing which party to vote for.

    As we close in on an election in 2025, voters will be looking to Albanese and Dutton. In the chart below, we can see that while on average Dutton has been only marginally beneficial for his party compared with Albanese, this gap has narrowed in the latter half of 2024.



    Although Albanese started at a historically very strong position, it appears his popularity began to decline in May 2023. The defeat of the Voice to Parliament Referendum in November sped up the decline.

    Dutton received a short-term boost after the result, after which his popularity declined and then has steadily built over time. Current projections indicate the next election will likely be close-run.

    It also appears the two current leaders, whatever their other merits, have fallen short of the levels reached by the most popular prime ministers and opposition leaders of the past.

    Albanese’s early popularity has waned, while the Coalition and Dutton’s fortunes rise in step with one another.

    This reflects a return to a normal vote share for the party after their loss in 2022. While it may prove problematic for the government, it doesn’t necessarily indicate a meteoric increase in Dutton’s personal popularity.

    Pandanus Petter is employed at the Australian National University with funding from The Australian Research Council.

    Ian McAllister receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    – ref. Do parties win elections because of their leaders, or in spite of them? History shows it’s a bit of both – https://theconversation.com/do-parties-win-elections-because-of-their-leaders-or-in-spite-of-them-history-shows-its-a-bit-of-both-248868

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: 3.5 kilometres underwater, scientists found a staggeringly energetic particle from outer space

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Luke Barnes, Lecturer in Physics, Western Sydney University

    An artist’s impression of a high-energy particle travelling through the KM3NeT neutrino telescope. KM3NeT

    Three and a half kilometres beneath the Mediterranean Sea, around 80km off the coast of Sicily, lies half of a very unusual telescope called KM3NeT.

    The enormous device is still under construction, but today the telescope’s scientific team announced they have already detected a particle from outer space with a staggering amount of energy.

    In fact, as the team report in Nature, they found the most energetic neutrino anyone has ever seen – and it represents a tremendous leap forward in exploring the uncharted waters of the extreme universe.

    To explain why it’s such a remarkable discovery, we need to understand what KM3NeT is, what it’s looking for, and what it saw.

    What is KM3NeT?

    KM3NeT is a gigantic deep sea telescope being built by an international collaboration of more than 300 scientists and engineers from 21 countries.

    At the site off Sicily, and another off the coast of Provence in France, KM3NeT will be made up of more than 6,000 light detectors hanging in the pitch-black depths. When the telescope is complete, it will cover about a cubic kilometre of sea.

    The KM3NeT telescope will eventually have more than 6,000 detectors like this one floating in the depths of the Mediterranean watching for tell-tale flashed of blue light.
    N Busser / CNRS

    Down deep, KM3NeT is shielded from ordinary sources of light, such as the Sun. It is also shielded from other particles like electrons and protons, which are absorbed by the water long before they reach the detectors. So what does it see?

    What is KM3NeT looking for?

    Of all the particles that physicists have discovered, only the elusive neutrino can reach all the way down to KM3NeT.

    The neutrino is an elementary particle with no electric charge and only a very tiny mass. It interacts with matter so weakly that it can pass through kilometres of ocean – and even thousands of kilometres of Earth itself – to reach the detector. That’s why KM3NeT is at the bottom of the sea: to see neutrinos, and only neutrinos.

    But won’t the neutrinos pass through the detector, too? Yes, almost all of them.

    When a high-energy particle passes through KM3NeT, the detectors register the tell-tale blue flashes and allow scientists to figure out how fast the particle was going and where it came from.
    KM3NeT

    But very rarely, a neutrino will crash right into a water molecule. When it does, it can pack an enormous punch.

    The energy of the neutrino can create many more particles. As these particles blast through the water, they create a bluish glow. That’s what KM3NeT detectors see.

    By analysing this bluish light, and by timing each flash, scientists can reconstruct the original energy of the neutrino, and the direction from which it came. (Either that, or they’ve just clocked one of those deep-sea glowing fish travelling at nearly the speed of light.)

    The most energetic neutrino ever detected

    On February 13 2023, KM3NeT detected a neutrino travelling so fast it had 30 times more energy than any previously detected.

    The amount of energy is 220 petaelectronvolts, but that doesn’t mean much to a non-particle physicist. It’s hard to imagine, but let’s try.

    The neutrino had 100 trillion times more energy than a typical particle at the centre of the Sun. It’s a trillion times more energy than medical X-rays, and ten billion times more than the most dangerous radioactive particles. Earth’s biggest particle accelerators can’t produce a particle with even one ten thousandth of this energy.

    Short story: it’s a lot of energy for one particle.

    Making neutrinos in space

    Neutrinos interact with matter very weakly, so how could a single neutrino have been given so much energy? What sort of cosmic event could create such a particle?

    That’s the exciting part: we don’t know.

    We know there are colossal explosions in the universe, such as supernovas: when a star exhausts its fuel and collapses. And there are gamma ray bursts, which are even more energetic explosions of supermassive stars, or collisions of neutron stars. These create extremely energetic neutrinos.

    But there are other candidates. Supermassive black holes at the centre of galaxies have millions to billions of times as much mass as the Sun.

    As matter is swallowed by these black holes, it is accelerated to extreme speeds, and becomes wrapped around intense magnetic fields. The particles that aren’t swallowed can be shot out at extreme speeds. These “active galactic nuclei” are another way that the universe could create extreme neutrinos.

    Third, the neutrinos could be created more locally (cosmically speaking). Explosions and active galactic nuclei also create cosmic rays: extremely energetic protons and electrons.

    These could stream across the universe towards us, before colliding with a particle of light along the way. That collision can create an energetic neutrino.

    How can we find the source?

    Here’s where the Australian connection comes in. KM3NeT tells us this neutrino came from a particular spot in the southern sky.

    If it came from an extreme explosion or an active galactic nucleus, we might hope to spot the source with other telescopes. In particular, both supernova remnants and active galactic nuclei can be spotted using radio waves.

    Australia has the biggest radio telescopes in the southern hemisphere. The Australian Square Kilometre Array Pathfinder (ASKAP) has mapped a lot of the southern sky, and found many supernova remnants and active galactic nuclei.

    My colleagues and I at Western Sydney University are using ASKAP to follow up on KM3NeT detections like this one. For this particular neutrino, there are no obvious candidates in the radio sky that it came from.

    However, KM3NeT doesn’t provide a very accurate position, so we can’t be completely sure. We’ll keep looking.

    KM3NeT is still under construction, and ASKAP continues to survey the sky. Our window on the extreme universe is just opening up.

    Luke Barnes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. 3.5 kilometres underwater, scientists found a staggeringly energetic particle from outer space – https://theconversation.com/3-5-kilometres-underwater-scientists-found-a-staggeringly-energetic-particle-from-outer-space-249590

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: German party leaders are united against immigration – but there is little evidence for a key part of their argument

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Dominic Afscharian, Research Officer of Comparative Public Policy, University of Tübingen

    As Germany elects its next Bundestag, migration remains one of the most important issues to voters. But politicians are not debating how to attract the 288,000 migrants the country needs every year to maintain its workforce. Rather, parties struggle over who can promise the most deportations and the tightest border controls.

    Anti-immigrant sentiment has profoundly reshaped Germany’s political landscape. It is connected to the surge of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), as well as the rightward shift of the Christian Democrats and Liberals, and the social democrat SPD under current chancellor Olaf Scholz.

    Even the Greens and the Left party were internally conflicted on the matter, ultimately leading the anti-immigration BSW to split off from the Left.

    One of the most prominent areas of anti-migrant sentiment is social policy. Migrants are depicted as the culprit behind problems with minimum income protection, child benefits, the education system and even dentist appointments.

    At the centre of the debate is the notion of “welfare magnetism”. This is the idea that migrants are drawn to Germany by its generous welfare system. Actors like the AfD and Christian Democratic chancellorship-hopeful Friedrich Merz refer to it more pointedly as “Sozialtourismus” – welfare tourism.

    Welfare magnetism: what does the evidence say?

    For decades, politicians in Germany have suspected welfare as a “pull factor” for migrants, especially those living in poverty. Parties have proposed and implemented the same solution again and again: welfare exclusions. In 2006 and 2016, EU migrant citizens were excluded from two major social assistance schemes for their first five years in Germany.

    Aside from normalising anti-immigrant sentiment, this achieved very little. In a major research project on the interplay between migration and social policy that ran from 2019 to 2024, we could find no evidence that introducing these exclusions led to declining migrant numbers.

    Generally, most research finds that welfare magnetism is an overstated idea. Analyses of various countries, including Germany, find no evidence of welfare take-up being a significant driver of (large-scale) migration.

    Even researchers promoting the idea struggle to produce convincing evidence. Their findings are often limited to hyper-specific scenarios, such as migration between border towns of two US states.

    While immigration economist George Borjas claims that “differences in welfare benefits generate strong magnetic effects” he himself calls the empirical evidence “relatively weak”, and notes that “there may well be alternative stories that explain the evidence”.


    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.


    In one study, researchers claimed to find “some of the first causal evidence on the welfare magnet hypothesis” in Denmark. Yet they analysed a case in which many of the immigrants in question were also excluded from the labour market and where their belongings were (partially) confiscated upon entering the country.

    Under these circumstances, the researchers found that radically cutting welfare benefits by up to 50% could lead asylum seekers – who were migrating either way – to choose a different country of destination. As the researchers point out, “most newly arrived refugees have very limited job opportunities and therefore no alternative to welfare benefits”.

    A major driving force of international migration is conflict. If refugees fleeing war are given no alternative option of sustaining a living than receiving benefits – and if these benefits are then cut – the refugees in question may seek asylum elsewhere. This, however, has little to do with a “pull effect” and is a far cry from anything that could be considered welfare tourism.

    When confronted with the research, centrist politicians argue that regardless of how big a threat welfare magnetism actually is, people are afraid of it. To beat the far right, politicians feel obliged to copy their arguments.

    But research shows this approach does not work. By copying the far right, mainstream parties normalise instead of weakening the fringes. Far-right parties will always be able to make more extreme demands than the mainstream – there is no point in trying to beat them on their own turf.

    Policies that link migration and welfare can also make situations in already struggling areas worse. In our forthcoming research, we identified such problems in Germany.

    In Nordstadt, a deprived neighbourhood in Dortmund, many migrants face poor living conditions as economic disadvantages overlap with welfare exclusions. Many cannot afford proper housing and healthcare, and have to accept exploitative working conditions.

    Social assistance could provide help, yet excluding migrants from federally funded welfare schemes means that municipalities are largely left to deal with these challenges.

    Working with the far right

    Despite the lack of evidence for welfare tourism, the current political trajectory suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment will thrive further in Germany. Recent acts of violence by asylum seekers, including a fatal stabbing in Aschaffenburg, led the far-right AfD – accompanied by mainstream parties – to immediately push for restrictive immigration policy reforms.

    In a watershed moment for German politics, the Christian Democrats subsequently broke with a postwar taboo, voting with the AfD in favour of border closures and similar measures. Merz was harshly criticised for cooperating with the AfD, and his immigration bill ultimately failed.

    But, notably, hardly any party openly opposed his anti-immigration positions as such. The dispute was primarily about his cooperation with the AfD and less about disagreement over policy substance.

    This was evident in the first televised debate between Scholz and Merz, where competition over who was tougher on migrants took up a significant portion of the run time.

    Rarely have German elections seen a list of lead candidates so unequivocally united in characterising migrants as a threat. However, political tides may shift. Some of these candidates will unavoidably lose – and, perhaps, parties will shift gear once in opposition or government responsibility.

    Dominic Afscharian has previously received funding from the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs under the FIS research grant. This article has followed from the associated project “Freedom of Movement and Social Policy in Historical and International Comparison (FuS)”. He currently works for the Zentrum für neue Sozialpolitik in Berlin, Germany, which was not involved in the genesis of this article.

    Martin Seeleib-Kaiser has previously received funding from the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs under the FIS research grant. This article has followed from the associated project “Freedom of Movement and Social Policy in Historical and International Comparison (FuS)”.

    – ref. German party leaders are united against immigration – but there is little evidence for a key part of their argument – https://theconversation.com/german-party-leaders-are-united-against-immigration-but-there-is-little-evidence-for-a-key-part-of-their-argument-249074

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Condemns Tulsi Gabbard’s Nomination To Serve As Director Of National Intelligence

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin
    February 12, 2025
    WASHINGTON – In a speech on the Senate floor, U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL) outlined his serious concerns with Tulsi Gabbard, President Trump’s nominee to be the Director of National Intelligence ahead of her confirmation vote. Durbin began his remarks by highlighting the history of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which was established after the September 11th terrorist attacks.
    “[September 11 led to the creation] of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which oversees the 18 intelligence agencies that span the CIA, Defense Department, State Department, Energy Department, and others. It is now essential to modern safety in America. But yet, the President—Donald Trump—has selected a person who has little or no experience to lead this critical part of America’s security apparatus: her name is Tulsi Gabbard,” Durbin said.
    “During President Trump’s first term, he made clear his fondness for certain leaders of the world that are controversial such as Viktor Orban of Hungary, Vladimir Putin of Russia, and Kim Jong Un of North Korea. So, he ends up picking a person to run America’s intelligence network who shares similarly terrible judgment on critical security matters. Tulsi Gabbard is infamous fordefending despots and other autocratic leaders in the world—including Vladimir Putin and Bashar al-Assad—and traitors to the United States such as Edward Snowden. And her fondness for these oppressive, anti-democratic regimes does not go unreciprocated—they know her [and] they like her,” Durbin continued.  
    Durbin then highlighted examples on the floor of the anti-democratic regimes who are cheering for Ms. Gabbard’s confirmation—including hosts of Russian media who believe her nomination will “dismantle America,” and some on Russian state channels have even referred to her as their “girlfriend.” Russian state TV also called her a Russian “comrade” in President Trump’s emerging cabinet. A pro-Putin propagandist Vladimir Soloviev once called Gabbard “our friend.”  Later, when asked if she was “some sort of Russian agent?” Soloviev replied: “yes.” In a profile in a Russian state newspaper, it said of Gabbard’s nomination: “The C.I.A. and the F.B.I. are trembling,” noting that Ukrainians consider her “an agent of the Russian state.”
    “Imagine that. The person tapped to head America’s intelligence community—being called a puppet of an adversary’s country by that very same country. It seems too ridiculous to be true. But I’m sorry to say it is. To merely join America’s intelligence community—never mind lead it—candidates must go through vigorous background checks and earn security clearances… If Tulsi Gabbard was applying for an entry-level position, her relationship with Russia would disqualify her for the job. Why, then, would we trust her to [head the entire intelligence network] given the examples that abound of Tulsi Gabbard proving publicly, shamelessly, and carelessly her sympathies for nations that undermine U.S. interests and security. That is unexplainable and irresponsible,” Durbin continued.
    “Our allies depend on us as much as we depend on their security and to share critical intelligence. Now, they are looking at us in disbelief that we would let someone like Tusli Gabbard with such an appalling record anywhere near the leadership of the intelligence community. Intelligence professionals from Canada and the United Kingdom—which are members of the critical Five Eyes intelligence alliance along with the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand—have expressed concern about even working with her if she is in charge. In order to keep Americans safe throughout the world, we need to have the trust of our allies,” Durbin said.
    Durbin then spoke about the impacts Ms. Gabbard’s confirmation would have on supporting our Ukrainian ally and their defense against Russia. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Gabbard has taken Russia’s side—claiming ‘Russia had legitimate security concerns,’ and blaming NATO, one of our most significant security alliances.
    “Let me be clear: Supporting democracies has not historically been a partisan matter,” Durbin continued. “For example, contrast Tulsi Gabbard’s nonsense with former President Ronald Reagan’s clear-eyed understanding of the danger of the communist Russian empire. Nearly 40 years ago, he stood at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin and famously challenged the Soviet Union to ‘tear down this wall.’ Reagan understood the true nature and threat of the Russians. And we have all seen the horrific costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine and increasing attacks against NATO allies.” 
    “Is there a deal to be made to end this war? Perhaps. But doing so must be with the best intelligence available—a clear eye about who we are negotiating with and long-term guarantees of the security of Ukraine, of Europe, and the transatlantic alliance. One would think that any American president navigating such difficult waters would want a top official to serve as the head of National Intelligence. Tulsi Gabbard fails that test,” Durbin said.
    Durbin concluded, “Tulsi Gabbard would not be qualified for an entry-level position within our intelligence community. And she is not qualified to lead it. Period. Some of the President’s cabinet nominees are hard to imagine because they are so unqualified. But for the position of DNI—putting someone unqualified in charge is not funny at all. It is life or death dangerous.”
    Video of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here.
    Audio of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here.
    Footage of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here for TV Stations.
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Holds Media Availability in Stuttgart, Germany

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: How’s it going everybody? Sir. Good to see you. It’s been a great day, really. Any day we can spend with the troops from the very early morning of PT with some high speed guys and gals to two COCOMs that are right in the front lines of advancing American interests. Proud to be here today.

    Just an impressive display of what Americans are doing in far flung places for the American people, so proud to be here for sure. I think we have a local — where’s our local reporter? I’d like to go first to our local.

    Q: Thank you so much. So —

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Where are you from?

    Q: I’m from Suddeutsche Zeitung. That’s the second biggest newspaper in Germany.

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, it’s my favorite now.

    Q: And you are visiting Africom as one of your first points in your duty. Does that mean that the American strategic aims in Africa are going to change?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, I think it’s a reflection of the importance of that command as well as EUCOM. We spent this morning at EUCOM, as well; made sense to come to both if we’re here in Germany.

    But it’s also a reflection that, you know, the PRC’s intentions are pernicious, not just in their part of the world, but also in South America and on the African continent. And America’s posture there along with allies and partners is going to matter about contesting that space. So, it certainly remains a priority.

    You saw the strike in Somalia on February 1st. That — as we talked to the command, that’s a reflection also of pushing decision authority down, untying the hands of war fighters who in the previous administration made multiple requests and were often denied for that kind of kinetic action, or the decision had to be made at the White House when it should be made at the four star level or at the Secretary of Defense level more quickly based on the ability to degrade the enemy.

    So, this is a very important part of the world for us. The President feels that way, as well, and we’re honored to be here. Thank you.

    Q: Mr. Secretary, are you planning to cut the number of American forces in Europe, shift to the Pacific and focus on China?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: There are no plans right now in the making to cut anything.

    There is an understanding that we’re going to review force posture across the world, right. President Trump’s planning assumptions are different in many ways, or at least strategic assumptions than Joe Biden’s were. We certainly don’t want to plan on the back of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and what happened on October 7th and the war that was unleashed in Ukraine.

    You have to manage and mitigate those things by coming alongside your friends in Israel, ensuring their defense and peacefully resolving the conflict in Ukraine. But those shouldn’t define how we orient and with hopefully a rapid peace deal in Ukraine, which the President is committed to delivering, we can then review force posture and encourage as we’re going to — you’re going to see tomorrow in Ukraine and — or at the Ukraine Contact Group and the NATO ministerial, we’re going to have straight talk with our friends.

    This kind of urgency of this moment requires friends talking to friends about capabilities, about leadership, about stepping up, about burden sharing and the incentives to say the European continent deserves to be free from any aggression.

    But it ought be those in the neighborhood, investing the most in that collective — individual and collective defense. That’s common sense. As the President talks a lot about, common sense is you defend your neighborhood and the Americans will come alongside you in helping in that defense. If and when that happens, and I believe it will because of President Trump, most NATO countries are already close to 2 percent.

    We believe that needs to be higher. The president has said 5 percent. I think he’s right. That’s a reflection of a need to invest on the continent. If and when that happens through investments in the defense industrial base, as well, then yes, America as the leader of the free world defending American interests is going to need to make sure we’re focused properly on the Communist Chinese and their ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, and as I mentioned before, around the world.

    So, we would be remiss in not reviewing force posture everywhere, but it would be the wrong planning assumption to say, oh, America is abandoning something or America is leaving. No, America is smart to observe, plan, prioritize and project power where we need to deter conflict. We don’t want conflict with China.

    We don’t want — the President has ran on being a peace president, and he’s delivered that. But being strong, peace through strength is how you deter that, and we want to posture for that just like we believe the Europeans alongside our support need to on the continent, as well.

    Q: Is China the biggest threat to the United States?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, right now, the biggest threat was securing our own border, which we are addressing rapidly. And I’m proud of what NORTHCOM has done and the Defense Department has done is shifting there. You don’t have a country if you don’t have borders, as the President has pointed out. And we’ve been defending other people’s borders for a long time; time to defend ours. So we’re sealing that border. We continue to do that. But as far as external threats, there’s just no doubt the communist Chinese ambitions are robust. Their view of the world is quite different than ours. And whoever carries that mantle is going to set the tone for the 21st century.

    UNKNOWN: Christine —

    Q: You made the point to do PT with tenth group this morning on very little sleep. Why was it so important for you to do this? And tell us about the workout?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: I did do PT with the troops this morning. Listen, it’s not that long ago that I was right there with them. I probably — no offense, General — I probably connect more with those guys than I do with four-star Generals. But now I get the chance of working with four stars and others who are committed to the troops.

    But when I can get down, do push ups and deadlifts with the troops, and just hear from them, what’s working, what isn’t, how do you see your mission set, I love that. So there was never a doubt. even though we got in at 2:00 in the morning, that we were getting up a couple hours later to go do PT. It’s a reminder that — you guys — the press in Washington might think I’m young, but in military terms, I’m old.

    And that showed this morning with these young guys who ran circles around me in that parking lot.

    UNKNOWN: We’ll [Inaudible] then Zach.

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Go ahead.

    Q: Thanks for doing this. Uh, you mentioned earlier that President Trump wants, uh, NATO countries to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense. Do you think the US should also spend 5 percent of its GDP on defense?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, I think the US needs to spend more than the Biden administration was willing to, who historically underinvested in the capabilities of our military. So the president is committed, as he was in the first term, to rebuilding America’s military by investing. And you’re going to see that in the conversations on Capitol Hill.

    We’ve already been intimately involved with the folks on HASC and SASC and appropriations, talking about the capabilities we’re going to need, not just next year and the year after that or for the next four years, but for power projection going forward and then the reforms needed to make sure that every dollar goes further.

    Now at a minimum, we should not go below 3 percent. That’s a view I know the President shares. But as far as going forward in that, those are decisions he will make based on my consultations with him. Listen, any defense secretary would be lying if they said they didn’t want more. You always want more.

    But we live in fiscally constrained times where we need to be responsible with taxpayer dollars. We’re $37 trillion in debt. That’s a national security liability, as well. So, we’re going to work with Capitol Hill. The President is going to lead the way on making sure the troops have the resources they need and that we truly rebuild our military just like President Trump did in the first term.

    Q: And President Biden — President Biden vowed against sending US troops into Ukraine. Would you be open to sending US troops into Ukraine to track weapons shipments?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: We are not sending US troops to Ukraine.

    Q: You talked about wanting to welcome Elon Musk and DOGE into the Pentagon potentially in the next few weeks. Do you expect him to start unilaterally cutting programs and contracts the way he’s done at USAID and other agencies? And are there any limits or supervision you’d want to place on his team, given his conflicts of interest [Inaudible]?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, we’ve been in touch with — I’ve been in touch with Elon Musk, who’s a great patriot, interested in advancing the America First agenda, knows that President Trump got 77 million votes and a mandate from the American people. And part of that is bringing actual businesslike efficiency to government; hence, what DOGE is doing.

    Uh, we’ve been talking to them, in partnership with them. And as I said on social media, we welcome DOGE to the Pentagon, and I hope to welcome Elon to the Pentagon very soon and his team, working in collaboration with us. There are waste, redundancies and headcounts in headquarters that need to be addressed.

    There’s just no doubt. Look at a lot of the climate programs that have been pursued at the Defense Department. The Defense Department is not in the business of climate change, solving the global thermostat. We’re in the business of deterring and winning wars. So, things like that we want to look for to find efficiencies and many others – the way we acquire weapons, system procurement.

    There’s plenty of places where we want the keen eye of DOGE, but we’ll do it in coordination. We’re not going to do things that are to the detriment of American operational or tactical capabilities. There’s just — President Trump is committed to delivering the best possible military. The Defense Department is not USAID. USAID has got a lot of problems that I talked about with the troops, pursuing globalist agendas that don’t have a connection to America First.

    That’s not the Defense Department, but we’re also not perfect, either. So where we can find billions of dollars — and he’s right to say billions — inside the Defense Department, every dollar we save there is a dollar that goes to warfighters, and that’s good for the American people.

    Q: [Inaudible] Mr. Secretary, Since we’re here at AFRICOM, I have a question about Africa. Now when you served, you fought jihadists in the Middle East, and there’s a lot of jihadists in Africa, whether it’s ISIS, al-Qaida, al-Shabab, go on and on. How do you plan to handle that threat?

    I’m not saying put troops on the ground in Africa to fight them, but are you concerned that there could be some sort of cell that might be plotting attacks against other parts of the world, trying to recruit soldiers because it’s Africa with a growing population? How concerned are you about the jihadist threat in Africa today?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Definitely concerned. I mean, anybody of our — anybody of my generation that served in Iraq and Afghanistan or have been a part of post-9-11 understands the threat of global jihad, especially the desire to export that against our allies in Europe or Israel or certainly the United States of America. So the counterterrorism threat focused on those who would seek to do us harm is of the highest priority, which is why you saw what AFRICOM did so well in that strike in Somalia.

    Where we see those growing, plotting or planning with increased capabilities we will strike. And that pertains to Islamist organizations all across the continent. But it also — we have to work with partners and allies. I mean, foreign internal defense and security force assistance — I was with Green Berets this morning.

    You know, we think of Green Berets in the context of post-9-11, right – kicking down doors, and they’re really good at that. But what they’re best at is doing security force assistance and foreign internal defense where they work with local security forces to build up their capabilities so that it’s indigenous forces fighting Islamists because they want to secure their country, as well.

    And AFRICOM is very directly committed to doing that. That’s a mission very much worth resourcing. I mean Africa is very much the front lines of a fight from Islamists. You’ve got Christian populations that are under siege in Africa and have been ignored for far too long and American interests there. It matters a great deal. And Islamists — we’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.

    UNKNOWN: We’re going to finish up with two questions from these two [Inaudible].

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Ok. One more here and then here.

    Q: John Barrowman, Stars and Stripes. Also related to AFRICOM and Somalia, during the end of President Trump’s first term, he elected to pull forces out of Somalia and switched to more of a rotational concept.

    President Biden sent troops back in there on a full time basis. What’s your vision going forward for Somalia? Do you want to maintain troops there continuously, or are you looking more towards pulling them back?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, I mean, I’m going to listen to the commanders on the ground, first and foremost, as is the President.

    And he’s charged me with, hey, give me your best advice, but also keep your ear to the ground of what’s most effective. But he’s also been very clear that we’re not trying to have American boots all over the globe. Where we can do counterterrorism effectively over the horizon, that’s the preference. But we’ll review the force posture there and with the generals doing the heavy lifting and take it into consideration, no doubt.

    But thankfully, we have the intelligence capabilities to do the kind of strike that we saw, and we believe we can do more of that.

    UNKNOWN: Last question.

    Q: So — so you renamed the name of Fort Liberty into Fort Bragg, and you honored the private first class who lost his life while liberating Germany. What does that mean for the US forces?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, first, it means Bragg is back. It means the legacy of an institution that generations of Americans have mobilized through and served at is back.

    I mean, it’s a shame what was done to vets, service members, their families who were born there, deployed out of there, lived there, gave there — I was with airborne troops here, some of which spent 25 years at Fort Bragg and never called it Fort Liberty because it wasn’t Fort Liberty, it’s Fort Bragg.

    And so I was honored to be able to put my signature on that. By the way, with the support of the President of the United States who set the tone on this and said, I want Fort Bragg back.

    And we’re honored to support a private first class who received a Purple Heart and the Silver Star at the battle of the bulge. We’re honoring a private first class and I’m proud that we have a Marine corporal as the vice president of the United States too. Junior enlisted have never seen better days. But it’s about that legacy.

    It’s about the connection to the community, to those who served. And we’re not, as the President has said and I’ve said as well, we’re not done there. There are other bases that have been renamed that erodes that very same legacy. There’s a reason I said Bragg and Benning when I walked into the Pentagon on day one.

    But it’s not just Bragg and Benning. There are a lot of other service members that have connections and we’re going to do our best to restore it. It’s an honor to do so. Thank you all for your time. Appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: The Paris AI summit marks a tipping point on the technology’s safety and sustainability

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Robert Diab, Professor, Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University

    United States Vice President JD Vance made headlines this week by refusing to sign a declaration at a global summit in Paris on artificial intelligence.

    In his first appearance on the world stage, Vance made clear that the U.S. wouldn’t be playing ball. The Donald Trump administration believes that “excessive regulation of the AI sector could kill a transformative industry just as it’s taking off,” he said. “We’ll make every effort to encourage pro-growth AI policies.”

    His remarks confirmed a widespread fear that Trump’s return to the White House will signal a sharp turn in tech policy. American tech companies and their billionaire owners will now be shielded from effective oversight.

    But upon a closer look, events this week point to signs that just the opposite may be unfolding. A host of nations took notable steps towards address growing safety and environmental concerns about AI, indicating that a regulatory tipping point has been reached.

    Prime Minister Justin Trudeau delivered the keynote address at the AI Action Summit in Paris, France.

    Wide consensus

    The two-day global summit in Paris, chaired by France and India, led to broad consensus. Some 60 countries signed on to a Statement on Inclusive and Sustainable AI. This included Canada, the European Commission, India and China.

    Both the U.S. and the United Kingdom declined to sign on. But the prevailing winds are against them.

    The meeting in Paris was the third global summit on AI, following meet-ups at Bletchley Park in the U.K. in 2023 and in Seoul, South Korea, in 2024. Each of them ended with similar declarations widely endorsed.

    The Paris communiqué calls for an “inclusive approach” to AI, seeking to “narrow inequalities” in AI capabilities among countries. It encourages “avoiding market concentration” and affirms the need for openness and transparency in building and sharing technology and expertise.

    The document is not binding. It does little more than tout principles, or affirm a collective sentiment among the parties. One of these — perhaps the most important — is to keep talking, meeting and working together on the common concerns that AI raises.

    Environmental challenges

    Meanwhile, a smaller group of countries at the Paris summit, along with 37 tech companies, agreed to form a Coalition for Sustainable AI — setting out a series of goals and deliverables.

    While nothing is binding on the parties, the goals are notably specific. They include coming up with standards for measuring AI’s environmental impact and more effective ways for companies to report on the impact. Parties also aim to “optimize algorithms to reduce computational complexity and minimize data usage.”

    Even if most of this turns out to be merely aspirational, it’s important that the coalition offers a platform for collaboration on these initiatives. At the very least, it signals a likelihood that sustainability will be at the forefront of debate about AI moving forward.




    Read more:
    AI is bad for the environment, and the problem is bigger than energy consumption


    Signing the first international treaty on AI

    A further notable event at the summit was that Canada signed the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. In recent months, 12 other countries had signed, including the U.S. (under former president Joe Biden), the U.K., Israel and the European Union.

    The convention commits parties to pass domestic laws on AI that deal with privacy, bias and discrimination, safety, transparency and environmental sustainability.

    The treaty has been criticized for containing no more than “broad affirmations” and imposing few clear obligations. But it does show that countries are committed to passing law to ensure that AI development unfolds within boundaries — and they’re eager to see more countries do the same.

    If Canada were to ratify the treaty, Parliament would likely revive Bill C-27, which contained the AI and Data Act.




    Read more:
    The federal government’s proposed AI legislation misses the mark on protecting Canadians


    The act aimed to do much of what Canada agrees to do under the convention: impose greater oversight of the development and use of AI. This includes transparency and disclosure requirements on AI companies, and stiff penalties for failure to comply.

    What does this really mean?

    While the U.S. signed the convention on AI and human rights, democracy and rule of law in the fall of 2024, it likely won’t be implemented by a Republican Congress. The same might happen in Canada under a Conservative government led by Pierre Poilievre. He could also decide not to fulfil commitments made under other agreements about AI.

    And if Poilievre comes to power by the time Canada hosts the next G7 meeting in June, he might decline to honour the Trudeau government’s commitment to make AI regulation a central focus of the meeting.

    The Trump administration may have ushered in a period of more lax tech regulation in the U.S., and Silicon Valley is indeed a key player in tech — especially AI. But it’s a wide world, with many other important players in this space, including China, Europe and Canada.

    The events in Paris have revealed a strong interest among nations around the globe to regulate AI, and specifically to foster ideas about inclusion and sustainability. If the Paris summit was any indication, the hope of sheltering AI from effective regulation won’t last long.

    Robert Diab does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. The Paris AI summit marks a tipping point on the technology’s safety and sustainability – https://theconversation.com/the-paris-ai-summit-marks-a-tipping-point-on-the-technologys-safety-and-sustainability-249706

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: AMMAT Unpacks Strategic Approach to Optimizing Oil & Gas Operations in Congo

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    BRAZZAVILLE, Congo (Republic of the), February 12, 2025/APO Group/ —

    As part of the Republic of Congo’s strategy to double its oil production, the government is encouraging independent operators to revitalize mature fields and boost output. Companies like AMMAT – participating as a Platinum Sponsor at the inaugural Congo Energy & Investment Forum (CEIF) 2025 – are playing a key role in this effort. In an in-depth conversation with Energy Capital & Power (https://EnergyCapitalPower.com), AMMAT CEO Massimiliano Mignacca outlines the company’s approach to technological innovations, a focus on sustainability and optimizing oil and gas operations in mature fields in Congo.

    Can you provide an overview of AMMAT’s activities in Congo?

    When we began exploring opportunities in 2021, we focused on West Africa and found promising prospects in the Republic of Congo. The Congolese authorities recognized our potential and supported our asset management approach. By the end of 2022, we had officially established our presence in the country. In March 2023, we secured exploration and production permits for the Zatchi and Loango fields – mature assets previously operated by a joint venture between Eni and Total until 2021 – followed by a transition period under SNPC [Congo’s national oil company Société nationale des pétroles du Congo]. We commenced operations in July 2023, applying our proven asset management strategies from Italy to optimize production in Congo.

    How does your partnership with SNPC contribute to Congo’s plan to double oil production?

    We operate under a joint venture framework, where SNPC plays a key role alongside two Congolese companies that collectively hold a 25% stake. Managing mature fields presents significant challenges, requiring close coordination with SNPC at all levels. We conduct regular meetings to align on work plans, performance, and projects that enhance safety, boost production and improve asset management. Our close collaboration with SNPC’s leadership ensures that our initiatives contribute directly to Congo’s production growth targets.

    AMMAT employs a data-driven approach to reservoir management. What technologies and methodologies are you using?

    One major initiative is the modernization of the sea pipeline linking our Loango treatment platform to peripheral platforms. We are also implementing an environmental risk mitigation program in partnership with other operators. Additionally, we have launched a campaign to replace outdated pumps and reactivate wells, utilizing advanced workover techniques such as ESP pump upgrades to enhance production. In 2024, we successfully revamped three platforms in Loango and are currently rehabilitating two more in the Zatchi field. We remain committed to integrating cutting-edge technology into our operations to maximize efficiency and sustainability.

    What sustainable practices does AMMAT implement in its operations?

    Sustainability is at the core of our asset management approach. The [oil and gas] sector has been central to Congo’s economy since the 1970s, producing a strong engineering workforce. Recognizing this, we have initiated partnerships with local universities and currently host three graduates in our maintenance, IT and HSE [health, safety and environment] divisions. This initiative strengthens local talent and ensures the long-term sustainability of our operations.

    AMMAT will be a Platinum Sponsor at the Congo Energy & Investment Forum (CEIF) in March 2025. What do you aim to achieve at this event?

    Our primary objective [at CEIF 2025] is to showcase AMMAT as a reliable and committed partner in Congo. The country entrusted us with two crucial production fields, and we want to demonstrate how our asset management expertise adds value. Additionally, we are looking to expand our upstream presence in Congo and other markets. Being a Platinum Sponsor allows us to make a strong impact, emphasizing our commitment to compliance with local regulations, collaboration and sustainable operations. This event provides an excellent platform to engage with stakeholders and reinforce our role in driving growth in Congo’s oil and gas industry.

    MIL OSI Africa –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: r* in the monetary policy universe: navigational star or dark matter? | Lecture at the London School of Economics and Political Science

    Source: Deutsche Bundesbank in English

    Check against delivery.
    1 Introduction
    Ladies and gentlemen, It’s a pleasure and an honour for me to speak here before such a distinguished audience.
    Remember to look up at the stars and not down at your feet. This was advice from Stephen Hawking, the famous English physicist and author of numerous books on the cosmos. And who would want to contradict the genius?
    So today I invite you to join me on a stargazing tour. If you don’t have a telescope with you, no worries. However, I should add a disclaimer here: When a couple look up at the stars, things could get romantic. When astronomers observe the stars, impressive images can come into view. When economists talk about stars, it usually gets complicated. Now you know what you’re getting into! 
    I’m sure you’ve already guessed what topic I have in mind: the natural rate of interest – also known as r-star. It is a concept that economists have been grappling with for more than 125 years.[1] And it has perhaps never received more attention than in the current era of monetary policy.
    From a central banker’s perspective, I would like to discuss what role r-star can and should play in the monetary policy universe. I will structure my lecture around four key questions: What is r-star and why is it of interest for monetary policy? How have estimates for r-star evolved over the past decades? What drives uncertainty about current estimates and the future evolution of r-star? What conclusions should monetary policy draw from this?
    2 Definition of r-star and use for monetary policy
    Let’s start with the definition. The natural rate is the real interest rate that would prevail if the economy were operating at its potential and prices were stable. R-star is commonly thought to be driven by real forces that structurally affect the balance between saving and investment. Think of technological progress and demographics, for example. This also means that r-star should, by definition, be independent of monetary policy. The latter follows from the widely held belief that monetary policy can affect real variables only temporarily, but is neutral in the long term.
    At first glance, the natural rate could be a guiding star for the conduct of monetary policy. If a central bank sets its policy rates so that the real interest rate is above r-star, monetary policy is restrictive or “tight”. Consequently, economic activity slows and the inflation rate should decrease. If the real rate is below r-star, monetary policy is expansionary or “loose”. It provides incentives for consumers to purchase more and for enterprises to step up investment and output. Hence, this should result in more economic activity and a higher inflation rate.
    However, the idea of the natural rate serving as a guiding star for monetary policy comes with profound challenges. Perhaps the name r-star evokes associations with astronomy and navigation. But these would be misleading. If r-star were like a star in the sky, it would be relatively easy to locate. Stars emit light and are therefore observable.
    The natural rate is a theoretical concept. It is based on a hypothetical state of the world. That means the natural rate is, by nature, unobservable. It can only be estimated. For example, models use assumptions about the relationship between measurable variables and r-star. In this respect, the natural rate is not so much like a star shining brightly in the sky. It is more a case of dark matter. As it is invisible, astronomers infer dark matter indirectly by observing its gravitational effects.
    If something is hard to find, it only spurs researchers to look even harder – whether they are astronomers or economists. Therefore, we can draw on a variety of estimation methods for the evolution of the natural rate.
    3 Estimates for r-star over time
    Since around the 1980s various estimates of different types have been pointing to a downward trend for r-star over several decades and across many advanced economies.[2] In the wake of the global financial crisis, the estimates slumped to exceptionally low levels.[3] This development was roughly in line with the observed trajectory of actual real interest rates of short- and long-term government bonds during this period. And no wonder: In the long run, both should be driven by the same fundamental forces affecting the balance between saving and investment.
    So the question is this: what has lifted saving and depressed investment? A simple answer would be: in the long term, the most important driver is potential growth. But this finding is not very enlightening. Potential growth is also not observable. It is determined by underlying forces such as demographics and technological progress. This is where we need to look for the causes.
    Indeed, according to a number of recent studies, waning productivity growth and population ageing were the key factors in pushing saving up and investment down.[4] Lower productivity reduces the return on investment, so people are less willing to invest. As they expect to live longer, they are more willing to save.
    In addition, inequality, risk aversion and fiscal policy could be other factors. For example, growing inequality raises saving, as richer households save a larger share of their income. Similarly, higher risk aversion leads to higher saving, especially in safe assets, while lowering investment.[5] 
    Many of the estimates for r-star reached their lowest point in the pandemic years 2020 and 2021. After that, there were signs of a partial reversal. A recent analysis by Eurosystem economists across a suite of models and data up to the end of 2024 suggests that estimates of r-star range from − ½ % to ½ % in real terms. In nominal terms, they find that it ranges between 1¾ % and 2¼ %.[6]
    It is clear that these ranges depend on the estimating approaches considered. Taking into account an even wider array of measures, Bundesbank staff calculations using data up to the end of 2024 reveal a range of 1.8 % to 2.5 %.[7] And the ECB found for the third quarter of 2024: When three estimates derived from versions of the Holston-Laubach-Williams model are factored in, the range of real r-star is − ½ % to 1 % and the nominal range is 1¾ % to 3 %.
    All in all, the results suggest that the range of r-star estimates most likely increased by about one percentage point from their lows. The latest estimates by economists from the Bank for International Settlements come to similar findings.[8]
    The reasons for the increase after the pandemic are not yet fully clear. For example, high fiscal spending with rising public debt levels could play a role. Or higher needs for capital, as companies make their value chains more resilient by duplicating structures and increasing stock levels.
    4 Uncertainties around r-star estimates
    Stargazing tours in economics are a journey into the uncertain. This is also and especially true for r-star. Estimates of the natural rate of interest are subject to major uncertainties, shaped by three M’s: megatrends, methodology and monetary policy.
    First, we are facing a number of megatrends. Think of climate change, ageing societies, digitalisation, and the risks of de-globalisation and increasing geopolitical divisions. The effects of these megatrends on natural rates are difficult to gauge and may change over time.
    On the one hand, they could contribute to a higher natural rate. Here are some examples: The widespread uptake of artificial intelligence could boost productivity growth. The green transition could lead to higher investment. Fiscal deficits could persist at an elevated level due to higher defence spending given geopolitical tensions. The entry of the baby boomer generation into retirement could reduce savings.
    On the other hand, life expectancy is predicted to keep rising; the high hopes for the productivity-enhancing effect of AI could turn out to be too optimistic; and given high public debt levels, fiscal space for additional spending is limited in many countries. Overall, it is virtually impossible to predict which developments will prevail in affecting r-star.
    The second factor of uncertainty is methodology. The methods used to define and estimate r-star differ in important ways, especially in terms of time and risk. 
    Ricardo Reis demonstrates this impressively in a recent paper.[9] He presents four different “r-stars”. They are based on four different conceptual approaches. And they developed quite differently between 1995 and 2019. 
    One major difference is the risk dimension. Knut Wicksell’s original definition of the natural rate was the rate of return on physical capital in equilibrium.[10] The rate of return on physical capital is the return on investment in the real economy. And this rate is very much associated with risks. 
    However, this perspective has been lost in virtually all of the model approaches. Generally, they use rather secure government bond yields as a starting point. Again, with regard to the real economy, a risky return on capital would be a more appropriate yardstick. When we look at measures for the return on private capital, we see a strong contrast with risk-free rates. Returns on private capital have remained broadly stable over the last decades in the US,[11] Germany[12] and the euro area as a whole.[13] 
    From these observations, Ricardo Reis draws the following conclusion: focusing exclusively on the return on government bonds as the measure of r-star, while neglecting the return on private capital, leads to the wrong policy advice.[14]
    Another case in point is the time horizon that is considered. Commonly cited estimates seek to assess the real rate that prevails in the longer run, when all shocks have dissipated. Most of these estimates are highly imprecise. Many methods simply project the current or the historical level of real rates into the future. This may confound permanent trends with cyclical factors, which may not be representative for the future. As a result, such methods could miss important turning points in real rate trends. 
    Other approaches characterise a short-run real rate in a hypothetical world without frictions. While interesting, this concept is of limited value for actual policymaking in the real world. Methods based on a short-term equilibrium tend to produce more volatile estimates of r-star.
    There is a third reason for caution: monetary policy itself may play a role in shaping the natural rate or its estimates. A number of studies challenge the view that money is neutral in the long run.[15] 
    There are different channels through which monetary policy could have lasting effects on real interest rates. Prolonged tight monetary policy, for example, may lower investment, innovation and productivity growth.[16] By contrast, persistent monetary easing could fuel financial imbalances and contribute to zombification.[17] 
    Moreover, recent research suggests that central bank announcements provide guidance about the trend in real rates. For instance, a narrow window around Fed meetings captures most of the trend decline in US real long-term yields since 1980.[18] This could mean: when central banks look for r-star in financial market prices, they might actually be looking in a mirror.[19] Feedback loops between monetary policy and markets could unduly reinforce their perceptions about r-star. And shifts in perceived r-star could affect actual r-star as it influences saving and investment decisions.
    5 Conclusions for monetary policy
    Against the backdrop of these major uncertainties, the final key question of my speech is this: what role can and should r-star play for monetary policy in practice?
    Let’s approach the answer with a thought experiment: Put yourself in the shoes of a monetary policymaker who only looks at r-star. The relevant interest rate with which you steer the monetary policy stance is currently 2.75 %. After a previous series of interest rate cuts, you consider whether a further cut would be appropriate.
    Your staff inform you that various point estimates of r-star range from around 1.8 % to 2.5 % in nominal terms. If r-star were at the upper end of the estimates, the policy rate would become neutral with the next rate cut. Things would be different if r-star were at the lower end of the estimates: Monetary policy would continue to be restrictive, even after several further rate cuts.
    So how would you proceed, given a certain stance you want to achieve? Beware: If you rely on a wrong estimate, your decision may have a different effect on inflation than you intended. Simply choosing the middle of the range might not be a happy medium. Around the point estimates, there are often uncertainty bands of different sizes and with asymmetries.
    As you have probably guessed: It is no coincidence that I have described this particular decision-making situation. It looks similar in the euro area ahead of the next monetary policy meeting of the ECB Governing Council at the beginning of March. After several rate cuts, the neutral rate could already be near – or there may still be some way to go.
    The President of the New York Fed, John Williams, put the problem in a nutshell when he said: as we have gotten closer to the range of estimates of neutral, what appeared to be a bright point of light is really a fuzzy blur.[20]
    The bottom line here is this: The closer we get to the neutral rate, the more appropriate it becomes to take a gradual approach. For this purpose, r-star is a helpful concept: it indicates when we need to be more cautious with policy rate moves so that we don’t take a wrong step. 
    At the same time, the limits of the concept are also clear: it would be risky to base decisions mainly on r-star estimates. Much more is needed to assess the current monetary policy stance and the optimal policy path for the near future.
    That is why the Eurosystem uses a variety of financial, real economic and other indicators along the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We want the fullest picture possible. And, of course, r-star also has a place in this picture. For instance, r-star is included in model-based optimal policy projections that we use in the decision-making process.
    In my opinion, proceeding in a data-driven and gradual manner has served the ECB Governing Council well. There is no reason to act hastily in the present uncertain environment. The data will tell us where we need to go.
    Away from day-to-day monetary policymaking, the concept of the natural rate of interest provides a useful framework. This is also exemplified in the policy scenarios that Ricardo Reis presented last week in Brussels.[21]
    He works with the assumption that government bond rates remain around current levels. I would add the assumption that inflation stays on target – actually, that is what I am in office for and committed to. Assuming output is at capacity, policy rates would be persistently higher than in the past. But the recommendations on actual monetary policy depend on the driving forces: is the new setting caused by less demand for safe and liquid assets or by an increase in productivity? And he has two more scenarios in his paper!
    That provides a good example of why we should take a close look at the factors behind r-star estimates. Here it is important to even better understand the forces that are shifting real interest rate trends. We need to find out how these forces and trends affect our work to ensure price stability.
    Reviewing our monetary policy strategy from time to time is therefore vital. That is precisely what we are doing right now in the Eurosystem. And, of course, in this process, we look at all the questions I mentioned about r-star.
    Our stargazing tour is drawing to a close. It turns out we were dealing more with dark matter than with a shining star. Just as dark matter is an exciting field for astronomers, r-star is a rewarding topic for economists.
    Using r-star alone to navigate the monetary policy universe could be like flying almost blind. But having it as one of many instruments in your cockpit is highly useful.
    I would like to end by quoting Stephen Hawking again: Mankind’s greatest achievements have come about by talking, and its greatest failures by not talking.
    Footnotes: 
    Wicksell, K. (1898), Geldzins und Güterpreise: eine Studie über die den Tauschwert des Geldes bestimmenden Ursachen, Jena, G. Fischer (English version as ibid. (1936), Interest and prices: a study of the causes regulating the value of money, London, Macmillan).
    Obstfeld, M., Natural and Neutral Real Interest Rates: Past and Future, NBER Working Paper, No 31949, December 2023.
    Brand, C., M. Bielecki and A. Penalver (2018), The natural rate of interest: estimates, drivers, and challenges to monetary policy, ECB Occasional Paper, No 217.
    Cesa-Bianchi, A., R. Harrison and R. Sajedi (2023), Global R*, CEPR Discussion Paper No 18518; Davis, J., C. Fuenzalida, L. Huetsch, B. Mills and A. M. Taylor (2024), Global natural rates in the long run: Postwar macro trends and the market-implied r* in 10 advanced economies, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 149; International Monetary Fund (2023), The natural rate of interest: drivers and implications for policy, World Economic Outlook, April, Chapter 2.
    On the development of risk appetite in financial markets, see Deutsche Bundesbank, Risk appetite in financial markets and monetary policy, Monthly Report, January 2025.
    Brand, C., N. Lisack and F. Mazelis (2025), Natural rate estimates for the euro area: insights, uncertainties and shortcomings, ECB Economic Bulletin, 1/2025.
    Additional models would also provide values outside this range, but are currently not deemed sufficiently robust.
    Benigno, G., B. Hofmann, G. Nuño and D. Sandri (2024), Quo vadis, r*? The natural rate of interest after the pandemic, BIS Quarterly Review, March.
    Reis, R. (2025), The Four R-stars: From Interest Rates to Inflation and Back, draft working paper. 
    Wicksell, K. (1898), op. cit.
    Caballero, R., E. Farhi and P.-O. Gourinchas (2017), Rents, Technical Change, and Risk Premia Accounting for Secular Trends in Interest Rates, Returns on Capital, Earning Yields, and Factor Shares, American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 107(5), pp. 614‑620.
    Deutsche Bundesbank, The natural rate of interest, Monthly Report, October 2017.
    Brand, C., M. Bielecki and A. Penalver (2018), The natural rate of interest: estimates, drivers, and challenges to monetary policy, ECB Occasional Paper, No 217.
    Reis, R., Which r-star, public bonds or private investment? Measurement and policy implications, Unpublished manuscript, September 2022.
    Jordà, Ò., S. Singh and A. Taylor, The long-run effects of monetary policy, NBER Working Papers, No 26666, January 2020, revised September 2024; Benigno, G., B. Hofmann, G. Nuño and D. Sandri (2024), Quo vadis, r*? The natural rate of interest after the pandemic, BIS Quarterly Review, March.
    Baqaee, D., E. Farhi and K. Sangani, The supply-side effects of monetary policy, NBER Working Paper, No 28345, January 2021, revised March 2023; Ma, Y. and K. Zimmermann, Monetary Policy and Innovation, NBER Working Paper, No 31698, September 2023.
    Borio, C., P. Disyatat, M. Juselius and P. Rungcharoenkitkul (2022), Why so low for so long? A long-term view of real interest rates, International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 18, No 3.
    Hillenbrand, S. (2025), The Fed and the Secular Decline in Interest Rates, The Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming. 
    Williams, J. C. (2017), Comment on “Safety, Liquidity, and the Natural Rate of Interest”, by M. Del Negro, M. P. Giannoni, D. Giannone, and A. Tambalotti, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1, pp. 235‑316; Rungcharoenkitkul, P. and F. Winkler, The natural rate of interest through a hall of mirrors, BIS Working Paper No 974, November 2021.
    Williams, J. C., Remarks at the 42nd Annual Central Banking Seminar, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 1 October 2018.
    Reis, R. (2025), op. cit.

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: U.S. 6th Fleet Celebrates 75th Anniversary, 250th Navy birthday

    Source: United States Navy

    U.S. 6th Fleet held a joint celebration of its 75th anniversary and the Navy’s 250th birthday onboard its flagship, the Blue Ridge-Class Command and Control ship USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20) Feb. 12, 2025.

    Originally named U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean, U.S. Sixth Fleet was established February 12th, 1950. Sixth Fleet provides credible combat forces to Europe and Africa, promoting regional security and stability to ensure safety for the world’s oceans and sea lanes.

    “As we mark the 75th anniversary of the U.S. 6th Fleet, we honor the enduring legacy of our Sailors, past and present, who have worked tirelessly to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the Mediterranean,” said Vice Adm. J.T. Anderson, Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet. “Sixth Fleet has been a cornerstone of U.S. Naval presence in Europe and Africa and we remain committed to defending our nation’s interests and upholding the principles of freedom and security that have guided us since our founding.”

    Sixth Fleet has enhanced transatlantic security through support to NATO, building partnership capacity and working with partners to promote trade and freedom, stop unlawful activity at sea, and ensure enduring relationships with allies.

    This year’s celebration coincides with the 250th birthday of the U.S. Navy, on Oct. 13. For 250 years, America’s Navy has promoted prosperity and security, deterred aggression, and protected the American way of life. The U.S. Navy, through Sixth Fleet, deploys its force of combat-ready Sailors, alongside Allies and partners, in waters and coasts throughout Europe and Africa.

    Gaeta served as the home of U.S. Sixth Fleet from 1967-2005 when it was united with U.S. Naval Forces Europe in Naples, Italy. One of the Navy’s first visits to Gaeta came in 1849 when Pope Pius IX visited former flagship USS Constitution. It marked the first time a Pope stepped foot on sovereign U.S. territory.

    Mount Whitney became Sixth Fleet’s flagship when it transited to Italy and relieved USS LaSalle (AGF 3) in 2005. The ship’s current Commanding Officer, Capt. Colin Price, assumed command Jan. 31.

    “Mount Whitney has proudly served as the Sixth Fleet Flagship for the last 20 years,” Price said.  “Our ship and crew enables the Sixth Fleet Commander to lead both U.S. and NATO forces at sea and deliver decision advantage to Vice Adm. Anderson and his staff. We’re honored to be a part of this team and to play a role in writing the next chapter in the Sixth Fleet’s storied history.”

    Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, conducts the full spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with allied, and interagency partners, in order to advance U.S. national interests and security and stability in Europe and Africa.

    MIL Security OSI –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Board member reappointed to Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Professor Ian Graham will rejoin the Board for a second term.

    Professor Ian Graham has been reappointed to the board of Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew for a second term of three years.

    His term will run from 1 May 2025 to 30 April 2028.

    The reappointment has been made in accordance with the Governance Code on Public Appointments.

    Biography

    • Professor Graham is currently based at the University of York, in the Centre for Novel Agricultural Products and holds the Weston Chair in Biochemical Genetics. He has previously held roles in the University of Glasgow, University of Oxford, and Stanford University.
    • Professor Ian Graham completed his PhD in Plant Molecular Biology from the University of Edinburgh. His research interests now focus on plant natural products such as noscapine (anti-cancer), codeine (analgesic), and artemisinin (antimalarial).
    • Ian was elected as a Fellow of the Royal Society in 2016 and won the Biochemical Society’s 2017 Heatley Medal and Prize for “exceptional work in applying advances in biochemistry, and especially for developing practical uses that have created widespread benefits and value for society”.

    The Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew

    • The Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew is a world-famous scientific organisation, internationally respected for its outstanding collections as well as its scientific expertise in plant and fungal diversity, conservation and sustainable development in the UK and around the world.
    • Kew Gardens is a major international and a top London visitor attraction. Kew Gardens’ 132 hectares of landscaped gardens, and Wakehurst, Kew’s wild botanic garden in Sussex, attract over 2.5 million visits every year. Kew Gardens was made a UNESCO World Heritage site in July 2003 and celebrated its 260th anniversary in 2019. Wakehurst is home to Kew’s Millennium Seed Bank, the largest wild plant seed bank in the world, as well as over 500 acres of designed landscapes, wild woodlands, ornamental gardens and a nature reserve.
    • The Kew Madagascar Conservation Centre is Kew’s third research centre and only overseas office. RBG Kew receives approximately one third of its funding from government through the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and research councils. Further funding needed to support RBG Kew’s vital work comes from donors, membership and commercial activity including ticket sales.

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    Published 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: How our team spotted the most energetic neutrino detected to date

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By David Benoit, Senior Lecturer in Molecular Physics and Astrochemistry, University of Hull

    A detector on the seabed near Toulon, France, has spotted a high energy neutrino. ivan bastien/Shutterestock

    Recent research on lightweight particles called neutrinos might have passed you by – much like the more than 10 trillion neutrinos passing through your body each second. Now, our new paper – with 21 countries, more than 60 institutes and around 360 scientists contributing – reports the observation of the most energetic neutrino yet.

    Despite the enormous number of neutrinos around us, this is one of the most exciting – and rarest – astronomical events of the year. Our paper has been published in the journal Nature.

    Neutrinos are tiny elementary (sub-atomic) particles that are abundant in our universe. Yet, you probably haven’t seen any. They do not interact with other matter in the ways we are familiar with.

    Their lack of charge, for example, means that the electrostatic force that governs most of our everyday experiences does not interact with them at all. And their vanishingly small mass means that gravity – the other major force we experience – also has no effect on them in lab conditions on Earth.

    So, detecting their presence is challenging to say the least.

    Neutrinos can be produced in a huge number of environments. These include the radioactive decays of bananas, the interior of the Sun, during the violent death of a massive star and in the hot, dense disks of matter around supermassive black holes, to name just a few.

    They are formed through the actions of the weak nuclear force, which governs radioactive decay. It is this force that enables positively charged particles called protons, which make up to atomic nucleus, to change into neutrons, neutrally charged particles which also exist in the atomic nucleus, and vice versa.

    We cannot detect a neutrino directly. But, every now and then (although very rarely), they might bump into something. When that happens, through the action of this weak nuclear force, a charged particle, such as an electron, may be created – seemingly out of nowhere – that we can detect.

    Those charged particles travel at enormous speeds. And when they move through a medium such as water, they create an eerie, faint blue glow as they are slowed down. This event, called the Cherenkov effect, also happens in nuclear reactor containment pools.

    How likely (or unlikely) are these interactions? Well, you would have to flip 75 heads in a row on a fair coin to have the same probability of a single neutrino interacting with a particle of matter. Think this is easy? Go ahead and flip them. It’ll take a while.

    Under the sea

    The KM3NeT telescope collaboration uses this Cherenkov effect to scrutinise the depths of the Mediterranean Sea for the telltale faint glow of those neutrino events. They operate two huge detection stations – one off the shores of Toulon, France and one off the southern coast of Sicily. Scientists keep watch for events around the clock.

    The scale of those detectors is gigantic, as are most neutrino detectors, since the only way of spotting the elusive neutrino collision is to try to increase the amount of matter that the neutrino can interact with. In fact, the KM3 part of the KM3NeT acronym stands for the kilometre cube (KM3) of seawater that the detector will be surveying when completed.

    The detection stations themselves each consist of nearly 600 light detectors – spherical buoys each containing 31 light sensing tubes, which are attached to cables anchored to the seabed up to 3.5km below the surface.

    The particle described in our recent paper was detected on February 13 2023. And you might wonder why the long wait? The intervening time has been spent by collaborators across Europe verifying and simulating the detection to confirm the nature of the event. After months of work by the KM3NeT team, we can finally say that this is the most energetic observation of a neutrino interaction ever recorded.

    About 28,000 photons (light particles) were detected across the array in Sicily, indicating that a hugely energetic event had just happened. That said, an average 75W lightbulb generates millions and millions of photons every second (about 100 quintillion to be more precise). But while these few thousands of photons might appear to be a small event, remember that this has been generated by a single particle.

    In fact, the energy of the neutrino responsible for such bright display was estimated to be 220 peta-electronvolts (PeV) or 30 times more energetic than the highest-energy neutrino recorded so far. In terms of particle energies, it is around 1,000 times more energetic than the particles generated at Cern, the most energetic accelerator facility in the world.

    The light generated by this record-breaking event could be followed through the detector array and our collaboration was able to use it to reconstruct the near-horizontal trajectory of this high-energy neutrino. The path taken indicates that this neutrino is of cosmic origin.

    We don’t know exactly where it comes from, but we’ve identified 12 potential blazars (bright cores of active galaxies) that may have produced it. It is also possible that it was created in the interaction of cosmic rays with photons from the cosmic energy background.

    This detection provides a window into the ultra-high-energy phenomena happening in the universe and could, for example, help us better understand the nature of some of the most energetic cosmic rays. Moreover, the observation can help us further test the theoretical models that predict the existence of high-energy neutrinos.

    David Benoit receives funding from the European Union, the Science and Technology Facilities Council and the UKRI National Quantum Computing Centre.

    James Keegans receives funding from the European Union.

    – ref. How our team spotted the most energetic neutrino detected to date – https://theconversation.com/how-our-team-spotted-the-most-energetic-neutrino-detected-to-date-249519

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Scottish colourists exhibition: the painters who stood shoulder to shoulder with Matisse and Cezanne

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Blane Savage, Lecturer in MA Creative Media Practice and BA(Hons) Graphic Art & Moving Image, University of the West of Scotland

    The exhibition curator James Knox is to be congratulated on bringing together an impressive collection of work that tells the story of a diverse group of artists who helped transform and modernise British art in the early 20th century and contains work held in private collections not seen by the public before.

    The Scottish Colourists: Radical Perspectives centres on the creativity of four Scottish artists: Samuel John Peploe, John Duncan Fergusson, Francis Campbell Boileau Cadell and George Leslie Hunter, who are known to be among Scotland’s most innovative and radical painters.

    The Scottish colourists, as they were known, all visited and lived in Paris and were heavily influenced by the burgeoning avant-garde movement there in the early years of the 20th century. This was during its most dynamic and transformative stages, when cubism, post-impressionism and fauvism movements were evolving.

    The exhibition highlights and contrasts the work produced by the colourists to that of Roger Fry’s Bloomsbury group members, Vanessa Bell and her amour Duncan Grant. It also includes work by the Fitzroy Street Group and several distinguished Welsh artists of that time, Augustus John and James Dickson Innes, as well as fauvist artists Andre Derain and Kees van Dongen.

    The colourists’ paintings stand out in the exhibition through the maturity and confidence of their artworks, the tonal qualities and vibrancy of their colour palettes consistently rising above the more muted works surrounding them.


    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.


    The capacity of the colourists to study, travel and seek inspiration internationally, away from a grey Scottish Presbyterian climate, and particularly, embedding themselves in the Paris art scene in the early 20th century is impressive.

    These artists stood shoulder to shoulder with their European contemporaries, inspired by the post-impressionist work of Cezanne, Matisse, Van Gogh and Derain. They delivered consistent and highly sophisticated artworks throughout their careers exploring light, shape and dynamic colour ranges, and often painted outdoors.

    Each of the Scottish colourists returned to Scotland bringing new approaches to art with them. Peploe experimented with Cezanne-like geometric forms, whereas Fergusson’s practice was heavily influenced by the fauves. Hunter experimented with simplified post-impressionist blocks of colour to create dynamic shapes, while Cadell often focused on bold shapes and stylish impressionistic compositions.

    Peploe, Hunter and Cadell exhibited in London’s Leicester Gallery in 1923 where they were first described as the “three colourists” by critic P.G. Konody.

    Peploe, Fergusson and Hunter’s reputations were enhanced in 1924 when their work was bought by the French state after an exhibition organised by one of the most influential art dealers in Europe, Glaswegian Alexander Reid. He represented the four artists at the Galerie Barbazanges in Paris entitled Les Peintres de L’Ecosse Moderne, and turned their loose affiliation into an art movement.

    Reid had also been responsible for developing the profile of The Glasgow Boys – a group of radical young painters whose disillusionment with academic painting signalled the birth of modernism in Scotland in the late 19th century. Reid was also a central figure in developing Sir William Burrell’s art collection. This was closely followed by a further exhibition in London’s Leicester Gallery in 1925 and then in Paris in 1931.

    Peploe was the most commercially successful of the four artists, having a still life purchased by the Tate in 1927. His painting of Paris Plage captures the atmospherically startling white light of that French region. His studio work with a still life of flowers and fruit had the hallmarks of Cezanne’s style.

    His love of outdoor landscapes, as shown in Kirkcudbright, painted in south-west Scotland, also resemble Cezanne’s primary geometric forms. He visited the island of Iona on a number of occasions with Cadell and other painters, revealing his love of the white sands, rocks and water which can be seen in Green Sea, Iona.

    Cadell was known for his powerful still lifes, stylish portraits of elegant women in hats, and for his landscape painting on Iona. Cadell’s Green Sea on Iona and Ben More on Mull on show are part of a series of paintings of the white sands he produced on his regular visits there.

    J.D. Fergusson‘s The Blue Hat, Closerie de Lilas is an outstanding piece on show which dazzles with the vibrancy of Parisian cafe life. He was attracted to fauve-like expressive colours and strong outlines in his work. The one piece of sculpture on display is by Fergusson, whose foray into sculptural medium in the Eastre, Hymn to the Sun is striking in its modernist aesthetic – like the female robot character in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis.

    Having no art training like the others, Lesley Hunter’s Still Life with White Jug and Peonies in a Chinese vase highlight his developing skills as a still life painter and they have a striking vibrancy to them. His outdoor scenes use loosely styled daubs of colour in a post-impressionistic style often in vibrant colours.

    All the Scottish colourists were recognised for their influence and contribution to the development of Scottish art during their lifetimes, combining aspects of The Glasgow School and cutting-edge Parisian avant garde. But they fell out of fashion due to economic decline before the second world war.

    They were rediscovered and packaged as a collective in the 1950s initially by art historian T.J. Honeyman in his book Three Scottish Colourists and were brought together with the inclusion of J.D. Fergusson in the 1980s. Although their key role in the development of Scottish art history is assured, interestingly their appreciation in France is even greater than in Britain.

    The Scottish Colourists: Radical Perspectives is on at the Dovecot Studios in Edinburgh until June 28.

    Blane Savage does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Scottish colourists exhibition: the painters who stood shoulder to shoulder with Matisse and Cezanne – https://theconversation.com/scottish-colourists-exhibition-the-painters-who-stood-shoulder-to-shoulder-with-matisse-and-cezanne-249624

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 13, 2025
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