US Senate News:
Source: The White House
Today, President Donald J. Trump held a call with Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom. President Trump offered his condolences for the recent loss of the Prime Minister’s brother and expressed his well wishes for the British Royal Family. The two leaders also discussed the recent release of Israeli-British national Emily Damari from Hamas captivity and how both countries can promote a fair bilateral economic relationship.
Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council
Holding an emergency meeting following advances by the 23 March Movement, or M23, towards the city of Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and concurrent attacks on United Nations peacekeepers there, the Security Council heard today that urgent action is needed to address a rapidly deteriorating situation while time remains to do so.
“The United Nations is profoundly concerned by the resumption of hostilities,” said Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations. On 23-24 January, M23 fired on positions of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). He reported that, as a result, several blue helmets were “killed in carrying out the tasks entrusted to them by this Council”. He also noted that M23 has significantly extended its territorial gains over the past few weeks and has opened a new front in South Kivu, from which MONUSCO recently withdrew.
“At this critical juncture, with the lives of countless vulnerable civilians, peacekeepers and respect for this Council’s mandate at stake, MONUSCO remains committed to the robust defence of its mandate,” he stated. He stressed that, for its part, the Council “must honour the sacrifices made by the peacekeepers who laid down their lives in pursuit of this noble goal by sending a clear and unequivocal message to M23 and its backers that actions endangering the lives of civilians and UN peacekeepers will not be tolerated.”
Also reporting on the situation was Bintou Keita, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of MONUSCO. Noting that M23 and Rwandan forces have penetrated the outskirts of Goma — “causing mass panic and flight amongst the population” — she said that roads are blocked and that M23 has declared Goma’s airspace closed. “In other words, we are trapped,” she said, calling on the Council to “act now” to secure the civilian population, humanitarian-aid workers and all UN personnel.
Calling on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to continue political negotiations in the context of the Luanda Process, she urged: “More than ever, we must find a political solution.” She also called on Rwanda to withdraw its forces from Congolese territory and end support for M23, and on the Democratic Republic of the Congo to “make significant efforts” to neutralize the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda, or FDLR.
Joyce Msuya, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, then stressed that if hostilities spread into Goma, “the impact on civilians could be devastating”. In North and South Kivu, hundreds of civilians have been killed and injured over the last few weeks. Further, hundreds of thousands have fled their homes, humanitarian access remains constrained and hospitals are overwhelmed. Against that backdrop, she urged all parties to “protect civilians and the critical infrastructure they rely on”.
She also urged them to avoid using wide-area explosives and heavy weapons in populated areas. “This will be particularly important should the hostilities spread into Goma, given the risks of conflict in urban areas,” she observed. And, to address the escalating humanitarian crisis “before the situation worsens further”, she called on the Council to end the hostilities, ensure respect for international law and provide adequate funding for humanitarian action.
“The resolution of the conflict in eastern DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] must be political, not military,” stated the representative of Sierra Leone, also speaking for Algeria, Guyana and Somalia. The Luanda and Nairobi Processes “remain viable paths to peace”, he said, while underscoring that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo must be respected “by all States and non-State actors alike”. France’s representative, stating that the presence of foreign military forces threatens civilian protection and contributes to displacement, concurred: “Force is not an option.”
Along those lines, China’s representative said: “All external forces should refrain from providing support to M23 and other armed groups to prevent further deterioration.” He also joined other Council members in pointing out that “attacks on peacekeepers may constitute war crimes”. The representative of Greece echoed that, also noting that attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers constitute a basis for sanctions designations. Also making these points was the representative of the United Kingdom, who observed that “the numbers of those lost and injured is changing by the hour”.
These attacks, stressed Slovenia’s representative, constitute “an attack on peace itself”. Recalling the Council’s recent, unanimous decision to renew MONUSCO’s mandate, she underlined the organ’s responsibility to “stand unequivocally behind [its personnel] in these perilous times and ensure they return safely to their loved ones”. She added: “The international community, and this Council, cannot afford to remain passive in the face of this crisis.” Panama’s representative similarly stated: “History will not judge us on our intentions but, rather, our actions.”
The United Nations must take immediate measures to ensure the safety and security of both civilians and peacekeepers, underscored the representative of Pakistan. Expressing particular concern over a “highly exposed” Pakistani artillery battery near Sake, he stressed that this unit should be quickly redeployed for the safety of its personnel and heavy, expensive equipment. Stating that peacekeepers cannot be expected to implement the “challenging mandate assigned to them by the Council” without adequate support, he also urged the organ to address the root cause of the conflict — the illegal exploitation of natural resources.
On that, Denmark’s representative observed: “The illegal exploitation of natural resources in eastern DRC is a key driver to instability in the Great Lakes region — this must end.” The representative of the United States also expressed concern over the illicit exploitation of mining areas in territories controlled by M23, as did the representative of the Russian Federation: “The struggle to gain access towards strategically important Congolese minerals is one of the reasons for the continuation of the crisis.”
The representative of the Republic of Korea detailed that crisis: “In the past week alone, as [M23] has expanded its territory by 11 per cent, the number of [internally displaced persons] has doubled to 400,000.” He joined other Council members in calling on Rwanda to cease its support for the group and urged both Kinshasa and Kigali to return to dialogue and fully implement their commitments under the Luanda Process. He added: “We recognize the differing interests of the DRC and Rwanda, but further escalation of tensions is simply unacceptable — many lives are at stake.”
Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Francophonie of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, meanwhile, took the floor to stress that the situation in her country is “not a conflict like others”. Rather, it is “a declaration of war that no longer hides itself behind diplomatic manoeuvres”, she said, stressing that “Rwanda is preparing to orchestrate a carnage in broad daylight”. She also said that it is “clear that this crisis is directly linked to the economic plunder of our country by Rwanda”.
On that, she said that over 150 tons of coltan are illegally extracted and transported to Rwanda each month, where they are fraudulently labelled for export. Yet, while this illicit commerce finances the military activities of armed groups, it is “only one aspect of the aggression carried out by Rwanda”, she stressed. Others include the systematic targeting of peacekeeping forces, the 24 January assassination of the military governor of North Kivu and the sabotage of the Luanda Process.
Underscoring that the Council “cannot content itself with declarations of concern or simply ‘remaining seized of the matter’”, she said that the organ’s duty is to “defend human life without distinction”. It must therefore order an immediate end to Rwanda’s hostilities, impose targeted sanctions against those responsible for the aggression, impose an embargo on the export of all minerals labelled as Rwandan — particularly coltan and gold — and revoke Rwanda’s status as a troop-contributing country. “History will remember your decision today,” she said.
Meanwhile, Rwanda’s representative stressed: “The current crisis could have been averted had the DRC Government demonstrated a genuine commitment to peace.” While the Luanda Process achieved “significant milestones” — including a ceasefire that came into force on 4 August 2024 — the Government and Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo decided to increase militarization in the country’s east in October 2024. This included the deployment of heavy weaponry and additional troops — 10,000 from Burundi — along the border.
“By prioritizing militarization of the conflict instead of embracing the regional mechanisms that have been put in place to foster a sustainable solution born out of dialogue, the conflict has continued to escalate — leading to the prevailing situation today,” he said. He added that the FDLR has “even moved from being a suppletive force to a strategic ally of the Kinshasa Government”. Further, he said that the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has publicly vowed to instigate regime change in Rwanda for two years now.
While stating that “no one should harm peacekeepers”, he expressed concern that MONUSCO is “at the risk of being sucked into a conflict in which it would be a belligerent force”. MONUSCO should therefore focus on protecting civilians instead of fighting alongside Kinshasa’s military coalition. Noting that the situation today mirrors that which occurred 12 years ago, he stressed that “the DRC must play a helpful role — after all, this is a Congolese problem, for which the DRC is looking to outsource its solution.”
“It is with profound regret that this meeting is taking place at a time when a number of peacekeepers have lost their lives in the line of duty,” observed South Africa’s representative. Urging the Council to “send a clear message that peacekeepers’ lives matter”, she underlined the need to “value and safeguard the contribution of those entrusted to carry out the mandates adopted in this chamber”. Extending condolences to all victims’ families, the representative of Uruguay reiterated his country’s “steadfast commitment to peace”.
Angola’s representative pointed to “remarkable progress in the implementation of the Luanda Process”. “We need speedy and unconditional de-escalation of the conflict and genuine, renewed engagement of the parties to explore the ways of overcoming the pending issues,” he added. On that, Burundi’s representative said that the Luanda and Nairobi Processes “set out a clear road map to reach a lasting ceasefire”. Calling on the Council to demand an end to foreign interference and act decisively to guarantee that the Democratic Republic of the Congo can fully exercise its sovereignty and restore peace, he stressed: “Security and stability in Central Africa and beyond are at stake.”
Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police
Fitzgerald Carty, 66, (13.10.58) of Dacre Park, Lewisham, will appear at Bromley Magistrates’ Court on Monday, 27 January.
The incident happened at a petrol station in Lee High Road, Lewisham at around 15:00hrs on Saturday, 25 January. It was alleged a man, armed with a knife, attacked another man aged in his 40s.
A local police officer on patrol, PC Morgan Younger, intervened and arrested the suspect.
The man was taken into custody and charged this evening, Sunday 26 January, as above.
Source: Scottish Government
Considerable progress made but impacts continue.
Considerable progress has been made to restore services following Storm Éowyn but some impacts are set to continue, a meeting of the Scottish Government’s Resilience Room (SGORR) chaired by the First Minister has heard.
Extensive work by utility companies, national agencies and local authorities has continued at pace over the weekend to respond to the significant damage caused by the storm.
More than 265,000 customers have had their electricity restored since Friday, with the road, ferry and aviation networks resuming a near normal service.
The scale, extent and severity of the storm has made the recovery operation a significant challenge, with issues remaining on the power and rail networks.
There are around 16,000 properties without electricity, with utility companies continuing to provide support to affected customers.
The rail network is recovering from multiple, major issues particularly in the Central Belt. Network Rail are working to repair the damage, with lines opening when safe to do so, enabling ScotRail to run services as soon as they are able.
While most schools are expected to reopen following the weekend, damage to some buildings will mean at least 20 will remain closed until repairs are made.
First Minister John Swinney said:
“I want to thank those working in the public, private and third sector who continue to work tirelessly in difficult conditions to get Scotland fully back on its feet following this extremely serious storm.
“I also appreciate the continued patience of the public while this work continues, and encourage them to take extra care and look out for each other, particularly those who are supporting vulnerable neighbours and family members.
“The severity of the damage caused by this major event has had a considerable impact across a wide area of the country. While every effort has been made over the weekend to fully restore services, unfortunately it is clear some disruption can continue to be expected.
“Utility companies are doing all they can to return power to the remaining affected properties as soon as possible. They continue to provide support to customers, including ensuring provisions are in place for the most vulnerable.
“Network Rail has been dealing with more than 500 incidents, including significant treefall, and some routes are still affected, particularly in the Central Belt. I understand that every possible resource is being used to ensure services are up and running as soon as possible.
“I would therefore urge rail commuters to plan their journeys ahead. The latest information can be found on Network Rail and ScotRail social media accounts and websites.
“While most schools will reopen, a small number are expected to be closed so buildings can be made safe. I expect Local Authorities to be giving advance warning to parents, pupils and staff, where this is necessary.”
Background
SGoRR was attended by Transport Secretary Fiona Hyslop, Justice and Home Affairs Secretary Angela Contance, Cabinet Secretary for Health and Social Care Neil Gray, Education Secretary Jenny Gilruth, Rural Affairs and Islands Secretary Mairi Gougeon, Acting Net Zero and Energy Secretary Gillian Martin, Cabinet Secretary for Constitution, External Affairs Culture Angus Robertson and Minister for Agriculture and Connectivity Jim Fairlie. They were joined by representatives from the Met Office, Police Scotland, Transport Scotland, SEPA, transport and utilities companies and resilience partners.
The latest Met Office weather warnings are available on the Met Office website.
Flood alerts are issued by the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency and can be viewed on their website.
Advice on preparing for severe weather can be found on the Ready Scotland website.
Follow Traffic Scotland for the most up-to-date information on the trunk roads throughout the warning periods, via their website, social media channels and radio broadcasts. Updates on ScotRail services and road conditions are available online.
To report a power cut or damage to electricity power lines or substations call the SP Networks national Freephone number 105. More information on what to do during a storm can also be found on the SP Energy Website.
During a power cut firefighters can be called to fires started by candles or portable heaters. For advice on how to stay safe during a power cut visit the Scottish Fire and Rescue Website.
Source: Australian Government – Minister of Foreign Affairs
Penny Wong, Foreign Minister: Thanks very much for being here at the Jewish Community Centre in Krakow. We thank Jonathan Ornstein for hosting us here. We thank Zofia, a Holocaust survivor who spoke with us about her journey and her life, and we thank her for the honour of sharing some time with her.
Tomorrow, we will mark the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau and International Holocaust Remembrance Day. Mark Dreyfus and I are here in Poland, here together, to remember the six million Jewish lives lost – taken – in the Holocaust. Six million men, women and children murdered, including a million, near to here, at Auschwitz.
We are here to say, never again, never again. To stand with others across the international community and say, never again. I would say at this time, we have to stand together – across beliefs, across political difference, across politics – we have to stand against prejudice and hate and antisemitism in all its forms. Because at this time and in this place, we remember where that can lead, and we say, never again. I’ll hand over to Mark.
Mark Dreyfus, Attorney-General: Thanks very much, Penny.
The Foreign Minister and I are here in Krakow to represent the Australian Government at Auschwitz, at the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. And of course, this is a commemoration of the Holocaust, which is the greatest evil that the world has known. Some 6 million Jews were murdered across Europe. Over a million Jews were murdered at Auschwitz, where we’re going to be tomorrow. That number includes, at Auschwitz, a member of my own family. My great-grandmother, Ida Ransenberg, then aged 60, was murdered at Auschwitz on the 14th of October, 1942. We’re attending the commemoration to remember the dead and to say never again. We are attending this commemoration to condemn antisemitism in all its forms, to condemn antisemitism anywhere in the world, to condemn antisemitism in Australia. And we’re at this commemoration to acknowledge the magnificent contribution that’s been made by Jews to our own Australian community, including the very many survivors of the Holocaust who found their way to Australia, particularly after the war.
I’d like to acknowledge the meeting that Foreign Minister and I have had with Zofia, a Holocaust survivor who has made a wonderful contribution to the rebuilding of the Jewish community here in Krakow, of which this Jewish Community Centre is a part. It’s a wonderful thing to think that, after what happened in the Second World War, that there is a reborn Jewish community here in Krakow. Thanks very much.
Reporter: Given the rise in antisemitism, is this year’s anniversary perhaps more important now than in any point in previous decades when this liberation has been remembered?
Foreign Minister: This commemoration is always important, but you’re right to point to the rise of antisemitism we see in the world. And when we say never again, we have to not only mean it, but bring that to what we do as political leaders. So, I do see, we do see, attending this commemoration as solemn and important, the memory of six million murdered and also the knowledge of what hatred can lead to.
Reporter: We spoke to some survivors back in Australia, who, the reason they went to Australia and fled there after the war was because it was, in their words, the furthest place from here that they could travel to. But antisemitism is now on our shores. I think it’s been, since December, more than 150 incidents are being investigated. Is there a sense of responsibility that the government has to share in the fact that it’s made its way our shores in such a large amount?
Foreign Minister: We all must stand against antisemitism whenever and wherever we see it, and we must all work together to confront it. And you would have heard me say many times, these attacks are not just an attack on the Jewish community – they are that – but they are actually an attack on who we are as Australians. People came to our country and come to our country because of who we are; a country that welcomes people of all faiths, people from all over the world, and we treat each other with respect. We treat each other with tolerance. We are accepting and we ensure that we provide a safe community for all our people. That is part of what it is to be Australian, and as well, we must hold on to it.
Reporter: Minister, given the rise in antisemitism back home in Australia, why is Prime Minister Anthony Albanese not here for the 80th commemoration?
Foreign Minister: This is a very senior delegation. This is the Foreign Minister, the Attorney-General and the Special Envoy. And the seniority of the delegation speaks to how seriously we take this.
Reporter: You mentioned in your opening comments, the need for it to come across political lines. Is that a nod, do you think this debate has been too partisan in recent weeks?
Foreign Minister: This is not a time or a place for politics. This is a time to be above politics, because this, it is such a solemn and sad occasion, but also a time to recommit ourselves to learning the lessons of the Holocaust, the murder of six million Jews, and to say, never again. So, I’m simply saying to all of us in Australia, we must all work together to ensure never again.
Reporter: This rise in antisemitism can’t obviously be separated from the conflict in Gaza, the kidnapped Israelis and destruction there. Overnight, in the last few hours, Donald Trump has said we should ‘clean out Gaza’ and see the inhabitants from there moved into either Egypt or Jordan. Have you had a chance to speak with any of your partners in the United States. Or is it a proposition you would support or entertain?
Foreign Minister: I would simply say this; we all want the ceasefire to hold, and we all want a path to peace and security for all peoples in the Middle East.
Reporter: Mr Dreyfus, thank you for sharing your personal story. A lot of Australian Jews have said that the past 18 months has been perhaps the toughest time for Jews in Australia. How hard has it been for you to live both roles as part of the Government that’s been criticised for that, but also you and your family connection?
Attorney-General: I understand all too well, perhaps better than most, the shocking rise in antisemitism that we’ve experienced in Australia and indeed, right across the world. Australia has not been alone in what has been a shocking, grotesque rise in antisemitism, unexpected after the horrific events of October the 7th. We’ve all got to work together, and that’s government, community, every part of the community has to work together to make sure that antisemitism, events of antisemitism, conduct that is antisemitic, violence that’s got an antisemitic association, all of that has to end, and all of us have to work together to make sure that it ends. It’s really important. It’s something that affects every part of the Australian community, not just the Jewish community, and I’ve got a real sense that we are working together to make sure that it is brought to an end.
Reporter: Minister Wong, Mr Dutton has been critical in the media of you being here. He says you shouldn’t be, you’re not the right choice to be here. What would you say in response to that?
Foreign Minister: This is not a day for politics. It’s not a time for politics. This is a time to remember the murder of six million people, six million Jews, and to say never again and that’s why we’re here. And it is, as I said, a solemn occasion. I simply say again, I think, if we really mean never again, then we need to work together across politics and across faiths. And I have confidence Australians can do that.
Attorney-General: And if I could add to that – this is an appropriate time, and it is an appropriate place to actually reject attempts to politicise the Holocaust or to politicise antisemitism. Combating antisemitism, remembering the Holocaust, does not belong to the left or the right. It does not belong to the progressive side of Australian politics, or the conservative side of Australian politics. It is the solemn duty of everybody, of all of humanity, to remember the Holocaust, to say, never again. And it’s been grotesque, I use that word again, to see the rise in antisemitism since October the 7th, but it has been equally grotesque to see attempts being made to politicise either commemoration of the Holocaust or combating antisemitism. We need to get politics out of this. It’s a joint effort for the whole of humanity to remember the Holocaust, to remember the six million murdered Jews, and to say, as the Foreign Minister has said, as I’ve said, never again. That’s the task that we’re here for. That’s why this is an appropriate time and place to say there’s been far too much politicisation. It’s time for it to end.
Reporter: On that note, was there any suggestion that the Governor-General may have come over, as a kind of neutral person?
Foreign Minister: I haven’t engaged with the Governor General about that. As I’ve said before in a press conference, Mark and I, and the Deputy Prime Minister and I spoke about this, and we believed this was a suitably senior delegation. Thank you very much everyone for your time.
Attorney-General: Thank you.
Source: United Kingdom – Prime Minister’s Office 10 Downing Street
The Prime Minister spoke to President Trump today.
The Prime Minister spoke to President Trump today.
President Trump opened by sending his condolences to the Prime Minister on the loss of his brother. The Prime Minister thanked President Trump for his kind words and congratulated him on his inauguration.
The Prime Minister paid tribute to President Trump’s role in securing the landmark ceasefire and hostages deal in Gaza. The President welcomed the release of Emily Damari and sent his best wishes to her family. They discussed the importance of working together for security in the Middle East.
They also discussed trade and the economy, with the Prime Minister setting out how we are deregulating to boost growth.
The two leaders stressed the importance of the close and warm ties between the UK and the US, and the President spoke of his respect and affection for the Royal Family.
They agreed to meet soon and looked forward to further discussions then.
Published 26 January 2025
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Henry Maher, Lecturer in Politics, Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney
Elon Musk has emerged as one of the most influential and controversial powerbrokers in the new Trump administration. He spent at least US$277 million (about A$360 million) of his own money to help Donald Trump win re-election, campaigning alongside him around the country.
This significant investment of time and money raises the question of what the world’s wealthiest person hopes to receive in return. Critics have wondered whether Musk’s support for Trump is just a straightforward commercial transaction, with Musk expecting to receive political favours.
Or does it reflect Musk’s own genuinely held political views, and perhaps personal political ambition?
Decoding Musk’s political views and tracking how they have changed over time is a complex exercise. He’s hard to pin down, largely by design.
Musk’s current X feed, for example, is a bewildering mix of far-right conspiracy theories about immigration, clips of neoliberal economist Milton Friedman warning about the dangers of inflation, and advertisements for Tesla.
Historically, Musk professes to have been a left libertarian. He says he voted for Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012, Hillary Clinton in 2016 and Joe Biden in 2020.
Musk claims that over time, the Democratic party has moved further to the left, leaving him feeling closer politically to the Republican party.
Key to Musk’s political shift, at least by his own account, is his estrangement from his transgender daughter, Vivian Jenna Wilson.
After Vivian’s transition, Musk claimed she was “dead, killed by the woke mind virus”. She is very much alive.
He’s since repeatedly signalled his opposition to transgender rights and gender-affirming care, and diversity, equity and inclusion policies more broadly.
However, if the mere existence of a trans person in his family was enough to cause a political meltdown, Musk was clearly already on a trajectory towards far-right politics.
Rather than responding to a shift in the Democratic Party, it makes more sense to understand Musk’s changing politics as part of a much broader recent phenomenon known as as “the libertarian to alt-right pipeline”.
Libertarianism has historically tended to be divided between left-wing and right-wing forms.
Left libertarians support economic policies of limited government, such as cutting taxes and social spending, and deregulation more broadly. This is combined with progressive social policies, such as marriage equality and drug decriminalisation.
By contrast, right libertarians support the same set of economic policies, but hold conservative social views, such as opposing abortion rights and celebrating patriotism.
Historically, the Libertarian Party in the United States adopted an awkward middle ground between the two poles.
The past decade, though, has seen the Libertarian Party, and libertarianism more generally, move strongly to the right. In particular, many libertarians have played leading roles in the alt-right movement.
The alt-right or “alternative right” refers to the recent resurgence of far-right political movements opposing multiculturalism, gender equality and diversity, and supporting white nationalism.
The alt-right is a very online movement, with its leading activists renowned for internet trolling and “edgelording” – that is, the posting of controversial and confronting content to deliberately stoke controversy and attract attention.
Though some libertarians have resisted the pull of the alt-right, many have been swept along the pipeline, including prominent leaders in the movement.
While this discussion of theory may seem abstract, it helps to understand what Musk’s values are (beneath the chaotic tweets and Nazi salutes).
In economic terms, Musk remains a limited-government libertarian. He advocates cutting government spending, reducing taxes and repealing regulation – especially regulations that put limits on his businesses.
His formal role in the Trump administration as head of the “Department of Government Efficiency”, also known as DOGE, is targeted at these goals.
Musk has suggested that in cutting government spending, he will particularly target diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) initiatives. This is the alt-right influence on display.
Alt-right sensibilities are most evident, however, in Musk’s online persona.
On X, Musk has deliberately stoked controversy by boosting and engaging with white nationalists and racist conspiracy theories.
For example, he has favourably engaged with far-right politicians advocating for the antisemitic “Great Replacement theory”. This theory claims Jews are encouraging mass migration to the global north as part of a deliberate plot to eliminate the white race.
More recently, Musk has endorsed the far-right in Germany. He’s also shared videos from known white supremacists outlining the racist “Muslim grooming gangs” conspiracy theory in the United Kingdom.
Whether Musk actually believes these outlandish racist conspiracy theories is, in many ways, irrelevant.
Rather, Musk’s public statements are better understood as reflecting philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s famous definition of “bullshit”. For Frankfurt, “bullshit” refers to statements made to impress or provoke in which the speaker is simply not concerned with whether the statement is actually true.
Much of Musk’s online persona is part of a deliberate alt-right populist strategy to stoke controversy, upset “the left”, and then claim to be a persecuted victim when criticised.
Though Musk’s public statements might fit nicely into contemporary libertarianism, there are always contradictions when putting ideology into practice.
For example, despite Musk’s oft-stated preference for limited government, it’s well documented that his companies have received extensive subsidies and support from various governments.
Musk will expect this special treatment to continue under a quintessentially transactional president such as Trump.
The vexed issue of immigration also presents some contradictions.
Across the campaign, both Musk and Trump repeatedly criticised immigration to the US. Reprising the themes of the far-right Great Replacement theory, Musk claimed illegal immigration was a deliberate plot by Democrats to “replace” the existing electorate with “compliant illegals”.
However, after the election Musk has argued Trump should preserve categories of skilled migration such as the H1-B visas. This angered more explicit white supremacists, such as Trump advisor Laura Loomer.
Musk’s motives in arguing for the visas are not humanitarian. H1-B visas allow temporary workers to enter the country for up to six years, making them entirely dependent on the sponsoring company. It’s a situation some have called “indentured servitude”.
These visas have been used heavily in the technology sector, including in companies owned by both Musk and Trump.
So what might we expect from Musk now that he has both political office and influence?
Musk’s stated aim of using DOGE to cut $2 trillion from the US budget would represent an unprecedented transformation of government. It also seems highly unlikely.
Instead, expect Musk to focus on creating controversy by cutting DEI initiatives and other politically sensitive programs, such as support for women’s reproductive rights.
Musk will clearly use his political influence to look after the interests of his companies. Shares in Tesla surged to record highs following Trump’s re-election, suggesting investors believe Musk will be a major financial beneficiary of the second Trump administration.
Finally, Musk will undoubtedly use his new position to remain in the public eye. This last part might lead Musk into conflict with another expert in shaping the media cycle – Trump himself.
Musk has already reportedly fallen out with Vivek Ramaswamy, who will now no longer co-lead DOGE with Musk.
Exactly how stable the alliance between Trump and Musk is, and whether the egos and interests of the two billionaires can continue to coexist, remains to be seen.
If the alliance persists, it will be a key factor in shaping what many are terming the emergence of a “new gilded age” of political corruption and soaring inequality.
Henry Maher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
– ref. Elon Musk now has an office in the White House. What’s his political game plan? – https://theconversation.com/elon-musk-now-has-an-office-in-the-white-house-whats-his-political-game-plan-248011
Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements
The Prime Minister spoke to President Trump today.
The Prime Minister spoke to President Trump today.
President Trump opened by sending his condolences to the Prime Minister on the loss of his brother. The Prime Minister thanked President Trump for his kind words and congratulated him on his inauguration.
The Prime Minister paid tribute to President Trump’s role in securing the landmark ceasefire and hostages deal in Gaza. The President welcomed the release of Emily Damari and sent his best wishes to her family. They discussed the importance of working together for security in the Middle East.
They also discussed trade and the economy, with the Prime Minister setting out how we are deregulating to boost growth.
The two leaders stressed the importance of the close and warm ties between the UK and the US, and the President spoke of his respect and affection for the Royal Family.
They agreed to meet soon and looked forward to further discussions then.
Published 26 January 2025
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments
Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on the Democratic Republic of Congo.
President, MONUSCO peacekeepers and personnel work bravely to deliver this Council’s mandate in the most difficult of circumstances.
The United Kingdom reiterates clearly today that attacks on UN peacekeepers are absolutely unacceptable, and may constitute war crimes.
We also recall that planning, directing, sponsoring or conducting attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers may constitute a basis for UN sanctions designations.
The UK extends its sympathies to the families of the Blue Helmets from South Africa and Uruguay who have lost their lives serving in MONUSCO, and we extend our best wishes for a full recovery to those peacekeepers who have been injured.
The UK also extends its condolences to the families of all troops from the Southern African Development Community Mission in DRC who have lost their lives in support of DRC’s stability and security.
As we do so, we fully acknowledge that the numbers of those lost and injured is changing by the hour. It is a critical moment for DRC and for the region.
President, I would now like to make three points.
First, the United Kingdom once again condemns the violent actions of all armed groups, including FDLR and M23.
We are deeply concerned by the scale and pace of recent M23 and Rwandan Defence Forces advances in eastern DRC.
In December this Council renewed MONUSCO’s mandate. And in the four weeks since, M23’s unacceptable offensive, and that of the Rwanda Defence Forces, through North and South Kivu, has resulted in the capture of several towns and villages.
As we’ve heard, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced, and violence has intensified as a result.
We are also deeply alarmed by M23’s declaration that they intend to take Goma, a city where the humanitarian situation is already catastrophic.
The rising number of displaced people resulting from M23’s territorial expansion has placed further pressure on crowded IDP camps and exacerbates the challenges faced by humanitarian actors.
This morning, the UK Foreign Secretary spoke with President Kagame and called for urgent de-escalation, outlining the need for Rwanda and the DRC to urgently return to the negotiating table.
Now, more than ever, it is critical that MONUSCO is able to deliver its mandate. M23 attacks on peacekeepers, with support from the RDF, must stop immediately.
These attacks prevent the force from being able to discharge its Security Council-mandated mission to protect civilians.
Rwandan spoofing and jamming of GPS signals, which obstruct UN and humanitarian operations, must also stop.
We urge all parties to remember their obligations under international humanitarian law.
Finally, President, the United Kingdom once again extends its thanks to Angola for its leadership on mediation efforts.
We encourage DRC and Rwanda to return to the negotiating table and to focus on making tangible progress on delivering on their commitments under the concept of operations.
There can be no military solution. Fighting must stop. Civilians must be protected. And the parties should engage in good faith in the political process.
Published 26 January 2025
Source: Government of Sweden
Published
Joint Statement by Nordic Baltic Foreign Ministers on Belarus, 26 January 2025.
The Nordic-Baltic countries support the statement by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas on support to the Belarusian people.
The Nordic-Baltic countries stand in solidarity with the Belarusian people who strive for a free, democratic, sovereign and independent Belarus. A future democratic Belarus has a place in the European family. Our countries will continue to support the tireless efforts of the Belarusian democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and independent Belarusian civil society both inside and outside Belarus.
The Nordic-Baltic countries continue to support the democratic right of the Belarusian people to choose their leaders through free and fair elections. This requires rule of law, political pluralism, and full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as genuine democratic preconditions. None of this is, regretfully, observed in today’s Belarus. Instead, the relentless and unprecedented level of repression, including arbitrary detention and torture, mass human rights violations, severe restrictions to political participation for opponents of the regime and highly restricted access to independent media have deprived the process that took place today of any legitimacy. This is also reflected in the decision of the Belarus’ authorities to invite the OSCE ODIHR mission only 10 days beforehand.
The Nordic-Baltic countries strongly urge the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, and their effective rehabilitation. Aliaksandr Lukashenka continues to lack any democratic legitimacy.
Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police
A man has been charged following a police investigation into the theft of high-value handbags from a shop on Wimbledon High Street.
Joshua Grant McKenzie, 22 (18.09.02) of Hounslow Rd, Feltham, was charged with theft on Sunday, 26 January in relation to the incident which took place on Tuesday, 14 January.
He is due to appear at Ealing Magistrates’ Court on Monday, 27 January.
Met officers have been working closely with Surrey Police colleagues, and today, McKenzie has also been charged by Surrey Police with theft from a store owned by the same business in Oakdene Parade, Cobham, on Monday 13 January.
The charges relate to the alleged theft of handbags, totalling around £15,000 in value, from the shops.
The store owner has been updated by police.
A 22-year-old man was arrested on Saturday, 25 January and charged as above.
Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police
An officer has been praised for his outstanding bravery in single-handedly tackling a suspect armed with a knife who was trying to stab another man.
PC Morgan Younger managed to take him to the ground and disarm and restrain him while calling for further assistance.
The incident happened at a petrol station in Lee High Road, Lewisham at around 15:00hrs on Saturday, 25 January.
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Jon Savell, in charge of policing London this weekend, said: “This is outstanding work from an officer who was on patrol alone, saw a very violent crime in progress and, without hesitation, raced in to assist.
“I cannot overstate how proud we are in the Met today of his quick-thinking and bravery. He was calm and professional and everything we want our police officers to be.
“I have no doubt without his intervention, the victim would have been seriously injured.”
PC Younger, who is attached to South East Command Unit and has five years’ service, was on patrol when he stopped at the petrol station to quickly buy a drink. At the entrance, he saw a man grab the victim around the throat and try to stab him with a large knife.
The officer immediately responded, took hold of the suspect and struggled with him while he continued to wield the knife.
He managed to bring him to the floor and disarm him without any help.
He then restrained him single-handedly while calling for back-up and still managing to arrest the man for attempted murder and possession of an offensive weapon.
He kept the man under control for five minutes until further officers arrived to help.
The man, in his 60s, remains in custody at this stage. He was further arrested for handling stolen goods and being concerned in the supply of Class A drugs, after a quantity of drugs was found at his home address.
The victim, aged in his 40s, was not injured thanks to PC Younger’s swift work.
Source: Northern Ireland – City of Derry
26 January 2025
Community Assistance for those affected by Storm
The public are advised that the following Derry City and Strabane District Council Leisure Centres at Templemore, Foyle Arena and Melvin Leisure Centres are open today, Sunday, from 9am – 6pm for anyone who is affected by the storm and who require help with heat, showers, water, phone charging and hot drinks.
The Riversdale and Derg Valley Leisure Centres will also open from 1pm – 6pm.
NIE Networks will have representatives at Foyle Arena today from 10am to 4pm to offer support to anyone who is without power.
NI Network have issued more info at the following link –
https://www.nienetworks.co.uk/news/article/2025/storm-eowyn-assistance-centres
Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Ingrid Waldron, Professor, Faculty of Humanities, HOPE Chair in Peace & Health, McMaster University
The police killing of George Floyd in 2020 in the United States was an appalling act involving a group of officers who did not place much, if any, value on the life of a Black man. In the agonizing nine minutes before he died under the knee of Derek Chauvin, Floyd cried out for air and for his mother.
Those moments, recorded by a passerby and shared widely and repeatedly over the days that followed, shocked the consciences of many Americans and others, triggering protests across the United States and in other countries, many of them led by the Black Lives Matter movement.
Chauvin was convicted of murder, and three other officers were convicted of other serious crimes.
Read more:
How to deal with the pain of racism — and become a better advocate: Don’t Call Me Resilient EP 2
While there is now greater awareness and scrutiny of racism and violence in policing, there is also a long record of reverting to old ways. Indeed, deeply entrenched racial bias is rooted in the soul and psyche of North American society and globally.
When we think about Black Lives Matter, we typically think of criminal justice, but the movement also started a conversation about the lingering mental health impacts of police brutality on those who experience it directly, as well as those who experience it vicariously.
The traumatizing after-effects of anti-Black racism also result from Black people’s experiences within other social structures, such as employment, education and health care.
The trauma resulting from multiple forms of anti-Black racism has a legacy that took root during the colonial era and has endured, impacting the spiritual, emotional, psychological and mental well-being of Black people in societies harmed by colonialism, such as Canada, the U.S. and the United Kingdom.
I am a professor and the HOPE Chair in Peace and Health in the Global Peace and Social Justice Program at McMaster University. I have been studying Black trauma for almost 20 years, and recently published a book on the subject, From the Enlightenment to Black Lives Matter: Tracing the Impacts of Racial Trauma in Black Communities from the Colonial Era to the Present.
The book documents that since the colonial era, Black bodies have been receptacles for trauma that carry the weight of the past and the present. Black trauma is deep, complex and continuing, and has harmful impacts on the mental health of Black people. It includes the dehumanizing and lingering consequences of the slave trade, the social and economic subjugation of Black people in Jim Crow America and the racist social structures that persist there and in Canada, the U.K. and elsewhere.
For Black people, trauma results from racist assaults to their spiritual, emotional, mental, psychological and physical well-being. When racism resides in the body in these visceral ways, it manifests as emotional pain and rage, and its lingering after-effects endure over generations.
Addressing the public health crisis of racial trauma for Black people requires that racism be recognized as a legitimate issue in health education and training, research, clinical practice, mental health services and policy, and in the mental health system more broadly.
It also requires that mental health professionals not only become more culturally competent, but also develop skills in structural competency.
That means being prepared to play a role in dismantling the inequities embedded within our social structures, including addressing the impact of upstream factors (poverty, poor public infrastructure, etc.) on the mental health of Black and other marginalized populations.
Addressing racial trauma experienced by Black people also demands an analysis that appreciates racism’s inter-generational and multifaceted features. This analysis would examine how racism not only manifests itself over generations, but also at different levels, such as through everyday interactions between people (individual racism), within institutions (institutional racism), or through cultural dominance (cultural racism).
For too long, efforts to address disparities between Black and white people in education, labour, employment, health and other social structures have focused on attributing these disparities to pathologies presumed to be inherent to Black culture and Black people. Instead, these efforts must be focused on identifying, dismantling and resolving the pathologies embedded within these social structures and peeling back the systems of power that impact mental health and well-being in Black communities.
Resolving structural pathologies that harm Black people must be accompanied by a willingness to understand and appreciate the complexities of Black life, Black trauma and Black responses to trauma that may appear maladaptive to many, but that are normal and natural responses to racism’s intergenerational, multi-faceted and multilevel manifestations.
Finally, resolving Black trauma must involve challenging the colonial and imperial legacies that reside within psychiatry and other mental health professions.
Ingrid Waldron receives funding from CIHR, SSHRC.
– ref. The legacy of anti-Black racism: The public health crisis of racial trauma – https://theconversation.com/the-legacy-of-anti-black-racism-the-public-health-crisis-of-racial-trauma-246104
Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Robert Jan van Pelt, Professor, School of Architecture, University of Waterloo
When, in the late 1980s, I began my research on the architectural history of the Auschwitz death camp, Jan. 27 wasn’t marked on any official calendar as a special day of commemoration.
Since then, as a historian who has focused on the history of the Holocaust in general and the history of Auschwitz in particular, and who has with collaborators curated the Auschwitz exhibition now showing in Toronto, I have seen changes in terms of how the Holocaust generally, and Auschwitz in particular, is publicly remembered and commemorated.
Jan. 27 is now identified as an annual International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust. On Jan. 27 1945, the Red Army liberated some 7,000 remaining prisoners in Auschwitz, located in south-central Poland. How was this date chosen, and what issues or reflection might it raise?
With 1.1 million murdered victims — of whom one million were Jews — Auschwitz was the most murderous of the German death camps. It had already become by the mid-1970s a powerful symbol of the Holocaust.
Yet during the Cold War, European nations commemorated the dead of the Second World War on dates that were anniversaries of the end of the war. In Poland, a profoundly Roman Catholic country, the observances of the victims of the war were held on All Saints Day or, since 1955, the Sunday closest to the Ides of April, not Jan. 27.
In the early 1990s, the Polish government led by President Lech Walesa decided to make the 50th anniversary of the arrival of the liberating Red Army at the gates of Auschwitz into a major international commemoration in 1995.
Seventeen heads of state, including German Federal President Roman Herzog, attended the occasion on Jan. 27, 1995. It was, in a sense, a “coming-out” of the now firmly democratic Polish Republic. At that time, Warsaw was eyeing membership of NATO and the EU, which had been formally established by means of the Maastricht Treaty two years earlier.
In the 1995 commemoration, Jews were largely invisible — in fact, Walesa forgot to mention the Jews in his speech.
Among Jews, primarily in North America and Israel, Holocaust commemorations are typically associated with three dates in the Hebrew (lunar) calendar:
1. The ninth day of the Jewish month of Av: Since time immemorial, Jews commemorated on this day the destruction of the First Temple (in 586 BCE) and the destruction of the Second Temple (in 70 CE).
2. The 10th day of the Jewish month of Tevet: This day, King Nebuchadnezzar II began the siege of Jerusalem that was to lead to the destruction of the First Temple. Traditionally on this day, Jews say the prayer of the dead for family members whose date of death is unknown. As the date of death of most of the Jews murdered in the Holocaust is indeed unknown, the 10th of Tevet became quite prominent in Israel as a date of Holocaust commemoration.
3. The 27th day of the Jewish month of Nisan: This day, established in 1953 as Yom Hashoah (Shoah Day) by the Israeli government, coincides with the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, which is a point of great pride to Jews. Thus, Yom Hashoah was meant to commemorate not only the depth of the catastrophe, but at the same time one of the few points of light within the Holocaust.
In American society, a custom arose in the 1980s to hold a commemorative day of the Holocaust in the period that stretches from the Sunday preceding Yom Hashoah to the Sunday following Yom Hashoah, creating a clear link with the Jewish practice. In Canada, Jews mobilized to introduce provincial days of remembrance, insisting that they would follow Jewish practice and be held on Yom Hashoah.
Months after the 1995 Polish commemoration, the leaders of the allied nations and Germany gathered in Berlin on May 8, 1995 to observe the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. German President Herzog noted that while many Germans still remembered May 8 as a day of defeat, in fact that day had opened a door to a future of peace and co-operation in Europe.
However, some Germans believed that it was now time to move on and stop talking about the the Nazis, the war and the Holocaust.
Herzog decided something had to be done to force continued engagement with the Nazi past, and to shut up revisionists who stressed German victimhood. He proclaimed Jan. 27 as Day of Commemoration of the Victims of National Socialism. It was a politically astute move. He knew that in any discussion about the meaning of the Third Reich, the name “Auschwitz” was the ultimate trump card that could not be beaten.
In 1998, Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson declared Jan. 27 to be an official day of Holocaust Remembrance. This move was to lay the groundwork for a larger Swedish-led inter-governmental educational initiative founded to combat rising antisemitism.
In support of this project, which lead to the Stockholm Declaration and the establishment of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), the British and Italian governments adopted Jan. 27 as a day of commemoration in 1999 and 2000.
A few years later, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia — plus Malta and Cyprus — joined the EU. Until then, it had consisted of countries that had been either stable liberal democracies since 1945, or had become such in the 1970s.
Most of the new members had been communist-ruled. There was nervousness about the baggage they would bring — especially persistent antisemitism. On Jan. 27, 2005, the European Parliament called on the European Council, Commission and member states to make Jan. 27 European Holocaust Memorial Day, to be observed across the EU.
The effects were profound: Aleida Assmann, a prominent historian of collective memory, observed that pan-European importance of the Jan. 27 day of commemoration since 2005 confirmed the Holocaust as a common “europäischer Gründungsmythos” or European foundation narrative
Later in 2005, the General Assembly of the United Nations made Jan. 27 an annual International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust. The resolution establishing the date invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed “that the Holocaust, which resulted in the murder of one third of the Jewish people, along with countless members of other minorities, will forever be a warning to all people of the dangers of hatred, bigotry, racism and prejudice.”
While deeply committed to the study of the history of Auschwitz and profoundly engaged with the commemoration of both the Holocaust in general and Auschwitz in particular, if forced to choose, I have a clear preference for Yom Hashoah over Jan. 27.
Jan. 27 as a day of commemoration emerged from initiatives taken by non-Jews at the highest political level, without much consultation with Jews.
A few of my now-deceased Auschwitz survivor friends told me that the entire Jan. 27 date should be cancelled as it has no or little meaning for Jews, and it certainly had no meaning for them as Auschwitz survivors, because they had been taken away from Auschwitz in a death march before the arrival of the Red Army.
Yet now it exists, and better to work with it. All the good reasons why Auschwitz became a symbol of the Holocaust are still valid — especially the fact that it ties a very complex series of events to a real place that everyone can visit.
But I would like to invite all who gather on Jan. 27 to remember the Holocaust to consider also its profoundly political origins. And I hope that they will decide to also attend a similar event a few months later, on Yom Hashoah.
Robert Jan van Pelt is curator for the Auschwitz exhibit at the ROM.
– ref. How Jan. 27 came to be International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust – https://theconversation.com/how-jan-27-came-to-be-international-day-of-commemoration-in-memory-of-the-victims-of-the-holocaust-248104
Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Véronique Plouffe, PhD candidate in Feminist and Gender Studies, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa
Canada presents itself as a gender equality and human rights champion both at home and abroad. But it’s also a global leader in mining, an industry with an abysmal human rights record.
Under the previous Conservative federal government, Canadian foreign aid was more directly aligned with mining and commercial interests. But when Liberal Justin Trudeau was elected in 2015, it appeared to signal a return to more “progressive” values.
Read more:
Justin Trudeau’s resignation creates a progressive void in Canada, part of a long-established cycle
The launch of the Feminist International Assistance Policy in 2017 was a powerful symbol in this direction. But despite Canadian mining companies being accused of environmental and human rights violations in various countries, the Liberal government continues to actively support mining abroad.
Canada is a global mining powerhouse, home to almost half of the world’s publicly listed mining and mineral exploration companies.
According to 2023 data, Canadian mining companies operate in 95 foreign countries and the value of Canadian mining assets totalled $336.7 billion. Half of Canadian foreign mining assets are located in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Peru is a key mining partner; 71 firms operate in the country and Canada has nearly $10 billion of mining assets in the South American country. Canada has the largest number of mining exploration projects in Peru at 24, and ranks third (after the United Kingdom and Peru itself) in terms of mining exploration investments.
At last year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Lima, Trudeau announced investments to create “a better future by focusing on a healthier planet and equal opportunities for all.” These included initiatives to support women’s and girls’ rights as well as improving access to the justice system for Indigenous and Afro-Peruvian communities.
Trudeau also announced the creation of a Canada-Peru Dialogue of Critical Minerals and Mining Sustainability.
But can Canada be both a human rights champion and a global mining leader? While Canada describes its mining industry as sustainable and socially responsible, human rights organizations paint a different picture.
Canadian mining companies have been accused in Peru of environmental contamination, criminalizing community leaders, land dispossession and the violation of Indigenous self-determination. Canada has also supported Peruvian mining law reforms in favour of foreign mining investment.
Canada’s support of the current and highly unpopular Dina Boluarte government, which ousted left-wing president Pedro Castillo in 2022, points to the ongoing prioritization of mining interests over human rights, even those of Canadian citizens.
Castillo meanwhile had proposed a plan to renegotiate mining contracts with multinational companies so that more profits stayed in Peru.
Reports have shown that women bear the brunt of mining’s negative impacts, which include gender violence, economic and food insecurity and health problems.
Women human rights defenders confronting extractive industries also face gender-specific risks and challenges. Indigenous women are often at the forefront of resisting extractive projects.
Despite the bold ambitions of Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy to promote a “more peaceful, more inclusive and more prosperous world,” critics have highlighted several weaknesses and challenges.
Among them: insufficient funding, its instrumentalist approach (when women are used for broader economic and political goals), as well as its emphasis on neoliberal capitalist growth and the private sector.
Some have also highlighted its lack of coherence with other policy areas, including trade and security, its support for Israel and its treatment of Indigenous women in Canada.
Read more:
Canada’s inaction in Gaza marks a failure of its feminist foreign policy
My ongoing research with civil society organizations in Peru suggests that Canada is providing much-needed and highly appreciated support for women’s rights, LGTBQ+ and Indigenous women’s organizations, namely through its Women’s Voice and Leadership Program. The positive impacts of such initiatives should not be overlooked.
But even though these projects — often short-term — may benefit some people and some organizations, they often fail to tackle the structural causes of poverty and gender inequality. They also neglect to take into account Canada’s role in creating and maintaining global inequalities through its disruptive mining activities.
Read more:
The role of Canadian mining in the plight of Central American migrants
For years, Canadian civil society organizations have been demanding greater accountability and regulation for Canadian overseas corporations. Despite promises to hold companies accountable for abuses abroad with the creation of the Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise, the Trudeau government has been criticized for failing to deliver on these pledges.
With the possible election of a Conservative federal government in the coming months, it’s unlikely that tightening regulations for private Canadian companies operating in other countries will be a priority.
Despite its feminist ambitions, taking a closer look at Canada’s role in countries where it has significant mining interests reveals a more complex and nuanced image of Canada in the world.
Véronique Plouffe receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).
– ref. Canada’s claim that it champions human rights is at odds with its mining practices – https://theconversation.com/canadas-claim-that-it-champions-human-rights-is-at-odds-with-its-mining-practices-246757
Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police
A man has been charged with murder following a death in Putney.
Rory Talbot, 30 (12.10.94), of Mossbury Road, Wandsworth, was charged on Saturday, 25 January with the murder of his father Mark Talbot, aged 75.
Rory Talbot is remanded in custody to appear at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on Monday, 27 January.
On Friday, 24 January at 03:36hrs police were called to an address in Deodar Road, SW15 following reports of a stabbing.
Officers attended alongside the London Ambulance Service who treated Mr Talbot.
Despite their best efforts, he was pronounced dead at the scene.
Our thoughts are with the family and friends of Mark Talbot who have been affected by this tragic incident, and who continue to receive support from specialist officers.
Mark Talbot’s family said: “We are grateful for the support provided by police, our neighbours and others. We ask that our privacy is respected while we come to terms with the tragic loss of a highly respected member of the community.”
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Thierry Vircoulon, Coordinateur de l’Observatoire pour l’Afrique centrale et australe de l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales, membre du Groupe de Recherche sur l’Eugénisme et le Racisme, Université Paris Cité
Senegalese president Bassirou Diomaye Faye announced on 31 December 2024 that all foreign military bases in his country would close by 2025. On the same day, the Ivorian president said France would hand over control of the Abidjan military base to his country’s army.
These announcements followed the planned withdrawal of French forces from Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Researcher Thierry Vircoulon discusses the potential implications of these decisions for France.
France’s military presence in French-speaking Africa has evolved in strategic importance over the past 65 years. Over time, the significance of this presence has diminished. By the end of the 20th century, some French military bases had been closed and the number of pre-positioned troops had reduced from 20,000 in 1970 to 6,000 in 2022.
Military bases have been a strategic asset for France, initially securing newly independent and fragile regimes in the aftermath of independence. They also played a key role in conducting external operations. These bases served as logistical hubs that enabled French military interventions and the evacuation of French nationals during crises.
For instance, Operation Sagittarius, which evacuated European nationals from Sudan at the start of the war in April 2023, relied on the resources of the French base in Djibouti.
Without these logistical points, projecting military strength becomes much more challenging and, in some cases, impossible. The closure of these military bases implies the end of major French military interventions, such as Operation Licorne (2002-2015) or Barkhane (2014-2022).
In recent years, the cost-benefit analysis of these bases has been questioned in Paris. They have become a political and strategic issue. On one hand, these bases symbolise the old post-independence security pact between Paris and the leaders of some countries, making them appear as a legacy of neocolonialism.
On the other hand, from a strategic point of view, having a pre-positioned military presence in Africa serves little purpose when the main threats to France come from elsewhere (for instance, eastern Europe and the Middle East). As a result, the strategic value of France’s military bases in Africa has diminished in recent years.
The closure of the bases would signal the end of France’s capacity to intervene – whether justified or not – in certain conflicts across Africa.
This would weaken its influence in the region, particularly as conflicts intensify across the continent, with more and more African countries seeking security providers. Addressing, stabilising or resolving these conflicts requires a combination of diplomacy and military intervention.
It’s important to distinguish between countries that have chosen to sever military cooperation agreements with Paris (such as Chad and Senegal) and those that have simply closed military bases but maintained the military cooperation (like Ivory Coast).
The announcement of base closures by African leaders, rather than by Paris, symbolises a rejection of French policy. This marks a significant loss of influence for France in the countries involved.
As part of the informal division of security responsibilities among western nations, France has long been considered the “gendarme of Africa”.
Between 1964 and 2014, France conducted no fewer than 52 military operations across the continent. At the start of the 21st century, it played the role of lead nation in European military interventions in Africa. Other western powers recognised France’s expertise in managing African crises. In most cases, they either supported or simply followed its policies.
This was reflected in France’s diplomatic responsibilities within the European Union and at the United Nations. French diplomacy is well represented in the Africa division of the European External Action Service. The French delegation is tasked with drafting UN security council resolutions on Africa. The peacekeeping department at the UN is led by a French diplomat.
The end of France’s military interventionism will have diplomatic repercussions beyond Africa. They are already being felt in Brussels, Washington and New York.
In Niger, the United States did not follow France’s hard line stance after the coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023. Instead it attempted to engage with the junta. This effort ultimately failed.
In Chad, while Paris was complacent towards the dynastic succession from Idriss Déby to his son, Berlin took a critical stance. This led to a diplomatic crisis and the expulsion of ambassadors from Chad and Germany in 2023. In Italy, prime minister Giorgia Meloni publicly criticised French policy in Africa, causing tensions between Paris and Rome.
In 2023, Africa accounted for only 1.9% of France’s foreign trade, 15% of its supply of strategic minerals, and 11.6% of its oil and gas supply.
France’s top two trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa are Nigeria and South Africa – former British colonies which have never hosted a French military base.
Since the beginning of the century, relations between France and African countries have been marked by a clear separation between economic and military interests. France not only has diminishing economic interests in Africa, but these are concentrated in countries that do not host French military bases.
– What France loses by closing its military bases in Africa
– https://theconversation.com/what-france-loses-by-closing-its-military-bases-in-africa-247898
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Thierry Vircoulon, Coordinateur de l’Observatoire pour l’Afrique centrale et australe de l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales, membre du Groupe de Recherche sur l’Eugénisme et le Racisme, Université Paris Cité
Senegalese president Bassirou Diomaye Faye announced on 31 December 2024 that all foreign military bases in his country would close by 2025. On the same day, the Ivorian president said France would hand over control of the Abidjan military base to his country’s army.
These announcements followed the planned withdrawal of French forces from Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Researcher Thierry Vircoulon discusses the potential implications of these decisions for France.
France’s military presence in French-speaking Africa has evolved in strategic importance over the past 65 years. Over time, the significance of this presence has diminished. By the end of the 20th century, some French military bases had been closed and the number of pre-positioned troops had reduced from 20,000 in 1970 to 6,000 in 2022.
Military bases have been a strategic asset for France, initially securing newly independent and fragile regimes in the aftermath of independence. They also played a key role in conducting external operations. These bases served as logistical hubs that enabled French military interventions and the evacuation of French nationals during crises.
For instance, Operation Sagittarius, which evacuated European nationals from Sudan at the start of the war in April 2023, relied on the resources of the French base in Djibouti.
Without these logistical points, projecting military strength becomes much more challenging and, in some cases, impossible. The closure of these military bases implies the end of major French military interventions, such as Operation Licorne (2002-2015) or Barkhane (2014-2022).
In recent years, the cost-benefit analysis of these bases has been questioned in Paris. They have become a political and strategic issue. On one hand, these bases symbolise the old post-independence security pact between Paris and the leaders of some countries, making them appear as a legacy of neocolonialism.
On the other hand, from a strategic point of view, having a pre-positioned military presence in Africa serves little purpose when the main threats to France come from elsewhere (for instance, eastern Europe and the Middle East). As a result, the strategic value of France’s military bases in Africa has diminished in recent years.
The closure of the bases would signal the end of France’s capacity to intervene – whether justified or not – in certain conflicts across Africa.
This would weaken its influence in the region, particularly as conflicts intensify across the continent, with more and more African countries seeking security providers. Addressing, stabilising or resolving these conflicts requires a combination of diplomacy and military intervention.
It’s important to distinguish between countries that have chosen to sever military cooperation agreements with Paris (such as Chad and Senegal) and those that have simply closed military bases but maintained the military cooperation (like Ivory Coast).
The announcement of base closures by African leaders, rather than by Paris, symbolises a rejection of French policy. This marks a significant loss of influence for France in the countries involved.
As part of the informal division of security responsibilities among western nations, France has long been considered the “gendarme of Africa”.
Between 1964 and 2014, France conducted no fewer than 52 military operations across the continent. At the start of the 21st century, it played the role of lead nation in European military interventions in Africa. Other western powers recognised France’s expertise in managing African crises. In most cases, they either supported or simply followed its policies.
This was reflected in France’s diplomatic responsibilities within the European Union and at the United Nations. French diplomacy is well represented in the Africa division of the European External Action Service. The French delegation is tasked with drafting UN security council resolutions on Africa. The peacekeeping department at the UN is led by a French diplomat.
The end of France’s military interventionism will have diplomatic repercussions beyond Africa. They are already being felt in Brussels, Washington and New York.
In Niger, the United States did not follow France’s hard line stance after the coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023. Instead it attempted to engage with the junta. This effort ultimately failed.
In Chad, while Paris was complacent towards the dynastic succession from Idriss Déby to his son, Berlin took a critical stance. This led to a diplomatic crisis and the expulsion of ambassadors from Chad and Germany in 2023. In Italy, prime minister Giorgia Meloni publicly criticised French policy in Africa, causing tensions between Paris and Rome.
In 2023, Africa accounted for only 1.9% of France’s foreign trade, 15% of its supply of strategic minerals, and 11.6% of its oil and gas supply.
France’s top two trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa are Nigeria and South Africa – former British colonies which have never hosted a French military base.
Since the beginning of the century, relations between France and African countries have been marked by a clear separation between economic and military interests. France not only has diminishing economic interests in Africa, but these are concentrated in countries that do not host French military bases.
Thierry Vircoulon is a research associate at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales and an expert on the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime.
– ref. What France loses by closing its military bases in Africa – https://theconversation.com/what-france-loses-by-closing-its-military-bases-in-africa-247898
Source: Greenpeace Statement –
QUEZON CITY, Philippines — Kapag sinabing “environmentally friendly” ang isang produkto, iniisip na mahal, sosyal, at pangmayaman ito nang marami. Pero ang isang negosyo, may sikreto kung bakit abot-kaya ang kanilang sustainable cleaning products — ang pagtanggal ng single-use plastic (SUP) mula sa produksyon.
Hulyo 2022 nang magsimula ang kwento ng Sabon Express, sa layuning mahikayat ang publikong gumamit ng boteng matatagpuan na sa kanilang bahay sa tuwing bibili ng sabong panlinis. Ani Mellany Zambrano, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) ng kumpanya, talamak kasi ang bentahan ng household cleaning materials sa plastic sachet at mga boteng itatapon lang din.
“Our campaign is towards [a] refill revolution,” sabi ni Mellany sa panayam ng Greenpeace Philippines. “So ‘yun ‘yung pangarap namin, na ‘yung mga Pilipino ay magiging responsable sa paggamit ng mga plastic na bote at mga lalagyan. Hindi ‘yung wala lang tayong pakialam na we are after convenience, na bumibili tayo, bumibili, kumukonsumo, at nagtatapon ng plastic.”
“So ang gusto natin is bumili tayo consciously, magkonsumo tayo at maging responsable tayo na hindi tayo makadagdag sa lumalalang plastic pollution.”
“Sachet country” kung ituring ng ilan ang mga bansang Third World gaya ng Pilipinas. Aabot sa 164 milyong sachet ang ginagamit sa bansa araw-araw, bagay na naiipon sa mga landfill, kanal at karagatan. Ito ay dahil sa walang-tigil na produksyon ng SUPs ng mga malalaking korporasyon at kawalan ng batas para rito.
Marami rito’y pinaglagyan ng personal care (19%) o household cleaning products (17%). Hindi ito nabubulok at bumabara sa mga estero, bagay na nagpapalala sa baha tuwing may bagyo. Nadudurog lang ito hanggang sa maging microscopic. Pwede itong malanghap, mainom, o makain bilang “microplastic” na siyang nagdudulot ng pagkabaog at cancer.
‘Di gaya ng mararangyang bayan, limitado ang kakayahan ng mga Pinoy na bumili nang bultuhan. Dahil dito, pumatok ang konsepto ng “tingi” na siyang sinakyan ng mga dambuhalang kumpanya lalo na’t hindi ito mabigat sa bulsa. Nakapako kasi sa P645 kada araw ang minimum wage sa Metro Manila — ang pinakamataas sa buong Pilipinas — samantalang P1,205 kada araw ang kinakailangang kita ng pamilyang may limang miyembro para mabuhay nang disente.
Isa sa appeal ng plastic ay ang “mababang presyo” nito. Pero alam n’yo bang malaking bahagi ng binabayaran ng consumer sa mga produkto ay packaging?
Karaniwang 10% hanggang 40% ng kabuuang retail price ng iyong binibili ay dahil sa lalagyan nito. Gayunpaman, dedepende ito sa uri ng packaging material na ginamit, laki at bigat ng produkto, at production process. Ito’y nasa porma ng plastic na bote, galon, sticker labels, shrink plastics o sachet na madalas itinatapon matapos ang isang gamit.
Sa pagtalikod ng Sabon Express sa SUPs at pag-engganyo sa customers magdala ng sariling bote at lalagyan, nagawa tuloy nilang makapaglabas ng produktong mas mura kaysa sa mga ibinebenta sa malls at supermarkets.
“Every time na bumibili kayo ng inyong mga produkto na gumagamit ng mga single-use plastics… at itinatapon niyo, hindi lang kayo nakakadagdag sa polusyon kundi actually nagsasayang po kayo ng pera,” prangkahang pagbabahagi ni Mellany.
“Kami po as manufacturer, ito po ay tapat na sinasabi namin sa inyo. Kayo po actually ay nagsasayang ng minimum 30% to a maximum of 70% [ng presyo ng produkto] sa packaging na itinatapon ninyo… So, imagine ninyo po ‘yung mase-save po ninyo [oras na umiwas kayo rito] at imagine din po ninyo yung perang itinatapon ninyo every time po nagpa-patronize kayo yung single-use plastic.”
Sa halagang P20, makabibili ka na ng 400 milliliters na dishwashing liquid sa Sabon Express. Ang kailangan mo lang gawin, magdala ng sariling bote o lalagyang ire-refill. Malayo ang presyo nito kumpara sa mahigit-kumulang P100 halagang dishwashing liquid (355 ml sachet refill pack) na mabibili gaya ng kilalang brand na Joy.
Ang Sabon Express ay isang case study ng University of Portsmouth sa United Kingdom bilang bahagi ng research at campaign nito sa pagbubuo ng isang Global Plastics Treaty. Una nang sinabi ni Mellany na naging katuwang nila ang Department of Science and Technology (DOST) sa pagtitimpla ng kanilang mga produkto.
Gayunpaman, aminado si Mellany na wala pang insentibo mula sa gobyerno para itulak ang mga negosyong maging plastic-free. Malaki raw sana ang magagawa ng pagpapababa ng buwis para mga negosyong gaya ng kanila para maeengganyo ang iba pa. Bukod pa rito, mainam daw kung mapapadali ang pagproproseso ng business permits atbp. dokumento.
Isa ang kulturang “tingi” ng mga Pilipino — o pagbili ng mga produkto sa maliitang sukat — sa isinisisi ng ilan sa pamamayagpag ng mga plastic sachet atbp. SUPs sa bansa. Pero alam n’yo bang environmentally-sustainable ang pinagmulan nito bago i-hijack ng mga korporasyon gamit ang mga plastic na pakete?
Tradisyunal na nagdadala ng kani-kanilang mga bote, garapon at bayong ang mga Pinoy noon sa mga palengke at sari-sari store na siya nilang pinupuno ng produkto sa tuwing bibili. Ang “reuse and refill” practice na ito ang nais ibalik ng mga negosyo gaya ng Sabon Express, bagay na kanilang minomodernisa sa pamamagitan ng mga makabagong kagamitan.
Kaugnay nito, nagdisenyo sila ng mga agaw-pansing vendo machines para mapadali ang proseso ng refilling sa kanilang mga tindahan. Hindi inumin o pagkain ang iniluluwa nito kundi dishwashing liquid, fabric conditioner, liquid detergent at hand soap. Puwede itong sahurin gamit ang mga lalagyang dala ng customer kontra plastic pollution.
Tumatanggap ang kanilang mga makina ng P5, P10, at P20 barya.
“Our dream is to be visible in all supermarkets, convenience stores, public markets, grocery stores,” patuloy ni Mellany.
“Pangarap po namin na laging merong Sabon Express dispensing machines or vendo machines na makakapag-offer ng murang produkto para sa mga Pilipino, para sa mga consumers na magdadala ng sarili nilang [containers]… para mabigyan po ng pagkakataon ‘yung lahat ng Pilipino na makabili ng produkto na high quality pero very affordable.”
Bahagi ang Sabon Express, sampu ng iba pang progresibong negosyo, sa lumalawak na koalisyong Champions of Change. Layon nitong pagbuklurin ang mga Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) atbp. negosyong lumalaban sa krisis ng SUPs. Nabuo ito sa inisyatiba ng Greenpeace International, Plastic Pollution Coalition and the Break Free From Plastic.
Lumaki ang grupo sa hanay ng mga entrepreneur habang hindi pa rin napagkakaisahan ng mga kasapi ng United Nations ang isang Global Plastics Treaty. Itinutulak dito ng Greenpeace ang hindi bababa sa 75% na pagbabawas sa produksyon ng plastic kasabay ng SUP bans.
Ayon kay Mellany, malaki ang maitutulong ng isang malakas na tratado sa pagsugpo ng plastic pollution para makapagbalangkas ng polisya ang mga bansang aayon at raratipika rito.
“A more concrete [example of this would be] sana… ma-incentivize ‘yung mga MSMEs na kagaya namin at magkaroon ng solid support ng government sa mga negosyo [na plastic-free],” paliwanag niya nang matanong kung ano ang nais niyang makita sa kasunduan.
Dagdag pa niya, responsibilidad ng mga negosyong maging kampeon ng kalikasan upang matiyak na malinis at mapakikinabangan ito ng mga susunod na henerasyon. Aniya, walang “satellite Earth” na malilikasan ang mga tao kung saka-sakaling tumindi ang krisis.
Napipintong plantsahin ng huling pagpupulong ng Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) ang isang Global Plastics Treaty sa darating na 2025. Nananawagan ang Greenpeace Philippines sa UN member states na pagkaisahan ang isang tratadong magtitiyak ng karapatan sa kalusugan at ligtas na kapaligiran habang hinihikayat ang publikong suportahan ang mga negosyong tumatalikod sa plastic wala pa mang kasunduan.
Pumirma rito para ipakita ang suporta.
###
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
BEIJING, Jan. 26 — As China continues to relax its visa-free policies, the country has seen a notable increase in foreign visitors joining the Spring Festival travel rush, eager to experience its rich cultural traditions.
The Spring Festival travel rush, or chunyun, began on Jan. 14 and will continue through Feb. 22. Preliminary statistics show that ticket bookings for inbound flights during this period surged 47 percent year on year.
As Japanese traveler Kyoko Shimada touched down at Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport, she was greeted by a vibrant display of red lanterns and paper cuttings featuring the Chinese character “fu,” a symbol of good fortune.
Having long dreamed of visiting China, Shimada and her husband seized the chance to travel just ahead of the Spring Festival, taking advantage of China’s visa-free policy for Japanese citizens.
“Although the airport was busy before the holiday, the immigration process was smooth and faster than I expected. The signs were clear, and some were even in Japanese,” Shimada said. During their three-day stay in Shanghai, the couple plans to enjoy the traditional lantern shows in the ancient Yuyuan Garden and savor the city’s local cuisine.
In 2024, China further relaxed its visa policies to enhance openness and promote people-to-people exchanges, allowing more foreign travelers and business people to visit the country visa-free.
A key development was the introduction of expanded unilateral visa-free entry policies in November 2024, allowing ordinary passport holders from 38 countries to stay in China for up to 30 days without needing a visa.
The following month, China announced a relaxation in its visa-free transit policy, increasing the permitted stay for eligible foreign travelers to 240 hours, up from the previous limits of 72 or 144 hours.
According to Trip.com Group, China’s online travel service giant, inbound travel orders from foreign tourists surged by 203 percent year on year during the Spring Festival, with the majority of visitors coming from the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Japan.
Recently, Thai tourist Ruchanewan Binsaree traveled to the ancient city of Xi’an, the capital of northwest China’s Shaanxi Province, with a friend. “I’ve visited cities like Shanghai and Hangzhou before, but we came here specifically to see the famous Terracotta Warriors,” Binsaree said.
During their trip, they explored the city’s historic architecture, strolled along a pedestrian street adorned with festive lanterns, and enjoyed watching locals dressed in red Hanfu, a traditional style of Chinese clothing.
Since the first day of the Spring Festival travel rush, Xi’an’s port has welcomed more than 3,100 inbound foreign visitors, marking a 187 percent increase compared to the same period last year. Among them, over 1,800 availed of the visa-free policies, while more than 360 took advantage of the 240-hour visa-free transit option.
Beyond air travel, the high-speed railway has become a popular option for foreign tourists during the Spring Festival rush, thanks to its convenience and efficiency.
“We originally planned to visit northern cities for the Spring Festival, but the high-speed railway made it possible to explore more places in a shorter time,” said a tourist from the Netherlands, as she waited at Guangzhou South Railway Station in south China’s Guangdong Province. “We are eager to experience the unique traditions of different cities during the Chinese New Year, making this Spring Festival even more memorable.”
Praising the clean, well-maintained environment of China’s railway stations, she said, “The process of entering the station was particularly smooth. Simply swiping my passport verified my identity and ticket information.”
“China’s ongoing efforts to ease visa-free policies have attracted a growing number of foreign tourists, providing them with the opportunity to experience the country’s rich cuisine, vibrant culture and beautiful landscapes,” said Zhu Mao, deputy director of the culture and tourism development commission of southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality.
This trend serves as a valuable platform for fostering people-to-people exchanges and deepening global understanding of China, he added.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Cultural tourism promotion event on Spring Festival held in Brussels
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
2025 ‘Happy Chinese New Year’ global launching ceremony and gala held in Malaysian capital
KUALA LUMPUR, Jan. 26 — The 2025 “Happy Chinese New Year” global launching ceremony and gala was held here on Saturday evening, featuring wonderful performances presented by actors from Malaysia and China.
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, China’s Minister of Culture and Tourism Sun Yeli, and Malaysian Minister of Tourism, Arts and Culture Tiong King Sing attended the event and delivered speeches.
At the beginning of the ceremony, distinguished guests from both the Malaysian and Chinese governments jointly performed the “dotting of the lion’s eyes” ritual, officially inaugurating the event.
During the event, artists from China, Malaysia, Britain, France, the United States, New Zealand, Egypt, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, and some other countries collaborated in performances, fully showcasing the cultural essence of the Chinese New Year (Spring Festival) and creating a festive atmosphere of global celebration.
The “Happy Chinese New Year” celebrations worldwide, organized by the Chinese Ministry of Culture and Tourism, have been held annually for 25 consecutive years.
The year 2025 will mark the first Chinese New Year following the festival’s successful inscription on UNESCO’s list of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.
This year, the “Happy Chinese New Year” event will feature nearly 500 diverse performances and exhibitions across more than 100 countries and regions worldwide.
Source: The Conversation – Indonesia – By Francesco Perono Cacciafoco, Associate Professor in Linguistics, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University
Shiyue Wu, a member of Francesco Perono Cacciafoco’s research team at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU), who is currently developing intensive fieldwork in Alor Island to document and preserve endangered languages, discovered and first documented Kape during a Language Documentation fieldwork in August 2024 and therefore actively contributed to this study.
As of 2025, more than 7000 languages are spoken across the world. However, only about half of them are properly documented, leaving the rest at risk of disappearing.
Globalisation has propelled languages such as English and Chinese into the mainstream, and they now dominate global communication.
Parents today prefer their children learn widely-spoken languages. Meanwhile, indigenous languages, such as Copainalá Zoque in Mexico and Northern Ndebele in Zimbabwe, are not even consistently taught in schools.
Indigenous people generally did not use writing for centuries and, therefore, their languages do not have ancient written records. This has contributed to their gradual disappearance.
To prevent the loss of endangered languages, field linguists – or language documentarists – work to ensure that new generations have access to their cultural heritage. Their efforts reveal the vocabulary and structure of these languages and the stories and traditions embedded within them.
My research team and I have spent over 13 years documenting endangered Papuan languages in Southeast and East Indonesia, particularly in the Alor-Pantar Archipelago, near Timor, and the Maluku Islands. One of our significant and very recent discoveries is Kape, a previously undocumented and neglected language spoken by small coastal communities in Central-Northern Alor.
Not only is the discovery important for mapping the linguistic context of the island, but it also highlights the urgency of preserving endangered languages by employing Language Documentation methods.
In August 2024, while working with our Abui consultants, Shiyue Wu, my Research Assistant at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, discovered a previously-ignored, presumably undocumented Papuan language from Alor, ‘Kape’.
At the time, she was gathering information about the names and locations of ritual altars known as ‘maasang’ in the Abui area, with assistance from our main consultant and several native speakers. In Central Alor, every village has a ‘maasang’.
During conversations about the variants in altar names across Alor languages and Abui dialects, some speakers mentioned the name of the ‘maasang’ (‘mata’) in Kape—a language previously unrecorded and overlooked in linguistic documentation.
‘Kape’ translates to ‘rope’, symbolising how the language connects its speakers across the island, from the mountains to the sea. Geographically and linguistically, it is associated with Kabola in the east and Abui and Kamang in Central Alor.
At this stage, it is unclear whether Kape is a distinct language or a dialect of Kamang, as the two are mutually intelligible. Much of Kape’s basic lexicon (the collection of words in one language), indeed, shares cognates (related words among languages) with Kamang.
However, Kape is spoken as the primary (native) language by the whole Kape ethnic group of Alor, and the speakers consider themselves an independent linguistic and ethnic community. This could serve as an element for regarding Kape as a language.
Kape also shows connections with Suboo, Tiyei, and Adang, other Papuan languages from Alor Island. The speakers, known as ‘Kafel’ in Abui, are multilingual, fluent, to some extent, in Kape, Kamang, Bahasa Indonesia, Alor Malay, and, sometimes, Abui.
So far, no historical records have been found for Kape, though archival research may reveal more about its origins. Based on its typology and lexical characteristics, Kape appears as ancient as other languages spoken in Alor. Like many Papuan languages, it is critically endangered and requires urgent documentation to preserve its legacy.
Language Documentation aims to reconstruct the unwritten history of indigenous peoples and to guarantee the future of their cultures and languages. This is accomplished by preserving endangered, scarcely documented or entirely undocumented languages in disadvantaged and remote areas.
External sources, like diaries by missionaries and documentation produced by colonisers, can help reconstruct some historical events. However, they are insufficient for providing reliable linguistic data since the authors were not linguists.
My research team and I document endangered languages, starting with their lexicon and grammar. Eventually, we also explore the ancient traditions and ancestral wisdom of the native speakers we work with.
We have contributed to the documentation of several Papuan languages from Alor Island, especially Abui, Kula, and Sawila. These languages are spoken among small, sometimes dispersed communities of indigenous peoples belonging to different but related ethnic clusters.
They communicate with each other mostly in Bahasa Indonesia and Alor Malay. This is because their local languages are almost never taught in schools and are rarely used outside their groups.
Over time, in addition to documenting their lexicons and grammars, we worked to reconstruct their place-names and landscape names, oral traditions, foundation myths, ancestral legends and the names of plants and trees they use.
We also explored their traditional medical practices and local ethnobotany, along with their musical culture and number systems.
Safeguarding Kape is not just linguistically relevant. Its preservation and documentation are not just about attesting its existence – they also contribute to revitalising the language, keeping it alive, and allowing the local community to rediscover its history, knowledge, and traditions to pass down to the next generations.
This journey has just begun, but my team and I – with the indispensable collaboration from our local consultants and native speakers – are prepared to go all the way towards its completion.
Francesco Perono Cacciafoco received funding from Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU): Research Development Fund (RDF) Grant, “Place Names and Cultural Identity: Toponyms and Their Diachronic Evolution among the Kula People from Alor Island”, Grant Number: RDF-23-01-014, School of Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS), Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU), Suzhou (Jiangsu), China, 2024-2025.
– ref. Finding ‘Kape’: How Language Documentation helps us preserve an endangered language – https://theconversation.com/finding-kape-how-language-documentation-helps-us-preserve-an-endangered-language-247465
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
SAN JOSE, Calif., Nov. 05, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Infinera Corporation (NASDAQ: INFN) today released financial results for its third quarter ended September 28, 2024.
GAAP revenue for the quarter was $354.4 million compared to $342.7 million in the second quarter of 2024 and $392.4 million in the third quarter of 2023.
GAAP gross margin for the quarter was 39.8% compared to 39.6% in the second quarter of 2024 and 40.3% in the third quarter of 2023. GAAP operating margin for the quarter was (3.1)% compared to (8.7)% in the second quarter of 2024 and 2.0% in the third quarter of 2023.
GAAP net loss for the quarter was $(14.3) million, or $(0.06) per diluted share, compared to net loss of $(48.3) million, or $(0.21) per diluted share, in the second quarter of 2024, and net loss of $(9.4) million, or $(0.04) per diluted share, in the third quarter of 2023.
Non-GAAP gross margin for the quarter was 40.4% compared to 40.3% in the second quarter of 2024 and 41.9% in the third quarter of 2023. Non-GAAP operating margin for the quarter was 3.5% compared to (1.3)% in the second quarter of 2024 and 7.7% in the third quarter of 2023.
Non-GAAP net income for the quarter was $0.3 million, or $0.00 per diluted share, compared to non-GAAP net loss of $(14.0) million, or $(0.06) per diluted share, in the second quarter of 2024, and non-GAAP net income of $19.9 million, or $0.08 per diluted share, in the third quarter of 2023.
During the three-months ended September 28, 2024, the Company generated positive cash flow from operations of $44.5 million and ended the quarter with cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash of $115.6 million.
A further explanation of the use of non-GAAP financial information and a reconciliation of each of the non-GAAP financial measures to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure can be found at the end of this press release.
Infinera CEO, David Heard said “Our team delivered another quarter with continued sequential improvements in our financial metrics and critical service provider and webscaler design wins across our ICE-X coherent pluggables, next-generation line systems, software, and ICE7 solutions. In addition, in October we signed a non-binding preliminary memorandum of terms with the U.S. Department of Commerce for an award under the CHIPS and Science Act that, together with other federal and state incentives, could result in more than $200 million in funds for Infinera.”
“Looking ahead, our customers remain excited about our pending acquisition by Nokia as they look forward to the combined company accelerating the pace of innovation in the industry. We are making good progress on the steps required to close the transaction, including receiving stockholder approval and attaining U.S. antitrust and CFIUS approval. There are still other regulatory approvals pending, but we believe we remain on track to close the deal in the first half of 2025,” continued Mr. Heard.
Pending Merger with Nokia
On June 27, 2024, Infinera, Nokia Corporation, a company incorporated under the laws of the Republic of Finland (“Nokia”) (NYSE: NOK) and Neptune of America Corporation, a Delaware corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of Nokia (“Merger Sub”) entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (as it may be amended, modified or waived from time to time, the “Merger Agreement”) that provides for Merger Sub to merge with and into Infinera (the “Merger”), with Infinera surviving the Merger as a wholly owned subsidiary of Nokia. The transaction is expected to close in the first half of 2025.
In light of the proposed transaction with Nokia, and as is customary during the pendency of an acquisition, Infinera will not be providing financial guidance during the pendency of the acquisition.
Third Quarter 2024 Investor Slides to be Made Available Online
Investor slides reviewing Infinera’s third quarter of 2024 financial results will be furnished to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on a Current Report on Form 8-K and published on Infinera’s Investor Relations website at investors.infinera.com.
Contacts:
Media:
Anna Vue
Tel. +1 (916) 595-8157
avue@infinera.com
Investors:
Amitabh Passi, Head of Investor Relations
Tel. +1 (669) 295-1489
apassi@infinera.com
About Infinera
Infinera is a global supplier of innovative open optical networking solutions and advanced optical semiconductors that enable carriers, cloud operators, governments, and enterprises to scale network bandwidth, accelerate service innovation, and automate network operations. Infinera solutions deliver industry-leading economics and performance in long-haul, submarine, data center interconnect, and metro transport applications. To learn more about Infinera, visit www.infinera.com, follow us on X and LinkedIn, and subscribe for updates.
Infinera and the Infinera logo are registered trademarks of Infinera Corporation.
Forward-Looking Statements
This press release contains certain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Forward-looking statements generally relate to future events or Infinera’s future financial or operating performance. In some cases, you can identify forward-looking statements because they contain words such as “anticipate,” “believe,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “intend,” “may,” “should,” “will,” and “would” or the negative of these words or similar terms or expressions that concern Infinera’s expectations, strategy, priorities, plans or intentions. Forward-looking statements in this press release include, but are not limited to, statements regarding the amount Infinera could receive in government funding; and statements related to the Merger, including the timing of completion of the Merger and the future performance and benefits of the combined business.
These forward-looking statements are based on estimates and information available to Infinera as of the date hereof and are not guarantees of actual or future performance; actual results could differ materially from those stated or implied due to risks and uncertainties. The risks and uncertainties that could cause Infinera’s results to differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements include statements related to the Merger, including whether the Merger may not be completed or completion may be delayed, and if the Merger Agreement is terminated, there may be a required payment of a significant termination fee by either party; the receipt of necessary approvals to complete the Merger; the possibility that due to the Merger, and uncertainty regarding the Merger, Infinera’s customers, suppliers or strategic partners may delay or defer entering into contracts or making other decisions concerning Infinera; the significance and timing of costs related to the Merger; the impact on us of litigation or other stockholder action related to the Merger; the effects on us and our stockholders if the Merger is not completed; demand growth for additional network capacity and the level and timing of customer capital spending and excess inventory held by customers beyond normalized levels; delays in the development, introduction or acceptance of new products or in releasing enhancements to existing products; aggressive business tactics by Infinera’s competitors and new entrants and Infinera’s ability to compete in a highly competitive market; supply chain and logistics issues and their impact on our business, and Infinera’s dependency on sole source, limited source or high-cost suppliers; dependence on a small number of key customers; product performance problems; the complexity of Infinera’s manufacturing process; Infinera’s ability to identify, attract, upskill and retain qualified personnel; challenges with our contract manufacturers and other third-party partners; the effects of customer and supplier consolidation; dependence on third-party service partners; Infinera’s ability to respond to rapid technological changes; failure to accurately forecast Infinera’s manufacturing requirements or customer demand; failure to secure the funding contemplated by grants Infinera may receive from governments, agencies or research organizations, or failure to comply with the terms of those grants; Infinera’s future capital needs and its ability to generate the cash flow or otherwise secure the capital necessary to meet such capital needs; the effect of global and regional economic conditions on Infinera’s business, including effects on purchasing decisions by customers; the adverse impact inflation and higher interest rates may have on Infinera by increasing costs beyond what it can recover through price increases; restrictions to our operations resulting from loan or other credit agreements; the impacts of any restructuring plans or other strategic efforts on our business; Infinera’s international sales and operations; the impacts of foreign currency fluctuations; the effective tax rate of Infinera, which may increase or fluctuate; potential dilution from the issuance of additional shares of common stock in connection with the conversion of Infinera’s convertible senior notes; Infinera’s ability to protect its intellectual property; claims by others that Infinera infringes on their intellectual property rights; security incidents, such as data breaches or cyber-attacks; Infinera’s ability to comply with various rules and regulations, including with respect to export control and trade compliance, environmental, social, governance, privacy and data protection matters; events that are outside of Infinera’s control, such as natural disasters, acts of war or terrorism, or other catastrophic events that could harm Infinera’s operations; Infinera’s ability to remediate its recently disclosed material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting in a timely and effective manner, and other risks and uncertainties detailed in Infinera’s SEC filings from time to time; and statements of assumptions underlying any of the foregoing. More information on potential factors that may impact Infinera’s business are set forth in Infinera’s periodic reports filed with the SEC, including its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 30, 2023, filed with the SEC on May 17, 2024, and its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 29, 2024, as filed with the SEC on August 2, 2024, as well as subsequent reports filed with or furnished to the SEC from time to time. These SEC filings are available on Infinera’s website at www.infinera.com and the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. Infinera assumes no obligation to, and does not currently intend to, update any such forward-looking statements.
Use of Non-GAAP Financial Information
In addition to disclosing financial measures prepared in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), this press release and the accompanying tables contain certain non-GAAP financial measures that exclude in certain cases stock-based compensation expense, amortization of acquired intangible assets, restructuring and other related costs, warehouse fire recovery, merger-related charges, foreign exchange (gains) losses, net, and income tax effects. Infinera believes these adjustments are appropriate to enhance an overall understanding of its underlying financial performance and also its prospects for the future and are considered by management for the purpose of making operational decisions. In addition, the non-GAAP financial measures presented in this press release are the primary indicators management uses as a basis for its planning and forecasting of future periods. The presentation of this additional information is not meant to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for gross margin, operating expenses, operating margin, net income (loss) and net income (loss) per common share prepared in accordance with GAAP. Non-GAAP financial measures are not based on a comprehensive set of accounting rules or principles and are subject to limitations.
For a description of these non-GAAP financial measures and a reconciliation to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures, please see the table titled “GAAP to Non-GAAP Reconciliations” and related footnotes.
Infinera Corporation
Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations
(In thousands, except per share data)
(Unaudited)
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September 30, 2023 |
September 28, 2024 |
September 30, 2023 |
||||||||||||
| Revenue: | |||||||||||||||
| Product | $ | 276,214 | $ | 316,613 | $ | 778,008 | $ | 931,057 | |||||||
| Services | 78,184 | 75,756 | 226,051 | 229,615 | |||||||||||
| Total revenue | 354,398 | 392,369 | 1,004,059 | 1,160,672 | |||||||||||
| Cost of revenue: | |||||||||||||||
| Cost of product | 170,693 | 190,312 | 494,248 | 577,152 | |||||||||||
| Cost of services | 42,515 | 40,209 | 121,910 | 124,889 | |||||||||||
| Amortization of intangible assets | — | 3,528 | — | 10,621 | |||||||||||
| Restructuring and other related costs | (24 | ) | — | 652 | — | ||||||||||
| Total cost of revenue | 213,184 | 234,049 | 616,810 | 712,662 | |||||||||||
| Gross profit | 141,214 | 158,320 | 387,249 | 448,010 | |||||||||||
| Operating expenses: | |||||||||||||||
| Research and development | 73,283 | 76,846 | 225,223 | 237,234 | |||||||||||
| Sales and marketing | 35,715 | 41,075 | 118,357 | 124,406 | |||||||||||
| General and administrative | 34,160 | 29,368 | 101,114 | 89,762 | |||||||||||
| Amortization of intangible assets | 2,257 | 2,976 | 6,769 | 10,088 | |||||||||||
| Merger-related charges | 6,954 | — | 15,471 | — | |||||||||||
| Restructuring and other related costs | (157 | ) | 400 | 4,105 | 2,621 | ||||||||||
| Total operating expenses | 152,212 | 150,665 | 471,039 | 464,111 | |||||||||||
| Income (loss) from operations | (10,998 | ) | 7,655 | (83,790 | ) | (16,101 | ) | ||||||||
| Other income (expense), net: | |||||||||||||||
| Interest income | 874 | 546 | 2,789 | 1,734 | |||||||||||
| Interest expense | (8,764 | ) | (7,608 | ) | (25,556 | ) | (21,795 | ) | |||||||
| Other gain (loss), net | 8,485 | (7,540 | ) | (8,910 | ) | 10,586 | |||||||||
| Total other income (expense), net | 595 | (14,602 | ) | (31,677 | ) | (9,475 | ) | ||||||||
| Loss before income taxes | (10,403 | ) | (6,947 | ) | (115,467 | ) | (25,576 | ) | |||||||
| Provision for income taxes | 3,910 | 2,466 | 8,528 | 12,510 | |||||||||||
| Net loss | $ | (14,313 | ) | $ | (9,413 | ) | $ | (123,995 | ) | $ | (38,086 | ) | |||
| Net loss per common share: | |||||||||||||||
| Basic | $ | (0.06 | ) | $ | (0.04 | ) | $ | (0.53 | ) | $ | (0.17 | ) | |||
| Diluted | $ | (0.06 | ) | $ | (0.04 | ) | $ | (0.53 | ) | $ | (0.17 | ) | |||
| Weighted average shares used in computing net loss per common share: | |||||||||||||||
| Basic | 235,832 | 228,077 | 233,905 | 225,465 | |||||||||||
| Diluted | 235,832 | 228,077 | 233,905 | 225,465 | |||||||||||
Infinera Corporation
GAAP to Non-GAAP Reconciliations
(In thousands, except percentages)
(Unaudited)
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September 30, 2023 |
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| Reconciliation of Gross Profit and Gross Margin: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| GAAP as reported | $ | 141,214 | 39.8 | % | $ | 135,594 | 39.6 | % | $ | 158,320 | 40.3 | % | $ | 387,249 | 38.6 | % | $ | 448,010 | 38.6 | % | |||||||||||||
| Stock-based compensation expense(1) | 2,084 | 0.6 | % | 1,777 | 0.5 | % | 2,515 | 0.7 | % | 5,754 | 0.5 | % | 7,672 | 0.7 | % | ||||||||||||||||||
| Amortization of acquired intangible assets(2) | — | — | % | — | — | % | 3,528 | 0.9 | % | — | — | % | 10,621 | 0.9 | % | ||||||||||||||||||
| Restructuring and other related costs(3) | (24 | ) | (0.0) | % | 703 | 0.2 | % | — | 652 | 0.1 | % | — | — | % | |||||||||||||||||||
| Warehouse fire recovery(4) | — | — | % | — | — | % | — | — | % | — | — | % | (1,985 | ) | (0.2) | % | |||||||||||||||||
| Non-GAAP as adjusted | $ | 143,274 | 40.4 | % | $ | 138,074 | 40.3 | % | $ | 164,363 | 41.9 | % | $ | 393,655 | 39.2 | % | $ | 464,318 | 40.0 | % | |||||||||||||
| Reconciliation of Operating Expenses: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| GAAP as reported | $ | 152,212 | $ | 165,403 | $ | 150,665 | $ | 471,039 | $ | 464,111 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Stock-based compensation expense(1) | 12,305 | 8,024 | 13,230 | 32,967 | 41,721 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Amortization of acquired intangible assets(2) | 2,257 | 2,256 | 2,976 | 6,769 | 10,088 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Restructuring and other related costs(3) | (157 | ) | 3,948 | 400 | 4,105 | 2,621 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Merger-related charges(5) | 6,954 | 8,517 | — | 15,471 | — | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Non-GAAP as adjusted | $ | 130,853 | $ | 142,658 | $ | 134,059 | $ | 411,727 | $ | 409,681 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Reconciliation of Income (Loss) from Operations and Operating Margin: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| GAAP as reported | $ | (10,998 | ) | (3.1) | % | $ | (29,809 | ) | (8.7) | % | $ | 7,655 | 2.0 | % | $ | (83,790 | ) | (8.3) | % | $ | (16,101 | ) | (1.4) | % | |||||||||
| Stock-based compensation expense(1) | 14,389 | 4.1 | % | 9,801 | 2.8 | % | 15,745 | 3.9 | % | 38,721 | 3.8 | % | 49,393 | 4.3 | % | ||||||||||||||||||
| Amortization of acquired intangible assets(2) | 2,257 | 0.6 | % | 2,256 | 0.7 | % | 6,504 | 1.7 | % | 6,769 | 0.7 | % | 20,709 | 1.8 | % | ||||||||||||||||||
| Restructuring and other related costs(3) | (181 | ) | (0.1) | % | 4,651 | 1.4 | % | 400 | 0.1 | % | 4,757 | 0.5 | % | 2,621 | 0.2 | % | |||||||||||||||||
| Warehouse fire recovery(4) | — | — | % | — | — | % | — | — | % | — | — | % | (1,985 | ) | (0.2) | % | |||||||||||||||||
| Merger-related charges(5) | 6,954 | 2.0 | % | 8,517 | 2.5 | % | — | — | % | 15,471 | 1.5 | % | — | — | % | ||||||||||||||||||
| Non-GAAP as adjusted | $ | 12,421 | 3.5 | % | $ | (4,584 | ) | (1.3) | % | $ | 30,304 | 7.7 | % | $ | (18,072 | ) | (1.8) | % | $ | 54,637 | 4.7 | % | |||||||||||
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| September 28, 2024 |
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September 30, 2023 |
September 28, 2024 |
September 30, 2023 |
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| Reconciliation of Net Income (Loss): | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| GAAP as reported | $ | (14,313 | ) | $ | (48,287 | ) | $ | (9,413 | ) | $ | (123,995 | ) | $ | (38,086 | ) | |||||||||||||
| Stock-based compensation expense(1) | 14,389 | 9,801 | 15,745 | 38,721 | 49,393 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Amortization of acquired intangible assets(2) | 2,257 | 2,256 | 6,504 | 6,769 | 20,709 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Restructuring and other related costs(3) | (181 | ) | 4,651 | 400 | 4,757 | 2,621 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Warehouse fire recovery(4) | — | — | — | — | (1,985 | ) | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Merger-related charges(5) | 6,954 | 8,517 | — | 15,471 | — | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Foreign exchange (gains) losses, net(6) | (8,039 | ) | 11,690 | 7,527 | 10,099 | (9,903 | ) | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Income tax effects(7) | (788 | ) | (2,604 | ) | (894 | ) | (3,775 | ) | 2,072 | |||||||||||||||||||
| Non-GAAP as adjusted | $ | 279 | $ | (13,976 | ) | $ | 19,869 | $ | (51,953 | ) | $ | 24,821 | ||||||||||||||||
| Weighted Average Shares Used in Computing GAAP Net Income (Loss) per Common Share: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Basic | 235,832 | 234,349 | 228,077 | 233,905 | 225,465 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Diluted(8) | 235,832 | 234,349 | 228,077 | 233,905 | 225,465 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Weighted Average Shares Used in Computing Non-GAAP Net Income (Loss) per Common Share: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Basic | 235,832 | 234,349 | 228,077 | 233,905 | 225,465 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Diluted(9) | 240,502 | 234,349 | 257,219 | 233,905 | 228,735 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA (10): | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Non-GAAP net income (loss) | $ | 279 | $ | (13,976 | ) | $ | 19,869 | $ | (51,953 | ) | $ | 24,821 | ||||||||||||||||
| Add: Interest expense, net | 7,890 | 7,370 | 7,062 | 22,767 | 20,061 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Less: Other gain (loss), net | 446 | 507 | (13 | ) | 1,189 | 683 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Add: Income tax effects | 4,698 | 2,529 | 3,360 | 12,303 | 10,438 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Add: Depreciation | 13,501 | 13,285 | 13,498 | 39,975 | 38,694 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Non-GAAP as adjusted | $ | 25,922 | $ | 8,701 | $ | 43,802 | $ | 21,903 | $ | 93,331 | ||||||||||||||||||
| Net Income (Loss) per Common Share: GAAP | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Basic | $ | (0.06 | ) | $ | (0.21 | ) | $ | (0.04 | ) | $ | (0.53 | ) | $ | (0.17 | ) | |||||||||||||
| Diluted(8) | $ | (0.06 | ) | $ | (0.21 | ) | $ | (0.04 | ) | $ | (0.53 | ) | $ | (0.17 | ) | |||||||||||||
| Net Income (Loss) per Common Share: Non-GAAP | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Basic | $ | 0.00 | $ | (0.06 | ) | $ | 0.09 | $ | (0.22 | ) | $ | 0.11 | ||||||||||||||||
| Diluted(9) | $ | 0.00 | $ | (0.06 | ) | $ | 0.08 | $ | (0.22 | ) | $ | 0.11 | ||||||||||||||||
| (1) | Stock-based compensation expense is calculated in accordance with the fair value recognition provisions of Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification Topic 718, Compensation – Stock Compensation effective January 1, 2006. The following table summarizes the effects of stock-based compensation related to employees and non-employees (in thousands): | ||||||||||||||||
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September 30, 2023 |
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| Cost of revenue | $ | 2,084 | $ | 1,777 | $ | 2,515 | $ | 5,754 | $ | 7,672 | |||||||
| Research and development | 4,623 | 4,497 | 5,734 | 14,232 | 17,557 | ||||||||||||
| Sales and marketing | 3,241 | 2,611 | 3,706 | 9,139 | 11,371 | ||||||||||||
| General and administration | 4,441 | 916 | 3,790 | 9,596 | 12,793 | ||||||||||||
| Total operating expenses | 12,305 | 8,024 | 13,230 | 32,967 | 41,721 | ||||||||||||
| Total stock-based compensation expense | $ | 14,389 | $ | 9,801 | $ | 15,745 | $ | 38,721 | $ | 49,393 | |||||||
| (2) | Amortization of acquired intangible assets consists of developed technology and customer relationships acquired in connection with the acquisitions of Coriant and Transmode AB. GAAP accounting requires that acquired intangible assets are recorded at fair value and amortized over their useful lives. As this amortization is non-cash, Infinera has excluded it from its non-GAAP gross profit, operating expenses and net income measures. Management believes the amortization of acquired intangible assets is not indicative of ongoing operating performance and its exclusion provides a better indication of Infinera’s underlying business performance. | ||||||||||||||||
| (3) | Restructuring and other related costs are primarily associated with the reduction of headcount and the reduction of operating costs. In addition, this includes accelerated amortization on operating lease right-of-use assets due to the cessation of use of certain facilities. Management has excluded the impact of these charges in arriving at Infinera’s non-GAAP results as they are non-recurring in nature and its exclusion provides a better indication of Infinera’s underlying business performance. | ||||||||||||||||
| (4) | Warehouse fire losses were incurred due to inventory destroyed in a warehouse fire in the third quarter of fiscal year 2022. Recoveries are recorded when they are probable of receipt. Management has excluded the impact of this loss and subsequent recoveries in arriving at Infinera’s non-GAAP results as it is non-recurring in nature and its exclusion provides a better indication of Infinera’s underlying business performance. | ||||||||||||||||
| (5) | Merger-related charges represent costs incurred directly in connection with the pending merger with Nokia. Management has excluded the impact of these charges in arriving at Infinera’s non-GAAP results as they are non-recurring in nature and the exclusion of these charges provides a better indication of Infinera’s underlying business performance. | ||||||||||||||||
| (6) | Foreign exchange (gains) losses, net, have been excluded from Infinera’s non-GAAP results because management believes that this expense is not indicative of ongoing operating performance and its exclusion provides a better indication of Infinera’s underlying business performance. | ||||||||||||||||
| (7) | The difference between the GAAP and non-GAAP tax provision is due to the net tax effects of above non-GAAP adjustments. Management believes the exclusion of these tax effects provides a better indication of Infinera’s underlying business performance. | ||||||||||||||||
| (8) | The GAAP diluted shares include potentially dilutive securities from Infinera’s stock-based benefit plans and convertible senior notes. These potentially dilutive securities are added for the computation of diluted net income per share on a GAAP basis in periods when Infinera has net income on a GAAP basis, as its inclusion provides a better indication of Infinera’s underlying business performance. | ||||||||||||||||
For purposes of calculating GAAP diluted earnings per share, we used the following net loss and weighted average common shares outstanding (in thousands, except per share data):
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June 29, 2024 |
September 30, 2023 |
September 28, 2024 |
September 30, 2023 |
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| GAAP net loss for basic earnings per share | $ | (14,313 | ) | $ | (48,287 | ) | $ | (9,413 | ) | $ | (123,995 | ) | $ | (38,086 | ) | |||||||
| Interest expense related to the convertible senior notes, net of tax | — | — | — | — | — | |||||||||||||||||
| GAAP net loss for diluted earnings per share | $ | (14,313 | ) | $ | (48,287 | ) | $ | (9,413 | ) | $ | (123,995 | ) | $ | (38,086 | ) | |||||||
| Weighted average basic common shares outstanding | 235,832 | 234,349 | 228,077 | 233,905 | 225,465 | |||||||||||||||||
| Dilutive effect of restricted and performance share units | — | — | — | — | — | |||||||||||||||||
| Dilutive effect of 2024 convertible senior notes(a) | — | — | — | — | — | |||||||||||||||||
| Dilutive effect of 2027 convertible senior notes(b) | — | — | — | — | — | |||||||||||||||||
| Dilutive effect of 2028 convertible senior notes(c) | — | — | — | — | — | |||||||||||||||||
| Weighted average dilutive common shares outstanding | 235,832 | 234,349 | 228,077 | 233,905 | 225,465 | |||||||||||||||||
| GAAP net loss per common share: | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Basic | $ | (0.06 | ) | $ | (0.21 | ) | $ | (0.04 | ) | $ | (0.53 | ) | $ | (0.17 | ) | |||||||
| Diluted | $ | (0.06 | ) | $ | (0.21 | ) | $ | (0.04 | ) | $ | (0.53 | ) | $ | (0.17 | ) | |||||||
| (a) | For the three-months ended September 28, 2024, June 29, 2024, and September 30, 2023, there were 1.4 million, 1.9 million and 1.9 million shares, respectively, excluded from the calculation of diluted net loss per share, due to their anti-dilutive effect. For the nine-months ended September 28, 2024, and September 30, 2023, there were 1.7 million, and 7.1 million shares, respectively, excluded from the calculation of diluted net loss per share, due to their anti-dilutive effect. | |||||||||||||||||||||
| (b) | For each of the three-months ended September 28, 2024, June 29, 2024, and September 30, 2023, there were 26.1 million shares excluded from the calculation of diluted net loss per share, due to their anti-dilutive effect. For each of the nine-months ended September 28, 2024, and September 30, 2023, there were 26.1 million shares excluded from the calculation of diluted net loss per share, due to their anti-dilutive effect. | |||||||||||||||||||||
| (c) | For each of the three-months ended September 28, 2024, June 29, 2024, and September 30, 2023, there were no shares excluded from the calculation of diluted net loss per share. For the nine-months ended September 28, 2024, there were no shares excluded from the calculation of diluted net loss per share. For the nine-months ended September 30, 2023, there were 1.2 million shares excluded from the calculation of diluted net loss per share, due to their anti-dilutive effect. | |||||||||||||||||||||
| (9) | The non-GAAP diluted shares include the potentially dilutive securities from Infinera’s stock-based benefit plans and convertible senior notes. These potentially dilutive securities are added for the computation of diluted net income per share on a non-GAAP basis in periods when Infinera has net income on a non-GAAP basis as its inclusion provides a better indication of Infinera’s underlying business performance. Refer to the diluted earnings per share reconciliation presented below. | |||||||||||||||||||||
For purposes of calculating non-GAAP diluted earnings per share, we used the following net income (loss) and weighted average common shares outstanding (in thousands, except per share data):
| Three months ended | Nine months ended | |||||||||||||||||||
| September 28, 2024 | June 29, 2024 | September 30, 2023 | September 28, 2024 | September 30, 2023 | ||||||||||||||||
| Non-GAAP net income (loss) for basic earnings per share | $ | 279 | $ | (13,976 | ) | $ | 19,869 | $ | (51,953 | ) | $ | 24,821 | ||||||||
| Interest expense related to the convertible senior notes, net of tax | — | — | 1,359 | — | — | |||||||||||||||
| Non-GAAP net income (loss) for diluted earnings per share | $ | 279 | $ | (13,976 | ) | $ | 21,228 | $ | (51,953 | ) | $ | 24,821 | ||||||||
| Weighted average basic common shares outstanding | 235,832 | 234,349 | 228,077 | 233,905 | 225,465 | |||||||||||||||
| Dilutive effect of restricted and performance share units | 4,670 | — | 1,123 | — | 2,005 | |||||||||||||||
| Dilutive effect of employee stock purchase plan | — | — | — | — | 70 | |||||||||||||||
| Dilutive effect of 2024 convertible senior notes(a) | — | — | 1,899 | — | — | |||||||||||||||
| Dilutive effect of 2027 convertible senior notes(b) | — | — | 26,120 | — | — | |||||||||||||||
| Dilutive effect of 2028 convertible senior notes(c) | — | — | — | — | 1,195 | |||||||||||||||
| Weighted average dilutive common shares outstanding | 240,502 | 234,349 | 257,219 | 233,905 | 228,735 | |||||||||||||||
| Non-GAAP net income (loss) per common share: | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Basic | $ | 0.00 | $ | (0.06 | ) | $ | 0.09 | $ | (0.22 | ) | $ | 0.11 | ||||||||
| Diluted | $ | 0.00 | $ | (0.06 | ) | $ | 0.08 | $ | (0.22 | ) | $ | 0.11 | ||||||||
| (a) | For the three-months ended September 28, 2024, and June 29, 2024, there were 1.4 million, and 1.9 million shares, respectively, excluded from the calculation of diluted net income (loss) per share, due to their anti-dilutive effect. For the three-months ended September 30, 2023, there were no shares excluded from the calculation of diluted net income per share. For the nine-months ended September 28, 2024, and September 30, 2023, there were 1.7 million, and 7.1 million shares, respectively, excluded from the calculation of diluted net income (loss) per share, due to their anti-dilutive effect. | |||||||||||||||||||
| (b) | For each of the three-months ended September 28, 2024, and June 29, 2024, there were 26.1 million shares excluded from the calculation of diluted net income (loss) per share, due to their anti-dilutive effect. For the three-months ended September 30, 2023, there were no shares excluded from the calculation of diluted net income per share. For each of the nine-months ended September 28, 2024, and September 30, 2023, there were 26.1 million shares excluded from the calculation of diluted net income (loss) per share, due to their anti-dilutive effect. | |||||||||||||||||||
| (c) | For each of the three-months ended September 28, 2024, June 29, 2024, and September 30, 2023, there were no shares excluded from the calculation of diluted net income (loss) per share. For each of the nine-months ended September 28, 2024, and September 30, 2023, there were no shares excluded from the calculation of diluted net income (loss) per share. | |||||||||||||||||||
| (10) | Adjusted EBITDA is a non-GAAP supplemental measure of operating performance that does not represent and should not be considered an alternative to operating loss or cash flow from operations, as determined by GAAP. Infinera’s adjusted EBITDA is calculated by excluding the above non-GAAP adjustments, interest expense, net, other gain (loss), net, income tax effects and depreciation expenses. Management believes that adjusted EBITDA is an important financial measure for use in evaluating Infinera’s financial performance, as it measures the ability of our business operations to generate cash. | |||||||||||||||||||
Infinera Corporation
GAAP to Non-GAAP Reconciliations
(In thousands)
(Unaudited)
Free Cash Flow
We define free cash flow as net cash provided by (used in) operating activities in the period minus the purchase of property and equipment made in the period.
Free cash flow is considered a non-GAAP financial measure under the SEC’s rules. Management believes that free cash flow is an important financial measure for use in evaluating Infinera’s financial performance, as it measures our ability to generate additional cash from our business operations. Free cash flow should be considered in addition to, rather than as a substitute for, net loss as a measure of our performance or net cash provided by (used in) operating activities as a measure of our liquidity. Additionally, our definition of free cash flow is limited and does not represent residual cash flows available for discretionary expenditures due to the fact that the measure does not deduct the payments required for debt service and other obligations. Therefore, we believe it is important to view free cash flow as supplemental to our entire statement of cash flows.
| Three months ended | Nine months ended | |||||||||||||||||||
| September 28, 2024 |
June 29, 2024 |
September 30, 2023 |
September 28, 2024 |
September 30, 2023 |
||||||||||||||||
| Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities | $ | 44,563 | $ | (59,954 | ) | $ | (29,793 | ) | $ | 8,635 | $ | (30,142 | ) | |||||||
| Purchase of property and equipment | (24,090 | ) | (14,582 | ) | (13,318 | ) | (46,748 | ) | (40,900 | ) | ||||||||||
| Free cash flow | $ | 20,473 | $ | (74,536 | ) | $ | (43,111 | ) | $ | (38,113 | ) | $ | (71,042 | ) | ||||||
Infinera Corporation
Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
(In thousands, except par values)
(Unaudited)
| September 28, 2024 |
December 30, 2023 |
||||||
| ASSETS | |||||||
| Current assets: | |||||||
| Cash and cash equivalents | $ | 115,089 | $ | 172,505 | |||
| Short-term restricted cash | 42 | 517 | |||||
| Accounts receivable, net | 288,265 | 381,981 | |||||
| Inventory | 356,119 | 431,163 | |||||
| Prepaid expenses and other current assets | 162,560 | 129,218 | |||||
| Total current assets | 922,075 | 1,115,384 | |||||
| Property, plant and equipment, net | 231,190 | 206,997 | |||||
| Operating lease right-of-use assets | 39,359 | 39,973 | |||||
| Intangible assets, net | 18,050 | 24,819 | |||||
| Goodwill | 237,509 | 240,566 | |||||
| Long-term restricted cash | 446 | 837 | |||||
| Other long-term assets | 57,128 | 50,662 | |||||
| Total assets | $ | 1,505,757 | $ | 1,679,238 | |||
| LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY | |||||||
| Current liabilities: | |||||||
| Accounts payable | $ | 259,225 | $ | 299,005 | |||
| Accrued expenses and other current liabilities | 137,078 | 110,758 | |||||
| Accrued compensation and related benefits | 48,683 | 85,203 | |||||
| Short-term debt, net | 10,473 | 25,512 | |||||
| Accrued warranty | 12,635 | 17,266 | |||||
| Deferred revenue | 116,332 | 136,248 | |||||
| Total current liabilities | 584,426 | 673,992 | |||||
| Long-term debt, net | 667,205 | 658,756 | |||||
| Long-term accrued warranty | 12,554 | 15,934 | |||||
| Long-term deferred revenue | 21,626 | 21,332 | |||||
| Long-term deferred tax liability | 1,770 | 1,805 | |||||
| Long-term operating lease liabilities | 44,563 | 47,464 | |||||
| Other long-term liabilities | 39,767 | 43,364 | |||||
| Commitments and contingencies | |||||||
| Stockholders’ equity: | |||||||
| Preferred stock, $0.001 par value Authorized shares – 25,000 and no shares issued and outstanding |
— | — | |||||
| Common stock, $0.001 par value Authorized shares – 500,000 as of September 28, 2024 and December 30, 2023 Issued and outstanding shares – 236,296 as of September 28, 2024 and 230,994 as of December 30, 2023 |
236 | 231 | |||||
| Additional paid-in capital | 2,012,820 | 1,976,014 | |||||
| Accumulated other comprehensive loss | (30,409 | ) | (34,848 | ) | |||
| Accumulated deficit | (1,848,801 | ) | (1,724,806 | ) | |||
| Total stockholders’ equity | 133,846 | 216,591 | |||||
| Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity | $ | 1,505,757 | $ | 1,679,238 | |||
Infinera Corporation
Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
(In thousands)
(Unaudited)
| Nine months ended | |||||||
| September 28, 2024 |
September 30, 2023 |
||||||
| Cash Flows from Operating Activities: | |||||||
| Net loss | $ | (123,995 | ) | $ | (38,086 | ) | |
| Adjustments to reconcile net loss to net cash provided by (used in) operating activities: | |||||||
| Depreciation and amortization | 46,744 | 59,403 | |||||
| Non-cash restructuring charges and other related costs | 32 | 1,183 | |||||
| Amortization of debt issuance costs and discount | 2,750 | 2,970 | |||||
| Operating lease expense | 6,905 | 6,402 | |||||
| Stock-based compensation expense | 38,721 | 49,393 | |||||
| Other, net | 139 | (683 | ) | ||||
| Changes in assets and liabilities: | |||||||
| Accounts receivable | 92,364 | 89,248 | |||||
| Inventory | 74,527 | (82,983 | ) | ||||
| Prepaid expenses and other current assets | (48,141 | ) | 16,811 | ||||
| Accounts payable | (57,127 | ) | (27,798 | ) | |||
| Accrued expenses and other current liabilities | (5,386 | ) | (46,163 | ) | |||
| Deferred revenue | (18,898 | ) | (59,839 | ) | |||
| Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities | 8,635 | (30,142 | ) | ||||
| Cash Flows from Investing Activities: | |||||||
| Purchase of property and equipment | (46,748 | ) | (40,900 | ) | |||
| Net cash used in investing activities | (46,748 | ) | (40,900 | ) | |||
| Cash Flows from Financing Activities: | |||||||
| Proceeds from issuance of 2028 Notes, net of discount | — | 98,751 | |||||
| Repayment of 2024 Notes | (18,747 | ) | (83,446 | ) | |||
| Payment of debt issuance cost | — | (2,108 | ) | ||||
| Proceeds from asset-based revolving credit facility | 50,000 | — | |||||
| Repayment of asset-based revolving credit facility | (40,000 | ) | — | ||||
| Repayment of mortgage payable | (354 | ) | (381 | ) | |||
| Principal payments on finance lease obligations | (469 | ) | (784 | ) | |||
| Payment of term license obligation | (7,882 | ) | (7,720 | ) | |||
| Proceeds from issuance of common stock | 5 | 14,931 | |||||
| Tax withholding paid on behalf of employees for net share settlement | (1,860 | ) | (2,217 | ) | |||
| Net cash (used in) provided by financing activities | (19,307 | ) | 17,026 | ||||
| Effect of exchange rate changes on cash | (862 | ) | (8,551 | ) | |||
| Net change in cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash | (58,282 | ) | (62,567 | ) | |||
| Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash at beginning of period | 173,859 | 189,203 | |||||
| Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash at end of period(1) | $ | 115,577 | $ | 126,636 | |||
Infinera Corporation
Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
(In thousands)
(Unaudited)
| Nine months ended | ||||||
| September 28, 2024 |
September 30, 2023 |
|||||
| Supplemental disclosures of cash flow information: | ||||||
| Cash paid for income taxes, net | $ | 18,205 | $ | 9,955 | ||
| Cash paid for interest | $ | 25,967 | $ | 21,579 | ||
| Supplemental schedule of non-cash investing and financing activities: | ||||||
| Property and equipment included in accounts payable and accrued liabilities | $ | 26,779 | $ | 18,529 | ||
| Transfer of inventory to fixed assets | $ | — | $ | 1,207 | ||
| Unpaid term licenses (included in accounts payable, accrued liabilities and other long-term liabilities) | $ | 16,380 | $ | 16,510 | ||
(1) Reconciliation of cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash to the condensed consolidated balance sheets (in thousands):
| September 28, 2024 |
September 30, 2023 |
|||||
| Cash and cash equivalents | $ | 115,089 | $ | 123,927 | ||
| Short-term restricted cash | 42 | 1,725 | ||||
| Long-term restricted cash | 446 | 984 | ||||
| Total cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash | $ | 115,577 | $ | 126,636 | ||
Infinera Corporation
Supplemental Financial Information
(Unaudited)
| Q4’22 | Q1’23 | Q2’23 | Q3’23 | Q4’23 | Q1’24 | Q2’24 | Q3’24 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| GAAP Revenue $(Mil) | $ | 485.9 | $ | 392.1 | $ | 376.2 | $ | 392.4 | $ | 453.5 | $ | 306.9 | $ | 342.7 | $ | 354.4 | |||||||||||||||||
| GAAP Gross Margin % | 37.1 | % | 37.5 | % | 38.0 | % | 40.3 | % | 38.6 | % | 36.0 | % | 39.6 | % | 39.8 | % | |||||||||||||||||
| Non-GAAP Gross Margin %(1) | 38.7 | % | 38.8 | % | 39.3 | % | 41.9 | % | 39.6 | % | 36.6 | % | 40.3 | % | 40.4 | % | |||||||||||||||||
| GAAP Revenue Composition: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Domestic % | 61 | % | 60 | % | 58 | % | 59 | % | 68 | % | 54 | % | 58 | % | 60 | % | |||||||||||||||||
| International % | 39 | % | 40 | % | 42 | % | 41 | % | 32 | % | 46 | % | 42 | % | 40 | % | |||||||||||||||||
| Customers >10% of Revenue | 1 | — | 1 | 1 | 1 | — | — | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Cash Related Information: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Cash from Operations $(Mil) | $ | (0.6 | ) | $ | (1.8 | ) | $ | 1.4 | $ | (29.7 | ) | $ | 79.6 | $ | 24.0 | $ | (59.9 | ) | $ | 44.5 | |||||||||||||
| Capital Expenditures $(Mil) | $ | 8.3 | $ | 16.8 | $ | 10.8 | $ | 13.3 | $ | 21.4 | $ | 8.1 | $ | 14.6 | $ | 24.0 | |||||||||||||||||
| Depreciation & Amortization $(Mil) | $ | 19.8 | $ | 19.6 | $ | 19.8 | $ | 20.0 | $ | 19.4 | $ | 15.4 | $ | 15.6 | $ | 15.7 | |||||||||||||||||
| DSOs(2) | 79 | 78 | 79 | 76 | 77 | 79 | 76 | 74 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Inventory Metrics: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Raw Materials $(Mil) | $ | 48.7 | $ | 67.6 | $ | 85.4 | $ | 110.4 | $ | 133.6 | $ | 132.5 | $ | 119.4 | $ | 105.2 | |||||||||||||||||
| Work in Process $(Mil) | $ | 66.6 | $ | 71.8 | $ | 71.9 | $ | 69.9 | $ | 68.4 | $ | 68.6 | $ | 68.7 | $ | 67.6 | |||||||||||||||||
| Finished Goods $(Mil) | $ | 259.6 | $ | 273.6 | $ | 270.1 | $ | 276.6 | $ | 229.2 | $ | 219.6 | $ | 196.1 | $ | 183.3 | |||||||||||||||||
| Total Inventory $(Mil) | $ | 374.9 | $ | 413.0 | $ | 427.4 | $ | 456.9 | $ | 431.2 | $ | 420.7 | $ | 384.2 | $ | 356.1 | |||||||||||||||||
| Inventory Turns(3) | 3.4 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.3 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Worldwide Headcount | 3,267 | 3,351 | 3,365 | 3,369 | 3,389 | 3,323 | 3,334 | 3,340 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Weighted Average Shares Outstanding (in thousands): | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Basic | 219,921 | 222,393 | 225,922 | 228,077 | 230,509 | 231,533 | 234,349 | 235,832 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Diluted | 258,030 | 265,921 | 262,712 | 257,219 | 259,210 | 260,980 | 265,591 | 267,999 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| (1) | Non-GAAP adjustments include stock-based compensation expense, amortization of acquired intangible assets, restructuring and other related costs and warehouse fire recovery. For a description of this non-GAAP financial measure, please see the section titled, “GAAP to Non-GAAP Reconciliations” of this press release for a reconciliation to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures. For reconciliations of prior periods that are not otherwise provided herein, see the prior period earnings releases available on our Investor Relations webpage. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| (2) | Infinera calculates DSO based on 91 days. Fiscal year 2022 was 53 weeks and the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2022 was 98 days. When calculation is based on 98 days, DSO was 85 days for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2022. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| (3) | Infinera calculates non-GAAP inventory turns as annualized non-GAAP cost of revenue, which is calculated as GAAP cost of revenue less stock-based compensation expense, amortization of acquired intangible assets, restructuring and other related costs and warehouse fire recovery, as illustrated in the reconciliation of gross profit above, divided by the average inventory for the quarter. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that RONALD BAUER pled guilty to conspiring to commit securities fraud in connection with his role in a long-running “pump-and-dump” stock manipulation scheme. BAUER pled guilty before U.S. District Judge Paul A. Engelmayer and is scheduled to be sentenced on May 20, 2025.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “For years, Ronald Bauer orchestrated a sprawling ‘pump-and-dump’ scheme involving the shares of numerous U.S.-based issuers that preyed on ordinary, retail investors. While Bauer and his co-conspirators lived outside of the United States, they took advantage of the U.S. markets to perpetrate their fraud and reaped millions upon millions in profits at the expense of the victims. Today’s guilty plea should send a clear message that this Office is committed to holding market manipulators accountable no matter how hard they try to conceal their crimes.”
According to allegations in the Indictment, public filings, and statements made in court:
BAUER, a/k/a “Patek,” a citizen of Canada and the United Kingdom who resided in the United Kingdom, orchestrated numerous “pump-and-dump” schemes, controlling various aspects of the plans. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) had previously filed securities fraud claims against BAUER in 2005 for engaging in an alleged market manipulation scheme that was alleged to have issued false and misleading press releases while secretly dumping tens of millions of shares into the inflated market that BAUER and his associates had created. In 2006, without admitting or denying the allegations, BAUER consented to the entry of a judgment against him providing for injunctive relief, barring BAUER from serving as an officer or director of a public company or participating in an offering of penny stock for a period of five years, and payment of disgorgement of $840,000.
As he admitted in connection with his guilty plea, BAUER and his co-conspirators participated in a conspiracy to commit securities fraud with respect to seven issuers: Cantabio Pharmaceuticals Inc. (CTBO) (previously Lion Consulting Group (LIOC)); Virtus Oil and Gas Corp. (VOIL) (previously Curry Gold Corp. (CURGD)); Steampunk Wizards (SPWZ) (previously Freedom Petroleum (FPET)); Black Stallion Oil and Gas Inc. (BLKG) (previously Secure IT Corp.); PetroTerra Corp. (previously Loran Connection Corp (LRNC)); Black River Petroleum (BRPC) (previously American Copper Corp. (AMCU)); and Cyberfort Software Inc. (CYBF) (previously Patriot Berry Farms (PBFI)) (collectively, the “Issuers”).
To perpetrate the “pump-and-dump” scheme, BAUER and his co-conspirators obtained ownership and control of all or the vast majority of the unrestricted (i.e., free trading) stock of the Issuers. BAUER and his co-conspirators sought to conceal their beneficial ownership of these controlling interests in the shares of the Issuers by causing their shares to be distributed to and divided amongst nominee entities that had been established by a Swiss corporation called Blacklight, S.A. These entities were nominally owned by unrelated third parties but were, in fact, controlled by BAUER or his co-conspirators. Thereafter, BAUER and his co-conspirators retained trading authority over the blocks of shares of the Issuers held by the Blacklight nominee entities and BAUER regularly provided trading instructions with respect to these shares to executives or employees at Blacklight. In addition, BAUER and his co-conspirators effectively controlled or otherwise maintained significant influence over the management of the Issuers during the “pump-and-dump” scheme.
At times, BAUER and his co-conspirators caused nominees to engage in “match trades”—i.e., place both buy and sell orders in the same stock on the same day—for no legitimate economic purpose. Furthermore, BAUER and his co-conspirators financed and coordinated promotional campaigns touting the Issuers to stoke trading interest in the Issuers’ stock, though without publicly disclosing their relationship to the promotional campaigns, their controlling interest, or their intent to sell a significant percentage of their holdings into the buying interest that they intended the promotional campaigns would generate. BAUER and his co-conspirators took steps to conceal the fact that the nominee entities they controlled were the true funding source for the promotional campaigns.
During or shortly after the promotional campaigns, BAUER and his co-conspirators caused the Blacklight nominee entities to engage in trading activity in the Issuers’ stock, including selling a large percentage of their holdings of the Issuers’ stock, then caused the Blacklight nominee entities they controlled to remit to them the proceeds of the stock sales.
* * *
BAUER, 49, of London, United Kingdom, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison. As part of his guilty plea, a money judgment in the amount of $4,377,228.74 was entered against BAUER.
The maximum potential sentence in this case is prescribed by Congress and provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.
Mr. Williams praised the outstanding work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He further thanked the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs of the Department’s Criminal Division, as well as authorities in the United Kingdom, in particular the Crown Prosecution Service’s National Extradition Unit. Finally, Mr. Williams also thanked the Securities and Exchange Commission, which separately initiated civil proceedings against BAUER.
The case is being handled by the Office’s Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jason Richman, Matthew R. Shahabian, Noah Solowiejczyk, and Vladislav Vainberg are in charge of the prosecution.
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
HAMILTON, Bermuda, Nov. 05, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Enstar Group Limited (Nasdaq: ESGR) today announced that its wholly-owned subsidiary, Cavello Bay Reinsurance Limited (“Cavello Bay”), has acquired a Bermuda-domiciled Class 3B insurer and segregated accounts company (the “Reinsurer”).
The Reinsurer underwrote property reinsurance business between 2020 and 2023 on behalf of third-party investors, assuming the risk through retrocession agreements with a fronting carrier. The Reinsurer had $66 million of shareholders’ equity at the end of July 2024.
The Reinsurer will be merged into Cavello Bay and a consolidated and amended retrocession agreement between the fronting carrier and Cavello Bay will become effective.
Dominic Silvester, Chief Executive Officer of Enstar, said: “This acquisition is our second transaction in the property ILS space in recent months, which we see as a growth market for legacy solutions. The deal structure eliminates collateral requirements, demonstrating the benefit of Cavello Bay’s strong balance sheet and financial strength rating.”
About Enstar
Enstar is a NASDAQ-listed leading global insurance group that offers capital release solutions through its network of group companies in Bermuda, the United States, the United Kingdom, Continental Europe, Australia and other international locations. A market leader in completing legacy acquisitions, Enstar has acquired over 120 companies and portfolios since its formation. For further information about Enstar, see www.enstargroup.com.
Cautionary Statement
This press release contains certain forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements include statements regarding the intent, belief or current expectations of Enstar and its management team. Investors can identify these statements by the fact that they do not relate strictly to historical or current facts. They use words such as ‘aim’, ‘ambition’, ‘anticipate’, ‘estimate’, ‘expect’, ‘intend’, ‘will’, ‘project’, ‘plan’, ‘believe’, ‘target’ and other words and terms of similar meaning in connection with any discussion of future events or performance. Investors are cautioned that any such forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, are not guarantees of future performance and involve risks and uncertainties, and that actual results may differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements as a result of various factors. Important risk factors regarding Enstar can be found under the heading “Risk Factors” in Enstar’s Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023 and Enstar’s Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2024 and are incorporated herein by reference. Furthermore, Enstar undertakes no obligation to update any written or oral forward-looking statements or publicly announce any updates or revisions to any of the forward-looking statements contained herein, to reflect any change in its expectations with regard thereto or any change in events, conditions, circumstances or assumptions underlying such statements, except as required by law.
Contact:
For Enstar:
For Investors: Matthew Kirk (investor.relations@enstargroup.com)
For Media: Jenna Kerr (communications@enstargroup.com)
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
HAMILTON, Bermuda, Nov. 05, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Enstar Group Limited (“Enstar”) (Nasdaq: ESGR) today announced that it will pay cash dividends on its Series D and Series E preference shares.
Dividends on Enstar’s Series D 7.00% Fixed-to-Floating Rate Perpetual Non-Cumulative Preference Shares of $0.43750 per depositary share (each of which represents a 1/1,000th interest in a Series D Preference Share) will be payable on December 1, 2024 to shareholders of record on November 15, 2024.
Dividends on Enstar’s Series E 7.00% Perpetual Non-Cumulative Preference Shares of $0.43750 per depositary share (each of which represents a 1/1,000th interest in a Series E Preference Share) will be payable on December 1, 2024 to shareholders of record on November 15, 2024.
About Enstar
Enstar is a NASDAQ-listed leading global insurance group that offers capital release solutions through its network of group companies in Bermuda, the United States, the United Kingdom, Continental Europe, Australia and other international locations. A market leader in completing legacy acquisitions, Enstar has acquired over 120 companies and portfolios since its formation. For further information about Enstar, see www.enstargroup.com.
Cautionary Statement
This press release contains certain forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements include statements regarding the intent, belief or current expectations of Enstar and its management team. Investors are cautioned that any such forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, are not guarantees of future performance and involve risks and uncertainties, and that actual results may differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements as a result of various factors. Important risk factors regarding Enstar can be found under the heading “Risk Factors” in our Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023 and in our Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the interim period ended June 30, 2024 and are incorporated herein by reference. Furthermore, Enstar undertakes no obligation to update any written or oral forward-looking statements or publicly announce any updates or revisions to any of the forward-looking statements contained herein, to reflect any change in its expectations with regard thereto or any change in events, conditions, circumstances or assumptions underlying such statements, except as required by law.
Contact: Enstar Communications
Telephone: +1 (441) 292-3645
Source: Australian Government – Minister of Foreign Affairs
We, the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and the High Representative of the European Union express our grave concerns regarding the deployment of DPRK troops to Russia, potentially for the use on the battlefield against Ukraine.
Several thousands of DPRK troops have been deployed to Russia. The DPRK’s direct support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, besides showing Russia’s desperate efforts to compensate its losses, would mark a dangerous expansion of the conflict, with serious consequences for European and Indo-Pacific peace and security. It would be a further breach of international law, including the most fundamental principles of the UN Charter.
We condemn in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, including the DPRK’s export and Russia’s unlawful procurement of DPRK ballistic missiles in breach of multiple UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), as well as Russia’s use of these missiles and munitions against Ukraine. DPRK soldiers receiving or providing any training or other assistance related to the use of ballistic missiles or arms is a direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions 1718, 1874 and 2270. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missile-related technology from Russia to the DPRK in violation of the relevant UNSCRs. We urge the DPRK to stop providing assistance to Russia’s war of aggression.
We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to support Ukraine as it defends its freedom, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. We are working with our international partners for a coordinated response to this new development.
Source: NASA
On October 29, 2024, a period of intense rainfall inundated Valencia province in eastern Spain. The extensive, deadly flooding destroyed infrastructure and spurred massive search and rescue efforts.
The downpours kept coming as a high-altitude, low-pressure weather system remained parked over the region. These systems, known as cut-off lows or locally by the Spanish acronym DANA, develop when cold fronts encounter warm, humid air masses and become isolated from the jet stream. In the days following the Valencia flash floods, rain continued to fall in Spain’s eastern coastal regions as well as its southwest, causing yet more flooding and disrupting transportation, classes, and other activities.
This map shows rainfall accumulation totals from October 29 through November 4, 2024. These data are remotely sensed estimates that come from IMERG (the Integrated Multi-Satellite Retrievals for GPM), a product of the GPM (Global Precipitation Measurement) mission, and may differ from ground-based measurements. For instance, IMERG data are averaged across each pixel, meaning that rain-gauge measurements within a given pixel can be significantly higher or lower than the average.
Ground-based measurements by Spain’s meteorological agency, AEMET, indicated that rainfall totals exceeded 300 millimeters (12 inches) in some areas of Valencia province on October 29 alone. A few days later, on November 1, Huelva province in southwest Spain saw torrential rains; 134 millimeters (5 inches) fell in the city of Cartaya in a 12-hour period. AEMET also issued warnings and reported strong storms along the Mediterranean coast on November 2 and 3.
Next, the heavy rains migrated north, and 150 millimeters (6 inches) fell in Barcelona by noon on November 4. Barcelona’s airport cancelled and diverted flights on that day due to flooding, and train services and schools were also suspended.
Cut-off low-pressure weather systems are typical in this region in autumn because intrusions of cold air from the Arctic encounter remaining surface heat from the Mediterranean summer. Storm systems of the same type drenched Spain and Greece in September 2023.
NASA Earth Observatory image by Michala Garrison, using IMERG data from the Global Precipitation Mission (GPM) at NASA/GSFC. Story by Lindsey Doermann.